
This collection includes a translation of Heidegger's essay "Kant's Thesis About Being," nine articles by various scholars and a bibliography of English translations of Heidegger's works. The translation and seven of the essays are reprinted from a Heidegger issue of the Southwestern Journal of Philosophy of 1973, although this is not acknowledged anywhere in the text, so far as I can see; to these the editors have added a 1972 paper by Douglas Kellner and a much more recent one by Thomas J. Sheehan, which takes account of recent publications in the continuing series of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. I mention the dates because Heidegger-forschung (an enterprise that would doubtless have been received with mixed feelings by its subject) has taken several steps forward in both Europe and the United States since most of these essays were written (in the U.S. this is due in large part to the appearance of translations that are accurately listed in the up to date bibliography at the end of this book). Nevertheless, there is much here that will still be rewarding and provocative for the student of Heidegger.

"Kant's Thesis About Being," first published in 1962, is a tour de force of Heideggerian hermeneutics. In an explication of Kant's famous saying that being is not a "real predicate" but "merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in and of themselves" Heidegger attempts to associate Kant with the philosophical tradition, as he understands it in which, the great thinkers from Plato to Nietzsche are concerned with how being and thought (Sein and Denken) belong together. Kant is often taken to be articulating a claim that would, if granted, utterly eliminate the kind of Seinsdenken practiced by Heidegger. But Heidegger implicitly contests this conventional reading of Kant by distinguishing real predicates (having to do with substantiality) from transcendental predicates; the other side of the coin is that he reads what is taken to be Kant's "merely positing" (e.g. in N. K. Smith's translation) as "purely positing" and proceeds to develop the notion that Kant has a relatively rich
and complex sense of positing (Setzung) that is associated with his involvement in the problematic of representational thought. This places Kant within the (Plato to Nietzsche) history of metaphysics as a thinker who has already taken the turn toward defining being in terms of will; the essay closes with some suggestive remarks about that which is unthought in this tradition, its commitment to a metaphysics of presence.

In a thoughtful consideration of the essay by Heidegger, Ted Klein (who translated the piece with William Pohl) inquires whether such interpretations can be valid. This is an important issue that many writers on Heidegger have preferred to avoid; but unless it is faced the impression will remain with many that Heidegger's interpretations are rather arbitrary fancies based on tenuous word-plays. Although Klein does succeed in sketching the major movements of the essay, his answer to the charge of arbitrariness is not completely adequate. He makes a distinction between the horizon of the author (here Kant) and the horizon of the interpreter (Heidegger); the first task of interpretation is to reconstruct the former and the second is to place it within the latter. The distinction, I think, is too sharp and it is symptomatic that Husserl's conception of intentionality is invoked to support it. Heidegger's claim, in Being and Time, that we are always already involved in interpretation suggests the impossibility, (and Gadamer makes it more explicit), of attaining a purely descriptive knowledge of an author's intention that would only later be reconsidered within our own horizon. A more penetrating approach is the one suggested by Gadamer (and perhaps at work in Heidegger's essay) in which the effective history of a text becomes the basis for a productive hermeneutic relation to it.

Otto Poggeler, in "Historicity' in Heidegger's Late Work," gives a careful account of the changing fortunes of that notion in the various stages of Heidegger's thought. In fact Poggeler, as he has done elsewhere, reads Heidegger's philosophical career from the standpoint of his latest works and proposes, at least implicitly, a three-stage version of the career that offers an alternative to the conventional distinction of two phases marked by the elusive Kehre. Poggeler sees Being and Time as ambiguous in its handling of historicity; the works of the 30's and 40's (e.g. "The Origin of the Work of Art," Nietzsche) are more fully committed to the historicity of all being and that of philosophical thought itself; but the last essays with their focus on Ereignis and Lichtung are seen as a turning away from the embrace of historicity to a concern with a giving or sending (Geschick) that is neither human nor totally historical. Anglophone readers who have too readily adopted an extreme historicist conception of the later Heidegger (owing perhaps
to influential presentations by Hubert Dreyfus and Richard Rorty) should take seriously Poggeler's warning that Heidegger is being distorted when his thought is too readily assimilated to "historicism and Historiognosis."

In the longest and most scholarly contribution to this volume, Thomas Sheehan offers a reconstruction of Heidegger's thought and writing on "Time and Being', 1925-1927." Sheehan's study is essentially an inquest into the philosophical scandal consisting in Heidegger's having repeatedly announced that he would complete Being and Time and his belated acknowledgment (in 1953) that it was uncompletable. Like Poggeler, Sheehan's orientation is based on the latest Heidegger, with emphasis on the bivalent structure of presence and absence that constitutes the meaning of all disclosure. Whereas Poggeler uses this orientation to produce a sweeping survey of all of Heidegger's work, Sheehan gives as a finely tuned, historically and textually informed analysis of the various sketches and hints which Heidegger offered in the writings and lectures of 1925-27 of how Being and Time might be completed by Time and Being. He constructs a detailed comparative analysis of Being and Time 1, 182 (the only published parts) and of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (lectures which were given immediately after the publication of Being and Time but published only in 1977). On the basis of the analysis, Sheehan makes a convincing case that none of the writings of this period (published or unpublished) are in fact the continuation or completion of his project which Heidegger sometimes hinted he had produced. However, the results are not exclusively negative. Sheehan shows us a Heidegger grappling simultaneously with the subtlest, most profound problem of being and temporality and the pressure of "the politics of publish-or-perish." The general perspective which emerges is that as early as the composition of these writings, Heidegger was thinking in terms of the dynamic bivalence of presence and absence, lethe and aletheia. Thus Heidegger is one for whom there was no epochal Kehre or transformation, but one who relentlessly sought more compelling and illuminating transformations of a single original insight.

