

**School Composition and Disproportionality in Discipline:  
A School-Level Analysis of Disciplinary Actions against Various  
Offense Types in the United States, 2007-2008**

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses race, poverty, and school locational and organizational characteristics to explore three specific questions: 1) Are there discrepancies across American public schools in terms of managing discipline? 2) What are the underlying factors that explain this discrepancy? 3) What are the school and organizational characteristics that are associated with the way in which students are disciplined? The school-level data for this study is based on the 2007-2008 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) and the Common Core of Data (CCD), both provided by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES).

Existing literature suggests that minority and poor students are disciplined differently – often more punitively - than White and affluent students. The findings from this research suggest that *school level* dynamics may be different than what the student level literature suggests. Specifically, the results indicate that racial and poverty concentrations do affect the types of violations that occur in schools and school officials' responses' to different offense types. However, it is not race and poverty alone that are associated with this. Racial and poverty concentrations are mediated by several school characteristics, and matter to a lesser degree when specific characteristics are accounted for. Additionally, disciplinary responses to violations depend on the type of violation, not necessarily on the racial or poverty make-up of the school.



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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Are there discrepancies across American public schools in terms of managing discipline? What are the underlying factors that explain this discrepancy? What are the school characteristics associated with the way in which students are disciplined?

This dissertation takes an important step in analyzing national data to explore these questions. Specifically, it addresses school compositional, locational, and organizational characteristics as they relate to how discipline policies and procedures are interpreted and implemented in American public schools. The analysis draws primarily on School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) data and Common Core of Data (CCD), both of which are collected by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). The 2007-2008 wave of data is utilized for this study.

### **1.1. History and Description of Disciplinary Responses in American Schools**

Schools across our nation are one of the safest places for children. Parents entrust educators with not only educating their child but also keeping their child safe and protected. In addition to teaching, educators are responsible to maintain a safe and orderly environment where children feel comfortable and free from harm. Due to an increase in school violence, bullying, and student victimization in recent years, societal demands and pressures to keep schools safe have risen.

Current disciplinary responses to student behavior have continued to develop as increasing emphasis has been put on state standards, accountability, and excellence (Leone and Drakeford 1999). The 1950s marked the beginning of the baby boom generation. This generation, defined as 1946 to 1964, saw the births of 80 million people (Adams 2000). The

baby boom generation made its mark on society and education in many ways. With this many births in such a short period of time, the nation experienced growth in the number of schools as well as an increase in school size (Adams 2000). During this same time, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the Vietnam protest movement overlapped with unruly behaviors of the baby boomers (Sagor 1999; Adams 2000). Up until now, corporal punishment had been the disciplinary response used in most schools to deter misbehaviors. One of the intended outcomes of corporal punishment was the public embarrassment it brought with it. School administrators hoped by having other students witness the punishment; it would deter misbehaviors (Hanson 2005). According to Adams (2000), this type of punishment was effective in one-room schoolhouses, but not as effective or as acceptable in larger schools. With an increasing focus on individual rights, school administrators were questioning whether corporal punishment was a fair and just way to discipline students. An increase in student enrollment, larger class sizes, and more misbehavior from students led schools to shift from corporal punishment to more effective and more manageable discipline. Schools turned to out-of-school suspensions and expulsions as a way to exclude students who misbehave from the rest of the students in the school (Hanson 2005).

Out-of-school suspensions and expulsions were a popular disciplinary response in the 1960s and early 1970s (Adams 2000). Excluding students from school was an easy and efficient way for school administrators to manage the large numbers of misbehaving students. It was also an effective way to isolate the students who were committing the violations from the rest of the student population (Hanson 2005). Excluding students from school, however, does have its' disadvantages. Existing research suggests that students who are excluded from school are more likely to drop-out, lose trust in authority, and experience delinquent behavior patterns (DeRidder

1990; Henault 2001; Skiba 2000). Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) stated that students who are excluded from school are more likely to feel isolated and defeated.

As exclusion as a disciplinary response to violations increased in popularity throughout the nation's schools, many Supreme Court cases that were brought against school districts in the 1970s had strong implications for the use of this disciplinary practice (Adams 2000). In *Goss v. Lopez* (1975) high school students claimed that the school district had violated their due process rights by suspending them. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students stating that students must be afforded their due process rights. Students must be given oral or written notice of the charges against them and given the opportunity to respond to the allegations. Also, students are entitled to explain and/or dispute any evidence that is being used against them, and have the right to a hearing before a neutral group (Hanson 2005). This court case had numerous implications to the way school administrators assigned out-of-school suspension and expulsion. For example, school officials now had to document that due process had been given to a student before suspending or expelling him/her. In turn, districts were more open to scrutiny from the public for thoughtless disciplinary responses that may have been ingrained in the organization as a simple way to handle unruly students (Adams 2000). School districts now could no longer exclude students from school as easily as before. In response to numerous lawsuits filed against school districts for violating students' due process rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s, schools began using other disciplinary responses to discipline violators such as in-school suspension (Adams 2000; Hanson 2005).

During this time schools experienced pressure from society to discipline in a more humane way students that misbehaved other than excluding them from school. In-school suspension provided a softer and less punitive approach to discipline and allowed for unruly

students to stay in school and receive instruction yet be isolated from the rest of the student population. With in-school suspension school administrators did not have to worry about disciplinary hearings or the threat of attorneys (Adams 2000). This type of disciplinary response, which was popular at the end of the 1970s through the mid-1980s, kept students off the streets and in school where they were supervised, and students did not lose out on instruction. However, not all in-school suspension programs were effective due to the quality of the program. For example, some schools implemented these programs as “holding grounds” for misbehaving students. Often times, these in-school suspension rooms were supervised by paraeducators who did not have the background or training to work with students who were at-risk. Additionally, necessary resources that students needed to help them be successful were not provided. However, there were schools who implemented in-school suspension programs that were just the opposite. These programs were run by certified teachers who provided effective instruction to students and had the necessary resources students needed (Adams 2000). According to Adams (2000), many students end up in in-school suspension because some teachers lack the training needed to mediate issues between students or help students in resolving their own conflicts. Therefore, placing them in in-school suspension is an easy alternative so teachers do not have to deal with misbehaving students.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s schools began to experience more violence such as guns, drugs, and gangs. In response to the increasing violent behavior of students, federal, state, and local school boards were eager to implement zero-tolerance policies that offered harsh penalties for students who committed serious offenses (Skiba and Knesting 2001). In 1994 the Gun-Free School Act was signed into law mandating that students be expelled from school for one calendar year for bringing a firearm to school, that schools are required to report such

violations to the criminal justice system, and gives the superintendent of each school district the authority to alter expulsions on an individual basis (Sughrue 2003; Verdugo 2002). Initially, the bill included only firearms but has since been expanded to include other types of weapons such as knives with blades over three inches, iron bars, pocketknives, daggers, and brass knuckles (Dunbar and Villarruel, 2004). In some districts, zero tolerance policies have been extended to include more types of punishable behaviors such as possession of drugs including Midol and aspirin, to possession of toy guns, truancy, threats, fighting, gang activity, and generally any form of disruption in schools, many of which pose little threat to school safety (Skiba and Peterson, 1999; Skiba, 2000, Henault, 2001; Sughrue, 2003). Skiba and Peterson (1999) stated that the broad interpretation of zero-tolerance policies has led to an “epidemic of suspensions and expulsions for seemingly trivial events” (p.375).

The consequences of violating zero-tolerance policies vary by state, district, school, and by violation, but, commonly, the harsher the violation the more severe the punishment. School administrators have the authority to use discretion in decisions related to inappropriate, threatening, or dangerous behavior that is outside the scope of zero-tolerance. School leaders, for example, could interpret whether or not *intent* existed in each situation (Dunbar and Villarruel, 2002). Examples of discretionary intent are illustrated in the following scenarios:

- In Michigan, a girl was suspended for taking a knife to school to use to cut brownies she has brought for the class for her birthday party.
- In Colorado, a 10-year old girl was expelled after it was discovered that her mother packed a small knife in her lunch to cut an apple.
- In Louisiana, an 8-year old girl was suspended for taking her grandfather’s pocket watch, which included a 1-inch fingernail knife, to school.

- In Michigan, a high school senior was suspended for one semester for wearing an Irish kilt, with part of the outfit including an open-blade knife that fit into a sheath tucked into his sock (Dunbar and Villarruel, 2002).

Additionally, in Chicago a 17 year-old junior used a rubber band to shoot a paperclip at a classmate, missed, and ended up breaking the skin of a cafeteria worker. The student was expelled from school, arrested, and taken to the county jail where he was held for seven hours and charged with misdemeanor battery. He was advised by school officials to drop out (Skiba, 1999). In San Diego a 12 year-old scuffled with classmates when they taunted him for being fat. The student was expelled for violating the zero-tolerance policy (Skiba, 1999).

The above examples illustrate a vast range of outcomes in how zero-tolerance policies interpreted and enforced throughout America. Zero-tolerance policies have been applied differently across the nation as well as within states, districts, and schools. The implementation of zero-tolerance policies has created uneasiness with parents, school administrators, law enforcement agencies, and civil liberty groups, because the law has the potential to deprive students of a year of public education (Dunbar and Villarruel, 2002; Dunbar and Villarruel, 2004). The perception among Americans exist that a free public education is a guaranteed right, however, a free public education is not a constitutional right. Consequently, schools are not required to provide educational alternatives for students suspended or expelled from school (Morrison and Skiba, 2001).

Although not required, some districts and schools in the nation have turned to alternative education facilities as a way to exclude disruptive students from the general population and still provide them an education. In the late 1960s and early 1970s alternative schools became very popular across the nation. The original intent of these types of schools was to provide students

who could not be successful in the mainstream of the traditional school organization with an alternative educational program (Gregg 1999). These programs provided students an option to the regular school setting. Alternative schools typically have fewer students than traditional schools, have a smaller pupil/teacher ratio, are more individualized to the learner, and have a modified or innovative curriculum (Gregg 1999). However, with the increase in school violence developing in the late 1980s, the implementation of zero-tolerance policies in the 1990s, safe-school legislation, and the ever increasing societal demand to provide safe and orderly schools, traditional schools began to turn to alternative education programs in the early 2000s as a way to isolate disruptive students from interfering with the safe and orderly operation of the traditional school environment (Leone and Drakeford 1999). Alternative schools have become punitive responses or “last chance” options for disruptive students (Leone and Drakeford 1999). Transferring disruptive students to an alternative school may appear to be less punitive than expulsion and suspension and provides students with an opportunity to continue their education whereas expulsion and suspension does not. According to Brown (2007), the effectiveness of alternative schools for students with disciplinary issues has yet to be proven. What research does show is that alternative schools may threaten equity by segregating minority students, students of poverty, and disabled students in alternative programs (Gregg 1999) since these are the groups of students who tend to commit more offenses and experience more punitive punishments (Children’s Defense Fund 1975; Townsend 2000; Skiba 2000). Gregg (1999) cautioned that alternative schools may become the “dumping grounds” for unruly and unwanted students.

We have seen major changes in the past 60 years in terms of how schools across the nation respond to misbehaviors of students. Before the 1950s corporal punishment was a punitive disciplinary response to student misconduct. The baby boom generation (1946-1964) created an

increase in the number of schools across the nation as well as an increase in school size and more disruptive behaviors from students causing schools to shift disciplinary responses to violations by expelling or suspending students from school. Although possibly somewhat less punitive than corporal punishment, excluding students from school allowed for an easy and effective way for school administrators to manage disruptive students. Numerous lawsuits against districts for violating students due process rights in the 1970s was the catalyst for schools to begin taking a less punitive approach when disciplining violators. It was during this time that in-school suspension became a popular disciplinary response to violations. An increase in violent behavior of students across the nation prompted schools to have less tolerance of misbehaviors. Zero-tolerance policies blanketed the nation in the 1990s. Depending on the interpretation and implementation of the policy from district to district, this policy had the potential to be very punitive. Shortly after zero-tolerance policies were put into law, districts also began to isolate unruly students by transferring them to alternative schools as a way to exclude them from the general population of the school. More research is needed to determine the effectiveness and possibly punitiveness of alternative schools.

## **1.2. Why Would Schools Use One Type of Disciplinary Response Over Another?**

Discipline is an inherent, ambiguous, and contextual concept that varies by school, district, region, and social groups. Existing research suggests that minorities, different socioeconomic groups, and boys and girls are disciplined differently (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004; Raffaele-Menedez, Knoff, and Ferron 2002; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson 2002; Townsend 2000). Minorities, students from low socioeconomic backgrounds and males are usually subjected to

harsher discipline than are other groups (Children's Defense Fund 1975; Cooley 1995; Dunbar and Villarruel 2004; Shaw and Braden 1990).

The typical unit of analysis in studies of school discipline is the individual student. But, school features are likely to have meaningful implications as well. For example, harsher discipline for minorities is in part associated with school location. Much research says that urban schools punish students more punitively such as in expulsion or suspension than do rural schools (Skiba, Peterson and Williams 1997; Wu, Pink, Crain and Moles 1982). This could be an important factor in the nationwide discipline gap. Since urban schools serve predominately nonwhite and socioeconomically disadvantaged students, these groups of students may be experiencing much more punitive punishments than White affluent students who typically make up a majority of the student population in rural schools. Depending on the context of the school, urban schools are typically larger than rural schools and therefore, tend to experience more violations (Heaviside, Rowland, Williams, and Farris 1998). High density of violations (i.e., a high proportion of students involved in disciplinary violations) may affect the way schools respond to misbehavior, as the school may react more punitively in order to control a potentially unruly and disorderly environment. In other words, administrators may prefer more punitive punishment for violations which will help to create some type of order in the school.

