The Attitude of the English Government Toward the Monroe Doctrine

by Charles Bisset

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The attitude of the English government toward the Monroe Doctrine is very difficult to determine. First, because the English government is not always consistent with itself on account of the frequent changes in the dominance of the political parties controlling the government. Again, because of similar changes in American political dominance, different theories have been advanced under the name of Monroe Doctrine. In the minds of the American people, this doctrine is very vague and ill-established and there is a great divergence of opinion as to what should be included under the term. There seems to be a kind of evolutionary process going on in the statement of our proper attitude toward the other American states. This development has been necessary to popularize the claims under consideration, each respective statesman taking advantage of the popularity of the Monroe Doctrine in order to get his position endorsed by the people and to declare to the world that he is not promulgating any new doctrine. It is much easier to add to a theory already made popular than to promulgate something entirely new. The people are slow to make distinctions. If we would take the Monroe Doctrine of Monroe it would not be difficult to show the development of English thought toward our claim for American independence. But as it is, English statesmen have often declared their unreserved
II.

acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine of Monroe, but contrast that with the questions under discussion in order to oppose the claim of that particular American statesman. For example, Washington and Jefferson opposed "entangling European Alliances"! Monroe added to that by guaranteeing the independence of the Spanish American states and by declaring the American continent no longer subject to colonization. Polk advised annexing Yucatan in order to prevent some state of Europe doing the same thing.

None of these had declared the supremacy of the United States over territory in Central or South America. Pierce and Buchanan were willing that America and England should divide honors and remain equal in the Central American country, each one agreeing not to colonize, fortify, etc. any part of Central America. Secretary Blaine went a step further and declared that American interests were paramount in Central America and the United States ought to have exclusive control of any canal across the isthmus. Several times in stating the Monroe Doctrine the declaration was made that there was no intention to interfere with any colony already held by any European State; but Secretary Olney went further and said: "American questions are for American decisions—no European power has the right to interfere forcibly in the affairs of the continent or to seek territorial extension at the expense of any existing American state, that the United States owing to its superior size and power is the protector and champion of all other American nations and

1—Olney to Lord Salisbury—See Doc.
it has the right and duty to interfere in all territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere whether such disputes directly affect its interests or not. The permanent political union between a European and an American state is unnatural and inexpedient." Surely this is a much broader statement of Doctrine than that of Monroe and we should not be surprised to find a European nation admitting the one and objecting very strenuously to the other.

"During the period that has elapsed since the message of President Monroe was delivered in 1823 the Doctrine has undergone a very noted development and the aspect which it now presents in the hands of Mr. Olney differs widely from its character when it first issued from the pen of its author!"

Comparing the statements of the positions held by our statesmen since 1820 we find that certain principles have been held by all. That part which has to do with our discussion contains these principal features:—  

2. The fact that there is no longer any territory in the Americas open for colonization by any European power.
3. The recognition of America as the leading power in the Western Hemisphere.

In the discussions to which their interest has given rise and in the arrangement by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of

1- Lord Salisbury Dispatch.
2- Monroe's Message.
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the United States are involved that the American Continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." This Doctrine might have been called Washington's Doctrine or Cleveland's or almost any other American statesman's doctrine as well as Monroe's, and if Monroe had never lived President Cleveland or Roosevelt would have found almost as much justification in utterances by former American Statesmen. It might better be called the American Doctrine and has been so designated by many statesmen and has come to mean that American questions are to be settled by American statesmen whether those questions be the control of American colonization or some other question of American interest.

