George III and the Wars of the French Revolution

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It is my intention to trace the attitude and influence of King George the Third on the wars of the French Revolution from the declaration of war by England against France in 1793 to the close of the year 1797. I say 1797, because after that year there was practically no opposition in England to the war, even its bitterest opponent, Mr. Fox, throwing his support on the side of the Government. Indeed, in 1802 and 1803 there was a peace under the Addington ministry but it is well known that the King dominated in matters of state while that minister held the nominal position of the head of the cabinet. After that period there was no cessation of hostilities until Napoleon was sent to Elba. The period from 1793 to 1797 is, in fact, the most critical and important in the long struggle, for it saw the rise and fall of Democracy in France, the determination of Great
Britain on permanent hostility, the formation of the policy of gain on the Continent, and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte.

This period naturally falls into three divisions both as to time and as to subject matter. The first division will be seen to include the years 1792 and 1793, and to embrace the declaration of war; the second will be seen to include the years 1794 and 1795, and to embrace the subject of the conduct of the war; while the third will be seen to include the years 1796 and 1797, and to embrace the subject of the continuance of the war or the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, these divisions are somewhat overlapping; but this will not interfere with the clearness of the expositions. We shall attempt to develop the last part with considerable fullness.

The French Revolution may be said to have been a popular movement against class privileges and wealth. The States-General of
the kingdom met May 5, 1787 for the reform of the financial measures of the Government. This event was followed by the assumption of the representative of the people of the Supreme power, the abolition of privileges, and many political and civil reforms. Outside the legislative halls, the suffering of the poor people, the failure of crops and cessation of business, and the formation of democratic clubs hastened the downfall of the monarchy. The king of France, fearing for his power, gave his life, fled from his capital, but was captured and returned. A constitution was established in 1791 providing a limited monarchy government. Offended by the hostile attitude of the Austrian government, France declared war against that state and the Empire April 20, 1792. Prussia entered the war against France and a war movement was agitated in England. At this time England was heavily
burdened with taxes to pay off an immense war debt. But she was enjoying unwanted business prosperity and religious peace. Great business transactions in India were exciting the commercial mind and gave the people little time to think of the idle theories spun by the Revolutionists. Trouble was brewing in Ireland, moreover, which required a large army to keep in peace. So, the opportunity for England to take part against the French popular uprise was, indeed, small. The king of England had been glad enough in 1790 to avoid war with Spain which, when fresh taxes should be laid, “must have shown how little the country is in a state to carry on war.”

But the great slaughter and carnage of the French Revolution awakened horror in the breasts of Englishmen which could not well be disregarded. The war spirit was steadily rising.

George the Third was in the 33rd year of his reign when England was drawn into the war. George had a strong personality. No sooner had he become king than he
to give up one single possession even when the necessity was overwhelming. Proud of his empire, George the Third thought he was a necessary part of it, and guarded his regal powers with a childlike obstinacy, democratic societies springing up in England and spreading their theories among the populace awakened in the sovereign a fear for his very crown. But it was in Hanover that George rejoiced: at his imperial sway and his absolute power. As Elector he exerted an influence on the policy of the great German Empire which he used against France and Democracy. But the king desired to use his kingdom for the defence of his electorate. He tried to lay bare the real self of the occupant of the British throne, a man whose personal conduct seemed above reproach, who was religious to an extreme, and whose conscience was a very strong factor in all his actions.

If George III had aimed at abdication he had certainly come near to its attainment. He had gained control of his cabinet by making each member dependent upon himself; and he had the same grip on his Parliament.
the king well understood that international law
would be disregarded if any country were
to interfere. "We have honorably not meddled
with the internal dissensions of France," he wrote "and no object ought to drive us from
that honourable ground." 4 The next year the
sovereigns of Prussia and Austria issued their
declaration of Pilsitz, stating that they be-
lieved the safety of the French King was a
matter of European concern and that they
would go to war to protect his government
if other Powers would consent. They desired es-
pecially that England should consent, for they
were doubtful as to her attitude. George had
indeed expressed sympathy for the French king
after his flight from Paris and capture 5.
All the men placed in power desired peace in
England, and Pitt had need of it for his great
financial operations, but there were many
Englishmen who longed for war against the
Revolutionists. 6 The cabinet, however, expressed
itself determined to observe a strict neutrality
and the declaration of Prussia and Austria
was withdrawn. George III wrote April 19, 1791,
"whatever can tend to secure a continuation of
peace to my dominion must meet with my
fullest approbation" and Mr. Stewart at Berlin "will be able to state how impossible it would be, at present, to incline this country to take a cordial part in any measures that might involve it in a war."

When Monsieur Chambrin came to London as ambassador from France in April 1792, he brought Talleyrand, a member of the last Assembly preceding that date, to act as advisor. Talleyrand was directed by the French Govt to Grenville who was the English Foreign Secretary. The King expressed his pleasure at Talleyrand's not being accredited to him as he could then be treated with contempt as his character as a democratic entitled him. The French ambassador was treated very coldly at London; of him the King wrote, "I know I need not recommend the greatest caution to Lord Grenville in conversing with persons much inferior to be employed with the new club in St. James' Street than with any servant of the crown."

