
The Sophistic Movement by Professor G. B. Kerford is an introduction to the Sophists of fifth century Athens. By an extensive analysis of the historical sources, Kerford comes up with a new interpretation of their thought. According to Kerford, two barriers stand in the way of anyone seeking to arrive at a proper understanding of the sophistic movement. First, no writings survive from any of the sophists, and as a result, we have to depend on fragments and unreliable summaries of their doctrines. Second, much of our information of the sophists comes from Plato, whose profound hostility to them is well known. This combined effect, says Kerford, has been fairly disastrous and led to a kind of received wisdom according to which it is doubtful whether the sophists as a whole contributed anything of value to the history of thought.

One of the goals of The Sophistic Movement is to question these beliefs. Actually the historical records do not support the contention that the sophists contributed nothing to their society. In reality they were quite prominent in Greek society. From 450 to 400 B.C., which was in many ways the golden age of Greece, there were profound social and political changes occurring in Athens. In many respects, it was a period of intense intellectual and artistic activity, a period in which previous patterns of life were slowly dissolving in favor of new patterns. The sophistic movement gave expression to all of this.

The Sophistic Movement is divided into 14 chapters with the first six ones being essential to Kerford's thesis. In these first six chapters Kerford deals with: (1) the history of interpretations of the sophistic movement; (2) the Sophists as a social phenomenon; (3) the meaning of the term sophist; (4) the individual sophists; and (5) the differences between dialectic, antilogic and eristic. The remainder of the book deals with the special problems the sophists concerned themselves with, such as the theory of knowledge, the nature of truth, the sociology of knowledge, and the theory of justice. Kerford finds the modernity of the range of problems formulated and
discussed by the sophists in their teachings as nothing short of remarkable.

In Plato's discussion of the sophistic movement, he presents seven different definitions of sophists, all are negative except one. The sophist as a hired hunter of rich boys, as a man who sells virtue, as a seller of learning, as a seller of goods fabricated for his customers, as one who carries on controversy called eristic, as a practitioner of a special kind of sophistry called enlenchus, and as a false counterfeiter of philosophy. Plato's student, Aristotle, defines the sophist as a person who makes money from apparent wisdom. This remained the standard view for over 2,000 years.

In challenging this view, Kerford discusses the historical reasons why the sophistic movement emerged in fifth century Athens in the first place. Athens during the second half of the fifth century B.C. was the real center of the sophistic movement, and there were two things responsible for the rise of the sophists in Athens. These were the changing social and political conditions in Athens and the direct influence of Pericles and his democratic government.

Periclean democracy rested on two principles, that power should be held by the people and that high offices should be entrusted to those best fitted and most able to carry out these functions. Both of these aspects were significant in developing a demand for the services of the sophists, but Kerford says more emphasis should be placed on the second. The sophists offered a contribution to the education of the masses by selling a product invaluable to those seeking careers in politics and public life.

As far as the individual sophists are concerned, we know the names of upwards of 26 who lived from about 460 to 380 B.C., when their importance and activity was at its height. Kerford points out that of the sophists known to us by name only eight or nine were outstandingly famous, and to these should be added the authors of two surviving anonymous works, the Dissoi Logoi and the so-called Anonymous Iamblichii. The outstandingly famous sophists are Protagoras, the most famous of them all, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Antiphon, Thrasymachus, Callicles, Critias, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus. Finally, there is the question of Socrates himself. It is quite clear, insists Kerford, that Socrates was widely regarded as a part of the sophistic movement. Through his well known friendship with the sophists, Aspasia, it is more than likely that he was in fairly close contact with the circle of Pericles.

Kerford concludes by arguing that few can deny the importance of the sophistic movement in Greek society when virtually every point in Plato's thought has its starting point in his reflections upon problems first raised by the sophists, or when virtually every dia-
logue in one way or another has one or more sophists either visibly present at or covertly influencing its discussions.

Kerford has been studying the sophistic movement for a number of years. He is currently the Hulme Professor of Greek at the University of Manchester. His previous publications includes articles on Antiphon, Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras and Thrasymachus. Now he has written a very good study of a neglected subject. His argument is cogently presented, logically analyzed, and, from this reviewer's perspective, generally proven. Students of ancient philosophy and classical studies should be well satisfied with this volume.


