The Geography of Caesar’s Campaigns

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Geography of Caesar's campaigns.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF CAESAR'S CAMPAIGNS.

I. THE GALLIC WAR.
A Collection of Notes on the Geography of Caesar's Campaigns in Gaul with a series of Maps to show Caesar's Acquisition of Territory.

By W. G. Magaw.
Caesar's "Gallic War" is admired for its plain, simple, straightforward style. It was written for a political purpose and is in the form of notes, hastily drafted, without any attempt at embellishment. Yet it possess an elegance and a conciseness that is the model of historical composition.

The interest of the "Gallic War" does not lie wholly in the style of its composition. It contains much valuable history. From it we learn the campaigns of one of the world's greatest generals, a vivid story of military operations which continued through seven years against strong and warlike tribes making a noble struggle to maintain their liberty and independence. The importance of the book as a literary production and as a record of history is such that anything which helps to give a clearer understanding of it is of considerable value.

It is difficult to get a clear understanding of the "Commentaries" without a study of the geography of Gaul. The mountains, the hills, the lakes and rivers which Caesar mentions must be identified; the routes along which Caesar led his legions must be determined; and the towns and battle-fields located if a complete understanding of the text is to be gained. In order to accomplish all this, a careful survey of the country as it is at the present time is of great importance. Ancient ruins must be discovered, old Gallic and Roman roads found, names of towns and places compared, and the topography of the country carefully studied. The brevity of the Commentaries makes it necessary to supply as much information from these outside sources as possible.

It would be well for the student who contemplates a study of the geography of the "Gallic War" to visit the country and become thoroughly acquainted with it. Few men can hope to do this, however. Most students must content themselves with an examination of the data which other men have collected and a careful comparison of the conclusions which they have reached. Authorities do not always agree and a comparison of the results of their labors is always of interest and value. Besides, a scholar may sometimes collect valuable data but may not always understand the significance of it nor draw the correct conclusions from it. Others may be able to use the evidence to better advantage than the men who collected it. There does not seem, however, to be very much that is wholly new, that can be accomplished for the geography of the "Gallic War". The ground has been pretty thoroughly covered. Authorities do not agree on every point, to be sure,
II

but many of the questions seem to be beyond an exact settlement and to venture an opinion would be simply to enter with others into the realm of speculation. On many points agreement is so general that questions have ceased to be raised. Other points cannot be settled beyond a degree of probability.

In writing these notes an effort has been made to examine the best authorities on the geography of the "Gallic War" and to present the results of the examination in a condensed and convenient form. When the authorities do not agree, the several opinions are given and, where possible, those which seem most reliable are indicated. What is generally known and accepted without question has been named over. For this reason an attempt has been made to determine the location of the Gallic tribes. Our work has had two purposes in view viz. (1) to collect information which relates especially to the conduct of the campaigns, as the train of routes, and the location of towns and battle-fields; and (2) to show Caesar's acquisition of Gallic territory in the several campaigns until his final and complete mastery of all Gaul.

A series of maps has been drawn to show how much territory Caesar added as the result of each successive campaign, also what tribes were in revolt at various times and how much territory Caesar lost by the disaffection. It is believed that such a series of maps has not before been constructed and the author hopes that his may be found of interest and value.

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Official Survey of France.


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B. Reference in figures are to the Official Survey of France. In Roman numerals to accompanying maps.
I. THE GALLIC WAR.

The Campaign Against the Helvetii.

I, 2. The commentaries describe the boundaries of Helvetii so plainly that there can be no doubt about the location of that country. The Rhine formed its northern and eastern boundaries, the Rhone and Lake Leman (Geneva) separated it from the Roman Province on the south, while the Jura mountains marked the separation from the territory of the Sequani on the west and northwest. It is included in the territory of modern Switzerland. The German territory was across the Rhine.

I, 6. The route through the territory of the Sequani was a narrow and difficult pass, now known as Pas de l'Ecluse between the Jura mountains and the Rhone. The route through the Roman Province was comparatively easy but necessitated fording the Rhone River which was then, though it is not now, fordable in many places. There was a bridge across the Rhone at Geneva, a town of the Allebrores nearest to the Helvetian territory (Dodge, p. 59; map 160).

I, 8. Caesar undertook to fortify the left bank of the Rhone between Lake Geneva and the Jura mountains. Napoleon and Dodge both say (Dodge, p. 63; Nap. p. 57) that this does not mean a continuous line of fortifications. The nature of the country is such that for much of the way it forms an impassable barrier and no additional fortifications would be necessary. But there are five places where the banks on either side slope sufficiently to allow them to be descended to the river and ascended on the other side. The places are opposite the modern villages of Ainay, Cartigny, Avilly, Chancy and Colony (map 160). It was at these points that Caesar made his defences. This could easily be done because of the natural advantage of the places. Dodge says that the assumption that "murus fossa" was a continuous line is untenable.

I, 10. The route of Caesar from Italy was over the road opened by Pompey when he was in command of Spain. This was through Oesulum (Usseau) over Mt. Genêvre to Briamantium (Brignon), thence to Culato (Grenoble), by Stabatio (Chatelle) or Le Meunier (Hauts-Apès), Dueroctinn (Villard-d'Arène), Mellaca (Mison or Bourg-d'Oyaurs, Isère) and Cater Isium (Bours-d'Oyaurs or Chaource, Isère); thence the route lay to Lyon, a little above which place the Rhone was crossed.
(v. 72) outlines the following route:

"They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyon to Autun, vestiges of which still exist: the latter following the course of the Saône as far as Bellville where it started from it abruptly, crossing over the Gol d'Avens; proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Gluny and continuing by Saint Villier to Autun. At Saint Villier they would omit this road and march towards the Loire to cross it at Decise". (Examine maps I59, I48, Map I67, I36).

Dodge also says that the Helvetii at modern Saint Villier had borne to the west towards the valley of the Loire down which they proceeded to march and cross it at Decise.

I, 21, 22. Dodge (v. 72) locates the camp of the Helvetii not far from modern Toulon. Napoleon (v. 75) identifies the place of encampment as near Issy-l'Évenique (Map I: 6) on a tributary of the Saône at the foot of Mt. Taurotrin. Issy-l'Évenique is about nine miles west of Toulon and is not too far away to be called near Toulon. It is surmised not to follow Dodge and not try to name the exact location.

I, 23. From the best evidence it seems best to locate Bibracte, not at Autun as some do, but at Mt. Beuvray about fourteen miles west of Autun (Map I: 6). This is the opinion, at any rate, of Dodge, Napoleon and Steffel.

We quote the following remarks from Dodge (v. 74):

"Bibracte is not to be located at Autun, but that it was Mt. Beuvray is much more probable. The Gauls were wont to place their towns on hills like Gergovia or Alesia; or, if on any plain, it was surrounded by a stream or a marsh, as Avaricum. They would scarcely have located their capital and largest city, Bibracte, at the feet of the mount in which lies Autun. Several ancient roads center on mount Beuvray and the hilltop is full of ruins of a town. There is every indication that this is the Bibracte of the Aedui."

In this Dodge is in line agreement with Napoleon, who gives the same reason for his conclusion (v. 78, 79). Freude and Duruy concur in this opinion. Goeler and Fowler say Autun.

I, 24. The battlefield was near modern Toulon (Map I: 6) and probably
two or three miles north of the town, on the road to Autun, near the village of Kemptor. From Dodge we quote (p. 75):

"The battle-field appears to have been identified by Colonel Stoffel as near Toulon." Also (p. 30):

"The location of the battle-field has by some been placed at Cussy la Calenre, but that does not suit the toponymy of the Commentaries. Napoleon III places it nearer Bibracte, but Stoffel's researches are the latest and most reliable."

Kelsey has followed Stoffel's opinion in his chart (GallII) of the battle-field. He locates the battle-field at the modern village of Kemptor, a short distance north of Toulon.

