I. Introduction

In William James' discussion of the sensible continuity of thought in personal consciousness, he proposes that through introspection we can determine certain aspects of thought which, as it were, "unite" various "substantial" elements of thought into a continuous "stream". For, even though the objects which come into consciousness may vary or change with startling abruptness, the flow of thought itself (or the experiencing of these changes) feels continuous. Such continuity of thought implies, for James, that successive objects of consciousness (or "fields" of awareness) dissolve or fade into one another. And this means that successive fields of awareness must share certain characteristics which allow for such continuity and smoothness of transition. Therefore within the stream of consciousness, we can detect a certain stability in those objects of thought which can be held before the mind for a period of time and a certain transitivity in those objects of thought which lead from one "substantial" part to another.

However, in order to speak about these shared characteristics which are common to successive fields of consciousness, James has to "take a slice" of the stream and make it "stand still", in order to compare one slice (or one "act" of consciousness) to a successive one. This changing of perspective from the stream to individual conscious acts has a number of ramifications as far as his vocabulary is concerned: for example, when his concentration shifts from the stream to one relatively-fixed object of consciousness within the stream, the terms implying movement like "flows", "stream", and "dissolving views" are replaced by more static words like "field", "part", "state", and "margin". And if we could just keep the two areas of concentration separate by the use of terms like these, then there would be little problem in understanding what area of concentration James is referring to when he uses these terms. But his purpose is not to give two explanations of how we can understand the continuity of thought; rather, it is to clarify how we can speak of a "stream" of thought by investigating parts within the stream.

Therefore, if we concentrate upon a particular act of consciousness, distinguishing within that act certain transitive elements (i.e., elements which include the "echoings"
of preceding acts and the anticipations of acts "about to be"), then we should be able to relate such transitive elements back to the stream of thought from which the act of consciousness as a whole is a slice. After all, we need to attribute to a particular act of consciousness all of the characteristics which such an act has in the stream before we can legitimately extract it from the stream in order to treat it as an "act of consciousness".

By an "act of consciousness" or "an act of awareness" I mean to include the whole act as encompassing the substantive and transitive parts, though in any such act we are directly conscious of only the focal or substantive part of the act, and indirectly aware of the transitive parts. The particularization of any "act of consciousness" is, of course, determined by and named according to the object of consciousness. And though the object of consciousness is itself a product of selective attention (and therefore is, in a way, an abstraction), we should not think that the "act" or "state" of consciousness upon which we focus in the discussion of fringes and transitive states is not also the product of selective attention. We delineate a particular act of consciousness in order to discuss the stream of consciousness just as we selectively attend to some elements in experience and not others.1

In the chapter on the "stream of thought" in the Principles of Psychology, and particularly in the section of the chapter dealing with the continuity of thought, James occasionally shifts his emphasis from the consideration of what constitutes an act of consciousness to a consideration of how that act fits into the stream of thought. The transitive parts of the content of an act of consciousness are recognized most explicitly when the thought is seen as appearing in the stream; but extracted from the stream, the thought appears to have other characteristics "on its fringes"-characteristics that may or may not become focal or consciously recognized in future acts of awareness.

In short, we will misinterpret what James says about "fringes" if we simply think of them as the static counterparts of the transitive states of the stream of thought. This, apparently, is what Bruce Wilshire does when he writes that a fringe is "a transitive state mirroring temporal relations."2 For, as I hope to show, fringes are not transitive states, nor are they limited to temporal relations alone. The fringe of an act of consciousness is part of the act of consciousness, i.e., that part which includes the dimly-known relations and objects connected to or related to the focus (or substantive part) of the "object cognized". [Note: Even though it is possible to speak about the objects of consciousness as having "fringes"-and James occasionally does so--the point that I
am highlighting here is that the act of consciousness itself has fringes which are included by James within the act (even in the process of the abstraction of the act from the stream of consciousness).

When these dimly-known relations are recognized as involving actual relations to previous or subsequent elements in the stream of thought, they become the transitive parts of the act of consciousness. The chief concern of this article will be to show how I have arrived at this understanding of James' use of "fringe", and how "fringes" relate to what James calls the "transitive states" of the acts of consciousness. I have generally limited my remarks to James' discussion of conscious activity and the brain processes which he feels limit, to a certain extent, the speed and duration of acts of conscious activity.

