
This book expounds what its author, in the Preface to the English language translation, describes as Hume's "most essential and creative contribution" to the history of philosophy. This contribution consists in the following: (i) Hume's establishment or belief as the key epistemological concept—indeed, of his reduction of knowledge to belief; (ii) Hume's use of the principle of association of ideas as both a culture-based and a convention-derived practice. As a culture-based and convention-derived practice, the associative mechanism exists "for the sake of law, political economy, aesthetics, and so on." And (iii), Hume created the first great logic of relations, showing in it that "all relations . . . are external to their terms" (pp. ix-x). These issues are amplified in a total of six chapters and a conclusion, the titles of which are as follows: "The Problem of Knowledge and the Problem of Ethics" (ch.1); "Cultural Worlds and General Rules" (ch.2); "The Power of the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge" (ch.3); "God and The World" (ch.4); "Empiricism and Subjectivity" (ch.5); "Principles of Human Nature" (ch.6); and a conclusion entitled "Purposiveness."

A uniting theme of the book is the place and role of the imagination in Hume's philosophy. Because this theme underlies the issues Deleuze raises, Empiricism and Subjectivity may therefore be read as an extended discussion of how the imagination functions in Hume's philosophical system. It is Deleuze's treatment of this topic that will be the focus of this review.

In Chapter One, "The Problem of Knowledge and the Problem of Ethics," Deleuze elaborates the role of the imagination in Hume's account of belief-formation. He tells us that Hume substitutes a psychology of the mind with a psychology of the mind's affections (p. 21). Deleuze's meaning is that Hume rejects the substantialist theory of mind proposed by Descartes and others, and advances the idea that mind is a collection of distinct and distinguishable perceptions united by the principles of association. Deleuze takes the claim further, saying that Hume "constantly affirms the identity between the mind, the imagination, and ideas" (p. 22). How then does the associative principle factor into the whole scheme?

The associative mechanism provides a rule by which atomistic perceptions are related to each other to constitute a system. In this sense, he says, the imagination (or the mind) becomes human nature. "Association . . . is a rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise. It guides the imagination, gives it uniformity, and also constrains it. In this sense, ideas are connected in the mind—not by the mind" (p. 24). And it is in virtue of this relation among the atomistic perceptions that a person, an empirical subject, can affirm more than s/he has evidence for, can have expectations about the future, can make judgements about others, etc. According to Deleuze, the fact of knowledge is, for Hume, transcendence. 'It is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgement goes beyond the idea. In other words, I am a subject. I say "Caesar is dead," the sun will rise tomorrow," "Rome exists"; I speak in general terms and I have beliefs, I establish relations—this is a fact and a practice' (p. 28, emphasis in text).

The discussion is again taken up in Chapter Three, "The Power of the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge." There, Deleuze shows that the role of the imagination in Hume's philosophy extends to his discussion of ethics. In particular, Deleuze argues that Hume's theory of ethics is grounded in the passions in so far as the passions are influenced by the associative principles or rules of the imagination. Thus, corresponding to the rule-following
behaviour of the ideas in the formation of beliefs is a similar rule-following behaviour of the passions in morals. Furthermore, he contends, there is a logical interdependency between the association of ideas and the association of the passions in Hume's system. As he puts it, "association links ideas in the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus they provide the imagination with a tendency [or a disposition]" (p. 63). In arguing for this position, Deleuze thus upholds Hume's claim about the unity of the various Books of the Treatise. In particular, he supports Hume's claim that the discussion in Book Two corroborates that which he had advanced in Book One.

In the context of explaining belief-formation and the affirmation of judgments in terms of both the mechanism of association and the notion of transcendence (of the subject), Deleuze provides an insight into the meaning of the concept of 'subjectivity'. "Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not have the characteristics of preexisting subject" (p. 29). Elsewhere, Deleuze says "The subject [qua collection] is not a quality but rather the qualification of the collection of ideas" (p. 64).

It would be a mistake to think that, on Deleuze's reading of Hume, subjectivity implies solipsism. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the associative mechanism enables the subject to transcend her/his individual self and to seek and acquire beliefs about others, the external world and so on, all of which are a part of nature. One of the reasons for the failure of rationalism in securing beliefs about the external world—indeed, of its being fraught with uncertainties—is its inability to recognize association both as the fundamental principle through which nature operates and manifests itself, and as the mechanism through which the subject transcends itself. Deleuze's discussion of the place of the imagination in Hume's philosophy, and of the significance of the principle of association, shows, if anything, why an empirical philosophy of the kind Hume proposed overcomes those limitations. It is for this reason he asserts that "empiricism is a philosophy of the imagination and not a philosophy of the senses" (p. 110).

