DEEDS DONE IN DIFFERENT WORDS: A GENRE-BASED APPROACH TO
THIRD PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN DISCOURSE

By

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Submitted to the graduate degree program in Communication Studies and the
Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Theories about political campaign communication have been based primarily on an understanding of the two-party system. Consequently, the rhetoric of third party presidential candidates has been seen as ineffective or unimportant because it violates the norms of political discourse. I maintain that this leads to a critical misunderstanding and under-appreciation for third party campaign rhetoric, since scholars too often ignore the situational barriers and perceived strategic constraints that these candidates routinely encounter. In the first two chapters of this project, I identify the purposes of third party campaigns and argue that the rhetorical style of serious minor party candidates is fundamentally different than the style of traditional incumbents and challengers. Functioning as agitators for change, third party presidential candidates use a rhetorical style that is polarizing, populist, rich in markers of authenticity, and aimed at producing public spectacle. In three additional chapters, I argue that the constraints, purposes, and rhetorical style that make third party candidates distinct from their major party counterparts means that even the most significant rhetorical moments of their campaign – the announcement statement, nomination acceptance speech, and concession – will violate the traditional norms of each genre. These differences suggest the existence of norms that are unique to third party discourse. As such, variants for each genre as they pertain to minor party candidates are described in detail, and applied to several case studies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am thankful for several people who were instrumental in the completion of this dissertation. Above all, I owe a debt of gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Robert C. Rowland. He was generous with his time and always willing to listen to my ideas, review drafts of chapters in sometimes a matter of a few hours, and provide quality feedback on how to improve my writing and sharpen my analysis. I also appreciate the time and guidance provided by each of my committee members, Dr. Donn W. Parson, Dr. Beth Innocenti, Dr. Mary Banwart, and Dr. Amy J. Devitt. The advice that I received from each of them in the early stages of this project helped me sharpen my focus.

I am also thankful for the assistance that I received from multiple institutions. With the help of the specialists at the Hall Center for Humanities at the University of Kansas, I applied for several grants and fellowships. The Office of Graduate Studies Summer Research Fellowship that I received as a result of this assistance paid for much of my travel to several archives across the country, and also provided me with time to focus on writing in the summer of 2010. Additionally, I sincerely appreciate the help that I received from several folks managing special collections and archives that I needed for this project, including those at the University of Iowa, Wichita State University, Alderman Memorial Library at the University of Virginia, Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, Elmer L. Anderson Library at the University of Minnesota, and many others.

Third, I am appreciative of several friends, colleagues, and mentors for their encouragement and intellectual support. Several of my close friends have been open to discussing my project, including Ben Warner, Jaclyn Howell, Kundai Chirindo, Astrid Villamil, Aram Parsegian, and Meredith Neville. Additionally, the love and support of Marc and Nancy
Stretch, as well as David Greenlaw, have made my entire post-secondary education possible. Finally, to Meredith, your patience with me over the last year has demonstrated that my most important decisions in life have been wise, or at least lucky. I look forward to many more years of your good humor and support, and look forward to providing you the same.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1
   Literature Review 4  
   Reasons for the Neglect of Third Parties in Communication Scholarship 9  
   Justification 15  
   Genre Theory and the Need for a New Approach to Third Party Presidential Campaign Discourse 17  
      The Situational Approach to Genre Criticism 17  
      Situational Constraints for Third Party Candidates 20  
   Methodology 29  
   Plan of Study 32

CHAPTER 2: A Theory of Third Party Style 34
   Campaign Style: Challengers and Incumbents 36  
   Categories of Third Parties in U.S. History 40  
   Purposes and Goals of Third Party Presidential Campaigns 43  
      Agenda Setting and the “Success” of Third Parties 44  
      Secondary Goals of Third Party Candidates 47  
   Third Party Campaigns as Social Movements 50  
   The Characteristics of Third Party Style 54  
      Polarization in Third Party Style 55  
      Populism in Third Party Campaign Rhetoric 60  
      Displays of Authenticity in Third Party Style 63  
      Dependence on Public Spectacle 69  
   Conclusion 73

CHAPTER 3: Presidential Campaign Announcements – A Third Party Variant 75
   The Surfacing Stage of Presidential Campaigns 77  
   Traditional Campaign Announcements and the Third Party Variant 80  
      Traditional Campaign Announcements 80  
      Third Party Campaign Announcements 84  
   Third Party Announcements: Three Case Studies 94  
      The Announcement Rhetoric of Henry Agard Wallace (1948) 94  
      The Announcement Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976) 99  
      The Announcement Rhetoric of Patrick Buchanan (2000) 104  
   Conclusion 109

CHAPTER 4: Unconventional – The Variant of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses 111
   Traditional Nomination Acceptance Addresses 113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Genre of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Nomination Acceptance Speeches: Three Case Studies</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nomination Acceptance Address of Strom Thurmond (1948)</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nomination Acceptance Address of Patrick Buchanan (2000)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nomination Acceptance Address of Ralph Nader (2000)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: Triumph in Defeat – The Genre of Third Party Presidential Concessions</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Presidential Concessions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function and Form of Traditional Concession Rhetoric</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables in Traditional Concession Rhetoric</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Genre of Third Party Concessions</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Concessions: Three Case Studies</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concession Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concession Rhetoric of Ralph Nader (2000)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concession Rhetoric of Harry Browne (2000)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: Conclusion</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction

In his history of the study of presidential rhetoric Martin Medhurst attributed Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. with being the first “to [publically] recognize and articulate a specific interest in the presidency and in presidential rhetoric as a specialization within the larger world of rhetorical studies.”¹ Windt’s observation came at a fascinating time. Political scientists were characterizing the modern presidency, starting with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, as an office of rhetorical leadership.² This “rhetorical presidency” involved “leadership of popular opinion” that used “popular or mass rhetoric” to “‘go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation and other initiatives.”³ At the forefront of what Medhurst called a “renaissance” in rhetorical studies of presidential communication,⁴ Windt defined presidential rhetoric as a “discipline . . . concerned with the study of presidential public persuasion as it affects the ability of a President to exercise the powers of the office.”⁵

Fleshing out the details of this “field of study,” Windt suggested that presidential rhetoric consists of four kinds of research. First, he argued, some scholars study presidential discourse by analyzing single speeches. Studies of this kind either produce criticism that is “intrinsic,” in that it illuminates “how a particular speech worked on intended audiences,” or “extrinsic” by using specific speeches to enrich our “knowledge of how a particular President used his persuasive powers to get done what he wanted done or for the development of theories about presidential rhetoric.”⁶ A second approach, Windt maintained, is the study of “rhetorical movements to build constituencies, to get legislation passed, [or] to defend against continuing opposition on basic issues.”⁷ This broader study of presidential rhetoric entails a dwelling “on the
chronological/rhetorical progression of a political idea or policy, or on the various uses of arguments a President employs in pressing a single theme.” Movement studies of presidential rhetoric, Windt remarked, “provide a valuable historical and political framework within which to analyze how presidents use rhetoric with other instruments of power to pursue policy and political goals.” The third kind of research that Windt identified was a category of miscellaneous studies, including those concerned with “textual accuracy, speech preparation” and among other things “the ethics of using speech-writers and consultants.” Windt also identified a fourth approach to presidential rhetoric that he labeled “genre studies” which concentrate “on comparisons of what different Presidents have said on similar occasions, on similar themes, or what they have said to similar audiences.” The last category is the subject of this study.

A genre-based approach to presidential discourse was underdeveloped as late as the mid-1980s, with most research focusing mainly on presidential apologia and crisis rhetoric. To say that things changed quickly is an understatement. “It was perhaps merely coincidental,” Medhurst remarked, that a rush of important books and essays started being published “at the same moment that Windt was proclaiming the existence of a recognized subfield called presidential rhetoric.” Research on the genres of presidential discourse in the years that followed has developed the form and function of a canon of speeches delivered by America’s top leader. The most attention has been given to the inaugural address, followed by presidential apologia, war rhetoric, the national eulogy, the State of the Union address, farewell address, and to a lesser degree other “emerging genres.” To this canon, scholars have added and meticulously studied several genres of presidential campaign rhetoric including the
announcement speech,\textsuperscript{19} nomination acceptance speech,\textsuperscript{20} as well as victory and concession speeches.\textsuperscript{21}

Although the genre-based approach to presidential discourse has evolved remarkably over the last three decades there is still much to be done. In particular, one significant shortcoming is that analysis of the genres of campaign rhetoric has focused predominately on candidates who have emerged from the two-party system. In other words, communication scholars have not only given minimal attention to third party presidential campaigns in general, but they have almost entirely ignored how the genres of campaign discourse differ for minor party presidential candidates. However, I contend throughout this dissertation that third party performance of campaign speech genres reveals a rhetorical style that is misunderstood and underappreciated. Ultimately, with this study I aim to fill a crucial gap in the existing literature in presidential rhetoric by answering three important questions: First, how does the general campaign style – or the kinds of common rhetorical strategies used by candidates in speeches, advertisements, websites, etc. – for third party presidential candidates differ from the styles typically used by hopefuls from the two-party system? Second, if there is a campaign style unique to third party presidential candidates then how does it shape the common genres of their campaign discourse, in both form and function? Third, how do the genres of third party presidential campaign discourse differ, if at all, among the various types of third parties that have been described by political scientists and other scholars?

In this chapter, I articulate the theoretical underpinnings and methodological framework of this study. First, I provide a review of the literature concerning third party presidential campaign discourse, from communication studies and other disciplines, to highlight the need for this research. Second, I explain three reasons for why third party discourse has been neglected by
presidential rhetoric scholars, and then offer a justification for a study of minor party rhetorical style and speech genres. Third, I define the approach to genre criticism that will inform my entire study. Fourth, through an analysis of the constraints that third party presidential candidates routinely encounter, I demonstrate that the function and form of their campaign discourse are different than the same kinds of discourse produced by two-party candidates. Fifth, I describe in detail my methods for each stage of this research project, from gathering rhetoric to contextual analysis, to theory building, and finally to uncovering rhetorical patterns. In closing, I preview the chapters.

**Literature Review**

In general, communication scholars have given minimal attention to third party presidential campaigns. For instance, the long-running series edited by Robert Denton offering “A Communication Perspective” of each presidential election since 1992 has discussed third party challengers only as a way of explaining the results for the Republican and Democratic candidates. The edition dedicated to the 1992 presidential election offered occasional analysis of Ross Perot’s advertising, participation in debates, and appearances on several television talk shows. However, no mention was made of Andre Marrou, the other minor party candidate who was on the ballot in all 50 states and received around 290,000 votes that year, or any of the other third party challengers. The edition on the 1996 presidential election made far fewer references to Perot, and not a single mention of the campaigns of Green Party nominee Ralph Nader and Libertarian nominee Harry Browne, who along with Perot captured almost ten percent of the popular vote. Likewise, the edition covering the 2000 election made only a handful of quick references to the campaigns of Nader and Reform Party nominee Patrick Buchanan, and no mention of Libertarian Harry Browne, although their campaigns took over three and a half
percent of the popular vote in an extremely close election.\textsuperscript{26} The absence of any significant discussion of third party campaign rhetoric characterized Denton’s edition on the 2004 election as well.\textsuperscript{27} The tendency to ignore third party presidential campaigns is not unique to Denton’s series. Several other respected books about presidential campaign communication have also made only brief references to the rhetoric of minor party candidates.\textsuperscript{28}

Although attention to third party presidential campaign discourse has been minimal, some communication scholars have examined the rhetoric of certain outsider candidates. For the most part, these studies have focused on the controversial discourse of a few widely-known third party candidates who campaigned for the presidency in the twentieth century. Eugene V. Debs, for example, piqued the interest of Bernard Brommel, who wrote a rhetorical history of Debs’ pacifist speeches.\textsuperscript{29} More notably, James Darsey wrote of Debs’ prophetic discourse, and argued that he gave himself to a life of suffering with a language of commitment and duty that made him “one of the most durable and generous legends in American thought.”\textsuperscript{30}

George Wallace’s presidential campaign as the American Independent Party’s nominee has been the subject of the largest number of studies by rhetoric scholars. Lawrence Rosenfeld, for example, profiled Wallace and compared his rhetoric to that of Patrick Henry because “both men . . . enlisted emotionally charged god and devil-terms to stoke up a mechanical passion.”\textsuperscript{31} According to Rosenfeld, Wallace routinely demonized “bureaucrats, pseudo-intellectuals, college professors, guideline writers, anarchists, federal judges, the news media, militants, the national parties, rioters, Communists, students”\textsuperscript{32} and many others. Wallace captivated Southern audiences by engaging in “burlesque routines,” Rosenfeld noted, where he would “confound his tormentors and amuse those television viewers who snickered in sympathy for the pixie who was faced with smart-aleck arrogance of a suspect college generation.”\textsuperscript{33} Similar findings led Richard
Raum and James Measell to describe Wallace’s rhetoric as exemplifying a “genre of polarization.” Ultimately, Lloyd Rohler argued, Wallace was successful in part because of the scene of the 1960s in that he was a self-avowed conservative populist who spoke to the fears of those who felt “powerless and that decisions affecting their lives were being made by people far removed from them and their experiences.” Despite having no real platform or organized party to put a program into operation, Rohler maintained, Wallace aroused discontent that has been used by conservatives ever since. In summary, as J. Michael Hogan concluded, George Wallace was effective as a third party candidate because he ran at a time of widespread alienation when frustrated working class white Americans could easily identify with his emotional, cathartic rhetoric that aimed to “[purge] feelings of anxiety . . . by creating scapegoats.”

The tendency of third party presidential candidates to resort to scapegoating has also been found in the campaign rhetoric of Independent John Anderson who ran against Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan in 1980. According to Barry Brummett, Anderson frequently claimed that America was being destroyed by factionalism and the pursuit of special interests, for which he blamed the Republican and Democratic parties. “Anderson not only scapegoated the competing parties,” Brummett noted, “but offered a vote for him as a chance for the country to achieve redemption.” Brummett concluded that Anderson’s strategy of using the two-party system as a scapegoat for America’s shortcomings had an inherent risk. “By entering a political arena which was traditionally governed by the two party system,” Brummett suggested, “Anderson may not have been able to escape the appearance of factional combat himself.”

Ross Perot’s rhetoric has also been examined by several communication scholars. Perot’s first campaign came at a time of escalating voter cynicism toward traditional politics, but
researchers have attributed his large share of the popular vote in 1992 to his unconventional rhetorical style. Perot, many have noted, temporarily circumvented the traditional gatekeepers in the media by discussing his campaign on various television talk shows. Perot was humorous in his public appearances, and more importantly he used simple language that the average American could understand. Perot’s unconventional style, though, ultimately hurt his campaign. As Mari Boor Tonn and Valerie Endress argued, “although Perot’s unorthodox approach to politics catapulted him into consideration and prompted his inclusion in the presidential debates, those same traits disqualified him in the eyes of many Americans.” In particular, Perot’s shocking withdrawal from the race in July 1992 and reentry in October, along with his surprising choice of James Stockdale as his running mate, doomed his campaign and caused voters to question his competence. Moreover, Perot’s preference for unmediated communication, John Zaller and Mark Hunt maintained, led to voters taking him less seriously as he dodged the traditional news media in the final months of the race. Perot’s “everyman style” of speaking, too, eventually backfired and looked unprofessional in certain contexts, such as his televised NAFTA debate with Al Gore.

Green Party nominee Ralph Nader’s rhetorical style has also intrigued at least one rhetoric scholar. Christine Harold characterized Nader’s rhetoric in 2000 as being similar to the rhetoric of Ross Perot, George Wallace, Theodore Roosevelt and Eugene V. Debs, because it characterized the government as being corrupt and broken. Nader’s rhetoric, Harold, suggested, “is filled with allusions to an electoral process that is contaminated by ‘monied interests.'” By characterizing his own campaign as pure, Harold suggested, Nader adopted a very specific version of authenticity and thus opened himself to an attack that he was the real contaminating force in the election. In short, Democrats “effectively cast the Green Party candidate as the
‘spoiler,’ as a contaminating element in an otherwise well-ordered political system,” due to his mission to eat into Democratic support and his disruption of the democratic process by encouraging online vote-swaps. When attacked for his own “impurity,” Nader denied the claims of Democrats and stood behind principle. Ultimately, Harold argued, “instead of ardently (and vainly) protecting a pure, unadulterated space from which to launch their attacks on a corrupt system, the Greens might have had more success by embracing their role as a viral corrupting agent . . . actively forcing a reconfiguration of the American political system.”

Considering that so few works have offered a detailed analysis of third party presidential campaigns, it is unsurprising that communication scholars have neglected to analyze the genres of discourse for these outsider candidates. All too often, the significant genres of campaign rhetoric have been mentioned only briefly in analyses of the discourse of minor party challengers. In his study of Eugene V. Debs’ pacifist speechmaking, for instance, Brommel barely mentioned the Socialist Party nominee’s acceptance speech in 1920. In his examination of nomination acceptance speeches from the 1996 campaign, Ray Dearin briefly discussed Ross Perot’s acceptance of the Reform Party’s nomination and argued that his emphasis on a traditional Republican version of the American Dream was problematic for the Dole campaign. Even when scholars have discussed a third party candidate’s performance of key genres of campaign rhetoric, the criticism has assumed that the generic norms for third party candidates are the same as for mainstream candidates. In an essay concerning candidate concession speeches in the 1992 presidential election, for instance, Paul Corcoran sarcastically suggested that Perot “[abided] by the rules, complete with a ballroom victory party.” Arguing that Perot’s speech violated all of the basic features of a concession, Corcoran called it “a classic of its genre . . . in every respect but form, style, and content.” Evaluations like Corcoran’s are to be expected,
though, when works detailing the recurring forms of political campaign communication fail to acknowledge the important differences between major party and third party campaigns.\textsuperscript{55}

In summary, the existing literature concerning the communication practices of third party presidential campaigns has a number of shortcomings. First, the tendency has been to mention third party campaigns only when describing the context of the race, or when explaining the outcome for the Democratic or Republican nominees. Only a few third party candidates are mentioned at all. Second, existing studies of third party presidential campaign rhetoric have tended to focus on single case studies of notable candidates or their political movements, and have therefore failed to describe rhetorical practices common to minor party challengers. Finally, the handful of journal articles examining genres of presidential campaign discourse have assumed that the form and function of the major kinds of speeches are the same for both mainstream and third party candidates.

Reasons for the Neglect of Third Parties in Communication Scholarship

At this point, there is an obvious question that needs to be answered: Why have third party presidential candidates been generally neglected in the field of presidential rhetoric? There are three main reasons. First, opinion leaders in the public sphere have long perceived third party candidates as odd, quirky, and at times just plain absurd. Aside from the few minor party candidates who occasionally receive serious public attention in presidential races, most are lumped into a category called “the other candidates.” The “other” candidates are portrayed frequently as “a little flakey”\textsuperscript{56} and proof to many journalists that “Anybody can run for President, and anybody does.”\textsuperscript{57}

Election after election, the only press coverage that most minor party candidates receive characterizes them as the freak show in the electoral circus. For instance, among the “other”
campaigns profiled by *Time* in the 1952 race were: the America First Party, which nominated General Douglas MacArthur without his permission and encouraged him to maintain “a dignified silence”; the Greenback Party, whose nominee admitted to running simply because as a grocer his customers thought it was neat; and the Washington Peace Party led by Ellen Jensen, described as a “50 year-old Miami grandmother and astrologist who claims to be in close communion with George Washington.” In 1956, newspapers also profiled the regular losing candidates of the Prohibition Party and the Communist Party, but highlighted as well Poor Man’s Party nominee Henry Krajewski who was a pig farmer “promising free beer and lower income taxes.” Among the other candidates of 1960, America First Party nominee Lar Daly was described as the “perennial Presidential candidate who campaigns in an Uncle Sam suit” and whose legal demands for equal access to the news media was the reason for Congress suspending “equal time” provisions for third parties. Moreover, write-in candidate Gabriel Green was characterized as claiming “he’s seen seventy-five flying saucers and has talked with space people,” and that his relationship with spacemen “will help me, not necessarily at the precinct level, but by supplying me with information.” In 1968, it was noted that third party candidates joining George Wallace included “a beagle, comedians, a ‘love candidate’ who campaigns in the nude and a Jewish mother who endorses sex education in the schools ‘as long as it’s boring.’” This kind of press coverage of third party campaigns is relatively common. Clearly, then, third party presidential candidates are stigmatized for failing to uphold the perceived ideals of democracy, and their campaigns are frequently seen as lacking the seriousness required for critical analysis.

A second reason for the neglect of third party presidential candidates by communication scholars is the reality that they have not won a presidential election since 1860. As William
Henry Chamberlain wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* just before the 1948 campaign, “Our political history since the Civil War is thickly strewed with the bones of third parties, some of which started out under favorable auspices . . . [and some] of these parties achieved voting success on a state and even a national level.” However, he noted, “no one of these third parties reached the point of electing a President or even of sending enough representatives to Congress to hold the balance of power between the major parties.”

Indeed, since Lincoln only eight minor party presidential candidates have received over five percent of the popular vote, and the ceiling remains the 27.4 percent given to popular former president Theodore Roosevelt, who headed the Progressive Party in 1912. Moreover, only six candidates since Lincoln have received electoral votes, but none of those campaigns were even close to winning the election. Therefore, it is somewhat understandable that political communication scholars have written little on a group of quadrennial underdogs who have not won a presidential election for over 150 years.

A third reason why minor party presidential campaigns are neglected in the field of presidential rhetoric is that contextual factors, rather than candidate strategy, are usually used to explain their successes. In short, there is a prevalent belief that third parties become popular when the electorate is alienated from the two major parties usually because some specific issue or after a major crisis. According to political scientists, this happens mostly when major parties resemble one another too closely, inviting liberal or conservative minor party candidates to cater to voters on the extreme ends of the political spectrum. As Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus suggested, “Because the cost of exit is high and the likelihood of achieving desired goals through third party activity is low, severe deterioration of the major parties must take place before significant third party activity occurs.” Political scientist Daniel Mazmanian, for instance, listed a number of cumulative conditions that lead to strong third party campaigns.
He noted that these conditions included “severe national conflict over a few very important issues, a period of ‘crisis politics’; division of the electorate on one or more of these issues into at least one intense and estranged minority and a broad majority; rejection or avoidance of the position of the minority by both major parties, causing alienation of the minority; and a politician or political group willing to exploit the situation by initiating a new party.” For Mazmanian and many others, discontent in the electorate always precedes a successful third party campaign. In other words, as Jeffrey Koch noted, most studies focusing on “political attitudes associated with the rise of third party movements are those that can be placed under the general rubric of political cynicism.” This is, by far, the dominant explanation for why many voters find third parties so appealing.

The cynicism and alienation among voters that many political scientists identify as the main cause behind the rise of third parties is attributed to a range of crises. Ronald Rapoport and Walter Stone summarized these crises as dealing with economic disparity, unpopular major-party candidates, and “significant issues that both major parties ignore or on which they take unpopular stands.” Other scholars have isolated times of war and economic depression as leading causes for the rise of serious third parties. Mazmanian even went as far to say that serious minor parties before 1974 emerged as a result of eight forms of conflict, regarding issues of egalitarianism, new territories and slavery, Reconstruction, agrarian protest, corporate regulation and government responsiveness, the Great Depression, and discontent about Civil Rights and the Vietnam War. In short, these many explanations of how contentious social and political environments give rise to third parties deemphasizes candidates’ agency in energizing the electorate.
In light of these explanations for why communication scholars have likely neglected third party campaign rhetoric, another question arises: Is this neglect justified? The answer is that common justifications for this neglect are inadequate. Contrary to the perception that third parties have been routine losers in presidential elections, they have impacted the outcome of multiple races. Mazmanian noted, “The final outcome of the three-party contests of 1848, 1856, 1860, 1892, 1912, and 1968 might have been changed by eliminating the third parties, for the victors won by pluralities.” Many other elections could be added to the list. According to one writer for *The Wall Street Journal* reflecting on the prospects of third parties in 1964:

The Liberal Party of New York, the most potent of the third-party groups [in 1960] in terms of voting strength, gave John F. Kennedy 406,176 votes; it ran no Presidential candidate of its own, throwing party support to the Democratic ticket. President Kennedy carried New York by 383,666 votes. In Illinois, which the Democratic ticket carried by a paper-thin margin of 8,850 votes, 10,575 voters cast ballots for third-party nominees. Had New York’s Liberals decided to sit out the election or vote for their own candidate, and had the GOP in Illinois been able to capture some 9,000 third-party votes, a switch of 72 electoral votes from the Democratic column to the Republican column would have occurred – and Richard Nixon would have been elected.”

In more recent memory, Ralph Nader may have helped elect Republican George W. Bush in 2000. Political scientist John Berg, for example, argued, “There is little room for doubt that Nader’s presence in the campaign changed the outcome of the election. Whatever the actual vote in Florida may have been, the official results gave Bush 2,912,790, Gore 2,919,253, and Nader 97,488 in the Sunshine State.”
Spoilers and near spoilers alike have had a serious influence on American policy as well. Many historians agree that Theodore Roosevelt’s candidacy as a Progressive in 1912 led to progressive reforms during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Others suggest that George Wallace’s campaign in 1968 as the nominee of the American Independent Party influenced the debate on civil rights and led conservative politicians to start catering to the “silent majority” of disgruntled white voters. Political commentator and author Douglas Schoen argued further, “In 1980, John Anderson scored only 6 percent of the vote, but his third-party run raised the profile of such critical national issues as fiscal restraint, environmentalism, Social Security reform, and energy independence.”  

Summarizing the significance of third party spoilers throughout history, Rapoport and Stone suggested, “Although such candidates are rare, they are hardly irrelevant, and their importance in the life and history of our politics means we must try to understand them.”

Moreover, another important reason for examining third party candidate communication is that their rhetoric, at least to some degree, is clearly tied to their success. One question that arises when examining polling data measuring voter alienation and dissatisfaction since the 1960s is why third party candidates sometimes do extraordinarily well during periods marked by low levels of alienation, and flop during periods marked by high levels of alienation. According to political scientists, 2008 should have been a record year for third parties, but their support was dismal. Mazmanian, for example, argued that even with a context ripe for third party politics, there must be “an individual or group of political entrepreneurs [who] then mobilizes the minority behind a third party.” The rhetorical skill of third party candidates is the difference maker. Jeffrey Koch argued, “It is reasonable to suspect . . . that third party candidates, acting as outsiders and severe critics of the political process and contemporary leaders, serve to increase
their supporters’ political skepticism.” Koch added that this “casts doubt on the importance of political cynicism as a determinant of third party candidate support.” In other words, Koch later argued, “Most models of third party support in America assume causality flows from political cynicism to candidate support. It is necessary to consider, however, that support for a third party candidate may lead individuals to assign the political orientations and positions of the candidate they prefer to themselves.” Third parties, then, perform a mentoring function in politics by “[providing] their supporters with explanations and solutions for contemporary political issues and social maladies.” Their rhetoric serves to polarize the electorate, and to make those susceptible to feelings of alienation lash out against the two-party system by supporting their third party campaign.

Justification

Study of the rhetorical style of third party presidential candidates, and its presence in the significant genres of their campaign discourse is important for three reasons. First, as I have already illustrated, communication scholars have largely neglected third party presidential campaigns. Studies of this rhetoric have tended to focus on just a handful of campaigns from the twentieth century. Little to no attention has been given to the rhetoric of recent candidates who have represented the Libertarian Party, the Populist Party, the Prohibition Party, Reform Party, and others. By failing to account for the different rhetorical practices in America’s presidential election, the field of presidential studies is helping “socialize students into the practice of citizenship according to the reigning paradigm, which holds the two-party system to be unbeatable (if not altogether desirable) and guarantees that a third-party ballot is a ballot wasted.” Closer analysis of this discourse, then, will help expand the field of presidential studies by acknowledging the importance of the communication practices of alternative
candidates and, in identifying similar rhetorical patterns among these campaigns, perhaps shed light on why third party candidates communicate differently.

Second, this project is important because there are good reasons to believe that the genres of campaign rhetoric for third party candidates will be different from major party genres. For more than 150 years minor party presidential candidates have always lost elections. Why would they behave similarly to those who have a chance of electoral success? As I demonstrate in the next section, third party candidates face an array of rhetorical constraints that force them to recognize that winning is extremely unlikely, and to adopt different goals and strategies. Understanding these different constraints and purposes is crucial to understanding minor party rhetoric.

Finally, such study is worthy for it expands the possibilities of genre criticism within the field of communication studies. As Martin Medhurst maintained in the keynote address at the Seventh Biennial Public Address Conference in 2000, scholars like Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson have “demonstrated the efficacy” of genre criticism but many genres have been “virtually untouched by our critical hands.”84 Although Medhurst suggested that scholars should explore the genres of the sermon, eulogy, lecture, essay, editorial, and the public letter, I argue that many genres commonly analyzed by presidential rhetoric scholars are treated too simplistically. As I argue in later chapters, studies of the campaign announcement, nomination acceptance speech, and concession discourse tend to be overly deductive, and assume that the generic functions and norms for each speech are similar for all political candidates. However, not all presidential candidates have the same constraints and goals, for instance, and thus the way that they approach certain genres is clearly different. By articulating these differences for third party candidates, my study makes genre theory more useful to critics
interested in political campaign rhetoric by acknowledging important variants of genres, thus enhancing the explanatory and evaluative power of this kind of genre theory.

Genre Theory and the Need for a New Approach to Third Party Presidential Campaign Discourse

In my effort to explicate the special nature of the campaign style of third party presidential candidates and how it surfaces in the major genres of their discourse, I adopt a very specific notion of what constitutes a genre. In particular, I use a strict situational approach to genre theory that acknowledges the importance of perceived strategic constraints. Thus, before discussing the style of third party candidates and how it is manifested in genres of campaign discourse, it is crucial to understand the situational approach to genre criticism and the many constraints that third party candidates face when running for president.

The Situational Approach to Genre Criticism

In the most basic sense, genre criticism deals with the categorization of discourse with “a recurrent form and uses the form to compare one rhetorical act” to another.85 One approach to genre criticism, what rhetoric scholar Robert Rowland called the interpretive/heuristic approach, “treats genre as a comparative method for revealing the character of a given work.”86 Edwin Black’s treatment of the “Coatesville Address” as a “morality play” is a good example of this metaphorical classification.87 The interpretive/heuristic approach uses genre as a comparative tool to illuminate something about a specific text. Although the approach may sometimes be useful in understanding a specific work, Rowland argued, “its value for explaining or evaluating the character of a broad class of works is problematic” because the category has no empirical existence.88

A second kind of genre criticism, what Rowland labeled the ontological/empirical approach, treats genres as tied to a recurring situation.89 Black, for example, argued that genre
criticism presumes that “there is a limited number of situations in which” rhetors will find themselves, that “there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond rhetorically to any given situational type,” and that the recurrence of situations and rhetorical responses will constrain which forms are acceptable in the future.\textsuperscript{90} In other words, for genre theorists using the ontological/empirical approach, recurring aspects of the rhetorical situation function as the glue for rhetorical genres. When Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson described a genre as “a group of acts unified by a constellation of forms that recurs in each of its members,”\textsuperscript{91} they argued that the formal characteristics of a genre depend on “external factors, including human needs and exposure to antecedent rhetorical forms.”\textsuperscript{92} “When a generic claim is made,” they maintained, “the critic is . . . arguing that a group of discourses has a synthetic core in which certain significant rhetorical elements, e.g., a system of belief, lines of argument, stylistic choices, and the perception of the situation, are fused into an indivisible whole.”\textsuperscript{93} This notion of genre allows “the critic to generalize beyond the individual event which is constrained by time and place to affinities and traditions across time.”\textsuperscript{94} Rowland argued that while this approach is valuable, it is also problematic because it tends to produce theories tied to just a handful of recurring occasions, and the case studies it produces often reveal little of interest because the term “situation” is sometimes used too loosely.\textsuperscript{95}

Building off Campbell and Jamieson’s early work, Rowland developed a revised situational approach, contending that rhetorical genres are “created out of the interaction of three related forces that together play the role of exigence and constraint.”\textsuperscript{96} These forces “create perceived strategic constraints which limit the options open to the rhetor and lead to substantive and stylistic similarities that define the genre or category.”\textsuperscript{97} First, every exigence entails a “felt need in response to some sort of recurring problem.”\textsuperscript{98} At the beginning of every political
campaign, for instance, candidates feel compelled to announce their candidacy before hitting the trail. Second, constraints consist, among other things, of “limiting purposes in confronting those needs.” An announcement speech requires that candidates identify their reasons for running, distinguish themselves from other candidates, and cite specific policy positions that describe what they represent. The third factor is “societal limitations on appropriate rhetorical responses,” or in other words the “general assumptions of the culture.” For an announcement speech, then, a candidate would have to cater to the social mores, history, and generic expectations of their audience. If a speech lacks one of these constraints, Rowland argued, then it need not follow the formal characteristics of a genre and should not be grouped into that category of discourse.

Although generic classification can be useful to rhetorical critics, there are problems that commonly occur in the identification or creation of genres, and a revised situational approach can avoid those pitfalls. First, as Campbell and Jamieson noted, some scholars have the tendency to adopt a deductive approach to genre criticism by assuming “that a genre already exists and is known and defined.” Second, Miller contended, some discourses are called genres even though, upon closer inspection, “there may fail to be significant substantive or formal similarities at the lower levels of the hierarchy.” In other words, discourses are all too often grouped into a genre while “there may be inadequate consideration of all the elements in recurrent rhetorical situations.” A revised situational approach to genre avoids these problems by focusing on stable genres that are characterized by the three situational forces that Rowland outlined, “without significant variation in a set of works.” This avoids overgeneralization about a category of rhetorical works, and maximizes the explanatory and evaluative dimensions of theory.
When viewed from a situational perspective, it is immediately obvious that third party rhetoric will not necessarily look like the rhetoric of the major parties. Third party candidates would produce rhetoric similar to the major parties only if they faced similar situations and shared the same purposes. However, this clearly is not the case.

Situational Constraints for Third Party Candidates

Third parties in America have been historically marginalized. As historian Clinton Rossiter suggested, Americans “live under a persistent, obdurate, one might almost say tyrannical, two-party system. We have the Republicans and we have the Democrats, and we have almost no one else.”\textsuperscript{105} The two major parties have had a “tenacious stranglehold over the presidency”\textsuperscript{106} due to numerous “multifaceted barriers that prevent third parties in this country from competing fairly in the democratic process.”\textsuperscript{107} “The hurdles are so prevalent,” former Green Party candidate Ralph Nader complained, “that leaders of oligarchic regimes in foreign countries might blush.”\textsuperscript{108} These barriers compose the major situational constraints that shape third party candidate rhetoric. Overall, there are several kinds of structural and cultural barriers that third party candidates routinely encounter.

*Political socialization and attitudes about America’s party system.* One of the most significant barriers that third party presidential candidates face is a political culture in which voters have been socialized to stick to the two-party system. Political socialization is “the process through which people acquire their political ideas and opinions.”\textsuperscript{109} Political socialization starts in the family when children gain their political knowledge and beliefs from their parents, and usually swear allegiance to the party that was preferred by their household.\textsuperscript{110} Consequently, Smallwood concluded, “the fact that so many children adopted their parents’ party allegiance played a significant role in strengthening the two major parties.”\textsuperscript{111}
A significant reason why political socialization is so disastrous for third party candidates is that once voters align themselves with a certain party they exhibit an attachment that is usually unshakable. While party attachment appears to be on the decline in recent years, the pool of “truly uncommitted voters” is fairly small. John Zaller and Mark Hunt explained, “In 1988, for example, 90 percent of self-described Republicans voted for the Republican candidate, while 85 percent of self-described Democrats voted for the Democrat. Since these figures include voters who describe themselves as being ‘closer’ to one of the parties, they refer to 93 percent of the electorate.” Surely, these trends have fluctuated in recent years, and party identification is not the only factor that voters consider in making political decisions, but the dominant political culture obviously puts third party candidates at a disadvantage. Ultimately, third party expert David Gillespie concluded, the political socialization process “(1) signals to each new generation that multiparty deviations from national two-party patterns are ‘unAmerican’ and (2) normally engenders either loyalty for the GOP or Democrats or a nonpartisan disposition.”

