SUICIDE:
THE ULTIMATE INSIDE-OUT
ad Hominem ARGUMENT

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I

One of the major recurring themes in the literature on suicide is that of the desirability of a more nearly neutral definition of the concept. And despite the numerous disagreements over the various aspects of suicide, many of the combatants agree that a more nearly value-free explication of the concept would not only serve to clarify the nature of suicide, but also enhance the subsequent moral considerations of suicide. In fact, there seems to be a consensus that most of the moral issues related to suicide could be handled with some ease if only there were a morally-neutral definition of suicide. Or in other words, the moral conflicts over suicide which currently exist would be virtually eliminated if we could start with a morally-neutral definition of suicide.

One of the most recent exponents of this theme is Tom L. Beauchamp in his "What is Suicide?". Mindful that since "significantly different moral, social, and legal sanctions will be implied by the classification of an act as suicide . . . the development of an adequate definition will have important practical consequences," Beauchamp argues towards a definition of suicide thought to be relatively free of moral prejudice. His "point is that we would be better off in discussing the moral justification of suicide if we had a more neutral concept than we in fact have."

In this essay, I will offer an alternative, stipulative definition to that of Beauchamp's, such that it not only will eliminate the controversial cases that Beauchamp's definition has trouble with, but also, is meant to increase the moral neutrality of the concept of suicide. Then I will argue that having such a definition (mine or anyone else's) is, contrary to Beauchamp's belief, of little value—for by being morally neutral, the definition loses the very quality
which initially prompted us to give the concept of suicide so much of our attention.

II

Beauchamp's analysis concentrates primarily on two classes of problems associated with suicide, treatment refusal and sacrificial death. He argues that the former class of bringing about your own death is not necessarily suicide, and that the latter class is not necessarily non-suicide. The first class involves passive means to death, and even though one might desire his own death, "the 'cide' part of 'suicide' entails 'killing', which is commonly contrasted with allowing to die." As for sacrificial deaths, many are not suicides, though not for the traditional reason that the act is other-regarding, as distinct from self-regarding. On the contrary, Beauchamp maintains that such a distinction is irrelevant, since "in such cases it cannot be said that he brings about the life-threatening conditions causing his death in order to cause his death." Similar to the "active/passive" distinction applying to refusal of treatment cases, the important distinction for sacrificial death cases is the "caused by/caused to" distinction.

Beauchamp cites the famous case of Captain Oates as a clear instance of sacrificial suicide. Oates, realizing that he was suffering from an illness that hindered the progress of a party attempting to make its way out of a severe blizzard, walks into the Antarctic cold to die. Interestingly, not everyone would agree with Beauchamp's judgment of this case. For example, R. F. Holland maintains that Oates did not commit suicide, "... the blizzard killed him. Had Oates taken out a revolver and shot himself I should have agreed he was a suicide." However, Holland does not claim that in the case of Socrates "the hemlock killed him." Yet what is pertinent is that while Beauchamp and Holland agree, for different reasons, that Socrates was not a suicide, R. G. Frey claims the contrary. Frey maintains that Socrates was neither forced to drink the poison nor was he under duress: "he drank the hemlock knowingly, not unknowingly or in ignorance of what it was or what its effects on him would be, and intentionally, not accidentally or mistakenly." Another controversial case is that of the Buddhist monk who sets fire to himself in order to protest the war. Joseph Margolis argues that "if an agent is presumed
rational, then if he takes his own life or allows it to be taken for some further purpose that he serves instrumentally, then we normally refuse to say he has suicided." Beauchamp disagrees and insists that the Buddhist monk is a suicide. Whether one kills himself instrumentally in order to achieve some ulterior objective is, for Beauchamp, beside the point. Rather, the crucial issue is "whether death is caused by one's own arrangement of the life-threatening conditions causing death for the purpose of bringing about death."

Despite the obvious conflicting views on what constitutes suicide, Beauchamp boldly offers his definition:

An act is a suicide if a person intentionally brings about his own death in circumstances where others do not coerce him to the action, except in those cases where death occurs through an agent's intentional decision but is caused by conditions not specifically arranged by the agent for the purpose of bringing about his own death.

At this point what is important is not Beauchamp's definition, but rather the unresolved controversies over what is a suicide. Note that the disagreement between Beauchamp and Holland is over whether Oates killed himself or was killed by the blizzard. As for Beauchamp and Frey, Frey maintains that Socrates was not coerced and therefore was a suicide, while Beauchamp maintains that since Socrates' death was decreed by others, then it was not a suicide. Finally, Beauchamp and Margolis disagree as to the relevance of arranging your own death as opposed to using your own death to serve some other purpose.

