The following essay is intended to lay out the important notions and relations in a development of an adequate theory of substance and of understanding. But it is not written in a typical philosophical vein. I hope to present what I feel to be the proper way of considering the issues and proceeding on them. But I do not hope to give at any point a thoroughly conclusive argument, much less an apodictic deduction of the necessary points. I hope to present in each case what I feel to be true and an indication of how one might proceed to demonstrate it, but not actually to demonstrate this truth. The aim is merely plausibility, not apodicticity. But the general way of proceeding, I believe, is as I have indicated.

1. On the Quest for Understanding. I take it as uncontroversial that Philosophy is the search for understanding, whatever disagreements which may exist concerning methods or limits of the enterprise not yet entering into consideration. I take it as slightly more controversial, but still quite reasonable, to suggest that the special sciences (physics, biology, psychology, etc.) share this goal of understanding, though their subject matters and perhaps methods vary widely among themselves and collectively from pure philosophy. But I think it is fairly clear that the notion of understanding is broad enough to encompass what differences in objects or methods there may be or appear to be. Put succinctly: Understanding is the goal of rational inquiry generally.

2. Conditions of Understanding. Granted that understanding is the goal of inquiry, the natural question, and it has been posed often enough in the history of philosophy, to be sure, is "What are the conditions of understanding?" Now it seems to me that this question divides into two parts which are best considered separately. The first part is: What are the minimal conditions for understanding? And the second part is: What are the conditions for full or complete understanding? Naturally the answers to both are indispensable to philosophy, but they should not be confused.

3. Minimal Conditions of Understanding. A seemingly trivial but really quite significant way of stating the minimal condition is that the object admit of understanding; that the object be understandable. Now of course one must further analyze the minimal conditions of understandability. Further it should be made quite clear that the use of the word "object" here is to be taken in the widest possible sense; it is to indicate quite generally anything which might be inquired into, about, or of. Since some philosophers claim that the notion of an object contains metaphysical presuppositions and prefer to distinguish objects from certain non-objects, I beg them to understand nothing more by the word than a possible area of inquiry. If it be later used in a different sense, I shall try to make that clear.

4. When Is a Thing Understandable? Recalling that I am seeking minimal conditions, it is to be expected that the conditions will be quite general and, to be sure, negative. Historically, there are two quite important principles which have been propounded, one the principle of non-contradiction, the other the principle of sufficient reason. It is in general not difficult to see that these in fact serve as minimum criteria, and while there has been considerable dispute about the nature and the relation of the two, and the applicability of the principle of sufficient reason, though not of the applicability of the principle of non-contradiction, there has been no serious dispute of their role in understanding. I will try to put each into a form here which does not presuppose anything controversial about the nature of the principles just to exhibit the transparency of their relation to understanding, although an exploration and elucidation of the nature and relation of the principles must form a central portion of the discussion of substance. Beginning with the principle of non-contradiction, it may be seen that a thing cannot be thought except in accord with this principle, and that which cannot be thought clearly cannot be understood, since surely understanding is a function of thought. Concerning the principle of sufficient reason, it must first be stated, and here merely stated, that a thing is understood through causes (in the most general sense of the word) or through its ground. The principle of sufficient reason merely states that a thing cannot be understood unless there be a determining ground adequate to the thing. That these are minimal conditions, I take to be undisputed.

5. Are There Other Minimal Conditions? I think not. That
there may be other limitations is surely yet an open question, but all other limitations will be material conditions. As an inventory of conditions which might be suggested, I will mention a few and try to indicate why they are not appropriate. One might suggest that only objects in space and time are proper objects of understanding, though I expect space or time is a more accurate way to put the point. While there may be good reasons for such a limitation, it seems quite clear that objects standing outside space and time are often the subject of inquiry: the immortality of the soul, the nature of space and time itself, and, I believe, all of mathematics, although the latter claim is not likely to meet with general agreement. The difference in the two sorts of limitations, let me call one a formal limitation and the other a material limitation, although I would not like to place too much emphasis on those terms, I believe, is obvious. One might also suggest that objects of the understanding must be finite. This may be taken strictly, such that numbers exist only insofar as they are counted, or loosely, such as accepting unending or unbounded series, but not infinite ones. Now this is an interesting suggestion, but it really finds its root in a supposed inability of finite intellects to comprehend real or absolute infinities, and is thus not a condition of the understandability of objects in themselves (so to speak!) but rather of the human ability to understand, and as such is not here in the same relation to objects of understanding as the foregoing principle. So why: Insofar as both of the foregoing material conditions may have to be granted, they must not be confused with minimal conditions of understandability.

