
Evan's book is a compendium of Aristotle's philosophy, von Leyden's an interpretation of some of Aristotle's statements on justice and equality and an adaptation to (undefined) contemporary questions.

Dialectic is the central theme of Evan's first chapter. Aristotle's genius is his considering all evidences, including common opinion, and then letting concrete objects display their own structures. This was an advance, first, because Aristotle recognized a wide variety of entities as real and, second, because he recognized real complexity within objects, as is evident in the hylomorphic theory. Accordingly, science must be divided by (material and) formal object, because "things do not all fall within any one definite kind. There is no kind of thing such that every thing is of that kind" (Evans, p. 17).

The belief that teleology is not actually present in natural objects is a common objection to Aristotelianism. Aristotle thought that teleology was evident in the fact of change, the actualization of potential qua potential. "A potential property is one which can be defined only by reference to the result to which it tends. (E.g.) The defense of the possibility of learning relies on the notion of knowledge, which is the final cause of the process:" (p. 98). The telos is evident to the mind, it would take objects (e.g. the process of learning) and analyze them as realities that flow from constitutive principles, causes, and occasions (e.g. ignorance and knowledge, act and potency).

Aristotle's contributions to theology are the arguments that there exists one and necessarily only one first and final cause of motion, and that his same God is pure actuality, hence the direct object of his (he'-theos, nous) own contemplative activity. These form a middle way between the theology in the second part of the Parmenides ("God has no concern for human affairs"), which, against Plato, Aristotle accepts, and the later, Stoic position that God is irrelevant to cosmic order. The good of the world as a whole is its orientation toward the perfection of the self-absorption of the primary substance." That perfection as final cause "makes all other things in the universe better than they otherwise might be" (p. 185). This a sound statement of the uniqueness of Aristotle's theology: nothing of God's won entity is participated by other objects, yet God is in all things by an extrinsic denomination, inasmuch as they seek his perfection.

Other concepts and issues that Evans treats are: form, matter, and privation as principles of physical change (pp. 87-89); the problem of backward causation, which Evans thinks mistakenly arises from not
grasping change and development as expressions of formality and finality (pp. 90-96); and how the unrestricted range of the objects of human thought requires, first, that the mind "be" all things potentially and, second, that in itself it be no physical thing (p. 128). Ross's *Aristotle* remains the best compendium in English, but Evans's is clear, mostly accurate and interesting.

Flaws include that the bibliography does not recognize approaches to Aristotle that compete with Evans's own, which is more or less analytic. Second, let me again refer to Evans's treatment of the claim that the mind, in order to think all things, must be independent of matter. The proper consequence is not that the mind "is a pure potentiality and only acquires actual existence when actually thinking" (p. 128), but that it is a pure potentiality in the line of operative or second actuality. It must exist in order to think, but its substance cannot itself be that of the material object that it thinks. Third, von Leyden's book was published by St. Martin's, as was Evans's, and not by Macmillan (see p. 191).

Von Leyden aims to "contribute to the discussion of Aristotelian as well as modern questions of (a) how to render the principle of equality, no less than that in inequality, compatible with that of fairness, and (b) how to combine the facts of individual as well as social diversity in civil life with the demands for political justice and cohesion" (p. vii).

The focus of his first chapter is the permanent (="natural"?) conflict between the few and the many. The conflict, von Leyden shows, is between qualitative rather than quantitative claims to rule. The few might be the wealthy, the otherwise privileged or gifted, or administrative specialists. The many value liberty, have sound judgment as to general directions of public policy, and a grasp of moral values to allow that certain yes/no questions be decided by plebiscite. Proportionate equality, i.e. treating like cases alike and different ones differently, exists in varying ways in popular regimes. It is necessary to define qualitative differences and distinctions in value (p. 25), in order that his equality be achieved.

Looking at a narrow physical conception (sameness in species or kind) and the analogous, transcategorical, metaphysical concept of equal in the next chapter, von Leyden concludes: "equality is a common term and as such stands for a pervasive concept...[which] does not *per se* indicate common features or refer to what is common to all parts of a given whole--such as the state" (p. 40).