The issues examined in this book are undoubtedly very important and the author does his best to show that. In particular, Deleuze's treatment of the importance of the imagination in Hume's philosophy, together with the value of the associative mechanism, is highly commendable. However, this is not a book for amateur Hume readers. The topics explored are intricately interwoven, so that the reader should be an adept Hume scholar in order to appreciate the movement (both forward and backward) of the discussion. This said, I must point out that a severe weakness of the book is its density, vagueness, stilted expressions, artificiality, pretentious language and sometimes absolutely empty expressions—features that seem to be increasingly characteristic of Continental writing and scholarship. The first indication of this permeating feature of the book is in the translator's introduction. What, for example, is the meaning of the following sentence?

Acknowledged or not, the empiricist principle of difference, along with the theorem of the externality of relations which was derived from it, strengthened Deleuze's choice of minoritarian discourse and fed into the problematic of paratactic serializations (p. 2).

Or take another:

Finally, whether marked or unmarked, the resources of Hume consolidated Deleuze's opposition to the petito

If you believe that you have a guarantee of validity when you use the first-order predicate calculus to deductively prove the validity of an argument, then you should read this book. John Etchemendy questions the foundation of logic and model-theoretic semantics. Specifically, he argues that we need a new interpretation of the soundness and completeness theorems for first-order languages. Strictly speaking, the soundness and completeness theorems jointly establish that all and only the model-theoretically valid arguments of a first-order language are provable within a given deductive system. The received interpretation, which Etchemendy believes is in jeopardy, is that the theorems jointly assure us that all and only the genuinely valid arguments of a first-order language are provable within a given deductive system. A new interpretation is needed, according to Etchemendy, because he identifies a false assumption underlying the acceptability of the received interpretation. The false assumption is that the

principii of all theories endowing the transcendental field with the very subjective (egological and personological) coordinates the constitution of which should rather be accounted for and explained (ibid.).

Or yet still:

Hypotactic subsumptions are replaced by paratactic conjunctions and arborite constructions give way to the strategy of the AND. Repetition—time and also habit as repetition—holds the paratactic series together, making possible their convergence and compossibility as well as their divergence and resonance. Difference and repetition displace the dialectical labor of the concept and thwart the mobilization of negation for the sake of allegedly superior synthesis (p. 8).

What we have here is nothing short of an egregious abuse of language, for these are but highfalutin expressions, full of sound and rhetoric signifying little. Because I am not proficient in the French language, I cannot therefore judge whether the general obscurity of the text is a result of poor workmanship on the part of the translator, or on Deleuze's own inability to convey his own ideas effectively with clarity. But the reader needs to be warned that this is not an easy book to plod through.

Other irritants in the book include a number of typos. For example, on p. 6, line 7 there is 'not' for 'nor'; p. 90, twelve lines from the bottom: 'form' instead of 'from'; and p. 91, third line from the bottom: 'certian' for 'certain'. At least one other error is more severe, even unpardonable, because it results in a misrepresentation of Hume's text. This error occurs in a note referring to Hume's discussion of how the principles of association guide the imagination, and there the word "More" is substituted for the word "Were." (See p. 138, note 9.) The passage being quoted from the Treatise contains the sentence "Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them" (T.p. 10). Imagine replacing "Were" with "More"! The sentence becomes absolutely unintelligible.
standard model-theoretic semantics captures the concepts of genuine logical
truth and genuine logical consequence (validity).

The bulk of Etchemendy's book is a development of his argument that
standard model-theoretic semantics fails to capture the concept of genuine
logical truth. (He explains how these results can be extended to the concept
of logical consequence.) He identifies Tarski's set-theoretic semantics as the
paradigm of standard model-theoretic semantics and then goes on to
develop his argument by focusing on Tarski's semantics and various
concepts of logical truth.

Time is devoted to clearing up confusions which Etchemendy believes
have served to obscure the extensional evidence against the adequacy of
model-theoretic semantics. But the main thrust of Etchemendy's argument is
that the principle which underlies Tarski's model-theoretic conception of
logical truth, the reduction principle, is false. The extensional evidence is
construed as symptomatic of this failure.

