BOOK REVIEWS


This is an ambitious book. Besides being tersely written, its arguments are neatly constructed. In order to help the reader make an easy transition between chapters, the author summarizes each chapter at its conclusion. The clarity of language notwithstanding, familiarity with the technical terms of Kant and Heidegger is assumed.

Briefly, the author strives to show that in opposition to Kant, who finds it necessary to invoke the eternal in postulating morality, an ethics can be established within the framework of time alone. To do this, he adopts Heidegger's reading of Kant as formulated in the former's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In addition, to assist him in his reading of Heidegger, he subscribes to Charles M. Sherover, author of Heidegger, Kant, and Time (Indiana University Press, 1971). The author is careful to note, however, that the point he is trying to make is not so much to gainsay Kant as to "reconstruct Kant's ethics." This he does by forging a path for "thinking about ethics in terms of the temporality of the practical self. That is, we see how it is possible to seek the basis for a normative outlook within the scope of human finitude, without having to make an additional assumption about man's kinship with the eternal" (172). The upshot is that practical reason is definable in a manner consonant with Dasein's temporality in the sense that it "displays the meaning of finitude in a more original way than does theoretical reason" (155). Were the arguments not so intricate, it would be interesting to retrace the steps taken by the author in building up his case. However, the book is not confined to Kant and Heidegger: engaged in the fray are Ernst Cassirer, Soren Kierkegaard, and Freidrich Nietzsche.

Against Cassirer, who maintains a rather conventional interpretation of Kant, the author argues that "the unconditioned commands of morality hold precisely because of the limitations imposed upon us by our temporal natures" (xi). His appeal to Kierkegaard is based on the belief that the Danish thinker was important to Heidegger and also because Kierkegaard "first provides the clue to a striking omission in Kant's ethics, namely, an explanation of the nature of moral commitment" (xii). But the connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger which the author tries to establish is not as convincing as would be desirable. The statements made about Kierkegaard do not do justice to the complex method of his writing.

Indeed, when the cards are down, only a few of the standard views of Vigilius Haufniensis (about time) and those of Anti-Climacus (about the self) are considered. These are then attributed to Kierkegaard without taking into account Kierkegaard's serious plea not to confound him with his
 pseudonyms. However, since Heidegger, too, reads Kierkegaard in this misleading and partial manner, the shortcoming, I argue, should be attributed to him.

The observation made by Nietzsche that it was the longing for permanence which gave rise to metaphysics, which in turn created the "self", jibes well with the book's overall project (121). When one identifies himself with an enduring substance, the tendency to resist anything that threatens its integrity is pervasive. "The instinct for self-preservation is reflected on a metaphysical plane through the belief in the 'after-life'" (122). Then the author expatiates on the doctrine of the eternal recurrence and the will to power without, surprisingly enough, considering Heidegger's own interpretation of Nietzsche.

Finally, *Imagination and Existence*, which draws its inspiration from Kant, and tries to build a system of ethics based on Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*, is to be commended for its daring and innovative spirit. The task is not simple. An ethics, by definition, is anthropological. Hence, to attempt an undertaking that would relate Heidegger to an anthropological enterprise runs the risk of doing violence to his thought, which is meant to be pristinely ontological. Yet, with an ingenuity and careful logical reasoning, Frank Schalow is able to construct an argument that, while not confuting Kant's dependence on the eternal order renders an ethics comprehensible based on the human being's understanding of the possibility of his own cessation in time. The question remains, however, whether Schalow retrieves Heidegger as compellingly as Heidegger retrieves Kant.

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In *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*, Rick Roderick examines the thought of Jürgen Habermas. He reads Habermas as one who attempts to synthesize: Kant, Hegel, Marx, Critical Theory, contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, thus to formulate a philosophical social theory. Roderick wants to "do justice to the real tensions in Habermas's texts" (3). Part of what generates these tensions is Habermas's attempt to put forth an effective foundational social theory in the face of the often telling objections of a wide range of antifoundationalists. Indeed, Habermas himself is critical of prior attempts to provide ultimate foundations for knowledge or political practice. Roderick explains Habermas's socio-political foundationalism through an examination of his move away from a Marxian "paradigm of production" to a more contemporary "paradigm of communication."
The first four chapters of Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory are concerned with the various stages in the development of Habermas's thought, from his early encounter and reconstruction of critical theory to his later thought concerned with communication. The final chapter is reserved for a broad critical overview. The move from a paradigm of production to a paradigm of communication is explained, primarily, in the second chapter. According to Habermas, in giving an analysis solely in terms of the relations, structures and effects of production, Marx cannot provide an adequate base for his concept of a historically developing social rationality. To understand how this is rooted in social practice, a distinction must be made between humans as tool-making animals, and as animals who use language. Out of this Habermas formulates a distinction between labor (instrumental action) and interaction (communicative reason) (49). In Habermas's social theory, communication, as communicative action and rationality, takes over the center stage Marx gave to labor. By Roderick's analysis, the move from production to communication is necessary for Habermas, so that he can preserve the role of reason and rationality in light of the Critical Theorists' critique of technocratic, "instrumental reason."