II. Parts of Acts of Consciousness and the Stream of Thought

James begins the study of an act of consciousness by looking at it as it appears in the stream of thought. In the stream, such acts are integrally bound up with and, to an extent, defined by other acts in the stream. For no act of consciousness is totally disconnected from those acts which precede and succeed it. The consciousness of the sound of thunder is not cognized apart from the consciousness of its breaking-in-upon-the-silence which preceded it or apart from the thunder's setting up an echoing condition for that moment which follows. But we characterize and name acts of consciousness (e.g., the consciousness of the sound of thunder) by those things, objects, or images which "can be held before the mind for an indefinite time." These "substantive parts" of the stream allow us to speak about one act of consciousness as distinguished from another act of consciousness.

However, a basic principle of the stream of thought idea is that such distinction of substantive parts does not indicate a distinction between acts of consciousness. In other words, each act may be characterized or named by the substantive part of the act, but this does not mean that the substantive part is the totality of the act. For the totality of the act includes the relations which the substantive part has with the substantive parts of previous or subsequent acts. These relations, which are internal to the act, constitute the transitive parts of an act of consciousness: they are the parts which unite the substantive parts of thought so as to account for its stream-like character.
The transitive parts of successive acts of consciousness overlap one another so as to make the distinction of acts meaningful only in terms of the substantive or "focal" point of each act. For example, in comparing an act of awareness in which silence is the focal point to the act of awareness which follows it in which thunder is the focal point, we notice "in between" the awareness of the contrast of the thunder-breaking-in-upon-the-silence. And, in a way, we would not be altogether wrong in recognizing such a contrast itself as a possible substantive part of the stream of thought. That is, we can extract from the stream acts of consciousness which have for their focal points either objects or objects in relation to one another. Indeed, on a superficial reading of James, one might think that relations of objects would apply only to the transitive parts of an act of thought. For he speaks about the transitive parts as "filled with the thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest," i.e., in the substantive parts.

But James does not rule out the possibility of our considering a relation itself as a substantive part, as a "matter contemplated in the periods of comparative rest." At one point he remarks that "space relations, relations of contrast, etc. are felt along with their terms in substantive states as well as in transitive states." Not only are the terms or objects substantive, but the relations between them might also be included in the substantive part of a larger, more inclusive act of consciousness. Thus, our awareness of thunder-breaking-in-upon-the-silence might be itself considered the substantive part of some act of consciousness whose transitive parts include the relation of the awareness of thunder-breaking-in-upon-silence to previous and subsequent focal points of awareness. These might include, for example, the act of consciousness where thunder is the focal point or one where silence is the focal point.

What I am indicating is that using James' method of speaking about consciousness as a stream and his method of extracting acts of consciousness from the stream in order to distinguish between their substantive and transitive parts, we are led to conclude that between the act of awareness of the silence and the act of awareness of the thunder, we could extract numerous acts of awareness in which the contrast of the silence and the thunder would be the substantive or focal point of the act. We could then understand the stream of thought as a continuous stream of focal points, with the transitive
states of each act of consciousness gaining meaning only in reference to one or another focal point. That is, if we pinpoint the focus of a particular act of awareness, we indirectly specify the transitive parts of the act at the same time. But each point along the stream can be designated the focal or substantive part of some act, because the substantive part can involve relations. Or, to put it bluntly, the stream of thought can be understood as a continual conscious awareness of focal or substantive parts which are recognized as comprising the relations of objects to one another; and the transitive parts associated with such a relational substantive part would involve relations of this focal relation to other substantive parts of the stream.

As Hans Linschoten points out, this tends to dissolve the distinction between substantive and transitive parts of conscious acts, for the substantive parts (determined by what we choose to use as a focal point by which to name the entire act) can themselves involve relations: "We must not look upon that substantivity and transitivity as upon actual classes; they are rather qualities that differ in degree." As we attempt to compact more and more objects into relations which constitute the focal point of our act of consciousness, however, we reach a point where the structuring begins to break down. At that point we can no longer hold objects and their relations in the well-defined and relatively stable arrangement characteristic of a substantive state. The relatedness of objects begins to "spill over" the limits of the substantive part. Such overflowing is characteristic of transitive parts of consciousness and feelings of tendency (or "fringes").