In a step toward clarity, Etchemendy introduces the notions of
representational semantics and interpretational semantics. They are treated
as different conceptions of model-theoretic semantics.

On the representational conception, models depict possible
configurations of the non-linguistic world, the world language is about.
Under this conception, a sentence true on every model would be true in
every possible world, a necessary truth.

On the interpretational conception, models provide possible
interpretations of certain expressions appearing in the language, those not
included in the set F of fixed terms which are set aside as the "logical" terms
of the language. A standard set of fixed terms for first-order languages is the
set consisting of 'or', 'not', and 'something'. Under an interpretational
approach, both the set of models and the set of model-theoretic logical truths
are dependent on two factors: the selection of F and satisfaction domains for
each semantic category of expression to be interpreted.

Etchemendy argues successfully that Tarski's model-theoretic semantics
is interpretational semantics, not representational semantics. But his main
point is that the failure to notice this difference leads people mistakenly to
believe that Tarski's model-theoretic treatment of genuine logical truth is
correct and to ignore the extensional evidence to the contrary. In other
words, by confusing Tarski's semantics with representational semantics
some think that Tarski's semantics has provided a guarantee that the set of
model-theoretic logical truths will coincide with the set of necessary truths.
To the contrary, Etchemendy constructs a number of fairly simple examples
where Tarski's interpretational semantics and representational semantics do
not have the same models and differ on the extension of logical truth. There
is a sense in which Etchemendy cogently demonstrates that Tarski's
semantics does not guarantee that the extension of model-theoretic logical
truths coincides with the extension of necessary truths.

Placing Tarski's semantics within the domain of interpretational
semantics, Etchemendy then goes on to present his extensional evidence that
Tarski's semantics does not provide a guarantee that its extensions of model-
theoretic logical truth will coincide with the set of genuine logical truths. I
want to call your attention to two very important notions at work in
Etchemendy's discussion.

First, there is the relativized concept of genuine logical truth. Genuine
logical truth is treated as a form of analytic truth and relativized to a
selection of F. A genuine logical truth is taken to be analytic relative to F,
i.e., true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions in F. (Hereafter, I will
refer to this set of relativized genuine logical truths as 'genuine (relativized)
logical truths." This way of speaking will be elliptical for "a genuine logical truth relativized via analyticity to the set F of fixed terms."

Next, there is the underlying principle of Tarski's interpretational semantics, the reduction principle. It is:

If a universal generalization is true, then its instances are logically true.

This principle determines the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic logical truths, and it need not be true in the languages for which it fixes the extension.

It is on the basis of the reduction principle and his notion of genuine (relativized) logical truth that Etchemendy goes on to lay out the extensional evidence against the adequacy of Tarski's model-theoretic semantics. The evidence is to show that there is no guarantee that Tarski's semantics gets the extension of logical truths right. But getting the extension right actually means being coextensive with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths.

It is important to notice that Etchemendy's attack on the extensional adequacy of Tarski's model-theoretic semantics, his claim that Tarski's semantics does not "capture" the notion of genuine logical truth, is not that Tarski's semantics provides us with the wrong extension for the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths for first-order languages where the set F is the standard set of logical expressions ('not', 'or', 'something'). His attack is that it gets it right by accident; the semantics does not capture the concept because it does not guarantee that the extension is right.

This is a problem, according to Etchemendy. His reasoning is that if there is no guarantee that the completeness and soundness theorems are about genuine logical truths, they cannot be interpreted as rigorous results about genuine logical truths. And if this is correct, then the completeness and soundness theorems guarantee neither completeness nor soundness for first-order languages.

Etchemendy's argument that Tarski's model-theoretic notion of logical truth gets its extension right by accident has two steps. First, Etchemendy argues that the general model-theoretic account of logical truth for arbitrary selections of F gets the extension wrong more often than it gets it right. But again, getting it wrong means that the extension of model-theoretic logical truth does not coincide with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths.

For instance, if F includes every expression in the language, then every truth of the language will count as a model-theoretic logical truth. But certainly, not every truth of the language will be true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions in F. In this case, model-theoretic truth is said to overgenerate with respect to the genuine (relativized) logical truths. The alternative is to limit F to a proper subset of the expressions of the language. But even if we do, the problem of overgeneration remains, and so too, the problem of undergeneration. In the case of undergeneration there will be some genuine (relativized) logical truths which will not be included among Tarski's model-theoretic logical truths. These will be true by virtue of the meanings of expressions left out of F. Etchemendy provides a number of good examples which demonstrate these points of extensional divergence.

