The Origin of the Whig Party

by Robert Tyler McCluggage

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Submitted to the Department of History of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
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R. T. McCLUGGAGE
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTORY.

The War of 1812 may rightly be called America's Second War for Independence. As the first gave nominal political freedom, independence from the mother country, so the second gave real commercial independence, untrammeled by European restraint. The war, disastrous as it may seem to have been from purely military point of view, was glorious in its results. Curiously enough these results were for the most part purely negative. The Treaty of Ghent was silent concerning the controversies which had brought the contestants to war. Not a single foot of land was acquired or a single boundary dispute settled. Yet the negative results were no less valuable. The war proved beyond question that the American nation was becoming conscious of its own existence and independence, and this fact was impressed on the world. Americans were made to feel that the confederacy was not an experiment. The American nationality was thenceforth to be an intense reality and national patriotism grew immensely. This all meant that new problems had arisen and would continue to arise. The problems which had agitated the country from the coming of Genet were obliterated. No longer was there any necessity for any further division of political parties according to British or French preferences. Time only was necessary for Jefferson's Anglomen and the Federalists' Mobocrats to change their respective costumes and don a new garb of a different stripe.

Jefferson, as father of the Democratic-Republicans, had regarded the opponents of his own party as the British party, exponents of monarchism at first, and later softening
into exponents of consolidationists as the next best thing. But the exigencies of the time compelled him and his successors to adopt in practice policies entirely out of harmony with the loose constructionist ideas. By the close of the War of 1812 the Republicans were construing the Constitution as broadly as the Federalists had done in Hamilton's time. "There should be now no difference of parties", said Josiah Quincy, "for the Republicans have out-federalized Federalism."\(^1\) But to a certain extent the Federalists had gone over the old Republican ground, consistent in one thing alone, they were still in opposition to the Republicans. They had opposed the war. This, coupled with the disunion projects of the Hartford Convention, had made them extremely unpopular. The successful issue of the war drove the last nail into their political coffin, and after 1817 they ceased to exist as a national party.

The close of the war gave a powerful impetus to the westward movement. People turned their gaze from the sea where they had been wont to look for an approaching snip from their "home" across the seas, and now turned towards the frontier. The settlement and development of the Western country was destined to be a potent factor in shaping the policies of the government and in moulding political parties. The two great questions of the time, internal improvements and the tariff, were to grow primarily out of this westward extension. Already in 1812 there were some evidences of a split in the dominant party. The Virginia dynasty was destined to hold the

\(^1\) See Schouler, History of the United States, ii., 462.
reigns of government until 1824, but the young Republicans, preaching heretical doctrines, were bound to cause a schism sooner or later. Madison yielded to their demands and gave them a war. But his true belief regarding the strict construction was incorporated later in his veto on March 3, 1817, of "An Act to set apart and pledge certain funds for public improvements" in which he denied to Congress any such Constitutional power. In the very next session Clay criticised this opinion very severely. The break on the party is evidenced further by the caucus contest of 1816 where Crawford, one of the young Republicans, dared to dispute Monroe's claims to the Presidency. Crawford in the caucus got fifty-four votes to Monroe's sixty-five.

Monroe was elected, however, and on March 4, 1817, began what, at Boston on the President's tour through the old Federalists regions, received the name of "the era of good feelings". The Federalists were satisfied with Monroe and, buried beneath the odium of their past sins, they were never resurrected as a national party. Party rancor, it seemed, was laid to sleep. The general belief was that all were merged into one great Republican party. Such a condition, according to Monroe, was an ideal condition, for he deprecated the existence of parties in a free government. But where there is only one great political party personal parties are certain to arise. Division is certain to arise on political questions. Out of personal parties there is likely to grow a new political party. That this fact was recognized by some is not

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, I., 584-5.
2. Niles's Register, lxv., 245.
3. Ibid., xxiv., 292-3.
at all strange. The wonder lies in the fact that so many were led to believe contrariwise. In tracing movements which finally grew into distinctive parties, and ultimately into the Whig party, it is necessary to study this period of "good feelings" so pregnant with events pointing to the future.
CHAPTER II. CLAY'S OPPOSITION TO MONROE. 1817-1821.

Among the supporters of Monroe for the presidency in 1816 was Henry Clay of Kentucky. It was expected that Monroe would be the last of the Revolutionary generation and the last of the Virginia dynasty to become president. He, it was supposed, would have two terms; but who would succeed him no one could tell. Madison had been Jefferson's Secretary of State before he became president, and Monroe had been Madison's. Because of this the position had come to be looked upon as a sort of a stepping stone to the presidency. To those fostering presidential aspirations this department was a coveted one. Perhaps no one had a better claim to the appointment than Clay. He had served in the Kentucky Legislature, in the United States Senate, as Speaker in the House of Representatives, and had been on a foreign mission to Ghent and London. Because of his extensive service and also his support of Monroe he had a fair right to expect the appointment. He believed that no one had a better right to the succession after Monroe's period had expired than himself.¹

But Monroe chose John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, a former Federalist, though a Republican since 1808. It is certain that Clay was very much opposed to this choice. He was opposed to Adams on the ground, he said, that he was not a Republican.²

That Clay was peeved because he was not chosen there can be no reasonable room for doubt. As a palliative he was offered the Department of War and the mission to London, both of which he refused rather curtly; nothing would satisfy him but the Department of State.

¹Schurz, Henry Clay, I., 141.
²Adams, Memoirs, iv., 130-1.
Clay was known to be ambitious and it was generally believed that he would only be satisfied with the first place in the cabinet. This fact was revealed at the time, and was shown to be true in subsequent debates regarding questions upon which Clay took direct issue with the Administration.

The question comes to us, Did Clay's disappointment cause him to pursue his consistent course of opposition? It seems altogether certain that such was the case. Had he secured the position which he coveted he would thereby have merged with the Administration. However much he might have opposed Monroe's policies he could not have carried on an open warfare as he did, and a secret warfare, such as was waged by Crawford would have been dishonorable, to say the least, and far more ineffective than a continuous campaign cunningly manipulated by one holding the position of Speaker of the House; being thus enabled to appoint favorable committees, to marshal and direct his forces in accordance with his wishes. Clay knew the power the Speaker had, for it was he who first made the position one of power. Failing to secure the place regarded as nearest to the presidency he saw that as speaker he might be more powerful than the Secretary of State, and such being the case why not make the Speakership the stepping-stone to the highest office in the land? It was generally expected that Clay would take grounds of opposition to the president, and it was not long until such

1. Gallatin, Writings, II., 38.
2. See Annals of Congress; 32, 1378-9; 33, 501, et seq.
3. Folliet, Speaker of the House, Par's., 45-46.
expectations were realized.

The fifteenth Congress met on December 1st, 1817, and Clay was on the same day elected Speaker of the House of Representatives by a vote of 143 to 7.¹ Monroe, in his first message to Congress,² after referring to an act passed at the previous session providing for internal improvements and vetoed by Madison, said that considering his position "it would be improper after what has passed that this discussion should be revived with an uncertainty of my opinion respecting the right". He stated further that after thorough deliberation it was his "settled conviction" that Congress did not possess the right to establish a system of internal improvements, and he recommended the adoption of a constitutional amendment which would give Congress the right, as both Jefferson and Madison had done. The committee to which was referred that part of the President's message did not take to the idea of Monroe. On December fifteenth Tucker of Virginia, from that committee, made a report³ which asserted the right of Congress "to construct roads and canals through the several States, with the assent of the States on such terms as may be agreed on, leaving the jurisdictional rights in the States respectively", and which contained a resolution to the effect that the interest of the Government in the bonds of the United States should be constituted as a fund for internal improvements. Some of Monroe's adherents did not even want to discuss the resolution because he had said that a

². Richardson, messages and papers, LL., 18.
constitutional amendment would be necessary. But Clay very early took occasion to say that he had no doubt the Constitution had vested the power in Congress independent of any State authority. In his first important speech on the subject, made March 7th, he outlined his constitutional views more fully and carefully than he had ever done before. He contended that he had improved his constitutional opinions from the celebrated production of Madison when he was a member of the Virginia legislature in 1799, and from others of analogous principles; that if he differed from those who professed to acknowledge the same authority, the difference was not as to principles, but as to the application of them. He asserted that in all cases relating essentially to the preservation of the union he would give the Constitution a liberal construction, and that in all cases where admittedly the power resided somewhere, but it was uncertain in which branch, he would contend that it belonged to Congress as "the safest repository." He declared that he would not admit that the President had the power of ordering roads whenever he pleased—this was a direct slap at an act of Monroe's—and that the Constitution had denied the power to Congress. Denouncing the practice which allowed the President to carry on such works of improvement, but which forbade Congress from exercising like powers, he exclaimed: "What! are we come to this— that imperial powers should be ascribed to our executive?"

2. Ibid., 1107.
3. Ibid., 1104-1180.
During his speech he took occasion to make some reflections on the union, as follows: "We are told that in these naiycon days there is no such thing as party spirit; that the factions by which the country has been divided, are reduced to their primitive elements, and that this whole society is united by brotherly love and friendship; and, indeed, the President of the United States had himself observed, in his message at the commencement of the session, that he 'is happy to observe that the benign spirit of conciliation and harmony which now manifests itself throughout our Union, promises to such a recommendation (an amendment to the Constitution) the most prompt and favorable result'. Sir, I do not believe in this harmony, this extinction of party spirit, which is spoken of; I do not believe that men have ceased to be men, or that they have abandoned those principles on which they have always acted hitherto." At every point Clay took issue with the President. Throughout his remarks there breathes the spirit of the Union, not union of parties, but the Union of the States. He was seeking to knit the States together more closely, and to do this he endeavored to effect a liberal construction of the Constitution than one of the Virginia school could conscientiously submit to without resistance. It was largely out of this fundamental difference that the specific issues between the Democratic and Whig parties were later to arise.

Substitute resolutions for the resolution reported by Tucker were agreed to in Committee of the Whole. One declared

2. ibid., 1249.
that Congress has power under the Constitution to appropriate money for the construction of roads, canals, and for the improvement of water courses. Others declared that Congress has power to construct post roads and military roads, roads and canals necessary for interstate commerce, and canals for military purposes; provided that in each of the cases mentioned private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation. These were of such nature that a debate was stirred up concerning States Rights. Hugh Nelson of Virginia in a speech on this subject became excited. Mercer, also of Virginia, in referring to this speech, said: "But, my honorable colleague who has just addressed you has ardently endeavored to interpose a yet more formidable obstacle to the adoption of these resolutions. He has gallantly unfurled the ancient banner of his party, and sought to rally his Republican forces on the side of the Executive. He has reminded them of their ancient victories, and summoned them to the same field of triumph— a triumph of States over the Federal Constitution."¹ This excerpt serves to show that the thought of party was still alive and also illustrates the divergent views concerning the Constitution. Before the debate closed Clay took occasion to criticise the President in a second great speech. He had plead for a free discussion of the subject of internal improvements and the powers of Congress concerning the same, and had taken direct issue with those who thought that no measure ought to be passed since the President

had said that he did not think that Congress had the power. Now in this second important speech made on the sixth day of March, 1818 he became more violent. "If, by the communication of his opinion (Monroe's) to Congress, he intended to prevent discussion, he has most woefully failed." "By volunteering his opinion that Congress does not possess this power", he continued, "he has inverted the regular order of legislation by beginning where it should end." Such "proceeding is irregular and unconstitutional". He had no doubt that the President was actuated by pure motives, but "in this passage the President has furnished us with no reasoning, no argument in support of his opinion—nothing addressed to the understanding". He said that the President had ordered a road to be constructed or repaired "on his sole authority in time of peace", and that this measure had been taken without the consent of the State of New York. But Congress has paramount power to the President. The result of the bout was that the resolution which declared that Congress has power to appropriate for internal improvements was adopted by a vote of 90 to 75. Those declaring that Congress has power to construct were defeated. So Clay carried his point only in part. Clay's criticism of Monroe throughout the debate had a flavor of bitterness. This did not work to Clay's advantage. A personal allusion was made to him and retorted that "motives had been ascribed to him, in relation to a particular office, as false as the imputation of them was malignant." I have desired no office from the Executive.

2. ibid., 32, 1359-80.
3. ibid., 1381, 1385.
4. ibid., 1386-1389.
5. ibid., 1378-9.
But in the heat of debate he may have forgotten that the position of Secretary of State was regarded as the stepping-stone to the presidency.

Meanwhile Clay's hostility was surging forth in other channels. Prior to Monroe's inauguration he had stoutly opposed the enactment of any law which could possibly be disadvantageous to the insurgent colonies of America. He was wholly wrapped up in the cause of the South American patriots and was sure to give vent to his feelings should anyone dare to incline towards the side of Spain. Three commissioners had been appointed by the President to go to South America in order to investigate affairs there. It was known in the cabinet as early as September 1817 that Clay was determined to propose the acknowledgement of the South American insurgents at the following session of Congress, and that he was dissatisfied that the commissioners had not been sent in order that they might be back in time to report to Congress. Adams in his Diary says that when he went to the President's on December 10th and found that "Mr. Clay had already mounted his South American great horse." He wrote further that "Clays project is that in which John Randolph failed, to control or overthrow the Executive by swaying the House of Representatives. He intends to bring forward his motion to acknowledge the government of Buenos Ayres, and perhaps Chile." Calhoun and the President pronounced themselves against it, and Adams had done so before. It was thought outside

2. Ibid., 38.
of the cabinet that the one subject which might furnish ground for ardent difference of principle was the trouble concerning the revolutionists of South America, though some displeasure was expressed at the declaration in the President's message that he would veto any measure passed for internal improvements. A few days after Clay's conference at the Capitol at a dinner at Crawford's he "came out with great violence against the course pursued by the Executive upon South American affairs, and especially in relation to Amelia island." Monroe, on January 13th, 1818, sent a message to Congress giving information concerning the suppression of the establishment at Amelia Island and transmitting the papers concerned therewith. Adams thought that the measures in relation to Amelia Island, South America, and Spain were "laying the foundation of a new system of opposition to the Administration, with Clay at its head." Clay himself told Crawford that he intended to follow up his attack and prophesied his success. But this was when he was a little warm with wine and a day or two later he went to Crawford and said that he was anxious to avoid collision if possible, and that he intended merely to make an appropriation for a minister to Buenos Ayres.

Clay in fact pursued the former course. Forsyth of Georgia reported a Neutrality bill and on March 17th Clay said that instead of being called an act of neutrality it ought to be "entitled an act for the benefit of His Majesty the King of

1. Wiles's Register, XIII., 357.
3. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 23-5.
Spain! The next day he made an impetuous speech which showed that he could not endure the easy going course of the Executive. "The Secretary of State tells us", he said, "very good-naturedly, that we have patiently waited for the settlement of our differences with Spain, and it will require no very great effort to wait a little while longer. Very good-natured indeed! No change, say gentlemen, in the aspect of our relations with Spain? Yes, a most humiliating one, within the last three or four years. We were told by the President at the commencement of the session, and, ambiguous as the intimation was, hope clung to it as promising a change; that a disposition has been shown on the part of Spain to move in the negotiations. And what sort of a motion was it? A motion which has terminated in something like perpetual repose, waiting until the passions and prejudices of His Majesty of Spain may have had time to subside. Admirable Job-like patience! I thank my God that I do not possess it." Forsyth was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and one whom the President regarded as perfectly confidential. Clay kept stinging him until, to show his independence, he disavowed any subserviency to the Administration, and even went so far as to propose measures utterly disapproved of by the President. Monroe was greatly agitated when he heard that Forsyth intended to introduce a motion authorizing the President to take possession of East Florida, and he requested Crawford to dissuade Forsyth from taking this action. It seemed that Clay was marshalling his forces.

2. Ibid., 1417-8.
for a system of regular opposition, and moreover it appeared that he was enlisting recruits from among the friends of the Administration:

Nothing suited Clay. The President appointed three commissioners to go to South America and had allowed them definite compensation. Clay declared that these commissioners should have been nominated to the Senate, that the President had not only made these appointments without the authority of the Constitution, or of any law recognizing them, but in derogation of a positive act of Congress. On the same day that he made this declaration, March 24th, 1818, he moved an amendment to the general appropriation bill, one clause of which provided for an appropriation of 30,000 dollars as compensation for these commissioners, to the effect that there be inserted in the bill a provision for appropriating 18,000 dollars for the outfit and one year's salary of a Minister to the independent province of the River Plata in South America. Clay supported his proposition in his grandest emotional and patriotic style. He took his accustomed flings at the President and the Secretary of State. He charged the Executive of having pursued such a course as to dissatisfy both Spain and the colonies. There followed just what one would naturally expect and what no doubt Clay

expected. Mr. Lowndes of South Carolina asserted that the

3. ibid., 1468.
4. ibid., 1498.
proposed measure was in hostility to the Executive, and from that time on almost every speaker referred to this assertion. Some denied it, others said that if it were true it would not deter them from acting on the proposed measure. Nelson of Virginia gave vent to his feelings of anxiety for the future and solemnly declared that he saw "that out of this proposition is to grow a division of the Republican party, that on the one side are to be rallied the exclusive friends of liberty, and those on the other side are to be denounced as inimical to it." He was opposed to the proposition and he claimed that the President was on his side, that he and his allies were as much the friends of liberty and free government as their opponents. "Why then," he continued, "are we and we to be denounced as the enemies of liberty? I do regret this debate, because I view it as the epoch of the division of the old Republican party. We are to be rent in twain, and one moiety of it is to be arrayed against the other. Those with whom I act are, it appears, to contend against the old disgusting tale of foreign influence." Clay at once took up the gauntlet. "But, sir," he said, "it seems that a division of the Republican party is about to be made by the proposition under consideration." He asked whose conduct was to furnish the standard of orthodoxy. "If there is to be a division of the Republican party," he declared, "I glory that I, at least, am found among those who are anxious for the advancement of human rights.

2. Ibid., 1596-7.
3. Ibid., 1601.
He declared further that he should continue to express his opinions coincident or not with those of the Executive. And then as a cover for the flight he was waging and as if in answer to the claim propounded by his opponents that they were the friends of the Executive, he said: "I contend that we are the true friends of the Executive; and that the title does not belong to those who have taken it. We wish to extend his influence and give him patronage; to give him the means as he now has the power, to send another minister abroad." This was cunningly ridiculous, for Clay had gone so far as to declare the action of the President unconstitutional and directly against an act of Congress. And he had moved the adoption of a scheme of his own. He was in effect saying that he knew the needs of the President better than the President himself.

Clay's mention of a division of parties was taken up by his opponents, and he and his adherents to the proposition were accused of claiming to be the exclusive friends of liberty. This called forth a disclaimer by Clay, who now (March 20th, 1818) said that he saw in the division nothing but a difference of opinion among those who were accustomed to act together: but he must have seen by this time that he would be hopelessly defeated. At all events his proposition was rejected on the day that he made his disclaimer by a vote of 45 to 115. The proposition was renewed by Anderson, a colleague of Clay, two

2. Ibid., 1618.
3. Ibid., 1637.
4. Ibid., 1644.
5. Ibid., 1646, 1655.
days later but it was defeated by exactly the same vote. An analysis of the vote shows that New England and the South were very strongly against Clay's scheme; that the Middle States were against him about two to one; and that the Southwest was about evenly divided, while the Northwest, including Kentucky, was the only section for Clay, and by a vote of about three to one.

Clay's course of hostility had greatly alienated Monroe. On the very day that Clay's proposition first came to a vote Adams wrote in his Diary; "But the subject which seems to absorb all the faculties of his (Monroe's) mind is the violent systematic opposition that Clay is raising against his Administration." The South American question in itself had caused a great deal of excitement. Hezekiah Niles said that it would seem from recent discussions that the question regarding the South American colonies would make one of the principal points of difference between political parties in the United States. During the summer a public dinner was given at Lexington as a testimony of the respect in which they held Clay for his exertions for the South American patriots. One of the toasts was "the independent minority of 45," referring to those who had supported Clay's measure. Colonel Barbee, one of the "45" was given a public dinner at Marietta, Ohio. Clay's devotion to the cause of the South American patriots had won for him the Northwest.

3. Niles's Register, XIV., 295.
4. idem.
5. idem.
his opposition to the Administration was thus far a disappointing failure. It was felt that he had pursued his course because of his disappointment in not being appointed Secretary of State. This had been hinted at during the debates and had called forth a passionate denial from Clay. He concluded this denial with the statement that "I will sacrifice no part of my public duty to a servile compliance with his (Monroe's) views." Whether the charge was entirely true or not, it was believed to be true and the coincidence of Clay's "public duty" always being in opposition to the Administration seemed to prove what was believed. During the summer Clay took occasion to positively disavow the intention which he said had been so often attributed to him of attempting to organize a party of opposition. Clay knew that but little success had come to him as a result of the first session's fight. And Crawford said that Clay told him that he had no intention of opposing the Administration at the session following.

Clay for a time kept his promise. He confined himself chiefly to a warfare on Adams and certain measures instead of indulging in personalities against Monroe. But trouble was imminent. General Jackson had crossed into Florida, Spanish territory, without express orders as it seemed, and had taken St. Marks, Pensacola, and the fortress of the Barrancas, and had been responsible for the hanging of several persons, notably Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert G. Ambrister. in the House

2. Miles's Register, XV., 9.
T.M. Nelson made a report from the Committee on Military Affairs containing a resolution "That the House of Representatives of the United States disapproves the proceedings in the trial and execution of Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert G. Amorister." To this three other resolutions were added by Cobb of Georgia which declared the seizure of St. Marks and Pensacola, and the fortress of Barrancas to have been contrary to orders and against the Constitution, and which asked for appropriate legislation. Clay took a leading part in the debate against Jackson. Conscious of the charges regarding his relation to the President he, at the outset, declared that all inferences drawn from the course which it would be his painful duty to pursue would be unfounded. Very characteristically he said that "rather than to throw obstructions in the way of the President, he would precede him, and pick out those if he could, which might jostle him in his progress- he would sympathize with him in his embarrassments, and commiserate with him in his misfortunes." He declared that he would never "form any resolution, or contract any engagement for systematic opposition to his Administration or to that of any other Chief Magistrate." Clay saw in Jackson another rival and so in this, his great speech of January 20th, 1819, he aimed his shafts at Jackson in particular. When it was attempted to defend both the actions of Jackson and Monroe, he could effectively point out the fallacy by saying: "If it were right in him (Jackson) to seize the place, it is impossible that it should have been right in the President immediately to surrender it. We, sir, are...

2. Ibid., 588.
3. Ibid., 631-55.
the supporters of the President.--- The President has in this instance deserved well of his country. Clay, realizing that he had injured himself by his course the previous session was mild and passionate. As said before he confined his attack to Jackson, and even attributed purity of motives to him. Adams wrote as follows regarding the speech: "It was against General Jackson, but professedly not against the Administration." but afterwards when Clay had renewed his open attack again Adams wrote that Clay, following his disappointment in failing to secure the appointment as Secretary of State, at once projected his opposition scheme which would bring him in as Monroe's successor after eight years, and that his engines the first session were South America and internal improvements, and the second session he "took up the Seminole War", but found himself no longer primary leader, for he was ranged under the banners of Crawford. Clay was earnestly laboring for the passage of the resolutions and he no doubt saw that their passage would mean an indirect censure on the Executive. R.L. Johnson of Kentucky, one of Clay's most enthusiastic followers at the time, took issue with Clay on this proposition. He asserted that it was no mere party squabble, that he was differing from friends with whom he usually acted in concert. And this view was accepted by some. But there was not wanting those who held that such a resolution implied a censure on the Executive by intimating that he had either been negligent or partial in allowing a fault in an officer to pass unnoticed.