I suggest (also boldly) that these controversies can be substantially resolved by employing a relatively stricter definition of suicide than those supplied by our disputants. And as surprising as it might be, the core of the new stipulative definition will come from Beauchamp's own analysis. On at least two occasions, Beauchamp specifically argues that a given case is not a suicide because the person did not kill himself "in order that he die." However, there appears to be a major inconsistency, for on other occasions (the Buddhist monk case for example) Beauchamp discounts the relevance of one bringing about his own death as a means to serve some ulterior objective. Yet to play down or ignore the role and objective of one's
intention in killing oneself goes contrary to virtually every theory of suicide. In fact, one of Beauchamp's early steps for his later definition is that a person is a suicide only if "the person's own death is intentionally self-caused." But the issue is whether Beauchamp means that the agent must have as his objective the sole and final goal of his own death, or whether Beauchamp would allow the agent's intention to be that of bringing about his own death in order to achieve some ulterior objective. In view of Beauchamp's apparent equivocation or ambiguity on this matter, I will opt for the former as the more defensible requirement for an act of taking one's own life to be considered a suicide.

To take seriously as one of the conditions necessary for suicide that one's intention is directed towards the sole and final objective of bringing about one's own death has the immediate effect of restricting suicide proper to those few cases in which the agent has no purpose he wishes to achieve other than his own death. Accordingly, someone who takes his own life in order to, for example, be rid of a specific physical or psychological state which is judged unbearable or foolish to endure, is not a suicide, for his death was used to achieve an objective which is only causally related to his killing himself, not logically identical to killing himself. Or, from another perspective, we should recognize the difference between the cessation of a particular (type of) experience, for example, pain or anguish, and the cessation of all experiences. Granted, if one brings about the absence of all experiences, there would be no particular experiences. Yet, in terms of intentions, often only some particular instance of the latter is desired, and the former is seen as merely a causal means towards its achievement.

Consider the following formulation of the intentional condition for an act of taking one's own life to be suicide proper:

The person's act of taking his own life was motivated solely by the desire to end all physical and psychological experiences. As such, the person was of such a frame of mind that no conceivable alteration in the possible consequences of the act would have been sufficient to dissuade the person from taking his own life. Accordingly, the act was not performed for the sake of anything other than the cessation of all his experiences.
The essential element is that no conceivable change in the possible results of the person's suicide would have been sufficient to alter his desire to take his own life. This means that the difference between a non-suicide instance of taking one's own life and suicide proper is that only in the former case would an agent change his mind about killing himself if convinced that the expected specific consequences of bringing about his own death would not obtain or would be other than expected. For example, one who is set on killing himself in order to produce a sense of guilt with his family, would not actually take his own life if he had reasons to believe that such a result would not follow from his act. Equally, if Captain Oates could have been convinced that his death would not increase the likelihood of his colleagues' survival, he would not have gone to his death. And the Buddhist monk would not have set fire to himself if he could have been convinced that no one would see his killing himself as an act of protest. Finally, since Socrates did not drink the hemlock in order to die, he was not a suicide.

Given this restriction, one might wonder if there can be any instances of suicide proper. I offer the case of George Sanders, the British actor, as one which satisfies the intentional condition for suicide proper. Sanders left a letter explaining that he had no insurmountable physical or psychological problems, no goal which he hoped his death would fulfill, no purpose sought other than no longer to have any experiences, for he had found that all experiences were boring and meaningless. Yet Sanders insisted that he was neither sad nor mad; he merely wanted release from the prospects of having any future experiences. Clearly, in this case there would have been no room for maneuvering the possible consequences (or lack of them) in such a way to dissuade Sanders from suicide. The consequences were irrelevant, for his death was not to be a means to anything else. In Beauchamp's terms, Sanders' act should be seen as an indisputable instance of "causing his death in order that he die." This is what I have termed suicide proper.