Next, Etchemendy addresses the case where Tarski's model-theoretic logical truth is coextensive with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths. This is the case where F is our standard set of logical expressions. In this case, he argues that the extensional agreement is not guaranteed, but a matter of accident. The reason is that Tarski's semantics reduces the model-theoretic logical truth of a sentence to the ordinary truth of a universal generalization of which the sentence is an instance. As a result, the
extension of model-theoretic logical truth can be influenced by facts which are entirely extralogical.

Etchemendy clearly demonstrates that when model-theoretic logical truth does coincide with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths (in the case of the standard set F), it does so because of specific extralogical facts. These include "an assumption of an infinite number of objects, the assumed distinguishability of those objects, the existence of transitive, irreflexive relations with and without minimal elements, and so forth" (p. 127). Our success is therefore not guaranteed, but contingent.

The final blow to the adequacy of Tarski's semantics is Etchemendy's argument that the reduction principle is false. Once again, it states:

If a universal generalization is true then all of its instances are logically true.

Etchemendy's argument is straightforward. It is: "The reduction principle is false because the mere truth of a universal generalization cannot guarantee that its instances will be logical truths.

Etchemendy explains that the failure to notice the falsity of the reduction principle is due in part to the extralogical facts about our set-theoretic world; they take the slack and, in effect, gerrymander the right extension. Again, the problem is that these extralogical facts are contingent and therefore do not guarantee that the extension is right.

Etchemendy also argues that any reasonable attempt to revise the reduction principle will fail. He considers how mentioning the set F might salvage the principle. There are two ways to do this. First, F may be treated as a variable, and Tarski's semantics may be treated as a completed analysis of a fundamentally relational notion. The other is to treat Tarski's semantics as an incomplete analysis of a fixed notion of logical truth, i.e., logically true for a fixed set F. Etchemendy explains why neither of these approaches are completely successful.

Under the first approach, the reduction principle becomes the following:

If a universal generalized sentence is true, then all of its instances are logically true with respect to those expressions not bound by the initial universal quantifiers.

This modification comes about because the set F determines which expressions can be replaced by variables and hence which expressions do not get bound by the quantifiers in the associated universal closure. Tarski's reduction principle now tells us that if the closure is true, then the instances are logically true with respect to that selection of John Etchemendy's and with respect to any selection that includes all the unbound expressions in the closure.

However, Etchemendy demonstrates that even this modified version of the reduction principle fails to capture the genuine (relativized) logical truth. For the truth of a universal generalization does not guarantee that all of its instances will be true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions not bound by the universal quantifiers. The universal generalization might be true because of certain contingent facts about the objects in the satisfaction domains.

The second approach is no help either. On the second approach, one would have to give some account of what makes one selection of F right and others wrong. But Etchemendy argues that this is not possible. For what makes Tarski's definition work is not that there is some relevant property for the selection of the expressions in F, but because of contingent features about
the world of set-theory, for instance, that the set-theoretic universe is infinite. These are contingent features of the world of the substitution domains.

The conclusion of Etchemendy's attack on Tarski's model-theoretic semantics is that Tarski's semantics does not provide a guarantee of its extensional adequacy. With this failure, Etchemendy believes that without some rethinking of the matter we cannot interpret the rigorous results of the completeness and soundness theorems as rigorous results for first-order languages. It is not until the end of the book that Etchemendy provides new, indeed leaner, interpretations of the completeness and soundness theorems. What is new is that the guarantee of completeness and soundness extends not just to the extension of deductive validity (as the received interpretation would have it) but to the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic validity as well. But to make this extension, the guarantee of completeness and soundness is limited. According to Etchemendy, what we have left are the following metatheorems for first-order languages:

(M1) Model-theoretic validity (as well as deductive validity) is sound in that only intuitively valid arguments are model-theoretically valid.

(M2) Model-theoretic validity (as well as deductive validity) is not complete in that there is no general way, short of making all the expressions of the language logical expressions, to guarantee that the model will capture them all.

(M3) Model-theoretic validity (as well deductive validity) is complete relative to a collection of algebraic structures characterized by first-order axioms in that "the consequence relation simultaneously captured by the model theory and proof theory coincide with the specialized notion of consequence used by the algebraist when reasoning about a range of structures" (p. 153).