Note: It might be objected here that the principle of sufficient reason is also a limit on the ability to understand and so ought to be separated from the principle of non-contradiction and classed with the finitist view, but not so. The principle of sufficient reason is a requirement of understanding quite in general, whether it be a finite intellect or an infinite one, and whatever its mode of sensibility might be, and as such is indeed a minimal condition for understandability.

6. On the Nature of the Principle of Non-contradiction. It is not particularly easy to arrive at a satisfactory formulation of this principle, for despite, or perhaps because of, its all-embracing character, each formulation tends to put emphasis on one aspect or another of it, and certainly not all of these are uncontroversial. The central issue, however, is whether the principle of non-contradiction has any ontological significance. At least since Kant it has been generally thought that it does not have any direct ontological significance, serving rather as the criterion, in the most minimal sense, of possible existence, without having any determination on actual existence. In this way of looking at things, the principle is a law of thought only, not a principle of things. Now it is my formidable task to show that this position can not be quite correct. Now there is a certain class of objects with respect to which the principle of non-contradiction is often held to be constitutive, and these are mathematical objects. Kant himself, although maintaining that the principle was not exhaustive of mathematical meaning since he maintained that a pure synthesis in intuition was required, held that the principle was constitutive and thus gave some ontological significance to the principle of mathematical existence. Now of course this is not by any means universally accepted, as intuitionists (Brouwer, Heyting, et al) deny the principle of excluded middle in certain cases, but it is nonetheless plausible to claim that the principle of non-contradiction is constitutive in mathematics. While this in no way demonstrates the point I hope to make, it does open the doorway a bit and points to a way of looking at things which can make the ontological character of the principle of non-contradiction both clearer and more plausible. Why is it one is willing to think of the principle of non-contradiction as constitutive in mathematics? I believe it is because he believes himself to be dealing with form or essence here. One thinks of course that he deals with the pure character of mathematical objects, and that a pure character is limited only by the agreement of its constituent predicates. This, I believe, can be expanded outside the realm of mathematics and be put in the following way: Insofar as the pure character of a thing is concerned, the principle of non-contradiction requires that no two incompatible predicates be located in the character of a thing. This is not particularly strong, it could reasonably be strengthened by adding that one and only one member of each mutually contradictory pair of predicates must belong to any arbitrary character. While true, I do not think it necessary at the moment to stress this point. I really wish here to do only one thing: Make the connection between essence or character and the principle of non-contradiction, and thus give some, however meagre, ontological significance to the principle.

7. On the Nature of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. There has never been much question that this principle, as generally viewed, has ontological significance, indeed: So my purpose here is not to argue further the ontological significance of the principle, but to show that it has a deeper or wider significance than usually supposed. One formulation which one finds of the principle is that all things which happen or are (in a certain way) must have some determining ground for their being in that way and not some other. I think this is perfectly true, but even more strong is the law of causality is in fact a limited statement of this principle, limited in the sense that it considers only spatial and temporal objects. Now I propose another way of putting the principle, and it is: All things must find
their ground in the character of an existent object. The ontological commitment of such a formulation is obvious. Perhaps the way in which it is an elaboration of the earlier formulation is not. This comes in two ways: first, from the extremely broad notion of object employed, and from the absurdity of universality in the sense that the first formulation have a universality not found in the second. In the sense that the first formulation is usually taken to be applicable to changes of some variety. That which did not alter had no need for the principle. My formulation makes no such distinction. The principle of sufficient reason is, I believe, equally required by unchanging, perhaps one could say unchangeable, objects. This will become clearer, I think, later. It is important to notice, as I am sure one can hardly do, that the principle of sufficient reason is also formulated in terms of character or essence. The usefulness of this will soon become quite clear.