The occasion for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine arose out the attitude of Spain and some other European powers toward Spanish America. When Napoleon had become dominant in Spain and had placed his brother upon the Spanish throne, the Spanish American colonies refused to recognize the new government or to be bound by the old commercial regulations which required high import duties. They threw their ports open to English and American commerce. The English especially developed a lucrative business. This, England was permitted to retain when
peace was declared and the colonies were brought back under the mother government. But the colonies had had a taste of independence; the yoke of the Spanish government was galling, so in 1817-18 they declared themselves independent and established republican governments. The Spanish government joined the Holy Alliance hoping by its help to win back her colonies. It was thought in England that Spain would be willing to give to France or Russia some territory in America in order to get help to conquer the rest of her colonies; this would restrict England's commercial intercourse with South America. The British government absolutely disclaimed, not only any desire of appropriating to itself any portion of the Spanish colonies, but any intention of forming any political connection with them beyond that of amity and commercial intercourse. England would be contented to see the mother country (Spain) in possession of an exclusive preference and to be ranked after her equally with others on the footing of the most favored nation." The attempt on the part of the Allies of the Holy Alliance to suppress representative government wherever found compelled England, the only representative government of any consequence in Europe, to seek allies of representative governments in America. In Rush's letter to Adams he says: "I believe that this government has the subject of Canning's proposition much at heart and certainly his note bears upon the face of it a character of earnestness as well as cordiality toward the government of the United States which cannot
escape notice. With England, commercial supremacy is vital to her existence. Anything that strikes at her commercialism is watched very closely. Their sympathies were with the Holy Allies and it was only the necessities of their commerce and revenue with the pressure of their debts and taxes which compelled them to side with South American independence for the sake of South American trade. Canning was afraid also that it might be difficult to collect debts due to English merchants without the backing of Spain. (Canning to Rush) "Suppose the recognition to have been made by Great Britain some time ago and the loan to have followed, would not the duty of countenance and protection have attached, and might not this serve to portray the hazard of coming too hastily into political relations with new and distant states whose credit, whose resources in their transactions with the subjects of other nations, did not yet appear to rest on any stable or adequate foundation?" Canning in report to France said that England would recognize the independence of Spanish America in case France should employ force in aid to their subjugation, or second, in case Spain herself, reverting to her ancient colonial system should attempt to put a stop to the trade of Britain with those colonies. In case of any attempt on the part of Spain to revive the obsolete interdiction of intercourse with countries over which she had no longer any actual dominion or in case of the employment of any foreign assistance

1- J. Adams in Snow's Am. Dip. p. 253
2- Rush's Memoirs p. 445
to reestablish her dominions in those countries by force of arms, the recognition of such new states by his majesty would be decided and immediate.

President Monroe touched a responsive note in Canning's politics when he wrote, "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should hold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

Canning had used all his powers of persuasion to get an alliance with the United States in order to prevent the allies from conquering and getting commercial or territorial concessions in South America but did not want to do as the United States had done (recognize the independence of these states) for fear of losing her influence with Spain, but under no other condition would our representative in London, Mr. Rush, agree to an alliance.

Canning was afraid that France might get a commercial foothold in South America and sent a dispatch to the
French Minister in which he spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by time and circumstances and disclaimed all designs on the part of the British government on the late Spanish provinces. Rush said he understood the import of this note to be that England would not remain passive to any attempt on the part of France to acquire territory in Spanish America. England conceived first, the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless, second, that the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time and circumstances, third, that England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between colonies and mother country by amicable negotiation, fourth, that she aimed at the possession of no portion of the country herself, fifth, that she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power with indifference.

How much these propositions resemble the declarations of Monroe! So we could expect that this part of the Monroe Doctrine would be well received in England. While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other the expression that each gave to the views of his government were no doubt rendered more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other government's attitude in the matter.

Monroe had prepared his remarkable document with much care knowing that it would be read and pondered by every
of losing her American possessions unless the Monroe Doctrine protects them. It is essential to the best interests of Great Britain that she maintain a close alliance with the United States and a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. Her attitude toward the United States since 1896 indicates that England has recognized that fact.

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and could not consent to see its increase unobstructed. This thought is prominent in a letter from Liverpool to Wellington: "If we allow these new states to consolidate their system and their policy with the United States of America it will in a few years prove fatal to our greatness if not endanger our safety." The English government never accepted the second declaration until the controversy arose in '96 over the Venezuelan boundary affair. Gradually the English government thro the influence of Canning recognized the independence of the South American states.

While Canning's policy toward the United States was not very successful, England rejoiced in her victory over Europe because she was able to free the South American states from the clutches of the Holy Alliance. It was a part of Canning's scheme to break up the Holy Alliance and establish the policy of non-interference, the crowning triumph of which was seen in the affairs of Belgium and Holland. If Canning had thought it possible to secure his point without giving the United States an opportunity to declare herself the first state in America he would surely have done so, but it was at a time when England did not dare to contradict her. Canning's last aim was political; to limit the influence of the United States; to prevent the designs of the Holy Alliance; and to make the Republics and Monarchies of South America look to England for guidance.
II.

