CAUSATION, MOTION
and the
UNMOVED MOVER

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I

In Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book XII, Chapters 6 and 7, the Unmoved Mover is said to be an eternal, entirely actual substance which moves other things without itself being moved in any way by any other thing. I attempt to analyse and clarify these views about the Unmoved Mover and will focus my analysis around the following two questions:

I. What does the Unmoved Mover cause?

II. In what way does the Unmoved Mover cause what it causes?

II

What the Unmoved Mover moves is importantly tied to what the Unmoved Mover is. Aristotle prepares the ground for the introduction of the concept of an Unmoved Mover in Chapters 1-6 of Book XII. In those chapters he summarizes much of the work he has done in the Metaphysics up to that point: for example, he discusses the different senses of substance (1069a30-40, 1070a9-15), the principles and causes of change and motion (1070a13-1070b35), and the potentiality/actuality distinction (1071a5-17).

He reminds us that there are two types of sensible substance: the type which is capable of change and is perishable; the other type is not capable of change, but is capable of motion and is imperishable. The first type is exemplified in an individual human being or an individual oak tree; the second type by the celestial bodies. Aristotle goes on to argue that there must be yet a third type of substance—an eternal, imperishable and immutable substance. (See

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his detailed discussion of these topics in Met. VI, 1.) His arguments for the existence of this third type of substance contribute to our question, since it appears that the concept of the Unmoved Mover is derived from his understanding of motion. In brief, he argues that if we construe motion in a certain way, then there must exist an unmoved mover. His argument begins in Met. XII, 6 1071b3, and I formulate it, with commentary, below:

(1) Substances are the first of existing things.
(2) If substances are the first of existing things, and if all substances are destructible, then all things are destructible.
(3) It is impossible that movement (motion) should either come into being or cease to be, in the same sense that time itself could never come into being or cease to be. Movement is continuous in the same sense in which time is continuous, because time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement (Physics IV, 11 and VIII, 6).
(4) If this is so, and motion must have always existed, then motion must have had a cause (source, origin).
(5) If there is a substance capable of producing motion in other things but is not actually doing so, then it does not follow that there will necessarily be movement. (Here the potentiality/actuality distinction becomes important. Just because a substance has a potentiality to produce motion, it is not necessary that it actualize that potentiality. We cannot
guarantee the existence of motion unless we understand this substance to be actualizing its potentiality for producing motion.)

(6) However, even this substance actualizing its potentiality may not be sufficient—if 'its essence is potency'.
(If the essence of this substance somehow consisted of only a potentiality for producing motion, then that it produced motion actually might be merely accidental or else not a production of motion per se.)

(7) Since 'that which exists potentially may possibly not be', it follows that motion may not be eternal.
(Unexercised potentiality may never be actualized. Hence, a substance with unactualized potentiality could never be sufficient for eternal motion.)

(8) Therefore, whatever substance is to be sufficient for eternal motion must be a substance whose 'essence is actuality'.
(Ross translated 'substance' here as 'principle', consistent with Aristotle's understanding of substance as a principle, source, origin--arche.)

(9) Further, 'such a substance must be without matter'.
(It should be mentioned here that Aristotle does not specify which sense of matter he means here. At 1069b25-27, he distinguishes 'matter for generation' which we understand is the matter possessed by sensible substances capable of generation and destruction. There is also matter for 'motion from one place to another'. The heavenly bodies possess this type of matter only. They are sensible substances, but due to the type of matter they possess, are incapable of destruction and hence, are eternal. The general principle here is that any substance which is capable of motion must have matter, in one of the two senses. Since the substance we are seeking must be eternal, it certainly could not have matter for generation. Further, if it possessed matter for motion, while remaining eternal, it would itself still be capable of being moved, just as the planets are capable of being moved.)
(However, the original hypothesis at 1071b5 is that there must be an eternal unmovable substance. Since motion is eternal, the substance we are seeking (a) must be eternal, (b) its essence must be complete actuality, and (c) it itself must have no potentiality for being moved. Aristotle does not spell out his argument for (c). I suggest that (c) can be justified, first by the argument about the two senses of matter given above; second, by arguing that (c) is a consequence of (b). A substance whose essence is actuality, by definition, is one which possesses no unactualized potentiality. A substance which possesses no unactualized potentiality is incapable of being changed or moved. Therefore, if our substance is indeed completely actualized, then it is entirely incapable of change or motion of any kind.)

