Book Reviews


A dual biography is at best a rather awkward creation, being neither strictly biography nor social history. The problems encountered in such a format include the difficulty of overall coherence, uncertainty of focus, insufficiency of background material in many instances, and a tendency to strike parallels and seek connections in a contrived and artificial way. One might expect that when the two figures under consideration are engaged largely in mathematical research, which is conceptually difficult even for the well-educated reader, that the result would be a boring, technical hodge-podge, of interest to a handful of specialists only. Certainly, one might be sceptical of the general philosophical significance of such a work. In a certain sense, Steve Heims' work, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener falls prey to some or all of the problems mentioned above, but avoids becoming either boring or technical. Happily, it succeeds, not by surmounting the difficulties, but by transcending them. The real issue of the biography is not von Neumann or Wiener, but rather certain archetypes which they embody. This work is actually a consideration of how the two archetypal figures, each in his own way heroic, molds and is molded by the events of the 20th century, most significantly, World War II and its aftermath, the Cold War. As such, the book moves to a different level and gains ethico-philosophical significance in a broad sense; the work's merits and defects should then be judged from this perspective.

Both von Neumann and Wiener are fascinating objects of study in themselves, both having been mathematicians of great power and originality. Norbert Wiener is undoubtedly the better known of the two men because of his very frank and interesting autobiographical writings. A highly celebrated child prodigy in the mold of John Stuart Mill, these writings exhibit the
same ambivalence toward his upbringing that Mill's autobiography does. Wiener entered Tufts College at age eleven and earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University at the age of 18. His interests began to shift more distinctly toward mathematics in the succeeding years, spent abroad studying with Bertrand Russell and G. H. Hardy in Cambridge and David Hilbert in Göttingen. Wiener emerges from the biography as a most gifted and sympathetic character, if a bit eccentric and subject to temperamentality. However it is John von Neumann who seems to dominate this book, as he did everyone with whom he came into contact. If Wiener was the prodigy, von Neumann was the magus.

Although von Neumann did not exhibit the precocity of Wiener in his education, every account of him by his contemporaries, many of whom were the leading physicists and mathematicians of the age, exhibits not just respect or admiration for his achievements, but real awe at his intellect. Hans Bethe, himself a Nobel laureate, is quoted as saying "I have sometimes wondered whether a brain like John von Neumann's does not indicate a species superior to that of man." (see footnote two, chapter two) One feels that von Neumann inspires this reaction in the author (and, to some extent, this reader) as well, in spite of an obvious bias against the political activities which dominated the last fifteen years of von Neumann's life. Where Wiener seems gifted and child-like, von Neumann seems gifted and god-like. Child prodigies are a curiosity; even when they grow up to be very important, even brilliant, members of the intellectual world, like Mill and Wiener. Adepts, like Einstein and von Neumann, inspire something closer to fear, so overpowering is their intellect.

This book would be interesting if it were only a characterization of these two men, but not of any deep importance. The book raises itself above the level of mere biography just because it is not really a biography. It takes on the dimensions of a tragedy, with both characters playing the role of very different, but still tragic, heroes. To establish the characters as heroic types, a biographical technique is employed, but the book has other ambitions. Naturally, the stage-setting for this play is that of the Atomic Age and the Cold War. Obviously, these are not the only figures who could have been cast for this tragedy, but they are interesting ones, indeed.

As we know from Aristotle, the tragic figure must be greater and nobler than most men. The biographical sketches of the two men, including some description of their work, establishes that both men were, without question, most uncommon: brilliantly original, deeply
insightful mathematicians, and very literate gentlemen. Both men were at the center of much significant work in mathematics and mathematical physics during the enormously innovative period of the 1920's, '30's and '40's. Parenthetically, the weakest part of this biography is the attempted explanation of the technical work and philosophical attitudes of the two men. One should not expect to learn much of measure theory, game theory, quantum theory, automata theory or philosophy of science from this book, although some attempt is made to give flesh to the areas of research that engaged von Neumann and Wiener. Sometimes the explanations seem slightly misleading, and I feel certain that experts in each of the areas would find much to criticize in each account. This is a relatively minor flaw, however, and not at all detrimental to the structure or purpose of the work, which, after all, is not a mathematics or physics primer.