Two related criticisms might be registered. First, that in Sanders' case, he was obviously suffering from boredom, and therefore, contrary to my claim, he actually took his own life in order to be rid of a specific (type of) experience. Yet this criticism ignores the distinction made earlier between the cessation of a specific (type of) experience and the
cessation of all experiences. Sanders' intention was directed towards the latter, not the former. If, however, one insists upon pushing the criticism, then I would grant that to the extent that boredom (or any other general psychological state) can occur only when specifically characterized by a distinct object of reference, then to that degree Sanders (or any other suicide) was seeking to use his own death as a means to alter a psychological state. Unfortunately, one consequence of pushing the thesis this far is that it ultimately renders it impossible for anyone ever to take his own life for non-instrumental reasons. In other words, by insisting upon a reinterpretation of Sanders' intention so that he killed himself in order to bring about some ulterior objective, any possibility of someone killing himself in order to die, has been eliminated. Clearly, such a move has dubious value in any attempt at clarifying the concept of suicide. Another unfortunate consequence of pushing this reinterpretation of Sanders' suicide is that if it is impossible ever to have a case of non-instrumental taking of one's own life, then there is equally no possibility of ever offering a value-free explication of suicide, for as long as an agent's intention is directed towards something other than his own death, then that something other will impose value characteristics upon the agent's act of taking his own life. That is to say, if my analysis is correct, then the most promising method for achieving a value-free explication of suicide is by restricting the agent's intention to the sole objective of killing himself. Once other intentions are allowed, then they bring with them the very value characteristics we initially sought to neutralize.

The second possible criticism is that Sanders was not really locked into his decision such that no change in the expected consequences would have altered his course of action, for what if he became convinced that even if he kills himself, he would still have boring experiences? Granted, if Sanders had been so convinced, than he would not have taken his own life. Yet, I do not take this admission to be a reversal or concession on my part. What must be realized is that while it is psychologically, and therefore logically possible to have experiences without boredom it is neither psychologically nor logically possible to experience boredom, while having no experiences. And if Sanders' death is logically co-extensive with the cessation of all his experiences, then still being
bored after one's death is logically impossible. Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that anyone who intends to kill himself in order to be rid of all experiences, does not expect to have experiences after he is dead.

The primary rationale for this stipulative intentional condition for suicide proper has been a quest for consistency. For many people, cases of sacrifice are not suicides, because of the instrumental factor. It would seem to follow that in the case of a person taking his own life, for example, in order to be rid of pain or anguish, it should equally be judged not a suicide, for such a case also involves the instrumental factor of doing X (taking one's own life) in order to achieve Y (the absence of pain or anguish). To appreciate this claim requires that a distinction be kept between the achievement or cessation of a particular (type of) experience, be it one's own or another's, and the cessation of all of one's experiences. Only when the latter is sought for its own sake do we have an instance of suicide proper. On this point, Beauchamp was conspicuously inconsistent—for while he uses the presence of the instrumental factor as the reason a given case is not a suicide, his definition of suicide is ambiguous as to the possible relevance of whether one's death, to be suicide, has to be sought for itself only.

III

In this section I wish to examine critically the notion that to the degree that one is able to start with a morally-neutral concept of suicide, then to that extent one can expect subsequent success in unravelling the complex moral issue associated with suicide. I have tried to offer such a morally-neutral understanding of suicide. Whether it is accepted as such is not pertinent to this section, for it is the general notion that it would be beneficial to have such a concept that will be at issue.

For an act description to be morally-neutral is to be characterized in such a way that the act's possible rightness or wrongness depends upon additional information. For example, stating what is not the case is a non-moral or morally-neutral specification of an act, while lying is a moral specification of an act and accordingly we do not need additional information to establish the act's prima facie wrongness. In like manner, if suicide is defined in a morally-neutral way,
then given that characterization, suicide proper would be neither right, wrong, nor permissible (if permissible is distinct from right), nor would it be prohibited (if prohibited is distinct from wrong). In other words, we go outside the act description or identification in order to determine suicide's moral status and worth. Yet where is this outside and of what does it consist? Certainly it cannot be the intention of the agent, for that is already an element in our neutral definition of suicide: the cessation of all of one's experiences. Furthermore, as was argued earlier, if we allow the concept of suicide to include the possibility of an agent's intention being directed towards something other than his own death, then that something other will most likely impose value characteristics upon the agent's act of taking his own life. And then we would not have a morally-neutral description of suicide. The point is that we cannot have it both ways; an initial morally-neutral description of suicide involving the agent's sole intention to terminate all experiences, and a subsequent moral evaluation of the agent's intention, of which his suicide was merely to serve as a means. In other words, an agent's intention for taking his own life cannot be solely non-instrumental and also directed towards some goal other than his own death.