The “winner takes all” electoral system. Another disadvantage for third party presidential candidates is the way that most states divvy up their electoral votes. This “single-member district/plurality system,” also known as the “winner-take-all” approach, means that candidates who win a majority in most states get all of the state’s electoral votes. An alternative, called the Congressional District Method, splits electoral votes based on which candidates win a plurality in the congressional districts of a state. This is a better alternative for third-party candidates, but to date only Maine and Nebraska have adopted this approach. The problem with the “winner-take-all” electoral system is that a third party candidate could finish in second place in most states and still not receive a single electoral vote. Something similar happened to Progressive Party candidate Robert LaFollette in 1924; despite polling nearly 5
million votes for 16.6 percent of the popular vote and placing second in all eleven Western and Southern states, he won only the 13 electoral votes from his home state of Wisconsin.\textsuperscript{117} Perot suffered the same fate in 1992, receiving no electoral votes at all despite receiving 18.9 percent of the popular vote. Only candidates who focus on a particular region – such as Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968 – are usually able to receive electoral votes, but never enough to be close to winning. Consequently, Smallwood lamented, “they fail to gain any political rewards because they do not receive the highest number of total votes.”\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Ballot laws.} Another barrier for third party campaigns is the restrictive ballot access laws in many states caused by the adoption of the secret Australian ballot. The Australian ballot, which has been used in the United States since the late nineteenth century, lists all parties’ candidates on a single ballot. Previously, all parties distributed their own ballots and third parties were able to work in tandem with major parties by creating “fusion tickets” where they would endorse the same candidates. As political scientist Lisa Disch suggested, “Although it was a controversial strategy, fusion enabled nineteenth-century third parties to survive as parties – to have a place on the ballot, to influence electoral outcomes, to put dissenting views into the public arena – even though they could not have beaten out either of the two dominant parties.”\textsuperscript{119}

Since the Australian ballot reform, third party presidential candidates have struggled to make it onto the presidential ballot in most states. The United States Supreme Court in \textit{Williams v. Rhodes} (1968) rejected some of the restrictions that states commonly used against third party candidates, but they still allowed for certain restrictions that serve a “compelling state interest.” However, the court’s goal of allowing states to make the electoral process comprehensible to voters has meant that third party candidates must navigate complex state laws in order to be added to the ballot. As Smallwood summarized, the “reality that faces third-party . . . presidential
candidates is that they must digest not one Waldorf salad, but fifty-one quite separate and distinct salads in the form of the different ballot access laws that are generated by the fifty states and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{120}

The differences in state ballot access laws are astonishing. Calling these diverse regulations “a crazy quilt of criteria,” Smallwood noted that petition signature requirements for ballot access in most states vary significantly.\textsuperscript{121} Some states require that third party campaigns collect signatures amounting to between one and five percent of the registered voters in the state, or one to five percent of the total votes cast in the previous general election. Frustrated by this challenge, former Green Party candidate Ralph Nader complained after the 2000 election that “each state has . . . its own arcane set of grossly complicated procedures for getting on the ballot.”\textsuperscript{122} “Mind you,” he added, “bipartisan-controlled state assemblies created all these incredible obstacles.”\textsuperscript{123} Because challenging ballot access laws requires doing so on a case-by-case basis, third-party candidates must raise enough money for a lengthy and costly legal challenge, and thus risk sacrificing resources meant for establishing a strong national campaign. For instance, Gillespie noted, John Anderson made all fifty-one ballots in 1980, but “spent more than half of the $7.3 million his campaign collected between March and September on petition drives and legal fees. Meanwhile, the Democratic and Republican campaigns allocated their much larger resources to campaign tactics for reaching voters before election day.”\textsuperscript{124}

\textit{Poor finances.} Third party presidential candidates tend to be remarkably underfunded as well. Theoretically, minor parties are supposed to benefit from the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), but its design puts those outside the two party system at an extreme disadvantage.\textsuperscript{125} The FECA encourages serious candidates within a major party to pursue matching funds in primaries and caucuses, as well as for the general election campaign, but
defines a party as one which has previously received over 25 percent or more of the total number of popular votes. Minor parties may receive funding, too, but only if they have received at least 5 percent or more of the vote in the previous election. As if that hurdle were not enough, new parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote cannot be reimbursed for their costs until after the election. “Given these requirements,” Rosenstone and his colleagues wrote, “only 10 of the 148 minor party candidates that have emerged since 1840 [and before 1996] would have qualified for retroactive public funding.” Without equal access to public money, third party candidates who cannot fund their own campaigns are at an extreme disadvantage.

Poor funding is problematic especially because the cost of running a presidential campaign is increasing so quickly that few third party candidates, outside of billionaires committed to funding their own campaigns, can be competitive. The cost of running for president has increased from the $100,000 spent by Lincoln’s campaign in 1860, to the $1.1 million spent by Garfield in 1880, to Nixon’s spending of more than $61.4 million in 1972. In more recent years, George W. Bush’s campaign spent more than $190 million to beat Al Gore in 2000, and over $350 million to get the president reelected in 2004. More astonishing is that it took Barack Obama more than $775 million to win in 2008. As political commentator Douglas Schoen concluded, “Realistically, a candidate [now] needs $100 million just to reach the starting gate. It’s the world’s most expensive horse race.” Furthermore, even the most successful third party candidates cannot compete in this expensive race. Rosenstone and colleagues noted, for instance, that “Former President Theodore Roosevelt, the best financed third party candidate on record, spent only 60 percent of the average major party total in 1912; George Wallace spent 39 percent and John Anderson only 49 percent when they ran.”
Poor media coverage. Another challenge for third party candidates is getting fair press coverage of their campaigns. Although the Communications Act of 1934 guaranteed all political parties equal access to the mass media, it was eventually suspended for minor parties after the 1960 election. Minor party candidates have only been occasionally covered ever since. In analyzing the 1992 election, for example, Zaller and Hunt concluded that while the press discussed Ross Perot’s candidacy with some frequency, the other third party candidates – from the Peace and Freedom Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Libertarian Party – were ignored altogether. The media’s failure to cover most third party candidates is due to the perception that they have no chance of winning and thus are not newsworthy. This is the basic rule of media coverage of campaigns, Zaller and Hunt noted: “the press tends to cover candidates in multicandidate races in proportion to how well it expects them to do.” This means that few third party tickets get significant media coverage unless they are headed by a prominent candidate, or benefit from the aftermath of a major political crisis.

Several historic examples indicate that third parties are usually ignored by the media. Sharing his experience from the 2000 campaign, Nader suggested that third party candidates should “count on receiving almost no media coverage” unless they “speak in eight-second sound bites.” James Stovall also maintained, through the example of George Wallace’s 1968 campaign, that even strong third party candidates do not receive anywhere close to the amount of press coverage of the two-party candidates. Quoting the research of Doris Graber, Stovall argued that George Wallace not only received less media coverage in his campaign than the major party candidates, but the coverage also emphasized his distinctiveness. Stovall argued that this trend continued in the coverage of the 1980 presidential campaign in which Independent John Anderson threatened the two-party system. In Stovall’s words, “The amount of coverage
and treatment that John Anderson received parallels the coverage and treatment given to previous third-party candidates. The amount of news about Anderson and the treatment news stories about Anderson received fell considerably short of that given to Carter and Reagan.\textsuperscript{134}

Clearly, the lack of media coverage of third party presidential campaigns is devastating. Zaller and Hunt argued, “Candidates who are ignored by the press never get off the ground. Among candidates who do receive attention, the favorability or unfavorability of the press coverage they receive is vitally important.”\textsuperscript{135} When third party candidates do not receive significant media attention, they are unable to deliver their message to potential voters, and consequently, are unable to build a group of supporters large enough to financially sustain a campaign. In turn, without the ability to take one’s message to enough voters to build the organization that brings major financing, third party candidates cannot afford much advertising for their campaigns, and therefore are perceived as insignificant candidates. Thus as Daniel Mazmanian concluded, “Media exposure is no guarantee of victory, but its absence surely spells doom.”\textsuperscript{136}

\textit{Exclusion in presidential debates}. Even if third party presidential candidates manage to raise enough money to stay somewhat competitive throughout the race, make it on many state ballots, and are considered strong enough to be covered by the media, there is no guarantee that they will be invited to debate with the Republican and Democratic candidates in front of a national audience. Presidential debates allow candidates to reach millions of potential voters, and according to Ralph Nader convincing the gatekeepers of these events to include third party candidates “still remains the biggest barrier of all.”\textsuperscript{137}

With the exception of Ross Perot and John Anderson, third party candidates have been excluded from debates since the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960. Independent John Anderson’s
omission in 1980 illuminated some of the unique problems that outsider candidates face. When the general election season opened, Anderson was a stunning “first choice Presidential candidate of approximately 15-20 percent of the nation’s prospective voters.”\(^{138}\) This was likely due to the fact that “the vast majority of the public seemed disturbed with the two traditional choices [and] an exceptionally high percentage of voters were undecided.”\(^{139}\) Declaring the legitimacy of Anderson’s campaign, the League of Women Voters, the organization sponsoring the debates, announced that the Independent candidate would participate in debates with Reagan and Carter. As Friedenberg argued, however, “the League dramatically reduced the likelihood for meaningful debates between the two major candidates” because the Carter campaign, threatened by Anderson’s rise, refused to participate.\(^{140}\) When Anderson’s support in later polls weakened, the League attempted to save the debates and uninvited him from later events.

Ultimately, the 1980 election highlighted the problems with the management of presidential debates. In particular, the criteria for whom to invite has always been fairly arbitrary. Although the management of the debates was passed over to the Commission on Presidential Debates in 1988, the formula for deciding who could participate has not been consistent from one election to the next. In 1996, for example, the Commission decided whom to invite to the debate by relying on what some pundits called “ridiculous polling of political scientists and political reporters for their suggestions on which candidates should be admitted.”\(^{141}\) When this proved unpopular, the Commission decided in 2000 that for candidates to qualify they needed to “average 15 percent backing in five public opinion polls sponsored jointly by the major television networks and newspapers shortly before the first debate.”\(^{142}\) In another decision that proved devastating to smaller third parties, starting in 2000 the Commission required that
candidates “must be on the ballot in enough states to achieve the 270 Electoral College votes needed to win.”\textsuperscript{143}

The “wasted ballot” belief. As long as all of the above constraints exist, voters are more easily convinced that a vote for third party candidates is a wasted ballot. After all, loyalty to the two-party system tends to get stronger as Election Day gets closer.\textsuperscript{144} Time and again, third party candidates have received somewhat respectable poll numbers only to see their support plummet when citizens vote. Many scholars claim that this happened to John Anderson in 1980, Ross Perot in 1992, and Ralph Nader in 2000.\textsuperscript{145} Unsurprisingly, the argument about a third party vote being a wasted ballot is made repeatedly by mainstream candidates with constant access to media coverage. On the disadvantage this poses for minor party candidates, Hazlett summarized, “Although it is difficult to provide direct evidence that this charge causes a decline in minor party voting, it seems obvious that it contributed to and reinforces the belief that minor parties cannot win at polls.”\textsuperscript{146}

Altogether, the structural and cultural barriers that third party presidential candidates routinely encounter demand that they be realistic about their dismal chances of winning an election. The constraints that these candidates face means that they often have goals other than electoral victory. For example, the underlying purpose of some third party campaigns is to gain attention for a particular policy or issue. In other cases, a third party may be focused on influencing a major party. Third campaigns fulfill other purposes as well. With different strategic constraints and different purposes, then, the function and form for most minor party candidates’ rhetoric should be substantially different than the rhetoric of the two-party candidates in the same race. In the rest of this project I examine how a distinct third party style responds to these
recurring constraints, aims to accomplish objectives other than winning, and changes the important genres of campaign discourse.

Methodology

In examining the common rhetorical practices that third party presidential candidates use to overcome the structural and cultural barriers they face in their campaigns, and how those practices are manifested in important genres of campaign rhetoric, I analyze the discourse of minor party presidential candidates in every presidential election from 1948 to 2008. My project focuses on the post-war period for several reasons. First, America’s minor parties in the nineteenth century were nothing like those in the twentieth century. For instance, Rosenstone and his colleagues noted, “Most nineteenth-century third parties functioned as complete political organizations. They were broad-based coalitions; often their supporters’ only common bond was opposition to a particular party, policy, or candidate. They held contentious nominating conventions, entered state and local races, and recruited experienced candidates.” Moreover, nineteenth century third parties were not as candidate-focused as contemporary minor parties. Government scholar Donald J. Green wrote, for instance, “During the 19th century, issues were the driving force behind significant third parties. Candidates for president were secondary and were selected at nominating conventions from a list of qualified individuals. In the 20th century, however, charismatic personalities were party founders. Issues mattered, but the entities would not have come into existence without political dynamos such as Teddy Roosevelt, George Wallace, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader.” Furthermore, the nineteenth century has been called “a golden age for third parties” because it “brought occasional ruptures and discontinuities in the national two-party system” that were not experienced after 1948. More importantly, reforms beginning around the turn of the twentieth century led to the contemporary constraints
for third parties that I discussed earlier. Disch noted, for instance, that the dominant parties exploited electoral reform to gain the upper hand on one another. In adopting the Australian ballot, using direct primaries to decide nominations, and enacting voter registration and ballot access requirements, the two major parties “joined forces to shut third parties out of the electoral arena.”\textsuperscript{151}

I also concentrate on third party campaigns beginning in 1948 because the post-war political process underwent “fundamental changes in how candidates . . . have been selected” and how they rely on advanced technology to campaign.\textsuperscript{152} Since World War II, the rise of electronic media and the fall of party-driven elections has led to a “new style” of campaigning that is more candidate-centered, engineered by consultants, driven by scientific research, more influenced by special interests, focused on the mass media in general, and better tailored to specific voter segments.\textsuperscript{153} As Rosenstone and colleagues summarized, thanks to technological innovations in the second half of the 19th century, “Independent-minded politicians who were once unwilling to embark on third party campaigns without the help of an already existing locally based party can now take the plunge more readily.”\textsuperscript{154} In short, third party candidates since 1948 belong to what it frequently considered the age of the modern political campaign.

Although the scope of this project is limited to third party candidates running from 1948 onward, I attempted to include all possible non-major party candidates who made it onto a ballot by Election Day. This means that throughout the project I will be treating minor party candidates the same as independent candidates.\textsuperscript{155} Nevertheless, while I examined campaign rhetoric of all kinds of third party candidates, the most serious candidates, including those from campaigns securing more than one percent of the popular vote, receive the most attention partly because their rhetoric was more available.
The process of researching and analyzing the campaign rhetoric of these candidates came in several phases. First, I used the internet, news coverage, political biographies, and archival research to collect the campaign discourse of various third party candidates. This included announcements, nomination acceptance discourse, and concessions, but also other kinds of significant campaign rhetoric produced by the candidates. Much of this could be found in partial transcripts in major newspapers and in video footage available on the CSPAN online archives. Many materials, though, were collected during trips to candidate archives housed in a number of libraries throughout the Midwest and the South. This included the Eugene J. McCarthy Papers housed at the University of Minnesota, the congressional papers of John G. Schmitz at Wichita State University, the Henry Agard Wallace and Progressive Party papers at the University of Iowa, and the John Rarick Collection in the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies at Southeast Louisiana University. Other special collections used for this project included the Libertarian Party Papers at the University of Virginia, the People’s Party Papers at the University of Missouri at St. Louis, the Prohibition Party materials housed in the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Strom Thurmond Papers from the Strom Thurmond Institute at Clemson University, and the Tom Anderson Papers in the American Heritage Center archives at the University of Wyoming.

Second, my analysis began inductively as I carefully analyzed the campaign rhetoric to identify patterns indicating common stylistic features among third party candidate rhetoric and their genres of discourse. In this stage I also conducted historical and contextual research in order to grasp the rhetorical situation for each candidate. As Lloyd Bitzer suggested, “A work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task.”\textsuperscript{156} In simplest terms,
the rhetorical situation is “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence.”\textsuperscript{157} Thus, for each campaign I researched key aspects of the rhetorical situation, including the exigence, audience, and constraints that limited the effectiveness of their discourse.

Third, after identifying the underlying rhetorical patterns in the third party presidential campaign discourse I focused on how the rhetorical functions and constraints facing third party candidates create perceived strategic constraints and shaped identifiable rhetorical form. From this analysis, I constructed a set of theories explaining how third party candidates enact the major genres of presidential campaign rhetoric, and isolated a definable rhetorical style used by third party candidates in campaigns. As I will demonstrate, this third party style is different in substantive ways from the style of major party candidates.

Plan of Study

Chapter Two of this dissertation, \textit{A Theory of Third Party Style}, examines the overall rhetorical patterns in minor party campaign discourse. I closely examine the dominant theories of presidential campaign style, as well as the different kinds of third parties and their various goals. Additionally, I argue that because of the constraints they face, third party campaigns behave much like social movements and usually must depend on a campaign style based more in confrontation than anything else. Thus, I explain the formal characteristics that are ever present in most minor party campaign rhetoric, and show how it is different from the style of major parties.
In Chapter Three, *Presidential Campaign Announcements: A Third Party Variant*, I examine the form and function of third party announcement statements. I describe the traditional form and function for announcement speeches, and explain how the different recurring constraints facing minor party candidates shape both function and form of their campaign rhetoric. I then discuss three case studies to exemplify the characteristics of minor party announcement speeches.

I use a similar approach in the next two chapters. Chapter Four, *Unconventional: The Variant of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses*, focuses on nomination acceptance speeches. I explain the history and significance of nomination acceptance speeches in American politics, and compare the form and function of those addresses given by major party candidates with those from third parties. I then offer three case studies exemplifying the characteristics of minor party nomination acceptance speeches. Likewise, Chapter Five, *Triumph in Defeat: The Genre of Third Party Presidential Concessions*, starts with a description of the traditional form and function of concession speeches in presidential races, and explains how the speech changes for third party candidates. Three case studies exemplifying the characteristics of minor party concession speeches will then be offered.

Finally, in Chapter Six I draw conclusions based on the analysis of the genres of third party rhetoric. Additionally, I make recommendations for future research, and spell out the lessons that minor party candidates, as well as the media, can learn from this study.
Minor party presidential campaigns are neglected in communication scholarship due mostly to the belief that they are historically unsuccessful, extreme, and ignorant of the norms of effective campaign rhetoric. Many scholars assume that third party candidates share the same goals as candidates from the two major parties; that is, that they aim to run a campaign to maximize the chance that they will give an election night victory speech. Indeed, some third party candidates do claim they aim to win. With less than a month left in the 1968 election, George Wallace professed that he still had a chance, stating, “I knew we could win after I saw the tremendous crowds we were drawing everywhere.”

Around the same time, the Prohibition Party candidate E. Harold Munn reminded the press, “The Prohibition party is not a temperance society. It is a political party with an objective – to win.”

John Anderson, too, was optimistic about his chances of winning the 1980 race against Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter. Despite polls indicating that he would receive just around ten percent of the popular vote, Anderson said as he wrapped up his election, “This campaign is geared and dedicated to the idea that we can win, polls not withstanding.” Others have made similar statements, but in reality these candidates fully realize that it would take a miracle for them to be elected.

When pushed on the question, most third party presidential candidates confess that winning is nearly impossible, and not really their goal at all. E. Harold Munn, who argued in 1968 that his party was built to win, stated in the midst of the 1964 election, “Of course, there’s no possibility of [winning].” Perennial candidate Gus Hall of the Communist Party echoed this pessimism, and in 1972 admitted, “We couldn’t be elected this year even if we were on the ballot.
in 50 states.”\textsuperscript{163} Libertarian Ed Clark, who ran in 1980 and received the most number of votes ever for his party admitted, “It’s not probable that I will win.”\textsuperscript{164} Clark’s third party opponent that year, Barry Commoner of the Citizens Party, openly confessed, “I am not running to be elected. I wasn’t raised to be President. I was raised to be a doctor.”\textsuperscript{165} Similarly, Socialist Workers Party nominee James Harris in 1996 stressed, “Our campaign is not about winning votes or political office.”\textsuperscript{166} It is not that third party candidates would not appreciate winning. Most simply see losing as their reality. As Socialist Party nominee J. Quinn Brisben summarized in 1992, “One good thing about running as a socialist . . . you can prepare your concession speech months in advance.”\textsuperscript{167} The same goes for most, if not all, third party candidates.\textsuperscript{168}

If third party candidates do not campaign with a serious hope of winning, what is their purpose? More specifically, what goals shape their rhetoric? The failure to seriously consider this question is one reason why communication scholars have both neglected and misunderstood third party campaigns. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the various constraints unique to third party challengers put them at a severe disadvantage, and force them – assuming that they are serious and realistic – to enter a race with goals and rhetorical strategies that are vastly different than those of the two-party candidates. In this chapter, I identify what I call “third party style” – a significant pattern typifying third party campaign discourse that stems largely from the recurring perceived situational constraints, and overall purposes, common to minor party presidential candidates.

Ultimately, I argue in this chapter that third party campaign rhetoric functions to agitate for change by disrupting the two-party system and forcing one of the two major parties to co-opt some of the controversial ideas of minor party movements. I contend that serious minor party candidates usually accomplish this goal with a rhetorical style characterized by polarization,
populism, displays of authenticity, and the use of public spectacle. This argument develops in several sections. First, I describe the dominant theory of “campaign style” proposed by political communication scholars Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg and demonstrate its inadequacy in explaining the nature of third party candidate discourse. Second, I define the various kinds of third parties, so as to illustrate the differences between serious campaigns designed to bring about change and those that are usually – and perhaps accurately – labeled as strange or idiosyncratic. Third, I describe the goals of serious third party candidates that shape their rhetoric. In so doing, I rely on the research of various political science and political communication scholars, but especially primary source evidence from various third party presidential campaigns from 1948 to 2008. Fourth, I suggest that third party campaigns function more like social movements than conventional political campaigns, and as such tend to require a balance between extreme rhetorical strategies designed to gain attention, and a sense of moderation necessary for them to be perceived as legitimate to a mainstream audience. Fifth, I describe the formal characteristics of “third party style,” and offer multiple examples from various campaigns. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the significance that a theory of third party style has for the analysis of the genres of third party campaign discourse.

Campaign Style: Challengers and Incumbents

Although politicians campaign in various ways, political communication scholars Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg claimed that challengers and incumbents have their own rhetorical styles. Ultimately, Trent and Friedenberg sought to provide “a more complete catalog of the communication strategies important to all who have sought and those who will seek elective office.” Those strategies, they concluded, formed certain patterns that they called “campaign style.” Defining what they meant by campaign style in general, the researchers argued that it
“can be seen as a blend of what candidates say – in speeches, news conferences, websites, talk show interviews, advertisements, brochures, and so on – as well as their nonverbal political acts or behavior, such as kissing babies, wearing funny hats, shaking hands at rallies, waving at crowds from the motorcade, and their facial expressions and gestures while answering a question.”

Different campaign styles emerge, Trent and Friedenberg noted, because of the importance of imagery in political campaigns. The image of a candidate, they wrote, should “be considered in terms of the impressions voters have – what they believe to be true or untrue, desirable or undesirable about the candidates and the campaign.” It is the candidate’s obligation to “determine just what attributes voters believe are ideal for the office sought” and design campaign strategies “to attempt to illustrate that the candidate possesses these qualities.”

Modern campaign style is heavily influenced by the mass media, in that radio, television, and the internet have “increased the number of campaign strategies available because candidates no longer [have] to be dependent on extensive national speaking tours to become well known to the public.” In other words, candidates now have more power than ever to take their message straight to voters.

Trent and Friedenberg identified three different kinds of campaign style. First, incumbency style is a combination of symbolic and pragmatic communication strategies “designed to make any candidate appear as both good enough for the office sought and possessing the office.” Those already holding political office may use various strategies, including use of symbolic trappings of their office to transmit their strength and importance, their legitimacy as a current leader, and their assumed competency. The pragmatic strategies of incumbency style also include creating pseudo events to attract and control media attention,
making appointments to state and federal jobs, appropriating federal funding, consulting with world leaders, manipulating domestic issues, emphasizing accomplishments, and using surrogates on the campaign trail.\textsuperscript{177}

Second, challenger style is complicated by the need for candidates who use it in order to call for change to “simultaneously demonstrate their own capability in bringing about that change.”\textsuperscript{178} There are various strategies linked to challenger style. Candidates, for instance, usually attack the record of their opponents, take the offensive position on issues without offering concrete solutions, and call for change. They also emphasize optimism for the future rather than rely on “rhetoric of despair,” speak to traditional values rather than calling for value changes, and delegate personal or harsh attacks to someone else in order to avoid sounding too extreme.\textsuperscript{179}

Finally, Trent and Friedenberg maintained, sometimes candidates use a hybrid style that incorporates features of both incumbency and challenger style. The authors noted, “It is not uncommon, for example, for challengers to assume the mantle of incumbency whenever and wherever possible.” As they further remarked, “Those who challenge must try to emphasize whatever accomplishments they have had in public life, appear to be acquainted with other leaders, and have a clear need to use whatever means available to them to gain the attention of the media.”\textsuperscript{180}

Although Trent and Friedenberg identified three dominant styles they were clear in noting that candidates might alternate between them throughout a campaign. “Candidates frequently combine strategies of one style with strategies of another,” they argued, “so that there are times during the course of one contest where an individual contender may assume a rhetorical posture normally associated with incumbency campaigning and at other times may
appear to be campaigning as a challenger.” This is due to the length of campaigns and the nature of media coverage at any given point in time. Thus campaign style is “the product of whatever candidates and their staffs believe is needed at a particular time within the context of their particular campaign.”

The catalog of strategies that fall under each of the three campaign styles is useful in understanding the options available to political candidates. However, there are several reasons why the theory is inadequate for explaining the nature of third party campaign rhetoric. First, Trent and Friedenberg formulated their theory mostly with early political campaigns in mind. They relied primarily on examples from nineteenth and early-twentieth century campaigns. Such campaigns came long before the major disparities in funding, media coverage, and ballot access that currently doom third party campaigns. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that the authors would not have seen the patterns that modern third parties use to adapt to their unique constraints. Second, Trent and Friedenberg’s theory assumes that challengers and incumbents are fighting to win. After all, they suggest that both make strategic decisions to create an image of electability, and no other goals of entering an election are mentioned in their research. That is not the case for third party candidates.

The third reason why Trent and Friedenberg’s notion of campaign style does not fit most third party campaigns is that it emphasizes strategies other than extreme tactics and confrontation. Incumbency style, for instance, does not describe efforts by third party candidates because its strategies must project a respectable “front-runner” status that is incompatible with the image of an agitator. On its face, the challenger style could describe some strategies of third party candidates. After all, Trent and Friedenberg suggested that “the ability to criticize freely (and often in exaggerated terms) may well be one of the most important benefits the
challenger possesses.” However, the authors clarified that candidates will be unsuccessful if their strategies are too extreme. Successful challengers, they declared, “must reinforce majority values instead of attempting to forge new ones,” and should avoid appearing to be from a fringe group by representing the philosophical center. Moreover, Trent and Friedenberg argued, candidates should attack “but hold out the promise of a better tomorrow,” and thus “assume a ‘rhetoric of optimism’ as opposed to a ‘rhetoric of despair.’” Thus, as they concluded, “successful candidates . . . do not themselves indulge in demagogic rhetoric,” and often leave such posturing to surrogate speakers and advocacy groups. Consequently, the style of discourse used by third party candidates cannot be explained with the conventional theory of campaign style.

Failing to consider the unique constraints and purposes of third party campaigns, and thus the reasons for their confrontational and unconventional rhetoric, the traditional theory of campaign style outlined by Trent, Friedenberg, and their colleagues needs revision. In the rest of this chapter, I define the different kinds of third parties, identify their goals, explain how they function like social movements in their need for balanced confrontational rhetoric, and describe the common elements of third party rhetorical style.

Categories of Third Parties in U.S. History

Third parties have been categorized in several ways, but six categories emerge from political science literature. First, there are third parties that resemble major parties in endurance, organization, and tactics. These are what political scientist David Gillespie called “continuing doctrinal parties” and what historian Clinton Rossiter referred to as “true minor parties.” They sustain themselves sometimes for several decades, on occasion win local or even congressional office, and are sometimes steeped in ideologies that keep activists faithful. Rosenstone, Behr,
and Lazarus argued, for instance, that most third parties of the nineteenth century fit this description because they were “broad-based coalitions” that “held contentious nominating conventions, entered state and local races, and recruited experienced candidates.” Furthermore, Rosenstone and his colleagues noted, “Their existence depended on no single personality, and they survived long enough to build up party loyalty among their supporters.” Parties from the nineteenth century within this category include the Know-Nothing Party, Greenback Party, People’s Party, and Prohibition Party. Parties from the twentieth and twenty-first century that fit this description include the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, Green Party, Natural Law Party, and Libertarian Party.193

A second type of third party in presidential elections is the personality or candidate-oriented minor party. These parties often form when charismatic leaders from the two-party system, for whatever reason, create their own political organizations and independent campaigns. Political scientist Paul Herrnson noted that candidate-oriented minor parties make “little effort to ally their campaigns with those of candidates for lower office and their organizations [are] dismantled after the election.” Included in this category would be the campaigns of Eugene McCarthy in 1976, John Anderson in 1980, and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996.195

The third type of minor party in America is the short-lived party, which David Gillespie argued starts “either as a movement of economic protest or as a splinter from one of the major parties.” Short-lived parties are often regionally based, and exist to protest policy positions held by one or both of the major parties. They divide the electorate by offering a centrist or radical choice where none previously existed. Parties within this category rarely last, because their candidates often rejoin the two-party system once they have triggered party realignment. Examples of short-lived minor parties since the turn of the twentieth century include Roosevelt’s

Fourth, some minor parties are single-issue parties, because they spread awareness about something long neglected by the two-party system. Political scientist Earl Kruschke described these parties as using “the electoral process to gain a public forum for their philosophical viewpoints.”¹⁹⁸ Many of these issues are salient for just a small segment of society. Single-issue parties in the twentieth and twenty-first century include the New York Right to Life Party, Prohibition Party, Vegetarian Party, and the pro-marijuana Grassroots Party.

Fifth, there are also “non-national significant other” parties. Gillespie described these parties as finding “an influential place for themselves in the politics of their state or community, some even becoming major party actors there. Some have sent nominees to Congress. But in their electoral base they remain confined, either by external circumstance or their own choice, to their originating boundaries.”¹⁹⁹ Parties in this category from the early twentieth century onward include the Wisconsin Progressive Party, the Progressive Coalition of Vermont, and New York’s Liberal, Conservative, and Right to Life parties. Notably, many of these parties never offer their own presidential candidates, but on occasion some do.

Finally, there are third parties which might be categorized as “non-national, insignificant other” parties. In most presidential elections since 1948, there have been at least a few candidates who make it onto a single state ballot and call themselves presidential candidates. Often times, they do not campaign, spend little to no money, have few supporters, garner a few thousand votes, and make a mockery of the democratic process. For these candidates, a presidential campaign is more of a hobby than an effort to influence public policy. Previous campaigns that

Purposes and Goals of Third Party Presidential Campaigns

Some minor party candidates may believe that a miracle could tip the scales for their campaign, but most realize that the barriers they face will make winning impossible, and that they are instead fulfilling some alternative function. Indeed, third party candidates almost always see themselves as providing choice in elections dominated by the two-party system. Eugene V. Debs summarized this position, and has been quoted many times since, when he stated, “I’d rather vote for somebody I want and not get him . . . than vote for somebody I don’t want and get him.” Perennial Prohibition Party candidate Earl Dodge said something similar in explaining his refusal to stop running, despite always performing poorly, stating, “It’s important for people to have the right to vote for what they believe in.”

While it might be true that third party candidates seek to provide more options in an election, most serious nominees have a higher purpose: playing the role of the agitator for change. Summarizing the work of Harold Lasswell, Gillespie noted that there are two personality types among political figures: political agitators and political administrators. “Political administrators,” Gillespie wrote, “are pragmatic, goal-centered people who are most effective and personally gratified in positions of governmental leadership and influence.” Political administrators work within the system, abide by cultural norms, and seek compromise in face of
disagreement. On the other hand, “agitators are more rigid people who invest their psychic energies in a mission or a cause. They pitch their political appeals in emotion and exhortative language and they vituperate their adversaries as enemies of all that is good and right.” According to Gillespie, because of “their consignment to the political periphery and the devotion of many of them to mission or cause, it would seem quite likely that third parties attract more than their share of political agitators.”

Gillespie was right in his assessment, but I argue that third party candidates are usually agitators not necessarily because of their psychological character, but because that is how successful minor parties function. To understand the purpose of agitation, one must comprehend how agenda setting is the most powerful accomplishment of third parties and their true measure of success.

Agenda Setting and the “Success” of Third Parties

As political agitators, serious third parties function to bring a few issues each election cycle to the electorate’s attention. Richard Hofstadter once summarized their existence by claiming, “Third parties are like bees; once they have stung, they die.” In simpler terms, political scientists Ronald Rapoport and Walter Stone explained, “Third parties instigate change by stimulating a response from the major parties.” In their words, “Change occurs because the successful third party presents the major parties with an opportunity to appeal to the third party’s constituency in subsequent elections.” Eventually, “One or both major parties changes its positions to bid for the third party’s constituency, and former third-party supporters migrate into the party that makes the successful bid.” Consequently, successful third parties have short lives. Gillespie noted, “The more popular an idea or issue put forth by a third party, the more likely it is that one of the major parties will take it for itself.” Thus, political historian John
Hicks argued, “it is not so much in the terms of victories won and candidates elected that the importance of third party movements should be assessed. What is of infinitely greater consequence is the final success of so many of the principles for which they have fought.”

Unsurprisingly, many third party candidates admit that setting the agenda for the two main parties, rather than winning, is their main purpose. Socialist candidate Frank Zeidler, for instance claimed in 1976, “Historically, the minority parties have always furnished the lead ideas and, when popular movements started going toward those ideas, the majority parties took them over.” Citizens Party candidate Sonia Johnson reported something similar in 1984, stating about third parties, “We are the ones who introduce new ideas, who take risks, who talk more about principle than power. We are the creative one.” Likewise, Libertarian David Bergland in 1984 suggested, “One goal that is very realistic is that by the end of [the election year], the Libertarian appeal and our discussion of the issues will become a very important part of the political debate. When we reach that plateau, we will have won.”

Earl Dodge of the Prohibition Party explained to an audience in the 1988 campaign, “When you bring forth ideas and those ideas grow, then the major parties pick them up. If I get a lot of votes, the major parties will look at what we stand for, and they’ll try to win those votes back. If that happens, it’s been a successful campaign.” Encapsulating his mission as the Natural Law Party candidate, John Hagelin stated “The purpose of my political party is not to become career politicians, but to bring new solutions to the problems we face as a country.”

Although it varies by type of third party to some degree, minor party candidates usually enter elections to influence the two-party system in respect to a few specific issues. They emerge on the national scene, Hazlett suggested, because “major parties, in order to ensure a constant level of majority support, will avoid those topics which may divide and or alienate segments of
the electorate that are essential for an election-winning majority.” In turn, “Minor parties, knowing that the amount of support that they will receive will likely be minimal, will meet an issue head-on.”

Throughout history, issues that were pushed to the forefront by minor parties include women’s suffrage, prohibition, and abolition. Socialists in the early twentieth century pushed, with great success, the Democratic Party to advocate for “unemployment insurance, old age pensions, federal aid to education, labor union rights, and many social security measures.”

Many other examples from the second half of the twentieth century can be highlighted. Henry Wallace’s campaign in 1948 functioned to protest the Truman administration’s foreign policy and its neglect of the civil rights issue. Furthermore, George Wallace in 1968 appealed to voters with his opposition to civil rights legislation.

Oftentimes the issues that third party candidates represent are not on the public’s radar. Mazmanian explained, “Third parties crystallize issues that might otherwise go unheeded or receive little attention during a campaign. If nothing else, they serve an educational function in drawing attention to neglected issues and proposing new and sometimes radical solutions.”