10 The conclusion to the argument can now be drawn: There must exist a substance which is eternal and unmovable.

In sum, given Aristotle's conception of motion as described, then in order to make this concept intelligible and (perhaps) to give it an ontological 'foot- hold', he argues (as formulated above) that there must exist a substance sufficient for the intelligibility of the concept of motion as well as causally sufficient to explain the actual existence of motion.

In Chapter 7, 1072a23-25, Aristotle gives a slightly different argument for the same conclusion:

(1) "There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; this is plain not in theory only but in fact."[2] (The 'something' referred to is the first heaven, the outermost sphere in the universe, "in which the fixed stars are set").

(2) "Therefore, the first heaven must be eternal" (1072a23-24). (This follows because only an eternal substance would be capable of engaging in eternal motion.)

(3) And since that which both is moved and moves is intermediate (i.e., the first heaven is intermediate in this sense), it follows that there is something which
moves the first heaven but is itself unmoved.

(4) Therefore, "There is something which moves without being moved" having been shown by previous argument to be 'eternal, substance and actuality" (1072a24-25).

It is this argument which reveals the first hint as to what in particular the Unmoved Mover causes—the eternal circular motion of the first heaven. Since eternal circular motion is the 'highest' sort of motion, this highest sort of motion cannot be accounted for by any other than that which possesses the requisite properties of substance, i.e., eternality and actuality. In Met. XII, 7 Aristotle does not explicitly name any other specific case of motion for which the Unmoved Mover is responsible. The discussion of the multiple unmoved movers in XII, 8 is not directly of concern here.[3]

If we accept that eternal circular locomotion (i.e., motion in space from one place to another), then it becomes clear why this sort of motion requires for its intelligibility the Unmoved Mover as described. It seems quite reasonable, however, to wonder whether there might not be more to the story. What about all the rest of the motion whose existence 'is plain not in theory only but in fact'? In hopes of not begging any questions, I phrase my concern roughly in this way: does the Unmoved Mover have anything to do with the motions (of any sort) observed in either terrestrial nature or in human activity?

In my view, the answer is yes. The Unmoved Mover serves as sufficient archê for motion in nature as well as human activity. There are difficulties with such a view, and I cannot hope to defend it adequately here. But I do try to sketch out the plausibility of this view in Section II below. The chief support for the view, I believe, rests solidly in the Met. XII, 7 text and in the overall teleological character of Aristotle's metaphysics.

The concept of a substantial, eternal, actual Unmoved Mover is developed as a principle or cause of the necessarily eternal character of motion. This principle is shown to be sufficient for the existence of eternal circular motion. What has not yet been shown is how the Unmoved Mover achieves the production of motion. Further, I have deliberately left unspecified the sense of cause in which the Unmoved Mover is said to cause, or to be the cause of, motion. It is to these interesting questions that I now turn.
In what way does the Unmoved cause what it causes? The Unmoved Mover which is substance, eternal, completely actual "moves in the following manner. The object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved" (1072a26, Loeb edition).

The Unmoved Mover, then, succeeds in producing motion in the world insofar as it is an object of desire or an object of thought. In order to understand the type of causation implicit here, it will be useful to examine the notion of an 'object of desire'.

In Book III, 10 of De Anima, Aristotle discusses the 'sources of movement' of the animal. He argues that the calculative intellect ("which calculates means to an end") and appetite ("in every form of it relative to an end") are both "capable of originating local movements" (433a15-16). The reason why these two are the sources of movement is that "the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought [i.e., calculation] gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation" (433a19-20).

