Jarry, Agent of Three Powers
During the French Revolution

by William Roy Manning

1902

Submitted to the Department of History of the
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
Master thesis
History
Manning, W.R. 1902
Jarry, agent of three powers during the French Revolution.
J - A - R - Y,

AGENT OF THREE POWERS

DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

By

W. A. Manning.

Thesis presented to the Faculty of the University of Kansas
for the degree of Master of Arts.

---000000 1902 000000---

Approved
OUTLINE

I.
Prussian Service.
A. In the army.
B. Secret agent of the court.

II.
French Service.
A. On a secret mission to Berlin.
   1. Sent by the Constitutionalists.
   2. Plays into the hands of the Royalists.
B. Commander in the French army.
   1. Burns the suburbs of Courtrai.
   2. Effect on the Belgians.
   4. His motives for the burning.
   5. Becomes an émigré and is dismissed.

III.
English Service.
A. Secret military advisor of the British Foreign Office.
   1. His introduction to British officials.
   2. His employment.
   3. Employed for a spy, becomes an advisor.
   5. Opposes territorial aggrandisement.
   6. Advises cooperation with the Royalists.
   7. Draws up a general plan for the campaign of 1794.
   8. His relations with the Austrians.
   9. Military advisor in the field.
   10. His wisdom and foresight.
B. Subsequent position in England.
AUTHORITIES.

Auckland,—Correspondence of Lord Auckland, by the Bishop of Bath and Wells.

Borgerget,—Histoire des Belges.

Bourgoing,—Histoire Diplomatique de L'Europe, pendant La Revolution Francaise.

Charpentier,—Mare, Duc de Bassano.

Chauquet,—Les Guerres de La Revolution.

Comite de Salut Public,—Rocqueil des Actes du Comite de Salut Public.


Dumouriez,—Memoires Sur La Revolution, par Berville et Barrière.

Fortescue MSS,—Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report XIV, Part V.

Fyffe,—History of Modern Europe, Popular Edition.

Gower,—Despatches of Lord Gower, 1790-1792, by Oscar Browning.

Henri Martin,—Histoire de France, depuis 1789.

Koch,—Traites de Paix.

Le Grande Encyclopédia.

Segur, Histoire de P. Guillaume II.

Sorel,—L'Europe et La Revolution Francaise.

Thiers,—History of the French Revolution.
Jarry is the name of a man who is scarcely mentioned in history, but to whom a great deal of interest attaches when it is known that he served as secret agent three of the great European Powers during the first years of the French Revolution. This interest increases when it is observed from the tasks intrusted to him and the universal commendations of those with whom he worked, that he must have been a man of unusual ability and recognized worth. The secret service is an important factor in the conduct of any war, since the success of military operations is in no small degree due to the skilful direction of the hidden manoeuvres. Hence in order to understand fully the significance of a campaign the student must know what was going on behind the scenes. This is doubly true of the French Revolution, in which there were so many nations engaged and so many occasions for jealousy and distrust.

The three powers which Jarry served, each in its turn, were Prussia, France, and England. Isolated incidents of his connections with the first two are recorded by several French historians, but the only English work, except collections of letters and manuscripts, which furnish any account of him is the Dictionary of National Biography, and this work makes no mention of his secret service to the British Foreign Office. The sources of information on his work in this capacity are the Correspondence of Lord Auckland (1) and the second volume of the Fortesque Manuscripts. The latter, which furnishes

1. This is William Eden, First Lord Auckland. During 1793 and 1794, when the letters were written to which reference is made, he was located at or near London. He was the medium through whom Jarry was introduced to the Foreign Office, and through whom the correspondence between Jarry and that office was transmitted. Born in 1745, he entered public life in 1773 as Under Secretary of State, filling in succession many important governmental positions. Having been appointed Ambassador to Holland in 1791, he negotiated an important commercial treaty. In 1793, about June 1st, he returned to England and became a confidential adviser to Mr. Pitt. Subsequently he held several official positions, dying in 1814. His correspondence was arranged and published in four volumes, under the direction of his son in 1881. -Auckland J.v.-xx.

2. The Fortesque Manuscripts are a collection of letters and papers of Lord Grenville, who was Foreign Secretary during the time of Jarry's services to the Foreign Office. After his retirement from political life he arranged and collected his papers at Droghere, his residence, where they remained practically unknown until after their present owner, Mr. J.B. Fortescue, gave permission for them to be examined on behalf of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. -Fortescue HSS.I.,iii.
the bulk of the material, was not published until 1894, and the in-
formation furnished by it is therefore new to history. It is the
purpose of this paper to state briefly Jarry's earlier activities in
Prussia and France as collected from already well known authorities,
and to examine in greater detail the new historical material furnished
in the Fortescue Manuscripts, with additional points from the Auckland
Correspondence, explanatory of his hitherto unknown career as con-
fidential military adviser to the British Government.

I.
PRUSSIAN SERVICES.

A. In the Army.

Francis Jarry was born in France in 1733. The records of the
French war office state that he entered the Prussian army and became
successively captain, engineer, major, and colonel, though the German
war office can find no trace of any officer of the name. He is said
to have been, with eleven others, personally instructed by Frederick
the Great, and later to have been at the head of a military school at
Berlin. (1) No explanation appears of the fact that he is not mentioned
in the Prussian army records. It is possible that he went under an
assumed name there, or that Jarry is an assumed name, though no notice
for the change of name is apparent. This would be entirely in keeping
with his character since so many of his acts are shrouded in secrecy. (2)
The records of his Prussian service found in the French war office
might have been given by himself on entering the French army. The state-
ment of his having been instructed by Frederick the Great and having
been at the head of a Prussian military school very plainly comes from
himself for it is based on the evidence of Sir Howard Douglass and
other officers associated with him in England at a later date. (3) Lord
Gower (4) in one of his despatches said that Jarry had been Professor

2. See index to despatches of Lord Gower under Jarry, where the editor,
   Oscar Browning, implies that Jarry is an assumed name. Browning suggests
   that Jarry may be Baron Stienne Amastase Gideon. This is not at all
   likely, however, for he gives 1764 as the date of Gideon's birth. Jarry
   was a much older man. (See above)
4. Lord Gower was at this time English Ambassador to the Court of
in the Military School at Berlin and had at that time courted the favor of the king of Prussia, (1) suggesting this as the reason why he was selected to go on a difficult mission to the Prussian Court. (2) There can, in fact, be no doubt that he was at one time in the Prussian army for he is referred to specifically in this connection by such authorities as Chuquet, (3) and Sorel. (4)

B. Secret Agent of the Prussian Court.

The evidence of Jarry's being in the secret service of Prussia is meagre, though unmistakable. Sorel, speaking of him in connection with the events late in 1791, says he had taken a hidden part in the Prussian manoeuvres in the recent revolution in Belgium, and that he might still be seen from time to time at Brussels, where he played the democrat. (5) The Belgian revolution here mentioned is that of 1790 as a result of which the Austrian power was temporarily overthrown in Belgium. Prussia and Austria were at variance then and it was to the interests of the former to weaken her rival by encouraging the Belgian revolution. According to Boignet, (6) he had in 1790 served the interests of the Vonokists (7) at Berlin.

II.

FRENCH SERVICE.


In 1791 Jarry appears in the French Service. He is said to have entered on the invitation of General Dumouriez who spoke of him as 'one of the cleverest officers in any service'. (8) He was admitted into the French army in July, 1791, as colonel and adjutant general,

2. See below, p. 10.
5. Sorel II., 340.
7. The Vonokists were the radical party in Belgium in 1790, led by Vonok. They united for the time being with the Statiste party, the conservatives, to overthrow the Austrian power. See Boignet I., Chs. V. and VI., or Dumouriez II., 89, note, or Bourgoing, Pt. I., Ch. I.
and became Marshal de camp May 13 of the next year. (1) It is late in 1791 that he begins to take an active part in the intrigues of the French Court, ostensibly serving the Constitutionalists, the party favoring the limited monarchy then in existence, but as a matter of fact playing into the hands of the ultra-royalists, who wished to restore Louis XVI. to absolute power. In order to understand these intrigues and Carry's connections with them a brief statement of the position of the French government at the time will be to the point.