The English had claimed a port in Southern Mexico called Balize or British Honduras since before the treaty of 1763 and that claim was recognized by Spain to be more or less valid. The Province was finally recognized by Mexico in 1826 as belonging to Great Britain. In 1840 there was much talk of a canal thro Central America. The canal would be of more use to Great Britain than to any other country except the United States and Mexico. Wishing to get control of one end of one of the feasible ways, England sent a ship of war in 1841 to San Juan del Norte at the mouth of the San Juan river in Nicaragua. Buchanan said of it: "The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her history of seizing upon every available commercial point in the world whenever circumstances have placed it in her power." It was convenient to declare a protectorate over the Mosquito Indian tribe along the coast of Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans were driven away and the name changed from San Juan to Greytown. This coast had been claimed by England at an earlier date and had been given up along with the Bay Islands only on the insistence of Spain. It was opportune to renew these claims given up under pressure now that the pressure was no longer applied. Actual occupancy was not made until 1848. The move was made in the name of the Mosquito King, two English war vessels entering Greytown harbor tore down the Nicaraguan flag, hoisted that of the Mosquitia in its place and assumed the reins of government. All offices were filled with Englishmen and Jamaican police force.
patrolled the town. The inhabitants of Balize who had exceeded the established limit by more than forty-five leagues founded their pretensions upon the circumstances of their having occupied the lands in controversy prior to the independence of Central America. But persistence in such a violation of existing treaties, despite the earnest and repeated remonstrances of the Spanish authorities, cannot give to Balize a lawful right to consider it as her own which she has in fact usurped.

In 1848 the United States, having acquired California, realized that the Canal would be of as much interest to her as to any nation, and began negotiating with Great Britain for an equal share with Great Britain in any Canal that might be built. These negotiations ended in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. A part of the first Article of the treaty reads: "The governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over said ship-canal agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same in the vicinity thereof nor to occupy, fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America."

While in this the Monroe Doctrine is not mentioned, the principle of it seemed to be applied very clearly so far as Central America was concerned. By the treaty the United States agreed to be governed by the same conditions.
she imposed on Europe, and England would be on an equali-
ty with the United States in Central America. England
claimed that by the treaty she did not give up any abso-
lute right over her own territory in Central America nor
renounce her protectorate of the Mosquito. "But Great
Britain has nowhere in the treaty of April 1850 renounced
nor ever had any intention to renounce the full and abso-
lute right which she possesses over her own lawful terri-
tories in Central America (such as that designation was
distinctly understood and declared by the negotiators of
the treaty) the protection which she has for centuries
past afforded and still affords to the Mosquito territory."
The treaty was hardly signed when Captain Jolly, visiting
the Bays Islands in a war ship, called a meeting of the
Bay Islanders and declared them under the sovereignty of
Great Britain. In 1852 a royal warrant was issued consti-
tuting the islands a colony of Great Britain under the
title of "The Colony of the Bay Islands", and again as-
serted her protectorate of the Mosquito Indians at the
same time declaring that she adhered strictly to the
treaty of 1850.

The English statesmen denied that they were protecting
the Indians in order that they might get territory or an
outlet to commerce, but that "she had no other interest in
Mosquito than that is derived from an honorable regard for
her old connection with the Indian nation." But San Juan
(Greytown) at the eastern terminus of the proposed

