Evolution of the Roycean Philosophy

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A THESIS.

By E. H. Parisho.
Bibliography.

McCintock and Strong---------Encyclopaedia.

Rogers-------------------------Student's history of Philosophy.

Locke----------------------Concerning Human Understanding.

Spinoza-----------------------------Ethics.

Descartes------------------Discourse on Method.

Leibniz------------------Discourse on Metaphysics.

Royce----------------------Religious Aspects of Philosophy.

Royce-----------------------Spirit of Modern Philosophy.

Royce------------------------The World and the Individual. I.

Royce------------------------The World and the Individual. II.

Royce------------------------Conception of God.
Introduction.

IDEALISM.

The thought that unity runs through all experience. The doctrine of Idealism is usually thought of as beginning with Plato, "The term ideas was older than Plato; but its application to heavenly types, its metaphysical employment, and its substitution for Pythagorean numbers, were almost certainly Platonic inventions." (Encyp.)

Plato taught that God and matter existed, and that out of matter, which had neither form nor organism, God made the world. But he fashioned it into, or like, the "Eternal forms", which were not only the patterns, but the essence of things. These "Eternal forms" were called ideas. Thus in the divine mind there existed, ideas, or forms, long before the worlds were made. This sense of the word is used in philosophy and literature down to the 17th century. Milton expresses it in these lines, "God saw his works were good answering his fair idea". (Oyp.) As it is with abstract qualities, so it is with individual things. (same)

A horse, a dog, a person, is perfect only as he approaches these ideal forms that exist outside of each individual. These ideal forms are alone real; all else is temporal and passing.

Sir Wm. Hamilton says that this idea was first changed by David Buchanan in 1636, one year earlier than Descartes. These men made the word, idea, mean thoughts about matter and not the
eternal forms. Leibnitz and Locke supported the two just named, and desired the word to stand for "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks" (Encyl.)

While Spinoza held to the Pantheistic view, we must still regard him as a disciple of Idealism.

"Everything swallowed up in God. God is all, and all is God,—not interchangeably, for that would be materialistic Theism, which is practically Atheism; "but with the precedence and exclusiveness of the divine, and that is idealistic Pantheism." (Cyp.)

The philosopher who tried to turn the keen edge of Spinoza's reasoning away from Christianity, and who might be said to be the first representative of modern Idealism was Bishop Berkeley. He maintained that," the qualities of supposed objects cannot be perceived distinct from the mind that perceives them; and these qualities, it will be allowed, are all that we can know of such objects.

If, therefore, there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever know it; and if there were not, we should have exactly the same reason for believing there were as we now have; all, therefore, which really exists is spirit, or the 'thinking principle'--ourselves, our fellow-men and God. What we call ideas are presented to us by God in a certain order of succession, which order of successive presentation is what we mean by the laws of nature."
Hume followed Berkeley and taking advantage of the liberty suggested in the quotation repudiated all certain knowledge. He not only denied the reality of the thing perceived, but of the mind perceiving. The German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling used the word idea again in the Platonic sense. About this period in philosophic history, Idealism met the new thought of Empiricism. Descartes had brought forward his doctrine of ' innate ideas'. Locke was greatly exercised over this and wrote with the especial purpose of refuting these ' innate ideas' of Descartes. The German idealism seemed something of a compromise. Innate ideas were merely methods or channels of grasping Universal truths. Kant taught: 'The world of our knowledge is a world which goes back for its explanation to the unity of the self, or of consciousness. This self, however, is not barely an individual; it is universal in its nature, and so knowledge has a rational validity and significance.' (425 Rogers H. of P.) Hegel so modified the word ideas, that his doctrine might well be called absolute Idealism.

With this hasty sketch of idealism we come up to modern thought and the more completely worked out philosophy of Royce and his conception of ideas.

We have referred to the two meanings of the word idea, as used in the different individual philosophies of the past. Prof. Royce adopts the Platonic idea rather than the Descartan; he says, "What existed before there was any
conscious life on this Planet? " In what sense was there light or heat, matter or motion, before there were eyes to see, tactile organs to feel, animal intelligence to understand these external facts? " Before there were conscious beings on this planet, this planet existed only in and for the universal consciousness. In that consciousness were facts corresponding to all the phenomena, or possibilities of experience, that geological science may declare to have really existed at such a time. When the earth became filled with life, there appeared in the universal consciousness the data known as organisms, and at the same time, beside the universal consciousness, somehow related to it, there arose individual conscious beings, whose states were more or less imperfect copies of the universal consciousness in certain of its facts." (Asp. 351)

We cannot see in the above clear cut "eternal forms" of Plato which existed in the consciousness of the Absolute before organized life appeared upon the planet, but there existed in the consciousness of the eternal ideas similar to what existed upon the early geological periods of the earth.