Up to this time the Revolution had been an internal struggle. In the mid-summer of 1791 a serious threat of foreign interference in behalf of the French Royal Family had been made by the combined declaration of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns at Pilnitz, but the proclamation of the French constitution and its acceptance by Louis in September, making the government of France a limited monarchy seemed for a time to alay all danger, and the declaration of Pilnitz was withdrawn. However, Louis's consent to the constitution had been a forced one and he was hoping for a pretext to overthrow it. The majority of the Legislative Assembly were of the aggressive party, known as the Girondists, who wished the entire destruction of the royal power, and believed the best way to bring it about was by a war against the sovereigns of Europe. The emigrant nobles collected at Treves were making warlike preparations, and the Empire maintained a threatening attitude. All Europe was trembling on the verge of an international war. (2) Frantic efforts to maintain peace were being made by the Constitutionalists, the center of whose manœuvres was at this time a Prussian alliance. It is around this proposed alliance that the interest centers.

1. Sent by the Constitutionalists.


2. P. 27.

3. Armand Louis de Gontran, d'abord duc de Lauzun et ensuite duc de Biron, né à Paris le 15 avril, 1747, prit part à la guerre de l'Indépendance américaine. Député de la noblesse du Quercy aux États généraux, général en chef de l'armée du Rhin, puis des côtes de la Rochelle (15 mai, 1793), destitué (11 juillet, 1793) guillotiné le 10 nivose an II.—30 décembre, 1793.—Comité de Salut Public, 1.27, note.
at the North, and Talleyrand located at Paris. At Berlin the French party was in great disfavor; but Biron and Talleyrand proposed to overcome this by bribery. The court was shamelessly corrupt; and 'favorites and mistresses conspired to animate the King of Prussia against France. Their hostility was well known; but their vanity was not less'. (1) Marbonne who was in sympathy with these leaders obtained a place in the ministry, thus giving them the opportunity they wished; and Biron confided their plans to him writing at the same time to Talleyrand. Talleyrand answered that he would do anything he could for the success of this great measure, saying that if they could get the King of Prussia to decide for them they would be masters of the earth; the constitution would march on and misgivings would cease. He thought the decision of the Prussian king would influence the Emperor, and would also furnish a necessary complement to the English negotiations. (2) This shows how important the measure was considered; and it would, therefore, he expected that these leaders would select as their agent to carry it out the most able men available.

Segur (3) had just been sent by the French cabinet to fill the vacant post of Minister at Berlin with instructions to restrain Frederick William from interfering in the internal affairs of France. They feared lest incited by the French Enrages, that prince would rush headlong into the struggle and the Emperor would be obliged to follow him. (4) This sending of Segur to secure a passive alliance, which was really nothing more than Prussian neutrality, disconcerted for a time the bolder plans of Biron and his associates (5) for bribing the Prussian court into an active alliance with France. But Biron soon

1. Sorel, II., 338.
2. Sorel II., 333.
3. Idem—Segur had taken part in the American war; was ambassador to Russia in 1784, where he won renown; ambassador to Rome, 1791; held some important positions later. See Bowar, index under Segur. He had refused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when De Lessart accepted it at the fall of Montmorin. —Segur II., 212.

There is an apparent discrepancy between Burgoing and Sorel as to whether or not Segur took with him money to bribe the court of Berlin. Burgoing states definitely that he did. Sorel, though he does not commit himself on the point, implies that Segur did not take money, in saying that Jarry was sent with money to accomplish what Segur was expected to fail in by using fair diplomatic means. (See above references to each.) Bowar in a despatch sent at the time, states indirectly that Segur took money. (Bowar, 147.) Bowar's statement is, perhaps, merely rumor, and he probably has confused the mission of Segur and Jarry. Burgoing's attitude may be explained on the same ground, since he does not mention Jarry.
5. Letter of Biron to Talleyrand, 25 Dec., 1791. (Cited by Sorel.)
recovered from his despair, finding a man who he thought could accomplish, as secret agent, what the official envoy could not. This was Jarry. Being fascinated with his personality, Biron at once confided to Jarry all his designs, and a few hours after he had written Talleyrand, 'all is lost', he assured him that he had sent a man capable of saving everything. (1) This was December 25, 1791. Arriving in Paris Jarry lodged with Talleyrand, who persisted in seeing in the idea of an alliance with Berlin the only salvation of the time. Harbomme, the Minister of War, did not hesitate to employ Jarry as Biron wished, but the rest of the ministry were not so ready. De Lessart, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was at first opposed; but after having been surrounded for a few days entirely by the party favorable to the scheme, his support was won and Jarry was sent, January 5, 1792. Talleyrand wrote Biron, 'I hope you will be somewhat pleased with my dear Lauzan. M. Jarry goes as you have planned for Prussia. His instructions are those which you have dictated.' (2)

3. Plays into the hands of the Royalists.

Now appears the interesting part of Jarry's secret mission to Berlin. It seems to have been an intrigue within an intrigue. Although employed and sent by the Constitutionalists he was really in sympathy with the ultra-royalists and betrayed his secrets to them. Two days after he left Paris for Berlin he was with La Marck (3) on the Belgian frontier. La Marck was an ultra-royalist and a friend of Mercy, who was the Austrian ambassador at Brussels, and a close friend and confidant of Queen Marie Antoinette. La Marck wrote to Mercy, 'The new agent departed two days since from Paris for Berlin, is one named Jarry. He has come to inform me of the mission which he has received.

1. As showing the high estimate placed on Jarry's abilities the following quotation from Sorel II, 340, is to the point, "C'était M. de Jarry, adjutant général, homme de toutes mains et de toute besogne, qui avait été le secrétaire officieux, ou comme on disait alors, le 'faiseur militaire' de M. de la Marck, de Laincourt et de Neales. Muri dans les brigues, Jarry avait servi vingt ans en Prusse et prit un part occulte aux événements prussiens dans les récentes révolutions de Belgique." (Sorel II, 340-41).

2. La Marck was a firm friend of French Royalty. He appears in several places in conferences with friends of the King and Queen, planning for their escape. (See Fortescue Mss.II, 803, and III, 128, 401.) In Fortescue Mss.II, 391 he is mistakenly identified with La Marque, one of the four deputies who were sent to arrest Dumasieres in April 1793, and were arrested by Dumasieres. (For account of this arrest see Thiers, 342.) La Grande Encyclopédia gives account of his meeting with Mercy at the
and to give me his address at Berlin." He wrote in the same letter, "This man is exclusively devoted to me. He serves against his will in the party which employs him. He wished to join the Princess at Coblenz but I hindered him, (1) assuring him that I would find a way for him to serve the Tuileries."(2) La Marok seems to have considered this mission of Jarry the expected opportunity, and La Marok and Jarry probably had some secret plan by which it was to be turned to the direct service of the French Royal Family.

The fact of Jarry's extreme royalist sympathies appearing in these quotations furnishes the key to all of his actions; and viewed in this light his career seems perfectly consistent. Otherwise it would be difficult to harmonize his actions, appearing at one time in the French service intriguing and fighting for the French Revolutionary Government, and at another time in the English service plotting against the French Government. He was serving not France so much as the French Monarchy, and as long as he thought he could best do this by serving the existing government he served that government though really against his will.

No benefit came to France from the mission to Berlin of Segur. He was repelled by the coldness of the King and Court.(3) Whether Jarry succeeded in buying influence for the Constitutionalist party at the Prussian Court, or whether he accomplished anything for the Tuileries according to his secret scheme with La Marok, does not appear. On April 20, 1792, some three months after he went to Berlin the conflict was precipitated by a declaration of war against Austria, latters request, and says he was employed by the Emperor Francis on several negotiations. (See under Arenberg, comte de.)