Larger organizations tend to implement more formalized and standardized procedures, uniformly enforce rules and policies and tend not to take into account individual and situational circumstances (Scott and Davis 2007). Urban administrators tend to have less tolerance for student misconduct due to the sheer number of students and violations that they experience and in turn tend to punish more punitively by expelling, suspending, or transferring students (Gregg 1999; Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). There are way too many students for urban administrators to

consider every offense on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, rural schools tend to have less students so therefore they may experience less violations. Administrators in rural schools tend to punish students – often White affluent students – less punitively by assigning violators detention time or in-school suspension or sometimes choosing not to punish the student at all (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). Since rural schools typically have less students, administrators in these types of schools are likely to be able to consider each offense on a case-by-case basis. Rural administrators tend to alter or modify discipline policies to meet the needs and culture of their districts, while urban administrators tend to enforce the policies as they are written (Bowditch 1993; Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). Having less tolerance for misbehavior, urban administrators tend to favor a stern approach to discipline; punishing their students more harshly than rural administrators would for the same type of offenses (Bowditch 1993; Dunbar and Villarruel 2004).

Relatedly, the culture of the community where the school is located may also play a role in how students are disciplined. Youth violence increased to record levels across the nation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Attar, Guerra, and Tolan 1995). Community violence, drug and alcohol abuse, gangs, etc. began infiltrating communities especially in urban areas (Attar, Guerra, and Tolan 1995). When the community is disorderly and chaotic, the schools serving that community may tend to be disorderly and chaotic. Therefore, the community may turn to the school system as a way to help control the disorder and disruption in the community by enforcing harsh punishments on students who misbehave in their schools (Brown and Beckett 2006). So much in fact, that urban schools have often been compared to prisons (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Parenti 2000; Staples 2000). According to Devine (1996), students attending schools that experience violence and gang activity are more likely to be treated like criminals

and subjected to more punitive punishments like expulsion and suspension. Criminalization is most often associated with schools that serve minority students and students of poverty (Hirschfield 2008). Urban communities tend to support punitive punishments for students who violate school policies. Parents that live in communities where violence and crime is prevalent tend to supervise their children closely because they are fearful of the community in which they live (Brown and Beckett 2006).

In contrast, rural communities tend to experience less crime and violence and therefore are somewhat more relaxed in how they expect schools to respond to violations. Less crime in the community may mean less crime in the schools. Like urban communities, rural communities also want and expect schools to be safe and orderly and support practices and procedures that keep children safe. However, rural communities tend to value student choice and freedom that allows for self-discipline and less punitive responses to student misconduct (Casella 2003).

Existing research suggests that minority and poor students are disciplined more punitively than White and affluent students. However, school level compositional, locational, and organizational characteristics may be more related to disciplinary responses to different types of violations than what the *student level* literature suggests. There are very few, if any, studies of between-school variation in disciplinary responses to different violation types. A vast majority of the existing literature focuses on district level and state level research. Table 2 shows a compressed list of existing research conducted at the district and state levels. Additionally, there are very few, if any, studies of within-school variation of students in terms of disciplinary responses to specific violations. To more fully understand how school level compositional, locational, and organizational characteristics may be associated with disciplinary responses to

different violations more research is needed in the areas of between-school variation and within-school variation of students.

This dissertation explores how minority and poverty composition of schools may be related to disciplinary responses to different types of violations.

## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE:

#### WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL DISCIPLINE?

##### 2.1. Discipline as It Relates to Race and Poverty

It has been well documented throughout the past 30 years that major discrepancies exist in the implementation of school discipline. In particular, minority students and students of low socioeconomic status are overrepresented in school punishment (Children's Defense Fund 1975; Dunbar and Villarruel 2002; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson 2002; Townsend 2000). However, even with the all-encompassing research that has been done in the area of school discipline, the reasons for the disproportionality that exists in terms of ethnic, socioeconomic, and gender biases is still vague. Is it race? Is it poverty? Is it the community context? Is it the school? Or, is it a combination of these factors?

The overrepresentation of minorities, especially African American males, as the recipients of exclusionary punishment such as suspension and/or expulsion, has been the topic of debate and sometimes litigation. Raffaele-Menedez, Knoff, and Ferron (2002) contended that African American students are suspended two or three times more than White students. During the 1999-2000 school year, Chicago Public Schools suspended and expelled more African American students than White students. African American students comprised 73% of the expulsions, but only 53% of the student enrollment (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). In a New Orleans school district, African American males made up 43% of the student population, however, they received 65% of the suspensions and 80% of the expulsions (Garibaldi 1992). A National Education Longitudinal study of the educational status of 25,000 eighth graders supported previous research that African American males are suspended more than any other

group (Townsend 2000). A national survey conducted by the Office of Civil Rights in 1993 showed that African American males made up 8.2% of the total student population, yet comprised over 25% of the suspensions.

Another important study conducted by the Children's Defense Fund used school discipline data from the Office of Civil Rights and found high rates of suspension for African American students. Approximately 3,000 school districts were represented in the Office of Civil Rights data, and more than 66% showed higher rates of suspension for African American students than for White students at the elementary, middle, and high school levels (Skiba and Peterson 1999; Skiba 2000). While 29 states suspended over 5% of their total African American enrollment, only four states suspended over 5% of White students (Skiba and Peterson 1999). Since this report, the disproportionality in the use of suspensions and expulsions due to race has been a constant finding (Gregory 1997; Nichols, Ludwin, and Iadicola 1999; Skiba 2000). Additionally, African American students also receive more punitive disciplinary responses such as corporal punishment than White students (Johnston 2000; Monroe 2005). In 1997 the Tennessee Office of Education Accountability found an overrepresentation of African American students in zero-tolerance related expulsions in the state's urban schools' system (Skiba 2000). A study conducted by Gordan, Piana, and Keleher in 2000 found higher than expected rates of suspension and expulsion for African American students in all 15 major American cities studied. Another urban school district study found African American students received more office referrals and therefore more suspensions than any other ethnic group (Skiba, Peterson, and Williams 1997).

The few studies that have been conducted involving the disciplinary punishment for students from other minority backgrounds have produced unreliable findings. Hispanic students

tend to be overrepresented in school discipline in some research; however, this finding is inconsistent across locations and studies (Gordan et al. 2000; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson 2002). A national data set comprised of parent surveys administered in 1999, found that only 20% of 7-12 grade Hispanic students had ever received a suspension or expulsion compared to 35% of African American students and 15% of White students (Gregory, Skiba, and Norguera, 2010). Krezmien, Leone, and Achilles (2006) concurred that based on nine years (1995-2003) of state discipline records in Maryland, Hispanic students were less likely to be excluded from school than White students.

The disproportionate number of minority students in American schools receiving more punitive punishment than White students prompted community organizations in twelve U.S cities along with the Applied Research Center to conduct a study of their local school districts to determine how they compared to others in terms of racial justice (Gordan, Piana, and Keleher 2000). Using a computerized survey instrument called the Racial Justice Report Card, they found that racial injustices in school discipline were prevalent in 11 out of the 12 cities studied. Boston, Massachusetts was the only city where racial injustices in school discipline were not found. San Francisco public schools suspended or expelled African American students more than three times their proportion of the student population (Gordon et al. 2000). There was not one city in the study which had discipline rates for African American students equal or less than the proportion of all students (Gordon et al. 2000). However, this study showed inconsistent findings in regards to the discipline of Hispanic students. In some cities Hispanic students received suspensions or expulsions in proportionate numbers to the overall school population. Conversely, in cities such as Salem, Oregon, Hispanic students were excluded from school two times more as the proportion of the school population (Gordon et al. 2000).

There are several possible theories as to why minority overrepresentation exists in school suspensions and expulsions. One theory is that the use of suspension and expulsion for African American students is not necessarily racial bias but instead it is the direct correlation with the overrepresentation of students from low-income backgrounds (Skiba 2000; Verdugo 2002). A second theory is that African Americans receive more suspensions and expulsions than their White counterparts because they commit more offenses. However, investigations of student race, behavior, and discipline have shown that African Americans do not misbehave at greater rates than Whites (McCarthy & Hoge 1987; Skiba 2000). What the research does show is that African Americans tend to receive harsher punishments for less severe offenses than White students (Skiba 2000). According to Skiba (1999) in a study of middle school students in an urban district, White students were more often referred to the office for vandalism, smoking, profanity, drugs, and alcohol while African American students were referred more for disrespect, excessive noise, loitering, and threats.

A third theory yet suggests that teachers, especially those of European-American origin, are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the more active and energetic style of African Americans, in particular black males, and therefore, refer them to the office more often (Townsend 2000; Skiba 2000). These authors elaborated that teachers who misunderstand the cultural norms and social interaction of African American males may be quicker to refer a student to the office for a minor infraction because they are fearful.

Students from low socioeconomic backgrounds are also overrepresented in school discipline and receive more punitive punishments than students who are of a higher socioeconomic status. Studies show that students who receive free or reduced lunch are more likely to be suspended and/or expelled from school (Skiba, Peterson, and Williams 1997; Wu,

Pink, Crain, and Moles 1982). Students who have fathers that do not carry full-time employment are at a greater risk of receiving a suspension or expulsion as punishment than students who have a father who carries a full-time job (Skiba et al. 1997). According to Brantlinger (1991) students from both low and high socioeconomic backgrounds believed that low socioeconomic status students were treated unfairly in the punishment they received for misbehavior. Students from lower income homes received different, often harsher, punishments than their higher income peers. Brantlinger noted that typical punishments for high income students include a different seat assignment, verbal warning, or conference with the teacher, etc. while lower income students tend to receive more punitive punishments such as having their personal belongings searched, being excluded from class, or being sent to see an administrator.

In addition to race and poverty, numerous research findings support the notion that there are gender biases in the way students are disciplined. Specifically, males receive more office referrals and are punished using a vast array of disciplinary consequences at a considerably higher rate than females (Shaw and Braden 1990; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson 2002; Skiba, Peterson, and Williams 1997). Bain and MacPherson (1990), Cooley (1995), Gregory (1997), and Skiba et al. (2002) concurred that males are four times as likely as females to be sent to the office, excluded from school, or to receive corporal punishment. Skiba et al. (2002) stated that the probability of receiving discipline depends on the interaction between ethnicity and gender. Based on the data from the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, Gregory (1996) concluded that African American males were 16 times more likely to receive corporal punishment as White females. Taylor and Foster (1986) discovered an ethnicity-gender order exists in the rate students are suspended from school: African American males receive the most suspensions, followed by White males, African American females, and lastly, White females. According to

Gregory, Skiba, and Noguea (2010), in 2004 11% of Asian Pacific Islander males were suspended from school compared to only 1% of Asian Pacific Islander females. In the same year, White females were half as likely to be expelled as White males and African American females were half as likely to be expelled as African American males (Gregory et al. 2010).

As reviewed above, much of the research on discrepancies in school discipline addresses the causes and outcomes at the individual student level. Yet there may be school level issues that are contributing to the discipline gap as well.

## **2.2. School Level Perspective on the Discipline Gap**

The central school factors that may be affecting the discipline gap include the density of violations, the variation in administrator interpretations of discipline policies and enforcement patterns, and the ways in which the community influences schools in terms of violence patterns and violence control.

### *2.2.1. Density of violations*

While much has been written on race and poverty disproportionality in school discipline, surprisingly little emphasis is placed on the issue of violation density, defined broadly as the “proportion of students involved in disciplinary violation.” In simple terms, the greater the density of a given violation in a school—irrespective of the building’s racial and poverty composition or location—the more punitive administrator responses may become, as way to contain and preferably reduce the pattern of violation. Such tendencies ought to be taken into account for an adequate examination of school racial and poverty composition as these relate to discipline. Logically, compositional biases in discipline would be more apparent if one could account for such effects *above and beyond* the effects of mere violation density. Although race,

poverty and school location may be related to violation density—at least with regard to some violations—robust inquiries on disproportionality should, at a minimum, examine patterns of disciplinary responses that violation density effects are unable to account for.

Despite the rarity of this perspective in school discipline studies, research on criminal justice and social control offer relevant insights. In a classic account of punishment in the United States, Grupp (1971) notes that increasing rates of crime in a community tend to elicit equally punitive responses as a means of deterrence and retribution, as opposed to rehabilitation. The roots of this insight can be traced back to Durkheim's (1893/1984) work on immoral conduct and social control, where he argued that increased crimes against common values typically bring about harsher punishment and stricter legal codes as a way to foster moral solidarity and to reaffirm the distinction between the sacred and the profane.

According to Taylor, Scheppele, and Stinchcombe (1979), harsher punishment for crime is often based as much on the “fear” of crime as it is on the objective increase in crime rates. In particular, when subjective and objective accounts converge, punitive orientations tend to emerge at the most pragmatic response (Conklin 1971). Under conditions of increased threat, the social anxiety of exerting control over deviant actors and of thwarting the impending disorder typically shifts both popular attitudes and policy choices towards harsher discipline options (Garland 2000).

Formal organizations, such as public schools, are a typical setting where such dynamics may transpire. As a matter of fact, organizations may develop a punitive “institutional mindset” (Douglas 1986) in order to maintain functional integrity when an increasing proportion of members engage in deviant conduct. Since schools with greater percentages of minority and poor students are often located in high-crime inner city areas, punitive responses to disciplinary

violations may in part be associated with the raw density of offenses irrespective of the schools' racial and poverty composition. Yet, once an organization *learns* a particular response to a particular contingency, it may use it even when it is not as necessary or when the contingency does not exist (Argyris 1976; Morgan 1986). Therefore, punitive patterns may become “habitual patterns” for administrators and other educators, which could be considered a central element of bias in discipline policies of urban schools (Monahan and Torres 2009). The following section considers scholarly insights related to this potential dynamic.