III. Substantive and Transitive States

Preceding and subsequent acts of consciousness, of course, are determined as "preceding" and "subsequent" by means of the present act. If we choose any different point of the stream upon which to focus, i.e., if we choose any different substantive part by which to name the whole act of consciousness, we will likewise have to re-define what constitutes the "preceding" and "subsequent" acts. We should, therefore, realize that the transitive states of successive acts overlap with one another. In fact, viewed objectively, the substantive states of successive acts overlap, though only the substantive state of the present act is recognized subjectively as being the focus of the act. In other words, when the psychologist compares successive acts, he recognizes that each has a
substantive or focal part. But what is focal for one may easily become a transitive part of another or an aspect of a substantive part of another. In one act of consciousness, the substantive part may consist of an awareness of silence; in the next act, the substantive part may be the awareness of thunder-breaking-in-upon-silence; in the third, the substantive part may be the awareness of thunder alone. In the first act of consciousness, the awareness of thunder is only vaguely known in the transitive part of that act as something which is a characteristic of the substantive part of the second and subsequent act of consciousness. The focal point of the second act contrasts the substantive parts of the first and third acts; at the same time, the transitive parts of the second act include the cognition of the first act as a fading echo of a previous act of consciousness, and include the cognition of the third act as an emergent anticipation of a subsequent act of consciousness.

As it might seem from all this, the temporal relations of acts of consciousness to one another are going to present a number of perplexing situations for this type of interpretation. For example, thunder-breaking-in-upon-silence might be the substantive part of an act of consciousness. Now this substantive part includes the awareness of the temporal progression which is involved in thunder breaking in upon silence. However, the preceding and subsequent transitive parts (or, as James calls them, the "backward-looking" and "forward-looking" transitive parts) refer to acts of consciousness which are temporally distinguished from the substantive part of the act. The "echoes" of previous acts and the anticipation of subsequent acts are included in the totality of the whole present act of consciousness through the transitive parts of the present act. And this is possible only because James understands the present not as some "point" along a line but as an indefinite temporal duration, a "specious" present, or an indefinitely determined "segment" of time.

Thus, the recent past might still be echoing in the specious present as a transitive part of the present act of consciousness. Or, to put this in terms of the physiological aspect of conscious activity, "there is at every moment a culmination of brain-processes overlapping each other, of which the fainter ones are dying phases of processes which but shortly previous wore active in a maximal degree." The dying phases constitute the "rearward-looking" transitive part of the present act, while the emergent phases constitute the "forward-looking"
transitive part of the present act. Transitive parts, then, are not to be considered "outside" of the specious present; they are recognized as transitive because they are the cognized relations of the substantive part to previous and subsequent substantive parts of other acts of awareness: as James writes, the transitive parts of our stream of thought "cognize the relations rather than the things."8

Note, however, that the things related in transitive states are always known or "cognized" as actually fading out of or emerging into the present act of awareness. That is, transitive parts of the stream deal with things which actually have been or will be substantive parts; there is no question, for example, that the transitive state is the cognition of simply a possible thing which might or might not become the substantive part of a succeeding act. An object which has been recognized in a previous act as that act's substantive part is cognized as actually related to the substantive part of the present act through the transitive parts of both acts. From the perspective of a previous substantive part, the present substantive part is cognized as future, while from the perspective of the present substantive part, the previous one is cognized as past.

Since the transitive parts of the stream of thought deal with the relations of successive focal points (or "resting places"), the objects related in transitive states are specified and "known" as definite objects. In the case of the forward-looking transitive part of an act, we would have to say that the act as a whole includes knowledge of specific objects which are making their way toward the substantive part of our thought, but which have not as yet become substantive; therefore we do not consciously know them in their specificity.

I do not mean to confuse this with those experiences which we have in which we had thought something would happen and then it did not. Such conscious awareness of the future would apply to the substantive part of our stream of thought, not to the transitive. The substantive part might be the conscious expectation that something would come into our conscious experience shortly. However, the transitive part of the same act of consciousness might at the same moment involve the cognition (of which we are not consciously aware) that something altogether different from what we expect "consciously" or "substantively" is shortly going to appear to us consciously, i.e., as a substantive part of our stream of thought. We often refer to the unconscious present
awareness of future substantive parts of the stream as "vague" or "dim" in comparison to the present substantive part, when in reality, they are as distinct and precise as the present substantive part. But because they are concerned with the relations of the substantive parts to one another, and not with the substantive parts themselves, we think of them as being indefinite or undefined.