1. It seems that Jarry's wish to join the emigrees had been expressed at some former time.
2. La Marok a Mercy, 10 Janvier 1792. Feuillet V. p. 127, (Cited by Sorel II., 341.)
3. Bourgoing, première partie, p. 439.-- This author quotes Frederick William as having said to Segur: "N'attaquez pas l'Autriche, laissez en paix l'Allemagne, et je vous ferai pas la guerre." The queen and court alike refused to treat with him. After some time, being certain that Berlin was pursuing the same course as Vienna, and being convinced of the uselessness of his mission he demanded and obtained his recall. Segur had failed, as was expected by the party of Biron and Talleyrand.
forced upon Louis XVI. by the pressure of the Girondin ministry and the national cry for war. (1) Prussia joined with Austria in accordance with a treaty made in February. (2) The war began on the Flemish frontier with an attack by the French upon the Austrians.

B. Commander in the French Army.

It is in keeping with the high estimate placed upon Jarry's abilities that he is found occupying an important position in this first campaign of the war. Although he was practically a foreigner (3) and had been in the French army less than a year he was one of the leading generals (4) in the army of Luckner, who was in command of this division on the Flemish frontier. The campaign had been planned by Dumouriez, the leader of the Girondin, or war, party in the Assembly. He had been admitted to the ministry after the triumph of that party, and his influence was so predominant that he practically managed the affairs of the War Department also, though he held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. (5) It was probably due to him that Jarry was given so important a place, since, as was stated above, Jarry entered the French service on his invitation. By a personal interview Dumouriez convinced Luckner of the advisability of invading Belgium (6) and then sent him to carry out the plan. Luckner possessed himself easily of Ypres, Menin and Courtrai. (7) About this time Dumouriez was transferred to the Department of War and was laying his plans for a vigorous campaign, when, after having held his new portfolio only four days (8) the king, influenced by ultra-Royalist advisors, demanded his resignation. After a vain attempt to convince the king of the folly of his measure, Dumouriez resigned, leaving his well wrought plans to be executed by feebler hands or abandoned entirely. (9) Royalist sympa-

1. Pyffle I.
2. Idem 29.
3. That Jarry was looked upon as a foreigner is reflected in several places. Berlin in the National Assembly spoke of him as an "officer general étranger." Borgnet II., 36. In a footnote Borgnet says of him, "Jarry dont nous ignornons la patrie." Borgnet II., 35.
4. Dumouriez II., 328.
5. Borgnet II., 7, and note.
6. Dumouriez II., 327.
9. Dumouriez II., Ch. IX., pp. 309-316. -- This pictures in a very vivid manner the last touching scene between the king and Dumouriez in a private conversation. Copious quotations are given.
thizers led by La Fayette had at the same time been at work in the army, and almost immediately after the break in the ministry and the fall of Dumouriez they prevailed on Luckner to abandon the plan for invading Belgium, to evacuate the places already gained and to withdraw the French forces in the fortifications of Lille. (1)

1. Jarry burns the suburbs of Courtrai.

All of the other features of the retreat of Luckner's army are eclipsed by an unhappy circumstance that occurred at the time of the evacuation of Courtrai, in which Jarry is the principal actor. Just before he gave orders to evacuate the city he caused fire to be set to the suburbs. It is stated that the Austrians who had attacked his army and had been repulsed intrenched themselves in the suburbs at one of the gates and to dislodge them the fire was set not only to the suburb but to all the others. (2) Though this was in itself a comparatively insignificant event and is scarcely mentioned by historians, yet it is of interest to note the effect it produced both in Belgium and at Paris. A study of the motives prompting it will help in forming an estimate of the character of Jarry.

2. Effect on the Belgians.

The government at Brussels, Austrian in sympathy, took advantage of the opportunity the incident offered to warn the Belgians against the regenerators of Aspers, the new apostles who resort to the incendiary torch to throw light on the visionary advantages of an incomparable regime. (3) Many numbers of the official journal, Gazette

1. Dumouriez II., 328, and 332.—The editor of the memoirs thinks, "perhaps if Dumouriez had arrived two or three days sooner he would have prevented this disgraceful retreat, which is seen evidently to have been ordered only by party spirit, consequent to some great project of the party of La Fayette, of which Luckner, beast by his staff, was the instrument and plaything." Dumouriez after his fall from the ministry had set out to join himself to the army of Luckner. (See p. 330.) A letter addressed from Hein in at this time to Delmas, a member of the Assembly in speaking of Luckner, says, "Il a reco hier un courrier de L. Lafayette, et, une heure apres, l'ordre de faire partir les convois pour Lille a ete donne." Quoted by Bonnet II., 30.

2. Bonnet II., 35.—A statement of the incident is also found in the Recueil Des Actes du Comite de Salut Public I., 347 in a footnote to the minutes of the meeting of the Conseil Executif Provincial of 21 Dec. 1793.

3. Gazette des Foy-Bas, du 3 Juillet, 1792 (Quoted by Bonnet II., 35.)
10.

Les Pays-Bas, were devoted to explaining in detail the damages caused by the burning. (1) In the Belgian Revolutionary Committee, which was in sympathy with the revolution in France an oration, making an eloquent appeal to the Belgians to take up arms against the French monarchy, says of Jarry, he declared haughtily that he did not wish popular movements and that he would prevent them by force of arms. We shrink in dismay, and name this general with repugnance, for even his name horrifies the friends of humanity, of liberty, and law. Murmurs of indignation rose through all the assembly. The Committee demanded justification for the burning of Courtrai. (2) This shows that in Belgium the act incensed both the friends and the foes of the revolution against the French government, which result was perhaps foreseen and desired by Jarry.


In Paris the Deputy Delmas denounced it in the National Assembly (3) and Isnard in the same body cried 'Brabant calls us and though already victorious we have deserted them; and in our desertion we have burned the dwellings of their fathers.' (4) Robespierre speaking to the Jacobins implied that the retreat was instigated by Royalty under the influence of the court of Vienna and called them to witness the country's danger in view of this, and when the flames of Courtrai were the only pledge of their attachment which they gave to the Brabantians. Lasource, taking the defense of Lucker, threw all the responsibility on Jarry, and declared the burning of Courtrai to be an infamous action capable of destroying the honor of the French nation if it did not openly bear

---

1. Borgnet II.,36.—A footnote on this page quotes from the Gazette des Pays-Bas a long list, giving the number of buildings burned and losses sustained by each of the separate suburbs of Courtrai, closing with this reflection: "Guerre aux chateaux, paix aux Chamarres, disent les Jacobins; il n'y a dans tout ceci aucun chateau, et l'on y vait pour trois millions des ravages."

2. Borgnet II., 43.

3. Borgnet II., 30.—Delmas read from two letters which had been addressed to him from Menin. Borgnet quotes from them and refers to the Moniteur no. 185, du 3 juillet, 1793.

4. Idem II., 35.—The quotation from Isnard Borgnet takes from the Moniteur, no. 218, du 5 aout 1793. That from Robespierre seems to be taken from the records of the Jacobin Club. The reference is, Semine du 10 juillet, 1793.
testimony to the indignity which such an act inspired in it; and if
the National Assembly after having repaired as much as possible the
losses of the unhappy Brabantians, did not deliver the author of this
injury to the sword of justice. (1) In the Jacobin club there was a
veritable concert of imprecations for not making Jarry stand trial. (2)
On July 3, only four days after the event, the Ministry of War brought
it to the notice of the National Assembly, and it was decided unanimous­ly
to indemnify the victims. (3) Thus its effects both in Belgium and
at Paris was to inspire the revolutionists with an intense hatred for
Jarry and for the Royalists with whom he was supposed to be in sympathy.