We see, then, that the object of appetite (of desire) starts a movement in the animal. The object of desire present to an animal stimulates the mind to calculate (deliberate) about achieving the object of desire. The calculative intellect will not begin to 'go to work', so to speak, unless there is present to it an object of desire. What emerges in the following sequence: what initially stimulates movement in the animal is the object of desire. The object of desire stimulates the 'faculty' of appetite in the sense that the animal recognizes the object present to it as an object of desire. Only after this initial recognition does the faculty of calculation exercise its function of deliberating about means to achieve the object of desire. "Mind [calculative intellect] is never found producing movement without appetite" (433a23).

Now what is it about the object of desire such that it produces movement in the animal to which it is an object of desire?

... this object [of desire] may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be [a] good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. (433a29-30)[4]
Thus, if the object of desire is to produce movement in the animal, it must be a good of the practical sort. Only a practical good could be brought into being by action. An absolute good could never be brought into being. Just as truth (as apprehended by theoretical intellect) is universal and necessary, 'truths' (as apprehended by the practical intellect) are opinions (Nichomachean Ethics VII, 3) and as such are contingent (Posterior Analytics I, 33).

So, an object of desire causes motion in an animal insofar as it is a practical good realizable only in the activity of the animal. While it is not correct to say, for Aristotle, that 'movement' and 'activity' are identical in meaning, it is nevertheless correct to say that in realizing a good in activity the animal moves.[5]

In the same chapter of De Anima and also in the Physics V,1, Aristotle distinguishes three factors or ingredients in movement generally. (1) "that which originates the movement, (2) that by means of which it originates it, and (3) that which is moved" (433b13-15). In the Physics, the three factors are stated as "a mover, a moved, and a goal of motion" (224b5-6).

In any case of movement, then, the object of desire is "that which moves without itself being moved" and "is the realizable good" (433b15-16); it is that which 'originates the movement' and is the 'goal of motion'. Second, 'that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite'. The faculty of appetite is 'that by means of which' the object of desire originates movement in the animal. The faculty of appetite is the 'mover,' a moved mover; whereas the object of desire is an unmoved mover. Third, 'that which is moved' is the animal.

In sum, an object of desire produces movement in a creature by means of an intermediary mover—the faculty of appetite. This faculty is moved by the object of desire, and in turn, the faculty acts upon the animal to try to realize this desired good in activity.

In Met. XII, 7 Aristotle says that an object of desire moves without itself being moved. And if so, then the Unmoved Mover is a good of some kind. Having gone this far, Aristotle introduces a term not new to his philosophy but new to the present discussion. The term is 'final cause'. He says that 'final cause' has two senses: (1) "some being for whose good an action is done," and (2) "something at which action aims" (1072b1-2). He goes on to argue that only in the second sense can the Unmoved Mover be a final cause, for the reason that "of these [final causes] the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not" (1072b3). Since the Unmoved Mover has been
proven to be an unchangeable entity, then if it is to be a final cause, it must therefore be a final cause in the second sense.

The arguments from the De Anima discussed above, I think, lend support and give content to Aristotle's concise argument about the Unmoved Mover moving other things as a final cause. In my view, the argument can be expanded and clarified as follows: An object of desire moves without itself being moved (i.e., is an unmoved mover) only insofar as it is a final cause in the second sense. The object of desire which stimulates the faculty of appetite does not itself change. The object of desire is a stimulus to the creature—through the intermediary of the faculty of appetite—to act in such a way as to realize a good in activity. The object of desire is not identical to that good; nor is it identical to the activity which brings that good into being. The object of desire is that entity which in some sense 'represents' or 'stands for' or 'serves as the ideal' of the good which the animal strives to realize in activity. In the sense, then, we can properly say that an unmoved mover is a final cause of movement.