The 700th anniversary of Aquinas and Bonaventure is not the only, or even the best reason for yoking these two figures together in this commemorative volume. Indeed, the lively twists and torque of thirteenth century thought is so well represented by them that the fact of both their deaths in 1274 seems but a convenient excuse for issuing a collection of eight superior studies on various aspects of the dialectic between them.

Four of the essays are explicitly comparative studies. Ewert Cousins exemplifies the freshness of this set of essays by his very strategy: the use of texts from Bonaventure to lead the discussion of 13th century thought on three themes: (1) knowledge through subjectivity; (2) the self-effusive dynamism and fecundity of God; and (3) the tension between emphasis on divine immanence and on divine transcendence. The ascendancy of Thomism over the past century has usually meant that the problematic comes to be set up in a Thomistic framework, but Cousins offers the novel approach of giving "home field advantages" to Bonaventure and thus to the chief scholastic form of Augustinian thought. Among the advantages to be counted from this undertaking is a reading of St. Thomas himself which is far more sympathetic to the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius than one usually gets. One could speculate that the instinctive move to see Thomas as an Aristotelian explains the prevalent forgetfulness of Thomas' debts to Dionysius, but one could also adduce the fact that Thomas' extensive commentary De Divinis Nominibus has yet to be translated into English, and so this aspect
of Thomas gets less attention than it rightfully deserves.

Ralph McInerny labors to show that Bonaventure and Aquinas need not be treated as mere curiosities or philosophical time-capsules, but can be read as contributors to the ongoing philosophical conversation, much as we tend to read the classical moderns. As a sample of such a hermeneutic, he works the theme of knowing and believing. Leo Sweeney, S.J., likewise makes the assumption of their current relevance and pursues their extremely diverse thoughts on whether the divine is infinite. Although Sweeney does not bring up the discussion of today's process philosophers, it comes as no surprise to find the heavyweights of the middle ages wrestling with some of the same problems.

The fourth comparative essay is by Francis Kovach and concerns the question of the eternity of the world. Of great merit is Kovach's extensive classification of the various types of cosmogonic views that have been offered in the history of philosophy as well as his carefully-evidenced insertion of Bonaventure and Aquinas into this classification. The doctrinal and critical comparisons that follow put the question about proof rather sharply: just how much can you prove about creation and what must be taken on faith?

Besides these comparative studies, the present volume also contains four essays whose scope is restricted to Aquinas alone or Bonaventure alone. John Quinn, CSB, offers a genetic, developmental perspective on Bonaventure's moral philosophy, while Robert Kreyche traces certain modern implications of Aquinas' teachings on virtue and law. The advantage of Quinn's genetic approach is the deepened understanding of Bonaventure's early-received and thorough-going Augustinian outlook, especially as he rises to meet and attack the errors of Latin Averroism. Kreyche's insights are rooted in Thomas' persistent refusal to separate ethics and politics, however carefully he distinguishes them for purposes of analysis. The implication of Thomas' position will not be lost on anyone who considers what men will attempt to justify politically when ethics is set at some great remove. What seems unfortunately to go unnoticed in this essay is that Thomas claims that religion is at the core of even the natural virtue of justice. Hence, for Thomas both ethics and politics had better not stray very far at all from an awareness that man's first debts are to God if either ethics or politics is to be successful.

Finally, Ignatius Brady, OFM, and Joseph Owens, CSSR, write about Bonaventure and Aquinas respectively on the theme of light and darkness. In an essay deficient only in its brevity, Brady traces the medieval and modern reactions to Bonaventure's famous doctrine of illumination. This doctrine, in reality, is a meta-
physical analysis of human certitude that places much importance on divine generosity.

Owens' piece is a fitting complement to Brady's. It is a meditation on what Aquinas calls the "darkness of ignorance" in even the most refined notion of God. In its metaphysical interpretation, this phrase means that the subsistent existence of God, even when concluded to in a posteriori fashion from sensible things, can never be conceptualized or represented in any form approaching adequacy. The notion of subsistent existence thus remains dark, but the darkness serves to prevent the attribution of any limitation or deficiency to God by the assignment of qualities customary for human consciousness.

Thus Owens' essay reminds us of the piece on infinity by Sweeney. This linkage is but one of many interesting connections that make this volume a cohesive unity, dedicated to exploring the frequent interactions between two great philosophers whose lives ended but a few months apart as they travelled to the same ecclesiastical council some 700 years ago.