8. Concerning the Relation of the Two Principles Generally. There was probably no separation of the principles prior to Leibniz. For him, the principle of non-contradiction was the principle of possibility, the principle of sufficient reason that of reality, and in a sense that of necessity. Thus 'possible worlds' are ruled only by consistency, but the real world requires a sufficient ground, God and his goodness. It may be also said that the principle of non-contradiction is the principle of analysis, or of analytical judgments, while the principle or sufficient reason is the principle of synthesis, or of synthetical judgments. Now I must admit that it is my intention to obscure all that. Not to destroy it, for there may be yet important things to be said in that connection, but certainly to blunt the seeming dichotomy. It is my intention to maintain that the relation between the principles is in fact that of identity, or to put it another way, to maintain that Leibniz' division may be useful in some ways, but it is not a distinction of independent principles. My formulation of the two principles is intended to facilitate this confusion, if you please. Recall the each was formulated in terms of the character of an object: That the character of a thing may not possess contrary predicates and that everything must find its ground in the character of an existent object. How then is one to see these two as being identical, or at least equivalent? (Equivalence is weaker of course, but will suffice for the purpose at hand.) Unity is the key. The principle of non-contradiction as we have stated it really says that an object must have a univocal or a unitary character. The denial of the principle of sufficient reason is an assertion that the object with which it is to be associated is indeterminate in some respect, which is to say that it does not have a univocal or unified character. Thus a univocal or denial of each is really an assertion of the unity of thinghood or a denial of the same. I thus maintain that the two principles are identical; but since I have allowed that the apparent difference in their scope may be useful, I will satisfy myself with the equivalence of the principles.

9. Again Concerning the Minimum Standards of Understanding. Thus it is possible to state the minimum standard of understanding in a rather simple manner: The object to be understood must have a unitary or unified and well-defined character. Again I wish to emphasize the quite general notion of object employed here, and indeed the somewhat oppositional notion of the character of such an object. The needs to be said on both of these points, but that will develop at a later point. Now it may be pressed here that this has not said much, as no one would suppose an object to have anything but a single character. I grant this entirely. As minimal standards, one would hardly expect them to make excessively strong requirements. The importance of what I have done thus far, as I see it, is to show that one may not deny one principle and affirm the other. Now no one has been seriously tempted to deny the principle of non-contradiction, but many philosophers and physicists take it as their duty to deny or call into question the principle of sufficient reason. As the two principles were seen to be independent, these thinkers naturally saw no difficulty in adhering strictly to the principle of non-contradiction and discarding the principle of sufficient reason. If I am correct, this cannot be done. The two principles (really one in my opinion) must be affirmed or denied together. It is naturally my belief that they must both be affirmed, and of course the opposite view is fraught with difficulties, since plainly one cannot understand what such a denial comes to. I suppose, however, that there may be those real mystery-lovers who will join Cratylus in wagging their fingers, but I think it fair to say that such persons have removed themselves from the philosophical enterprise and make no demands on those who seek, according to their nature, to know. Perversity may be understood as a trait of certain humans, but that to which the perverse cling is usually nonsense, and requires nothing of the philosopher. There is, however, another sort of claim which, owing to its source, may be of considerable depth, and that is that there may be existents which are not objects or things. The candidates for such non-object status are rational beings, or perhaps rational concepts. The importance of seeing whether sense can be made of this claim is self-evident from my formulation of the minimum standards of understanding, for then either my formulation is inadequate or rational beings are essentially mysterious. But more on this point later. This concludes the discussion of when an object is understandable: Namely, when its character is univocal.
10. Transition to the Notion of Substance. What, then, has the foregoing to do with substance? I suppose in order to see the connections clearly, one must see, roughly, what one understands by the notion of substance, or better, when one is inclined to employ the notion of substance. It is my belief that the notion of substance finds employment when one wishes to distinguish one sort of thing from another sort (or other sorts) of things in a fundamental way; to cleave, as it were, one thing or sort of thing from all others. Thus, Descartes showed that Aristotle, individuals are substances in the primary sense more or less in virtue of their individuality itself: They are in a fundamental sense separated from other individuals. Thus, one might say of the Atomists, Atoms and the Void are substances because of the fundamental cleavage between Being and Not-Being, and one might say of Parmenides that there exists only one substance because Not-Being was thought by him to be impossible. Descartes showed that body and mind must be separate substances by showing the independence of the two: That one might think whether there be a material world or no. I use these merely as problematical examples, as such interpretations would require, no doubt, considerable discussion, but I believe that a similar prima facie case can be made in the history of physics, for example, matter and energy were considered as substances as long as it was thought that there was a fundamental independence of the two. Perhaps one could follow the following way: As long as it was thought that a thing is seen as complete in itself, that thing is thought of as a substance.