2. Russell Letter to Ormsby, June 53
3. Edgington, Monroe Doctrine 7076
Nicaraguan Canal was not under the control of the Mosquitoes nor governed in their interests. The Mosquito Coast territory began at Cape Cameron on the coast of what is now Honduras and extended as far as 165 leagues south from Cape Gracias a Dios. This would end 100 miles north of Greytown. The Bay Islands which had been given back to Spain were not a part of English possessions in Central America but were needed to form a continuous territory from Balize to the mouth of the Canal. Balize, the Bay Islands, Mosquito Coast, and Greytown would give to England a continuous strip controlling the Eastern coast of Central America. These latter acquisitions were a clear infraction of the Monroe Doctrine as well as of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. But Clarendon in a letter to Buchanan May 24, 1854 said: "With regard to the Monroe Doctrine it can only be viewed as a dictum of the distinguished personage who delivered it, but her majesty's government cannot admit that doctrine as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of European States." Or in other words the Monroe Doctrine was to be considered a dead letter not worthy of consideration in international disputes where England herself was concerned. This was the lowest mark of influence ever reached by the Monroe Doctrine since its declaration. Under pressure from the United States the Crampton-Webster Treaty was negotiated in '52 wherein England tacitly renounced *
the contested protectorate and surrendered to Nicaragua the Mosquito Coast over which the republic was to hold a nominal sovereignty, but the treaty failed of ratification by Nicaragua. In '56 the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty was arranged for arbitrating the question, but the treaty was opposed in the United States. The correspondence of Mr. Buchanan then Minister in England to the Senate (Sen. Doc. I & 2 Sess. 34th Cong.) throws considerable light upon this controversy, "He (Lord Clarendon) stated distinctly that this treaty was in their opinion entirely prospective in its operations and did not require them to abandon any of their possessions in Central America. At this I (Buchanan) expressed my astonishment. In regard to Balize there was not the least appearance of yielding on the part of his Lordship. He repudiated the idea with some warmth that any person could suppose they had surrendered this settlement under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. When I pointed out the extent of the encroachments which British settlers had made beyond the treaty limits his only answer was in a tone of pleasantry that we ought not to complain of encroachments and instanced our acquisition of Texas." Both the United States and England had now placed themselves in a position from which they could not recede without loss of honor; and trouble seemed imminent when England found a way out of the difficulty by making treaties directly with Nicaragua and
Honduras. To Honduras she agreed to give up unreservedly
the Bay Islands and to Nicaragua she agreed to give the
Mosquito Coast on conditions—A district was to be
assigned the Indians under sovereignty of the republic—
the Indians were to enjoy the right of free government.
Greytown was to be a free port with certain privileges
of local self government—England reserved the right to
interfere if the terms of the treaty were not carried out,
which might be interpreted to mean that the treaty
could be considered broken any time England wished to
strengthen herself in Central America. These treaties
satisfied the demands of the United States and the trouble
was considered settled. England in this affair declined
to recognize the Monroe Doctrine as forming a part of
International Law and considered that she had as well
established claims in Central America as had the United
States, but by her treaties with the separate states the
issue was postponed for a time.

The real contest over the Monroe Doctrine between the
United States and England was concerning the Venezuelan
boundary question. In 1817-18 Venezuela, along with
the other Spanish American States, won her independence
from the mother country and acquired the territorial
rights held by Spain before 1810, and England during the
Napoleonic wars conquered the western portion of the
Dutch possessions and acquired the Dutch title to this
territory. The boundaries of both countries were very indefinite. The line between the territories had never been agreed upon but had been in dispute between the Dutch and Spain and again between England and Spain so that Venezuela inherited a disputed claim. Several attempts were made by England and Venezuela to adjust the matter but each ended in failure. So long as the regions of the disputed boundary remained uninhabited there was not much interest in the settlement. But English subjects became more aggressive and crowded in on the unoccupied land. England's demands became a little larger with each attempt at settlement, because, as she said, her subjects were settling the vast area of unoccupied land lying between the two inhabited areas of their respective capitals. Finally gold was discovered near their southern boundary and English and American subjects furnished the capital for the development of the mines and demanded England's protection for their capital. About the same time the English merchants recognized the value of the Orinoco river as a commercial high-way. The English government extended her boundaries so as to include the gold mines and the principal outlet of the great river. Venezuela had repeatedly protested and had asked the intervention of the United States. Two notes were addressed by Venezuela to Great Britain demanding the evacuation of the whole territory held by Great Britain from the mouth of the Orinoco river to the Pomeroon River,
and adding that should this not be done and should the evacuation not be accompanied by the acceptance of arbitration as the means of deciding the pending frontier question diplomatic relations would be broken off. These demands not having been complied with she finally broke off diplomatic relations. The United States in 1886, '87, '88, '90, '94, and '95 tendered its friendly offices for securing arbitration only to have its offices persistently declined. The English government refused to arbitrate on any line East of the western-most settlement of her subjects, and Venezuela was unwilling to arbitrate on any line so far west. England's aggressions were directed toward securing the Orinoco, the great river system of Northern South America and also the rich mining district of the Yuruari. Each time the subject came up England offered to arbitrate on a line farther west than the former one, but persistently refused to offer the whole question for arbitration. At the same time a statement went forth from the throne as follows: "Now this is to inform those British and all others concerned, and they are hereby required to take notice, that her majesty's government cannot undertake to afford protection to British subjects so employed in those tracts as aforesaid, and that all British subjects can only be recognized as a community of British adventurers acting on their own responsibility and at their own peril and cost."
But in spite of this her boundaries were steadily pushed westward till her territory included the gold fields and the South bank of the Orinoco river.