The remaining essays in the book can be divided into three groups, on the basis of their relation to Heideggerian themes. These groups are themselves typical of the general varieties of the literature on Heidegger. One such approach is to identify a specific concept or topic that Heidegger writes about and to analyze his views with the aim of placing them in the philosophical tradition or, more broadly, in the history of Western thought. Such a circumspect approach which is aware of its goals and limitations, is followed by Joseph Kockelmans who contributes a useful essay on "Heidegger on Theology." Kockelmans stresses
Heidegger's awareness of the difference between philosophy and theology (construing the latter as a positive science) and the importance of the experience of faith; he also briefly assesses the prospects for renewing theology by means of a non-objectifying thought and language, as Heidegger has attempted a renewal or overcoming of philosophy. To the second group of essays belong two by John Salis and Calvin Schrag that offer sensitive and evocative accounts of themes that are obviously central to Heidegger's thought: language and art. These studies move within an essentially Heideggerian framework and mode of discourse.

A final group of essays seeks either to expand the Heideggerian thematic, to confront it with themes and topics that are not obviously Heideggerian, or that seek to put Heidegger in a new perspective by comparing him in novel ways with another thinker. Charles Scott writes on "Heidegger, Madness, and Well-Being," exploring the distinctions between two views of mental health and illness that claim to be inspired by Heideggerian ideas. One form, represented by Ludwig Binswanger, sees Heidegger as a theorist of transcendental subjectivity who offers a hermeneutic key by means of which the inner world of the mad person may be deciphered. Another perspective is exemplified by Medard Boss, who, Scott convincingly argues, is closer to the most authentic and radical strains in Heidegger. Boss does not see the schizophrenic as "trapped by a self-defecting world-design [as does Binswanger] but as "a person who is open in the world in a way that denies significant aspects of his world-openness" (p. 148). In distinguishing these two views of madness, Scott is implicitly following the differentiation suggested in the editors' introduction between the "existential" Heidegger as seen by the earliest anglophone reception and the Heidegger who is concerned with articulating the structure of presence and absence and of openness to being. Michael Gelven engages in another comparative study that tries to demonstrate "a meaningful similarity between Heidegger's theory of existential understanding and Plato's erotic idealism," by suggesting analogies between the way in which each sees the activity of understanding. The similarity depends upon seeing common themes in Heidegger's notion of Dasein as projective, always beyond itself in its possibilities, and Plato's conception of éros as the dynamic tension between ideal possibility and actuality. In attempting to strengthen the analogy by suggesting that Lichtung is comparable to Plato's image of the sun, Gelven seems to ignore Heidegger's critique of Plato's appeal to the goal of absolute presence in Plato's Doctrine of Truth; that critique, read in relation to the thematics of what Sheehan calls pres-ab-sence (and which is developed in several of the essays) would yield a rather different account of Heidegger, stressing the inevita-
ble ambiguity of the Holzwege of his thought. Douglas Kellner's "Authenticity and Heidegger's Challenge to Ethical Theory" is a succinct outline of the resources to be found in Being and Time for mounting a challenge to some of the assumptions that have been prevalent in Angloanalytic ethical theory in this century. Kellner points out that Heidegger has either an implicit or explicit critique of the alleged independence of "is" and "ought" statements, of the possibility of pursuing serious ethical thought without regard to ontology, and of the viability of an ethics which takes our common practices and the language in which they are expressed as a norm. In a footnote he mentions that he has since writing this piece in 1972 become more critical of Heidegger; it is also worth noting that many ethical theorists in the English speaking world would now be on the "Heideggeran" side of the issues delineated by Kellner, and a few would even acknowledge the convergence of ideas.

The editors point out that the understanding of Heidegger has shifted from an existential concern to an orientation that is directed more to the history of being and the end of philosophy. The change in reception has been symbolized and furthered by the appearance of the Gesamtausgabe, following Heidegger's death in 1976. Part of that change, which they do not remark, is a growing tendency to give a less inflationary reading of Heidegger's thinking about being; since the editors adopt the latter phrase as their title, one cannot tell with certainty whether they agree with recent English translators of the Gesamtausgabe who have marked their own "demythologizing" reading of Sein by refusing to transplant the idiosyncracies of German typography into versions intended for anglophones. (In the recent translations of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology by Albert Hofstadter and The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Logic by Michael Heim, Sein is rendered simply as "being"; Heim refers to this as a "demythologizing" approach.) Another way of expressing this changed attitude is that there is now much less interest in "the secret of Heidegger" than there was when those who wrote about him attempted either to ape his style or to discuss his thought by the introduction of esoteric perspectives. And Heidegger now has what his student Hans-Georg Gadamer calls a Wirkungsgeschichte, an "effective history"; his work must be read by us as it has been productive in Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Derrida, and even in the philosophy of Richard Rorty and Stanley Cavell. That there has been a reported loss of interest in Heidegger in Germany raises interesting questions about the relatively unproductive Heidegger-reception in German philosophy, to which Gadamer is the most notable exception; one suspects that this may have something to do with a traditional German pattern (now happily on the wane) of uncritical veneration for the
thought of just one scholar or thinker at a time. In any case the variety of perspectives represented by these essays and similar recent work on Heidegger suggests that the force of Heideggerian thought is separable from such trappings.