I, 26, 27. The Commentaries say that the Helvetii fled into the territory of the Linones and that, after an interval of three days, Caesar began to follow them. It does not seem possible to determine the exact route nor the exact place where the Helvetii were examined awaiting Caesar's arrival. It is evident that he went into or somewhere in the territory of the Linones, where he remained some time. The evidence at hand leads us to think that this was in the region of modern Tonnerre which lies almost directly north of the scene of the defeat of the Helvetii and at a distance of seventy-five or eighty miles. (Examine Maps I:6, 124, III:97.) According to Napoleon (p. 85) "the locality occupied by the Helvetii is unknown, yet all circumstances seem to occur in placing the theater of this event in the western territory of the Linones. This hypothesis appears more reasonable, as Caesar's march in the following campaign can only be explained by supposing him to start from this region. We admit, then, that Caesar received the submission of the Helvetii on the Armaneen towards Tonnerre." Dodge simply remarks (p. 31) that Caesar entrenched his camp near Tonnerre, and here he remained until near midsummer. Prowde places the scene of the surrender at Langres. We think the opinion of Dodge and Napoleon should be followed.
I. 37, 38. Caesar left the neighborhood of Tonnerre (Map 97) and moved towards the upper Arar where Ariovistus lay. "There was subsequently a Roman road which led from Tonnerre to Langres (Map 98). So that we may fairly assume that there was a previous Gallic path or road and it was this that Caesar took" (Dodge). In locating this route Dodge follows Napoleon (p. 94) who mentions Tanlay (Map 97), Gland (Map 97), Laignes (Map 97) and Dèvèges (Map 98) as being between Tonnerre and Langres. He also mentions that between Tanlay and Gland the Roman way is still called "Route de César" (Map 97).

Caesar was following the most direct route to the Rhine which led through Vesoul (Map 113), Lure (Map 100) and Belfort (Map 100). On hearing, however, that Ariovistus was marching toward Vesontio (Besançon) he turned aside from his direct course so as to seize it before Ariovistus could reach it. It is probable that he turned aside from his direct route in the neighborhood of Langres (Dodge p. 88; Napoleon p. 94).

Napoleon gives the relative position of Caesar and Ariovistus when Caesar learned that Ariovistus was already advanced three days' journey and was marching to seize Vesontio. He says that Caesar was at Arc-en-Barrois (Map 98) one-hundred-thirty kilometres from Besançon and the distance from Besançon to Germay is one-hundred-twenty-five kilometres (Napoleon p. 95; Maps 97, 98).

Arc-en-Barrois is about twenty kilometres nor west of Langres. As neither Dodge nor Napoleon mention an exact point of departure from the direct road to the Rhine, we may consider that Napoleon's statement "towards Arc-en-Barrois" and Dodge's "near modern Langres" is a practical agreement. Nor is it of great importance to have the exact place located. As to Caesar's route from near Langres to Besançon, no one seems to have determined it.

The location of Vesontio is so plainly indicated by Caesar's descriptive that there can be no doubt of its being the modern Besançon. "It was so well fortified by nature that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Dubas (Doubs), forming a circle, surround it almost entirely, and the space of 1600 feet which is not bathed by the water is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches on each side to the edges of the river." Those who have visited Besançon (Dodge p. 87; Napoleon p. 95) say that this description is applicable to the present town.
Caesar did not travel by the most direct route for the reason that the country was exceedingly rough and wooded and such would offer a good opportunity for the enemy to lay an ambush. He made a detour of about fifty miles through a smoother country and returned to the direct road after it emerged from the rough district. Dodge's statement gives the situation admirably (p. 90):

"If Caesar would go the direct road from Vesontio to the Rhine, he must cross the northern part of the Jura forthills. That part which lay along the Dubas was extremely rough and in parts a continuous defile, and much more wooded and difficult than now. But Divitius pointed out that by a northerly circuit, of which the Dubas would be the short line, he could move in a comparatively open country and reach the Rhine valley without danger of ambush."

This route (Map p. 100) followed the present road from Besançon to Vesoul (Map III) as far as Pennevierres, continues by Villers-la-Bois (Map III) to Arcey and Villers-rotel (Map IV) to Arcey (IV). He then Caesar would come upon the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort (Map 100) and Cornay (Map 100). By this route the distance from Besançon to Cornay is eighty-five or ninety miles (140 kilometres) and at Caesar's usual rate of march he must have traveled in seven days at least eighty-five or ninety miles, and this would have carried him beyond Belfort usually chosen as the scene of the battle against Ariovistus (Dodge p. 91) to near Cornay. Goeleer and Froude also have this same opinion. "Rustow is in error in selecting the upper Saar as the theater for the approaching campaign" (Dodge p. 91).

There is a question about the meaning of the words "millium amplius quinqua ginta Circuitu". Some want to make them mean the whole distance traveled in seven days; others that fifty miles must be added to the direct distance. It seems more simple and more in harmony with the facts to consider fifty miles as the distance from Besançon to the point where Caesar strikes the direct road again.

The hill mentioned here has been identified by Colonel Steffel (See Kelshy notes p. 23) with the hill of Plettig (Map 71) an elevation of a oval shape, twenty-four miles southwest of Strasbourg (Map 71) between the village of Epfig (Map 71) and Dambach (Map 71). It rises in isolation more than a hundred and seventy feet above the surrounding plain. This location is about forty miles north of Cornay. According to the Official Survey, this hill has an elevation of two hundred-twenty feet and there are no others in the immediate neighborhood. We do not have before us Steffel's map.
reasons for placing the scene of interview so far north (he doubts there are other reasons for doing so) but he must, it seems to us, admit one of two th-

ings viz. that Caesar must have made longer moves here during the seven days after leaving Vesontio than was his custom, or that he moved his camp nearer to Ariovistus sometime during the five days interval between the receive-

ing of Ariovistus’ legates and the interview. But Caesar does not mention anyt-

hing about moving his camp nearer to Ariovistus these five days, though it is quite possible that he may have done so. If we were to choose be-

tween these alternatives we should say that Caesar must have moved his camp farther north after receiving Ariovistus’ legates. It is not sufficient that a hill has been found answering to the description given in the commen-
taries.

Dodge does not attempt to locate the hill precisely. He says that the seven days march of Caesar would have carried him beyond Belfort to near

Cernay and that no large plain exists near Belfort, another reason for placing the scene farther to the east (Dodge p. 91).

Napoleon agrees with Dodge in saying that there is to be found among the Jura mountains no plain of any extent. He further says (p. 102) that

‘tumulus’, probably means a rounded knoll and such knolls are found between the Vodges and the Rhine, the most remarkable of these knolls are sit-

uated, one near Feldkirch (Map IOI) and the other between Wittenheim and Ensisheim (Map IOI), whence he supposed the interview took place on one of these. These places are about eight or ten miles northeast of Cernay and would agree with Dodge in that they are near Cernay. In this opinion we have the agreement of Geeler. However, he chooses as the exact place of interview an eminence which rises on the left bank of the Little Doller to the north of the village of Asch-le Bas (Map IOI). This is a very short distance immediately north of Cernay. Napoleon objects to this location, say that this eminence is so

close nearer to the meaning of ‘collin’ than of ‘tumulus’. Nor is this eleva-
vation in the plain. It is separated from the hill by a brook and the plain begins only from its northern slope.

On the whole it seems best to agree with Dodge and Napoleon in placing the interview near Cernay. Perhaps Napoleon is right in his choice of the exact hill where the interview took place but here again it seems hard to do more than find a region which has the necessary conditions and not try to find the exact location. It seems to us that Caesar would have mentioned the fact that he changed his camp had he done so, and though Stoffel may have found i
a hill which fills the necessary requirements, without some other evidence he would have hard work to establish a location so far north. This opinion will be clearer from a study of the remarks which follow on the place of the battle, or next place.

I. 49. Caesar's camp is located by Steffel between Gemar and Astheim (Map 96) about thirty-six miles southwest of Strassburg. Ariovistus' second camp probably lay on the low spur of the Vosges mountains which rise from the low plain west of Astheim. in transferring his forces thither Ariovistus was protected from attack by the low elevations and ridges behind which they could march (Helsay, notes p. 287; also Plan III, p. 80).