### *2.2.2. Administrator orientations to discipline*

Public education is challenged with educating every single student to meet specified standards and indicators while taking into account the complex needs and issues that some children bring to the school house door. Educators must find ways to educate classrooms of students with abilities that range from one end of the spectrum to the other all the while using limited resources. Teaching is difficult work and when students do not comply with rules and policies it makes it even harder. School administrators have the responsibility of maintaining a safe and orderly environment that is conducive to learning. Rules and policies are put in place to help maintain a productive environment; however, there will always be those students who will present challenges to the safety and security of our nation's schools. One of the easiest ways in which schools discipline students who defy educational policies and procedures is to exclude them from school.

In the wake of Columbine High School massacre in 1999, the deadliest high school shooting to date, along with other school shootings across America, federal, state, and local school boards have taken a serious stance on school safety. One way in which they have responded is through the development and implementation of zero tolerance policies. Zero-

tolerance policies are school or district policies that mandate predetermined punishments for specific offenses without taking into account the circumstances of the offense or the disciplinary history of the student (Morrison, Anthony, Storino, Cheng, Furlong, and Morrison 2001).

Zero tolerance became a national policy when the Clinton Administration signed the Gun-Free School Act of 1994 into law (Skiba 2000; Verdugo 2002; Sughrue 2003). The law mandates that students be expelled for one calendar year for bringing a firearm to school, that schools are obligated to refer law-violating students to the criminal or juvenile justice system, and the provision that state law must give authority to the chief administrative officer of each local district to modify such expulsions on a case-by-case basis (Sughrue 2003; Verdugo 2002). When the bill was first enacted it covered only firearms, but amendments have expanded the language to include any instrument that may be used as a firearm (Casella 2003).

Many states have used this as an opportunity to take a stronger stand on school safety, expanding the range of their legislation to encompass a number of other criminal acts such as drugs and violence (Skiba 2000; Seymour 1999). Policy makers in several states tend to think that school violence and disruption could be diminished even further by suspending or expelling students for noncriminal behavior such as disorderly conduct or truancy (Skiba 2000; Sughrue 2003). Skiba attributes the inclusion of “trivial incidents” in zero tolerance policies to an “overzealous administration” (2000). Serious infractions (weapons, drugs, gangs) are the primary target of zero tolerance policies; however, these types of behaviors occur relatively infrequently (Sughrue 2003). The most frequent discipline that schools across the nation deal with are for minor disruptive behaviors such as tardiness, absences, disrespect, and defiance (Skiba 2000). A “one-size-fits-all” policy that punishes both major and minor offenses equally will result in the punishment of a small percentage of serious violations and a much larger percentage of minor

infractions (Henault 2001). We could expect that the “trivial incidents” connected with zero tolerance will not decrease, but could possibly even accelerate as those policies continue to be extended by local school districts (Skiba 2000).

Today, zero-tolerance policies are still being enforced by school administrators to punish relatively minor offenses. For example, a high school honors student in North Carolina was suspended for four weeks for wearing a nose piercing to school. School policy states that students will be disciplined for nose piercings, skirts that are too short, sagging pants, abnormal hair color, and anything else that the school deems distracting or disruptive (Deseret News, October 2010). In Detroit, a charter school expelled a 10 year-old honor roll student for wearing his hair too long. Educating nearly 1,000 students, mostly African American, this school has a policy stating that students must have haircuts that are “even, neat, and close-cropped” (Lee 2007). Students are not allowed to have “designer hair-cuts, tails, dreadlocks, braids, facial hair, sideburns, or goatees” (Lee 2007). The policy does not include anything about hair length; however, this fifth grader was expelled for wearing his hair a half-inch long (Lee 2007).

### *2.2.3 Location of the School*

Location is one of the reasons that discrepancies exist in discipline policies. One way to understand this is to examine the values administrators hold in different types of schools. Dunbar and Villarruel’s (2004) study of how school discipline—specifically zero-tolerance policies—as enforced differently in urban, suburban, and rural districts found a significant imbalance in the number of suspensions and expulsions. The study focused on how administrators modified or altered discipline policies to support the values and beliefs of their environments.

When studying the discipline consequences for bringing a firearm to school, Dunbar and Villarruel (2004) found major differences in the beliefs and values of administrators across different types of districts. Rural administrators believed that their districts already had solid policies that addressed violence and therefore viewed zero-tolerance policies as unnecessary. One rural administrator stated that he did not care to try to understand zero-tolerance policies or determine whether the law was even necessary. In a Midwest rural community where hunting was an important part of the culture, a student was not subject to search and prosecution when he came to school with his hunting rifle in his truck because the school administrators did not view this situation as a realistic threat to the safety of students (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). In another example, a rural school administrator told a student who he knew had a rifle in his truck, presumably to go hunting after school, to turn his truck around and take his gun home without any disciplinary punishment. Rural administrators were more likely to overlook this violation as long as the weapon was in the student's vehicle. One administrator stated that hunting was a part of the culture of the community and that it would be assumed that the student would only have the firearm for the purpose of participating in that activity (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004).

Urban administrators felt quite differently. A majority of them believed that it was their duty to keep a safe and orderly environment and welcomed zero-tolerance policies. They felt that the policy made discipline issues black and white and therefore made their decisions about how to discipline violations much easier. If a student brought a weapon to school, regardless of the reason, urban administrators were much more likely to enforce zero-tolerance policies which resulted in students being suspended or expelled from school (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). In an urban district, a student's electronic beeper went off in school which triggered a search of his vehicle where a shotgun was found. The student was charged with gun possession and faced a

20-year prison sentence. In an urban district in Colorado, a ten year-old girl was expelled from school for having a small knife in her lunchbox that her mother packed for her so she could cut an apple. Louisiana suspended an eight year-old girl for carrying her grandfather's pocket watch which contained a one-inch fingernail knife (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004).

Overall, rural administrators did not view the possession of a weapon as a threat to the school or community and therefore did not enforce zero-tolerance policies as mandated, but instead used their own judgment and discretion when disciplining violations (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). They would not expel a student from school unless they had a worthwhile alternative (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). Instead, they would find other ways to discipline students such as in-school suspension, detention, etc. In sharp contrast, urban administrators were more likely to assume that a student in possession of a firearm would use it to commit a violent act (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). A majority (80%) of urban administrators in this study did not view the law as intrusive, complied with zero-tolerance policies and enforced them the way in which they were intended regardless of how time-consuming the process was. A study conducted by Bowditch (2003) found that school administrators in urban districts often view their role as punishing persistent troublemakers who challenge the school's authority.

#### *2.2.4 Family and Social Conditions*

Family and social conditions play an important role in explaining the discrepancies in school discipline as well. In rural and possibly suburban schools administrators may assume that a student's family will help the school to resolve any issues that the student may have—since students in such contexts often enjoy a greater degree of affluent-style parental supervision and efficacy (Lareau and Horvat 1999). In addition, schools in these communities tend to be smaller

and therefore administrators have a better opportunity to get to know students and their families. Closer relationships with families may help make it a little easier for rural and/or suburban administrators to punish students less severely because they know they will have the support of the family in helping to resolve the issue. In contrast, urban schools tend to be larger and typically experience a lower degree of parental involvement (Domina 2005; Epstein and Sanders 2006) complicating administrator efforts to build relationships with students and their families. Oftentimes, administrators know very little about a student's background and family structure due to the sheer number of students in their building. Therefore, administrators in these schools may not be quite as comfortable assuming that the family will help to resolve the issue which may make it easier for them to punish students more severely.

There is an increasing recognition across the nation that students who break school rules would be better served by some type of additional academic, social, or personal assistance instead of punishment. For example, when interviewed about the topic of school discipline, some administrators shared that they used an office referral event or suspension event as an opportunity to involve the parent in the schools' concerns regarding his/her child. Some administrators used this opportunity to work with community agencies to provide support for the student (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004).

Morrison and Skiba (2001) stated that the philosophies school administrators hold regarding students who misbehave and about the nature and cause of their misbehavior were crucial in determining whether they approached the discipline from a punitive or learning perspective. Administrators who believe in punitive punishments have a need to control student behavior and believe that if a rule is broken, the student must be punished. As Arum (2000) noted, schools are affected not just by their regulative environment, but also by their community

context. Administrators who believe in punitive punishments are typically found in urban schools and often do not feel it is necessary to involve the parent or community agencies to provide support and possible remediation for the student. Administrators whose philosophy is to support students view student misbehavior as an opportunity to work with parents and outside agencies to assist families with ongoing problems. These administrators are often found in rural and/or suburban school and place emphasis on improving the behavior of the child and his/her overall school functioning (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004; Morrison and Skiba 2001). Typically, schools that have administrators who follow the “get tough” or authoritarian approach have more suspensions and expulsions than do schools whose administrators follow the “student support” or authoritative approach (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004).

Urban administrators tend to enforce discipline policies as the law intended regardless of the circumstances of the offense and therefore have a more authoritarian style of leadership. Rural administrators are more likely to consider the culture of the community when deciding on the disciplinary punishment for a student. Their leadership style is more authoritative in that these administrators punish students in a way that is more in tune with the inappropriate behaviors. In contrast, urban administrators take into account other factors that played a role in the misbehavior. Urban administrators will be a bit more edgy in terms of dealing with violations because these schools tend to be less orderly so administration may actually be more successful by being more punitive. According to Dunbar and Villarruel (2004), urban administrators are more likely than rural administrators to make snap suspensions in regards to zero-tolerance policies due to their leadership style, values, and beliefs.

Overall, while thin, existing research indicates that there is much variation in the way actors in education interpret and implement discipline policies. This study will address the

discrepancies that exist in public schools in terms of managing discipline. Specifically it addresses the race and poverty issues and the school locational and organizational characteristics as they relate to school discipline.

Larger organizations typically institute more formalized and standardized procedures and implement rules and regulations in a uniform fashion irrespective of situational and individual idiosyncrasies, as opposed to a particularistic manner where situational attributes are taken into account (Scott and Davis 2007). The same pattern is likely to be evident in large urban schools. These schools tend to follow policies as they are written and seldom deviate from the intent of the policy. There are simply too many students to consider each offense on a case-by-case basis. Smaller schools such as rural and suburban schools tend to consider students on an individual level taking into account several factors when determining the punishment the student will receive. These administrators deal with far less students than urban schools and therefore have the time to consider each offense on a case-by-case basis.

### *2.2.3. Community effects on schools*

In the late 1980s and early 1990s youth violence in America increased to unprecedented levels causing communities to question whether violent behavior was permeating through the schoolhouse doors. In particular, urban communities found themselves struggling to manage the high rates of community violence, substance abuse, and poverty (Attar, Guerra, and Tolan 1995). Schools were also experiencing the same types of struggles. Typically, the more crime that takes place in a community, the more crime that will take place in the school. For example, according to Atkins et al. (2002), students from low-income urban communities display disruptive behavior three times more than the national average. Parents want their children to be safe at home and at school. Therefore, the more disorder that takes place in the community the more punitive the

community may expect schools to be. So much in fact that there is a strong body of research comparing urban schools to prisons (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Parenti 2000; Staples 2000; Giroux 2003). Giroux (2003) notes over-zealous laws like zero-tolerance have caused schools to view students as criminals who need to be tested, searched, and watched by administrators who are more concerned with policing students than they are with educating them. Devine (1996) concurs that students are more likely to be labeled criminals in schools where violence and gangs are prevalent and therefore treated as such through harsh policies and practices. In many schools metal detectors, police officers, drug-dogs, and transparent backpacks have become the norm as ways to curb misbehavior (Giroux 2003).

With crime rates much higher in urban districts, communities support school practices that will keep their children safe such as law enforcement officers, metal detectors, video cameras, personal searches, zero-tolerance policies, etc (Hirschfield 2008). Some view these practices as “criminalization”: treating students like criminals and subjecting them to suspension or armed police officers and metal detectors (Hirschfield 2008). In schools that have serious challenges such as gangs and violence which is often found in the urban setting, students will be penalized more harshly and will in turn be treated more like a criminal. According to Hirschfield, criminalization is found more in schools that serve predominately low-socioeconomic status urban minority students. In high crime areas such as New York City and Chicago, school districts have given complete power to city or school police departments to determine what violates school security and safety. These law enforcement officials have the authority to arrest any student for violating the law regardless if school officials support the arrest or not (Hirschfield 2008). Nearly every state mandates that violations involving drugs, violence, and weapons be referred to law enforcement.

Due to higher incidents of crime and violence in urban communities, many minority parents support the harsh and punitive punishments students receive for violations of school policies. For example, poor African American parents that live in areas with high crime and violence tend to control their children more strictly and allow them less personal freedom because they are fearful that they would not be able keep their children safe (Brown and Beckett 2006). In turn, they often expect the same from their schools. They believe that school policies should not ignore misconduct, but instead enforce harsh punishments so as to teach students a lesson and to prevent more serious offenses in the future (Brown and Beckett 2006).