The eight essays presented in this volume, six of which first appeared in Vernunft im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft (1976) (the other two, "The Heritage of Hegel" (1979) and "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task" (1976) were published separately), represent not so much a substantial shift in Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy as a new perspective on fundamental themes previously elaborated in such works as Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976), Truth and Method (1976), Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies (1976), Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (1980) and various single articles. This new perspective is developed in Reason in the Age of Science through a hermeneutical investigation of the rationalistic presuppositions underlying the development of technological science today and the impact of this development on present and future human society. The elaboration of hermeneutical theory and practice from this perspective also contains a tacit critique of the failure of contemporary philosophical reflection to generate a meaningful and comprehensive understanding of the nature of reason which incorporates the moral, practical and political dimensions of human being along with the conceptual dimensions of logic, mathematics and physics. Gadamer intends to rectify this lack. Utilizing the hermeneutical principles whose very foundation he is at the same time commenting upon as he follows the interrogative lead of his subject matter, Gadamer expounds a hermeneutical concept of reason whose dialectical "logic" is as much a process of the heart as of the head. Although a humanistic concern for the ethical ground of understanding revealed in the universality of language has always been fundamental to the dialectical motivation of Gadamer's hermeneutical project, it becomes here the conscious, thematic focus of his reflections.

In his earlier work, especially Platosa dialektische Ethic (1968)--Gadamer's Habilitationsschrift written under the direction of Martin Heidegger--and Dialogue
and Dialectic, the conversational structure of the Platonic dialogue was shown to be an indirect pedagogical "method" which allows truth to come to light within the "to and fro movement" of question and answer: a literary re-presentation of that inner dialectic of the individual soul with itself which is at the same time a fundamental orientation of self-conscious beings to others and to Other Being itself. This conversational interplay would later become—as the beating heart of the concept of "linguisticality" (Sprachlichkeit)—the ontological foundation of hermeneutical self-consciousness in Truth and Method. In that comprehensive text the practical dimension of philosophical hermeneutics, though clearly present as the question to which Truth and Method can be understood as an answer, took a back seat to the critique of aesthetic and historical consciousness which led the way to the ontological grounding of understanding in language. Gadamer's hermeneutical appropriation of Plato's ethical dialectic was thus employed to extend the Heideggerian critique of ontotheological metaphysics to include all presuppositionless understanding.

The essays contained in this present volume, however, reveal a reversal of this procedure in their explicit return to the practical and political dimensions of philosophical hermeneutics. The ethical critique of science as abstract, bloodless theory on the one hand, and unreflective technique on the other—a situation brought about by the subjective idealism of Enlightenment rationalism since the time of Galileo—is now brought back into the foreground. There is a clear softening of the ontological critique which was developed in Truth and Method in support of the Heideggerian project, but a retention and broader application of the basic hermeneutical principles which were worked out there, as will be shown below.

The first essay, "On the Philosophic Element in the Sciences and the Scientific Character of Philosophy," establishes the theme of the collection. Appealing to the Greek conception of philosophy as a comprehensive project which included every kind of theoretical and practical knowledge, Gadamer focuses his hermeneutical spotlight on "the critical situation of our day in which one finds a world transformed on the basis of science into a single huge business." As an antidote to this situation, Gadamer recommends a hermeneutical retrieval of the Aristotelian conception of philosophical "science" as he sees this appropriated by Hegel (and Schelling). Although Gadamer remains skeptical toward the eschatological pretensions of German Idealism, he sees in Hegel an "attempt to get beyond the idealistic notion of self-consciousness and to let the world of the objective spirit issue as a higher dimension of the truth." In contrast to this hermeneutic appropriation of the dialectical movement of historical
Geist (like Anaxagoras' Nous, only more self-conscious), Gadamer criticizes the "bad infinity" of a metaphysics of closure or pure presence which he describes as "self-crucifying and self-aggrandizing," and which he perceives as being far from the truth of the Hegelian system. Thus Gadamer calls for a revitalization of the concept of rationality as a dialogical interplay which avoids both the false idealism of technological science and the "precipitous constructions" of modern philosophy. Rather, as creatures distinguished by the ritual burial of their dead, human beings must learn to live in that hermeneutical region of the in-between—a dynamic tertium quid which is the juncture of finitude and a taste for the infinite. In short, as Hegel suggested, we need to learn once again how to "make ourselves at home in the world" without getting stuck in it.

Gadamer continues this line of thought in the second and third essays, "Hegel's Philosophy and its Aftereffects" and "The Heritage of Hegel," which reveal a deep and vital affinity between his philosophical hermeneutics and Hegel's dialectical logic. This becomes particularly evident in Gadamer's assessment of the Hegelian notion of objective spirit—the concrete manifestation of universal reason within historical structures and social institutions. For Gadamer, Hegel's concept of the objectification of absolute spirit stands in the tradition of what the Greeks attempted to speak in the word Nous, a notion which, by virtue of its radical otherness, puts the modern idea of self-conscious subjectivity into a more realistic perspective. This "Hegelian turn" (Gadamer states explicitly that he will be no "disciple") is a pivotal move on Gadamer's part and a key to the new look of his hermeneutical project revealed in these essays. A rationality wholly lodged in subjective self-consciousness demands of that finite subjectivity an epistemological ideal which it is unable to provide, thus leaving subjectivity alienated from itself and grasping at a domination of the supposed source of that alienation through the manipulation and objectification of the natural, social, political, economic and cultural spheres; thus arises a thoughtless technology based on abstract theory. Instead of alleviating the conditions of alienation, this dehumanizing action of technology further exacerbates the situation, leaving modern science caught in the vicious circle of that unhappy consciousness which Hegel described so elegantly through the dialectic of lordship and bondage.