From the expression, " When the earth became filled with life, there appeared in the universal consciousness the data known as organism," it appears that life organism preceded the "eternal forms". However, priority is not the main point with Royce. But that the idea holds a very important place in matters pertaining to Reality.

After quoting many different writers on Idealism,
our author says, that they all agree on the one point, viz:
"that thought, where it inquires into its own meaning,
can never rest satisfied with any idea of external reality
that makes such reality other than a datum of consciousness,
and so material for thought."

"Sensualism and the most transcendent a priori spec-
ulation agree in coming at last to flee in ceaseless unrest
every support for an external reality that may seem to offer
itself beyond the bounds of consciousness. This phenomenism
of post-Kantian speculation, is at all events, the simplest
and least contradictory postulate." (Asp. 363.)
Preliminary

The object of this Thesis is to trace the philosophy of Prof. Josiah Royce as it has appeared to develop from its incipiency in "Religious Aspects of Philosophy" to its completion in "Conception of God". We do not deem it presumption to say there has been a development for the written page has not failed to speak the same thing to others.

The following topics, when treated by the younger Royce appear to the reader in a very different light when treated by the elder and more mature Royce.

The first contrast to be noted is the spirit exhibited in the earlier work and the one manifested in the last book.

In the first, it is impetuous and shows an impatience and lack of due tolerance for the opinions of men who may differ from him.

As an example of this, we call attention to his references to what he calls 'Traditional Theology'. He asserts that he belongs to no religious organization and has no sort of a desire for such connection.' (Asp. 6)

Referring to the present religious agitation he says, "How may mankind live the harmonious emotional life, when men are driven for their ideals back upon themselves, when traditional faith is removed, when the age is full of wretchedness and of blind striving." (Asp. 117) Again, "We know not yet what form our coming faith will take".
It is quite evident that he assumed that present religious forms of faith were practically dead.

In rejecting miracles he terms belief in them "Traditional Superstition", (Asp. 481.)

In referring to one of his own thoughts he asserts "If this is philosophy Traditional Theism can do what it pleases about the matter". (Asp. 417.)

This chip on the shoulder spirit is further shown by his language when referring to philosophers of note. He says of Spencer," We reject wholly the notion that Mr. Spencer or any like teacher has ever caught a glimpse of the fundamental ethical problem. Spencer seems to be in the most childlike ignorance that there is any such problem at all." (Asp. 177.)

That this spirit was a part of his nature is evidenced by his language when referring to himself. It seems that at one time he held that there was little difference between truth and error--merely a verbal one.

In referring to this he terms it "plausible jargon" and meaningless doctrine".

We find that this spirit is carried, in a great measure, through the entire book" Aspects of Philosophy", but when we read his "Conception of God" we can but note a
decided change; from the spirit that the world has waited long for me to the spirit of seeking to agree with brother philosopher: to a real oneness with Traditional beliefs, which beliefs seem to have grown in harmony with his own philosophy.

From this discussion of the Spirit of our philosopher we turn to his philosophies.

At this place in the examination, it would be well to mention the different points showing the change, and then leave the further consideration of each to its proper place in the paper.

Upon the question of the Absolute or God, our author first took a strong Pantheistic view; he even declared it not to be Theism, and warned his readers, that if he did say God at times, they must not think he referred to the being usually meant by God.

From this position he finally reached pure Theism, which will be shown in its place.

As a young man he strikes at a popular chord when he really rejects" future punishment", and says that Jesus anathematized all who would not believe in him. As a mature philosopher he finds that all persons must get the quest of their lives, this too, will be noticed in its place. His idea of truth developed from the misty" higher thought" to his clear ideas of purpose.
The freedom of the individual merged into his overshadowing Absolute, reaches the power to choose its own goal—life or death.

His eternity of evil was an important doctrine during his younger years. In his later philosophy he sees his individual easily win out and overcome. His individuality so blended and absorbed and lost, developed into the unique separate individual. From a totally hopeless man our author traces his immortality doctrine up to the full conception of a life after death.

Among the theories taken up and rejected we mention Realism, Altruism and Egoism, Ethical skepticism and ethical Pessimism; Monism, Religion of Jesus, Pantheism and Theism.

After having examined and rejected all of these ideas by means of Skepticism, he turns on it and says, "Ethical skepticism leads to the gloomiest pessimism". But when used to find truth, it is of great value. Thus he cleared the way for his own ideas.

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

I shall now refer to one of the rejected moral ideals, that of Jesus. Our author is willing to grant the excellence of Jesus' ethical teaching, but finds that his position is not defensible against the skeptic.

