Charles Guignon, in his recent critique of Heidegger, argues that Heidegger deflates the skeptical attitude by showing that it has concerned itself only with an illusion: gone astray in the dark wood of the subject-object relation. Neither the subject nor the object need justification; both are constructs around a single human "Being-in-the-world." A hiatus arises, for Guignon, in Heidegger's account of language, however, between an instrumental and a constitutive view, fairly allegorizing the classical duality (HPK,118). The first view considers language a tool to express meanings or intentions already "there" as prior object or content (e.g. Condillac). The second pictures language as a medium in which "man dwells;" we arrive at apprehension of the world and its meanings through the articulatory structure of language (e.g. Wittgenstein). Guignon suggests Heidegger opts for the second, at least in his later writings ("poetically man dwells"), but goes on to add that if the structure of understanding is already a grasp of the world ("There is a prior grasp of the non-semantic field of significance of the world which becomes the basis for gaining mastery over a language."), then language is also instrumental. Though Dasein is the bridge that constitutes its two riverbanks as subject and object, nothing bridges the gap between the grasp of given contextual language and language's grasp of the human (as human dwelling place). On Guignon's account, Heidegger's indecision on language shifts the duality to two aspects of the Anyone (Guignon's translation of "das Man"), the context of intelligibility (the Anyone as social context, and the Anyone as morass of inauthenticity). This produces what Guignon calls the problem of reflexivity--meaning that the results of a critique can be reflected back onto the critique itself (HPK,209). If Being and Time is context-dependent for its language, if it is an instrumental use of language from the period "into which it is thrown" (HPK,208), the "essentiality" of the structures of Dasein transcending the subject-object relation is eroded.

Two things are neglected in Guignon's account. First, for Heidegger, such critical circularities as reflexivity are positive; he resides within them. And second, to undermine the metaphysical account of consciousness, one must speak without bespeaking; as soon as the subject (matter) is

Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Molly Arrow whose friendship and dialogue contributed immeasurably to this project.

1Guignon, Charles; Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1983). Hereafter cited in the text as HPK.
articulated and defined, it becomes metaphysical. Heidegger must remain indecisive about language because his concern is non-language, a non-articulation of consciousness, or intentionality. Guignon's insights do not seem off base; he is simply claiming as a problem what Heidegger has already accepted as necessity.

Heidegger appears to confront himself with three monsters: circularity, inarticulability, and a hiatus in his text. In a sense, the hiatus suggests a textual schizophrenia, in which Heidegger's language, as a wholly personal metaphor structure, confounds itself with a meta-language (in a way we shall attempt to reveal), from which there arises both an exclusion and an overlay between the Anyone and Being-in-the-world. But rather than look at these "monsters" as problems within a rational framework, as Guignon does, we shall attempt to reveal what they mean as signs. This will require reconnoitering the material of which they are molded—a journey through an inferno of circularities, to their very center where one should see the entire circle.

Vestibule: the First Circle

In Being and Time, we enter a realm of circles. The circle is Heidegger's ground, the way his text configures itself: Being is the basis for the meaning of Being; the meaning of Being is the basis for the unknowability of Being; the unknowability of Being is the basis for Being. When the search for ground finds only what is grounded, equiprimordially, in itself (the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle), then only the circle is ground. This configuration is common to the terrain of philosophy. Any account of consciousness or theory of intentionality assumes a circularity; it requires itself in order to understand itself. Mind looks at mind and finds mind self-consciously set out upon the road to find itself. What fascinates about Heidegger is that though he too sets out to find, he does so by erasing the presence of mind at both ends of the search, and redreaming what is already there.

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2 Jacques Derrida has been at greatest pains to point this out. See the article, "Ousia and Gramme," in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1982), p. 60. See, also, "The Ends of Man" in the same volume.

3 For a discussion of this notion of schizophrenia, see Bateson, Gregory; Steps Toward an Ecology of the Mind (Ballantine: N.Y., 1972).

4 Guignon points this out with respect to historicity. See Guignon, op. cit., p. 214-5.

In "The Ends of Man," Derrida claims that Heidegger has generally been misread. He locates the source of this misreading in Sartre, who seems to re-position Heidegger in metaphysics. But Sartre is just the fall guy. Because Heidegger attempts to avoid the metaphysical in a poetic and elliptical language, to read him or to use him textually is already to undo that endeavor. If he is not misread, he must be miswritten. His own journey's agon, then, is not to "miswrite" himself, but to live in the interstices between text and non-text. He writes a text that achieves its content in non-articulation (a text that is what it is not), and that formally cancels its own form (a text that is not what it is). His text duplicates the Sartrean "metaphysics" of the for-itself. Sartre bespeaks in content what Heidegger has already done in form. The divided nature of Heidegger's text, touched on by Guignon, is isomorphic to Sartre's 'divided self.'

If Heidegger's purpose is to generate a text that evades the assumptions and presuppositions of metaphysics, then his task is to generate an intelligible signified for a unarticulated yet still intelligible signifier. To

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6"The Ends of Man," op.cit.
7The bone of contention is the 'structure of consciousness.' Heidegger sees Sartre and Husserl losing themselves in the primacy of consciousness, while he himself relinquishes his hold on logos, leaping toward what precedes articulation. Heidegger suggests that structures of consciousness have no foundational meaning, that they are falsified superstructures, because thinking, to take account of the 'truth of Being,' must already reside in the inarticulable.
8In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger attempts to deal with this schizophrenia, but only ends up adding to it. In Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (Harper; New York, 1977), we find:

Thinking is of Being inasmuch as thinking, coming to pass from Being, belongs to Being. At the same time, thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the belonging to Being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its essential origin. Thinking is. (Basic Writings, p. 196)

Thinking becomes both the state of Being and the act of accomplishing. It is overdetermined.

Dasein itself reveals its own hiatus. As jemeines, the personal, Dasein is particular, while in its inarticulateness, it remains non-particular. Heidegger over-generalizes in that Dasein remains disembodied like an ether in the world, and he over-specifies in that Dasein is but an aspect of the organism (an "office-holder," as Guignon points out — HPK,104). Dasein is both over-generalized in transcending experience in the presence of the earthy, and over-specified in being what experiences in the absence of experiential "aboutness."
fulfill this purpose, 'the meaning of Being' must make sense, and yet remain non-metaphysical. The question of intelligibility (of the meta-text of that intelligibility) is, for Heidegger, the question of how the non-text 'makes sense.' The circular, the unarticulated, and the hiatic are three ways textual content is decentered and dissolved. To fulfill itself, Heidegger's textual surface must enter a Dantean Limbo of non-structure, non-telos, and non-method.