This discussion generates further lines of investigation. Granting that, in general, an unmoved mover is a final cause of motion and moves as an object of desire, why and in what sense is the Unmoved Mover an object of desire?

First, in general, any final cause is properly understood as an object of desire, 'that for the sake of which' an activity is engaged in by a creature. And further, any final cause in the second sense described above is an unmoved mover, i.e., produces motion in an animal without itself being moved. Granting these general points, for what in particular is the first Unmoved Mover—an eternal, immutable, entirely actual substance—an object of desire?

We have already noted the argument by which Aristotle shows that the Unmoved Mover must be the cause of the eternal circular motion of the first heaven. If the Unmoved Mover is to be the final cause of eternal circular motion, it must be an 'object of desire' for the first heaven, such that the first heaven realizes some good in that motion. If this interpretation is justified, exploration of it requires that we give more content to the formal notion of the Unmoved Mover.

Thus far, Aristotle has argued that the Unmoved Mover is a substance, eternal, imperceptible (i.e., without matter of any kind), entirely actual, capable of producing motion without itself being moved. Insofar as it is a final cause, it is an object of desire...
for that which it moves. An object of desire must be a good or an apparent good which can be realized in some respect in some motion or activity.

At 1072b5-14, Aristotle gives additional arguments for (1) the necessary existence of the Unmoved Mover, as well as arguments for the sense in which (2) the Unmoved Mover is a first principle, and the sense in which (3) the Unmoved Mover is a good. I will consider each in turn.

(1) Eternal circular locomotion must be accounted for in some way. Eternal circular locomotion is the highest kind of motion and therefore could not have been caused by anything which itself is in motion. If eternal circular motion were caused by a mover which was also in motion, the motion of that mover would have to be of a higher kind than eternal circular motion. But that is impossible. Therefore, eternal circular motion must be caused by something which itself is not in motion. Eternal circular motion exists. Therefore, the Unmoved Mover exists necessarily (1072b5-10).

The sense of 'necessity' proper to the Unmoved Mover is specified in Met. V, 5: "We say that that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is. And from this sense of 'necessary' all the others are some­how derived" (1015a34-35). A thing (a being) is neces­sary (exists necessarily) when it cannot be otherwise than it is. "Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in other things" (1015b9-10).

The first heaven owes its being actualized to the Unmoved Mover which is its final cause; the Unmoved Mover does not depend upon anything else for its existence, and is itself the source of its being as it is--eternal, entirely actualized substance.

Aristotle says in Met. V, 5 that it follows from this notion of necessity that which exists necessarily is "the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it cannot even be in one state and also in another" (1015b11-12). This view is, of course, consistent with his comment in Met. XII, 7: "substance is first, and in substance, that which is simply and exists actually" (1072a32-33). To be 'simple' means to be without parts and not to admit of alternate states of being--which is to say, not to ad­mit of any motion or change of any kind.[6] If a being could admit of motion of any kind, then it must have some unactualized potentiality. But the Unmoved Mover has no unactualized potentiality. Therefore, in this sense, the Unmoved Mover is shown to be simple. Its simplicity, I suggest, is a consequence of its necessity, in this way: a being which is necessary
cannot be other than it is. A thing can be other than it is when it admits of parts; because when it admits of parts, it admits of potentiality. The Unmoved Mover is necessary; therefore, it can admit neither of parts nor potentiality.

(2) In what sense is the Unmoved Mover a first principle? From Met. V, 1 we understand a principle to be a 'beginning' or a 'starting point'. The relevant senses of beginning or starting point, I take it, is the most general sense: "It is common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some are immanent in the thing and others outside" (1013a17-20). A major argument of Met. VII is that substance is that sense of being in which its beginning or principle is immanent and not extrinsic. Thus, insofar as the Unmoved Mover is substance, it is true to say that the Unmoved Mover contains within itself its own starting point from which it exists and is known.