"If I feel not the love of God how prove to me that I ought to feel it?", or, "Why must I be loving and unselfish"?
Our author seems to think these questions unanswerable, for he says: "Now, the simple, practical way of dealing with all such objectors is to anathematize them at once." He that believeth not shall be damned: but anathemas are not arguments. To resort to them is to give up theoretical Ethics; "We who are considering not whom we shall practically condemn, but what we can say in favor of any moral theory must be unwilling to be put off with mere oratorical persuasion, or to mistake practical adhesion for theoretical conviction. We want a code that shall seem not only admirable, but, if so it may be, demonstrable." (Asp. 48-9)

He finds then that the moral idea of Jesus is blocked because the objector asks why must I love God &c, and as he says is anathematized by Jesus. But Royce is to find a moral insight not so blocked but one that is demonstrable.

Now let us follow him and see if the very skeptic who so blocked the path of Jesus may not block him with the same query.

His first positive doctrine he terms his "Moral Insight". He says, "So act as thou wouldst will to act if all the consequences of thy act for all the aims that are everywhere to be affected by this act, could be realized by thee now and in this one indivisible moment". (141 Asp.) Again: "Lift up thine eyes, behold that life." (168 Asp) Once more: "Get and keep the moral insight as an experience and do all that thou canst to extend among men this experience.
Now comes Royce's own skeptic and says: "Why must I lift up my eyes and see this life?" "Why must I get and keep and carry to others this experience?"

This insight is an action of the will and may be rejected by any one. To these Royce says: "Remain blind if you will; we have no means of preventing you." (170 Asp.)

What is the Junior Royce going to do with those who do reject this Insight?

He says the simple practical way that the Christian would deal with them would be to anathematize them.

"But anathemas are not argument." And we are not allowed to use "oratorical persuasion", and by his own concession men may reject his Insight. But for the timely help of the Elder Royce. Our Skeptic would have the same power of the Junior that he had of the moral ideals of Jesus.

In conception of God, page 283 we read, "In such cases, the goal of life remains the ideal, but the individual is an evil-doer, a relatively lost soul." And again, "To be sure, if this life-ideal has its essentially anarchical or diabolical aspect, this implies that this ego may, as a moral being, reach the perfection of its own kind in the form of a relatively lost or morally bankrupt Ego: and I see no reason to deny that numerous individuals, freely attending to the ideal which rationally involves their own
damnation, attain, in their special types of relative perfection to their chosen goal." Now who are these numerous individuals who thus attain their goal as lost souls and are rationally damned? The answer must be those who rejected the Moral Insight. And what has the elder Royce finally done with them? Let's not call it anathema, for that is not argument. It is merely getting out of life what you sought. But after all, the elder Royce does just what he accuses Jesus of doing, viz: allowing those who refuse the good to freely reap the rightful harvest. It is remarkable how some things become anathemas when uttered by certain men, and good philosophy when uttered by others.

THE ABSOLUTE.

On the question of God, Royce's early philosophy differed very materially from that of his later years. His first thought was largely Pantheistic. But during the developments of his completed work, he becomes strongly Theistic.

We shall show this development by quoting freely from his earliest work," Religious Aspects of Philosophy" and contrast this with his later books. "Hence, the deepest assertion of idealism is not that above all the evil powers in the world, there is at work some good power mightier than they, but rather that through all the powers, good and evil, and in them all, dwells the higher spirit that does not so much create as constitute them what they are, and so include them all". (Asp. 335)
"And thus we have found Job's all knowing judge".

"He knoweth the way that I take. " Here is an absolute estimate, objectively present in the world, an estimate of all your good and evil deeds." " You are a part of the universal life. Your thoughts are parts of the whole. Your acts form an element in the universe that the good Judge knows", " and for him are all relations, present, past and future." (Asp. 331)" We must see the divine everywhere." (482 Asp.)

"And when we turned to see, and behold, God was in this place, though we had known it not." "The genuine God that we thus found was no incomplete struggling God, whom we might pity in his conflict with evil, but the all-embracing thought, in which the truth is eternally finished".(443 Asp.)

"No power it is to be resisted, no plan-maker to be foiled by fallen angels, nothing finite, nothing striving, seeking, losing, altering, growing weary; the All-Enfolder it is, and we know its name." (435 Asp)

"Thou hast never seen, or heard, or touched, or handled, or loved anything but God". "Serve the whole God, not the irrationally separate part that thy delusions have made thee support to be an independent thing." (Asp. 442)

Whether his doctrine is Theism or Pantheism, the younger Royce is absolutely indifferent, in fact, he asserts it is neither." It differs from the common traditional form of both. Both usually consider God as a Power, and either leave
him off on one side to push things occasionally, or to set them going at the outset, or else identify him with his products."

(477 Asp.) We take neither of these ways".