3. ibid., V., 52-3.
yet which the House "might think worthy of animadversion".  

On February 8th, 1819, Clay suggested to Cobb such modification as would, he hoped, unite the conflicting opinions of the members of the House and so enable them to agree in a vote. But nothing came of this and on the same day the resolution was defeated by a vote of 70 to 100. An analysis of the vote shows that New England was about evenly divided. The Middle States and the Northwest including Kentucky voted over two to one for Jackson. The South was strongly against him, while the Southwest was unanimously for him.

The proceedings of the second session revealed the facts very clearly that Jackson's star was rising, while Clay's had been dimmed by his course of opposition. His failure to oppose an Administration policy was regarded as something strange and afforded a fit subject for speculation. A striking example of this is related by Adams in his Diary. Middleton of South Carolina asked him now he thought it happened that Clay let the Piracy Bill pass without opposition. Adams in answer said that he supposed that Clay intended to wait for its execution and then take his stand of opposition. But Middleton informed him that Clay's losses at the card table had so discomposed him that he had paid no attention to the business of the House during the remainder of the session. So unpopular had Clay become with some that there was talk of displacing him and of electing a new Speaker. But

2. Ibid., 1104.
3. Ibid., 1138.
Monroe advised against this on the ground that such would give him more consequence than belonged to him, that Clay in his course of opposition was injuring himself more than anyone else and finally that there was no member of the Administration from the Western country. Adams concurred in this judgement. The matter was accordingly dropped and Clay was elected Speaker of the Sixteenth Congress on December 16th, practically without opposition.

The Missouri struggle began in the spring of 1819. As it will be discussed in the next chapter nothing more will be said of it at present. Clay, as was said above, was re-elected Speaker in December 1819 almost unanimously. This may have had the effect of reassuring him in his opposition schemes. The Missouri question, as will be seen, had presented a vista not at all pleasing to Clay. By drawing the attention of Congress into other channels he may have hoped to keep himself prominent. At all events, the fire in his breast was kindled by a special message of the President on March 27th, 1820. Adams had concluded a treaty with the Spanish Minister early in 1819 which provided for the cession of Florida. But the King of Spain withheld his ratification beyond the time specified in the treaty. There were many who desired to take forcible possession of Florida. But such was against the President's policy. So in this message he submitted to Congress the advisability of postponing a decision on the question until

3. Ibid. 702.
4. Treaties and Conventions, 1016-1023.
the following session, assigning as reasons the facts; first, that foreign nations were interposing their good offices to promote the ratification and had expressed a desire that the United States would take no step on the principle of reprisals; and second, that the distress of Spain afforded a motive for forbearance. This was more than Clay could stand and so on that same day he presented two resolutions; the first that Congress has power to dispose of the territory belonging to the United States and that no treaty "purporting to alienate any portion thereof" is valid without its consent, and the second, that the equivalent which Spain proposed to give for Louisiana west of the Sabine was inadequate, and that the transference thereof or the renewal of the treaty is inexpedient. It is evident that these would operate against the Administration in every possible contingency, for if a party of opposition should prevent ratification then all of the Spanish troubles would be present to clog the Administration, and if ratified the treaty would be made obnoxious. On April 3d Clay made his speech before the Committee of the Whole upon the resolutions. It had been his anxious wish, he said, to be able to concur with the Executive branch of the government regarding Spanish affairs. He asserted that the policy of appealing to the "justice and affections" of Spain had failed; that the President in his message at the beginning of the session had recommended an enforcement of the provisions of the treaty, but after three months of deliberation the Committee of

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 69-70.
3. Ibid., 179-31.
Foreign Relations, not able to agree with him, has reported re­commending the seizure of Florida in the nature of a reprisal. Now, he said, the President advises a postponement. He denounced the idea of abandoning the policy on the avowed ground of the interposition of foreign powers, and ridiculed the idea of wait­ing for the recovery of a rival's strength so that he might suc­cessfully resist the demands made upon him. Clay held that the treaty was at an end and since it was a bad one it should not be reaffirmed. Though nothing came of the resolutions nevertheless Clay had proceeded with considerable show of success; he could not reasonably have expected the House to do much owing to the fact that treaty making concerns the Senate and the Executive departments primarily. But by his tactics he was able to make the treaty highly unpopular. The people in the Western part of the United States were instigated against the treaty because they were led to believe that it had not obtained enough territory. The Missouri question had acted to indispose every part of the Union; the South and West, because they wanted all the territory to the Rio del Norte for more slave States; and the North because they did not want even Florida for a slave State. Adams, who was scrutinizing developments as keenly as anybody, wrote in his Diary May 3rd 1850 that "the baseness of the King of Spain has played the game into the hands of Clay, and that which at the close of the last session appeared to be the most fortunate of events to me, is now the most powerful engine wielded against me."

1. See Adams, Memoirs, V., 91.
2. Ibid., 91.
Meanwhile Clay was fighting for the South Americans, undaunted by former reverses. On the same day that he spoke for his resolutions regarding the alienation of territory he offered a resolution which asserted the expediency of providing by law for an outfit and salary for such Minister or Ministers as the President, by and with the advise and consent of the senate might send to any of the South American governments maintaining their independence. This was taken up for discussion on May 10th and Clay made a virulent attack on the Administration policy. Clay said that after the return and report of the commissioners from South America it was generally supposed that recognition would follow as a matter of course. The surprise caused by the Executive pursuing a different course at the last session was proportionally great. So strong was the message of the beginning of the session on that point that recognition was expected without doubt. Indeed, he continued, one of the presses near had said that there was "a race of popularity between the United States and the humble individual who now addresses the House". As he proceeded he became more virulent. "If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do, if not, we do not. A single expression of the Minister abroad, he was ashamed to say, had moulded the policy of our government towards South America- an expression which, like Mr. Adams definition of republicanism, had been construed to mean anything or nothing." The resolution passed the same day by a vote of 80 to 75.

Adams said that Clay was surprised at the result, as was most

2. Ibid., 2223-30.
3. Ibid., 2230.
everyone. He attributed its success to the failure of the negotiations with Spain and particularly to certain correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Spanish Minister which had been transmitted to Congress the day before. Clay's victory, Adams said, was generally regarded as a victory against the Administration, and he added: "The run of luck is now in favor of Clay." And a few days later he said the result "is no doubt, an indication of Clay's influence in the House, and of his increasing popularity in the nation, as the great antagonist of the Administration, at least in the House of Representatives, and will affect the policy of those whose propensities are to desert failing and fly to rising fortunes."

At the session of 1820-21 Clay, in spite of the Missouri controversy, continued his fight for the South Americans. On February 3d, 1821, he moved that the resolution adopted at the last session "by a majority very decisive— declare it expedient to make an appropriation, by law, for a mission to such of the governments of South America as had established their independence, "should be carried into effect." He therefore moved that it be referred to the Committee of the Whole that there might be inserted a clause making an appropriation? A few days later when the General Appropriation Bill was being considered, he moved an amendment to appropriate a sum not exceeding $18000 for an outfit and a year's salary to such Minister as the

2. Ibid., 118.
to any independent South American government. Clay made a speech,
which is not recorded. But he is quoted as saying that "the res­
olution of the last session was an expression of public senti­
ment which no monarch in Europe would have dared to disregard." It
was pointed out that the reasonable inference would be that
Clay intended to urge the President still more persuasively to do
that which he was unwilling to do. It was shown further that
Clay at the last session had announced that his object was merely
to get an abstract expression of the sympathies of the citizens
of the United States and that he had disavowed any wish that it
should be construed into a dictation or a recommendation to the
Executive. And all this was very true. Clay was now attempting
to construe the resolution as being an enunciation of public
sentiment which the President was bound to obey. On February 9th
Clay's motion was voted down 79 to 86. Whereupon Clay at once of­
fered another resolution to the effect that the House of Repres­
entatives participates with the people of the United States in
deep interest for the success of the South American provinces, and
that it will give Constitutional support to the President when­
ever he may deem it expedient to recognize the independence of
any of the said provinces. Both clauses were agreed to. It was
ev­
edent that this resolution was adapted to cover up the defeat
of the previous day. A committee of two, Clay being one, was
appointed to lay the resolution before the President. This was

2. Idem., 1044.
3. Ibid., 1077.
4. Ibid., 1081.
5. Ibid., 1091-2.
done and Clay reported that the President in common with the people of the United States takes a deep interest in the success of the South American provinces, and would take the resolution into deliberate consideration. So far as Clay was concerned the South American fight against Monroe was over. He did not return to the next session of Congress, and it was at that session that formal recognition was given in accordance with the advice of Monroe. Monroe in his own way and time did that for which Clay had fought so long. Clay's efforts, however, were not unavailing, for they made him very popular in the West. He had there struck a popular chord and was to receive from this section a hearty support in his later efforts in behalf of the "American system".

CHAPTER III. THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY. 1819-1821.

Meanwhile the Missouri question, "a flaming sword that moves around on all sides and cuts in every direction," had arisen and added to the complexity of the situation. The practice had grown up of maintaining a balance of power between the slave and free sections of the country by an alternate admission of slave and free states. And it may be said at the outset that the struggle over Missouri was, primarily, a struggle for political power between the two great and opposing sections, "interested on the one side, in manufacturing and the raising of food products under a system of free labor; and, on the other in the production of great staples, cotton, tobacco, and sugar by the use of slave labor."

The struggle began in this wise. A bill to authorize the people of the territory of Missouri to form a Constitution and State government was being considered in Committee of the Whole on February 13th, 1819. In the course of his remarks Talmadge, a Representative from New York, moved an amendment designed to limit the existence of slavery in the new State. This immediately precipitated a warm debate in which Clay took Southern ground. Adams said that Clay would thus "continue to keep himself in the public eye as a party leader, and be ready for every event that may happen." The bill passed the House with the restrictive amendment. This was struck out by the Senate, and as both Houses adhered to their original position the subject

5. Idem.
7. Ibid., 273.
remained over to the next session.\(^1\)

Short as the debate was, practically all of the arguments later used were made. The whole danger was laid bare before the people. The spectre of a division of parties on a geographical basis came to haunt the minds of idealists who thought that there had come to be one all-embracing universal Republican party and of those as well who may have hoped for other divisions on the basis of political principles national in character. The branches of the legislature failing to come to an agreement, the issue was transferred to the people, and in all quarters of the Union spirited mass meetings were held to discuss the imposing question of placing an anti-slavery restriction upon the proposed State.\(^2\) The legislatures of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and even the slave state of Delaware, passed resolutions against the further introduction of slaves into the territories of the United States and against the admission of new slave States; while those of Maryland and Virginia declared against such restriction.\(^3\) The action of Pennsylvania, so long the trusted ally of the South, is especially significant. Resolutions were unanimously adopted by both branches of her legislature in December 1819 against the Southern view. She invoked her sister States "to refuse to covenant with crime" by supporting a measure "which proposes to spread the crimes and cruelties of slavery, from the banks of the Mississippi to the shores of the Pacific" and resolved that her

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Senators and Representatives in the Congress of the United States
2. Niles's Register, XVII., 151,189,199,200,241,304,305,342,343.
4. Ibid., 344-5, 343-4, 395.
be requested "to vote against the admission of any territory as a state into the union", unless the further introduction of slavery should be prohibited, and that all children born therein should become free at the age of twenty-five.

There appeared the vista of a united South against a united North. In the North in several States the Federalists were yet in the ascendancy. As a party remnant they were opposed to slavery. The Northern Republicans found themselves united with the Federalists on the issue of slavery. And just at this time it was the paramount issue. Rufus King, the venerable Federal leader, was exerting himself to unite the North against the South. It was only natural for many to think that the Federalists were attempting to rehabilitate themselves upon the issue of slavery. Popular demonstrations in the North only confirmed this belief. "All such public expressions at the North", says Schouler, "seemed spontaneous enough in the excitement of the hour. But there was a political force working beneath the surface which gave to this popular movement, which so many out of national influence espoused, a peculiar impetus and direction. That force was Federal in its basis, negative in the main as to Monroe's administration and policy, immutably jealous of Southern ascendancy. King, venerable in years and courtly of aspect, was its chief inspiration, as befitted one of his commanding talents and vast and varied public experience, reaching back to Revolutionary times! Later it will become known with what success his efforts were crowned.

1. Niles's Register, XVII., 287, 296-7.
The sixteenth Congress convened on December 6th, 1819, and Clay was the same day elected Speaker of the House almost unanimously. Smith of South Carolina on the 29th presented to the Senate a memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Missouri, praying for admission to the Union. A bill providing for the admission of Maine passed the House on January 3d. Three days later in the Senate a motion was made to amend the Maine bill by adding the Missouri bill thereto and this passed on the 18th of February by the close vote of 23 to 31. On the same day Thomas of Illinois proposed an amendment to the Missouri branch of the bill which if adopted would prohibit slavery in all territory north of 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude except in Missouri. This was adopted the following day by a vote of 34 to 10. But a little later the House disagreed to all of the amendments to the Maine bill, and the House began to consider its own Missouri bill. January 36th, Taylor, a Representative from New York, had moved an amendment to the Missouri bill then under consideration substantially the same as the proposed restrictive amendment of Talmadge. This was passed by the House on February 29th by the vote of 94 to 86, and on March 1st the bill as amended passed 91 to 83. But the following day the Senate struck out the restrictive amendment and substituted the Thomas amendment, by which slavery would be excluded from all the territory ceded by France in the Louisiana Purchase north of 36.

2. Ibid., 42.
3. Ibid., 449.
4. Ibid., 73.
5. Ibid., 424.
6. Ibid., 428.
7. Ibid., 36, 1455-7.
8. Ibid., 35, 947.
9. Ibid., 36, 1585.
10. Ibid., 1572-3.
degrees 30 minutes. 1

The debate between the representative of the two sec-
tions of the country had waxed hot. The constitutional debate
had centered around the question whether or not Congress had the
right to place a restriction on a State. This question however
was incidental to the struggle between the sections for political
power. The South, not yet seared, not yet oblivious to the evils
of slavery, urged that diffusion would mitigate the evils. They
urged the injustice of excluding the Southern citizen by render-
ing it impossible for him to migrate to the new State with his
property. The North, on the other hand, urged that diffusion would
mean extension of slavery, that it would strengthen the institu-
tion of slavery. The Northern man, it was contended, would be
unable to compete with slave labor and thus would be excluded.
Economic necessity would finally, through an increased demand for
slaves in the new section, call for the reopening of the African
slave trade. As the debate waxed hotter and hotter threats of
disunion were heard on all sides. 2 Clay was fully cognizant of the
state of affairs. In January 1820 he wrote that all questions had
given way to the Missouri question. "It is a most unhappy ques-
tion", he said, "awakening sectional feelings and exasperating
them to the highest degree. The words, civil war and disunion,
are uttered almost without emotion." As at the previous session
he opposed the restriction and hence was on the Southern side. He

wrote further that in the Senate the majority "is with us", in
2. Adams, Memoirs, V., 13, 56; Benton, Abridgment of Debates,
C. XIII, 5075, 467-9.
the House it is doubtful. It was the general feeling that the controversy was creating new parties, parties divided by geographical lines which would tend towards disunion. Such a result was greatly feared. This fact is plainly shown in the trend of the debates. Whereas before there was a slight tendency for the West and Middle States, or the agricultural and manufacturing regions, to unite against the South and New England, or the planting and commercial States, there was now already formed an almost solid North against a more solid South. No possible al­

ignment could have been more dangerous to Southern domination. Nothing could have been more dispiriting to a Southerner nurtur­
ing Presidential aspirations. Clay was a Southern Unionist. No­
thing augured more of ill to such an one than the defection of Pennsylvania from the South. Clay, while depicting the probable consequences, should the proposed restriction be adopted, made a fervent appeal to Pennsylvania, "the unambitious Pennsylvania— the keystone of the Federal arch", whether she would concur in a measure calculated to disturb the Union. He was indeed alarmed and even predicted that within three years the Union would be divided into three distinct Confederacies. The venerable Sage of Monticello, who regarded the Missouri question as the "most pot­tentious one which ever yet threatened the Union", said that all depended upon the action of Pennsylvania. He contended that while Virginia and Pennsylvania would hold together the Atlantic States

could never separate.

5. Niles's Register, XVIII., 47.
The discussion seemed to indicate that new political divisions would be formed. On February 20th, 1820, during the heat of the conflict Adams wrote in his Diary that the discussion of the Talmadge amendment "disclosed a secret: it revealed the basis for a new organization of parties. Clay had been two years laboring, first upon South American patriotism and then upon the Spanish War, first in defiance of Crawford and then as a sualtem to him, to get up a new party. In both instances he had failed. But there was a new party ready formed, but of no pleasing aspect to either Clay or Crawford, terrible to the whole Union but portentiously terrible to the South—threatening in its progress the emancipation of all the slaves, threatening in its immediate effect the Southern domination which had swayed the Union for the last twenty years, and threatening that political ascendency of Virginia upon which both Clay and Crawford had fastened their principal hopes of personal aggrandizement. A little over a year later he wrote that the Missouri question "disconcerted Clay's projects by presenting party combinations and divisions very unsuitable to them. It looked to dissolution of the Union upon principles which could not serve his purpose. An analysis of the vote in the House shows that there was a distinct line of demarcation between the States north of the Mason and Dixon line and the Ohio River and the States to the South. But there had been and was now being made a desperate effort to secure a

2. Ibid., 52-3.
sufficient number of Northern votes to admit Missouri without restriction. This of course disgusted King and his faithful band. He expressed his disgust at the efforts made to divide the Representatives of the free States. He said that Pennsylvania was "assailed, coaxed, flattered and menaced, in order to detach her from her union with the free States."1

On the same day that the Senate had struck out the restrictive amendment and added the Thomas amendment instead (March 2nd, 1820) a Senate message was sent to the House. But it was there laid on the table in order to give Mr. Holmes of Massachusetts an opportunity to give a report from the conference committee which had been appointed to adjust the differences between the House and Senate if possible. The report recommended that the Senate recede from its amendments, and that both branches of the Legislature agree to strike out the restrictive amendment and add in substance the Thomas amendment? Now this was precisely what the Senate had just done. The House, however, gave in and agreed to concur in striking out the restriction by a vote of 90 to 87; and agreed to add in lieu thereof a clause inhibiting slavery north of 36 degrees 30 minutes, by a vote of 134 to 42. Thus the so-called Thomas Compromise was passed by the two houses. It is plainly evident that the Northern phalanx surrendered to the Southern. The deserters from the North turned the tide in favor of the South. The weakening of the North was due to several considerations; partly to

1. King, Life and Correspondence, VI., 278.
3. Ibid., 1586-7.
4. Ibid., 1587-8.
Constitutional arguments, partly to a knowledge of the fact that only thus could Maine secure admission, partly to a fear of disunion, and partly to an increasing fear on the part of the Democratic politicians of the North who saw the unity of the Democratic party menaced. This last consideration seems to have been the most important. Jefferson time after time reiterated his belief that the idea of the Federal party being dead was fallacious and that the Missouri struggle was largely an effort on the part of the Federalists through the guise of a moral issue to regenerate their party in the hope of controlling the Presidency in 1824. They had a very respectable minority in several of the Northern States and in a few a majority. Such a belief as Jefferson's was only natural. Certain extremists of the North were not unwilling to accept the alternative of disunion if they could not carry their point. It was evident to all that the North could elect a President if only they would hold together. But many Northern politicians saw their own depositions by such a party staring them in the face. In Pennsylvania an "anti-slavery" ticket was gotten up for electors of President and Vice-president and this was supported by a good many people in Philadelphia. Colonel Benton says that when he appeared in Washington in November he found many of the Northern Democrats entertaining fears over the possibility of such a party and so they were extremely anxious to settle the Missouri question for good.

2. King, Life and Correspondence, VI., 374,386,387,387.
3. Niles's Register, XIX., 134,190-1.
surrender to the South was made. King, too, was not so uncom-
promising as he had been. In the latter part of November Adams
wrote in his Diary: "Upon the Missouri question he (King) has
much cooled down since last winter. The question is not now the
same as it was then, and is much more clear against Missouri. But
he has discovered that the people of the North, like many of their
Representatives in Congress, flinch from the consequences of this
question, and will not bear their leaders out. Personal and am-
bisious motives have also been imputed to Mr. King for the part
he has taken in the affair."

The great battle over Missouri had been fought. But a
third and final struggle was pending. The Missouri Convention met
in June 1830 and framed a State Constitution. The Constitution
contained among other things two obnoxious provisions. One for-
bade the Legislature to interfere with slavery, and the other re-
quired the Legislature to so frame laws as to prevent free col-
ored persons from settling in the State. Congress convened at the
close of the recess on November 13th. Clay had sent in his res-
ignation as Speaker, and so it devolved upon the House to elect a
new one. On the 22d ballot, John W. Taylor, the slavery candidate,
was elected over Lowndes, the compromise candidate. In the Senate
a report was accepted and a resolution was adopted in favor of ad-
mission with Eaton's proviso as a rider which disclaimed any as-

2. Niles's Register, XVIII., 400, 448.
3. Ibid., XIX., 50-7.
5. Ibid., 438.
vended the constitutional rights of citizens of each State. The next day in the House Lowndes's report in favor of admission was rejected 79 to 93. The Senate resolution was laid aside by the House for about a month, and was then referred to a committee of the Whole. Eustis of Massachusetts had submitted a resolution declaring for admission after the obnoxious clause should be expunged, and this was also referred. It was later defeated by a large majority. Clay had now appeared on the scene and on his motion the Senate resolution, with Eaton's proviso came up for discussion. But no agreement could be reached. On the main issue there was clearly an even division. There were those on the one side from both North and South who favored a compromise and so either desired the mollification or rejection of the clause in dispute; on the other side were the radical anti-slavery men led by Sergeant who would have kept Missouri out, and the radical Southerners, led by Randolph who wanted to submit to no compromise at all. Sergeant attempted to have the issue postponed until the following session. But Clay, desirous of a final settlement, moved that the Senate resolution be referred to a committee of thirteen. The motion was agreed to. About a week later the report was made. It showed that the committee were almost unanimous in the belief that the compromise of the former session should not be disturbed, and that the present issue rested on the provisions of the proposed Constitution which

2. Ibid., 670.  
3. Ibid., 864.  
4. Ibid., 944.  
5. Ibid., 37, 982.  
6. Ibid., 1037.  
7. Ibid., 1078-80.  
8. Ibid., 1116.
some believed to be incompatible with the Constitution of the United States. The majority of the committee therefore proposed that Missouri should be admitted on the fundamental condition that this clause should not be construed or any law ever be passed in derogation of the rights of citizens of other States coming into that State. And the Legislature of Missouri should, by a solemn public act, declare the assent of the State to the said fundamental condition, then the President's proclamation when issued would make the admission of the State complete. It was understood that Missouri when admitted should have the rights and powers inherent in the original States. The resolution was disagreed to 80 to 83. It was reconsidered and defeated a second time by a vote of 82 to 88. In each case Randolph and his band voted with the stalwart northerners like Sergeant.