The essence of a tragedy is the fall of great men through some defect in an otherwise noble character. Here the paths of Wiener and von Neumann diverge. Wiener's uneven temperament and lack of social grace, in combination with his utter contempt for authority, completely destroyed any influence he may otherwise have enjoyed in the decision processes of the governmental circles. Thus, his high political ideals ended in utter frustration; nothing more, at best, than the cries of the prophet in the wilderness. His natural anarchism prevented his participation in groups whose ideals were consonant with his own. He resigned from the National Academy of Science in 1941, and refused to join the Society for Social Responsibility in Science. Wiener's influence, then, was that of an outsider, dependent upon his popular writing or lectures.

Von Neumann was a radical contrast. Aristocratic by birth, though somewhat compromised in the Europe of his day by his Jewish ancestry, von Neumann was completely at ease in social and political situations. He was held in awe by all those who knew him. The concentration of great power in his hands seemed almost inevitable. Two factors are involved in what I am representing as von Neumann's tragic flaw. First, he seemed incapable of freeing himself from the aristocratic Budapestian values of his youth. This led to his political stance during and after World War II: von Neumann, like Edward Teller, took on the role of the arch-Cold Warrier. Repeatedly, one sees that Russia, the land of barbarism, seemed to von Neumann to be the pre-eminent threat to the civilized world, even when National Socialism was the more immediate problem. Von Neumann is even quoted as having favored a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union to prevent
their arms buildup! He was constantly in the forefront of weapons research, and his phenomenal mental capacities made him the leading expert on weapons development and strategic deployment. Von Neumann, along with Teller, argued the feasibility of the development of the fusion bomb at the time at which J. Robert Oppenheimer opposed its development on technical grounds. These political attitudes, as well as his willingness to work within the military organization, drew him to the heart of U. S. policy decisions as inexorably as Wiener (or Einstein!) was excluded from these circles. The second element is that the collection of power and prestige seems finally to have overtaken von Neumann. Unlike J. Robert Oppenheimer, who also found himself in possession of great influence after the success of the Manhattan Project, von Neumann did not seek to influence policy through public hearings or statements, but rather through the more clandestine avenues by which policy is shaped. He avoided public exposure or notoriety, but delighted in the enormous behind-the-scenes power he was able to wield. Unlike Edward Teller, who was largely ostracized after his testimony during the security hearings on Oppenheimer, von Neumann retained excellent relations with the scientific community by testifying on behalf of Oppenheimer, about whom he privately had some misgivings. This action does not seem to stem from hypocrisy on von Neumann's part, but rather from his conviction that science should not be subject to political persecution; he does not seem to have shared any of Oppenheimer's views on the advisability of disarmament. During this period, von Neumann became the chief representative of the scientific community to government agencies, and also the representative of governmental authority and policy for the scientific community.

John von Neumann emerged by the early 1950's as the 'technical advisor' par excellence and a man of more real power than hardly anyone must have realized. The height of his public power, and possibly the honor he most genuinely desired, was his appointment to the Atomic Energy Commission in 1955. It was a singular honor for a naturalized American to be entrusted to a position of such importance and sensitivity. The characters are set for the theme of this tragedy.

Norbert Wiener is a tragic figure because his basic humanitarian instinct was thwarted and made impotent by his inability to make his views heard by those men in whose hands the fate of civilization lay. Perhaps he is a kind of Promethean figure, eager to save mankind, but bound tight by the chains of his character, forever ineffective, condemned to watch the Olympian rulers of
the world wreak their awful vengeance. Yet one must admire Wiener for his Thoreauvian determination: If one cannot avert the terrible path of world history, at least he will not cooperate with those intent upon constructing it. His constant counsel to his fellow scientists was to refuse to participate in research aimed at anti-human goals. It goes without saying that few of his colleagues were prepared to hear such advice.