Napoleon and Steffel agree in placing the operations narrated in this chapter much farther south than Steffel. It is necessary for the place chosen to be in the immediate neighborhood of the place of the interview, as, of course, Steffel places the operations near (twelve miles) to the interview while Dodge and Napoleon put them in the neighborhood of Gemar. That is, if we assume that Caesar's army did not move since the time of the interview. If it did, Caesar makes no record of it. Napoleon explains the movements as follows and Dodge agrees, only he describes them with less detail (Nap. p. 105; Dodge p. 92):

"The German camp was at the foot of the Vosges, at a distance of six thousand paces from that of Caesar which was between Soultz and Feldkirch (Map 101) not far from the Lauch. Next day they crossed the Thur near its confluence with the Ill and Little Dolder, and only halted at Reiningen (Map 101) after having gone two miles beyond the Roman camp."

The detour of the Germans is thus shown to be to the east of Caesar's camp. Steffel's explanation of the movement takes them around to the west of his camp along the foot hills of the Jura mountains.

I. 54. Dodge suggests that the place of winter quarters was likely near Vercingetorix.
In driving out the Helvetii, Caesar did a double service. He not only warded off a possible danger to the Roman Province, but he saved the Gauls from a dangerous enemy. The Gauls recognized this and not only thanked Caesar for his services but invoked his aid to drive out the hordes of Germans who, under the leadership of Ariovistus, were striving to gain a foothold in the country. No sooner had Caesar defeated the Germans than the Belgae awoke to the realization of their danger from Caesar, and attempted to form an alliance strong enough to resist his aggressions. They feared that if Caesar should succeed in subduing Gaul (Gallia Celta) he would lead his army against them also. But at the close of the Campaign against Ariovistus, Caesar was practically master of Gallia Celta. His authority, indeed, does not appear to have been very strong—he was little more than an ally—still he had influence and power sufficient to make him master of the country.

The accompanying map I shows the territory over which Caesar is said to have been master at the close of his first summer's campaign.

**CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE.**

Sprig, 57 p. C.

The country occupied by the Belgae, according to the Commentaries, included the territory between the Rhine and the Ocean and north of the Matrona (Marne) and Segunda (Seine). It is the territory of what is now northern France and Belgium. The coalition extended over all the tribes in this area.

II, 2. The army of the Belgae was encamped in a region north of the Axum (Aisne) River. Caesar joined his army probably at Vesontio. (Dodge: Napoleon; Kelsey).

From Vesontio he would most likely follow the same road over which he had marched on his way to meet Ariovistus. He would pass through Langres (Map 98), thence proceed by Bar-sur-Aube (Map 83) to Vitry-le-François (Map 68). The distance is one hundred-forty-five miles and it took him fifteen days to accomplish it. The route is laid down on the assumption of an old Gallic road between these points (Dodge p. 102). This route is also marked out by Napoleon who adds in a footnote (p. 116):
"This route, the most direct from Besançon to the territory of the Remi is still marked by the numerous vestiges of the Roman road which joined Vesontio with Durocortorum (Besançon with Reims)."

In making this journey Caesar would pass through the territory of the Lingones and Senones and arrive on the border of the territory of the Remi, who immediately sent legates and sued for his friendship.

II, 5. Caesar crossed the farthest part of the territory of the Remi and awaited the attack of the Belgae. His route lay across the Batavor (Marne) through Durocortorum (Reims), at Berry-au-Bac (Marne 34); (See Dodge p. 104; Nav. p. 119; Kelséy, notes p. 297), Caesar crossed the Axona and went into camp. This camp lay north of the river on a hill between the river and a low marshy brook now called the Montre. Remains of the camp still exist (Dodge p. 106; Nav. p. 119).

II, 6. The location of Bibraix is certainly the mountain Vieux-Lac. It is situated eight miles from the Roman camp and is of such a shape as to accord with the description of the movement mentioned in the text (Dodge p. 106; Nav. p. 120).

II, 12. Noviodunum, modern Soissons, is twenty-four miles down the Axona River from Berry-au-Bac. Caesar's route lay along the north side of the river (Mar. 33; Dodge p. 110; Nav. p. 125; Kelséy p. 304).

II, 13. Bratusontium is identified as modern Breteuil (Mar. 21). Beauvais (Mar. 32) is also suggested, but seems less probable (Dodge p. 110). Beauvais is almost directly west of Soissons and due north of Beauvais. Kelséy in the note to his Caesar marks that Bratusontium was apparently a fortified place of refuge, occupied only in time of danger, and he quotes as authority, Benjardins, Geog. de la Gaule Rom., Vol. II, p. 451. Na leon also adopts Breteuil as the most probable situation.

II, 16. From Breteuil Caesar marched northeast terly to the territory of the Nervii. The place where the Nervii collect their women and children, is supposed to be Noin (Mar. 9) which answers admirably to the description of the Commentaries (Dodge p. 113; Nav. p. 28, note). Kelséy
sage that possibly the spot here referred to was in the marshy country about Thin (Map 9) on the south bank of the Sambre, some miles north-east of Hautmont (II, 16, 22).

In the three days march Caesar had reached a point near modern Bavay (Map 9) not far from the Sambre, on which river ten miles away, the alien troops were awaiting the Roman army at a place near modern Maubeuge (Map 9).

II, 18. The site here described lies on the river Sambre; in France, near the Belgian frontier, about three miles south west of Maubeuge.

Caesar's camp was on the north side of the stream on a hill at Neuf-Mesnil. The enemy were on the south side on a wooded hill at Hautmont (Map 9; Dodge v. I: 10; Kelsey II, 13, 17 who quotes Napoleon and Geog. de la. Gaule Rom., Vol. II, pp. 6, 56, 6).

II, 229. The site of the town mentioned here, but not named, was in the angle made by the Sabis and the Moira (Meuse) opposite Marne. To reach this place Caesar marched down the Sambre River. All of our authorities agree on this site.

II, 234. Caesar gives us the result of Crassus' campaign but no explanation of any of the movements. The countries mentioned lay along the north-western coast of France. Although Caesar's next campaign was directed against these same tribes, we can hardly believe that their subjection was more than nominal.

I, 55. The exact location of the winter quarters does not seem to be known. Caesar's statement is that the leions were led into winter quarters among the Carmautes, the Andes and the Turones. Dodge says that the winter quarters were along the Loire between Orleans and Angers.

The Subjection of the Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni by Galba.

III, 1. The Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni held the country between the territory of the Alliages, Lake Leman and the summit of the Alps.

The road which Galba was to open was one of the most available routes between Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul. It ran from Milan via the Simion
of the Great Saint Bernard pass to the Rhine valley (Dodge p. 128; Nap. p. 142).

Octodurus, the modern Martigny, was situated in the Rhone valley. Nautein mentions that it is situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains and was divided by the river Durance.

III, 6. Galba, by this victory, added the territory of Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni to the Roman territory.

If we were to follow Caesar's account strictly, we should believe that the whole of Gaul was completely under his power at the close of the second summer's campaign. But we are inclined to take his statements in this particular with some reservation, for he seems to claim more than his own statement of facts warrant. To be sure, he had received the submission of the Remi and had defeated the allied tribes of the rest of the Belgae at the Battle of the Axeana. The Sequani had surrendered, the Bellovaci had given hostages as a pledge of future good behavior and the Ambiani had brought in their submission. Caesar had next turned his attention to the Nervii, who, allied with the Atrebates and the Viromandui, almost succeeded in defeating Caesar's forces in the Battle of the Sabii. The Atrebates, who were expected to join the Nervii, were terribly defeated and their fortified oppidum was captured. Galba had made the road across the Alps safe for merchants and travelers and annexed the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni to Roman territory. But the conquests of Crassus along the northwestern coast can have been conquests in little more than name. Had these tribes been completely subjected they could not have raised such a formidable rebellion the next summer—a rising which taxed Caesar's strength to the utmost to put down. The strong tribes of the Marsi and Morini had not humbled in their allegiance. Besides these tribes in the south and southwest of Gaul who had never formally recognized Caesar as their master, it is probable that they had not yet realized the danger from Caesar's presence in Gaul, and, if not allies in name, were at this time at least friendly towards him. The whole country at the close of the second summer's campaign was, without doubt, quiet and in this sense Caesar's "omni Gallia pacata" is true, but it seems difficult, in the absence of more specific information, to determine over just how much territory Caesar was in actual fact master.