In the third chapter, Roderick examines Habermas's notions of "the ideal speech situation" and "universal pragmatics." Roderick is critical of Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation, whereby democratic decision makers can resolve disputes utilizing a language undistorted by constraints of domination. Roderick has doubts, first, that the ideal speech situation can be anything more than an idea, and second, that, even were it not, its application would be far more limited than Habermas requires. Roderick finds more favor with Habermas's universal pragmatics, according to which, the rational foundation of ethical norms, that which gives them their binding character, can be grounded in the universal nature of linguistic practices. Roderick, however, does not accept this uncritically. He finds, for example, an unresolved tension between a Searlean and Chomskian account of meaning. Habermas appears to conflate both theories without a rigorous recognition of their contradictory aspects.

In Chapter Four, Roderick traces the direction of Habermas's thought in the early Eighties. The examination is given here in terms of the relation of communicative action to rationality and social rationalization. Communicative action is what occurs when social practice is guided by "the mutual and co-operative achievement of understanding among participants," instead of the "egocentric calculations of the success of the actor as an individual" (109). Here, Roderick recounts how Habermas has moved away from the ideal speech situation toward a more empirically grounded consideration of "communicative rationality." The move is made to social rationality in terms of the way "the potentialities of communication elaborated in his formal account provide an interpretive guide which may be used to investigate the level of rationality (scientific,
moral, aesthetic) achieved in different societies" (116). Roderick's account here is given in clear, careful terms, and should be accessible to those trying to get a picture of Habermas' latest thinking of communication.

The final chapter of Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory is perhaps the weakest. Here, Roderick departs from the style of critical explanation of the earlier chapters and launches into a mild polemic against: Habermas, post-structuralism (in particular, Baudrillard), and the ranking of communication over production. His criticisms are good, so far as they go. It is difficult, however, when given a number of broadly based criticisms in a single chapter, to make any of them count. If Roderick does not, in general, agree with Habermas (and it is not certain that he does not) then why should he write a book mostly explaining his theories? Given these reservations, the book is an excellent explanation and analysis of the thought of Jürgen Habermas. It would serve as a good overview for anyone seeking an intelligent explanation of this most important thinker.


Bernard Lonergan's philosophical work is not well known outside Catholic philosophical circles. That is a shame, both because he has something strikingly new and important to say and because (as I shall argue a bit later) his thought suffers from the absence of a thoroughgoing critique from philosophers who do not share his religious commitments. As its title suggests, Mr. Matustik's book gives us an exposition of Lonergan's philosophy from the perspective of his concept of mediation; part of this project is a comparison of Lonergan with the deconstructionists—birds of a very different philosophical feather.

This book is a tour de force of Lonergan scholarship, not an introduction to his philosophy; hence, those unfamiliar with Lonergan may appreciate a little help from this reviewer. Lonergan himself does not introduce his thought through the notion of mediation. His procedure in Insight is as follows. 1 First, one is invited to get puzzled about any problem; Lonergan proposes problems in contemporary mathematics and science, but any set of data which provoke genuine puzzlement will do. Next, when one has worked out the solution, one is invited to get puzzled about the acts he has just been engaged in (a meta-puzzlement heading toward a meta-cognition, as the cognitive psychologists would put it). One's response to the first

invitation will be an act of understanding—the perfectly ordinary experience of getting puzzled and catching on; one's response to the second invitation will be an understanding of that understanding.