To apprehend, without rewriting what is inarticulable in Heidegger's text, one must grasp its form. The form of writing, however, hides behind the ghostly presence of content that emerges from the printed page, like a photograph submerged in developer. If that form exists, it must have a medium. Instead of words, or sentences, philosophy's medium is the rules of logic and grammar. A sculpting of sentences, in a style of reasoning, occurs in this medium, like working with clay. Though the text's "sculptural" content is ephemeral, an absence, its "sculptural" form, discerned in the lens of a meta-text, is nevertheless present, a signifier that points to an unarticulated signified.

This approach seems particularly appropriate for Heidegger, who seeks to reveal the underlying body of Being, behind the screen held by Being on which philosophy has traditionally painted its tableaux—a screen rendered visible only by the paintings on it. Heidegger desires to strip away the screen and paint the very body of Being, to silhouette it in his poetics. This essay will attempt to encounter the body of Heidegger's text. Our guide in this task warns us that we will have to cleave to Heidegger's semantics (as our own medium) and feel our way around.

The Second Circle

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger directly addresses the question of circularity three times, in three different ways. The first time, he answers the charge of logical circularity. In the "interrogation of Being," a Being is required whose mode of Being is to question Being, and which "gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being." (27) Syllogistically, the argument dissolves in presuppositions; each is already the essential condition for the other. But Heidegger demurs; his project is descriptive rather than deductive.

It is quite impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' in formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one of grounding something

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9Allusions to Dante's *Inferno* will use the language of John Ciardi's translation (NAL; New York, 1954). Since that will be done in a fairly free-form fashion, as a metaphor structure and source of images, no references will be given.
by ... a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them. (28)

The difference is between logical consequence and ontological precedence. The first moves forward toward derived results, the other moves backward toward foundations. Dasein's subject matter and its mode of inquiry are the same thing.

If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle? (27)

Some commentators interpret this 'attitude' of Heidegger's as implying a desire to think in the circle. Heidegger would accept that ontologically, and reject its logical form. In the passage above, he uses the term "circle" in its "logical" sense, while ontologically its meaning is quite different. For him, it refers, instead, to "a remarkable 'relatedness backward and forward'" (28). The fact of Being as questioning, implies it is an act of Being whose attention to itself as interrogation looks back at where it came from. Consciousness, ahead of itself, looks back at itself revealed as already up ahead—as Paolo and Francesca look back at their having foreseen their fate in the whirlwind. The act of revealing takes itself as its presupposition, and presupposition is what is revealed. Being-there reveals Being there, and vice versa—like the swing of a pendulum. Logical circularity

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10Taminiaux, for instance, sees what Heidegger is doing with the circle, and relates it to Heidegger's "ontological difference." He does not see the topological difference between traditional circularity and Heidegger's procedure. This does not prevent him, however, from understanding the power of the circle to avoid the subject-object duality. Jacques Taminiaux, "Finitude and the Absolute," in Heidegger: the Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Precedent; Chicago, 1981), p. 195-6.


When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, ... rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it. (p.157)

See also, Martin Heidegger; On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (Harper; New York, 1971), p. 12. Hereafter cited as WL. Heidegger says: "Only the way back will lead us forward." It is important to notice that the forward and backward analytic remains central to both early and later writings.
transfigures itself into an oscillation between the act of revelation and the fact of presupposition. What logic sees as a circle, Heidegger sees a circle as.

This pendulum motion becomes, for Heidegger, an analytic formalism in his text. If "already" names the pendulum's backswing, there is "always" a forward projection to engage in that backward analytic. The "Always Already" names this formalism as a rhetorical style, one which conflates both the instrumental and constitutive accounts of language. Just as Dasein's mode of inquiry emerges from its object (Dasein itself) as revealed by that mode, so Heidegger draws a rhetorical procedure from his subject matter.

The Third Circle

Our guide informs us that here we will receive a foretaste of future difficulties that threaten to consume; the circle will open in a different way. When Heidegger next addresses the question of circularity, in his discussion of understanding, he allows the Always Already, in its form as a pendulum arc, to be engulfed by an ontological circle.

Understanding exists in reciprocity with interpretation. "Understanding" names the way Dasein existentially confronts its possibilities in the world, and "interpretation" names the act of rendering possibility explicit. As an act of Being (which is already revelatory), understanding confronts the fact of Being (which is always presupposed). As an act of understanding (which is not yet explicit), interpretation conducts the fact of understanding (which is no longer only possibility). Understanding founds itself on interpretation, and interpretation founds itself on understanding. This differs from the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle in that there is a forward dynamic to it. Each establishes the other in order to re-establish itself. It is like a dialogue in which repetition is impossible because the reiterated utterance occurs in the context of having already been spoken, distinguishing it from the first. Each expresses the other ontologically, in the sense of being the other's mode of existence.

Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted. (194).

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12Heidegger himself almost presents it as a formalism in and of Dasein. In "The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic," we read:

Propositional truth is more primordially rooted, rooted in already-being-by-things. The latter occurs "already", before making statements — since when? Always already! Always, that is, insofar as and as long as Dasein exists. Already being with things belongs to the existence of Dasein, to its kind and mode of being. (126-7)
Yet they do not look back at each other. They move in the different dimensions of possibility and explicitness, each finding a form of existence in the other.

If we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways of avoiding it, ... then the act of understanding has been misunderstood. ... It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. (195)

Three configurations are implied here. First, there is still a pendulum arc. The discourse on understanding is the core of Heidegger's text; since *Being and Time* is itself an interpretation, an understanding of understanding, it returns to itself (reflexively) from its own ontology of understanding. In discussing understanding, Heidegger's text looks back on its textual act of looking back. But second (unlike the logical circle, which flattens itself to a methodology), the pendulum arc inflates itself into an ontological circle, into the shape of Heidegger's content. It is like looking at the breakfast cereal box whose side panel design is a boy looking at the breakfast cereal box. What is going on inside is what is going on outside. A mise-en-abîme, it is also an ontological circle; the design box brings us back to the box we are looking at. It refers to itself for us by existing for the boy, and refers to itself for the boy by existing for us.