John von Neumann is the more tragic figure, however, perhaps because he seems, most certainly, the greater of the two. That a man of such gifts is capable of such narrowness of vision, dogmatic conviction and susceptibility to the 'arrogance of power' strikes one with numbing force. Not only did von Neumann collaborate with the architects of cold war policy, he was himself a prime force in creating this policy, subverting several efforts aimed at the international control of nuclear weapons. Perhaps this could be dismissed as merely error in judgement; the climate of these times was not such that wise policies or attitudes were entirely transparent. While admitting that there must be much truth is this, such an explanation does not seem to me to penetrate deeply enough. If Prometheus bound can be used to characterize Wiener (however loosely!), Faust seems to be the appropriate model for von Neumann. John von Neumann was seduced by his paranoic attitude towards the Soviet Union and a rather genuine lust for power and recognition. Not for public acclaim; he avoided the public limelight. Recognition, rather, from those in positions of power and authority themselves, the Princes of political darkness. In the process, the man who was regarded with some justification as a kind of demi-god by his contemporaries lost his humanity altogether, becoming a not-so-very-comic Dr. Strangelove figure.

I hope that I have not put the reader off by this overly-dramatic presentation of this biography as a work of classic tragedy. This is, obviously, merely an imposed construction on the work, and very artificial at that. Yet it is certainly fair to say this much: the tremendously troublesome problem of the role of the scientist (technocrat) in a society increasingly dependent upon these men is the central issue of this biography. Neither Wiener nor von Neumann (nor, for that matter, Oppenheimer, Galbraith, Friedman or Kissinger) have succeeded in finding an acceptable way of playing this role. Perhaps the process of policy making and that of science are too radically different to permit a truly symbiotic relationship to form. Nonetheless, the experiences of two men such as Wiener and von Neumann is instructional, if disquieting.
I would like to close by pointing out that Mr. Heims has demonstrated that a quality piece of work in the sociology of science is possible outside the confines of a normal academic setting. Although I know nothing of Mr. Heims except what appears in his introduction, I recommend this introduction to all those in the throes of seeking permanent academic employment.

Finally, I feel constrained to echo the constant lament that the cost of books is rising so dramatically as to very soon exceed the ability of the scholar, and especially the student scholar, to purchase them, if it has not already done so. A book, such as this one, largely free of unusual symbolic notation, is somewhat high-priced at $19.95. Clearly, some breakthrough here in the near future is absolutely necessary.

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Roger Waterhouse lectures in philosophy at Middlesex Polytechnic and, as the dust jacket of this volume explains, "has been a member of the Radical Philosophy Group since its inception and a regular contributor to the journal (Radical Philosophy)," which has been published regularly since 1972. The Radical Philosophy Group itself, according to a purpose statement in the journal, "grew out of a convergence of two currents which had been largely formed by the student movements of the 1960's---on the one hand, discontent, especially among students, with the sterile and complacent philosophy taught in British universities and colleges, on the other hand, a revival of interest in the theoretical work on the left and a recognition of the need to confront the ideology enshrined in orthodox academic disciplines." This volume is the fifteenth in a series being jointly published by Harvester Press in England and the Humanities Press in this country apparently to broaden the influence of this group and to contribute to the criticism of the methods and assumptions of "the analytic movement started in the early years of the century" which, according to the purpose statement of the series ("Harvester Philosophy Now") has largely ignored the
real crises of the twentieth century and instead "submissively dwindled into a humble academic specialism, on its own understanding isolated from substantive issues in other disciplines, from the practical problems facing society, and from contemporary Continental thought." What unifies the titles in the series, however, is "nothing except discontent with this state of affairs" and the belief that "the analytical movement has spent its momentum [and that] its latest phase [is] no doubt its last."