In contrast to this, Gadamer wants to show that a synergistic, dialectical conception of reason, removed from the "bad" eschatological metaphysics of ontotheology, is the narrow course threading its way through the Scylla of intellectual idealism and the Charybdis of a relativistic subjectivism, toward a hermeneutical
appropriation of true knowledge. One begins to see that the hermeneutical concept of "the fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung), expounded in Truth and Method, is closer to the dialectical unfolding of the Hegelian absolute in concrete, political and social states, than it is to the objectifying pretensions of Husserlian reflection or the Kantian transcendental ego. As in the model of genuine conversation (which is the fundamental metaphor Gadamer uses to describe this hermeneutic consciousness) there is an expressive aspect of objective spirit which perpetually surpasses subjective self-consciousness, toward a communal self-consciousness which always grips subjectivity more than subjectivity ever grasps it. Openness to this surpassing quality of the rational, which Gadamer locates preeminently in Greek thought and sees revived in Hegel, is the dialectical cornerstone of hermeneutical self-consciousness conceived as a "mutual recognition" within a synergistic intersubjectivity where the unobtainable whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. Thus, Gadamer now denies that "bad infinity" of an absolute historical closure (which he once thought to be necessarily inscribed in Hegel's teleological architectonic) with which "overzealous epigones" have burdened Hegel's philosophy. To ask the question of the absolute transparency of self-understanding is already to have taken the first step out of the ongoing interrogative dwelling which we are and to have moved decisively toward that false idealism of absolute control which is the central corruption of contemporary technological self-consciousness, as manifested in its commitment to an anesthetizing form of self-surpassing which it labels "progress."

In "What Is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason" Gadamer moves from the Hegelian dialectic to the dialectical interdependency of the Aristotelian notions of theoria and praxis and shows how the separation of these in the modern conception of science has led to a dependency on the technology of social engineering to solve those human problems which it is incapable of solving. This has resulted in the alienation of human consciousness from itself and a consequent loss of individual and collective identity, which has led the human race to the brink of self-destruction. Gadamer thus takes his hermeneutical consciousness clearly into the realm of the practical and the ethical when he issues a plea for the rediscovery of a new solidarity based on a hermeneutical approach to understanding, in the face of the monster of technological consciousness which, in keeping with the well-known inversion of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, is poised in readiness for the total annihilation of its master. An urgency in Gadamer's message is revealed here. In his well-informed introduction to the collection, the translator of these essays, Fred-
erick G. Lawrence, touches on this sense of urgency when he caricatures Gadamer as an "evangelist" promulgating "the 'good news' of hermeneutical philosophy." Although we should not be discouraged by prophets of pessimism, Gadamer suggests that nevertheless "no one knows how much time we still have." On this ominous note we move to the more positive outlook of the two essays which are the heart of the volume.

"Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy" and "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task" endeavor to establish the contention that philosophical hermeneutics is something essentially more than a teaching of the technical skill of interpretation (Kunstlehre). Building on the Aristotelian notion of the interdependency of theoria and praxis within a comprehensive concept of philosophy as "science," and showing the manner in which this holistic understanding of science became self-estranged through the Enlightenment hubris of inductive technique, Gadamer traces the general hermeneutics he has developed back through the Romantic period where various regional hermeneutics established themselves (particularly in jurisprudence, classical philology and Scriptural exegesis) on the model of the emerging empirical sciences, to the Greek origin of hermeneutical consciousness in Aristotelian and Platonic thinking. The parallel rise and fall of the history of science and the history of thought is brought to light through an analysis of the history of interpretation. Viewed from an Aristotelian perspective, philosophy is the "scientific" study of all that is knowable, both as practical/political/ethical knowledge and theoretical/mathematical/metaphysical knowledge, and what we call science today is, in contrast, a left hand which no longer knows what its right hand is doing—a "bad" kind of technē. Given this context, philosophical hermeneutics sets as its task both the elaboration of the interpretive conditions necessary for all understanding within the practical and theoretical "science" of philosophy as well as the actual application integral to this interpretive orientation. What is finally revealed here is how the ethical, practical and political dimensions of hermeneutical theory are more an openness to experience in the formation of practical judgement within the interpretive context—along the lines of Aristotelian phronēsis—and a willingness to be led by the dialectic of question and answer after the manner of Plato and Hegel, rather than the rote learning of a specific philological skill (technē). From a hermeneutical perspective, then, practice is theory-in-action and theory is the active self-reflection of practice. Thus Gadamer sets the stage for a hermeneutical rapprochement between philosophy and science.