The pendulum arc suggests a third circularity by synecdoche. An arc is a truncated circle; it points to the circle of which it is an arc. The ontological circle of understanding points to a supra-ontological (or supra-logical) circle that completes it. To paraphrase the example already given: the nature of Being is to inquire into the meaning of Being; the meaning of Being is to be the Being questioned; to be the Being questioned is the nature of Being. Each of these three statements is a pendulum arc. As a whole, they fit together like large pie slices. It suggests the story of the detective who, setting out to solve a murder that has not yet occurred, finds he must commit the murder in order to catch himself as the criminal. The meaning and nature of Being, and the inquiry into Being, all belong to each other (as do the supra-logical, the ontological, and the logical circles), like the three heads of Cerberus. If Heidegger's text is not schizophrenic, it is at least a multiple personality.

It seems we have a glut of circles. Our guide warns us: "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way." (195) To do so, a topology of circularity will have to be built; i.e. our guide will be a geometrization.
The Fourth Circle

Heidegger returns to address circularity once more (362). The issue is presupposition. Our guide comforts us that they are harmless when in circular form, though warns that we should be ready for a kind of war of reasoning styles.

Heidegger counterposes the "common sense" attitude toward presupposition to that of ontological description. Common sense concerns itself with propositional consistency and its logical rules—a consistency it thinks will avoid logical circularities. "What common sense wishes to eliminate in avoiding the 'circle'" (363) is consciousness' 'act' of being ahead of itself. Common sense would rather have language confront its propositions as its own foundation: propositions made of language insisting on language made of propositions. As a result, it confused factuality (what one "comes across" propositionally) with facticity (the content of understanding) in order not to have to understand "understanding" in its essential circularity. It buries the very activity that encounters, and thus engenders, 'factuality' in the first place (i.e. understanding itself). (363) Understood ontologically, logical consistency is only an attribute painted on the body of the real relationship between language and proposition--a pendulum arc between possibility and explicitness. Thus, common sense covers up, in miserly fashion, the vast poetic wealth of that relation.

Ontological description, on the other hand, neither addresses propositions nor requires consistency.

We cannot ever 'avoid' a 'circular' proof in the existential analytic, because such an analytic does not do any proving at all by the rules of the 'logic of consistency'. (363)

It addresses, instead, the pre-condition for there to be pre-suppositions in the first place. "What does presupposition signify?" (362) Heidegger asks. What is presupposed in Being's act of inquiry into Being is the fact of inquiry, the situation of its questioning, the 'context of thinking'—which Heidegger calls "the hermeneutic situation" (275).

Hermeneutics means neither the theory of the art of interpretation nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt first of all to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds. (WL,11)

That is, "hermeneutic grounds" are the basis upon which analysis can proceed: the transcendental conditions for the possibility of interpretation and understanding (HPK,62), the foundation of language and thinking. What is presupposed in the hermeneutic situation is the point from which its own origin can be encountered in interpretation itself. That is, hermeneutic grounds are constituted by a relation (an ontological circle)
of thinking to language, to text. A hermeneutic is both a text about a text (i.e. an understanding, a reading) and an understanding of understanding (i.e. a text, like Being and Time). Language eternally confronts its own foundation, and dispenses itself as its own meta-language. Language and "hermeneutic grounds" are "always already" there toward and for each other, always already squandering each other. The very extravagance of language's expenditure of its resources on itself distinguishes it from the penuriousness of logical consistency.

Thus, the dialectic of prodigal ontology and miserly logic consists of a confrontation of similar (arc) structures. These are mediated by a third one. In the investigation of understanding, understanding is always ahead of itself, while pointing back to what has become it. In the hermeneutic situation (a relation of factuality and facticity, of text and understanding), understanding already points out the properties that articulate what it has made possible for itself. In other words, predication (or proposition) and the hermeneutic situation are 'always already' there for each other as each other's ground.

In effect, three pendulum arcs, engendered by the ontology of presupposition in backward and forward analytics, connect the three points of discourse (called language, proposition, and the hermeneutic situation), one between each pair of terms. These three provide, in reverse order, the form, the content, and the ontological mediation (what returns understanding to the possibility of propositional rules) of logic's insistence on consistency. They constitute the priority (as itself a meta-linguistic situation), the supposing (as language), and the positing (as proposition) of pre-supposition. Structurally, they fit together, again like a pie, a wheel of interpretation completing the circle synechdochically implied by each pendulum arc, and constituting the totality of "pre-supposition." The wheel, a supra-logical circle, returns each term to itself as its own source. As with Dame Fortune, one can start anywhere; pre-supposition merely spins the wheel.

But Heidegger is not a gambler. He wishes to know the outcome first.

We must rather endeavor to leap into the 'circle', primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being. (363)

13Language must be included because it belongs to the context of intelligibility that founds discourse, from which care derives. The nature of care is what logical consistency seeks to avoid. (p.363ff and sect. 34) "Language defines the hermeneutic relation." (WL,30) As Guignon points out, though understanding is prepredicative, it is not pre-linguistic. (HPK,131)
Why does Heidegger want to jump into the circle? Because a circularity of priority, or ground, implies the circle itself is ground. Though our guide assures him that a 'full view' can only be obtained from the center, he does not tell Heidegger that if the circle itself is ground, through its center lies only the abyss, the psychosis of thinking one is not when one still is. Heidegger was to discover this for himself in 1934.

Where first, Heidegger's circle concerns method, or rhetorical form, and second, analytic content, in this third instance, we find him spinning a meta-analysis, a meta-text of his analytic. The logical (rhetorical pendulum), the ontological (return of understanding to itself), and the supra-logical (triadic) circles are brought together, each a topological component of a unitary structure (or sculpture). Like the statue hidden within the raw block of marble, Heidegger has outlined a structure that transcends his own, yet is found only within it. 14

The Fifth Circle

A sculptural motif (for instance, the notion of presupposition) "names" its configuration (its supra-logical circle) in the same way a set of quantum numbers—as indices rather than as "measurements"—"name" a subatomic particle. The quantum "name" is but an index pointing to a system of quantum mechanical formulas. Similarly, Heidegger's system of names for Dasein's existentials function as indices. They are meta-meta-textual because they point to a discourse that is already metaphoric for what Heidegger does not want to articulate. They are "there" as signifiers, and "not there" because as indices they belong to a transcending structure.

