This work poses the question whether gains in the knowledge of human biology, behavior, and social interaction provide a basis for conclusions in the realm of political theory. As suggested by the book's title, Masters adopts an Aristotelian approach to argue that the question can be answered in the affirmative. Stated simply, his thesis holds that we can choose among possible structures of political organization more intelligently when we take into account what is known about human nature from the study of evolution, game theory, animal behavior, biology, and linguistics. General political institutions can be selected on a rational basis by examining the empirical evidence about human nature. That evidence, Masters believes, would support a more detailed description of human nature than could be contained in a simple formulation such as "rational animal" or any other brief definition. It would have to take into account the connection between such matters as the functioning of DNA as a carrier of information in genetic activity and the functioning of language in social discourse as well as the discoveries of anthropology and ethology.

Such a far-reaching and ambitious project does not deny the normative character of politics, seeking to replace it with biological necessity, but does direct us to look at biological evidence for the support of such norms. Masters anticipates two major objections to his view. He expressly denies that it involves the naturalistic fallacy by arguing that the derivation of value from scientific knowledge occurs in many instances, for example, in discovering the value of not smoking from the scientific evidence that smoking causes cancer. Although this argument may be missing a premise: that health is the ultimate desideratum in this situation, one not based on scientific knowledge, any evidence that human nature tends to support certain political forms over others should not be ignored. For social norms themselves are, in Master's view, products of human nature. As we learn more about human nature, we learn more about human society and politics. Like Aristotle, Masters sees humans as naturally social, and, because we employ language, as naturally political. But he uses the term "natural" in a way Aristotle would not, to include the evolutionary past as evidence of the kind of beings we are. In that way, human nature is a changing one, dependent on its past, uncertain as to its future.

Such a nature, according to Masters, can be explained neither in a deterministic way nor relativistically. He takes issue with the positivist tradition that would look for advancement in human science along the lines of physics. He argues that evolutionary biology has shown that individual variation is too broad to allow application of anything like mechanistic
principles to the study of humans. Cultural differences prevent similar rules from being applied to social groupings.

He traces moral relativism in modern times to Nietzsche, arguing that it represents the opposite position from determinism. Between these extremes one finds what Masters calls naturalism, the position purportedly reinforced by biology. He relies on the predominance of some human features and behavioral forms over long periods of evolutionary time as showing that we do not make ourselves, that what we are results from genetic influences as well as personal choice, environment, cultural pressures, and other causes. Naturalism takes all of these into account by seeing morality as persistent, but not rigid, modified by time and place, but broadly shared.

Unlike the moral theory of Kant, that of Masters lacks a priori elements and is subject to qualifications imposed by concrete circumstances. It lacks universal principles of morality, but contains a natural morality and a natural justice in political matters. Masters looks upon these in biological, even medical terms, describing justice in terms of social health, its absence as an illness. His notion of morality recognizes the complexity of human nature and the variety of situations without constituting relativism.

The second objection anticipated by Masters is that of the nature/nurture distinction. Humans are biologically fitted to be political. In the first instance, they are social, dependent upon a social way of life for survival and comfort. In the second, they are able to produce speech and with that to fashion a way of life that permits large-scale organization. Even though through most of the human past people lived in relatively small groups where face-to-face relations made the state unnecessary, Masters does not view life in the modern state as a departure from a natural condition. Rather, it constitutes a further development of what preceded it, not by necessity nor by conscious choice, but as political organization taking on a life of its own. At all times it remains the expression of human nature. Theories of politics such as those of Hobbes and Rousseau fail to take into account the more advanced knowledge of human nature available today. As a result, contractarian theories of political association must be rejected if they rest on any suggestion that acceptance of the limitations on personal action inherent in political organization runs counter to a nature that is solitary, selfish, and independent. According to Masters, available anthropological evidence indicates that humans have always been social, that some measure of altruism appears in the interpretation of the use of the earliest artifacts, showing such practices as burial, art, education, and cooperation.

What distinguishes the modern state from its predecessor for Masters is its hierarchical structure and its formal constitution as a state of a particular kind. Because it supports greater specialization and, for the individual, absence of a need to interact with all others, what Masters calls total reciprocity, it frees the individual from the restraints imposed by the need for consensus, allows even greater variety of expression, and leads to a large increase in social diversity. The means of social control, which in the hunger-gatherer society consisted of moral censure of the entire group, in
the modern state consist of enforced ostracism, carried out by assigned agents. It is in this feature of modern government that Masters sees the greatest possibility for differentiating political structures available for rational choice today. The reasons for ostracism and the alternatives to it will vary as a state is authoritarian or democratic.

In Chapter 7, Masters refers to a work of Albert O. Hirschman entitled *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. The three terms in the title correspond to what Masters sees as three modes of political participation. When conflict occurs in a social group, these represent the options for dealing with it. Exit allows one or more individuals to break off from the group and seek new associations. Voice represents attempts to influence the situation through complaint or argument. And loyalty represents the acquiescence to existing social conditions when these are disapproved. Masters argues that totalitarian societies demand loyalty and deprive dissidents of voice and of opportunity for exit. Democratic societies, on the other hand, desire loyalty, but extend to all the opportunity to participate (voice) and the opportunity to exit, at least individually. This arrangement he sees as characteristic of primitive societies and as normative for more advanced political structures. His argument does not assume the superiority of primitive groups. Rather, the less self-conscious practices of primitive groups tell more about human social nature than do the deliberate policies of modern societies, especially where those policies result from a large disparity in social influence and power.

Masters exhibits restraint in describing the political nature of humans. From the great detail of knowledge available concerning the biology, evolution, and sociology of human life he might have drawn more detailed conclusions about politics. That he did not suggests something about what he takes to be the political consequences to be drawn, that is, about democratic institutions themselves. He seems to suggest that no one, not even a careful student of the underlying sciences, can properly prescribe the detailed features of political life for groups who must find their own prescriptions. Beyond the most fundamental structures of social participation there are, for Masters, no a priori answers to questions that face political groups. To be political means to engage in the search for the answers and to seek to apply them in formal ways to the life of the group. The drive to act in this way he sees as deeply human, not as an acquired interest of the few who seek power.

This conclusion is, I think, inarguable. If we are political by nature, then we are all political as mature adults and any effort to limit political participation to the few would be seen as an effort to deny or to violate human nature. But the problem for Masters is to show what is meant by "nature" and especially "human nature," given the opposition to such language by existentialists, pragmatists, and others. His approach to the problem consists in seeking to avoid the kind of superficial definition of human nature that became the target of criticism and to replace it with one which includes and accounts for all the evidence. Such a definition can
hardly be a brief label. Rather, it must take into account the diversity of individual characteristics and of cultural forms. The picture of human nature that emerges from a scientific examination of all the evidence cannot easily be summarized.

Masters sees in that picture a persistent teleology, a seeking after human good both for the individual and for society. While conceptions of the good vary among societies and individuals, Masters believes that the attempt to understand what constitutes the good belongs both to scientists and philosophers, just as it belongs to all people to decide what is in their own interest and in the interest of their groups. He proposes three principles of justice based on twentieth-century evolutionary biology: respect for the individual along with what this implies about equality and cultural diversity; duties of virtue derived from social obligation; and a concern for human justice. He does not describe these principles in detail, but offers them as features of "the new naturalism," features that rediscover "the soundness of the Western tradition."

Whether Masters' conclusions will gain broad acceptance depends as much on the direction of future science as on that of philosophy. But his effort to reformulate the Aristotelian position and to ground it in contemporary biology deserves careful consideration in a world grown skeptical of both science and politics.


Feldman's primary aim for his book is to defend two commonsensical claims about death. The first is that the nature of death is essentially mysterious. The second is that death is most always a very serious, and usually the most serious, sort of harm that can befall a person. These claims may seem so obvious as to require no argument. But as Feldman shows, a number of astute philosophers have called each into question. Answering their arguments leads us into one of the most philosophically rigorous treatments of the questions regarding the nature and value of death.

The claim that death is essentially mysterious might mean either (1) that we do not know what it would be like to be dead, or (2) that we cannot define death. Feldman is interested in (2), since he claims, rightly, that there is nothing it is like to be dead--to be dead is to be incapable of experiencing anything whatever. Feldman's claim that death is mysterious is the claim that no philosopher (himself included) has yet been able to provide a set of conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions to define death.

The most intuitive way to capture what it means to be dead is to identify death with the cessation of life. In keeping with the maxim of not defining the obscure by the yet more obscure, we are taken through two chapters (2,3) in which we come to grips with the notion of life. There are two major routes to take. The life-functional theories of life identify certain
things that living entities do as essential to their being living things. Vitalist theories of life identify certain things that beings possess as crucial to defining life. Both families of theory fail.

No set of functions comprises necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a thing's being alive. The most plausible and historically prominent candidates—nutritive, reproductive or rational capacities—all fail, as do other less historically important alternatives. Living plants lack rational capacities; living humans lack reproductive capacities; and certain living moths lack nutritive capacities. Efforts to alter the definitions so that one is alive just in case one is a member of a species most of whose members possess the relevant "life-functions" also fails. For this move allows dead members to count as living—a dead butterfly is still a butterfly, and so satisfies the amended definition.

Nor is there any sort of "stuff," possession of which entails and is entailed by being alive. DNA and RNA are the most obvious choices, but it is at least conceptually possible that alien beings who act and think like us are composed of something else—say, ZNA. That this is not actually the case is irrelevant. Feldman is engaged in a conceptual exploration. An appropriate definition of life must accommodate all conceivable counterexamples.