This is not to say that suburban and/or rural communities do not support the same types of school practices that will keep children safe. They do, but typically to a lesser degree. Urban communities tend to support practices and policies that are more punitive whereas suburban and rural communities want school practices and policies that support student choice and freedom (Casella 2003). The middle class want “softer” approaches to school safety. For example, video cameras provide a way for students to “self-monitor” their behavior as well as provide a venue for school officials to unassumingly monitor, deter, and prosecute crimes (Hirschfield 2008). However, metal detectors as a school safety measure are not supported by some suburban communities and parents because they are more invasive and less discreet. Cook and Fine (1995) reported that White middle class parents who lived in communities with low crime rates allowed their children more personal freedom and choices because they believed it allowed for self-discipline. In turn, they expected the same thing from their schools. Their expectation is that schools will have policies and practices that allow for a safe and orderly environment but at the same time allow for student self-discipline. For example, most working class parents do not support zero-tolerance policies for fighting. Urban schools often may discipline any student who

is involved in a fight regardless of who started the fight. In contrast, suburban communities expect that a student who is defending himself/herself in a fight will not be subjected to zero-tolerance policies. Punishing a student who is trying to protect himself/herself is unfair and unjust (Brown and Beckett 2006). Lareau (1996) noted that middle class parents in a small Midwestern city supported teachers when they encouraged students to not hit back, while working class minority parents expected their children to “defend” themselves if hit. Additionally, the role of police officers or school resource officers in suburban and/or rural schools is drastically different than in urban schools. Due to the lower crime rates in suburban communities and schools, these officers can focus more of the time and energy on educating and counseling students and save the harsher disciplinary punishments for the more serious offenses (Brown and Beckett 2006).

Consequently, middle class schools experience less criminalization than do urban ones. Schools located outside the inner city have less crime in their communities and therefore their schools’ reaction to crime is less intense because there is less of it. However, in the urban communities where crime and violence are major concerns, school disciplinary approaches are much more punitive. Hirschfield (2008) referred to the security revolution of suburban schools as a “gated community” whereas the security revolution of urban schools is more like a “prison.”

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1. Data Sources**

This dissertation addresses race, social poverty, and school locational and organizational characteristics to help define how disciplinary policies and procedures are enforced in U.S. public schools. Specifically, this research aims to identify whether there are discrepancies in the way discipline is managed in U.S. public schools. If so, what are the reasons for the discrepancy? What are the school and organizational characteristics associated with the way students are disciplined?

The primary data for this study is drawn from the School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS). The 2007-2008 data wave is used for this study. The Common Core of Data (CCD), the second set of data utilized in this research, contains several school and district measures that the SSOCS data does not contain. Both of these data sets are provided by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).

SSOCS is a cross-sectional survey of public schools in the United States designed to provide estimates of school crime, discipline, disorder, programs, and policies. It is administered to approximately 3,500 elementary and secondary school principals in the spring of even-numbered school years. For any given wave, the sample includes over 2,000 schools, which allows for a national estimate of all public schools while accounting for several factors such as the level of instruction, student enrollment size, and urbanicity (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010). The data includes information on elementary, middle, high and mixed grades schools.

Principals are given the questionnaire towards the end of the school year to allow for the most up-to-date information to be reported. The first administration of SSOCS was in the spring of the 1999-2000 school year. Since then the survey has been administered in the spring of the 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2010 school years (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010).

The survey asks principals to respond to a variety of areas related to crime and safety. Such areas include school practices and programs, parent and community involvement at school, school security, staff training, limitations on crime prevention, frequency of crime and violence at school, frequency of incidents reported to the police or law enforcement, frequency of hate-crimes and/or gang-related crimes, disciplinary problems and disciplinary actions, and other school characteristics related to school crime (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010). For this study, several school and district characteristics in the SSOCS sampling frame were obtained from the CCD data.

The Common Core of Data is the main database on public elementary and secondary schools and school districts in the United States. This database is a comprehensive, annual, national statistical database containing data on all public elementary and secondary schools and school districts that is comparable from state to state. The CCD contains three categories of information. These are general descriptive information on schools and the school district, data on staff and students, and fiscal data (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010).

A set of five surveys sent to state education departments make up the CCD. A majority of the data are obtained from administrative records maintained by the state education agencies. Statistical information is collected every year from nearly 100,000 public elementary and secondary schools and approximately 18,000 public school districts in all 50 states, the District

of Columbia, and Department of Defense Schools (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010). The five components of the survey are public school universe, local education agency universe, state aggregate nonfiscal data, state aggregate fiscal data, and school district fiscal data. Public school universe includes school location and type, enrollment by grade and student characteristics, and the number of teachers. The local education agency component contains information regarding the current number of students and the number of high school graduates. State aggregate nonfiscal data includes information on all students and staff aggregated at the state level including how many students are in each grade and full-time equivalent staff. The state aggregate fiscal data includes average daily attendance, school district revenues by source (local, state, and federal), and expenditures by function (instruction, support services, and non-instruction) and subfunction (school administration) at the state level. The school district fiscal data component includes revenues and sources of expenditures by function and subfunction at the district level (National Center for Educational Statistics 2010). This dissertation utilizes data on 2,223 schools for the 2007-2008 wave.

### **3.2. Measures**

The central outcome measure in this study is the *proportion of a given disciplinary action for a specific offense*. For example, if 20 students in a school are involved in a fight in a given year and 10 of those students are out-of-school suspended (OSS) then “out-of-school suspension” for fights is .50. In this respect proportions were developed for five different disciplinary actions. The actions include expulsion, out-of-school suspension, transfer, detention (which in some schools include in-school suspension), and no-punishment. Each of these proportions was calculated with regard to six different offense types. The types are use or possession of a firearm; use or possession of a weapon; distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs; distribution,

possession, or use of alcohol; physical attacks or fights; and insubordination. A detailed explanation of each of these offense types and disciplinary actions can be found in Table 2. In essence, for each school building in the sample there were 30 different potential outcome measures (five different disciplinary types for six different offense types).

Naturally, for any given school, not every single offense type and disciplinary type was observed in each year. Therefore, although more than 2,200 schools were available in the data wave for the analysis, the size of the sample for predictive models varied depending on the particular offense and disciplinary types being examined.

The proportion for a given disciplinary action for a given offense type was based on the number of *students* rather than the number of incidents. The schools were instructed to define students in the following manner: If more than one student was involved in an incident each student was counted separately in the number of disciplinary actions; if a student was disciplined more than once each offense was counted as a separate offense (e.g., a student who was suspended three times would be counted as three suspensions); and if a student was disciplined in two different ways for an offense (e.g., a student was both out-of-school suspended and referred to counseling), the most severe disciplinary action was counted.

The central predictors in the study are the racial and poverty composition of the schools. As discussed in Chapter 2, disciplinary actions for similar offenses may be disproportionate in schools with a greater percentage of minority or poor students. In addition to these predictors, a number of control measures are included in the study. A full list of the controls can be found in Table 2. Broadly, these control variables include school location, size, community crime, special education, gender, and scheduling options as well as key school practices and programs. In addition, the number of discipline related school features were accounted for such as parent and

civic involvement in the schools and policy, safety, and violence training services provided to school personnel.

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Insert Table 2 about here  
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### 3.3. Modeling Strategy

The likelihood of a given disciplinary response to a specific violation in 2007-2008 is logically contingent upon whether that school experienced the violation *at all* in that year. This conditional probability of disciplinary response involves a “selection” problem, meaning the school must first be selected into the analysis concerning the response to the violation in question. A standard linear regression model is inappropriate for this selection issue. Therefore a two-stage Heckman selection model is preferable. In this model, the first stage involves a selection model estimating the likelihood of a given violation in the school based on a number of predictors. The findings from this stage are used to produce an *inverse mills ratio*, similar to a conditional probability obtained from a probit model. The second stage involves the prediction of a disciplinary response to the violation conditional on the probability that the violation occurs at least once, obtained from the first stage. The predictors in the two stages can be partly or even fully the same (Wooldridge 2002). The basic two-step Heckman model for predicting disciplinary responses to different violations is show below:

$$V_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 L_i + \sum \lambda C_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$D_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 M_i + \delta_2 L_i + \sum \zeta C_i + \epsilon_i, \text{ given } V_i \neq 0 \quad (2)$$

where  $i$ =school ID,  $V$ =proportion of students committing a given violation type,  $M$ =percentage of Black and Hispanic students at the school,  $L$ =percentage of students on free or reduced-price lunch.  $C$  is a vector of school-level control measures discussed in the previous subsection and shown in Table 2, such as school size, location, crime in the community, and so on. This basic model will be repeated five times (once for each disciplinary response) for each of the six violation types included in the dataset. Each model will be estimated using FNLWGT (“final sample weight”) as the weight variable in the SSOCS data set. As shown in Table 3, the density of violations were not systematically and strongly correlated to one another at the school level, allowing for separate Heckman models for each violation type.

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Insert Table 3 about here

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**CHAPTER 4**  
**FINDINGS**

**4.1 Bivariate Patterns**

The results of numerous linear regressions as they relate to offenses and the disciplinary responses to them with regard to race and poverty can be found in Figures 1-7. In general, Figure 1a shows as minority concentration of a school increases, the percentage of students disciplined increases. The same is true for poverty. Figure 1b illustrates the higher the poverty concentration in a school, the more likely students will be disciplined for offenses. Figures 2a-e show the different types of disciplinary responses with regard to race. We can see from Figures 2a-e that in general, the higher the minority concentration of a school, the more likely they are to expel, transfer, out-of-school suspend and detain. No-punishment with regard to race follows the same pattern as well. Therefore, as minority concentration increases all types of disciplinary responses, it also increases the likelihood offenses may go unpunished. There are a few exceptions to this. In Figure 2b the percentage of transfer increases with higher minority concentrations. However, transfer rates start to decline in schools predominately minority (80 percent or more). Figure 2d shows detentions increase as minority concentration increases, except when schools reach 60 percent minority concentration, the detention rate begins to decrease, although, it is still much higher than majority White schools.

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Insert Figure 1a and 1b and 2a-e about here

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Figures 3a-e show how schools respond to offenses with regard to poverty. Like race, as poverty concentration increases, the more likely a school is to expel, transfer, out-of-school suspend and detain. Like minority concentration, no-punishment with regard to poverty concentration follows the same pattern as well. As poverty concentration increases all types of disciplinary responses, it also increases the chance offenses may go unpunished. There are a few exceptions worth noting. As seen in Figure 3a, expulsion rates begin to decrease in schools that are 80 percent or more poverty, however, the rates are still much higher than in affluent schools. Figure 3b shows transfer rates begin to decrease in schools that are 60 percent or more minority, but again they are still higher than affluent schools.

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Insert Figure 3a-e about here  
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Turning to offense patterns, the percentage of students involved in offenses with regards to race and poverty can be seen in Figures 4a-b. Both figures show as minority and poverty concentrations increase, the percentage of students involved in offenses increases. Figures 5a-f show specifically what types of offenses are being committed with regard to race and Figures 6a-f show the same thing with regard to poverty. In Figure 5a we see the percentage of firearm offenses remain consistent in schools less than 40 percent minority to schools 60-to-80 percent minority. Firearm violations tend to increase in heavily minority schools (80 percent or more minority). Figure 5b shows weapon offenses increase as minority concentration increases and tends to level off in schools 60 percent or more minority. The percentage of drug offenses with

regard to race is shown in Figure 5c. Drug violations tend to decrease slightly as minority concentration increases (60-to-80 percent minority), but then begin to increase in schools that are predominately minority (80 percent or more). According to a study conducted by Bachman (1991), minority students report lower rates of drug use than White students. Rates of drug use among Hispanic students are typically higher than Black students and only slightly less than White students (Bachman 1991). Figure 5d tells a different story with regards to alcohol violations. We see from this figure as minority concentration increases, alcohol violations tend to *decrease*. Existing research shows White students are 50 percent more likely to drink alcohol than Black students, and significantly more likely to engage in this behavior than Hispanic students (Blum et al. 2000). Bachman (1991) concurred alcohol use among White students is significantly higher than Black or Hispanic students. Figures 5e and 5f illustrate that the higher the minority concentration of a school, the more likely they are to experience fights and insubordination, respectively.

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Insert Figure 4a and 4b and 5a-f about here  
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Figures 6a-f tells a similar story with regard to poverty. In Figure 6a we can see as poverty concentration increases, the more likely the school is to experience firearm violations. The same is true for weapon violations as seen in Figure 6b. However, weapon violations begin to slightly decrease in high poverty schools - those that are 80 percent or more free/reduced lunch. Figure 6c illustrates drug violations are uniform from affluent schools to schools

predominately minority. There is a slight decrease in drug violations as poverty increases, but the difference is very small. Similar to minority concentration, alcohol offenses tend to *decrease* as poverty concentration increases as seen in Figure 6d. As noted above, similar dynamics may be happening here. Regardless of family income, Black and Hispanic students use alcohol less than White students (Blum et al. 2000). The higher the poverty concentration, the more a school is likely to experience fight and insubordination offenses as seen in Figures 6e and 6f, respectively.

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Insert Figure 6a-f about here  
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Figures 7a-f show how schools respond to offenses with regard to race. We can see from Figure 7a expulsion, transfer, and detention rates for firearm violations increase as the racial composition of a school increases. Expulsion rates begin to decrease in schools predominately minority (80 percent or more). This is likely because schools are transferring and assigning detention more than they are expelling. Out-of-school suspension rates decrease as the minority composition of a school increases. Figure 7a shows that most schools regardless of racial composition tend to punish students for firearm violations. Very few schools regardless of the racial make-up of the school choose not to punish students for firearm offenses.

In Figure 7b we see as minority concentration increases expulsion and no-punishment rates remain uniform across race for weapons violations. Out-of-school suspension rates tend to decrease as minority concentration increases, and transfer rates increases with race, but begin to

decrease in schools 60 percent or more minority. Detention rates are uniform across race, but when transfer rates begin to decrease, detention rates start to increase.