4. His motives.

As to the motives which prompted Jarry to burn Courtrai several
theories are suggested. The bare statement of the fact is that it
was done to dislodge the Austrian riflemen. (4) This was undoubtedly
the ostensible purpose and is perhaps the official explanation which
Jarry gave for his actions; but the fact that Courtrai was evacuated
almost immediately afterward, and that this evacuation was evidently
in obedience to orders which were given before the firing, not only
makes it seen a worse than useless defensive measure, but indicates
some hidden purpose. Attempts were made at the time to find in it an
evidence of a plot. (5) Borgnet suggests that possibly Jarry did it in
a spirit of revenge, wishing to punish the Courtraisans because they
had failed to respond when, in 1790, as the agent of the Prussian
government he was attempting to rouse in the Belgians a general spirit
of patriotism and to stir up rebellion against Austria. (6) Isnard

1. Borgnet II., 37.
2. Idem, II., 36. — Reference is here given to the Jacobin records,
Sesione du 2 Juillet 1793.
3. Idem II., 36. — See also Comite de Salut Public I., 336. On this
page of the records the matter of indemnifying the Courtraisans is
brought up in the meeting of the Provisionary Executive Council of
December 31, 1792. It seems that the indemnity had not been paid though
it had been voted July 3, and sanctioned the next day. At this meeting,
Dec. 31, the sum of 300,000 livres was placed at the disposal of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose, and the matter of the veri­fi­cation
and regulation of the indemnities was left to the national com­missioners
sent to that part of Belgium.
4. "le maréchal de camp, Jarry, l'un des généraux placés sous les
ordres de Luckmar, fut attaqué dans Courtrai par les Autrichiens qu'il
responsa, mais qui se retranchèrent dans les maisons du faubourg situé
hors le porte de Gaud. Pour les déloger, fit mettre le feu non soule­ment
a ce faubourg mais aussi a tous les autres."
5. Borgnet II., 35.
6. Idem, note. — As a basis for this conjecture, Borgnet in the same
in the National Assembly conjectured that Jarry was at this time influenced by the Austrian government through the French king and that this act was to avenge Austria for the Belgian rebellion in 1790. (1) But the consensus of opinion at the time seems to have been that it was done in keeping with the policy of the Royalists, and that it was the result of a carefully thought out plan intended to inspire in the Belgians a hatred for the French to counteract the general rising in favor of the French revolution then taking place in Belgium. (2) The prevalence of this opinion at Paris is indicated by the fact that a month later when Petion came into the National Assembly at the head of a deputation from the Communeh of Paris to demand the deposition of Louis XVI, the burning of Courtrai was still alleged to be one of the grievances which the Revolution imputed to the monarch. (3) This is also in harmony with Charpentier's idea of the possible purpose of the whole retreat of which the evacuation of Courtrai was only an incident. He suggests that it was said at the time that the army was withdrawn from Belgium to march against Paris for the purpose of avenging loyalty for the outrage of June 20. (4) According to the same author, Robespierre wrote in his journal that the object of the war is not to dethrone the house of Austria in Brabant but to reestablish its empire in France. (5) Henri Martin agrees with this view in saying that this retreat which was believed to have been secretly ordered by the king, and this burning coincident with the news of the march of the Prussian and Austrian armies toward the Rhine excited cries of fury at Paris and in all France. The public clamor was that France betrayed by her government must save herself. (6) It is safe to assert that whether or

footnote characterizes Jarry thus: "Jarry, dont nous ignorons la patrie, et qui fut impliqué dans la conspiration de Babeuf, avait, en 1790, servi à Berlin les intérêts des Vénetiastes; il existe de lui une lettre dans le Mémoire historique de Vander Mersch. Vol.II., p.345.

1. Borgnet II., 35.--The statement of Isnard is quoted by Borgnet from le Moniteur, no.318, du 5 aout, 1792.

2. "Il paraît que cet acte de ferocity a été préparé, et qu'on a voulu par ce moyen vous faire abhorrer des braves Brabançons et de toute la terre."--Patriote française no. 1061. Quoted by Borgnet II., 35.--On page 37 the same author quotes from a speech of Merlin in the National Assembly: "Sans doute pour inspirer aux Brabançons de l'horreur pour les Français, a qui ils avaient tendu des mains généreuses."--Again on the same page he quotes Camille Desmoulins "pour rendre la nation exécrable a ses allies les Belges."


4. This refers to the insurrection known as the affair of the Tennis Court.

5. Charpentier p.60.

not Jarry had immediate orders from the king to burn Courtrai, it was
his Royalist sympathies that led him to do it, since we have un-
mistakable evidence that he was closely in sympathy with the Royal
family, and since his action cannot be explained on the ground of a
defensive measure. This may be taken as another and strong evidence
of Jarry's Royalist partisanship, and as showing his consistency through-
ut his known service in the revolution, both while serving France
and while serving England against France.

5. Becomes an émigré and is dismissed.

Chuquet affords one more glimpse of the subject of this sketch
in the French service. This author states that on the 31st of August,
1792, 'Jarry, who commanded the advance guard of Luckner's army, to-
gether with Colonel Froissay fled (émigré). Their sudden defection
in the face of the enemy augmented the rumors of treason which were
current in the army.' Jarry's desertion is noted as one of the princi-
pal occasions of the numerous and bitter complaints which the aged
Luckner made to the government at the time. (1) In discussing the
reasons for Luckner's being deprived of his command the same historian
mentions his being influenced by intriguers, such as Jarry, Berthier,
and other counter-revolutionists. (2) Here Jarry is definitely identi-
ified with the Royalists and opposed to the revolution.

The French monarchy had been overthrown August 10, and the Royalist
sympathizers had been compelled to flee from France. Probably Jarry
immediately after his desertion took refuge with the émigrés at
Brussels, since it is there that he is next to be found. On the very
day that he deserted Luckner he was dismissed from the French service,
according to the records of the Committee of Public Safety. (3) At this
point the French historians seem to have lost sight of Jarry entirely;
and the Dictionary of National Biography does not resume the account
of him until 1795. It is in this interval that the most interesting
role was played by this cosmopolitan actor in the Great international
drama.

2. Idem, 201.
3. Comité de Salut Public, I., 27.—His dismissal is recorded in the
minutes of the Provisionary Executive Council for the 21st of August,
1792. The editor of the collection states in a footnote: 'Le maréchal
de camp Jarry, en évacuant Courtrai (29 juin 1792) avait incendié les
III.

ENGLISH SERVICE.

A. Secret Military Adviser of the British Foreign Office.

Jarry's first appearance in the secret service of the British Foreign Office is in the early summer of 1793, some nine months after his dismissal from the French service. During those nine months the revolution had been making rapid strides. The unexpected defeat of Brunswick at Valmy in the fall of 1792 together with the atrocities committed in France brought about a complete change in international politics. France was preparing to attack all constituted authority and by January 1793 it was evident that England also must be counted among her enemies. On February 1st the Convention declared war against England and Holland. Once committed to the struggle Pitt spared neither effort nor money to unite all Europe in opposition to France. (1) Armies were subsidized and sent to the front; individuals whose services might be valuable as advisors or secret agents were employed and set to work. This frantic search for advice and help was the occasion of Jarry's being brought to the notice of the British Foreign Office.

1. His introduction to British officials.

Mention is made of him in a letter of May 27, 1793, written by Quintin Crawford to Lord Auckland. The former was an English gentleman of fortune who had for many years resided at Paris, but had taken refuge with the French emigrees at Brussels on the fall of the French monarchy. (2) The latter was English Ambassador at The Hague. (3) In this letter (4) Crawford writes Auckland that if Jarry comes to The Hague he fauburs de cette ville. This the editor evidently considers the reason for Jarry's dismissal.

A slight discrepancy appears between this minute and the account of the Dictionary of National Biography. The latter states that Jarry left the French service Aug. 16, 1792. It is likely that the mistake is in the latter authority, for according to Henri Martin's account Jarry was in the French service until August 21.

1. Fyffe pp. 40-43.
2. For an account of Crawford see the Dictionary of National Biography under Crawford, Quintin, Auckland III., 41, note, gives a brief statement regarding him at this time. This volume also contains a number of letters written by him.
3. For an account of Lord Auckland see note to page 11 above. The Dictionary of National Biography furnishes a full biographical sketch, also the introduction to Auckland I.
4. Crawford to Auckland, May 27, 1793, Auckland III., 70.
may probably be able to give some useful information with regard to Dunkirk and Lille. The statement indicates that Jarry had been the subject of previous correspondence or conversation, for he is referred to as though he were perfectly familiar to both. He had probably come closely in contact and formed an intimate acquaintance with Crawford since both were intimate with French Royalty and both had probably been for some time at Brussels. Crawford was at the time an agent of the Foreign Office and corresponded frequently with that office through Auckland.