Feldman next has us assume that we can fully understand what it is for a thing to be alive. Still, it does not follow that to be dead is to cease to be alive. Living cells or embryos that are frozen and later successfully thawed have ceased for a time to be alive, yet have not died. Suppose that someday human cryogenics is perfected. During the time that frozen humans exist in suspended animation, it appears that they are neither alive nor dead. Yet they have ceased to live—they are not engaged in any metabolic activity, any growth, motion, etc. Nor does it help to add the conditions that one cease permanently and irreversibly to be alive. A series of ingenious examples (pp.63-5), too intricate to describe here, helps Feldman make his case. Further, there are fusion and fission cases that buttress Feldman's contentions. It seems odd to speak of a living cell that divides into two as dying, yet it ceases to live. Similarly, two living cells that fuse with one another to create a new, single cell have both ceased to live, yet have not (according to linguistic intuitions I share with Feldman) died. Cases of fusion, fission and suspended animation all cast doubt on the claim that to die is identical with ceasing to be alive.

Nor is it the case that to be dead is to cease to exist. The claim that death entails ceasing to exist is called the "termination thesis." Feldman rejects it. One may be dead and yet exist (though one's existence won't involve any conscious experiences). As Feldman notes, there is an ambiguity in the notion of "existence." One may exist qua F, or exist simpliciter. The termination thesis concerns only the latter notion. Adherents of the termination thesis claim that when one dies, one ceases to exist, period (in a way that an incinerated table no longer exists [as a table or anything else]). They think that an antemortem being is a fundamentally
different thing from its postmortem remains; when a person dies, she goes out of existence and a new thing—a corpse—replaces her. Feldman disagrees. If the termination thesis were correct, we could not say of a deceased pet that it was once alive, since there is no single "it" of which we could predicate both life and death. An apparently innocuous sentence like "My Aunt Ethel died last week and we're burying her tomorrow" (93) becomes paradoxical. Feldman combines an appeal to deep-rooted linguistic intuitions (92-5) with attacks on the major arguments favoring the thesis (96-104). I found the combination persuasive.

Feldman has shown that being dead is not identical to ceasing to be alive, or ceasing to exist. The last set of conceptual difficulties Feldman tackles is that of dying as a process. What does it mean to say that someone is dying? We want to avoid a definition that is too liberal—it cannot mean simply that one will die eventually, since everyone would satisfy the definition, yet most of us aren't presently dying (except perhaps in a figurative sense). We also want to avoid a definition that's too restrictive—we don't want to ensure that a dying being will actually die of the thing causing it to die. Miracle cures can intervene. Feldman considers all the most prominent candidate definitions and rightly concludes that they fail. (74-80) Feldman does attempt to offer an analysis of dying, employing the notion of being in a terminal state (a notion he does define [84]), but acknowledges a number of gaps in his analysis. He concludes that dying, like the notions of death, being dead and being alive, escape precise analysis. They remain mysterious.

Feldman does offer some positive conclusions specifying relations between being dead, existing, being alive and dying. (Chapter 7) But I found these less interesting than his mostly critical remarks and arguments in the rest of Part I. Though not optimistic about the prospects for conceptual analysis in this domain, Feldman rightly operates on the assumption that such analysis is a necessary preliminary for the axiological arguments that get most people interested in the philosophical issues surrounding death. His arguments in Part I are rigorous. He is invariably fair to the opponents he is criticizing, and generous in interpretation. One of the most fruitful of philosophical enterprises is to show us how ingrained assumptions (eg, about the transparency of notions like death and life) are mistaken, and how difficult it might be to remedy them. Feldman does just this. Part I of Feldman's book would be an excellent corrective to those who think that the enterprise of conceptual analysis is a sterile and profitless business.

In the second part of the book, Feldman tackles the perennial problems surrounding the (dis)value of death. He begins with a useful expository

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1 Consider the most popular conception: dying is a matter of being engaged in a process that will, absent interference, shortly or prematurely end with one's death. However, a ninety-year old may be walking across a street, about to be fatally hit by an eighteen-wheeler, yet not be dying. The definition thus fails.
chapter (Ch. 8) on Epicurus' argument that death cannot be an evil for the person who dies. Suffering entails a subject of suffering, and "where death is, we are not." Since we cannot suffer from death, death is no harm. Feldman nicely dissolves several confusions in the Epicurean argument as a prelude to his own account of the evil of death. Death is a misfortune, when it is, because of the value it deprives those who would otherwise live. The novelty of Feldman's "deprivation account" rests in his analysis of extrinsic value. Feldman claims that being dead is not intrinsically bad. If bad at all, it must be extrinsically so. But this raises problems, for it is thought that to be extrinsically bad is just to cause something intrinsically bad to occur. If death is not itself intrinsically disvaluable, and doesn't cause anything intrinsically bad to occur, how can it be extrinsically bad?

Feldman's answer rests on a counterfactual analysis of extrinsic value. He claims that "the extrinsic value for S of P = the difference between the intrinsic value for S of the life S would lead if P is true and the intrinsic value for S of the life that S would lead if P is false."(150) On this account, S's death may be very (extrinsically) bad indeed, since remaining alive might hold the prospect of much intrinsic value, whereas being dead brings none. This account also shows how one needn't exist during the occurrence of an event that is extrinsically bad. The activity of planting a bomb set to go off in six years is extrinsically bad for the five year old killed in the explosion. Similarly, says Feldman, even if we grant the termination thesis, the "fact" that we do not exist when dead is insufficient to show that we are not harmed by death.

I'm not sure that Feldman has successfully solved "the problem of the subject"—who it is that gets harmed by death. To see this, consider a related puzzle about death—when to date the harm that occurs. If we date it before death, then no harm has yet occurred. If after, then no subject exists to be harmed. Feldman claims that the harm should be dated "eternally," because (when death is a harm) it will always be the case that the difference in intrinsic value of a continued life and death is such that death is extrinsically bad. But this seems unsatisfactory. Imagine conducting a homicide investigation and asking when the wrong was inflicted. "Eternally" isn't very helpful. We want a time, presumably the time at which our victim expired. But then we are confronted all over again with the problem of dating, for the time of expiration brings with it the death of the subject, and prior to the death there was no harm (assume, for simplicity's sake, that death was instantaneous). The problem of dating seems to force a reconsideration of Feldman's response to the problem of the subject, which in turn forces reconsideration of his notion of extrinsic value. I cannot pursue this farther here. For those interested, the relevant discussions occur at pp. 138-154.

Feldman next moves to the problem of explaining the wrongness of killing. He endorses a version of act utilitarianism that couples a maximizing strategy with a "justicist" theory of value. Acts are right if they maximize the fit between what people deserve and what they receive, wrong otherwise.
The reason that killing is (ordinarily) wrong is because it fails to give the victim what he deserves, and confers an undeserved benefit on the killer. For those cases where we believe the killing justified, it is because we think the decedent deserved to die, or the decedent's continued life stood in the way of the desert of too many others.

Feldman applies his "Justicist Act Utilitarianism" [JAU] to the problems of abortion and euthanasia, arguing, in the abortion case, that its moral status differs with the stage of pregnancy. At early points, abortion is no wrong, since the mother deserves to be happy and the fetus does not deserve to be sustained. Later, however, the fetus has "put in its time" and so deserves to live, and its desert may well override that of a woman's to be happy and autonomous.

I think the abortion chapter is the least plausible in Feldman's book. Its implausibility forces a reconsideration of JAU. Though Feldman thinks it a merit of his account that he avoids ambiguous or vague concepts like "person" or "right to life," I think he has traded one difficulty for another. The notion of "desert" is anything but perspicuous. Unlike his rigorous analytical treatments of concepts like death and life, Feldman pays scant attention to the intricacies of the notion of desert. If, as I strongly suspect, "desert" is not univocal\(^2\), then Feldman will be left with the problem of trying to maximize over several variables (each of the different senses of "desert"). Even if "desert" were univocal, the problem would remain, for there is more than one ground or basis on which we apportion desert (talents, effort, capacity, etc.) and the problem would repeat itself at this level.

Another problem for his account is that he never argues for the dubitable claim that people deserve to live or be happy. Killing is wrong only if people ordinarily deserve to be alive. That this claim requires defense becomes quite clear in the abortion discussions.(200-205) There Feldman argues that an eight month fetus deserves to live and experience the joys of living because it has already made a "substantial investment," having undergone months of boredom.(203) Regardless of whether this is an empirically accurate description of fetal experience, we have to ask about the underlying conception of desert at work here. Earlier on the same page Feldman describes the premature deaths of two women as "great injustices," despite the fact that no wrongdoing was involved. It seems that he is confusing the notion of what is due, owed or deserved and that of what it would be good to have or experience. We can all agree that it is a good thing for most now living to continue to live. But that is different from showing that they deserve to do so. Only if they do do we have an explanation for the wrongness of killing.

Feldman's comments about fetal investment would indicate that he believes justice to be properly apportioned to individual effort. But this

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raises some problems. First, what do people deserve? How are we to correlate their efforts and their desert? Feldman repeatedly speaks as if people deserve to be happy and to live. But what sort of effort on their part would confer this, would make life and happiness their due? One of the putative benefits Feldman cites for his account over those involving a right to life is that the latter accounts tend to make possession of the right an all or nothing affair. He allows for degrees of desert: an embryo does not deserve to live, though a third trimester fetus does. But if desert is apportioned to effort, why isn’t it the case that those who have "invested more" better deserve to live? And why is it that their efforts, whatever they may be, entail that they deserve happiness and life, as opposed to anything else?