In this sense, third parties function to agitate for change by raising awareness. Rosenstone and his colleagues suggested that the Socialist Party and other related groups fit this description by advocating for policies benefiting the working class. Communist candidate Gus Hall used the 1972 campaign to stage a “massive assault” on poverty and racism. Eldridge Cleaver, the once-imprisoned Black Panther turned nominee for the Peace and Freedom Party in 1968, used his campaign to raise awareness of racism in America, as did Peace and Freedom Party nominee Ron Daniels in 1992 and New Alliance Party nominee Lenora Fulani in 1988 and 1992. Sonia Johnson, who headed the Citizens Party ticket in 1984, used her campaign to educate the public about feminism, claiming, “To understand my presidential campaign . . . you
only have to understand one principle: To be born female in our society is to be born behind enemy lines.\textsuperscript{220} Natural Law Party nominee John Hagelin used his campaigns in 1992, 1996, and 2000 to spread the message about the benefits of transcendental meditation and other unconventional scientific approaches to address society’s problems.\textsuperscript{221} When asked if he would welcome a major party taking his ideas, even if it killed his party, Hagelin responded, “If that were to happen, that would be a graceful way to die. For us, if the platform gets out…we will do well.”\textsuperscript{222}

Secondary Goals of Third Party Candidates

In pursuit of having their issue positions accepted by one or both of the two major parties, minor party candidates seek to accomplish several secondary goals. At best, some candidates hope to receive enough electoral votes to force a tie between the mainstream candidates, or even a three-way tie, and to give away their own votes in a high-stakes bargain. This would be highly unusual, and is almost the best-case scenario for minor party candidates. Political scientists Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde contended, “From 1828 through 1992 a single presidential candidate has gained a majority of the electoral vote. But even if a third-party or independent candidate did become eligible for election by the House, a legislative body dominated by Democrats and Republicans would be unlikely to turn to a [minor party candidate].”\textsuperscript{223} Despite the long odds, several candidates have made a House vote their aim, including Constitution Party nominee T. Coleman Andrews in 1956, George Wallace in 1968, and Independent Ross Perot in 1992.\textsuperscript{224}

A second goal for many minor party candidates is to be an election spoiler. A spoiler reduces the support for one of the major parties, and in rare cases may tip the election by siphoning electoral votes. Political scientists suggest that third parties have succeeded in spoiling
elections numerous times. For example, the Liberty Party’s presence in the 1844 election is often identified as the reason for James Polk’s win over Henry Clay, and Martin Van Buren’s candidacy for the Free Soil Party in 1848 supposedly led to Zachary Taylor’s win over Democrat Lewis Cass. Additionally, the elections of 1860, 1892, 1912, 1992, and 2000, are others in which the outcome may have been altered had the leading minor party candidate not run. Many candidates have cited this accomplishment as their goal. American Independent Party nominee Lester Maddox in 1976 argued that he could spoil the election for Jimmy Carter by winning the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Lenora Fulani, the black female candidate for the New Alliance Party who made it onto all 50 state ballots in 1988, claimed that she wanted to take enough black votes from the Democratic Party to defeat Michael Dukakis. She declared that the move would, “send a very potent message to the Democrats that if they want our votes, they’re going to have to start working for ours like they are working for the white conservative vote.” More recently, Libertarian Bob Barr expressed a desire to tip the 2008 election to Barack Obama by challenging John McCain’s support in a few southern states.

A third aim for minor parties is to reach certain benchmarks to qualify for matching federal funds. Those funds give third parties more legitimacy with the electorate, and a head start for the campaign in the next election cycle. Barry Commoner of the Citizens Party in 1980, much like many other candidates, sought 5 percent of the popular vote to receive matching funds. The Green Party, under Ralph Nader in 2000, John Cobb in 2004, and Cynthia McKinney in 2008, sought the 5 percent benchmark, too. For instance, McKinney argued, “5% of the vote makes the Green Party, not a minor party in the eyes of the federal government, but a major party.” She concluded, “And with that 5%, we can pull up another chair at the table of public
policy making. It only takes 5% of those who vote . . . and then we will have an official third party in this country, and public policy that truly reflects our values.”

Fourth, many minor party candidates aim to create a sustainable political movement that can accomplish greater things in future elections. In other words, without hope of winning, they attempt to create a grassroots organization to build a stronger party for future cycles. Ben Spock of the People’s Party, for instance, claimed in 1972, “What we’re trying to do is to build an independent movement for the long run.” Elaborating on another occasion, after being asked why he runs without a chance of winning, Spock said, “we’re out to build a grassroots movement. Our national campaign is not to see how many votes we can get but to call attention to our local movements and inspire some to join us there.” American Party nominee John Schmitz, who was also in the mix in 1972, similarly described his goal as building a “permanent party.” Libertarian Ed Clark in 1980 expressed his hope that his campaign would be “building a new coalition. By that I mean that I want to carve out a whole new constituency of voters who will unite behind the Libertarian message of rolling back the coercive power of government in all areas.” Likewise, Libertarian nominee Ron Paul indicated that he was focused on the distant future, claiming “A significant political revolution takes time . . . We’ve reached millions of people . . . There’s more respect for the Libertarian message than ever before, so we’ve made great strides.” This future-oriented goal is common among third party candidates.

Finally, sometimes third party candidates run for the sake of continuing to challenge electoral norms in America, to serve an example to future third party campaigns, and to make the path easier for those to come. The campaign that best exemplified this mission was probably Eugene McCarthy’s run as an Independent in 1976. In the months leading up to his announcement, McCarthy argued, “The concept of the Presidency and the concept of the
institutions of government have been distorted, and we have to re-examine the way candidates are selected and elected.”238 McCarthy used his stump speech throughout the campaign to argue that the two-party system needed to be overhauled because it was not fulfilling its function, imposed blind loyalty, and failed to hold either party accountable for its actions.239 Lenora Fulani, who ran as the nominee of the New Alliance Party in both 1988 and 1992, committed herself to a similar mission. Fulani wanted to highlight the need to reform the democratic process in the United States. “The major thrust of the campaign is on the issues of fair elections and democracy,” she stated, “and the degree to which we need more democracy in this county.”240 For Fulani, this meant opening the presidential debates to parties representing different perspectives, making it easier for lower class Americans to vote, and stripping the Democrats and Republicans of their power to create election laws for their own benefit.241

Third Party Campaigns as Social Movements

Considering the barriers they confront and their goals in confronting those barriers, America’s third parties since the beginning of the twentieth century have functioned less like the major political parties and more like social movements. Political scientist Andrew Busch saw the similarities between many serious third parties and social movements as especially striking. Both, he argued, tend to have “a broad base of support” and are “driven by a relatively small and committed hard core.” Both are “organized generally through an informal coalition of groups,” and are identifiable entities to outside observers,” but are “less institutionalized than a political party.” Both, he maintained, are “motivated by at least a rough ideology.” Additionally, both attempt “to promote change based upon [their] ideology through political action.”242 Even third parties led by strong personalities for just a few election cycles, Busch stated, “seem to occupy an awkward position in which they share virtually none of the defining characteristics of a
movement but attempt to fashion a pseudomovement in their own image.\textsuperscript{243} In short, there are many structural and functional similarities between social movements and minor party campaigns.\textsuperscript{244} Most importantly, the communicative practices of both are similar in that they use many of the same strategies in confronting similar barriers.

The biggest challenge for social movements is gaining legitimacy. Social movements are perceived as out-groups, and are often “criticized for not handling conflicts and controversies through normal, proper channels and procedures, even when those channels and procedures are systematically denied them.”\textsuperscript{245} Social movements constantly battle for the attention of the news media, which tends to cover movements rarely, and usually only when they have done “something spectacular or stupid.”\textsuperscript{246} In response to this neglect, social movements create messages to maximize media coverage of their cause. Because social movements “must attract, maintain, and mold workers into an efficiently organized unit,” rhetoric scholar Herbert Simons argued, they create messages with their internal audience in mind. However, because they “must secure adoption of their product by the larger structure,” social movements must be constantly mindful of their external audience as well.\textsuperscript{247} As Simons concluded, “harassed from without, yet obligated to adapt to the external system, the leader of a social movement must constantly balance inherently conflicting demands on his position and on the movement he represents.”\textsuperscript{248}

In order to gain legitimacy with both external and internal audiences, social movements use a combination of coactive and confrontational rhetorical strategies.\textsuperscript{249} Coactive strategies establish common ground with the external audience. They demonstrate that the social movement deserves legitimacy because it is willing to work within the norms of the public sphere. However, if used too often these kinds of strategies can fail to energize supporters by giving the appearance that the movement is working within the system.\textsuperscript{250} Confrontational
strategies emphasize dissimilarities and conflict with the external audience. Elaborating on this point, Stewart, Smith, and Denton explained that confrontational strategies challenge “the normal relational patterns of society while offering new ones.”251 Confrontation is often necessary because it raises awareness of the movement, and mobilizes supporters by dramatizing public affairs. However, confrontation can also be risky, Stewart, Smith, and Denton argued, because “Neither social movement members nor those in the larger society can accept harsh rhetoric and confrontation for long. Fatigue, fears of anarchy, and boredom inevitably set in.”252 Thus, a strong social movement communicates with a balance of adaptive and confrontational rhetorical strategies.

Third party campaigns face rhetorical requirements that are similar to the requirements of social movements. Because minor party presidential candidates are neglected by the news media, excluded from debates, underfunded, and are generally unknown or disrespected, they must produce rhetoric which appeals to both the internal and external audiences. Minor party candidates must use unconventional and confrontational rhetorical strategies to motivate their core of followers and attract media attention, while eventually appealing through coaptive strategies to mainstream voters whose support is necessary for the candidate to threaten the two-party system. This is needed to successfully shape the issue agenda in a presidential race.

To build a base of supporters, minor party candidates use confrontation and other unconventional rhetorical strategies by molding an image of authenticity. Used in this sense, authenticity is defined as being distinct from the mainstream, appearing to be true to one’s self.253 Bibby and Maisel argued, for instance, “Electoral success for minor party candidates in presidential elections relates more to individual candidate characteristics than to party organization.” The goal is to be perceived by voters as “a breath of fresh air” rather than a carbon
copy of every other politician. Creating authenticity is one way for outsider candidates to reach the masses. “The media may give it greater attention,” Simon et al. contended, “when the movement stays outside the framework of conventional politics” and therefore proves its authenticity.

Achieving an image of authenticity through confrontation and other unconventional rhetorical strategies is only useful for serious third party contenders if they avoid appearing like a buffoon, or going so far to threaten the democratic system itself. In other words, the appearance of legitimacy is still important for minor party nominees who eventually have a chance at gaining widespread public support, and they must maintain their legitimacy with a mainstream audience by adhering to at least some of the norms of political discourse. Discussing the importance of embracing an image of legitimacy, Rosenstone and his colleagues remarked, “When citizens view a minor party candidate as legitimate – that is, when the candidate has attributes that resemble those of most major party nominees – voters are more likely to choose the third party alternative.”

Candidates who embrace an image of being radically different must, when the conditions change in their favor, perform many of the basic rituals associated with a presidential election. Concerning these expectations, Simons et al. wrote, “The campaigner is expected to affirm old shibboleths, to sing the anthem, eat hot dogs, and above all, to surround his campaign with glitter and pageantry.”

At what point would a third party presidential candidate have to pivot from the style of a provocateur to a serious challenger? This could happen in the rare case of the minor party candidate being invited to a presidential debate and receiving a surprising level of support in major polls. Regardless of the cause, third party candidates tend to become legitimate when they transition from being unimportant to the media to a viable contender worthy of serious news
coverage. At this point, the candidate faces scrutiny like never before. Political scientists John Zaller and Mark Hunt explained, “The following generalization appears to hold fairly well: The better a candidate’s prospects, the more critical the press is likely to be.”\(^\text{258}\) This is known as the boom-and-bust coverage of campaigns.

Independent Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign is an example of how the failure to pivot to a traditional challenger style can sink a third party ticket. In their study of Perot’s campaign, Tonn and Endress concluded, “In Perot’s case, these conflicting functions and expectations presented a formidable Catch-22: although Perot’s unorthodox approach to politics catapulted him into consideration and prompted his inclusion in the presidential debates, those same traits disqualified him in the eyes of many Americans.”\(^\text{259}\) Hanging onto an unconventional style late into the campaign, despite strong support for his ticket, Perot lost legitimacy by appearing prone to political missteps. Perot’s abrupt withdrawal from the race on July 27, 1992, was likely the key event that led supporters and opponents to question his character.\(^\text{260}\) Perot’s odd choice of Admiral James Stockdale as running mate, and Stockdale’s poor performance in a televised debate, further damaged Perot’s image.\(^\text{261}\) Eventually, many of Perot’s unconventional ideas throughout the campaign, such as the “electronic town hall meetings” across America, were ridiculed and cited as further evidence of his political ineptitude. Perot’s authenticity and provocative style worked against him in the final months of the campaign because his decisions “spurred reconsideration by many, including those flirting with a Perot presidency, of the inherent value of those conventional political processes that Perot had bypassed.”\(^\text{262}\)

**The Characteristics of Third Party Style**

Common rhetorical constraints and strategic purposes among third party candidates means that their discourse exhibits recurring patterns that set them apart from typical incumbents
and challengers. These patterns form what I call third party style, which is a collection of rhetorical strategies commonly used by minor party candidates to disrupt the political process, establish an image of authenticity, and build a base of passionate supporters. Third party style ceases to be useful when candidates gain legitimacy, at which point they must pivot to a traditional challenger style. To reach this point, though, third party candidates typically practice a form of rhetoric characterized by its polarization, populism, and demonstration of authenticity through deeds, words, and non-verbal behavior. Additionally, third party campaigns frequently communicate through the use of public spectacle.

Polarization in Third Party Style

Above all, third party style is almost always defined by the use of scapegoating, or shifting blame for perceived shortcomings in society to another party or group of people, and this is achieved primarily through polarizing rhetoric. Richard Raum and James Measell argued that polarizing discourse consists of two separate strategy types. The first type, which they called concrete description devices, consists of god and devil terms, *reductio ad absurdum*, and exaggeration. God terms are used to portray the political movement as righteous, and devil terms to vilify the institution. *Reductio ad absurdum* belittles opponents by portraying them in humorous situations or predicaments. Exaggeration is over-stating to make certain situations seem less favorable than they are in reality. Together, concrete description devices are used “to portray people and events in such vivid, forceful language that the auditor is forced to respond. He cannot maintain neutrality, for the verbal images created by the speaker provide only for feelings of absolute attraction or absolute repulsion.”

The second strategy type, what Raum and Measell called copula tactics, “represent distortions of reality and these distortions form the basis of judgments and arguments.” Copula tactics include artificial dichotomies, we/they
distinctions, monolithic opposition, motive disparagement, and self-assertion. Creating artificial dichotomies means that the rhetor argues that only two alternatives can be chosen to deal with a certain issue. We/they distinctions promote in-group solidarity and cast those in the out-group as undesirable. Describing the opposition as monolithic means that all who challenge the movement have despicable motives. In a related method, impugning the motives of this monolithic group means arguing that they are self-serving and care not for the interests of the people. Finally, self-assertion is the tactic used to suggest that only the rhetor can bring about necessary societal change.

Polarization is routine in third party campaign discourse, whether the candidates are reformists or revolutionaries, and what Raum and Measell labeled concrete descriptive devices are frequently used to demonize the mainstream parties. Peace and Freedom Party nominee Eldridge Cleaver referred to his opponents in the dominant institution as “the pigs in the power structure” consisting of those “actively involved in the oppression of people . . . the avarice businessmen, the demagoguery politicians, and the racist police.” Similarly, Populist Bob Richards described incumbent politicians as the “tyrants who rule us.” In the 1976 campaign, Georgia governor Lester Maddox portrayed Jimmy Carter as tied to the special interests of drug dealers and pornographers, and aligned with “pointy-headed liberals.” In 1984 Lyndon LaRouche raised eyebrows by claiming in a 30-minute advertisement that Democrat Walter Mondale was an “agent of influence” of Soviet intelligence services. Gloria La Riva of the Party for Socialism and Liberation frequently called mainstream politicians “imperialists.” Conservatives like Michael Peroutka of the Constitution Party in 2004 have openly attacked those in favor of government intervention in healthcare, environmental protection, and social welfare as socialists. Moreover, Peroutka lamented, those hoping to drive God out of
government are on the same path of “the Chinese Soviet Communists, the Nazis, the Cambodian Communists and countless other petty, God-hating tyrants.” Constitution Party nominee Howard Phillips in 2000 offered a similarly extreme perspective of the two-party system in respect to abortion policy, declaring that both parties were guilty of putting unborn children under the “butcher’s knife” to be “sliced, diced, burned and beheaded.” They were murderers, he declared, because they authorized and subsidized “the slaughter of more than one-and-a-half million innocent children each year.”

The use of concrete descriptive devices by third party candidates to polarize the electorate distinguishes them from the typical incumbents and challengers in the campaign because they are used somewhat consistently, publically, and unapologetically. The strategies are utilized in stump speeches as well as in the most significant genres of campaign discourse that are defined by norms of civility for major party candidates. There is usually no use of surrogates for these attacks, and the candidate embraces antagonistic language that violates societal expectations of civil discourse.

Copula tactics are used to further dramatize the presidential election. Political opponents are often portrayed as being evil-doers who secretly plot to harm innocent Americans. As such, the we/they distinction in third party style tends to reflect paranoia, and occasionally resembles conspiracy rhetoric. For instance, American Independent Party nominee John Schmitz in 1972 accused Richard Nixon of being un-American for allegedly supplying technology to the country’s enemies in Vietnam. Lyndon LaRouche in 1988 used a half-hour ad to accuse the government of lying about its ability to control the spreading of the AIDS virus, and in 1991 told reporters that George H. W. Bush is a “new Emperor Caligula of sorts” who conspired to extend his prison sentence for mail fraud. Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney in 2008 accused
Republicans of stealing the 2000 election and running a racket that led to “war crimes, torture, [and] crimes against the peace.” Candidates on the far left perpetuate theories of sinister plots involving the wealthy hijacking democracy. Roger Calero of the Socialist Workers Party reported in 2008, for instance, that “Today the billionaire ruling families and their spokespeople in the U.S. are trumpeting the success of their many-year-long efforts to undermine our wages, job conditions, and living standards.” The agents of capitalism, according to this line of reasoning, repeatedly steal from the working class, and aim to create a semi-colonial world.

Short of demonizing their opponents and implicating them in vast conspiracies, many third party candidates use copula tactics to portray major party politicians as trapped into representing the financial interests of rich elitists. In a point repeated throughout her campaign, Lenora Fulani in 1992 told CNN that the country’s leadership is “controlled by political action committees.” Ralph Nader in his campaigns made a similar point, calling Washington a “corporate-occupied territory [where] every department [is] controlled by overwhelming presence of corporate lobbyists, corporate executives in high government positions, turning the government against its own people.” Mainstream politicians may have good intentions in serving, according to this argument, but they can do very little to challenge corporate control of politics. “The entire election process – from the primaries to polling day,” the Socialist Equality Party said on behalf of Bill van Auken in 2004, “is dominated by big money and the media, which put the various candidates through their paces and whip them into shape.” Of course, reformists from the two-party system occasionally portray Washington the same way, as Barack Obama did in 2008, but third party style almost always features this argument. As Harold argued, this form of polarization constructs the system as contaminated by “monied interests,” and has
been a distinguishing characteristic of third party discourse, including the campaign rhetoric of H. Ross Perot, George C. Wallace, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene V. Debs.\textsuperscript{279}

In creating a monolithic opposition in the two-party system, third party candidates frequently portray Democrats and Republicans as political doppelgangers. They are called the two-party duopoly or dictatorship, and accused of leaving voters with the mere choice of deciding between the “lesser of two evils.” Describing how Ralph Nader in 2000 responded to accusations that he was a “wasted vote,” Christine Harold wrote

Whereas the Democrats in this race wanted to conflate rhetorically a Nader vote with a Bush vote, Nader and his supporters persistently argued that Gore and Bush, because of their shared positions on the death penalty, their failure to offer a plan for universal health care, and their acceptance of huge donations from corporations, were essentially no different from one another, forcing voters to choose between the aforementioned ‘lesser of two evils.’\textsuperscript{280} The system was so spoiled, Nader argued, that the two parties had “mutated into one two-headed monster, wearing different makeup.”\textsuperscript{281} Nader’s point is a common line of attack in third party discourse. For example, George Wallace repeatedly justified his campaign by declaring, “The two national parties are just tweedledee and tweedledum.”\textsuperscript{282} John Schmitz in 1972 piggy-backed off Wallace’s claim that there was not a dime’s worth of difference between Democrats and Republicans by arguing, “Well, now you can get eight cents of change on that. There isn’t two cents worth of difference.”\textsuperscript{283} In fact, parties on the left have often summarized the two party system as “Capitalist Party Number 1 and Capitalist Party Number 2,” and those on the far right have similarly attacked the institution for being “Socialist Party A and Socialist Party B.”\textsuperscript{284}
More recently, Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka stated in 2004, “it’s just as wrong to vote for Gomorrah as it is to vote for the slightly more evil Sodom.”

With all the talk of evil-doing and corruption, the polarizing rhetoric of third party discourse suggests that the future is dark unless voters side with the third party agitator. Without the revolution or reform guaranteed by a third party vote, more babies will be murdered, the environment will further deteriorate, the economy will collapse, and wars will be inevitable. Describing America as a police state, for instance, Libertarian candidate Neil Smith wrote in his campaign announcement, “At this point, instead of a brilliant, colorful future, it’s likelier to be a future resembling Beirut at the fiercest of the fighting there, or Dachau at the worst moment of the Holocaust.” Perhaps some candidates do not take their cynicism as far as Smith, but the implications of much third party rhetoric are quite similar.

Populism in Third Party Campaign Rhetoric

The rhetoric of polarization, however, is not enough to move many potential voters. “What is essential for these arguments to be effective,” rhetoric scholar Lloyd Rohler argued, “is for the people who are the target audience to feel powerless and resentful toward an elite that is perceived as unresponsive to their needs.” Describing the two-party system as corrupt and evil, many third party candidates position themselves as the voice of the silent majority in America. The rhetoric of populism, rhetorician Michael J. Lee summarized, pits the “people” against a distrusted “elite” class, expresses disdain for traditional democratic deliberation, and provides a language available to almost any group claiming to speak for ordinary people. Populism is clearly a form of polarization, but its substantive characteristics go beyond demonizing an opponent by specifying how the “we” should respond to the monolithic “they.”
The rhetorical form of populist argument, Lee stated, consists of four interconnected themes. First, a “definable ‘people’ are portrayed as the heroic defenders of ‘traditional’ values.” These “people” might be defined by their race, class, religion, or other major identity markers. More importantly, the “people” share certain characteristics, in that they are “ordinary, simple, honest, hard-working, God-fearing, and patriotic Americans.” Second, populist discourse defines and labels an enemy. The enemy, as I mentioned in the previous section, could be accused of declaring class warfare, wrecking the environment for future generations, or threatening the church in public life. The enemy is usually characterized as coming from a different class, geography, or system of values, that does not represent the real “people.”

Third, populist discourse describes the “system” as having been ideal when it was conceived by the Founders, but its modern form as corrupt, exclusive, and in need of being reclaimed by the “people.” Finally, populist discourse proposes that restoration of the ideal state for the “people” can only come about with historic confrontation with the forces of oppression.

George Wallace exemplified the populist rhetoric of outsider political candidates. Hogan, for instance, wrote that Wallace’s speeches exhibited crusade-like characteristics by justifying the negative emotions of his white followers, promising a better day for the “Great Middle Class,” and presenting himself as the great leader of the battle. Wallace defined his movement’s enemy as those who leached off hard-working Americans, or as he put it, “those who won’t work when they can find work . . . and the filthy rich.” Meanwhile, the “people” in this discourse were defined as “those who produce the wealth, and fight the wars, and pay the taxes that hold our country together.” The problem, as Wallace put it, was that the right of the people to determine public policy had been denied by parasitic bureaucrats in the Federal Government. And Wallace, in true populist style, was the natural leader of the movement.
because he himself was the “common man.” To those in the South, Wallace preached, “I am the only candidate in the race who speaks both for you and to you.” Highlighting his status as the common man candidate, Wallace told others, “You won’t find any friends of mine at the country clubs or the black-tie dinners.”

Other examples of populism in third party campaign discourse could also be cited. For instance, the rhetoric of candidates from the far left, from Ralph Nader to Gus Hall, is saturated with populist themes. The “people” in this rhetoric are those in the working class, while the enemies are the capitalists who eliminate jobs, and restrict access to food, education, and health care for the sake of profit. In this discourse, the “system” has been thoroughly corrupted by powerful corporate entities, thus requiring a class revolt. Harold found this to be true for Nader’s rhetoric in 2000, as he declared that “capitalist scavengers” had polluted democracy to make it a “rat race.” To make democracy “a rational public space unsullied by state corruption,” to represent the interests of working class Americans who had been short-changed, Nader argued that the “people” needed to rise up and protest. For Lenora Fulani of the New Alliance Party, the “people” she represented were marginalized blacks and other minorities who were victims of white lawmakers who catered to their elite supporters. Fulani felt that the system had squashed the democratic rights of voters, thus warranting a “radical restructuring” of America. On the far right, candidates like David Duke of the Populist Party in 1988 have mimicked Wallace’s brand of populism, defining the “people” as hard-working white Americans who have been turned into second-class citizens due to affirmative action and social welfare policy. Because the “system” in this kind of right-wing rhetoric is dominated by special interest groups such as the NAACP, only a radical revolution through support for a third party ticket will “wake up the leadership.”
Displays of Authenticity in Third Party Style

Because third party presidential candidates describe the system as hopelessly corrupt and out of touch with the people, they must demonstrate that they are somehow clean and different from those they attack. As they ask the country to “Sweep the rascals out!” and to “Clean the House,” they must prove their own purity by conveying a sense of political authenticity. This authenticity, I contend, is proven in deeds, words, and in visual style. For many candidates, it is the surest way to appeal to the masses and generate the serious media attention that they desire. Showcasing his charm on dozens of unmediated talk shows, for example, Ross Perot motivated thousands of people to call his campaign headquarters and volunteer their services. As his popularity grew, Zaller and Hunt argued, the message delivered to the “conventional press [was] that Perot was a candidate who merited serious attention.” The “boom” period of press coverage led to stories about Perot’s successful grassroots movement, his rising poll numbers, and how he might influence the race.

Authenticity Through Deeds. Taking strong positions on the flaws of the two-party system, minor party candidates often argue through deeds that they are free of the corruption that has polluted modern politics. As Harold summarized, candidates like Ralph Nader are marketed as the only candidates with integrity, a pure heart, and a willingness to walk their talk. Most common are commitments to reject the “monied interests” that are associated with campaigns. Ralph Nader in 1996 went as far to say that he would spend no money at all on his campaign in order to protest the dominance of big business in democracy. In an interview with CNN’s Bernard Shaw, for instance, Nader claimed, “I’m not going to raise or accept any money. I’m going to try to make a stand on a no-money campaign in order to punctuate the need for fundamental campaign finance reform.” On another occasion, Nader reported on C-SPAN’s
Washington Journal, “This is a no-money campaign. One of the things people complain about in politics is, money corrupts, money and politics nullifies their vote, money and politics leads politicians to break their promises when they get elected. Here’s a campaign with no money.”

In most instances, third party candidates commit to restricting corporate donations to their cause, claim to be very frugal with any public financing, or boast that they are spending only their own money on the campaign. In fact, Nader changed his tune in 2000 and began accepting limited financial assistance for his campaign in order to run pricey television advertisements. Nader boasted that his campaign was “citizen-run,” that he was operating on a shoe-string budget, and that he refused to accept any form of corporate sponsorship. Nader maintained this approach in 2008, telling Tim Russert on Meet the Press, “we will receive no money from commercial interests, no money from political action committees, only from individuals. And, and we are very frugal. They’ve labeled me Mr. Frugal, my, my associates. We know how to use it.”

Authenticity Through Words. Explaining Ross Perot’s success in 1992, Tonn and Endress wrote that many voters “judged him by standards different from those applied to veteran politicians.” The difference, they suggested, was that “Perot’s spontaneity, plain talk, sense of humor, and go-getter attitude not only compensated for his generally ‘vague answers’ but eclipsed traditional leadership yardsticks such as overall presidential ethos, command of specific issues, and elective credentials.” In short, Perot attracted voters by conveying authenticity whenever he spoke. In regards to Ralph Nader, some have called this an “anti-style.” Whenever it is combined with dynamism, this spoken style captivates audiences. Even those who hated George Wallace, for instance, praised his speaking. One audience member stated, “He’s simply more alive than all the others. You saw those people in the auditorium while he
was speaking – you saw their eyes. He made those people feel something real for once in their lives.” Concluding, the spectator noted, “You almost love him, even though you know what a little gremlin he actually is.”

The secret to this plainspoken style, I argue, is that it communicates authenticity when it is humorous, folksy, and blunt.

First, strong third party candidates demonstrate their authenticity through humor. Humor functions to increase the likability of candidates by building identification with the audience. Funny candidates show that they do not take themselves as seriously as the “elitists” they are challenging. For instance, Ross Perot, who was unafraid to poke fun at his large ears, was a master of self-deprecation and humorous jibes against his opponents, and was embraced by voters because he was such a “contrast to the common view of politicians as aloof or self-important.”

George Wallace was gifted in using entertaining humor to turn his audience against hecklers, who he treated as symbolic of his opposition. Protesters at his rallies were inundated with “a standard litany of put-downs,” emphasizing conservative culture’s disgust with those who embraced an alternative lifestyle. With his audience cheering, Wallace would tell protestors, “There are two four-letter words I bet you folks down there don’t know: ‘work’ and ‘soap.’” He would purposefully refer to long haired men as “honey and sweetie,” and tell them “You need a good hair-cut. That’s all that’s wrong with you.”

Candidates like Perot and Wallace succeeded in part because they entertained, spoke to the frustration of many Americans, and demonstrated their authenticity as regular people like their audience.

Many third party candidates have not been as talented with humor as Wallace and Perot, but have also mastered the use of one-liners to loosen up with the press and produce a few good sound bites. Eugene McCarthy in 1976, for instance, was said to “scan the news the way a comedian searches for material,” and he supposedly “refined a stand-up repertoire” that he used
in interviews. John Schmitz, who accepted the nomination of the American Independent Party in 1972 after losing his position in the U.S. House of Representatives, was known to tell “more jokes than any candidate on the Presidential circuit,” and used dozens of one-liners whenever he spoke. He was probably most remembered for stating that unlike other conservatives, he “did not oppose President Nixon’s trip to Peking. Only his trip back.” Sometimes Schmitz would even carry his jokes in his pocket, and pull them out in dramatic fashion. One time he grabbed a card and read “Provide air cover for the Bay of Pigs,” correcting himself after a pause by saying, “Oops, sorry. That one must have been meant for Jack Kennedy.” In another memorable moment, while appearing on ABC’s “Issues and Answers” Schmitz declared, “You know what the Nixon family motto is? The Nixon family motto is ‘Be sincere whether you mean it or not.’” The consistent use of humor on the campaign trail has been used by many other minor party candidates, and its purpose is usually clear. Socialist J. Quinn Brisben in the 1992 race admitted, “I don’t mind the funny stuff,” when listing his qualifications for the presidency as his experience smuggling 3,000 condoms into the Soviet Union and writing an unpublished novel about midgets in the aircraft industry during World War II. However, like other third party candidates Brisben made his true intentions apparent to one reporter, asking, “please tell them something about my platform [as well].”

A second way that third party candidates communicate authenticity through their words is with folksy reasoning. Rather than “talking down” to the audience, many candidates use folksy reasoning as an exercise of practical wisdom and inductive reasoning. Ultimately, they demonstrate to the audience that they can relate to the way that they think about issues. About Ross Perot, for instance, Tonn and Endress argued that much of his rhetorical power came from his “couching of political issues in the metaphors of down-home, everyday life: sports, illness,
family relationships, and domestic chores like car repair, cooking, and housework.” With his earthy figures of speech, Perot “often implied that the challenges of everyday living cultivate commonsense critical reasoning skills that have become elusive to . . . career politicians.”

There are many examples from the twentieth century of minor party candidates excelling in the use of folksy reasoning. Perot was obviously one of the best. On 60 Minutes he “compared the federal deficit to ‘a crazy aunt you keep down in the basement. All the neighbors know she’s there, but nobody talks about her.’” On Larry King Live, Perot “compared the tax system to ‘an old inner tube that’s been patched by every special interest in the country.’” Perot’s down-home style was supposedly so attractive to voters that White House staffers feared that he would trounce Al Gore in a televised debate about NAFTA by spitting out effective sound bites.

Years before Perot, George Wallace was the master of sounding like the common man. His illustrations were simple and his anecdotes plentiful. When speaking about law-and-order, Wallace “made his point with an equally hyperbolic, simplistic illustration,” Hogan argued. For example, Wallace once exclaimed to an audience, “And according to the decisions of the Supreme Court . . . if you go into the streets tonight and are attacked and a policeman knocks the person in the head, he’ll be let out of jail before you get to the hospital, and then they’ll go and try the policeman about it.” Folksy reasoning like that used by Perot, Wallace, and so many other candidates conveys authenticity, because the candidates identify with audiences by relating debates to real life experiences and thus proving that they are not a cookie cutter political type.

A third way that minor party candidates communicate authenticity through their words is by being frank in public appearances. Being frank consists of saying exactly what is on one’s mind, or purposefully rejecting temperate language. George Wallace’s humorous ridicule of hecklers during political rallies exhibited the frankness that energized his supporters. Max
Frankel of *The New York Times* quoted one Wallace supporter as saying, “We like his honesty; he isn’t a fence-hopper like the others.” Another supporter told Frankel, “He’s saying things that need to be said,” and one more claimed “He’s blunt . . . You’ll find a lot of strong feelings for him.”

Libertarian Ron Paul gained the same reputation in 1988. Jim Barnett, an editor of Paul’s hometown newspaper, *The Brazosport Facts*, contended, “He was a very up-front guy, uncharacteristic of many politicians, and I think if people didn’t like him personally, at least they liked that straightforwardness.”

Ross Perot was also notable for his frankness, making news for calling Gore a liar during the NAFTA debate and attacking the vice-president for not honoring the rules of turn-taking when speaking.

Ralph Nader earned a similar reputation. His frank style, Harold argued, “communicated a truthful, transparent politics serving as an unmediated conduit for the will of the people.” Thus, speaking clearly about what one thinks is just another way that third party candidates often demonstrate their political authenticity.

*Authenticity Through Visual Style.* As minor party candidates’ verbal style violates social norms, so too does their visual style. In extending Robert Hariman’s work on political style, Harold wrote of Ralph Nader, “If we take Hariman’s cue, and understand style as a necessary feature of political rhetoric, then it makes sense that Nader and his followers might utilize stylistic codes as tools for communication.” Concluding, Harold maintained, “It would also make sense that the media might observe the campaign for these markers.”

Harold’s point holds true for most third party candidates. Although visual style is important to all political campaigns, the image preferred by the two party candidates – who seek to look “presidential” – is quite different from the image sought by third party candidates. In most cases, minor party candidates match their dress to the “common man” to whom they appeal, thus trying to prove their authenticity, and distinguish themselves from the prototypical politician.
Whether intentional or not, third party presidential candidates stand out for their visual signs of authenticity. Ralph Nader was discussed as being frumpy and earnest for wearing wrinkled and over-sized suits on his slouched figure, symbolic of his maverick political style. Gene McCarthy in 1976 became the subject of discussion for his “offhand style” and “the way he has let his hair grow into a silver-gray mane much like the one Lyndon Johnson wore after his return to the ranch.” Apathy Party nominee Jim Boren was described as being distinct for “Wearing a black shoestring tie, a gold chain, and a large gambler’s hat.” Bearded Socialist J. Quinn Brisben in 1992 was also noticed for wearing “a red string tie – red because that’s the color chosen in 1848 to represent the movement.” Another bearded candidate, Andre Marrou of the Libertarian Party made a big deal about the clean images of the presidential candidates debating in 1992. “Look at these candidates” he complained, “They’re all cleanshaven, with short haircuts, and red and blue striped ties.” Continuing, Marrou lamented, “They’re all wearing single-breasted suits. They’re all left-handed, did you notice that? They’re peas in a pod.”

Dependence on Public Spectacle

The desire for significant media coverage leads many minor party campaigns to stage public spectacles, or to make odd campaign choices, for the sake of appearing different. Although major party candidates occasionally use a similar strategy, as Barack Obama did when he decided to deliver his nomination acceptance speech in a Denver football stadium in 2008, third party candidates are different because their public spectacles are staged more frequently and aim to shock audiences. In some cases these actions are genuine efforts to protest the two-party system, or to act consistently with one’s worldview. In other cases, these decisions are simple pandering to the drama-starved news media. The available kinds of public spectacles are limited only by imagination. Some of the more common strategies, though, involve public acts of
protest, running shocking advertisements, focusing electoral efforts on a small region to generate an unlikely success story, and proposing odd ideas.

Many public spectacles staged by minor party candidates have involved protest. Some have been passive forms of protest. Peace and Freedom Party candidate Dick Gregory in 1968 embarked on two fasts for peace when he campaigned. He lost over 50 pounds in his first fast, while maintaining a “rigorous schedule of college concert one nighters” for the world to see. After delivering his nomination acceptance speech, Prohibition Party candidate E. Harold Munn led picketers to a local tavern, and received the most media coverage in his campaign. In a more outrageous stunt by another Prohibition Party candidate, Gene Amondson in 2008 dressed as the Grim Reaper and protested drinking on Bourbon Street in New Orleans.