Map II indicates the territory that had passed under Roman rule at the close of the campaign of the summer of 57 B.C. The intention has been to
include as conquered, not only the territory of the tribes whom Caesar subdued by force of arms but also that of tribes who seemed to have come under his power by alliance or some peaceful method.

Revolt of the Veneti and Allied Tribes.

The Veneti headed the revolt and had for their allies (III, 9) the Osismi, the Lexovii, the Namnetes, the Ambiani, the Norini, the Diablintes and the Arverni. Besides these the Venelii were at the head of a strong faction and had associated with themselves the Aulerci, the Lemovii and Eburovices (III, 19). The uprising included almost all, if not all, the tribes along the coast between the Loire and the Sabis (Sabeldt). It seems altogether probable that the neighboring tribes gave support to this insurrection even if they were not actively engaged in it.

III 7. The exact place of Crassus' camp is not known. It was probably in the valley of the Loire. Caesar says that it was among the Amnis.

III 9. The location of Venetia is suggested to be probably in the estuary of the Auray River which discharges into the Bay of Quiberon (Dodge p. 1:2; Naun. p. 147; Maps 108 89).

III, II. Caesar divided his army and placed the divisions so as to control practically the whole country. Labienus with a part of the cavalry was sent to the Treveri near the Rhine with orders to visit the Remi and the rest of the Belgic tribes, to hold them in their allegiance and to prevent the passage of the Rhine by the Germans. Crassus was sent to Aquitania to preserve quiet and to prevent Aquitanian support of the Venetian insurrection. Titurius Sabinus was stationed along the Venelii and other tribes along the coast of modern Morbihan (Dodge p. 184) for a similar purpose. Decimus Brutus was placed in command of the fleet made up of Gallic boats which the Redones, Santones and other tribes had collected for Caesar and of some galleys brought from the Mediterranean. "Caesar's eight legions at the opening of the Campaign were thus distributed: north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitania, one legion; a legion on the fleet; two legions and eight cohorts with Caesar. Galba had, no doubt, rejoined
from his winter quarters among the Allobroges. Caesar probably rendezvoused
in the vicinity Nantes (Map II7) not far from the mouth of the Loire and
then he crossed the Vilaine" (Dodge p. 134, see also Map p. 149).

Geeler, in his map, makes Angers the point from which Caesar sent out
the several divisions of his army. It is certain that the point of separation
was in the vicinity of Angers, but whether Angers was the exact point is not
certain.

III, 14. Authorities agree in placing the scene of this naval engagement
off the heights of St. Gildas, just north of the mouth of the Vilaine River,
on the east side of the Bay of Guiberon. Caesar's army was encamped on the
east side of the Bay of Guiberon, on the east side of the Bay of Guiberon. Caesar's army was encamped on the heights from which they viewed the contest (Map I 03).

III, 16. The overwhelming defeat of the Veneti ended the war and brought
again under subjection all the tribes along the northwestern coast.

Sabines Among the Venelli.

III, 17. Sabines started from the vicinity of Angers, marched north and
encamped among the Venelli. Napoleon and Dodge agree in saying that the
remains of a camp, some four miles east of Avranche s (Map 61), known as Camp d
Chastellier, indicate the probable location of Sabines' camp. It is possible
that the remains may be those of a later camp, but it was not uncommon
to pitch new camps on old locations (Dodge p. 140; Map p. 156). Geeler agrees
with this location.

III, 19. Caesar's defeat of the Veneti and Sabines' defeat of the
Venelli occurred about the same time. This coincidence, no doubt, hastened
the submission of the tribes. They all sued for peace at once. The
coalition quickly broke up and the fickle minded Gauls lost all hope. The
Menapii and Noffini withdrew to the security of their forests and swamps
and avoided acknowledging allegiance to Caesar.

Grassus in Aquitania.

III, 20. Caesar's statement here, that Aquitanis formed the third part
of Gaul in the extent of territory and population is not true. His former s
statement (Book I) is that it was one of three parts of Gaul and that the northern boundary was the Garumna River. The contradiction is evident.

Crassus recruited his forces from Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo in the southwest Province. The tribes immediately north of the Garumna (Garonne) must have been friendly and undoubtedly furnished aid.

The Sotiates were first attacked and defeated. The territory of this tribe lay along the left bank of the Garumna River.

III, 21. The oppidum of the Sotiates has been identified by some as Lectour (Map 217), by others as Sos. Dodge merely mentions both without stating his preference. Napoleon and Goeler and Kelsey say Sos. Sos was a station on the road between Tolosa and Burdigala (Real-Encyclopaedie der Classischen Alterthumswissenschaft, Vol. II). This town fell into the hands of Crassus and the Sotiates gave up at once.

III, 21. The Vovates were along the left bank of the Garumna below the Sotiates. The Tarusates held territory on the Aturis (Adour) south of the Sotiates.

III, 27. As a result of this victory of Crassus almost all the tribes of Aquitania acknowledged Roman authority and desired peace.

Caesar's Campaign Against the Menappii and Morini.

III, 28. The Morini and the Menappii inhabited a wooded and marshy country along the northern coast of Gaul. The Morini held the territory north of the Lys River. The Menappii held the territory between the Mosa (Meuse) and the Scaldis (Scheldt). Caesar acknowledges here that they had never submitted to him. Because of the forests and swamps Caesar failed to reach them and had to withdraw without an engagement.

III, 29. The army was put in winter quarters among the Aulerici, the Lexovii and other peoples recently vanquished. The army lay between the Seine and the Loire.

At the close of the third summer's work Caesar was master of all Gaul
Only the Menappii and Morini had succeeded in escaping him and these were sufficiently injured to prevent them from spreading mischief. Caesar had conquered Gaul; the difficulty was to keep it conquered.

For the results of the work of the third summer see map IV.

Operations on the Rhine
Spring of 55 B.C.

probably

IV, I. The place of crossing was near modern Cleves and Xanten. Dodge and Napoleon both adopt this opinion. Dodge says (P. I51): "The left bank from Xanten down is a chain of heights some thirty miles long, at the foot of which the river used to flow. Two gaps pierce these heights, at Xanten and near Cleves. That these passes were used by the Germans in their incursions is shown by their having been fortified by the Romans after the conquest. The Usipetes and *\text{\textit{Tenochtheri}} had moved forward nearly to the Mosa (Meuse)". (See map V).

IV, 6. The place of calling the tribes together was near Samarobria (Amiens) and Caesar is supposed to have rendezvoused in the vicinity of this place (Map II) and thence marched to Cambré (Map I3) Charleroi, Tongres and Maestricht. This would have been his most natural route (Dodge p/ I52; Nap/ p. I68. For illustrations see accompanying map V).

IV, II. Caesar proceeded across the Meuse, past modern Venloo until he came within twelve miles of of the *\text{\textit{Sirtalain}} enemy. This would have brought him near Strallen (Dodge p. I53; Nap. p. I70). The Usipetes and the *\text{\textit{Tenochtheri}} were on the levels near Goch on the Niers River and this river probably is meant as the place to which Caesar moved for the purpose of getting water. Here was the place where the Germans attacked Caesar's cavalry. (See map V).

IV, I5. The scene of the German defeat was the narrow strip of land between the Rhine and the Meuse. This Caesar says plainly.