Secondly, Feldman owes us an account of how to measure desert, in a way that allows for interpersonal comparisons. The maximization strategy relies on such an account. These are notoriously difficult to provide, and it is not surprising that in a relatively short book Feldman should avoid providing it. But vindication of his theory awaits this development.

Third, the theory, as with all maximizing forms of consequentialism, may be too demanding. Whether this is so is a vexed question. But making failure to maximize justice a sufficient condition of wrongdoing is presumptive, if rebuttable, evidence that the theory is too stringent in its demands.

Fourth, JAU may not be able to avoid the problems of distributive justice that Feldman hoped would set it apart from other forms of utilitarianism. It is possible to maximize the amount of fit between what is deserved and received by doing a grave injustice to some small number of people. We might kill a wealthy landlord and redistribute her possessions to hundreds of peasants, whose strenuous efforts are likely to have entitled them to something more than they were receiving. Some scenario of this sort seems possible. Since this is so, JAU may license killing where we think it gravely inappropriate. Admittedly, generating counterintuitive consequences is insufficient to condemn a moral theory. However, Feldman staked the fate of JAU on being able to account for intuitions about familiar problem cases (killing one to save five by distributing the deceased's organs, etc.). Failure to comport with deeply held intuitions about the justification of killing would, on his own terms, likely be a quite serious theoretical liability.

3 This problem may lead Feldman to adjust the basis of allocating desert, so that what we deserve depends on our capacities rather than efforts. But this seems to introduce all the old problems of identifying morally relevant features that will ground a right to life, something Feldman explicitly wants to avoid.

4 Perhaps Feldman would say that the life she deserved overrides the possessions the peasants deserved. Possibly. But possibly not. This shows the need for some sort of interpersonal measure of desert. He might also say that the peasants don’t deserve the land. But if that’s so, we need a more sophisticated measure of what people deserve than their efforts, and we need a way to establish just what it is that people are due.
Despite these worries, I think Feldman's book a significant contribution to the literature. His book is lucid enough to be profitably read by intelligent nonspecialists—it would, in fact, make a very suitable text for a medical ethics or applied ethics course. The book is exceptionally well-organized, very clearly argued and written, and filled with imaginative examples. All those interested in the philosophical issues surrounding death will learn a great deal from coming to grips with Feldman's work.


In this excellent intellectual biography, Rudiger Safranski achieves the near impossible: a loving examination of perhaps the most unlovable of all modern philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer. This biography should prove enjoyable and informative to anyone interested in the culture and politics of 19th century Germany, and may well become required reading for Schopenhauer scholars. Rich in detail (especially those of the more titillating sort) and scrupulously researched, Safranski's work does an excellent job of revealing the philosophical, cultural and political forces which shaped Schopenhauer's thought, and also tries to provide some psychological insight into the mind of one of the greatest philosophers of that complex century.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the book is the account given of Schopenhauer's turbulent relationship with his parents, the reverberations of which surfaced again and again throughout his life. The suicide of his merchant father when he was 17 left Arthur financially secure for life, but also left him without a paternal figure from whom to find approval, a loss keenly felt by him. Arthur's mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, through her resultant success as a literary figure in her own right, and her refusal to be overshadowed and controlled by the memory of her dead husband, doomed her always formal relationship with her son to be more and more strained as Arthur sought his own place in the sun. Before his 25th birthday, Schopenhauer's relationship with his mother collapsed entirely, with her writing him, saying "you are...irritable and unbearable, and I consider it most difficult to live with you.... If you were less like you are, you would only be ridiculous, but thus you are most annoying" (91). Few he would encounter in life would find much kinder words for him, with the notable exception of Goethe.

Arthur's friendship with him sprang from Goethe's close friendship with Johanna. While never close friends due to their differences in temperament, Goethe and Schopenhauer shared a common enemy, namely, Newton and his theory of light. A high point of the book is its extended treatment of Goethe's theory of color, and its influence on Schopenhauer's On Seeing and Colors. I know of no finer overview of the issues, both
psychological and personal, involved in this work. While their friendship was a somewhat short one, Goethe's last remarks on him were friendly and positive, a true rarity in Schopenhauer's life.

Equally admirable is the effort given to placing Schopenhauer's philosophy in its historical context, and Safranski does a better job than most historians of philosophy in bringing out the salient points in Kant's philosophy, and tracing them through their Fichtean transformation. Several chapters are devoted to Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly *The World as Will and Representation*, accurately and enticingly presenting the deep existential angst behind it, as well as the immediate circumstances under which it was composed. Perhaps the finest service done to Schopenhauer is the relegation of Nietzsche to the margins of the discussion. Safranski consistently resists the temptation to let Schopenhauer's "greatest disciple" (341) dominate the interpretation and overshadow the importance of Schopenhauer's philosophical enterprise. Little is read backwards into Schopenhauer, while much of what followed is referenced, without forcing it into the spotlight.

The historical situation surrounding Schopenhauer's life is displayed brilliantly, and the reader watches with amazement as the cultural and philosophical scene of Germany switches its allegiance from the romantic idealism of Arthur's youth to the crass materialism of his old age. Hegel, Schelling, Marx, Feuerbach, and others dance in the margins of the book, entering occasionally to change the scenery, and to remark upon the evolution of thought which finally allowed Schopenhauer, in his last years, to enjoy a taste of the fame and acceptance he had sought throughout his life. The petty politics of the German city-states are interspersed with the figures of Napoleon and Metternich, and the rise of Industrialization finds its climax in the revolution of 1848 and Schopenhauer's panicked condemnation of it, as well as his complicity in its suppression.

Safranski is wise enough to let history take center stage when Schopenhauer's life settled into the dull routine it followed for the last thirty years of his life. The last chapters focus more on the rejection of idealism and the embracing of science by German culture in the forties and fifties, which set the stage for Schopenhauer's belated success. His *Aphorisms for Practical Wisdom*, to which he owed his success, is dissected as a compromise with the diminished expectations of the German bourgeoisie. The rise of ideology is examined at breakneck speed, especially through Marx, along with its implications for such an ahistorical thinker as Schopenhauer. At the very end, the first movements in the cult of Schopenhauer appear, soon enough for Schopenhauer to "interpret his prolonged incognito as the long road to truth" (3).

Despite the wealth of historical, biographical, cultural and personal information the book contains, all of which speak strongly in its favor, there are some weaknesses as well. Perhaps the most dangerous is the author's own idealism, which reveals itself in the thorough treatment given to Kant and Fichte. While not in itself objectionable, the philosophically uninitiated
may overlook the larger questions and problems surrounding that position, and Safranski's defense of Schopenhauer against materialist interpretations is, I believe, a bit overdrawn, I believe. In an effort to remain true to Schopenhauer's Kantian roots, the author closes off other possible approaches to him which would probably better serve the contemporary Schopenhauer reader. While rigorous philosophical analysis is certainly beyond the goal of this book, a certain degree of philosophical openness would have better served the reader first encountering as important a philosopher as Schopenhauer.

A less serious flaw, which perhaps is a virtue in this case, is the psychological analysis given to both the man and the age in which he lived. While at times these interpretations of Schopenhauer's behavior and motives are suspect, they never fail to be thought-provoking and intriguing, and the author's defense of Kantian ethics against what he considers the modern equivalent of the medieval practice of indulgences, namely, modern psychology, is rather convincing. Nevertheless, Safranski has a tendency to resort to outdated sociological theories of religion and behavior, when simply telling the story would suffice. In any case, the thoughtful reader can easily separate the interpretation from the facts, and gather much food for thought from both.

While not flawless, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy should serve as a model for philosophical biography. The author has the good sense to realize that some of the greatest philosophical insights are motivated more by personalities than by philosophical issues, and to distinguish between the two. More importantly, he gives a fair and compassionate (indeed, sometimes far too compassionate) account of the life and foibles of Arthur Schopenhauer, and if he occasionally shares in Schopenhauer's rationalization of his boorish behavior, much more is gained by the author's compassion than from the condemnations of many of Schopenhauer's other biographers. I can heartily recommend the book, for both the bedside and the study.


This book is admirably clear and concise, thought it has little or not originality. But originality is overrated. One can usefully read the book in one sitting. Though it is a good introduction to most of the key issues involved in rationally supporting an objective morality, and though I agree with Rescher that moral relativism and moral skepticism (what he calls moral nihilism) are false and that many moral claims are objectively and rationally justified, his book ultimately fails to achieve its goal of showing how moral claims are objectively and rationally justified independently of cultural (or individual) moral beliefs or customs. Given the book's brevity,
perhaps we can forgive its errors of omission (e.g., ignoring Gewirth's arguments on absolute rights) and its oversimplifications (e.g., ignoring Mill's qualitative, value-enhancing utilitarianism in dismissing utilitarianism (93)). But, as we shall see, Rescher's argument falls into self-contradiction and fails to meet the same standards he rightly sets for his opponents.