Although the hermeneutical (Heideggerian) structures of facticity, historicity and temporality make
the complete self-transparency of human understanding impossible, and permit interpretation, at best, to be only and always "on the way" to true knowledge, still the hermeneutical project as Gadamer finds it originally conceived in Greek thought opens up a future of "endless" possibility for that finite self-consciousness which has penetrated and been penetrated by the dialectic of universal and concrete reason through the mediation of language. But one does not follow this hermeneutic path without risk. The hermeneutical transformation of human self-consciousness is an adventure with a direction, Gadamer claims, and "like any other adventure, is dangerous." Unfortunately, Gadamer does not elaborate this point. But it is clearly vital to the understanding of hermeneutics as a practical philosophical project because it is exactly at the juncture of this risk that subjective self-consciousness, burdened with the impossible task of creating its own meaning—as Existentialism revealed in what Gadamer thinks was a misguided project—and threatened by the possibility of failing to achieve authenticity within the limitations of its inescapable finitude, turns to the impotent security of abstract theory and the comforting illusion of thoughtless technique. If the central thrust of hermeneutical consciousness is the practical transformation of what Plato calls the "polity of the soul" within the dialectical framework of question and answer within the larger framework of communality, and if this expansion of the horizon of human self-understanding is truly a risky and dangerous undertaking, as Gadamer suggests, then the therapeutic dimension of philosophical hermeneutics stands in need of further elaboration. It is precisely from the therapeutic vantage point at the heart of hermeneutical theory that one can see how the Freudian orientation of Habermas' social action theory and Derrida's deconstruction(ism), for instance, with its psychoanalytic ground in the kind of Enlightenment rationalism of which Gadamer is critical, becomes caught in the self-referentiality of its own suspicion. This was the thrust of Gadamer's argument in his well-known debate with Habermas and the critical theory of the Frankfurt school—a debate which, from the evidence contained in these present essays, has left Gadamer more open to the critical, explanatory moment of philosophical hermeneutics and encouraged his new appreciation of Hegel. The critical and risk-free application of Habermas' "depth analysis" to social and cultural structures, would, in turn, benefit from a hermeneutical appropriation of what the Greeks called "therapeia."

The last two essays are a fitting conclusion to the volume because they lead the reader back to the beginning through a dialectical recapitulation and synthesis of the whole. Together they represent a masterful overview of the development of the hermeneutical pers-
pective. "On the Natural Inclination of Human Beings Toward Philosophy" and "Philosophy or Theory of Science?" bring to light a need for a new unity within the distinct orientations of contemporary philosophy and science. But this need for an intra-unification must begin with a recognition of the necessary interrelatedness of philosophy and science in terms of their mutual horizon described by Gadamer as "the humaniora." Thus philosophy must not seek to be a corrective intervention into the scientific project. Rather it must pursue its own proper task of becoming itself that "theory of science" (Wissenschaftstheorie) which will integrate the dogmatic, privatized "falling apart of human thought into types of Weltanschauung." And science must recognize its hermeneutic dimension in its linguistic situatedness, its reliance on determinative paradigms (as Thomas Kuhn has pointed out) and its inescapable mediation of past, present and future history through openness to the self-transformation of its own historical orientation. In this manner, Gadamer claims, science will be reconciled with the hermeneutical reflection of philosophy, and philosophy will be reconciled with the hermeneutical praxis of science, and both the horizon of philosophy and the horizon of science will be lifted beyond themselves in a hermeneutical fusion with the limitless horizon of the humaniora.

Beyond a few typographical errors and an occasional awkward rendering of a complex German syntactical structure, in an otherwise smooth, consistent and easily readable translation, one drawback indigenous to collected volumes is apparent in this text: the repetitiveness of certain areas of the subject matter which one notices, particularly when reading the entire collection straight through. However, I would be the first to agree that the integrity of the individual articles should not be sacrificed for the sake of the economy of the whole. Given the intriguing alteration of perspective in each of these essays, the recasting of the history of hermeneutics, or Hegel's historical philosophy, or the conception of theory and practice in Aristotle, is certainly more of a nuanced broadening of Gadamer's hermeneutical horizon than mere slavish duplication. At any rate, this unavoidable problem of repetitiveness is more than compensated for by Gadamer's many penetrating insights into the human condition, his extraordinary grasp of the philosophical tradition, his ability to express complex and subtle movements of thought with lucidity and felicity of style, and, in general, his willingness to undertake in his own interrogation of the central issues of hermeneutical philosophy the kind of hermeneutical risk this same philosophy establishes as a necessity in such an investigation.

423
There is much to be recommended in these eight hermeneutical studies. They contain a vertical multidimensionality which will make them easily accessible to those who are new to the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, while at the same time providing a refreshing challenge to the advanced hermeneut already familiar with the work of this influential continental thinker. There is also a horizontal, interdisciplinary orientation to these essays which extends the scope of their appeal beyond the confines of academic philosophy to the social, political and scientific fields of inquiry as well as to anyone interested in the current state of the human condition. *Reason in the Age of Science* is thus a welcomed addition to Gadamer's other works available in English translation.


Max Picard's *Man and Language* is a very meditative work concerning the origin, meaning and importance of language for man. It reads more like a series of personal insights and observations than a philosophical treatise, but one feels that this is rather a credit to Picard's genius than any deficiency in the work. Such a technique forces the reader to move slowly--almost devotionally--through the passages and thus hopefully to relive in some measure the experiences, the attitudes, and the mysteries which yielded the author his insights.

Such a style also makes it rather difficult to evaluate Picard, however, for one is often left with the impression that one's own contact with the "datum" of language and its related phenomena has not been as full and deep as the author's own. Of course, this is true to some extent vis-a-vis every great thinker. However, Picard seems to consciously shy away from a mere intellectual exposition of themes--which could be more easily grasped and evaluated. Rather, he wishes to bring the reader to an intuitive contact with language itself. His brief chapters and sub-chapters are like so many windows encircling language through which he attempts to bring one into a state of "wondering" at the fundamental datum itself.

**Origin of Language**

The first major theme which Picard investigates in the work is that of the origin of language, which he regards as a divine gift allotted to man as a part of
his basic endowment. To follow the author in this insight, one must attempt to step back from the unthinking commonplace acceptance of language as men habitually use it. We must try to experience with Picard the completely new moment of being which occurs when a word is spoken—when the first word was spoken and when each child speaks his own first word. The level of human existence is reached, as Picard notes: "Cardinal Polignac is reported to have said to the orangutan: 'Speak—and I will bless thee'—a dictum which suggests the distance of the animal from man, not its nearness to him."