We copy the following paragraph from Dodge (p. I55) on this campaign: 

"The whole campaign lacks clearness in the Commentaries. Florus confuses it still more by placing the defeat of the Usipetes and *\text{\textit{Tenochtheri}} in the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, and Dion Cassius by stating that Caesar reached them among the Treviri. This latter has been the theory of many who in compiling their data, stray unwanted from the Com-
mentaries. The country of the Moselle-Rhine region has no traces of ancient roads, and could scarcely have supported these tribes. To conduct his marches on the theory that he reached the enemy there, Caesar would have been led through the Forest of Ardennes, a fact which he does not mention, as he most likely would have done. It looks more probable that the situation was as described, and that on learning of Caesar's approach, the Usipetes and Tenchantti withdrew their foragers and retired toward their base among the Menapii. To cross the Rhine near the Moselle would have led them among their enemies, the Ubii. To make them head that way is an improbable assumption. Napoleon sets forth these same reasons at length in his note (p. 167) and his conclusion is the same as Bode gives. (See map V).

Caesar Crosses the Rhine.

IV, 17. The location of the bridge has been much in dispute. Some think modern Koblenz should be chosen, others select Ponn and still others Cologne. The advocates of Koblenz are those who place the defeat of the Usipetes and Tenchantti at the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine. Napoleon and Dodge both adopt Bonn as the most probable site. Their reasons are, briefly, as follows:

Caesar was near the territory of the Sugambri; Koblenz was far above.

Two years later Caesar crossed the Rhine a little above the present bridge and the line of march described described described from the Rhine west make Bonn more probable than either Koblenz or Cologne.

At Bonn the river bed is well suited for piles; south of Ponn it is not.

Fifty years later Drusus crossed at this same place to attack the Sugambri. He would have profited by Caesar's experience (Dodge p. 159; Na Nap. p. 173), (Map V).

Kelsey (note to p. 126.1, 16) says: "Though the exact spot can not be determined, there are good reasons for supposing that Caesar's bridge was built somewhere between Bonn and Koblenz. The average depth of the Rhine there is from fourteen to sixteen feet, the width from fifteen hundred to sixteen hundred feet*. (Kampen: Description, Tab. 6).

By driving back the Germans Caesar did more than defend the Territory he had already acquired.

*
He went ostensibly to aid the Ubi and punish the Sugambri for not giving up the fugitive cavalry. He failed to be of any aid to the Ubi and he did not succeed in bringing on an engagement with the Sugambri. No territory was added.

The First Invasion of Britain.

IV, 21. Caesar brought his army to the territory of the Morini, for this was the nearest to the coast of Britain. The harbor chosen for the embarkation was Portus Itius which was probably the site of modern Boulogne (Map 3; also map V).

IV, 22. The Morini formally made submission to Caesar. It does not seem that the whole tribe submitted, however, for Caesar speaks in this same chapter of sending two of his lieutenants against the cantons that had not sent hostages. Nor was their desire for peace sincere but that they had a good opportunity to attack a small part of Caesar's army on the return from Britain where it was compelled to land apart from the main body.

IV, 23. The cavalry embarked at a point north of Portus Itius. Ambleseteuse is suggested as the place (Map 3; also map V).

We copy from Dodge a description of the coast of Britain:

"In Caesar's day the sea came so close to the cliffs that a dart thrown from the top would reach the tide-covered beach; but by 950 A.D. the old port had been quite blocked up by alluvium. In sailing farther up the coast he doubled the promontory, no doubt South Foreland, and stopped part at Deal (Map 1)."

IV, 36. This invasion of Britain accomplished very little for Caesar. As soon as he returned from Gaul his authority in Britain ceased. Although he was victorious over a few tribes and although they formally treated for peace, he was unable to compel the observance of the treaty nor to punish the tribes for non-compliance. Only two of the tribes sent hostages as demanded (Chap. 38). Caesar added no territory by his first invasion of Britain.

IV, 37. The fact that the Morini were so ready to take advantage of Caesar's weak position shows how lightly they regarded their former su-
mission. However, Caesar's defeat of them in this engagement seems to have been decisive.

Caesar's lieutenants were unable to bring the Menapii to an engagement. They used their favorite tactics of retiring into the swamps and forests out of reach of the Romans. Again they avoided surrender.

We are not able to decide more definitely upon the location of Caesar's army during the winter of 54-55 B.C. than is given in the Commentaries. This is, that the army wintered among the Belgae.

As far as adding conquered territory was concerned the work of the summer of 55 B.C. was wholly barren of results, unless we except the territory of the Morini. The campaign into Germany and that into Britain had added no territory. The map remains the same as at the close of 56 B.C. (Map IV).

Second Campaign to Britain.

Summer, 54 B.C.

V. 2. Portus Itius probably occupied the site of Modern Boulogne.

V. 8. The landing was probably made at a place which Caesar had observed to be suitable when he visited the island the previous summer (Map V).

V. 9. Caesar marched inland about twelve miles. The stream mentioned in this chapter is probably the Little Stour and Caesar reached it near Kingston or Littlebourne (Dodge J 62; Nap. P. 225). Napoleon, after giving argument which seems to us conclusive that the Little Stour is the stream meant, goes on to say that there is a question whether Caesar reached the Little Stour towards Parham and Kingston or towards Littlebourne. His opinion based upon the topography of the region is that the country of Parham and Kingston best agrees with the requirements of the text. He mentions the fact that some authors, and among them General Goeler, make the scene of the engagement the Great Stour. But as the text states that the engagement was not serious and that Caesar's cavalry crossed the stream without difficulty, the objection to the Great Stour seems justified. For the cavalry could not have thus crossed the Great Stour. Besides the Great
Stour is fifteen miles from Deal, while the Little Stour is twelve miles as the text requires.

Dodge says that the locality of the Britons' fortified camp cannot be identified, nor are most of the places settled beyond dispute, but some of them may be considered as practically determined.

V, II. Thames is the modern Thames. The territory of Cassivellaunus lay about eighty miles up from the sea (Dodge p. 183; Nap. p. 228).

V, 18. Caesar's advance on Cassivellaunus was via Maidstone and Westerham (Dodge p. 185; Nap. p. 231). The place chosen by Caesar to cross the Thames was between Kingston and Brentford. Dodge says there were several fordable places; Napoleon says there was only one. Napoleon's note (p. 231) concerning the location of the ford is interesting. After speaking of the futility of attempting to trace Caesar's route exactly, he says:

"It is no more possible to ascertain the exact place where Caesar crossed the Thames. We are convinced of this by the researches of all kinds made by the officers of Stoffel and Hamelin. The boatmen of the Thames all assured them that between Snapperon and London there are now reckoned eight or nine places fordable; the most favorable is that of Sunbury. At Kingston where General De Goeler placed the passage, nothing leads us to suppose a ford ever existed. The same thing must be said of Conway Stakes. At Halliford, in spite of the termination of the word, the inhabitants have no ancient tradition of a fexa an ancient ford. The only thing which appears evident to us is that the Roman army did not pass below Meddicton. We know that this village, the name of which comes from Tide-end-town, makes the last point of the Thames where the tide is felt; we cannot believe that Caesar would expose himself to be surprised during his passage by an increase in the volume of water."

Kelsey in his note to page 148 1. 7 says:

"Till a century ago there were some remains of some very ancient stakes in the Thames, near Walton Bridge. Bede, a writer of the earlier part of the eighth century, thus speaks of them as the stakes set to oppose Caesar's progress (Hist. Eccles. I, 2):

'quaerum vestigia sudium (Driven by Cassivellaunus) - ibidem usque hodie visuntur, et videtur inspectantibus, quod singulæ earum ad modum
humanis femoris grossae et circumfusae plumbo immobiliter arfur in profundum fluminis infixae.

Most of those who have studied the matter, however, reject this explanation and consider the stakes the relic of an old fishing weir. We can do little more than present the severest opinions about the matter. Perhaps the best conclusion to be drawn is that there is no possibility of settling the matter definitely. We have consulted Dodge's map (Map V) which indicates as well as any, perhaps, the probable route Caesar followed and the location of places. (See also Kammen: Descript. Tab. 7)

V, 20. The tribes which submitted covered substantially the entire southeastern section of Britain.

V, 21. The oppidum of Cassivellaunus was built probably at modern St Albans.