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Insert Figure 7a-e about here  
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The responses to drug offenses with regard to race are shown in Figure 7c. As with weapons violations, expulsion rates and no-punishment rates are uniform across race. Out-of-school suspension rates decrease and then level out in schools 60 percent or more minority. Transfer rates for drug violations are similar, but they *increase* and then level out in schools 60 percent or more minority. Therefore, these types of schools out-of-school suspend and transfer at the same rate. When out-of-school suspension rates and transfer rates begin to level off, detention rates begin to increase.

Figure 7d shows the responses to alcohol offenses with regard to the racial composition of a school. Since most schools and administrators view alcohol violations not as severely as some other types of offenses, expulsion rates and no-punishment rates are uniform across race. As the racial composition of a school increases, the school is more likely to detain and transfer for alcohol violations, and less likely to out-of-school suspend. However, out-of-school suspension rates begin to increase in schools 80 percent or more minority. This is because transfer rates begin to decrease in these types of schools.

In Figure 7e and 7f we see relatively the same disciplinary responses to fight and insubordination violations, respectively. All disciplinary responses are uniform across race for

both fight and insubordination. Detention is the most popular form of punishment for these two offenses regardless of race.

In all, these figures show as racial and poverty concentrations increase, the amount of violations increase. Most of the violations are patterned this way with the exception of alcohol. Alcohol violations tend to *decrease* as racial and poverty concentrations increase. Although these figures provide significant insight, they are ultimately bivariate charts and do not control for a variety of school characteristics that may affect offense and disciplinary responses.

Below is a series of multivariate tests of effects on violations and disciplinary responses.

#### **4.2 Predictors of Violations**

We know race and poverty affect the type of violations occurring in schools and the disciplinary responses to those violations by school officials. In general, Figures 1-7 show us how race and poverty are associated with violations and disciplinary responses. We question, though, why certain schools experience certain violations. Race and poverty do matter, but what else matters? Since school quality, resources, and other attributes tend to vary by race and poverty, race and poverty effects are likely to be mediated by several school characteristics. Therefore, additional controls were added to adjust for these characteristics.

Since any given violation may *not* happen in every school, both the violations and disciplinary responses to the violations are left truncated. This makes ordinary regression models subject to bias. Therefore, in order to predict violations a number of Tobit regressions were fit adjusting for the left truncation. These Tobit regressions helped examine the effects of school characteristics such as school size, pupil/teacher ratio, location, community crime as well as controls possibly reducing offenses such as counseling, student involvement, and safety training.

This type of regression gives a much clearer picture as to exactly what is influencing violations and responses, in addition to race and poverty.

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Insert Table 4 about here  
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#### 4.2.1. *Firearm Violations*

Table 4 details the estimated effects of race and poverty and the several control variables on each of the six violations types – firearm, weapon, drug, alcohol, fight, and insubordination. The Tobit results show when other control measures are a part of the model, firearm violations increase as minority concentration increases ( $\beta=0.008$ ,  $p<0.050$ ;  $\beta=0.016$ ,  $p<0.010$  for 60-to-80 percent minority and 80 percent or more minority, respectively). This finding is supported by Figure 5a illustrating an increase in firearm violations as racial concentration increases. In contrast, the Tobit results also indicate poverty concentration is not associated with firearm violations net of the additional controls included in the model. We know from Figure 6a this is not the case. Figure 6a shows the higher the poverty concentration in a school, the more firearm violations the school experiences. The poverty coefficients in the Tobit regression are not significant. This means the control measures are weakening the effects of race and poverty alone. In other words, the control measures are explaining why race and poverty matter; they are plausible mediators of the race and poverty effects on violations. As seen in Table 4, the larger the school ( $\beta=0.00000873$ ,  $p<0.010$ ), the more likely the school will experience firearm violations. In Table 4 and other tables to follow, some of these correlation coefficients look

noticeably small because what is being reported are unstandardized coefficients. These coefficients are difficult to compare since they have different scales, hence, the reason the raw coefficient is reported. The degree of parent involvement ( $\beta=-0.005$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) in the schools tends to decrease firearm violations. Preventive training ( $\beta=-0.008$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) also decreases the likelihood of firearm violations in the school. However, civic involvement has a positive and significant effect on firearm violations.

#### *4.2.2. Weapons Violations*

While the Tobit results indicate race and poverty concentrations, with the exception of schools with 60-to-80 percent of students on free/reduced lunch, are not associated with increased weapons violations, Figure 5b and Figure 6b show the higher the minority and poverty concentrations of a school, the more likely the school is to experience weapons violations. The one exception to this is schools predominately free/reduced lunch (80 percent or more) tend to experience a slight decrease in weapons violations. We know race and poverty matter in terms of weapon violations and responses. We gain from the Tobit model there are other school characteristics helping to explain why race and poverty may matter. Like firearm violations, larger schools ( $\beta=0.00000454$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) are more likely to experience weapon violations. When crime in the community ( $\beta=0.002$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) is high, weapons violations in schools increase. Schools having a higher percentage of special education students ( $\beta=0.0000822$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) also tend to experience more weapons violations. Preemptive control measures such as controlled access to the building or campus ( $\beta=-0.001$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) and preventive training ( $\beta=-0.002$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) both tend to decrease weapons violations.

#### 4.2.3. Drug Violations

When other control measures are part of the model, race and poverty appear to have no effect on drug violations (Table 4), however, we know from Figure 5c and Figure 6c they do. Figure 5c illustrates drug violations are relatively uniform as minority concentration increases. Figure 6c shows drug violations tend to decrease as poverty increases, however, the extent of the difference is very small. The Tobit results show several control measures having a positive and significant (all at the  $p < 0.010$  level) effect on drug violations including crime in the community ( $\beta = 0.002$ ), school size ( $\beta = 0.0000113$ ), pupil/teacher ratio ( $\beta = 0.0003113$ ), percentage of special education ( $\beta = 0.0001198$ ), location of the school ( $\beta = 0.003$ ), and civic involvement ( $\beta = 0.002$ ). In contrast, the degree of parent involvement ( $\beta = -0.002$ ,  $p < 0.050$ ) in the school tends to decrease the number of drug violations. The more preventive training ( $\beta = -0.003$ ,  $p < 0.010$ ) provided to students in a school, the less drug violations the school experiences.

#### 4.2.4. Alcohol Violations

The effects of race and poverty on alcohol violations appear to tell a somewhat different story. The results from the Tobit regression show greater minority and poverty concentrations in a school are *not* associated with greater alcohol violations. The linear regressions in Figure 5d and Figure 6d support this finding. We can see the greater the minority concentration in a school the *less* alcohol violations the school will experience. In addition, the greater the poverty concentration in a school, the *less* alcohol violations the school will experience. From Figure 5d and Figure 6d as well as the Tobit results, it appears White affluent schools experience more alcohol violations than nonwhite poorer schools. With the exception of the coefficient for 40-to-60 percent minority schools ( $\beta = -0.002$ ,  $p < 0.050$ ), all other coefficients for race and poverty are

non-significant. The reason for this is the other control measures in the model are weakening the effects of race and poverty on alcohol violations. Race and poverty effects are likely to be mediated by several school characteristics. As crime in the community ( $\beta=0.002$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) increases, the likelihood a school will experience alcohol violations increases. As with the previous three violations – firearm, weapon, and drug – larger schools ( $\beta=0.00000813$ ;  $p<0.010$ ) are also associated with increased alcohol violations. Rural schools ( $\beta=0.002$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) also tend to experience more violations for alcohol. As with weapons violations, when schools have controlled access to the building and the campus ( $\beta=-0.001$ ,  $p<0.010$ ), alcohol violations tend to decrease. The more preventive training ( $\beta=-0.002$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) the school provides to students, the less alcohol violations the school experiences.

#### *4.2.5. Fight Violations*

The Tobit model results indicate race is not associated with greater fight violations net of the additional controls included in the model. However, we know race may be associated with fights. This is supported by the linear regression in Figure 5e showing as minority concentration increases, fight violations increase. The coefficients for race shown in Table 4 are non-significant simply meaning the additional control measures included in the model are weakening the effects of race alone. On the other hand, as poverty concentration increases, fight violations increase. The Tobit model shows the coefficients for poverty are significant at the 0.050 level for all poverty concentrations ( $\beta=0.009$ ,  $\beta=0.014$ ,  $\beta=0.013$ , respectively). This finding is supported in Figure 6e which shows that an increase in poverty concentration results in an increase in fight violations. There are other control measures appearing to explain why race and poverty matter. When the crime in community increases, schools tend to experience more fight violations.

Again, the larger the school, the more likely the school is to experience fight violations. Also, as the male population of a school increases, the likelihood the school will experience fight violations increases.

#### *4.2.6. Insubordination Violations*

As seen in Table 4, it appears minority concentration and poverty concentration are not associated with greater insubordination violations when other control measures are a part of the model. The coefficients for race and poverty are all positive, however, none of them are significant. In contrast, Figure 5f and Figure 6f show as minority and poverty concentrations increase, violations for insubordination increase. Unlike any of the other Tobit regressions, none of the additional control measures included in the model are significant, therefore, none of the additional control measures explain why race and poverty matter in regard to insubordination violations.

In all, the Tobit regression results suggest the effects of race and poverty composition of schools are indeed mediated by other school characteristics. These include crime in the community in regard to weapon, drug, alcohol, and fight violations; school size in regard to all violations except insubordination; pupil/teacher ratio with regard to drug violations; percent of special education students in regard to weapon and drug violations; percentage of male students in regard to fight violations; if the school is a rural school in regard to drug and alcohol violations; parent involvement and civic involvement in regard to firearm and drug violations; controlled access to the building/campus in regard to weapon and alcohol violations; and preventive training for students in regard to all violations except fights and insubordination.

It should be noted even though not all controls are significant, specifying the controls as a whole significantly weakened the effects of race and poverty alone. Since the Tobit regressions tell us the significant predictors of different violations most of these predictors were used for the selection step in the Heckman regressions where the outcomes measures were the disciplinary responses to the violations. In other words, since a given violation may not happen at all in a given school, the selection step in the Heckman models helped to predict the disciplinary responses to a violation on the condition of the probability the violation occurs at that school.

### **4.3 Predictors of Disciplinary Responses**

#### *4.3.1. Firearm Violations*

The Heckman regression results for disciplinary responses to firearm violations are shown in Table 5. As seen in the table, violation density has a strong and significant effect on all disciplinary reactions. It reduces expulsion ( $\beta=-4.633$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) and transfer ( $\beta=-8.550$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) rates, but tends to increase suspension ( $\beta=4.963$ ,  $p<0.010$ ), detention ( $\beta=11.511$ ,  $p<0.050$ ), and no-punishment ( $\beta=0.0000363$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) rates. It appears schools experiencing more firearm violations are likely to suspend and detain violators, rather than expel or transfer them. Race/ethnicity and poverty composition do not have strong and systematic effects when entered in the model without additional controls. An important exception is the effects observed with regard to detention and no-punishment. Specifically, when schools are composed of 60-to-80 percent minority students, they tend to detain more ( $\beta=0.372$ ,  $p<0.050$ ). As seen in Figure 7a, the greater the minority concentration of a school, the more likely the school will detain for firearm violations. Another exception to note is the effect of high minority concentration on no-punishment ( $\beta=0.156$ ,  $p<0.010$ ), which suggests that predominantly nonwhite schools may at

times choose not to discipline for firearm violations. Figure 7a shows no-punishment is relatively uniform across race. By contrast, poverty concentration seems to have a uniformly negative effect on detention ( $\beta=-0.399$ ,  $\beta=-0.294$ ,  $\beta=-0.248$ ; all significant at 0.050 level). Therefore, it appears poorer schools tend not to detain students for firearm violations.

When additional controls are specified in the models, the estimated effects of poverty composition tend to remain the same. However, important changes are observed in the effects of race/ethnicity. In particular, increasing percentages of nonwhite students tend to have positive and significant effects ( $p<0.010$ ) on the school's likelihood to transfer ( $\beta=0.354$ ,  $\beta=0.661$  for 60-to-80 percent and 80 percent or more minority composition, respectively) and detain students ( $\beta=0.486$ ,  $\beta=0.610$  for 60-to-80 percent and 80 percent or more minority composition, respectively). As seen in Figure 7a, as minority concentration increases, transfer and detention rates increase. The Heckman findings also suggest greater minority concentration (e.g., 80 percent or more nonwhites) may be associated with tendencies to not punish for firearm violations ( $\beta=0.218$ ,  $p<0.050$ ).

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Insert Table 5 about here  
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In essence, while race/ethnicity composition does not predict expulsions and suspensions for firearms, it tends to increase transfer and detention rates, as well as no punishment. Poverty, on the other hand, is negatively associated with detention only. In addition to this important pattern, a number of control measures also have effects worth noting. Some of these effects are

expected. For instance, both middle and high schools tend to expel, suspend and transfer more than elementary schools, since elementary schools are less prone to violations and thus less likely to punish for them. Unsurprisingly, larger schools tend to transfer and detain more in response to firearm violations. As shown in Table 4, school size is positively related to the density of firearm violations, therefore schools transfer and detain most likely because such responses are more effective in deterring violations as the number of the students in the school increase. Also, having a special transfer facility in the district negatively affects suspensions, since the schools are less likely to use other disciplinary responses when a transfer facility is available. The degree of parent involvement in the school tends to decrease the rate of all responses, except for expulsion. However, this effect is statistically significant only with regard to transfers and detentions. As seen in the Table 4, parent involvement negatively affects the density of firearm violations. The negative effects of parental involvement may be associated with stronger supervision on the part of parents, which reduces the disciplining tasks of the schools. Civic involvement, on the other hand, appears to have the opposite effect, increasing transfer and detention rates in particular. Civic involvement is positively associated with the density of firearm violations.