The King had becomealarined at the growth of these English Democratic clubs which he bitterly detested. "He was beginning to be more open in the expression of his dislike for Frenchmen. The French did not gain in his estimation
by their first encounter with the allies. The French troops under D'Isor were to march from Valenciennes upon Mons, while those under Dillon were to make a demonstration against Fournay. Dillon's division was seized with a panic, fleeing. Dillon, accused of betraying the army, Fignon's division was charged on April 80 by a small band of Austrian cavalry, and fled to Valenciennes with the loss of its baggage. Upon the receipt of the news George wrote to Grenville: "The brutality and cowardice that have attended the wars of the French hostilities do not augur either a successful or honorable issue of their warlike fury, but, indeed, from the commencement of the Revolution, more acts of barbarity have been committed than by the most savage people." This hatred of the French democrats went a long way to bring the mind of George to favor war as a later period. He expressed later, that "the desire of destroying all religion, law, and authoritatem seem to be the only prevailing idea after this destruction, to build up anything." Added to this was the idea of the king that the French government was weak, and tottering to its fall. This popular movement in France culminated in the convention's declaration
of December 15, 1772, that henceforth that nation would carry on an offensive struggle to re-
manicipate oppressed people, calling on all
kings to abdicate, and declaring enmity to
all class distinctions. This proclamation caused
England to arm to prevent the carrying out of
the threat.

By treaty, England agreed to help Holland,
whenever she should be attacked. Besides this
guarantee to Holland, that country was given
the exclusive commerce of the North Sea.
Antwerp, a city in Belgium, was deprived
of all trade or commerce by the prohibition of
the navigation of the river Scheldt. This was an
injustice to the people of Antwerp and Belgium;
but it was guaranteed by treaty, that of
which stood England. It was the desire
of France to wrest the Austrian Netherlands
from their oppressors, and add those provinces
to France. Thus they would have the Scheldt
as an outlet to the ocean and would control
a part of the commerce of the North Sea.

Great Britain was jealous of France gain-
ing so much as it would not only raise up
a powerful competitor in commerce, but would
also disturb the equilibrium of Europe—
the balance of power. Holland naturally looked up to France as her enemy, as that country was about to rob her of a powerful monopoly.

Holland refused to receive an ambassador from the convention, as also England had done, on the ground that such ministers came not from the recognized sovereign, the King of France who had been deposed. George III kept well informed on the actions of France on the Scheldt and of Holland. Spencer coming from the Hague talked with His Majesty at a levee held in December. Spencer told him that Holland was very anxious to know whether she might depend upon being supported by England in refusing to recognize D'Oulon who had been sent out from Paris as minister to Holland. The king wondered at the idea of its being doubted, and showed clearly that they had no idea in England of receiving a minister from the convention. He, no doubt, favored the maintenance of the treaty to protect Holland even at the expense of war. The French in their encounters with the Austrians were pushing rapidly into Belgium and were threatening the Austrian power in that province.
The King wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, Dec. 3 1792: "The intercepted letters that accompany this convince me that the French are hard enough to attempt opening the Scheldt," and added, "which we can never allow." But the French Executive Council had already declared the Scheld open to the navigation of the world, and also ordered the commanders of the French armies to pursue the Austrians, disregarding international law, even into Holland if they should flee into that country. George wrote about this time 10 that felt the advantage of a general peace if it could be effected to the real satisfaction of the various parties concerned, but at the same time he felt not less forcibly a disinclination to France gaining her point, and perhaps laying a foundation to encourage other countries to attempt the same game; for it was peace alone that could place the French Revolution on a permanent ground, as then, all the European States must acknowledge this new Republic. This, of course, was what the King most bitterly opposed. He would not go to war on the ground of restoring monarchical and thus interfering in the international affairs of another nation, yet that was his real object. He would make the opening
the Scheldt, and the attacking Holland the inexten-
sible ground for war; for in the first England was
bound by treaty to protect the blockade and,
in the second she was bound by treaty to help
Holland whenever brought into war.

We have seen how strongly George was
opposed to recognizing a French Republic
for which there seemed no explanation other
than that contained in his letter above re-
ferred to, namely that he feared that it would
lay "a foundation to encourage other countries
to attempt the same game." That is, he was
afraid for his own crown, and whenever that
seemed seriously threatened, we shall see George
pronouncing for war. As far back as Sept. of this
year His Majesty had written, "Undoubtedly
there is no step that I should not willingly
take for the personal safety of the French king
and his family that does not draw this country
into meddling with the internal disturbance of
that ill-fated kingdom." In all communications
with the English govt. which the govt. at Paris
carried on, that govt. never referred to the sover-
ign of England but to the English nation
as a body separate and distinct. This was taken
by George as a personal affront and caused him
to avenge the insult. On January 21, 1793,
that the king was desirous of war and was precessing Pitt onward into war. Militia
writing to Pitt, in the summer of this year declared he believed "it was impossible you
could have avoided (delaying war) without
a personal offence to the King." The King wrote
to Pitt February 2: "If the occasion ever
could occur that every power for the preservation
of society must stand forth in opposition
to France, the necessity seems to be of the
present hour. Indeed my natural sentiments
are so strong for peace, that no event of less
moment than the present could have made de-
cisely of opinion that duty as well as inter-
est calls on me to join against that most
savage as well as unprincipled nation." On
Feb. 1, 1793, the National Convention declared war
against England and Holland jointly. On
the 9th. George wrote Greenville: "The confirmat-
ion of the step taken by the faction that governs
in France of jointly declaring war against this
kingdom and the Dutch Republic is highly
agreeable to me, as the mode adopted seems
well calculated to rouse such a spirit in this
country that I trust will curb the insolence of
those despots, and be a means of restoring some
dergree of order to that unprincipled country,"
whose aim it presented to destroy the foundation of every civilized state." The king feared that the English people had not been aroused to a war fever, but he thought it would be now. He may accept the thought left here, that the people were not pressing hard on the govt. for war. We see from the quotations which I have given that the people desired peace, they were interested in business, and they were enjoying prosperity. Fox tried to block the declaration of war, but was unsuccessful. The king expressed his pleasure at this failure to Mr. Pitt. As late as May, Grey tried to reverse the actions of the govt. and bring about peace. Again George thanked Heaven for the failure, expressing to Pitt his great satisfaction. But the country was soon committed to war, and it was pushed vigorously. The people now seemed reconciled to it. The allies were almost universally successful and drove the French back into their territory. Le Brun wrote to Grenville concerning peace. The king now felt that the people were back of him, and his letter to Grenville on Le Brun communication was milder than formally. "Though it must be obvious to everyone how highly detrimental to every
idea of concert with other courts, how liable to jealousy, and how advantageous to inferior cabinets any encouragement to the letter from Le Brun to Lord Grenville would occasion, I cannot help just giving my disapprobation to the idea in the first instance and suggesting either that it should receive no answer, or if Lord Grenville on consulting the other ministers should think that too strong, the framing an answer that should set aside the idea of any negotiation, which I am certain cannot with safety be even opened. Our line seems perfectly plain. The war once begun, the expenses already entailed, France must be greatly circumscribed before we can talk of any means of treating with that dangerous and faithless nation. The main object seems to be, that France shall be cut down, that the balance may be kept among the European powers, and that Hanover shall not be threatened.