11. On the Notion of Substance. So I think it possible to say that one mark of substantiality, at least, is independence, which comes from a certain completeness of character. What is it for a character to be complete in this way? Clearly, it must mean at very least that the most significant, or essential, properties depend on the internal character of the thing and not on any thing or substance outside itself. This means, I believe, that a substance cannot have been produced by or from any other thing or substance, since surely being produced is a dependence. Clearly also these properties (essential ones) cannot be affected by anything exterior to the substance, nor may any substance affect any other substance in this respect. Now the big step is this: If a character is fully independent, that is if such a character is fully complete, then it may in no way be affected by other substances. This is what Leibniz meant when he claimed that "monads have no windows," for example, and this sets the tone for the notorious problems of dualism. The very perfection of character which merits the name substance implies complete lack of connections or (real) relations between (or among) those things taken to be substances. This again is what Leibniz meant when he asserted that all relations are internal relations. Thus the notion of substance is that of a completely self-subsistent, fully complete, and therefore eternal, unaffected thing. Naturally this is not to claim that everyone who wrote or thought of substance had precisely this in mind. Only a few thinkers have clearly seen the real consequences of the notion of substance to any degree—Leibniz and Spinoza being the two who most readily come to mind. My claim is, I suppose, that this was the result of this notion of substance which inevitably drawn to, sometimes very confusedly, sometimes with hostility. But I believe that this is the proper framework to employ in a discussion of substance. One more point: Kant characterizes substance typically as that which is subject only and never a predicate. I feel that this formulation is altogether consistent with the foregoing, and that this can easily enough be seen when one considers predication in the sense of being a determination. A completely and perfectly independent thing cannot be the determination of any other thing. Nor can it be determined by any exterior thing. But this is merely to show that my formulation is plausible even on the Kantian interpretation.