Other forms of protest involving minor party candidates have been more disruptive. In some cases, candidates have appeared at presidential debates uninvited, and have protested their exclusion. In recent years, John Cobb of the Green Party and Michael Badnarik of the Libertarian Party received news coverage when they were arrested for appearing at a presidential debate in St. Louis in 2004, crossing a police barrier to deliver a message to the debate commission. Additionally, Monica Moorehead of the Workers World Party stormed a small third party debate in 1996 along with her running mate, “forcefully asserting herself as the only presidential candidate who is a Black woman and represents the working class.” When approached by security, Moorehead shouted “Let me speak! Let me speak!” leaving organizers to watch in shock. Moorehead’s campaign declared the civil disobedience to be a success, as the “media blockade had been broken-at least partially,” with the Associated Press and various radio and print journalists reporting on the incident.
Shocking advertisements have also been used by minor party candidates to create public spectacles. In 1980, for example, Citizens Party nominee Barry Commoner attempted to turn heads by running a radio ad in which an actor shouted “Bullshit.” The ad was broadcast on more than 600 stations, and used the word to characterize the campaigns of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and John Anderson. Commoner’s aids described the ad as an attempt to do “something drastic” after six months of being ignored by the media. The strategy paid off. As one writer for *Newsweek* wrote, “The response was, well, overwhelming. Hundreds of offended listeners demanded to know why the expletive was not deleted.” More importantly, “Commoner was also besieged with interview requests.”

Sometimes, minor party candidates attempt to create a public spectacle by focusing most of their campaign efforts on a small geographical area in hopes of producing success. Libertarian Andre Marrou used the “Dixville Notch strategy” to raise awareness of his campaign by concentrating on the tiny New Hampshire town known as one of the first areas to declare its election results. The news media was at a loss when Marrou picked up more votes in Dixville Notch than any Democrat or Republican in 1992’s presidential primary. In response to his success, Marrou exclaimed, “I must have done 30 or 40 interviews today, certainly more than I’ve ever done before.” Boasting about the attention he received from the major television networks and top newspapers, Marrou expressed, “People are starting to recognize me and wave at me. We’ve got a good image, and we need to build on that.” Summarizing the significance of the victory, Marrou’s campaign coordinator Jim McClarin stated, “We accomplished the objective of this campaign which was to break in to the national media awareness.”

Finally, many third party candidates propose odd policies that make them stand out from candidates from the two-party system. These policies tend to be extreme, bizarre, or simply
humorous, and serve as sound bites that get mentioned by the news media. Although they perpetuate the negative stereotypes of third parties, these policies are sometimes all that a candidate has in the early stages of the campaign to raise awareness of their existence. Many minor party presidential candidates, for example, have promised that their first order of business would be to substantially change the presidency. Socialist Labor Party candidate Julius Levin in 1972 promised to abolish the presidency altogether.\textsuperscript{343} Socialist J. Quinn Brisben proposed instead that the president should be stripped of power and made a ceremonial figurehead.\textsuperscript{344} In 1988, candidate Eugene McCarthy suggested that he would instead abolish the vice presidency to prevent unbalanced tickets.\textsuperscript{345} Natural Law Party nominee John Hagelin took a less extreme approach, and proposed mandatory electronic brain testing of all presidential candidates to make sure they had the intelligence, stability, and comprehension necessary for the job.\textsuperscript{346}

There has been no shortage of unique policy proposals by third party campaigns. Presidential candidates have proposed novel ways of improving life for working class Americans. Ben Spock of the People’s Party in 1972 proposed a guaranteed income for all citizens, averaging $6,500 for a family of four, in order to combat poverty. They have suggested many unconventional ways to curb militarization, too. Spock, for example, advocated closing all of the country’s 3,000 military bases. Sonia Johnson of the Citizens’ Party proposed chopping the military budget in half. More oddly, Johnson announced that on her first day she would “announce a national emergency plan to eradicate the conquistador mentality from our culture.” On the second day, she concluded, she would sit “in a circle of nonpatriarchal women from every country, planning how to bring arms immediately and globally under female control.”\textsuperscript{347} Candidates also propose far-fetched ideas to strengthen American democracy. Ross Perot suggested he would create an electronic town hall through which the president and Congress
would present bills to the public for feedback. During an appearance on *Larry King Live*, Perot explained, “With interactive television every other week, say, we could take one major issue, go to the American people, cover it in great detail, have them respond, and show by congressional district what the people want.” Furthermore, candidates often introduce unique ways to improve the economy as well. During his fifth campaign for the presidency, Lyndon LaRouche advocated a program to colonize Mars.

As a general rule, candidates receiving the least amount of press coverage tend to propose the most radical solutions for what they perceive as society’s problems. Minor party candidates with a serious public following offer a handful of unique proposals that sound silly to some, but plausible to others. On the other hand, third party candidates running in a few states without much campaign organization often take the most ludicrous positions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the dominant theory describing the campaign style of presidential candidates is a poor fit for understanding third party campaigns. Not only does this traditional notion of campaign style neglect the perceived rhetorical constraints of minor parties, but it also does not take into consideration that some political candidates do not run with the goal of winning. I demonstrated that because many minor party candidates are dedicated instead to agitating for change, the substantive characteristics of their rhetoric frequently violate societal expectations of political discourse. Third party style is heavily emotional, is polarizing and populist in nature, dependent on public spectacle, and contains displays of authenticity.

Third party style is very common, but it is not necessarily used throughout the entire campaign. As with any social movement using confrontation to raise awareness of its existence and cause, third party style must eventually be tempered and requires balance with strategies
better suited to mainstream audiences. If the news media begins to treat the campaign seriously, it is vital that the candidate pivots to communicative practices of a typical challenger. Failure to follow this general rule could explain why successful third party candidates of the past have rarely done as well as they anticipated on Election Day.

In the rest of this project, I will demonstrate that elements of third party style are present in the various genres defining third party campaigns. The proceeding chapters will examine announcement rhetoric, nomination acceptance speeches, and concession discourse to show that third party style is continually present in the rhetoric of minor party candidates with only few exceptions.
Chapter 3
Presidential Campaign Announcements: A Third Party Variant

Presidential announcement speeches formally emphasize for the first time in a campaign a candidate’s fit for the highest job in the land. Recognizing the similarities between many of these statements, Time’s Kenneth Baer and Jeff Nussbaum reported in the midst of the 2008 primaries that announcements follow a “time-tested template.” That is, candidates describe their life story, depict how it represents the nation’s story, and explain how the next chapter of the nation’s narrative should develop. In this sense, announcements often describe how the candidate emerged from humble roots because of hard work, how the nation has solved major crises in the past by remaining faithful to certain principles, and how following those same principles can solve contemporary struggles. In other words, those announcing their candidacy are usually hopeful for the country’s future, and for their chances of winning the election.

If these are the most basic guidelines for announcement speeches, then a quick glance at the announcements by third party candidates in the 2008 presidential election indicates that they clearly violated the norms of the genre. Most notably, candidates often conceded that they would not win while simultaneously announcing their campaigns and dedicated their speeches to attacking the two-party system rather than highlighting their own accomplishments. For instance, Libertarian Bob Barr stated that he was announcing his candidacy “not to win an election,” but to “let the American people know that they are going to have a choice.” Ralph Nader announced his campaign on Meet the Press, and mostly attacked Democrats and Republicans while defending his own right to run. And rather than argue that he could run a competitive campaign, Nader boasted that he would shun political consultants, and accept “no money from commercial interests, no money from political action committees, only from individuals.” The Party for
Socialism and Liberation also appeared extreme in announcing Gloria La Riva as its candidate, denigrating those in government as racist imperialists who serve corporate interests above all. Additionally, Green Party candidate Cynthia McKinney in 2008 accused Republicans of stealing the 2000 election and deceiving America in launching two wars, and also complained that both parties “eat out of the hands of corrupt lobbyists and feed at the same corporate trough.”

The unconventional and extreme character of third party campaign announcements in 2008 was not lost on the news media. Many remarked that Cynthia McKinney’s announcement demonstrated that she was a “quintessential activist” with a “fiery spirit” and “firebrand” style. McKinney was said to have “particularly harsh words for her former party,” having “blasted the ongoing war effort in Iraq and ripped into [both] Democrats and Republicans.” Bob Barr was described as displaying a grudge against John McCain after appearing bitter throughout his announcement. *Washington Post* journalist Dana Milbank described Barr as angry, as well as having “problems with subject-verb agreement throughout the speech,” “going on too long,” and delivering his remarks with a “flushed face and gyrating body.” Ralph Nader’s announcement was portrayed in press coverage as hyperbolic and egotistical. An editorial from *The Boston Globe*, for example, called Nader’s rationale for running both “familiar and unpersuasive” because it oversimplified the positions of the two major parties. Nader’s announcement was mere “rambling,” the *Globe* reported, and evidence that he derived “less joy from protecting his own legacy of consumer protection than from sending Democratic presidential candidates into fits.” Another critic wrote that Nader’s “ill-conceived candidacy simply gives opponents the opportunity to see him – and his concerns – as the work of an addled mind.”

The tendency for announcements by third party presidential candidates to violate societal expectations of campaign rhetoric is not unique to the 2008 election cycle. In this chapter, I
argue that these announcements are a variant of the announcement genre and are influenced by the third party rhetorical style warranted by the challenges that minor party candidates routinely face. That is, because of the recurring situational barriers and perceived strategic constraints for minor party presidential campaigns, the function and form of their candidates’ announcements are different than for candidates from the two major parties. I develop this argument in several sections. First, in order to understand the context and purpose for announcement rhetoric, I describe what Judith Trent called the “surfacing stage,” or pre-primary phase, of presidential campaigns. Second, I explain the function and outline the form of traditional campaign announcements. Third, after highlighting some basic reasons for why the generic norms for announcements by mainstream candidates would not fit for their minor party counterparts, I offer an alternative theory based on the analysis of over forty such statements by various third party nominees between 1948 and 2008. Fourth, I provide three case studies of third party announcements to demonstrate this unconventional and polarizing variant of the genre, including statements by Progressive Henry Wallace in 1948, Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, and Reform Party candidate Patrick Buchanan in 2000. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications that these findings have for my overall study.

The Surfacing Stage of Presidential Campaigns

Announcements occur during what Judith Trent called the “surfacing stage” of the presidential campaign.\(^{359}\) Surfacing, Trent suggested, is defined as “the series of predictable and specifically timed rhetorical transactions which serve consummatory and instrumental functions during the pre-primary phase of the campaign.”\(^{360}\) According to Trent, surfacing became standard in presidential campaigns in 1976 when fourteen presidential hopefuls traveled in early primary states two years prior to the election to convince voters that they were viable candidates.
“Since that time,” Trent argued, “and with very little deviation in either form or content, surfacing has played a major role in presidential politics and accounts for what has become known as the seasonless or permanent campaign.” The length of the surfacing period varies for each election, depending on “candidates’ perceptions of their national visibility and credibility, financial backing, and organizational strength.” However, surfacing clearly begins whenever potential candidates initially try to reach out to the electorate ahead of an approaching election. Certain rhetorical activities during this period include “building state organizations, speaking to many different kinds of public gatherings in an attempt to capture media attention, conducting public opinion polls to assess visibility or to determine potential issues for which stands will later have to be devised, putting together an organizational structure and campaign ‘blueprint,’ raising money, and announcing to the media that they are, or could be, or might be, or are flattered to be considered a presidential contender.”

There are seven functions of the surfacing phase of presidential campaigns. First, candidates for the first time demonstrate their fitness for public office. Because the electorate instantly draws conclusions about how the candidate would behave as a president, presidential hopefuls attempt to craft an image of being “trustworthy, intelligent, or competent enough to do the job; compassionate; articulate; poised; and honorable.” Second, the surfacing stage functions to teach the electorate about the candidate’s general goals and important policy positions. In 2008, for instance, candidates stated positions on issues including reducing dependence on foreign oil, creating jobs, providing more affordable health care, addressing the budget deficit, and planning an eventual withdrawal from Iraq.

The third function of the surfacing stage is to develop voter expectations of a candidate’s administrative and personal style. Candidates, for example, can establish well-organized and
disciplined staffs to demonstrate the kind of administration they would form if elected, or they can establish a looser grassroots campaign to show how they would reject corporate interests and a hierarchal approach to governing. Moreover, in creating an image of their personal style, candidates can display the articulateness and charm of a polished leader, or the visual appearance and speech patterns of the “common man.” Fourth, surfacing also functions as an opportunity for the candidate to “set the rhetorical agenda for the campaign.” Meeting with constituents and discovering the issues that will potentially decide the election, candidates begin influencing media coverage with a chain of public appearances. “In national or statewide elections,” Trent and Friedenberg explained, “the media repeat a candidate’s statements and thus aid in translating the problems and positions into national or state issues.”

Fifth, the surfacing stage functions to begin the process of selecting front-runners or “separating the serious contenders from the not so serious.” At this stage, candidates who obtain the greatest visibility tend to be perceived as being the most serious.

Sixth, the surfacing stage functions to establish a relationship between the media and the candidate that lasts throughout the entire campaign. Although candidates need media coverage to gain legitimacy, serious candidates are needed almost as much by a news media expected to produce interesting coverage of the campaign. As such, Trent and Friedenberg argued, because “the media need information that only access to the candidate or immediate campaign staff can provide,” there tends to be an open-mindedness to learn about any serious candidate. Thus, candidates in the surfacing stage create relationships with journalists, and set the tone for how they will interact with the press later in the campaign.

Finally, the surfacing stage functions to initiate the important political rituals of a campaign. Candidates for political office in the United States are expected to abide by certain
protocols. “For example,” Trent and Friedenberg elaborated, “a press conference is called, the candidate is surrounded by family and friends while announcing the decision to run for office, and then the candidate embarks immediately on a campaign swing through the district, state, and nation.” The rituals followed throughout the campaign begin with the announcement speech, and this sets the tone for how closely the candidate can be expected to abide by the norms of political campaigns.

Traditional Campaign Announcements and the Third Party Variant

Voters’ preconceptions of what it means to seriously campaign require that candidates announce their intentions publically in some form of address. This requirement is not trivial, Trent argued, for “Candidates must announce early so that decision-makers have time to consider them; they must begin campaigning immediately after the announcement to demonstrate their commitment, sincerity, and ability to persevere during a long campaign.” Although communication scholars have not written as much about the announcement as they have about the other genres of presidential discourse, existing studies have suggested that the address fulfills certain functions and has basic formal characteristics. Within this section, I identify the form and function of traditional announcement speeches. Then, after suggesting several reasons for why this framework does not apply as neatly to similar addresses made by those from outside the two-party system, I identify a variant of the announcement for third parties.

Traditional Campaign Announcements

Candidates were once expected to give major public speeches to kick off their campaigns. Following this tradition, for example, Republican Senator Phil Gramm in 1995 declared his candidacy at Texas A&M, where he was once a Professor of Economics, surrounded by cadets and flags. In the same election, Senator Robert Dole returned home to Russell, Kansas to deliver
his announcement to a large audience and “a shower of balloons.” Al Gore began his campaign in 1999 when he “returned to his hometown of Carthage, Tennessee, was introduced by his daughter, and was surrounded by family, friends, and local community supporters in front of the Smith County courthouse.” Barack Obama began his presidential campaign in a similar manner in 2007, declaring his candidacy to an audience of thousands of supporters and hundreds of journalists in front of the Old State Capitol building in Springfield, Illinois where Abraham Lincoln once gave his “House Divided” speech. However, announcements no longer require such flair. “In recent years,” Trent and Friedenberg argued, “at the presidential level, public expectations for candidate announcements have changed to some degree.” Because the news media does not cover campaign announcements as closely as in previous elections, Trent and Friedenberg remarked, modern “candidates have often revealed their intentions gradually.”

Because the announcement is no longer a “full-fledged media spectacular,” there are many ways to offer the statement other than through a major speech. Candidates sometimes give multiple announcement speeches to generate greater attention from the media, while others have not in an effort to encourage the electorate to “draft” them for president. Long before the 1988 campaign season, for example, Republican Pat Robertson informed the media that he was being asked to run, and later announced “in a three-hour production of trumpet fanfare and patriotic song” that he would run if “three million registered voters signed petitions” asking him to do so. In other cases, as with Gerald Ford and Jerry Brown in the 1976 campaign, candidates treat the announcement as a low-key “mini-media event.” In more recent years, candidates have announced their campaigns while appearing on a variety of television talk-shows. For instance, in the 2008 election cycle Republican Fred Thompson announced his candidacy on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Rudy Giuliani kicked-off his campaign on Larry King Live, and Mike
Huckabee did the same on Meet the Press. The internet, too, has been used for the announcement. Since Steve Forbes was the first to declare online, other prominent candidates, including Hillary Clinton, have utilized sites like YouTube to address voters with their intentions to run.

Despite the differences in presidential campaign announcements, the genre fulfills the same basic functions. Political communication scholars William Benoit, Jayne Henson, Sheri Whalen, and P. M. Pier argued, for instance, that announcements fulfill what Trent and Friedenberg identified as the seven functions of the surfacing stage. “Although the surfacing phase encompasses more than just the announcement speech,” the authors argued, “it is fair to say that these messages are the most prominent component of this element of presidential campaigns.” In this sense, the campaign announcement is used to mark the beginning of political ritual. Second, announcements “are a vehicle for indicating a candidate’s ‘fitness for office.’” As political consultant Dan Patlak wrote, the announcement is “an opportunity to make a positive first impression with the public.” Third, announcements function to articulate a candidate’s goals and positions on important political issues. Fourth, announcements are used to identify the main themes of the campaign. Fifth, they are used to display the candidate’s personal style. Patlak noted, for instance, that announcements should “impress upon the media and your base of supporters that you possess well-developed organizational and public speaking skills, giving your campaign credibility.” Sixth, announcements are used to convey that the candidate should be considered a serious contender in the race. As Patlak wrote, announcements “should send a clear message to the media and political insiders that you are serious about running a professional campaign. This will go a long way toward convincing these audiences that you are a viable candidate and help attract vital contributions and media attention.”
seventh function of announcements is to influence the decisions of potential opponents.\textsuperscript{382} On this point, Patlak suggested that announcements “should serve notice to any potential primary or general election opponent that they may have to invest significant resources in defeating you and thus may discourage otherwise viable challengers, who may then choose to run for a different office.”\textsuperscript{383}

Sharing common functions, campaign announcements of major party candidates also tend to have similar substantive characteristics. Announcements obviously contain a statement expressing that the candidate intends to run for office.\textsuperscript{384} Secondly, announcements also contain a clear rationale for why the candidate is running.\textsuperscript{385} Candidates often explain how their own lives mirror the experiences of most Americans, thus giving them insights into the needs of the American people. They explain the greatest problems that the country faces, and how they are best able to represent the constituency in finding solutions. Third, announcements usually establish the themes of the campaign. Some candidates, Baer and Nussbaum argued, tend to weigh in on just about every issue and offer programmatic details. However, they suggested, most often candidates offer a thematic framework of what they intend to accomplish. In the process, they offer “no specifics on the major issues of the day” but instead identify the principles that will guide their actions. In 2008, for example, Republican Fred Thompson announced that his campaign would be about “security, prosperity, and the unity of our country.”\textsuperscript{386} President Bush in his 2000 announcement address claimed that he would be guided by conservative principles, including maintaining a small government, governing with compassion, and fostering communities of faith.\textsuperscript{387}

Fourth, candidates state that they can win.\textsuperscript{388} They do this by expressing that they are in the campaign for the long haul, and that they are “in it to win in.” The candidate, Trent and
Friedenberg suggested, “claims to be better able to manage the office, better able to represent the constituency, and of course better able to attract funds and wage an effective campaign than anyone else.”

Fifth, in order to highlight their own strengths and how their party has the best plan to improve conditions in America, candidates tend to remain hopeful and avoid too many negative attacks on the opposing party. In analysis of the announcements from the 1992 presidential campaign, Palazzolo and Theriault argued that “candidates focused more on challenging their own party to change than praising or blaming parties’ past performances.”

Palazzolo and Theriault discovered that candidates spoke of their own parties almost 50 percent more than they brought up the opposing party. Benoit, Henson, Whalen, and Pier made a similar point, suggesting that 75 announcement speeches delivered between 1960 and 2004 contained far fewer attacks on opponents than discussion of accomplishments of the candidates or their party. They concluded, “it seems likely that candidates are overwhelmingly positive . . . because they want to appear positive and upbeat to voters (and because voters dislike mudslinging).”

Third Party Campaign Announcements

The traditional characteristics of announcement speeches are incompatible with the rhetoric of third party candidates. Because their campaigns serve the purpose of raising awareness about certain issues rather than winning office, many of the functions of traditional announcements do not apply to third party candidates. Minor party candidates have no need to indicate their fitness for the presidency, nor to display an administrative style, since in most cases they have no intention of actually making it to the White House. Similarly, they have little need to argue that they should be considered a serious contender, because no third party presidential candidate has come close to winning in over 150 years.
Some of the functions of traditional announcements, though, still relate to third party candidates, albeit in a slightly different way. First, as with any presidential hopeful, the announcement for minor party candidates functions to commence the political rituals common in the campaign. Second, the announcement also functions to introduce the personal style of the minor party candidate, even though that style is more polarizing and less formal than that of major party candidates. Third, the announcement still functions to articulate the goals and policy positions of the minor party candidate, but these usually focus on just a few important issues that the two major parties have somehow neglected. Finally, minor party announcements function to influence the decisions of other candidates campaigning, or considering a campaign, for the same office. Rather than trying to dissuade others from running, though, minor party candidates frequently use their announcements to set the agenda for the other candidates. That is, they present the issues for which they stand, and provide the two major parties an opportunity to address their cause in an effort to head off a third party uprising.

Third party announcements also have three unique functions. First, they function to convince the news media that the candidate poses a serious threat to one of the two major parties. In order to dramatize the campaign and to receive press coverage in the later stages of the race, minor party candidates use their announcements to outline for the first time which party they intend to target. Second, minor party announcements function to convince the public that the candidate will not only syphon votes from one of the major party candidates, but that they have the staying power to remain a threat throughout the entire campaign. Finally, minor party announcements also function to use polarizing rhetoric to appeal for the first time to voters who are inclined to feel alienated from the system. Without voter alienation, voters do not support third party tickets. However, the alienation felt by voters who support third party tickets is often
the result of the polarizing rhetoric of the candidate that for some reason appeals to that particular group of citizens. Announcements, then, are the first chance for the candidate to rationalize the public’s discontent, and to build a strong base of grassroots supporters.

Because they fulfill different functions than announcements by mainstream candidates, third party announcements also tend to differ in their substantive characteristics. It is unnecessary for minor party candidates to inspire potential supporters with the hope that the campaign will win on Election Day, because most understand that this is highly unlikely. Additionally, minor party announcements tend not to be positive in tone, since they function to demonize the two-party system and polarize the electorate. Overall, third party announcements exhibit six important formal characteristics.

First, as with any campaign announcement, minor party announcements contain some statement indicating that the candidate is launching a presidential campaign. Because serious candidates often see themselves as leaders of movements rather than heads of parties, though, announcements are frequently ambiguous and tentative at first. Candidates announce that they are willing to be nominated if there is nobody else willing to lead the political movement. And unlike the case for mainstream candidates, this is rarely a pose since so few candidates are willing to take over the mantle for a party bound to lose. Norman Thomas, for instance, after having been the Socialist Party’s nominee five times, tentatively announced in 1948 that he “may have to accept [the] nomination if the convention goes as I think it will.” Thomas later admitted to accepting the nomination that year only because nobody with name recognition had stepped forward. Addressing the reality that his party faced, Thomas announced, “I have been compelled to agree with my friends that, under present circumstances, with the difficulty that exists in getting on the ballot in many states, it is imperative that the party should nominate one
who is already well known by the public, rather than someone who must be built up in public
knowledge and esteem.”393 Announcing one’s candidacy as the result of being drafted by a
political movement is fairly common among third party campaigns. The same happened to
former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T. Coleman Andrews who was recruited by the
National States Rights Party in 1952 for his opposition to Federal tax policy and his popularity
with right-wing voters.394 In 1971, Benjamin Spock co-founded the People’s Party in preparation
for the 1972 race, and expressed interest in finding a high-caliber candidate to head the ticket.
When Eugene McCarthy, Shirley Chisholm, and Ralph Nader passed on the offer, Spock was
forced to step in.395 In 1980, Barry Commoner announced that he had “no personal ambitions
other than doing my scientific work,” but that he would be “engaging in politics in my spare
time” to be a place holder for the nomination of the Citizens Party.396 John Anderson
ambiguously announced under the same conditions in 1984, though he abandoned the effort
when he was unable to make it onto many state ballots.397

Other third party presidential candidates have avoided ambiguity in announcing their
campaigns.398 Independent John Anderson, for example, formally announced that he was
abandoning his quest for the Republican nomination in 1980 to run as an independent. Anderson
stated, “I have chosen, after careful deliberation, to pursue an independent course toward the
Presidency of the United States.”399 Libertarian Harry Browne’s declaration was just as clear in
2000, stating, “I hereby formally announce my candidacy for president as a Libertarian,”400 and
Ralph Nader in the same election spoke with similar transparency, saying, “I am seeking the
Green Party’s nomination for President.”401

The second formal characteristic of third party announcements is an acknowledgment
that winning is unlikely, with a corresponding statement about the candidate’s alternative goals.
Some candidates, usually those who were once active members of the two-party system, are reluctant to wave the white flag in the first official speech of the campaign. For instance, John Anderson in 1980 proclaimed in his announcement that polls indicated that he could receive about 20 percent of the popular vote, and that reaching out to the 50 percent of the electorate that rarely votes was “where my campaign will succeed.” During a press conference announcing his campaign in 1988, Consumer Party candidate Eugene McCarthy was rather adamant that he could be elected, stating, “I don’t expect to lose.” Similarly, Libertarian Bob Barr tried to avoid suggesting that he would lose by noting, “I am a competitor. The American people are competitors. For far too long, they have been treated as serfs, not competitors, not peers, not equals.” “We aim to change this,” Barr stated, declaring, “we intend to succeed so that in November America will have and see a president who will then be sworn into office” and represent their interests.

This optimism is hardly reflective of these candidates’ understanding of their electoral destiny. As Libertarian L. Neil Smith wrote in his announcement in 1999, “I don’t expect to be president, but campaigns, like a novel or a movie, require willing suspension of disbelief, engendered by attention to detail by the author.”

Most third party candidates are not as willing to “suspend disbelief,” and instead openly admit that they are likely to lose. Populist Party candidate Bob Richards, a two-time Olympic gold medalist and the long-time face of Wheaties, admitted in the opening days of his campaign in 1984 that he was “sure to lose.” The Socialist Equality Party in announcing Bill van Auken’s campaign in 2004 claimed to be “completely realistic,” in that “our candidates will, in the present situation, win only a limited number of votes.” Even Bob Barr, who attempted in his announcement to portray himself as a “competitor” had a moment of honesty, telling his audience that “the point of announcing a candidacy is not to win an election.”
Minor party candidates in their announcements, though, replace the purpose of winning with some larger purpose for their campaign. These include representing neglected issues to set the agenda for the campaign, and offering a choice to alienated or apathetic voters. Announcing his independent campaign in 1980, John Anderson said that his candidacy was “an effort to broaden the choice available to millions of potential voters who simply do not participate in party primaries and caucuses.” An independent campaign, he declared, “would vastly increase the likelihood that a thorough, dispassionate discussion of the host of complex issues confronting the nation will take place.”¹⁴⁰ Sonia Johnson of the Citizens Party stated in her announcement, according to one journalist, that her bid was “part of the grand tradition of third party candidacies throughout American history – the pesky pest who shakes up the status quo and raises issues that the mainstream political parties can’t or won’t talk about.”¹⁴¹ Similarly, Howard Phillips of the U.S. Taxpayers Party contended that although he would not win an election, his campaign would “provide him the chance to air his views.”¹⁴¹ Ralph Nader, too, was a vocal advocate for providing more choice in elections, and stressed that his role was to highlight the issue of corporate corruption. In his announcement in 2000, for instance, Nader confessed, “It is easy and true to say that this deep democracy campaign will be an uphill one.” However, he noted, “The scope of the campaign is . . . to engage as many volunteers as possible to help overcome ballot barriers and to get the vote out. In addition it is designed to leave a momentum after the election day for the various causes that committed people have worked so hard to further.”¹⁴²

A third formal characteristic of minor party announcements is a detailed rationale for why the candidate is running. Third party candidates focus on the few issues that they hope to force other campaigns to discuss throughout the election. Conservative candidates often defend their campaigns by addressing what they see as a growing moral or economic crisis in the
country. Constitution Party candidate Michael Peroutka in 2004 claimed that he wanted to “call this country back to its original, Godly Constitutional greatness.” In addition to creating a Christian state, Peroutka focused more narrowly on the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage, and immigration. Fiscal conservatives like Libertarians Bob Barr and Harry Browne sought to defend the power of the private sector, to balance the budget, and to prevent wars that ravage the economy. Other conservatives such as Strom Thurmond, George Wallace, and David Duke, demonized the Federal government for civil rights policy. Candidates on the Left have frequently made corporate power in America their biggest concern. Citizens Party candidate Barry Commoner in his announcement identified “the dominance of the big corporation” as the “fundamental issue” in his race, as have other leftist candidates such as Bill van Auken of the Socialist Equality Party, Gloria La Riva of the Party for Socialism and Liberation, and Ralph Nader.

Fourth, third party announcements contain a statement about the strengths of the campaign, and how it might threaten the two-party system. Without the potential to throw the election, minor party candidates are not newsworthy. There are many ways that candidates illustrate that their campaign is a legitimate force in the election. Most often, candidates usually address how many states they expect to target; appearing in more states increases the likelihood that the press will take the campaign seriously. In his announcement in 1968, George Wallace reported that he would campaign actively in all 50 states. In his less formal announcements before the winter of 1968, Wallace described his strategy in greater detail, clarifying that he could win in many states even without a majority. “If I got that 34 per cent in Wisconsin again and the Democratic candidate got 33 per cent and the Republican candidate 33 per cent, I’d win. All you need is a plurality.” Inspired by this thought, Wallace predicted that he would “do much
better than you expect” with potential wins in Southern and border-states and in a handful of states in the Midwest. Other candidates, though, have considered targeting fewer states to be a more effective use of their resources. Launching the Citizens Party’s campaign, Barry Commoner said that his movement was organizing in 40 states.

Minor party candidates also address the strength of their campaigns by disclosing the financial and organizational resources that distinguish them from other third party tickets. In early versions of his announcement, George Wallace reported that he received over $396,000 in voluntary donations to run in the Democratic primary in 1964, and suggested the same would happen for his third party bid in 1968. During one campaign stop on his announcement tour, Wallace contended, “People came up to me in this very auditorium to ask: ‘Where do I send money?’” Following Barry Commoner’s announcement for the Citizens Party, Katherine Ellison of The Washington Post noted that “party workers have already collected about $25,000 from individual donations, and are confident they can muster the $3 million to $5 million dollars they estimate will be necessary for a presidential campaign.” John Anderson in his early announcement rhetoric in 1984 pointed out that he was eligible for $5.8 million in public election funds, and that he “had mailed letters to some 40,000 people who worked for or gave money to him in 1980” in order to build a grassroots organization for his campaign. Harry Browne, in announcing his 2000 campaign, boasted, “we have assembled the largest campaign organization in Libertarian history, and we’re raising money faster than any previous Libertarian campaign.”

Fifth, announcements by serious third party presidential candidates contain a response to audience concerns about the campaign only playing the role of a spoiler. Accusing a candidate of spoiling an election is equivalent to questioning that candidate’s integrity. Many candidates have
openly embraced the label of spoiler, seeing it as their duty to punish the major parties for ignoring the interests of the people. George Wallace, for instance, stated in his early announcement rhetoric, “If the politicians get in the way of this people’s movement, they’re going to get run over.” Wallace seemed amused that his chance of spoiling had caused so much debate, stating, “Usually they would just ignore talk about a third party.” Barry Commoner also embraced the title, claiming that he was “fine” if the impact of his campaign was damaging the Democrats’ chances of winning in 1980. Eugene McCarthy in 1988 also embraced the criticism of his campaign, noting “I don’t mind tilting at windmills. They said it in ’68 and I said, yeah, I guess we did, but when it was over there were a lot of beaten-up windmills.” Others, however, have denied that the term “spoiler” fit their campaign. John Anderson in 1980 argued in his announcement, “I strongly disagree with those who claim that my intended action to run an independent candidacy places me in the role of a so-called spoiler. It does not ‘spoil’ the political process when I seek to involve in that process young people and others who in the past, and even now, consider our democratic system irrelevant to their lives.” Ralph Nader made the same point in all of his announcements. For example, in 2004, he told Tim Russert on Meet the Press, “A spoiler is a contemptuous term, as if anybody who dares to challenge the two-party system and corrupt politics and broken politics and corporate power is a spoiler.” Similarly, he stated in launching his 2008 campaign, “This bit of, of spoiler is really very astonishing. These are the two parties who’ve spoiled our electoral system, money, they can’t even count the votes, they steal – the Republicans steal the votes, and the Democrats knock third party candidates off the ballot.”

Sixth, and finally, minor party announcements make strong attacks, often in a polarizing style, and portray the major parties as a monolithic opposition acting against the interests of the
people. As John Anderson stated briefly in his early announcement rhetoric in 1984, “The two old parties are barriers to change and progress.” Benjamin Spock of the People’s Party stated in his early announcement rhetoric that “the Republican and Democratic parties have proved themselves almost totally incompetent. The war hasn’t ended, poor people get poorer, education deteriorates and everything is getting worse.” Tying both parties to corporate influence, Socialist David McReynolds said in his announcement in 2000, “Anyone seeking the nomination for President on the Democratic or Republican ticket must raise so much money that the real question is not the drugs used in the past, but, to put it bluntly, which corporate forces have bought and paid for the candidate.” In his announcement rhetoric before the 1984 election, John Anderson similarly suggested, “the two old parties are simply too tied in to a vast and intricate web of interests to which they are already in debt for money and support to ever deliver on a promise for example to do something about tax reform.” Ralph Nader’s announcements, too, have repeatedly made this point. Announcing in 2004, Nader suggested, “The corporate lobbyists are still swarming over Congress. Money is still poring in from corporate interests. Washington is corporate occupied territory and the two parties are ferociously competing to see who’s going to go to the White House and take orders from their corporate pay masters.” In short, the polarizing rhetoric of minor party candidates cited in the previous chapter is found frequently in their announcements.

As I have indicated, campaign announcements by third party candidates vary from those of their major party counterparts in significant ways. Although third party announcements still commence political campaign rituals, introduce the personal style of the candidate, and focus on important policy issues, they also function differently in that they appeal to those who feel alienated, aim to convince the media that the candidate is legitimate, and attempt to persuade the
public that the third party campaign can influence the outcome of the race. These functions lead to some formal characteristics in third party announcements that are similar to major party announcements, including a declaration of one’s candidacy and an explanation of why the candidate is running. However, unlike major party announcements, the third party candidate explains their campaign goals as something other than winning, identifies the strength of their campaign and how they will threaten the outcome for the two major parties, addresses the spoiler charge, and uses a polarizing rhetorical style.

Third Party Announcements: Three Case Studies

The formal characteristics of third party announcements are apparent in most examples of the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the announcements of three prominent third party candidates since 1948, including Progressive Henry Wallace, Independent Eugene McCarthy, and Pat Buchanan of the Reform Party. Although the execution of the campaign announcement was slightly different for each of these candidates, the substantive characteristics of their statements contained little to no variation from the generic norm.