3. His employment.

At the time of the writing of the above mentioned letter Auckland, Crawford and Jarry were all on the continent, the first at The Hague and the others at Brussels. A month later all three were in London. (1) Auckland arrived about June 1st (2). The others probably went together, since Jarry is referred to a little later as Mr. Crawford's friend. (3) On the 26th of June Auckland proposed to Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, the employment of Jarry to obtain secret intelligence from the interior of France. (4) It seems that the matter had been under consideration, for he refers to it as though it were a familiar subject. In another letter of the same day he said that he could postpone Jarry entirely or make arrangements with him through Crawford, or direct Jarry to wait on Grenville. (5) Three days later Grenville, in his reply, approved the scheme, saying it would be a better way to get news than to depend on the newspapers from Ostend, and asking him to speak to Crawford about it and put it in train. (6) Crawford was to be with Auckland the following Sunday (7). About a week later Auckland informed


2. He left Lord Henry Spencer, who was a very young man, as Charge d'Affaires at The Hague. About two months later he was appointed Minister to Sweden. A number of his letters appear in Auckland III.

3. Grenville to Auckland, July 31, 1793; Auckland III., 84
4. Auckland to Grenville June 28, 1793; Fortescue MSS. II., 400. 5. Idem.
6. Green to Greenville, July 1, 1793, Auckland III., 77.
7. Auckland to Greenville, July 7, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 453.
that Crawford had talked with Jarry and that an arrangement had been made subject to Grenville's approval. The arrangement was that Jarry should be allowed 100 lb for postage, printed matter, etc., and should receive as personal compensation £20 per month. He was to account for the 100 lb before he should receive an additional allowance and the 30½ lb per month was to continue for six months but no longer, unless he was thought to merit it. Auckland added that as soon as Grenville approved he would pay Jarry his salary for the month of June and postage for June and July. This shows that Jarry had been at work for some time, for his pay was made to begin more than a month before he was employed. (1) A few days later Grenville wrote that he thought Jarry's terms perfectly reasonable and requested that they be accepted. Thus the bargain was closed and he became a secret agent of the British government, giving advice and information to the Allies against the government of France, in the army of which country he had been serving less than a year before.

3. Employed for a spy, becomes an advisor.

From a remark made by Auckland it seems that the intention when Jarry was employed was to use him as a spy "to secure secret intelligence from the interior of France." (2) The purpose must have been changed, for as will be seen he remained in London and was a military advisor of the Foreign Office, giving suggestions on the conduct of the various campaigns and the direction of the allied armies. While he was waiting for his appointment he employed his time and proved his fitness by preparing and submitting several papers on the military situation, which met with very high approval. It is probable that his talent in this direction, combined with his knowledge of the details of the country over which the operations were to be conducted, and the lack of such talent and knowledge in England, convinced the government that it would be useful to have such an advisor at hand. Hence the change in plan.

1. Auckland to Grenville, July 7, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 453.
2. Grenville to Auckland, July 11, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 406.
3. Auckland to Grenville, June 28, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 490.
It will be of some interest and value to review a few of the many
schemes which Jarry proposed to the government, and to note the hearty
approval with which they almost invariably met. In the interval be­
tween the first of February when England was forced into the war and
the middle of July when Jarry was employed there had been a great
change in the fortunes of war. The year 1792 had closed in a blaze of
glory for the arms of the French Republic, led by Dumouriez in the
north and Curtine in the east. All Europe was trembling before their
victorious advance. Dumouriez's party, the Gironde, had been in con­
tral of affairs in France since the overthrow of the monarchy in
the previous August. But now a new and far more radical party, the Mountain,
was rapidly gaining strength, and the Gironde, which had been the radi­
cal party in the Legislative Assembly under the limited monarchy, became
the conservative party in the Convention. They tried in vain to check
the rising tide of democracy which they feared would sweep the country
to ruin. As a concession to radicalism in their hopeless struggle to
retain power, they agreed against their better judgment to the execu­
tion of the king. But instead of conciliating the opposite party they
thereby alienated the strongest men within their own. Dumouriez who had
been their leader in the government of the limited monarchy, and had
led their armies to victory under the Republic, was now at open enmity
with the Jacobin government of the Convention. Being attacked by the
Austrians in March he offered only a half-hearted resistance and was
defeated. Then determining to deal a crushing blow on the Republic he
deserted the French cause to unite with the Austrians in an attack on
the Convention. (1)

The same month that saw Dumouriez's treason saw the defeat of the
army of the east under Custine. In a few days he lost all he had gained
the previous autumn. At the same time the peasants of La Vendee rose in

1.Fyffe pp. 42-47. Dumouriez's desertion was early in April. Calling
to mind again the relations between him and Jarry it is interesting
to note that it is the next month after Dumouriez's treason that Jarry
is found to be in communication with the British officials. If Jarry
felt under any obligation to Dumouriez for his patronage, which would
be natural, this would no longer have any influence in keeping Jarry
in the French service since his patron was now a fugitive. Jarry would
be free on that score to sell his services to England. Whether this
can be taken as a motive on Jarry's part or not makes little difference.
The interests of Dumouriez and Jarry were one, namely, the destruction
of the Jacobin power and the overthrow of the government of the Con­
vention.
revolt to resist a levy of soldiers by the Convention. An army sent to put them down was attacked and cut to pieces. The French armies were defeated, the victorious allies were marching across the borders, and the country was rent with internal wars. The disasters were laid at the door of the Girondists. On the last day of May a mob invaded the Convention, and two days later armed forces of the Commune arrested the leading members of the Girondists and the victory of the Mountain was complete. The Committee of Public Safety with Robespierre at its head became supreme and by means of its representatives established all over France assumed despotic power and inaugurated the Reign of Terror.

While France was in this unhappy condition, General Jarry, a former defender, was sitting at his office in London planning for the British Cabinet the best means to accomplish the complete overthrow of the Republic, and to reestablish the Bourbon monarchy under the most favorable conditions for the Bourbons, allowing at the same time just compensation to the Allied Powers for their trouble and expense in restoring order. It was believed to be at most a struggle of only a few months. The prevalence of this opinion throughout the year continually appears in the correspondence of the time. The question was how to accomplish it with the least cost of blood and treasure. So now when the Republican structure in France was tottering and seemed ready to fall of its own weight, each of the Allied Powers instead of spending its energies in a vigorous campaign was planning to seize and hold the particular slice of France that it believed most advantageous. The interests of both Austria and England seemed to lie in the north. The former was looking with eager eyes toward the Somme as a new frontier between Austrian Netherlands and France. The latter as her share of this rich booty would be satisfied with the city of Dunkirk on the channel, and possibly Calais, her ancient and not yet forgotten poss-

1 Pyfe, pp. 47-49.
2 "Do I flatter myself with the hope of what I so strongly wish, or does it strike you as it does me that every fresh account from France brings decisive proofs that the system is drawing to a close and cannot longer support itself."—Granville to Auckland, Nov. 11, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II, 484. Auckland replied: "I most fully concur with your lordship in the opinion that, if this can be done, the Jacobin system is drawing to its close and will be unable to support itself." Auckland to Granville, Nov. 17, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II, 488. — M. de Jarry thinks it possible that the effects of famine may finish the war, or if not that
Jarry, while waiting for his appointment, prepared an extended memoir on the advantages of the "Line of The Sorne," and discussed the military operations and fortifications necessary to seize and hold this line. On July 1st Grenville returned to Auckland an uncompleted paper of Jarry's which he said he would be glad to see when Jarry had finished it. This was perhaps the paper on the "Line of The Sorne," and it probably had much to do with convincing Grenville of Jarry's ability, and his fitness for such work, since it is in this letter that he asks Auckland to speak to Crawford about Jarry's employment and put it in train. (2) July 14, three days after Grenville had agreed to Jarry's terms, Auckland sent him the completed memoir, saying, "It appears to me that the inclosed paper merits the attentive perusal of those who have an influence in directing the farther objects and exertions of the campaign." (3) About a fortnight later Grenville returned the memoir to Auckland, saying "it is certainly written with knowledge and judgment." (4) Following this letter in the Auckland correspondence the memoir is printed in full. It is in French and covers some fourteen pages. This is the only paper of Jarry's printed as a whole, at least in the collection at hand. He discusses at length the justice and importance of establishing the new line, then the number and character of the fortified places necessary to hold it, and proceeds to trace the line from Luxembourg west to the Meuse, down that river to Charleville, thence through the forest of the Thierache by way of Rocroi to La Pere, then across the country to Peronne, and from there down the Sorne to the sea. He advises in addition a second chain of fortifications to the north of this line between Givet or Charlemount, and Dun-