12. On the Number and Existence of Substances. Here begins the most difficult inquiry: What can be said about substances with regard to their existence and their number from just what is known concerning the requirement for intelligibility? To deal with this issue, I will employ, obviously, in a more or less direct way the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason. The exact relation of the notion of substance to these principles will of course have to be explored, but first I will merely use them to make certain points more clearly. First concerning the number of substances: There seem to be only three distinct possibilities. Either there is one and only one substance, or there is some finite number of substances greater than one, or there is an infinite plurality of substances. One may see these points of view reflected respectively in Spinoza, Descartes, and Leibniz (to stay within a period). There are two ways to proceed here: Positively, that is, to show that one of the views is necessarily the case, and negatively, that is, to show that two of the views are unacceptable and so the third must be true (disjunctive syllogism). The latter, of course, hangs upon having exhausted the possibilities through such a trichotomy, and so should properly have a demonstration of this exhaustiveness. I nonetheless choose to employ the negative method and to do so without prior demonstration of the exhaustiveness of the trichotomy, but I would like to restate the trichotomy in order to reveal more clearly what is involved. It is: Either there is necessarily one and only one substance, or there is some arbitrary finite number of substances, or there is necessarily
qualities. It does not require much to see that some
stances differ in qualities lack the unity of character
between a single substance with infinite qualities and
not a true unit. I believe any more materialism would be
of this sort. This is distinguished according to modality
from a necessary unit. So the last statement of the
trichotomy is the one which I will deal with; I take it
to be self-evident that there is no fourth option to this
trichotomy. It will be possible also to use certain
positive signs to fortify the result. So firstly: Can there
be a finite plurality, or non-necessary unity, of substances?
Now the reason that there be some number and not more
less wants an explanation, which must be found in the
character of an existent object. But if a substance, being
truly independent, cannot depend upon another thing,
then there cannot be a finite plurality of substances.
What of an infinite plurality of substances? One might
think that the foregoing argument suffices generally against
pluralisms, and indeed it may, but it is not as clear here
when dealing with infinite quantities, and so I wish to
avoid at present such a discussion and instead shift the
manner of proceeding slightly. The question here is: If
there be an infinite plurality of substances, how do they
differ? They cannot differ in the perfection of character,
for any limitation of character requires explanation in
terms of another object and so would make the substance
dependent; they may be said to differ in modality or relation;
early they may not differ in modality or relation. Therefore
if substances differ, it can be only in quality. But if
substances differ only in quality, then how can an infinite
number of substances differing in quality be disinguished
from a single substance with infinite qualities?
The only distinction possible here is one of modalities:
qualities of a substance are not themselves absolute,
but independent, even though they may be absolutely separated
from each other, or absolutely necessary. Now I believe
the real key is the integrated principle of non-contradiction
and sufficient reason, which is that an object must have
a unified character, for this provides a further difference
between a single substance with infinite qualities and
infinite number of substances differing qualitatively.
It is this: The Totality of an infinite number of sub-
stances differing in quality lacks the unity of character
demanded by the principle. There cannot be, therefore,
an infinite number of substances differing in quality.
This leaves, of course, that one and only one substance
(necessarily one and only one) of either finite or infinite
qualities exists. It does not require much to see that
just as there cannot be a finite number of substances, so
too the one substance cannot have a finite number of
qualities. So the answer to the first question is that
there can be only one substance and it must be infinitely
qualitatively rich. I wish to drop the word "quality" and
adopt the technical word "attribute" here, as the term
"quality" may have overtones which I do not intend to
attach to the notion. Thus the content of the above
attributed principle implies this notion of substantiality and
the one which I will deal with; this must be further explicated at a later
point. But for now, on to the question of the existence of
substance. Although this is a question of some import,
I plan to give a quick answer. To come to be requires a
cause sufficient to produce the thing; now a substance
cannot be produced from another thing, as then it would not
be independent, not to mention the previous claim that
there can be no other substances from which it could con-
ceive be produced. Ceasing to be likewise requires
outside limitation which is impossible for precisely the
same reasons. That which can neither come to be nor pass
out of existence must be eternal and necessary. This I
assert that there is a necessary, unitary substance of
infinite attributes.
13. What is the Relation of Substance to the Integrated
Principle of Non-Contradiction and Sufficient Reason? It is
my opinion that the three must be very closely bound as
should be obvious from the discussion to this point. I
have already indicated that the principles of sufficient
reason and of non-contradiction should be regarded minimally
as equivalent; and more satisfactorily as identical. I now
wish to make precisely the same claim with regard to the
integrated principles and the notion of substance. They
are minimally equivalent: The truth of the integrated
principle implies this notion of substantiality and the
existence of substance guarantees or implies the integrated
principle. But I believe they are just three moments of the
same principle, which is constitutive of being as such.
A rough statement of such a principle might be something of
this sort: Being must have a thoroughly unified character.
The three previous principles exhibit this principle in
three aspects: The principle of non-contradiction might be
seen as the form of unity in being, the principle of
sufficient reason represents what I'll call the material
unity in being, and substance the form-in-matter of being.
Now I'm not certain how far I would press this, as the
to mention the previous claim that
there can be no other substances from which it could con-
ceive be produced. Ceasing to be likewise requires
outside limitation which is impossible for precisely the
same reasons. That which can neither come to be nor pass
out of existence must be eternal and necessary. This I
assert that there is a necessary, unitary substance of
infinite attributes.
the notion of substance might be nicer because it exhibits more directly the relation among the three, but that is not deeply significant. In the end, this merely asserts, with Parmenides, that Being is one.

14. What Else May Be Known of Substance? Both quite a lot and not much. I could repeat many conclusions of some import from Spinoza's Ethics, with some profit, no doubt. But it is not my intention here to give a thorough explication of the notion of substance. And in the end, it is only very general conditions which one can easily apprehend. The notion of a mode is necessary in this connection at least, and by it I mean nothing more than a certain determination of substance, but one must be careful to note that such a determination must arise from the nature of substance itself, and from nothing else. Since all modifications arise from the nature of being alone, all are without qualification necessary, though they are contingent in the sense of being dependent. I concur with Spinoza that thought and extension are two of the infinite number of attributes, although the notion of extension may have to be altered somewhat. I do not concur with Spinoza's treatment of time and feel that some more adequate discussion be altered somewhat. I do not concur with Spinoza's treatment of time and feel that some more adequate discussion of its nature must be forthcoming, and I have hinted some thoughts on this, but I must confess that I am as of yet not satisfied with the role of time in this, or any other, philosophical system. Let me return for a moment to the earlier discussion of the attributes. Although each attribute must be understood through itself, it is not thereby independent. What is meant is that no attribute can be understood through any other attribute and so is independent in just that sense from the other attributes; it is not independent in the way that a substance must be independent. In fact, the independent existence of an attribute is quite inconsistent with the previously enunciated tri-fold-principle of Being. But it is sufficient to see only that the attributes may both be seen as substances. Thus I have nothing more to add here concerning the nature of substance.