Influence is one of the hardest claims to prove in the history of philosophy, for unless a thinker explicitly tells who his sources were and who inspired him, the historian of philosophy must play the detective. Some thinkers present special difficulties--Descartes, for example, who would deliberately mislead his readers about his sources, or Dewey, whose later writings retain an incredible amount of the Hegelian dialectic he imbibed early on, yet the later Dewey seems naively unconscious of just how Hegelian he remained. And for even the most conscientious thinker, the origin of many an idea is forgotten once he has thought through the insight on his own and carried it forward for himself.

The present set of 19 studies on Neoplatonism and Christian thought manifests penetrating analysis combined with remarkable scholarly restraint on the question of influence. Some of the essays trace historical currents among avowed Neoplatonists. Others undertake the more arduous task of showing the Neoplatonic heritage of thinkers not well known for this particular link. And even among those explicitly involved with Neoplatonism, the delicate question of the direction of the influence persists. To what extent, for example, does the Neoplatonism of one of the Church
Fathers affect his view of Christianity? And to what extent, in turn, does the commitment to Christianity require him to alter or to choose among the received Neoplatonic doctrines?

The selections are arranged historically, beginning with the Patristic thought of the Latin West, and Northern Africa, but proceeding through later Greek and Byzantine thought, medieval Latin thought, the Renaissance, and into modern times. Henri Saffrey's paper on the links between (Pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite and Proclus is a master-example of the attention that must be paid to hard evidence for the claim of influence in an historical study. Only by meeting rigorous standards in the comparison both of texts and of philosophical arguments is the historian warranted in claiming actual influence and not the less interesting result of parallelism or common intellectual parentage.

That the influence of one figure or school of thought need not always be a positive influence in the sense of assimilation, but could also be of a negative sort is evidenced by John O'Meara's essay on St. Augustine. Among his findings is the rejection by Augustine of Neoplatonic solutions to philosophical problems presented in the doctrine of the Incarnation and Resurrection. This is genuine influence, however, for the inadequacy of the Neoplatonic answers proved a creative goad to spur Augustine on to his own more orthodox resolution of these questions. It is only unfortunate that O'Meara confirms rather than questions the alleged Neoplatonism of other Augustinian doctrines, especially as regards the human soul.

One of the better essays in the volume on the modification of Neoplatonic views for the purposes of Christian thought is Cornelio Fabro's essay on Thomas Aquinas. Thomas's use of Neoplatonic ideas is vastly underrated in the entire field of Thomistic scholarship at large, but Fabro makes a fine contribution to the subject of analyzing Aquinas's absorption and critical reshaping of Neoplatonic metaphysics, in particular of the Neoplatonic metaphysical triad of Being-Life-Intellect in his own philosophy about God as ipsum esse subsistens.

Interesting but less cogent are the arguments of the essayists concerned with Neoplatonism in modern thought, notably in Robert Browning, C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams. As studies of the contemporary authors themselves, the essays are very perceptive, but the extremely broad conception of what Neoplatonism is that is here employed renders these papers less forceful as historical studies.

The highly specific doctrinal focus of most of the contributors to this collection is an additional reason for commending it. In each of the historical periods, one or another of the authors takes up certain crucial
philosophical problems dealt with by the original Neoplatonists and their various successors. Negative theology, the relation of philosophy to Scripture, the problem of general concepts, the Christian insistence on the creation instead of the eternity of the world—all these and others are examined, primarily historically, but also with attention to the quest for truth in the answers to these questions. It is a refreshing surprise to find a historically-inclined volume not disabled by the historicism that forbids discussion of answers in its rigid insistence on raising questions. Many of the authors of Neoplatonism and Christian Thought respect the philosophers they are writing about enough to recognize that they worked energetically to resolve intellectual difficulties that were being presented to Christian thought. Bearing this in mind, they have traced out the role of Neoplatonism in history so as to bring added illumination to the answers their source-thinkers presented.


In a recent article in Professional Engineer (March 1981), Samuel Florman, one of that profession's most literate and well-known spokesmen, bemusedly belittles the idea that "small is beautiful" as one that "does not bear much scrutiny and, if it takes hold in our thinking, has the potential for doing much harm" (27). He believes, moreover, that the small-is-beautiful idea consists of "irrational fantasies" though it also comprehends "human yearnings that we dare not ignore" (29). To readers of Jeremy Rifkin's Entropy, such words must seem at best humorous and at worst profoundly frustrating. For Rifkin's book is a sustained and well-documented assault on the notion that our individual and social welfare, now and in the future, is tied to a program of unlimited growth in economic production and consumption, increasingly large and complex technologies, and constantly expanding social and political institutions to control and coordinate our activities. It argues with a congenial urgency that human welfare and survival depend on scaling down in these and other areas to a level more in tune with the finite resources of the planet and the biological and psychological capacities of its inhabitants. In the tradition of Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth, and the Global 2000 Report, Rifkin's
book should be read by all who care about the future, especially by those with power to shape it.