James takes this into account when he notes that transitive states are filled with thoughts of relation which are either "static" or "dynamic." A spatial relation, for example, could well exemplify a thought of a static relation. In our stream of thought we might concentrate first on the pupil of someone's eye, and then shift our concentration to the iris of the eye. The substantive part of the first act does not include the spatial relationship of the pupil to the iris, though the act's transitive part does include it. The iris is known specifically in its relation to the pupil in the transitive part as an object existing simultaneously with the pupil but not included with the pupil as the focus of the act.

A temporal relation could exemplify a cognized dynamic relation which is transitive or non-focal. For example, we might focus on a period of silence in one act of consciousness, and in a subsequent one focus on thunder. The transitive parts of the two acts indicate the occurrence of a temporal sequence: an awareness of silence is being broken into by an awareness of thunder. Both are related to each other in the transitive parts of both acts, but the relations are such that the substantive part of the conscious awareness of thunder is recognized as temporally following the substantive part of the awareness of the silence, and the transitive part of the awareness of the silence includes the substantive part of the awareness of the thunder.

IV. "Fringes"

When James, then, begins to speak about the "fringes" of acts of consciousness, one might assume that he is referring to the transitive states of such acts—states which appear on the "fringe" of the substantive parts. Indeed, I have already described how we might refer to transitive parts as "vague" or "dim" as compared to substantive parts, and James uses words like these often to describe
what he will want to call the "fringes" or "fringe" of an act of consciousness. For example, he says, "Let us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe, to designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived." It would appear that a transitive state of thought is what is meant by a "fringe."

But this passage occurs several pages after James has indicated that he has finished speaking about transitive states and is turning his attention to "other unnamed states or qualities of states" which he generally refers to as "feelings of tendency."

In fact, he refrains from speaking about "fringes" until he begins his discussion of these feelings of tendency, referring to transitive states up until that point by terms such as "thoughts of relation" or "feelings of relation."

That James does not mean by "fringes" the same thing as transitive states appears most obvious in his discussion of the difference between "mere acquaintance" and "knowledge-about" as different states of thought. The difference between them, he notes,

is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or overtones. Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression which it makes. Of most of its relations we are only aware in the penumbral nascent way of a 'fringe' of unarticulated affinities about it.

We have seen already that transitive states in large measure cognize relatively specified objects as the terms of the relations of which the transitive parts are the cognitions. In fact, "knowledge about a thing as knowledge of its relations" seems to refer explicitly to transitive states. For transitive states always unite objects which have been or will be actually felt in relation to the substantive part of a present act. Furthermore, the distinguishing characteristic of a transitive state of one personal consciousness is that it does not mistake past or future substantive acts of other personal consciousnesses for its own: only those objects which are actually felt and determined to belong to this actual stream of thought are felt, thus insuring the continuity of the personal stream.
States of "acquaintance" or "feelings of tendency" appear too vague and tenuous to provide for the firm continuity which characterizes the stream. But James will want to hold that they should not therefore be excluded from consideration as integral parts of the stream. Indeed, such "inarticulated affinities" of the substantive parts are propaedeutic to transitive states, sharing in the bringing about of transitive states by presenting a "fringe" of actualizable relations. Each substantive part of an act of consciousness has a fringe of innumerable relations to, as yet, unrecognizable objects. When the objects are specified in their relation to the substantive part, the relations themselves are specified. That is, the relations become actualized or "cognized" in the act of consciousness: they become transitive parts of the stream. As James writes, "The fringe...is part of the object cognized--substantive qualities and things appearing to the mind in a fringe of relations. Some parts--the transitive parts--of our stream of thought cognize the relations rather than the things." We are therefore to expect that each act of consciousness contains three different "kinds" of cognition: (1) the substantive part; (2) the fringes of each aspect of the substantive part and the fringe or "halo" of the substantive part as a whole; and (3) the fringes whose objects are actually specified as previous or subsequent parts of the stream, i.e., those fringes which become transitive parts.

Every object has about it a certain fringe of relations which simply "point beyond" the object without specifying it as having any particular meaning. It gains its meaning when it is put into a context, when it becomes "significant" in terms of the whole stream, or when certain vague affinities are "followed up" and specified in a transitive part of the stream. In short, the substantial object does not become thought until it is thought in a context of determined relations by the transitive parts.