Rescher argues that morality is absolute in only 3 of the 5 senses of 'absolute' he identifies. Unfortunately, Rescher waits until page 76 to disambiguate the highly equivocal word 'absolute', a task which should have occurred early in Ch. 1. Rescher concludes that morality is absolute in that it applies universally to obligates and beneficiaries, and it is a matter of objectively determinable facts established by impersonal standards. Rescher concludes that morality is not absolute in the sense of lacking any conditions or in the sense of being so decisive as to sweep all other considerations aside.

Rescher's strategy is to use Ross, Brentano and, especially, Kant as allies. Together they oppose Hume, Nietzsche, Marx, and C. L. Stevenson. Rescher's alliance also opposes utilitarian economists such as Harsanyi and what Rescher calls anthropological reductionism, attempts by Benedict, Sumner and others to reduce morality to custom. This makes for quite a fair fight! Rescher's strategy in at least four key battles is to argue that moral realism (the denial of moral relativism and moral skepticism) is true because otherwise important distinction in commonsense moral thinking would be lost. This strategy will hardly persuade one who is already a hardened moral skeptic, who dismisses commonsense moral thinking as delusional anyway. But the inherent appeal of the four distinctions should help prevent one from accepting moral skepticism, and give moral skeptics second thoughts.

The first distinction is used to show what Rescher calls the "Anthropologists' Fallacy," which is to move from observing the use of traditional moral guides to reach moral conclusions to the view that morality means whatever moral guidance is traditional. (30) Rescher rightly points out the key distinction with an analogy: using multiplication tables traditionally in school does not imply that multiplication means using those tables.

The second distinction is between the moral convictions of others and one's own moral convictions. Rescher rightly concludes that "I cannot consistently look on my own moral convictions as 'mere matters of opinion'." (65) For then why would one feel any need to stick to one's convictions? Why wouldn't one experiment willy nilly with other moral approaches? A relativist or skeptic would guarantee us that such experimentation would never lead to any objective moral error. But the cautious approach we commonsensically use in changing our moral convictions is consistent only with moral realism, which recommends caution due to the realistic possibility of moral error in switching moral convictions.

The third distinction is between that which pleases and that which benefits. Rescher says "People are no doubt the definitive authorities regarding what pleases them, but certainly not regarding what benefits
them. And this objectivity of interests carries in its wake also the objectivity
of interests-promotion—and thus of morality." (67) A slight problem here for
Rescher is that his argument is not one for moral realism per se, since some
moral realist views (e.g., hedonistic utilitarianism) fail to make such a sharp
distinction between pleasure and benefit.

The fourth distinction, relying on Brentano, is "that the objectively good
is not that which we love or desire but that which is worthy or deserving of
our love or desire." (68) Rescher rejects the position of Marx and Nietzsche—
that morality is merely masked expression of subjective desire—because they
cannot allow for Brentano’s distinction.

But Rescher cannot dispose of Nietzsche so easily. Rescher morally
requires benevolence whereas Nietzsche morally requires hating one’s
enemies. But both of them try to ground morality on nature. Nietzsche, in
Beyond Good And Evil, endorses "the natural origin of morality" and "a
natural morality." Rescher concludes that morality is objective because
morality requires us to follow our nature and because it is a "reason-
establishable fact that A is more (or less) consonant with our nature than B
is." (69) He speaks of what we should do "in virtue of our nature" (79) and
speaks of "the world’s scheme of things" and "the world’s interests." (91)
Rescher morally requires maximal realization of the better part of our
nature, what we "believe ourselves to be called upon to be." (90) But called
upon by whom? Not society, for that would be moral relativism. Rescher
makes the mistake of personifying nature (or the world) and giving no
argument to support the personification. I consider the so-called naturalistic
fallacy not to be a genuine fallacy, since the is/ought gap can be bridged (as
Searle, Foot and others have argued). But Rescher's bridge is untenable.
There are simply too many counterexamples of things natural yet bad (e.g.,
lightning bolts to the temple) and unnatural yet good (e.g., modern
medicine, ice cream) to endorse his suggestion that whatever is natural or in
the natural scheme of things is good. Later Rescher distinguishes between
good and bad parts of our natures. But each is equally natural. So his
suggestion that nature supports the objectivity of morality must be wrong.
Consider the insightful exchange in the film "The Lady From Shanghai:"

--"One who follows his nature keeps his original nature in the end."
--"But haven’t you heard ever of anything better to follow?"

Rescher does make a few very brief and very underdeveloped analogies
between morality and natural sciences, but I expect a book to present much
more. (35 & 71)

Another problem is that Rescher cannot consistently ally himself with
Kant. First, Rescher repeatedly stresses that the central feature of morality is
interpersonal benevolence (altruism). (1, 4-8, 81, 93 & 103) He endorses the
universal altruism of the golden rule, do unto others as you would have
them do unto you. (94) But Kant rejects the golden rule as fundamentally
inadequate, since it says nothing about duties to oneself, which Kant also
considers central to morality. Second, Kant accepts and Rescher rejects externalism, the doctrine that belief in an act's morality entails some motivation to do it. (6 & 104) Third, Rescher criticizes K. Baier for failing to see how thoroughly Kantian rules can be absolutely exceptionless once qualified. (10) But then Rescher departs from Kantian consistency by qualifying one rule as "Never mislead another merely for your own advantage" while insisting that we may mislead a madman simply in order to avoid becoming his victim. (11-12) Fourth, Rescher agrees more with Ross than with Kant about how decisive moral considerations are. Ross sees morality as a set of conflicting prima facie factors that are not necessarily decisive and that can outweigh each other in different cases, whereas Kant sees morality as a consistent categorical imperative that decisively applies to all cases. Rescher tries no direct reconciliation of his view with these views of Kant.

A chance for reconciliation comes in the last chapter when he relies on an ethic of self-realization, saying that morality requires us to maximally realize our potential for good. But Rescher's reliance on self-realization of potential, which is hypothetical, contradicts his view that we must reject Baier's attempt to ground morality because it is hypothetical. (82) Moreover, Rescher begs the question about whether and how we can objectively tell our potential for good from our potential for evil. It merely relocates the issue of objectivity rather than showing the objectivity of morality by giving, as Rescher aims to do, a Kantian metaphysical or ontological underpinning of morality in self-realization. Rescher is as guilty of question-begging here as his contractarian opponents (Hobbes and Rousseau) are when they try to ground morality on a contract. Rescher rightly notes that contractarians simply relocate the question of the objective grounding of morality to the question of why we should honor our contracts. (87) Similarly, Rescher must show why we should realize only that part of our potential that is allegedly for objective good. Incidentally, Rescher is inexplicably dismissive of political morality or values, which he conceives of as sharply distinct from moral values. (9 & 88) Further, Rescher fails to explain adequately how he can consistently accept maximal self-realization as the foundation of morality and reject egoistic moralities due to their opportunism and their self-centeredness. (4-8, 81 & 103) He also fails to explain why the self-realization must be maximal rather than merely adequate. Why isn't good enough when it comes to self-realization?

Finally, Rescher addresses the question "Why be moral?" "Why should I act morally?" puts the matter more clearly and concretely. Rescher agrees that H. A. Prichard has correctly answered this question. Rescher says "it makes no real sense to ask 'Why should I be moral?' For once an act is recognized as being the morally appropriate thing to do, there is really no room for any further question..." Rescher suggests the question resembles "Why believe the true?" to which one should answer, simply, because it is true. The true is always inherently worthy of belief. No further reason for belief is needed. One may object that Rescher commits the fallacy of false
analogy, since belief is so involuntary and since voluntariness is the hallmark of actions for which we are morally responsible. But I think the question "Why should I act morally?" can be answered after trying to understand its component question "Should I act morally?" "Should I act morally?" which we can rephrase as "Should I do the moral act?" is analogous to "Could I do the possible act?" Once an act is admitted to be possible, the question answers itself--yes, of course you could do the possible. One an act is admitted to be moral, "Should I act morally?" answers itself--yes, of course you should do the moral act. So the answer to "Why should I act morally?" is: the self-answering "Should I act morally?" shows how it is the very nature of a moral act that it should be done. Rescher dismisses Prichard's analysis as perfectly correct but unhelpful in persuading to those who are already moral skeptics. Rescher tries to go beyond Prichard by arguing that one should be moral in order to make oneself proud to be a human. (96 & 101) But this collectivist and vague appeal is unsupported and unpersuasive. Further, Rescher's own reliance on the four commonsense moral distinctions above is similarly unpersuasive to moral skeptics. Persuasiveness is overrated; it is enough for Prichard to be, as Rescher says he is, "perfectly correct." (89) One need not be able to persuade everybody in order to be correct.


Reviewed by Albert Cinelli, The University of Kansas

When reviewing a book whose primary use is as an introductory textbook the essential question to ask is: how well does this book introduce and explain its field? One may also ask of an introductory book: is it balanced in its presentation? Is it comprehensive? Does it adequately present the main concepts and ideas addressed by a field? Does it transcend the individual biases of its authors? Most importantly: does it provide the student with instruction in the range, depth and significance of that field? A critical look at _Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology_, edited by George Dickie, Richard Sclafani and Ronald Roblin, provides a mixed answer to these questions.

The goal of this book, as the editors state it, is to:

- combine historical materials, works of recent scholarship and contemporary critical analyses in an effort to present a comprehensive account of the field of aesthetics as it is primarily understood in the Anglo-Saxon world (v).

To this end, the authors present 48 essays, papers and book excerpts divided into five larger areas of aesthetic inquiry. The effort is made throughout to present these works in a "dialectical-critical" manner, with a piece presenting
an argument or point of view followed by a second and often a third piece that provide either criticism or counterpoint. Generally, the method is used to good effect, though with some limitations, chief among them, the limited focus and range of the selection of contemporary and traditional texts.