Further, he says that there are as many senses of cause as there are senses of beginnings, "for all causes are beginnings" (1013a16). Combining these ideas, then, we can say that the Unmoved Mover is a principle in the sense that it contains within itself the starting point, source, or origin of its own being and being known. And insofar as it is a principle of its being and being known, it is a cause. Of what? I suggest that the Unmoved Mover is properly said to be the cause of itself, for no other thing is higher in being, goodness, or actuality. Further, the Unmoved Mover is the final cause of the highest sort of motion.

Lastly, as I shall argue below, it is the final cause of the natural motions and activities of natural objects. Before I present this argument, it is important to examine Aristotle's claim that the Unmoved Mover is a good.

(3) The argument that the Unmoved Mover is a good is extremely condensed:

... and insofar as it [the first mover] exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. (1072b10-11)

At first glance, it appears that the goodness of the Unmoved Mover derives from its necessity and that the Unmoved Mover is a first principle by virtue of the fact that its 'mode of being' is good.

Our earlier concern was to understand in what sense the Unmoved Mover was an object of desire. If an object of desire is either a good or an apparent good,
then the sense in which the Unmoved Mover is an object of desire depends on the sense in which it is good.

Aristotle's argument quoted immediately above is surely a nexus of central and fundamental themes in Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. I cannot hope to treat all of them in adequate detail here, but I will try to cite those important details which will illuminate the link between the Unmoved Mover and its being a good.

First, I interpret the puzzling discussion about the "column of opposites" (1072a30-35), following Apostle, in this way[7]: 'good' has as many senses as 'being'. 'Good', like 'being', can be predicated of all the categories. There is no sense of 'good' apart from its being predicated of any of the categories, i.e., there is no good-in-itself which has being apart from a good action, a good house, a good argument (Nichomachean Ethics I, 6 1096a19-29). Therefore, the Unmoved Mover cannot be said to be a good in the sense of the good-in-itself.

A thing is most good when it is chosen for its own sake (NE 1097a15-23). A lesser good is one chosen for the sake of something else. Now a thing chosen could be said (with qualification) to be an object of desire; therefore a good—a thing chosen for its own sake—is an object of desire. And insofar as a thing chosen for its own sake is said to be better than a thing chosen for the sake of something else, it follows that an object of desire chosen for its own sake is most good, or as Aristotle puts it, "the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best" (1072a36). First in the class of goods, then, are those chosen for their own sake.

The argument proceeds similarly, I think, for being. The first in the class of being is that which exists as it is and could not not exist other than it is, i.e., the primary sense of being is that which exists necessarily. It follows, as we have seen, that any such necessarily existent being must be eternal, simple, and entirely actual as well.

What emerges from this analysis is that the Unmoved Mover is pre-eminent among substances in that its essential attributes are supreme or superlative attributes—most truly existent and most truly good. If so, then the link between its necessity and its goodness is an essential link which I think fair to call extensional equivalence. Insofar as a thing exists necessarily it also must be entirely good. Such a thing, therefore, must be an object of desire because anything which is entirely good, if chosen, is chosen for its own sake.
Second, there is another sense of 'good' relevant to the being of the Unmoved Mover. Not only is the Unmoved Mover said to be a good and hence chosen for its own sake, it is also an object of love (eromenon, beloved, 1072b4):

The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. (1072b4)

I think it reasonable to interpret this passage in this way: as a final cause, the Unmoved Mover is more than an object of desire—it is an object of love; but generally, because all final causes need not be objects of love. What is the relevant difference between these two notions?

Aquinas characterizes it in this way, in his commentary on the Metaphysics:

And it is better to speak of it [the Unmoved Mover] as something loved rather than as something desired, since there is desire only of something that is not yet possessed, but there is love even of something that is possessed.[8]

The point here, I take it, is that we only properly desire that which we do not possess or that which we have not yet achieved. If we have possessed or achieved it, we would no longer desire it. But even if we possessed or achieved our object of desire, we could still love, admire, greatly value our possession or achievement and continue to act for its sake. In the context of the Unmoved Mover, it is odd to speak of the first heaven, for example desiring to 'possess' the Unmoved Mover; likewise it is odd to say that natural objects desire to possess it. But it is at least not odd in the same way to say that the heavens and terrestrial beings move and act as they do for the sake of achieving the 'good' which the Unmoved Mover qua object of love is properly said to be.

