
Beyond Analytic Philosophy is the first in a series of books aimed at developing a philosophy Wang calls phenomenography. We are not given an actual definition of 'phenomenography', but Wang does provide us with its guiding principle: philosophy is to do justice to what we know, believe, and feel. Under this principle, philosophy can abandon the concerns of discovery and creation. According to Wang, they were adopted from science and art in order that philosophy may become a speciality in its own right, but have led to a specialization and fragmentation so extreme that philosophy's ability to provide a comprehensive framework for human understanding has been seriously jeopardized. Wang's phenomenography is concerned with describing and classifying the whole of human experience. It is, accordingly, a type of phenomenology, but Wang warns us not to confuse it with the type of phenomenology practiced by Husserl and his followers. Unlike Husserlian phenomenology, phenomenography includes the subjective and the objective among the data of our experience and abandons any attempt to arrive at absolute certainty in its search for some measure of global definitness.

Wang addresses the question how philosophy can possibly consider the vast and diversified range of what we know, believe, and feel. He attempts to answer this question by looking at current philosophy with this very question in mind while actually doing philosophy from such a perspective. As the first in a series of books devoted to this dual concern, Wang's book deals only with doing justice to what we know. Furthermore, the current philosophy he considers is analytic philosophy since it is considered to be the home realm of epistemological questions.

One of the major themes of the book is that analytic philosophy does not do justice to what we know about mathematics. Wang's argument is directed at a limited conception of analytic philosophy which he calls analytic empiricism. Its guiding principles are:

(a) Empiricism is the whole of philosophy and there can be nothing (fundamental) which could
be properly called conceptual experience or conceptual intuition.

(b) Logic is all important for philosophy, but analyticity (even necessity) can only mean truth by convention.

Wang considers both Carnap and Quine to be analytic empiricists.

Wang argues that analytic empiricism cannot do justice to what we know about mathematics because it cannot provide an adequate account of the certainty, clarity, range, and applicability of mathematics. According to Wang, what is required is a concept of analyticity which does not require analytic propositions to be void of content—their truth must be understood in terms of the meanings of the concepts contained in them. The bulk of Wang's argument is directed at explaining why neither Carnap's nor Quine's analytic empiricism is compatible with such a concept of analyticity.

Although Wang's argument is directed at analytic empiricism, he believes that his observations point to certain inadequacies of the whole spirit of analytic philosophy. Following through with a phenomenographic analysis of the development of analytic philosophy, Wang characterizes the development as a series of resolutions to continual conflicts between the dual commitments to empiricism and the centrality of logic. Wang furthermore characterizes the resolutions to be in favor of the commitment to empiricism. He considers this to be the major reason why the movement fails to do justice to what we know about mathematics: its attenuated conception of logic cannot provide us with an adequate notion of analyticity.

Wang begins his phenomenographic analysis of analytic philosophy with the work of Russell. Russell's early work in mathematics is said to be in the tradition of doing justice to what we know about mathematics even though Wang characterizes Russell's no class theory as a concession to empiricism. Wang emphasizes Russell's concern to construct a natural axiom system from which ordinary mathematics could be derived. According to Wang, Russell's real transition from what we know to the empiricist's concern of how I know began when he turned his attention to epistemology. Russell's logic became a tool for constructing empirical knowledge out of sense-data.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus is identified as the major force behind the shift from what we know to how I know. Wang focuses on three basic assumptions which he considers responsible for this. They are: the principle of finiteness, the principle of atomicity, and the principle of extensionality. They were to provide us with a model of the world in which all knowledge could
be decomposed into truth-functions of definite, unambiguous elementary propositions concerned with some finite domain. Yet these assumptions reduced logic and analyticity to the tautological. According to Wang, they thereby trivialized mathematics.