I strongly recommend this book to anyone who has a philosophical interest in model theory, even those who lack a forte for the formal details of proof theory. Etchemendy's book is well written, and the reader can easily follow the reasoning about the form notions without getting bogged down with tedious formulas and definitions. At the same time, I do have some philosophical reservations about the rigor of Etchemendy's project.

Etchemendy's goal is not simply to attack Tarski's model-theoretic semantics. He also wants to interpret the completeness and soundness theorems as providing rigorous results about genuine logical truths and logical consequences of first-order languages. All of this he attempts to do with the help of some auxiliary notions which are in some cases to link Tarski's model-theoretic semantics to genuine logical truth. These auxiliary notions are representational semantics, genuine (relativized) logical truth, i.e., analytic with respect to a set F of "logical" terms, and common logical truths. However, the relationship between the genuine logical truths, on the one hand, and the extensions of Etchemendy's quasi-formal notions of representational semantics, genuine (relativized) logical truth, and common logical truths is no better off epistemologically than is the direct relationship between the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic logical truths and the extension of the genuine logical truths. There are three places where this is
evident, and in each case I find an obscure philosophical notion vitiating rigor.

First, there is the argument that Tarski's model-theoretic semantics is not representational semantics. This Etchemendy does establish. But what impact does this have on the relationship between Tarski's model-theoretic logical truth and genuine logical truth? Since Etchemendy is unclear about the relationship between representational semantics and genuine logical truth, the answer has to be that we don't know for sure.

Etchemendy tells us that representational semantics does not give an adequate analysis of the notion of genuine logical truth, but he does "identify" genuine logical truth with necessary truth (p. 25). This identification is as obscure as is the notion of necessity, and although Etchemendy admits the obscurity of his notion of necessity, he fails to realize that this obscurity vitiates his claim that he has proven anything rigorous about the relationship between Tarski's semantics and ordinary logical truth. All that Etchemendy rigorously establishes is that the set of Tarski's model-theoretic logical truths does not coincide with the set of necessary truths as defined within a representational interpretation of model-theoretic semantics.

Next, the extensional evidence which Etchemendy musters against Tarski's semantics is to show that Tarski's semantics gets the extension of genuine logical truth wrong for most selections of \( F \) and right only by accident. But the evidence is actually not in terms of genuine logical truth; it is in terms of the notion of genuine (relativized) logical truth, true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions in \( F \).

Again, genuine logical truth is associated with an obscure philosophical notion, this time, analyticity; a genuine logical truth is associated with being analytic with respect to \( F \). In Etchemendy's terms, "we can view logical truth as so relativized" (p. 106). Is "viewing" a semantic notion? But again, the lack of rigor surrounding the notion of analyticity stands in the way of what Etchemendy's rigorous argument has to say about the relationship between Tarski's semantics and ordinary logical truth. Is there a definite set of analytic truths? What sort of guarantee's do we get from "a view" of logical truth?

Finally, there is a failure of rigor in what I have characterized as Etchemendy's third metatheorem, (M3). (M3) is our best hope in view of (M2). (M2) tells us that model theoretic truth is not complete, and (M3) is a statement of limited completeness. But when proving (M3), Etchemendy employs what he calls a trick. "The trick is to shift attention from the logical properties of any particular language to the logical properties common to a range of languages" (p. 151).

The problem with this trick is that the notion of common logical truth is not built on the notion of genuine logical truth, rather it is built on the notion of genuine (relativized) logical truth, analytic with respect to a set \( F \) of fixed terms. So, this notion of common logical truth can hardly pass as our notion of genuine logical truth anymore than the notion of genuine (relativized) logical truth can so pass.

Accordingly, Etchemendy is not clear about how this notion of common logical truth can be identified with what he refers to as "the specialized notion of consequence used by the algebraist when reasoning about a range of structures is related to the concept of genuine logical truth." Is the genuine logical truth the one used by the human when reasoning about anything at all?

What is clear is that Etchemendy believes that genuine logical truth is somehow tied up with necessity, analyticity, and a prioricity, even if he does not rigorously explain how. He does argue that Tarski mistakenly believed
that his own semantics captured an essential necessity of genuine logical truths. Etchemendy even dubs the reasoning as "Tarski's fallacy" (pp. 85-94). But with the philosophical difficulties facing the latter notions and the fact that Etchemendy does not address any of them, I find his argument for the existence of significant intentional differences between Tarski's model-theoretic extension of logical truth and the set of genuine logical truths lacking the sort of rigor required to force a recall on the received interpretation of the completeness and soundness theorems for first-order languages.