Unlike some other contemporary assessments of 'what is wrong' with our socio-politico-economic system, Rifkin's analysis is not explicitly ideological in nature and applies alike to capitalist and socialist systems as they presently exist. Instead, Rifkin rests his case on the first two laws of thermodynamics, especially the second, according to which "the total energy content of the universe is constant and the total entropy is continually increasing" (33). He systematically applies these laws to the current world situation, showing how the dissipation of our energy and resource supplies generates mounting disorders in all areas of life at a geometrically accelerating rate.

We know from Einstein that matter and energy are convertible, and from the Second Law that they exhibit a tendency toward decay. This tendency is most evident in closed systems like the earth, which receives new energy from the sun but experiences no significant kind of matter repletion. Within such a context, taken as a whole, change is always unidirectional deconstruction, as energy goes from usable to unusable, available to unavailable, and ordered to unordered states. All energy use or work exacts a price that cannot ultimately be repaid, since the repayment process will itself use more energy in turn. Therefore, as Rifkin puts it, our building the earth resembles the creation of larger and larger islands of order amid expanding seas of disorder (56).

Energy loss (use) through work is a complex and many-tiered affair, as we see in the food chain. There are also diverse sources of energy upon which to draw. Yet, even nature's cycles are incomplete and operate at a loss, and energy extraction and exchange become more difficult, expensive, and wasteful as we reach from more to less available sources. This is particularly so if we include the growing problem of waste management and disposal that has habitually been ignored. In one sense, human beings can do nothing about this general 'entropy problem' of their world, but in another sense they can. For they are able to control the rate of energy dissipation by adjusting their lifestyles and consumption patterns. Instead of being closely attuned to this opportunity, however, our existing economic systems strive instead to maximize the energy flow-through (via growth in production) in a manner that may be described as thermodynamic madness. To top it off, people still operate under the illusion that this frantic activity is actually creating more order in the world ("taming nature", etc.), when all the while it has the precise opposite effect of maximizing disorder and squandering the precious natural capital of the future. Rifkin's purpose is to explode this illusion
in order to get us off the high road to species extinction.

Entropy is divided into six main parts. Since he proposes the principle of entropy as an over-arching world view, "a frame of reference for organizing life's activities" (5), Rifkin first contrasts it to the "seventeenth-century Newtonian world machine paradigm" (6) which we have all uncritically internalized. Wedded to the Enlightenment ideology of unlimited progress, the Newtonian world model, with its conception of absolutely repeatable events and entirely reversible processes, has ushered in the industrial or machine age, whose premier values of precision, speed, and accuracy have come to rule even human self-conception and description. After tracing the mechanistic view back to its founders (Bacon, Descartes, Newton) Rifkin shows how it was adapted by Locke and Smith to the analysis of human political and economic activity. In these latter versions, it has shaped the concrete life and institutions of capitalist and socialist countries alike, defining people's attitudes toward nature and one another. Accordingly, nature is considered a storehouse of unlimited bounty which we may exploit in any way we please, and human beings are seen as devoted egoists impelled by the dynamics of avarice. Though the first of these assumptions is overtly mistaken, and the second at least highly dubious, both continue to be preached today as genuine revelations in our gospel of material acquisition and consumption—before whom we have no other gods.

Part II examines the Second Law in more detail, including its historical development, theoretical challenges, and its operation in the larger cosmological theater. Moreover, Rifkin describes our paradoxical efforts to 'save time' through faster applications of complex labor-saving technologies. These 'save' time only in the idealized context of Newtonian physics, however; in the real thermodynamic world, they actually 'waste' time. For time is a measure of motion (as Aristotle said), and all motion dissipates energy. Hence, the faster we dissipate energy by creating new technologies to save labor and time, the less energy (and time) there is left. This is quite the reverse of what most people think. Another interesting discussion centers on the application of the Second Law to living things, which have been singled out by systems theorists such as Koestler as obvious examples of nentropic processes. And so they are. But we need to remember that the production of negentropy within a closed system comes always at the expense of greater entropy elsewhere within the system, and the more negentropy is created (e.g., more complex organisms), the greater the overall 'cost' (whether or not this is explicitly noted by human accounting techniques). Hence, the more 'efficient' an organism becomes at in-
creasing its energy flow-through from the environment, the more degraded (and less fit for future use) that environment becomes. Nature is prodigiously capable of creating a balance between itself and the many living systems that depend on it. But man and his current technologies are too 'efficient' for even nature's resiliency and healing powers, so that the whole ecosystem now threatens to collapse.