What one might expect then from such a text as this is some explanation as to why the tradition of modern continental philosophy might have more to offer contemporary philosophy than recent analytic philosophy or some suggestions about the direction that philosophy should now take in the closing years of the 20th Century; but judging from this volume the series probably promises far more than it actually delivers[1]. For, unfortunately, even those who might share something of the sentiments of the Radical Philosophy Group or even agree with the purpose statement of the series will probably be disappointed with at least this volume of the series. For the only alternative to contemporary "English-speaking philosophy" that it ultimately offers is little more than a rather simplistic appeal to certain concerns of the "early" Marx that are not even presented with the creative spirit of much current neo-Marxist thought. But even more disappointing, rather than forging a new direction for contemporary Anglo-American philosophy through a long-overdue critical reexamination of the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger, Waterhouse seems overly concerned with justifying perhaps the poorest excuse that anyone could have for not reading Heidegger: his supposed collaboration with the Nazis during his brief tenure as rector of the university at Freiburg from April 1933 to February 1934[2].

What Waterhouse initially set out to do in this volume is meritorious, however. His "aims" were perhaps best expressed in the first of three articles, each of which parallels the development of this text, which appeared in Radical Philosophy: "My aims... are threefold: to express the main outlines of Heidegger's thought; to consider his philosophy as a cultural phenomenon; and to evaluate the truth of what he has to say"[3]. He correctly recognizes the two major difficulties in any presentation and critique of Heidegger's work: the problem of translating Heidegger's terminology into comprehensible English without either mystification or distortion and that the "ordinary English reader" finds the philosophical basis of the text obscured "not only by Heidegger's mind-
bending style, but by his own ignorance of the cultural background from which Heidegger's thinking sprang"[4]. He also appreciates the major shortcomings of most secondary works on Heidegger[5]:

Pro-Heidegger enthusiasts convinced of his profundity and importance see their task as making the thought of the great man accessible to a wider audience. These expositions are often good: they are rarely critical. In the other camp are the dismissive critics, who frequently garble their account of Heidegger in order to prove how very wrong he is. Consequently no dialogue develops.

So apparently Waterhouse has some interest, consistent with the general aim of the series, to provide the basis for such a "dialogue" about Heidegger's philosophy. He is even partially successful in such an effort insofar as he provides a clear, readable, and balanced account of the major themes of Being and Time as well as a general history of the development of continental philosophy from about 1890 to the mid-1930's in roughly the first half of the book. These accounts could even be especially informative for Anglo-American philosophers educated in the 1950's and 60's who received very little training in the development of recent continental philosophy or who could never bring themselves to actually reading Heidegger. He does not, however, actually engage in any such dialogue himself in this text except for a few convenient allusions to "ordinary language philosophy" in the concluding section of the book that are included mainly to augment his own final, harsh criticisms of Heidegger.