At this point three questions are posed. First, what is one doing when one is understanding: what core intentional acts ("operations", in the sense common to mathematicians and Piaget) are occurring; what motive is essential to the inquiry? Second, why is doing that knowing; what makes it count as knowing; would any other significantly different set of acts, assembled to satisfy some other desire, count as knowing? The answer to the first question is that one is engaged in intrinsically related acts of experiencing, inquiring, hypothesizing, and judging (verifying) driven by one's detached and disinterested desire to know (just to know), i.e., by Aristotle's "wonder". Thus for Lonergan, knowing is not simply taking a sensible or conceptual "look"; it is, crucially, getting intellectually interested in what one would otherwise be merely experiencing, and doing something about that intellectual interest; it is caring whether one's understanding of the experience is correct. The answer to the second question is that any different account of knowing will necessarily be self-refuting; for either it will rely for its cogency on the very structure and motive it is rejecting or it will be forced to acknowledge itself to be inexperienced with knowing, or bored with uninquiring, or unintelligent, or unconcerned with whether the alternative theory is correct.

Finally, the third question: what is one knowing by the operations of experiencing, inquiring, catching on, and verifying? Lonergan argues that the structure of the known is isomorphic with the knowing: potency corresponds to what is merely experienced, form to what is merely hypothesized or supposed, and act (esse) to the judgment that an hypothesis is verified. (This will sound familiar to Aristotelians and Thomists.)

This "Insight into insight" grounds an integrated heuristic account of mathematics, science, commonsense, and the various species of philosophy. Such hitherto problematic notions as real, being, and objectivity are implicitly defined in terms of cognitional structure and dynamics: being, for example, is "the object of the disinterested and unrestricted desire to know" or , alternatively, "what is intelligently conceived and reasonable affirmed." If it is objected that one wants to get beyond what is merely immanent in cognitional structure in order to know the world as it is in itself, Lonergan will point out that that very desire is part, indeed the point, of the dynamics and structure he has been noting.

I have given a description of how one comes to see what Lonergan is up to; but one will not succeed in doing this merely by understanding the description; one must perform the cognitional acts described. Lonergan will be intelligible only to those (you, the reader) who catch on to the implications of their own intellectual curiosity and their own acts of catching on.
To return to Mr. Matustik's impressive book, Lonergan's "axiom of mediation" is as follows:

Any factor, quality, property, feature, aspect is (1) *mediate* and may be considered to be (2) *immediate* in the source, origin, ground, basis, and (3) *mediated* in its consequences, effects, derivations, outcome, field of influence, radiation, expansion, expression, manifestation, or reflection. (p. 6)

The axiom is viewed as an implicit definition of its terms (The classic case of such definition is Hilbert's account of lines and points, which picks out any set of three entities such that two and only two determine the third and vice versa). There is simple mediation (e.g., premises and conclusions), mutual mediation (among part of a whole), and self-mediation (e.g., development of consciousness through the operations we have been discussing). The concept is then applied through cognitional structure to the world as isomorphic with it: to classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical method; to the development of individuals and cultures; to hermeneutics, etc.

Mr. Matustik makes a compelling case for the claim that a correct understanding of one's knowing, and of the polymorphousness of human motives and consciousness which diverts one from knowing, constitutes ("mediates") a powerful critical and methodological control comparable to Kant's, though quite different from it.

Mr. Matustick also argues that Lonergan's re-analysis of philosophy, science, interpretation, and the rest in terms of cognitional structure and dynamics is a "deconstruction":

Lonergan's 'deconstruction' of various human discourses leads to a point of assembly—which is not a point but an implicit definition thereof—mediated through a series of displacements in human operational development. His is a 'deconstruction' upwards, i.e., though one's appropriation of self-mediating functions. For it is a function that . . . can comprise both its variable differentiating and integrative aspects—and thus be simultaneously "inside" and "outside" the constructed. (p. 34)

By a scrupulous use of quotation marks, Mr. Matustik avoids equivocating on 'deconstruction', but this reviewer can't help feeling that he misses the spirit of deconstructionism, what sets it off most sharply from Lonergan's Idea of Being (God)—a timeless, unchanging presence utterly dominating its opposites—must remain irretrievably "straight". There seems to be an insensitivity to the profoundly intractable ontological, epistemological, and logical paradoxes (or near-paradoxes) which partly motivate Derrida's "double game." Since Hume and Kant, philosophy has been
mainly preoccupied with containing the damage to its aspirations incurred in attempting, under rigorous standards, the transition from "proportionate" to "transcendent" being (to use Lonergan's expressions). Derrida's différence is in part an invitation to defer / differ the structure which makes such philosophical dead-ends objectionable, by deconstructing the very notions of structure & objectionable, and indeed by deconstructing deconstruction itself (deconstruction "reverberates within itself"). By accepting (and rejecting) both the "position" and the "counterpositions" différence "plays" (the opposite of 'operates') between both. This may be more than an excessively baroque exercise for French intellectuals; but it is certainly not Lonergan, who remains deeply committed to the "position" as development within an invariant structure. Perhaps Mr. Matustick should just give Derrida and company 'deconstruction'.