A people's social and political institutions reflect the energy flow-line which sustains them, and the technology of that flow-line is determined in turn by the specific base of available energy. Rifkin examines this thesis in Part III by focusing on two so-called "entropy watersheds" (63): the transition from wood to coal in the early modern period, and our anticipated move from fossil fuels to solar energy. During the final stages of each energy era, as the watershed draws near and there are increasingly desperate attempts to sustain a certain level of flow-through with a diminishing resource, the "external costs" of energy-specific technologies accumulate to the point where efforts to deal with such diseconomies in the flow-line are parasitic upon the very energy supply that it is meant to deliver. Many of society's resources are now spent on maintaining a failing system rather than on genuine innovation and growth. Much of this sounds eerily familiar today. Other familiar aspects of the institutional developments accompanying entropy watersheds include the tendencies toward more complexity, specialization, and centralization. All of these make institutions more vulnerable to malfunction and collapse, and the individuals within those institutions not only less autonomous and creative, but also less secure.

Part IV deals with the energy problem as such and examines synfuels, nuclear fission and fusion, mineral supplies, and proposals for substitution, recycling, and conservation. None of the proposed energy sources emerges as plentiful, affordable, and safe enough to sustain current levels of use. Rifkin also notes, significantly, that recycling only slows the overall process of entropy creation because it is seldom more than 30% efficient, and that conservation on a meaningful scale will only cause disruption in the present system which is oriented toward massive energy flow-throughs. Furthermore, even if there were an abundant source of energy, this would still not solve the mineral supply problem, nor that of pollution.

The entropy law is used, in Part V, to illuminate a host of observations that other writers have previously made about economics, agriculture, transportation, urbanization, the military, education, and the health care system. In all these areas, there are clear signs that energy thresholds have been reached and that we can expect diminishing returns if we continue with
'business as usual'. Whether we focus on soil erosion or newly created pesticide-immune insects, iatrogenic diseases, the highly trained one-track minds leaving our educational institutions, or the M-1 tank and the MX missile system, it is clear that we are getting less for more, and that Adam Smith's "hidden hand" is having cramps.

In Part VI, Rifkin presents his own vision of a world operating with respect for the entropy law. Topics addressed include Third World development and the domestic redistribution of wealth. The latter is essential in the difficult transition from the industrial to the generally more frugal solar age. Rifkin also makes the important point that solar energy, since it is so diffuse, can replace our highly concentrated fossil fuels only with the aid of an "intermediate" or "appropriate" technology—one that is "locally produced, labor-intensive to operate [there is nothing bad about labor as such, only about certain modes of work], decentralizing, repairable, fueled by renewable energy, ecologically sound, and community-building" (217). These and other comments in this section are necessarily broad, as Rifkin himself recognizes (220), since it is one thing to criticize a system and another to provide a full-blown alternative. But defenders of the status quo are unreasonable if they simply dismiss visions of alternative futures as unworkable (within the framework of their old assumptions, of course) and imprecise. Our current system is itself the result of centuries of development achieved by many people working together. Critics like Rifkin cannot simply be dismissed because they take our cake and do not provide us with another just like it on the spot.