The work is divided into four sections. The first is "something of an intellectual history," as he describes it, which begins with a biographical sketch of Heidegger's childhood and youth that emphasizes the humanistic Catholic training that he received in the grammar schools in Konstanz and Freiburg and his study under the Catholic theological faculty at Freiburg. But, just as Waterhouse duly recognizes, except for the rigorous training in classical languages emphasized in this course of study, its influence on Heidegger's later development is hardly so consequential as his reading of Brentano's On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle, the hermeneutical tradition as represented by Dilthey, Husserl's phenomenology, and, especially important for understanding the genesis of Being and Time, according to Waterhouse, Jaspers' "Existenzphilosophie," and, specifically, his book, Psychology of World Views, which first appeared in 181
1919. This account of "the cultural background from which Heidegger's thought sprang" is indeed probably the most valuable part of the text, just because it is a brief, but highly informative and very readable, overview of the development of recent continental philosophy which places Heidegger's thought squarely in the midst of the development of Husserlian phenomenology. This account is not, of course, nor could it be in a work of this scope, as thorough as that of the standard work on the history of modern continental philosophy, Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement[6], or even as comprehensive as Pierre Thevanaz's much shorter book, What is Phenomenology?[7]. But it would serve the purposes of this volume well enough except for the following shortcomings: (a) he doesn't make anything of the opportunities provided by such an account to develop any constructive "dialogue" between Anglo-American and continental philosophy; (b) he tends to distort his account of the influence of Jasper's book on Heidegger to set the basis for his later charge of a fundamental "irrationalism" in Heidegger's philosophy that made him susceptible to the anti-scientific tendencies of Nazi ideology; and (c) a similar distortion can be found in his account of Heidegger's eventual break with Husserl, a topic which is discussed very impressionistically and without the serious, technical attention that it deserves.

Waterhouse notes, for example, in his discussion of Husserl, that he, "like Frege and Russell . . . turned to logic to discover the foundations of mathematics, but the logic they [i.e., Frege and Russell] found was inadequate. The question was thereby pushed back one remove and the problem now became how to establish the basis of logical truth" (p. 22). He hardly makes a serious effort to substantiate this claim that the logic of Frege and Russell was inadequate, however, a claim which most readers of the text will question, nor does he provide anything more than a half-page explanation of Husserl's later criticisms of Frege and Russell (p. 23). He does not even note that it was Frege who so severely criticized Husserl's early Philosophy of Arithmetic that he was forced to abandon his own version of "psychologism," but instead suggests in a footnote that it was Husserl who criticized a Fregean "psychologism" in his subsequent Logical Investigations, whereas in fact Husserl credited Frege in that volume for turning him away from naively "psychological" investigations into the nature of logical truth and toward the development of phenomenology[8]! But perhaps even more significant in a work on Heidegger, Waterhouse might have provided us
with a fuller account of Heidegger's own early work in the "philosophy of logic," his doctoral dissertation, The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism, or his habilitation dissertation, which was based on a text mistakenly attributed to Duns Scotus, the Grammatica Speculativa. The point here, of course, is not that Waterhouse doesn't recognize the importance of these works for Heidegger's own development, but that if he really wanted to have a "dialogue" with Heidegger's critics, he might have related the concerns of these texts to similar issues in the analytic tradition. But the fact of the matter is that Gilbert Ryle did far more to advance such dialogue in his 1929 Mind review of Being and Time than Waterhouse does in this volume[9].

Perhaps Waterhouse can be excused for not taking up such technical matters as these in an introductory text. Perhaps he will take up some of these issues in subsequent articles for Radical Philosophy. But the very subtle distortion that can be found in his account of Jaspers' influence on Heidegger can hardly be so easily excused. Here again, the point is not that he doesn't correctly emphasize the importance of Jaspers' book for Heidegger, or even that his account of this influence is inaccurate, for his views on this matter are not so different than those of other important scholars (p. 48)[10]:

What [Heidegger's (unpublished) review of Jaspers' work] reveals is that while at one level [he] was cooperating with and learning from Husserl, at a deeper level he had already articulated fundamental criticisms of his mentor. Moreover, what the Jaspers book did was to identify a central problematic for Heidegger: the need to give an account of the a priori structures of individual human existence—not Husserl's bloodless 'consciousness', but the anguished and throbbing human being. Jaspers had gone further; he had set out the markers for that account in his concept of the limit-situation. The way to get at the truth was through the extremity, particularly the extremity of death.