In another place, when referring to Theism, he says, "There are writers who have undertaken to defend Theism, and who have actually, in all sincerity, argued for the necessity of the Universal Thought." The plain people have reason to suspect such of trying to substitute for the 'God' of our Fathers' something else". (475 Asp) We answer very plainly that we desire to do nothing of the sort". (A 475)

This is one of the cases, evidently, where men do things that they have no desire to do, for we know of no man who holds more strongly to the Universal Thought than does Royce. And he later becomes one of these very "writers", who undertake to defend Theism and held" in all sincerity for the necessity of the Universal Thought. The man who could not defend Theism, and who was careless as to what you called him, has reached a place in philosophical development when the following quotations taken from conceptions of God expresses his modified views. (49,50, C of G.)

"In brief, then, the foregoing conception of God undertakes to be distinctly Theistic and not Pantheistic".

"It is not a Universal Substance, in whose law our ethical independence is lost:" "Every ethical predicate that the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of our
present view," "For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents to religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy."

As a contrast we quote: "This Universal thought is what we have ventured for the sake of convenience, to call God. It is not the God of very much of the traditional theology. It is the God of the idealistic tradition from Plato downward."

In his earliest book he asserts what he, for convenience, terms, "God", is not the God of very much of "traditional theology". In his later one he asserts that what the faith of our fathers has meant by God, is identical with the God of reflective philosophy. Thus we see in the first book he is not, while in the second he is, but the positive has been reached by a second "reflective" act.

From these quotations we perceive that Royce was, at the beginning of his philosophic career, neither Pantheistic nor Theistic in his own view. But his earlier writings, however, have impressed his readers as being strongly Pantheistic. Prof. Howison clearly reads Pantheism in them, even after Prof. Royce had avowedly declared that his philosophy was Theism. But to us he seems to have gradually progressed from what was, in fact, pure Asiatic Pantheism to the historic Theism which he in his later works, fully
embraced. It would seem that our author is almost ready to concede in his "Conception of God" the very idea of "God as Father" which he found hardest to establish in his first book.

**GOD'S RELATION TO EVIL.**

Royce says the "True God" is no "struggling God", but sees all victory at a moment." Is not a struggling God, needs no man's help; uses no means to accomplish his work". Now, a proper analysis of the above leads us to quite different results than those reached by our author. He sees in his Absolute a being that needs no agent to help him. Now just what he means by agent might be a question. One might assert that he means no external agent to himself, but he says, "no man's help", and he has said that all men are in God, therefore he can't mean external to himself. Now, according to his theory of good and evil and victory, evil is an essential to both good and victory. In fact, evil is an agent,—is "a means" that God uses to produce good. He says, "For now I assert even in all this that the divine fulfillment in Eternity can be won only through the sorrows of time".

"In the moral man the evil will is an essential element of goodness" 466, "The good is eternally gained even in and through the evil" (466) A. This certainly puts a decided limit upon his Absolute, who must call to his aid the very agent and the only thing that is to be finally overcome, in order to realize his own eternal fulfillment.

When Prof. Royce puts evil as an essential element of God
he leads us into a very hazy doctrine. He asserts that unsatisfied desire is only in the finite, not in the inclusive Infinite. (444A) But on page (442 A) all things are included in God, then it would appear that, unsatisfied desire, must be in the possession of the included. But unsatisfied desire is not necessarily an absolute evil. Of the latter, our author takes the position in his earlier writings that it is eternal, abiding forever, a part of the Absolute. "For in him—the moral man—the evil will is an essential element of his goodness. The conflicts of morality are and must be eternal" (466 Asp.)

"No genuine moral goodness is possible save in the midst of such inner warfare. The absence of evil impulse leaves naught but innocence or instinct, morally insipid and colorless",—God's life is this Infinite rest, not apart from but in the endless strife. This idea of God and I struggling together to overcome the sorrows of time is carried all through his two volumes of "World & Individual" but at the close of Lecture 9 second series, he sees the assurance of the divine triumph in Eternity lighting up the Whole. But, nowhere in Time is perfection to be found." But God sees fulfillment from the beginning; God sees final triumph. Then final triumph must come or God sees wrong.

"Ah, then, to be sure, there will come somewhere my last temporal moment". "If I am to be perfected in my own kind—as I must be, so sure as God is,—then there seemingly lies ahead of me the temporal fulfillment of my life, the last moment of my process toward my perfection." Now, remember, the
only process toward perfection is in overcoming evil. And now we have come to the last moment. What of the next moment following this last moment of time-sin-struggling activity?

