
*Of Mind and Other Matters* is principally a work in the development and application of Nelson Goodman's epistemology. The book does meet the challenge it sets for itself: that is, to provide a sense of unity to an epistemology which is broadly conceived as philosophy of the understanding. Specifically, the challenge is to provide a coherent conceptual framework for an epistemology which embraces the philosophy of science, the philosophy of art, and a relativism so radical that "the world" gives way to a pluralism in which multiple worlds are created under the stress of equally correct but conflicting ways of describing, picturing, and perceiving it. Accordingly, what makes this book an important philosophical work is that Goodman's general theory of symbols (developed earlier in *Languages of Art*) emerges as a coherent framework in which the ways of world making in the sciences and the arts are embraced in a philosophy of the understanding.

One cannot avoid noticing the behavioristic orientation of Goodman's treatment of cognition. It is in connection with this orientation that the centrality of his theory of symbols begins to emerge. Following the lead of John B. Watson, Goodman focuses on the activities and states involved in thinking in order to render thought accessible to scientific observation. But under Goodman's conception of cognition, thinking involves a variety of symbolic forms. 'Thinking in' must be interpreted broadly enough to include thinking in pictures and other symbols as well as thinking in words. In order to accommodate such diversity in the forms of thought, Goodman argues that the states and processes involved in thinking must be understood in terms of preparations for producing, judging, and perceiving symbols of all kinds.

Goodman is careful not to suggest a reduction of the mental to the physical, and he warns against confusing the forms of thought with either the forms of the processes and states or the forms of the systems in which thinking occurs. Nevertheless, he makes it clear that his theory of symbols is to play an integral role in the development of a theory of the forms of thought. As he states, "The forms of processes and states pertaining to readiness to produce or judge or perceive a symbol are in many respects determined by the syntactic and semantic form of the systems that the symbols to be produced or judged or perceived belong to; for instance, thinking in characters of a notational system involves activities and states differing in form from those that thinking in ordinary language or in pictures involves" (pp. 27-8).
It is not until Goodman considers the consequences of his relativism for "the world" about which we think that the centrality of his theory of symbols is fully realized. Goodman presents his commitment to a radical relativism as his response to the fact that some truths do conflict. Since there are conflicting true versions which cannot without paradox be true in the same world, he concludes that they are true in different worlds. For Goodman, nothing short of a commitment to multiple worlds is required in order to avoid accepting a single world in which all versions are true and the distinction between truth and falsity is lost. But not only does Goodman argue that there exists a world for each conflicting true version, he stresses that each true version actually creates its world. This follows, Goodman explains, from the fact that there is "no true version compatible with all true versions" (p. 33). According to Goodman, all that there is, is a product or construct of some true version.

Even though Goodman maintains that worlds are the constructs of right versions (of which true versions are a species), he does not claim that a right version is identical with the world it creates. He points out that a version will be in some symbol system or other and will, accordingly, have some features that the world it creates will lack. Nevertheless, Goodman maintains that the dependency of a world on its version may be traced to the form of the symbol system in which the version is right. As Goodman states: "And the forms of what we think of are by no means independent of the forms of what we think in. The form of classical music heard is affected and constrained by the structure of the notation in which the score is written. And I maintain that a world, much like a musical performance, is the creature of and is informed by a version constructed in a symbol system" (p. 28).

It is, then, out of a relation of dependence which Goodman's theory of symbols emerges as a foundation for his epistemology. He argues that both the forms of thought and the forms of the worlds about which we think are dependent on the forms of the symbol systems in which we think. But Goodman also demonstrates that his theory of symbols actually provides a coherent framework for his epistemology. He does so by providing an analysis of the forms of reference employed in the various symbol systems whose versions make our worlds. It proceeds as follows. The term 'reference' is taken as a primitive term and is explained to cover all sorts of symbolization usually taken to be cases of "standing for" (p. 55). The elementary and complex forms of reference frequently employed in the sciences and the arts are then explicated in terms of the syntactic and semantic form of the systems in which they occur. The forms of reference considered include: literal verbal denotation, notation, pictorial denotation, quotation, exemplification, fictive denotation, figurative or metaphorical denotation, expression, and allusion.

Indeed, Goodman successfully demonstrates the centrality of his theory of symbols and its ability to unify an epistemology which he broadly
conceives as a philosophy of the understanding. On this score alone, Of Mind and Other Matters is a valuable work in philosophy. Yet, Goodman’s concerns are not confined to theory. He is also concerned with applications of his epistemology. Turning to literary theory, Goodman provides a lucid analysis of narrative discourse and realism. In a discussion of art education, he makes a number of impelling recommendations for reform, some of which concern museum management.

One shortcoming of the book arises in connection with Goodman’s inquiry into the standards of rightness of versions. Truth is discussed at length, but “truth as rightness of what is said is a narrow species of rightness” (p. 39). Truth is rightness of literal verbal denotation. The standards of rightness of pictorial denotation, exemplification, etc., are barely mentioned. This is disappointing especially since Goodman clearly identifies the broader inquiry as “one of the most pressing problems of present-day philosophy, and one of the most perplexing” (p. 14).

Of Mind and Other Matters is a work of considerable breadth. This review has considered only a few of the concerns addressed in it. The value of the book is that Goodman successfully relates those concerns to his general theory of symbols. The result is a unified epistemology in which both the arts and the sciences participate in informing the understanding by employing symbol systems which contribute to the forms of thought and the forms of the worlds about which we think. Whether you are familiar with Goodman’s work or not, I strongly recommend reading the book.


Manuscript Essays and Notes and Manuscript Lectures are the final two volumes in the nineteen volumes of The Works of William James published by Harvard University Press under the auspices of Fredrick H. Burkhardt, General Editor. Beginning in 1973 the American Council of Learned Societies sponsored The Works of William James for a National Endowment for the Humanities grant. Max H. Fisch, Eugene T. Long, John J. McDermott and H. S. Thayer constituted an Advisory Board that established general policy and were consulted on substantive problems in the editorial process. The works in this series are edited according to the standards of the Center for Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language Association of America.
The final volumes of this series bring to a close a monumental project that in conjunction with the Southern Illinois University's Dewey project, the University of Chicago's Royce series, and the new editions of Peirce and Santayana provide a firm foundation for a reassessment of the classical American philosopher's contributions to the mission of philosophy in general. With the planned future publication of The Correspondence of William James, under the general direction of John J. McDermott, sound and definitive editions are becoming available for James research and ancillary American studies.