We can go somewhat further than Aquinas. Granted that the Unmoved Mover is not an object of desire in the sense that creatures desire to possess it, nevertheless desire is important in understanding the causal relation between the Unmoved Mover and the heavens and natural objects. We do not desire to possess the Unmoved Mover, but we do desire to bring about, in particular activities, the good—pure actuality—which the Unmoved Mover formally captures in its being.

One last point on the relevant sense of 'good'. An oversimplified but basically sound judgment about Aristotle's commitment to the teleological character of
natural activity is this: what natural objects do of their own nature is the best for objects of that kind. The essence of a substance must capture 'what it is to be' a thing of this kind. The essence of a substance, hence, is intrinsically normative in that it discloses the essential attributes, so to speak, which a thing must actualize if it is to be a good thing of its kind. Thus, the motions of the heavens and the activities of terrestrial creatures, when these arise out of their natures, are for the best. The specific content of what is best, of course, differs from species to species. But the very notion of what it is to be best is the essence of the Unmoved Mover. The Unmoved Mover is that substance whose reality, eternality and goodness just is what is it to be best. And I venture this interpretation that, for Aristotle, what it is to be best is to be as actualized, completed, perfected as possible. All natural objects have matter of some kind and hence cannot be perfectly actualized. Unactualized potentiality will always remain in any natural object due to that matter. But, formally, what it is to be a good rock, or a good oak tree, or a good human being is to be as actualized as possible, in the way appropriate to the species.

The Unmoved Mover is essentially a perfectly actualized substance, and hence, is that most real and most good being which we desire to become like insofar as we strive in our nature to be as completely actual as possible. We strive, within the bounds of our natures, to achieve in activity that good which completes or perfects us. But actualization of our potential requires effort, and since our essence is not that of actuality, our potential may not be actualized. The essence of the Unmoved Mover, however, is pure actuality. The Unmoved Mover is the final cause of those activities by which we actualize our being, because it is that eternal ideal of perfection which inspires us to persist in those activities which contribute to our actualization. The Unmoved Mover is that being which exists in the way each natural object strives to exist--actualized. The Unmoved Mover is a final cause as we have seen, in the sense that it is the actuality 'at which action aims'.

If this analysis is sound, it reveals at least in broad outline how the Unmoved Mover stands in the relation of final cause to not only the first heaven, but to all the other spheres and to terrestrial natural objects as well.[9]

It has been my intention in this paper to develop the notion of the Unmoved Mover and to analyse Aristotle's arguments in an entirely non-theological context. To do so is appropriate, since in none of the
texts examined here has Aristotle used the term for God, theos. An examination of the connection between the attributes and characteristics of the Unmoved Mover explored here and the concept of a theological God in Aristotle (if there is one) comprises another fruitful inquiry in itself. I close by suggesting that the analysis herein might contribute to such an inquiry in this way: If I am right about the relation of final causality holding between the Unmoved Mover and all natural motion and activity, then a traditional criticism of Aristotle's 'theology'—viz., that Aristotle's 'God' is remote from and plays no role in the world of human activity—can be seen to be without foundation.[10]
NOTES

Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Aristotle's works are taken from Richard McKeon, Editor, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941.)

1There is, of course, a long tradition of literature debating the question of whether the modal predicates can properly be predicates of 'things'. I do not try to make any case one way or the other here for Aristotle's view, except to say that his language when construed literally seems to indicate that some beings exist necessarily--i.e., not dependent on any other. I discuss the topic further in Section II of this paper.