The excitement was intense. Niles's Register said that "it may safely be said that the situation of Congress, and of the United States was never more unpleasant than now. An excitement prevails such as has never been witnessed in the house of Representatives." An inciting cause for increased excitement was the question whether or not the vote of Missouri should be considered in the electoral count. Clay, from a joint committee, reported that should objection be made to counting such votes and they would not essentially affect the result of the election, that then a hypothetical announcement of the vote should follow the electoral count.

2. Ibid., 1146.
3. Niles's Register, XIX., 401.
In spite of the vigorous protests from such Southerners as Floyd and Randolph this was the procedure adopted. Since Missouri's vote made no essential difference in the result of the election the crisis was past, though action on a motion of Randolph that such proceeding was irregular and illegal was escaped only by an immediate and confused adjournment. This motion and confusion came immediately after the Senate had withdrawn from the Chamber after the electoral vote had been counted by the President of the Senate in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives.

About a week later, on February 22d, Clay moved for the appointment of a joint committee of Congress. This was the last chance to settle the question at that session. Clay was making a supreme effort to get rid of the "distracting question". His motion prevailed in the House in a short time by a vote of 101 to 55, and the proposal was agreed to in the Senate 39 to 7. The resolution offered by the joint committee was practically the same as the one which the House committee of thirteen had reported. It passed the House on February 26th by a vote of 87 to 81, and the Senate two days later by a vote of 28 to 14. King and other uncompromising Northerners in both branches of the legislature were opposed to the arrangement. But practically all of the Southerners favored it except Macon in the Senate, and Randolph and a few others like him in the House who insisted on admission without any compromise. Most of the Southern men saw very clearly that opposition was mere opposition to form and not

2. Ibid., 1219-20.
3. Idem.
4. Ibid., 382.
5. Ibid., 1239-40.
6. Ibid., 390.
to substance, for at the previous session the real and vital points had been settled. The Clay compromise so far as placing any restriction on Missouri was concerned amounted to absolutely nothing. She merely had to formally promise to what all the States knew they themselves knew they had to do in order to abide by the Federal Constitution? The great conflict for the present was over, but it had shown very clearly the distinctive character of the inhabitants of the great divisions of the Union, and men having the foresight of Jefferson saw that the issue between the sections was only postponed. The difference was thenceforth to appear in the decision of questions of national policy such as the tariff, internal improvements, and the bank. But the lines of demarcation were not to be so hard and fast as to preclude the formation of political parties drawing support from all sections of the country, though the motives impelling Northerners and Southerners to be in the same party were to be oftentimes far different. While the divisions caused by the Missouri controversy were not of pleasing aspect to Clay, yet by posing as a compromiser between the sections he had really gained in strength. Adams, in writing of the conflict of three sessions, said: "The greatest results of this conflict of three sessions have been to make John W. Taylor Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to bring into full display the talents and resources of influence of Mr. Clay."¹

¹ Adams, Memoirs, V., 507.
CHAPTER IV.

THE RISE OF PERSONAL PARTIES. 1816-1824.

The campaign for the presidency in 1824 may be said to have begun in 1816.\textsuperscript{1} Crawford as a representative of the younger generation of Republicans, had, in the caucus of that year, secured 54 votes to Monroe 65.\textsuperscript{2} But he accepted the Department of War and so became merged with the Administration, and that too in a secondary position not regarded as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Adams secured first place in the cabinet, and so became the heir apparent. It has already been seen how Clay, within the clutches of ambition, took opposition ground and attempted to block every move of the Executive. While he failed in his purpose of raising up a western party he was in fact by his advocacy of internal improvements and the tariff etc., laying the foundation and hewing out the material on which and out of which the Whig Party was to be constructed. His idea of raising up a western party with himself at its head was doomed to defeat because of the rise of Jackson. He was to a large extent the cause of the west coming into its own. But as Professor

\textsuperscript{1} See Adams, Memoirs, V., 89.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Niles's Register, XXI.}, 51.
Turner has well said, if Clay was one of the favorites of the West, Jackson was the West. However Clay was not supplanted in the West until after the election of 1824. Jackson was not seriously considered as a presidential possibility until after Monroe's first Administration. Crawford was all the while shyly working, in fact using his cabinet position for personal aggrandizement. And this he was the more able to do because of his strength in Congress. This was not at all pleasant to Adams. In 1818 he wrote that the country was taking the character of preparation for the presidential election, not in 1820 but in 1824. But Crawford worked on. In 1820 he secured the passage of an act, which was drawn up by himself, limiting the term of district attorneys, collectors, and various inferior officers to four years who before had served during good behavior and acceptable service. The real purpose of the act was to increase his patronage. Calhoun as Secretary of War was increasing his popularity because of his labors in behalf of national policies. He was not so actively engaged in politics as Crawford and Clay, but was honorably discharging the duties of his office.

The political waters were apparently placid in

1. Turner, Rise of the New West, 188.
3. Ibid., VII., 424-5; U.S. Statutes at Large.
1820. To the superficial observer the only ripple of the surface was the Missouri Question. It was indeed a "distracting question" but its political significance was not seen only by men of foresight. Monroe was elected practically unanimously. Idealists saw one great all-embracing Republican Party. But where there is only one party in free government the soil is fertile for the growth of personal parties. They were sure to spring up. In essence they were parasites feeding on the old Republican Party. They were the immediate cause of its break-up into curious constituent elements. Their growth was checked during Monroe's first term because it was understood that he was to have two terms. But during the second the violent struggle for existence began. The development of these personal parties during the period from 1820 to 1824 insured the formation of two great parties on the principle of an Administration and an opposition party, though it was long before the definite characteristics political principles were adopted. This as will be seen came largely through chance.

Monroe's career was considered as closed. Clay said that there was not a man in the United States who would possess less personal influence over Congress than the President, despite the fact that his election had been nearly unanimous. Organization began in earnest

1. Adams, Memoirs, V., 324
in the very first session under Monroe's second Administration. This Congress met on December 3d, 1821, and on the twelfth ballot Philip Barbour was chosen Speaker of the House by a bare majority. The election of Barbour was really a Crawford victory. Barbour soon showed his partisan temper in his appointment of the House committees. He passed over both Taylor and Rodney, two of his competitors for the Speakership, and gave the important places to Crawford men. It is hardly necessary to take up the work of this session in detail. A few remarks as to its nature and purposes will suffice. It was one of the most ineffective legislative bodies in the nation's history. Clay was replenishing his depleted exchequer in the practice at the bar in Kentucky. His effective leadership was missed. Congress degenerated from a dignified deliberative assembly into a mere arena for personal party conflicts. Crawford's party ruled through this stormy session. It was little else than a struggle between Crawford and Calhoun. Calhoun was very bitter because of the proceedings in both Houses of Congress and especially against the Speaker, who, he thought,

2. Ibid., 518-9.
was in coalition with the Crawford and Clay parties and purposely appointed unfriendly committees. It was at this time that Calhoun and Crawford became such inveterate enemies. This intense hatred manifested itself in various cabinet discussions. Calhoun said that there had never been a man in the history of the country who had risen so high of so corrupt a character and so slender a basis of service.

Hezekiah Niles made a trip to Washington in January, 1822, and in describing the conditions of affairs said: "On arriving at Washington---- I was astonished to find such a buzz about the person who should succeed Mr. Monroe, as President of the United States, especially when it occurred to my recollection, that he delivered his inaugural address only in March last- and it seemed really to be feared that the whole legislation of this country, for the entire term of the present Congress, at least, would hinge upon the question, how it might effect the election of a favorite candidate.

Outside of Congress partisan influences were at work. The first candidate to formally nominated was William Lowndes of South Carolina. He was nominated

2. Ibid., 497-8
3. Niles Register, XXI., 321.
by a legislative caucus, which many of Calhoun's partisans refused to attend, on December 18th, 1821, by the close vote of 57 to 53. As soon as the news of this action reached Washington the friends of Calhoun secured his consent to avow his candidacy.\footnote{Turner, Rise of the New West, 195.} A few members of Congress with an Irishman named Rogers, who edited a paper in eastern Pennsylvania, set Calhoun up as a candidate. From that time caballing began in earnest. It seemed that a legislative caucus would nominate Calhoun formally, but this was prevented by the friends of Crawford and Clay rising up against him.\footnote{Adams, Memoirs, VI., 42-3.} Crawford's party carried on violent offensive warfare against Calhoun. Various investigations were ordered to be made in the War Department in order, if possible, to bring to light some mismanagement. Other candidates were not asleep during this period. Various newspapers were kept busy putting forth the pretensions of some favorite candidate. By April 1822 it was estimated that some sixteen or seventeen candidates had entered or been entered in the lists for the great presidential race of 1824.\footnote{Mile's Register, XXI., 124-5.} But the main fight was between Crawford and Calhoun. The Richmond Enquirer was the mainspring
of Crawford's election in Virginia and indeed throughout the Union. ¹ The organization of Crawford newspapers throughout the whole country was very extensive. He had supporting him the "National Intelligencer," "The National Advocate," the "Boston Statesman," the "Portland Argus," the "Democratic Press," the "Washington City Gazette." The watchwords of Crawford recruiting service were Democracy, Economy, and Reform; Democracy was used against Adams, Economy against Calhoun, and Reform against both. ² The presses of each of the two kept an incessant warfare.

Crawford had other troubles. He had from the first pursued a course which, to say the least, was hardly one of candor, considering the fact that he was part of the Administration. Monroe realized this but he preferred to pursue a course which would not cause open rupture. But Crawford had become so bold that by the spring of 1822 reports were common that Crawford's resignation would be demanded. ³ And during the summer an open breach took place. Monroe in a letter to Crawford made it known that it was the duty of the cabinet officer to give a determined policy of the Executive cooperation and support. Crawford in reply denied that he had personally opposed administration policies. ⁴ But no better relations

¹ Adams, Memoirs, VI., 50.
² Ibid., 56
³ Adams, Memoirs, VI., 56, 61-3
⁴ See Gallatin, Writings, II., 241.
obtained. And during the winter of 1824-5 they had a quarrel after which they never met again. It became therefore necessary to have someone act as a medium of communication between the Treasury Department and the President thereafter.\(^1\) Monroe thought that Crawford should have separated himself from those who were making such violent attacks upon him by some public act.\(^2\) But this Crawford would not do.

In the midst of the cabinet dissention another gladiator entered the arena. The name of General Jackson was submitted to the people of the United States for the Presidency by the general assembly of Tennessee on July, 20th, 1822.\(^3\) And a little later another one was formally entered. The general assembly of Kentucky on November 18th, 1822 formally nominated Clay.\(^4\) The following year similar action was taken by the legislature of Illinois and Ohio in January and of Louisiana in March.\(^5\) In the fall elections of 1822 in Kentucky the candidates opposed to the administration were everywhere elected, Clay being one of them.\(^6\)

The second session of the seventh Congress did little worthy of a Congress of the United States. Politics dominated as it had done in the first session. Some

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1. Turner, Rise of the New West, 197
2. Adams, Memoirs, VII., 80-1
3. Monroe, writings, VII., 82; Adams, Memoirs, VI., 485-6
4. Niles Register, XXII., 402.
5. Ibid., XXIII., 245.
6. Ibid., 305; XXIV., 82.
attention was given to the subjects of tariff and internal improvements. Such will be discussed later.

The first session of the eighteenth Congress met on December 1st., 1823. It was far ahead of the Congress before it. Clay was presented and was elected Speaker over Barbour, the only who had the temerity to offer himself, without an effort. Clay was now somewhat in tune with the Executive than he had been before. The South American Republics had now been recognized, the Florida treaty settled, and the Monroe Doctrine enunciated. In fact the old dissensions regarding foreign policies had disappeared and Clay now took the lead in urging domestic reforms, internal improvements under national auspices and tariff for the protection of manufactures. But before entering into a discussion of the work of this session it will be well to make a brief survey of the tariff situation from 1816 to 1824. The vote on the various provisions of the bill of 1816 had shown that the south in general was opposed to protection, and this to a certain degree was true of New England, while the Middle States—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio favored protection. "The vote on the tariff bill of 1818 revealed much the same division. It passed the House by a vote of 80 to 69.  

3. Nile's Register, XXIII., 341.
New England gave 19 votes for and 14 against; the four Middle States—New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania—gave 55 for and 1 against; the Northwest including Kentucky, 13 for to 3 against; the South 4 for and 50 against. The motive of protection was back of the bill and opposition to protection was the motive which lead the South in general to oppose the bill.¹ After 1818 the movement in favor of a more general and thorough protective tariff set in, and at the same time popular agitation in opposition to an increase began.²

In December 1819 a new House of Representatives, strongly protective, assembled. Separate committees on Commerce and Manufactures were created and Clay made up the Committee of Manufactures exclusively from friends of protection.³ The protective bill came before the committee of the Whole for discussion on April 21st, after the protentious Missouri question had taken up most of the time of the session. It came to a vote on the 28th, and was then ordered to a third reading by a vote of 90 to 69. It passed finally by a vote of 91 to 78.⁴ The expression shown by the different sections in the vote is nearly the same as in 1816. The Senate rejected the bill May 4th, by a vote of 22 to 21.

¹Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, I., 176.
²Ibid., 178.
³Ibid., 180.
The vote shows that the geographical position was almost identical with that of the House. New England gave 6 for and 4 against; the Middle States 8 for and none against; the South 3 for and 16 against; the West 4 for and 2 against.\(^1\) The constitutional objection to the protection of manufactures was made for the first time, but only by one speaker and then only to a slight degree.\(^2\)

The protectionist sentiment during the session of 1821-22 was weak. Clay was absent. Barbour was elected Speaker, and as he was opposed to protection he constituted the Committee on Manufactures with a majority against tariff legislation.\(^3\) Nothing of importance was done. At the following session Tod of Pennsylvania became chairman of the Committee just mentioned. He, on January 9, 1822, reported a bill "for the more effectual encouragement and protection of certain domestic manufactures".\(^4\) He succeeded in getting the bill considered for several days late in the session in the Committee of the Whole. He was unable to bring it to a vote in the House. But it is of some importance in showing the increased opposition on the ground of constitutionality.

Constitutional objections were made to the bill several times. Adherents to the bill said such objections were made for the first time.\(^5\) This was largely true, for it was the first time.

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2. Ibid., 190
3. Ibid., 197.
that much objections had been made to any considerable extent. 1 Niles said of this debate; "Since the Missouri question, no matter had been so warmly debated as the principle of this bill." 2

At the session of 1823-4 Tod was again Chairman of the Committee on the Manufactures. On January 9th, 1824 he reported a protective bill. A sharp debate which lasted for six weeks began on February 10th. 3 Clay led the protectionist forces and it may be said that the whole object in the mind of the friends of the bill was to secure protection for the manufactures. 4 Clay based his argument on the general distress of the country, which he attributed to the loss of foreign markets for agricultural products. He would have this remedied by building up a home market by means of fostering manufactures. He called such protection the "American System." 5 Webster on the other side was perhaps the strongest. He represented commercial New England, as yet in favor of free trade. He made a classical expression of the argument for free trade, ridiculed Clay's discovery of an "American System", and denied the existence of general depression. 6 The planting and commercial States made a formidable opposition to the

2. Niles's Register, XXIII., 369.
6. Ibid., 712-718.
bill. The constitutional objection was again urged against the bill, notably by Barbour of Virginia and Hamilton of South Carolina. This shows the constantly growing constitutional reaction that was taking place in the South and which to the great extent was to determine the line of cleavage respecting the more specific issue of the bank, internal improvements and the tariff.

The bill passed the House on April 6th, by the close vote of 105 to 102. An analysis of the vote shows that New England was yet divided, giving 15 votes for and 23 against the system of protection provided for by the bill; that the Middle States were stronger for, giving 57 for and 9 against; that the South was strongly against protection giving only 4 for the bill to 56 against; that the Northwest including Kentucky was strongly for the system, giving 29 for the bill and 56 against; that the Southwest was of the same opinion that the South proper, giving only two for the bill and 14 against. In general the vote shows the process of a northern section in Union with the Ohio Valley forming against the South. There was a loss of support in the Eastern States.

Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire in 1818 gave gave 8 out to 21 for the tariff, but in 1820 gave only three out of 25. New York had given none against the

tariff bill of 1818 but now gave 8 out of 34 against. The South gave 3 votes for on each occasion, excluding Maryland. The West had saved the bill of 1824, by supporting it unanimously.¹

Of no less importance were the proceedings regarding internal improvements. A brief survey will be of value. The national road by 1818 had been constructed from Cumberland to Wheeling. In 1822 a bill was passed authorizing the President to cause toll houses, gates, and turnpikes to be erected on the road, and to appoint toll gath¬ers having power to enforce the collection of tolls to be used preservation of the road. The bill passed the House by a vote of 87 to 68,² the Senate by a vote of 29 to 7.³ The West was almost a unit for the bill. Monroe vetoed the measure on the ground that it implied the power to execute a complete system of internal improvement with the right of jurisdiction and sovereignty. Congress, he said, does not possess the power.⁴ This with this veto he sent an elaborate disquisition, being the expression of his explicit views on Internal Improvements.⁵ He denied that the general government had the right of jurisdiction and sovereignty, but as asserted that Congress might appropriate money

¹ Nile's Register, 26, 113-4.
² Annals of Congress, 39, 444.
³ Ibid., 38, 1734.
⁴ Ibid., 39, 1803-5.
⁵ Ibid., 1809-63.
for internal improvements. The bill was reconsidered, but was rejected by a vote of 68 to 82.\textsuperscript{1} Two-thirds would have been necessary to secure its passage. Congress at the following session in accordance with the President's views passed and act appropriating $25,000 for the repair of the Cumberland Road and this approved by the President on February 28th, 1823.\textsuperscript{2} The Bill had passed the Senate by a vote of 26 to 9,\textsuperscript{3} had been ordered to a third reading in the House by a vote of 89 to 66,\textsuperscript{4} and had passed the House by a vote of 75 to 45.\textsuperscript{5} Three days after the President had signed the bill he signed another providing for the improvement of harbors.\textsuperscript{6}

In January 1824 the House began to consider a bill authorizing the President to cause the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates of the routes of such roads and canals as he might deem of national importance in a commercial or military way, or necessary for the transportation of public mail. Clay did his best to commit Congress to the exercise of the power of the construction of interstate roads and canals, which if built at all must be by the nation. He enumerated what had been done by the Atlantic States. But, he said, "Not one stone has yet been broken, not one..."
of earth removed, in any western state." He pleaded for internal improvements for the West, "that highly embarrassed and highly distressed portion of the country." Clay voiced the sentiments of a united west. The South was divided. Randolph opposed the measure with his characteristic recklessness. He declared "that should this bill pass, one more measure only requires to be consummated; and then we, who belong to that unfortunate portion of this confederacy which is south of Mason and Dixie's line, and east of the Alleghany mountains, have to make up our minds to perish like so many mice in a receiver of methyllic gas." McDuffie, of South Carolina on the other hand supported the bill, speaking earnestly in support of a liberal construction of the constitution. The bill passed the House by a vote of 115 to 86. New England gave 12 votes in favor of the measure and 26 against; the Middle States 37 to 36 against; the South 23 for to 34 against; the West 43 for to none against. The opposition was chiefly centered in New England, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolinas. Pennsylvania and the Potomac valley acted with the solid west, including the southwestern slave states in support of the measure. The bill passed

the Senate on April 24th by a vote of 24 to 18. The section supported was about the same, except that New England was almost solidly against the measure. On the 30th the bill was signed by the President. Internal improvements had by this time become so popular that Monroe, it seemed, was yielding and beginning to follow the line of least resistance. The vote as given does not show the real sentiment in favor of such improvement. New York, for instance, was opposed to certain measures proposed in Congress merely because she feared that such might injure the improvements she was carrying on through State action. The object of the survey bill was considered to have for its object the laying of a solid foundation for the improvements of the country by the aid and direct action of the general government. The fact that the President gave his assent to such a measure would seem that he was yielding to the popular clamor. Adams a few years later wrote that the combination by means of Calhoun and Lowndes for internal improvements became so strong that "it overpowered the resistance of Mr. Monroe and produced the act of Congress of April, 1824." The

While Congress was doing all of this work is

1. Annals of Congress, 41, 570-1
2. Ibid. 3217.
is not comparable with the one before it, nevertheless along with the working out of great national policies went clandestine plotting. Clay, Crawford, Calhoun, Jackson, and Adams were all in Washington. It was at this time that the caucus issue culminated and the death blow was dealt to "King Caucus". At a meeting of the Republicans members of both branches of the legislature of New York held in Albany on April 22nd, 1823, it had been resolved that "the republican members of Congress" should elect a candidate for presidency, "a sound democratic republican in principle and practice."¹ The caucus at once became a great issue and was vigorously debated through the press.² Crawford's forces dominated Congress to a large extent, although they constituted only a plurality, and hence they were strongly for a caucus. Opponents of the caucus contended vehemently that if a caucus were held that it would not be for party political purposes as formerly, but for some particular person.³ Although Crawford was prostrated by a stroke of paralysis in September 1823 he was nevertheless the strongest candidate so far as support in Congress was concerned. So the other candidates united to defeat the caucus. But the Georgian's supporters, knowing that the only thing that could bring a victory

¹. Niles Register, XXIV., 135-6; XXV., 17.
². Ibid., XIV., 404.
³. Ibid., XXV., 2.
to him was strict party unity, held a caucus on February 14th, 1824. Only 66 of the 216 Republicans attended. That these were practically all Crawford men is shown by the fact that he was nominated by this caucus with only four dissenting votes.¹

The campaign went on through the year constantly increasing in excitement. The issues were not definitely drawn though it is not correct to say that there were no issues. On March 8th, 1824, a meeting of the members of the legislature of Virginia favorably to Clay was held and an address issued to the people of Virginia.² It stated that while a large majority of the members of the legislature favored Crawford, they favored Clay. "Two measures only," it stated, "of all his political life, have ever been objected to in Virginia,—his support of the bill for internal improvement, and that for the increase of tariff." But it was declared that his competitors were subject to the same objections. Clay realized that his advocacy of these two measures had injured him in Virginia, but he thought such discrimination was unjust when other candidates had supported the same doctrines.³ In May 1824 he said that if his efforts in behalf of the tariff had injured him in Virginia they had benefited him in other quarters.⁴ His platform was

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1. Ibid., XXV., 388-392.
2. Ibid., XXVI., 42-3.
4. Ibid., IV., 90.
tersely stated in the words of a toast given at a public dinner in Lexington Kentucky on June 17th, 1824. "Henry Clay—Our friend and guest; agriculture, domestic manufactures, internal improvements, and struggling claim him their foremost champion.″ Clay later saw that he had been deluded in his hope that his support of the tariff would win him support in quarters where such was naturally more popular than in Virginia. And in September he wrote: "It is a little remarkable that my support of the tariff has excited against me in the South, a degree of opposition which is by no means counterbalanced by any espousal of my cause in Pennsylvania and other quarters where the tariff was so much desired."