No fault can be found with the excellent critical apparatus contained in both Manuscript Lectures and Manuscript Essays and Notes. Emendations and alterations to manuscripts are exhaustively cataloged and explained. Also, the indexes are thorough and the introductions more than helpful. In fact, the introductions to both volumes, written by Ignas K. Skrupskelis, Associate Editor of the James works and James bibliographer, are invaluable. They offer over one hundred pages of exegetical and evaluative information about the contents of the volumes. Skrupskelis weaves together the seemingly separate strands of public lectures, fragmentary course outlines and incomplete manuscripts into an understandable and admirable whole cloth.

Manuscripts Essays and Notes includes James's works in progress on philosophical and psychological subjects. By far, the manuscript that will garner the most interest will be James's "The Many and the One" written from 1903 to 1904. James hoped this book would explain his philosophy of radical empiricism for a technical, that is professional, philosophical audience. The manuscript offers explanations and discussions not found in James's published works.

"The Many and the One" occupied James from the middle of July 1903 to the middle of July 1904. After promising to issue a systematic volume on his philosophical views in his preface to The Will to Believe, and urged in fact to write the book by such reviewers as F. C. S. Schiller, James found little time to devote to the work because of the demands of lecturing and the writing of short essays. James's completion of the work was also inhibited by growing frustration over the project which is clearly revealed in his proposed motto for the book—a quotation from Melville's Moby Dick: "God help thee, old man, thy thoughts have created a creature in thee; and he whose intense thinking thus makes him a Prometheus; a vulture feeds upon that heart for ever; that vulture the very creature he creates." (Introduction, xix)

The title, "The Many and the One," immediately shows the character of the manuscript and its author. As a transposition of the usual phrase, "the one and the many," the title emphasizes the importance of pluralism in James's thought. This is followed closely by a qualifier:
"The moment of Experience" is what I should have called it (the book), if I had thrust into the foreground the second aspect of my picture, of which I next make mention. How, on the supposition that the manyness of things precedes their unity, does any unity come into being at all? (6)

And here is the perennial rub, that most basic of all philosophical problems—How does pluralism achieve unity and how does monism explain diversity? James's pluralism is united in "the continuity, the absolute nextness of one part to another which we find in the minutest portions of our inner experiences." (6)

However, "The Many and the One" contains some extremely puzzling notions that must have contributed to James's unwillingness to complete the book. For example, Section 5 of the manuscript is a discussion of the concept of pure experience: "A philosophy of pure experience can admit no 'matter' except that which some subject of experience shall perceive or think. The matter is there only for that subject. Conversely it can admit no 'mind' not given in correlation with some material or immaterial 'object' which is felt or thought." (21) Hence, for James, the difference between a subject and an object is found in their functions assigned from our reflection of the experience and are not found in the immediate stuff composing the experience. He uses this concept of experience as the unity of a pluralistic universe. James explains in his marvelous style:

If the world be made of the stuff of experience, then it must be experienced throughout, just as everything in a picture must be painted, and everything in a story must be told. The picture, it is true, needs a canvass, and the words need a tongue, & so some philosophers have thought that experiences also need substantial supports. But as painted fishes can live in a painted sea, and a storied palace hold a storied king & court, even so experience connexions are sufficient fasteners together of experienced terms, and transitions realized by us are the only relations possible between such things as our experiences grasp. (23)

And it is this experience that James names radical empiricism.

The seamlessness of pure experience is proved by the psychology of perception, as found in the Principles of Psychology. James thought that "the fusion of an incoming impression with a mass of resident ideas that apperceive it" could not be separated into its discrete parts. Again he gives a wonderful explanation of this fusion:

As in those great circular Panoramas, views of foreign places or of battles, which have of late been exhibited in our cities, the real earth & grass and cannon of the foreground connect themselves
so subtly with their continuations on the painted canvass, that it is impossible to part them, and the whole scene shares in the effect of reality; so in a percept it is impossible to say what share of the thing before our eyes comes from the outer world and what our own mind's memories contribute. (31)

Other concepts James wrestles with in "The Many and the One" include idealism, pragmatism, analysis of possibility and a discussion of necessity. Yet, the manuscript is incomplete and at times consists of random notes that are either repetitive or sketchy and incoherent. There may be several reasons for this lack of completeness but one should not overlook the fact that it may be due to James's philosophical outlook. Maybe James's inability to complete his proposed magnum opus, "The Many and the One," resides in his theme of fallibilism, that is, that all assertions are open to revision. In no case is this clearer than in James's position on radical empiricism.

It is generally admitted that in the question of fact argument can lead to but probable conclusions. The pattern of construction of the universe is, after all, a question of fact, and it is quite enough for the dignity of a system of philosophy if, without pretending to invulnerable certainty, it succeeds in giving to the hypothesis for which it argues a supreme, or even a superior degree of persuasiveness. Such a superior persuasiveness is all that I aspire to, and probability for my conclusions is all that I shall claim. (4)

Such an attitude as expressed by James's fallibilism would make any conclusive and final work, like a magnum opus, an impossible task.

The only other material in these two volumes that will be of sustained interest for James scholars will be his notebooks on the objections raised by Dickinson Sergeant Miller and Boyd Henry Bode to radical empiricism. The Miller-Bode objections summarily described argue that James's philosophy of pure experience was incapable of answering the fundamental problem of the many and the one. His notebooks reveal his construction of radical empiricism as a response to these conundrums and as a rejection of the dualities inherent in modern philosophy.

The other philosophical essays in this volume revolve around discussions of idealism and the meaning of truth. They will be of little research value. The psychology sections will be of little interest except to the historian and the biographer. However, "The Many and the One," the Miller-Bode notebooks, and Skrupskelis' introduction are worth the investment in Manuscript Essays and Notes for the serious James scholar. All other scholars will find the earlier volumes in this series a richer field of study, as they contain most of the pertinent miscellanea of the topic covered by the individual volume.
"Manuscript Lectures" consists of James's public lectures and his lecture notes from the various courses he taught at Harvard from 1872 to 1907. The public lectures start with the John Hopkings Lectures on "The Senses and the Brain and Their Relation to Thought," of 1878, the Lowell Lectures on "The Brain and the Mind," of 1878, and concluded with his notes of addresses to graduate clubs from 1902 to 1906. James's teaching career was closely tied to the presidency of Charles William Eliot, who transformed the school from a traditional college to a modern university. Nowhere was this reformation more evident than in the philosophy curriculum. Eliot insured that academic freedoms were securely in place which allowed the teaching of evolution and Herbert Spencer, two of James's favorite topics. This freedom allowed James to pursue his interest and expand his knowledge of philosophy through his teaching duties. In such a tolerant atmosphere the philosophy department expanded its offerings from five courses in 1872-73 to twenty-seven courses in 1906-7, the last year of James's teaching. Furthermore, the philosophy teaching staff included such luminaries as James, Royce, Santayana and Ralph Barton Perry, and the psychology program was taught by Hugo Münsterberg, Edwin Bissell Holt, and Robert Mearns Yerkes. James flourished in this atmosphere.