15. At Last the Question: What Are the Conditions for Full or Complete Understanding? All of the foregoing flows from minimal conditions for understanding. The question remains how much more one can find out. The question is not susceptible to a really precise answer at this point. Certain things can easily enough be said: Only an infinite intellect can comprehend all being fully. Another way to say this is that only nature can know itself fully. The limitations on the human intellect in concrete terms are naturally restrictive when compared to the infinite intellect. But that comparison is hardly a useful one. What one wishes to do, I take it, is to understand the real connections of being. This proceeds I believe in a fashion analogous to the process of an infinite intellect. One tries to unite seeming differences into a whole. I will call these wholes quasi-substances, for the intellect proceeds by isolating quasi-substances as the explanations for other things which were once themselves seen as quasi-substances.

Intecl can fully realize that this process does not yield absolute results without thereby discounting the importance of such a process. Further, one can know absolutely that a quasi-substance can be found to ground any other quasi-substance. Now we proceed via quasi-substances just because it is necessary for full understanding, or God or Nature is thoroughly rational and without essential mystery: That it is One. I claim also that Man is very far from understanding fully Being itself, but that this does not stand in opposition to knowing in some degree, through some way, a part of Being. And I hold it to be the sole task of inquiry, whether it be called philosophy or science or just curiosity, to come to be the best understanding possible of whatever is. There remains but one topic which I promised to consider; and I must do so now. That is, whether there are existents which are not things. I must say that what I have said thus far surely denies any straight-forward interpretation of this. But let me try to state why such a possibility might be made on behalf of rational agents who are in fact the only intended members of this class. It is desired to cleave off men from nature, to set them apart. Why? In an attempt to save that illusory notion of freedom,
absolute and unbounded, of the will, which is contradicted by experience and by reason. Only by making the rational agent essentially and thoroughly mysterious are they able to make an equally mysterious doctrine appear appropriate. Frankly, I find the move most unhappy, for it apparently removes from the realm of rational inquiry the rational agent himself. I find that not only contradicted by what I believe are the principles of Being itself, but also a fruitless attempt, for the notion of freedom so purchased is completely unable to aid human understanding in any way whatsoever. As I have previously indicated that I am not entirely certain what is intended by the forementioned claim, I hope and trust that if I have misconstrued it in some way that its propounder will instruct me further in its meaning. This ends what I wish to say at this time about substance.

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Connecting Nature and Freedom in Kant's Third Critique

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One of the express purposes of Kant's Critique of Judgment is to provide the all important ground of mediation between the two earlier Critiques. Indeed the ultimate success of Kant's critical philosophy itself may be said to hang with his ability to demonstrate that such a ground of mediation exists to unite the seemingly different realms of nature and of freedom. To view Kant as offering two worlds for our consideration, one (as in the first Critique) which stands only under the mechanical laws of nature and the categories, and the other (as in the second Critique) which stands only under the laws of freedom, is to recognize in Kant an uncomfortable dualism which, without making any allowances, we should find untenable.

Because our idea of philosophy as a system (and indeed of reality itself as unified) does not allow an absolute plurality with no ground of mediation from one to another, we are prone to reject as untenable any philosophy which suggests an absolute plurality. And yet we do discover in Kant a kind of absolute plurality in his separation of understanding from reason; a separation which, in turn, divides the theoretical from the practical, the realm of nature from the realm of freedom, and finally the territory of the first Critique from the territory of the second Critique.

Now I believe it is precisely because this separation is regarded as unavoidable and even necessary by Kant that the need for a ground of mediation becomes so pressing, and I hope to clarify in this paper the role of the third Critique in effecting this mediation. True to his method, Kant aims here at a synthesis of nature and freedom by introducing a "third thing" which will provide a common basis of unity; and in this case the "third thing" is simply an indeterminate condition for apprehending nature and freedom themselves.

It is right to begin this investigation by recognizing the bare pluralities which are explicit in Kant's philosophy. By the time of the writing of the third Critique it is clear that the legislation of reason results in at least two kinds of conditions: in its theoretical employment it results in the conditions of nature, and in its practical employment it results in the conditions of freedom. Now this double division of the legislation of reason (to which a third division will be added in the Critique of Judgment) cannot be reduced to an obvious unity according to Kant,