Wang traces the influence of the Tractatus from Russell's logical atomism through Carnap's logical positivism to Quine's logical negativism (Wang's term). Although Quine's logical negativism is characterized as a reaction to Russell and Carnap, his views are described as continuing a program which favors empiricism at the expense of logic and our ability to do justice to what we know about mathematics. Quine is credited with maintaining a commitment to the centrality of logic. In Quine's philosophy, logic serves as the canonical framework of scientific theories, ontology is simply a matter of the quantifiers of logic, and epistemology is a behaviorist theory of linguistic learning in which logic sets the primary goals to be obtained. However, the conception of logic Quine chooses to occupy the center of his philosophy is elementary logic—a logic which does not include set theory and which does not provide us with a clear conception of analyticity.

Wang discusses Quine's philosophy in detail because it is the most recent or current manifestation of analytic empiricism. But it is also Wang's concern that we look at Quine's philosophy from a phenomenographic viewpoint and attempt to assess what must be altered in order that we may do justice to what we know about mathematics. Wang's assessment is that logic should be a theory of concepts which includes predicative set theory as a proper part. This broad conception of logic is admittedly an attempt to return as closely as possible to a Russellian conception without reintroducing the paradoxes. For Wang, the value of this conception of logic is that it will enable us to interpret logical truths as analytic propositions which are true by virtue of the meanings of the concepts occurring in them. One of the most basic themes of Wang's book is that without such a concept of analyticity we cannot hope to do justice to what we know about mathematics.
David Milligan deals with some of the most exciting writers and topics in contemporary philosophy. For this reason alone I would recommend the book, especially to the introductory student. Also, Milligan deliberately avoids "the fashionable reliance on the techniques and concepts of formal philosophical logic" (x). Instead, he prefers to use what might be called a phenomenological approach, which involves "look[ing] at particular examples and . . . a careful examination of the ways people feel, think and act" (x). Here we see the classical tension between definition and example, which can be found in the dialogues of Plato and also in the basic difference of approach between Civil Law jurisdictions and Common Law jurisdictions.

What is the status of the reasons we act on and the reasons we have for acting? Such questions are central to action theory. Milligan formulates his own questions by reference to the speech of Brutus in Julius Caesar, where Brutus declares that he loved Rome more than he loved Caesar, that he wanted to protect the Roman Republic from Caesar's despotism. Milligan asks: "How does [Brutus'] reason explain his action? What is the relation of his great love for Rome to his . . . murdering Caesar? Is it a causal relation? . . . How is this kind of explanation related to other types . . .—physiological, psychological or sociological?" (ix)

Milligan could have drawn a sharp distinction between explanation and justification (or our practices of reason-giving), and then proceeded to discuss the relationship between the practices of justification and our actions. Instead he examines the process of deliberation. Milligan rejects all views of deliberation which see reasoning as no more than deductive or causal reasoning. Instead, he sees "it as a matter of weighing up reasons for and against different conclusions and deciding which one is best supported" (x).

Here we see the weakness of Milligan's method of examining concrete examples. There is a tendency to under-analyze and to leave the analysis at too metaphorical a level. The weighing-metaphor is familiar enough to students of the Common Law—the metaphor's vagueness in this context is mitigated by on-the-job training with a community of experienced practitioners. Milligan, however, cannot mitigate in
This fashion. This is a point at which phenomenology must give way to logic. Milligan's reliance upon metaphorical description often causes him serious difficulties, since the comparison between deliberation and the weighing of physical objects is never drawn out in detail. The result is vagueness.

"Evaluation" is the key to Milligan's analysis of deliberation (which, nonetheless, remains vague for the above reasons). He writes:

It is through his evaluation of the relevant factors that an agent determines what is to be a reason, a good reason, and finally a decisive reason. When Brutus murders Caesar as a result of his deliberation . . . [he decides] that the welfare of Rome outweighs all other factors; he decides that it is a sufficient reason to determine his action. His desire for the welfare of Rome is not itself sufficient to result in his action. It is only through his evaluation of it that it becomes so. (x)