The book is structured as follows: Part One addresses traditional theories of the arts supplemented by contemporary critiques of these theories. The intent here (Wimsatt and Beardsley's criticism of authorial intention aside) is to provide a variety of answers from the philosophical tradition to the fundamental aesthetic question: "what is art?" The section begins with the discussion of poetic inspiration from Plato's *Ion* and "the quarrel between philosophy and poetry" from Book X of the *Republic*. This is followed by Aristotle on "the nature of poetic imitation," from *Poetics*, and a commentary on both thinkers by Eva Schaper. Leo Tolstoy, Clive Bell and R. G. Collingwood round out the traditional theories, with commentary on them by, respectively, Stanley Bates, Noel Carroll and Alan Tormey. These selections, like most in this book were selected to present substantial arguments, positions and ideas. The editors have sought to avoid giving mere "snippets" of texts.

Part Two addresses contemporary theories of art and contemporary critiques of these theories. The section offers a generally Wittgensteinian set of linguistic theories of family resemblances and open concepts (Maurice Mandelbaum, Morris Weitz, Benjamin Tilghman) and a pro and contra discussion of the institutional theory of art (Arthur Danto, Anita Silvers, George Dickie, Robert Stecker). The editors show a partiality towards anglo-analytic philosophy of language. This is evident as the "contemporary" discussion is limited to a 1950s, late Wittgensteinian "antitheory" movement and an early sixties "institutional" theory to the exclusion of other, equally interesting and vital, contemporary theories of art. Contemporary marxist, poststructuralist, feminist and existential discussions of the theory of art, to cite a few examples, are nowhere addressed. Nonetheless, there are some good articles. Besides those from the authors mentioned above, Anita Silvers' "Once Upon a Time in the Artworld" proved to be instructional and Robert Stecker's "The End of an Institutional Definition of Art" merits praise.

Parts Three and Four discuss theories of the aesthetic, as distinguished from theories of art. The distinction involves a concern with matters of taste and aesthetic attitude over and above the physical work of art itself. Part Three presents traditional theories of the aesthetic along with contemporary discussions of these theories. The emphasis here is on the traditional role of taste in aesthetic theory. Hutcheson and Hume introduce the British tradition with Peter Kivy and Mary Mothersill providing commentary. They are supplemented by Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment from *The Critique of Judgment* with Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer providing commentary. These selections are interesting, though again, they are limited to a particular list of authors. Other views, such as the eighteenth century neo-platonism of Johann Winkelmann, or Edmund Burke's other than Kantian commentary on
the sublime, to name two, are alluded to in individual articles though not given any significant discussion. The question of what sanctifies a given reading list as "traditional," as representing "the tradition," is left an open one by the editors.

Part Four, which presents contemporary theories of the aesthetic with contemporary criticism also offers some interesting articles though it is somewhat narrowly conceived. Edward Bullough's concept of "Psychical Distance," Jerome Stolnitz on the Aesthetic Attitude, and Frank Sibley on "Aesthetic Concepts" are presented as contemporary theories of the aesthetic, even though Bullough's 1912 article is more contemporary with Tolstoy and Collingwood, the "traditionalists" of Part One, and Stolnitz and Sibley's 1959 and 1960 articles are older even than most graduate students. The anthology's critical-dialectical method is at its most strained in this section as George Dickie and Ted Cohen make merely dismantling attempts at refutation. To say, as Dickie does, that all aesthetic attitudes fail is to hold to an "antitheory" skepticism that is, perhaps, no longer, 'the hottest thing going.' I found Ted Cohen's attempt at logically "dissolving" Sibley's Aesthetics/Non-Aesthetics distinction to be an example of the "analytic" approach at its worst, a mere hammering away at a mostly heuristic distinction. This section, especially, would have been a good place to bring in some other theoretical approaches. One wonders why, for example, an article expressing a pragmatist theory of aesthetics was not included. An exception to this complaint is Kendall Walton's article "Categories of Art," which provides an interesting, and more recent (1970), account of the relationship of categories of art to actual artworks. His discussion of the perception of Picasso's Guernica as a painting or as a "guernica" was particularly thought provoking.

After setting the terms of debate in Parts One through Four—giving answers, traditional and contemporary, to the questions "what is art?" and "what is the aesthetic?" the book moves, in Part Five, to a presentation of six series of discussions on categories of the individual arts: literature, drama, the plastic arts: painting and architecture, film, music and dance. The editors' goal is to broaden the aesthetics discussions of the earlier sections of the book by examining aesthetic discourse in relation to individual regions of the arts. However, the same problem of limited focus in the selection of essays is evidenced here as throughout the book.

The section on literature is a case in point. Its focus is on "intention and style in the literary work." It includes one article by Monroe Beardsley, and another, "The Intentional Fallacy," co-authored by Beardsley and William K. Wimsatt. It also includes commentary and counter-argument by Colin Lyas and Jenefer Robinson. The Beardsley article attempts to set some criteria for judging the parameters of literature and ends with an affirmation of a moderated formalism. The Beardsley-Wimsatt article, a standard text from the "New Criticism" movement of the 1950s, attempts to move critical inquiry away from a literary or historical speculation about authorial intention. Lyas' piece gives a direct response to Beardsley-Wimsatt, while
Robinson attempts to provide a theoretical account of the nature of authorial style. The discussion in this section is thus limited to the formalistic understanding of literature that is the analog in criticism of the analytic method in philosophy. Again, one wonders whether a wider range of theory could not have been introduced. Perhaps this is also where the editors' dialectical-critical method should have been less strictly adhered to, allowing several perspectives to be presented, rather than just one point of view, followed by counterpoint. This criticism follows for most of the remaining sections.

The section on the theory of drama is one of the few that gets outside of the narrow analytic focus. This section features Nietzsche's discussion of the apollinian and dionysian in tragedy, with Richard Schacht providing commentary. It is interesting that this passage from Nietzsche was retained from the first edition while passages from other "nonanalytic" theorists such as Hegel, Suzanne Langer, even Marcel Duchamp were not. As a personal note, it was this section in the first edition of Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology that, as an undergraduate, began my own significant association with the thought of Nietzsche. In his response to the Nietzsche selections, Richard Schacht points to Nietzsche's ideas of overcoming and transformation as the central ideas of his theory of art. It would have been interesting for editors to have given some more recognition to contemporary theorists who have followed in the wake of Nietzsche. The editors, however, seem oblivious to those critics and theorists.

The next section offers a discussion on the questions of representation, meaning and truth in the plastic arts: painting and architecture. E. H. Gombrich, Richard Wollheim and Nelson Goodman contribute articles. The selection from Gombrich's Art and Illusion speculates on the way representation is shaped by the purposes to which it is put. Wollheim responds to Gombrich and poses some interesting questions on the nature of the history of art. Goodman follows with a discussion of "how buildings mean." He addresses such issues as the role of interpretation in understanding "the meaning" of a building and the aesthetic significance of a building's physical impact on its surroundings.

The section on the theory of film, subtitled "metaphysical reflections," includes: a selection from The World Viewed, by Stanley Cavell, a response to Cavell by Stanley Bates and a further essay by Alexander Sesonske. These essays are fairly interesting though the focus of this section seems to be on mainstream, "classic" films of Hollywood (a point of criticism noted by Bates). Sesonske does deliver an interesting excursus on the question of "what is film." Sesonske even provides some metaphysical reflections on the aesthetics of the "chase scene" in film—as a way of displaying cinematic space, time and motion. While the section on film focuses on popular film, the section on music emphasizes the question of expressiveness in "serious," classical music. Eduard Hanslick's "A Musical Theory of Sound and Motion," from On the Musically Beautiful gives a nineteenth century case as to why Brahms is a better composer than Wagner. In teaching this essay, it
would be useful to pose Nietzsche's apollinian and dionysian discussion as counterpoint. Edward T. Cone and Renee Cox present more recent views in the debate between formalism and expressiveness in music. The form versus feeling debate in music is an old one. Here, Hanslick defends form, Cone defends feeling, while Cox attempts a synthesis.

A section on the theory of dance rounds out Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. Francis Sparshott's essay "Why Philosophy Neglects the Dance" begins the section. It poses some interesting speculations on why "the dance," does not receive the philosophical-aesthetic scrutiny accorded other forms of art. The essay also makes one of the collection's few references to Hegel, arguably a pivotal figure in the history of aesthetics (the reference is to why Hegel neglects the dance). Monroe Beardsley offers another critical analysis, titled "What is Going on in a Dance?" Noel Carroll and Sally Banes conclude the anthology with a critique of Beardsley that poses some pointed questions of the avant-garde in dance as resistant to the attempts at clarifying definition that typify Beardsley's framework of aesthetic analysis.

There are a number of flaws with Aesthetics: a Critical Anthology. The dialectical-critical method used in this book, while meritorious in principle, works to limit the range of aesthetic discussion presented. Occasionally the respondents both enlighten and explain the original text or provide thought provoking refutation. Often, however, the approach is forced, with the criticism ending up in nitpicking attack. Moreover, while the readings and responses do not all present a single point of view, the respondents must respond to the theses according the limited terms of debate set by the original article. This limits the scope of the book's aesthetic inquiry. The problem of narrowness has become more pronounced in the second edition of Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. The first edition of the anthology, published in 1978, contained readings from Hegel, Clement Greenberg, Suzanne Langer, even Marcel Duchamp.