At this point, our guide interjects that the supra-logical circle, the implicate structure of Heidegger's "quantum numbers," will be the terrain we will traverse. He warns that, as we approach the city of understanding, and enter its gates, we will find a veritable inferno of circles, a complex textile of terms—understanding, interpretation, meaning, and assertion 15—
to be entered, in their knottedness, as an environment. But before reaching this city, we must cross Heidegger's circle of 'significance', which, like the river Styx, marks the division between thinking the circle and being in it; it is a marsh of sullen hyphenated (in the English) 'instrumental' terms.

An object (action or event) appears, or is discovered, as an instrumentality (a "for-the-sake-of-which") for something in which one is involved. (121) Whether event, object, or action, what appears will eventually have an 'objective' quality; it is discovery, significance, involvement that refer to Dasein's activity or occurrence, and thus are the quantum numbers. Involvement relates back to the object (in recognition or familiarity) and forward to what "for-the-sake-of-which" the object plays a role (the hammer is recognized in its role as hammering). And "involvement" names the way this pendulum arc is grasped as the object itself. Grasping it, however, constitutes an "assignment" of significance. Assignment relates backward to involvement with the object as an "in-order-to," and forward to its usefulness, its "toward-this," toward the object and its role as such (one picks up the hammer with a nail in mind). "Assignment" names the way this pendulum arc clothes the 'thing' in objectivity and purpose, assigns it its significance. But objectivity is already an assignment of the object's significance. It relates backwards to the assignment that lets something be involved (an "in-which"), and forward to an instrumentality, the "with-which" of the object and its role, which returns to an "involvement" (the nail permits the hammer to be itself and recognized). In other words, recognition both precedes and returns to involvement. And "objectivity" names the way this pendulum arc presents the object's appearance as instrumentality. Again, these three pendulum arcs close upon themselves and constitute a circle, one we shall name the "significance-circle."

structural and connotational overlay is already in place; it would only be muddied by mixing in brief aspects of a German connotational overlay. Even if slightly distorted, the translation has already pulled the kernal from the German cultural integument. Pieces of that integument might be of interest, but are ancillary to this discourse, which is about Heidegger, not of him.

16Heidegger puts this altogether in one quick progression of states:

The "for-the-sake-of-which" signifies an "in-order-to"; this in turn, a "towards-this"; the latter, an "in-which" of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the "with-which" of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. (120)
This ontology of 'objectivity' is a restatement of the familiar phenomenological notion that meaning is the way the world is apprehended; familiarity with an object's significance is a precondition for the object's revealing itself, and significance is the pre-condition for objectivity (120). That is, apprehension of objects and events occurs before the fact. The object is separated from its background by prior assignment founded on and engendering familiarity. In sum, no part of this structure can be said to precede any other. Involvement is constitutive of assignment based on objectivity; assignment is constitutive of objectivity based on involvement; objectivity is constitutive of involvement based on assignment. They are equiprimordial. Each is always the succeeding, and already the preceding. The component pendulum arcs do not simply attach to each other; they interlock, like a chain. The fact of objectivity is the form assignment takes, while the object's content is the act of assignment. Similarly, the fact of involvement is the form objectivity takes, while the content of involvement is the instrumentality of the object, its act of objectivity. And finally, assignment is the form involvement takes, while the content of assignment is the act of involvement.

Our guide warns us not to become hypnotized by this circle, lest we fall into it. There is activity in this configuration. Each "index" runs to the next to find itself hidden, and retreats to the preceding to hide in what will disclose it. The sculpture constitutes itself out of meta-textual dynamics, scintillations in the conformation of the pendulum arc, the ontological circle, and the supra-logical circle. It perhaps should be noted that this supra-logical circle is not dialectical; its relations are positive and equiprimordial. There is no synthesis, no entelechy. It is a cloud chamber, a nebulous realm of quantized motion, an organic whole (named and indexed, in this case, by the term "significance") whose reality resides only in the braiding of its components—in the same manner that a "steady-state" in a computer program is constituted by a loop.

And the object has become what Heidegger desired. It has already been pushed beneath the surface of this river of activity where it can no longer engender the subject. It dissipulates there, not even as a sign, though assigned the equiprimordiality of as-sign(ation) and as-sign(ment) constituting themselves as sign[ificance].17

The Sixth Circle

Thus far, a topology has been built conflating three circular formations—a truncated circle (the pendulum arc), an ontological circle, and a supra-logical circle; these have been used to map the terrain of "significance." Our guide tells us that we are entering the central core of Heidegger's discourse, where Heidegger presents a heretical view of understanding. Its

17See Fell, Joseph P.; Heidegger and Sartre (Columbia; New York, 1979), for an interesting discussion of objects as dissimulation (e.g. p. 111).
topology will become a sign for understanding's Always Already being 'there', that is, the 'here' where it burns, as it were, by its own light.

Heidegger's account of understanding is traversed in three phases—possibility, projection, and interpretation. In the first phase, "understanding" names the way Dasein confronts its possibilities as an act of Being. This means that possibility functions as familiarity that is left uncovered, not yet sealed by final judgment, open to involvement. In the second phase, understanding finds its possibilities in the world by projecting them; that is, it looks ahead, prophetic because it will have engendered what it will discover. In projection, it banishes itself to the world, becoming what it seeks to understand. "As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities." (185) Finally, in the third phase, "interpretation" names the act of rendering projected possibility explicit for understanding—i.e. the way understanding returns to, or turns upon, itself, a way its future catches up with it. These terms—possibility, projection, and interpretation—exemplify how Heidegger's language parallels quantum numbers as indices. They are familiar terms given new possibility because their traditional meaning, which underlies their use, is projected upon an underlying metaphor ("possibility as possibility") whose content is left unarticulated, but whose form is an interpretation that specifies that very possibility, and thus returns to itself as pure recognition; like a sub-atomic particle—it remains unseen except through the lens of prior familiarity, which is projected upon the unseen as its name, the name of a metaphor which, thus literalized, becomes what is apprehended. Recognition occurs prior to perception.