V, 23. The army is carried back to Gaul.

The second invasion was almost as fruitless as the first. It is true that Caesar had landed on the island, had been victorious in all the battles he had fought, and had marched inland at least eighty miles. The tribes in the southwestern part of Britain had sued for peace and given hostages as a pledge for their continued allegiance and they had been laid under tribute. Still, Caesar's authority was very shadowy; nor was he in a position to hold what he had conquered. The result of the work of the summer of 54 B.C. is indicated in map IV. The territory of southwestern Britain is marked as conquered, although the submission was not very complete nor lasting.

Winter Quarters, Winter, 54-53 B.C.

The legion under Fabius was located among the Morini at St. Pol (Map 7); the one under Q. Cicero, among the Nervii between the Scaldis and the Sabis Rivers, probably at Charleroi (Map 9). One legion under Roscius was placed among the Bervii in southern Normandy near Seess (Map 63). Labienus with one was located among the Remi, near the Treveri, very likely at Lavacherie. Crassus, Plancus and Trebonius, with three legions occupied the Belgium, between Scaldis and the Isara Rivers; Trebonius at Amiens (Map 12), Crassus among the Bellovaci (Map 21) twenty-five miles from Amiens.
and Plancus near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne. The new legion last raised on the Po and five cohorts under Sabinus and Cotta were placed near the Meuse, among the Eburones, the country governed by Ambiorix and Cativolus at Aduatuca (Tongres). The bulk of the legions were thus in the northwest section of Gaul. The exact locations of course, not certain, the only ones which are determined are Samobriva (Amiens) and Aduatuca (Tongres). The others are set down according as topographical features or the subsequent establishment of Roman oppida or camps, suggest the probable earlier locations and are approximately correct (Dodge p. 191). In making these locations Dodge agrees in every particular with Napoleon (Nap. pp. 243, 244). The accompanying map will show these locations (Map VII).

The insurrection began among the Eburones with Ambiorix as the principal leader. But Idutioramus, a chief of the Treviri, was thought to have been the prime mover though it does not appear that he took an active part in carrying out the plans. After the destruction of Sabinus and Cotta and their command at Aduatuca a large number of tribes joined the uprising, the most important of which were the Nervii and Aduatuci. There were many others who ranked as dependents of these more powerful tribes, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii and the Geidumni. (See map VII).

V, 26. That the Aduatuca of the Commentaries was Tongres is considered well proven. The topography and all the requirements of distances made by the Commentaries suit this place (Dodge p. 193; Nap. p. 244).

V, 32. The place of ambush was the defile through of Lovaige where the Geer River flows between two hills (Dodge p. 195; Nap. p. 246).

V, 39. Cicero's winter quarters were at the location of modern Charleroi probably.

V, 46. Caesar was at Samarobriva, Crassus was at Montdidier and Fabius at St/Pol. The legion of Trebonius was at once headed for the relief of Cicero and Crassus.
This was especially true of Indutiomarus, the leader of the Treviri (Chap. 56). Labienus had not dared to leave his winter quarters to succor Cicero for fear of being himself attacked and destroyed by Indutiomarus. On receipt of the news of Caesar's victory, Indutiomarus withdrew his forces from before Labienus' camp. In a very short time, however, he became the leader in another uprising.

**New Winter Quarters.**

Winter, 54-53 B.C.

V, 53. Caesar established his headquarters at Samarobriva with three legions, Cicero's and Trebonius', in camps in the immediate neighborhood. "of these" Dodge says "there are relics still: A camp, at the citadel of Amiens; the camp de l'Etoile; and one near modern Tancourt". Fabius was sent back to St. Pol and Planus, Labienus and Roscius made no change of location.

V, 53. The Revolt of the Treviri.

Discontent prevailed through all Gaul. The Aremorican states had threatened to attack Roscius and had desisted only when they learned of the defeat of Ambiorix (Map 3). The Senones now openly refused to obey (V, 54). Caesar and their boldness gave courage to other tribes. There was throughout Gaul a desire to throw off the yoke of Roman domination. The Aedui and Remi alone remained firm in their friendship toward the Romans. (V, 55.)

Indutiomarus, Chief of the Treviri, worked unceasingly to stir up another revolt. The Senones and the Carnutes joined the movement and the Aduatuci and the Nervii were ready to help and also the Eburones (Chap. 55) were ready to help.

The accompanying map (VIII) indicates the tribes which were foremost in the Revolt under Indutiomarus. The account in the Commentaries is not sufficiently clear to allow all to be determined accurately. We cannot say just how far the revolt extended but Caesar emphasizes the fact that the dissatisfaction was general, though not many seem to have broken out into armed rebellion.
Rebellion Under the Leadership of the Treviri.
Spring and Summer 53 B.C.

VI, 2. The tribes in revolt were under the leadership of the Treviri. They were the Eburones under Ambiorix, the Senones, the Carnutes, the Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menappii and all the Germans on the Gallic side of the Rhine (Mao IX).

VI, 3. The four nearest legions were those under Fabius, Crassus, Cicero and Trebonius respectively. Fabius was at St. Pol, Crassus, Cicero and Trebonius in camps close to Samarobriva (Amiens). Caesar directed a sudden expedition against the Nervii and completely cowed them. He then withdrew to his winter quarters at Samarobriva.

The assembly of the Gauls was first called at Samarobriva, but as the Carnutes, Senones and Treviri did not send representatives the place of meeting was changed to Lutetia (Paris), a town among the Parisii. The Parisii were the neighbors of the Senones but had no part in the revolt. Caesar made a demonstration against the Senones who submitted and gave hostages as an assurance of future good behavior.

VI, 4.

VI, 5. Caesar next gave his attention to Ambiorix, leader of the Eburones. The Menapii had never sent ambassadors and as they were the close neighbors and allies of the Eburones, Ambiorix had a safe place of retreat. In order to deprive him of this place of safety, Caesar determined to subdue this tribe. Another thing necessary to the overthrow of Ambiorix was the defeat of the Treviri. Labienus was located at the frontier with one legion, undertook this latter work while Caesar himself managed the campaign against the Menapii. The Commentaries (V, 24) say that Labienus wintered among the Remi on the confines of the Treviri. But we are afterwards given to understand (VI, 7) that Labienus encamped among the Treviri where he had passed the winter. On this point Napoleon says:

"We believe with certain authors, that the country in which he encamped was either on the boundary of the two countries or on the ground which the Remi and Treviri disputed the possession. It is not evident, moreover, that after the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging himself no further in a hostile country by separating himself from the other legions."
The Menapii Campaign.

VI, 5. Napoleon (p. 276) says that Caesar followed the general direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay and Brussels to arrive at the frontier of the Menapii. The particulars if the campaign are not given. The result was the submission of the Menapii. After the surrender Caesar sent to join Labienus among the Treviri.

Campaign against the Treviri.

VI, 7. Labienus marched out of the fortified winter quarters to meet the Gauls before the Germans should send reinforcements. The river mentioned in this chapter was the river Quath (Dodge, Nap.).

VI, 8. The Treviri were compelled to surrender. Thus on either side Ambiorix was deprived of aid.

VI, 9. "Caesar, from the land of the Menapii, had marched up the Rhine and remained at Bonn near the place where he had crossed two years before" He built a similar bridge a little above where he had built the first one: Cf. note to IV, 17.

VI, 10. The Suevi withdrew to Bacenis forest (Hartz mountains) and Caesar did not deem it wise to follow them, so he returned to the Gallic side of the Rhine and prepared to punish Ambiorix. VI, 29.

Campaign Against Ambiorix.

Caesar started from near Bonn via Zulpich and Eupen across the forest of Ardennes, which extended from the banks of the Rhine to to the country of the Nerfii (Dodge 217; Nap. 282).

VI, 32. Aquatua was the place where Sabinus' legion had been destroyed. Here the baggage of the legions was left and Cicero was left to guard it. The rest of the army Caesar divided into three divisions.