In view of how an analysis of the agent's intention will not yield a determination of suicide's moral status and worth, then the other possibility is the consequences of the act. Yet the immediate and direct consequences of the agent's act is the fulfillment of his intention, the cessation of all his experiences. But what of other consequences, what of the more remote consequences? To suggest this direction of analysis is to be primarily concerned with certain moral principles (for example, the utilitarian principle) and only incidentally with suicide. Accordingly, what gives suicide its moral status and worth, on this model are principles which are established quite independently of any analysis or characterization of suicide. As such, it is difficult to understand how the many controversies over whether certain acts were acts of suicide (for example, those dealt with in the first section of this article) have any bearing on the subsequent and independent judgment of the moral status and worth of suicide. The point is that the different views on suicide expressed by Beauchamp, Holland, Frey, and Margolis are apparently not moral disagreements nor grounded in moral disagreements. Rather, they seem to
differ on whether a given example was or was not an instance of suicide. If that is the case, then contrary to the expectations of Beauchamp and others, the disagreements over identifying instances of suicide are not of such a nature that a more morally-neutral characterization of suicide would abolish or rectify, for the model that Beauchamp and others have been assuming is one which places moral considerations of suicide outside of the domain of analyzing and identifying suicide. As such, the moral issue of under what circumstance, if any, is it justified to operate from solely self-serving intentions (for example, when, if ever, is it justified to take your own life for non-instrumental reasons) is quite an independent issue from that of analyzing and identifying an act of suicide. Therefore, to use the remote consequences of suicide to determine the moral status and worth of suicide, is to use a model which is in direct contradiction with the explanation offered by Beauchamp and others for the many disagreements over what constitutes an act of suicide.

Where then does this leave us? Is there no way successfully to distinguish a morally-neutral concept of suicide from moral evaluations of suicide? Perhaps the makings of a solution are hinted at in the prior reference to the difference between stating what is not the case and lying. And I suggest that for our purpose the importance is in the distinction between a more general as compared to a more specific act description. As such the more general (stating what is not the case) can accommodate a greater number as well as variety of instances than can the more specific (lying) act description. Yet, as we previously discovered, the general act description is also the morally-neutral characterization. Therefore, one way to distinguish suicide proper from a moral evaluation of it is by defining suicide in terms of a general act description. Now the most obvious move would be to define suicide as either the taking of one's own life or the bringing about of one's own death. But due to the lack of any further specifications, this would allow for not only certain accidental deaths to be labeled suicides, but also it ignores the important distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental acts of killing oneself. To correct these two faults our definition must be made more precise, more specific. However this is where and how we ran into trouble before, for each of the disputants had their own set of conditions for what makes an act of taking one's own life a suicide.
Also, at this level we were told that the competing concepts of suicide were too value-laden, not morally-neutral enough. This was then rectified by the stipulative definition of suicide which required that the act of killing oneself be solely for the sake of terminating all of one's experiences. Therefore, we once again have a morally-neutral definition, but this time in terms of a very specific act description.

Now let us examine what we have to give up or assume in order to achieve this new morally-neutral concept of suicide, and determine whether it is really any more serviceable than the overly general concept of suicide as killing oneself. First of all, even to request, not to mention achieve, a morally-neutral conception of suicide presupposes some form of the fact/value dichotomy. According to those who hold to such a bifurcation, issues of truth and falsity are restricted to the former realm, while value considerations must make it independent of any epistemological standards. Extended, this theory would have us believe that there are basically three sorts of categorizations: purely factual (e.g., swans cannot fly); purely evaluative (e.g., swans are beautiful); and evaluation based on factual beliefs (e.g., swans do not make good pets). Now to request a morally-neutral description of suicide is to say that we should strip away all evaluations previously associated with the concept, leaving the purely factual characteristics.

Yet does this request make sense? Consider the so-called value-neutral concept of truth. Truth is considered value-neutral because it is said to be restricted to the factual realm. To be value-neutral, as I understand it, would be to lack any general type of good or bad characteristics. Therefore, apparently the characteristic of being superior to falsehood should be seen as merely a non-essential, evaluative addition to the concept of truth. That is, allegedly, truth can be fully and properly characterized without any reference to being superior to, or better than, falsehood. I find this analysis absurd.

Consider another example. Peter Goldstone in his response to Daniel Pekarsky's paper on education and manipulation, argues that the debate over what a person is,

. . . is not to be settled by an analysis of the common sense notion of a person, for the criteria implicit in the use of that term do not incline us persuasively in one direction or the other.
The debate over what a person is, is not a debate that exists independently of substantive moral judgments, rather the moral judgments one is prepared to make are part of the debate over what a person is.  