Skrupskelis again gives an excellent introduction to this volume. As with James's actual lecture notes, Skrupskelis' introduction is a wealth of information that will be of interest to the biographer and historian, especially those interested in a time of rapid change at Harvard. However, there is little here to offer other James scholars. The lectures tend to be cryptic short phrases interspersed with paragraphs of complete lucid notes. A point of contention I have with this volume is that some of the lecture notes included seem to be superseded by later drafts of the same lecture. Hence, there is too much redundancy in the lecture notes. For example, "Notes for a Lecture in "The Physiological Effects of Alcohol"" (1886) includes two separate sections of notes, the actual draft of the lecture, and then an outline of the lecture. It would seem that much dead wood could have been dispensed with if the notes and maybe also the outline would have been left out. Overall, I cannot recommend this volume, except to the historian and biographer. For philosophical research, some of the earlier volumes in this series would be a much better investment, along with "Manuscript Essays and Notes."

1. General review. Bubner's eight essays record two developments: first, an intellectual history of the last twenty years (German originals were published between 1971-1984) in hermeneutics, critical theory, and the Anglo-American philosophy of science; second, Bubner's mediation of critical theory and hermeneutics through the mean of practical philosophy. What Bubner says about young Hegel in his Frankfurt and Jena periods discloses Bubner's aspirations to reconcile Hegel and Aristotle: "[H]e wanted...to bring together Kant and Aristotle. He therefore had to answer the question of the compatibility of practically applied reason and reality of political practice..." (205).

But Bubner's journey away from Hegel—from hermeneutics and critical theory to the immediacy of practical philosophy—is ambiguous. In the last essay, Bubner warns against the type of reconstructive science envisioned, e.g., by Habermas: "The writer of history must, of course, be on his guard against the specialist's temptation to confuse reconstruction with reality" (231). The preface gives a Hegelian twist to Bubner's self-interpretation: the present volume reconstructs the problems that emerged in Bubner's life and marks the shift from the context of investigation to historical practices that generate contexts, from method to substantial issues, from the two strands of the philosophy of reflection—Gadamerian receptive hermeneutics and forward-looking critical theory—to radically contingent reason in action and history. (vii-viii) The book moves from Hegel only to come closer to Hegel's shadow.

Bubner's ambiguous journey allows for two different readings of his text. First, one could strengthen his concern with history, finitude, and the sophistic deception expressed in the *Gorgias* and push him in the direction of radical hermeneutics and deconstruction in the style of Caputo and Derrida.1 This reading would make Bubner's case against idealism, functionalism and communicative ethics more angular, but it would also undermine his "good" will to discourse against the deceptive will to power.2 Second, one could present Habermas' communicative

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more comprehensive and successful mediation of theory and practice than Buhner's but also as a rebuttal of deconstruction to which Buhner leaves himself open.³

The movement from method to action in history divides Buhner's collection into two asymmetrical parts. The first five essays follow the methodological debates of the early 70s—dialectics with positivism, phenomenology with Marxism, the Hegelian-Marxist tradition with the post-empirical philosophy of science, critical theory with the philosophies of the lifeworld. The last three essays take up the issues of practical philosophy, action, and reason in history.

II. Essays in or beyond hermeneutics and critical theory?

1. "What Is Critical Theory?" (1971, pp. 1-35) examines that self-overcoming of ideological interests which is effected by critical theory's own resources. Buhner shows how the aporias of self-grounding reappear in Horkheimer's "unconcluded dialectic" which freed itself from the quest for the absolute standpoint. Can there by a non-traditional, post-liberal, critical theory that takes into account its historically situated interest? Can critical theory flee the deception of the Gorgias?

Buhner sounds almost postmodern in his acceptance of the lesson from Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.⁴ There is no ideology-free theory possible; critique can fulfill itself only in its negative dialectic by bringing out the untruth of any will to discourse.⁵

Because he cannot conceive how communicative will to discourse could protect itself against will to power, Buhner portrays Habermas as a decisionist: critical reflection, even when it mediates knowledge and interests, can only claim but not legitimate its stance.⁶ Buhner picks up


⁴Translated by John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1987).

⁵The motif of our beginnings in untruth, i.e., in the "absolute difference" of sin-consciousness, rather than in truth was first launched neither by Heidegger nor by Adorno nor by the postmodernists like Derrida and Foucault but by Kierkegaard against Hegel. See Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus. Vol. 7 of Kierkegaard's Writings. Edited and trans. by Hong and Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985).

⁶Habermas explicitly argues against decisionism and differentiates his position not only from Popper but also from Apel. On this see my "Habermas on Performative Contradiction and Communicative Action." New German Critique (forthcoming).
Habermas' distanciation from tradition, interest-free theory (still operative in the late Husserl's theme of the lifeworld). But he argues that Habermas' version of critical theory lacks self-understanding: Habermas' appeal to language as the medium of maturity objectifies dialogue and projects theory into practice, but it fails to secure itself against power-interest. In place of communicative action and dialogical rationality, Bubner proposes practically situated reason.

Critical theory has so far failed to come up with a concept of reason which is, beyond the sphere of interests, *internally* related to concrete practice and would make a better connection between the realms which are so deeply divided in the Idealist conception (31).

2. "Philosophy Is Its Time Comprehended in Thought" (1971, pp. 38-61) asks how a reflective stance can be reconciled with time. If critique can't remain free from ideology, could the future guarantee an actual reconciliation of reality with thought? Bubner agrees that Adorno's negative dialectics allows for a reconciliation with time but pays the price of weakness in its positive critique of the present. Similarly hermeneutics, which claims to have overcome via its pre-reflective truth the split between theory and practice, also suffer weakness in its reflective opposition to the present. Both Adorno's negativized dialectics and Gadamer's claim to the universality of hermeneutical truth oppose the "bad" will to power at the cost of being at best aporetic and at worst irrelevant as critiques.