To summarize, Pitt, the Prime Minister, was opposed to war with France because he needed peace to replenish the English treasury and pay the public debt, and because he feared that Russia would annex all of Poland.
if England should go to war with France. The people were too well satisfied with peace to care to break it, especially when they were to gain nothing immediately by war with France, and would be heavy losers in the taxes to be shouldered. The only person to gain was the King. He gained in the security to his crown and the safety of his Electoral possessions. However, from the beginning of the Revolution, he was for peace. When the French destroyed her frontier and marched into Holland, the king began to be afraid for the balance of power. When dethroned Louis, she became alarmed. When they opened the Scheldt and declared all kings their enemies he favored war, and when they killed Louis, he resolved upon immediate war. He have quoted from his letters to Pitt and Grenville, the principal men in his cabinet. He have seen him advising war. He know his influence on his cabinet. We see no other reason why war should be declared. We are forced to the conclusion that it was the King's influence which brought England to take part in the war at all. He favor'd war. He declared war.
The war once begun, the king used his influence to put his son, the Duke of York, into the command of the English contingent. York possessed neither genius, capacity, nor experience; but by a system not yet eradicated from the British army, he secured his position by the influence of the king. The king believed in his son and was always anxious for him to have a place where his brilliance might be shown. Pitt was desirous of pleasing the king, though it were "a millstone about his neck." At first while on the offensive and in a siege York came out well, having received the surrender of Valenciennes during the summer. Then, however, the French, once organized, came back to the encounter, York was badly beaten and driven from the siege of Dunkirk, losing his army at the price of abandoning his artillery. York had the persistency and might have been brilliant in besieging cities, but for the active part of real battle and for manoeuvre he was absolutely incapable. Pitt, Grenville, Dundas and three Austrians drew up a plan of battle early in 1794 in which York was given
the important position of commanding the right of the allied armies. The king was greatly pleased that his son should be given a position where he might display his brilliance, and not be assigned to West Flanders which, though just as important and as essential to the whole plan, was more obscure. His son must not be given a smaller corps of British troops than he had formally commanded and the king thought he ought to have an additional brigade of British infantry. As far as the Hanoverians were concerned, George would, of course, assign everyone to York's command. And so York was again defeated at Turnagain. But Pitt could not always follow the recommendations of his royal master. All the allied troops were thrown together, the Austrian and British coming in contact daily. Now a large number of the English troops were Prussians and Hanoverians in the pay of Her Majesty. The haughty soldiers of the Emperor were wont to insult His Majesty's paid troops calling them mercenaries. This caused trouble, which grew from day to day. York wrote to his father telling him of the disastrous condition of affairs in the army. The king
wrote to Grenville enclosing York's letter:

"I have just received the enclosed very judicious letter from my son the Duke of York. I am clearly of opinion that it would be highly proper to authorize my son to collect all the troops in the pay of Great Britain into one corps. I have for some time thought the measure advisable, but in the present posture of affairs absolutely necessary." Considering that the Duke of York had not made a very brilliant success, we can scarcely wonder at Pitt's brief note to Grenville in which he said "-- I am clear that forming a separate army of the troops on British pay is a measure that cannot be adopted." In the month of August 1794 York retreated from Breda towards Bois-le-Duc and upon the advance of Richeguiz crossed the Maese. The ministers determined to relieve York and give the command to Cornwallis. The King was hurt but could not help consenting to a measure so evidently reasonable. He would have preferred giving the chief command to the Austrian commander and subordin
acting York to him. This would not have hurt his case so much: But Cornwallis was sent. York's military career on the continent came to an end when he sacrificed the English army in Holland in 1799 and yielded everything to the enemy.

He is incompetence in battle, manoeuvre, or retreat is undeniable. Fife says of him, "York in command, the feeblest enemy became invincible." Much as the King desired war, his influence on the conduct of it proved disastrous to his very aim. It is no more than justice to say that the King subordinated family pride to the good of the common cause, and quietly acquiesced in York's dismissal.

Turning to Hanover on the other side on which the King was enabled to influence the conduct of the war, we find that George guarded very jealously his Elector of State. It has been mentioned that the King put all his Electoral troops under the command of his son and thus rendered them a nullity in the early part of the war. At that time many Frenchmen who had fled
for his democratic tendencies. The analysis showed that it was possible for the king to form a ministry of the Independents and his own followers, to the exclusion of both Pitt and Fox and their followers. It would however taken an extreme case to bring this about, for the talent lay almost altogether in the party of Pitt or of Fox.

On the Declaration of War.

The attitude of the king toward the French Revolution and the outbreak of war will be traced from 1790 to Feb. 1793.