This was because Jackson became the favorite in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. It seemed to the people that Jackson was a mere passive observer of the movement for making him President. Ever since his return from Florida Territory, where he had been governor, the popular current had been running toward him. His managers were hard at work. They secured the use of the Columbia Observer of Philadelphia which was edited by Stephen Simpson. Crawford was thought to be Jackson's most formidable rival. So Major John H. Eaton, Jackson's colleague in the Senate, and William B. Lewis of Nashville, his most confidential friends, directed a

1. Nile's Register, XXVI., 326
2. Ibid., XXVII., 61-2.
great fight for Jackson, "the people's candidate", and against
Crawford whom they represented as "the Giant of Intrigue".
Calhoun's friends were conciliated. Of course the idea
was to get Calhoun to withdraw from the presidential race
and become the Jackson candidate for the Vice-Presidency. Now
Calhoun had been very popular in Pennsylvania precisely because
of his advocacy of a protective tariff and internal improvements.
At Carlisle a resolution was offered expressing preference for
Calhoun for President. But this was amended by striking out
the name of Calhoun and substituting that of Jackson, and in
the amended form the motion carried by acclamation. A short
time after this meeting, on February 18th, 1824, at a large
Democratic meeting held in Philadelphia for the purpose of
selecting delegates to the State Convention to be held in
March, George M. Dallas, "the well known friend of Mr. Calhoun,
rose and said that in deference to [inserted text] what seemed
to be the preference of the people of Pennsylvania he with­
drew the name of John C. Calhoun as a candidate for the Presi­
dency, and [inserted text] proposed the name of Andrew Jackson for
President and Mr. Calhoun for Vice-President, and that
these nominations be recommended to the State Convention". The
proposition carried without opposition, and the State Convention
carried out the program, though there was some opposition to
Calhoun.\[1\]

1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 56.
2. Ibid., 41-3; Adams, Memoirs, VI., 250.
The "Radicals" as the Crawford men were called, were incensed. They called a Convention which met at Harrisburg on the 9th day of August, 1834, repudiated the nomination of Jackson, and resolved to adhere to "the true Democratic candidate, Mr. Crawford". Gallatin had been nominated on the Crawford ticket. It was thus hoped that Pennsylvania, Gallatin's State, would support Crawford. But Gallatin found Pennsylvania "Jackson mad". He accordingly withdrew from the race because, as he wrote to Van Buren, Crawford's manager, his name "was injurious to the Republican electoral ticket in some quarters, and that my withdrawal would facilitate a plan which you (Van Buren) had in view of substituting another candidate". This other candidate to which he referred was none other than Clay. Van Buren, the "Little Magician", was using his wand in an effort to defeat the "people's man". To do this he was trying to get Clay to become the Crawford candidate for the Vice-Presidency. The desires of the Crawford forces were conveyed to Clay in September 1834. But Clay firmly declined the preferred invitation. He refused to withdraw from the race for first place in order to become second on the Crawford ticket. Clay knew very well that such was merely a bid for Western support. He had written in February of that eventful year that Crawford's friends would make an effort to keep him out of the House in the hope that his Western friends would take Crawford if they could not get him. But Clay said:

1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 41-3; Adams, Memoirs, VI., 250.
2. Gallatin, Writings, II., 297-8.
"They will vote for no man residing in a slave State but me, and they vote for me because of other and chiefly local considerations, outweighing the slave objections".¹

Clay's platform, it has been seen, was definite. Jackson's military renown counted for much, though as yet he did not have the vast number of blind followers that he had a few years afterwards. His views on the important question of the tariff were made public in a letter to Dr. S.H. Coleman of North Carolina.² This letter had an important influence on the election. It was dated Washington, April 26th, 1824, Jackson being in the Senate at the time. He declared himself in favor of a judicious tariff, an "adequate and fair" protective tariff. Jackson was supposed to be in favor of internal improvements. He had voted for such measures on various occasions in Congress. Where the tariff and internal improvements were popular it was an easy matter to show that Jackson was a supporter of them as well as Clay. But in sections where such were unpopular it was also an easy matter to keep silent regarding them, or to interpret a "judicious tariff" as meaning a tariff far less protective than the act of 1824. Jackson also gained greatly through the publication of the "Monroe letters". These were letters that Jackson had sent to Monroe several years before and Monroe's answers thereto. They were published and did much to win Federal votes, for in them Jackson had advised Monroe to appoint Federalist to office and to exterminate that "monster" called party spirit.³

2. Miles's Register, XXVI., 245; Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 62-3
3. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 64-5.
Crawford had supported measures of a national character, but he did not make his views known publicly at this time. He was relying upon superior organization and the support of the South. He more nearly represented the Constitutional views of the South than any of the other candidates. He was the choice of Jefferson.¹

The man who was to be the successful rival was all this time taking but little part in the active fight. He was, as he said, "attached to no party".² But New England had come to think that he was the best candidate. In January 1823 at a meeting of "most of the members" of the legislature of Maine it was declared that the State was not for Crawford as had been intimated and that none were better qualified for the Presidency than J.Q. Adams; but it was thought to be inexpedient to nominate a man so early in the campaign.³ During the same month the legislature of Massachusetts resolved that Adams was especially fitted for the Presidency. Rufus King, the old Federal leader, after a long period of thought decided to give his support to Adams.⁵ Adams was formally nominated by the several New England legislatures early in 1824.⁶ After it seemed that Crawford was no longer a formidable rival the Jackson managers made an effort to win his friends and directed their batteries against Adams. Lewis wrote to Simpson: "Crawford's friends cannot believe that he stands any chance of success. I have no doubt they feel pretty sore. Oil ought to  

³. Miles's Register, YXIII., 322.  
⁴. Ibid., 342-3.  
⁵. King, Life and Correspondence, VI., 501.
be poured into their wounds by the friends of Jackson. With the States that support him we may bid defiance to the Yankee nation," in other words to Adams.

1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 60.
CHAPTER V. THE BIRTH OF THE NEW PARTY. 1825.

Congress assembled on December 6th, 1824. The popular election had taken place and it was known that there would be no choice in the Electoral College. It was known furthermore that Clay would not be returned to the House and that the disagreeable distinction of choosing from his rivals would devolve upon him.

Clay for a long time had/his mind made up to vote for Adams in case he should be the lowest of the four contestants. On January 24th, 1825, Clay and a majority of the Ohio and Kentucky delegations openly avowed their determination to vote for Adams. Adams said that "this immediately produced an approximation of the Calhoun, Crawford, and Jackson partisans, and will effectually knit the coalition of the South with Pennsylvania." On January 28th there appeared in the "Columbia Observer" of Philadelphia the famous Kremer card asserting that overtures had been made by the friends of Adams to the friends of Clay, offering him the appointment of Secretary of State in return for his aid in electing Adams. On February 3d Clay rose from his place in the House and an article said that there had appeared/that morning in the "National Intelligencer" under the name, and he presumed the authority, of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Kremer) containing serious implications the truth of which the author avowed himself ready to substantiate. Clay expressed his anxious Hope that an investigation would be made into the truth of the charges by the House in order that if guilty, punishment might be applied, and if innocent that then his conduct and character might be vindicated.

1. Niles's Register, XXXII, 375-6; Benton, Thirty Years View.
debate ensued as to whether Clay's address should be entered in the Journal. It was finally decided that it should. The proposition of Mr. Forsyth that the whole matter should be referred to a committee was postponed. 1

Clay's opponents for the most part took ground against the investigation, while his friends favored it. Opponents said that the charge, as stated, was little else than a vague rumor, and did not charge upon the Speaker any act directly criminal. But they knew very well that if the charge were not proved untrue that it would be a most effective campaign weapon to use against Adams and Clay. They contended further that no charge was made against any portion of the House, that the House was called upon to punish a libel alleged to have been uttered against a member of the House, and to "prepare the law, judge the facts, and inflict the punishment, by the same act!" They opposed such investigation further on the ground that during the heat of a Presidential campaign was no time to make such an investigation, and that such investigation if made could lead to "no constitutional act" on the part of the House. But as was pointed out in the debate the opponents of Clay were against such an investigation because they knew that no such corruption existed. An investigation would vindicate Clay probably and so deprive them of valuable campaign material, the "corrupt bargain" cry. Friends of Clay said that the charge was direct and urged an investigation that the guilty might be punished and the innocent.

1. Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., 440-4.
be acquitted. In the end the House voted to refer the communication made by the Speaker to a select committee by a vote of 135 to 69. The vote shows very clearly that the line was beginning to be drawn between those who had formerly belonged to one party. And it was the separation of the friends of Adams and Clay from those of Jackson and those who were to become a part of his party: "It was the beginning of new parties, not yet fully developed, but to become as inveterately hostile to each other, in time, as the old Federal and Republican parties ever were."

Unfortunately the committee was not very friendly to Clay and nothing was settled. The whole matter was left open, in fact in such a shape that whether true or not the "corrupt bargain" cry was destined to operate as a powerful force in cementing the Adams and Clay men together, and as a most effective slogan to be used by their heterogenous adversaries.

On February 9th, 1825 it was announced by Galliard, President of the Senate, that no person had received a majority of the electoral votes cast for President, and that the three who had received the highest vote were Jackson, Adams and Crawford. On that day the election by the House in the presence of the Senate, took place. Even with Clay's support it was not certainly known that Adams would be elected. It was not known how New York would vote; some of her Representatives being in favor of Adams, some in favor of Crawford, and others in favor of Jackson. Louisiana was also divided.

2. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 74.
Massachusetts, Vermont and Connecticut were called and each cast their vote for Adams. Finally New York was called. All eyes were centered upon her. To the surprise of nearly all she cast her vote for Adams. His election was now assured for it was known that Louisiana would follow and thus effect the election. The reason for this unexpected result is explained by a political plot. The clever Van Buren had got many Crawford men of various States to agree to unite with the Crawford men of New York and vote for Adams on the second ballot. This it was known would elect Adams by a large majority. The result it was thought would be attributed to Van Buren and Crawford and consequently they could come in and claim favors of the new Administration. But this little plot was discovered and made known to General Stephen Van Rensselaer, of Albany, and Parmenio Adams, of Batavia, both politically antagonistic to Van Buren. So these two gentlemen voted for Adams on the first ballot and elected him.

If this account as related by Nathan Sargent is true, and he has given valuable corroborative proof of its authenticity, if Adams had failed to be elected on first ballot and had been elected on second ballot through the efforts of the cunning Van Buren, one can scarcely conjecture what would have been the result on later history. The Crawford-Van Buren party, instead of being hostile to the Adams Administration from the start, would, in a way, have been friendly to it. Jackson might have been deprived of the efficient manager of his later campaigns. It is not at all

2. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 76-8.
   Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., 527.
probable, however, that he would have remained on friendly terms with the Administration for a very long period, for Adams was not disposed to reward his friends by the conferment of political offices.

Mention ought to be made of another similar action that probably would have had a more profound influence than this had it happened. Clay had been kept out of the House it might be said by mere chance. Had Clay been returned to the House instead of Crawford, or had only Adams and Jackson been returned, which would have been the case had all those instructed for Clay voted for him, it is probable that the development of parties would have been quite different than what it was.

At all events such was not so. Adams was elected by the aid of Clay. And as had been said would be the case Clay was chosen Secretary of State. And thus was proved in the minds of those who could not or would not discriminate between that which merely follows and that which is really/resultant or effect of a cause, the truth of a corrupt bargain. Thus were the Clay and Adams factions united. Thus it may be said a new party was formed, soon to be called the Clay and Adams or Administration party, then the National Republicans, and finally the Whig Party.

CHAPTER VI.
ORGANIZATION AS A DEFENSIVE PARTY. 1825-1829.

The new party was not consciously brought into being. Adams was wholly unconscious of its birth. But the fact that it had no conscious existence as an organization in 1825 does not show that it was not a reality. The fierce invective heaped upon Adams and Clay and their supporters created a common bond of sympathy. It was only natural that constant attacks should make them feel that they were really a party, although as late as 1828 both factions were claiming to belong to the Republican party. To adapt themselves to an onslaught of virulent attacks a certain amount of organization developed. They in fact organized as a defensive party.

If the new party was born in 1825, unconscious though the process may have been, even so was the first platform of the new party unconsciously enunciated in Adams's inaugural address and his first message to Congress. Adams said in his inaugural that from the time of our peace with Great Britain in 1815 the old "baneful weed of party strife was uprooted" and that since then there had been no "continued combination of parties! He outlined the course pursued by his predecessor and concluded this survey by saying: "In this brief outline of the promise and performance of my immediate predecessor the line of duty for his successor is clearly delineated. To pursue to their consummation those purposes of improvement in our common condition instituted or recommended by him will embrace the whole.

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 296-9.
sphere of my obligations". He then alluded to the topic of internal improvements and asserted that at the time of the construction of the first national road about twenty years before there had been no doubt as to the authority for its construction. He expressed the hope that all "constitutional objections would be ultimately removed." While Adams here said that he intended to pursue the policy of his predecessor he nevertheless made clear that he favored a far more liberal construction of the Constitution than Monroe. Benton said that his address "furnished a topic against Mr. Adams and went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinious construction of the Constitution. It was the topic of internal improvement by the federal government.——-The declaration of principles which would give so much power to the government and the danger of which had just been so fully set forth by Mr. Monroe in his veto message on the Cumberland road bill, alarmed the old Republicans, and gave a new ground of opposition to Mr. Adams's Administration, in addition to the strong one growing out of the election in the House of Representaties!"¹

Before taking up the message to Congress it is first necessary to notice briefly other events following closely the inauguration. Systematic opposition to the Administration was foreshadowed by the vote in the Senate March 7th, 1835 on Clay's confirmation. Though the nomination was confirmed by the vote ¹. Benton, Thirty Years View., I., 54.
of 27 to 1—nevertheless such a strong negative vote manifested a hostility or at least resentment towards Clay and Adams. The vote foretold the effective reunion of Pennsylvania with the South, for both of her Senators voted with those of the South against the confirmation. Of the eighteen votes from the nine Western States only five, two from Tennessee, Jackson being one, two from Mississippi, and one from Illinois, voted against Clay. In short it may be said that the vote foretold the rise of the triumphant self-conscious democracy which, for so long a time, was to know no definite distinctive principles, except that it had come into its own. The basis of this democracy was to be social, and not to be explained by a sectional economic survey.

Congress convened December 5th, 1825. The Administration candidate for Speaker was elected on the second ballot by the narrow margin of five votes over his opponents. Clay, whose hopes for the Administration had been very sanguine, thought that such did not represent the real attitude towards the Administration, but that Taylor, the Speaker, was opposed for personal reasons. This may have been true to a limited extent. But it soon became evident that such showed very clearly the real feeling towards the Administration. Just at this time Adams gave the opposition ground for attack by sending his message to Congress. Adams in writing his message was bent on taking extreme ground. He even went further than Clay was willing to go, Clay doubting not the power of Congress to do the things recommended but opposing anything that would be unlikely to succeed. In regard to

1. Niles's Register, XXVIII., 17.
4. Ibid., 61-3.
Adams's extreme position on internal improvements William Wirt said he thought that Congress had the power, but he warned Adams that his statements were exceedingly bold and that such an expression would give the opposition party in Virginia a hold and enable them to represent the Administration as "grasping for power."¹ A Senator from South Carolina wanted Adams to say something conciliatory to the South and to calm their inquietude concerning their slaves in order that the friends of the Administration might be sustained in their opposition to the rising Calhoun party.² But Adams modified his plans but little? He stated in his message that the United States had been invited to the Panama Congress. "The invitation," he continued, "has been accepted, and Ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations."³ This proved to be a firebrand which started the real conflagration. He said particular emphasis on the subject of internal improvements. He recommended a University, aid for explorations, and for scientific researches, and the erection of an astronomical observatory.⁴ He said further that if "after full and solemn deliberation upon all or any of the subjects which, urged by an irresistible sense of my own duty, I have recommended to your attention should you come to the conclusion that, however desirable in themselves, their enactment of laws effecting them would transcend the powers committed to you by that venerable instrument which we are all proud to support, let no

¹. Adams, "Memoirs," VII., 64.
². Ibid., 57.
³. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 302.
⁴. Ibid., 306-14.
granted to you by the people."¹ He had again made it clear that his own opinion was that he thought Congress had the power. He had at the same time, it is true, freely granted the right of a different view to Congress. But politeness was to make no difference in the war methods used by the opposition. Benton said that the new ground of opposition regarding the construction of the Constitution which had arisen from the inaugural was "strengthened at the delivery of the first annual message, in which the topic of internal improvements was again largely enforced, other subjects recommended which would require a liberal use of constructive powers, and Congress informed that the President had accepted an invitation from the American States of Spanish origin, to send Ministers to their proposed Congress on the Isthmus of Panama."²

On December 23d, 1825, Jesse B. Thomas, Senator from Illinois, told Adams that he had been asked to join a party of formal opposition to the Administration.³ Very early in the session the work of organizing the opposition party began. There were some who were possessed with fear, but for the most part the opposition was for political reasons. Their end was to put down the Administration irrespective of its merits and to unite on Jackson as their head.⁴ On December 16th, 1825, Hamilton of South Carolina offered a resolution calling for papers concerning the Panama Congress,⁵ and on January 30th, 1826, Metcalfe of Kentucky offered a similar resolution.⁶ On the 31st debate began. It

¹ Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 315.
² Benton, Thirty Years View, I., 54.
³ Adams, Memoirs, VII., 91-2.
⁴ Ibid., 103-4.
⁵ Congressional Debates, II., Part I., 818.
⁶ Ibid., Part II., 1192.
showed very clearly the formation of an opposition. Adams, in speaking of the debate of this day, said it was "the first subject upon which a great effort had been made in both Houses to combine the discordant elements of the Crawford and Jackson and Calhoun men into a united opposition against the Administration." After a week's debate the resolution in an amended form passed by a vote of 135 to 40. The vote itself is not significant. An amendment offered by Hamilton was amended on motion of Webster in such a way that he himself voted against it in the final form. Opponents of the measure were found on both sides of the question as it was put.

Meanwhile important proceedings were going on in the Senate. Adams in a special message to the Senate on December 25th, 1825, named two envoys and a secretary to attend the Panama Congress. He said he had no doubt of his constitutional right to accept the invitation as he had done, but he deemed it expedient for Congress to concur in the expediency of such an important measure, and to have the Senate confirm the nominations and the House vote the appropriations. Opposition began with a motion by Van Buren on February 15th, 1826, to the effect that the Senate ought to act with open doors during the discussion of the question whether the United States should be represented at Panama, unless publications necessary to refer to would be "prejudicial to existing negotiations." This motion carried by the vote of 23 to 20. Adams retorted that the papers which he had transmitted had been transmitted in confidence.

1. Congressional Debates, II., Pt. 1., 1808 et seq.
2. Adams, Memoirs, VII., ill.
4. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 318-20.
5. Congressional Debates, II. Pt., 1, 142.
said he believed the established usage of confidential communications between the Executive and the Senate ought to remain unimpaired, but he would leave it to the Senate whether there should be a departure or not. On receiving this in the Senate the opposition boiled over. Six resolutions were offered— in effect a censure on the Executive. They declared that the Senate had the sole right to declare what are and what should be the "rules of its proceedings", and that the President could not interfere with the same without violating a constitutional right of the Senate; and that it is the right of the Senate to call upon the President for such information as may be in his possession; and that the President is not competent to decline giving such information on the ground that he disapproves of the mode of proceeding which the Senate may choose to follow on the subjects to which the papers may relate. Each one of the resolutions was voted down the same day by a strict party vote, in each case, of 34 to 20, the question being on postponing them indefinitely— in reality a defeat. From a sectional viewpoint the vote reveals but little. It shows generally that New England was for the most part supporting the Administration while the South was against it.

After several other skirmishes the Committee on Foreign Relations reported a resolution declaring it inexpedient for the United States to send any Ministers to the Congress. And the real battle began. The force in opposition to Adams made their main fight on the ground that the purpose of the Congress was to make a league of republics and to drag the

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 327.
2. Congressional Debates, II., Pt. 1, 143.
3. Ibid., 144-6.
United States into "forbidden entangling alliances", and that the United States had no business to enter a league or apply the Monroe Doctrine to countries which had abolished the slave-trade or to countries demanding the recognition of Hayti, the negro republics, or seeking to free Cuba and Porto Rico and emancipate their slaves. Senator after Senator from the slave States denounced such 'satanic' purposes bitterly. Benton moved an amendment to the resolution declaring that the Senate could not advise that it was expedient to send Ministers to the proposed Congress of the American nations until it had satisfactory information on four points; viz., (1) the subjects which would engage the attention of that Congress, (2) the substance and form of powers to be given to the Representatives, (3) the modes of organizing the Congress, (4) mode of action in deciding the questions submitted to the Congress. This proposed resolution was rejected on March 14th, 1836, by a vote of 19 to 24, a strictly party vote. Van Buren moved thereupon, as an amendment, that the Constitution authorizes the President to nominate officers of a diplomatic character only, and does not empower him to appoint Representatives to an Assembly of nations, that the power of forming or entering new political associations belongs to the people in their sovereign capacity; that in the opinion of the Senate the appointment of Deputies to the Congress of Panama by the United States would be a departure from the wise and settled policy by which the intercourse of the United States with foreign nations had been before regulated. This was 1. Congressional Debates, II., Pt. 1, 153-351.
2. Ibid., 148.
3. Ibid., 149. etc.
also rejected on the same day by the same vote of 19 to 35, also a strict party vote. And on that day the resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations was rejected by almost exactly the same vote as on the six resolutions. The three men nominated by Adams were confirmed.

The matter then went to the House in order that the necessary appropriations might be voted. On March 25th McLane from the Ways and Means Committee reported a bill "making appropriations for carrying into effect the appointment of a mission to the Congress of Panama". This was read and committed. Whereupon Crowninshield from the Committee of Foreign Relations made a report concluded by a resolution to the effect that it is inexpedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President to send Ministers to Panama. This was also sent to the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union. The latter was taken up for discussion first. An amendment was offered declaring it to be the settled policy of the government to have as little political connections with foreign nations as possible; that the Ministers should be sent as diplomatic characters merely and that they should be authorized not to discuss or consider any alliance between the United States and the South American governments, or any stipulation, compact, or declaration binding the United States to resist interference abroad in the domestic concerns of the said South American governments. In the debate which followed a part of those opposed to the amendment, led by

1. Congressional Debates, II., Pt.1, 150.
2. Idem., 152.
3. Ibid., 151.
5. Ibid., 1765.
6. Ibid., 2009.
7. Ibid., 2011-98.
Webster, declared that to pass such a resolution was to really instruct the Ministers? And this, they said, was an Executive function, not one for the House. Others said that since the President had recommended the scheme and the Senate had approved his action the only thing for the House to do was to vote the appropriation. Those who favored the amendment asserted that subjects of serious importance would be discussed at the Congress and that if the United States should send Ministers uninstructed they would be free to take part in the deliberations. Such, they declared, would endanger the peace and safety of the country. After various political schemes invented by the opposition to the Administration, the resolution was finally defeated, and the appropriation bill was passed.