In this assessment of Adorno and Gadamer, Buhner's position comes close to Habermas' in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. They differ in the strategy for cure. Habermas will elaborate a distinction between the system and the lifeworld to account for both the pathologies of communication and the resources against colonization of the lifeworld by system. This distinction enables him to overcome the weakness of critical posture in Adorno's totalizing critique and in Gadamer's uncritical receptivity, on the one hand, and of the performative, i.e., not purely logical, self-contradiction in post-modern narratives, on the other hand. Bubner accepts what sound like a postmodern claim, i.e., that no ideology-

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7 For Habermas' refutation of Bubner's critique, see Habermas, TCA I, 85 and 101:
8 Translated by Fred Lawrence (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1987). Hereafter abbreviated as PDM. See especially the lecture V. on Adorno's and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Again, verify this point with the weakness in Gadamer's reply to Derrida in *Dialogue and Deconstruction*, op. cit.
9 Habermas, TCA II, 113-197.
free unmasking of deception is possible (53, 59). But in place of a differentiated account of distorted and undistorted action, he longs for some access to the immediacy of historical contingency, particular reflection, and concrete content (57-59). It is here that he will be vulnerable to a radically hermeneutical and deconstructionist genealogy of any naive presence in such immediacy.

3. "Logic and Capital: On the Method of a 'Critique of Political Economy'" (1973, pp. 63-96) focuses on the paradox of critique and of its presuppositions. This essay highlights the interplay of Hegel's logic of contradiction and the role of mediation in Marx's critique of capitalism. Marx learned from Hegel's Logic that method and content, theory and reality, can exhibit a unity only through negative telos, i.e., through an absence of unity. Marx neither prematurely leaps to praxis nor to a systematic elaboration of the communist future. The terms of Marxist critique like commodity, labor, capital, and money are developed through a mutually mediating relation of essence, illusion and appearance. Mediation surmounts the presuppositions of the beginnings of critique by defining all terms in mutual relations to one another. Critique operates via the logic of contradiction but never ventures into a vision beyond concrete historical analysis of capital. Because Marx presents only a negative vision, theory can't be projected outside of its immediate historical mediation.

4. "On the Role of Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Science: A Contribution to a Discussion" (1973, pp. 97-112) discusses three senses of hermeneutics: first, a contingent coming to an understanding, second, the quasi-transcendental canons of interpretation and, third, hermeneutics as a philosophical theory. Bubner clears two common oversights: first, hermeneutics is not a special method for the human sciences. Here, he aligns himself with Gadamer against Dilthey. Second, hermeneutics is not practical philosophy. Bubner wants to differentiate his own position from both the hermeneutical claim to universality (Gadamer) and Habermas' communicative action.

While Bubner is justified in setting hermeneutical truth apart from Aristotle's practical wisdom oriented to action, he does a poor job in critiquing Habermas' position (102-103). He objects rightly that there is a contradiction in Gadamer's claim to universality, on the one hand, and in his refusal to assume the status of a transcendental theory, on the other

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10 Also 169-70, 188-89, 192.
(105-107). He is correct that systems theory (Luhmann) and constructivism, while they manage to avoid Gadamer's dilemma of either falling into dogmatism or becoming ineffective against sophistic deception, yield only an empty concept of a universal system. But he misses that Habermas' distinction between system and the lifeworld does full justice to this aporia within hermeneutics and in systems theory. Bubner needs this distinction in order to reconcile the quasi-transcendental character of critique and the historical dimensions of time (107-112).

5. "Dialectical Elements of a Logic of Discovery" (1973, pp. 113-145) is an excellent bridge between Continental debates of hermeneutics with critical theory and the Anglo-American philosophy of science. Bubner goes after Popper's decisionism (119, also 102) and the theory of truth based both on the notions of verisimilitude and progress. He also incorporates into his critique of the post-empiricist philosophy of science (Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Toulmin) some of his preceding reflections on hermeneutics, the lifeworld, and the logic of presuppositions and contradictions. His reflective angle in this essay is a thoroughly Hegelian opposition between dialectic and positivism, verisimilitude and falsificationism, the correspondence and the progressivist notions of truth.13

III. Practical philosophy and communicative action.


First, because Bubner pushes Habermas closer to traditional theory (in Horkheimer's sense), he misses the fallibilist and mixed nature of ideality in communicative incommunicative ethics.15 This results, in the first place, in Bubner's mis-reading of the role that counterfactuals (communicative and ethical ideality) play in actual dialogue. In the second place, he completely bypasses Habermas' performative argument against decisionism (whether of Kant, Adorno, Popper or functionalism) and against postmodern totalizing critiques of reason. A case of this oversight is Bubner's exemplification of Feyerabend and Habermas as extremes of irrationalism and decisionist rationalism (204).

13 Compare this with essay #3.
14 On Bubner's full position, see Rüdiger Bubner, Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976).
15 Compare with the conclusion of Lecture V., on Adorno and Horkheimer, in Habermas, PDM 130.
Second, Bubner argues against counterfactual conditions of discourse and against Habermas’ supposed decisionism (unjustified claims). But this argument from the possibility of the sophistic deception brings him closer to the post modern camp. But then, is not Bubner’s uncritical return to Aristotle itself arbitrary? Even Alasdair Maclntyre says that while we need socially situated practical reason, we do not at present have cultural paradises that could ethically guide our action. Is not there a longing for presence in any uncritical return to the immediacy of action?

Third, in essay 7, Bubner assigns false utopianism to Habermas, while he disregards a genuine place for utopia in the theory of action. For all its brilliant analysis of idealism and Weber’s functionalism, this essay suffers from the reduction of the difference between system and the lifeworld. The thesis of practical rationality, which is to sublate both critical and hermeneutical reason, lacks the differentiated structure of communicative rationality. Habermas’ position does justice to Bubner where the latter de-differentiates: Habermas does not deny the teleological component of action, but in addition he distinguishes strategic and communicative action. In reference to Bubner, he says:

To avoid misunderstanding I would like to repeat that the communicative model of action does not equate action with communication. Language is a medium of communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. In this respect the teleological structure is fundamental to all concepts of action.