2Locomotion (motion in place) is more perfect than any of the other types of motion (viz., alteration, increase and decrease) because the substance undergoing locomotion does not become different from itself, merely different in place. Locomotion in a circle is more perfect than linear locomotion (vertical or horizontal) because it is continuous. Cf. Physics VIII, 7-9; also De Caelo I,2 268b15-169b18. See also, Leo V. Elders, Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book λ of the Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. 141-42.

3See W. K. C. Guthrie, "The Development of Aristotle's Theology," Classical Quarterly XXVII (1933), pp. 162-71. In brief, Guthrie argues that there is textual evidence that Chapter 8 is a later treatise, written from personal study with Callipus well after the initial broader conception of the Unmoved Mover (in Chapters 6 and 7) was formulated. In my view, the arguments in Chapter 8 do not affect the interpretation of the Unmoved Mover which I offer here. See also, Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: The Fundamentals of his Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 345-67, for his discussion of Aristotle's later views on the 'Prime Mover'.

4Hicks translates this passage as follows:

Hence it is invariably the object of appetency which causes motion, but this object may be either the good or the apparent good. Not all good, however, but practical good: where by practical good we mean something which may not be good under all circumstances.

6 An additional argument for the simplicity and indivisibility of the Unmoved Mover is found in Met. XII, 7 1073a1-12 and in Physics VIII, 10.


9 I recognize that in order to defend this view much more work needs to be done; but best done, I think, in future work. For instance, Aristotle's comments about the thinking of the Unmoved Mover and the object of its thought in 1072b14-30 is directly relevant to the sense in which the Unmoved Mover is the final cause of human activity. Further, the notions of 'activity' and 'excellence' must be explored, and a detailed inquiry into the question of whether the acquisition and exercise of human excellences--both moral and intellectual--arise out of our nature and in that sense are properly said to be natural activities. If they are natural activities, then perhaps my analysis can fill an apparent gap in the foundation of Aristotle's ethics: viz., that the moral 'motivation' for acquiring the excellences rests in our desire for actualization; in our striving, not for the being of the Unmoved Mover, but for the mode of his being--perfect, complete, actualized.

In his History of Greek Philosophy, Fuller indicates a somewhat similar view in the following passage:

Aristotle had now a form of being, the example of whose perfect actuality was sufficient to set every degree of potentiality in the universe going, from the operations of the human mind and the stately 'whence and whither' of the outer heaven to the crude capacities of prime matter. Such a being was a combination of metaphysical catalyzer and magnet. Its mere presence set up a commotion in which it took no part and by which it was

10 See Fuller, *ibid.*, pp. 146-53. For example:

The most serious and disqualifying charge is that, if the Unmoved Mover is so shut away from the universe as to be totally unaware of its existence, it is difficult to see how the universe can be in any way aware of God, not to speak of being thrilled and moved by the appeal of his perfection. (p. 146) On religious grounds, also, Aristotle's theology has been severely taken to task. We must admit that his God is, to say the least, an austere object of worship. Regarded merely as an ideal and as a beloved whom one is content to adore at a distance, such a being can with difficulty be conceived as moving the world's heart or even its head. (p. 147)

The objection from religious grounds perhaps is summed up in this way:

The religious value of any God will lie, then, largely in the reciprocal interest he shows in us, our affairs, and our needs. He must be not only an unmoved mover untouched by imperfections, but a moved mover as well, stirred by compassion for the weakness and the misery of the finite creature, and bestirring himself actively on our behalf. (p. 148)

Further objections along these lines can be found in T. M. Forsyth, "Aristotle's Concept of God as Final Cause," *Philosophy* XXII (1947), pp. 112-23, and George A. Lindbeck, "A Note on Aristotle's Discussion of God and World," *Review of Metaphysics* I (1948), pp. 99-106. Both of these authors are highly critical of the theological adequacy of Aristotle's concept of God. Such criticisms seem, however, narrow and off the point. It is not entirely clear that one is obliged, on the basis of anything Aristotle says, to confer theological, 'belief-inducing,' or 'worship-worthy' attributes to the Unmoved Mover.