In fact, quantum mechanics discloses the same "schizophrenic" nature as Heidegger's text. Its meta-meta-metaphoric structure puts it in a double bind. It tells itself that its traditional (real world) categories are only metaphors for its (quantum) world, but the meta-language it tells itself in, which itself metaphorizes those categories, it takes to be the real world. It realizes its (quantum world) language is only metaphoric, but to do so makes its traditional language real.

We can sense a circular interlocking between understanding's quantum numbers. Projection is the form possibility (as an act) takes, while the fact of projection, what is projected, constitutes the content of interpretation. Similarly, possibility is always again the form interpretation takes, since it founds understanding's possibility for itself, while the fact of possibility becomes the content of projection. How interpretation becomes the fact of projection in its explicitness will be discovered in the Seventh Circle, but as Dasein's own possibility toward itself, interpretation (in its explicitness) is always again the content of possibility. Our cloud chamber picture has moved to a different energy level. As quantum mechanics sets boundaries to the infinitesimal, Heidegger sets boundaries to the strictures of
metaphysics, emptying its terms and refilling them with their mutual self-referential structuring.

The "understanding-triad" parallels the involvement, assignment, and objectivity of the significance-circle; as such, it structures the way meaning arrives to the world, and is attributed to it—or, as the Epicureans would say, the way the world lives and dies with it. And though, like the damned, understanding sees ontologically ahead, its present is hidden from it between the already and the not yet, an interstice that it returns to itself as possibility; the object or state of affairs, the "aboutness" that bodies forth understanding, is eclipsed; possibility, projection, and interpretation provide themselves with their own content. The object lies entombed in the structure of understanding, and also up ahead, deferred by primordial apprehension.

The Seventh Circle—First Round

Our guide now confirms our suspicion that these circles whose environment we are entering are not concentric; rather they form parts of each other, exhibiting a topology that is ever more complex. Interpretation, the next circle, and one of the understanding-triad, is itself triadic, composed of an as-structure, a fore-structure, and Meaning (Sinn): a triad in a triad.

The first, the as-structure, is "the explicitness of something that is understood," (189) its being "something-as-something." We take apart in its 'in-order-to' that which is circumspectively ready-to-hand, and we concern ourselves with it in accordance with what becomes visible through this process. (189)

'Taking apart' does not signify dismantlement or analysis, but the emergence of figure against background. (192) The 'in-order-to' finds its form in "what becomes visible" (189), which in turn finds its form in "something as something." In other words, in making explicit (though still pre-predicatively) the possibility of the object (of involvement), the as-structure renders explicit (assigns) the projection of that possibility as object, whose objectivity then emerges "as something." This "as-something" has already found its form in the 'in-order-to', since it is ready-to-hand, an instrumentality whose content is "something." The as-structure topologically recapitulates the significance-circle. The significance-circle is not overlaid on the as-structure; it is achieved by it through possibility.

As-ness is specification, a particularization of the significance-circle's generalized involvement. As such, the as-structure completes involvement. In its separation of object from background, it allows involvement to reveal itself in the object disclosed. If involvement is like a
hunter that aims to keep for itself the object it has disclosed to itself, then
the as-structure marks its arrow's success in hitting the target. Where the
term 'significance' named an entityhood (the significance-circle itself), the
term "as-structure" names an eye through which entityhood in general (as
figure) can be discerned. That is, the object swims there in circumscribed
or silhouetted entityhood. The as-structure particularizes the content of
significance, and generalizes its form.

In a sense, this first structure of interpretation—already of the objective—
can be construed as perception. Heidegger was not openly speaking of
perception here, but he has presented the projected facticity that
characterizes perceptual cognition. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger is
providing a structureless structure for perception that precludes both the
will-less or "uninvolved" perceiver and the notion of true objectivity. It is
structureless because the content of perception is in the act, not the state;
it is a structure because its equiprimordiality determines one for it: a
triadic circle. Yet, there is an assumption that Heidegger makes, a thought
that he leaves unthought, a memory left forgotten about memory, that
undermines his evasion of non-involvement. We shall return to it below.

It is worth noting that perception has traditionally resisted linear
description or representation; perhaps casting it as a triadic circularity
suggests why. Any account of perception must incarnate processes of
recognition (involvement as something—i.e. possibility), attribution
(assignment, accomplished as projection), and pointing out the object
(engendering objectivity, i.e. interpretation), while at the same
apprehending these components as separately namable. As Empedocles
has said (via Dante): if discrete elemental matter should feel harmony and
fly together, all would be chaos. The circle holds them apart, without the
absolute independence of linear analysis.

The Seventh Circle—Second Round

The as-structure ontologically positions (inscribes, rather than
establishes) objectivity; the next, the fore-structure, projects projection
onto the notion of projection. Composed of what Heidegger calls fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, it is also a triad in the
interpretation triad.

Each aspect of the fore-structure represents a different relation to what
is 'in advance.' The first, fore-having, as an "act of appropriation", is
"interpretation ... grounded in something we have in advance" (191). What
we have in advance is the ability to recognize pursuant to involvement; it is
not yet one that makes the "as-something" fully specific, "stand out from
the background" as more than general objectivity. Objecthood obtains to
possibility, but not yet to understanding's specified possibility for itself.
Fore-having flows in what is still hidden in understanding, and bleeds out
toward the object as its already lived involvement.
We could not say it represented 'prior experience' for two reasons; first, Heidegger's notion of either 'lived experience' or ontic **erfahren** occur in the 'present;' and second, prior experience would imply cognition. On the other hand, fore-having seems to hold the 'two keys' to the aporia of Husserl's noema. His account implies that the noematic correlate must be prescribed to be recognized and recognized to be prescribed. Fore-having presents itself as appropriation prior to specification, but mediated through the circular structure enacting projection. The "noema" is mapped onto a recognition *always* prior to possibility being *already* "for-the-sake-of- which."

As a first unveiling of the object, fore-having is already a disclosure seen from a point of view, in "fore-sight". Fore-sight is "something we see in advance." It directs projected possibility to what is already encountered because it already sees. It knows where to look. This is not seeing ahead into the future (as the Inferno's denizens do), but having seen ahead already to the present as familiarity. It sets the object against its surrounding, like singling out a bush against its surrounding woods, which then effloresces as presence-at-hand. In guiding the "act of appropriation," fore-sight becomes the form fore-having takes.