VI, 33. Labienus, with three legions was sent toward the ocean near the boundary of the Menapii and Eburones. Labienus he sent southwest to lay waste the
country contiguous to the Aduatuci. He himself with three legions marched towards the Scaldis (Scheldt), intending to pursue Ambiorix to the confines of the forest of Arduenna between modern Brussels and Antwerp. By some authorities the river Sabis, read instead of the the Scheldt, because the latter does not flow into the Meuse as stated by the Commentaries. The phrase is 'the river Scaldis which flows into the Meuse.' But Caesar could readily be in error geographically and the Scheldt does not empty into the sea not far from the mouth of the Meuse. The Sabis Scheldt was more likely to be the objective point than the Sabis. A column which marched only so far as the Sabis could accomplish nothing, and this, Moreover, was the Trebonius' direction (Dodge p. 220).

VI, 34. Caesar turned over to the neighboring tribes the work of inflicting punishment on the Eburones and gave full liberty to plunder and kill.

VI, 35. The Sugambri Attack Caesar's Camp.

The Sugambri crossed the Rhine about thirty miles below Caesar's bridge. They crossed the Meuse at Maestricht (Dodge p. 222).

VI, 43. Caesar burned and ravaged so terribly through the country of the Eburones that the tribe was almost annihilated. However, Ambiorix succeeded in making his escape.

VI, 44. Durocortorum, the chief town of the Remi was under attack. Two legions were encamped on the frontier of the Treviri, two among the Lingones and the six others in the land of the Senones at Angedicum (Sens).

A General Uprising.
Winter, 53-52 B.C.

The uprising which began in the early part of the winter of 53-52 B.C. extended over a large part of Gaul. It was the most formidable revolt which Caesar had thus far, to deal. The principal leader was Ver- cingetorix who belonged to the tribe of the Arverni. Through his efforts a large number of tribes entered into a compact to stand together for
the purpose of overthrowing the Roman power. Those whom Caesar mentions as most active in the uprising were the Carnutes (VI 3), the Arverni, the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cardurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovices, the Andes and all other peoples who dwell on the shores of the ocean (VI 6). Besides these the Bituriges were forced to join the coalition (VI 5) and the other tribes who were induced to join were the Ruteni, the Nitiobroges and the Gabali (VI 7). There were doubtless many others on the point of open revolt. Caesar, indeed, would trust none of them. It is certain that his prompt measures prevented many tribes, who were thus wavering, from lending active support to the uprising. Although we are assured that more tribes took part, either as active participants or at least as sympathizers, than Caesar mentions, it is a difficult matter to decide just which tribes these were. In our map (X) we have indicated as in actual revolt only the tribes which Caesar mentions. Further than this we cannot go with any certainty. On the other hand sufficient evidence may be gathered from Caesar's account to warrant the assertion that all the tribes were more or less in sympathy with the revolt. Even the Aedui, Caesar would barely trust.

VI 8. The route across the Cevenna Mountains was up the Ardeche and down the Loire Valleys, by modern Aps (Map 1 98), Aubenas (Map 1 98) and St. Cirgues (Map 1 86) and advanced to Brioude (Map 1 75), (Dodge p. 283; Nap. p. 297).

VI 9. Vienne is situated on the Rhone (Map 1 68). The two legions which were wintering among the Lingones were at Andaematurnum (Langres, Map 98). All the legions Rendezvoused at Agen-dicum (Sens, map 81).

Gorgobina, now St. Parize le Caatel, was located at the confluence of the Liger (Loire) and Elavey (Allier), (Dodge p. 236; Nap. p. 298). Goeler and others have proposed other locations, but this site is probably better attested than the rest.

VI 2. Genabium was modern Gien. On this point we will give Dodge's opinion which is the same as Napoleon's:

"This was probably modern Gien, though generally assumed to be Orleans. In pushing for Gorgobina, which he aimed quickly to reach, it would be much out of Caesar's way and over a bad tract of country to march
to Orleans, and as it was not essential to do so, he would not be likely
at this moment to vary from the straight course. Moreover, Gien is a
better location for an oppidum, being on a hill while Orleans is on a
slope. This town, Genabum, the Carnutes had not yet garrisoned, as
they expected Caesar would be delayed a long time at the Vellaunodunum,
whereas he reached Genabum much to the surprise of the inhabitants, in
two days after Vellaunodunum had capitulated, when they had barely received
news of the fact. He scarcely could have reached Orleans, hampered by his
considerable trains, which is fifty miles as the crow flies, in this
short time — another argument in favor of Gien" (Dodge p. 236).

Goeler says that Orleans is the proper location and that Napoleon
III is not right in choosing Gien.

Vellaunodunum according to Dodge and Napoleon should be located at
Triguères. Napoleon's reasons are (p. 305):

"The situation of the territory of the Poii being admitted, as well
as that of Genabum, we have to find on the road which Caesar pursued from
Sens to Gorgobina, namely Vellaunodunum the intermediate points of Vellaunod-
unum and Noviodunum. On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at a distance of
forty kilometres from Sens we meet with the little town of Triguères (Map 96). The hill which overlooks it from the north agrees with the position
of the ancient oppidum; The remains of walls, fosses and parapets
have been found in it. Further, there were discovered in 1856, at 500
metres to the northwest of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical
theatre, capable of containing 5000 to 6000 spectators. In another
direction the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out; in
fact everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in
the Gallo Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by
a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with
stones, considered by some to be a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by
all Archaeologists as a Roman road, goes directly from Sens to Triguères by
Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the oppidum. Another ancient way leads similarly from Triguères to Gien. We feel no hesitation
after what precedes in placing Vellaunodunum at Triguères".

Goeler says Ladon, between Montagris and Orleans is the proper site
for Vellaunodunum. We think that Napoleon and Dodge should be followed.
ancient Noviodunum. Napoleon, after describing the condition which the text requires and showing that Nouan-le-Fuuselier Pierrefitte-sur-Landre, Noisaut-en-Gâté, Neuvy-en-Sullias, and Néovvy-sur-Barangeu do not fill the conditions, proceeds to discuss the merits of Sancerre (p. 307):

"Sancerre, answers all the conditions. It is situated on a hill which rises 55 metres above the valley watered by the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines it can only be approached on the point situated to the east, where the ancient Roman road of Pourges terminated, which is still at the present day called "Pig road". The Abbe Leboeuf, as early as 1727, had designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near the St. Satur, at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo Roman town existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have been found. It is probable that this Gallo Roman town had succeeded to a great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily have occupied in their country a point so admirably fortified by nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of boundary between them and the Aedui."

For these and other strong reasons Napoleon insists that Sancerre is the ancient Noviodunum.

Goeler Places Noviodunum at Moreau.

VII, 15. Avaricum is identified as modern Pourges (Map 122). For a detailed description of the site as it appears today see Dodge p. 240. Other authorities who agree on this location are Napoleon (p. 370), Kampen, Descriptione, Tab. 9; Meyer-Koch, Atlas zu Caesar, VII, p.; Goeler, Uebersichtskarte zu Caesars Gallisch. Kreig. p. 5; Kelsey plan 9.

VII, 33. Decetia (Ded&ae-) on the Liger (Dodge p. 249; Nap. 323).

VII, 34. Two legions were left at Angedicum against the Senones and Parisii. Caesar himself, with the six remaining legions in the land of the AXXAXI marched on gergovia in the land of the Arverni. Caesar started from Decetia (Decize) near modern Moulins. From Decetia there was an old Gaulish road which led to Moulins, and was later made a Roman road. (Dodge p. 325).

VII, 34. Dodge and Napoleon both state that Varsenns is the most probable point.
probable point where Caesar crossed the Allier (map, note B. 326).