In December 1895 President Cleveland sent his message to Congress calling attention to the fact that the British government was encroaching on the territory of Venezuela and had refused to arbitrate. He suggested that a commission be appointed to investigate the claims of each party and that the report of the commission would furnish a basis for the action of the American government. Secretary Olney a short time before had sent a very strong letter of protest against the action of the English government to Lord Salisbury calling his attention to the fact that he had disregarded the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary Olney's main propositions were that "American questions are for American decisions, and that no European power has the right to interfere forcibly in the affairs of the continent or to seek territorial extension at the expense of any existing American state, that the United States owing to its superior size and power is the protector and champion of all other American nations and that it has the right and duty to intervene in all territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere whether such disputes directly affect its interests or not, and that permanent political union between a European and an American state is unnatural and inexpedient." Lord Salisbury after getting the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown
replied: "As far as I am aware this Doctrine has never been before advanced on behalf of the United States in any written communication addressed to the government of another nation." "Mr. Clayton who was Secretary of State under President Taylor expressly stated that that administration had in no way adopted it, but during the period that has elapsed since the message of President Monroe was delivered in 1823 the Doctrine has undergone a very notable development. The two propositions which in effect President Monroe laid down were: First-That America was no longer to be looked upon as a field for European colonization, and Second-That Europe must not attempt to extend its political system to America or to control the political condition of any American community which had recently declared its independence. In declaring that the United States would resist any such enterprise if it was contemplated, President Monroe adopted a policy which received the entire sympathy of the English government of that date." "The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day. There is no danger of any European State treating any part of the American continent as a fit object for colonization." "The British Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are neighbors and have differed for some time in the past and continue to differ as to the line by which their dominions are separated. It is a controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical concern. The disputed
frontier of Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe."

In thus refusing to arbitrate as requested by the government of the United States and in refusing to recognize the authority of the United States in South America, the English sought to overthrow the power of the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by the government under President Cleveland. While Lord Salisbury said that the English government accepted the Doctrine as stated by Mr. Monroe unreservedly, still that question raised by Mr. Canning concerning colonization of America by European powers seemed to be as difficult a one for Lord Salisbury to accept as for Mr. Canning. There might be a difference between a disputed boundary line and the desire for colonization, but in the case of Venezuela the process of colonization was the principal cause of the boundary dispute as it led to England's demands growing greater with each new advance of English settlements in the gold region or along the coast. So to be consistent with his own demands Lord Salisbury had to produce argument to show that the Monroe Doctrine was no longer in force.

"Whatever may be the authority of the doctrine laid down by President Monroe there is nothing in his language to show that he ever thought of claiming this novel prerogative for the United States", "viz. that the refusal on the part of Great Britain to accede to the demands of the United States for arbitration would "greatly embarrass the future relations between Great Britain and the United States."
"International Law is founded on the general consent of nations." Mr. Olney's principle that "American questions are for American decisions" cannot be sustained by any reasoning drawn from the law of nations." Such contingency may equally happen in the case of China or Japan and the right of interference is not more extensive or more assured in the one case than in the other. The United States have a perfect right like any other nation to interpose in any controversy by which their own interests are affected, and they are the judge whether those interests are touched and in what measure they should be sustained." "They (The British Government) are not prepared to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily concerned in every frontier dispute which might arise between any two of the states which possess dominion in the Western Hemisphere and still less can they accept the doctrine that the United States are entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of territory which one of those states may make against another."

Mr. Bryce shows that the English did not appreciate the feeling in America over the Monroe Doctrine as the subject had not been discussed in England, and did not realize what a united front would oppose them in America. Salisbury's reply to Olney would indicate the same thing.
Mr. Stanley said: "What strikes me, however, is that we have not rightly apprehended what a force in international discussion the Monroe Doctrine from the American point of view has become." From the reply of Salisbury of one party and of Roseberry, the March before, of the other, it may be seen that both the English parties were of the same opinion. When the English people learned of that attitude of the Americans, pressure was brought to bear on the government to make concessions to the demands of America.