Fore-sight gives appropriation a target, something to apprehend; and its form of apprehension is conceptual. Thus, finally, fore-conception is the decision to conceive the object in a definite way, as "something we grasp in advance." "Decision" does not signify intentionality or decision procedures, but highlights the involvement which ontologically grounds the object in understanding. Rather than the object being brought more and more into focus, fore-conception is the ontological objectivity from which the object apprehended slowly forms toward the world, and thus in the world.

Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards which we set our sights 'foresightedly', becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation, ... drawn from the entity itself. (191)

Fore-conception is the form fore-sightedness takes, while the "what" of fore-sight provides its content.

And finally, since the fore-conception, as conceptualizability, is what we "have in advance" to ground our apprehension of the object, fore-having is the form fore-conception takes. Fore-conception bespeaks the object's particularity through the act of fore-having, for which it becomes the content. What is appropriated, in its fore-having, becomes the content of what is seen.\(^{18}\) The fore-structure too becomes a full circle of braided form

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\(^{18}\) Again, there is a relation to Husserl; the moment of the noetic act has already, and not yet, prescribed the object in noematic correlation. That is, as an explicit awareness (recognition, attention to, grasping), the fore-
and content. And in its apprehension of the object, it provides the form for
the projected explicitness of the as-structure.

To summarize the supra-logical circle: its three indices (or terms) name
three pendulum arcs that interlock to form a whole circle (like pie slices).
Each arc signifies an "Always Already" structure of precedence and
succession in equiprimordiality. (For instance, fore-sight both succeeds
fore-having and precedes it as what guides appropriation.) That each
index finds its form in the next, and receives its content from the
preceding constitutes the interlock. To find its form in the next means it
manifests itself 'there' in a form for which it then provides itself as the
content. This imparts a directionality to the circle, a directionality which
essentially represents the opening of the pendulum arc into an ontological
circle, where the "forward and backward motion" returns to its starting
index through the mediation of the third index. For instance, in the
significance-circle, the forward and backward relationship of involvement
and assignment moves forward to assignment and backward to
involvement through objectivity. In other words, the indices remain
separate, but without independence, as if something previously torn
asunder had been welded back together. Heidegger's project of evading
metaphysics leads to a reconstitution of a transtextual analysand from
which the metaphysical categories, which he has transformed into indices,
can be considered to have been drawn, or analysed.

The Seventh Circle—Third Round

Our guide now cautions us to follow him closely; this next index will not
only be a circle itself, but it will close two others—the interpretation circle
and the understanding-circle of which that is a part—and thus complete a
substructure of the overall topology. This is the circle of Meaning, he adds;
we are getting down to the nucleus.

Meaning is the upon-which of a projection in terms of which
something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from
a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. (193)

This passage seems to be a conflation of the interpretation-circle's
previous indices. Its syntactical form parallels that of the as-structure
("The explicitness of something that is understood ... has the structure of
something as something."), while its poetic form (its relations of terms)
reflects the possibility-triad, as if the one were a sand-bed, a ground on
which to operate, and the other fell into it from above. Thus: "Something (a
possibility seen) becomes (is projected as) intelligible (conceived) as

structure seems to name the formal aspect of a structure of intentionality;
structurally, it hides within itself, as a ellipsis, what will represent the
speaker, the seer, the doer.
something (an objectivity appropriated).” Meaning is presented as equiprimordially fore-having (or 'as-something') dissolved in objectivity, fore-conception carried by projection, and fore-sight embedded in possibility. Possibility, projection, and objectivity, in their collective guise as the as-structure, are conducted by fore-sight, fore-conception, and fore-having respectively, to become the circle of Meaning. Meaning becomes the name for fore-seen possibility receiving its content from objectivity as-something, which has received its content from projected fore-conception, and which, in turn, has received its content from fore-seen possibility. Following the route charted by the significance-circle. The as-structure flows over the fore-structure to Meaning, as over a stream bed. In other words, Meaning finds its form "as something," and its content in the fore-conception. The process of specification, from objectivity through what is "in advance" (primordial recognition), becomes manifest as Meaning. As such, it transcends possibility, absorbs projection, and embeds objectivity in itself.

In completing the explicitness of understanding, and taking as its own substance the fore-structure, Meaning completes interpretation as a triadic circle. Similarly, the understanding triad is completed. In interpretation, understanding becomes what it already was. Interpretation conceptualizes what possibilities are projected; possibility appropriates what projections are interpreted; and projection sees what interpretation presents as possibility.

In structuring these circles, we may seem a bit mechanical; that is because the meanings (literal, poetic, and structural) of Heidegger's terms are being used as instructions. The intention is not to cancel the poetry of the text, nor its evasion of the metaphysical, but to place its structure on exhibit, and to render Heidegger's implicit, fluid interrelations explicit not in language, but in a topological dynamic of intertwining form and content. This ecology of circles discloses itself as a sign that floats up out of the depths of the text, and which will carry us back down into it.

It may be worth noticing at this point that because understanding is already an assignment of significance, it appears as prior familiarity with the object. That is, understanding reveals itself as primordial recognition, a recognition constituted by an unrecognized past. In finding (attributed) significance, understanding is telling a story about itself that it no longer remembers—a journey through the interstices of its own historicity, a journey through objectivity that reflects yet veils an (un)remembered event. Thus, Heidegger reveals something crucial for any understanding of consciousness (or consciousness of understanding); viz. that recognition precedes cognition. It is a mediation in a process of "attention to" that

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19Dasein is usually translated as Being-there. But the "there" is not only being, or relational; it is also a directedness that brings one there, with
cannot escape apprehending the world as meanings. Heidegger’s "understanding" frees him from the enigma of Husserl's noema (in its disincarnation, its eternality, its presencelessness seemingly stretched between memory and ideology, as an allegory for perception).

The Eighth Circle

Like Dante, Heidegger has reserved the penultimate circle for the use (or abuse) of language. Our guide informs us that we are entering the circle of assertion. The eighth circle completes our topology; it is the final stage in specification, in which the object is grasped. Since language follows assertion in Heidegger's analytic, it should find itself in the ninth circle, where all that precedes becomes frozen, written, metaphysical. Though we are headed that way, and were promised that the circle could be seen from the center, it seems to be precisely where Heidegger does not want to go, what he remains indecisive on, as Guignon has pointed out.