Fourth, because Bubner operates with a monological mode of rationality and action, he is unable to target the Aristotelian mean between theory and practical philosophy. Habermas’ distinction between communicative and strategic action, between the lifeworld and system, is that theory-saving strategy which Bubner omits from among those he considers as a possibility of practical reason (217). The theory of communicative action allows both for the historicity qua the unthematized and pre-reflective lifeworld and for its theoretical reconstruction—whether in direct discourse or in deciphering of distorted communication. With a dual model of action one doesn’t run the danger of confusing reconstruction with reality (231).

IV. Conclusion. All criticism notwithstanding, the book is extremely helpful to those interested in hermeneutics, critical theory, the philosophy

17 Habermas, TCA I, 101.
of science and the Aristotelian renewal in ethics: First, Buhner belongs to those authors who deliberately and in a clear language bridge the chasm between the analytical camp and Continental thought. Secondly, in his use of the Hegelian-Marxist methodology, he brings socio-political concerns into the philosophy of science. Thirdly, his neo-Aristotelian critique of Habermas parallels recent communitarian critiques of deontological ethics such as Sandel's or MacIntyre's. Fourthly, his ambiguous passage between postmodern critiques of the ratio and the philosophy of presence, on the one hand, and a purely receptive hermeneutic and a purely formal critical theory, on the other hand, only illustrates the important character of the present debate between modernists and postmodernists.

Fifthly, I suggest that from Buhner's argument one should learn that neither the "good" will of Gadamer's hermeneutics nor Habermas' communicative ethics, on their own, can fully protect the will to discourse from emerging as the sophistic will to power. Still, neither an uncritical return from will to discourse to the immediacy of practical reason nor a postmodern evasion of responsible agency and accountable rationality will help. Rather, one needs to intensify will to discourse through an existential ethic of will against power. In place of Buhner's move to practical reason, one might substitute the feminist call for the concrete self in communicative ethics. The concrete self of needs complements the generalized intersubjective selfhood of communicative ethics. With this complement, it becomes clear that the possibility of undistorted communicative action resides not only in the performatively apprehended counterfactual condition of will to discourse but also in the existentially embodied counterfactual of will against power. Performative self-

20Here I have in mind mainly Levians' essential verticality of the face-to-face and Kierkegaard's indirect communication with will to power.
contradiction is the sophistic deception. Where communicative ethics can't fully protect its will from power-interests, existential ethics provides that concrete but not decisionist counterfactual of will against power which Bubner sought in his uncritical return to the immediacy of practical reason.


The author's main project, as stated in the introduction is to "read Marx on Hegelian terms," to demonstrate the implications of Hegel's Logic for reconstructing "social relationships and social structure," and to dispel the myth of Hegel the idealist which was perpetrated through Marx's misunderstanding of the 'Hegelian Idea' (p. 3). While MacGregor does a great deal to make these theses plausible, there is another thesis which he assumes throughout the book and this is that we must also read Hegel in light of Marx. (On p. 239 he quotes favorably from Althusser: "...it is impossible to understand Hegel without having thoroughly studied and understood 'Capital'"). MacGregor seems to want to show that, despite Marx's critique of Hegel, when properly understood these two thinkers have little, if any, significant opposition between them—and I suspect that this leads to the contrary extreme of those who have put these thinkers in a completely antithetical relation. The danger in reading Marx back into Hegel is that the significant differences between the two thinkers are either ignored or underplayed.

There is little doubt that the dialectical character of "ideation" (being-for-self as externalization and retrieval in a progressive development) is Marx's legacy from Hegel. But MacGregor speaks of "ideation" and "revolutionizing practice" in the same breath. If by "revolutionizing practice" in Hegel he means that the process of ideation involves intrinsic qualitative transformation resulting in progress and novelty, then use of the term is fair. However, if he really means to include as well the Marxian conception of radical critique and revolutionary praxis, then I believe we have a distorted Hegel as a result. In this critical review I wish to consider MacGregor's specific arguments for his position. In particular, I will discuss his view of Hegel's critique of capital, theory of class struggle, and conception of the transition to communism.

MacGregor's interpretation of Hegel's critique of capitalism, and civil society generally, rests in part on the thesis that Hegel has something resembling Marx's theory of surplus value. This point is anticipated in Chapter 6 with the claim (p. 173) that for Hegel "the relation of contract involves an element of contradiction," suggesting a critique of the "abstract" freedom of contract, and then arguing that for Hegel "the
worker and the capitalist form an essential, if antagonistic, unity" (p. 180). This latter point seems to be deduced from the requirements of dialectical logic rather than from Hegel's specific social analyses. MacGregor makes the quite remarkable assertion that "for Hegel as well as for Marx, the dialectical movement of modern society will eventually result in a real unity of the business class where the opposition and distinction between capitalist and worker disappear" (p. 181), again apparently as a deduction of dialectical logic.

Next, MacGregor comes up with an Hegelian critique of capitalist private property, and correspondingly a critique of wage labor, on the basis of what appears to be a labor theory of property. The basic idea is that property is an expression of the free will through externalizing labor, but since in wage labor the product of labor is possessed by someone other than the laborer, the result is solely an abstract freedom—"everyone must have property" but not everyone receives the fruits of their labor. Moreover, since ownership of a thing is simply a function of the constant use of it, and since the worker is constantly using the means of production, it follows that the means of production are properly the (social) property of the workers, rather than the private property of the capitalists. The contradictory relationship between, on the one hand, the ideality of productive labor resulting in the externality of the means of production and of the product and, on the other hand, the abstract ownership of capital, MacGregor refers to with Hegel's term "the insanity of personality" (pp. 190f). Moreover, he argues that because of the inequality in the contract between the worker and capitalist (subsistence wages vs property as renewable source) this sort of contract is merely formal and exploitative in a manner similar to the alienation of surplus value analyzed by Marx. The conclusion drawn is not only that Hegel has a "corrosive critique of capitalist private property" (p. 190) but also that the resolution of the contradiction between the worker and the capitalist for Hegel requires a "necessary, because rational, transition to common ownership of the means of production" (p. 194).