The Announcement Rhetoric of Henry Agard Wallace (1948)

The 1948 presidential election was unique in that two powerful splinter parties, one liberal and the other conservative, challenged the Democratic Party for the support of its followers. While the conservative Dixiecrats were represented by South Carolina Governor J. Strom Thurmond, the new Progressive Party was led by Henry A. Wallace. Unlike many third party candidates, Wallace had a long and successful career in the two-party system, having served as Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and as Secretary of Commerce under Roosevelt and then Harry Truman. Wallace’s relationship with Truman quickly soured, though, and he was ousted from the cabinet following a series of
speeches in which he attacked the president’s Cold War foreign policy. Wallace set out on major speaking tours in Europe and the United States throughout 1947, drawing large audiences as he railed against the Truman administration for embracing “imperialism.” By the end of the year, a coalition of left-wing groups urged Wallace to run for office, and he announced his candidacy in a radio address on December 29, 1947, and printed an expanded announcement in The New Republic on January 5, 1948 upon resigning as the magazine’s editor.434

Wallace’s announcement rhetoric contained an unambiguous statement declaring his candidacy. Wallace ended his radio address, for instance, by calling for a “new political alignment in America which requires the organization of a new political party.” Continuing, Wallace stated, “To that end I announce tonight that I shall run as an independent candidate for President of the United States in 1948.”435 Similarly, in his statement in The New Republic Wallace said, “I am convinced the time has come for an independent presidential candidacy.”436 Describing his timing, Wallace wrote, “Election laws in key states make delay impossible if there is to be an effective independent candidacy.”437

Announcing his campaign, Wallace acknowledged the likelihood that he would lose. Of course, he was hopeful at times, comparing his new party with the unlikely victors of the past. In his radio announcement, for example, Wallace stated, “When the old parties rot, the people have a right to be heard through a new party.” Suggesting this is what happened for the Jacksonian Democrats and the Republican Party, Wallace declared, “The people must again have an opportunity to speak out with their votes in 1948.”438 Wallace’s optimism, however, was somewhat tempered. At the end of his announcement in The New Republic, Wallace admitted, “There is talk that an independent candidacy is doomed to failure because of financing. It is said that many millions of dollars will be required for such a campaign.” Claiming to be realistic
“about the opposition and the big-money press,” Wallace still expressed “confidence in democracy” but it was evident that he did not expect to win.\footnote{439}

Acknowledging the likelihood that he would not be elected, Wallace identified the alternative goals of his campaign. Above all, he sought to provide voters a choice in the election. To the readers of The New Republic, Wallace wrote, “My reason in striking out for independent action is to give these Americans their democratic right to choose.”\footnote{440} Additionally, Wallace expressed a desire to raise awareness of the public’s support for peace with the Soviet Union. Asking supporters to send a message to the rest of the world, Wallace stated, “The bigger the peace vote in 1948, the more definitely the world will know that the United States is not behind the bipartisan reactionary war policy which is dividing the world into two armed camps and making inevitable the day when American soldiers will be lying in their Arctic suits in the Russian snow.”\footnote{441} Although Wallace did not address accusations of acting as a spoiler, his call for a large “peace vote” implied that he wanted to send a message to those in the two-party system. Finally, Wallace also explained that he was running to draw attention to other progressive candidates. Resigning from The New Republic, Wallace claimed, “There are many excellent progressives within the Democratic Party – a few members of Congress and hundreds of local and state offices. I believe that the surest way of getting them reelected is to supplement their efforts with a hard-hitting campaign based on principle, not on political expediency.”\footnote{442}

Wallace supported his campaign with two basic themes that he repeated throughout his announcement rhetoric. Claiming that “peace” and “abundance” were always important to him as a political leader, Wallace reminded his radio audience that he previously argued “If the Democratic party continues to be a party of war and depression, I will see to it that the people have a chance to vote for prosperity and peace.”\footnote{443} In his radio address, Wallace focused on the
issues of the power and profits of monopoly, how the Truman Doctrine was leading the country to war with the Soviet Union, unjust racism in the South, and short-sighted arms sales to Greece, Turkey, and China. These issues were identified in Wallace’s announcement in *The New Republic* as well.

Emphasizing the strength of his campaign, Wallace used parts of his announcements to describe his level of support, and address his fundraising expectations. Wallace claimed in two places throughout his radio address that he had plenty of supporters. For instance, he began his address by depicting the popular demand to hear him speak, stating, “For the past fifteen months I have traveled up and down, and back and forth across the country. I have talked with half a million people in public meetings and with thousands in private gatherings.” He ended the radio address, by contending, “Thousands of people all over the United States have asked me to engage in this great fight. The people are on the march.” Describing his own supporters, Wallace noted, “We have assembled a Gideon’s army – small in number, powerful in conviction, ready for action.”444 This army, Wallace suggested, was ready to help him raise enough funds to remain competitive. “I am not worried about money,” he wrote in *The New Republic*, “because I know that we shall get millions of dollars donated by housewives, stenographers, professional people, workers and shop stewards, and others who will work with a devotion big money can’t buy.”445

Most striking in Wallace’s announcements, though, was his use of polarizing rhetoric. He described the major parties as a monolithic opposition. In *The New Republic*, for example, Wallace wrote, “Today we live under a one-party rule. No scrapping over spoils, no disagreement over strategy and timing, no amount of fine-sounding speeches and gestures for liberal support can obscure this fundamental fact.” In further elaboration, Wallace noted, “on the
basic foreign and domestic issues that affect the lives of all Americans, we are denied any opportunity to choose.” Although the war was long over, he told his audience, “a bipartisan bloc governs us in the name of an undeclared emergency. In peacetime one-party rule is a real threat to our democracy.” There was obviously no hope in the Republican Party, Wallace told his radio audience, but even worse, he added, was that “the leadership of the Democratic party would deprive the American people of their rightful opportunity to choose between progress and reaction in 1948.

Beyond depicting the two-party system as a monolithic bloc, Wallace described his opponents as sinister and corrupt. He regarded voting for a president as being forced to pick the lesser of two evils. In his radio address, Wallace told listeners, “Stop saying, ‘I don’t like it but I am going to vote for the lesser of two evils.’ Rather than accept either evil, come out boldly, stand upright as men and women and say so loudly all the world can hear . . . ‘We are voting peace and security for ourselves and our children’s children.’” In *The New Republic,* Wallace added, “It is thus admitted that our choice is between two degrees of evil. Personally, I have yet to be convinced that the welfare of the American people can be served by voting for any degree of evil.” Wallace characterized the “two-party bloc” as taking “the first decisive step on the road toward fascism” due to plans for universal military training. Such strong devil terms could be found elsewhere in his remarks. For instance, Wallace dismissed critics who called him a Communist by claiming they resorted to “Hitlerite methods” of political persuasion. More importantly, though, Wallace argued that Democrats and Republicans served monopoly capitalists. In his radio address, Wallace contended, that the America of old was “betrayed after World War I by forces which found their origin in monopoly capitalism.” He wrote in *The New Republic,* “The fundamental fact is that the directing of this country of ours does not at
present belong to the people, but to a relative handful of wealthy men. The foundation of the government, as presently constituted, is not the general welfare, but the special of industrial and financial giants.” The giants “control both parties,” he noted, and “both major parties serve faithfully the few who own so much at the expense of so many.” Republicans and Democrats were complicit in this conspiracy to rob the people, Wallace contended, “for the primary concern of both parties is for the profits of monopoly.”

The populist nature of the “we/they” distinction in Wallace’s rhetoric could not have been any clearer. The two-party bloc was evil for it resorted to manipulation, and worked exclusively for the wealthiest Americans. At the end of his radio address, Wallace maintained that he wanted to “usher in the century of the common man.” The “people,” he implied, were the heirs of the country’s populist founders. Writing in The New Republic, Wallace noted, “We are speaking once again in the American tongue, fighting monopoly as our fathers have fought it from the time of Jefferson to that of Franklin Roosevelt.” The only way for the populist revolt to succeed, he exclaimed, was when “the American people regain control of their own destiny.”

Ultimately, Henry Wallace’s campaign announcement stood out from announcements by mainstream candidates because he tempered expectations that he could win, identified alternative goals such as providing voters choice and sending a message about the support for peace with the Soviet Union, and lashed out at his opponents with a polarizing style. His announcement, then, was light on hope, and defensive in ways that one would not expect from a presidential contender.

The Announcement Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976)

Eugene McCarthy is best known as the hero of the anti-war movement whose success in the 1968 Democratic primary helped pressure incumbent Lyndon Johnson to drop out of the
race. McCarthy, who served multiple terms in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate until leaving in 1971, returned to the political scene ahead of the 1976 election when he announced an interest in running for president as an independent. McCarthy’s formal announcement was delivered in Madison, Wisconsin on January 13, 1975 to an audience estimated between 400 to 1,200 young adults. In reality, though, McCarthy’s announcement was delivered and re-delivered in the span of at least five months dating back to August 1974 when he was introduced as the honorary chairman of the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency. McCarthy continued to “announce” his campaign well into July 1975, declaring at another stop in Madison, “I have to keep announcing my candidacy because people seem to forget, or the press does, but we’ll keep on doing it until October or November of 1976 at which point we’ll have to be taken more seriously.”

It was clear early on that McCarthy was a presidential contender. At a news conference on August 25, 1974, attorney Patrick Crowley introduced the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency and announced, “Late next year, or early in 1976, it is planned to propose a slate of President and Vice President who will appear on the ballot as Independent candidates, through petitions that have to be filled in the various states. If the Committee decides to ask Senator McCarthy to be the presidential candidate, he has agreed to run.” In his own statement to the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency that same day, McCarthy said, “I am pleased to do what little I can by letting you use my person and whatever reputation I have, either as a candidate or in support of some other who may become the candidate, so that that goal at least in some measure may be achieved in 1976.” When asked by the press why he was only vaguely committing to the race, McCarthy stated, “I might just be John the Baptist. You know, he did a good job. If no one else had shown up, he might have gone ahead with the movement. So that is
sort of our function now.”\(^{460}\) Despite his attempt at ambiguity, the message was clear. As George Will noted about McCarthy’s reference to John the Baptist, “The statement tells you who will have to show up to cause McCarthy to step aside.”\(^{461}\) McCarthy’s announcement became clearer in the months that followed. During an appearance on *CBS Morning News* on October 29, 1974, McCarthy admitted, “Well, I am serious, and I’m a presidential candidate, yes, for 1976.” Furthermore, he said, “I’ve not said I was the, necessarily the ultimate candidate for the committee that we’ve organized, but that, if, when we got to ’76 and they hadn’t found someone better, that I would be the candidate, so I suppose that’s sort of a commitment.”\(^{462}\) By January 13, 1975, months before the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency had planned to select its nominee, McCarthy revealed during his official announcement in Madison, “The committee asked if I would be its candidate, and I answered in the affirmative.”\(^{463}\)

Perhaps because McCarthy was once from the two-party system and had some success before while facing tremendous odds, he was reluctant to surrender so early in the campaign. When asked if he expected to win, for example, McCarthy after his official announcement in Wisconsin responded, “They won in 1776, didn’t they?”\(^{464}\) Yet in other statements, McCarthy seemed to embrace the reality that he would not win. Appearing for the first time with the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, for instance, McCarthy mentioned nothing about winning in 1976, and instead portrayed the campaign as important in “[educating] the public not only about the abuses of the presidency, but the process by which presidential candidates are selected.”\(^{465}\) More generally, like other third party candidates, McCarthy identified his goal as providing choice in the election. “In 1964, there was not choice for many moderate and liberal Republicans in the Goldwater-Johnson election,” McCarthy stated. Moreover, “In ’68 Humphrey
and Nixon surely gave no choice for persons against the war. And in ’72 there was no realistic choice or Nixon wouldn’t have won by such a landslide.”

In his announcement rhetoric, McCarthy supported his campaign by focusing on many of the same issues that were at the heart of his campaign in 1968. Comparing the two elections, he noted, “The basic challenges and the basic problem remain the same.” McCarthy stated, “So we will first talk about the operation of the presidency itself and at the same time talk about the political process.” In McCarthy’s view, presidents had been violating the constitution for years, including Johnson who committed America to fighting in Vietnam, and Nixon who used government agencies for political purposes.

McCarthy also made effort to demonstrate the strength of his campaign. In the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency’s first major press conference, its financial officer Patrick Crowley described the committee as “a new political movement” with “a staff already functioning with an office in Washington.” More importantly, McCarthy added during the press conference, “we have enough money to see us through the next several months.” The committee revealed its financial backers during its first press conference as “William Clay Ford, owner of the Detroit Lions football team; Suzannah B. Happ, of New Hampshire and Washington; Karl Gruhn, president of Tonka Mills, St. Bonifacius, Minn.; and Patrick F. Crowley, Chicago attorney.” With wealthy backers and a committed organization, McCarthy’s camp announced that it hoped to put the independent candidate on the ballot in all 50 states.

Although McCarthy did not directly discuss being a spoiler until after his formal announcement in January 1975, his remarks communicated that he embraced the role. In his announcement in Madison, for example, McCarthy explained that he decided to run as an independent because of the Democratic Party’s “retreat from responsibility” and its tendency to
“hedge and compromise” on major issues. This point became clearer as the campaign advanced toward the summer, with McCarthy telling a crowd at Oregon State University that he was targeting the Democrats in the race because they “are much more to be faulted, since they claim to be the party of initiative, of experimentation, and of courage. And in a way, they have been until recently.” Unfortunately, McCarthy remarked, “They have now begun to talk about moving to the center.” McCarthy’s campaign, then, functioned to disrupt the election and move the Democrats back to the Left.

In fulfilling the final characteristic of third party announcements, McCarthy’s rhetoric contained exaggerated arguments about the problems with the two major parties. McCarthy portrayed the two-party system as a monolithic bloc by claiming that Democrats and Republicans were working together, and against the wishes of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution, to consolidate power and further marginalize third parties. Discussing “proposed legislation for federal funding of campaigns, equal time provisions and candidate-imposed limits on campaign contributions,” McCarthy implied that this was all aimed at further entrenching the two-party system. Furthermore, McCarthy stated, most presidents had violated the Constitution. “I do not think that we have had anything close to a constitutional presidency since that of Harry Truman,” McCarthy argued. Elaborating, he noted, “the constitutional relationships have been eroded – in part, as I said, in the Eisenhower administration and in part in the Kennedy administration and to some degree in the Johnson administration and then even more clearly in the Nixon administration.” Presidents were ignoring the limitations of their Constitutional power, according to McCarthy, because the two major parties has “deified the President.” Portraying the Democrats as being no better than the Republicans on this matter, McCarthy contended, “the Democrats seem to have fallen into the same state of mind; they begin
to talk about how they have to get a candidate, instead of talking about processes and procedures and substantive issues.”

According to this reasoning, then, the majority of Republicans and Democrats had turned their back on the Constitution and given the president too much power, and Eugene McCarthy was the only politician capable of returning the government to the way the founders had designed it.

As Henry Wallace did in his announcement, McCarthy exhibited the basic characteristics of a third party announcement. He made his intentions clear, he at least half-heartedly admitted that he could not win and instead committed his campaign to challenging the systemic oppression of minor parties, and implied that he was proud to play the role of spoiler even though he refused to embrace the label. Moreover, McCarthy indicated that he had enough financial backing and popular support to seriously threaten the two major parties.

The Announcement Rhetoric of Patrick Buchanan (2000)

Pat Buchanan was another political figure with years of experience in the two-party system who eventually became a third party candidate. An ardent conservative, Buchanan was a top adviser to Republican Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan. He was also a well-known news commentator, appearing regularly on The McLaughlin Group and Crossfire. Buchanan embraced the role of the outsider in the 1992 and 1996 campaigns, challenging incumbent George H. W. Bush for the Republican nomination and winning a surprising 38 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary in 1992. In October 1999, well ahead of the 2000 election, Buchanan announced from Falls Church, Virginia that he was resigning from the Republican Party to seek the nomination of the Reform Party, which was created by Ross Perot for the 1996 election. His speech reflects the tradition of third party announcements.
Buchanan left little mystery about his intentions. In the first lines of his speech, he declared, “Today, I am ending my lifelong membership in the Republican Party, and my campaign for its nomination; and I am declaring my intention to seek the nomination of the Reform Party for the presidency of the United States.” With that statement, he became the biggest opponent to many other conservatives rumored to be seeking the Reform Party nomination, including Jesse Ventura, Donald Trump, and John Hagelin.

As with other minor party candidates who have emerged from the two-party system, Buchanan seemed somewhat reluctant to admit that winning was impossible. He never mentioned losing in his announcement, but he also avoided mentioning that he had any chance of beating his opponents. The closest he came to such a statement about his odds of winning was discussion of how an insurgent campaign within the parties was impossible. “Never again,” he stated, “will our political establishment permit a dissident to come as close to capturing a nomination as we did in 1996.” Instead, Buchanan set alternative goals that are often found in third party campaign rhetoric. He explained that his campaign was about providing conservative voters with greater choice in November. “Only the Reform Party,” Buchanan argued, “offers the hope of a real debate and a true choice of destinies for our country.” The problem with the two major parties, he suggested, was that they too frequently agreed on issues that needed more debate. “On foreign and trade policy, open borders and centralized power,” Buchanan argued, “our Beltway parties have become identical twins.” He claimed this was true for several issues, including the country’s participation in NAFTA and the WTO, the war in Serbia, and the development of close relations with China.

Additionally, Buchanan explained that his campaign was about providing a voice for social conservatives. “With our miraculous advances in medicine, science, and technology, none
of us would want to go back to yesterday,” Buchanan stated. However, he added, “But something good has been lost from those years as well: The old patriotism . . . the idea that we Americans are a people who sacrifice and suffer together, and go forward together, the mutual respect, the sense of limits, the good manners; all are gone.” Buchanan spoke of the election being the “last chance to save our republic,” and argued that he was providing a voice for the conservative movement when few other candidates were willing to do so. Rather than committing to winning, then, Buchanan was clearly dedicated to raising awareness of right-wing discontent in order to pressure the Republican Party.

Creating a wedge between his campaign and the Republicans, Buchanan developed strong positions on a few contentious issues. In response to conservative concerns about the war in Bosnia, Buchanan stated, “I pledge to you: I will never send an American army to fight in a foreign war, unless our country is attacked or our vital interests are imperiled.” He also proposed cutting ties to the IMF, claiming, “We Americans are a good and generous people . . . But IMF bailouts of deadbeat dictators must end; and we must phase out foreign aid and start looking out for the forgotten Americans right here in the U.S.A.” There was something more important than all of this, though, Buchanan contended. “But of all the needs of this nation,” he suggested, “none is greater for our peace and happiness than racial reconciliation.” Distinguishing himself as more radical than most conservatives in the election, Buchanan deemed multiculturalism the biggest problem in the country, suggesting that “the backsliding toward hyphenated-Americanism must end.”

Buchanan made few references to the strength of his movement. At most, he alluded to being drafted by his supporters, who he said would wage a fierce campaign. Early in his announcement, Buchanan stated, “‘If we don’t go now, Pat,’ I have been told by loyalists all
across America, ‘every cause for which we fought for seven years will die.’” Contending that he would not let this happen without a fight, Buchanan declared, “So let me say to the money boys and the Beltway elites who think that, at long last, they have pulled up their drawbridge and locked us out forever: You don’t know this peasant army. We have not yet begun to fight.” Yet, this was the extent of Buchanan’s proof that he had the strength to carry on throughout the race. His failure in this respect might partially explain, in addition to his fringe positions, why the Reform Party broke into factions and endorsed two separate candidates.

Buchanan refrained from calling himself a spoiler in his announcement, much as Ralph Nader did in each of his presidential campaigns. In fact, when asked about whether he would spoil the election for Republican George W. Bush, “Buchanan bristled at the thought,” stating that he did not accept that “anybody else who runs is a thief taking it away from those two parties that are entitled to the presidency.” According to Buchanan, he could not be seen as a spoiler if the two-party system itself was already spoiled. He remembered fondly his years as a Republican, starting his speech by admitting, “I will forever cherish the memory of having been perhaps the only Goldwaterite in the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University in 1961.” Continuing, he added, “Nor will I ever regret my nine years of service to Richard Nixon.” Stating that he was thankful to serve with Reagan, too, and that “the Republican party has been good to me,” Buchanan then declared, “Sometimes party loyalty asks too much. And today it asks too much of us.” The two-party system, he concluded, is a “snare and a delusion, a fraud upon the nation.” In that sense, there was nothing left to spoil.

The polarizing nature of Buchanan’s announcement was its most distinguishing characteristic, and reporters quickly noted that “the message was vintage Buchanan: angry,” and that his “wonderful theater” embraced rage instead of “practical solutions to long-ignored
problems.” Buchanan portrayed both parties as the same throughout his remarks, stating for instance, “Our two parties have become nothing but two wings of the same bird of prey.” Both parties, he further insisted, were corrupt and representing the interests of the corporate elite. “Neither party speaks for the forgotten Americans whose jobs were sent overseas,” he argued, and “Both parties are addicted to soft money.” Explaining the system’s ties to “monied interests,” Buchanan stated, “Both write laws with lobbyists looking over their shoulders. Both embrace the unprincipled politics of triangulation.” Candidates from both parties were simply vessels for the special interests, Buchanan claimed. “Candidates of ideas need not apply, as both parties seek out the hollow men, the malleable men, willing to read from teleprompters speeches scripted by consultants and pollsters for whom the latest print-out from the Focus Group is sacred text.” Even worse, Buchanan suggested, both parties conspired to weed out challengers. “They have rearranged the primary schedule,” he noted, “and rigged the game to protect the party favorites.”

Buchanan’s announcement was also polarizing due to its use of devil terms and exaggeration. In conspiratorial language, Buchanan warned his audience that the election was their “last chance to save our republic, before she disappears into the godless New World Order that our elites are constructing in a betrayal of everything for which our Founding Fathers lived, fought, and died.” American democracy had crumbled, he maintained, stating, “I cannot think of a time since Watergate, so poisoned with rancor and hostility, and I don’t know if any president can change that.” The election was also portrayed as an opportunity to stand up to the “tyranny of judges” who governed the country. Exaggerating the state of affairs, Buchanan claimed that “today America is among the most over-taxed, over-regulated, and over-governed societies in history. Our Federal Government collects a fifth of all wealth we produce and controls perhaps
half of it.” Buchanan’s remarks were filled with hyperbole. As with the examples from Henry Wallace and Eugene McCarthy, his announcement was everything that a traditional major party announcement was not, but quite clearly fit the genre of third party announcements.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have suggested that third party presidential candidates violate public expectations of political discourse from the very beginning of the campaign. The traditional norms of announcement rhetoric do not apply to minor party hopefuls, who as a group face daunting barriers ranging from a lack of public visibility, little to no campaign funding, exclusion from public debates and forums with the mainstream candidates, and a widespread belief that voting for their party would be a wasted ballot. Conceding the race before it even begins, these candidates tend to embrace their positions as movement leaders, and disrupt the race in order to raise awareness of various issues and influence the agenda for the remainder of the election. Their announcements are akin to the attack ads usually run in the late stages of campaigns, proving to be shockingly negative and polarizing.

The description of the form and function of third party announcements applies to almost every type of serious third party candidate, whether they are from “true minor parties” or “short-lived parties” or even “non-national significant other parties.” Even though the case studies in this chapter focused on the somewhat high-profile campaigns of Henry Wallace, Eugene McCarthy, and Patrick Buchanan, the framework applies just as clearly to the announcements of lesser-known candidates like Socialist David McReynolds, Libertarian Harry Browne, and Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka.

Admittedly, there are some exceptions to the generic norms that I identified. Announcing his candidacy during an appearance on *Larry King Live* in February 1992, for instance, Ross
Perot expressed a sincere belief that he could win the election if he was on the ballot in all 50 states, and mentioned nothing about being a spoiler or any other goal commonly embraced by third party candidates. However, because the billionaire Perot promised to pay for his own campaign, it was clear that he had the resources that immediately made him a more serious contender in the eyes of the news media. Although he was still unusually polarizing for a challenger, a third party rhetorical style was not as important to his campaign. Precisely because Perot had the resources to compete and his polling indicated the potential for support, his announcement falls into a gray area between announcements of major party candidates and those of third parties. In most ways it was like a major party announcement, but the nature of Perot’s appeal was tied to his idiosyncratic personal style, which meant that in stylistic terms his announcement was similar to that of third party candidates.

In the following two chapters, I demonstrate how third party rhetorical style changes other major genres of campaign discourse for minor party candidates. As the election evolves, and minor party candidates continue to agitate for change, significant campaign moments like the nomination acceptance speech and the concession are similarly utilized to accomplish their unique goals.
Chapter 4

Unconventional: The Variant of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses

Nomination acceptance speeches are often bland and predictable, Kurt Ritter argued, but they “continue to be regarded as vitally important events in presidential campaigns” to the point that they have “become a type of ritual – a ceremony expected and even demanded by the audience.” Political communication and rhetoric scholars have studied the address perhaps more than any other genre of campaign discourse. Nevertheless, these scholars have said very little – in fact, almost nothing – about the nomination acceptance addresses of minor party candidates. It cannot be because these candidates do not give such speeches; for the 2008 election alone, there were at least seven acceptance addresses delivered by third party nominees. And it is not the case that these speeches are irrelevant to the outcome of the election. Of the seven addresses available from 2008, four involved candidates with extensive experience in the two-party system or who had run as potential spoilers in previous presidential races. These speeches were also far from being bland or predictable, as Ritter suggested, and actually stood out for their differences from the traditional acceptance address.

Indeed, those viewing the minor party nomination acceptance addresses in 2008 would have been shocked, if not entertained, by the tendency for candidates to violate generic norms for major party addresses. For example, Green Party nominee Cynthia McKinney demonstrated blatant paranoia throughout her remarks. Notably, she thanked her friend John Judge for sharing top secret documents with her about “the murders of Malcolm X, John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., Bobby Kennedy, COINTELPRO, other government covert operations directed at certain U.S. citizens, and what really happened on 9/11.” McKinney also referred to President
George W. Bush as “an international climate change villain for not signing onto the Kyoto Protocol,” and chastised both parties for “voting to spend 720 million dollars a day on war and occupation, war crimes, and crimes against peace.” The rhetoric of right wing candidates was equally extreme, often influenced by fundamentalism. Alan Keyes, who accepted the nomination of the American Independent Party, argued for a “restoration of the very best aspiration with which this country was founded,” the understanding and recognition of God’s will in a constitutional democracy. Similarly, Constitution Party nominee Chuck Baldwin embraced Christianity in his acceptance, telling the convention audience, “I am here because I think God has led me to this place.” His mission was obvious, he stated: to return the country back to its status as “One nation under God.”

The extreme nature of third party nomination acceptance addresses raises an interesting question: Do speeches like those from the 2008 election cycle violate the norms of the genre, or do they simply represent a different set of norms altogether? In this chapter, I argue that third party nomination acceptance addresses are a variant of the genre of nomination acceptances, and that they differ in both function and form due to the recurring situational barriers and perceived strategic constraints for minor party campaigns. I develop this argument in several sections. First, in order to contextualize the genre, I examine how the acceptance address has evolved to its modern form, and how it fits the design of party conventions. Additionally, I describe both the form and function of traditional nomination acceptance addresses. Second, based on my analysis of over 50 nomination acceptance statements by minor party candidates dating from 1948 to 2008, I describe the function and form of this variant of the genre. Third, in order to better illustrate the elements of third party nomination acceptance addresses, I provide three case studies including the statements of Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond in 1948, Reform Party nominee
Patrick Buchanan in 2000, and Green Party nominee Ralph Nader in 2000. Finally, I end with a brief discussion of the implications that this analysis has for the understanding of third party campaign rhetoric.

Traditional Nomination Acceptance Addresses

The convention stage in the United States is one of the most important periods of the presidential election, but it has changed significantly over time. Trent and Friedenberg noted that at one point conventions were important because “the presidential and vice presidential nominees were selected, the platforms were determined, and even the tone or ‘battle posture’ for the general election campaigns was established.” However, conventions are now more important for their “symbolic or ritualistic functions,” due mostly to the introduction of television to the presidential campaign, the modern reliance on primaries for selecting delegates, and the growing dependence on campaign specialists responsible for candidate strategy throughout the entire election. Consequently, party conventions are now less about democratic deliberation, and more about “putting on the best show.” As political communication scholar Dan Hahn argued, “The purpose of the convention is now not so much to nominate a candidate as to sell the obvious candidate to the public and to weld together the warring factions of the party after the vicious primaries.”

As the process of nominating a candidate has been transformed, so too has the process of candidates accepting that nomination. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, presidential candidates were expected to “stand for the office in dignified silence on the basis of their public record and character,” rather than campaign in public. Consequently, the nomination acceptance address is primarily a modern phenomenon. Candidates as early as the 1830s responded to their nomination with letters of acceptance, communication scholar David Valley
noted, but the statements were “short and were thought to be of little significance.” Gradually, acceptance letters grew longer and began providing “commentary on the platform, in which the nominee would amplify his interpretation of the issues and reinterpret certain planks of the platform.” The genre began shifting to an oral form, starting with Democrat Horatio Seymour in 1868, with the rise of post-convention nomination celebrations. Early addresses were usually delivered at a private residence, and were short and issue-less since deeper discussion of the election was saved for the formal letter. By 1892, with Grover Cleveland’s public address to supporters at Madison Square Garden, the oral form of the acceptance replaced the formal letter, and the form became a longer partisan statement focused on the major issues of the campaign.

The modern form of the address, though, did not begin until Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 became the first to accept the nomination at a party convention. “The candidate-centered campaign certainly did not begin with Roosevelt,” Ellis argued, “but the modern candidate-centered national convention arguably did.” Starting with Roosevelt “[the] duty of the nominee was not to expound upon or even interpret the party platform but rather to tell the party what it should stand for.” Candidates since Roosevelt speak with first-person pronouns more than ever before, and assume the leadership of both the party and the campaign with confidence and eagerness. More importantly, the audience has expanded immensely. Roosevelt’s public performance, Wayne Fields argued, “rested on [his] professed conviction that the general public could understand the most esoteric aspects of national governance and that the most desirable quality a presidential candidate could offer was everyday logic combined with common values.” Rather than serving the purpose of explaining the intricate details of important issues, then, the speech was a call for Americans to rally behind the candidate. As Ellis summarized, “The aim of the acceptance speech became to stir the audience rather than to set out in detail the
nominee’s positions on the issues.” This pattern became increasingly common after 1932, especially with the advent of the televised campaign twenty years later.

In its modern form, the nomination acceptance address fulfills three important functions. First, nomination acceptance addresses function to unite members of the political party following the tribulations of the primary battle. Trent and Friedenberg noted, “the convention is the time when wounds from the primary campaigns can be addressed and healed.” In other words, as Larry David Smith summarized, “a convention converts the individual campaign themes of the winter and spring into the party discourse of the fall.” Therefore, as the most important speech of the campaign, the nomination acceptance address must signal once and for all that all factions of the party are working together to guarantee the ticket’s success in the general election.

Second, presidential nomination acceptance addresses function to legitimize the candidate as the official spokesperson of the party. Trent and Friedenberg argued, “the address is the means through which the candidate publicly assumes the role of a candidate/leader of the party.” In other words, the address is the defining moment in which the nominee emerges from the pack of candidates, receives “prestige and respect,” and as Trent and Friedenberg stated, becomes “something of an American icon.”

Finally, the traditional nomination acceptance address highlights campaign themes. Election after election, Trent and Friedenberg noted, “the acceptance speeches of the nominees have frequently signaled the issues on which they plan to campaign and/or have announced an overall campaign style/plan they intend to follow.” Because the opposition at this point has changed for the candidate, and the audience has switched from primary voters to the general electorate, many of the campaign’s themes and policy positions are designed to prepare for a
different kind of clash. With new slogans and perhaps a more detailed discussion of public policy, the candidate must ultimately “establish contrasting visions of the American Dream that frame the general election campaign.” It is with this web of themes and issue positions, David Timmerman and Larry Smith argued, that the candidate begins to “generate the story lines that provide motives for the partisan action which shall be the campaign.”

Because of the situational constraints and the long established norms of the occasion, those accepting their party’s nomination tend to deliver an address with a consistent rhetorical form. Commenting on the similarity between most of these speeches, Ritter argued that they “rarely include original or enduring public discourse.” The addresses, which he argued constitute the most scripted moment in the campaign, “do not present new themes, as they typically include stock phrases and appeals which the candidate found successful on the stump during the primary campaign.” Although scholars have disagreed about the precise number of common elements in nomination acceptance addresses, there are five substantive characteristics in the genre. First, and most obviously, the candidate ritualistically accepts the party’s nomination and steps into the new role as party leader. Second, the nominee calls for unity in order to secure victory in the general election. This may be accomplished by thanking other candidates for the contributions that they made to a national dialogue during the campaign, or simply for their years of service. Additionally, unity is discussed in terms of common goals for all segments of the party, and in relation to political partnerships that have started to blossom. As Trent and Friedenberg noted, “Calls of this sort may be exceptionally important if the nomination has been bitterly contested.”

A third feature of traditional nomination acceptance addresses is the presentation of a clear vision for America that distinguishes the nominee from his or her opponents. In other
words, nomination acceptance speeches develop reasons for why the nominee and their party are the best choice in the general election. In this regard, Trent and Friedenberg contended, the speaker presents a partisan worldview “suggesting that there is no real choice in [the] election – that their position and party are clearly right and their opponents are clearly wrong.” This point is made in several ways, but usually through a focus on issue positions, guiding philosophy, and personal experience. In discussing policy, nominees discuss past accomplishments, and contrast their party’s achievements with those of the opposing party. Candidates tend also to weigh in, in a more general manner, on major policy debates and align themselves with certain solutions.

Candidates detailing their guiding philosophy identify the values that they see as most important to the American way of life. Explicitly linking these values to the American Dream, the worldviews proposed by each party are steeped in opposing ideologies. As rhetoric scholar Ray D. Dearin suggested, “One of the sharpest demarcations between the ideologies of the two parties has been the emphasis placed by the Republicans on individualism and private initiative, while the Democrats have stressed the idea of community and the building of a just humane society.” In Ronald Reagan’s acceptance speech in 1980, Henry Scheele argued for example, the nominee based his campaign on the values of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom.

The tendency for nominees to use details from their biography to demonstrate their fitness for office, but more importantly their ability to carry out the vision they describe, is a more recent development in the genre. Once the conventions were televised and viewed by a mass audience, Trent and Friedenberg noted, candidates began “[comparing] themselves with their opponents to a greater degree than ever before” and their own biography played a more
important role.\textsuperscript{518} As Trent and Friedenberg remarked, “Often, the biographical sections of their acceptance addresses are used to contrast themselves with their opponents, and hence to make implicit, if not explicit, attacks on their foes.”\textsuperscript{519}

A fourth substantive characteristic of nomination acceptance addresses is a ceremonial style. With the whole country watching, the nominee utilizes language that fits the formal occasion. William Benoit argued, for example, that the speeches often feature diction that is “distinctive and figurative through the use of metaphor and allegory,” and the composition resorts frequently to inverted word order.\textsuperscript{520} Theodore Sheckels added that nominees typically use “extended schemes more dramatically . . . to seem more eloquent” to the audience.\textsuperscript{521} While still present, this ceremonial style in nomination acceptance addresses seems to be slightly declining. Since Harry Truman’s nomination speech, Fields contended, there have been more candidates willing to address their audience with a vernacular that sounds at times more like “what regular folks might say among themselves.”\textsuperscript{522}

Finally, traditional nomination acceptance addresses usually contain an overall positive tone. Nominees still use “harsh and uncompromisingly partisan language” to “suggest that there is no real choice in [the] election – that their position and party are clearly right and their opponents are clearly wrong.”\textsuperscript{523} However, the overall tone of acceptance speeches has become more positive over time, with the candidate using surrogates to function as the “attack dog.”\textsuperscript{524} This shift in the genre came when conventions began being televised. As Hahn argued, “It soon became evident that while positive repetition might sell cigarettes, negative repetition is not an acceptable method for selling politicians.”\textsuperscript{525} This has been confirmed by various scholars who have discovered that negative attacks in nomination acceptance addresses are present yet minimal.\textsuperscript{526}
The Genre of Third Party Nomination Acceptance Addresses

Although the nomination acceptance speech has been perceived as a genre with a consistent form and function, several communication scholars have recognized that the content of the address may vary slightly depending on the context and the candidate giving the speech. After discussing the formal elements of the genre, for instance, Trent and Friedenberg wrote, “Which of these . . . strategies will dominate an acceptance address is largely a function of the specific situation in which that address is being delivered.” Furthermore, Benoit found that the strategies would likely differ depending on whether the candidate was an incumbent or challenger, leading him to conclude that “a single generic description of acceptance addresses” would be inappropriate” because it would ignore “important and interesting factors.” Extending these arguments, I propose that whether the nominee comes from the two-party system or a third party will shape the formal characteristics of the nomination acceptance address. Because third party candidates have very different rhetorical constraints than their major party counter-parts, I argue that both the function and form of the genre are different as well.

Before understanding the minor party nomination acceptance address as a variant of the genre, it is necessary to realize that the speech is not as important for third party candidates as it is for their major party counterparts. Ritter noted that “it would be unthinkable for a political convention to eliminate the acceptance speech, despite the circumstance that the candidate’s nomination is as predictable as his address.” However, there are many reasons why the speech is not as important for third parties. The most obvious reason is that the candidate could be running as an Independent, rather than as a party’s nominee. Thus, prominent Independent candidates like Eugene McCarthy in 1976, John Anderson in 1980, and Ross Perot in 1992 had no party conventions. Second, high-profile minor party candidates sometimes decide against
holding conventions because the party was created solely for their candidacy and they fear that they might lose control to a rival faction if they convene. Such was the case for George Wallace who created the American Independent Party ahead of the 1968 election as a vehicle for his own campaign. Eventually deciding against holding the convention that he had once promised, Wallace explained, “You get a big bunch of folks together like that, there’ll always be a few who’ll try to take the thing over.” Finally, some candidates do not give formal acceptance speeches because their parties have so few supporters and such a small budget that a major convention is not worth the burden. For example, although the Prohibition Party continued to convene long after its cause was lost, its convention in 2004 nominated perennial candidate Earl Dodge in his living room, where he simply thanked the few people in attendance but said little more. Ultimately, nomination acceptance speeches are most common among serious splinter party candidates and those from true minor parties like the Green Party, Libertarian Party, and the Reform Party. Those who do not campaign or work in an organized party structure have no need for the genre.