In limiting themselves, in the second edition, to the rather oxymoronic notion of the "analytic tradition," or the curious phrase "anglo-saxon world," (the books also contains numerous typographical errors) the editors exclude much that is of philosophical merit in current discussions of aesthetic issues. "Traditional" authors such as Longinus of Colonus, Johann Winkelmann and Hegel ought to be given some place alongside Aristotle, Frances Hutcheson, Tolstoy and Kant. Contemporary continental authors, among them: Roland Barthes, Martin Heidegger, Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida (to name a few) have contributed as much or more to contemporary discussions of aesthetics as the book's "analytic" theorists. They also belong in a work that purports to be a "critical anthology" of aesthetic theory. To the objection that at 678 pages already, there simply is not room for more perspectives, one wonders, for example, whether there is a need for three articles by Monroe Beardsley at the expense of Roland Barthes; or whether some of the articles are not just "filler" intended to flesh out the editors dialectical-critical approach. Indeed, an age of multi-culturalism and the breaking down of
disciplinary boundaries, the restriction of aesthetic discussion to the analytic "tradition" is almost reactionary.

Though to be fair, a number of women theorists, albeit analytic ones, do appear in this textbook. In conclusion, Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology exhibits a certain conservativism that is not in keeping with the dynamism and multiplicity that stand as hallmarks of artistic expression, the things that make artistic endeavor worth practicing and noticing. This anthology would be improved by some more effort to grasp this dynamism and to provide balance and comprehensiveness in presenting and introducing the range of aesthetic inquiry.


Throughout his life and career John Dewey shunned any sort of dualism or dichotomy and, as a result, was a philosopher for whom thought and life were intimately connected. Dewey's philosophy and life experience cannot be divorced without significant distortion of either, for if there is one thing Dewey sought above all else it was a thoroughgoing unity in his own life and of his life with the life of the society in which he lived. Recognizing the fundamental impact Dewey's life had on his thought (and vice versa), Steven C. Rockefeller in John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism attempts to address the religious element of Dewey's thought by examining it not only in the context of Dewey's philosophy as a whole but also in the context of the biographical and historical element that served to shape and influence Dewey's philosophic thought.

Rockefeller divides Dewey's religious thought into six stages. The first two of these stages cover Dewey's childhood and college years (including the three years preceding Dewey's matriculation at Johns Hopkins), and in the first chapter of this book, Rockefeller skillfully traces the influences on Dewey's life and thought during his formative years in Vermont. In particular, Rockefeller shows how the faith in a democratic ideal that Dewey professed throughout his career was instilled by Dewey's mother, his church, and his teachers so that it acquired an important moral and religious significance that was to underlie all of Dewey's thought.

The third stage of Dewey's religious thought, as identified by Rockefeller, began when Dewey entered Johns Hopkins as a graduate student, during which time Dewey was introduced to Hegelian idealism. Rockefeller discusses how in Hegel Dewey found the vision of organic unity for which he had eagerly sought during his years in Vermont and how Dewey was influenced by George Sylvester Morris and G. Stanley Hall, from whom Dewey gained many of the foundational tenants of his mature philosophy. Rockefeller also includes in this period a discussion of Dewey's attempt to unify philosophy and psychology and an explication of how this integrated psychology and philosophy related to Dewey's conception of science,
morality, and religion. One of Rockefeller's main contentions is the interconnectivity and inseparability of these three disciplines throughout Dewey's work, and throughout this book, Rockefeller does an excellent joy of portraying the relationship of these elements in every aspect of Dewey's philosophy.

When Dewey graduated and began his first job as a professor of philosophy, his social consciousness, which had been instilled in him from his youth, was aroused. The absolute idealism of Dewey's student days gave way to what Rockefeller calls a radical version of liberation theology and to a political radicalism. This transition marked the end of the third stage of Dewey's religious thought and the beginning of a new stage in which, Rockefeller maintains, Dewey's conception of God was transformed to one of naturalized immanence; God became for Dewey a creature who realizes its being through the history of humanity's evolving social and cultural life. This period encompasses the decade Dewey spent at the University of Michigan, and Rockefeller traces not only the intellectual influences on Dewey's developing thought but also the relationship of Dewey's philosophy to external influences such as his addresses to and involvement with the Student's Christian Association, his friendship with Franklin Ford and the "Thought News affair," his emerging friendship with Jane Addams, and his romance with and subsequent marriage to Alice Chipman. In fact, Rockefeller offers a well-rounded view of Dewey as an individual and provides a clear view of how Dewey's thought evolved and matured as he moved away from neo-Hegelian idealism and toward an experimental naturalism. Rockefeller indicates how, during this time, Dewey began to break away from the Congregational Church in particular and traditional Christianity in general; yet Rockefeller also takes great pains to demonstrate how Dewey sought to retain the essence of the Christian faith in both his life and his thought.

The final two periods of religious thought that Rockefeller identifies deal with Dewey's mature philosophy, but Rockefeller continues to indicate how Dewey's youthful experiences and his earlier philosophical outlook served as the foundation for the development of his mature thought.

The fifth period of Dewey's religious thought began when Dewey left the University of Michigan and became the chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. During this time Dewey's thought came to focus around the problems of individual self-realization and freedom, democratic social reconstruction, and the scientific search for practical truth, and Rockefeller indicates how this led Dewey to take an active interest in education and pedagogy. Rockefeller centers his discussion around Dewey's theory of education and his faith in the democratic way of life, but Rockefeller integrates this discussion with an account not only of Dewey's involvement in the educational reform movement and in Sunday schools and public schools but also of Dewey's own personal tragedies during his decade at Chicago.
Also included in this fifth period of Dewey's religious thought is Dewey's move to New York City and Columbia University. As he does throughout the book, Rockefeller traces the intimate connection between Dewey's thought and life as Dewey entered into one of the most difficult periods of his life. While at Columbia Dewey sought through his philosophy an adequate conception of the nature of intelligence and its place in action in order to address the problems of humanity and in his life he functioned as both a teacher and reformer, who was involved in the formation of the AAUP, ACLU, and the NAACP, among other things. In addition to these positive accomplishments, however, the connection between Dewey's philosophic thought and his social activities was greatly affected by World War I and the strain it placed on Dewey as he contemplated the role of war in a democratic society and as he found himself arguing against pacifism. Rockefeller does an excellent job of portraying how the war affected both Dewey's professional and personal life and how it left him intellectually isolated and emotionally drained. With respect to Dewey's personal growth during the war years, Rockefeller devotes an entire chapter to Dewey's poems and letters and discusses Dewey's continuing emotional tie to the God of his childhood, his revealing correspondence with an amateur philosopher, and his interest in the Alexander technique and French painting. Rockefeller also discusses the regenerative impact Dewey's trip to China had on the embattled and weary philosopher.

The sixth and final segment of Dewey's religious thought covers the period from Dewey's Gifford Lectures in 1929 until his death in 1952. Unlike his discussion of the previous periods of Dewey's thought, Rockefeller spends less time discussing Dewey's personal life during these years, rather the spotlight is placed more on Dewey's philosophical writing. During this period Dewey wrote *Experience and Nature* and *The Quest for Certainty* as well as *A Common Faith*, and in these works he provides his most complete statement of his understanding of the nature of the universe, the human situation, and the revelation of the ideal and the real. Rockefeller clearly explicates Dewey's position on each of these areas and shows how each ultimately relates to and is intimately connected with Dewey's philosophy of religion. In fact, these concluding chapters provide a wonderful overview and synopsis of Dewey's mature thought, for Rockefeller examines Dewey's thought on topics such as the integration of mind and matter, the character or experience, the moral life in an evolving world, Dewey's theory of action, his definition of truth, and his conception of social and economic reform. In covering Dewey's thought in each area, Rockefeller ties it into Dewey's larger project, the overcoming of all dualisms through a complete naturalization of metaphysics, epistemology, and religion. Rockefeller also provides an overview of the religious debate of the period and Dewey's place within it, and furthermore, he puts Dewey's religious view into perspective by showing its relation to Dewey's entire career.

If there is one criticism I have of Rockefeller's book, it would have to be that I find it lacking any genuine critical element. Undoubtedly, Dewey is a
philosopher, educator, and social reformer of great merit and one of the United States towering intellectual figures; however, Rockefeller paints a portrait of Dewey that is almost too sympathetic. Several places in this book Rockefeller mentions either actual or potential criticisms of Dewey's thought, but rather than give these criticisms any serious consideration as challenges to Dewey, Rockefeller generally proceeds to provide Dewey's own response to the criticism, thereby seemingly dispersing any significant problem.