The primary note by which one may come to see that language is truly of divine origin, a gift to man from a sphere above the human level, is the unity of opposites which language holds within itself—and that on many different levels. For example, though language is pre-given in man, he is free in relation to it and may use it as he wills. "This unity of activity and passivity, of freedom and compulsion in language, belongs to a sphere above the human level."

This coincidentia oppositorum is again present in various aspects of language. Though sound is material and physical, it is taken up into the realm of the spiritual when language harnesses and absorbs sound as the vehicle of its expression. Further, the physical body itself, sharing in the life of the mind, participates in language "which raises man right above the physical." And again, Picard points to the voice as a compound of the objective and the subjective, of the eternal and the worldly. "The voice reveals a man's basic nature and capacity; the words he speaks reveal what he has made of his basic capacity."

Picard goes on to reject various explanations "from below" of the origin of language, missing its truly transcendent nature. These theories are of three main types. First, that language was originally the expression which arose from and accompanied collective activities. But if so, then why have not animals also developed language?

Next it is suggested that language may be derived from gesture, but Picard notes that gesture belongs to a totally different category from language.

Language is clear and free and sovereign, rising above itself and leaving everything behind it except the silence from which it comes. Gesture, on the other hand, is unfree, unredeemed, still completely mixed with the material it uses in its attempts at self-representation. It is still inside the material and bound up with it, not approaching the material freely from outside as the spirit approaches the word. (from The World of Silence by Picard).
Finally, some would assert that human language might be derived from animal sounds, or at least to have arisen from an imitation of the sounds of nature and animals. But again Picard resists this interpretation a la baisse, and indicates instead that the sounds of nature and of animals "aspire towards the level of human language," but that "the animal is enclosed inside its own nature and cannot reach out beyond itself by means of language."

Does Picard really prove his point? No, but neither does he attempt a strict proof. He offers an explanation of the origin of language which, through his insights and meditations, he tries to show to be more adequate to the mysterious nature, depth, meaning, and complexity of human language. Is he successful? Yes, I believe he is. Any thinking man, of whatever persuasion, would be arrested in his flow of thoughts and theories by a serious reading of Picard, whose writing has a freshness and wonder about it which causes one to pause and rethink the "commonplace."

Further, from the standpoint of a believer, Picard's words on language--its relation to eternity, God, and creation; its character as a gift--become increasingly relevant and illuminative. The impossibility that language might have developed "from below" becomes increasingly apparent as one reads. The ontological level of being on which human language and communication occurs, upon closer observation, proves itself to be utterly distinct from the cries and songs of the animal kingdom.

Language between Man and Things

A second major theme running through Man and Language is the position of language between man and things. This intermediary status allows language to both reveal and conceal being. This marks yet another union of opposites within language. "Language replaces the natural immediacy of the animal world with the immediacy of the spirit. The direct and the indirect are opposed to one another and yet they co-exist quite peacefully in language."

Language has its effects on both man and things. Language both inspires man with a reverence for things (by means of the "distance which language creates between man and things"), and protects man from things, and this latter in two ways. First, by not allowing everything to reach man. "There exist in the world things more terrible than can be expressed in language.--Speech was powerless before the gas ovens in which millions of human beings were done to death." Secondly, Picard indicates not just that language protects men from terrible things, but that ordinary things would be terrible if not accompanied by words! "Without its attendant word, a thing becomes a menace."
Picard has in view here a very deep truth, which he puts forward in both its positive (reverence for things) and negative (protection from things) aspects. Language ushers in the human level of awareness, knowledge and responsibility: to know a thing, to know that one knows it, to name it—these acts establish an object as object in clear differentiation before the mind. The object can then be "placed" in its proper category and position in the hierarchy of being, and the proper attitude, in reverence, can then be adopted toward it. Conversely, when one is unable to name an object, one cannot be said to fully know the object, nor to know how to handle or approach it—thus can it become a source of anxiety and fear. "Without words man would not be able to endure the divine awfulness of things."

Language thus bestows light and order on being. "When the inner light of language is present, man is at home and unafraid." Language is the vehicle by which man understands the world. Moreover, the language that a man is born into, if it be in a healthy state of contact with being, already contains an ordering of being as a gift to man. Its words will be in deep interpenetration with the objects to which they refer.

The object grows and increases through the word. Objects crowd in on man, clamoring to be named by him . . . . Words themselves need objects. They are sustained and protected by objects. The word that is bound up with a particular object cannot easily be taken away by another word and attached to another object . . . . Words embrace objects but they are also embraced by objects.

Language is thus a gift to man by which being is made intelligible and understandable to him. Language is man's vehicle of contact with the world on the level of self-consciousness, whereby man gains both reverence for things and a measure of protection from their awesomeness and mystery as objects over against him.

**Language and Basic Phenomena**

Though language orders being for man, it does not strip of their mystery even those things which man names. To the contrary, language leads man and things into the depths of being, into contact with other basic phenomena: birth death, love, silence, truth, eternity, God.

Man not only looks at things; he is himself looked at by them. They look at him first, before he looks at them. Language is man's response to the questioning gaze of things . . .
In the questioning gaze of things there is a reflection of the eyes of God, questioning man. In this respect, things stand proxy for God, questioning man on His behalf.