Aristotle's attempt to apply the principle of proportionate equality to the whole of a society fails. Proportionate equality requires a common term, whereas the contributions of various members of a political society are specifically and qualitatively different (pp. 56-57). Von Leyden next treats his attempt to establish a basis for a common equality between diverse components of a body politic. Because he is committed to having a state whose members are equals and peers as far as possible. Aristotle is in fact committed to equality as fairness. Nevertheless, the equitable
calculus used to distribute power must "start from the assumption that the ...
classes disagree and would pursue conflicting policies". Moreover, Aristotle
cannot justify the oligarchic privilege, which is, ultimately, wealth. Therefore it is unlikely
that equalizing qualitative and quantitative claims could bring about equality (p. 62). The practical solution is to decide by lot. That, however, cannot produce justice and equality directly and consciously, even if it does so constitutionally.

Von Leyden argues in Chapter Four that Aristotle favors a legal system that is both based on nature and open to reform. In favoring stability, Aristotle concedes that pure practical reason is insufficient. First, while tradition is as such is not normative, still it is necessary. Second, respect of law, and obedience to it, are normative principles. Von Leyden notes that the permanence implied by nature and the gradualism required by his own interpretation partly conflict (p. 105). At any rate, Aristotle is not a radical egalitarian and disfavors revolution. Yet his belief that the few and many both have civic virtue allows that "equality can be imposed upon people who are unfairly discriminated against as a result of the low assessment of their value or usefulness as citizens" (p. 114).

All these are critical and interesting issues. But having read the entire book twice, and parts four-plus times, I judge that it lacks a definable viewpoint. The beliefs that Aristotle has a unified argument on equality and justice and that we should be concerned with uncovering it are not demonstrated. Doubtless equality and justice concerned Aristotle and are important questions today. But the reader needs to understand, first, why the author thinks so, and, second, why he thinks that Aristotle is a good teacher.


Pooled here with editorial expertise is an *omnium-gatherum* of 25 expository essays, 44 letters to the editor, and 113 book reviews in a display of James's career beginning with his first publication in 1865—a review of an anatomy book by Thomas Huxley in the *North American Review*. One is first struck by an unbound curiosity which roams from Morley (on Voltaire) to Wundt to Lipps; Royce and Renouvier; a novel by Grimm; Bernhard Berenson's *Florentine Painters of the Renaissance*. In its apparent heterogeneity this volume of the collected works, the seventeenth published by Harvard UP, reveals an element of James's work usually excluded from philosophical forums. This could be called the backpressure of his thought in the exigency of working out what Eugen
Bleuler once called the *disporportion between striving and understanding*. One is provoked less to assimilate James' thought to recent work in neopragmatism or phenomenology than to discuss the philosophical significance of his apparently longstanding interest in problems such as dementia, effort, emotivity, energetics, and the morbid and creative dynamics of volition. Such research, at once personal and scientific, moved his philosophy to stress the dynamogenic complicity of effort and idea in their capacity to snap inanition and stimulate a creative pulsation through which truth is brought about as activity or becoming.

For here is a sensibility which always situates the act as the very camber of a life of thinking, forcing that life into public argument; and that thinking, through the act of writing, disposes of itself in public as a necessary condition of it development. How odd to us today seems the imbrication of this thinking-writing with non-academic culture. In a letter to the editor of the *Springfield Daily Republican* in 1903, James strongly protests against the lynching epidemic, accusing American newspaper coverage of converting lynching "into an established institution" (171). James did not publish only in specialized journal each with their own nomenclature. The writing, to borrow a phrase from William Bass, *convokes a community of writers*. There are pieces here from *The Monist* and *The Psychological Review* and *Philosophical Review*, but also from the *Nation, Boston Evening Transcript, New York Evening Post, Science, Atlantic Monthly*, and *Forest and Stream*.