The above quotation also introduces another key concept in Milligan's analysis. He labels our desires to act as "feature-wants" when a course of action has a property which leads us to choose it (24). He says: "There is no limit to what may count as a feature . . . ." (25). Feature-wants are divided into impulse-desires, which "rise up in the agent uninvited and unguided," and other feature-wants, which "may be determined by the agent himself and need not be caused by anything external to the agent's deliberation" (7). Milligan often suggests that though impulse-desires are caused, our decision "to have" other feature-wants is without causal antecedents (e.g., 7, 140ff). However, he does not prove, nor does he show why he need not prove, that our selection of some feature-wants and our evaluations must be uncaused. Milligan stipulates that a desire cannot constitute a reason and be by itself the cause of an action; to become a reason, the desire must be evaluated and the agent must decide that it is to constitute a reason (9). Surely, given the advent of modern psychology, the burden of proof is upon Milligan, to establish his claims about evaluation having no causal antecedents.

Thus, arguably, Milligan's account of evaluation is vague and fails to meet the present burden of proof in the field of study. These problems mainly arise from Milligan's choice of method that I discussed above. The creative and critical reader may find in these remarks the incentive to improve upon Milligan's efforts.
William Lyons, in the subtitle, advertises his book as an "introduction" to the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle. The danger of introductory works is that they tend to oversimplify. This is doubly dangerous for a work on a philosopher like Ryle who thought that facile classification and dichotomizing often lay behind philosophical theories and "isms." Lyons is aware of these dangers and would have his intended audience read both his work and Ryle's in the careful and critical manner advocated by Ryle. This book can be recommended to both those who must lecture and be lectured to on Ryle.

Lyons examines two main themes in Ryle's work. First, Ryle's interest in the nature and method of philosophy, and his interest in philosophical puzzles not just in themselves, but also as objects on which to test philosophical methods. Second, Ryle's use of such methods to expose a mixture of mistakes that constitute Cartesian dualism.


On the whole, Lyons' presentation of Ryle's and his opponents' views is clear and comprehensible. However, I would like to make some brief critical remarks. On pp. 19-20, Lyons asks whether Ryle's view of the nature of philosophy is descriptive or normative, and answers that it is not descriptive because not all philosophers would agree with Ryle's account. However, it is arguable that skilled practitioners of an art (e.g., judges) are not always the best describers of their own skills. Thus, the errors of self-description by philosophers of their own activity (or even Ryle's errors if any, in his account of the nature of philosophical activity) may well remain descriptive in nature.

Finally, discussing Ryle's adverbial theory of thinking (in analysis, we should concentrate on "X-ing
Another more basic objection is that, if thinking is just an adverbial modification of activities and not itself an activity, how is it that some thinking is laborious and some easy? In short, if thinking is itself a modification, it ought not to be subject to modification (191).

Adverbs can and certainly often do modify adverbs, modifications are subject to modification. The force of Lyon's criticism escapes me here.

All in all, for the introductory student, and for some advanced students, Lyon's book provides a good introduction to Ryle's philosophy and a stimulus to further thought.


From the beginning, any attempt to understand Nietzsche's philosophy is problematic. Not only do his writings lack the established structural clarity of traditional texts, but the problem is exaggerated by Nietzsche's use of non-traditional philosophic language. In presenting his legacy Nietzsche was aware of this and thus he comments "Only the day after tomorrow belongs to me. Some are born posthumously . . .," signifying that his works are destined to be grasped only in the future (Preface to The Antichrist). Well, this future may have finally arrived. Thanks to the beginning efforts of Walter Kaufmann there has been a renewed interest in Nietzsche as a serious philosopher. In recent times, particular attention is being paid to certain French authors (Foucault, Deleuze, Kofman) who attempt to explain Nietzschean thought as an expression of metaphor.

It is according to this French influence that Alexander Nehamas offers his recent work Nietzsche: Life as Literature. As the title suggests a comparison is made between Nietzsche's view of life and the artistic genre of Literature. As Nehamas states, "Nietzsche, I argue, looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he looks at it as if it were a literary text" (3). Using the novel as a metaphor to help clarify Nietzschean thought Nehamas attempts to elucidate the coherent systematic unity which entitles Nietzsche's works to the appella-
tion "philosophical." "Life as Literature therefore deals not with an isolated topic but seeks to unify what appears to be chaotic concepts, and on this basis alone I must recommend the work.