What Waterhouse quite correctly suggests then in his initial account of Jaspers' influence on Heidegger is that despite Heidegger's praise for the book, he also found it methodologically deficient because it lacked "scientific," i.e., phenomenological, rigour. What was needed was not such a rambling, unsystematic and highly personal Lebensphilosophie, rooted only in the relativism of a view of human history and culture
compatible with the philosophies of Dilthey or Spengler, but, as Waterhouse describes it, a "rigorous phenomenological account of human existence" (p. 48). Yet when Waterhouse discusses the influence of this same work again later in the text, it is not Heidegger's demand for greater rigour that he emphasizes, but the fact that Jaspers' book had "found a ready audience in the dislocated world of the post-war German intellectuals" in which "the integrity of the individual" was upheld as the only possible response to "the crisis and collapse of state institutions, ... social 'disintegration', ... abortive revolutions and freebooting private armies" (p. 46). So it is not at all the ideal of a "scientifc rigour" that Waterhouse emphasizes in his subsequent account of the great popularity of Being and Time, but again the instability and irrationality of German social and cultural history of this period. The clear suggestion is that in his rejection of the Cartesian ontology so fundamental to the development of modern science Heidegger was also contributing to the irrationalism of the Nazis, not only in Being and Time, but also in the major lectures of the 1930's, such as What is Metaphysics? (pp. 124ff). But more on this later.

The second section of the books is devoted to an analysis of the main argument of Being and Time. His analysis, at least in this part of the text, is indeed remarkably clear and actually does avoid the excesses of all "Heideggereze" that mar so many commentaries on this difficult text. The really serious difficulties with the book do not emerge then until the third section, which he describes as having a "hybrid character" (p. xi). This section, on first reading, might seem to be an attempt to combine several different projects in one "transitional" section before "the gloves are off" and Waterhouse allows himself to become "highly critical of many aspects of Heidegger's argument" (p. xi). As he explains it, the section "looks to Heidegger's career in the thirties and then considers the breakdown of his relationship with Husserl, and his involvement with the Nazis ... [and] concludes with a summary of Heidegger's principal insights" (p. xi). Clearly the strongest part of this section is the presentation of what Waterhouse considers the four principal "insights" of Heidegger's philosophy: "knowing is founded in being" (i.e., the attempt to reestablish the centrality of ontology rather than epistemology as the principal concern of post-Kantian western philosophy), "the falsity of everyday life," "objectification," and "the finitude of existence" (pp. 132-45). The account of these
"insights" is already biased by the criticisms of Heidegger that are finally unveiled in the fourth, and final, section, however. So the pairing of these topics with an account of Heidegger's association with the Nazis and his "final break" with Husserl is not really coincidental at all, but a cross-fertilization of issues that is intended to lead directly to Waterhouse's central criticism of Heidegger: Heidegger's sympathy for the Nazi cause was neither coincidental nor merely the consequence of his political naivety, but a direct consequence of the philosophical stance of Being and Time.

Waterhouse is hardly the first to criticize Heidegger's entire philosophical enterprise because of his collaboration with the Nazis, although one does not expect to find such criticisms so forcefully, but subtly, presented in a work otherwise so balanced and unprejudiced as this text[11]. This is not to deny that some relationship might exist between Heidegger's philosophy and the fact that he was more willing to compromise with the Nazis than many of his colleagues. But exactly what would one have to do to establish as strong a relationship as that claimed by Waterhouse? From a philosophical perspective, one would need to demonstrate a logical connection between the stance of Being and Time and the rise of a spirit of anti-scientific "Irrationalism" such as Waterhouse identifies as a central tenet of Nazi ideology. From the perspective of "social history," one would need to seriously analyze the development of Nazi ideology and what Heidegger might have actually known about Naziism. But Waterhouse, despite the subtitle of the work, "A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger," and his expressed interest to "consider [Heidegger's] philosophy as a cultural phenomenon" stated in his first Radical Philosophy article (p. 8), does not do either of these tasks very well. What he offers instead is a very selective and even inconsistent analysis of Heidegger's lectures of the 1930's which relies mostly on a juxtaposition of passages from What is Metaphysics? with newspaper reports of Nazi activities during the same period, an approach which turns out to be very superficial cultural history at best. But even more disconcerting is his attempt to level the charge of "irrationalism" on Heidegger inasmuch as he has already correctly noted that Heidegger's main criticism of Jaspers' work was its unscientific character. Yet he consistently confuses Heidegger's "anti-scientism," a view which he shared with Husserl—including Husserl's final work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, with the anti-scientific irrationality.