For those minor party candidates who deliver a nomination acceptance address, the speech serves four important functions. Above all, the speech introduces the third party movement to the public in one of the few moments in the campaign that the news media may cover one of its events. The voting public knows very little about third party candidates, as I argued in the first chapter, because the parties receive little attention in the news media and usually lack the campaign resources to buy advertising time. Third parties are also ephemeral in that they tend to disappear after a few election cycles. Even parties that have run candidates in many consecutive elections, however, need to reintroduce themselves because they are often re-organized from scratch and committed to a different purpose depending on which candidate
assumes leadership of the movement. For instance, the Reform Party led by Ross Perot, who focused on fiscal issues in 1996, was not the same party when social conservative Patrick Buchanan took its reins in 2000. A second function is that the minor party nomination acceptance address highlights the important policy issues and themes of the ticket. This is the same purpose for major party acceptance speeches, yet the issue positions are more radical and the policy proposals are sometimes designed to create a public spectacle. Third, because the success of minor party candidates often hinges on grassroots support and their ability to appeal to voters fed up with the two-party system, their convention speech should try to polarize the audience in order to persuade them to join the movement as activists. Fourth, in order to encourage the media to cover their campaign throughout the election, minor party candidates often use the speech to indicate how they are a serious threat to the two-party horse race.

Since nomination acceptance addresses serve a different purpose for minor party candidates than for their major party opponents, and because their campaigns must overcome different situational constraints, third party nomination acceptance speeches contain a rhetorical form that is both similar to and different from the ritualistic acceptances of their opponents. In specific, third party candidates: accept their nomination, offer a vision of America that is more extreme than that proposed by their major party counterparts, justify their campaign by describing it in some way as a continuation of the mission of the country’s founders, and address the electorate’s concerns that voting for a third party is a wasted ballot, all while using a polarizing style to appeal to those likely to feel alienated by the two-party system.

First, minor party candidates responding to their party’s nomination accept their new role. The acceptance is sometimes implied, but most serious candidates are more direct. Appearing at the Progressive Party’s National Convention in 1948, Henry Wallace stated, “I tell
you frankly that in obtaining the nomination of the Progressive Party, a nomination I accept with pride, I have made commitments.” At the end of his speech, Wallace concluded, “and I am committed to accept and do accept the support of those who favor the program for peace I have outlined here; the support of all those who truly believe in democracy.”

In the same year, Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson announced at his party’s convention in Winona Lake, Indiana, “It is with deep appreciation and a spirit of humility that I come before you today to accept the nomination of the Prohibition Party as its Presidential candidate.”

More recently, in 2004, Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka stated in his convention speech, “I am proud and honored and humbled to accept the nomination of the Constitution Party for the Office of President of the United States.”

The second characteristic of minor party nomination acceptance speeches is a vision for America based on public policy positions and values that tend to be more extreme than those of the Democrats and Republicans. For right-wing third parties, this vision is often grounded in a Christian faith. Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson in 1948, for example, swore that he would “strive with all my might in behalf of the Christian endeavor in which I am proud to be a part.” Regarding God as his guiding light, Watson expressed appreciation for being able “to carry the banner of this glorious cause and this fight for righteousness, justice, and Christian democracy.”

A commitment to Christianity led Constitution Party nominee Howard Phillips in 2000 to call for ending the legal practice of abortion, while Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka in 2004 embraced policies linked to God, Family, and the Republic.

Right-wing candidates who consider themselves fiscal conservatives have grounded their vision for America in the individualistic version of the American Dream. Reform Party nominee Ross Perot in 1996, for example, argued that he wanted “to make sure that some other kid who’s
a nobody from nowhere has [the] same opportunity” that he had to live the American Dream by moving to the top of corporate America. The pursuit of happiness, these candidates have routinely declared, requires smaller government and lower taxes. Charles Jay of the Boston Tea Party in 2008 stated a commitment to “decreasing the size, scope and power of an all-too powerful government and increasing liberty and freedom for all Americans.” The same themes are common in most Libertarian rhetoric. In 1980, Libertarian Ed Clark spoke of fighting inflation, protecting individual liberty, and improving energy policy in America, but proposed “a massive tax cut program.” In a similar vein, Harry Browne accepted his party’s nomination in 2000 and stated that he “promised every individual the freedom to pursue his own dreams.” Furthermore, he argued, “No one will stick a number on you. No one will extort a percentage of your income as the price of getting a job. You will be free to pursue the life you’ve always dreamed of.” As such, Browne lobbied for abolishing the income tax and Social Security, ending the War on Drugs, and protecting gun owners’ rights in all conditions.

Candidates from the far left have been equally committed to an ideological view of the world, maintaining an agenda of peace and social justice. Henry Wallace, for example, spoke longingly about how when Franklin Roosevelt was president “everyone of us held a dream.” Elaborating, Wallace suggested, “everyone of us dreamed of a time when the sound of peace would come back to the land, and there would be no more fear, and men would begin to build again.” This commitment to peace led to his promise of dropping “get tough” policy toward the Soviet Government in favor of negotiations, strengthening the United Nations, improving work conditions, pursuing desegregation, and breaking up corporate monopolies. Other progressive minor party candidates like Vincent Hallinan, Ralph Nader, and Cynthia McKinney have stated similarly idealistic liberal worldviews.
Third, minor party candidates often justify their role as outsiders, thus making a case for the seriousness of their campaign, by describing their political movements as a continuation of the efforts of America’s Founding Fathers. At the Progressive Party convention in 1948, nominee Henry Wallace told his audience that they were convening to “[talk] to the people of the United States and the world on behalf of the everlasting principles of the founding fathers of the country.” It had been 150 years, Wallace noted, since Thomas Jefferson was attacked in Philadelphia “because he spoke courageously for the peaceful settlement of alleged differences between the United States and France.”542 Wallace’s plea for peace with the Soviet Union was treated as an extension of Jefferson’s righteous mission.543 Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson in 1948 drew parallels between his religious conviction and the intention of America’s forefathers. Quoting the reference to the Creator in the Declaration of Independence, Watson told his audience, “[you] and I believe in God and in the principles upon which the Declaration of Independence was founded. And we reject now and forever the materialistic conception that denies God and the spirituality of mankind.” In voting for him, Watson concluded, the electorate would be following the example of America’s religious founders.544

An explicit comparison between one’s third party movement and the Founding Fathers is extremely common in minor party enactments of the genre. Libertarian Roger MacBride told his party’s convention in 1976 that they would “wage a presidential campaign the likes of which the nation hasn’t seen since Thomas Jefferson carried the day for libertarian ideas in 1800.”545 Even clearer, Libertarian Ed Clark told those at his convention in 1980 that his campaign was standing on the shoulders of “Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams, of Patrick Henry, of Thomas Jefferson and Tom Paine.” Moreover, he argued, “As our nation enters the last decades of the twentieth century, we are the keepers of their ideas. And we hold a great responsibility, because I
125

believe – in all honesty – that we are their only heirs today.” Constitution Party nominee Howard Phillips referenced many of the same historical figures in his acceptance speech in 2000, stating, “We are the party of George Washington, of Thomas Jefferson, of John Adams and James Madison – of George Mason and of Patrick Henry. We are the only party which offers the American people the opportunity in the year 2000 to reaffirm the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the strictures of the Constitution of the United States.”

Speaking of the Founders’ commitment to Christianity, Phillips added, “My prayer is that Almighty God will bless our launch of this campaign just as He blessed the inauguration of the Presidency of George Washington so that we may, indeed, be instruments of His will at the end of the 20th Century, just as was George Washington at the end of the 18th Century.”

Fourth, minor party nomination acceptance addresses contain a justification for voting for the candidate, especially to counter the belief that it would be a wasted ballot. Claude Watson told convention goers in 1948 that voting for the Prohibition Party was “the most powerful weapon any Christian has in a democracy.” Elaborating on this point, Watson added, “you do not lose your vote simply because you vote for someone who may not be elected to office. You lose your vote when you do not vote your God-given convictions as to what this country would be if all the other voters voted just like you.”

Addressing voters concerned that he would not win in 1952, Progressive Party nominee Vincent Hallinan argued, “We can win if we get enough votes to instruct whichever party is elected that the American people want peace. If you want an end to the war in Korea and an enduring peace . . . vote your convictions . . . and you may win.” Explaining the alternative, Hallinan noted, “But, if you vote for Eisenhower or Stevenson – then, no matter which one is elected, you can’t win.” Voting for principle rather than voting pragmatically is the argument that many of these candidates make in response to the “wasted
ballot” belief. Howard Phillips of the Constitution Party told his supporters in 2000, “[if you] fail to vote for what you believe to be right . . . then you can no longer blame the professional politicians, the well-heeled lobbyists, or the Left-wing media for a policy outcome which you fervently oppose.”

Finally, minor party nomination acceptance addresses feature a polarizing and frank style that far exceeds the partisanship in similar speeches by major party candidates. In 1948, Progressive Henry Wallace labeled the Truman administration a “great betrayal” of Franklin Roosevelt’s legacy, because “Into the Government came the ghosts of the great depression, the banking house boys and the oil well diplomats.” Wallace insisted that the two-party system was contaminated, by declaring, “We ally ourselves to stand against the kings of privilege who own the old parties – the corrupted parties.” The demonization of the major parties was also clear in Prohibition Party nominee Claude Watson’s acceptance, delivered during the same summer. Watson told supporters at his convention, “The time has come for the Christian people of the United States to join in a crusade to restore moral, Christian leadership to this nation and to overthrow the evil, antisocial forces that have been too long in control.”

Constitution Party nominee Michael Peroutka in 2004 made a similar attack on the two-party system, chastising Democrats and Republicans for sending “mothers and Daughters and wives and sisters to fight and bleed and die [in] its foreign . . . undeclared wars.” Furthermore, Peroutka attacked the major parties for supporting “sodomites,” torturing and executing “more than one million of [the country’s] unborn every year,” and backing public policies that “come straight from the Communist Manifesto.” In a slew of negative attacks, Green Party nominee Cynthia McKinney stated in her acceptance speech that the two parties were running a “racket.” Clarifying her criticism, McKinney stated, “the racket is about war crimes, torture, crimes
against the peace; the racket is about crimes against the Constitution, crimes against the American people, and crimes against the global community.\textsuperscript{555} Rather than leave the harsh attacks against opponents to surrogates, third party candidates embrace vitriolic political rhetoric in their own addresses.

Encountering different situational and perceived strategic constraints, serious third party candidates often use their nomination acceptance speeches to introduce their party and the themes of their campaign, while reaching out to alienated voters and persuading the news media that they are worthy of coverage. Their addresses resemble those of their major party opponents in that they accept the nomination and offer a vision for the country, but the similarities stop there. Third party candidates accepting their party’s nomination often propose extreme solutions to political problems, justify their campaign by comparing its goals to the aims of the Founding Fathers, explain why they should receive support despite an inevitable loss, all while speaking in a polarizing style that can potentially move certain sympathizers to become their foot soldiers.

Third Party Nomination Acceptance Speeches: Three Case Studies

The substantive characteristics of minor party nomination acceptance addresses are present in most examples of the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the acceptance speeches of three minor party candidates: National States’ Rights Party nominee Strom Thurmond in 1948, Reform Party nominee Patrick Buchanan in 2000, and Green Party nominee Ralph Nader in 2000. Each of the candidates enacted the genre perhaps as closely as one ever could.

The Nomination Acceptance Address of Strom Thurmond (1948)

President Harry Truman’s advocacy for civil rights legislation in 1948 to address lynching, poll taxes, and segregation drew the ire of many Southern politicians. By the beginning
of February that year, Truman was given an ultimatum by the Conference of Southern Governors to “cease attacks on white supremacy” within 40 days or else risk a political revolt.556

Convening after the 40 days passed, the association pledged to oppose Truman in the 1948 presidential election. Several Southern governors asked Democratic state conventions to instruct national convention delegates to walk out of the Philadelphia gathering if a civil rights plank were added to the Democratic Party’s platform. When this happened, the Dixie Democrats created the National States’ Rights Party and nominated a ticket headed by South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond. At first, Thurmond claimed that he expected to win, and would run in every state.557 By the time that he accepted his nomination at the new party’s national convention, it became apparent that his candidacy would simply be regional.558 His acceptance speech exhibits all of the characteristics of third party acceptance addresses.

Thurmond’s address featured several statements in which he accepted the role as the new party’s leader. He expressed a “great honor and a great responsibility” in being chosen to “lead in this fight to preserve the freedom secured by our forefathers.”559 At the end of his remarks, Thurmond clearly stated, “With humility, with the knowledge that the greatness of the cause must overshadow all its servants, I accept the nomination for President, and promise an utter dedication to the limit of all power that is within me.” In this way, his acceptance was like any other delivered by a nominee from the two-party system.

Identifying the important issues of the campaign, Thurmond made it clear that the States’ Rights Party existed to revolt against the Federal Government’s plans for civil rights legislation. Thurmond declared, “The preservation of the prerogatives of the people of a sovereign state, to deal exclusively with domestic problems . . . [is] just as vital as, and more intimately [affects] the welfare of every man, woman and child in America than . . . all other serious questions which we
face today.” Thurmond then applied this position to several policy debates related to civil rights. The Federal Anti-Poll Tax Bill, he contended, allowed Congress to invade “the power of the states to elect their own officials and would control elections within the states by taking this power from the people.” In reference to anti-lynching legislation, he suggested, “the Reds, the Pinks, and the Subversives are making use of the horror which the American people hold for this form of murder to try to change our system of government.” Thurmond also addressed Truman’s desire for desegregation, arguing ultimately that “The people in a local community have the right to use the means and the methods that will best promote harmonious racial relations.” Regarding the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), which made discrimination in matters of employment illegal, Thurmond used the same argument he used elsewhere in the speech. He explained that local businesses should be able to make decisions that relate to their own establishments, without the interference of government.

Like other third party candidates accepting a nomination, Thurmond placed the movement in the context of the Founding Fathers. The South, he claimed, “stands at a crossroads in American history.” Given the choice between “greater centralization of political power in the Federal Government” and the preservation of states’ rights, he argued, “We favor the latter road, and sound a call for the preservation of constitutional government in America.” By selecting this path, Thurmond claimed, his party was choosing to follow “Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Jackson,” who “were great presidents” who “championed states rights and stood immovable for constitutional government.” According to Thurmond, protecting states’ rights was the best way to protect the constitution, and defend “the American way of life” established by the country’s forefathers.
With it becoming increasingly clear that his party would only be a factor in the South, Thurmond explained why his candidacy still mattered, suggesting that his party provided a voice for ignored voters. “There are millions of Americans who subscribe to the principles we are fighting for,” Thurmond argued. Continuing, he suggested, “The voice of these people must be heard. We want them heard through the Democratic organizations in each state, if those organizations will make it possible for them to be heard.” In other words, Thurmond considered his candidacy as the only way to send the two-party system a powerful message. The governor exclaimed, “Dewey offers no hope to a voter who believes in States Rights and constitutional government. Truman offers you no hope.” Even worse, he concluded, “Wallace has destroyed any hope of his doing anything but following the communist party line.”

Finally, Thurmond’s nomination acceptance address contained a polarizing rhetorical style that drew attention from the news media and his southern target audience. By describing the election as a battle between those who favor “greater centralization of political power in the Federal Government” and those who favor the Constitutional “division of governmental sovereignty between the states and the Federal Government,” Thurmond framed his speech with an artificial dichotomy. The Democratic Party had turned its back on the Constitution, he claimed, by adopting “a program of mis-named Civil Rights, calling for all of the fundamentals of a police state in this country.” Disparaging the motives of Truman, Dewey, and Wallace, Thurmond described their choice to advocate for civil rights as a commitment “to make a shambles of constitutional government in America in exchange for a block of disgruntled votes.”

Thurmond’s polarizing style went beyond over-simplifying the ideas of his political opponents as he described them repeatedly with the use of obvious devil terms. Democrats and Republicans in favor of civil rights legislation were simply dictators, the nominee argued. The
National States’ Rights Party was described as fighting the “absolute and unqualified denial of a totalitarian state in the United States.” In other words, Thurmond suggested, violating states’ rights was akin to throwing “overboard the compass that has guided us to the port of greatness,” a decision that would mean the country was “headed for the rocks of totalitarianism and the persecution and cruelties of a totalitarian state.” This argument was foregrounded throughout the entire address. The Truman administration’s claim to be protecting “human rights,” Thurmond contended, resembled the efforts of European fascists. He stated, for instance, “Hitler offered the people of Germany a shortcut to human progress. He gained power by advocating human rights for minority groups.” Because the result was horrifying, he argued, “We oppose these disciples of political expediency who today emulate Hitler and who offer the ill-fated European experiment.” Drawing comparisons to another totalitarian regime, the governor suggested it was no coincidence that “Russia is ruled from Moscow” and that America’s “federal police state [is] directed from Washington.” For anyone missing the point, Thurmond made himself clear. The FEPA, he stated, “was patterned after a Russian law written by Joseph Stalin about 1920.”

The rhetorical patterns in third party nomination acceptance speeches were clearly present in Strom Thurmond’s address. He accepted the nomination and thanked those who supported him as the party’s new leader. Secondly, he identified violations of states’ rights as the main issue in his campaign, and applied it to several proposals coming out of the two-party system. After likening his movement of southerners to America’s revolutionary leaders, he explained that his party’s potential to win was not as important as being heard by Democrats and Republicans. Thurmond’s style was polarizing and demonstrated that he did not have the temperance to be America’s leader.
Pat Buchanan’s road to winning the nomination of the Reform Party was not as easy as he might have expected. Seeking the party’s $12 million in campaign funds secured by Perot’s success in 1996, Buchanan was challenged by physicist-turned-politician John Hagelin of the Natural Law Party for the nomination. The party eventually split into two factions, but Buchanan won a ruling from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that gave him both Perot’s money and the ballot line for the Reform Party. However, Buchanan was only polling between one and two percent nationally. His address, then, served an important function in re-introducing his message. Buchanan’s acceptance address, a few weeks before the decision by the FEC, was what Helen Kennedy of the New York Daily News called a “fire-and-brimstone speech,” and as such a classic example of a third party nomination acceptance address.

Beginning his speech with a simple acceptance, Buchanan then identified the central themes of his campaign. He asked: “Where are we going? How are we Americans using all this wealth, power, and freedom? Are we still God’s country? What about the forgotten Americans of Philadelphia?” In answering these questions, and providing solutions to what he perceived to be America’s greatest problems, Buchanan took positions that were isolationist and both fiscally and socially conservative. Regarding America’s military involvement in Kosovo, Buchanan stated, “Friends, I am called many names. Isolationist is one of the sweeter ones.” Under his leadership, Buchanan argued, “we will not longer squander the blood of our soldiers fighting other countries’ wars or the wealth of our people paying other countries’ bills. The Cold War is over; it is time to bring America’s troops home.” Recounting a story about a Serb-American complaining about her parents’ deaths as the result of American bombing, Buchanan asked, “Why did we do this? Why did we bomb this little country for 78 days when it never threatened
or attacked the United States?” Buchanan added, “We will reclaim every lost ounce of American sovereignty.” Elaborating further, he stated, “We will lead this country out of the WTO, our of the IMF, and I will personally tell Kofi Annan: Your U.N. lease has run out; you will be moving out of the United States.”

Buchanan’s preference for a simplistic, emotionally-driven response extended to major social issues as well. On the issue of civil rights, he stated, “I knew the old leaders of that movement, and while I did not always agree with their tactics, I respected them.” However, he argued, “today’s agenda has nothing to do with civil rights, and everything to do with special privileges. No discrimination means to me: no discrimination; not against anyone because of color or creed.” As most social conservatives of his era, Buchanan also stated his position on abortion. He stated, “When Supreme Court vacancies open up, only constitutionalists who respect the inalienable right of life of all Americans and our religious heritage will be nominated.” In essence, Buchanan took a far-right position on every issue. As the major parties nominated two candidates who appeared to be centrists, his identity as the arch-conservative clearly gave him more ground to convert disenchanted Republicans.

As with most third party acceptance speeches, Buchanan’s statement contained a clear comparison between the Reform Party and the Founding Fathers in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of his movement. Complaining about America’s direction, Buchanan stated, “Friends, I am ashamed to say it, but we have begun to behave like the haughty British empire our fathers rose up against and threw out of this country.” Connecting the dots, Buchanan continued, “That, then, is what our party, our campaign, and our cause are all about. We are Americans who say with our fathers: To hell with empire; we want our country back.”
With the polls suggesting that Buchanan would have little influence on the election, it was crucial that he explain why a vote for his ticket was not a wasted ballot. He argued that the Reform Party was a place for alienated conservatives to go in order to send a message to the Republican Party. “For years,” Buchanan stated, “we have all heard that familiar taunt: Don’t worry about them; they have nowhere else to go.” Continuing this point he remarked, “Well, guess what? We have somewhere else to go. At long last, we have a home of our own.” The Reform Party was depicted as being more than just a place of refuge, though. According to Buchanan, voting for his ticket would force the Republican Party to clean up its act. Explaining his intentions, Buchanan stated that he decided to accept the nomination of the Reform Party “Because there has to be one party that has not sold its soul for soft money. There has to be one party that will stand up for our sovereignty and stand by our workers who are being sacrificed on the altar of the global economy.” In other words, Buchanan was providing voters an opportunity to not only vote their conscience, but to remain pure by refusing to vote for the corrupt major parties.

Finally, Pat Buchanan’s acceptance speech exhibited a polarizing rhetorical style that was well adapted to a sound-bite obsessed news media. At times, he labeled George W. Bush as a political clown. Recounting one of Bush’s more embarrassing moments on the campaign trail, Buchanan repeated the Texas governor’s statement about education, “Is our children learning?” Poking fun again at perceptions of Bush being unintelligent, Buchanan stated, “Bill Clinton understands this issue of sovereignty. Al Gore, he understands it. George W., he doesn’t understand it; but, don’t worry, he is still being home-schooled by Condoleeza Rice.” Buchanan also embraced a polarizing style by labeling his political opponents as ungodly. He was the only candidate, he suggested, willing to rescue “America’s unborn children, another million of whom
will die this year without ever seeing the light of day.” His old party was doing nothing, he suggested. “Republicans may be running away from life,” he argued, “but as long as there is life left in me, I will never run away – because their cause is my cause, and their cause is God’s cause.” Instead, he argued, his opponents supported policies that murdered innocent humans. Buchanan attacked the major parties for selling the country “down the river into some godless New World Order.” Where was all of this heartless policy taking the country? According to Buchanan, too many innocent people were being sacrificed and America had lost what made it great.

Satisfying all of the characteristics of the genre of third party acceptance addresses, Buchanan’s speech contained an acceptance of his party’s nomination, followed by a radically conservative vision of where the country needed to be heading. Just like any third party candidate trying to combat perceptions that their campaign was extreme, Buchanan compared the Reform Party to America’s revolutionaries and insisted that his ticket was worth a vote because it would steer the country back to its constitutional foundations. His polarizing style was a part of his public persona, but it simultaneously satisfied the requirement of ignored third parties to turn heads with shocking language.

The Nomination Acceptance Address of Ralph Nader (2000)

Following a minimalist campaign in 1996, Ralph Nader had gained popularity by the time he accepted the nomination of the Green Party on June 25, 2000. At this point, Nader was receiving upwards of 6 percent of the public’s support according to some national polls, and his message was resonating with enough voters that Green Party members were confident he could change their reputation as a fringe party. Although it was clear that Nader would not win the general election, he was quickly becoming an important factor in the race. Phil Jones of CBS
Evening News, for instance, stated, “Now polls show Nader drawing enough votes to possibly kill Al Gore’s chances of winning.” With the news media following his campaign at least to some extent, and with voters growing increasingly curious about his message, Nader delivered a speech that contained all of the main elements of a typical third party nomination acceptance address.

First, Nader unequivocally accepted his nomination. Addressing “all Americans who seek a new direction, who yearn for a new birth of freedom to build the just society” and “who wish to build a deep democracy by working hard for a regenerative, progressive politics,” Nader announced, “I welcome and am honored to accept your nomination for president of the United States.”

With the Green Party being somewhat new to the political scene, Nader spent a good deal of time in his acceptance address describing his campaign’s vision for America. Arguing that Americans once had succeeded in battling corporate power, Nader said “that the shift of power is extremely critical to a democratic society.” Quoting Louis Brandise, Nader said, “We can have a democratic society, or we can have the concentration of great wealth in the hands of the few.” In a line he repeated throughout his campaign, Nader stated, “The Green Party stands for a nation and a world that consciously advances the practice of this deep democracy, a deep democracy that facilitates people’s best efforts to achieve social justice; a sustainable and bountiful environment; and an end to systematic bigotry and discrimination against people just because they’re different.” In other words, “Green goals place community, and community and self-reliance, over dependency on even larger and more absentee giant corporations.” The Nader campaign was really about allowing peoples’ “right to participate in power, to shape their own communities, countries, world.” Unfortunately, he added in more cynical terms, “Because our
democracy is underdeveloped, there is little accountability. The corporate commercialization of our country, our government, our universities, our schools, our youngsters, our very expectation levels.”

Defending his third party movement by tying it to the Founding Fathers, Nader explicitly discussed his outsider campaign in terms of the American Revolution. “In the past,” he declared, “citizens who had participated in this country’s social justice movements faced deep concentration of . . . of power and overcame them.” Clarifying, Nader stated, “The sources of civic motivation come very often from the heroics of our forebearers.” The Green Party’s example went all the way back in American history. “Common themes occur,” he suggested, “from the revolution of 1776 against King George III’s empire; to the anti-slavery drives and the women suffrage movements of the 19th century; to the farmer’s revolt against the big banks and the big insurance companies and big railroads that began in the late 19th century.” All of these acts of protest, Nader pointed out, “took on excessive power, pressed for relinquishment or sharing of this power, despite vigorous opposition by elements of the dominant business community.” Suggesting that his campaign would was necessary, from a historic perspective, Nader added, “When citizens and Torie merchants in the Revolutionary War lost – when citizens won and content slave-holders lost, and corporations were compelled to share that power with the people they oppressed or excluded, America was a better place as a result.” Clearly, Nader linked his campaign to important movements dating back to the Founders.

Confronted with the problem that his campaign was unlikely to win, and that potential supporters could view his ticket as a wasted ballot, Nader explained the significance of his candidacy in terms of providing choice where none existed. More importantly, for Nader the campaign was about building a new movement against corporate power to strengthen local
communities across America. “The people of this country have options,” Nader argued. Continuing, he added, “There are more citizen organizations and individuals knocking on the doors of their governments than a government responding. This means we must persist until we prevail.” Activists were organizing for a dream, he explained, stating, “This campaign is about strengthening our Republic with ‘liberty and justice for all’ so that freedom is defined as participation in power: power to solve our problems and diminish our injustices that cause such pain and stultify so many Americans and their children.” Support for the Green Party was described as sending a powerful message, and continuing a “progressive political movement” that liberates “wisdom, judgment, experience, creativity and idealism.” As Nader explained in ending his speech, “By debating, phoning, e-mailing, and marching during the next four months, we the people will grow a new political start, a green planet pushing up between the two fossil parties.” Thus, according to Nader, the election was just a beginning rather than an end.

Finally, Nader’s speech contained the same polarizing style common in third party nomination acceptance addresses. Throughout his comments, Nader created a dichotomy between community and corporate power, between “the people” and “Big Business.” Corporations, he explained, had stripped many social movements of political power over the last several decades. “Over the past 20 years,” he noted, “after having to give up a little in the 1960s and 70s to the various populous movements,” big business “has generated its own brand of wreckage, propaganda, and ultimatums on American labor, consumerists, taxpayers, and most generically, American voters.” As a result, he remarked, “Big business has been colliding with American democracy, and American democracy has been losing on all too many fronts.” By positioning the two-party system against the interests of “the people” and in favor of this dangerous “corporate power,” Nader described Democrats and Republicans as a monolithic
opposition. “Over the next four and one half months,” he suggested, “this campaign must challenge the campaigns of the Bush and Gore duopoly in every locality by running with the people.” By reducing corporations and the major political parties to one single entity and depicting its actions as ultimately oppressive, Nader sought not only to identify with those feeling alienated from traditional politics, but to provide them with a clear choice in the 2000 election.

Nader’s speech illustrates that the characteristics of third party nomination acceptance addresses are as present in the remarks of a candidate on the far-left as they are in similar statements by candidates on the far-right. Just like Strom Thurmond in 1948 and Pat Buchanan in 2000, Nader accepted his nomination in a ceremonial fashion, offered a vision of America that was far more extreme than that of his opponents in the two-party system, all while defending his campaign as a natural extension of the efforts of the country’s Founding Fathers. Also like the other candidates, Nader recognized that losing was inevitable, and sought to motivate voters by identifying alternative goals and offering such a polarized view of the election that any sympathizer would think twice before casting a ballot for the Democrat or Republican nominees.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that third party presidential candidates encounter a series of situational and perceived strategic constraints that shape their nomination acceptance addresses. Consequently, the speeches are utilized to agitate for change, and follow a recurring form in which the candidate accepts the nomination, offers an extreme vision of America, grounds their cause in the efforts of the country’s founders, and addresses concerns that they will not win, all while using the polarizing style characteristic of their rhetoric in general.
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that conventional wisdom about the communication practices of political candidates does not hold up for those on the fringes. Generic norms based on the analysis of major party candidates fail to apply to the different circumstances and goals for the minor party candidates. In the next chapter, I demonstrate further how third party rhetorical style changes another significant genre of campaign discourse, the concession statement.
Celebration over the historic outcome of America’s 2008 election overshadowed perhaps one of the most awkward moments in the final hours of a presidential campaign. As the results of exit polls began being reported, four-time presidential candidate Ralph Nader appeared in an interview with Shepard Smith from Fox News to concede the race and address the victory of Democrat Barrack Obama. Smith, however, started the interview by playing a clip from Nader’s concession rhetoric earlier in the day where he stated, “To put it very simply, he is our first African-American president, or he will be. And we wish him well. But his choice is whether he’s to be Uncle Sam for the people of this country or Uncle Tom for the giant corporations.” Smith was horrified by what he saw as a racist tone in Nader’s comment and after asking the candidate if he regretted the statement was told that Obama “turned his back on 100 million poor people in this country, African-Americans, and Latinos, and poor whites.” Continuing, Nader defiantly maintained, “And we’re going to hold him to a higher standard.”

Although this was the most polarizing comment in his concession rhetoric, the rebellious Nader, who received just over one-half of one percent of the popular vote, made other statements indicating that he refused to bow out gracefully. For instance, in a message to his supporters the day after the election, Nader’s campaign team posted a message stating, “Against all odds . . . We prevailed.” The election was a success, Team Nader contended, because the ticket campaigned with less than “what Obama raised in one day,” it “overcame ballot access obstacles” to appear on 45 state ballots,” and in the process “exposed Obama and Biden for the corporate politicians they are.”

The defiant nature of Nader’s concession rhetoric is not abnormal for minor party candidates. Journalists observing the election night gatherings of third party presidential
candidates and their supporters have long remarked that the events seem odd. For example, *Washington Post* reporter Christopher Shay attended the Libertarian election night gathering in 1980, and asked, “Huh? Ed Clark didn’t win? The Libertarian victory party at the Planet Café . . . went on anyway.” Shay looked on as one of Clark’s supporters noted, “Four years ago we would have had 10 people in this room. Now, look.” Gesturing to the 100 or so people in attendance, the supporter stated, “That’s why we’re calling it a victory party. The Libertarians are the party of the future.” Shay was also amused when he heard one supporter gasp in glee, “1 percent!” to the news that Clark would win that much of the popular vote in Virginia. Similarly, eight years earlier in 1972, *Los Angeles Times* reporter Jack Boettner attended the rally for American Independent Party nominee, and former U.S. Congressman, John G. Schmitz, and described how, “There was a strong undercurrent of hope for their party and their candidate for the days ahead.” After a 14-piece band started playing classics from Glenn Miller and Schmitz entered the room, Boettner wrote that “It looked more like a victory celebration,” especially with “A blackboard to the right of the speaker’s platform [which] read: ‘The Journey Has Begun!’” Schmitz “conceded” with the same optimism of his supporters, claiming, “This is just the beginning. We got one million votes . . . enough to strike fear in some of the hearts in the country.” As the candidate concluded, “Maybe you have noticed that this is not a typical concession speech.” One could say the same of most other concessions from third party candidates.

In this chapter, I argue that concessions from candidates like Ralph Nader and John Schmitz belong to a variant of the genre of concessions and are shaped by the third party rhetorical style demanded by the situational constraints that third party candidates almost always encounter. In other words, concessions from minor party candidates are rarely graceful rituals of
accepting defeat and praising the democratic process. Rather they are final calls from those who perceive themselves as heads of movements to encourage their supporters to continue digging the trenches and go on with the fight. I develop this argument in several sections. First, after providing a brief history of how the concession speech developed as a political ritual, I identify the function and outline the form of traditional concessions involving candidates from the two-party system. Second, after identifying what previous scholars have suggested are the conditions that lead to occasional violations of these generic norms, I suggest that the norms are rarely ever followed by candidates from third parties. I then describe the function and form of third party concessions, based on an analysis of over thirty such statements dating from 1948 to 2008. Third, in order to better illustrate the essential elements of third party concession rhetoric, I provide three case studies of the genre including statements by Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, Green Party nominee Ralph Nader in 2000, and Libertarian Harry Browne in 2000. Finally, I end with a brief discussion of the implications that this analysis has for understanding third party rhetoric.

**Traditional Presidential Concessions**

The concession statement is a genre of campaign communication that has received increased scholarly attention in recent years. Concessions mark an end to the electoral battle and appear to follow basic procedural conventions that are the same for almost every race and every candidate. As communication scholar Ruth Ann Weaver described in her crucial essay on the subject, modern electoral losers are supposed to concede so that victors may deliver their victory statements. This usually occurs in the form of personal communication followed by a public statement acknowledging the results of the race. Conceding in front of the public, losing candidates usually appear “personally, surrounded by family, to a group of supporters.”
Concession statements are so ritualistic that scholars have argued that they are quite formulaic. Political communication scholar Paul Corcoran has stated that concessions are “rituals with little scope for complex or expansive rhetorical aims,” and political scientist John Vile noted that the same “elements pop up in nearly all speeches.” So consistent seems the genre that Weaver argued, “when these [conventions] are violated disruption in the transition process occurs.”

The Historical Development of the Concession Genre

Although most studies of concession rhetoric analyze speeches from 1952 to the present day, the genre has a much longer history. In perhaps the only work that discusses the origins of the concession, Vile contended that the genre developed along with communication technology. Before such technology, “voters nationwide did not cast their votes for president on the same day, and there was no telegraph, telephone, or other electronic media to produce instant analyses.” Concessions still existed in some form, but they mostly consisted of interpersonal interactions between candidates and personal letters between the losing candidate and his acquaintances. Concessions from candidates were also never really public before advanced communication technology, Vile stated, because “With a few notable exceptions . . . nineteenth-century candidates did not actively campaign.” However, all this changed when Democrat William Jennings Bryant sent a telegram conceding to William McKinley shortly after losing the presidential election in 1896. Vile suggested, “Bryan’s telegram started a new tradition.” From that point forward, losing candidates began conceding privately with a telegram, and later with a telephone call, and following those short talks with longer speeches directed to the public and the campaign’s supporters.

The rise of television has had the most influence in shaping the modern concession genre. “Since 1952,” Vile stated, “almost every winning or losing presidential candidate has delivered a
brief television address, usually on election night.”

This is not a matter of choice. “Before television,” political scientist Reed Welch noted, “the victory and concession process was not a public spectacle.” However, he concluded, “Today . . . there is an unwritten rule, enforced by the news media and the public’s expectations that the victory and concession process be carried out on national television.”

Responding to the dramatistic sensibilities of the news media and the public’s demand for closure, Corcoran contended, “the loser’s concession converts loss into honor: a heroic sacrifice, not to fate but to the popular will.” The concession in the modern age of mass media thus “ritually condones a victory to the winning candidate as a noble act in a great epic of Democracy and nationhood.”