Assertion is a pointing out which gives something a definite character and which communicates.(199)

Heidegger structures assertion as a triad, but this time as a triad of significations. (196) Signification differs from significance as quiddity does from existence. Where significance constitutes a that-ness that means the object, signification is meaning's what-ness—its properties.

Assertion's first signification is that it is a 'pointing out' ("letting an entity be seen from itself"—196). Its second is predication, in the sense of the entity being given a definite character. And the third is communication, "letting someone see with us"; the entity is something to be shared with others (as predication) or passed on by "retelling" (re-predication). 'Pointing out' is to be distinguished from 'representation' in that it lacks the (psychic) distance implied by representation. As an involvement in "there-ness," a directed attention to the object, to the "as-something," it is what returns the objectivity of the object to seeing; one "sees for oneself," just as interpretation returns understanding to "understanding for itself." "Predication" is a retrieval of what is assigned as there-ness; the object pointed out is grasped (reconceptualized and reappropriated). Predication exists only if it is a pointing out (197); it is the form taken by pointing out. And finally, communication is founded on the situation that an entity is given predication, yet is not close enough to be directly pointed out. It communicates by being the objectification of distant there-ness. Thus, communication is the form taken by predication, in which it finds its content. And it is a pointing out, because it signifies the entity, while remaining independent of it. That is, communication takes the form of a attention, as in "being there for" the object of that attention — being in the situation of paying attention to something.
pointing out, for which it is, itself, the content. Assertion is again a triadic circle.²⁰

We now have a triad of significance, understanding, and assertion, whose structure is again circular. Assertion is involved in, assigns, and objectifies understanding (that is, it returns to the understanding-circle through the mediation of the significance-circle). It is the possibility of, the projection of, and the interpretation of significance (that is, the significance-circle returns to it mediated by the understanding-circle). And understanding points out, predicates, and communicates significance (the understanding-circle returns to the significance-circle mediated by the assertion-circle). Mediation, the inner workings of the Always Already, returns each index as a form to what is its content. In so doing, it reveals that each mediating index is, in fact, the content of the index it finds as its form.²¹

The sculpture is complete. It is topologically the place where consciousness sites itself (in significance), sights itself (in understanding) and cites itself (in assertion). Its formal significance resides in the inseparability of its terms. Wrested from this 'nest', each term becomes unintelligible—a fish out of water—something that must invent (metaphysical) determinations to cover the indeterminateness creating by separation. Alone, each becomes self-defining, finding only the circularity of definition as its foundation.

The Analysand and the Ninth Circle

We are poised on the lip of Cocytus, where everything freezes in stasis. What do cyclicity and directedness imply?

First, the interlocking of the supra-logical circle establishes it as an organic whole. Heidegger begins with traditional terms taken from traditional accounts of consciousness, and in circumnavigating metaphysics, allows them to fall through the center. Mind's thingness is gone; all that remains is the inseparability of elements that had always before been separate. His sculpture is an analysand, the hidden

²⁰Each signification increases the distance from the object, and becomes a further point of reference to it. The recognized object becomes the perceived object, still within the ontological structure of "objectivity." The act of assertion is an act of reference — necessarily by a subject, but one which is not dual to its object. Both subject and object are hidden inside the dynamics of the circle.

²¹The overall configuration of this sculpture can be conceived as a nesting of circles of circles. From the innermost: the fore-structure is a circle of circles; it is one element on the interpretation-circle, which is a circle of circles; the interpretation-circle is one element of the understanding-circle, which is a circle of circles; and the understanding-circle is one element of the total circle of significance, understanding, and assertion.
ontological whole, already forgotten, from which these traditional terms had already unknowingly been wrested—like the elephant in the parable of the five blind men, each of whom touches it in a different place, and gives a different account.

Heidegger was looking for foundations. He makes reference to triadic unitarity as a foundation where no foundation is possible. (192) But it is only the cyclicity of an evasion of metaphysics that obviates foundations. (Where grounding is circular, and grounds only what grounds it in turn, then only the circle itself is ground.) For instance, cyclicity posits the priority of textuality to definition (something Derrida has repeatedly demonstrated by employing the formalisms of the ontological circle (circle #2)). Textual cyclicity engenders a transcendence of definition because in it definition itself must be derived from what it defines. That is, terminology is contextually determined by the text its terms engender. This is the essence of the poetic; because the poem is a sign that refers essentially only to itself, the words that compose it ultimately obtain their meaning from the sign they themselves engender as a context. It is this which opens poetic language to a circumvention of metaphysics. Without cyclicity, one enshrines oneself in definitions, in the univocity of metaphysics, in sentences floating in mid-air, like a cord thrown off a cliff as a signal, and lazily falling into the darkness.

Let us move a little beyond the sculpture a moment. The essential nature of consciousness, for which foundations are sought, is a process of discovery that engenders what it will discover; it is self-referentiality. The form is its own foundation. Its spontaneity and autonomy can be seen in themselves only spontaneity and autonomy. If something were not self-determined, it would be apprehensible as undetermined by the act of looking; it would be 'there' to be attended to, rather than 'there' as "attention to." Two things meet that description: memory and the means of articulation (language and the literary). These are, respectively, what precedes attribution, and succeeds assertion; i.e. what lies outside the Heideggerian sculpture. One enters the sculpture from what came before, and one leaves across the frozen expanse of articulation.

The issue of memory shifts the question of foundations. No foundation is possible if no intentional account of memory is given.22 One of the fascinations with Heidegger is the mystery that is silhouetted by his understanding-circle, in which recognition appears prior to cognition. This

22The question of intentional memory is an unsolved problem because it is a contradictory notion. Memory refers to what is remembered, and can be brought to mind. To intend something is to have it in mind, or to be mindful of it, in the sense of an attention to it. What then could the notion of intentional remembering mean? If it is intended, it is in mind and need not be recalled. If it needs to be brought to mind, then how can it be intended? Yet recall is well-directed, and generally precise.
priority is real, but meaningless without an account of memory. Intentional memory answers the question: how do we think this thought rather than that one, speak this word rather than that? Intentional memory is the thought that Heidegger has left unthought. Without it, the 'thinker' returns to passivity. This omission produces the hiatus in Heidegger's text, because memory is the required bridge between the Anyone, the context for language, and Dasein. In its absence, the fore-structure becomes the representative of what must lie at the heart of every act, of every word spoken, of every recognition. It becomes the Anyone without the Other—a self divided against itself as other.