"Now I am fulfilled": but Professor Royce believes in Immortality. The individual lives on, but in what condition, and why: our author doesn't know, but a positive explanation is not necessary. He is not struggling with evil. Evil is conquered: if this is not true, then all quests are not found; the victory is not complete. But this is impossible. God knows complete victory from the beginning and the individual knows it now. And, so evil is not eternal. Again, we see our author abandoning his earlier position. His first conception of real goodness is that of eternal battle, but later he sees the fruitlessness of an individual trying to do what he may never do, and finally allows him to overcome.

TRUTH and VALIDITY:

Upon the question of truth, Prof. Royce seems to have made quite an evolution. In his earlier books, if he had a clear cut idea of truth and error, it is certainly not clearly expressed. As near as we can come to his thought, truth is somewhere lodged between the mind of man and that of God, but his idea of the individual is also hazy, and perhaps the dislodgement of the truth will come with the releasing of the individual from the grasp of the all absorbing Absolute. And this very idea runs through nearly all the points that will be discussed in this paper. The idea of an absorbing
Absolute takes from the human individual his power to know truth, his freedom of choice, his individuality, and his immortality. The expected happens, for when our author liberates the individual he takes him with his idea to the object and lets him find out by trial whether it answers to his purpose. We pass to his teachings regarding reality. "External reality was to be postulated, not given; existence for us because we willed it to be. To a portion of our conscious states we ascribed a validity beyond the present". Such an external reality was always conceived as more or less completely the counterpart of our idea of it, and hence, as in nature, like the facts of our consciousness," "But the external reality was also conceived as being real for consciousness and real only for consciousness. The external reality, being an organic whole, must therefore be conceived as the object of an Absolute experience, to which all facts are known, and for which all facts are subject to universal law." (Asp. 369.)

But his meaning is here quite obscure, reality is only for consciousness and our fellow man are conscious beings, therefore, reality is for men, but he explains that the agreement or the disagreement of his judgment with their intended object exists and has meaning for an actual thought, a consciousness, to which both these related terms are present, namely, both the judgment and the object wherewith it is to agree. So that, if my thought has objects outside of it with which it can agree or disagree, those objects and that agreement can have meaning, can be possible only if there is a thought that includes both my thought and the object wherewith my thought is
to agree".

Thus reality has meaning only when the idea formed in the mind about an object and the object are both included, and are a part of a higher thought. We have thus really answered the question of truth: but a further investigation might throw additional light on this much discussed point."

"Judgments are true or false only in reference to a higher inclusive thought, which they presuppose, and which must, in the last analysis, be assumed as Infinite and all inclusive". (393 Asp.) "So that every error implies a thought that includes it and the corresponding truth in the unity of one thought with the object of both of them. Only as present to an including thought are they either true or false." "What then, is an error? It is an incomplete thought, that, to a higher thought, which includes it and its intended object, is known as having failed in the purpose that it more or less clearly had, and that is fully realized in this higher thought, and without such higher inclusive thought, an assertion has no external object, and is no error". (Asp. 425) "A truth, then, is a complete thought, which is opposed to an error. Only as actually included in a higher thought that gives to the first its completed object, and compares it therewith, is the first thought an error". "But, the higher thought must include the opposed truth, to which the error is compared in that higher thought. The higher thought is the whole truth, of which the error is by itself an incomplete fragment." "You cannot make a truth or a falsehood
by your thought. You only find one." (Asp.431) "Save for thought, there is no truth, no error. Save for inclusive thought, there is no truth, no error, in separate thought. Separate thoughts, as such, cannot then know or have the distinction between their own truth and their own falsity in themselves, and apart from the inclusive thought. There is, then, nothing of truth or error to be found in the world of separate thoughts as such". (432 Asp) "All thoughts, therefore, are true or false, in the last analysis, only for the all-including Thought, the Infinite." Thus, to us, we have a very impractical idea of truth error and reality. There is neither of the three only for the Infinite. We have failed to see how the finite, this man, is to know truth or error.

It wouldn't require much speculative philosophy to prove to most men that God, the Infinite, comprehended all truth and error. The real question is not yet reached. "How is this man to know?"

A minister sought certain recognitions; he was asked to what organization he belonged. He replied, "I get my credentials from God". His friend replied, "That is good, present them."

We see the same difficulty here. God knows truth, to be sure, but how is he to get it to this individual fragment? Now, leaving the earlier books of our author, we find something like this. "Ask me how I discover, in a concrete case, the validity of my idea, how I make it out for certain that a given experience is possible; and then I answer, 'By actual experience alone". 
"When I say then, 'A given idea is certainly valid; I primarily mean merely a given idea is fulfilled in actual present experience'. But the range of actual validity is much greater than actual human experience."

Now comes his clear distinction between internal and external meanings, the former the idea, the latter the object.

He says there can be no judging only with reference to external objects. "To judge is to judge about the Real". It is to consider internal meanings with reference to external meanings. (W. of I. I-273) "We have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner experience. There they get presented as something of universal value, but always in fragments, they dissatisfy. We conceive the Other wherein these meanings shall get some sort of final fulfillment."