One cannot but find this interpretation to be extremely forced. In particular, there are problems with the glosses on a number of the paragraphs on property and contract in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (hereafter, *PR*). To begin with, Par. 62 is not at all aimed at capitalism but rather at feudalism, and Hegel's charge of the "insanity of personality" applies to the relation of overlord and vassal. But what justifies the interpolation of this discussion with reference to the relation of capitalist and worker? Are we to simply presume that the structure of the relations in feudalism and capitalism are isomorphic? Even Marx would deny that. Indeed, what distinguishes wage labor from slavery and serfdom is that the former is free labor as a result of contract. So the conclusion that capitalism for Hegel violates the principle that constant use is the basis of property ignores the fact that, beyond taking possession and making use,
alienation (Entausserung) of labor is a perfectly legitimate process. Not only can I alienate my property strictly speaking, but also "[s]ingle products of my particular physical and mental skill and of my power to act I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities for a restricted period, because, on the strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and universality of my being" (PR, par. 67).

MacGregor distinguishes between "formal" and "real" contract (p. 192) as a way of showing that the capitalist exchange relation is alienated (in the sense of estranged or entfremden) for Hegel—when this is not Hegel's intention here at all! By a merely formal contract in par. 76 Hegel means a gift as opposed to a contract of exchange. Clearly the worker does not provide his labor power as a gift to the capitalist but as an exchange for wages, and yet MacGregor claims that since the wages represent only subsistence, and not property as such, "the worker gets only a part of the value he or she creates; the capitalist pockets the rest" (p. 192). But where does Hegel say that the only sorts of proper exchange involve strictly property in kind? He does say, and MacGregor quotes this on p. 192, that "what thus remains identical throughout as the property implicit in the contract is distinct (my emphasis) from the external things whose owners alter when the exchange is made" (PR, par. 77). Hegel's discussion of laesio enormis in the remark to par. 77 is in no way aimed at the wage worker but is simply a general observation about the annulling of obligations when the values exchanged are extremely disparate.

Instead of taking Hegel's discussions in their proper context the author gives Marxian readings of them and concludes not only that Hegel's "critique" of capitalism bears resemblance to Marx's theory of surplus value but that Hegel really was the first to come up with the theory of value exploitation! Ultimately, Hegel's solution to this problem turns out to be virtually identical to Marx's, i.e., the "transition to common ownership of the means of production" (p. 194), a conclusion drawn, again, only by giving an amazingly liberal interpretation to the remarks at PR par. 62.

In Chapter 7, "The External Capitalist State," MacGregor elaborates on the Hegelian solution to the alienation of labor by showing that the transition in Hegel between civil society and the political state is, in effect, the same as the transition to communism. Hegel's civil or bourgeois society, the "state external," is, as he puts it, "precisely 'the modern representative State' described by Marx as 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'" (p. 195). Right off this comparison is misleading since Marx was thinking of the state as including those specifically political institutions which for Hegel are not part of the "external state." In any case, MacGregor wants to show how "the external capitalist state is simply a 'stage of division,' a point of transition to a much different social order" (pp. 195-96). But just what does it mean to say that a
"new civilization" is being heralded? Apparently he thinks that Marx's idea of transition to a higher form of society is what Hegel had in mind (despite his saying on p. 253 that "the order of the categories in the Philosophy of Right has little to do with historical succession") and by the end of Chapter 7, in analyzing the relation between civil society and the state, he explicitly claims that "Hegel is convinced that the corporation is the means through which society will pass into the rational state where common ownership of the means of production by the associated producers will prevail" (p. 235).

Notice that this conclusion means that the distinction between civil society and the state is no longer just a strictly conceptual distinction of moments within the totality of ethical life but is now a temporal distinction: civil society paves the way historically for the state as a succeeding form of social order. I find this interpretation of Hegel simply astonishing! How can Hegel be providing such a temporalized dialectic when in the preface to PR he explicitly says that he is not constructing the state (as totality) as it ought to be but aiming to "comprehend what is" (p. 11); when he says "those who try to justify things on historical grounds confound an origin in external circumstances with one in concept" (p. 17); and when he claims that "[a]ctually, therefore, the state as such is not so much the result as the beginning. It is within (my emphasis) the state that the family is first developed into civil society, and it is the idea of the state itself which disrupts itself into these two moments" (par. 256r). Hegel's division of the subject of the Philosophy of Right given on pp. 35-36 is clearly a conceptual, philosophic division, not an external or historical one.

The author's discussion of the fundamental aspects of civil society, the competitive self-seeking and the rational universalization, appears basically sound. However, I wonder if he is clear about which aspects of civil society promote which ends. His references simply to the external capitalist state, when speaking either of its rationality or irrationality, seem to blur at times the distinction within civil society between the system of needs and the system of justice (see bottom of p. 201). Also, I think that he reads too much into Hegel's notion of the business class when he posits within it a class struggle between capitalist and worker leading to a dialectical unity of the two in the rational "communist" state (pp. 205-07). While Hegel does see struggle as part of the process of Bildung it is not clear why this has to be given a Marxist description. Moreover, how can MacGregor say both that "[u]niversal concerns are unknown to the individual in bourgeois society who looks after only purely personal and selfish interests" and also say that "[t]he product of education under capitalism, then, is the social individual" (p. 214)? In the subsection of Chapter 7, "On Law and Justice," he acknowledges that the capitalist and worker share the values of law, liberty, and freedom, and on p. 220 he notes that Marx concurs on the desire for law and liberty. Generally, however, MacGregor seems to waver on the extent to which rationality is possessed
immanently in bourgeois society. At any rate, it is clear that for his Hegel there is not enough rationality in civil society to prevent its historical demise.

Another troublesome point has to do with the discussion of the Korporation in Hegel. In spite of the acknowledgement of Hegel's Corporation as "a democratic political organization with direct links to the state" (p. 233) MacGregor insists that "Hegel deliberately defines the corporation as a contradictory organization representative of the opposing interests of capitalists and workers" (p. 234). But even if one were to acknowledge that the joint stock company is one example of a Corporation in Hegel's sense, where do we get the democratic political organization between capitalists and workers? The relation between management and labor is hardly like the "second family" which, for Hegel, the corporation produces for its members. MacGregor says that "Hegel, of course, is not referring to the actual reality of the corporation, but to its historical tendencies, tendencies reflected, however inadequately, in the modern corporation with its job protection and mobility schemes, retirement and health plans, and so forth" (p. 232). But do these social gains, which result from concessions made due to collective bargaining, really point to democratical tendencies in the modern corporation? Anyway, it seems that Hegel thought the Corporation would be managed effectively only on the basis of an overriding common interest, which is rather difficult if the Corporation, by including the capitalist and wage worker, reflects the antagonism between classes (Cf. PR, par. 288).