The question of language, still undecided, now takes on a more ominous meaning. If it lies at the center, in the ninth circle, then Heidegger turns away from it. Perhaps, he intuited that only disappearance, either in ellipsis or in metaphysics, would ensue from a leap into the center. He circles back, asking why it is valid to consider assertion as a mode of interpretation. And he finds nothing to found validity. Here too, the circle is essential.

"Validity" can be seen in three ways: first, as a judgment, validity being the "form of actuality"; second, as a word referring to the validity of the meaning of a judgement - i.e. the referent having an 'objectively valid character' (objectivity); and third, as a meaning given as valid for everybody--i.e. as a bindingness. Heidegger shows that actuality, objectivity, and bindingness become confused with each other, leaving the notion opaque. (198) But the circle forms an analysand within which the three forms of 'validity' make sense. If we translate the grammatical forms for validity in the original German, we find the following: 1) the gerund 'validity' (being valid); 2) the noun 'validness'—valid character; 3) the verb 'to be valid'. These braid themselves. The way of being valid finds its form in valid character, and valid character finds its form in what is being valid (for everyone). Similarly, being valid provides the content for the notion of a valid character, or objectivity; and the fact of having a valid character provides the content for bindingness, for validity for everyone. Finally, the circle closes because actuality is the form of bindingness for everyone--i.e. what is accepted as true (as predicated) in its actuality in a community. In sum, objectivity is the form taken by the actual, which then points to what is the actual for that community.

We recognize the circle of significance, understanding, and assertion writ small. This triadic unity of the actuality of significance, the objectivity of understanding, and the bindingness of assertion, is validity itself. Not simply the 'content of judgment' (199), it is the emergence into the 'judgment of content', and characterizes Heidegger's very project toward understanding.

In effect, this validity-circle presents a picture of mythic structure. If myth, in its narrative function, is what gives a community its common language (and thus renders its emotional and social relationships
discernible, apprehensible), then mythic structure is precisely the positing of what is valid for a community; and it resides behind the totality of community dialogue. As such, it is elliptical, hidden and only silhouetted by its circumscribing analysand, the totality of community dialogue itself. The ellipsis in the validity-circle, as mythic, is precisely what Heidegger wished to leap into. But at the brink of Cocytus, he turned back. It was opaque for him down there. Thus, what he left out is the role of narrative in the generation of language. And narrative, as the transcendence of the general by the particular, is the other form whereby discourse evades metaphysics. This suggests that Heidegger leaves language unclarified because he does not see the dynamic of the circles his triads drew in potentia. In the absence of a place for validity, language is trapped within its written poetic.

What is the abyss? The significance-circle is a text, a braid of form and content. As it re-expresses itself (finds new content) in the circles of understanding and assertion, it sculpts, in the abstract, a sign: a sign which enacts a theory and practise of there-ness, a source and echo of meaning, and a discovery in engenderment of the object. Rather than a meaningless "thingness" for mind, this textual sculpture presents an icon of "attention to." Elliptically, it enacts the essential structure of intentionality. In other words, Heidegger's text contains a theory of intentionality silhouetted within the whorls and interstices of his sculpture, and his journey is a descent to the ellipsis at its center. There, superimposed upon the effaced metaphysics, resides the silhouette, an absence cohabiting with what seeks to write it as a text. This is the inarticulable in Heidegger's text, the account of intentionality that he outlines, circumscribes, and leaves untouched in its circular abyss.

The notion of superimposed silhouette within his circles of circles suggests that Heidegger's account is a photographic negative of metaphysics. In a photo-negative, objects in the positive are mapped onto spaces, and spaces onto objects. What is real for metaphysics becomes transient, airy in the spinning of Heidegger's wheels, the ellipsis of Being's endless circumscription; and what is real for him is left empty for metaphysics in his non-articulations. The forward and backward analytic reveals no change of place, only a reversal of entityhood. This, then, accounts for the schizophrenia of the text. Its indices (as quantum numbers for Dasein as "attention to") present themselves as wholes, while

23Part of the reason is that he conceives of Dasein as not being circular. Dasein is not present-at-hand (361), and thus what holds for Dasein does not hold for anything that is present-at-hand. "If we note that 'circularity' belongs ontologically to a kind of Being which is present-at-hand, we must altogether avoid using this phenomenon to characterize anything like Dasein ontologically." (195) In the sense of circularity Taminiaux is speaking about, it is not (see note 3).
withdrawing to synecdochic outline. The meaning is in effect in the form, while the form looks for itself in the meaning. The text is in a rhetorical double bind.

In a sense, this essay remanifests all this in form. As a critique, it is the articulation, the rewriting, of the unwritten and destined to be miswritten text of Heidegger. Thus, it is circular. As a discourse on Heidegger's sculptural form, it has rendered Heidegger's clearings objects for study. Hence, it is the photo-negative of Heidegger's text. And in painting a metaphorology from Dante's Inferno on the body of Heidegger's text, it has in a sense, narrativized it. That is, it is itself schizophrenic. Narrativization does not turn Heidegger into a story; the Heidegger-Dante connection is invented. Rather, the narrative is transformed into a means of discourse. As a sign system, the narrative is a way of seeing what cannot be seen, a lens through which something is "seen in a different light." It is a process of mythification. What is a metaphor structure for the writer becomes a myth structure for the reader.

Heidegger's Inferno makes possible a psycho-political hypothesis about him. Understanding, for Heidegger, is hermetic; all of its elements come back to themselves. He does not see the dynamic of their doing so, only the fact of it. Can we say he was attracted to hermeticism? The opacity of validity for him leaves him without myth, and therefore without community. Community for him is not based on narrative, but on "das Man," which produces language. His hermeticism separates him from community, while co-opting its terms. He attempts to "destroy" their meanings (or "deconstruct" them, as Derrida says), but in so doing, encysts them. Perhaps that is why the destruction of human meaning in the demogogy of the early 1930s seduced him. In addition, he remains without an account of memory. Memory becomes "das Man" itself. To bridge the gap of separation, he forces Being-in-the-world and "das Man" together, and resides within this artificial union. Perhaps this artificial junction explains why he was attracted to an artificial community. He is trapped in this Inferno, encircled and facing the abyss of his own absence of circularity, of ground.