The editorial apparatus for this critical edition provides copy-text and emendation data for each publication, and letters and notes which inform one of the circumstances in which a manuscript was generated. For instance, as context for a letter to the editor "Abbot against Royce" which appeared in the *Nation* in 1891, we are provided with a letter James wrote to his sister Alice informing her of his submission: "The only excitement in our domestic circle is the Abbot Royce Controversy into which I have been drawn (see the *Nation*) by Charles Peirce's letter" (682). Professor Skrupskelis's introduction and textual apparatus also contribute to our understanding of the complicated publishing situation which confronted James as his career evolved. Surely one cannot fully grasp the aims and rhetorical ambience of James's writing without familiarizing oneself with the cultural conditions and publishing scene which shaped it and made it possible.

Given the jumble of James's intellectual cargo found in this text and essays--including a piece on the need for more vacation time in America ("Vacations") and a critique of academic credentialism ("The Ph.D. Octopus")--one can at least say that the material gathered here shows the problems and reading practices which informed the development of pragmatism and radical empiricism. At one point James saw the future of philosophy as belonging to either Hegelianism or the philosophy of Renouvier. It was in the work of the latter that James first found a positive
notion of the "inevitable complicity of our active nature in our theoretic life" (442). James would have to reconcile the discoveries of Bergson with what he found most positive in Renouvier, clarifying within his own philosophy as he did so the specific powers of action and discontinuity. In these pages James can also be found setting down his views concerning the value of both descriptive method and empirical inquiry. James's scientific training sometimes made him "cry for a Galileo or a Lavoisier" to lift us from the level of flat description, thinking as he did that it is always only a matter of time before descriptive efforts are superceded by causal-empirical discoveries (485). Yet the scientist in James never censored his descriptive ability when it was called for, as in a review of one of Royce's works: "Never was a philosophic work less dry; never one more suggestive of springtime, or, as we may say, more redolent of the smell of the earth. Never was a gentler, easier irony shown in discussion; and never did a more subtle analytic movement keep constantly at such close quarters with the cubical and concrete facts of human life as shown in individuals" (387-88).

As we said earlier, one finds here an abiding interest in research concerning effort and initiative, volitional phenomena, the pathology of striving. James reviewed many books concerned with the excessive sensibility, Heerderscheinungen, paranoia, "clamorous impulses and obsessions," insanity and the controversy over its treatment, somnambulism, hypochondria, neuresthenia, insomnia, and states of consciousness associated with experiences of the numinous. James may have coined the term melanchology, which could describe the study Julia Kristeva has recently done of affective energy disturbances which infiltrate action and communication in Dostoevsky and Nerval. In such research, which is one the one hand not opposed to philosophy accepting certain insights made available the challenge posed by the excess of being in the supposed non-knowledge of action, affectivity, and connotative dispersion.

How to situate all this research into pathology? Perhaps many treatments of James's work start out too far ahead in their assumptions in the name of pragmatism. The material collected in this volume makes it clear how much James was concerned with everything that happens both before and as the taking of position. As in Heidegger, the "before" and the position-taking should not be split into a duality, but bonded or compounded within the movement of projection of/into possibility, in James's words becoming true (313). It is correct that truth is for James a sort of provisional cement that holds things together in order for the existent to accomplish something. But this also means our capacity to foist the Walt Whitman in each of us against the horizon to confound the Schopenhauer in each of us (312).

This it not to say that something like pragmatism, James's apparent misprision of Peirce's work, is merely a by-product of research into
pathological phenomena. But one should keep such research in view as
one moves with James to consider an energy which forms a practical
differential within/against what is circulating in the inertia of speculations
and proofs; the energy of the linking up of instants in a guise or circuit
which would discourse and will to appear as possible to the existent in the
first place, when said existent is confronted with eternity or radical
passivity. (How peculiar their relation is, radical belief and radical
passivity.) One has to try and better situate in philosophical discourse
such an energy, and a certain exigent narrativity or productive delirium:
"the faith that comes of willing, the intoxication of moral volition" (287).
This would bring James much closer as a (New England-type) contributor
to die fröhliche Wissenschaft.