While the Panama question proved to be the main weapon wielded against the Administration at this period, it was not by any means the only one. While the Senate was debating upon the Isthmian mission a far more spirited contest was going on in the House. On December 9th, 1835, McDuffie moved resolutions to the effect that a Select Committee be appointed to report a joint resolution that the Constitution be so amended as to provide for a uniform system of voting by districts throughout the United States, and in such manner as to prevent the election of President by Congress. Another resolution was offered, providing for the election of the President by the direct vote of the people, and still another which would render

1. Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., 2490.
2. Ibid., 2514.
3. Congressional Debates, II., Pt. 1, 797.
4. Ibid., 865.
the President ineligible for a second term. These were avowedly direct attacks upon the President. The long and heated debate upon them and others of like nature gave ample opportunity for charging that the recent election in the House had cheated the people; that it had been accomplished by a corrupt bargain, a coalition between Adams and Clay. In like manner did the Senate fritter away its time. On May 4th, 1836, Benton, from a select Committee to whom had been referred the subject of inquiring into the expediency of reducing the Executive patronage, made a report and offered six bills, the purpose of each one being to limit some particular power of the Executive, the implication in each case being that Adams was usurping undue powers.

And thus did the first session of Congress under Adams slip away. It had accomplished but little in the way of constructive legislation. But great progress had been made towards dividing the people into two factions, in fact the line between the Administration and Jefferson parties was pretty definitely drawn. Jackson, the people's man, had been nominated in October, 1828, by the Tennessee legislature for the Presidency. He had accepted the nomination in an address before the two Houses of that body and had resigned his seat in the Senate. In the fall elections in 1836 the tickets in some of the States were avowedly "Administration" and "Jackson." In the first October number of Niles's Register, 1836, there appeared an editorial as follows: "Our readers will recollect that we have

1. Congressional Debates, II., Pt. 1, 201.
2. Benton, Abridgement of Debates, 553-
3. Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 144; Niles's Register, XIX., 156.
4. Adams, Memoirs, VII., 154; Niles's Register, XXXI., 102.
protested, and we do protest against the terms 'friendly to the Administration' or 'opposed to the Administration'. But such terms cannot be avoided, if it is desired that party political feelings should be made known." It stated further that the use of such terms was compelled for the public intelligence. Early in 1827 the National Intelligencer said: "Recent circumstances have disclosed the existence of an organized opposition to the present Administration, the object of which is to put it down, right or wrong."

The elections which occurred in the fall of 1826 resulted in a sweeping victory for the Jackson party. This insured them a majority in the next Congress. The last session of the 19th Congress was uneventful and may be characterized by a growing indifference to Administration policies and an increasing hostility to the Executive.

The year 1827 proved to be an important one so far as the organization of parties was concerned. About the middle of February, John Floyd, of Virginia, made a speech in which he said: "Combinations have been formed, and are forming, which will wrest the power from those hands so unworthy to hold it, because it is used to abridge the rights of the states, and the liberty of the people. These are no coalitions of daring politicians, but the combinations of great states, who know their rights and will protect them, and combinations in the people themselves, who are determined to take this matter into their own hands, and elect a President for themselves, who will be

2. Niles's Register, XXXI., 82.
3. Ibid., XXXII., 20-2.
4. Sargent, Public Men and Events, 1., 137.
their choice, and will respect their claims. Not long after this utterance Van Buren made a trip to the South. He visited Crawford and it has been generally supposed that the result was the definite alignment of Crawford with the opposition forces.

During the summer the contest centered into a fight between Jackson and Clay. Prior to this time the bargain and corruption hue and cry had been general. But now Jackson came out as the sponsor of this. In a letter addressed to and published in the "Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer" Carter Beverly said: "I have just returned from General Jackson's. I found a crowd of company with him. -- He told me this morning before all his company, in reply to a question I put to him concerning the election of J.Q. Adams to the Presidency, that Mr. Clay's friends made a proposition to his friends that if they would promise for him not to put Mr. Adams into the seat of Secretary of State, Clay and his friends would, in one hour make him, Jackson, the President." Clay expressed his unwillingness to believe that Jackson had made such a statement. Whereupon Beverly addressed a letter to Jackson. Jackson then in a letter dated June 5th, 1827, reiterated the charges. Clay at once came out with a letter utterly denying the charges put forth and called upon Jackson for evidence. Jackson, in a long publication accusatory of Clay, stated that James Buchanan had come to him with the proposals, coming as he believed from Clay. This in turn brought forth a letter from Buchanan dated August 8th, 1827.

1. Niles's Register, XXXII., 114-5.
2. Ibid., XLIII., 19.
3. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 140; Niles's Register, XXXII., 162.
Buchanan said that he had called upon Jackson December 30th, 1834, and had told him that there was a report in circulation to the effect that he had made up his mind to appoint Adams Secretary of State in case he were elected. Jackson denied that he had ever intimated such. Buchanan further stated that he had called upon Jackson merely as a friend and not as agent of Clay. "The conception never once entered my head", he said, "that he (General Jackson) believed me to have been the agent of Mr. Clay or of his friends, or that I intended to propose terms of any kind to him for them! But in spite of the fact that Buchanan had made a positive denial of having been Clay's agent, the press at once insisted that the letter proved Jackson's charge. The hue and cry was raised and the cry of corrupt bargain rose higher and higher.\(^1\)

All this time Clay was doing his best to prove himself clear of the charge, and he confidently believed that time would vindicate him and a reaction set in in his favor. In a speech at Lexington July 13th he said that he rejoiced again and again that "General Jackson has now thrown off the mask, and comes confessedly forth from behind his concealed batteries to accuse and convict me. -- -- I demand the witness and await the event with fearless confidence."\(^2\) In December Clay issued a long address to the people in answer to Jackson.\(^3\) He had collected a great mass of evidence to prove his innocence. By this time he was not so confident of immediate vindication. It was

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1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 148-3;
2. Ibid.; 375.
3. Ibid.; XXXIII., 396-315; XXXIV., 696-12.
his grip already evident that he had lost [his grip on Kentucky]. The address was of such a despondent character that Adams advised Clay to change it. It contained the idea that he was retiring from public life and being sacrificed to calumny. While Adams thought Jackson would be elected in 1828 he tried to encourage Clay by telling him that Jackson's Administration would be a failure. A reaction, he said, would set in in favor of Clay. But Clay feared that it would not be within his lifetime. The Jackson-Clay fight was causing commotion throughout the country. "The subject," (corrupt bargain), said an editorial in Niles's Register, "seems now narrowing to an affair between General Jackson and Mr. Clay; and we are pleased with the hope that an appeal to the public judgement by the parties, may end this long continued and unhappy controversy."

Meanwhile a fall election had taken place and the new Congress had assembled. In the elections the Administration party was generally defeated. Adams viewed the defeat in New York as decisive on the following Presidential election. The results of the election encouraged the opposition. Several of the newspapers urged the men to reach Washington before the beginning of the session. And this they did, their purpose being to elect a Speaker of their own party. They were successful in this effort. The Speaker thus elected appointed on all the committees four Opposition to three Administration men. In the Senate the committees were chosen by a ballot by a majority of 25 to 19, and all the

1. Adams, Memoirs, VII., 375.
2. Ibid., 382-3.
3. Niles's Register, XXXIII., 289.
5. Ibid., 363.
committees consisted of four Opposition to one Administration. Congress was organized in full for Jackson. The recommendations of the President went unheeded. Little else was done in the long session of the 20th Congress than taking up the various attempts to defame the Executive Department.

On January 8th Hamilton of South Carolina introduced a resolution in the House proposing to fill up one of the panels in the Rotunda of the Capitol with a painting to be made by Washington Allston of the battle of Orleans. This of course was a slap indirectly towards the Administration and an exaltation of Jackson. The proposition was defeated by a vote of 98 to 103. The Adams men were also in the fight? Sloane of Ohio on January 11th, 1828, moved a resolution directing the Secretary of War to furnish the House with a copy of the proceedings of a court martial held on December 5th, 1814, for the trial of certain Tennessee militiamen. The resolution was adopted. The militiamen referred to had been tried for insubordination and mutiny and having been found guilty were condemned to be shot. Jackson had ordered the sentence to be carried out. On February 11th the Committee on Military Affairs made a long report exculpating Jackson. A resolution providing for a printing of the report with the documents was passed by a vote of 108 to 69. This was done that there might be more effective campaign literature for the Jackson forces.

On January 38th, 1828 Mr. Chilton of Kentucky introduced

A. Adams, Memoirs, VII., 377; Congressional Debates, IV. Pt. 1, 811.
B. Ibid., 953.
3. Ibid., 975.
4. Ibid., 1487.
5. Ibid., 1048.
6. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1506.
two resolutions asserting the expediency of discharging the National Debt by a judicious reduction of the number of officials receiving pay from the general government, and by avoiding every appropriation not imperiously demanded. The action of Chilton disconcerted his party leaders because his proposition did not exclude departments under the control of the Jackson party. It directed the charge of extravagance against Congress. A long and exciting debate followed. Hamilton proposed an amendment providing for a Select Committee to report in detail on expenses and retrenchment, the real effect of which was to cast all suspicion on the Executive Department. Thus amended, the resolution passed unanimously and a committee was appointed, Chilton being passed by. After a long and minute investigation a majority report was made by Hamilton on May 15th, 1838, and a minority report was made by Sargent, afterwards Clay's running mate. About 6000 copies of each were printed for campaign purposes. The opponents of the Administration used them to prove the extravagance of the Administration, and the friends of the Administration to show that the increase was due to the natural growth of the nation. The Congressional debates revealed numerous other petty charges which at the time were given prominence because they served as engines of attack. The cases given above illustrate the instruments of warfare used.

By far the most important act of the session did not figure so prominently in the campaign as some of the minor measures. This was the "Tariff of Abominations." It was the result

2. Ibid., 1335.
3. Ibid., 1458.
4. Ibid., IV., Pt. 2, 3714-5.
5. Schouler's History of the United States, III., 419.
of an extensive propaganda carried on by such men as Hezekiah Niles and Mathew Carey. The tariff of 1824 seemed to give satisfaction for a time. But a movement in favor of greater protection began in 1824 or 1825 in Pennsylvania. On September 24th, 1826, a meeting of woolen manufacturers was held at the Exchange Coffee House in Boston. It was unanimously voted to petition Congress for an increase of duties; and at an adjourned meeting about a month later a memorial was accordingly adopted. Numerous petitions were presented to Congress in December 1826. The petitions were referred to the Committee on Manufactures and on January 10th, 1827, Mallory of Vermont reported the famous woolens bill. It passed the House on February 10th by a vote of 106 to 92, but it was defeated in the Senate by laying it on the table through the combined vote of a united South and some of the Middle States protectionists. Cambreling of Pennsylvania was working in concert with Van Buren to organize the opposition to Adams. During the debate he said that the bill was a "prohibitory act for the benefit of the woolen manufacturers of New England." He was attempting to array protectionist Pennsylvania against New England. He indirectly urged the Pennsylvania members to make a doubling of the duty on bar iron a condition to their supporting the bill. His coajutor, James Buchanan, became excited over the wrong done to the hemp interest by the growing protection to the woollens. He was attempting to array the hemp-growers of Kentucky against Clay, by having the Jackson men stand as the  

1. Niles's Register, XXXIV., 187.  
2. Ibid., XXXI., 105.  
3. Ibid., 185.  
4. American State Papers, (Finance) V.  
5. Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, I., 255.  
7. Congressional Debates, III., 745.
friends of the hemp growers. For the most part both Pennsylvania and Kentucky voted against the provisions of this bill.

After the defeat of the measure numerous meetings were held by both the protectionists and the free-traders in an effort to control the session of Congress during the winter of 1827-8. The most important protectionist meeting was the Harrisburg Convention held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in July, 1827. It recommended further protection for woollens, bar iron, hemp and flax, and the readjustment of cotton duties so as to protect printed cotton goods. It was charged by some of the Jackson papers that this was mere party manoeuvre of the Adams men, but this was denied by some of the Jackson papers. Mathew Carey, while admitting he was an Adams man, protested against "amalgamating the question of the presidency with that for the protection of manufactures." Among the delegates to the Harrisburg Convention were both Adams and Jackson men. Niles, who was a member of the Convention, persistently denied that politics had anything to do with it. But there is some reason to believe that the Adams men would have been glad to make the tariff an issue. In the same month in which the Harrisburg Convention was meeting Clay wrote: "All who are opposed to the American system; all who are opposed to internal improvements, are now united with others in their endeavors to defeat the re-election of the present chief magistrate, and to elevate another individual." Clay during the summer made a Western trip and the burden of his speeches was the tariff. But

1. Niles’s Register, XXXIV., 105.
2. Ibid., XXXII., 356.
3. Ibid., 388-396.
4. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 84. (note)
5. Niles’s Register, XXXII., 349.
6. Ibid., XXXIV., 187.
7. Ibid., 356.
the publication of the Carter Beverly letter caused political attention to be transferred to the "corrupt bargain" cry and Clay had to give his efforts to his attempts to prove his innocence. It is not necessary to trace the tariff bill of 1838. It will be sufficient to say that the Southerners voted with certain of those from the Middle States and West in the hope that if wool and woollens were left unprotected the New Englanders would vote against the bill, especially if the duties on hemp, iron, and molasses were advanced. Twenty-three of the New England members did "fly off", but enough voted for the bill to pass it. The South were caught in their own toils. The bill as passed was acceptable to no one. Adams favored the bill as being better than none at all. Benton said, "This tariff was made an Administration measure and became an issue in the canvass." Randolph said that the bill had "no reference to manufactures whatever- but to the manufacture of a President of the United States" and Niles was of the opinion that he was too nearly right. While, as will be seen, the tariff question played some part in the campaign, the one great principle on which the opposition united was, as Webster well said during the campaign, that of ousting Adams. The numerous slanderous projects invented by the opposition were servants to this ruling master. On the two great issues which had been before the people since the treaty of Ghent the position of Adams and Clay could not be doubted. While Jackson had voted

for internal improvements and for a Protective tariff when in

1. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 85. (note)
2. Niles's Register, XXXV., 34.
4. Niles's Register, XXXIV., 137.
5.,ibid., 275.
Congress, and had made his views known during the campaign of 1834, nevertheless many of his adherents who were strongly in favor of these measures wanted to be reassured. They no doubt realized that they were in strange company, united with Southerners who had come to deny the constitutionality of both of these measures. At a great "democratic" meeting in Fayette county, Pennsylvania, resolutions were adopted favoring increased duties and which stated that Jackson was the man entitled to such support, for he was the "decided and open friend to domestic manufactures and internal improvements." They stated further that Jackson while in the Senate had voted for the tariff of 1834 and five times in favor of internal improvements in one year, while Adams when a member voted seven times against internal improvements and never once for them, and he never in any of his messages to Congress recommended the tariff. The truth is he was afraid to make any such recommendation because he was well aware that such would meet with a storm of disapproval. The Senate of Indiana passed a resolution stating that since Jackson was supported in the Western States on the ground that he was a supporter of internal improvements and an advocate of a judicious tariff, while in Virginia, North and South Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama, and Mississippi his claims to office were advocated on the ground that he was opposed to such measures, the governor should therefore be requested to write him and get an explicit statement of his views, which statement would be printed in the

1. Niles's Register, XXXIII., 312.
2. Adams, Memoirs,
Jackson, in a letter dated February 8th, 1838, authorized the Governor to tell the Senate that his ideas were precisely the same as when communicated to Dr. Coleman in 1834. This left matters indefinite. On the other hand Clay, wherever he spoke took occasion to praise the "American system". He made it known too that he was in perfect accord with the Administration on all the leading acts and principles. Niles said that Jackson was supported in New York, Pennsylvania and the West as a friend of internal improvements and the tariff, but in the South was sustained by those who denied both the right and the constitutionality of such—in short as a Southern man of Southern principles. Niles well said that both of these factions would prefer their claims upon him.

In addition to the aforesaid charges against Adams there are two others which must be given some consideration. They were influential in moulding the Whig Party as is later seen. The first to be considered is a charge made by William B. Giles of Virginia in October 1828. He caused to be published a statement regarding the circumstances of Adams' defection from the Federal party in 1808, and a part of certain correspondence between Jefferson and Giles in 1835. The effect was to place Adams in a bad light. He authorized a reply which was printed in the National Intelligencer in the course of which he made the serious charge against certain Federal leaders of Massachusetts of a plan.

1. Niles's Register, XXXIII., 439.
2. Ibid., XXXIV., 158.
3. Ibid., XXXV., 44-5.
4. Ibid., 194.
to disrupt the Union. Thirteen men, most of whom had been leading Federalists in 1808, demanded a substantiation of the charges or a retraction. A bitter correspondence ensued. Adams wrote an extremely long document, his last word on the subject, at the close of his Administration, which however was never published by him, and which coming as it did after the election had nothing to do with the results. But the controversy had the effect of repelling Federalists who had reluctantly come to the support of Adams. However as it was in a part of the country strongly anti-Jackson it loss him no electoral votes. But it was undoubtedly one of the considerations which led Adams to abandon the National Republicans, as his adherents were now called in many papers.

More important, both as an issue in 1828 and as a subsequent problem, was a question regarding the Masons. Morgan had been abducted in 1826 by the Masons for threatening to publish a book exposing their sects. It was believed that he was put to death by them. A wave of indignation swept over New York, Pennsylvania and some other States. An anti-Masonic party arose. In several States it held the balance of power and it often would go for the side which seemed to be against Free Masonry. This meant that a great deal depended on the character of the candidate. Adams was not a Mason, but in certain parts of the country he was heralded as such and he was not able to exculpate himself of the charge, owing to the baseness of certain newspapers purposely perverting the facts known to them.

we have a cause for Adams's defection from the National Republicans.

Adams was beaten from the start as he well knew he would be. He in fact got fewer electoral votes than he had in 1825. He resigned himself to his fate, bitterly wounded by the unscrupulous men who had conspired against him. But the people were vindicated. At last the perpetrators of the "corrupt bargain" were humbled before the bar of public opinion. The social revolution had been a success. Now that the Jackson party would soon begin to rule it behooved them to formulate some principles. No longer could the purpose of ousting Adams suffice. It was for them to have some definite policies. This, indeed, was a Herculean task for such a Babel of sentiment. Some faction necessarily had to gain the ascendancy.

The last session of Congress under Adams met December 1st, 1828. As might have been expected it was comparatively uneventful so far as party development was concerned. Practically no debate could be elicited on retrenchment measures. All measures relating to the subject came to naught. Congress showed a disposition to confine itself to the necessities of the government and to avoid new legislation. The one important subject discussed seriously was a bill relating to the Cumberland road. The House passed a bill providing for the erection of toll gates on the road, and for an appropriation.

In the Senate the bill was amended to strike out all that part.

1. Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 141, 149.
2. Congressional Debates, V., 266.
3. Ibid., 361.
of the bill which provided for the erection of toll gates.
The House concurred in the amendments. It is seen that the Senate clung to the doctrine of appropriation for such works, but not for construction. And it was in the Senate the South had far greater prestige than in the House.

2. Ibid., 386.
CHAPTER VII.
ORGANIZATION AS AN OFFENSIVE PARTY. 1829-1833.

The comparative quietness of the session of 1828-9 was the calm before the storm. Already the crafty and persistent Clay was planning for the next Presidential election. On December 26th, 1838, he asked Everett if he could depend upon the support of the Eastern States. He averred that if he could he would be sure of the support of the Western States. Adams expressed his belief that Clay would be the leader of the opposition to the succeeding Administration. At the same time he believed that the two recent parties were virtually dissolved, the Administration party irretrievably; and both he and Clay were of the opinion that Webster might adhere to the new Administration. This was their opinion early in January 1839.

As to the dissolution of the Administration party Adams was right in what he was to be no longer its leader. Clay was to become its pilot. "Whether I ought to be brought out, and when," he wrote, to Brooke, his manager in Virginia, "I leave to my friends." The party led by Adams in 1828 was to continue for a time much the same as it had been. The work of organizing needed to be done. The work was to be greatly aided by the course of the new Administration. In fact the principle of opposition to Jackson and his methods was to be, primarily, the basis for the final moulding of the Whig Party. Only secondarily were the principles of protective tariff, bank and internal improvements to operate as an organizing force.

1. Adams, Memoirs, VIII., 86.
2. ibid., 89-90.
in the midst of a motley concourse of his admirers. Jackson was inaugurated March 4th, 1839. His inaugural address was artfully drawn to mean practically nothing regarding the tariff and internal improvements. He took occasion to take a slap at the out-going Administration. "The recent demonstration of public sentiment inscribes on the list of Executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with the freedom of elections, and the counteraction of those causes which have disturbed the rightful course of appointment and have placed or continued power in unfaithful or incompetent hands." The address as a whole was welcomed by some in the South as an utterance calculated to soothe their excited feelings, and by others it was criticized because it recognized the constitutionality of the tariff.

A virtual reign of terror held sway during the summer. The spoils system terrorized the government employees and many the faithful servants of the public who fell before it. Jackson pursued with no visible show of reluctance, a baneful system of proscription, and by the summer's end he had to a great extent accomplished the blacklisting task. During the first year he made as many removals for political reasons as had been effected by all of his predecessors, who had made removals mostly for cause. In fact, so numerous were the removals that the bus-

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 436-8.
2. Niles's Register, XXXVI., 131.
3. Ibid., XXXVII., 343, 393.
4. Ibid., XXXVI., 243; Fish, Civil Service and Patronage, 118.
5. Peck, Jacksonian Epoch, 146.
iness of Washington seemed demoralized. Cay at once sounded the tocsin of alarm, denounced the system, and warned the country of its direful results. In the fall elections the parties were generally known as the Jackson and the anti-Jackson parties.

Jackson in his first annual message recommended, as chief among domestic matters requiring the attention of Congress, an amendment to the Constitution which would remove all intermediate agency in the election of President and Vice-President in order that the people might truly govern. He attempted a defense of the rotation principle which he had so conspicuously exemplified. There was no definite announcement of the policy he would pursue regarding the tariff, though he said it ought to be removed from "the party conflicts of the day". To reconcile the diversified interests of the States and strengthen the bonds which unite them, and to surmount the constitutional difficulties in regard to making appropriations for internal improvements, he recommended the apportionment of the surplus revenue among the States according to the ratio of their representation. He explained his action of advising the Indians to migrate beyond the Mississippi or else submit to the laws of the States wherein they were residing. Towards the close he called into question both the expediency and the constitutionality of the United States Bank. He asserted that it had failed to establish a uniform currency, and he asked if there might not be a substitute created.

The message was unreasonably extolled by many papers and with no

1. Parton's Jackson, III., 214.
2. Niles's Register, XXXVI., 399-405.
3. Ibid., XXXI., 68, 122, 132, 150, 177, 341.
4. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 442-462.
more show of reason it was condemned by others.  

Jackson, with lynx eye, watched the proceeding of Congress. Anything done which did not meet with his approval was sure to incur his resentment. His anger was first aroused by the Senate proceedings in regard to his proscription system. The Senate "gazed with genuine dismay at the list of removals and new appointments submitted for their confirmation." The Executive secret sessions were long and exciting. Jackson was forced to withdraw some of the more obnoxious names and some of the members of his own party were rejected. In fact some of his most prominent politicians were denied confirmation, perhaps of some ability, but obnoxious to the opposition. Two such were Isaac Hill and Mordecai M. Noah. Some of those whom the Senate rejected Jackson rewarded in other ways.