Mystery surrounds man on every side: the vastness of the universe, its origins and meaning; man's own consciousness, his purpose and ultimate ends; the inescapability of truth; the prospect of eternity, and its intimations in such overpowering phenomena as silence and love; the coming into existence and passing away of beings, the birth and death of men. Language is given to man as one of these basic phenomena, all of which lead into contact with each other. "The brightness of language reaches back to the darkness of birth and pushes this darkness further back into the past and the darkness of death further into the future. Through the light of language, birth and death are impelled outwards to the edges of human existence. In the animal, which lacks the light of language, birth and death are nearer to one another."

In reference to language as a basic phenomenon, Picard expresses a thought which, at first meeting, seems very difficult to grasp, i.e., that language is both prior to any man's spoken word and is even prior to the objects about which it speaks.

The former--language as prior to speech--is not such a problem, if one interprets language to be a basic capacity given to man, on a spiritual level of being, like man's reason and his will. However, Picard also speaks of language as prior to things themselves and as constituting its own objects. "The nature of being is determined by man, by the language of man. Being opens itself up so that it may be determined by man and brought into the world of man." And in another place: "It is language that first gives existence to things."

Such expressions may seem dangerously "idealistic," yet Picard is obviously not an idealist. So, what does he mean by such radical statements? Here is an attempt at an explanation.

The basic phenomena meet at creation and in eternity. When God created our world of experienced, changing being, He did so with a view toward language.

But man must make some response to the fact that objects exist at all. By calling an object by name he intimates to the creator that he has received it. That is why man has language at all. Human language is above all an answer to the Creator. Language is the inventory of Creation.

Thus the spoken word does not constitute its object, rather is the thing itself created from all eternity with a view toward man's spoken word as reiterat-
ing the thing, embracing its depths and meaning, and offering it back to God on the spiritual level of language. "The Logos which is in the world, in the object, helps man to think as well as the logos which he has in his own mind."

The heart and soul of language is born when the inner and outer world of a people is brought before God. The moment of eternity for the language of people is when the heart and soul of the language is created, and it will remain such so long as the people allow it to be determined by the first decision.

Thus both language and being are created originally by God in a primordial unity—each ordered to the other, each a gift to man, each waiting for man.

The Destruction of Language

However, as indicated above, this unity in the depths between word and object, between language and being, between man and being, can only occur in the context of a language which is still in a close and full contact with being. "What is frightening is the reduction of language to pure sound: a reduction which is only a symptom of a universal reduction of all human phenomena today. It is as though some central authority were draining off the substance from all human phenomena."

When language no longer penetrates to the depths of being, when the word is no longer in a unity with its object, then language is not longer a basic phenomena. Words and speech take on a superficial relationship with the world, and man quickly does too. Instead of leading man into the depths, superficial verbal noise pulls him toward the periphery and pulls all deep things outward toward the periphery as well. "Language has lost its spiritual quality; all that remains is a purely acoustic quality. This is the transformation of the spirit into the material, the transformation of the word that is spirit into the material of noise (from The World of Silence)."

This basic opposition to depth which is the characteristic of verbal noise has devastating effects upon man's life in relation to being.

On the one hand, language without depth and contact with being acts as a great leveller, accepting everything into itself, allowing everything to be expressed—but all is expressed on the same horizontal level, whether it be true or false, demonic or divine. "Language is not longer a resisting force. It is pervious to everything, far too pervious."

"Language is now only the noise of things, no longer the utterly different which is added to things.—Everything is
mixed up in verbal noise, everything and nothing: it creates a deceptive and illusory relationship between things."

Further, this superficiality in language today is not merely unfortunate, though neutral in itself. It is a blockade--of confusion and noise--keeping man from realizing the depths and meaning of being, the seriousness of his own existence, the hierarchical structure of reality.

Verbal noise, as a vehicle for communication favors evil, in fact, and is hostile to good. "Everything can steal into the noise of words; everything can get mixed up in it, even the demonic. In fact the noise is itself a part of the demonic (from The World of Silence)."

Through the machinery of verbal noise, more evil than good is spread abroad, for the phenomena of evil correspond to the structure of noise and its uncertainty and vagueness more than do the phenomena of goodness. Goodness is almost always clearly defined and demarcated. Evil on the other hand loves the vagueness of twilight.

Verbal noise is not evil itself, but it prepares the way for evil: The spirit easily becomes submerged in the noise (from The World of Silence).

Moreover, the message of goodness, though it also be proclaimed to the world, cannot retain its depth and true message when it must speak in the language of verbal noise, competing with the swirling "doxa" of superficiality to gain a hold on man's attention. "The power of secular language is so intense today that it would drown the truth of the Gospel if it were translated into 'the language of the modern age.'"

This is Picard's great fear, and a most justified one, that modern man by his very language, his means of communication, the language he is born into, is losing contact with the true and fundamental data of human life: silence, love, truth, God, and eternity. Picard's solution? Each man must try to regain his contact with basic phenomena, to regain his wonder at nature, his awe of birth, his consciousness of death, his contact with silence, his faith in God, his love of men, his reverence before the mysteriousness of being, his intimations of immortality.

In The World of Silence, Picard especially recommends prayer as a prime avenue toward regaining contact with these basic data of human life. By such renewed contact, language itself can again be found among these central phenomena—in its character as a divine gift to man, ordering being for man, allowing him to deal with its awesomeness, leading him into its true depths and meaning. Thus perhaps can the true message of goodness
and redemption again be proclaimed in all its fullness, in the only manner in which men can assimilate it—through interior silence.