Failure to appreciate the significance for philosophy of its major defeats leads Lonergan to blunder in attempting the transition to transcendent being and in arguing for certain orthodox religious views: antinomies are ignored and arguments are given for free will, the existence of God, and a theologically innocuous version of the problem of evil which for a good long time have been known to be unsound. These aberrations contrast sharply with the uncompromising authenticity with which the structure of proportionate being is laid out in the early chapters of Insight. Such lapses are not without their irony in a philosophy grounded in an authentic commitment to the "pure, unrestricted desire to know."

However, Mr. Matustik's purpose is expository, not critical, and he is not to be faulted for not confronting these issues. As an exposition of Lonergan's thought from the perspective of mediation, this book will be standard reading of Lonerganians.

Marcuse and Freedom by Peter Lind. Reviewed by George A. Trey, University of Kansas.

Herbert Marcuse's philosophy is well known both in the United States and Europe. Nonetheless, argues Peter Lind in Marcuse and Freedom, one of the most important components of his extensive work in social theory is often ignored. Lind contends that a central and continuous theme in Marcuse's writings is a unique conception of freedom.

He (Marcuse) suggests that there may be a freedom that is at once material and spiritual, individual and communitarian, spontaneous and rational. (4)

Marcuse and Freedom provides a careful historical and theoretical analysis of Marcuse's intellectual development. The aim in doing so is to
demonstrate that the aforementioned doctrine of freedom binds together all of Marcuse's writings.

Lind begins with an account of the relationships between Marcuse and his influences. It is clear that Marcuse is a marxist. The real question pertains to the type of marxist he is and the role other thinkers play in his writings. In the earliest published essays it is Heidegger's influence that shapes Marcuse's marxism. This distanced him from marxist orthodoxy and provided a hermeneutical methodology that applies both to written texts and social phenomena. The product of the Marx-Heidegger synthesis is a theory of radical action which overcomes oppressed existence through a political transformation of prevailing economic conditions. Lind asserts that the early writings provide the initial development of a concept of freedom which is rooted in the Heideggerian notion of authentic existence. Marcuse diverges from Heidegger by addressing the existential question from the social-political perspective of marxism rather than of the solitary individual.

The next major phase in Marcuse's work is directly related to the development of the MEGA edition of the collected works of Marx and Engels. Volume three of MEGA contains what is now known as The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In these fragments Marcuse discovered Marx's theory of alienation. He immediately saw this as the foundation of marxism. By applying a Heideggerian close reading of the most philosophical sections of The Manuscripts Marcuse was able to formulate a distinctly marxist theory of freedom. Methodologically Marcuse remained indebted to Heidegger, but the theoretical substance was provided by the young Marx. The most important publication of this period is an essay that deals exclusively with The Manuscripts: "The Foundations of Historical Materialism". This paper, according to Link, is a reference point for understanding the concept of freedom that is central to Marcuse's work. The theory of radical action is now driven by an idea of liberated, as opposed to alienated, labor. Achieving authentic existence is no longer the objective of Marcuse's formulation of marxism. This somewhat dubious goal is replaced with the quest for emancipated "species being". In Lind's estimation, it is this crucial development that guides the remainder of Marcuse's work.

Lind's analysis of Marcuse's influences is extremely helpful for understanding his overall theoretical development. Too much emphasis, however, is placed on the role of Marx. To be certain, Marcuse is a marxist philosopher. But to situate Marx alone at the fulcrum of his thought, and to represent other influences such as Heidegger, Freud and Nietzsche as peripheral (although important), requires more force than the text allows. This creates some problems for Lind's reading of the later writings.

The remainder of Marcuse and Freedom outlines and analyzes what Lind refers to as the "co-operative society" theory. The initial formulation of this theory reflects Marcuse's reading of the Manuscripts. As such, labor
and work are central issues. In pre-revolutionary capitalist society labor is alienated. Laborers working under these conditions are denied full participation in the cooperative transformation of nature into civilization. The suffering and discontent this generates provides the condition for revolution. Lind argues that Marcuse appropriates Marx's understanding of these revolutionary economic-political conditions and from them develops a theory of human essence based on a free form of labor. This would materialize in the co-operative society. Such a society would have a productive mode that has a democratic decision making process, full participation in the social world and would enhance individual talents through cooperative work. Ultimately, this social milieu facilitates the realization of human essence as "species being". In the co-operative society, labor is free—"a form of activity which individuals take upon themselves with the sole objective of furthering their own goals and pursuits" (122). The concept of freedom that emerges from this is a synthesis of positive liberalism (such as that of T. H. Green) and marxism: freedom, realized in the co-operative society, is power—a capacity to do.