One of the most important occurrences of the session was the Webster-Hayne debate. It arose over a resolution offered by Senator Foot of Connecticut on December 29th, 1839, to the effect that the Committee of Public Lands be instructed to inquire into the expediency of limiting for a certain period the sales of lands to such lands as had been before offered for sale. On its face it appears to be a simple and harmless proposition. But it was made the occasion for a memorable happening. Benton took ground against referring the resolution. He attacked the East and attempted to unite the South and West against the North and East, and Senator Hayne joined in the attempt. Hayne's

1. Niles's Register, XXXVII., 257.
3. Niles's Register, XXVIII, 142, 216, 229, States, Ill., 476.
speech of January 19th marked a turning point in the debate\(^1\). In this he spoke for States Right's and against consolidation. Webster, who was independent of all party, though \(^2\) leaning to Clay, thought that it was his duty to uphold the cause of the Union and of his State. Webster was wanting a good chance to strike a blow at Calhoun and by a proper batting in his speech \(^3\) he got Hayne to elucidate the Calhoun theory. \(^4\) Then in a powerful speech he exposed the fallacy of the compact theory of the Constitution. The debate illustrated the growing divergence between the sections in regard to the Constitution. As yet the President had not taken sides in the contest. With whom he stood it was not known. The leading Nullifiers in Congress arranged for a birthday banquet on April 30th, 1830, in honor of Thomas Jefferson. Invitations were sent to the President and the Secretaries, a list of toasts was prepared, republicans in and out of Congress who desired to go were requested to send in their names. The ostensible purpose was to honor the name of Jefferson. But an attempt was made to trick the Pennsylvania members into the drinking of anti-tariff and nullification doctrines. Present at the banquet were the President and eight members of the Pennsylvania delegation. George R. Leiper, one of the members, asked to see the list of toasts before they were drunk. After he had read a few, he announced that he had had enough. He and his colleagues then withdrew. But the obnoxious toasts were drunk nevertheless. Jackson gave: "The Federal Union, it

2. Ibid., 35-41.
3. Ibid., 41 et seq.
4. Ibid.
must be preserved". South Carolina wanted to preserve the Union by repealing the tariff; Pennsylvania by enforcing the tariff. How the union would be preserved, no one could tell. But it was very certain that the President would not be a supporter of the Nullifiers. And from this time Calhoun felt that his principles were out of favor with the President. Very soon he began to take the ground of other South Carolinians, that Jackson was "the victim of political intrigues".

Upon the question of internal improvements there arose an issue to count as one charge in the anti-Administration party's indictment against Jackson's Administration. Jackson very early in the session saw that those of his own party were not disposed to act in concert. He concluded to apply his own corrective. The first bill of the kind to reach him was the Maysville and Lexington turnpike bill. A large majority of those who voted for the bill in the House of Representatives were opponents of the Administration, while of the 86 who voted against the bill only about three or four were not of the Jackson party. Jackson sent the bill back to the House in which it originated with his objections and it was thus killed, for it failed of passage over his veto. He opposed the bill both on the grounds of constitutionality and expediency, his main objection being that it was local in character. The veto caused a great storm of protest to sweep over one section of the country, while in another it was received with joy. On May 31st he vetoed a bill authorizing a

1. Adams, Memoirs, VIII., 238-9; Niles's Register, XL., 193.
2. Congressional Debates, VI., Pt., 2, 342.
3. Niles's Register, XXXVIII., 288.
5. Ibid., 1148.
subscription of stock in the Washington Turnpike Road Company, referring the Senate to his Maysville veto message for his reasons. He signed a bill appropriating $30,000 for examinations and surveys, $100,000 for the extension of the Cumberland Road, and various sums for other roads; but in doing so he sent a message to Congress May 30th informing that body that he did so with the understanding that the road from Detroit to Chicago for which $8000 was appropriated should not extend beyond the limits of Michigan Territory. He pocket-vetoed an act for making appropriations for light-houses, rivers and harbors, and an act authorizing a subscription for stock in the Louisville and Portland Canal Company. The reasons for these vetoes were given in the second annual message December 6th, 1830. A bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was killed in the Senate May 22nd, 1830, by laying on the table an order that the President might be relieved from acting on it, by a vote of 21 to 19. It was almost a strict party vote, Sprague of Maine being the only opponent of the Administration who voted for, and Smith of Maryland and Livingston of Louisiana being the only friends of the Administration who voted against this action. Jackson's vetoes of so many internal improvement bills gave ample evidence of the fact that he was adopting the strict construction of the Constitution according to the Republicans of 1798. His course roused the ire of many of the adherents of the internal improvement policy and gave ground for

1. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 493-4.
2. Ibid., 483.
3. Ibid., 494.
4. Ibid., 508.
Political events were moving rapidly. In January 1830 some of the friends of the previous Administration had wanted to proclaim Clay as their candidate for the next Presidential election. Adams said at the time that "a new organization of parties with reference to the Presidency must take place; that questions will arise from the progress of the Administration which would divide the country; that in the discussion of these questions Mr. Clay may very probably take a lead, which will bring him conspicuously before the country." Just before the close of the session a meeting of the members of Congress friendly to the previous Administration had been held to consider whether it would be expedient to make a nomination of a candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Jackson. They had concluded that it would be best for the first nomination to come from a State Legislature. In May Niles said that the lines between parties were tightening. He analyzed the parties in Congress as follows: (1) the original friends of Jackson, (2) the anti-Jackson party, (3) the old radical or Crawford party revived—friends of Van Buren, (4) friends of Vice-President Calhoun. Then there were, he said, various parties with reference to measures such as supporters and enemies of the bank, friends and opponents of the tariff, constructives and anti-constructives, etc. In short, if a man was not at the time a Jackson man

1. Niles's Register, XXXVIII, 379.
3. Ibid., 231.
4. Ibid., 231.
5. Niles's Register, XXXVIII., 202-3.
it did not signify that he was a supported of Clay or a National Republican. Clay was considered the prospective leader of the National Republicans, and he was laboring to become such. On August 3rd he delivered a great speech at Cincinnati, which was manifestly designed to proclaim his opinions upon public questions. "We suppose," he said, "that it may be called the 'platform' upon which it stands." There was little that was new in the speech. Indeed it was the old platform upon which he had stood for years with the additional plank of the bank. Upon this question he came out strongly against Jackson, declaring himself against Jackson's scheme for a bank and contending that the question of recharter was merely one of expediency. He enthusiastically alluded to the wonderful growth of the American system, denounced nullification, and declared that those who opposed the tariff on constitutional grounds were a new class. He said he had supposed that if anything was settled it was that Congress had the authority to carry into execution internal improvements. Here again, he asserted, the constitutional objection had no force. Jackson's course in vetoing the Maysville road bill was entirely inconsistent with his whole previous course. He had heard on good authority, he continued, that Jackson had vetoed the measure in order to hold his Southern support. About four months previous to this speech Niles had said that it required not the gift of prophesy to be able to say that in the next presidential elections the great question would hinge upon constitutional constructions as to the principles.

1. Niles's Register, XXXIX., 25-35.
2. Ibid., 18.
involved in a protective tariff and appropriation of money for internal improvements. Clay it seemed would make such the issue.

The Jackson party all this time was not idle by any means. On March 30th, 1830, the democratic-republican members of the Pennsylvania legislature met and on the following day resolutions were reported, one of which was, that "the unanimity and harmony of the great democratic party of the union will be greatly promoted by placing the name of Andrew Jackson before the people as a candidate for reelection." On April 13th, 1830, the republican members of the legislature of New York held a caucus. An address to the republicans of New York, reported by a certain Mr. Benton, was unanimously adopted. It stated that whatever the pretences of those who had gained ascendency over the republican party, referring of course to the previous Administration, they have exercised power in much the same way as the Federalists did in 1798. "Professions of affection for the people", it continued, "were forgotten as the occasion for making them passed away; their interests were disregarded, their rights abridged; favoritism cherished, extravagance introduced, and the boundaries of the delegated government overleaped.----Such was the progress of events that ushered in the present administration of the general government. They were merely republicans in name, not in principles."

From the evidence available it appears that in the fall elections of 1830 the opponents of the Administration were known as republicans or National Republicans more generally than they

1. Niles's Register, XXXVIII., 169.
2. Ibid., 168.
3. Ibid., 170. et seq.
had been the previous year.1

The second session of the 21st Congress convened December 6th, 1830. The President's message2 recounted the Administrative triumphs which had made for great prosperity, defended his course in his vetoes of internal improvement measures, vindicated himself especially regarding his Maysville road veto and to a lesser degree the use of the veto power in general, and regarding the proposed apportionment of the surplus revenue among the States. He again recommended the removal of "all intermediate agency" in the election of the chief magistrate, and the limitation of the time of service to one term, defended the policy of Indian removal, touched intangibly on the tariff, and concluded with a larger warning against the bank than he had done the year before. Not much of importance was done at this session. But throughout the country preparation was making for the next election. The House of Representatives of Alabama on December 7th, 1830, placed Jackson in nomination for the Presidency. One of the resolutions adopted was as follows: "That the very able, firm and patriotic course pursued by Jackson— at the last session of Congress, in opposition to the passage of the Maysville road bill, and others of like character, requiring appropriations from the treasury of the United States for local objects of internal improvements, justly entitle him to the highest respect and gratitude of all the friends of liberty and free government."3

The legislature of Delaware on the other hand declared that the veto of the Maysville road bill and others of like nature was

2. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 500-523.
3. Niles's Register, XXXIX., 341.
disapproved, and that such was "a wanton exercise of power regard­less of the interests of the people", and Clay was recom­mended instead of Jackson. On February 19th, 1831, at a meeting of the members of both branches of the legislature of Maryland opposed to the Administration a series of resolutions was adopted, one of which is as follows: "That it is expedient that a national convention be held, to which the people of all the States shall be invited to send delegates in which their will can be authentically ascertained, and that concert of action produced which is essential to the success of our cause", and "That our brethren of other States, who with us deplore the election of Andrew Jackson" are hereby invited "to meet in general conven­tion, at Baltimore on the second Monday of December next." Great preparations were under headway for the election of 1833. The motto of the Burlington (Vermont) Free Press was being adopted by the opponents of the Administration: "Not the glory of Caesar but the welfare of Rome." Numerous conventions of National Repub­li­cans were held in various States primarily for the purpose of choosing delegates to the national convention. At most of these resolutions were adopted which may be summarized as follows: the Administration was condemned because (1) of a perversion of the removing power through removing officers of government and re­placing them by partisans, (2) of irregularities in the Post Office Department, (3) of general extravagance, (4) of violating the provisions in treaties with the Indians, (5) of being respon­

1. Niles's Register, XXXIX., 452.
2. Ibid., XL., 28-9.
3. Ibid., 113.
4. Ibid., 28, 127, 174, 278-9, 293, 353, 387, 438.
sible for the disgraceful disruption of the cabinet, (6) of attempting to prostrate the Federal Courts through sanctioning the repeal of the section of the judiciary act which authorizes an appeal from State to Federal courts, (7) of a royal use of the veto power, (8) of the appointment of members of Congress by the Executive. As a rule there were in these resolutions some positive declaration such as; (1) Congress has the power to construct or appropriate for carrying on a system of internal improvements; (2) a protective tariff is essential for the prosperity of the country. Clay was recommended for the Presidency.

Great enthusiasm was manifested in these meetings. The spirit which permeated the whole party is well illustrated by the course pursued in Pennsylvania. There the calls for country meetings to appoint delegates to the National Convention were headed by "our country" or as was usually the case by "Not the glory of Caesar but the welfare of Rome".

In the dominant party a schism had occurred. The cause for it first arose over the question whether the wives of the cabinet members should associate with Mrs. Eaton, wife of Secretary Eaton. Mrs. Calhoun, during the winter of 1829-30 in order to avoid such association did not go to Washington. Calhoun became thereby the leader of the 'moral party', while Van Buren, another aspirant to the Presidency, paid his court to Mrs. Eaton. This no doubt was a political move to win the favor of Jackson, who, chivalrous as he was, had made up his mind that Mrs. Eaton must be treated as a virtuous woman. From the moment of Jackson's

1. Niles's Register, XL., 438.
3. Ibid., 185.
election a fierce rivalry had sprung up between Van Buren and Calhoun. The New York Courier and Enquirer, Van Buren's organ, on December 19th, 1839, said that Jackson would serve another term, and that when the time comes to choose a successor Van Buren would be the proper man for the place. The United States Telegraph expressed regret at this announcement, for it contended that it would have a tendency to encourage those who are relying on a division in the republican party. The fight went steadily on. The rivals very well knew that the favor of Jackson would mean success or failure. Calhoun in order to ingratiate himself into Jackson's favor, had been largely instrumental in getting up the Jefferson banquet. But as has been seen he was rebuked. Very soon after this, on May 30th, 1830, the break came. On that day the President sent a letter to Calhoun enclosing a letter written by Crawford to Forsyth which revealed secrets regarding the proceedings in Monroe's cabinet in 1818 upon the Seminole War controversy and asserted that Calhoun in these cabinet discussions had proposed the arrest and punishment of Jackson. Calhoun penitently supplicated Jackson's mercy, but the haughty Jackson knew not the virtue of forgiveness. Following the break there came immediately serious consequences, although the public for nearly a year was left in the dark. The Telegraph, which had been the Administration paper began to change its tone. The Administration searched the country to find a man to become the editor of a new official Administration organ. Francis P.

1. Niles's Register, XXXVII., 300.
2. Ibid., 300; Adams; Memoirs, VIII., 209.
4. Parton, Jackson, III., 333.
Blair, of Kentucky, and a former supporter of Clay, was finally selected, and thus he became the editor of the Globe. Gradually the gulf widened. Towards the close of the short session of the 21st Congress Calhoun published a pamphlet containing his correspondence with the President, "and a mass of letters, statements, and certificates illustrative thereof." The pamphlet was discussed throughout the country in a partisan way, as being an attack on the President. Outside of South Carolina, the Nullification nest, the press for the most part condemned Calhoun and vindicated the President. But all of this preliminary occurrence was merely the beginning of the really significant event, the break up of the cabinet. In order to get rid of Ingham, Branch, Berrein, three of Calhoun's friends in the cabinet, Van Buren and Major Eaton resigned. It was expected that the obnoxious trio would take the hint and also resign. As had been anticipated, the resignation of Van Buren and Eaton was followed by that of the other three. Jackson was thus able to reconstruct his cabinet to suit his fancies. But the unity of the dominant party was irretrievably broken. The opposition took renewed courage and was inspired to greater efforts. Clay, from his retreat at Ashland wrote: "I think we are authorized, from all that is now before us, to anticipate confidently General Jackson's defeat. The question of who may be the successor may be more doubtful. The probabilities are strongly with us. It seems to me that nothing can disappoint the hopes of our friends, but anti-Masonry."  

2. Account based on ibid., 344-69.
Anti-Masonry had indeed become a problem. J.Q. Adams, the leader of the new party during its defensive period had become an anti-Mason and had ceased to have any concern about the National Republicans. The anti-Masons had made a wonderful growth and were sure to be an important factor, it seemed, in the election of 1832. It is difficult to understand the action of Adams. As early as January 5th, 1831, he wrote that he intended to take no part in the coming Presidential election. He said he never had been consulted or never desired to be consulted by the National Republicans since March 3rd, 1829. In March 1831 he wrote of "the prostitution of principle, as well as the hostility of me, manifested by the party now upholding Mr. Clay as the candidate for the next Presidential election". A little later he attended a State anti-Masonic Convention in Faneuil Hall, and after returning from the meeting he wrote that duty to his country would soon demand his making an open avowal of his opinions regarding masonry. When asked how far his attendance at the Convention might be taken as pledging his opposition to Clay in the approaching election he said that he proposed to take no part in the Presidential election, and that "the dissolution of the masonic institution in the United States" was more important "than the question whether Mr. Clay or General Jackson shall be the President chosen at the next election". He continued to attend anti-Masonic meetings and confided to his Diary his belief that Clay was in secret Masonic communication with the

2. Ibid., 341.
3. Ibid., 363-4.
4. Ibid., 368.
Masons, his supporters. By August it was widely scattered that Adams would be the anti-Masonic candidate for the Presidency, though he believed that the Masons had no idea of nominating him. By this time he had gone so far in his opposition to Clay that he did not see how an anti-Mason could support Clay at all, who he said was at "the head of the Masonic and so called National Republican party." In September Adams was waited upon by a committee from Boston who came to see if he would be the anti-Masonic candidate for President. Later the anti-Masonic State Convention unanimously agreed to nominate him for Governor of Massachusetts, but Adams declined this on the ground that Governor Lincoln was his personal friend and that his opinions against Masonry were strongly expressed. At an Anti-Masonic Convention held at Harrisburg on May 28th delegates were appointed to the Anti-Masonic Convention to be held in Baltimore in September following. An attempt was made to pass a resolution instructing the Convention to give no support to Clay. This was a firebrand and it was not adopted until Clay's name was struck out. The National Convention met in October and nominated William Wirt for the Presidency and Amos Ellmaker for the Vice-Presidency. Wirt had been chosen as a delegate to the National Convention, which place he now resigned. A letter was addressed to Clay asking his sentiments regarding Masonry. He answered that such was a personal private opinion and had nothing whatever to do with a man's fitness for office. And so he refused to make his

2. Ibid., 380, 392.
3. Ibid., 401.
4. Ibid., 403, 412.
5. Ibid., 414, 416.
7. Ibid., XLI., 86–90.
8. Ibid., 221–
opinions definitely known. He was known to be a Mason. He thus stood in the way of any definite alliance, between the anti-Masons and the National Republicans. Politically the natural thing was for the anti-Masons and the National Republicans to coalesce.

Friends of the Administration were busy. Meetings of "Democratic-Republicans" were held in New York. A number of the democratic-republican republican members of the New York legislature held a meeting at Albany February 21st, 1831, and nominated Jackson for reelection. The Jackson party was coming to be known as the Democratic-Republican party as opposed to the National Republican party. In some places, especially in Pennsylvania, the tendency was to speak of Jackson's adherents as Democrats. In December 1831 the Senate of Georgia declared for the reelection of Jackson by a vote of 65 to 0 because, (1) he is a friend of the continuance of the union, (2) he is determined to have the national debt extinguished, and hopes under his second Administration to place agriculture, commerce and manufactures on an equal footing, (3) he has done all in his power to secure Georgia in the possession of the territory held by the Cherokees, (4) he has by his Maysville road bill arrested the system of internal improvements.

During the summer the nullification cloud darkened the Southern horizon. The nullifiers were beginning to oppose

2. Ibid., XL., 61, 173-4.
3. Ibid., 126.
4. Ibid., 300, 329.
5. Ibid., XLI., 272.
Jackson. It was thought that the tariff would be the pretext for the South's desertion of the President. South Carolina was in a ferment. The 22nd Congress assembled for its first session on December 5th, 1831. A session just before an election is naturally very exciting, for parties are anxious to make political capital. This session was particularly exciting. At the same time it was one of the most important in the nation's history. Clay had been elected to the Senate and now came to the center of the stage with all eyes centered upon him. He was there to manage his campaign personally. The opposition to the Administration, strengthened by his magnetic power, was doubly powerful because of his inflamed ambition and his true heartfelt patriotism. The opposition would be strengthened by the defection of Calhoun. As a party it at once started out to lessen the public confidence in the Administration. Jackson, in his annual message set forth the diplomatic achievements of the year previous, declared the financial condition of the country to be entirely satisfactory, asserted that the chief business of the session would be the tariff. He said nothing more of the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States. He reiterated his former recommendation regarding the election of President by the direct vote of the people. Again he closed with a warning to the United States bank, for the last time, as it was shown by closely following events.

Jackson had appointed his chosen successor, Van Buren, Minister to Great Britain. But, by the casting vote of the Vice-

1. Niles's Register, XL., 71, 104-1377.
2. Ibid., 428.
3. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 544-558.
President on January 17th, 1833, the Senate rejected the nomination although Van Buren had already gone abroad. The defeat of Jackson's pet scheme gave warning of a fight in the near future between the Executive and the Legislative Departments. This particular defeat was due to the union of the opposition.

On January 9th, 1833, the Bank's application for a re-charter was made in both Houses. The Bank was the subject of debate covering a period of six months. The National Republican convention, in accordance with the call of the Maryland legislature, had met at Baltimore on December 1831, and had nominated Clay of Kentucky for the Presidency and Sergeant of Pennsylvania for the Vice-Presidency. In the address issued by this Convention the Bank question was made a leading issue. It eulogized the Bank as a "great and beneficent institution" which "by facilitating exchanges between different parts of the Union, and maintaining a sound, ample, and healthy state of the currency, may be said to supply the body politic, economically viewed, with a continual stream of life-blood, without which it must inevitably languish and sink into exhaustion." It declared that three times the President had gone out of his way to "consign it, as far as his influence extends, to immediate destruction!" The address made clear that it was thought that his reelection would mean such destruction. "Are the people of the United States prepared for this? Are they ready to destroy one of their most valuable establishments to gratify the caprice of a chief?"

1. Register of Debates, VIII., 1309.
2. Niles's Register, XLI., 444.
3. Register of Debates, VIII., 53-4; Catterall, Second Bank of the United States, 221-4.
4. Niles's Register,
magistrate who reasons and advises upon a subject, with the
details of which he is evidently unacquainted, in direct con­
tradiction to his own official counselors?" Clay and Sergeant
were lauded as the great defenders of the Bank.1 There was, then
a direct clash between the opposition and the Administration.
The bill for rechartering the Bank finally passed the Senate
on July 11th by a vote of 28 to 20,2 and by the House on July
4th by the vote of 109 to 76.3 On the 10th of the same month it
was returned vetoed4 in the veto message Jackson enumerated
the various odious features of the monopoly. This veto was re­
garded as valuable campaign material by the National Republic­
ans. On July 11th Webster made a great speech in the Senate
on the veto.5 He prophesied the direst consequences to the
country unless the people should reverse the judgment of the
President. Clay followed on the following day with an ene­
getic harangue.6 The closing paragraph of his speech which con­
tains the charges in the National Republican indictment against
Jackson is as follows: "Mr. President, we are about to close
one of the longest and most arduous sessions of Congress under
the present Constitution; and, when we return among our con­
stituents, what account of the operations of their government
shall we be bound to communicate? We shall be compelled to say
that the Supreme Court is paralyzed, and the missionaries re­
tained in prison in contempt of its authority, and in defiance
of numerous treaties and laws of the United States; that the

1. Niles's Register, XL., 307--et seq.
2. Register of Debates, VIII., 1073.
3. Ibid., 3852.
4. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 576-591.
5. Niles's Register, XLIII., 106-12.
6. Ibid., XLII., 426--et seq.
Executive through the Secretary of the Treasury, sent to Congress a tariff bill which would have destroyed numerous branches of our domestic industry, and led to the final destruction of all; that the veto has been applied to the Bank of the United States; our only reliance for a sound and uniform currency; that the Senate had been violently attacked for the exercise of clearly constitutional power; that the House of Representatives has been unnecessarily assailed; and that the President has promulgated a rule of action for those who have taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States that must, if there be practical conformity to it, introduce general nullification, and end in the absolute subversion of the government?