The present state of the world and the whole of life is diseased. If I were a doctor and were asked for my advice, I should reply: Create silence! Bring men to silence. The Word of God cannot be heard in the noisy world of today. And even if it were blazoned forth with all the panoply of noise so that it could be heard in the midst of all the other noise, then it would not longer be the Word of God. Therefore, create silence (Soren Kierkegaard).


Hanfling's monograph is a detailed historical illustration of logical positivism (or logical empiricism as the author, despite the title of the book, prefers to call it). The views of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, Alfred J. Ayer, Otto Neurath, Frederick Waismann and Ludwig Wittgenstein are those to which more attention is given. Hanfling succeeds in giving an accurate exposition of the main claims of logical positivism and a fair illustration of the debate that such claims generated.

The author summarizes the central strands of logical positivism as follows:

1. the concern about meaning and the attempt at providing a theory of meaning, by means of the verification principle;

2. the elimination of metaphysics;

3. the "unity of science" claim.

After the introductory chapter, chapter 2 discusses various readings of the verification principle, i.e., "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification," and stresses the difficulties involved in Schlick's account. Chapter 3 discusses the "criterion of verifiability" which follows from the verification principle. The author carefully stresses the difference between the two: while the verification principle states what is the meaning of a statement, the criterion of verifiability is appealed to in order
to decide whether or not a statement is meaningful. Since one of the main aims of logical positivism is that of eliminating metaphysical statements from the range of meaningful discourse, it is evident why the criterion of verifiability plays a central role in the discussion of this view. The discussion of how successful the criterion of verifiability is in eliminating metaphysics is the content of chapter 7, while in chapter 8 the status of ethical statements is discussed. The central chapters of the volume deal with the idea of the unity of science and with the various attempts at grounding it in the uniformity of language. Chapter 4 deals with the notion of logical analysis, i.e., "the reduction of concepts to more fundamental concepts and of statements to more fundamental statements." Hanfling considers different accounts of analysis, namely, Waismann's, Ayer's, Schlick's, Carnap's, and stresses the problems arising in connection both with the verifiability of general statements and with the reference of observation statements. This is perhaps the most wide-ranging chapter. The author concludes that it seems doubtful that there can be one "single account of the relation of meaning and verification which will be true both for ordinary language and for the statements of science." Chapter 5 discusses the problems which originate from the denial that protocol statements, i.e., basic elementary statements, directly refer to any experiential content. Hanfling introduces Carnap's distinction between the material and the formal mode of speech. According to Carnap only once the language of philosophy had been fully translated into the formal mode would most of the traditional problems disappear. But then, what is left of the notions of truth and verification once any reference to experience has been eliminated in all statements? Hanfling discusses some attempts at justifying the notions of truth and verification like, e.g., Neurath's and Hempel's. Finally, Chapter 6 begins by illustrating the aims of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and then extensively illustrates Carnap's claim about the unity of the language of science as evidence of the unity of science itself: "there is a basic kind of language to which the statements of all the various sciences are reducible."

The main values of the book are the clarity of the language and the frequent connecting of some neo-positivist views with the views of the classic empiricists like Locke and Hume. Hanfling succeeds in showing the continuity between the issues which were worrying Locke and Hume and the problems which logical positivism addressed. This monograph would be very useful for undergraduate students who do not have a wide background in the history of modern and contemporary philosophy.
A negative aspect of the book is the way in which the discussion of the various issues and views is organized. It is difficult to retain, after having finished reading the book, a clear overall picture of the philosophical movement that has been presented. Despite the indication of the three main stands of logical positivism, which is given at the beginning of the exposition, somehow the analysis of these strands gets lost in a detailed account of the different points of view of each single author on each single issue, as for example, happens with the discussion of the relationship between experience and meaning, or with the problem of what are the basic elementary statements of language. The reader has to find out by him/herself how the issue of the existence of physical objects connects with the logical positivist discussion about the meaning and truth of basic observation statements, and why this last issue is relevant to the idea of the unity of science. But this is just what a monograph on Logical Positivism should provide to the reader.

Furthermore, the attempt at showing that logical positivism is a philosophical movement still worthy of analysis and discussion is not very successful. Rightly enough, in Hanfling's book, many of the logical positivist tenets are criticized and most of the times successfully shown to be false. But for the frequent mentioning of Wittgenstein's views as a kind of possibly more promising further development of the logical positivists views, the logical positivist doctrines seem all doomed to failure. Just because of this careful illustration of the many criticisms to logical positivism, Hanfling's effort at showing that logical positivism is still important, despite the criticisms, for it still arouses "the interest and critical reaction of those who think about the fundamental questions of philosophy," would have been much more convincing had the author shown the continuity between the problems that logical positivists dealt with and the problems which contemporary philosophers deal with. Just as the historical background linking the empiricism of Carnap and Schlick to Locke and Hume is very useful, so would have been also some mentioning of, for instance, Quine's empiricism or of the contemporary debate on meaning in philosophy of language.

Perhaps because of this lack of a link with the contemporary literature, Hanfling's monograph is not a stimulating book. It is doubtful that it can raise any interest in pursuing the study of these authors any further. Even Wittgenstein's views, although the author clearly favors them, are presented without making the reader aware of the debate, criticism and analysis of which they have been and are still object.

This monograph on logical positivism often has been reviewed together with the collection of readings edited by Oswald Hanfling and published also in 1981 by
Basil Blackwell with the title, *Essential Readings in Logical Positivism*. The two volumes together constitute a good basis for a course on Logical Positivism, but a teacher using them would have to "build" on this basis in order to make the course stimulating and adequate to the contemporary philosophical debate.