1. Auckland to Grenville, July 14, 1793, Auckland II., 79.
2. Grenville to Auckland, July 1, 1793, Auckland III., 77.
3. Auckland to Grenville, July 14, 1793, Auckland III., 79.
4. Grenville to Auckland, July 31, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 408, and Auckland III., 84.
hence following a little to the south of the present boundary between Belgium and France. (1)

This was certainly an ambitious scheme and France could never except under the most distressing circumstances consent to such a dismemberment. Someone writing in the middle of the last century says, "We invite our readers to look at the map of France, and see what the project of the line of the Somme by Abbeville, Amiens, Peronne, would include, and then say whether they can ex facie believe that at the commencement, or at any period of the war, the most insane ambition or blindness could have contemplated such a dismemberment of France." (2) The complete article is not at hand, so it is impossible to tell the purpose or conclusion of the writer, but this indicates that he believed the author of the memoir to be a visionary schemer and that no sane mind ever really thought seriously of such a dismemberment. But from an examination of the official correspondence of the time it plainly appears that this was exactly what was contemplated by the English and Austrian governments, and that all the operations of the allied armies in the north in the summer of 1793 had as their primary purpose the establishment of this new frontier. According to Fyffe it was claimed "with the full approval of Pitt's cabinet." (3) As early as April the British Minister of War, Dundas, (4) in sending instructions to the Duke of York, commander of the English contingent of the Allied army, through Sir James Murray, (5) his Adjutant General, wrote: "I think I may without any reserve state to you that no operations of the combined armies on the continent can be so essential in our eyes as those whose ultimate tendency is to establish the Netherlands in the House of Austria, with such extended and safe frontier as may secure the independence and tranquility of Holland; and so far as opportunity occurs you will lose no means of resisting every idea of a deviation from that system." (6) So the plan was not Jarry's, but he was simply

1. Auckland III., 85-99. This gives the full text of the memoir in French.
2. Quarterly Review for 1852, p. 340 (quoted by the editor of the Auckland correspondence, Auckland III., 90, note.)
3. Fyffe, 52.
giving his advice as to the best means for establishing and holding the new frontier, since that was the settled purpose of the campaign. In fact, after Jarry became an official advisor he constantly exerted his influence against territorial aggrandisement on the part of the Allies at the expense of France. While his memoir was being considered and discussed events on the continent indicates that the campaign would be successful and that the new frontier would be established. The tone of some of the official correspondence at this juncture manifests almost a boyish jubilancy at the success of the allied arms. (4) Conde surrendered to the Austrians on the 10th of July; and Valenciennes capitulated to the Duke of York a fortnight later. (2)

5. Opposes territorial aggrandisement.

Jarry continually advised rapid vigorous strokes directed toward the center of France instead of pursuing the dilatory policy of occupying border provinces in the hope of retaining them as indemnity when the expected crash came with its scramble for territory. In keeping with this policy, in the early summer before he was employed, and before he submitted his memoir on the "Line of the Somme", he advised that the army of the king of Sardinia should direct its operations through Savoy toward Lyons in preference to any attempt to gain possession of Provence. (3) Auckland expressed his opinion that Jarry's idea was well stated and well supported. (4) In November of 1793 Auckland sent to Grenville "a letter from M. de Jarry criticising the conduct of the Allies each of whom was led away by shortsighted views of advantage, to the conquest of outlying frontiers of French territory." (5) In commenting on Jarry's letter Auckland remarked: "I incline to his opinion, that 'our first and great object ought to be to destroy the Convention'; and it appears to me that if we are materially

2. Fyffe 51.
3. England had subsidized the Sardinian army and consequently had the right to direct its movements. The treaty was made April 25, 1793. The king of Sardinia was to keep 50,000 on foot during the war for 200,000 livres per year. — Koch IV., 234.
4. Auckland to Grenville, June 26, 1793, Fortescue MSS., 400.
5. Quoted from a note of the editor of the Fortescue MSS., inserted at the close of Auckland's letter, 11., 455. It is probable that this letter is to be found in full in the original manuscripts but the editor did not consider it of sufficient importance to print in full, so gave this summary of the substance. There are similar in-
33. diverted from that object by the pursuit of conquests, whether on the continent of Europe or in the East or West Indies, we risk the fate of the whole war and of the existing race of mankind."(1) Another letter written ten days later indicates that Jarry had advised extreme measures in dealing with the French Republicans, for Auckland remarked, "I do not however, infer as he seems to do that it is necessary to destroy them by fire and sword."(2) Jarry's plan seems to have been to strike at once at the center of the government, overthrow the Convention, and then arrange the matter of indemnity at leisure.

6. Advises cooperation with the Royalists.

A measure which Jarry considered very important and on which he gave very urgent advice in the summer of 1793 is that the Allies should weaken the government of the Convention by supporting the enemies within the country itself; that is, by cooperating with the Vendeans and the Royalist risings in western France. The risings were then at their height and the Vendeans had successfully resisted an army of the Convention. Early in July he proposed that the allied armies should act "in concert with the Royalists of Britigne and Poitau against the French Republicans."(3) In discussing Jarry's suggestions, Auckland remarked, "the proposition of sending two persons of known ability and confidence to bring authentic accounts from Gaston certainly may be worth immediate attention." Gaston was one of the Vendean generals who had defeated the army of the Convention.(4) The difficulty of obtaining news from France and the consequent ignorance of real conditions are shown by the fact that English ministers were not aware that Gaston had been dead more than two months.(5)

In a paper submitted in November of 1793 Jarry still "insisted that

1. Auckland to Grenville, Nov. 7, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 454, and Auckland III., 137.
2. Auckland to Grenville, Nov. 17, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 468.
3. Auckland to Grenville, July 9, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 494.
4. "Les escelrarts qui commandent les convoes rebelles se font appelier Gaston et Verteuil."—Comite de Salut Public, Seance du 15 mars, 1793, II., 368.
5. It was reported to the Committee of Public Safety on April 29, 1793, that he had been arrested and killed. A ransom of 600 livres had been offered to anyone who would deliver up any leader of the revolt.—Comite de Salut Public, Seance du 30 avril, 1793, III., 528.
the objects of the war could be fully achieved only by united efforts
to sustain and cooperate with the insurrection in France, for the
purpose of destroying the Convention."(1) At about this time, perhaps
in the same paper, Jarry had given his idea of the force that would
be required to take and defend Bordeaux as a center for the proposed
operations in the west. Grenville suggested that these ideas were on
too large a scale for them to engage in, but added, "I could wish to
have his ideas of Belleisle, Noirmontier, St. Malo, and Havre, on the
supposition of a smaller force than he supposed necessary for Bordeaux,"
showing that the Foreign Office was beginning to fall in with the idea
and was considering means for carrying it out. About a week later Jarry
submitted the desired information and Auckland in sending it to Gren­
ville remarked that his statements were conformable to the opinions of
other intelligent officers.(3)

It seems that Jarry had not discussed in this paper the advisability
of occupying at that time one of these positions, beyond expressing
his opinion that Noirmontier, though insignificant in itself, would be
important as a point of support and communication. But two days later
Auckland forwarded to Grenville a letter just received from Jarry, "pointing out that an English expedition might with great advantage have been
sent to Noirmontier, or some other point on the west coast of France,
when the Royalists were triumphant in Poitau or Bretagne; but that now
when they have been cut off from the seacoast, and Vendee is a heap
of cinders, the time for such an enterprise has gone by."(4) It will
be remembered that such an expedition is exactly what Jarry had advised
some five months before, but his advice had not been acted on. Auckland,
in commenting on this letter of Jarry's, said, "He reasons on the
supposition that there are no Royalists at Noirmontier as has
been reported, and that such parts of the Royalist armies as remain
in France are cut off from the seacoast and likely to be soon destroyed.
I hope and believe that he is mistaken in both of these points." The
Cabinet seems to have inclined to Auckland's opinion. A scheme had been