Finally, I am surprised that, since MacGregor claims the political state in Hegel is essentially the rational communist society, there is such little space in the book devoted to analysis of the political constitution of the state (only on pp. 255-59 of the last chapter). He does say that for Hegel "monarchy, constitutional or otherwise, will have no place in the rational state" (p. 258). However, this conflicts with Hegel's claim in PR, par. 280r that it is the Understanding which cannot comprehend how the monarch represents the unity of the Idea. (Also see the addition on p. 288 of Knox.) In PR, pars. 278-281 MacGregor seems to select out Hegel's mention of the negative moment of the monarchy without also acknowledging the positive moment and the fact that, above all, Hegel explicitly says that the monarch is an "absolutely decisive moment of the whole [of the constitution]" (par. 281), and therefore is a rational manifestation of the Idea. Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right is given no substantial discussion in the book, but in light of the conclusions drawn about Hegel's own critical view of monarchy I suspect MacGregor might hold that Hegel would find Marx's critique of constitutional monarchy quite acceptable (at least, this is the logical outcome of reading Marx back into Hegel). While MacGregor gives recognition to the role of the universal class of civil servants in Hegel's polity, one wonders why this class would not itself eventually "wither away" once the network of representation in future
political constituencies "will be transformed through a process of struggle and conflict into organs of direct democracy and worker's control" (p. 256). But, in any event, does the idea of direct democracy really square with Hegel's critical comments on public opinion in PR, par. 318?

Apart from the zeal and determination with which the author pursues Hegel the "communist," I think his conclusion about the rational state in Hegel are the result of certain misunderstandings about Hegel's Logic and its relation to actuality. First, while he acknowledges that for Hegel the dialectical Aufhebung is an identity which preserves differentiation, the ways in which he appeals to the Logic to support the "notion of the unity of the capitalist with the worker" (p. 180), especially as it relates to the critique of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, seems to overplay the unity at the expense of the differences. Second, he seems to handle the relation between ideality and reality in a manner such that the difference between the two is not just the difference between the Concept (Begriff) and its instantiation in space and time, but also the difference between instantiation in the (ideal) future versus the (real) present. It is on this basis that he turns Hegel's Philosophy of Right into a sort of Hegelian "Critique of the Philosophy of Right." But this is to do exactly what Hegel said he was not doing, i.e., philosophizing about the state as it ought to be. Third, while one can agree that "the Philosophy of Right must be seen as a concrete application of dialectic method" (p. 180) care must be taken that the method is not utilized such that form is imposed in an arbitrary way upon the content. (Marx, of course, did think that Hegel was guilty of logical a priorism and it seems fair to say that Marx was wrong about this. In fact, Marx's own vision of the rational society was somewhat a priori given his sweeping dismissal of many of the important rational functions of bourgeois society, and more generally of the role of social and political institutionalization overall.)

Nonetheless, MacGregor requires that even with Hegel bourgeois society must be historically (and not just conceptually) transcended because of the a priori requirements of dialectical Logic. Isn't this "unity of the capitalist and work" which presumably points to the future society, and which Hegel himself nowhere uncovers in his concrete analysis of bourgeois society (and which, in his historical situation, would hardly be discoverable even by anyone else), precisely a result of imposing the form of dialectical synthesis upon the content of political economy in an a priori manner?

To claim in a Leninist view that the categories of the Logic are specifically social categories, as if they are uniquely intended as means for deducing a particular conception of the social ideal, is to foster a somewhat ideological approach in their application to reality. The main defect of MacGregor's book is that in attempting to make Hegel into a "communist" the author has given us a Hegel who speaks primarily, and
rather ideologically, to the future instead of the Hegel who reflects, more retrospectively, on the rationality of the present.

Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory

Since its appearance in English translation in 1985, Helmut Dubiel's Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory (originally published in 1978 as Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung: Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie) has been widely reviewed and its influence on critical theory in the United States is firmly established. As such, I will not spend a great deal of time surveying its content. Rather, I will briefly comment on the spirit in which it was written and outline its basic structure. I will proceed with several critical remarks before concluding with some suggestions as to how this book can be appropriated in a theoretically and politically relevant fashion.

Dubiel characterizes his assessment of the development of critical theory in contrast to the poles represented by partisan support and adversary attack: the former accounts for its subject matter as a continuously fruitful venture, the latter as a fragmentary and ultimately ill conceived project. In contrast, Dubiel states his agenda as such: "The program of this book will, on the contrary, be to define the continuity of the theory's development from 1930 to 1945 precisely in terms of the discontinuity of its subject matter. We grasp its entire development as the reflective expression of a historical experience" (3). His aim then, in line with the most fundamental views of Max Horkheimer, is to show that theory is immanently historical—that to understand the course of theoretical development within the Frankfurt Circle it is necessary to understand it as, and in relation to, a series of historical phenomena. The book is divided into two major sections. The first deals with what Dubiel delimits as the three main phases in the development of critical theory, discussing each in terms of "Historical and Political Experience", "Theory of the Theory-Praxis Relation" and "Theoretical Position". The second offers a more detailed account of the Frankfurt Circle's organizational structure and project coordination at the inception of Horkheimer's directorship of the Institute for Social Research.

Dubiel tags the first phase (1930-1937) "Materialism". The driving force during this period was an effort to develop a theory of interdisciplinary science as an extension of Marxist dialectical materialism. Three prominent features of the political landscape upon which critical theory established its footing were determinate: a waxing disillusionment with existing socialist parties in Germany (which were becoming increasingly dogmatic and jargony); a waning sympathy for the
social-political program of the Soviet Union; and the ambiguous predicament of assessing the rise of fascism in Europe from an internal perspective. The most serious question prompted by this situation pertained to the relationship between theory and practice. If the proletariat becomes categorically suspect as the source and bearer of revolutionary theory, what will take its place? For the prime movers of critical theory this translated into a withdrawal (albeit tentative at this point) into the alcoves of meta-theory. Their main concern was to reformulate Marxist materialism, with the aid of contemporary social science, such that it could accommodate and account for the rapidly changing conditions faced in pre-war Europe. This was attempted with a view to the reformulation of a tense theory-practice dynamic.