The transition from the industrial to the solar age will be rough because it must be achieved in such a short time (in view of current consumption rates), and Rifkin expects three kinds of responses to his prediction that "life is going to get a lot uglier in the years ahead" (185). The optimist will continue to hold the mechanistic world view and rely on anticipated technological fixes to see him through, especially in genetic and computer engineering. Yet, gene tampering is not only a radical and risky intervention into nature's evolutionary wisdom, but also falls under the Second Law's constraints. Nor will computers save us. Given today's economic systems worldwide, computers will only serve to escalate consumption and waste even more. The pragmatist will acknowledge the Second Law's constraints to some extent, and will react by trying to streamline or fine-tune the present system in order to eliminate some of the grosser sources of waste and disorder. Ironically, this will only oil the system so as to intensify the entropic process in the long run. Finally, there is the hedonist of the "apres moi, le deluge" persuasion who sees the problems we face but
plans on doing nothing about it besides going out with a bang rather than a wimper. This group includes all those decent and mildly worried individuals who respond to the situation with "There is nothing I can do to change anything," and who then continue their own wasteful lifestyles exactly as before. There is also, Rifkin hopes, a fourth group of people who believe that the entropy paradigm must and can direct our lives, and who become active in seeking to realize it. It is these individuals who think that "small is beautiful" and that an "appropriate" or "intermediate" technology can satisfy genuine human needs and aspirations. It is their ideas that Samuel Florman casts aside with a chuckle as "irrational fantasies." After reading Rifkin's book, however, it should become quite clear what the real fantasies are, and why they are irrational.

Entropy is filled with specific figures and percentages, some of which will undoubtedly be disputed. Yet, it would be tragic if these and other arguable points (of which each reader will have his own) became an obstacle to serious reflection on and discussion of this book. Written clearly throughout and dotted with helpful examples, it is more than interesting, creating a suspense of its own that quickly absorbs the reader who is interested in the state of the world. There is an afterword by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, a Bibliography, and an Index.


"This book may be seen as an attempt to undermine all three of the main justifications of punishment: retributive, reductive, denunciatory." With these words, Nigel Walker, well-known English criminologist and author, opens his inquiry into the varied aspects of criminal punishment (which Walker, in company with most criminal law jurisprudents, unfortunately terms "criminal justice"). But these inquiries, product, no doubt, of a sharp mind, are of only limited value to those interested in the questions of criminal punishment—even less so to those this side of the Atlantic.

Surely the term "directionless" would be too strong to apply to Walker's Punishment, Danger and Stigma; still, any work with the avowed purpose of attacking something else is usually prevented from charting its own course, and is instead dependent upon its intellec-
tual adversaries to set the tone of the discussion. In light of this, several factors combine to diminish the value of Walker's work to American academics and attorneys.

First, and perhaps most importantly, American criminal law jurisprudence operates from a significantly different set of categories from those of her English compatriot. While both share, as a basis for criminal punishment, retribution theories, important and varying nuances appear between American deterrence and English reductiveness, and the English denunciatory scheme is completely different from the ill-fated American rehabilitation experiment. Thus do problems arise when studying the three justifications of punishment; to wit, which three? The English? If so, how do they compare with the American?

In addition, numerous statements put forth by Walker as facts are completely undocumented, often enough, statements on hotly contested issues. Example: "If legal abortions were not so difficult to arrange, there would not be a black market in illegal ones, with its high mortality" (PDS, p. 6). Compare Walker's unsupported assertion, more typical of Ann Landers or Ms. magazine than of a reasoned jurisprudential analysis, with J. Brown, The London Evening News, April 18, 1974, "There has certainly been no decrease in the number of back street abortions [since England legalized artificial abortions in 1967]," or similar statements in the May, 1970 British Medical Journal, The Lancet (March 2, 1968, p. 467); or Wilke's Handbook on Abortion (pp. 104-110), discussing the European experience on this matter, sources of information Walker had access to in England. On would be remiss not to look carefully on other such statements of alleged fact by Walker in light of this example of poor research.

On a more mundane level, English habits of citation—where they do occur—are such as to leave the American reader almost powerless to check the references for accuracy or context. Consider:

In 1978, for example, a judge in Mason County, U.S.A. ordered a marihuana-grower to wheel his plant twenty times round the courthouse in a wheel-barrow, carrying a notice of his belief in the legislation of marihuana use.

Which Mason County? Which judge handed down the sentence? Under what piece of legislation was such a sentence authorized? The only reference supplied by Walker is "Sunday Times, 14 April 1978." Practically useless.

Socrates rarely put forth positive statements of theory, but instead limited himself to demonstrating the flaws in another's position. So Walker but occasionally offers his own solutions to criminological
conundrums, content to undermining, as he says, all three of the main justifications of criminal punishment. And, while one empathizes with the frustration felt by Socrates' students under such an approach, yet must one acknowledge that such an approach has its value. And indeed, Walker's work has some good to offer.

Walker's chapter on "Treating" contains several strong points, summed up in its opening paragraph (p. 46):

Penologists have discovered the ineffectiveness of treatment, including reformatory treatment. This has led to the discovery of the right to be punished instead, especially when this means getting out earlier. Moralists have discovered C. S. Lewis' objections—and some new ones—even to treatment that does work, if of course there is such a thing.