"We view our ideas as shadows or imitations of this Other".

"This experience by which we compare the idea with the Other, is lighted up by ideas, is carefully selected. (285, W. of I. Vol.1). But the real test of the correspondence of the idea and the object is Purpose. (306, W. of I. Vol. 1) If the object possesses the real correspondence that the idea wanted it to possess it is truth; otherwise it is not truth."

There seems to be little place here for the "higher thought" but it is manifestly more mundane. While it matters but little which takes the initiative the idea or object in a given judgment our author puts stress on the former. This doctrine of truth is thus developed from the Milky-way of "higher thought"
wherein truth and error is only for the Infinite, into the clear cut idea that a truth is such when the object fulfills the purpose of the idea, and we know this agreement by actual empirical methods.

It is remarkable how all of the ideas of Prof. Royce have a trend away from the dreamland of youth toward the wide awake realities of actual life.

INDIVIDUALITY.

There seemed to be no place in the earlier writings of Royce for the individual. In fact, the place of the individual was so filled up with his Absolute that he really disappeared. We do not desire to be unfair, so will quote freely from the Book, "Aspects of Philosophy". We practically experience the truth that a perfectly fair judge of us all would not be satisfied merely with one individual contentments as such, but would also demand the destruction of all our individual limitations. But such a life would be no longer a life of separate individuals, each limited to his petty sphere of work. It would be a life in which self was lost in a higher unity of all the conscious selves.

(A200) "Thou and I, neighbor, have no rights in this world as individuals. We are instruments." (215.)

"No one who wanders into the fold of Idealism may expect to find it ordered for his individual good.

"The Infinite was not elected by his vote".
"If the moral insight wants religious support, possibly the failure of all these personal concerns of ours to find any hint of response from the Absolute, may not render impossible the ethical undertakings of the human Spirit."

(438) Here we find no hint of response from the Absolute coming because of our personal concerns. "The world of life is, then, what we desired it to be, an organic total. And the individual selves are drops in the ocean of the Absolute truth." Drops:—swallowed up into the whole, no individuality no identity. "Whereas we formerly said, devote thyself to Art, to science, to the State, we now say," Devote yourselves to losing your lives in the Divine life." (442)

Thus the young and enthusiastic Royce exhorted men to cease their endeavors in the ordinary pursuits of life, and turn their powers toward being lost in God, whatever that might have meant to him. Just how long a sleep this may have meant it is impossible to say. Certain it is if that losing process was not too complete the elder Royce probably reached them with his more matured voice, for he calls out to the same people," Thou art in God, but thou art not lost in him". (W of I. Book I P 465.)

There is certainly quite an evolution here, or language is capable of little accuracy. "And herein we have comfort. We perish but thou endurest. Ours is not thy eternity. Like healthy leaves that flourished for a time but have fallen. The simile is certainly good, like leaves once alive but now fallen and trodden under foot. This is comfort, and here
Individuality and immortality blend. "Does it help you to know, not of a goodly place where you personally and individually shall live? The religious comfort that a man gets from contemplating all this is very different from the consolation of the separate individual." (447.)

"But of a personal judge who respects not a whit your person". 447. "Then it is not your triumph that you seek, but the triumph of the highest. (447)

"In God thy separateness is destroyed, and with it thy sin as evil". Not much left here for ethics to fasten to. The individual with his sin destroyed. Wherein comes personal effort?

Thus does the early Roycean philosophy lose the individual in the Absolute. And to him there apparently comes great peace and joy because of the complete triumph of the Eternal. Oh, it is but the peace of being nothing, 'tis the sleep of ancient India, it is the merging into Buddha. This is surely the sleep called Nirvana. But the philosophy of Royce has not reached this Nirvanic sleep; it lives and grows.

In a later work (W of I. preface I 15) he says: "I was not clear as to how the general doctrine ought to apply as to the individual". But the problem of the individual as I have since more clearly seen, is the central and important one in the Idealistic theory of being."

"Moreover, Socrates, even as an individual, has a two fold being in God as an individual idea eternally present."
--Plato's eternal forms--" And out of God as created being " (apparent Theism) (C of G. 283) Again, " Be unique even as your Father in Heaven is unique, be loyal to the unique". (C of G. 268)

In his chapter on Immortality, he says," You want to know that somewhere he--this individual, he himself, and not another--knows himself, as fulfilled". Your individual goal--is by yourself--you yourself and not another". (C of G 3256)

Besides the references here quoted, much of his later energies have been spent in providing a place for the individual in his philosophy. It was upon this point that Prof. Howison, of the University of California, criticised him so sharply; but whether he established a place in his philosophy or not makes no difference to us. The fact that he tries to do so, shows an evolution from his earlier works wherein no such effort was made.