IV, 36. The following is the description of the site of Gérgovia, &c.

as given by Dodge (p. 254):

"The heights of Gérgovia, four miles south of modern Clermont-Ferrand, stand boldly up twelve hundred feet above the plain. It has been rechristened its ancient name. At the top is a quadrangular plateau a mile long by over a third of a mile wide. On the north and east the slope was probably wooded; access to the plateau by a body of troops might have been difficult. The south slope is a succession of terraces rather wide and not over steep. These apparently were not wooded. On the west lie the heights of Risolles, whose top is only one hundred feet lower than Gérgovia and is connected with it by a neck of land. Two other hills, Mounts Rognon and Puy Giroux, flank the Risolles, and are northwest and southwest of Gergovi respectively. On the south like a huge buttress, is Roche Blanche, a long and narrow hill, with rocky face on the south and east, and easy slope elsewhere, about five hundred feet below the plateau of Gergovia. The Auzon flows south of Gergovia, and falls into the Allier. On the northwest runs a small brook. On the east was a large shallow lake, now drained. On the south and southeast, Gergovia was thought to be most accessible to attack".

Napoleon and Goeler agree with Dodge in this location of Gergovia.

"Caesar established his camp on the high and healthful ground south of the lake, perhaps one hundred feet above the plain. The Auzon ran behind his camp".

VII, 40-41. The Aeduan army was at Rondon on its way to join Vercingetorix. From the Gergovian camp to Rondon was a distance of twenty-five miles. Caesar made the march there and return in twenty-four hours.

VII, 53. Caesar, on his withdrawal from Gergovia, probably crossed the Elaver (Allier) at Vichy (Dodge).

VII, 57. Caesar led his army across the Loire, crossing at Bourbon-Lauchy (Dodge 269). Thence he went toward the territory of the Senones to join Labienus.

Labienus' Campaign.
Labienus' base of supplies was at Agendicum (Senec, map 18). He marched down the left bank of the Isean (Yonne) and the Sequana (Saine) with Lutitia (Paris) as the objective point. The town occupied an island in the river where Notre Dame de Paris now stands (Map 48).

The marsh referred to was at the mouth of the Essonne (Map 65) and the Saine. Labienus was prevented from crossing this marsh. He then withdrew a short distance up the Saine and crossed it at Metiosedumum (Meulan, map 65), situated on an island in the Saine. Labienus then marched down the right bank of the Saine to Lutitia.

VII, 60-61. The place of crossing was probably near the modern Point du Joir.

In the location of places in Labienus' campaign we have followed Dodge pp. 271-273; Nap. pp. 348, 349, 352; Kampen, Descript. Tab. 11; Meyer-Koch, Atlas Zu Caesar X. A, and Kelsey plan XII.

Goeler sends Labienus down the right bank of the Yonne. Napoleon's argument seems to be conclusive (p. 348 note 2).

A General Revolt.

VII, 63. The revolt of the Aedui was a serious thing for Caesar. This tribe had given him its loyal support ever since he had first come into Gaul, and it was natural that the action of the Aedui should have great influence with other tribes. The Pellovaci were the first to follow the example of the Aedui (Chap. 59). The Aedui assumed the leadership and summoned a council of all the tribes to meet at Pibracte. Only the Remi the Lingones and the Treviri were not represented. The reason the Treviri were not represented was because they were so far away and they were, besides, having trouble with the Germans. The Aedui hoped that one of their leaders would get the chief command but it was given to Vercingetorix. All Gaul was now in arms except the Remi, the Suessiones, the Liris and the Lingones. The more distant tribes are not mentioned by Caesar and it is hard to determine just what part they had in the rebellion. The inference is that they were in hearty sympathy if not actually in arms. (Map XI).
"After crossing the Liger on his way from Gergovia (see note to VII, 57.), Caesar apparently directed his march due north to join Labienus, who, when he had defeated Camulogenus had made his way toward his chief. Not far south of Agendicum the captain and lieutenant met" (Dodge p. 276).

"Labienus after returning from Sens, Having advanced to meet Caesar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point in our opinion, is Joigny. Encamped not far from the confluence of the A mancon and the Yonne Caesar could easily receive the contingent which he expected from Germany" (Hd., p. 356).

VII, 66. After Caesar had affected a junction with Labienus he set out to carry aid to the Province. He could not take the most direct route because the territory of the Aedui lay between him and the Province and the inhabitants were in open rebellion. He chose, rather a round-about a course the Territory of the Lingones and thence he would proceed through Sequania. He could thus have Besançon for a base. He probably followed the same road he had pursued when he went against Ariovistus and the winter before when moving from Vienna to Agendicum (Dodge p. 272; Nap., p. 359). Napoleon says that, after reaching the Aube at Dancesvoir, he proceed d towards the little river of Vingeanne. His intention was, doubtless, to cross the Saône at Gray or at Pontailler.

VII, 67. Vercingetorix had concentrated his troops near Ribacte. He placed his forces so as to bar Caesar's road through the territory of the Sequani. He camped at the fork, in the roads in three divisions, each covering one of the paths Caesar might choose towards the Arar and Vesontio. "Vercingetorix' position was on the modern heights of Saquenay. The heights bulged out in three promontories, so to speak, on each of which lay a third of Vercingetorix' army. The right flank of his army thus rested on the Vingeanne. The Baïon brook was in its front.

"That this is the field of Battle Seems to be proven by the tumuli of the region, which contain skeletons, identified from their ornaments, as Gallic, and by the horseshoes still occasionally dug up by the peasants. Moreover it suits the distance from Alesia given by the Commentaries" (Dodge p. 279; see also Nap., p. 361, Meyer-Koch, Atl. zu Caes. X. P. Kampe Kampen, Desc. Tab. 12).
Seige of Alesia.

VII, 69. Authorities are agreed that the summit of mount Auxois on the western slope of which the modern village of Alise St. Reine is situated, is the site of ancient Alésia. Napoleon says of the location:

"Alise St. Reine is undoubtedly the Alesia of the Commentaries. The examination of the strategic reasons which determined the march of Caesar, the correct interpretation of the text, and lastly, the excavation lately made, all combined to prove it" (p 365; see also Nap. note T1 p. 365).

Dodge (p. 283) gives the following admirable description of the site of Alesia:

"The stronghold lay on an isolated hill (Mount Auxois) or rather an elevated oval plateau, one and a quarter miles long east and west, by a half a mile wide at the center north and south, five hundred feet above the surrounding valleys, in the confluence of two of the small tributaries of the upper Sequana, the Lutosa (Osa) and Osera (Oserain), in front of the town from the west was a plain over three miles in length north and south—now called Plaines Les Loues—bisected by the Oserain and a little brook. Around the town on the three other sides, north, east and south at a distance of a mile or so meandered from the edges of the plateau, was a line of hills of about equal height as Mount Auxois, separated from each other by smoothly sloping valleys. There were springs on the plateau and many wells. The streams at the foot of the hills were accessible by many paths. The grade up the hill was easy, but at the top was a wall of rock interrupted at intervals, but on the whole steep, and impracticable of assault! Consult also Napoleon pages 366 and 367 for a similar description.

A good idea of the topography may be gained by a study of the map of the Official Survey of France (Map J12).

Winter Quarters.

Winter, 52-51 B.C.

VII, 90. Labienus with seventh and fifth legions and some cavalry was placed among the Sequani, with Rutilius as his lieutenant; Fabius with the eighth and Basilius with the ninth, among the Remi to protect against the Bellovaci; The legion of Antistius, the eleventh, among the the
Ambeveriti; that of sextius, the Thirteenth, among the Bituriges; that of Caninius, the First, among the Ruteni; Cicero with the Sixth at Matiseo (Macon), and Sulpicius, with the Fourteenth, at Cabillonum (Chalons). Caesar himself fixes his headquarters at Fibracte. The location of Antonius with the tenth and twelfth is not given (Dodge p.306).

The Final Submission of Gaul. Summer, 51 B.C.

VIII, With the fall of Alesia the power of the Gauls was broken forever. Not all of the tribes immediately brought in their submission, but they never again attempted a general revolt. There were many scattered uprisings throughout the country which had to be put down. The Bellovaci made the most determined resistance and they did not surrender until forced to do it by the siege of their chief town Axellodunum (Puy-Issoy Issolu). Aquitania was conquered, the Treviri conquered and the last resistance was overcome by the defeat of Caninius. Caesar was now in fact master of all Gaul (Map XIII).