As late as October 1790, George III was thoroughly convinced that peace was essential to the prosperity of his country, and not even the uprising of a people against their sovereign would entice him from the pacific course. Perhaps, indeed, he did not look with favor, as did Pitt, on the change in France to a responsible cabinet government, for he wrote to his ministers advising that no encouragement be given to forwarding the views of the democratic societies in France. The French Revolution had looked for encouragement to England, the only free country in Europe, but
from France and the Revolution had spread over Europe. Some of these were
French noblemen afraid for their very lives, others were soldiers and civilians
who deplored the doctrine of the Revolution.
A large proportion of these men, who
were called "émigrés," were desirous of
joining the allies in their crusade against
the Revolutionary government in France.
The English cabinet was desirous of en-
dlisting as many of these émigrés as possible,
and at a council meeting in November
recommended that despatches for this pur-
pose be established in Germany. They
asked George as Elector of Hanover to
lead the states of Germany in this good
cause, and to establish detachments under such
restrictions as he might think necessary
to hinder the resort of émigrés in general
to his dominions. They well knew the hat-
tred and suspicions which the king bore
to Frenchmen and consequently approached
this matter as delicately as possible. The
king replied: "As to admitting French
corps to be levied in my electoral
dominions, or to admitting any duty for collecting them there, it is absolutely out of my power to countenance such a request; I have difficulty enough in forming a new corps to supply the deficiencies of the Hanoverians in Flanders which requires the greatest attention, and the eyes of every military man to keep things quiet. I cannot therefore risk the admitting French in the present unsettled state of all minds on the Continent." 38 In 1795 the King favored a subsidy which would keep the Prussians in the war, otherwise "the rest part of Germany cannot be prevented long from falling into the hands of the enemy." 39 The defence of Hanover cost England heavily, and so long as Hanover remained in the war, the French Revolutionary army might overrun the country and take her as they had Holland. The King determined to have Hanover become neutral and thus ward off the blow which France would aim at that Electorate.
This course received the acquiescence of the English Cabinet, and the English army was relieved of the defence. Meanwhile George used his influence at the Diet of Germany to keep the Emperor in the war. The cabinet withdrew the English cavalry from the Continent and left the King to lament that England should desert the German Empire. The Court of Vienna was desirous of knowing what conduct the Electorate of Hanover was intending to hold toward the war. George ordered that all emigré and foreign troops should leave the electorate, that no more such troops should be raised there, that the King of England would adhere to the neutrality and engage to observe it carefully. Thus did Hanover retire from the war in order to save itself from the advance of the French armies. British troops were kept in the electorate, however, in order to protect it, shouldn't be attacked, but otherwise they were to remain perfectly
neutral, there was some apprehension that
the French would attack Hanover, but the
armies of Austria drove the French back.
That George had helped the cause of the
war cannot be doubted, for the British
were now relieved of the defence of Hanover.
Nevertheless, Hanover's neutrality caused
many German states to retire from the
war, and thus the Emperor's power
was weakened. George had saved Hanover,
by fighting when the French fell back,
by neutrality when they advanced.
Early in 1794 Prussia had become
tired of the war against France and
was longing for a slice of Poland. It
was evident to everyone that she would
shortly retire from the war. But the
king of Prussia was willing to continue
the struggle if his expenses were
paid. Pitt tried to get Austria to aid
in the subsidy to be paid Prussia
but that nation promptly refused. The
treaty which was concluded with Prussia
in April was to continue until the close.
of 1794: England and Holland were to pay £50,000 per month, £300,000 for transportation, to, and £100,000 from the field, and to furnish rations. For which Prussia was to furnish 62,400 men to act as directed by Great Britain and Holland. Pitt intended to use the troops for the defence of Belgium. The King, impressed with the necessity of the step, agreed willingly to the treaty. He recommended that the Prussians be brought forward immediately. Just at this time the Polish war broke out and Prussia kept her troops under Möllendorf on the upper Rhine and the results drove worthless to England. The King wrote to Grenville, "On the maturest consideration I am clearly of opinion that the only measure to be taken with either attention to our own dignity or the success of the great cause in which we are embarked, is to order Lord Malmesbury to join the King of Prussia and make a last attempt to get him to hold a conduct agreeable to
the treaty signed at the Hague, the object of which there is no shadow to dispute. Should this not succeed, we must then take the unpleasant step of stopping any further payments of the subsidy, and I own I should think it wise to offer the Court of Vienna that sum for 624000 men to be employed in Flanders in addition to the 100000 we have proposed should be left there by the Emperor." 47 Grenville agreed with the King in regard to this matter, but the Cabinet decided to renew the Prussian subsidy. George, seeing that the French would enter Germany unless the Prussians came into the war, acquiesced in the Cabinet's action. But nothing came of the second attempt to get Prussia to fight.
On the Continuance of the War.

I mean in this part to shew by quotation from the correspondence of the King what he thought about the various treaties of peace which were from time to time proposed, and at the same time, explain the manner in which he managed to prevent any treaty's being made.

During the early part of the French Revolution many attempts were made to bring about peace negotiations, but each nation demanded so much and the necessity was so little urgent that nothing came of them. To each one of these George III was very much opposed and was only willing to open any negotiation when the proposal should come from France and then only when that country was reduced to dire necessity. The years 1796 and 1797 however brought forth several attempts to make peace. Pitt had been unwilling to enter upon the war and he was the first of the King's servants to desire peace. During the
previous year Prussia and Spain had concluded treaties of peace with the French nation, and the Emperor was very lukewarm in his fighting. England stood out almost alone against that blood-thirsty nation. It was owing to George the Third, whatever his faults, that England continued in the war. George wrote to his prime minister, giving his objections to the opening negotiations with France. Pitt replied that the English people demanded an attempt at pacification and unless the Government began it, the Parliament would demand that the Cabinet ask for peace. This would show to France that England must make peace and thereby prevent England from securing any concessions from that reckless nation. The King said he objected to the course; the country should hold out until France should take some aright step for attempting to treat. "My mind," quoth he, "is not of a nature to be guided by the
obtaining a little applause or starving off some abuse; rectitude of conduct is my sole aim. I trust the rulers in France will reject any proposition from hence short of a total giving up any advantage we may have gained, and therefore that the measure proposed will meet with a refusal. 49. But the king did not intend to be obstinate about the matter and so allowed the measure proposed by the cabinet to be taken. The 'feelers' sent out by the English government reached Paris and received an insolent answer. "I should have hoped the courage of this nation had not been so sluggish as to require this insolence to bring it to its proper tone." 50. Again, "I never would have entered into the war but on a fair supposition that we meant to go through with it." These had been the remarks of His Majesty.