In the case where the substantive part of an act of consciousness includes a number of words or objects, each word or object is "fringed" (i.e., indeterminately related to a number of dimly discerned items) before the whole act of consciousness is specified as having one complete, though perhaps complex, meaning. Uttering the sentence "Columbus discovered America in 1492" specifies a number of fringes of each word or thought (a) by putting them in the context of the whole "Object" or "theme" of the sentence (b) by giving each word meaning because of its grammatical form and use, and (c) by relating it temporally to the words of the sentence which come before and follow after it. "America," for example, gains meaning through the specification of its transitive parts in being related to the whole...
"thought" (or "Object") of Columbus' discovery of America in 1492, in acting as the direct object of the sentence, and in constituting a substantive part of the Object which is related through its transitive parts to the fading echoes of "Columbus" and "discovered" and to the anticipation of "in 1492".

Suffuse all the words of a sentence, as they pass, with these three fringes or haloes of relation, let the conclusion seem worth arriving at, and all will admit the sentence to be an expression of thoroughly continuous, unified, and rational thought. Each word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a word, but as having a meaning. The 'meaning' of a word taken thus dynamically in a sentence may be quite different from its meaning when taken statically or without context. . . . The object of every thought, then, is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the manner of the thinking may be. 15

Fringes, therefore, accompany every act of thought and every substantive part of an act of thought. They point to "gaps" which are dimly perceived as the appropriate or inappropriate objects to which we feel the substantive parts should or should not be related in a certain way. But we cannot really "name" the gap nor the relation of the gap to the substantive part because the content of the gap is unknown—that is why it is a "gap"—and because the relation is unspecified until we have determined the nature of the gap, i.e., until we have determined the other "end" of the relation. When and if this occurs, the fringe is replaced by a transitive state. Or, more precisely, the filling of the gap specifies that one of the numerous possibilities opened in the "fringe of relations" has now been cognized as the terminus of a relation which constitutes a transitive part of the stream of thought.

As each fringe of every substantial part of thought yields to some transitive part, numerous obscure relations which are not cognized in a transitive part go unrealized and unnamed. For example, take A B C D E as the constitutive elements of a conscious act, with C as its substantive or focal part and the relations A-C, B-C, A-B-C, C-D, C-E, and C-D-E as the transitive parts. The relation C-X is included in a vague way as one of the possible obscure relations contained in the fringe of C, but because D and E were perceived as closely following C in the stream, the relation C-X is not included within the limits of the
specious present (which has for its focal point C) because
one of the terms of the relation (viz., X) is not an in­
cluded element in the act of awareness. As such, the
relation C-X would not be recognized (or "thought",
"cognized") as a relation (at least from the viewpoint of
C) because of the failure to specify X as an actualized
terminus of a relation with C. All but those few relations
which are realized in the specious present remain simply
possible cognized relations whose "time had not yet come":
"the mass of our thinking," James remarks, "vanishes for­
ever, beyond hope of recovery."16

A "fringe" is thus an incomplete relation and is dis­
tinguished from transitive states by its incompleteness.
A transitive state is always finalized as a definite part
within the stream by the objects which are the terminal
points of the relation of which the transitive part is
the cognition. But we must add that James refers to
fringes also as "unnamed states" of consciousness which,
as H. B. McGilvary points out, cognize such incomplete
relations.17 Therefore, even though fringes are only
vague feelings of tendency which may never become con­
sciously recognized as referring to any specified object,
they still exercise the cognitive function of giving
vague indications of the possible direction of thought
and must be included as actual parts of the stream of
thought.18

If we are to relate fringes to the substantive and
transitive parts of an act of consciousness, we would
have to say that fringes originate in the substantive
parts as the possibilities which the substantive part
has for being meaningful. As various fringes are deter­
mined and specified in transitive states (or, as they
"become" transitive states), the substantive parts are
recognized as gaining meaning because of the contexts in
which they are found. The transitive states define the
context, while the fringes define the possibilities for
the realization of the transitive states. For this reason,
to refer to the fringes as "marginal" is deceptive if we
conclude from this type of language that fringes do not
have much importance in terms of the stream of thought.
For the fringes are necessary for the establishment of
transitive parts, and transitive parts give meaning to
the substantive parts by which the act as a whole is
named. Thus, the fringes are the ground for the naming
of an act of consciousness and for giving an act or
thought its meaning; in themselves, though, fringes
involve a minimum of meaning and specification.
Concluding Note

In order to recognize the import or significance of many of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's remarks on and uses of William James' writings, it is necessary to understand James' images--for example, of "field" and "stream"--as concepts operative not only in his discussion of fringes and transitive states but also in the positions developed by Husserl and Wittgenstein. Both Husserl and Wittgenstein refer to these images--numerous times in contexts where James is also often referred to. Seldom, however, is an attempt made to show exactly what James' position was in regard to the use of these images--a position which apparently prompted the two later thinkers to find so much of interest in James.