Life as literature, as a metaphor, is open to two readily observable exposes. First we could compare Nietzsche's conception of life to that of the author of a novel, and secondly there is the relation of the reader to novel. Nehamas prefers the interpretative endeavor and therefore understands the metaphor in relation to reader/novel and not author/novel. This is apparent in the lack of concern throughout the work with Nietzsche's insistence on the importance of the "creative" endeavor.

Given Nehamas's concern with the reader/novel relation, he contrasts two divergent modes of dealing with existence: that of traditional dogmatism and Nietzschean perspectivism. Traditional dogmatism, primarily offered in the guise of the Christian ascetic, is understood metaphorically as the attempt to universalize the interpretation of the novel, of existence. According to the metaphysical tradition of dogmatic philosophers there is but one correct interpretation that should be sought, this is Reality in the objective sense. Nietzschean perspectivism, on the other hand, wants to allow for not only possible, but the necessary diversity of interpretative responses to existence. And this is where the central problem that Nehamas seeks to alleviate lies. If we accept Nietzsche's perspectivism, if we allow for the variety of interpretations, then our first problem is understanding the how? and the why? of this perspectivism. Secondly we need to concern ourselves with the problem of the hierarchy of perspectives. If all that there is are perspectives, then is Nietzsche condoning all perspectives including the most hideous? Life as Literature attempts to answer these two questions, essentially dividing itself into two major sections, the first confronting a justification and explanation of perspectivism, the second establishing a basis for judging perspectives.

Nehamas's first section, "World," confronts the enigma of the metaphor, "life as literature," by supplying a foundation from which to justify perspectivism in opposition to dogmatism. The traditional approach to "World" has been through the dogmatic ontologies that grounded Western Metaphysics. In this first section we are made aware of why ontology, in any manner, is fundamentally deceiving itself about existence. Nehamas accomplishes this by gradually working through Nietzsche's concept of the "World" as expressed in our attempt to comprehend "things," which here is representative of inanimate as well as animate objects. Implicit is the continual battle between the traditional comprehension of "World" through dogmatism (the
universal answer) and Nietzsche's perspectivism (a multiplicity of answers).

Nehamas suggests that the characteristic distinguishing between these two systems is Nietzsche's view of the world as a novel open to a variety of interpretations, and these interpretations are based on an endeavor similar to the interpretative process as exemplified in literature. Novels, precisely because of their use of language, are open to a multiplicity of interpretations depending upon the readers familiarity with the language, as well as the author. Yet Nietzsche offers his view of perspectivism as a preferred perspective and thus as a superior viewpoint and therefore a problem surfaces that Life as Literature as a whole seeks to answer: "if the view that there are only interpretations is itself only an interpretation, and therefore possibly wrong, it may seem to follow that not every view is after all an interpretation and that Nietzsche's position undermines itself" (1). In other words, if Nietzsche is correct, and perspectivism is our only means to understand existence, then why should his view be viewed as preferred, a position which he does hold?

In attempting to answer this question, Nehamas shows that Nietzsche's perspectivism is not dependent on the traditional dichotomy of correct and incorrect interpretation and therefore we can not condemn it as a "mere perspective." Such condemnation is to judge perspectivism according to the possibility of a "false" perspective, and this is precisely what perspectivism does not allow. The first four chapters will supply a justification for this by explaining Nietzschean perspectivism. These chapters will present perspectivism as fundamentally opposed to dogmatism, metaphorically expressed as the search for the one correct interpretation of the novel.