Although Rockefeller's intention clearly is not to provide an exhaustive critical analysis of Dewey's religious thought, the lack of critical discussion at times can be disconcerting and can leave one with a sense that something is missing in this book. For example, in an early chapter Rockefeller offers an in-depth discussion of Dewey's conception of God during his idealistic phase, yet although a clear and fundamental tension is evident in Dewey's position, Rockefeller does little more than merely mention the tension between theism and pantheism in Dewey's idealistic notion of God as an independent universal consciousness that is realized only through individual human beings. Rockefeller does return to this problem near the close of the book, and it is only at this juncture that he adopts a clearly genuine critical stance toward Dewey's religious perspective; yet even here the questions are merely raised and passed over. However, the difficulty raised is one central to Dewey's thought, and thus one that could potentially undermine much of Dewey's work. Put simply, Rockefeller discovers Dewey to be faced with a paradox: Dewey's notion of religious meaning and value entails a fundamental sense of ultimate meaning, but without some eternal truth beyond the nothingness of the destruction of nature there is no intelligible foundation for this ultimate meaning. Thus, Rockefeller finds that Dewey's naturalistic world view seems to point to some sort of transcendent dimension of reality. If Dewey's philosophy does indeed rely on a notion of transcendence, this is no small problem: the overarching goal of all of Dewey's thought was an elimination of dualisms, particularly a dualism between the transcendent and the immanent. Yet before Rockefeller moves on to his concluding chapter, there is little more than a mere indication that this might indeed provide some difficulty for Dewey.

Despite the lack of critical assessment however, I found Rockefeller's book to be skillfully written, intellectually stimulating, and enjoyable. For those who are not familiar with Dewey's work or life, this book provides an interesting and informative overview of Dewey as a philosopher and as a man. For those who are familiar with Dewey, Rockefeller offers a unique perspective by focusing his discussion around the significance and role of religion in Dewey's life and thought. Rockefeller demonstrates how Dewey's own religious experience and the evolution of Dewey's religious consciousness served as the fundamental inspiration for his interpretation of religious experience in general but then proceeds to also locate Dewey's religious thought within the whole of Dewey's philosophical project.

Rudolf Makkreel's work *Imagination and Interpretation* is one among several recent attempts to interpret and expand the possibilities of Kant's critical project to the philosophy of language. He is interested in theory of interpretation based primarily on the "orientational" role played by the imagination throughout the Kantian corpus. Both theoretical judgments, as well as reflective judgments, will require the imagination to mediate between intuitions and concepts. In the former case, determinative concepts of objects are made possible, in the latter, indeterminate concepts or ideas, which serve heuristically, are produced. As mediator, the imagination will provide a criteria for the harmonization of parts to whole; Different relations of parts to whole, or particulars to universals determine the different types of judgments. Since, interpretation is only possible if parts of any object can be made sense of in relation to a whole, the imagination will play a pivotal role in interpreting experience, whether scientific, or merely aesthetic. As an interpretive principle, the imagination is seen to go beyond the formative powers of precritical writings and the synthetic function attributed to it in the Critique of Pure reason.

*Imagination* focuses primarily on the third critique and reflective judgment- the judgment which allows us to identify which of our distinct faculties are being engaged by any given representation, sensory or conceptual. Makreel insists that the Critique of Judgment (CJ) is not intended as a synthesis between the first and second critiques, the theoretical and the practical. He agrees with Hegel that if this is Kant's intention then CJ is a failure. Rather, Makreel insists that the in the CJ Kant's implicitly points to the transcendental role of the imagination as a principle or orientation which allows for a meaningful interpretation of individual representations, in terms of the systematicity of our representation in general. The imagination is central for both determining the concepts of understanding by the sensory manifold, and on the other hand generating ideas which allow for an integrated understanding of knowledge in general, but which go beyond determinate intuitions. Achieving this integration, or holistic viewpoint, will require going beyond the constraints of theoretical judgments.

*Imagination* is divided into three parts: the first parts is concerned with the precritical writings and the Critique of Pure Reason. The second part turns to reflective judgment as seen in aesthetic judgments, both of the beautiful and the sublime. The third part discusses the role of ideas, normal, aesthetic, and teleological as models for specification of empirical contents, and the way these models provide for "reflective interpretation". And finally, Makreel discusses common sense as a transcendental principle of orientation.

In part one, Makreel traces the epistemological role of imagination in the precritical writings to the determinate role it plays in the theoretical
judgments of the first critique. Kant began his analysis of the imagination in his *Reflections on Logic* and his *Reflections on Anthropology*. In the precritical writings, the synthetic role of the imagination is not fully developed. Rather, the emphasis is on the "synoptic" and "formative" reproductive activities. As a formative faculty the imagination is related to what is directly given and indirectly given. At this stage, imagination is empirical and the differences between different functions of imagination are based on the temporal relationship of images to the immediate presentation of the object. Kant is very influenced in these early writings by Christian Wolff and A. G. Baumgarten's empirical psychology.

Makreel outlines eight functions of the imagination in the precritical development of Kant's writings: Two of these--*Ausbildung* and *Gegenbildung*--will be relevant to the interpretive role of imagination in their ability to go beyond experience. The first is a "completing formation" when imagination projects" and idea of the whole" (19), while the second, is analogue formation where symbols act as linguistic signifiers forging links between sense and reason. These are developed inn later chapters.

Three other species of image formation (*Bildungsvermogen*) are particularly interesting for Kant's later theory, in particular because of their connection with time. *Abbildung* is direct image formation; *Nachbildung* (productive image formation), and *Vorbidung* (anticipatory image formation). Each are empirical images based on the past, present and future. Makreel is particularly interested to show that *Abbildung* is not only the representation of a present object, but also contains within it past images and anticipates future images. Hence, he argues *Abbildung* possesses "synoptic" capabilities insofar as it can contain in a moment all three relations of time. In doing so, Makreel argues a synoptic image will have spatial features. This is evident in Kant's discussion of an image of a city. Hence, Makreel concludes, "Abbildung provides an interesting starting point because it illustrates that even the most direct empirical images are formed" (19).

These three image formations are developed further in Kant's "Lectures on Metaphysics." Here *Abbildung* is described as the process of "running through" and "gathering together" the different elements of a manifold. This description anticipates Kant's analysis of the apprehension of imagination in the CPR. Makreel offers a convincing critique of Heidegger's comparison in his well known work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* of the three synoptic functions of the precritical writings, with the three synthesis of the first critique. There are important differences between these modes. Imagination in the precritical writings is merely empirical, being primarily reproductive and hence passive; whereas in the first critique, imagination is transcendental (as well as reproductive) and plays a much more active role, i.e. the judgments inform objects, rather than merely receiving the imprint of objects. Furthermore, Imagination is not only representation in time, but is seen actively generating time a priori through schematization (see CPR A143,B1820.) Unlike *Abbildung*, the synthesis of apprehension is not confined to the present, but represents a continuum of temporal moments,
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rather than the concentrated or synoptic moment of Abbildung. Hence, it does not have the spatial connotations of synoptic imagination.

In chapter 2, Makreel turns to the CPR and focus' on Kant's insistence that our representations must be "ordered, connected and brought into relation" (A99). These stages are evident in the three subjective synthesis: (1) The intuitive apprehension (2) imaginative reproduction and (3) conceptual recognition (20). These are discussed as cumulative, as well as "presuppositional" for each other. Makreel raises questions concerning the independence of the imagination from the understanding, arguing for an interpretation which would tie the two together. "Ultimately all synthesis is a function of the understanding and its categories" (28). Therefore, Kant's description in the precritical writings of image formation as origination from "below" is no longer possible in the first critique: Now "the sequence must begin with the synthesis of recognition" (28). It does not make any sense then to talk of a synthesis of apprehension apart from the concepts of understanding. Makreel dismisses several passages of the A edition (i.e. A78/B103), which suggest imagination as a synthetic faculty apart from understanding, as an oversight in Kant's editing.

Makreel draws a distinction between the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding and the schemata of pure sensible concepts. The first is transcendental and therefore without content, while the latter serves to mediate between concepts and intuitions. Transcendental schematism is said to be the imagination which schematizes by "translation the rule implicit in the categories into a temporally ordered set of instruction for construction of an objectively determinate nature" (30). This schemata "can never be brought into any image whatsoever" (CPR A142/B181) even though it is related to the production of the temporal schemata.

The schemata of pure sensible concepts on the other hand, is called "figurative" by Kant. The graphic term suggests a spatial connotation. Makreel insists that on the one hand, these figurative schema should not be thought of as empirical images of reproductive imagination, but must be understood as "a rule for generating configurations of lines." On the other hand, figurative schema should not be confused with the intellectual ideals of reason which possess no content. Rather, they allow for the schematization of intuitions according to the categories of understanding, i.e. it makes images possible. These schema act as "monograms" (CPR A142/181) or rules for the "generating of spatial forms" (32), thus, allowing for the discernment of patterns, e.g. mathematical patterns. These patterns or "mathematical cipher(s) become an intuitive replacement of the object (it is called a "sign in concreto)"

Mackreel offers an interesting analysis of the interpretive applications of the productive imagination's use of monograms. Typically the term "monogram" is applied to a grouping of the letters of the alphabet. The
"deciphering" of discrete letters of the alphabet is compared with the schematization of intuition by the imagination. The "running through" of individual letters must happen before these discrete letters are joined together to form individual words so that they can be then "read." The imagination can be seen then to first, "decipher" entziffern) that which nature "spells" (buchstabieren) out in letters, and then to "read" (lesen) these letters as words. Makreel shows monogrammatic schema to be hermeneutically related to the transcendental schemata:. "If a monogrammatic schema of a pure sensible concept enables us to discern recurrent mathematical patterns in sense, then a transcendental schema of a pure intellectual concept indicates what kind of meaning can be predicated of objects of experience" (33).