To a great extent, Husserl's continual concern for giving a phenomenological explication of the constitution of the ego highlights the fact that meaningfulness in general (as it defines potential evidences as both real and logical--i.e., statically meaningful possibilities for experience) arises out of and in the context of the actual synthoses of evidences which "constitute" the process or stream of consciousness. This awareness of the contribution to meaningfulness of "history"--understood not only in terms of the history of man (in human community and culture) but also in terms of the history of the individual ego--is a theme that links works of such different tonal characters as Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. From the Meditations point of view, the field-stream contrast becomes recognized in the complementarity of the concern with essences (in Husserl's eidos-ego discussions) and the concern with the life of the transcendental ego as the center of horizons which continually appear as clarifying the real possibilities for modalities of being and consciousness. The determination of the logical structure or categories of constitution which characterize the eidous-ego are limited not only statically--i.e., in terms of the requirement that the constitution of all objectivities of possible consciousness be understood according to the cogito-cogitatum schema--but also genetically--i.e., in terms of the fact that the factual dictates of coexistence and succession in time limits the composibility of possible types of ego and possible types of experience.

From the Crisis viewpoint, in an unmistakably Hegelian way, history is seen to constitute meaningfulness in expressing reason itself--that is, reason
understood as ratio (meaning, "rationale"). Reason operates in history, for Husserl, because history defines meaning; and on the individual's level, reason operates in the "history" or stream of consciousness which itself becomes the basis for the development of logic. Meaningfulness, in short, is ratio-nality.

Throughout the Philosophical Investigations and Zettel, Wittgenstein indicates that a proper description of the "meaning" of words should consist of (1) a recognition that the meaning of a word is grounded in the stream of experience and that "only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning" (Z 173); and (2) a recognition that the elements of the stream can be singled out or temporarily considered apart from the stream in order further to understand the content of experience in terms of images of "fields" or "pictures." For both Wittgenstein and James (whose Principles of Psychology Wittgenstein often refers to), an important contrast develops between considering ideas in terms of a stream of thought and considering ideas in terms of a state or "field" of static relations. While James' prime concern is to show that the ideas we have have significance and value primarily in terms of the stream of thought in which they appear, Wittgenstein is more concerned with the meaning words have for us--though he does feel that James' point goes to the very heart of the discussion concerning the fact that words have meaning in terms of their use within the stream of thought, life, and experience.

For Wittgenstein, family resemblances have meaning insofar as they are considered as relationships of familiarity in streams of personal experience. Insofar as such streams overlap in coinciding "ways of life," the meanings of our words are psychologically grounded in such a way as to negate the possibility of meaningful private languages. What I am suggesting is that the key to Wittgenstein's family resemblances argument might be found in understanding objects as related to one another intentionally--that is, in terms of how they are in fact related as familiar in a stream or streams of experience; this familiarity in the stream becomes the basis for ontological claims and for Wittgenstein's Investigations and Zettel descriptions of the logical and pictorial (static or field) theories of meaning. The converse--that logical or pictorial theories of meaning act as the basis for meaning in the stream of experience--apparently is much less true of the later Wittgenstein than of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. In short, for the
later Wittgenstein, the similarity of the terms "familiar" and "familial" is not simply coincidental; and I would suggest that the basis for this recognition lies in understanding James' discussion of objects of consciousness in the stream of thought.

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NOTES


5Ibid., I, p. 249, footnote.


7James, Principles, I, p. 635.

8Ibid., I, p. 258, footnote #2.

9Cf. James, Principles, I, p. 255: "Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of wither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood." (This is an important passage for understanding the influence of James on the later Wittgenstein.)

10Ibid., I, p. 258.

11Ibid., I, p. 249.

12Ibid., I, p. 258.
13Ibid., I, p. 258, footnote #2. See also I, p. 250.
14Ibid., I, p. 265.
15Ibid., I, pp. 264-265, 276.
16Ibid., I, p. 276


18In regard to the question of the content of fringes, see James' marginal comments quoted by Gurwitsch, op. cit., p. 320.