1. Quoted from a remark of the editor of the Fortescue MSS., at the
close of Auckland letter, II., 455.
2. Grenville to Auckland, Nov. 11, 1793, Fortescue MSS., II., 464.
3. Auckland to Grenville, Nov. 12, 1793, Fortescue MSS., II., 468.
4. Auckland to Grenville, Nov. 19, 1793, Fortescue MSS., II., 469.
foot for some time before this to send a force under Lord Maira to cooperate with the Royalists. Jarry's advice was disregarded and the expedition about 300 strong was sent near the end of the year, but failed to accomplish anything. (1) Fyffe says, "It was too late—the war of pitched battles ended on the Loire with the year 1733. It was succeeded by a war of merciless and systematic destruction on one side and of ambush and surprises on the other." (2) Jarry's opinion that the time for such an enterprise had passed was confirmed.

7. Draw up a general plan for the campaign of 1794.

Toward the end of 1793 the fortunes of war again changed. The desire for territorial aggrandisement had led the Allies each to seek their own ends instead of uniting in a hearty cooperation, and dissensions arose among them. The star of the French Republic was again in the ascendant. The centralized despotic system of the Committee of Public Safety afforded the means for prompt action. Carnot, an officer of engineers, was appointed to a seat on the Committee and directed his superior ability toward the military administration. He dismissed the old army officers and filled their places with young vigorous men from the ranks. The army took on new life. In September the Duke of York who had been besieging Dunkirk, after his capture of Valenciennes, was defeated and driven off; and the middle of the next month Jourdan defeated the Austrian army of the north. Thus ended for the winter the campaign at the north which had promised so much for the Allies in the summer. In the interior of France the armies of the Republic were also successful during the closing months of the year. Lyons, which had been in revolt, surrendered. The Vendeans were crushed and Toulon which had thrown itself into the hands of the English and proclaimed Louis XVII had been captured by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the English Admiral Hood sailed out of the harbor deserting the city to the tender mercies of the Terrorists. The last week of the year saw two decisive French victories on the eastern frontier.

The young generals Hoche and Pichegru defeated the Austrian troops

1. Some information on the preparation, equipment and unsatisfactory results of this expedition may be gleaned from the following references: Fortescue II. 11., 431, 432, 474, 476, 477, 490-492.

2. Fyffe, 56.
and again forced them back on the Rhine as Custine had done a year before. (1)

The prospect for the Allies was a dark one; they had met with defeat on all sides. To add to the gloom, Prussia was withdrawing from the war. King Frederick William had concluded with the Empress Catherine a treaty for the partition of Poland and the strength of the Prussian army was directed toward making its possession sure. Only a small force was left to cooperate with the Allies against France and that had orders to do as little fighting as possible. (2) England and Austria were left practically alone to resist the French Republic. With Pitt at the head of the former and Thurgut of the latter they knew no such thing as owning defeat, and began to make plans for an extensive and vigorous campaign to begin in the early spring of 1794. In looking forward to this it was felt that expert advice as needed and all parties turned to Jarry as the man best fitted to give it.

In a letter to Grenville the previous November Auckland wrote, "I conceive that it might be of some possible service to call on Jarry for his general ideas of a plan; but I will not do it unless your Lordship approves it, and, if you approve it, I wish that you would give me your sentiments as to the manner of turning and expressing such a requisition, so as to draw every practicable effect from it; after which I will set M. de Jarry to work." (3) Grenville approved and Jarry accepted his task. Early in January Auckland wrote, "Jarry is to give me next week for your Lordship's use the heads of a detailed plan for the ensuing campaign adapted to the late change in circumstances. From what has passed relative to it I have reason to believe that your Lordship will find it deserving of attention." (4) A week later he wrote again, "I shall have occasion to write your Lordship tomorrow morning with a very interesting paper which I have received from Jarry, and which will merit your perusal immediately if you can possibly find time." (5) At about the same time Crawford wrote from Brussels reporting an interview he had held with Mercy, the Austrian representative there, in accordance with a request of Auckland's that he should find out

1. Fyffe, 51-52.
2. Fyffe 56-61.
3. Auckland to Grenville, Nov. 17, 1793, Fortescue MSS. II., 468.
4. Auckland to Grenville, Jan. 9, 1794, Fortescue MSS. II., 492.
5. Auckland to Grenville, Jan. 16, 1794, Fortescue MSS. II., 496.
what Mercy thought of the posture of things at the time. He said Mercy’s advice was that a Commission be named by the Courts of Austria and England to oversee the operations of the armies, and added that Mercy “wishes very much that Jarry should be employed as soon as possible to make out a plan of operations for the next campaign.”(1) This plan of Jarry’s which had been already submitted, after having been considered in England was probably sent to the army headquarters on the continent, for on the 10th of February Crawford wrote, “I understand from Lord Elgin (2) that he delivered Jarry’s memoir to Mack who had carried it with him to England.”(3) Mack was one of the leading commanders of the Austrian army and had gone to London to be present at a conference between the British cabinet and Austrian representatives to lay before them his ideas of a general plan for the ensuing campaign.(4) He had probably taken Jarry’s suggestions with him that he might have them at hand to consult at the London conference on the subject, showing that he thought them at least worthy of consideration. Mack’s plan was adopted.

8. His relations with the Austrians.

It is interesting to note here Jarry’s relations with the Austrians during the time he was serving the British government. July 1st, before he was employed, Grenville believed he was in correspondence in some way with the Austrians, for he asked Auckland to what extent Stahremberg, the Austrian Minister at London, knew of his intercourse with Jarry, and said that he had reason to believe that Stahremberg meant to propose to him the employment of Jarry to go to France.(5) The last of the same month when he suggested sending copies of Jarry’s papers to Murray to be consulted by the Duke of York, he said, “Murray is to be told that they cannot be communicated to the Prince of Coburg, as they might compromise the writer, who is in some degree under the protection

2. Lord Elgin was English Envoy at Brussels,—Dictionary of National Biography, under Bruce, Thomas.
4. A report of this conference is given in a letter of Lord Grenville’s to George III., Feb. 16, 1794, Fortescue MSS. 505.
5. Grenville to Auckland, July 1, 1793, Auckland III. 77.
of the Austrians. (1) But it appears later that Grenville need have had no fears for Jarry, for the Austrians were glad to consult him, and it is possible that the Austrian leaders, who seem to have been his friends, knew all the time of his relations with the British Foreign Office, or at any rate, would not have objected had they known. In February of 1794 Crawford wrote, "M.de Mercy has mentioned him to Mack and (that) both de Mercy and La Marck continue to speak of him, not only as a military man of superior abilities, but as a person who may be confided in, and whom they earnestly wish to see employed."(2) The purpose for which they desired his employment was probably as military advisor in the field with the allied armies in the coming campaign, since he appears shortly afterward in this capacity. This La Marck is the same man who, as Borel notes, wrote some two years before that Jarry was exclusively devoted to him, at the time when Jarry was going in the employ of the French Constitutionalists on his secret embassy to Berlin (3) Thus it is seen that in addition to being employed in turn by Prussia, France, and England he was closely in touch with Austria, the fourth great European Power concerned, and exerted no inconsiderable influence on the conduct of that Power during the Revolution.