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Earl MacCormac has set himself a formidable task: "to develop the
first unified cognitive theory of metaphor" (ix). His approach can be
characterized as multidimensional, interdisciplinary and eclectic. This
reflects among other things his position that philosophy should have "a
proper empirical stance" (6). His theory draws from many sources, among
which: cognitive science, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of culture,
literary theory, aesthetics, semantics, fuzzy set theory, speech act theory,
theory of knowledge and theory of truth. This leads to a theory of
metaphor in which a great many aspects of meaning are incorporated:
semantic meaning, linguistic meaning, metaphoric meaning,
communicative meaning, cultural meaning, cognitive meaning and iconic
meaning. It may truly be called a holistic theory of metaphor.

The basic model of MacCormac combines three ideas. The first idea
is that there is a cognitive process underlying every metaphor. Although
metaphor may be described as a phenomenon of surface language (level
one), or as a phenomenon of the deeper semantic and syntactic structure
of language (level two), the real and deepest explanation comes from the
knowledge process that underlies the making of a metaphor (level three).
In metaphor the human mind intentionally combines concepts that are
not normally associated to produce new insights or new hypotheses about
the world, as for example in "quarks are colored." There is a cognitive
process involved here and this should be seen in the wider context of the
cognitive functioning of the human mind. Consequently MacCormac
links his theory of metaphor to theories about memory, creativity, mental
imagery and the recognition of similarities (chapter five).
The second idea is that metaphor always involves a semantic anomaly. Although MacCormac rejects the controversion theory of metaphor, according to which the literal reading of a metaphor always produces a contradiction, he wants to preserve that intuition that there is a some sort of conflict in metaphor. In metaphor semantic markers of the juxtaposed referents clash when taken in the ordinary literal sense, as can be seen in "quarks are colored." But this doesn't have to lead to a complete falsehood. To escape from this conclusion he develops a quasi-formal semantics of metaphor, using fuzzy set theory for semantic makers (allowing for degrees of membership) and four-valued logic (allowing for partial truth). The four truth values are F, D, E, T. corresponding to degrees of similarity between the semantic markers of the referents of a metaphor. If there are very few similarities the metaphor should be called false (F); if the dissimilarities outweigh the similarities we have a very suggestive metaphor, called diaphor (D); if the similarities outweigh the dissimilarities we have a very expressive metaphor, called epiphor (E); finally if there are very few dissimilarities the metaphor should be called true (T) and this is what we call a dead metaphor. The life cycle of many metaphors is from diaphor via epiphor to dead metaphor, thereby increasing the degree of similarity and therefore of truth. According to MacCormac semantic anomaly is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphor (78), because not every juxtaposition of referents constitutes a meaningful metaphor based on a cognitive process.

The idea of a semantic anomaly presupposes the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical. This is the third idea that MacCormac uses to build his basic model. It is central to his position. He rejects the idea that all language is metaphorical and the relativism that follows from it.

"The contention that the hearer can distinguish between literal and metaphorical language is crucial to my theory of metaphor. Without such a distinction one would not be able to recognize metaphor as a special cognitive device that suggests new hypotheses. I also claim that the literal offers an Archimedean point for objectivity in knowledge" (227).

Here he takes an objective line, using the work of Berlin and Kay on color and the work of Eleanor Rosch on categorizing and cultural prototypes. From this he concludes that there are cultural universals that are natural in the sense that they reflect the way nature cut itself at its joints” (147). Natural categories in literal language serve as bridges from language to the real physical world. This enables literal language to provide "a linguistic Archimedean point of reference from which one can discern language that is figurative" (215).
The basic model of MacCormac is embedded in an evolutionary epistemology. Language is an instrument for human survival (149) and metaphor functions as a device in the cultural and biological evolution of mankind. There is an interaction between mind and culture and between culture and biological environment. A change in culture will result in a change in biological environment, which will alter the biological evolution in the long run. Metaphor can accomplish such a change. For example, our culture changed when the metaphor of "the mind as a mirror of nature" became the dominant metaphor of the western world and MacCormac speculates that this will also affect our biological evolution (156).