But don't take my word for it; read the book and judge for yourself. If Etchemendy is correct, the foundation of logic and model-theoretic semantics is fractured. I will close with Etchemendy's summary of the situation:

Identifying logical consequence with model-theoretic consequence is as mistaken as identifying it with derivability. The question of whether one sentence follows logically from another does not come down to whether there are interpretations that make the latter one true and the former false; logically valid arguments can fail this test, while invalid arguments can slip by it. Through the model-theoretic account may sometimes get the extension exactly right, as may deductive characterizations, this is not because either of them captures, or comes close to capturing, the genuine concept (p. 157).


Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" constitutes the Inaugural volume of the Princeton University Center for Human Values. The volume centers on Charles Taylor's essay, "The Politics of Recognition," which is followed by responsive essays by Susan Wolf, Steven Rockefeller and Michael Walzer. Amy Gutmann, the director of the Princeton Center, introduces the volume.

As Gutmann's helpful introductory essay notes, the volume "focuses on the challenge of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition as it faces democratic societies today, particularly the United States and Canada...." Gutmann identifies the challenge in the following question: "Is a democracy letting citizens down, excluding or discriminating against us in some morally troubling way, when major institutions fail to take account of our particular identities?" While the problem is not an exclusively Hegelian one, the general tenor of Taylor's solution is.

Taylor begins his featured essay with the noncontroversial claim that "our identity [as individuals] is partly shaped by recognition, or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves." But, Taylor notes, while this claim appears noncontroversial today, it would not have been so appeared two or three centuries ago.

Two historical facts have ushered in the contemporary concern with identity and recognition. First is the collapse of those social hierarchies
which underwrote a system of honor, a system which distributed recognition in zero sum fashion—one's status as a lord depended upon the status of others as servants. Today we think in terms of the universal dignity of all persons, we distribute recognition equally, at least formally. The second historical fact underwriting the contemporary concern with identity and recognition is the emphasis upon the individual as the source of her authentic identity—the notion that each must find for herself her unique way of being. Historically, the ideal of authenticity has been understood monologically. That is, the individual finds her true self internally. However, in recent years philosophers and social psychologists have come to see that identity is produced dialogically. Thus, the modern age represents less the emergence of a need for recognition than the appearance of the conditions under which an attempt to secure recognition might fail. Where recognition is thought formally to be distributed equally and identity is understood to be an internal rather than social affair, the recognition needs of some, typically minorities and women, may not be met.

Taylor notes the tension between these two historical developments. The first ushers in a reign of formal equality and the idea of universal human rights. The second gives rise to a politics of difference and suggests that privileging universal notions of humanity, what is common to all, simply cannot sustain for every individual the dialogic realization of an authentic identity. Thus, in a democratic society marked by sexual, gender, cultural, racial and religious diversity, an inevitable contradiction arises: representatives of certain cultures (or gender, etc.) demand that the specific content of their identity, their cultural background, etc., be affirmed as of worth equal to that of the dominant culture (or gender, etc.) To put it differently, individuals demand to be recognized as equal, not formally, but in their concrete differences. They demand meaningful recognition.

Taylor spends the lion's share of his essay analyzing this demand within the context of liberal democracies. I cannot review that analysis here. I can, however, preview Taylor's conclusion. Taylor concludes that 1) a liberal democracy must take seriously the recognition needs of all its citizens and that 2) in a culturally diverse liberal democracy this requires approaching minority cultures and forms of life with a "rebuttable presumption" that they have something to offer, that they are of value and deserve recognition. Importantly, Taylor concludes that the idea that all cultures are, a priori, of equal value undermines the possibility of conferring the very recognition members of minority cultures desire: they desire respect, not condescending acknowledgement. Finally, Taylor draws upon Gadamer to suggest that in studying minority cultures members of the dominant culture will experience a transformation of their terms of evaluation, thus opening up the possibility for a recognition of minority cultures in their difference, a recognition beyond the unsatisfactory "they have value because they are like me."