9. Military advisor in the field.

Not only was it desired that Jarry should give his advice on the general plan for the campaign of 1794, but it was also desired by those most concerned that he should be on the ground with the allied armies to be continually consulted on the conduct of that campaign. Crawford in writing to Auckland in October 1793, concerning a contemplated movement of Coburg's army suggested that probably Jarry would be able to furnish Coburg information on the subject.(4) In January of 1794 Mercy expressed the opinion that Jarry should be sent to converse with the Duke of York as he would be able to give the Duke much valuable information. (5) The next month Auckland suggested to Grenville that it might possibly be useful to send him for ten days to Mercy and to Colonel

1. Grenville to Dundas, July 31,1793, Fortescue MSS. II.,409.
3. See above.
Mack, more especially as the latter expressed such a wish. (1) In March Crawford wrote that Mack was much satisfied with Jarry's former writings, and wished to see him as he thought Jarry might be able to give much local information. (2) A few days later Grenville wrote Auckland, "Will you have the goodness to mention to M.de Jarry that it is wished he should go to Brussels to be there under Lord Elgin's directions, in order to be at hand to be consulted on the different occurrences which may arise." (3) And now Jarry who had hitherto been simply giving theoretical suggestions in a general way to the British Foreign Office becomes an active, practical advisor at the headquarters of the allied armies where he had a better opportunity to influence the conduct of the campaign. It is in the latter part of April, just before the fall of Landreoy, that mention is made of him in connection with the army. Morton Eden, the English Ambassador to Austria, had just arrived at Brussels from Vienna, probably in company with Thugut and the Emperor, who had come to the army to take command in person, thinking thereby to lend harmony and weight to the campaign. Eden wrote his brother, Lord Auckland, that there was a difference of opinion as to the next operation after the fall of Landreoy which was daily expected; that Mack was for attacking Avesnes, while others, among whom was Jarry, were in favor of making a stand somewhere in the plain which might enable them to bring the enemy to a general engagement. He added that Jarry "went this morning with Lord Elgin to the headquarters to have a meeting with Mack." (4)

The last day of April Landreoy surrendered to the Allies and they were inspired with new hope; but their advance was checked and they were thwarted by a flank movement. This movement was toward the north and west through the plain which according to Jarry's advice ought to have been occupied. The Allies were compelled to fall back to the north. Fichégru won some minor engagements and finally overthrew the Duke of York at Turcoing, May 18. (5) On May 9, after Fichégru had begun his

2. Crawford to Auckland, March 11, 1794, Auckland III., 189.
3. Grenville to Auckland, March 16, 1794, Fortescue MSS. II., 533.
4. M. Eden to Auckland, April 25, 1794, Auckland III., 207.
5. Henri Martin II., 208-215. This gives a full account of this campaign.
successful manoeuver, and the mistake of the Allies was apparent, Crawford wrote, "I must do Jarry the justice to say that in some conversations I had with him, he foretold what has happened. He was of the opinion that having an army of full 40,000 men upon the left to act defensively or offensively as circumstances should admit, the Allies ought to have begun the campaign on the right, by which they would have had the advantage of being in a plain open country and in a position to support the corps that might have been destined to watch the enemy toward the frontier of Flanders." (1) Had the Allies made the movement Jarry advised and forced a general engagement on the fall of Landrecy not only would they have prevented Pichegru's dash to the north but they would have stood a good chance of defeating him, since, had they employed their full force they would according to Henri Martin have had 195,000 men to have opposed to 140,000 composing Pichegru's army. (2) At the same time a French army under Jourdan was steadily gaining successes on the eastern flank of the allied army under Coburg's command. After a series of hard fought battles Charleroi surrendered to the French June 25 and Coburg's army was defeated the next day at Fleurus. The Emperor had already quitted the army, and now the Austrians became discouraged and retreated, abandoning the Netherlands late in July. The Duke of York was compelled to retire "before the superior forces of Pichegru who entered Antwerp and made himself master of the whole of the Netherlands up to the Dutch frontier." (3)

Once more Jarry appears in the correspondence as an advisor. He was still on the continent at the time. On August 19 Lord Helens, who was now English Ambassador at The Hague, wrote Grenville enclosing, "a most voluminous despatch which has been sent me from Rotterdam by General Jarry, who, by the way, appears from the little I have seen of him to be by far the most judicious, clear-sighted, and unprejudiced of the emigrants in this part of the world; which may perhaps be one reason for his being universally scouted by them!" (4) Jarry had probably retired into Holland with the Duke of York's army, since according to

the account of the Dictionary of National Biography he went to England with that army the following year.

10. His wisdom and foresight.

It is a well known fact that the successes of the French armies during these early campaigns were due not so much to French superiority as to the follies and shortsightedness of the Allies. Whether or not any of the great diplomatists in England or Austria, or their generals in the field with the allied armies possessed sufficient foresight to know that the execution of their plans would almost invariably be attended with failure, yet from a study of the suggestions of Jarry in regard to the enterprises on which he was employed, it appears plainly that there was at least one man who foresaw and foretold many of the disasters to which these plans led. When the Allies were laying their plans for the campaign of 1794, referring to the disastrous campaign of 1793, Crawford wrote Auckland in regard to Jarry, "Your Lordship may recollect that this man, sitting in London, from his knowledge in war, and of the country where it was carried on, foretold almost every miscarriage of any consequence that happened in the late campaign."(1) Again when the plans of 1794 had been partially executed and when their failure began to be apparent the same writer said that Jarry had foretold what had happened.(2) At another time, writing of Jarry, he said, "His opinions are very much respected, but I believe never followed."(3) This accounts for Jarry's gloominess which appears at times, and for the fact that in his letters he occasionally indulged in unpleasant personal reflections, especially in regard to Mack on whom the blame for the failure of 1794 seems to rest, and when Jarry seemed to think incompetent even before that time. It is said that on the contrary he was usually a very modest man and very respectful in his behavior.(4)

Though it would be idle to conjecture what might have been the effect on the French Revolution, and consequently on all the subsequent history of Europe, had Jarry's advice been followed, yet it is plainly

---
2. Crawford to Auckland, May 9, 1794, Auckland III., 310.
seen that his advice as far as it is known was directly opposed to many of the policies that were largely instrumental in causing the failure of the Allies. He strenuously opposed attempts at territorial aggrandizement, but all to no purpose. He advised cooperation with the French Royalists and the internal revolts against the Convention, but help was delayed until the risings had been put down and there were no forces with which to cooperate. He advocated rapid vigorous strokes at the center of France, but the dilatory policy of occupying detached frontier districts was kept up. He drew up what was recognized to be a wise plan for the campaign of 1794, but General Mack's plan was accepted instead. When an official advisor in the field to assist in the execution of that plan and when Mack was for seizing a small fortress on the left, he advised a bold stand on the right; but Mack's plan was followed, and Pichegru's army was thereby allowed to escape and begin its victorious campaign that overthrew the allied armies, drove them completely out of Belgium, and finally resulted in the entire abandonment of the Austrian Netherlands.

B. His Position After 1794.

Just how long Jarry remained in the service of the British Foreign Office does not appear. The last mention of him as advisor in the correspondence examined is in the latter part of August 1794, some fifteen months after his services began. It will be remembered that the conditions of his employment were that his pay should continue six months, and no longer unless he was thought to merit it. It is likely that at the expiration of the six months he was re-employed for a year, for in the latter part of October 1794, about seventeen months after his service began it appears that he is either seeking re-appointment, or seeking some other position under the government. Helens writing to Grenville from The Hague at that time, said, "I have been particularly requested by General de Jarry to lay before you his humble entreaty that you would be pleased to pronounce sur son sort, the meaning of which expression I do not exactly understand, but suppose that he refers to some previous application. He appears to me to be
extremely intelligent, and I know that he was highly considered by
the late Count de Mercy." (1) Nearly two years later Pitt in writing
to Grenville proposed the employment of Jarry to go on a tour of in-
spection to the ports of England to suggest his ideas of defence and
to report on the state of the country. (3) This indicates that Jarry
was not then in government employ.

The Dictionary of National Biography gives what is apparently a
continuous account of him after 1795. That work states that he was
first engaged as a sort of private military instructor, then employed
to deliver tactical lectures to voluntary classes of officers, and
finally became head of the Royal Military College when that was est-
ablished in 1801, which position he held until the time of his death in
1807. A short time before his death he became Inspector General of
military instruction. He wrote several books on military science and
tactics.