The second formulation of the co-operative society theory takes place during the years when Marcuse is most closely affiliated with the "Frankfurt School". Lind points out that his work during this period earned Marcuse the reputation as a negative philosopher. To a certain extent this is an accurate description; his essays dealt primarily with social and political criticism. Lind claims, however, that the critical work in this period supplies the reflective basis for a positive conception of a free society which appears in the later writings. Marcuse realized that in order to posit liberating alternatives to oppressed socio-economic conditions, these conditions must first be carefully implicated. This activity takes the form of an intensified critique of alienated labor.

Lind intensifies three key additions to the co-operative society theory that were made during this period. First, reason and rationality become central categories. This is crucial in that it roots Marcuse firmly in the tradition of Hegel and Marx (see Reason and Revolution). And, according to Lind, it lengthens the distance between Marcuse and Heidegger. The positive theoretical contribution that this enables is based on the enlightenment view that reason can change the world: a rationality aimed at communitarian, rather than instrumental, objectives will contribute to human emancipation. Second, labor must be eliminated in a free society. Following Marx, Marcuse does away with any discussion of emancipated labor. Labor, in the co-operative society, will be superseded by an activity oriented exclusively towards personal and communal gratification. Finally, it becomes clear in this period that for Marcuse, critical theory has active political content; theory and praxis are complimentary and inseparable. From these developments a concept of liberation can be extracted that is rooted in the truth of marxism as a rational political theory, the tradition
of western—particularly German—philosophy and culture, and, a synthetic materialist-idealist concept of human essence.

The final period is initiated by a number of crucial transitions that had a significance effect on Marcuse's work. Most notably, his Frankfurt colleagues returned to Germany while Marcuse remained in America. This, as Lind points out, has a marked influence upon the ongoing development of the co-operative society theory.

At this point the analysis becomes somewhat forced. Lind, dealing primarily with the flamboyant and somewhat utopian version of the co-operative society theory found in *Eros and Civilization*, attempts to demonstrate that the slightly outrageous proposal of a society defined by an ethic of play and open sexuality represents a reading of Freud that is guided by *The Manuscripts*. This is a plausible interpretation of *Eros and Civilization*, one which Lind argues carefully. However, in order to defend the claim that the writings during this period (*E&R* in particular) represent another sequence in the continuous development of Marcuse's marxism, he finds it necessary to dismiss another important book, *One Dimensional Man*, as a work that lacks "inner coherence and vision".

If Lind were to concede that Heidegger's presence was not completely eliminated in 1933, and that Nietzsche's and Freud's influences are central to the co-operative society theory, an interpretation of *Eros and Civilization* would emerge which does not require that *One Dimensional Man* be discounted. This interpretation would also recognize a sharp revision (rather than slow evolution) in Marcuse's marxism. Further, such a reading would be more sensitive to the influences (positive and negative) of American culture and sub-culture, the disappointment over Soviet marxism (see *Soviet Marxism*) and the primacy of Freud as a source of theoretical inspiration.

*Marcuse and Freedom* has several features that make it a valuable asset to anyone interested in studying Marcuse seriously. A number of tables carefully lay out the assumptions and argumentative logic of Marcuse's theory. These are helpful as Marcuse is often vague and assumes a considerable knowledge of the German philosophical tradition. The book is also accompanied by an exhaustive bibliography of both Marcuse's writings and the secondary literature. Finally, the text is well organized and concisely written.

Lind's characterization of Marcuse is a carefully documented and clearly presented vindication of a unique and important 20th century philosopher. His historical approach provides a lucid account of the thinkers that influenced Marcuse and the innovative way that he molded their methods and ideas into a social theory that is rooted in a positive concept of freedom. Rather than reading Marcuse as a new left sage or a cynical colleague of Adorno and Horkheimer, Lind reveals an often ignored but important side of his work: his ongoing pursuit of a theory of
emancipation. For this reason Lind's book is an important contribution to the body of Marcuse literature.