The first chapter, "The Most Multifarious Art of Style," begins by carefully examining Nietzsche's use of divergent styles and the reasoning behind them. As Nehamas notes, more often than not Nietzsche's style is classified as aphoristic, overlooking the fact that only a selection of his works are formatted in this manner. Nietzsche presents us everything from the traditional scholarly treatise (The Birth of Tragedy), to an autobiography (Ecce Homo) and a variety of styles in between, therefore to suggest that his style is limited to one genre is, as Nehamas suggests, to miss a relevant fact of his philosophy. Nehamas understands this "Multifarious Art of Style" as the Nietzschean desire to be "hyperbolic," a desire by Nietzsche to avoid presenting his so called "positive views" in a dogmatic fashion, as if they were universal answers, for this would undermine his perspectivism. To do so would be to revert to the style of his predecessors who claimed universality in their solutions and Nehamas in-
imates that the use of divergent styles was precisely an attempt to further refrain from dogmatism by avoid­ing a stabilizing of the style of interpretation.

Chapter 2, "Untruth As A Condition Of Life," is the fundamental beginning for the foundations of perspec­tivism according to the literary metaphor. In the creation of a character, an author concerns himself with select characteristics, purposefully avoiding other traits that might be attached to the character. In a similar manner, Nietzsche suggests that when we interpret the world we select, according to our preferences, relevant material while neglecting the rest, and therefore selection must exclude possible material of concern. To imagine a complete interpretation, a universal selecting, would be absurd, for as Nehamas suggests according to Nietzsche's "artistic model, the understanding of everything would be like a painting that incorporates all styles or that is painted in no style at all--a true chimera, both impossible and monstrous" (51). Again we have implicit the struggle between dogmatism and perspectivism. Dogmatists pre­sent their readings of the world as if they were capable of incorporating all styles, all information; an impossible and absurd task. Perspectivism, on the other hand, exists entirely on selective relevance of material, while necessarily excluding much. The inter­pretative model suggests that our knowledge about the world is selective according to our interests and goals, and thus untruth is a condition of life.

Continuing on this literary examination, Nehamas shows that just as in a novel we come to understand a character according to the presentation, for Nietzsche all "things" in the world are nothing more than the sum of their effects, nothing more that a sum of presenta­tion. Chapter 3 "A Thing Is The Sum Of Its Effects," emphasizes the connection of the will to power, as the endeavor to interpret, to this interconnectedness of all "things." A comprehensive interpretation would, by necessity, take into account all effects of a given ob­ject, but this is precisely what is beyond our abilities. We must select and choose those effects that are to be relevant in our investigation of ex­istence, and therefore we construct a world according to our selective nature. This is not to say that we live in error or that we can avoid the selecting of relevant effects, for as Nehamas suggests "Nietzsche repeatedly insists" that this constructed world "is ab­solutely necessary, and we could not live without it; for us it is as real as can be. We are not in error to live in it, to think and talk about it as we do, and to continue to do so. Our error is to believe that the ways in which we think and talk about it make by them­selves any commitment about the real nature of the world, the world that is the common object of all the different perspectives on it" (95-96). Selecting of
perspectives is necessitated by our inability to encompass everything (in the extreme) in our examination of the world.

The primary mode of selecting is genealogy, which is "Nietzsche's alternative to ontology" (104). Genealogy allows us to understand a thing according to its historical development and thus not in relation to some essential nature that adheres to the object. Chapter 4, "Nature Against Something That Is Also Nature," delves into a proper genealogical understanding of the ascetic ideal as presented by Nietzsche in the Genealogy of Morals. What concerns Nehamas is the fact that if Nietzsche is correct, and perspectivism is the best that can be achieved, then how can he treat the Christian ascetic in such a negative manner, especially as this is just another perspective of many possible interpretations. As Nehamas states, the Christian "ascetic ideal does not rest content with ordering the lives of those who may actually need it" (125), rather it attempts to supply a universal answer. As such, the Christian ascetic exists in the non-realization of his selective interests which have lead to his particular interpretative endeavor. Nietzsche, therefore, is capable of both praising and condemning Christian ascetics: they are praised as an expression of the Will To Power exemplified in an interpretative endeavor resulting from specific needs and goals, they are condemned in their lack of recognition of the perspectival nature of their ideal, in their attempt to dogmatize thier interpretation as if it were universal. Nietzsche is capable of both because for him to "say of a view that it is an interpretation is not to say that it is false. It is, rather, to say that it is a view that, like all views, is produced by specific interests, for specific purposes, and that it is appropriate for specific types of people" (127).