In July the cabinet decided to send Hammond to Berlin to make peace arrangements if possible by which
the Austrian Netherlands were to be given to Prussia, and Bavaria to Austria, while France was to have her conquests to the Rhine. The king objected very strenuously to this wholesale robbery. She declared this to be the most serious step which the Cabinet had ever anticipated taking as it contained no less than the outlines for a treaty of peace by which the domains of the Princes in Germany were to be given up for the advantage of Austria, and consequently Austria would be rendered more dangerous to the various small princes of which the German Empire was composed, in order to tempt her to give up the Netherlands to Prussia, which she had often said she looked upon as a burden, not an advantageous possession. He was certain that his ministers could not be surprised that he felt such repugnance at the idea of giving up any conquests made by their country, and still more when it was so vaguely stated that the King of Prussia might suppose this went to any extent to obtain the object.
of an immediate peace. What right had England to give away the rights and interests of other Princes, who had neither by England nor Austria been brought forward into a business their own inclinations did not suit? He could not see a shadow of justice or the pretence of interference. It was hard on the individual and was subversion of every idea that ought to actuate the stronger to support not oppress the weaker. He thought a more just arrangement might be made, by which Russia should get the Netherlands and give up to Austria the Margraviates of Ansbach and Barenth, except for the county of Sayn which belonged to George on the death of the present incumbent. He should be indemnified by getting the Bishopric of Minden wherein the present possessor should die or resign. This, he thought, was more reasonable exchange, which the necessity might authorize. If the two Margraviates did not equal in value the Netherlands, then Russia might give Austria some of her Polish territory. In his particular situation,...
as a member of the German empire, he would certainly at the Diet protest against so unjust a measure. He told Lord Grenville that he, to acquaint Mr. Pitt with his desires that the instructions to Hammond might be drawn up conformable to them. Pitt and Grenville in a long letter to the King urged him to accept their proposals, as they had become absolutely necessary to check the conquests of France and to regain peace. They particularly wanted to keep the Netherlands out of the hands of France as otherwise, it would be a menace to Great Britain. The arrangements of particular exchange could be made later. The elector of Bavaria might be given the Palatinate in compensation for his loss of Bavaria. The King would not yield to the proposition of giving up Bavaria to Austria. So the two ministers paid him a visit in which we can imagine long argument finally satisfied his mind; for Hammond was sent. But the expedition proving a failure for as Prussia had already signed a convention with France agreeing not to dispute the French title to the territory on the left bank of the Rhine. In
this instance the King failed to prevent the negotiations. It showed the ministers what they might expect from His Majesty on any like occasion. Perhaps, the King was convinced that the mission would fail before he gave his consent. Lord Kinnerville was willing to make peace so long as he secured his own terms. Mr. Pitt, looking on the side of the English finances, was more desirous of peace.

The negotiations of Stanhope at Berlin having failed, Mr. Pitt next proposed to negotiate directly with the Directory at Paris. The English statesman felt keenly the want of money which the Parliament would not vote. This meant that the people were growing tired of the war and would welcome peace as a relief from taxation and the restraint on business. The reduction of the French settlements in the West Indies had given the minister strong hopes of securing peace. By offering to restore these conquered possessions to France, she might be induced to hand back the Low Countries to the Emperor. Mr. Pitt
went to the King at Dealmouth with the object of laying before him the project of the negotiation. At the same time His Majesty received from Lord Grenville a letter giving the details of the proposed method of procedure. To this letter George replied, September 4, 1796: "... I certainly do not object to the trial; but should have liked it better if the preparations for an active campaign had been first prepared and this been the subsequent step, as it would have come with more dignity; but as perhaps others think the refusal which most probably will ensue may rouse men's minds and make them more ready to grant supplies of men and money, I do not object to the mode proposed being adopted." 56 Here the King is willing for the attempt to be made not because he thinks France will accept but because he thinks the refusal by France will stir the English people up to grant greater supplies of men and money to carry on the war. This seems
very certain, since Mr. Pitt was with George
at the time arranging for men and money,
and to gain the result — peace — that states-
men would probably use this argument. At
first, the Directory returned an insolent
answer to the request for passports. Still
Grenville advised steady measures and
further trial of negotiation. The King thought,
however, that no one could be as lost
to the sentiment of self-respectability as
to think any other measure necessary than
the letting Parliament know the offensive
turn given to what some might think a
humiliating step taken by the country. If
such a communication would not rouse
the British lion, he must have lost his
accustomed energy. Pitt and Grenville
decided to bring the matter to an issue
by sending a messenger by flag of truce
to Paris. From Grenville's letter to the King
on this subject, we see that he at least was
possessed with the same object as His
Majesty: "There can be little expectation
that a measure of this nature can now
conduce to the re-establishment of peace, which the present dispositions of the Directory appear to set at a distance. But it will clearly prove the existence of these dispositions, and will, in that respect, be highly advantageous to the interests of your Majesty's dominions." The next day the King replied: "As Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt think a further step of humiliation necessary to call forth that spirit which used to be characteristic of this island, I will not object to the proposed declaration being sent by a flag of truce." In this attempt at negotiation George hopes only for a refusal on France's part that England may be assured to continue the war. On the 31st of October he sees with pleasure that there is not the smallest appearance of the negotiation advancing, for he never thought the present an advantageous moment for concluding peace. And in November, speaking of the cautious notes written by La Croix to Malmesbury, who was conducting the negoti-
ration, he thought they ought to have been made the cause of breaking off the communications; for forbearance when too long pursued has too much the appearance of a degree of caution, nearly approaching timidity. And again he is certain that Lord Grenville cannot be surprised when he knows that the king has, from the first moment of any idea of treating with France being proposed, uniformly shown his disinclination to a measure which undoubtedly at this hour so manifestly destroys the solid ground on which the war was undertaken, the truth of which never was more clear than at the present time period. He did not mean to oppose Grenville's sending the project to Vienna, yet he certainly hoped the Directory would break off the negotiation, since the scene in Italy had become so much improved, as well as in Germany, another campaign must be with pleasure looked to by those who like him dread any intercourse with a French Republic. On the dispatch to be sent to Malmesbury, drawn up by Grenville and unanimously adopted by the cabinet December 10, the
King writes Grenville upon its being submitted to him that he will not interpose his objections but hopes "the propositions will be rejected by the Directory, as I cannot think either the terms proposed, or the time for treating, such as I can wish shall end the present struggle." The Directory broke off negotiations December 19, immediately after the receipt of these instructions by Malmesbury at Paris. That the attitude of the King emboldened Lord Grenville to raise his demands from France, is a reasonable inference from the foregoing remarks. The conclusion is forced upon us that George himself was the factor which made the refusal of France to England's proposals a necessity.