Function and Form of Traditional Concession Rhetoric

Because presidential concession statements come at the end of a lengthy and often nasty battle for the executive office, they function primarily to put the electorate at ease, and to assist in the transition of power by calling for unity behind the newly elected leader. For this reason, Corcoran argued, “The concession speech is an institutionalized public speech act integral to democratic life and the legitimacy of authority.” Losing candidates often transcend defeat “by translating the meaning of the campaign from the language of genuine combat into metaphors of chivalry and sport.” In the concession, the losing candidate “forgives the depredations of his private and public honor by journalists, comedians, media experts, the general public, and the party process as a whole.” In response, journalists, parties, political adversaries, and even voters “recant their scorn, drollery, fear, prejudice, professional self-interest, and hatred,” and portray the failed candidate as graceful, committed to a righteous cause, and worthy of leadership.
Concession statements fulfill minor functions as well. Using analogies to other genres, Vile contended that concessions, like farewell addresses and eulogies, function as an opportunity for the losing candidates to transition to another role. Some commit to becoming a private citizen again, while others may resume a leadership role in an opposition movement.\textsuperscript{586} Second, because campaign discourse is much like war rhetoric the concession functions as one of the last public opportunities for candidates to reach out to their troops. According to Vile, “Individuals who surrender are typically expected to act with grace, to forswear future conflict, and to assure their troops that they fought bravely for a noble cause.”\textsuperscript{587}

Given the pressure that losing candidates receive from news media and the American audience to follow these norms, the characteristics of traditional concession statements tend to be fairly consistent in the context of the two-party system. While these speeches often “retain a spontaneous quality and are a direct extension of the excitement of election night,”\textsuperscript{588} scholars have described concessions as having seven basic formal characteristics.\textsuperscript{589} First, the losing candidate formally declares defeat. This occurs normally when those who have lost congratulate the victor for their success, and acknowledge that they have fallen short of the support necessary to become president. Second, the candidate calls for national unity to support the victor. This is especially important after contentious elections. Third, the candidate pays tribute to American democracy. Corcoran, for instance, argued, “The paean to Democracy implicitly exonerates and legitimizes the losing campaign.”\textsuperscript{590} Fourth, the losing candidate argues for the importance of his or her own campaign, despite the failure to win, usually through a discussion of the causes for which they fought. Fifth, they articulate their goals for the immediate future and indicate their willingness to transition from a fulltime candidate and adversary to some other kind of role. Sixth, concessions usually contain a call to continue the fight. As Corcoran suggested, “A plea to
continue the fight converts defeat into a trooping of colors for the just cause and the future victory.”

Finally, candidates dedicate a substantial portion of their concession to thanking their supporters. Importantly, as Ritter and Howell noted, every concession speech does not necessarily contain each of these elements, but “it is unusual for a candidate to omit very many.” Whatever is emphasized, for a concession to be considered effective losing candidates must portray themselves as “good losers” willing to end the campaign with “a brave face and a kind word for [their] opponent” and with a sense of self-control “sufficient to avoid giving vent to [their] true feeling or breaking into uncontrollable sobs.”

Variables in Traditional Concession Rhetoric

Although presidential concessions tend to share the formal characteristics cited above, scholars have suggested that variations of the genre may exist depending on the context. Welch, for instance, argued that the rhetorical situation is not always identical for those who concede, concluding, “The type of campaign that was carried out, the election results, and the kind of candidates involved in the election in large measure explain why candidates say what they do in their victory and concession speeches.” Furthermore, Willyard and Ritter contended, “To ignore such factors is to ignore part of the rhetorical dynamic that creates political speeches.”

Overall, communication scholars have recognized a handful of conditions that may occasionally lead those who have lost elections to emphasize certain elements of the concession while downplaying others.

First, the degree to which an electoral loser calls for unity behind the victor, and similarly to what extent they urge supporters to continue to fight, depends on the margin of defeat. In her analysis of victory and concession speeches from 1952 to 1976, for instance, Weaver discovered, “There appears to be a consistent pattern over the years examined: that the greater the loss, the
stronger the call for ‘continued opposition,’ instead of unity.” Welch confirmed this hunch, and found that those who lose by significant margins “use their concession speeches to emphasize their contributions to a movement, promise to continue the battle for the principles and issues they have been campaigning for, or predict the eventual triumph of their cause.” Welch found this to be especially true for the concessions of Barry Goldwater in 1964, George McGovern in 1972, and Walter Mondale in 1984.597

Second, calls for unification or continued opposition also depend on the degree to which the campaign was fought on ideological grounds. Weaver wrote that violations of generic norms were seen in the concessions of Democrat Adlai Stevenson in 1956, Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964, and Democrat George McGovern in 1972, and that their overwhelming emphasis on the issues of their campaign made sense in light of their worldviews. According to Weaver, Stevenson’s world-involvement philosophy, Goldwater’s conservatism, and McGovern’s anti-war platform made each candidate more inclined to call for a continued struggle “until the issues were resolved.” In short, ideological campaigns, especially those that lose by large margins, are far less likely to use adaptive rhetoric in the concession statement.

Scholars also have identified contextual factors that might lead candidates to emphasize certain elements of the concession more than others. Vile argued that candidates who lose unexpectedly, as Republican Thomas Dewey did in 1948, probably respond differently than most traditional candidates. Moreover, Vile maintained, “We might also expect candidates who squeaked by or lost narrowly or who lost the electoral college vote while winning the popular vote to have a different level of emotional response.” Vile’s suspicions about those who lose the Electoral College vote was confirmed by Ritter and Howell in their analysis of the victory and concession speeches of Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 campaign.600
In light of the conditions that lead to variations in the genre of campaign concession rhetoric, third party concessions would clearly differ from those of the major party candidates. After all, minor party campaigns have frequently lost by enormous margins, and they are almost always steeped in ideology or focused on a few political issues. That these speeches look different from major party concessions has been briefly noted by political scholars. In the introduction to an anthology of victory and concession speeches, Vile argued, “Because third party candidates are challenging the hegemony of the two dominant parties, we might expect these candidates to buck some of the conventions relating to concession speeches.”601 In the only other significant analysis of third party concessions, Welch suggested that third party candidates tend to “concede the election, portray their campaign as a success, discuss their own campaign themes, and promise to remain a force.”602 In the next section of this chapter, I extend Welch’s work by specifying the function and form of third party concessions based on the analysis of over thirty examples of the genre.

The Genre of Third Party Concessions

In conceding, third party presidential candidates respond to a different rhetorical exigence than their major party peers. Presidential winners from the two-party system do not wait for third party nominees to concede the race before declaring victory.603 And outside of a few minor party candidates since 1948 who have significantly influenced the presidential race, these candidates are not sought by the media for their thoughts on the election results. They also do not concede to help the country transition from a heated electoral battle to a sense of normalcy, because they ultimately see the two-party system as corrupt and alienating. Rather, in conceding, third party candidates respond to the needs of their supporters to translate the meaning of the outcome of the election. In short, the primary function of third party concessions is to urge supporters to
continue the fight for the political movement, and to argue to anyone willing to listen that the party is growing and worthy of future support and attention. In using the final moment of the campaign when the mainstream media might provide them access to society at large, minor party presidential candidates concede in the same unconventional style they use throughout the campaign to raise awareness of their signature issues while emphasizing that the battle is ongoing.

Because concession statements serve a different purpose for minor party candidates than for their major party counterparts, and since their campaigns routinely face situational constraints that set them apart from Democrats and Republicans, the rhetorical form of third party concessions is both similar to that of major party candidates and distinctive. Third party concession statements have five substantive features: candidates thank their supporters, acknowledge the election results but portray the campaign as victorious, shift the blame for the loss to highlight the inequalities in the race, call for the fight to continue, and speak with the same unconventional style used elsewhere in their campaign to increase the likelihood that their statements receive media attention.

First, minor party candidates use their concessions to thank their supporters. This is the strongest resemblance between concessions from third party candidates and major party nominees. Minor party candidates usually show appreciation for the sacrifices of their friends and family, for the help of those on their staff, and for activists who got the third party ticket on state ballots and donated money and time along the way. For instance, Independent John Anderson stated when conceding in 1980, “there are so many people whom I should thank tonight and my heart is full, full of the gratitude that I feel for all of the efforts that these many thousands and thousands of people have made.” Anderson dedicated the most lines, though, to
thanking his wife who he compared to Eleanor Roosevelt, for campaigning “wherever across the face of this great land.” In his first post-election interview directed to fellow Libertarians, Andre Marrou in 1992 thanked “certain members of the national committee who went out of their way to help,” “members of my campaign operating committee” who “helped out in terms of fund raising,” and “various people [who] did outstanding jobs.” In 1996, Reform Party candidate Ross Perot stated, “I want to thank the millions of people across this country that did it. Nobody does it better.” Perot continued by thanking “the staff that’s worked tirelessly on this for doing an incredible job,” and also his “incredibly talented team that put all those television shows together.” This is a very standard practice in concession statements, but the rest of the distinguishing features of third party concessions are what makes them unique.

A second substantive characteristic of minor party concessions is an acknowledgment of the election’s results accompanied by a reframing of the campaign as victorious. The acknowledgment of an electoral loss does not come easy, and sometimes is ignored altogether, especially because defeat is obvious and a concession is not really required by the media or opposing candidates. Third party candidates rarely congratulate the victor because that would involve them accepting the legitimacy of the two-party system. Henry Wallace in 1948 conveyed this clearly when responding to advisers asking him to congratulate Harry Truman in a telegram, “Under no circumstances . . . will I congratulate that son of a bitch.”

It is not surprising that third party candidates reframe election results as indicating victory. Welch noted in his brief study, “Whereas a major party candidate would only be considered successful if he won the election, a third party or independent candidate’s success is not necessarily measured by winning or losing an election but by whether he was able to affect the campaign and shape what issues were discussed.” This is the agenda setting function of
third party campaigns, and the reason why these candidates often see themselves as agitators for change. George Wallace remarked that his ultimate accomplishment in 1968 was that “the principles and philosophy that we espoused continue to live on” in Richard Nixon and the Republican Party. Elaborating, Wallace suggested that the American Independent Party “is living because the winner of the Presidential campaign said almost identically the same things we were saying in the campaign.” Indicating that this was because he had successfully influenced Republicans, Wallace continued, “And I dare say, had this movement not been in existence, that would not have been the case.” After all, he argued, “the President-elect of the United States is a minority President as far as the popular vote is concerned, so we did well.”

This inspired such feelings of accomplishment that Wallace’s running-mate, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay stated in his post-election comments that he was “the most happiest man in the world, because I think I accomplished all the goals I had in the beginning.”

Third party candidates also often reference secondary goals in concession statements, including forcing a tie, playing the spoiler, reaching certain benchmarks to qualify for matching federal funds, creating a sustainable political movement, and challenging electoral norms to pave the way for more successful third parties in the future. Serious third party candidates conceding the race point out their accomplishments in respect to these benchmarks and suggest that their supporters should celebrate, and their opponents should be fearful because they have built significant support and organization for the party that they consider will eventually shift political power in America. In his election night remarks in 1948, Henry Wallace suggested, “The Progressive Party has opened the door. In 1950 it will walk in. In 1952 it will clean house.” Elaborating, Wallace noted, “Moving from a standing start it has accomplished the incredible.” Twenty years later, George Wallace argued that he considered his campaign to be
a success, declaring, “You just cannot underestimate a deep southern movement operating out of
the capital of the Confederacy and getting 10 million votes.”613 In 1980, Libertarian Ed Clark
pointed to his half a million votes as proof that he was “very, very successful,” and contended,
“This is the beginning of the three party system in the United States.”614 Furthermore, Clark
argued, “The primary goal of this campaign was to show the United States there was another
choice.” He concluded, “We’ve built a national party, we’re building it for the future.”615 Ross
Perot made similar comments in his concession in 1996, stating, “thousands of volunteers across
the country, true patriots, did what was necessary in a heroic effort to get this party on 50 state
ballots; 1.4 million Americans had the courage to sign a ballot to create this party; and tonight, it
appears that somewhere in the neighborhood of six to eight million people had the integrity to
vote their conscience.” Furthermore, Perot noted, “What we can say tonight, now that this party
has passed the five % level and met the test, is that hence forth in America our policies and our
governance will be dictated by a three-party system.”616 Third party candidates treat any success
in organizing significant numbers of voters as a major victory.

Third, although minor party candidates conceding the race reframe defeat as success, they
blame their electoral loss on the two-party system, the news media, and sometimes even their
own party. Minor party candidates blame their loss on the two-party system because they say that
the democratic process in America is corrupt and rigged to ensure the defeat of all third party
challengers. Following his loss in 1976, Eugene McCarthy complained that the Federal
Communications Commission doctrine requiring equal time for all presidential candidates meant
nothing in his race, especially because its decisions “about who shall talk to the people and what
information they shall be given” were made entirely by Democrats and Republicans.617 Ralph
Nader in his concession following the 2000 election articulated this argument about power
imbalance and the control of the two-party system, concluding, “The two parties raised these statutory barriers to get on the ballot, and they campaign with most of the money by raising corrupt soft money and corporate money and PAC money.”

Minor party candidates also blame the news media for their electoral loss due to poor coverage of their campaign. Progressive Party nominee Vincent Hallinan in 1952 argued in his concession that his party “suffered from an unparalleled radio and press blackout.”

Coleman Andrews of the National States’ Rights Party in 1956 had a similar complaint, stating, “We have been treated with silent contempt by television and radio stations.”

Eugene McCarthy in 1976 argued that his results would have been much better, and that he could have won over more voters “had he been able to reach them through mass media.”

Occasionally, minor party candidates even blame their own parties for their failure at the polls. As with farewell speeches in which presidents offer advice, minor party candidates sometimes identify the problems that their party needs to address before it can compete seriously with the major parties. In a post-election interview, Libertarian Andre Marrou told his followers, “We’ve had problems with Libertarians in positions of authority telling us things which were not true, and we relied on them and then we paid the price because what they told us was not true. I guess the only thing I can say about that is that I hope it doesn’t happen again.”

Republican-turned-Libertarian Bob Barr identified similar challenges following his campaign in 2008, and told one Libertarian news magazine, “There’s a lot of work that has to be done to move the party down the road it started on . . . into a truly professional viable political entity. There are still those in the Libertarian Party that do not want to go down that road,” Barr stated, “and there are some in the party that will have to make an important decision about that.”
Fourth, minor party concessions feature a call for supporters to continue the fight, but notably without a call to unite behind the victor of the race. Conceding the race in 1948, Henry Wallace told his supporters, “Now the time of real organization comes when the Progressive Party in every state in the Union will organize in every Congressional district, every city, ward, precinct and election district.” After all, he added, “No matter what the final vote for the Progressive Party may prove to be, I say that the need for the Progressive Party is greater now than ever before.” More bluntly, Wallace declared to his supporters, “We who fight in the people’s cause will never stop until that cause is won.”

Progressive Party candidate Vincent Hallinan, in 1952 made a similar request for supporters to take a stand against the victor of that election, Dwight Eisenhower. Hallinan stated, “There must now be an unparalleled mobilization of the people to fight for their demands to prevent reaction from converting the Eisenhower victory into a license for inaugurating the programs of Taft and the NAM at home, and of MacArthur and Dulles abroad.” Toward that end, Hallinan suggested, “To help develop and organize the Progressive Party as a vital part of the coming movement of people, I intend to spend my next two years, going state by state.” Clarifying that the electoral battle was far from over, Hallinan countered, “I consider that my candidacy was the beginning of our Party’s new organizational drive.”

The call to continue resistance is all too common in third party rhetoric. In 1992, Perot urged his supporters to continue to put pressure on the government, stating, “As long as we’re together nationwide you have enormous voice in the country. So we will stay together and you will be a force for good for our country and our children.” He made the same request when conceding in 1996, noting, “We’re going to keep the pressure on on the major issues.” Continuing, Perot remarked, “We must set the highest ethical and moral standards for the people who serve in our government. And all of that has got to be changed from rules to
laws in the next four years, and we’re going to have to stand at the gate and keep the pressure on.”

Finally, third party concessions feature the same rhetorical style that the candidates use elsewhere, a style characterized by polarization, populism, authenticity, and tendency to create a public spectacle in order to generate press coverage and appeal to those who feel alienated from the two-party system. When conceding to Harry Truman, for instance, Progressive Henry Wallace exaggerated the harms of the Cold War, claiming that bankruptcy of the American economy was unavoidable if the country continued to “support reactionary regimes abroad, arm Western Europe, and militarize America.” This doom was inevitable, Wallace warned, unless Truman was willing to clean up corruption by “[removing] the military from the civilian branch of Government, and the bankers from the State Department.” Suggesting that “bipartisan foreign policy” was evil and dangerous, Wallace pushed for the “return to the Roosevelt policy of friendship and collaboration among all countries through the United Nations.” Wallace’s polarizing slant on foreign policy was obvious, but typical for third party candidates conceding the race. Progressive Vincent Hallinan in 1952 attributed Eisenhower’s success to “his demagogic promises about ending the Korean War.” Conceding in 1976, Eugene McCarthy also outlined the ways that the two major parties had worked together, as a monolithic opposition, along with the League of Women Voters, the Federal Election Committee, and the Federal Communications Committee, in a conspiracy to eliminate the threat of third parties. Similarly, in his concession in 2004, Nader described the difficulties of his campaign as the product of “the two-party electoral dictatorship.”

In short, third party concessions are not graceful exits from elections. Rather, they serve the purpose of encouraging supporters to keep up the fight. Although minor party candidates
thank their supporters just as their major party counterparts would, they stray from the generic norms almost immediately by characterizing their loss as success, blame the media and the two-party system for their inability to win, and call on supporters to continue their resistance against the victor. Moreover, they communicate all of this in a polarizing and unconventional style to maximize the chance that their message reaches a broader audience.

Third Party Concessions: Three Case Studies

The substantive characteristics of third party concessions are obvious in most examples of the genre. In this section, I trace this form in the concessions of three minor party candidates since 1948: Independent Eugene McCarthy in 1976, Libertarian Harry Browne in 2000, and Green Party candidate Ralph Nader in 2000. While McCarthy and Nader are used to illustrate concessions from candidates who arguably influenced the presidential election, my analysis of Browne’s post election statement indicates that the characteristics are similar even for continuing-doctrinal party candidates who are little known and without much support.

The Concession Rhetoric of Eugene McCarthy (1976)

Despite Eugene McCarthy’s early start in the 1976 race, formally declaring his candidacy almost two years before Election Day, he never found the level of support that made him a household name in the summer of 1968. Just weeks before the election it was clear that he would appear on only 29 ballots as a result of the Democratic Party’s effort to keep him away from crucial electoral votes needed to beat Republican Gerald Ford. Furthermore, his stump speech lacked relevance to most audiences, Newsweek’s Daniel Chu and Jane Whitmore wrote, since it was “in many ways an extension of the themes he played while running for the Democratic nomination in 1968.” And with his campaigning and fundraising restricted largely to college campuses, McCarthy never had a chance. A Gallup poll from October 18, 1976,
indicated his support was hovering around just 2 percent.\textsuperscript{634} Nevertheless, he was still considered a potential spoiler. As Richard Scammon, Director of the Elections Research Center, told \textit{US News & World Report} a few weeks before Americans headed to polls, “even if McCarthy gets 1 per cent – principally in the North – it could make the difference in a State where Carter and Ford are running very close.”\textsuperscript{635} But McCarthy was not a spoiler, and Democrats evaded defeat with McCarthy receiving just nine-tenths of one percent of the popular vote. Three days after the election, he formally discussed the results in a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.\textsuperscript{636}

Although McCarthy spent little time thanking his supporters in his press conference, his reframing of the loss was impossible to miss. When given the opportunity to confess his disappointment, McCarthy refused. After one reporter asked if he “did as well as you had hoped to do,” he responded, “Well, I don’t know whether we hoped to do – We didn’t do as well as most of the polls said we would do.” However, he elaborated, even though he received well under the six percent predicted by NBC, “I didn’t take any polls. I just reported what was being said. I took the best one I could find.” Asked by another reporter if the campaign would have been more effective had he spoiled the race for Jimmy Carter, McCarthy stated, “I don’t think so. I think that count came out just about the way we wanted it to. I would have preferred to have had more votes in a quantitative number. But I think the public now knows that a third party can have an effect on the election even though it gets a very small percentage of the vote.” McCarthy listed several ways that the campaign had emerged victorious, despite the low number of votes. The campaign, he insisted, had many “legal accomplishments” in “challenging . . . the unconstitutionality of something like 20 to 25 state laws.” In addition, it succeeded in raising “in the Federal Communication Commission the question of equal time and also the fairness
"doctrine," and “we have laid, we think, the basis for a further challenge to the unconstitutionality of the federal elections act.”

Despite this optimistic statement, McCarthy used much of his post-election press conference to blame the two major parties and the news media for his campaign’s inability to run a more serious campaign. The two parties, he insisted, “have moved to establish the idea that politics has to be conducted in this country through the structure of the two parties – as an idea, first of all – and have proceeded to formalize it in law.” The Federal Election Commission was made up solely of Democrats and Republicans, he argued, and made “magisterial decisions about politics in this country.” He then characterized the Federal Communications Commission as a protector of the two-parties, “making decisions which leave out of any deliberation or any power something like 40% of the people who are independents.” Even the state courts hearing his cases on state ballot access laws, McCarthy complained, were made up of “Republicans and Democrats elected to their judicial positions.” All this, he pointed out, reflected “upon the question of a free and open political system in the country.”

The news media was also responsible for his campaign’s shortcomings, McCarthy remarked. For instance, he argued that his campaign received minimal attention, and that “the Equal Time Doctrine means nothing if it can be evaded as easily as it was this year.” In particular, he stated, “CBS said they thought they had met the fairness doctrine by giving me 22.5 minutes on their news in a period of three months.” This mattered, he contended, because “Forty-five percent of the people didn’t vote. And I think we would have gotten more of them if we could have reached them.” He also criticized the “writing press” for doing “little more in this campaign than television commentators.” Most coverage, he argued, was “reduced to speculating on what would happen in the debates, reporting what was said, and then interpreting and running
a kind of Nielsen rating as to who won.” According to the candidate, the news media as a whole was too focused on the horse race and missed out on the opportunity to create a dialogue about the democratic process in America.

McCarthy’s call for his supporters to continue the fight was focused less on liberal politics and more on the electoral transformation that he sought throughout the race. “As to the future,” he suggested, “We hope, with the help of others, to pursue a number of cases in the states and with reference to the federal elections act and also possibly with reference to the Federal Communications Act.” After being asked by a reporter if he could continue the legal fight after the election had already been decided, McCarthy responded, “there is a basis for going to court. There is a possibility of any number of citizens’ lawsuits on the grounds that they have been denied the right to participate in the elections by unconstitutional laws and by discriminatory laws.” Even though he was reluctant to commit to running in future races, McCarthy swore that he would fight the two-party system’s tight grip on electoral politics to pave the way for future candidates.

Finally, McCarthy spoke in a polarizing, populist, and frank style aimed at gaining attention from the media. In essence, McCarthy spoke of America’s political process in exaggerated language suggesting that Democrats, Republicans, and the League of Women Voters were involved in a conspiracy theory to exclude alternative voices from entering the electoral arena. His claim that the lack of Independents serving on the Federal Election Committee and the Federal Communications Commission led to both organizations making decisions that created a two-party dictatorship. The courts were supposedly in cahoots, too. Without considering the basis for their decisions, McCarthy insisted that with the two-party
system controlling judicial appointments, “it would appear to be more than coincidental that the votes went as they did.”

McCarthy saved his harshest words, though, for the League of Women Voters, the organization responsible for excluding him from the presidential debates. The League, he suggested, maintained god-like powers over the democratic process, without any system of checks and balances. “I think we are in a new era of politics,” he remarked, “in which the great mother goddess is the President of the League of Women Voters. She decides who the candidates are. Then the three minor gods are the heads of the three networks.” When told to exclude certain candidates, McCarthy implied, “the heads of the networks . . . have a kind of instantaneous illumination. They all come to the same conclusion at the same moment. They don’t conspire . . . but instantaneously they all have the same conclusion.” Curiously, by stating that these players did not conspire against him, McCarthy was suggesting such a thought. According to his polarized worldview, those involved in making decisions leading to the exclusion of third parties were cooperating to preserve a two-party monopoly on political power.

McCarthy’s concession certainly violated the generic norms for major party candidates. He acknowledged that he did not win, but did not congratulate Democrat Jimmy Carter. Instead of accepting the results and calling for unity, McCarthy insisted that he was cheated by a corrupt political system that he would continue to resist. There was little grace in his defeat, and almost no attempt to avoid looking like a sore loser.

The Concession Rhetoric of Ralph Nader (2000)

Ralph Nader received just 2.73 percent of the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election, but many believe that his support was just enough to spoil the election for Democrat Albert Gore who lost the crucial state of Florida by only 537 votes. Nader, who attracted the
support of some liberal Democrats, received around 97,000 votes in the state, more than enough to have influenced the outcome of the election. Regardless of the results, the 2000 campaign was the finest of Nader’s career. The Green Party appeared on ballots in 44 states, Nader raised more money than ever before, and he was endorsed by enough unions and celebrities to raise the profile of his candidacy. Although Nader vehemently rejected the spoiler label, his influence in the 2000 election was a rare display of strength for a progressive third party ticket. Thus, when conceding the race in the context of the goals of a minor party campaign, Nader had a lot to celebrate.

Nader thanked his supporters throughout his concession. “Let me thank all these people who worked on the campaign,” he stated, adding “What we know for sure is that we’re coming out of this election day with the third-largest party in America, replacing the Reform Party.” The feat took many “people from all over the country to do that,” Nader contended, “so great staff, working day and night here in Washington and above all it took a commitment by people to no longer settle for the least of the worst or the less of two evils.” Besides his activists, Nader also thanked “people for voting for us.” Their commitment to his ticket, he argued, was “not just building a unifying force in civil society, but above all, building a deeper democracy. That’s what it’s really all about, building a deep democracy.”

Although Nader alluded to the outcome of the race, he never acknowledged defeat. Rather, he reframed the race as a success on almost every front. As he had done before, Nader swore off corporate donations and considered his campaign to be better off for it. Whereas the two major parties “campaign with most of the money by raising corrupt soft money and corporate money, and PAC money,” Nader praised his campaign for rejecting these funds “because we wanted to set an example of what is necessary for real reform of our corrupt
The Green Party candidate also considered the campaign to be a success due to the respect that it had gained from important figures in the news media. Quoting journalist David Broder, who said that the Green Party ran the best campaign that year, Nader exclaimed, “we really performed I think all of us in a very exemplary manner.” Moreover, he added about Broder’s praise, “I think it reflects that we really practiced what we preached in order to preach what we practice. Not just in the way we raised our funds, but in the way we comported ourselves, focusing on one important issue after another.” The party’s commitment to principle was the cause of its success, Nader concluded, and “the important thing here,” he added, “is we’ve reached a take-off stage in the Green Party, and that this is the last time that the two parties in a national election will have a monopoly power to exclude significant Third Party members from debate.” The aim of Nader’s reframing was obvious. Even while shunning the spoiler label, his claim of success made him a candidate to fear for at least two more election cycles.

Like most third party candidates, Nader blamed his inability to offer a more competitive campaign on the two-party system and the news media. Democrats and Republicans were to blame for creating barriers to third party success. “The two parties raised these statutory barriers to get on the ballot,” Nader argued. Additionally, he suggested, “the two parties control the debate commission which is really a private company. And they exclude Third Party candidates, so really it’s a quite amazing and varied system of rigging the election for the two major parties.” Consequently, he concluded, Democrats and Republicans “[exclude] all kings of competition.” Furthermore, the news media was to blame, Nader maintained, because “you’re up against (the fact that) most of the coverage on the horse race was between these two horses.” Attention to third party candidates was limited to how they might impact this two-
horse race, he declared. Regarding the spoiler question, Nader stated, “It’d be so predictable that the reporters would say ‘I know you’ve been asked about this one thousand times’ – I felt like having a recorded announcement.” As a result, he argued, “It really didn’t give us a chance to raise the subject matter that the press over the years have been reporting on.” In other words, the news media’s focus on the spoiler issue neglected Nader’s more substantial contributions to debate about crucial issues.

Having described the two-party system as corrupt and impervious to change, Nader failed to call for unity and insisted instead that his supporters continue their fight. The news media, Nader claimed, “misread the distinction of this Green Party’s mobilization. They said ‘Well, it’s just another Green Party, and makes a valiant effort, election’s over and then it recedes, and their leaders go back to their business in Texas or elsewhere.’” This was nonsense, in Nader’s ideal world. Instead, he described, “Right after the election the Green Party moves and locks arms with all those neighborhood and citizen groups all over the United States who are fighting for a more just America.” Emphasizing his core themes, Nader elaborated, “Who are fighting for the environment, fighting to establish missions against poverty, and enforcing the civil rights law and civil liberties laws. Missions that say to the American people, that the choice is the sovereignty of the people, or the sovereignty of global corporations over the United States.”

Finally, Nader’s concession was delivered in the same polarizing and populist style that entertained political commentators and made him popular with liberal voters. Nader demonized the two major parties as being corrupted by corporate financing of their campaigns and committed to excluding alternative voices by creating a “corrupt campaign system.” Much in the same way that Eugene McCarthy implied that a conspiracy kept him out of the debates, Nader argued that the “two parties control the debate commission” and pull strings through a
“rigged system” to keep themselves on center stage.\textsuperscript{652} Both parties were so guilty in this effort, Nader suggested, that they were essentially the same. According to Nader, “The Republican and Democratic parties take more money from the same source . . . [and] morph into one corporate party with two heads.” Political power is thus stripped from the people, Nader maintained, and special interests dominate government. Rather than policy being crafted by the State Department or Department of Commerce, he concluded, “The decisions are made by the people we trip over in Washington D.C. every day: 22,000 corporate lobbyists, and 9,000 political action committees pumping money into both Republican and Democratic coffers.”\textsuperscript{653} In the tradition of populists like Robert LaFollette, Nader urged “the people” to continue the fight and “come back and take our government back from the corporate supremacists who think that there’s nothing they can’t control, there’s nothing that they can’t commercialize, there’s nothing they cannot daunt.”\textsuperscript{654}

Ralph Nader’s concession in 2000 conceded to nobody. He thanked supporters for keeping his campaign energized, and for turning out and making a difference in a close race. In his eyes, his campaign emerged victorious, especially considering the barriers that it faced in reaching voters. More importantly, though, he urged his supporters to continue resisting the two-party system by participating in the grassroots movement that they built for the campaign. Although the forces of evil won, according to Nader’s view, continued resistance would force the government back into the hands of the people. It was only a matter of time.

The Concession Rhetoric of Harry Browne (2000)

Ralph Nader was joined in the 2000 election by Libertarian candidate Harry Browne, who headed his party’s ticket for a second time. An investment adviser turned politician, Browne was an active member of the Libertarian intelligentsia, having written several books and participated on numerous speaking tours across the country. Browne’s campaign accomplished a
rare feat in 1996 by making it onto every state ballot, and he repeated this again in 2000. Support for his campaign was unimpressive, though, as he received one-half of one percent of the popular vote in 1996, and just two-fifths of a percent in 2000. Still, for a young party, Browne’s support in 1996 was the second best in its history, and 2000 was its third best performance. All this was achieved by a candidate who rejected federal matching funds, and who lacked the name recognition of some of the party’s previous candidates such as *Little House on the Prairie* producer Roger MacBride and former Republican Congressman Ron Paul. Browne’s concession on November 7, 2000 was still consistent with the genre of minor party concessions.655

Browne thanked his supporters several times throughout his speech. Toward the end of his remarks, he told his audience, “We appreciate the fact that you supported this campaign. We appreciated beyond words that I can say, all of the people you’ve been talking to over the last six months or a year, all the people you’ve encouraged to vote Libertarian, all the people you have taken by the hand.” Browne had similar praise for his supporters just before leaving the stage, suggesting, “You’ve seen the support that we’ve had here tonight. It has been going on all over America.” Listing the accomplishments of supporters, Browne stated, “People have been volunteering their time. People have been taking the initiative. People have not been waiting for instructions and orders but instead going out and finding ways to spread the word. And it’s paying off.”

In typical fashion for third party candidates, Browne did not concede to the winner. His statement that he had “no idea what the outcome will be tonight” may have reflected the reality of the election in 2000, but from the beginning of his remarks he clearly reframed his campaign’s results as a major victory. “Somebody just told me that we have seven percent in Nebraska,” Browne announced. Such news would be a nightmare for any major party candidate, but Browne
jovially continued, “And then after the six people picked me up and put me on my feet again, I was able to resume the evening.” Restating his goals for the campaign, Browne commented, “Of course you know I want us to get over 1 million votes. I want us to be Pat Buchanan.” Even though this probably was not going to happen, he claimed that his campaign was not a failure. “The American people have not chosen against our message,” he argued. Rather, “The American people have simply not heard the message.” According to Browne, who then cited a statistic from the 1996 election, “only four percent of the American people knew who the Libertarian candidate president for candidate was.” This was not a campaign problem, then, but a systemic problem common for all minor party challengers. The very fact that he campaigned at all, and that his campaign began educating the public about Libertarianism, was the true measure of success.

Browne blamed his failure to receive a greater share of votes, despite appearing on 50 state ballots, squarely on the news media and the two-party system. He ran, he argued, because “I want the press to sit up and pay attention.” In short, communicating with the electorate is difficult if the candidate is blocked out of media coverage. Additionally, the major parties were responsible for the failure of third party bids, he suggested, because they created barriers to their success. Browne promised that “the Libertarian Party will continue to grow to the point where we will be able to challenge them despite the ballot access laws, despite the campaign finance laws, despite the taxpayer funding of the Republicans and Democrats, despite the Debate Commission, despite all of these things.” In other words, with proper funding and the right message, he contended, the party would one day overcome the constraints perpetuated by the two parties that made campaigning as a minor party candidate so difficult.
The call to continue the fight was not as militant in Browne’s concession as it was for McCarthy and Nader, but it was still a clear rejection of unity and a request for supporters to further commit to the movement. He said, “I’m not going to stop tonight and I hope you won’t stop either.” Emphasizing the need to continue, he stated, “We want to keep going starting tomorrow morning.” In a kind of moment rarely seen in concessions, Browne used the stage to start raising funds for a new organization to be used to run television advertisements introducing the Libertarian Party to America. “We want to go to those young people on MTV, on VH1 and Comedy Central, we want to go to the non-voters on ESPN,” Browne stated, and then added, “we want to go to these places where people are sitting and watching all of these other things cause they can’t stand politics.” Reaching out to alienated voters, he argued, was the best way to “build name recognition for the Libertarian label.” The effort was unconventional, as Browne was essentially calling for supporters to help fund the campaign long after it was over. This became clear by the end of his speech with his final rally call to supporters in which he asked, “Do you want to go on from here? Do you want to get this message before the American people? Will you help us do it?”

As someone more comfortable in a professorial role, rather than as a polarizing political campaigner, Browne was less inclined throughout the campaign to speak in a divisive style. Yet, his use of third party style was still unmistakable in his concession. According to Browne, the Democrats and Republicans together offered nothing good for America. Because of that, he exaggerated, “We are the only ones who are offering to dramatically improve people’s lives and that’s much stronger than anything that they can do.” In calling for a campaign free of public money that was also full of ideas rather than negative rhetoric, Browne characterized the two major parties as too willing to buy elections and “sling mud at anybody.” However, this was just
what he was proposing for the Libertarian Party with the creation of an independent group capable of running advertisements bashing the two-party system. In an especially awkward moment, the Libertarian candidate showed his supporters around nine minutes of political advertisements, many of which they had already seen. The messages were shocking, even if his language during the speech was not. Browne showed ads depicting the destruction of the IRS building to free Americans from the slavery of taxation, comparing the Federal Government to an abusive husband, and showing a young girl discovering her mother’s dead body after she had nothing to defend herself against a home intruder.

While less extreme in stylistic terms than Nader, Browne’s speech contained the characteristics of third party concessions. After thanking his supporters, he stood firm in declaring the election to be a victory for his party and blamed both the news media and two-party system for any of his shortcomings. Most importantly, Browne avoided a call to unite behind the actual winner of the race, and instead urged his supporters to fund a campaign designed to continue the fight against both major parties.

Conclusion

I have argued throughout this chapter that third party presidential candidates end the campaign just as they begin it – with a violation of public expectations of political discourse. Facing various barriers to their electoral success ranging from poor campaign financing, restrictive ballot access laws, exclusion from official debates, and a belief that supporting their candidacy would be a wasted vote, third party candidates resort to a confrontational and unconventional rhetorical practice to raise awareness about the issues they support, and to encourage supporters and sympathizers to continue the fight. They deny that they lost and reject the opportunity for a graceful exit. Depicting their opponents in polarizing fashion, their
concessions take the tone of a negative attack ad. In Libertarian Harry Browne’s case they go so far as showing such attack ads again and again in the middle of their remarks.