Taken as a whole the book is a huge theoretical building. Few books on metaphor cover such a large field and MacCormac deserves credit for it. Apart from the subjects mentioned there is a discussion of metaphor as a speech act (chapter six), of the iconic meaning of metaphor (chapter seven) and of the relation between metaphor and the coherence and correspondence theory of truth (chapter eight). Although the approach has been eclectic the resulting theory seems to be more or less coherent. The book contains a wealth of examples and is well written, although there is some needless repetition in it. Unfortunately but almost inevitably for a book of such a scope, there are a number of inaccuracies in it (for instance on page 183 where it is states that according to Frege the reference of a sentence is its truth conditions instead of its truth value).

But apart from this there is another and major drawback: the cognitive theory of metaphor of MacCormac seems to have weak ontological foundations. His theory presupposes a basic metaphor—that the physical world is composed of natural categories (78). What this metaphor implies is not clear. On the one hand MacCormac agrees with Rosch position that the world provides structured information and presents the perceiver with natural categories that reflect the way nature cuts itself at its joints (147). On the other he seems to suggest that these categories are interactive rather than inherent (65), or are even projections of our cognitive categories on the world (96). The metaphor is also fuzzy because there is a tension between its field of application and the empirical evidence that is available. It is supported by the work of Berlin and Kay on color and of Rosch on cultural prototypes, but at the end of the book its application is extended by MacCormac to cover most of our common sense categories. "Metaphorical truth could be viewed as completely relative if it were not for its participation in this evolutionary process in which the stability of the ordinary, banal perceptions and expressions of the world in literal language provides an objective base for metaphor" (224). These ordinary categories are grounded in "universal, intersubjective, testable experience" (218). Apart from the fact that both the work of Berlin and Kay and of Rosch is not uncontroversial, by extending their work MacCormac seems to commit the fallacy of cognitive
imperialism: our common sense categories are seen as the universal categories of the world.

More general, MacCormac's discussion of cultural universals suffers from the fact that most of the literature he uses is from the seventies. It neglects therefore a great deal of the discussion on relativism and the problematic status of cultural universals that followed. This can also be seen from the fact that the notion of convention is completely ignored. One may ask whether the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical needs to be based on such ontological claims at all.

In the afterword MacCormac admits that the ontological consequences of his theory need to be explored further (228) and he tries to anticipate criticism in this respect. But this will not do, because his ontology is not a consequence of the theory but a presupposition of it. If forms a crucial and integral part of the presented theory itself. The distinction between literal and metaphorical language and the idea of metaphor as necessary involving a semantic anomaly is based on it. So in the end the reader will wonder whether the foundations of this huge theoretical building are strong enough to support it. If not, the building as a whole will collapse.


The Evidence of the Senses offers a highly original exposition and defense of direct realism. This book should be required reading for any professional with an interest in human cognition, but especially so for philosophers and psychologists with interests in perception and the basis of knowledge. Because of its comprehensiveness in covering the vast literature of the epistemology of perception and because of the clarity of its prose, The Evidence of the Senses should also be attractive to instructors looking for a text for graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses.

The major theses of Part I of Kelley's book can be summarized as follows: Perception is a direct, preconceptual, noninferential mode of awareness of physical objects and their properties. A chapter or two is devoted to detailed expositions and defenses of each of this statement's constituent theses.

Chapter 1 lays out the basic assumptions of Kelley's realisms, his main arguments for the directness of perception, and his polemic against the basic assumptions and arguments of its rivals, representationalism and idealism. The chapter is more historical than the rest, discussing the major sources of the contemporary debate: Descartes'
representationism (10-16), Kant's idealism (16-27), and the traditional "mirror of nature" realisms. Chapter 1 is also the heart of the book, for it is here that Kelley sets the tone for what follows by laying out his guiding principles. Kelley presents his direct realism in the context of a dichotomy between two fundamental approaches to all issues of cognition: the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of existence consists of two related these: (1) the real world, or "existence", exists independently of consciousness, and (2) consciousness is fundamentally dependent upon reality for its contents. The primacy of consciousness, in its purest form, denies each. Representationalism, on this analysis, is a middle ground, affirming that existence exists independently of our conscious states, while denying that the content of consciousness is fundamentally dependent upon that real world. After establishing an historical framework, and in the context of his distinction between primacy of existence and primacy of consciousness approaches, Kelley attempts to establish the axiomatic status of realism (27-31), to show the self-refuting nature of idealism (31-36), and to uncover two major (though not often discussed) issues that lie at the center of the controversy: the problem of integrating the 1st- and 3rd-person perspectives on perception (35-37), and the view that if the perception is to be direct then the means of perception must not affect the result in any way; perception must, according to this latter (and erroneous) view, be "diaphanous" (37-43).