The discussion of "Deterrence" is also of merit, and is, in fact, one of the best organized chapters in the book, concluding in an especially helpful summary. This reviewer would still suggest, particularly to one new to the waters of American deterrence theory, the writings of, say, Ernest Van den Haag for a more comprehensive study.

In his considerations of "Stigmatizing," Walker does venture his own proposals on the subject, including "prohibiting the public identification of offenders not only before conviction but also after it," and rejection of judicial consideration of past convictions when passing sentence. While one might well argue against public disclosure of arrested suspects' identity (and considering the awful abrasiveness of the news media as they film suspects being led down police corridors, one would argue all the stronger), still, disclosure of a convict's identity has merit under both retributive and deterrence theories of punishment. Moreover, a blanket prohibition against judicial consideration of past convictions overlooks that fact that repeat offenders present society not just with multiple offenses, but, often enough, with a new category of offender.

Walker's study goes on to include such subjects as "Protecting," "Righting," and "Simplifying." This volume, slender enough, and printed in an agreeable type, merits a place in the library of the informed jurisprudent; whether it merits a primary place in that library is another matter.

As the title suggests, this book attempts to introduce students to logic in a nontraditional manner. Thomas is concerned to demonstrate how reasoning is detected and evaluated in ordinary language. Thus he eschews most of the formal aspects of logic, e.g. categorical syllogisms, truth tables, and all but the most basic rules of deductive inference. He is following to a large extent a method used by Monroe Beardsley in his book Practical Logic and recognizes a great debt to Beardsley.

Space is given, in Chapter One, to defining an argument, distinguishing between reasons and conclusion, and analyzing an argument so as to make clear which statements are being given as support for which other statements. In this chapter he presents a good discussion on four basic ways in which reasons can be related to conclusions. In Chapter Two Thomas turns to the evaluation of arguments. His definition of validity reflects his concern for ordinary language. Thus a valid argument need not logically entail its conclusion but may only make the conclusion highly probable. Thus both inductive and deductive arguments admit of validity. Arguments that do logically entail their conclusions are distinguished by being called deductively valid. Thomas also introduces the following formal rules of inference in this chapter: double negation, transposition (which he calls contra-position), modus ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism, disjunctive syllogism and reductio ad absurdum. The chapter ends with a discussion on supplying suppressed premises. Chapter Three is given to guidelines in decision-making. In Chapter Four we get more analysis of arguments along the order of what was introduced at the end of Chapter One. But Chapter Four's arguments are more complex and difficult. Thomas also discusses in Chapter Four the following informal fallacies: genetic, ad hominem, equivocation, bifurcation, hasty generalization, straw man, and ad ignorantiam. The last chapter is devoted to more analysis of arguments along the lines of Chapter One, but these arguments are longer, and even more complex and difficult than the arguments in Chapter Four.

My complaints with the book are few. There is a seemingly inordinate amount of space given to the determination of the structure of arguments. Some of this space could have been better utilized by discussion of more informal fallacies and/or a systematic treatment of scientific reasoning, both of which play a significant role in ordinary language argumentation. Another complaint arises from Thomas' discussion of
hidden premises. He considers a statistical argument wherein a certain property is possessed by a sample of a population, and this property is then inferred to be possessed by the members of the population that were not part of the sample. Thomas says that if in examining such an argument we add the statement that the sample taken is representative of the whole population, then the argument will be deductively valid. But of course there is no way of knowing that the sample is representative outside of sampling the whole population. Nonetheless, Thomas says that strong, though nonconclusive, reasons can be given for thinking that the sample is representative (p. 182). Thomas thus labels this extended argument as deductively valid. If the sample is representative then of course the argument is valid. But even though we have good reasons to think the sample is representative we do not know this for certain, and in fact cannot know this except by sampling the whole population. Thus I think it would be better to label the support given to the conclusion as "strong" or "very strong" rather than deductively valid. Thomas' labeling, though not incorrect technically, is misleading. It makes us think that the conclusions to such statistical arguments can be known with absolute certainty.

Thomas' writing is extremely readable, and his progression through the material is methodical and not at all rapid. In fact it sometimes seems to read too easily and proceed too slowly even for first year college students. But in using the book for an introductory course I found that the students seemed to think highly of it.