Wolf, in her responsive essay, takes Taylor to task for two alleged failures. First, she highlights the need to distinguish between the claims of cultural, racial and ethnic minorities, whose particular identity is not recognized, and women, whose particular identity is all too recognized, indeed is relied upon to discriminate (e.g., women are frail, emotional and less rational than "we" are). If equality in difference constitutes a political ideal Taylor and Wolf share, Wolf notes that whereas cultural, racial and ethnic minorities place slightly more emphasis upon obtaining recognition of their "difference," women continue to place slightly more emphasis upon obtaining recognition of their "equality." Here Wolf correctly notes that feminism in the United States and Canada remains, for largely historical reasons, more humanistic than gynocentric, although gynocentric feminism has gained ground in recent years. (Humanistic feminism tends to evaluate
women's moral, social and political status against criteria taken to be appropriately gender-neutral or humanist, criteria applicable to men and women. Gynocentric feminism tends to dismiss the possibility of any such criteria and instead seeks in women's experience a normative benchmark against which to judge women's, and in some accounts men's, moral, social and political status.) In any case, Wolf fails to note that like women many members of minority racial, ethnic and cultural groups too feel that they are identified with their differences as seen from the perspective of the dominant culture (e.g., their food, literature and music is primitive and tribalistic and they are therefore unlike "us"). This identification, of course, motivated several decades of (and continues to motivate) equality-oriented (humanistic rather than, say, afro-centric) struggles for emancipation in the United States. Wolf's essay would benefit from a more careful discussion of the relationships between humanistic and, for example, gyno- or afro-centric struggles for recognition.

Second, Wolf notes that one need not sort out, as Taylor attempts to do, the difficult issues regarding the value of particular cultures and ways of life to advance the multiculturalist agenda. She notes that in a diverse liberal democracy such as the United States, simply asking "Who are we?" and "What is our history?" will require an opening of the canon and a broadening of curriculum. For surely "we" are not all white males of European descent. Wolf assumes that if "we" are truly diverse individuals, then those diverse individuals will achieve a healthy identity within the "we" to which they belong. The problem here is that once one has acknowledged that "we" are black, gay, asian, native american, female, jewish, etc., one feels compelled to undertake a normative evaluation of "our" diversity. And this raises the very problem Taylor seeks to address: the evaluation of our diversity.

Rockefeller, who subscribes to John Dewey's substantive conception of liberalism, worries that identifying the public identity of particular individuals with their cultural group will inevitably undermine liberalism. Liberalism for Rockefeller is a form of the good life, one in which a democratic articulation of value is taken to be the highest good. Thus, setting aside any set of cultural commitments as somehow deserving respect regardless of their survival in a sort of marketplace of ideas constitutes a threat to the liberal democratic way of life. While Taylor attempts to back away from this consequence of his position through the notion of a "rebuttable presumption" of value, Rockefeller argues that he does not completely escape it.

Walzer, who confesses complete agreement with Taylor, devotes his energy to clarification rather than criticism. He contends that state neutrality vis a vis conceptions of the good life does not necessarily follow from liberal commitments, but may follow. That is, members of a liberal society may choose to endorse state neutrality, and this will be particularly appropriate for those societies whose members are primarily immigrants like the United States and Canada. On the other hand, members of a homogenous society of indigenous peoples, for example, Norway, need not commit to state neutrality but may instead foster particular forms of the good life, provided they do not run afoul of the basic rights of any citizens in the process. Unfortunately, Walzer does not establish the relationship between state neutrality, which is often understood as a principle of constraint, and the politics of multiculturalism Taylor envisions. For surely, if Taylor is correct, a liberal state may act so as to ensure minority cultures enjoy a rebuttable presumption of value and receive a fair evaluation within civil society. Whether such state action runs afoul of our best conceptions of state neutrality is not clear.
In sum, this short book is well worth reading for those whose interests include contemporary liberal theory and the so-called "politics of difference," the oft-discussed "right" to cultural identity/survival, affirmative action issues, and the fate of liberal education. To be sure, the book's length and format preclude a sustained, treatise-like analysis of any of these issues. Nonetheless, the work should prove thought-provoking to the interested reader. And while the authors only infrequently make the connections to Hegel implied by the book's title, those connections are there for the pondering. I recommend the work for those who wish to think carefully about the possibilities liberal democracy presents for those of us in the United States and Canada to move beyond a lingering master/slave consciousness and realize in a meaningful way the equal dignity, worth and freedom of all.