Chapter 2 is concerned with the often-advanced claim that, since perceptual awareness is the result of the integration of vast amounts of sensory stimuli, perception is therefore inferential or computational. This conclusion is then often offered as supporting nativism (e.g. by von Helmholtz, Fodor), or at least the indirectness of perception. Here, drawing on the work of perceptual psychologist J.J. Gibson and discussing the famous van Senden cases, Kelley is concerned to refute inferentialism in favor of the view that the necessary integrations of sensory stimuli can and should be conceived of as the result of non-computational, non-inferential, physiological means. Kelley argues further that just as from the fact of sensory integration one cannot properly conclude that computation or inference is occurring, from the fact that sensory information is processed it does not follow that the resulting perceptual awareness is cognitively indirect.

Chapter 3 is largely concerned with giving a realist account of perceptual relativity and the standard distinction between appearance and reality that it gives rise to. Since the existence of relativity has often been seen as necessitating the epistemological subjectivity of perception and thus as presenting a major obstacle to the directness of perception, Kelley here explores the reasons why this has been so, what perceptual relativity actually should commit us to, and what the perceptual relativity actually should commit us to, and what the connection is between the
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related concepts "appearance" and "reality." Kelley argues that perception is inherently relational, involving both an independent object and a subject with a specific means of consciousness, and that accordingly it is incorrect to conclude from the facts of perceptual relativity that the result of the contact between subject and object—perceptual awareness—is "in" one of the relata as opposed to the other. As an extended example of how this works out, Kelley looks in detail at the nature of color perception (95-111) and then applies it to the traditional primary/secondary quality distinction. (111-120).

Chapter 4 is devoted to a critique of representationalism in its many and varied forms. Representationalism is here defined as any view that first makes a distinction between an internal, subjective content of awareness and an external object, and which then argues that the latter is not essential to the existence of the former. This implies that the internal content can be described without reference to any external object that may have caused it. Perception is thus seen, on the representationalist model, as of a kind with dreams and hallucinations, the only difference being that in the case of a perception, the internal content will have been caused by an external object. Kelley here notes an interesting connection between representationalism and adverbialism. Although adverbialism is offered as a direct realist account of perception, it shares with representationalism the view that, since any experience state can occur in the absence of an external object, experience is essentially nonrelational. And it is as non-relational theories of consciousness that Kelley critiques both (122-129). In the course of the chapter, and as a required element in a defense of direct realisms, Kelley also offers an original (to my knowledge) analysis of that phenomenon which is a major weapon in the arsenal of any representationalist (or idealist, for that matter): hallucinations (133-138). Perceptual relativity is again discussed, this time in the context of the representationalist interpretations of it (129-131). Also discussed are representationalist arguments which turn on a certain view of the causal processes involved in perception: How can direct realism handle the notorious dead star/time lag and double image issues (131-133)? What does it have to say about the possibility of scientists stimulating the appropriate nerve endings to produce "apparent" perceptions (138-141)?

Chapter 5 summarizes and integrates the material in Part I, yielding a distinction between sensation, perception, and conception, and a formal definition of perception (143-164). Kelley then considers the relationship between conception and perception in greater detail, with special attention given to views on the "theory-ladenness" of perception, to arguments for perceptual discrimination (165-169), and to the role of attention in perceptual discrimination and learning.