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of the Nazis[12]. Moreover, his account of the differences between Husserlian phenomenology and that practiced by Heidegger is too brief and too superficial to make much of the similarities of their projects, for he is far too concerned with a largely biographical account of how the younger man turned on his Jewish mentor. But not even his own account of Heidegger's ten months as rector of the University of Freiburg is adequate to establish that Heidegger was actually committed to, or that he carried out, the actual policies of the Nazis, since he is finally forced to admit that "there is no evidence that Heidegger did or said anything to implement the racialist policies of the Nazis" (for "while his speeches had numerous things to say in favour of the Nazis, racialism is not one of them") (p. 127)[13].

All that Waterhouse really has then is circumstantial evidence against Heidegger and not a serious philosophical argument to demonstrate any clear logical connection between the stance of Being and Time and Heidegger's sometimes favorable statements about the Nazis. But having already convicted Heidegger on circumstantial evidence in the third section of the text, he must try to construct a case against him in the fourth. However, it seems to me that one can only find such implications in Heidegger's text if one wants to provide what he refers to as a narrow "right-wing Catholic" reading of the text—which is what he suggests was the most common reading in the 1930's (even though he never cites one example of such an interpretation), rather than that of such well-known thinkers as Bultmann and Biswanger (who he does discuss in some detail) (pp. 162-63)[14]. Worse yet, his specific analysis of Heidegger's final break with Husserlian phenomenology comprises only about half a dozen pages, much of which is of an anecdotal and not strictly philosophical nature, although he repeatedly implies that if Heidegger had not rejected Husserl's version of phenomenology he surely would have never come under the spell of the anti-scientific world-view of Naziism. But if this is so, why didn't Sartre, or almost the entire "second generation" of phenomenologists, almost all of whom similarly rejected the Husserlian ideal of "transcendental phenomenology" (and in particular his views on the nature of the epoché and the "transcendental ego"), also become Nazis?

So despite the promises of the editors and the solid scholarship that is to be found in most of the first half of the text, this turns out to be a very disappointing book. Waterhouse simply substitutes a revised version of the charge of Naziism against
Heidegger for the serious philosophical analysis that his project really demands. I don't, of course, make this remark from the position of an uncritical defense of Heidegger. I think, in fact, that the prospects of an informed dialogue between Heideggerians and Marxists, which Waterhouse attempts in the final section of the book, is indeed a very worthwhile project and certainly there is need for additional work in English on such topics as Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl[15]. But for a general introduction to Heidegger in English there remain no better studies than those by J. L. Mehta[16], and there are already far better discussions of the relationship between Heidegger and Husserl that are not so clouded by such discussions of German social and political history as one finds in this book[17].

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Among the other titles in the series are a two-volume study of Sartre, several studies on different aspects of "ideology", and works on "naturalism", art (Art, An Enemy of the People), dialectic, and Hegel's Phenomenology.

No one denies that Heidegger accepted the post as rector at Freiburg, or that he made speeches during this period in support of the Nazi regime, but there are a number of varying interpretations of Heidegger's political philosophy and his reasons for accepting the post at Freiburg. Heidegger himself discussed these matters in a well-known interview for Der Spiegel, which appeared in English translation in Philosophy Today, Vol. 24 (Winter 1976), pp. 267-84 (Waterhouse relies extensively on this interview). Probably the best discussion of Heidegger's political philosophy in English is Karsten Harries article, "Heidegger as Political Thinker," Review of Metaphysics," Vol. 29 (June 1976), reprinted in Michael Murray, ed., Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 304-28.