This first section presents a justification, and clarification, of perspectivism. It concludes by comparing Nietzschean perspectivism, based on the selective, interpretative process of Will to Power, to the dogmatism of the Christian ascetic ideal, based on an attempt to "make a claim to unconditional acceptance," in which "the ascetic ideal conceals its will to power and its partial and specific origins and goals" (129). Yet given this justification of perspectivism, this metaphor of life as literature, are we to conclude that Nietzsche condones all perspectives? From what has been presented so far all interpretations appear to be univocally allowed, but does this mean preferred or cononded, including the most hideous example, i.e. Hitler? Is Nietzsche truly advocating the immoralism that is so often equated with him?

The second half of Life as Literature examines this problem through an analysis of the "self" as projected in Nietzsche's philosophy. Traditional exposes of
Nietzsche's concept of "self," especially his ideal "self," have come to equate it with the Ubermensch, yet if this view is taken then it would appear that Nietzsche has committed the same fallacy as the Christian ascetic: he would be presenting a universal as if his particular interests and goals were objective. In understanding the Ubermensch as this ideal we would be replacing one form of dogmatism with another and Nehamas avoids this pitfall by showing that Nietzsche's conception of "self" is dependent on perspectivism and therefore can not easily be equated with some single, identifiable type. Yet, this does not imply that Nietzsche condones all perspectives, including the most hideous, only that the "self" will be multifaceted and not some substantial, essential unity.

In attempting to clarify Nietzsche's view of the "self" Nehamas begins by presenting what he considers a new understanding of Eternal Recurrence. Traditionally this topic has been grasped according to two primary interpretations. One accepts Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological thesis of the circularity of existence (everything will continually repeat itself in an unending circle of sequential events); the other perspective considers the doctrine as a hypothetical used to entice us into a certain response (a Nietzschean motivational tool to illicit his desired responses). Nehamas seems to suggest that his interpretation is new and novel, but it is nothing more than a rephrasing of the hypothetical viewed according to the conclusions of his previous section.

What Nehamas proposes is that if we accept the conclusions of the first section, if we accept that a "thing" (ourselves included) is nothing more than the complete sum of its effects, then if my life was to recur, if eternal recurrence existed as a cosmological fact, my life would have to recur in every detail, no matter how insignificant, and in the exact same sequence. Using one of his most insightful analogies, Nehamas compares this interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence to Proust's "Remembrance of Things Past." In this fictional autobiography the narrator relates in enormous, painstaking detail all the silly, insignificant, pointless, accidental, sometimes horrible things he did in his rambling efforts to become an author" (167). At the conclusion of the story we are brought back to the beginning to achieve a kind of endless repetition of the story. Nietzsche does not suggest that this is the actuality of our lives, a continual cycle of every event, rather he intimates that in order to live the "ideal" life we must be aware that we are only the sum of our effects and therefore if we seek to act according to the ground that perspectivism supplies we must come to understand our "self" in order to create the preferred existence for my specific in-
terests, goals and genealogy, but not "The Preferred" existence.

This individually preferred existence demands the accomplishment of one of Nietzsche's most problematic proclamations: "How One Becomes What One Is." This proclamation "is problematic, and not only because Nietzsche denies the distinction between becoming and being" (172). The real problem lies in the comprehension of the "self," which traditionally has been understood as a unity maintaining its singularity throughout an individual's life, but with the Nietzschean notion of "things" as sums of their effects this consistency is undermined. No longer is the "I" some mysterious, static, unifying construct that subsists throughout all our temporal wanderings, but it is reduced to the totality of its effects, to the totality of its actions which "once again (is) applying his doctrine of the will to power, . . ." (172). What results is a notion of "self" in process, a "self" which is "constantly in the process of changing" (182). Life is a continual process of new possibilities for effecting, and as such life entails the continual changing of the "self" according to its continually increasing sum of effects. The unity which the tradition had supposed in regards to the "self" is a fiction, for the "self" is in a never ending process of enlarging its genealogical history and thus enlarging itself.