While the Venezuelan question was under discussion with America, England was extending her borders in South Africa against the Germans. She was having territorial trouble with France in upper Egypt and had the everpresent trouble with Russia on the Indian frontier so that while Lord Salisbury had repeatedly refused to arbitrate with Venezuela he was influenced by these complications to back down when the United States made her demands and he agreed to submit the question to arbitration. It was better for England to submit this question to arbitration than to risk war when her title to so much of her territory was not certainly fixed. The arbitration committee was composed of two English, two American, and one Russian representative. While as a result of the arbitration England got about all she had demanded a precedent was set recognizing the hegemony of the United States in American affairs from which it will be very difficult for England to recede.

1-19 April '96
Since 1896 England has very consistently followed out the concession made by Lord Salisbury. In 1901 the Hay-Pa^lcefote Treaty was made to supercede the convention of 1850, and all claim on the part of Great Britain to a part in the construction and ownership of the Canal was withdrawn. The Carribean Sea has come largely under American control and the way from New York to San Francisco is as necessarily American as the high-way from the British Isles to India must be British, and England seems finally to have become cognizant of this condition.

On one other occasion has the Monroe Doctrine been put to the test—again in Venezuela. For a long time Venezuela had neglected to pay her debts to severals of the European powers. The many revolutions and consequent changes of government made it appear that a settlement would never be made. In 1903 England and Germany, later joined by Italy, allied themselves to force a settlement, and Germany incidentally wished with such backing to test the Monroe Doctrine. Germany expected to land troops to insure payment of debt in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but this right was denied by the United States. President Roosevelt prevented the Allies from holding territory as a guarantee for settlement, and forced them diplomatically to submit their questions to the Hague Court of Arbitration. England, never enthusiastic about holding territory soon saw the logic of their position and withdrew her war vessel. Germany beaten at her own game was compelled to recognize the force of the Monroe Doctrine,
and withdrew somewhat later in ill humor. The controversy was settled in just the way the United States had suggested.

It is evident that several English statesmen thought that England was as interested and should have as much authority in American affairs as the United States. The action of Great Britain has continually disproved the American protectorate. With Adams in power she has established the Republic of Uruguay, she has retained the Falkland Islands. President Jackson had refused to check her territorial aggressions tho Central America implored him to interfere." In assisting Monroe in his first declaration England had in mind to keep the continental powers out of South America, especially France from the East coast and Russia from the West. Adams thought Canning's object was to obtain some public pledge from the government of the United States ostensibly against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between Spain and South America, but really or especially against the acquisition by the United States themselves of any part of the Spanish American possessions. The controversy in the middle of the Century over Central America shows that England wanted an equal voice with the United States. When France wanted to gain territory and overturn the Mexican government England withdrew her aid, not because of her respect for the Monroe Doctrine but because she did not want France to get a foot-hold.

1. Reddaway - Monroe Doctrine 794
2. Snow. Am. Diplomacy 253
England, without requesting the cooperation or intervention of the United States, forced the Brazilian troops to evacuate Uruguay and declared that state an Independent Republic. In 1838 England and France undertook warlike operations against Mexico again without resistance or remonstrance from the United States, and a little later on expelled the Argentines from Monte Video and jointly guaranteed the independence of Uruguay by a Treaty to which the United States has never been invited to become a party. One writer stated that it is not water but land that separates countries and that England is nearer Southern South America than is the United States, and is more concerned in the independence and good government of that region than is the United States. But she preferred to give up South America to the political influence of the United States rather than to endanger the political and commercial influence of the other contested points to her continental rivals.

England has nothing to lose by the application of the Monroe Doctrine, except the possibility of acquiring territory, while without the Monroe Doctrine, at some critical period France, Germany, or Russia might seize territory in that region and deprive her of her commercial supremacy if not shut her entirely out of the South American markets. As long as the Monroe Doctrine is enforced British possessions in America are safe from seizure by any Continental power. As long as England is in danger of war with other powers she is in danger
of losing her American possessions unless the Monroe Doctrine protects them. It is essential to the best interests of Great Britain that she maintain a close alliance with the United States and a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. Her attitude toward the United States since 1896 indicates that England has recognized that fact.

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