Stevenson of Virginia had been chosen Speaker of the House in December 1831. He had constituted the Ways and Means Committee favorable to free trade and the Committee on Manufactures evenly balanced as between the protectionists and free traders, with J.Q. Adams as chairman. On January 9th, 1832, Clay reported a resolution to the effect that the tariff ought to be abolished on articles not coming into competition with similar articles made or produced at home, except on silks and wines, and on them ought to be reduced. Hayne on January 16th moved that this be so amended as to declare for a reduction of the tariff to a revenue basis. Debate continued intermittently upon this proposed amendment until June, when the House bill was submitted for concurrence. Meanwhile the House had been excited over the tariff.

2. Register of Debates, VIII., 55.
3. Ibid., 77.
McDuffie on February 8th from the Committee of Ways and Means made a long report condemning the system of protection. The Committee of Manufactures was thus forestalled. But before this bill from the Ways and Means Committee was taken up for discussion there was another report and bill from the Committee on Manufactures. Adams explained that the report and bill was based on a report and bill emanating from the Secretary of the Treasury. The "Globe" said that the proposed modification of the tariff was "predicated on the salutary principles avowed by our venerable President and in the patriotic spirit of reconciliation recommended by him". Protectionists were violently opposed to the bill. They saw that if such was the President's notion of a "judicious" tariff that he might henceforth be regarded as an open enemy. Adams stated that the report was the expression of his views only, and that none of the committees had approved all of it except he himself. While the report in general favored protection Adams at one place went counter to the accepted tenet of all protectionists when he contended that the ultimate effect of raising the duties was not to reduce the cost of the domestic article. His bill was however a fair compromise and it was to a large extent adopted. Then followed nullification in South Carolina. Clay contended that the bill affirmed the principle of protection and this was the opinion of South Carolina. Through it their burdens were lightened, yet they saw a continuance of the principle of protection.

2. Account based on Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, I., 370-87; Niles's Register, XLII., 417.
The National Republican address had declared that Jackson could not be relied upon as a friend of the tariff. It declared that "by avowing his approbation of a judicious tariff, and at the same time recommending to Congress precisely the same policy which had been adopted as the best plan of attack by the opponents of that measure" he had proved his inconsistent and vacillating course. The tariff was another issue in the campaign between the two chief parties in the field.

The question of internal improvements did not form such an important issue as one might expect would have been the case. During the first session under Jackson such had promised to be very important, but at the second session Jackson had signed some internal improvement bills, and this had had the effect of reassuring the friends of such measures. Resolutions were passed in Pennsylvania (legislature) against nullification and for internal improvements. In Missouri at a Jackson convention an address was issued in which it was shown that Jackson had spent more money for internal improvements than Adams had done. Talk was heard of the reformed judgement of the President because he had signed some internal improvement bills. The question of the veto was more important than that of internal improvements in the campaign.

The Jackson Convention met in Baltimore on May 21st, 1833. The committee to which was assigned the duty of preparing an address from the Convention to the people reported that they

1. Niles's Register, XL., 310.
2. Ibid., XL., 58.
4. Ibid., 56.
5. Ibid., XLII., 40, 79, 214-5.
6. Ibid., 355.
7. Ibid., 234.
agreed "fully in the principles and sentiments which they believe ought to be embodied in an address of this description", but they nevertheless advised that the several delegations to the Convention, in place of a general address to the people of the United States, should make such explanations by address or otherwise to their respective constituents. This was an artful way of enabling the adherents of Jackson to proclaim Jackson in one part of the country as an advocate of one thing and in another part as an advocate of another. The members of the Convention no doubt saw that any utterance regarding the bank might lose for them Pennsylvania, and that the adoption of a platform without reference to the bank would be absurd. Jackson's course in vetoing the bank recharter bill had already injured him in Pennsylvania. Early in 1831 a resolution recommending a renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States passed the Senate of Pennsylvania unanimously and the House almost unanimously. And after the veto, many meetings were held condemning Jackson for his course. He had however secured such a hold on the people of that State that many were bound that they would vote for him bank or no bank. It was good politics as one generally understands politics for the Jackson party to leave the proclamation of its principles to the discretion of the local delegations. Jackson had secured a hold on the people because he was the people's man, and because, of course, of his military record. To alienate them it would require indeed despotism on

1. Niles's Register, XLII., 235-6.
2. Ibid., XL, 73.
3. Ibid., XLII., 374-5.
4. Ibid., 394, 406-
the part of the President. If he had begun to act despotic the
thing for his campaign managers to do was to blind the real is-
sues even to the extent of misrepresentation.

During the summer the tendency was for the Anti-Masons
and the National Republicans to unite whenever they could. In
Ohio the National Republicans withdrew their candidate for gov-
ernor and endorsed the Anti-Masonic candidate. The Anti-Masons
in turn withdrew their candidates for electors of President and
Vice-President and endorsed those of the National Republicans,
though they said this was not meant as lending any support to
Clay. In Pennsylvania the National Republicans adopted the "anti-
masonic and anti-Jackson" ticket for electors and withdrew their
own ticket though they said in so doing they were not abandoning
Clay and Sergeant. They expressed themselves as believing that the
candidates thus urged would vote for the man in opposition to
Jackson who with their exertions might have a plurality of the
voters of the Union. A similar "coalition" occurred in New York.
The National Republicans adopted the Anti-Masonic candidates for
governor, lieutenant-governor and the whole ticket for electors
of President and Vice-President. These had been made by the Anti-
Masons purposely acceptable to the National Republicans. Certain
of the Jackson papers ranted against this coalition. The National
Republicans asserted that their purpose was to put down the reg-

1. Miles's Register, XLIII., 53.
2. Ibid., 158-9.
3. Ibid., 118, 136-7.
4. Ibid., XLII., 339, 418.
5. Ibid., 402, (199, 539)
the three States then where the Anti-Masons were most powerful they united with the National Republicans and voted a fusion ticket.

The result of the election showed that Jackson still had a wonderful hold on the people. Niles said that two questions had been settled because of the reelection of Jackson; (1) the right of Congress to appropriate money for internal improvements is generally denied, (2) the unconstitutionality and inexpediency of the Bank of the United States is affirmed. He said that the question of a protective tariff remained fairly debatable. 3

The attention of the last session of Congress was given largely to the tariff. South Carolina during the summer of 1833 was rebellious. On November 24th a Convention called by her legislature passed an Ordinance of Nullification which declared all acts imposing duties on foreign commodities unauthorized by the Constitution and null and void within the limits of South Carolina. Jackson, in his fourth annual message referred to the diplomatic relations of the country, congratulated Congress and the people upon the proximate extinction of the public debt, asserted that such extinction would call for a reduction in the revenue, recommended the consideration of the advisability of reducing the protective tariff, stated that in one quarter of the Union an opposition to the revenue laws had arisen which threatened to thwart their execution if not to endanger the integrity of the Union, and gave notice that he would at once inform Con-

1. Houston, Nullification in South Carolina, 109-12.
2. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 591-506.
3. Niles's Register, XLI., 177.
gress should the exigency arise rendering the execution of the laws impracticable. He announced that the Bank had made arrangements whereby the government might be deprived of the use of the public funds longer than had been anticipated and recommended an investigation in order to determine whether public deposits were safe in the Bank. He called attention to the disposal of the public lands, again dealt with the subject of internal improvements, the method of choosing President and Vice-President, and the tenure of offices in general. Adams asserted that this message went to dissolve the Union into its original elements. It is, he said, a complete surrender to the nullifiers of South Carolina.

On December 10th Jackson's proclamation was issued in which he said it was his duty to enforce the laws, and since the opposition appeared imposing he would indicate the course he intended to pursue. He declared that the doctrine of State veto was absurd. He indicated his views in a special message to Congress on January 16th, 1833. He described the condition of affairs, declared that the Constitution was competent for its own defense, and asked for authority to alter or abolish certain ports of entry and to use the regular army and navy and militia to protect the customs officers in the discharge of their duties. On January 21st, 1833, the Force Bill was reported, the purpose of which was to give the President the powers asked for. This called forth memorable speeches by Calhoun and Webster.

2. Richardson, Messages and Papers, II., 640-656.
3. Ibid., 610-32.
4. Register of Debates, 23d Cong., 2d sess., 150.
Meanwhile the subject which was at the base of all the nullification trouble was being discussed. On December 28th, 1833, Verplanok reported a rather radical free-trade bill. On February 13th, 1833, in the Senate Clay presented a bill intended to be a compromise. He had seen that the tariff was not a means of securing the Presidency and he was ready, from patriotic motives no doubt, to act as the pacificator between the sections. He declared that his purpose was two-fold, to save the tariff and to conciliate South Carolina. On the 20th the Force Bill passed the Senate. On the 26th the Compromise tariff bill, essentially Clay's, was substituted in the House since tariff bills by the Constitution must originate in the House of Representatives. On March 1st this bill passed the Senate and on the same day the House passed the Force Bill. Both went to the President and were signed by him on the following day, and thus as has been said was bound up together the "rod and the olive branch". Clay had fathered a public lands bill which he claimed as part of the compromise. But this was pocket-vetoed by the President and Clay was left out as was often the case.

Clay for the course he pursued regarding the tariff was denounced by many of the protectionists as a traitor to the cause.

But it was out of no love for the Administration or because of a

1. Register of Debates, 23rd Congress, 2d sess., 936.
2. Ibid., 463-82.
3. Ibid., 689.
4. Ibid., 1789-1816.
5. Ibid., 787-809.
6. Ibid., 1903-4.
7. U.S. Statutes at Large, IV., 693, or 633.
loss of his faith in the cause of protection that caused him to do as he did. He was actuated by a supreme desire to allay the danger which seemed imminent. As the "Great Pacifistor" he appeared at his best. As an immediate result of the compromise tariff the Nullification cloud began to vanish. On March 15th the South Carolina Convention rescinded the Ordinance of Nullification, but three days later issued a final triumphant shot by adopting an Ordinance annulling the Force Act. Nullification disappeared from the scene of action and left the field clear for a reorganization of forces. But as it slowly stalked away it uttered a promise in the form of the ordinance annulling the Force Act, to return again. It came again twenty years later as it gave promise of doing, and found a fairly well organized Whig Party. It is needless to say that returning with renewed vigor it was able to destroy that which in leaving it had permitted to take form. Within a year after the scare had passed over, the Whig Party in fact and in name had been moulded.

1. W. H. Dallas, Nullification of South Carolina, 130-3.
CHAPTER VIII.

THE PARTY REBORN AND CHRISTENED THE "WHIG PARTY."

On the day after the President signed the Compromise Tariff Act and the Force Act, the House adopted a resolution by a vote of 109 to 46 declaring that the government deposits might be safely continued in the Bank of the United States. But Jackson was bent on removal. During the summer he sent Amos Kendall, one of his henchmen, on a mission of visitation in order to ascertain the banks that would be willing to keep the public money. On the 18th day of September Jackson read a paper to the cabinet, which had been prepared by Taney, in which his reasons for the removal were fully set forth. Little did it matter to him whether the cabinet members approved or not. On the 20th the "Globe" announced that on or before October 1st deposits of the public money would cease to be made in the United States Bank and would begin to be made in certain State banks.

Duane, Secretary of the Treasury, attempted to thwart Jackson's purpose by refusing to order the removal of the deposits or to resign. Whereupon Jackson curtly dismissed his Secretary. Taney at once became Secretary of the Treasury and on September 26th he issued orders for removal.

1 Register of Debates, 22nd Cong., 2d Sess., 1922.
2 McMaster, History of the United States, VI., 188
3 Richardson, Messages and Papers, III., 519
4 McMaster, History of the United States, VI., 191
5 Macdonald, Select Documents, 1776-1861, 295-300.
The 23d Congress met on December 2d, 1833. Andrew Stevenson was re-elected Speaker of the House of Representatives on the first ballot. On the following day the President sent his annual message to Congress, in which he explained the removal of the deposits on the ground of the Bank's pernicious activity in politics. On the same day Taney, in a letter addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, gave a full statement of the reasons for the removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the United States. In this he showed that the Secretary of the Treasury had the right to remove the deposits and that such course at this time was expedient. On the day following the delivery of these remarkable documents, Jackson took the extraordinary course of sending a veto message to the new Congress of a bill that had passed at the end of the last session. This was Clay's pet public-land bill which provided for the distribution pro rata among the States of the proceeds of the public lands. It had passed Congress by such a majority as to indicate that it might have secured a two-thirds vote, so that if the President had then vetoed it it is quite probable that it might have passed over his veto. But by pocket vetoing the measure he effectively killed it. And now

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 2136
2. Richardson's Messages and Papers, III., 19-35
3. Register of Debates, 23d Cong. 1st Sess., (Appendix) 59-68
4. Richardson, Messages and Papers, III., 56-69.
in his message he attempted to excuse his action by saying that he had not had time to consider the bill before the adjournment of Congress. This gave Clay another personal grievance. The House could be relied upon to support the Administration. Niles analyzed the parties in Congress as follows: (1) the Jackson party proper, (2) the Jackson-Van-Buren party, (3) the Jackson-anti-Van Buren party, (4) the anti-Jackson party, (5) the nullifying and anti-Jackson party, (6) the anti-Masonic and anti-Jackson party. In the House he said the first three named amounted to about 140, while the last three amounted to about 100, but in the Senate the majority was against the President. Under such circumstances Clay began the task of upholding the legislative department which, it seemed to many, had been cringing before the Executive department. As soon as the veto of the land bill reached Congress Clay gave vent to his stored up wrath. He had claimed the measure as a part of the compromise arranged with the Nullifiers and now he inveighed against the President as having withheld the bill arbitrarily and unconstitutionally, and because of which Congress, especially the Senate, was deprived of its constitutional right of passing on the bill. He

1. Niles' Register, XLV., 228.
declared that such despotism ought not to be tolerated.

This was merely a foretaste of what was to come. On December 10th he said that he desired to find out who it was that had ordered the removal of the deposits and he moved the following resolution: "That the President of the United States be requested to inform the Senate whether a paper, under date of the 18th day of September, 1833, purporting to have been read by him to the heads of the several departments, relating to the deposits of the public money in the treasury of the United States, and alleged to have been published by his authority, be genuine or not; and, if it be genuine, that he be requested to cause a copy of the said paper to be laid before the Senate." ¹

Clay of course knew that the paper was genuine, but he was looking for an opportunity to strike the President a blow. On the next day the resolution was adopted by a vote of 23 to 18.² But on the day following this vote the President struck back: "The Executive is a co-ordinate and independent branch of the Government equally with the Senate; and I have yet to learn under what constitutional authority that branch of the Legislature has a right to require of me an account of

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong. 1st Sess., 27.
2. Ibid., 37.
any communication, either verbally or in writing, made to the heads of departments acting as a cabinet council. Clay regarded the blow as a mere feint, and on the 26th of December he introduced his famous resolutions of censure. They were as follows: (1) "That, by dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury, because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposit with the Bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion; and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which had been done, the President has assumed the exercise of a power over the Treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people"; (2) "That the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for the removal of the money of the United States, deposited in the Bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to Congress on the 3d day of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient."

Clay's long speech on the resolutions was very violent against Jackson. He accused the President of "open, palpable, and daring usurpation." He declared that after

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong. 1st. Sess., 37
2. Ibid., 58-9
3. Ibid., 59-94
Jackson had secured all the other powers of the government, executive, legislative, and judicial, he had finally seized the public purse, as Caesar seized the treasury of Rome. In his peroration he declared: "The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die—base, mean, and abject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind, unpitied, unwept, and unmourned!" An immense crowd had gathered to hear Clay. At the conclusion of his speech they became so enthusiastic that it was necessary to order the galleries to be cleared.1

Calhoun vied with Clay in an effort to outdo him in vituperation and his efforts were attended with a remarkable show of success.2 He, with Clay, said that the question in its true light was a struggle on the part of the Executive to seize the power of Congress, and to unite in the President the sword and the purse. He declared that the plundering of the Roman treasury, with sword in hand, was a virtuous act as compared with the recent conduct of Jackson. "The actors in our case", he declared, "are of a different character—artful, cunning, and corrupt politicians, and not fearless warriors. They have entered

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong. 1st Sess., 94.
2. Ibid., 206—223.
the treasury, not sword in hand, as public plunderers, but, with the false keys of sophistry, as pilferers, under the silence of midnight. The motives and the object are the same, varied in like manner by circumstances and character. 'With money I will get men, and with men money' was the maxim of the Roman plunderer. 'With money we will get partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money,' is the maxim of our public pilferers.'

Webster also spoke in decided opposition to the President's course. 1 On February 5th, 1834, the second resolution offered by Clay and the report of the Secretary of the Treasury were referred to the Finance Committee. 2 Finally on March 29th the resolution as reported back by the Finance Committee was adopted by the vote of 28 to 18, 3 in the following form: "That the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for the removal of the money of the United States, deposited in the Bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to Congress on the 4th day of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient." On the same day the first resolution offered by Clay was modified to read as follows: "That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution.

Register of Debates, 23d Cong. 1st Sess., 466-67, 74, 82-85.
2. Ibid., 466
3. Ibid., 1187
and laws, but in derogation of both." In this form it was passed by a vote of 26 to 20.1

Two weeks later on April 15th Jackson sent to the Senate an elaborate Protest.2 He declared that the resolution of censure was unconstitutional and that it was necessary for the President to vindicate himself. He contended that the Legislative department was stepping over its bounds, asserted that he had been accused and found guilty of an impeachable offense, but in an entirely unconstitutional way, and he asked that the Protest be entered on the Journal. Before the vote was taken Webster made a powerful speech against the President's course, in which he endeavored to vindicate the Senate's right to pass the resolution of censure and in which he plead, as an able advocate, for the preservation of the Senate's rights against the onslaughts of Executive usurpation. Finally, after three weeks had been taken up in debating the question whether the Protest should be entered on the Journal, the question was disposed of on May 7th by the passage of four resolutions, each by the vote of 27 to 16.4 They were in substance as follows:

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 1187
2. Ibid., 1317-1336
3. Ibid., 1711-12.
4. Ibid., 1663-1690.
President inconsistent with the just authority of the two Houses of Congress, and with the United States Constitution; (2) That the President has no right to send a protest to the Senate against any of its proceedings and request the Senate to enter such on its Journal; (3) That such is a breach of the privileges of the Senate, and that it be not entered on the Journal. As will be seen later the Protest had an important influence on the politics of the day.

Meanwhile the Senate and the President were having other troubles. On December 17th, 1833, Jackson nominated Jas. A. Bayard, Peter Wagner, Henry D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, and Hugh McElderry and government Directors in the United States Bank for the year 1834. On January 21st the Senate consented to the nomination of Bayard, but on February 11th a resolution to inquire into the fitness of the others was voted down, and on the 27th the nominations were rejected. Jackson, determined not to be thwarted in his purposes, again sent their names in to the Senate March 11th in a message vindicating their conduct, eulogizing their character, and protesting against their rejection by the Senate.

1. Register of Debates, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., (Appendix) 369
2. Ibid., 310
3. Ibid 310-11.
But with commendable independence the Senate again rejected them May 11th by a vote of 30 to 11.¹

It is thus evident that Jackson met with stubborn resistance in the Senate. But in the House he controlled a majority. On December 13th, 1833, a memorial from the Government Directors of the United States Bank was presented to the House.² It stated that the Bank had sought to deprive the Directors for the Government of every right conferred on them by the charter, and to assume to themselves "a secret, irresponsible, and unlimited power". On December 18th, Horace Binney of Philadelphia presented to the House of Representatives a memorial from the President and Directors of the Bank of the United States.³ This document states that the custody of the public moneys was a part of the original contract between the Bank and the government, that the Bank had performed its part of the contract, that the order of the Secretary of the Treasury had broken the contract, and the Bank asked the House for redress.

This, along with other memorials, was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means of which Polk, who led the Democrats, was chairman. On April 4th the committee reported to the House and the House adopted its findings.⁴

¹. Register of Debates 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 316.
². Ibid., 2181; Pt. 4, (Appendix) 82-94.
³. Ibid., Pt. 2, 2207—2220.
⁴. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3472—3477.
It was resolved by a vote of 134 to 82 that "the Bank of the United States ought not to be re-chartered"; by 118 to 103 "that the public deposits ought not to be restored"; by 117 to 105 "that state banks ought to be continued as the places of deposit"; and by 175 to 42 that a select committee should be appointed to make an examination of the Bank's affairs and an investigation of the reasons for the commercial panic. The committee was accordingly appointed. But the Bank successfully frustrated all the efforts made to investigate its books, by refusing to submit such for the inspection of the committee. The majority of the committee reported to the House on May 22d their failure, and submitted resolutions declaring that the Bank had thus contemned the legitimate authority of the House, that either house may compel the production of any such paper or books as had been called for, and may compel the President and Directors of the Bank to testify to such interrogatories as might be necessary to a full understanding of the Bank, and that the Speaker of the House issue a warrant to the Sergeant-at-Arms for the arrest of the President and Directors and for bringing them to the bar of the House to answer for contempt of its lawful authority. The minority of the committee reported on the same day.

2. Ibid., 193-205.
This report justified the Directors in every particular. The motion of the majority was never acted on.

On January 2d, 1834, the commissioner of pensions ordered the Bank to give up the books, accounts, and funds relating to pensions disbursed under the act of June 7th, 1832. But the Bank refused to be any such thing. And so on the 4th day of February Jackson, in a veritable rage, sent a message to Congress complaining of the Bank's action. The Senate of course decided that the Bank was right and Jackson wrong, while the House decided that Jackson was right and the Bank wrong.

Congress adjourned June 7th, leaving the President as much master of the field as he had been at the beginning of the session. The session was a remarkable one nevertheless,—the most remarkable ever held within the walls of the Capitol perhaps. It was indeed the "panic session", so-called because of the great commercial panic which had the country within its crushing grip. The trouble was due largely to the fight on the Bank. The Bank authorities were fully cognizant of the temper of Jackson and his allies. Since the institution had come to a point where it expected it might have to

2. Register of Debates, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., (Appendix) 108-10
3. Ibid., 101-2
go out of business in March 1836 it was only natural that it should begin to diminish its operations. It began its operations of curtailment on August 13th, 1833, and closed effectually July 11th, 1834, and closed entirely on September 16th, 1834. The total contraction through the reduction of discounts, through restrictions on drawing of bills of exchange, through the collection of balances against State banks, through the restrictions placed on the receipt of State bank notes, and through the hoarding of specie, amounted to a reduction of the Bank's business from August 1st, 1833, to August 1st, 1834, of probably over twenty-five million dollars.

