

circumstances of life. Consequently, when she generalizes about literature and our society, it is without setting up schematic abstractions.

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LOGIC AND CRITICISM. By William  
Righter. London: Routledge and Kegan  
Paul. 1963. 21s.

It is Mr. Righter's contention that the multiplicity of meanings in a literary work of art can not closely enough be explicated by a single complex of exact logical terminology, either to do justice to the work under scrutiny, or to merit the designation of system rather than insight for the critical tool. He engages in some of the same language ambiguity as the critics whom he considers (Blackmur, Empson, Ransom, Eliot). Yet he ably demonstrates that literary critics often lack a close training in logic. To cap his argument he cites Wittgenstein's comment about "exactness" as the basis of his own claim that, "It is the nature of 'the goal' in criticism that must shape the reasons critics give, and this goal is usually of such a nature that it would be difficult to prescribe the kind of exactness that would be welcome." Perhaps more important than any new insights into the relationship between logic and criticism is his survey of some modern critical positions.

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Twayne's United States Authors Series (TUSAS), Hardback Editions)

HERMAN MELVILLE. By Tyrus Hill-  
way. New York: Twayne Publishers.  
1963. \$3.50.

Like so many of the volumes in this series this one bears evidence of careful and conscientious preparation, but leaves one wondering just what it is for. Too little emphasis is placed upon the great issues for it to serve as a satisfactory introduction to Melville for students, who would be too easily sidetracked into other things. Certainly it is not intended for scholars, for while it does contain a generally satisfactory review of the state of Melville scholarship, its approach is generally very elementary--it includes, for example, a lengthy summary of Moby-Dick.

Although Mr. Hillway properly warns against reading Melville into his characters, he does so himself in his first account of Typee and again in his discussion of Moby-Dick. The problem of point-of-view in Moby-Dick is well known; the book contains chapters which could not have been told by

Ishmael because Ishmael could not have seen what happened or known the thoughts of characters. Mr. Hillway fails to mention this; instead he claims that Melville often speaks in his own voice because Ishmael is not bright enough to say what needs saying. I think we should be impatient with authors who speak of "Ishmael-Melville" (101ff.). Moreover, for an expert on Melville's use of cetology, the author is surprisingly apologetic for the wonderful whale-lore chapters. Careful reading nearly always makes their purpose perfectly clear; Melville tells us what he is about. Moreover, while the author is doubtless correct in playing down the enthusiasm of amateur Freudians, he himself makes some silly statements--what, for instance, are "social urges that form an element in every man's racial inheritance" (93)?

Interestingly, Mr. Hillway reads Clarel as affirmative; most readers, I believe, have been unconvinced by the pious noises at the close of the poem and have taken them as the equivalent of similar statements in Moby-Dick, which are usually juxtaposed with passages of deepest rebellion and doubt.

The general saneness of this volume is reflected in a statement such as this: "Had . . . [Melville] been such a totally defiant individualist as he is frequently painted, he would no doubt have sacrificed home, income, family pride, and reputation in the wild struggle for truth. But this he never did--unless unwittingly. In his books he deliberately compromised with public taste, made strenuous efforts to control and conceal his deeper concerns and openly imitated the methods of more popularly successful authors--all to no avail for his purpose" (137). But such careful tempering of older views is often contradicted a few pages later. Of Billy Budd, Mr. Hillway first says that it is "a parable of human sacrifice gentle in its tone and yet savage in its depiction of spiritual and social wickedness" (139), and then immediately reverts to the "testament of acceptance" theory: "Billy Budd offers only acquiescent submission to necessity. Billy's death is, like that of Jesus, a willing sacrifice to social necessity" (139, 140). I am not a Christian, but I am surprised to find that that is all Jesus' death is supposed to represent. Vere, says the author, is like Pilate: "He is forced by necessity into a choice he abhors" (140). I fail to see how this means that we should accept the choice. Is Pilate the hero and Jesus a damn fool idealist?

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FRANK NORRIS. By Warren French.  
New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.  
1962. \$3.50.

With his presentation of Frank Norris as a romantic moralist, closer to transcendental sentimentality than to scientific determinism, Professor