One indication of Kant's recognition of the hermeneutic import of his theory can be found in his use of the terms objekt and Gegenstände. The latter term has semantic connotations and suggests "objective meaning." Kant uses the term objekt to refer to that unity through which all the manifold in an intuition is united in a concept (CPR B139). But at the point where the understanding is said to become conscious of an object Kant uses the term Gegenstände. Hence, Makreel suggests "the imagination makes possible the crucial transition from logical meaning to objective meaning."¹

A "reading" of nature does not however insure a complete interpretation of nature. It is possible to read the individual words in a sentence, taking note of their respective places in a linear progression. However, interpreting the sentence requires more than reading the individual words; it requires that each of the parts be understood in relation to the whole sentence. By analogy, the understanding is able to read nature, but it is not able to interpret nature. This involves a "completing function" of the imagination (Ausbildung) as it relates to reason: "If concepts of the understanding provide the rules for reading the manifold of sense so as to produce knowledge of objects in nature, then ideas of reason can be said to provide the rules for interpreting these objects so as to form a coherent and complete system of nature" (cf CPR A314/B370-71). In the Opus Postumum Kant distinguished between two types of "interpretation" (Auslegung) of nature, the one "doctrinal" and the other "authentic". Doctrinal interpretation is said to be "scholastic system" of physics, while the "authentic" interpretation is "experiential" physics. For Kant, interpretation must be connected with experience. Ideas will be valid heuristically for the interpretation of nature, only insofar as they relate to actual experience. In other words, Kant is not interested in metaphysical speculation.

Before turning to a discussion of ideas, which occurs in part three, Makreel first discusses aesthetic judgments and the distinction between determinate and reflective judgments. The first two critiques deal with judgments where a universal concept is given and a particular is brought

¹ Makreel goes onto distinguish other valid uses of the term objekt in relation to intuitions (B 156).
under the concept. Hence, the concept is determined by intuition. Reflective judgment, on the other hand, begins with given particulars. The reflective judgments are never determinate insofar as they do not bring intuitions under determinate concepts. Rather, they bring the particular qua particular in relation to either the subjective conditions of judgment in general, as is the case with judgments of taste, or ideas of Reason, as is the case with aesthetic and teleological judgments.

Makreel begins with a discussion of judgments of taste which is the purest form of reflective judgment since it does not deal with any purposes or concepts. At this stage ideas do not enter into the picture. We are primarily concerned with our aesthetic responses to natural forms of beauty. Beautiful forms in nature are referred to as "Ciphers" (Chiffereschrift) through which nature speaks to us figuratively (CJ #42, 143). These are analogous to the mathematical monograms produced by the synthesis of imagination in the CPR. Although, Kant never uses the term 'synthesis' in reference to the imaginations role in aesthetic judgments, Makreel believes it is a mistake to assume he held aesthetic judgments to be epistemologically irrelevant. On the contrary, Makreel argues that Kant does not view aesthetic judgments as simply precognitive, but as important for "cognition in general." The difference is the way in which particulars are related to concepts.

Judgments of taste are subjective, since they refer to the feeling of pleasure in the subject, rather than the object. These judgments are concerned with natural beauty (a point Makreel does not always make clear). The pleasure produced is disinterested, rather than an agreeable pleasure based on some instrumental use found for the object. As already mentioned, the judgment is pure, since it does not relate to an empirical object of desire. It is also important to distinguish judgments of taste from intellectual aesthetic ideas, since the judgment is not related to any specific purpose, and these as we shall see are related to moral purposiveness. The pleasure which is derived from judgments of taste occurs because of a "harmony' between faculties. This harmony is to be distinguished from the synthesis of the first critique where intuitions are "subordinated" to concepts. Rather, in harmony there is a "coordination" between faculties.

Makreel insists in aesthetic consciousness "all the categories remain relevant to aesthetic judgments, but are used differently than in cognitive judgments" (53). The activity of the imagination in relation to (pure) concepts is analogous to the schematism in the first critique, but not identical to it. Kant claims that in reflective judgments the imagination, "schematizes without a concept. (CJ, #35, 129)" Instead of a schematism, Kant refers to this activity as a Presentation which includes "symbolization" and "reflective specification." If I am understanding Makreel correctly, reflective judgment "specifies the categories reflectively to organize pure mental contents" (53). It would appear that reflective judgment consists in taking an indeterminate unity, or aesthetically apprehended form and coordinating it with the different possible principles of cognition. What is "schematized" or better,
specified in the reflective judgment is the transcendental principles themselves. The "accord" between the aesthetic apprehension and the judging faculties in general produces pleasure: "The aesthetic judgment directly compares the apprehended form of an object with the way categories are generally schematized in relation to the form of time and it is this accord that is aesthetically pleasing" (58). In pure aesthetic judgments this coordination produces a "play" of the faculties, since there are no determinate intuitions.

The transcendental principle that makes possible this coordination between the aesthetic form and the transcendental categories is "common sense." This principle enables us to orientate apprehended forms by specifying them according to different available principles: "Reflective judgment is concerned with the specification of universal concept of the understanding as concepts, in order to make it possible to classify objects into a system of genera and species." (57) Kant goes on to claim that reflective judgment "cannot undertake to classify the whole of nature by empirical differentiation unless it assumes that nature itself specifies its transcendental laws from some principle (Fl, 20). This passage suggests the possibility of alternative transcendental principles, each co-existing. For example, it is possible to consider nature as directed by different types of causality, mechanical and teleological. Reflective judgment is responsible for classifying these different types of causality, as applied to organic objects and inorganic objects.

In the 4 and 5 chapters. Makreel examines the sublime and the feeling of life. The feeling of life provides a ground for the common sense revealed in the judgment of taste. In the case of the sublime the imagination connects the purposiveness of the judgment with the faculties of the subject, thus serving to bring to light the unity of the faculties. The inability of the imagination to comprehend mathematical infinity produces a regress that allows us to feel a sublime infinity with ourselves. "This regress is best understood transcendentally as the basis for an integration of the faculties" (87). Both 'common sense" and the "feeling of life" (also called spirit) are subjective transcendental principles which allow for the orientation and unity of the judging faculties. Makreel quotes Kant's Anthropology: "Spirit is what is truly creative what enlivens, because it is the unity from which all movement of the mind is derived" and from the same work, "the spirit of an art is whole, a systematic method, which contains a comprehensive idea." In Part II, Makreel elaborates in Chapter six, on the points made earlier concerning specification. Now specification is of empirical intuitions, rather than transcendental principles. He explains in detail how ideas, normal, aesthetic, and teleological, act as model images or archetypes which provide "the rules for judging whether an empirical figure accords with the archetype used by nature in producing its species" (61) These are not to be confused with ideals of reason, which are purely abstract and are not related to intuitions under universal concepts, Reason begins with an idea of the
whole and proceeds to interpret the parts in terms of that idea. These ideas are useful for interpreting nature, and symbolizing moral ideals.

Normal ideas act as models for specifying empirical concepts. Aesthetic ideas are symbols of the good and provide a concrete object by which to understand the moral ideal of Reason. The guidelines provided by the ideas are revisable. Thus, reflective judgment is adaptable to particular experiences. Ideas act as organizing models of wholes, and can be changed to accommodate changes in the parts. Teleological judgments are explored in chapter seven, primarily in their application to history, particularly what is called "divinatory history", i.e., history which assumes progress. The notion of amelioration requires a conception of teleos, a "sign of universal moral tendency in a particular factual event." (153)

Where intuitions served as the matter for concepts, schematized concepts are seen as the matter for ideas. Ideas do not have any claim to theoretical knowledge. These ideas enable us to think of unities that go beyond the determinate judgment. This is important if the imagination is to provide a comprehensive idea of the whole, without ever determining the individual parts. Makreel sees the distinction between deciphering, reading, and interpreting as a differences between "the completing functions". The last of these is the function of ideas.

In chapter eight, Makreel develops the full implications for a critical hermeneutics. Ultimately, the imagination acts as a faculty of orientation. We saw this first in the precritical writings in the discussion of Abbildung and later in the discussion of reflective judgments, as orientation "cognition in general" through the specification of the transcendental principles. In this final chapter, Makreel discussed the role of imagination in more detail as it relates to the "common sense." Here "common sense" Is understood as the belief in the universal communicability of my judgments. This is presupposed for every possible principle and judgment. It is a general feeling, without a concept. common sense suggest the possibility of a transcendental reflection. In his essay "What is Orientation in thinking" Kant distinguishes between two types of orientation: spatial orientation where an individual situates herself in relation to the external world; and "mental orientation" of the thinking self to the transcendental realm". In place of these determinate forms of orientation, Makreel suggests for reflective judgments a "Aesthetic orientation" and a "Teleological orientation." Hence, we see the importance of the imagination for gaining a perspective which will allow for interpreting different types of experience.

At times Makreel seems to go beyond the explicit implications of Kant's corpus, but on the whole he does a good job of bringing to the fore the implicit possibilities for a theory of interpretation. His general point is at times lost in the details of his analysis. Sometimes this is due to poor organization of the chapters. Sometimes it is simply due to his pull from so many texts. He does not seem to consider the possibility of incongruities between the different texts and takes them for the most part as a consistent with one another. He is more interested in tracing the development of
imagination and suggests that the role it plays increases with each of Kant's writings. Whether this is by design or necessity is not altogether clear. Although Makreel's project is clearly in the continental Hermeneutical tradition, as evident in his discussion of his work in relation to Gadamer, Heidegger, and Kilthey, his clarity of style and careful analysis of the role of imagination should prove interesting for the analytic philosopher, as well. It is an important contribution to a little discussed topic in Kantian scholarship.