There seems to be more of a new creation here to us rather than a development. In his earlier writings he purposely merges the individual into the Absolute, with no reference to the desire of the individual: with no thought as to the quest or desire of the personal Ego. But in his later works, he labors hard to develop the doctrine of individuality.

Thus the individual, blinded and blended by and with the Absolute, arises from a fire-mist of intangible forms, and walks out into the Drummond light of separate individuality.
FREEDOM.

A lengthy discussion on the subject of Freedom would be but a repetition of what has been said in other parts of this paper: Immortality, Individuality, and Freedom are each and all depending upon the conception of God.

If the Absolute actually absorbs the individual there is clearly no place for separate immortality or freedom. This is the attitude that our author assumes in his early philosophy. On the question of freedom he comes as near being inconsistent as on any one he discusses. Before he gets into his pure philosophy, he grants to the individual the privilege of personal choice. He allows him to reject the Moral Insight; as we have already quoted, In his chapter on "Religious Insight" he reaches complete abstraction and loses the individual with his freedom completely in the Infinite; whatever the individual chooses, he chooses God's plan for him; if he choose evil, that was God's idea; but evil will must be overcome by a sort of over balancing of good wills.

When we get to "Conception of God" we find that the individual may freely choose his destiny in life; in fact, immortal life consists of possessing the goal of life-freely chosen in a temporary life. This doctrine then, arises from a conglomerate mass and grows into "the man who freely chooses his own destiny in life", but the latter position is but a reversion to the first, expressed in his discussion of
the "Moral Insight" and so I have chosen to see a small amount of, not pure evolution, but inconsistency.

**IMMORTALITY.**

The last question to be examined is Immortality. The younger man had no place in his philosophy for it, in fact, his doctrine stops short of anything pertaining to the future. He asserts that as a child he had no faith in such a speculative idea. To quote, "We know nothing about individual immortality, nothing of any endless future progress of our species, all that is dark." Then he sees no place where we may individually dwell as a reward for a good life. But this is not positive. Here are some statements that have no uncertain sounds. "We perish, but thou endurest, Ours is not thy Eternity." (Asp. 440) "It is not your triumph but that of God." Then he sees not one of the aspirations of the human heart satisfied. And what a climax to a book that had as one of its avowed objects the discovery of a power or person that shall help us in our poor efforts to do right.

He scours the world of philosophy, and being free from any previous bias, he speculates about the Absolute, about truth, about mental powers, about theology, in fact, most of human interests are examined, and he finds much that cheers him. As a final windup he discovers a little girl who had great love and respect for her king. A wedding feast is in progress at the palace and the little girl would bring him a wedding present: a bouquet of wild flowers is all she has to offer. She waits a long time outside the palace gate amid the jostling
throng and finally sinks down beside the gate, weary and tired
and disappointed. She sobs herself to sleep, and the night
wind scatters the leaves of her now withered flowers into
the streets to be trampled into the mud by the king's horses
and carriages. "Yet all that happens only because there are
infinitely fairer treasures within the palace than the igno-
rant child could bring. The King knows of this, yes, and of
ten thousand other proffered gifts of loyal subjects. But he
needs them not. " (Asp.483)

What consolation? Neighbor, why dost thou toil and
struggle and work? Others are not striving to live a right
life; they are not gathering wild flowers for the king, why
needest thou? Thou wilt only fall underneath the palace
window, weary and sick, and helpless and hopeless, and—dead.
The night winds will scatter thy flowers and all because in
thy ignorance thou didst not know that some one else had
brought costlier gifts than thou couldst bring. Or, perhaps,
thou didst gather the flowers in the king's forest.

What a pity that little flower girl can't accompany
the writer hereof as he closes, "Aspects of Philosophy" for
the last time, with its dead leaves, and gloomy darkness, and
hopeless heroic self sacrifice, and opens "Conception of God"
wherein the author has caught a higher conception of human life.

But let us trace this evolution logically. The very
pages of this last book seem to grow in perception as our
author proceeds.
It required a great force of will power to rescue this man from the grasp of the absolute, and what Royce had chosen to call "white-robed-sabbath school ennui" prejudice.

Prof. Royce, in his final immortality idea, runs up against the very difficulty he previously found in the older theology, viz: a place of victory where there may be nothing to do. In his efforts to avoid such a winding up he declined to wind up at all in his first book. In his other books, he boldly attacks the old enemy and evidently discovers that it was only a chained lion. His idea of God is that he is no "struggling God" but that he is ever and always victorious.