On April 9, 1794, in consequence of Napoleon's victories in Carinthia, making it necessary that Austria should soon be compelled to treat with France for peace, a minute of cabinet was adopted at London for appointing the English minister at Vienna to begin negotiations with the Emperor for the submission of the war to the a settlement by the Emperor.
of Russia. It was thought that the Czar could be induced to intervene in the war bringing matters to an honorable conclusion. Previous to this decision of the cabinet, Pitt had sent a paper to the King containing his ideas on what should be done in this crisis of affairs in Italy. The King replied that as the cabinet was to meet that very day, he did not have the time to make any extended exposition on the subject in hand; but at the same time he is desirous that Mr. Pitt should communicate to the members his sentiments previous to their forming any final opinion. In the first place he is opposed to a decision being made so hastily as it deserves cool examination. He thinks this country has taken every humiliating step for seeking peace the warmest advocates for that object could suggest, and they have met with a conduct from the enemy bordering on contempt. He had hoped this would have prevented any further attempt
of the same nature, the news from Italy is certainly unfavorable, but too untrustworthy for them to build any sound opinion upon until further information shall come from Vienna. The language in which the English minister writes from Vienna looks as if the Emperor intends to continue the conflict as, otherwise, he must make excessive sacrifices. Would it not, therefore, be wise to wait for further accounts before they cast a die that, he fears, must forever close the glory of his country, and reduce Austria to a small state in comparison with her situation before the war? Besides, would it not fix the present wicked constitution of France on a solid ground of more extent and preponderance in the scale of Europe than the most exaggerated ideas of Louis XIV. ever presumed to form? If the Low Countries remain in the possession of France and the former United Provinces remain a state dependent upon the former, one may talk of balances of power, but they cannot exist. The same chain of
reasoning that will admit the above measure will, he fears, not prevent France from adding all the territory to the banks of the Rhine to her possessions, as to the state of finances he cannot decide how far they will help England to assist Austria. Anyhow, he would rather see Austria make a separate peace, if peace she must have, than for his country to join her, for the former would leave England liberty to make a treaty with France with fewer sacrifices than if a joint negotiation were made, where England’s acquisitions must be employed to regain the territories of Austria.

This letter was accordingly passed around, said Pitt in answer, but the Cabinet was forced by the necessity of lack of means to decide for peace. The country could not stand an increase in taxation, and if Austria should make a separate peace with France, it, instead of diminishing, would increase the expenses of this country. The cabinet, however, decided on Pitt’s plan and the King wrote Pitt that he would acquiesce in the measure as one of necessity, not choice. But his opinions
which encouraged him to withstand the difficulties of the war is not changed. But he
dispenses the measure from the bottom of his heart: Grenville transmitted the minute
and devoted to the King and in his letter tells him that the step taken was necessary. Considering
the fact that Grenville had read the Majesty's letter of objections, it is not at all
unlikely that he should have undertaken the plan of defeating peace by the measures of
which demanding too much and using highly
imperative language. For Grenville was
opposed to this making peace and giving too
much. He knew also that the King was back
of him. Attest these facts, by the following
letter from George to Grenville of April 10, 1797:
"Lord Grenville is too sensible of my opinion
on the whole business to doubt my sorrow
at finding myself obliged to acquiesce
in a measure that I think big with
evils; but he has in his note, which
accompanied the Minute of Cabinet, shown
he is equally impressed with the same
opinion, that it would be a waste of time
for me to add more on the present melancholy occasion." He could not force the war in this instance, because the people would not vote the money. In England the Parliament controls the purse, and even King George could not force money measures. But, the King continues in this same letter, "Staying cast my eye over the paper for Sir Morton Eden, I should not do right if I did not in the strongest manner, as a member of the German Empire, declare that in that capacity I never can accede to the Emperor's gaining any acquisition at the expense of the Empire, but shall as Elector think myself in duty bound to object to any such unjust measure." Sir Morton Eden was the English minister at Vienna. The opposition of the Elector of Hanover and the proposed intrigues of Grenville were never brought into use in this connection; for the Austrian government signed preliminaries of peace with Napoleon April 18, 1797, before the English envoy reached Vienna.
One more attempt at negotiation was made in the summer of 1797, and in this we have considerable evidence that the King's chief ministers were at variance. While Mr. Pitt again desired peace even at the expense of Great Britain's losing some of her possessions, Lord Grenville desired peace only if France were willing to give up some of the advantages she had won. The correspondence of Lord Malmesbury, who was again sent to France to negotiate, shows plainly that there was a material difference in the two ministers. The King, however, was in an undesirable position. On the one hand, Pitt as finance minister threatened to cut off supplies, while Lord Grenville as Secretary for Foreign Affairs held in his own hands the power to prevent any peace. So it was who sent out all the minutes on which the cabinet decided; he was who instructed Malmesbury on the conduct of the negotiations. Then agent was aware that his every purpose in France was being handicapped by Lord Grenville at London. He longed to be rid of his master and to receive a free
and from the prime minister himself. The King held the balance, the power; and whatever the result of the negotiation was an attribute to the King's action or, at least, consent.