The two chapters that make up Part II range over some of the broader implications of Kelley's theory of perception for epistemology in general, from issues such as the role of perception in grounding our knowledge, the
status of perceptual judgments and the need for a theory of concept-formation, to the implications of his direct realism for the foundationalism/coherentism issue, and to how his realisms responds to the linguistic turn in philosophy this century (and especially to the linguistic versions of idealism which have gained wide currency--e.g., those of Quine, Sellars, and Rorty). Kelley holds that perception justifies our beliefs about physical objects, and does supply a valid basis for our knowledge. However, his views on how this is achieved do not place him very neatly into the foundationalist camp--at least not as this camp has been defined and defended through much of this century. Perceptual evidence is also held to be non-propositional; Kelley thus rejects the widely-held thesis that any justification of a belief or propositional state must be in terms of or on the basis of other beliefs or propositional states.

This book is worth a close reading. The argument is new, the historical and contemporary context of debate is presented elegantly and accurately, and Kelley's own stance with respect to the historical and contemporary debate emerges clearly.


French philosophy since 1968 can, among other things, be said to complicate issues of authority and authorship, the metaphysics of presence and representation, and the secure place of the philosopher in society. Jean-Francois Lyotard, someone steeped in phenomenology, a former member of the socialisme ou barbarie group, critic of structuralism, pro-Algerian activist, an astute reader of Freud and Lacan, and a name linked with post-modernism and post-structuralism, has been a key player in much of this upheaval. His strength and complexity as a philosopher is informed by his willingness and ability to read and write across many discourses, language-games, genres and "regimes of sentences" (his words). The scope and variety of his undertakings makes introducing Lyotard to English readers no easy task.

Importantly, Geoffrey Bennington, in Lyotard: Writing the Event is well aware of the problem of representing, simplifying or valorizing such a figure as this. To narrate Lyotard in English is a project Bennington takes, on, however, with a great deal of integrity. He knows that one demand on such a book would require a "don't-worry-and-I'll-explain-it-for-you" style. Still, he will frustrate this and produce an important work of philosophy in its own right. Another demand is to find the essence of "Lyotard's" thought, which will be difficult given the various developments, reversals

1G. Bennington, p. 4.
and discontinuities gathered up under the Lyotardian signature, itself a "fence around the terrain of writing, the grabbing by a supposed subject of products ipso facto raised to the dignity of an œuvre."  

One powerful aspect of Bennington's narrative is tied up in Lyotard's and his concern about "gaining time," a way in this case of summarizing Lyotard for the English reader so as to preempt the necessity of reading Lyotard himself. In fact, Bennington is able to slow the pace of this book by breaking with conventional footnoting practices and interrupting his narrative with colliding segments (indented and in a smaller point size) of text. As a reader, I cannot just follow along. I am stopped midsentence in many cases by a compelling tract of orthogonal text. By the "end" of the book, I have "lost time" in a powerful interplay of discourses which themselves re-present Lyotard in a temporality which deliberately cares little for calendar time. If acceleration inverts politics, Bennington has slowed the apprehension of Lyotard and becomes dramatically convincing of Lyotard's "primarily political motivation for his work." In fact, some of Lyotard's most unsettling, yet worthwhile work seems to lie in his articulation of problems of justice and political judgment, to which I will turn shortly.

Lyotard's place within French intellectual stardom is complex. Bennington notes Lyotard's position in the shadow of figures like Deleuze, Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida but does not perhaps go far enough to situate his borrowings and differences from these thinkers. At first blush, Lyotard will appear—to those familiar with recent French philosophy—almost as a journalist interpreter of the superstars, whose respect he nevertheless commands. The familiar "Frenchifications" and a frequently cumbersome prose similarly mark much of Lyotard's work. More importantly, when Bennington discusses Lyotard's notion of the dispositif—the libidinal "set-up" in which, for example, the theatre, museum, factory or consulting room stage and direct desire toward investment in representations which obscure activity of the director, curator, manager of analyst—he does the very thing Lyotard is trying to destabilize. Some of this is inevitable, and Bennington knows it. He must make Lyotard critically separate and place him under the microscope of a close reading.