The second main phase (from 1937-1940) is labeled by Dubiel "Critical Theory" and was inaugurated by Horkheimer's seminal essay "Traditional and Critical Theory". Fundamental to the Circle's theoretical work during this period was the influence of further disintegration within German socialist parties, increased abuses in the USSR and the flourish of fascism that was sweeping Europe. As Dubiel points out, this cast serious doubts on the viability of Marxist theory in any orthodox sense. Rather than scrapping Marxism, however, the circle re-tooled it in such a way that the rise of fascism could be understood as the product of a highly organized, centrally administered form of capitalism. "The thesis maintains that fascism is a political consequence of the reproduction of capital in the developed monopolistic period:" (46). The project that emerged was a rigorous, internally critical theory of the relationship between philosophy, science and the material conditions of human existence. Modeled after Marx's *Critique of Political Economy*, the idea of "Critical Theory" was now formalized. As Dubiel summarizes: "Thus critical theory is the name for the Circle's theoretical-political orientation, a mark of belonging to the tradition of Marxist theory, and—significantly—the expression of the claim of representing the real substance of the authentic tradition" (61).

Dubiel terms the final phase of critical theory (1940-1945) "The Critique of Instrumental Reason". During this time the full force of fascism, Stalinism and the collapse of hope in the proletariat was absorbed, internalized and reflected in the work of the Frankfurt circle. Dubiel assesses the impact as follows: "According to this judgment, the political function of critical theory could now consist only in reflecting upon the determinants of this disintegration" (69). In brief, the practice of theory became strictly negative. And negate it did; the dark, landmark work by Horkheimer and Adorno—*Dialectic of Enlightenment*—traces a gloomy history of the logic of western rationality from Odysseus to Hitler that leaves little room for hope. As Dubiel, not to mention Habermas, points out, this locks theory into a state of cynical political quietism—effectively bringing an end to the project as it was initially conceived. Marxism loses its force; science is always already co-opted by the
bureaucratically structured mechanisms of big capital; and political discourse within the "revolutionary" classes becomes little more than mindless chatter. As such, critical theory is reduced to abstract philosophical lamentations on the present condition and the lengthy chain of events that provide its foundation.

Apparently Dubiel feels that the way to determine where critical theory went wrong is to return to the first phase and reconstruct it more meticulously. This in fact is what he does in the second major section of the book. Here the foundations of critical theory are viewed in terms of the hierarchies of power, networks of influences and the programmatic strategies that follow from the unique web of relations that compose the Frankfurt Circle. Horkheimer is located neatly in the center of all this (see diagram on page 157) as in Dubiel's view it was his directives that formulated the Circle's projects. While Dubiel leaves us with little more than documentation—nothing in the way of insight or vision—his careful scholarship is commendable as are the exhaustive bibliography and relevant notes that accompany the main body of the text.

Putting aside the rigor of its analysis and the merits of its reconstructions, Dubiel's presentation is problematic in several respects. First, the picture that he paints of critical theory's development, if illustrated graphically, would look like an irrigation system. The central position, or main stream of thought, would be firmly stamped with the name Horkheimer. The tributaries would be labeled with the names of various figures that followed the directions of critical theory's patriarch. This is most telling in Dubiel's discussion of the dis-integrated third period. Without a programmatic essay by the Circle's Rector, critical theory falls into discontinuous patterns of detached reflection.

This model, while interesting in many respects, downplays the internally dialectical tenor of critical theory that marked it from the earliest phase. Testimony to this is provided by Dubiel's documentation of the rich series of correspondences that took place between various participants in the Circle's theoretical and political development. Further, this picture is not accepted by a number of important figures in critical theory. As no less than Herbert Marcuse puts it (in a discussion with Jürgen Habermas when he is asked about the independence of direction and research tasks that Dubiel suggests): "No, that's an unthinkable split, a completely undialectical split between research and representation. It really wasn't practiced at the institute. It is not at all the case that Horkheimer was responsible for philosophical stimulation and integration and his colleagues represented his thoughts. Not at all. Every one of the colleagues shared the area here reserved for Horkheimer!" (Telos 38, p. 128.) As such, one of the most remarkable aspects of critical theory—its commitment to theory formation through internally reflexive self-critique—is nominalized.
A second problem crops up when Dubiel's own relation to "Theorie" is considered. In his effort to document the Frankfurt Circle's development as objectively as possible he abstracts himself from any commitment to the development of theory. The passion and fervor that drove the thought tradition that he provides an account of is completely absent in his presentation. This is not a work in critical theory but simply a chart of its rise and decline. Effectively, critical theory is rendered as little more than a museum piece—a relic to study. While it could be argued that this is the logical consequence of the third phase, I will suggest momentarily why this is not necessarily so and how this book, in spite of its disengaged approach, can contribute importantly to the revitalization of critical theory as an active intellectual, as well as political, force.

Finally, the second major section of the book—"Dialectical Presentation and Interdisciplinary Research"—is attached with no obvious purpose to the historical narrative of the first. Had it been a bona fide analysis of the circumstances between 1930 and 1937, with reflection on the alternative routes that theory might have followed given those conditions, it would have genuinely contributed to the ongoing task of developing an adequate critical theory of society. As it stands, however, section II is merely an awkward appendage to I, often simply repeating, rather than building upon, points already established.

In spite of these shortcomings, Dubiel's book does contribute significantly to the development of critical theory. While detached and inspiring (much like the sciences that the early versions of critical theory hoped to dialectically transform), Theory and Politics provides a carefully thought through schematization of the methods, projects and visions of critical theory in its earliest stages. The model that Dubiel reconstructs offers a source pool of material upon which further attempts at formulating a practical-theoretical course of study can reflect upon and critically receive. Without the sense of precedence provided by Dubiel's book (along with numerous other important works in the history of critical theory) critical theory would likely culminate in a frustrated dead end. When viewed within the context of an urgent pursuit of theoretical and political objectives this work can serve as a well spring, rejuvenating the ongoing projects that have their roots in the work of the Frankfurt Circle. As Dubiel states in an unusually visionary moment: "Our interests in reconstructing this context is not an interest in group biography or historiography, even though our goal of an exemplary, in-depth analysis can be realized only by means of the greatest possible historical and philological knowledge of the case as offered by the most recent research on the literature and documentation. Instead, this investigation is presented as a case study that, by drawing upon material dealing with the history of science, considers the methodological and organizational conditions necessary for interdisciplinary research" (127).