The bank was placed in an impregnable position, thereby, while the county suffered severely. Pressure constantly increased from September 1833 to May 1834. By December of 1833 laborers were being discharged because of their employers could not procure credit. In January failures of business houses and banks began, continuing without intermission until June. May, however, marked the culmination of the distress. In the issue of "Niles's Register" for May 24th the editor says: "We have never seen or felt anything like the present pressure, and it is

1. Catterall, Second Bank of the U. S., 314; Senate Documents., 17, 23c., 1s., 16-18
2. Ibid., 314-325.
3. Ibid., 325-6
4. Niles's Register, XLV., 265
5. Ibid., 309, 375, 390, 393; XLVI; 5, 65, 96, 113, 117, 245.
becoming every day worse and worse."¹ By the middle
of July money was more plentiful.² Throughout a large
part of the session of 1833-4 distress ruled the country.
Distress petitions and memorials literally flowed into
Congress. There were in fact 223 petitions in all, of
which 52 approved the removal of the deposits, and 171
asked for their restoration to the Bank of the United
States.³ The blame for the existing conditions was not
definitely fixed. The Bank, in answer to charges that
it was to blame, each time would retor that the Adminis-
tration was responsible for the distress, and it prefaced
every movement towards contraction by a reference to the
sins of the President.⁴ At first the Administration
denied the distress. Later, when such a stand would
have been manifestly absurd, the Administration and its
partisans alleged that the Bank and its partisans were
framing up evidence of such conditions.⁵ It was true
that the supporters of the Bank were glad of the oppor-
tunity offered for representing to the people the de-
plorable conditions of the country. In fact Nicholas
Biddle and the Directors were confident that they would
be able to force a re-charter.⁶ On January 14th, 1834,

¹ Niles's Register, XLV., 204
² Ibid., 346
³ Parton's Jackson, III., 546.
⁴ Catterall, Second Bank of the United States, 328.
⁵ Benton, Thirty Years View, I., 421.
⁶ Catterall, 2d Bank, 331.
Clay wrote to Francis Brooke as follows: "What is doing in your legislature about the deposits? We want all aid here on that subject which can be given us from Richmond. What has been done there has been of immense service to us." 1 On February 10th, he again wrote to Brooke. "The debate on the deposits continues," he said, "-- -- -- -- -- --. Our city is full of distress committees. The more the better." 2.

Excitement was at a high pitch. Benton said: "It will be difficult for people in after times to realize the degree of excitement, of agitation and commotion which was produced by this organized attempt to make panic and distress. The great cities especially were the scene of commotions but little short of frenzy." 3 One morning in the Senate Clay enacted a remarkable scene. On March 7th, 1834, he was speaking in support of referring a memorial from Philadelphia mechanics after a calmer effort had been made by Webster. During his speech he delivered an apostrophe. 4 "To you, sir," exclaimed the orator, addressing Van Buren, the Vice-President,"-- -- -- -- I make the appeal. By your official and personal relations with the President, you maintain with him an intercourse which I neither enjoy nor covet. Go to

2. Ibid., 377.
3. Benton, Thirty Years View, I., 421.
4. Register of Debates,X.,Pt.1,
tell him the actual condition of his bleeding country.
Tell him that it is nearly ruined by the measures which
he has been induced to put into operations. Tell him that in a single city — bankruptcies
involving a loss of upwards of fifteen millions of dollars
have occurred. Tell him of the alarming decline in the
value of all property, of the depreciation of all products of industry, of the stagnation in every branch
of business, and of the close of numerous manufacturing
establishments which a few short months ago were in
active and flourishing operation. Depict to him, if
you can, find language to portray, the heart-rending
wretchedness of thousands of working classes cast out
of employment. Tell him of the tears of helpless
widows, no longer able to earn their bread, and of unclad and
unfed orphans who have been driven, by his policy out
of the busy pursuits in which but yesterday they were
gaining an honest livelihood. Entreat him," he finally added, "to pause, and to reflect that there
is a point beyond which human endurance cannot go and
let him not drive this brave, generous, and patriotic
people to madness and despair." Colonel Benton records
"that during the delivery of this apostrophe, the Vice-
President maintained the utmost decorum, looking respec-
fully and even innocently, at the speaker all the while, as if treasuring up every word he said, to be faithfully repeated to the President", then after the speech was finished, having called a senator to the chair he went up to Clay "for a pinch of his fine maccaboy snuff", and having received it walked calmly away.  

This speech was taken earnestly in some parts of the country, and at a great meeting at Philadelphia it was resolved "that Martin Van Buren deserves, and will deserve the execrations of all good men, should he shrink from the responsibility of conveying to Andrew Jackson, the message sent by the Honorable Henry Clay, when the builders memorial was presented to the Senate".  

The grand jury of Davidson County, North Carolina, presented Andrew Jackson for "his arbitrary, despotic and unconstitutional conduct, in seizing the public money", "his haughty and kingly deportment", etc.  

On the other hand Jackson's supporters assailed the Senate as an Oligarchic institution attempting to overthrow the Executive. The "Pennsylvanians" thought the Senate should be altered or abolished.  

Gossip had it that the President would issue a proclamation against the Senate if it should refuse to receive his Protest and

1. Benton, Thirty Years View, I., 420  
2. Niles's Register, XLVI., 93.  
3. Ibid., 155-6  
4. Ibid., 131.
that a gathering was making in Washington to support him in "certain ulterior measures". ¹ McDuffie in a speech at Baltimore referred to such reports and was wildly cheered when he declared "that 10 days after the entrance of the soldiers into the Senate chamber, to send the Senators home, that 200,000 volunteers would be in Washington."²

The time was ripe for a new alignment of parties. The excitement reached to almost every nook of the county. It was only natural that the outburst of popular indignation should first break upon the Administration. Such is generally the case. This fact coupled with the real provocation for popular protest, which Jackson had undoubtedly given, made conditions especially favorable. Now, if ever, was the time for a common bond of sympathy to bind an incongruous combination into an apparent unity. Now was the opportune time for the party born in 1825 to experience a re-birth and to go forth with renewed strength and virility to wrestle with "King Andrew". The political elements of the country had been too long hindered in their onward flow by a triple division and they now began to turn back into two definite and distinct parties. We have noticed in a former chapter events which tended to this confluence; the nullification trouble which had

1. Miles's Register, XLVI., 145.
2. Ibid., 146.
alienated South Carolina and many all over the South, the election of 1832-3 in which there was a fusion of National Republicans and Anti-Masons in some of the States. This election really sounded the death knell of the National Republicans and the Anti-Masons, for it told effectually the fact that the Anti-Masonic ship would flee from Clay, in their eyes a true Scylla, because of his views regarding masonry, as a political issue. In short neither the Anti-Masons or the National Republicans could bring themselves to the place where they would be willing to unite under the banner of the other. There was wanting a new slogan, a new flag, a new name under which all those who were opposed to the Administration could unite. In the way of real and enduring national issues there was little to prevent such a union. The tariff had been taken out of politics by the Compromise of 1833, internal improvements were no longer a factor to be considered, the Bank was doomed it was pretty certain, though it was necessary for the opposition to pose as being favorable to it, since the Administration was so bitterly against the Bank and since the Bank controversy was largely responsible for the crisis of the time. What was there then to hinder a re-birth upon the paramount issue of Executive usurpation, the relation which the Executive should bear to the Legislative department?
Jackson's opponents

It was an easy matter for Jackson's opponents to make a party on such an issue and postpone financial and other policies until power should be entrusted to them.

One of the most important considerations in forming such a party is the choice of a name. Just when or where the name Whig was suggested has been a matter of some doubt. Nathan Sargent asserts that he suggested the name and upon the suggestion the name came to be adopted. He relates that a number of gentlemen were about to begin the publication of a tri-weekly political paper, to be called the "Star Spangled Banner" and that he suggested to Joseph McIlvaine, recorder of Philadelphia, that it would be well to drop that name and substitute one which would appeal "to the patriotic sympathy of the masses". McIlvaine replied that they had no such name. Whereupon Sargent suggested the term "Whig", the name by which the patriots of the Revolution were known. McIlvaine, he says, concurred with the suggestion and at his request Sargent wrote an article for the first number of the "Star Spangled Banner", February 11th, 1834, proposing the change. From that time the paper designated the opposition party as "Whigs". The paper was sent to every member

1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 262.
of Congress of any prominence during the rest of the session, and soon the term Whig was generally adopted.\(^1\)

It is certain that by April 12th, 1832 the opponents of the Administration in New York and Connecticut were known as "Whigs", and that they called their opponents by the offensive name of "Tories".\(^2\)

The election in New York city was held on April 9th, 10th, and 11th. Great excitement prevailed. Niles records that "the parties seem to have been engaged in a death struggle: the public officers and all their dependents, with the friends of the general and state governments, on the one side— and the merchants and traders and mechanics, and opponents of the general and state governments on the other." There was a great deal of confusion at the polls.\(^3\) During the three days the "Whigs" had a miniature frigate, "Constitution", which they drew through the streets.\(^4\) This frigate "Constitution" was destined to occupy an important place in other Whig meetings. It was a very effective way of expressing the one great issue of the campaign—a popular way of expressing the belief that the Constitution was at stake. The immediate result of the election was to place all the municipal power of the city

1. Sargent, Public Men and Events, I., 262.
3. Ibid., 100-1.
4. Ibid., 116.
in the hands of the anti-Jackson party.\textsuperscript{1} Immediately following the election a very large public meeting was held in Philadelphia "to compliment the 'Whigs' of New York on the late victory gained by them." The resolutions alluded "to the recent triumph of the friends of the constitution in New York". Great enthusiasm manifested itself.\textsuperscript{2} A grand "Whig" salute of 100 guns was fired on the common at Boston when the news of the victory in New York was heard and a general meeting of the people was called.\textsuperscript{3} An immense multitude of people partook of a collation in Castle Garden, New York to celebrate the victory. Among the ceremonies was the firing of a salute from the miniature frigate "Constitution".\textsuperscript{4} About a week after these meetings a vast concourse estimated at 50,000, attending from various States, met near Philadelphia as a rallying "to support the constitution" and "in honor of the late Whig victory at New York". A large delegation was present from New York and they brought with them the frigate "Constitution". At the close of the meeting nine cheers were given for the "Whigs of New York".\textsuperscript{5} In Connecticut the Whigs won in the election, an election which "warmed the people into

\textsuperscript{1} Miles' Register, XLVI., 115.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 116.
\textsuperscript{3} Idem., 116.
\textsuperscript{4} Idem., 116.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.; 130
action." Impetus was given to the opposition just at this time because of the President's Protest, which it will be recalled, had been sent to the Senate on April 15th. The first great meeting to protest against the Protest was held in Baltimore on April 23d. It was the largest meeting that had ever assembled in Baltimore on any like occasion; probably 10,000 people were in attendance. The primary purpose of the meeting was to adopt certain proceedings with a view of expressing the opinions of the people on the late Protest of the President. A series of resolutions was drawn up and passed, repudiating the doctrines of the Protest and sustaining the Senate, and others for the formation of a "State Whig society". Mob violence was rampant and numerous fights took place between the "Democrats" and the "Whigs". Niles in speaking of the proceedings of the people in various places with reference to the elections in New York and the Protest of the President said: "We have passed through several seasons of high excitement, and mixed much with the people, and felt and acted freely with them, at different times, since the year 1717; but a degree of animation now prevails, or is about to prevail, which goes beyond that of past times,

1. Niles's Register, XLVI., 117.
2. Ibid., 130, 165-166.
3. Ibid., 130-131.
and may be considered an augury of exceedingly important events. And this animation and excitement is hourly increased by the new difficulties experienced in business, and the greatly increasing number of persons cast out of employment.¹ And again he says in the same issue of his "Register" for April 26th:

The ardency of public feeling hourly increases—and its influence is extending with accelerated force over all parts of the country. The result of the New York election with the now relied on issue in Virginia, have given fresh courage to one party, and even increased the zeal of the other, whose strength is said to be weakening.——-—-It may be observed also that the 'anti-Jackson' party are generally assuming the appellation of 'Whigs'—to this no objection ought to be made, seeing that the 'Jackson' party exclusively assumed to itself the 'democratic' name.² In May the party opposed to Jackson was successful in Virginia. Following this victory were several great Whig meetings.³

It was now certain that the Whig party would be a great national party. The masses were stirred. The issue at stake cannot better be stated than Niles

1. Niles' Register, XLVI., 130.
2. Ibid., 131.
3. Ibid., 190, 243.
has stated it. "The result of various late elections", he wrote early in June, "and the excited feeling that prevails among the people, shows, as we have always contended would be the case, that PARTY POLITICS are being, or about to be, discarded, in considerations that reach the heart and home of every man, unless a petted office-holder, or others living upon fixed incomes. The great question is not now 'Jackson' or 'anti-Jackson', though these words are still used to express ideas--it is whether our late public safety and private prosperity, under just interpretations of the constitution and a wholesome administration of the laws, shall be restored or, the present confused and alarming state of the public mind and increase of public suffering, caused by a perseverance in the rash and ill-advised acts of one man, the president of the United States, shall be permitted to continue and extend the general excitement and general distress—and so the people, the sovereign people, will soon decide upon it, the blind leadings and abject followings of mere party men to the contrary notwithstanding. 1

It remains finally to trace the steps by which the Anti-Masons were led to join the new party. As we have already seen in a previous chapter, in the

1. Niles' Register, XLVI., 242.
election of 1832 the National Republicans and Anti-Masons united upon fusion tickets on the basis of mutual concessions. But the movement in 1834 was reorganization under the banners of a new party, although the National Republicans formed the nucleus about which the other discontented elements gathered. On March 27th, 1834, there was held a meeting of the Anti-Masonic members of the House of Representatives at which J. Q. Adams was the presiding official. The occasion for the meeting was the presence of Granger of New York in the city of Washington. He reported to the meeting that Masonry was practically extinct in western New York and that as a result the spirit of Anti-Masonry had subsided. In his opinion it would be impossible to longer maintain a mere Anti-Masonic party. And all of the New York members were of the same opinion. The Anti-Masonic leaders, as Adams says, were discouraged. The fact that the Anti-Masons were just at this time so willing to go into the new party was quite as much due to the fact that the cause for such agitation had largely disappeared, as to the fact that Jackson was "reigning."

In a letter dated July 31st, 1834, Pliny Merricks wrote in behalf of the Anti-Masonic committee for the county of Worcester to the governor of Massachusetts.

said: "The measures and the policy of the present national administration have been, and now are, of such character as to awaken in every patriotic mind a strong feeling of solicitude for the preservation of our constitution and laws, and the perpetuity of our republican institutions". The opponents of the administration in Massachusetts are divided. "It is obvious to every one that the masonic institution is the cause of this division. Must that division necessarily continue? In the present aspect of our affairs having reference alike to public opinion and the existing laws of the commonwealth upon this subject, is it not reasonable to anticipate that the sentiments of the whig defenders of the constitution will be found to be so far in accordance with those whose motto is 'the supremacy of the laws' as to enable them, at least on great and leading questions of policy, to act in harmonious union with each other?" 1 Gov. Davis in his answer said that the request had not come from those who had supported him, but he thought it came not from a spirit of political intrigue "but from an honest desire to advance the public good.---I concur, therefore, in the opinion that this commonwealth will not have its just influence in the councils of the United States, unless those who harmonize in their views

1. Niles' Register, XLVI., 433-4.
of public policy can act in concert."¹ During the month of August the Anti-Masons in several of the strong Anti-Masonic counties of Pennsylvania held large meetings and resolved to go back to their political preferences, and as Niles adds: "As a body the anti-masons are also anti-administration"; they go back to rescue the constitution "from the misrule of those who have despised its claims and trespassed upon its sacred provisions".²

At a Masonic meeting in Worcester County, Massachusetts, held on August 18, 1834, resolutions were passed to the effect that it had become a civil duty to endeavor to effect the entire extinction of the masonic institution by voluntary and general relinquishment and that "the act of incorporation of the grand lodge of Massachusetts having been surrendered— an act of the legislature having declared any unauthorized oath or obligation unlawful—the meetings of most of the lodges in the State having been suspended, and masons in different parts of the commonwealth having generally long since ceased to act as such, we believe their views in regard to the masonic institution are in accordance with our own". They invited others to make similar expressions of their views.³ It was estimated that in New York from four-fifths to seven-eights

¹. Niles' Register, XLVI, 434
². Ibid., 430
³. Ibid., 447-8.
of the lodges and chapters were closed, and that the society was in a rapid state of decline in several other States. 1 At a convention of the Anti-Masons of the county of Washington, New York, on August 21st, 1834, it was resolved that the Anti-Masonic party was not dissolved, but that masonry depended for its perpetuity on the Jackson party "under whose shelter it has taken refuge." It has rallied around and clung to the skirts of Andrew Jackson", and "that if by our divisions the dominant party retain their power, we subserve most effectually the cause of free masonry" and "that the union of free-masonry with Jacksonism and the regency, demands the union of all opposed to either". 2 Mies said September 6th that the masons were rapidly withdrawing themselves from the society in the East. 3 A circular was signed by some of the most influential citizens in Washington County, New York, and affords an example of the movement. "Free masonry", it ran, "has been, and in some degree, still unhappily continues to be, the all exciting and disturbing subject in the community. Our connection with the institution is charged as the cause of preventing perfect harmony and concert of action among those in this country who entertain the same opinions respecting the measures

1. Niles' Register, XLVI., 448
2. Ibid., XLVII., 35.
3. Ibid., XLVII., 4.
of government and the grand questions of national im-
portance now before the people. The political aspect
of the times, no less than the interest of social peace,
we believe requires of every man who loves his country
to exemplify his devotedness to the general good by
a surrender not only of individual interest, but if
needful of a manly sacrifice of personal feelings and
long cherished partialities. In order then to promote
social peace and to remove all cause of offense or
alienation out of the way of our friends, and in order
to deprive our opponents of a weapon which is used
against the Whig cause with untiring and mischievous
activity, we do publicly declare our total abandonment
of free-masonry forever.¹ On September 20th, Miles
remarked that politics had entered the masonic question;
that of the body of Masons four-fifths to nine-tenths
belonged to the opposition party and that hence the lead-
ing purpose of the Jackson party was to keep alive an
Anti-Masonic party. By so doing they might command by
reason of the division in the opposition party. At the
same time the members of the anti-Jackson party were
joining with the Anti-Masons in order to quiet them
and to aid them in closing the lodges of the masons.²

¹ Miles' Register, XLVII., 4-5.
² Ibid., XLVII., 34.
was held in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, which recommended
that the lodges of that district should surrender their
charters. 1 A large number of lodges were dissolved
in Massachusetts, 2 and Vermont, 3 at this time. A paper
dated October 1st, 1834, and signed by numerous citizens
of Buffalo stated that an anti-masonic county conven-
tion had been called to meet on October 15th to make
nominations for Congress, county officers, etc., and
declared that the Whigs of the city and town being
desirous of harmony agreed to forego all feeling that
they might have regarding local party strife in order
to accomplish a great national good. This paper was
regarded as important by many of the politicians of
New York. Thomas M. Clark was announced as the anti-
masonic candidate for State senator in Essex, but he
withdrew because the public interest in masonry had al-
most ceased, as he said, and because union and harmony
was essential regarding great national questions. 5
November 15th, 1834, Niles remarked that the bitter
divisions among the people regarding anti-masonry
had about abated if it was not altogether done away,
and that probably the reflecting people of the United
States would have much more important matters to deal

1. Niles' Register XLVII., 62-3.
2. Ibid., 72.
3. Ibid., 73.
4. Ibid., 104.
5. Ibid., 134.
While other meetings of later date could be cited such would take us beyond the period of rebirth into the history of the Whig development and its later accessions. We have seen the period of greatest excitement, for by the fall and winter the depression in business was far less oppressive than in the spring. And in the fall elections the anti-administration party was not so successful. Spirit was not running so high. But nevertheless a party had been regenerated and in its regenerated form it was destined to exert a great influence on the history of the country for a period of twenty years. The Anti-Masons for the most part united with the Whigs. In order to illustrate this movement further, it may be well to give an account of the election in the State of New York in 1834. William H. Seward was one of the several who afterwards became prominent in national affairs who got his start as an Anti-Mason. In 1834 he was nominated by the enthusiastic Whig State Convention for governor of New York. The little band of Anti-Masons and the other elements of the opposition party united as one. The new party thus formed exulted in its name. Its members announced themselves as the true successors of the "Whigs of '76" and called their

1. *Miles' Register*, XLVII., 163.
movement a revolution against "King Andrew", whom they charged with "tyranny", "usurpation", and "denial of popular rights". They raised their liberty poles in Boston and New York as their ancestors had done in the former revolution. But this time it was in defiance of the hickory poles of the Democrats. Their emblems were "the nation's flag, live eagles, and portraits of Washington". Webster was there and added to the enthusiasm by saying: "I have been educated from my cradle in the principles of the Whigs of '76!" The term Whig pleased the Federalists of New England. Webster had appealed to the "old Whigs" in a Federal pamphlet. The name pleased the States Rights party. Hayne had used it in his debate with Webster. For a long time there had been a newspaper called the "Whig" in Virginia. Jefferson had several times spoken of Whigs and Tories—his belief being that in every government there are two parties, the one cherishing the people, the other fearing them. As the irony of fate would have it Van Buren had made a similar distinction which was now thrown back at him. Van Buren was speaking in the Senate on Foot's amendment to the rules of the Senate by which it was proposed to give the vice-president

2. Lodge's Webster, 44.
the right to call to order for words spoken in debate." He said that the Senate should be wholly exempt from executive control. "In every point of view in which this subject has presented itself to his (Van Buren) mind it had produced but one sentiment, and that was unqualified opposition to the prerogative claimed by the chair. Although this claim of power is now for the first time made, the principle in which it originates is as old as the government itself. I look upon it, sir, as the legitimate offspring of a school of politicians, which has, in times past, agitated and greatly disturbed the country—of a school the leading principle of which may be traced to that great source of the political contentions which have pervaded every country where the rights of man were in any degree respected. I allude, sir, to that collision which seems to be inseparable from the nature of man, between the rights of the few and the many—to those never ceasing conflicts between the advocates of enlargement and concentration of power, on the one hand, and its limitation and distribution, on the other: conflicts which, in England, created the distinction between Whigs and Tories: the latter striving by all the means within their reach to increase the dominion and influence of the throne, at the expense of the commons.
and people; and the former to counteract the exertions of their adversaries, by abridging its dominions and influence, for the advancement of the rights and consequent amelioration of the condition of the people." 1

We have thus seen the formation of the Whig Party as such in the year 1834, formed upon far less distinctive national policies than had been the case with the National Republicans. The union of the dissatisfied elements was upon a principle broad enough to include all those who were opposed to the methods of the Executive. Horace Greeley's Almanac for 1838 describes the party as then constituted, and so similar is it to the party of 1834, that to quote him will effectively describe the nature of the new party, which formed about the National Republicans as a nucleus, and with which the Anti-Masons were for the most part able to coalesce, though an Anti-Masonic organization was kept up for a number of years. 2 Greeley describes the party as follows: "(1) Most of those who, under the name of National Republicans, had previously been known as supporters of Adams and Clay, and advocates of the American system; (2) most of those who, acting in defense of what they deemed the assailed or threatened rights of the States, had been stigmatized as Nullifiers, or the less virulent States' Rights men, who were thrown into a position of armed neutrality towards the Administration by the doctrines

1. Niles's Register, XLVI., 434-5.
of the proclamation of 1832 against South Carolina; (3) a majority of those before known as Anti-Masons; (4) Many who had up to that time been known as Jackson men, but who united in condemning the high-handed conduct of the Executive, the immolation of Duane, and the subserviency of Taney; (5) numbers who had not before taken any part in politics, but who were now awakened from their apathy by the palpable usurpations of the Executive, and the imminent peril of our whole fabric of constitutional liberty and national prosperity. These elements, it may be said, constituted the Whig Party of 1834; the party born in 1825, re-born and christened the Whig Party in 1834.
APPENDIX.
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   A. General secondary works.


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