On June 1 an official note addressed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was prepared. It stated that the signature of preliminaries of peace between France and Austria seemed to afford an opportunity and new facilities for renewal of peace between France and Great Britain, a part of the obstacles having been removed; that the court of London is still disposed to treat for peace, and that the Government authorizes Grenville to propose entering into a regulation of the preliminaries of a peace, which may be definitively arranged at the future congress, and that, as soon as a form of negotiation shall be agreed upon, the British Government will be ready to take "such measures as are the most proper for accelerating the re-establishment of the public tranquility." This note having been sent by Grenville to the King, His
Majesty returns with comments. He would not be doing justice to his feelings if he did not, in confidence, state to Lord Grenville that the many humiliating steps he has been advised to take in the last nine months have taken so deep an impression on his mind that he undoubtedly feels this kingdom lowered in its proper estimation much below what he should have flattered himself could have been the case during the latter part of his reign; that he certainly looks on the additional measure now proposed as a confirmation of that opinion; at the same time that Lord Grenville has certainly worded it as little exceptionally as its nature would permit. He cannot add more on this occasion; but, if both Houses of Parliament are in as tame a state of mind as it is pretended, he does not see the hopes that either war can be continued with effect or peace obtained but of the most disgraceful and unsolid tenure.

The arrangements progressed rapidly from this time on. It was agreed that the French and English governments should
appoint ambassadors to some place where a treaty or a preliminary of treaty could be drawn up. On the request of the English government, the French government sent a passport for the English ambassador; but it was worded to allow to pass a person furnished with the full powers of His Britannic Majesty for the purpose of negotiating, concluding, and signing a definitive and separate treaty of peace with the French Republic. The British Cabinet objected to the wording of the passport which did not permit a preliminary treaty but a definitive treaty, and its reading a "separate treaty" would seemingly debar England from settling matters in respect to her allies and the allies of France. Grenville desired the Cabinet to return a forcible and severe objection to the wording of the passport. Instead, a very mild one was made, stating that this form was unusual and that "this new form appears liable to produce, in many instances, considerable inconvenience, and according to the terms used in this particular
instance, it would have the disadvantage of not answering exactly to the powers and the mission of the minister in question." Pitt transmitted this objection of the Cabinet to the King, and Grenville sent his reasons for disagreeing with the majority of the cabinet. Grenville thought the tenor too low, and declared he would resign but for the critical state of affairs, referring to the mutiny in the fleet.

George replied to Pitt's letter, June 17: "I am sorry to find the note officielle, and consequently the Minute of the Cabinet, could not be drawn up agreeable to the sentiments of all the ministers; for though Lord Grenville is the only one that has dissented, yet I perceive neither Lord Liverpool nor Mr. Wyndham attend, which I must suppose was to avoid taking the step which, with Lord Grenville's manner of viewing the paper, he could not honorably avoid. I do not deny, though I shall not object to its being sent to Paris, that I rather think the tone taken is too low; and that I
fear the object will be destroyed, as it will probably raise that of that horrid nation, and must oblige us to come to some explanation which might have been done more advantageously at present. I am happy to find, howm unpleasant this business may be to Lord Grenville, that he is too sensible what he owes to me at this time to think of wishing to change his situation, and I am certain his talents will be very material in conducting the present negotiation should it really come to be the serious object of both nations."

The same day the king replied to Grenville: "The explanation which I have received in writing from Lord Grenville for his distress to the Minute of Cabinet, and the proposed note officielle in answer to the last communication from Paris, so much more tallyes with my own view of the business than the opinion of those who have drawn it up, that I can fairly approve of the whole of his conduct on this occasion; but however I think the tone adopted is below that which I should
think advisable, I fear the having sought from hence—a negotiation precludes our instantly breaking it off. Staying it may be irksome to Lord Grenville to hold the pen on this occasion, I must feel at this particular moment his remaining in his situation absolutely essential, for he will be able to stay off many further humiliations that might be attempted from having shown a mind jealous of what seems in the outset an attempt to draw us into future embarrassments. I shall not be surprised if the note now prepared may not open a scene of chicanery that may prevent the negotiation, in which case the conduct of Lord Grenville will be as highly thought of by his colleagues as it is now by me. We see in the King's two letters a sentiment opposed to the negotiations at all, and a desire to see them ruptured. He urges upon Pitt in the last paragraph to him the necessity of keeping Grenville, then upon Grenville the possibility of Grenville's so manipulating matters as to break off the negotiation.
Cabinet was sent, and the negotiations must advance. Malmesbury went to Risle and there met the Frenchmen sent by the Directory to negotiate. Matters dragged on through the summer. Brunville was determined to concede nothing; the Directory was trying put off settlements until the projected Revolution was over. On this delay and other points, George wrote Brunville, August 10: "I cannot say that I admire the state in which the negotiation is getting through. . . . M. le Peint and his director March pretend to much good intention, I strongly recommend that all answers from hence may be of the most cautious kind. At the same time I will confess to Lord Brunville that I see no disadvantage to us in letting the negotiation draw into length, and that events at Paris may affect that which the bad intentions of the three warmest Directors wish to prevent." The Revolution occurred on the 3rd of September, and the negotiations at Risle were immediately broken off by the order of Napoléon Bonaparte and his associate directors.
at last had the King accomplished his purpose, the continuance of the war. This he managed to do because he had an ally in his minister who was equally anxious that England should conclude peace only when France should yield up all he desired. Backed by the influence of the King, Lord Grenville was not afraid to make his demands high. Thus the arrangements dragged on until it was too late to make a settlement. We have seen how King George fell in with Grenville's ideas and how he sympathized with his views while he acquiesced in the measures proposed by Mr. Pitt. He could not afford to lose Pitt's talent as a financier, but he was resolute in having peace put out of the question. Lord Grenville's correspondence with Malmsbury at first clearly shows that the minister's demands were higher than a defeated nation could expect. George III called Lord Grenville to the head of the state in 1806 as prime minister of the Crown.
There was nothing left for Pitt to do now but address the Parliament from the throne, declaring that war was inevitable and must be continued. The House arose to the occasion and voted the supplies necessary. The King wrote Pitt the 17th November: "It is impossible to receive more satisfaction than I have experienced at the receipt of Mr. Pitt's note, as it contains an assurance of the spirit expressed by the whole House of Commons on the subject of the Address, which undoubtedly promised the most active exertion in every measure that may be required for the public safety. I hope these will be cautiously considered before they are brought forward, for to some of those of the last year I fear may be in great measure attributed the mutiny of the navy, and the total failure of recruiting the army. I own, I am still sanguine, if we will profit by the experience we have had, and act firmly, that the resources of the enemy are as totally exhausted, and the enmity now ailing between Bonaparte,
and the Directory of France so likely to occasion incalculable events, that with the attempt now making towards Russia and Prussia, there is a foundation to expect a more honorable conclusion of the war and the prospect at a proper time of a more lasting peace than the last year had promised.” 74