Furthermore, consider the relationship between abstracting and rendering a concept morally-neutral. R. G. Collingwood argues that nothing exists nor is intelligible in isolation. Specifically,

... one cannot abstract without falsifying. To think apart of things that are together is to think of them as they are not, and to plead that this initial severance makes no essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle.

The lesson is to be learned from Collingwood is that to the extent that one removes a concept from its normal context, to that degree one has distorted the meaning and status of the concept. Finally, H. I. Brown has made the same point as Collingwood in his treatment of being rational. Substituting 'suicide' for 'rational' the argument is that suicide is "a concept that does not exist in isolation, but is intimately linked to a variety of other concepts in a Quinean net", such that to judge a given act as a suicide is to make a claim that not only presupposes certain fundamental principles, but also has serious consequences for our understanding of human conduct.

Addressing the same issue from still another perspective, Hyland reminds us that

... when a Catholic says that X has committed suicide he is not making a purely factual statement. The statement is already imbued with moral significance to the effect that, within the Catholic community, suicide is considered to be morally wrong.

And this is not an isolated example nor is it unique to certain points of view. Gellner observes that "fundamental moral approval is constitutive of this, that or the other conceptualisation (in effect--construction) of the world, and thus is welded to the objects it has constructed." Stated quite succinctly the point is that "the most important moral issues are prejudged by the time we identify objects."
What I take to be common to these arguments and observations is that more often than not the very reason we sense a need to attempt a so-called value-free explication of a given concept is exactly why such an explication is not possible. That is to say, it is due to their being moral-laden that certain concepts initially prompt our need for and desire to clarify them; and then in our misguided method of clarification we attempt to rid these concepts of the very moral characteristics which initiated our inquiry. It is not realizing this methodological flaw that accounts for Beauchamp and others questing after the neutrality of moral-laden concepts. The crucial point is to appreciate that the vast majority of concepts that are germane to value and moral issues cannot be successfully or properly explicated in neutral terms, for all such attempts require the falsifying procedure of abstracting. Furthermore, all attempts at a neutral-analysis of moral-laden concepts result either in failure or in an empty notion: while such an attempt is unsuccessful if the concept retains value or value related characteristics, an attempt yields an empty notion to the extent that it is so general (e.g., suicide as killing oneself) or so so specific (e.g., suicide as the intentional taking of one's life solely for the sake of dying) that there is nothing left to which value considerations can be applied.

As the final (and yet perhaps principal) reason for insisting that the concept of suicide is moral-laden, consider the impossibility of neutralizing or eliminating the ethical aspect of whether, and to what degree, there is a ground for respecting human life (or, if preferred, whether, and to what extent, there is a right to human life). The point is that the issue of respect for (or right of) human life is an ethical issue, and as such, any act of taking a human life, for example, suicide, is a matter which clearly falls within the domain of ethics.

The above analysis produces a dilemma. Either one is successful or not successful in formulating a neutral explication of the concept of suicide. If one is successful, then there is nothing available to which we can attach moral considerations. On the contrary, if one is able morally to consider the concept of suicide, it is because the concept has not been rendered neutral. Therefore, Beauchamp and others must decide exactly what warrants their undivided attention: either formulating a neutral explication of suicide, which will lack both actual and potential moral
significance, or dealing with the moral considerations of suicide which can be done only in an existing moral context.
NOTES


2 Beauchamp, p. 97f.

3 Beauchamp, p. 97.

4 Beauchamp, p. 99.

5 Beauchamp, p. 100.


8 Joseph Margolis, Negativities: The Limits of Life (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), p. 28.


11 Beauchamp, pp. 100, 101.

12 Beauchamp, p. 98. In support of this orientation, Edwin Schneidman has argued that our existing fourfold classification of deaths into homicide, accident, natural, and suicide is over­simplified and inaccurate. Specifically, in reference to suicide, the classification is "too confusing, primarily because the psychological factors—the individual's intentions, his motivations, and his role in his own demise—are omitted." Accordingly, what is


14 For another version of this problem see Bruce B. Suttle's "Neutralizing Positive and Negative Duties," unpublished.

15 It could be mentioned that in this context I am assuming that if living can be taken as an end-in-itself, as many have argued, then so can one's own death. Related to this, see Bruce B. Suttle's "A Difference in Killing or the Killing of the Difference?" under consideration by Ethics.


17 What is being alluded to is the doctrine of the ethics of belief. For another version of the normative character of truth, see "Truth as Authenticity" in Dorothy Walsh's Literature and Knowledge (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969).


23. Gellner, p. 44.