The effects of classroom changes are also unexpected. More changes—meaning more interaction among different children—result in less suspensions and detentions. However, even though not significant, schools tend to transfer as the number of classroom changes increase. This is likely because schools may wish to limit the interaction of violators with non-violators, and therefore prefer to transfer. School climate improves and discipline problems decrease when students have less classroom changes (Queen and Isenhour 1998). The authors compared three schools that had implemented a 4X4 block schedule. With this type of schedule students have

the same four classes every day for a semester. With fewer classes than a traditional schedule, which often includes seven or eight different classes, students change classrooms less often. The authors found discipline problems decreased dramatically after the first year the schools had implemented the 4X4 block schedule. In two of the three schools they studied, discipline referrals decreased over 35%. In addition to this new type of schedule, the third school also implemented a new responsible classroom model and saw office referrals decrease by nearly 70% after the first year (Queen and Isenhour 1998). In another study conducted by Queen and Isenhour, 84% of teachers surveyed reported fewer classroom changes resulted in a safer school environment, and 81% of administrators noted an improvement in school climate when students have less classroom changes (1997).

There are also some findings that are difficult to interpret. For example, the presence of counseling therapy programs to reduce violations tends to *increase* expulsion rates. One reason may be the schools providing such help may become inadvertently more punitive towards violators, particularly repeat-offenders. Another explanation might be the staff running such programs may at times choose to expel frequent violators, and focus more on infrequent violators. Unfortunately, the SSOCS data does not allow further examining of these issues.

#### 4.3.2. Weapons Violations

The results for weapons violations are shown in Table 6. As seen in the table, violation density has a strong and significant effect only on expulsion and no-punishment. It decreases the rate for the former ( $\beta=-2.264$ ,  $p<0.050$ ), but considerably increases the rate for the latter ( $\beta=7.015$ ,  $p<0.010$ ). This means schools with increasing weapons violations tend not to punish for these violations. This pattern is robust to all other predictors in the model. In general,

race/ethnicity and poverty effects on disciplinary reactions to weapons violations are small and non-significant. This pattern remains the same whether or not additional controls are included in the model. The only important exception is relatively racially balanced schools (40-to-60 percent minority) tend to suspend ( $\beta=0.195$ ,  $p<0.050$ ) and transfer ( $\beta=0.215$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) more for weapons violations. This finding is supported in Figure 7b. The SSOCS data does not provide insights into whether a particular racial/ethnic group in racially balanced schools is at a greater risk of suspension or transfer. However, existing research on discipline disproportionality suggest nonwhite students in such schools may receive more punitive disciplinary punishments (Skiba 2000, Monroe 2005). This is an important point for further research.

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Insert Table 6 about here  
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In all, race/ethnicity and poverty compositions do not tend to be associated with disciplinary responses to weapons violations. An important exception to note is racially balanced schools tend to suspend and transfer more for weapons violations. A number of control measures show important effects in Table 6. The effects of school level, for instance, suggests weapons violations in middle and high schools as well as in mixed grades schools tend to be treated by expulsion, suspension, and transfers, but are subject to detention in elementary schools. This is because middle, high, and mixed grades school effects tend to be strong and positive for expulsion, suspension, and transfer, but are negative for detention. Crime in the community appears to be an important factor as it associated with greater suspension, transfer, and detention

rates. From Table 4 we see crime in the community is positively related to the density of weapons violations, therefore suspension, transfer, and detention responses may reflect school efforts to deter weapons violations that may originate from social disorder outside the schools. Grupp (1971) noted that when crime rates increase in a community it prompts punitive responses as a way to deter crime. Schools with high percentages of minority and poor students are frequently located in communities experiencing high crime rates, therefore, they may respond to violations in a more punitive way simply due to the density of the offenses regardless of the racial and poverty make-up of the school.

A similar pattern is observed with regard to school size. It appears larger schools tend to suspend and transfer more and expel less. School size also is positively associated with the density of weapon violations; therefore schools suspend and transfer more, most likely because these types of disciplinary responses are more effective in deterring violations as the number of students in the school increases. Schools with higher percentages of male students tend to expel and transfer more for weapons violations possibly due to the perceived difficulty to manage male offenders over female ones. The presence of a special transfer facility in the district unsurprisingly lowers expulsion rates and is positively associated with transfer rates. Parent involvement has a particularly punitive effect. It increases expulsion and decreases no-punishment rates. Therefore, it appears greater involvement by parents makes schools less tolerant of weapon offenses perhaps because the parents exert pressure on the schools to respond in this manner. Classroom changes are positively related to detention, and a plausible reason for this is because schools may wish to exclude offenders from other students who they would otherwise interact with. However, unlike in the case of firearms, weapons violations do not appear serious enough to warrant suspension, therefore, schools may view detention as an

adequate means for exclusion. Finally, if the school controls access to its facilities (for instance, by locking doors during school hours) weapons violations are often subject to expulsions.

#### *4.3.3. Drug Violations*

Table 7 presents the Heckman regression results for disciplinary responses for drug violations. Violation density has a significant effect only on detention ( $\beta=4.577$ ,  $p<0.050$ ). This means schools with increasing drug violations tend to assign detention for this violation. Violation density is not associated with any other discipline responses to drug violations. Race/ethnicity and poverty compositions do not have much of an effect when entered into the model without additional controls. The only exception to this is the racial/ethnicity effects observed in regards to suspension. Schools racially balanced (40-to-60 percent minority) or heavily minority (60-to-80 percent minority) tend not to suspend violators for drug offenses ( $\beta=-0.122$ ;  $\beta=-0.178$ , respectively; all significant at the  $p<0.050$  level). In Figure 7c we see suspension rates begin to decline in schools that are 40 percent or more minority. Transfer has a limited effect for racially balanced schools ( $\beta=0.101$ ,  $p<0.050$ ).

When additional controls are added to the model, the estimated effects of race/ethnicity are even more pronounced, specifically in expulsion, suspension, and transfer. In particular, the increasing number of nonwhite students tend to have positive and significant effects on a school's likelihood to expel ( $\beta=0.102$ ,  $p<0.050$  for 60-to-80 percent minority) and transfer ( $\beta=0.125$ ;  $\beta=0.114$  for 40-to-60 percent minority and 80 percent or more minority, respectively; both significant at  $p<0.050$ ). Figure 7c shows expulsion relatively uniform across race, and transfer rates increasing as racial concentration increases and then leveling out in schools that are 60 percent or more minority. In contrast, the increasing number of nonwhite students tend to

have negative and significant effects on suspension ( $\beta=-0.149$ ,  $\beta=-0.233$ ,  $\beta=-0.168$ ; all significant at 0.050 level). Out-of-school suspension rates decrease as racial concentration increases as seen in Figure 7c.

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Insert Table 7 about here  
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Essentially, while race/ethnicity is not associated with detention and no-punishment for drug violations, it tends to increase expulsion and transfer rates and decrease suspension rates. Poverty is not related to any disciplinary responses to drug violations; it is all about race. There are several control measures worth mentioning in Table 7. For example, the effects of school level suggest schools will assign detention for drug violations regardless of their level. Middle and high schools as well as mixed grades schools will all assign detention for drug violations. The effects of school level are very weak for expulsion, suspension, transfer, and no-punishment. One exception to this is the mixed grades negative effect on suspension. Larger schools tend to detain for drug violations instead of expelling. As seen with firearms and weapons, school size is positively associated with the density of drug violations (Table 4), therefore detention is a response that schools may be using to help deter this problem.

Similarly, the ratio of students to teacher has a positive and significant effect on detention. This makes sense because typically larger schools will have larger student/teacher ratios. As seen in the Table 4, the student/teacher ratio is positively related to the density of drug violations in a school; therefore detention may be a disciplinary response from schools in an effort to decrease drug offenses. This finding supports the outcome that larger schools will detain

for drug violations. Crime in the community is associated with greater detention rates. From the Table 4 we see the density of drug violations is positively affected by the crime in the community. Thus, detention may reflect a school's response to decrease the number of drug violations that may initiate from social disorder outside the school. Unsurprisingly, the presence of a special transfer facility in a district lowers the expulsion and suspension rates and increases transfer rates. Rural schools tend to transfer for drug violations instead of suspend. This may be one way rural schools counteract the drug problem since the Tobit regression shows rural schools tend to have more drug violations than others. If schools have check-in procedures (requiring visitors to check-in), drug violations are often subject to expulsion. Finally, whether or not the school was a choice school (charter, magnet program, magnet school) was positively associated with expulsion. Therefore, it appears choice schools will be less tolerant of drug violations. A reason for this could be because it is a choice school, it has a particular, often positive, reputation and not responding to drug violations in a punitive way could possibly tarnish the school's image.

#### *4.3.4. Alcohol Violations*

The Heckman regression results for disciplinary responses to alcohol violations can be found in Table 8. As seen in the table, violation density has a strong and significant effect only on suspension and transfer. It reduces both suspension ( $\beta=-14.498$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) and transfer ( $\beta=-6.646$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) rates. This means that schools with increasing alcohol violations tend not to suspend or transfer for these violations. When additional controls are added to the model, violation density remains negative and significant for transfer ( $\beta=-10.728$ ,  $p<0.010$ ). Neither race/ethnicity nor poverty appears to have any strong effects on any of the disciplinary responses to alcohol

violations. An important exception to note is the effects observed with regard to transfer. Specifically, when schools are composed of 60-to-80 percent minority students ( $\beta=0.238$ ,  $p<0.010$ ), they tend to transfer more for alcohol violations. As seen in Figure 7d, transfer rates peak in schools that are 60-to-80 percent minority. Figure 7d shows that transfer rates decrease in schools that are 80 percent or more minority. By contrast, schools with 80 percent or more poverty concentration tend to not transfer for alcohol violations ( $\beta=-0.140$ ,  $p<0.010$ ). When additional controls are specified in the models, the estimated effects of race/ethnicity and poverty concentrations tend to remain the same with the exception of schools that are 80 percent or more minority. Like 60-to-80 percent minority schools, schools that are very heavily minority concentrated tend to transfer less for alcohol violations ( $\beta=0.136$ ,  $p<0.010$ )

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Insert Table 8 about here  
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In essence, the greater the nonwhite percentage, the higher the transfer rates for alcohol violations. However, the greater the poverty concentration of a school, the lower the transfer rates for this type of violation. From Figure 5d it appears that the more nonwhite a school is, the *less* the school will experience alcohol problems. Such violations seem to be predominately a White school problem. Surprisingly, schools that experience this violation less – the schools with increasing concentrations of minority students – are the schools that are transferring more. As seen in Figure 7d, transfer rates increase as racial composition increases, however, transfer rates begin to decrease in schools that are 80 percent or more minority.

In addition to these findings, a number of control measures from Table 8 also have effects worth noting. For example, school level effects are non-significant at all levels. The only exception to this is with suspension. The effects of school level suggest that middle and high schools, as well as mixed grades schools, do not suspend for alcohol violations. School size also is associated with how schools respond to alcohol violations. As school size increases, suspension rates for alcohol violations decrease. The student/teacher ratio appears to be an important factor as it is associated with greater suspension rates but less transfer rates. A similar pattern is observed with regard to the percentage of male students in a school. Schools with higher percentages of male students tend to suspend but not transfer for alcohol offenses. The percentage of special education students is negatively related to transfer. A plausible reason for this is because under the Individuals with Disabilities Educational Act, there is a detailed process schools must follow, including conducting a manifestation determination meeting, to change placement of a special education student. The laws governing special education are detailed and often tricky, therefore, schools may often avoid transferring students for minor violations to keep from having to go through the exhaustive process. Unsurprisingly, having a special transfer facility in the district positively affects transfers since schools are more likely to utilize a transfer facility when it is available. The more classroom changes a school has, the more likely the school will suspend for alcohol violations. A plausible reason for this is that schools may wish to separate offenders from non-offenders, and therefore prefer to suspend. School size has a negative and significant effect for suspension. Although not significant, the larger the school the more likely the school will assign detention for alcohol violations. This interpretation is supported by Tobit model which suggests that an increase in the student population creates opportunities for an increase in policy violations, therefore causing schools to react by detaining

students. The effect of choice school is positive and significant for suspension. Schools that are choice schools have a reputation to uphold, and do not want to be viewed as a school that is loose in disciplinary responses to offenses. By suspending for alcohol violations, schools send the message that these behaviors will not be tolerated in the school.

#### *4.3.5. Fight Violations*

The Heckman regression results for fights are shown in Table 9. As seen in the table, violation density has a significant and negative effect on suspension ( $\beta=-0.612$ ,  $p<0.010$ ) only. When schools have increasing fight violations, they tend not to suspend. In general, race/ethnicity and poverty effects on disciplinary reactions to fight violations are small and non-significant.

However, this pattern changes when additional control measures are added to the model.

Specifically, increasing percentages of nonwhite students tend to have a positive but small effect ( $p<0.050$ ) on the school's likelihood to expel ( $\beta=0.013$ ,  $\beta=0.015$  for 40-to-60 percent and 60-to-80 percent minority composition, respectively), suspend ( $\beta=0.069$ ,  $\beta=0.076$  for 40-to-60 percent and 60-to-80 percent minority composition, respectively), and transfer ( $\beta=0.032$  for 60-to-80 percent minority concentration). In contrast, when schools are 60-to-80 percent minority they tend to detain less ( $\beta=-0.107$ ;  $p<0.050$ ). As seen in Figure 7e, detention rates decrease in schools that are 60-to-80 percent minority. It is unsurprising to see that race/ethnicity has a negative effect on detention since expel, suspend, and transfer are all positive. Similarly, poverty concentrations have the same type of effects as race/ethnicity, just not as pronounced. Poverty has a positive and significant effect on expulsion ( $\beta=0.019$ ,  $p<0.050$  for 60-to-80 percent poverty), suspension ( $\beta=0.071$ ,  $p<0.050$  for 80 percent or more poverty), and transfer ( $\beta=0.032$ ,  $p<0.050$ ).