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4See P. Virilio's Speed and Politics (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986) for this argument.

5Bennington, p. 5.
Nearly making a "theory" of Lyotard, a Lyotardian dispositif, Bennington does not situate him as strongly as he could among the façons de parler (Lyotard's expression) in which Lyotard is articulated. This said, the strength of Bennington's text lies in the way he writes Lyotard centrally into some of the most urgent philosophical and political issues of the times, which is where he belongs. The irreverent *Economie Libidinale* (the title of an important book by Lyotard and the title of Bennington's Chapter 1) involves a movement to question the theoretical dispositif in the Marxist master-narrative. Rather than becoming one more Freudo-Marxist synthesis, it interrogates the question of the desire to theorize, the libidinal investments which produce theory and intellectuals in particular set ups just as a worker is set up to desire his own oppression.6

Bennington then shows how the previous work, the difficult *Discours, figure* (Bennington's Chapter 2), anticipates the problems of *Economie Libidinale* and *Le Différend*. Its deconstruction of the Hegelian dialectic through a complex analysis of negation in the unconsciousness of seeing and speaking via the "anomaly" of deictics (words like this, that, here, there, etc.) is important to a surpassing of structuralist and semiological ways of "reading the world" and "seeing a text." Lyotard posits three figural orders which inform and irrupt in discourse: imaginal (comparison, metaphor), formal (an operation on the signifier) and sensory (a distribution of the plastic signifiers in a visual rhythm on a page) figures, which

From a chain or relay between the intelligible discursive order and the sensory spatio-temporal order, they prove the presence of forms able to cross the barriers separating the intelligible world and the sensory world, forms independent of the milieu they inform.7

The figural will disrupt the distance knowledge conventionally makes of its object by virtue of its transgressive power as an event in both discourse and sensation. Hence, Bennington's title, *Writing the Event*, a title evoking other such related titles as Blanchot's *The Writing of the Disaster* or Clifford Marcus's *Writing Culture*.

Bennington's explication of *Le Différend* in his third and final chapter, has Lyotard still concerned with the "event." In *Le Différend*, Lyotard deconstructs two apparently oppositional historiographies, one the realist account in which an event occurs and its narration follows, and the other that events are irrevocably fictions "purely 'produced' by the narrating agency."8 This apparent opposition is destabilized by a consideration of

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8Bennington, p. 107.
the meta-narrational status to which each genre aspires. If, as Lyotard maintains, there is no meta-narrative, then what (or whose) narrative counts? The narrational positions of intellectuals, scientists or politicians are a matter for analysis and challenge for Lyotard. To put it simply, perhaps too schematically: there are genres (e.g. juridical, political, scientific) which employ heterogeneous regimes of sentences, each variously positioning or effacing a sender, addressee, referent and meaning in some pragmatically determined way. Le Différend is a condition which results (again I am oversimplifying) from conflict between parties around a judgment where any rule of judgment is incommensurable with the genres of the conflicting parties. Restoring, for example, to a genre of the conflicting parties. Restoring, for example, to a genre of litigation for resolution leads to the wronging of one party's rules governing its genre. It amounts to a "forbidding of sentences" by a manner of linking sentences for or through someone which are alien to that part's genre. From Levinas Lyotard derives the necessity that each sentence is linked to and followed by another. What that next sentence is is a matter of radical contingency. Justice, for Lyotard, does not lie in the pursuit of a final sentence which passes judgment on its predecessors, but rather in the studied attempt to keep this contingency radicalized.

Space requirements make it difficult to do Bennington's work justice, so to speak, just as Bennington is compelled to select from vast regions those sentences linkages he will use to introduce Lyotard. In my mind, however, he accomplishes his task in a first-rate manner and has written a very important book precisely because its careful explication opens a horizon of ethical conversations, sentences, that invite rather than proscribe that "next sentence" which is often too readily and automatically available from either the left or the right. It is a must read for anyone willing to reexamine the terra firma ethical systems since the great revolutions have mapped out for us in the West.