In January 1798 several men made direct contributions to the treasury for carrying on the war against France. The King subscribed £20,000 annually or one-third of his privy purse. 75 George III was willing to make a personal sacrifice to subdue the principles and the people which he hated.
Notes to "Ito. III and the French Revolution."

1. (Page 1.) "as to Ireland, I expect that the avoid of civil war will be drawn before the return of summer unless the demands of the Catholics are complied with." Mr. Miles to Mr. Long, Nov. 12, 1792. Diaries and Correspondence of W. A. Miles, Vol. I, p. 344.


3. Historical MSS. Beaufort, Donoughmore, etc., MSS. 373.

   "Party of the Crown -- 185."
   "Party attached to Mr. Pitt -- 52."
   "Detached parties supporting the present administration. 43"
   "Independent members of House 108."
   "Opposition to present admin. 155."
   "Absences and Neutrals 14."

   MSS of P. J. Smith, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn.


   George III to Mr. Pitt, October 26, 1790: "From a thorough conviction how essential Peace is to the Prosperity of this Country it is impossible for me to object to any means that may here a chance of effecting it, though not sanguine that Mr. H. Elliot and his French Friend [Mira]..."
pas aussi uni qu'il paraissait l'être."

7. Stanhope's Life of Pitt, II. p. 135.
10. Ibid.
11. George III to W. Pitt, May 1, 1792: "The most daring outrage to a regular government committed by the new Society, which yesterday published its Manifesto in several of the newspapers, could only be equalled by some of its leaders standing forth the same day to aver their similar sentiments in the House of Commons; and I cannot see any substantial difference in their being joined in debate by Mr. Fox, and his not being a member of that Society." Stanhope's Life of Pitt. Appendix to Vol. II., Page XIV.
17. Ibid.
George III. to Pitt, May 8, 1793.
27. Ibid. Geo. III. to Pitt, June 18, 1793.
30. Correspondence of W.A. Miles on the French Revolution. Volume II., p. 27.
31. Fortescue II. p. 507.
33. Fortescue MSS. Vol. II. p. 60.
35. Fyfe: History of Modern Europe, page 133.
36. Fortescue MSS. Vol. II., 645.
37. Fortescue MSS. Vol. II., 420. Buckingham to
Grenville. The King had an earnest present suspicion of Frenchmen in his kingdom, as shown by his suspecting the French clergy, who are described as praying forty hours for the French queen.

39. Fortescue MSS. Vol. III., page 50. George III to Lord Grenville, April 9, 1793: "... now that the Austrians are retiring entirely to the Rhine, the west part of Germany cannot be prevented long from falling into the hands of the enemy; unless by keeping the Prussians to aid in driving them back, and if possible moving forward to regain the united Dutch Provinces."

41. Ibid., page 92.
42. Ibid., page 134.
43. Fortescue III. 148. "Prelis of Correspondence."
44. For text of treaty, see State Papers on the War against France, Vol. II., pages 9 to 12.
45. The King wrote to Grenville, April 10, 1794: "... I see with pleasure ... that ... the business may be brought to an happy conclusion."
46. Correspondence of Lord Malmesbury. III. 96.
47. Fortescue MSS. II., 604.
48. Stanhope's Pitt; appendix to Vol. II., page XXX.
59. Stanhope's Pitt. Appendix to Vol. II., pp. XXX. and XXXI.
60. Fortescue III. 186.
61. Fortescue III. 173.
63. Fortescue III. 228-30.
64. Fortescue III. 230. The King to Grenville, July 31, 1746.
65. Stanhope's Pitt II. 381.
66. Fortescue III. 142.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Fortescue III. 265.
71. Fortescue III. 275.
72. Fortescue III. 298.
73. Fortescue III. 284.
75. Same, pp. IV, V, and VI.
76. Same, page VI.
77. Fortescue III. 311.
79. Fortescue III. 330.
80. State Papers on War against France, VI. 209-11.
81. Fortescue III. 330.
82. Fortescue III. 330-1.
83. Fortescue III. 354.
84. Stanhope's Pitt. Vol. III. Appendix, pages XI & X.
85. Diaries & Correspondence of George Rose, I. 210.