Of the individual he says: "For in this life the finite ego is only a seeker of its goal, as a Knight of his quest, yet, by our foregoing hypothesis, the goal of the ego, its life-ideal, is one of God's ideals, actual or genuine." (C of G. 322-3)

But the reaching of this goal does not occur in this life. He says: "It does not occur in our earthly experience." (C. of G. 324)

"The individual's life is a process of experience that means the aim of attaining his life-ideal". "If this aim is one of God's aims—as it is—this aim does not remain, from an absolute point of view, a barely possible ideal". (C.ofG.323)

"In God all is Perfection." (Asp. 443)

"And for God there are no genuine possibilities unfulfilled; no true ideas that have above reality as bare possibilities." (C of G. 323)
It follows that "This attainment of the ideal of one's life is a concrete, a conscious attainment". "I cannot attain it in this life, I must then have another life—but what life? An endless one."

Now the former idea of our author was that there was no goodness only as it came from overcoming the evil will—evil is eternal—but from the above quotation it appears that there is a goal to be reached and that not in this life. If this thought—good is attained through conflict with evil—be true, immortality is the price of an endless strife, because if the goal is reached, strife must cease, for a cessation of strife is the goal of most men. Now if the strife has ceased goodness has ceased also, and life without goodness means a genuine "old-fashioned hell".

But our ideals are God's ideals—and God has no unfulfilled ideas, therefore," all quests are fulfilled: the goal—yes, your individual goal is by you attained in the eternal life". C of G. 326)

But this is the faith of our philosopher set on fire of human hope. And now comes the conflict of philosophy and faith. "If I am to be perfected in my own kind—as I must be, so surely as God lives—then there seemingly lies ahead of me the temporal fulfillment of my life, the last moment of my process toward my perfection. On the other hand, if there is ahead of me such a last moment, it must be a last moment, not of a nature-process, but of a moral ego. But a temporal moral ego that still says: " Now I am fulfilled; there is no more beyond; time ends
for me'- it seems a contradiction in terms".

Our author has thus led the individual through earth's conflicts and probably a dozen other temporal lives, and finally brought him to his last moment before his perfection and goal, which, if God lives, must be, and now he hesitates what to do with him next; no wonder it seems a contradiction.

"Choose ye this day whom ye shall serve", was a demand of an older prophet. Like those people, Royce must choose one of the horns of the dilemma. He must merge the individual into his Absolute, which he did as a young man, or he may transfer him into a final heaven of victory, which latter idea has been so repugnant to him up to this point. He has given up the idea of keeping him heroically fighting on forever, because his Absolute in that case would fail to see the victory, and he has seen that from the beginning. He deliberately chooses the final victory idea with all its ennui and insipidity. He now discovers what he could not perceive for the older faith, viz: That many of the things said about the future of men were uttered in symbol. (C of G 325)

"Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor does language convey to us the realities that shall be". At this point he abandons all bases of supplies and steps boldly forth from all earlier positions and exclaims:-" You want to know that somewhere this individual, he himself and not another-knows himself as fulfilled after his own kind; as possesses of a life that, in its wholeness, earthly and superhuman, is adequate to his ideal. That this is the case is just what tradition
has asserted in its doctrine of the final perfection of the just and of the unjust, each after its own freely chosen kind. Philosophy here supports tradition.--all quests are fulfilled the goal--yes, your individual goal--is by you yourself attained in the eternal life." (C of G 326) No merging into the absolute here; no eternity of evil, but a triumph over it. No quests to be sought; yes, the individual has triumphed over all. All has been reached after that last moment of strife and the individual of a thousand battle fields, has reached the place supported alike by philosophy and theology. This surely is not the place referred to in Prof. James' "Dilemma of Determinism," which our author quoted with delight as a young man. That was a place of "white-robed-harp-playing-heaven of our Sabbath schools. The vacuous and expressionless, and unexampled insipidity, and inoffensive lives--better lose than win and be saved from so singularly flat a winding up". With this faith stretch and the exhaustion of earth's categories to explain the beyond, our author sees the agreement of old things with the new, and is probably willing to leave the religion of childhood with them. We have not seen, or heard, nor dreamed what God hath in store." "But how and when we cannot know upon this shoal of time".

As we close, we see a doctrine that has grown from neglect--yes, from real opposition--from darkness into a clear cut idea of real, personal immortality. From dead leaves under the tree to the leaves of the traditional tree of life; from unappreciated wild flowers to the flowers that forever
bloom. Little flower girl, arise: if that bunch of wild flowers is thy goal up to thy time of life, the king will open the palace gate sometime, somewhere, and bid thee freely come in. To the child it will be flowers and joy; to the Indian a hunting ground; we can only make it what is within our grasp. Why ridicule the Sunday school boy's conception? It is probably as perfect as thine. Tradition says, "I shall be satisfied," Philosophy, "All quests are found."