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Insert Table 9 about here  
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Essentially, race/ethnicity composition increases expulsion, suspension, and transfer rates for fight violations, and decreases detention rates. On the other hand, poverty composition tends to increase expulsion, suspension, and transfer rates, but not as strongly as race. Therefore, disciplinary responses to fight violations appear to be a race/ethnicity and poverty issue, but it is more of a race/ethnicity issue. Table 9 highlights a number of other important effects. The effects of school level suggest that schools tend to respond to fight violations at the middle and high school level by expulsion, suspension, or transfer, but are subject to detention in elementary schools. This is because middle and high school effects tend to be strong for expulsion, suspension, and transfer, but are negative for detention. Additionally, mixed grades schools tend to be positive and significant for suspension. All school levels are negative for no-punishment, but only middle schools are significant. School size appears to be an important factor as it is associated with greater suspension and transfer rates. As school size increases detention rates decrease. This is because larger schools are choosing to suspend and transfer instead. As shown in Table 4, school size is positively related to the density of fight violations suggesting that a plausible reason for such disciplinary responses is that they may be more effective at reducing the number of violations as the number of students in the school increases. Similarly, the student/teacher ratio has a positive and significant effect on expulsion and suspension rates. The

percentage of males in a school also affects how schools respond to fight violations. Schools that have high percentages of males tend to expel and suspend more and detain less.

Table 4 shows that the percentage of males in a school is a positive predictor of the density of fight violations; therefore, expulsion and suspension may be effective responses in reducing the number of fights. This may also be due to the perceived notion that male violators are more difficult to handle than female violators. The degree of crime in the community has a positive and significant effect on suspension and a negative and significant effect on detention. Crime in the community is a positive predictor of fight violations (Table 4), therefore, suspension may be a way for schools to prevent or decrease fight violations that may originate from disorder outside of the school. As expected, the presence of a special transfer facility increases transfer rates and decreases detention rates. Finally, whether or not the school was a choice school was negatively associated with transfer rates.

#### *4.3.6. Insubordination Violations*

The regression results for insubordination violations are found in Table 10. As seen in the table, violation density has a positive and significant effect on detention ( $\beta=0.245$ ;  $p<0.010$ ). In contrast, violation density has a negative and significant effect on suspension ( $\beta=-0.089$ ;  $p<0.010$ ) and transfer ( $\beta=-0.0000000693$ ;  $p<0.010$ ). Schools that experience insubordination violations tend to assign detention and tend not to suspend or transfer for these types of violations. Figure 7f shows schools do tend to transfer or assign detention for insubordination violations; however, detention is the more popular response to this violation. Race/ethnicity composition does not have strong and systematic effects with the exception of no-punishment. Specifically, when schools are composed of 60-to-80 percent nonwhite students, they tend to not

punish students for insubordination violations ( $\beta=0.092$ ;  $p<0.050$ ). Poverty also shows little effect on disciplinary responses when other controls are not added. For example, poverty is only significant for transfer in schools that are 80 percent or more minority ( $\beta=0.033$ ;  $p<0.050$ ). When additional controls are specified in the models, the estimated effects for race/ethnicity remain the same. The effects of poverty, however, change. In particular, increasing poverty concentration tends to have positive and significant effects ( $p<0.050$ ) on the school's likelihood to transfer students for insubordination violations ( $\beta=0.038$ ,  $\beta=0.044$  for 60-to-80 percent and 80 percent or more poverty, respectively). Additionally, the more students on free/reduced lunch the school has, the less likely the school is to detain students ( $\beta=-0.070$ ,  $\beta=-0.091$ ,  $\beta=-0.092$ ; all significant at the 0.050 level).

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Insert Table 10 about here  
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Essentially, race/ethnicity does not tend to be associated with disciplinary responses to insubordination violations. It is poverty that is related to how schools respond to these violations. The poorer the school, the more likely the school is to transfer and the less likely the school is to detain. Table 10 also shows important effects when additional control measures are added to the models. Some of these effects are expected. For example, both middle and high schools tend to expel, suspend, and transfer for insubordination offenses more than elementary schools do. This makes sense because elementary schools are less likely to experience violations and thus less likely to punish for them. Middle and high school effects tend to be negative and significant for

detention. Mixed grades schools appear to have very little effect on disciplinary responses with the exception of a positive effect for suspension. School size appears to be an important factor as it is associated with greater expulsion ( $\beta=0.0000127$ ;  $p<0.050$ ), transfer ( $\beta=0.0000267$ ;  $p<0.0510$ ) and no-punishment rates ( $\beta=0.0000796$ ;  $p<0.010$ ), and lesser detention rates ( $\beta=-0.0001595$ ;  $p<0.010$ ). Again in Table 10, the coefficients look noticeably small because what are being reported are unstandardized coefficients. These coefficients are difficult to compare since they have different scales, hence, the reason the entire coefficient is reported. Larger schools tend to expel and transfer more, but also not punish or detain for insubordination violations. When special transfer facilities are available in a district, schools tend to transfer ( $\beta=0.0000000423$ ;  $p<0.010$ ) more. The only other control measure that was significant in this model were the number of classroom changes. The more classroom changes a school has the less likely the school is to transfer ( $\beta=-0.00000000261$ ;  $p<0.050$ ).

In all, it appears that increasing minority concentration is associated with expulsion with regard to fights. Suspension rates increase for weapons and fight violations as minority concentration increase. Transferring to alternative facilities appears to be a common response that becomes more frequent with regard to all violations with the exception of insubordination as minority concentration increases. Detention appears to be increasing with minority concentration only for firearm violations. Schools with significant high percentages of minorities also tend to choose no-punishment as a response to firearm and insubordination violations.

Poverty concentration appears to have no effect on expulsion and/or suspension with regard to any of the given offenses with the exception of fight violations. Transfer rates increase for fight and insubordination violations as poverty concentration increases. Finally, increasing

poverty in the schools tends to be associated with lower rates of detention for firearm and insubordination violations.

## CHAPTER 5

### DISCUSSION

Public schools tend to punish minority and poor students more severely than White and affluent students. A majority of the existing literature draws on student level data, overlooking *school level* characteristics.

Do racial and poverty compositions of the schools influence how discipline is managed? Besides race and poverty, what are the underlying factors that explain potential discrepancies? What school compositional, locational and organizational characteristics are associated with the way in which students are disciplined? This dissertation utilized school-level data from the 2007-2008 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) and the Common Core of Data (CCD), both provided by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), to explore these questions.

School discipline is a natural but oftentimes unclear concept that varies across schools, districts, regions, and social groups. For the past three decades literature has suggested major discrepancies exist in the way students are disciplined. Specifically, minority students and students from low socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be punished more severely than White and affluent students (Skiba et al. 2002; Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). In particular, minority students tend to receive more exclusionary punishment such as expulsion or suspension for violations than White students (Menedez, Knoff, and Ferron 2002). Research also suggests gender influences how schools respond to violations. Males, especially Black males, receive more office referrals and are punished more punitively than females (Gregory 1996; Skiba et al. 2000).

Disciplinary responses to violations have evolved over the past 60 years. Before the 1950s corporal punishment was a popular and punitive disciplinary response to student misconduct. The baby boom generation created new issues for school administrators in the way they disciplined students throughout the 1950s and 1960s. More schools popped up across the nation and school sizes increased to accommodate the 80 million people that were born during this time. The more students a school has the more likely the school is to experience violations. Therefore, administrators found themselves having to adjust how they disciplined students. They turned to expulsion and out-of-school suspension as more effective way to manage unruly students. Both punitive in nature, expulsion and out-of-school suspension remained popular forms of punishment until the 1970s when in-school suspension became the predominant response to disciplinary violations. Seen as less punitive than any other disciplinary response used before, in-school suspension remained popular until an increase in student violence in the late 1980s and into the 1990s prompted harsher penalties for students committing offenses. It was during this time that zero-tolerance policies were enacted. These policies are punitive and often exclude students from school for up to one calendar year. Transferring students to alternative schools as a way to isolate unruly students also became a type of disciplinary response during the 1990s to present. Although possibly seen as less punitive than expulsion, there is concern that alternative schools have become a “dumping ground” (Gregg 1999) for unwanted students. More research is needed to shed light on the effectiveness of alternative schools. Is it possible that this disciplinary response may be more punitive than it appears?

Much of the research on the discrepancies in school discipline typically focuses on the causes and responses at the individual student level. However, in addition to race and poverty, there are likely to be school characteristics affecting the types of violations occurring in schools

as well as administrators' responses to those violations. This research took an important step in identifying *school level* compositional, locational, organizational characteristics affecting the violations and disciplinary responses to those violations. The results suggest school level dynamics may be different than what the student level literature suggests. A number of important insights are summarized in Table 11.

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Insert Table 11 about here  
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### *5.1 Racial and Poverty Effects*

A major finding from this study indicates that race and poverty concentrations alone are *not* uniformly associated with the violations that occur in schools or the disciplinary responses to those violations. While race and poverty concentrations do matter, school quality, resources, and other attributes also have important implications. Specifically, race and poverty effects appear to be mediated by a number of school characteristics such as crime in the community, school size, student/teacher ratio, the number of classroom changes, parent and civic involvement as well as other factors. When these characteristics were added to the Heckman models, the effects of race and poverty, and sometimes violation density, weakened. For example, schools with high concentrations of minority students may punish individuals for violations in a certain way because of the amount of crime in the community where the school is located. These disciplinary responses may reflect school efforts to deter violations that possibly originate from social disorder outside of the schools. Another example is that schools with high concentrations of

students who receive free/reduced lunch may punish for violations in a certain way because of the size of the school. These poor schools may choose particular types of punishments as a means to deter violations as the number of students in the school increases. The point is race and poverty do matter in terms of the types of violations schools experience as well as the disciplinary responses to those violations, however they are mediated by other important school characteristics. In essence, while not all of the controls were statistically significant, specifying them as a whole significantly weakened the effects of race and poverty.

Racial concentration affects how schools respond to all six violations with the exception of insubordination violations. As minority concentration increases, transfers rates increase for *every* violation type except insubordination offenses. Additionally, schools with greater minority concentrations will also detain for firearm violations, suspend for weapon violations, expel for drug violations, and expel and suspend for fight violations. Poverty concentration does not have much of an effect on how schools respond to a given violation. We see from Table 11 that poverty concentration affects disciplinary responses to fight and insubordination offenses only. Schools with a greater number of students on free/reduced lunch will expel, suspend, and transfer for fight violations and transfer for insubordination violations.

Transferring students to alternative educational facilities may have become a highly institutionalized response even with violations that do not occur frequently. Alcohol violations, for instance are more prevalent in White schools yet transfer rates in these schools for this violation are relatively low. However, as minority concentration increases, alcohol violations *decrease*, yet these schools are transferring *more* even though they are experiencing *fewer* violations for alcohol. Typically schools with greater percentages of minority students are located in urban districts. Administrators in these districts tend to respond to violations in a more

punitive way simply because they have less tolerance for misbehavior (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). According to Douglas (1986), to maintain integrity when an increasing proportion of members violate policies, organizations may develop a punitive “institutional mindset”. Based on the works of Argyris (1976) and Morgan (1986), once an organization learns a response to an incident, the organization may choose to respond to incidents in this particular way even when the incidents are not significant. Therefore, once schools learn a particular disciplinary response to a violation, they may continue to respond in the same way regardless of the density of the violation. In Scott’s (2001) work on neoinstitutionalism, he stated that routines are followed because they are taken for granted as the way we do these things. The cognitive element of neoinstitutionalism proposes that individuals make certain choices or decisions because they cannot envision any other alternative (Scott 2001).

#### *5.1.1. Density of Violations*

Another important finding from this research is that in addition to race and poverty, specific school characteristics affect disciplinary responses to particular violations including the density of the violation, school level, school size, the number of classroom changes, special transfer facilities, and crime in the community. As shown in Table 11, the density of a violation – the proportion of students involved in a given disciplinary violation – also conditions disciplinary responses to a given offense. Although not as prevalent as one might think, we see that violation density has an effect on firearm and insubordination offenses only. As violation density increases, suspension and detention rates for firearm offenses increase and detention rates for insubordination offenses increase. The greater the density of a given violation in a school,

regardless of the school's racial and poverty composition, the more punitive administrators' disciplinary responses may become as a way to deter or reduce the frequency of the offense.

### *5.1.2. School Level*

Another important school characteristic that appears to mediate how race and poverty affects how schools respond to violations is the level of the school. Table 11 shows that middle schools and high schools tend to expel, suspend, and transfer for firearm, weapon, fight, and insubordination violations. Both middle and high schools are likely to detain students for drug violations. We would expect to see more disciplinary responses to violations in middle and high schools since these schools experience more offenses than elementary schools. One may think that middle school students may be disciplined less punitively than high school students simply due to the younger age and developing maturity of the student. However, we see from Table 11 that middle school students tend to receive the same disciplinary responses for the same types of violations as high school students. We question why younger students tend to be punished just as severely as older students. This is a point of future research. In addition, mixed grades schools suspend for weapon, fight, and insubordination offenses. Mixed grades schools also transfer for weapons violations and detain for drug violations.