Although this chapter examined the form and function of third party concessions in the post-election statements of Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Nader, and Harry Browne, the same framework applied to the concessions of most other candidates from “true minor parties,” “short-lived parties,” and other kinds of third parties. In short, many other case studies could be offered, including the concessions from candidates like Norman Thomas, Henry Wallace, George Wallace, John Schmitz, Bob Barr, Gloria La Riva, Ross Perot and many others.

Occasionally, but not often, third party concessions from serious candidates violate the generic principles I have identified. Following a contentious campaign in 1948, Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond conceded in a telegram telling Harry Truman, “The American people have spoken at the ballot box and you are entitled to the United Support of a United People.” In another commitment to unity, albeit a modified commitment, Thurmond stated, “You can rest assured that as Governor of South Carolina I shall cooperate with you and your administration in every constitutional endeavor.” From a candidate who had rejected the Democratic Party, the gesture was surprising. Further clarifying his commitment to the democratic process, Thurmond told supporters, “It is our duty as good Americans and true Democrats to close ranks and work together as a nation for peace in the world and the continued progress of the American people at home.”

Similarly, Independent John Anderson used almost half of his concession speech to thank his family and supporters, and unlike other third party candidates he admitted defeat rather clearly. “History will record that it was at 8:35 P.M.,” Anderson stated, ‘that I telephoned Governor Reagan in California and offered my congratulations to him, because the returns by
that time had clearly shown that I was not destined to be the next President of the United States.” More importantly, Anderson did not pretend that he won. “Well of course I’m disappointed,” he argued, “I’m only human. But I hope that you can tell from my remarks and from my spirit and from my demeanor tonight, that I am not bruised in spirit or in mind.” What kept Anderson happy was not the movement that he might have built, or his potential status as a spoiler in the race. Rather, it was the “good fortune to run with somebody like Pat Lucey.” Anderson, a third party candidate, took a graceful bow out of the race.

Why might some minor party candidate concessions lack some of the elements of the genre of third party concession statements? This occurs for two kinds of candidates: the independently wealthy candidate who heads a candidate-oriented minor party, and the leader of a splinter movement with years of experience in one of the major parties who intends to return to the two-party system following the campaign. In the case of the candidate with deep coffers, continued agitation may be unnecessary because they do not see themselves as a leader of an ongoing movement, they have been viewed as a legitimate candidate and wish to maintain that respect, or perhaps because they have simply accomplished their goals. Certain splinter candidates, too, might be more likely to follow the norms of traditional concessions because they wish to be respected by a more general audience and to return to their own party. For everyone else, though, the form is surprisingly consistent.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

From the day they launch their campaigns, third party presidential candidates face the unfortunate likelihood that they are on a path to obscurity. Unlike the Republicans and Democrats they oppose, they too often belong to tiny parties with little organizational strength, have no chance of raising enough money to remain competitive, and are excluded from the presidential debates and ignored by the news media. It is not surprising that most voters perceive supporting third parties on Election Day as a wasted ballot. However, the overall neglect that minor party candidates receive in the public sphere is perpetuated by the failure to understand their behavior. In this project, I have claimed that communication scholars in particular have been guilty of neglecting and misunderstanding third parties, excluding them from most studies concerning political communication and examining them only when an occasional high-profile candidate disrupts the two-party system. The tendency for third party candidates to violate the norms of major party campaign rhetoric may be another reason why communication scholars have given them little attention. However, their tendency to violate societal expectations about campaign rhetoric is their main communicative strategy and a norm due to the conditions that minor party candidates routinely face in the presidential campaign. My analysis of how this strategy is tied to their constraints and overall purposes, and how their role as agitators molds the most important rhetoric in their campaign has several important implications for the study of communication.

One of the most significant implications of this study is that it demonstrates the limitations of theories proposed by political communication scholars. Theories about the communicative strategies used in presidential campaigns – for example, in relation to debates,
advertisements, and speech genres – tend to be focused on candidates from the two-party system. This scholarship is loaded with certain assumptions that make the resulting theories incompatible with third party candidates. It is assumed that candidates ultimately aim to win. Political success, then, is measured by how the candidate fares in the election. Similarly, it is assumed that the communicative strategies of political candidates will be designed to help them achieve this goal of electoral victory. In contrast to these assumptions, third party candidates frequently admit that they have no chance of winning. Instead, they argue that their campaigns aim to provide voters greater choice in an election and to raise awareness of important political issues by playing the role of the agitator. This overall purpose means that their rhetoric is substantively different than that of their major party counter-parts. Third party campaign rhetoric purposefully violates societal expectations to generate media attention, reach out to sympathetic voters, and forces Democrats and Republicans to react. Through analysis of the available campaign rhetoric of third party nominees from 1948 to 2008, I demonstrated that their alternative discourse is characterized by polarization, populism, displays of authenticity, and an effort to create public spectacle. As such, I have moved beyond case studies of this discourse by identifying common patterns in the campaign style of minor party rhetoric.

In a way, this study is a call to political communication scholars to make a better effort to account for the rhetoric of third party presidential candidates. At the very least, this means that post-election essays and books frequently published in the field should include minor party candidates in the election narrative whenever possible. As I indicated in the opening chapter, Robert Denton, Jr.’s edited volumes of essays offering a communication perspective of presidential campaigns dating back to 1992 have almost entirely ignored third party candidates, with the exception of Ross Perot and a few mentions of Ralph Nader. Special election issues of
journals in the field have suffered from the same shortcoming. Beyond including third parties in
the election narrative, political communication scholars could also apply their theories to minor
party candidates. In his analysis of victory and concession addresses of presidential candidates,
for instance, Reed L. Welch briefly assessed how the generic framework applied to concessions
by candidates such as George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot. Political communication
scholar Paul E. Corcoran also evaluated Ross Perot’s concession in 1992 with the generic
framework he described. Ray Dearin’s essay on the American Dream as depicted in the
nomination acceptance addresses of 1996 also serves as a good example of how third parties can
be included in analysis of major party campaign discourse.658

A second implication of this study is that it indicates the flaws of a purely situational
approach to genre criticism, and the value of a revised situational approach that recognizes the
importance of a recurring exigence and recurring situation constraints. As I explained in the first
chapter, a situational approach to genre criticism, or what Rowland called the
ontological/empirical approach, assumes that recurring situations lead to similar rhetorical
responses that restrict the rhetor’s strategic choices. This approach treats genre as a constellation
of forms warranted by recurring situations and antecedent forms. My argument in the last three
chapters, however, has been that the genres of campaign rhetoric cannot be understood with the
same framework if the candidates giving those addresses encounter vastly different constraints
and thus adopt very different objectives.

In Chapter 3, I suggested that presidential announcement addresses are different for third
party candidates, who face daunting constraints and accept losing as a reality for their campaign,
than for major party candidates. While their addresses function to commence political ritual,
introduce their leadership style, articulate their goals and policy positions, and to influence the
decisions of their opponents as in major party addresses, they also function differently by
demonstrating the campaign’s threat to the two parties, convincing voters that they are in the race
for the long haul, and polarizing the electorate in order to reach out to sympathetic voters. In
light of these different functions, third party announcements still contain a statement indicating
that the candidate has entered the race, a statement of alternative goals, a rationale for running a
campaign based on a few key issues, an indication of the campaign’s strength, and a response to
accusations that the candidate will spoil the election, all expressed with a polarizing style.
Despite the appearance of a recurring situation, third party candidates announcing their
campaigns are usually unknown and face hills far steeper than their major party opponents
usually encounter. Consequently, their different constraints and purpose give way to a different
rhetorical form.

In Chapter 4, I argued that nomination acceptance addresses for third party candidates
differ from similar speeches by their major party opponents for the same exact reasons. The
function for such addresses given by third party candidates is to introduce the minor party to
America, highlight the campaign’s policy positions and themes, polarize the audience to create
committed activists, and indicate how the ticket threatens at least one of the two major parties.
These different functions lead to formal characteristics that are also quite different compared to
similar speeches by major party candidates. Minor party candidates accepting their party’s
nomination accept their new role, offer an extreme vision for America, justify their fringe
campaign by linking it to the Founding Fathers, and respond to fears that support for their ticket
is a wasted ballot, all while polarizing their audience in shockingly partisan language.

Continuing to highlight the usefulness of a revised situational approach to genre
criticism, in Chapter 5 I argued that third party concession statements were nothing like those
delivered by major party candidates because they almost always function as a final act of defiance rather than a graceful exit from the presidential race. Because they are more like leaders of movements than legitimate party nominees, third party candidates use the last significant rhetorical moment of the campaign to draw attention once again, for anyone willing to listen, to the cause for which they fought. This alternative purpose for the speech leads to substantive characteristics that are different than what is typically found in traditional concessions by Democrats and Republicans. In their concessions, I argued, third party candidates thank supporters, acknowledge the election results but claim an ultimate victory, and blame electoral shortcomings on the two-party system and the news media. Moreover, I contended that third party concessions call for the fight to continue, while using their typical rhetorical style characterized by polarization, populism, authenticity, and a tendency to create public spectacle.

With my analysis in the last three chapters, I have ultimately argued that to analyze the most important campaign speeches of third party candidates with the traditional theories of announcements, nomination acceptance addresses, and concessions is to make the most basic mistakes in genre criticism. Analyzing such speech genres with theories derived from analysis of addresses by major party candidates is to treat the genre deductively, or to assume that it already exists and is known and defined. However, as I have illustrated, the substantive characteristics of third party concessions, for instance, do not resemble concessions by Republicans or Democrats. Additionally, relying too much on the situational approach to these genres means that many scholars are also failing to recognize the variations within the categories. As such, only a revised situational approach to genre criticism recognizes the unique constraints and purposes of third party candidates, and thus maximizes the explanatory and evaluative dimensions of theories concerning campaign speech genres.
A third implication of this study is that communication scholars attempting to understand their discourse should not treat third party candidates as a homogeneous group. Because there are many types of minor parties with a variety of constraints and overall objectives, any theory about their communication will be inherently limited by the fact that there are obvious exceptions to whatever rules one recognizes. Prominent candidates with significant financial backing may be outsiders in theory, but their communication tends to conform more closely to the norms of the two-party system because they have a better chance of being taken seriously by voters. Additionally, prominent minor party candidates appealing primarily to centrist voters would also be exceptions to theories regarding the communicative practices of third party candidates. Thus, rare candidates like Ross Perot and John Anderson are likely to be outliers, compared to other minor party candidates because they have a better chance to succeed and therefore are most likely to use adaptive rhetoric rather than the third party style I have identified.

There are important ways that the findings in this dissertation can be extended by future studies. First, the realization that the different objectives and constraints of third party candidates distinguishes their communicative practices from those of their major party opponents means that other conventional theories about campaign discourse should be amended. For example, contemporary understanding of the function and substantive strategies in presidential debates is one area where future scholars should compare third party candidates with Democrats and Republicans. This would undoubtedly require a case study approach since so few third party candidates have engaged in debates alongside major party nominees. While some scholars have made progress in this endeavor, 659 very few have examined the alternative televised debates featuring only third party nominees. Such programs have been featured on C-SPAN, for instance, and are remarkable in that minor party candidates often choose to cooperate in targeting the two-
party system rather than engaging with one another. Such cooperation is unusual, and even impossible, in debates between major party candidates and this suggests that traditional theories might not explain how it is that third party candidates debate. Similarly, theories about campaign advertising have frequently neglected third party candidates. Because many minor party nominees have purchased television and radio ads in the past, and since some of those candidates ended up influencing their races, conventional approaches to campaign advertising should be tested with examples from these political outsiders.

Another direction for future research is to examine the genres of political discourse that are unique to third party candidates. For example, many prominent minor party candidates with experience in the two-party system formally resign from their party before starting a presidential bid with a third party. Candidates who did this in the past include John Schmitz, Patrick Buchanan, Cynthia McKinney, Alan Keyes, Bob Barr, and many others. There are some obvious questions about this genre that could be answered by other scholars: What are the characteristics of these resignations and how do they differ from political resignations in general? Additionally what role do resignations by eventual third party candidates play throughout the campaign? Obviously, because third party campaign rhetoric has been neglected in the field of communication, little has been written on this subject.

Another genre of third party campaign rhetoric that could be developed in future research is candidates’ apologia in response to accusations that they aim to spoil an election. As I have indicated throughout this project, being labeled a spoiler is akin to being called anti-American. Spoilers are seen as contaminating agents in democracy, and the charge stains the character of third party candidates who are portrayed as intentionally interfering with the will of the electorate. Minor party candidates have often but not always issued statements of self-defense in
response to this accusation. Candidates like Strom Thurmond and George Wallace embraced the label, while candidates such as Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Nader, and Bob Barr rejected the allegations while claiming to be legitimate political contenders. Despite the fact that this kind of apologia is common among minor party candidates, only rhetoric scholar Christine Harold, who analyzed Ralph Nader’s “rhetoric of purity” in 2000, has studied the genre. Examining the ways that candidates have addressed this criticism may help scholars understand why some third party candidates succeed in gaining electoral support while others flop.

This research could also be extended in the future by expanding the scope of the project from the period between 1948 to 2008 back to at least the beginning of the contemporary two-party system that started after the Civil War. Comparing the rhetoric of third party presidential candidates in their Golden Age, which ended at the beginning of the twentieth century, with their more recent discourse may yield interesting findings. Some questions that could be answered by future studies on this subject include: Were third party candidates in the nineteenth century more willing to assume rhetorical leadership of their campaigns than their major party counterparts? Does the third party style described in this project resemble the rhetorical style of minor party candidates before the turn of the twentieth century? On a related note, how have third party speech genres changed as minor parties have lost their power in the public sphere?

Finally, this analysis of third party campaign rhetoric has focused entirely on presidential candidates. This is a common practice in political communication research. Nevertheless, future research could build on my findings by examining whether my observations hold true for third party candidates who have run for governor, the United States Senate and House of Representatives, as well as various state offices. It seems reasonable to believe that third party candidates except those with deep coffers and name recognition encounter similar challenges in
just about every region of the country, as do their presidential counterparts, but this theory should be checked.
Chapter 1


3 Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 4.

4 Medhurst, “From Retrospect to Prospect,” 13-21.


7 Ibid., 106.

8 Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Medhurst, “From Retrospect to Prospect,” 13.


32 Rosenfeld, “George Wallace Plays Rosemary’s Baby,” 43.

33 Ibid., 43-44.


Rohler, “Conservative Appeals to the People,” 321-322.


Brummett, “Burkean Scapegoating,” 263.


Hart, *Campaign Talk*, 142-144.


For more on Perot’s withdrawal and reentry, and how communication scholars expressed it may have impacted perceptions of his campaign see Roger Aden, “The Rhetorical Functions of H. Ross Perot’s Political Apologia,” *National Forensic Journal* 10 (1992): 135-146; Donn W. Parson, “’If You Want Me to Be Your President’: H. Ross Perot’s Strategies of Rhetorical Transcendence,” *Eighth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation* 1993:


50 Ibid., 583.


52 Dearin, “The American Dream as Depicted,” 698-713.

53 Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 126.

54 Ibid., 127.

55 Although this point will be made clearer in subsequent chapters, a telling example of this is Trent and Friedenberg’s description of the forms of political campaign communication. See Trent and Friendenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 226-276.


for Presidency,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1952, 21; In his analysis of the minor parties failing to make state requirements in New York, Shuster, for instance, highlighted how Church of God Bible Party nominee Bishop Homer Tomlinson said “win or lose, he would go to Korea after the election to seek and [sic] end to the fighting,” and that Greenback Party nominee ridiculously campaigned for printing plenty of money for all.

59 Walter Trohan, “Third Parties on U.S. Scene for 150 Years: Not All Aim at Putting Man in White House,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 18, 1956, B3. Krajewski was also in headlines for the sale of a polka album that supposedly funded his campaign, and for carrying a pig underneath his arm while on the stump. See Alvin Shuster, “They Also Run: Nixon and Kennedy Aren’t the Only Ones Who Want to Be President,” *New York Times*, September 18, 1960, SM70.

60 Shuster, “The Also Run,” SM70.

61 Ibid.

62 Linda Matthews, “Blomen, Soeters, Munn Also Want to Be President,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 4, 1968, 1.


Rapoport and Stone, Three’s a Crowd, p. 48. Many others have offered similar conditions explaining third party emergence, including: Joseph Hazlett, The Libertarian Party
and Other Minor Political Parties in the United States (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1992); Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 125-139.

71 See Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, 137; Schoen, Declaring Independence, xxiv-xxv.


73 Ibid., 69-70. See also: J. David Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 94-95.


77 Rapoport and Stone, Three’s a Crowd, 227.

78 The 2008 election is a strong example; voter dissatisfaction was at one of its highest levels during an election year, according to the Gallup Poll, but support for third parties was lower than average. Likewise, according to the Harris Alienation Index, the election of 1968
came at a time of the lowest levels of alienation on record, but support for third parties was exceptionally high. For a full record of these numbers, see *Harris Interactive*, “Harris Alienation Index Remains Lower Than it was for Most of the Last 20 Years,” August 10, 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/450/Default.aspx; Steve Pendlebury, “Gallup Poll Confirms: We Can’t Get No Satisfaction,” *AOL News*, May 20, 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/2010/05/20/gallup-poll-confirms-we-cant-get-no-satisfaction/.


82 Ibid, 49-50.


Ibid., 131.


Campbell and Jamieson, “Form and Genre in Rhetorical Criticism,” 19.

Ibid., 21.

Ibid

Ibid., 27.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 135.

Campbell and Jamieson, “Form and Genre in Rhetorical Criticism,” 23.
102 Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” 163.

103 Ibid.


108 Ibid., 163.


numbers. Douglas Schoen, for instance, wrote, “Independent voters now make up the largest segment of the American electorate. Evidence that voters are generally unhappy with today’s Democratic and Republican parties is mounting everywhere. According to the American National Election Studies at the University of Michigan and Stanford University, independents made up 38 percent of the electorate in 2004 and 33 percent of those who actually voted.” For more, see Schoen, Declaring Independence, xvi-xvii. See also John F. Bibby and L. Sandy Maisel, Two Parties – or More? The American Party System, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2003), 73.

113 Zaller and Hunt, “The Rise and Fall of Candidate Perot – Part 2,” 111.

114 Those who are convinced that we are on the brink of a very serious third party emerging in America point out that voters are self-identifying as Independents in record numbers. Douglas Schoen, for instance, wrote, “Independent voters now make up the largest segment of the American electorate. Evidence that voters are generally unhappy with today’s Democratic and Republican parties is mounting everywhere. According to the American National Election Studies at the University of Michigan and Stanford University, independents made up 38 percent of the electorate in 2004 and 33 percent of those who actually voted.” For more, see Schoen, Declaring Independence, xvi-xvii. See also Bibby & Maisel, Two Parties – or More?, 73.

115 Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery, 29.

116 Smallwood, The Other Candidates, 9-10.

117 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 97.

118 Ibid.

Smallwood, *The Other Candidates*, 254.

121 Ibid., 255.

122 Nader and Amato, “So You Want to Run,” 165.

123 Ibid; See also Mazmanian, *Third Parties in Presidential Elections*, 90.

124 Gillespie, *Politics at the Periphery*, 35.


131 Ibid. See also Herrnson, “Two Party Dominance,” 27-28.

132 Nader and Amato, “So You Want to Run,” 164.


Nader and Amato, “So You Want to Run,” 168.


Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 97.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Rapoport and Stone, *Three’s a Crowd*, 3-4.


Ibid., 46-47.


Ibid., 158-159.
Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, *Third Parties in America*, 121.

Rosenstone and his colleagues did the same in their study, but elaborated, “There are admittedly differences between minor parties that run candidates for other offices and persist for several elections and independent candidacies that rise and fall in a single race for the presidency.” I have noted some of these differences in the next chapter. See Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, *Third Parties in America*, 10.


Ibid., 61.

Chapter 2


169 See Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 72-121.

170 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 72.

171 Ibid., 73.

172 Ibid., 75.

173 Ibid., 77.

174 Ibid., 81.

175 Ibid., 86-87.

176 See Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 86-91.

177 For a more complete list, see Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 91.

178 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 105-106.

179 See Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 106-113.

180 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 114.

181 Ibid., 86.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid., 72.

184 This shortcoming is not unique to Trent and Friedenberg’s research. According to political scientist John Aldrich, many political scientists assume that the primary motivation underlying campaigns is the desire to win an election. Aldrich says that scholarly literature often

185 For more on the limitations of incumbency style, see Trent & Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication*, 105.


187 Ibid., 110-111.

188 Ibid., 110.

189 Ibid., 113.


193 For more, see Bibby and Maisel, *Two Parties – or More?*, 14-15; Gillespie, *Politics of the Periphery*, 9-10.


195 Some scholars also include the campaigns of Progressive Party nominee Henry Wallace and National States’ Rights Party candidate Strom Thurmond in 1948, and George Wallace in 1968. However, because their parties evolved after they ended their campaigns, this claim is contentious. For more, see Bibby and Maisel, *Two Parties – or More?*, 9.


Matthews, “Blomen, Soeters, Munn Also Want to be President,” 1.


Ibid.

Rapoport and Stone, *Three’s a Crowd*, 5.

Gillespie, *Politics of the Periphery*, 43.


Davis, “Libertarian Expresses His Party’s Line.”


213 Hazlett, The Libertarian Party, 17.

214 Ibid., 28-30.

215 Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, 148-149.


Boston Globe journalist Marilyn Goldstein noted; instead “she asks to be listened to.” For more, see Marilyn Goldstein, “For Candidate Johnson, Goal is to Be Heard,” Newsday, August 9, 1984, http://infoweb.newsbank.com; Caldecott, “Guardian Women.”


225 Hazlett, The Libertarian Party, 34.

226 See Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections, 69-70; Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery, 94-95.


229 Charles M. Madigan, “She Leads Dump-Dukakis Party; Jackson Supporter Runs to Gain Revenge on Democrats,” Chicago Tribune, October 23, 1988,


Bibby and Maisel, Two Parties – or More?, 15.


Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 139-140


Ibid.

This argument is made convincingly by Aden, “The Rhetorical Functions,” 135-146.

As noted by Tonn and Endress, “Looking Under the Hood,” 296: “Although many citizens had responded to Perot’s humanizing of the presidency, Stockdale by contrast, appeared all too human.” Unlike Perot, Stockdale was perceived less as unconventional, and more as a buffoon.
Ibid., 297.


Ibid., 31.


Peroutka, “Announcement Speech.”


277 Ralph Nader, interview by Tim Russert, Meet the Press, MSNBC, February 24, 2008,


280 Ibid., 595.


282 Ray Jenkins, “George Wallace Figures to Win Even if He Loses,” New York Times,
April 7, 1968, SM26.

283 Monroe W. Karmin, “Keep ‘Em Laughing is John Schmitz’s Motto in Presidential

284 This line, emphasizing the lack of difference between the two parties, has been used in
some form by third party candidates in every presidential election. For more examples, see
Constitution, October 27, 1992, A8; Carlic, “Presidential Candidate Struggles for National
Attention”; Brian Coleman, “Socialist Takes 1st Step to ’88 in Sandals,” Post-Standard, August
Debate,” 34; Katherine Ellison, “A Feminist Who’s Not Looking Back,” Philadelphia Inquirer,

285 Peroutka, “Announcement Speech.”


287 Rohler, “Conservative Appeals to the People,” 316-317.


289 Ibid., 358.

290 Ibid., 359-360.

291 Ibid., 362.


293 Ibid., 42-43.


Some scholars disagree with this idea, though. Harold in “The Green Virus” demonstrated the dangers of the purity theme in third party discourse, and made a case that candidates might be better off declaring their campaign the *agency for* purity, rather than considering themselves *agents of* purity. In any case, authenticity simply demands proof that the candidate acts ethically, says what they mean, and stays true to themselves.
Political communication scholar Shawn Parry-Giles offered a somewhat similar breakdown, suggesting that the news media uses four tests of political authenticity, including motive, consistency, oppositional opinions, and geography. See Parry-Giles, “Political Authenticity, Television News,” 215. See also, Edwards, “Presidential Campaign Cartoons,” 191-208.

For more precise figures, see Zaller and Hunt, “The Rise and Fall – Part I,” 358.

Ibid., 363.


Note that this kind of style requires personal dynamism, because otherwise the speaker will simply appear unprepared and ineffective. Perennial candidate Gus Hall from the Communist Party is a good example to consider. Laughing about the “clumsy” reputation he gained as a speaker, Hall later admitted that he read his speeches without much feeling or spontaneity. One former Communist who followed Hall agreed, stating, “When Gus Hall speaks
. . . it’s very difficult to listen. You had to hold yourself to the bench with both hands, he was so bad.” See David Gates, “A Communist in America,” *Newsweek*, February 27, 1984, 9.

312 Raum and Measell, “Wallace and His Ways,” 34.


314 Hogan, “Wallace and the Wallacites,” 41


318 Karmin, “Keep ‘Em Laughing is John Schmitz’s Motto,” 1.

319 Ibid.


321 Sanders, “Socialist Pushes His Platform,” B1;


Hogan, “Wallace and the Wallacites,” 44.


Nichols, “Libertarian Candidate Uses Low-Key Approach.”

It is doubtful that this was beneficial to Perot so late into the campaign, though. For more, see Simons, “Judging a Policy Proposal by the Company it Keeps,” 279-281.


Ibid.

Third party candidates, as a group, have been so consistent in looking like outsiders that the few candidates who come along appearing ‘presidential’ in the conventional sense have often turned heads. Dr. Benjamin Spock of the Citizens’ Party, for example, was described as cutting “an incongruous figure among the ranks of the New Left. He wears fine blue suits with vest and tie, a pocket-handkerchief and a gold watch chain. His hair is white and grows ever thinner, but he is tanned and spry.” Even the Libertarians were surprised in 1980, when their
nominee Ed Clark brought an unusual youthful charm and Kennedy-like good looks to the campaign trail. For more, see *New York Times*, “Other Presidential Aspirants,” 46.


333 Furgurson, “Along the Independent Path,” C7. Notably, the mane was also characterized like McCarthy as being a bit wild and unpredictable. For instance, see Gar Joseph, “Candidate Downplays His Nostalgia Factor,” *Philadelphia Daily News*, June 2, 1988, 14.


Chapter 3


Although this literature will be described in detail later in the chapter, see Baer and Nussbaum, “How to Announce for President”; Benoit and others, “‘I Am a Candidate for President,’” 3-18; Palazzolo and Theriault, “Candidate Announcement Addresses,” 350-363; Dan Patlak, “Announcing Your Candidacy: Checklist for a Successful Kickoff,” *Campaigns &

352 Bob Barr, “Announcement Transcript.”


357 Boston Globe, “Nader vs. the Democrats” (editorial), February 26, 2008, 12A.


363 Ibid.


366 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 52.

367 Ibid., 33.


370 Baer and Nussbaum, “How to Announce for President”; Benoit and others, “‘I Am a Candidate for President’”; Palazzolo and Theriault, “Candidate Announcement Addresses”;

371 These examples were cited in Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 29.

372 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 228.

373 Ibid., 30.


375 See Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 234.

376 For more examples from 2008, see Baer and Nussbaum, “How to Announce for President.”

377 Benoit and others, “‘I Am a Candidate for President,’” 4.

378 Ibid.


380 Ibid.

381 Ibid.


385 See Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 236; Palazzolo and Theriault, “Candidate Announcement Addresses,” 350.

386 Baer and Bussbaum, “How to Announce for President.”


Trent and Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication*, 236.


Benoit and others, “I am a Candidate,” 13-14.


Anderson, “John B. Anderson Announces Candidacy for President.”

Linder, “Eugene McCarthy, at 72.”

Barr, “Announcement Transcript.”


Barr, “Announcement Transcript.”

Anderson, “John B. Anderson Announces Candidacy for President.”

Battiata, “Sonia Johnson Making Bid for President,” B3.


Nader, “Statement of Ralph Nader, Announcing his Candidacy.”

Peroutka, “Announcement Speech.”


Browne, “Why I am Running for President.”

Ibid.

Turner, “Barry Commoner is Almost as Eloquent.”


Anderson, “John B. Anderson Announces Candidacy for President.”


McReynolds, “Press Conference Speech.”

Reckard, “Anderson Founds a Political Party.”


437 Ibid., 10.


440 Ibid., 5.


442 Wallace, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” 11.


444 Ibid.


446 Ibid., 4.


448 Ibid.


451 Ibid.

452 Ibid.

453 The evidence above comes from Wallace, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” 7-9.


455 Wallace, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” 8.

articles were found in the Eugene J. McCarthy Papers, Elmer L. Anderson Library, University of Minnesota.


463 Herald Examiner, “McCarthy to Seek Presidency.”

464 Napoli, “Gene McCarthy Throws His Hat in the Ring.”


Crowley, “News Conference of Eugene McCarthy – August 25, 1974,”


Ibid.


Herald Examiner, “McCarthy to Seek Presidency.”

Napoli, “Gene McCarthy Throws His Hat in the Ring.”


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Chapter 4


According to many scholars, the end of the “dignified silence” as a norm in presidential elections, and the rise of presidential rhetoric on the campaign trail, can be dated back to the election of 1896. As Richard Ellis wrote about that election year, Democrat William Jennings Bryan “spoke to an estimated five million Americans across twenty-seven states while William McKinley spoke to about 750,000 people in the 300 speeches he gave from his front
porch in Canton, Ohio.” Although this was the result of about a decade of shifting norms, it was at this point that presidential candidates, rather than party bosses, became the primary spokesman for the campaign. See Ellis, “Accepting the Nomination,” 113.


495 Ellis, “Accepting the Nomination,” 128-129.

496 On the increased use of first person pronouns since Roosevelt, see Ellis, “Accepting the Nomination,” 128; Fields, Union of Words, 90.

497 Fields, Union of Words, 93.

498 Ellis, “Accepting the Nomination,” 131.


500 The functions are not actually too different than the general functions of the nomination convention as a symbolic event. This is not surprising, since many scholars have noted that it is but one part of the institutional discourse at a convention. However, the speech still has unique functions since it is the capstone of that event. For more on the functions of conventions, see Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 51-65. For more on national political conventions as institutional discourse, see Larry David Smith, “Convention Oratory as Institutional Discourse: A Narrative Synthesis of the Democrats and Republicans of 1988,” Communication Studies 41 (1990): 19-34; David M. Timmerman and Gary M. Weier, “The 1996 Presidential Nominating Conventions: Good Television and Shallow Identification,”

501 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 60.


503 Many other scholars have written about this function. For more, see Benoit, “Acclaiming, Attacking, and Defending,” 247; Cline, “Victory Rally Cheer,” 22; Nordvold, “Rhetoric as Ritual,” 34; Smith, “Constituting Contrasting Communities,” 48; Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 239.

504 Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 239.

505 Ibid., 55-60.

506 Ibid., 63.

507 For more, see Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 240.

508 Smith, “Constituting Contrasting Communities,” 48.


511 Ibid., 154.

512 Some have identified just a couple of common characteristics, while others have suggested that there are as many as twelve. For more, see Gustainis and Benoit, “Analogic Analysis of the Presidential,” 23; Ritter, “American Political Rhetoric”; Sheckels, “Conforming to and Departing”; Trent and Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication, 238-252; Valley, “Significant Characteristics of Democratic.”

Ibid., 241.

Ibid., 243-244.


Ibid., 252.


Sheckels, “Conforming to and Departing” 10.

Fields, *Union of Words*, 95.


See Sheckels, “Conforming to and Departing,” 4, 6-7.


Benoit, “Acclaiming, Attacking, and Defending,” 262, 265; Additionally, Theodore Sheckels argued that the content of nomination acceptance speeches depends on the office sought, and concluded that the genre “[seems] to fall somewhere in between the stable and the evolving and, therefore, [requires] a definition neither firm nor loose.” See Sheckels, “Conforming to and Departing,” 6.

530 Quoted in Rohler, “George Wallace: Conservative Populist,” 56.


536 Peroutka, “Presidential Nomination Acceptance Remarks.”


540 Browne, “We Believe in You: Acceptance Speech.”


542 Ibid.
Wallace drew parallels to the goals of other founding fathers, too. In the Progressive Party’s effort to end segregation, he argued that they were “[dedicating] ourselves to the complete fulfillment of Lincoln’s promise.”

Watson, “The Acceptance Speech of Dr. Claude A. Watson.”


Libertarian Party Papers, University of Virginia.

Clark, “Clark’s Acceptance Speech,” 2-3.


Ibid.

Watson, “The Acceptance Speech of Dr. Claude A. Watson.”


Watson, “The Acceptance Speech of Dr. Claude A. Watson.”

Peroutka, “Presidential Nomination Acceptance Remarks.”


Chicago Daily Tribune, “Rebels to Try to Put Ticket in All States,” July 25, 1948, 2.
For the rest of this section, quotations will come from J. Strom Thurmond, “Address of J. Strom Thurmond, Governor of South Carolina, Accepting the States’ Rights Democratic Nomination as President,” August 11, 1948, Strom Thurmond Collection, States’ Rights Papers, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University.


Chapter 5


571 Weaver, “Acknowledgement of Victory and Defeat,” 482.

572 Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 113; Vile, Presidential Winners and Losers, 2.

573 Weaver, “Acknowledgement of Victory and Defeat,” 482.

574 Vile, Presidential Winners and Losers, 6.

575 Ibid., 7.

576 Ibid.

577 Ibid., 7-8.

578 Ibid., 8.

579 Ibid.

580 Welch, “The Rhetoric of Victory and Defeat,” 86.

581 Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 113-114.

582 Ibid., 114.

583 Ibid.

584 Ibid.

585 Ibid.

586 Vile, Presidential Winners and Losers, 3-5.

587 Ibid., 4.


589 The following analysis is based on the work of Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 114-116; Corcoran, “Presidential Endings,” 263-265; Ritter and Howell, “Ending the
2000 Presidential Election,” 2316-2317; Vile, *Presidential Winners and Losers*, 8-9; Weaver, “Acknowledgement of Victory and Defeat,” 483-485; Welch, “The Rhetoric of Victory and Defeat,” 88. According to Vile, though, all of these lists are incomplete. “Other elements,” he suggested, “are expressions of grief or pain, expressions of thanks to family and supporters, statements of faith in God and his providence, appeals to youthful supporters, and (probably most quoted, requited, and remembered) the use of humor to case the pronouncement of public pain.” See Vile, *Presidential Winners and Losers*, 8.

590 Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 115.

591 Ibid.


593 Corcoran, “Presidential Concession Speeches,” 115.

594 Welch, “The Rhetoric of Victory and Defeat,” 86.


596 Weaver, “Acknowledgement of Victory and Defeat,” 483.


598 Weaver, “Acknowledgement of Victory and Defeat,” 485.


602 Welch, “The Rhetoric of Victory and Defeat,” 96. While I ultimately agree with some of Welch’s suggestions, his brief study relied on a very small sample size, having been based on analysis of just three candidates including George Wallace, John Anderson, and Ross Perot.


622 Marrou, “Interview with Andre Marrou.”
Weigel, “Bob Barr Looks Back.”


Hallinan, “Statement of Vincent Hallinan and Charlotta A. Bass.”


Hallinan, “Statement Released Evening of November 4, San Francisco.”

McCarthy, “Press Conference at the National Press Club.”


All of the quotations in this section come from this press conference. See McCarthy, “Press Conference at the National Press Club.”

Although Nader and others insist that he was not a “spoiler” and that Gore could have won had he picked up other states, many political scientists have concluded that the Green Party’s support in Florida clearly crushed Gore’s chances of winning. See Berg, “Spoiler or Builder?” 323-336; Barry C. Burden, “Ralph Nader’s Campaign Strategy in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election,” *American Politics Research* 33 (2005): 672-699.

For the rest of this section regarding Nader’s concession, see Ralph Nader, “Speech on Election Night, Nov. 7, 2000,” 326-328.

Ibid., 326.

Ibid., 328.

Ibid., 326.

Ibid., 327.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 326.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
For the remainder of this section, I will be referencing Browne’s concession as delivered on the night of November 7, 2000 from the state of Georgia. Although a transcript of Browne’s remarks does not appear to exist, at least in circulation, the video is available through C-SPAN’s Video Library. See Harry Browne, “Post-Election Speech” (video), November 7, 2000, C-SPAN Video Library, http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/160356-1.


Chapter 6


Selected Bibliography

In accordance with the *Chicago Manual of Style* (15th Edition), I do not list newspaper articles or the speeches that are the focal point of my analysis. Full citations for each of these can be obtained in the endnotes for each chapter.


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