Ibid.

A Heidegger Critique, p. ix; subsequent references to this work cited in text.
Despite the fact that Husserl is often still critical of Frege in the Logical Investigations, for example, his notions of "Sinn" and "Bedeutung," he explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Frege and that he has rejected his earlier "fundamental criticisms of Frege's antipsychologistic position" (J. N. Findlay, trans., Quadrangle Books, 1968). Husserl even suggests that it would be worthwhile to read the Preface of Frege's Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik "in relation to all the discussions of these Prologomena" (i.e., Volume One of the German edition of the Investigations). For a more complete discussion of the Husserl-Frege relationship, see J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship," reprinted in the author's anthology, Readings on Edmund Husserl's "Logical Investigations" (Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); Edo Pivcevic, Husserl and Phenomenology (Hutchinson University Library, 1970), esp. Chps. 2 & 3; Ignacio Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1967), and D. Føllesdal, Husserl and Frege (Aschehoug, 1958). The extant Husserl-Frege correspondence was published in the Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5 (Fall 1974), pp. 83-96.

Reprinted in Murray, pp. 53-64. Heidegger's dissertations have both been republished in the Fruehe Schriften Frankfurt am Main, 1972); Heidegger's Marburg lectures from the Winter Semester, 1925-26, Logik, Der Frage nach der Wahrheit are also available now in the Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 21 (Frankfurt am Main, 1976).


What Waterhouse really intends to be his central criticism of Heidegger in this regard is that his "fundamental ontology" does not reveal a universal a
priori structure of human existence, but just like Jaspers' book, only the unique experiences of one individual, i.e., Martin Heidegger, a point which is brought out more fully in the final section of the book. But in his comparison of Heidegger and Husserl he seems to suggest that Heidegger gave up entirely on any ideal of a "rigorous science," while Husserl always remained true to this ideal of western civilization. There is, of course, some truth to this comparison, but Husserl also rejected "scientism" as did Heidegger, and it is this "scientism" rooted in the Cartesian ontology that is at the center of both Husserl's later work and Being and Time—and neither Husserl nor Heidegger were alone in their criticisms of this attitude. For example, Leo Strauss has also been referred to as a strong critic of "scientism," like Husserl and Heidegger, but certainly this doesn't justify a claim that he should be considered a Nazi! Cp. Hwa Yol Jung, "Two Critics of Scientism: Leo Strauss and Edmund Husserl," Independent Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 2, 1978), pp. 81-88.

I think that the most balanced statement on Heidegger's association with the Nazis is that made by Hannah Arendt, who concludes that the fact of the matter is that Heidegger's real "error" was that he was terribly naive politically and that he knew almost nothing about Nazi ideology during this period; but while he might be excused for having never read Mein Kampf, he need not be excused for having either been oblivious to or having ignored "the reality of the Gestapo cellars and the torture-hells of the early concentration camps;" she also thinks that "Heidegger himself corrected his own 'error' more quickly and more radically than many of those who later sat in judgement over him—he took considerably greater risks than were usual in German literary and university life during that period" ("Heidegger at Eighty," reprinted in Murray, p. 302).

On Biswanger, and others, see also, Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry (Northwestern University Press, 1972).

I find it very odd, considering the mixture of interests in phenomenology and Marxism that would appear to be central concerns for Waterhouse, that he does not even mention the "phenomenological Marxism" of Enzo Paci in his bibliography (The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man [Northwestern University Press, 1972]).


The relationship between Husserl and Heidegger from 1930 to 1938 was deeply influenced by political events. But however tragic the situation may have been, particularly from Husserl's point of view, it would seem that dwelling upon it serves no purpose in clarifying the relationship between their philosophies. In my opinion a perpetuation of this irretrievable aspect of the relationship between the two great philosophers lends more to sensationalism than to the quest for wisdom.

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