As a result of this historical enlarging we are capable of being fundamentally involved in the process of effecting. This involvement rests in the ability to take responsibility for our actions, for our increasing effects and therefore we have the capability of "becoming who we are." To "become who we are" entails first an understanding of our genealogy, and Nietzsche's concern with his historical tradition exemplifies this. Secondly, as active participants in "becoming who we are" we must have an understanding of which "who" we want to be, as the process is continually adding material to the sum of the "self." But, for many, perspectivism seems to imply the acceptance of all possible "who's" as not only justified but condoned, and therefore Nietzsche is quite often equated with immoralism. In its most damaging relation, this equating has Nietzsche condoning such hideous "self" creations as Adolf Hitler, and certain readers (including Nietzsche's sister and the Third Reich) have used text, quoted out of context, to justify this type of Nietzschean immoralism (i.e. the reference to the "blond beasts" in Genealogy of Morals, a reference which Kaufmann places in proper perspective). What results is that Nietzsche's perspectivism is degraded as if this was a necessary consequence of it; but is it?

It is this question that Nehamas answers in his last chapter, "Beyond Good and Evil." In examining
this epigram Nehamas intimates that we must be careful in understanding the expressed relation. What is implied is not the attempt to get beyond morality, but the honesty to properly grasp not only the foundations of morality, but also the concept of an "order of rank" in morality. Foundationally, Nietzsche wants to show that "morality too, like everything else in the world, is a product of the will to power" (202). Morality is nothing more than the interpretative endeavor in relation to actions, and thus it is nothing more than a further elaboration of perspectivism in relation to actions viewed as right or wrong.

From this standpoint it would seem that Nietzsche might be condoning all moral decisions, and therefore immorality as such, but this has been a common misunderstanding that Nehamas seeks to correct. Even Nietzsche warns us that the attempt to get "Beyond Good and Evil" at least does not mean 'Beyond Good and Bad,'" (206) and hence it is not a condoning of all actions. What Nietzsche wants to get beyond are those moralities that exist on the dichotomy of Good and Evil as if they were universally, objective axiological decisions valid for all. Again we are presented the opposition between dogmatism and perspectivism. Dogmatists want their moralities to be universal, perspectivists desire that mores be fitted to the individual needs and goals of each "self." Nehamas, therefore, rightly shows that Nietzsche is quite capable of condoning the will to power of the "noble masters," and yet does not condone the savagery that is quite often attached to his examples. These "savage beasts" are condoned for their expression of the will to power, the will to interpret the world according to their individual interests and goals; they are condemned in not realizing that one's morality is only obligating to similar "selves," and not to all. In fact Nietzsche praises the "noble type" that shows mercy precisely because it recognizes an "order of rank" in morality. Traditionally morality has shown up "order of rank" by its attempt to subsume all actions under its universal guidelines, and this is precisely what morality must show, an "order of rank" dependent upon the will to power as the interpretative endeavor.

Nehamas concludes by bringing us back to the beginning. As he states, Nietzsche's texts therefore do not describe but, in exquisitely elaborate detail, exemplify the perfect instance of his ideal character" (232). What Nietzsche accomplishes in his writings is representative of the character that he creates, himself. Life, therefore, is a novel for Nietzsche in which each person interprets his own "self."

In conclusion let me remark that Nietzsche: Life as Literature should follow in the footsteps of Kaufmann's work and become a central work in the Nietzsche literature. Not only is it well written, but
it does a great service in unifying concepts that have often been approached as isolated topics in Nietzsche. Nehamas, to his credit, justifies his interpretation through an indepth search and analysis of the texts, always seeking repetitive verification for his view. To further clarify his position, Nehamas also shows his familiarity with other interpretations by constantly comparing and contrasting his interpretation with the major scholars on Nietzsche. What results from all this is a clear, informative work that should only enhance Nietzsche scholarship.