### *5.1.3. School Size*

School size is another organizational characteristic that mediates the effects of race and poverty on disciplinary responses. From Table 11 we see that school size affects how administrators respond to all six violation types except alcohol offenses. The larger the school, the more likely the school will transfer and detain for firearm violations; suspend and transfer for weapon

violations; detain for drug violations; suspend and transfer for fight violations; and expel and transfer for insubordination violations. The more students there are in a school, the more violations that will occur. Therefore, schools suspend, transfer, and detain most likely because such disciplinary responses are more effective in managing unruly students and deterring violations as the number of students in the school increase. Existing literature suggests that large schools tend to expel, suspend, and transfer students as a way to most effectively manage disruptive students (Hanson 2005). In 1992, Haller studied nearly 600 American public high schools in an effort to determine the impact school size has on student behavior. He found that the larger the school, the more likely the school will experience disorder and have greater problems with student attendance. This could be in part because in larger schools administrators and teachers may not have the time or opportunity to truly get to know students individually and build lasting, positive relationships. With so many students to manage and more discipline issues to deal with, school administrators may have to focus more time and energy on disciplining students for misbehavior and less time on developing positive relationships. In 1997 the National Center for Educational Statistics surveyed over 1,200 elementary, middle, and high schools across the nation focusing on violence and discipline problems. The schools were divided into categories: small schools (less than 300 students), median schools (300-999 students), and large schools (1000 or more students). Their findings indicate that larger schools experience more discipline issues such as fights, vandalism, alcohol use, drug use and trafficking, gangs, absenteeism, and tardiness (Heaviside, Rowand, Williams, and Farris 1998). On the other hand, smaller schools were associated with less discipline issues, a safer and more orderly environment, and higher student achievement (Heaviside et al. 1998). The United States Department of Education found that schools with 1,000 or more students had higher rates of

violent behavior than schools with 300 or less students. In contrast, smaller schools were associated with greater rates of participation in athletics and activities. Students who are involved in extracurricular activities tend to have good grades, are less likely to drop out of school, have higher self-esteem, attend school on a regular basis, and have fewer behavior issues (U.S. Department of Education 1999).

#### *5.1.4. Classroom Changes*

The effects of race and poverty on disciplinary responses are also mediated by the number of classroom changes students experience during the school day. From Table 11 we see that as the number of classroom changes increase so do suspension rates for alcohol violations. The more classroom changes a school has in their schedule, the more likely the school will detain for weapons violations. These disciplinary responses are likely because schools may wish to limit the interaction between offenders and non-offenders, therefore schools will exclude the offenders from the non-offenders by suspending or detaining them. Most discipline problems happen during transition times such as passing periods. Queen and Isenhour (1998) stated that discipline problems decrease when students change classrooms less often. Fewer transitions mean that students spend more time in the classroom. Deuel (1999) found that an increase in teacher-student contact time enabled more involvement with students and helped teachers to connect with students. Because of this, deeper, more meaningful relationships developed between teachers and students contributing to improved student behavior and therefore less discipline referrals.

### 5.1.5. *Special Transfer Facilities*

Another characteristic that mediates the effects of race and poverty on disciplinary reactions to violations is whether the district has a transfer facility available. Table 11 shows that when transfer facilities are available, schools tend to transfer for every type of violation with the exception of firearm offenses.

We know that schools with greater minority concentrations choose to *transfer* more for several violations — firearms, weapons, drugs, alcohol, and fights— than any other disciplinary response. Schools do not want to deprive students of an education. Instead of expelling a student from school with no opportunity to continue his/her education, schools can transfer students to alternative schools. This allows for the student to be removed from the building where the offense occurred yet still be provided with an opportunity to continue his/her education. Transferring students to alternative schools helps maintain safety and order in the base school while still providing an educational opportunity for the student. This became a popular disciplinary response in the 1990s and is still used readily in districts that have access to alternative schools.

Formally, expulsion and suspension are significant punitive responses to violations. Transferring may not necessarily be as punitive as expelling or suspending students, however, there is very little consistent evidence of the effectiveness of alternative schools for students with disciplinary issues (Brown 2007). In addition, the curriculum, instruction, support for students, etc. varies greatly from one alternative school to the next (Lange and Sletten 2002). Yet existing literature finds students are better off transferred to an alternative educational facility than excluded from school (Christle, Nelson, and Jolivette 2004; Morrison et al. 2001). Students who are excluded from school are at a greater risk of drug use, sexual and illegal activity, academic

failure, and dropping out of school (Christle et al. 2004; Taras, Frankowski, McGrath, Mears, Murray, and Young, 2003).

However, one can raise questions about the effectiveness of placing unruly students in the same alternative educational facility. For example, if a district has one alternative school all students who commit an offense and are disciplined by being transferred to an alternative site will all end up in the same building. In essence, all drug offenders, for example, could be contained in the same building making possession and trafficking of drugs possibly more prevalent due to the student population. A point of future study is to understand the function and consequences of transferring students to alternative educational facilities. Could this disciplinary option be more punitive than it appears on the surface?

#### *5.1.6. Crime in the Community*

Race and poverty effects on disciplinary reactions to violations are also mediated by the amount of crime in the community where the school is located. Table 11 shows that as crime in the community increases, suspension, transfer and detention rates for weapons violations increase; detention rates for drug violations increase; and suspension rates for fight violations increase. Characteristically, the more crime that takes place in a community, the more crime that will possibly take place in the schools located in that community. The more disorder that takes place in the community, the more punitive the community may want schools to be in response to particular violations.

Urban communities tend to experience more disorder and crime than rural and suburban communities. Minority parents living in these types of communities tend to expect schools to punish students more severely for misbehaviors. They often allow their children less personal

freedom due to the violence and disorder in the community, and therefore, expect schools to do the same. They believe harsher punishments will teach students right from wrong and deter more serious offenses in the future (Brown and Beckett 2006). In contrast, communities outside the urban setting – rural and suburban communities – experience less crime and in turn, schools located in these communities tend to be less punitive in disciplinary responses to violations.

### *5.2. No Punishment*

From this research we discovered that based on the racial composition of the school, some schools choose to not punish students for firearm and insubordination violations. This raises a definite concern with regard to firearm violations. As a result of the federal Gun Free Schools Act of 1994, all states receiving federal education money must require schools to expel, for no less than one calendar year, any student who was found to have brought a firearm and/or weapon to school. The initial intent of this zero-tolerance law, which was originally drafted by the United States Congress, was to focus on truly dangerous and criminal behavior by a student such as possessing a gun on school property (Skiba and Peterson 1999). However, many states have extended these laws to include other types of weapons such as knives with blades over three inches, iron bars, pocketknives, daggers, and brass knuckles (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). In some districts, zero tolerance policies have been extended to include more types of punishable behaviors such as possession of drugs including Midol and aspirin, to possession of toy guns, truancy, threats, fighting, gang activity, insubordination and generally any form of disruption in schools, many of which pose little threat to school safety (Skiba and Peterson 1999; Skiba 2000; Henault 2001; Sughrue 2003). How then are certain types of schools not punishing students for firearm violations when there is a federal law mandating that they do so? Findings show that the

behavior of schools in response to this type of violation depend on a variety of factors in addition to race and poverty. These factors include the level of school, student/teacher ratio, school size, the number of classroom changes, and others. Due to these factors, a one-size-fits-all policy such as zero-tolerance may not be effective in deterring this type of violation. Administrators who decide not to punish students for firearm violations may be considering other factors contributing to the violation. Research suggests that rural and suburban administrators may be less punitive in disciplinary responses for firearms due to the culture of the community. For example, in a rural town where hunting is a big part of the culture of the community, a student who “forgets” to take his hunting rifle out of the truck may not be disciplined under the zero-tolerance law because administrators may not view the situation as a threat to the safety of students (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). Under zero-tolerance, the student should receive a one calendar year expulsion from school, however, the law does allow for the chief administrator of the district to amend the punishment on a student-to-student basis.

### *5.3. Policy Implications*

Race and poverty effects alone are not uniformly related to the types of violations that occur in schools or the disciplinary responses to given violations. School quality, resources, and other attributes may also have other important implications in addition to race and poverty. Race and poverty effects appear to be mediated by several key school characteristics including the location of the school. It is well documented that minority students and students of poverty are disciplined more punitively than White and affluent students (Children’s Defense Fund 1975; Skiba et al. 2000; Skiba and Rausch 2006). Many urban schools have high minority and poverty concentrations. Oftentimes, urban schools may be larger and have greater student/teacher ratios

than rural and suburban schools. These types of schools may also not have the necessary resources, funding, materials, teachers, etc. that they need to help students be successful. All of these issues could possibly lower the quality of the school.

Disciplinary policies are so ambiguous and often are left to school administrators to interpret the meaning of such policies. Existing literature suggests that urban administrators may assign more punitive disciplinary responses to given violations because of their lower tolerance of misbehavior due to the sheer number of violations (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004). Suburban and rural schools typically experience lower racial and poverty concentrations than urban schools. In addition, these schools may be privy to more resources, funding, smaller class sizes, and be located in communities where crime rates are lower. Administrators in these types of schools may respond to given violations with less punitive disciplinary responses because of the values and expectations of the community in which the school is located (Dunbar and Villarruel 2004), thus contributing to the widening discipline gap that exists in our nation's public schools. To close the discipline gap that appears to be prevalent across the country, discipline policies must become more equitable and reasonable. For this to happen, school characteristics such as location, school size, student/teacher ratio, the number of classroom changes, as well as others must be addressed. These contributing school characteristics cannot be ignored when designing and implementing disciplinary policies.

By nature, discipline is ultimately a response to a violation of a rule, formal or informal. We live in a society that tends to support the idea that a given violation may result in a given punishment. For example, if a driver chooses to speed he/she may receive a speeding ticket; if a student decides to cheat on a test, he/she may receive a zero for a test score. For discipline policies to be effective and reasonable, they cannot be considered in isolation. They must be

associated with violation policies – specifically, they must account for the *source* of the violation. We know that schools experiencing more violations tend to punish more. We must ask why some schools experience more violations than others. From this study we know that school size, student/teacher ratio, classroom changes, community crimes rates, as well as other school characteristics have significant effects on the types of violations schools experience as well as the disciplinary responses to the given violations. Discipline policies must be designed to account for these other factors in helping to reduce the amount of violations. For example, the more classroom changes students have during the school day, the more opportunities they have to engage in misbehavior and thus the more violations schools with several passing periods a day will experience (Queen and Isenhour 1998). This is an element of the school that should be addressed as a way to decrease the number of violations. Also, higher student/teacher ratios may increase the opportunities for students to misbehave. The more students in a classroom the more difficult it is for the teacher to supervise and therefore, the likelihood that students may misbehave is greater. This is another area that schools can address to possibly lower the opportunities for violations.

Some view discipline policies as a way to punish behavior, and oftentimes this is the case. However, these types of policies must be designed to help reduce violations. Simply expelling or suspending a student from school for a given offense may not necessarily do anything to curb the behavior. The hope is that when students are punished for an offense that they will learn from it and not do it again. We know that in life as well as in school this isn't always the case. Just because a person is punished for an offense doesn't necessarily mean that he/she will never commit the same offense again. Discipline policies need to be designed to not only punish a student, but more importantly to deter the behavior and reduce offenses.

Given the requirements for sound disciplinary policy, the only “uniform” discipline policy we have in America is zero-tolerance policies. Zero-tolerance policies are in some ways a myth. The federal government enacted a policy that requires students who bring firearms or weapons to school to be expelled for one calendar year. We know from our research that there are schools that do not punish for firearm violations. The policy does allow for the chief administrator of the educational organization to modify the one year expulsion on a student-to-student basis if needed. However, the SSOCS and CCD data utilized in this study does not provide the information needed to determine if students are not being punished for firearm violations due to a decision made by the chief administrator or if there are other reasons why this may be happening. Are certain types of schools deciding to turn a blind eye to these violations because they do not want to deal with them? Do firearm violations occur so infrequently that when they do happen schools choose to respond by not punishing students? Are these violations occurring in schools where administrators hold beliefs that the student did not mean any harm by bringing a firearm to school, and therefore, they do not punish the student? These are all areas where future research is needed to help answer these questions.

Thinking that zero-tolerance policies or any discipline policy can be uniformly applied across our nation’s schools is somewhat absurd. Schools are so different across the country, from region-to-region, state-to-state, and often district-to-district. It is very difficult to have a national policy that treats every single student and violation the same way. We see this difficulty already in the way schools and districts *define* zero-tolerance. The federal government defined zero tolerance for us by including firearms and weapons, yet numerous schools and districts across our country have extended this definition of zero tolerance to include many other offenses.

Although well intended, zero-tolerance policies are more of a symbolic gesture in response to violations as a way to appease the public and school administration.

We know that discipline policies vary by school, district, state, and region as well as by race and poverty. Zero-tolerance policies are a good example of this. As noted above, some schools enforce zero-tolerance policies how they were intended— to punish students for firearm and weapon violations. However, other schools and districts have expanded these policies to include numerous other violations such as drugs, alcohol, fights, and truancy (Skiba and Peterson 1999; Henault 2001). This study shows us that disciplinary responses depend on the type of violation, and each violation may not receive the same type of disciplinary response. Race and poverty alone are not uniformly associated with disciplinary responses. Instead, these characteristics are mediated by several contextual, locational, and organizational characteristics of the school. Knowing this, is it possible for schools across America to be more uniform in the violations they did decide to punish and the disciplinary responses to those violations? This too would be very difficult.

In all, race and poverty do matter in terms of violations and disciplinary responses. However, these effects are mediated by other school characteristics. For discipline policies to be more equitable and reasonable, these key school characteristics must be accounted for. Additionally, discipline policies must be associated with violation policies, and the source of the violation must be accounted for as discipline policies are designed and implemented.

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
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
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
**FIGURE 1a**




**FIGURE 1b**




**FIGURE 2a**




**FIGURE 2b**




**FIGURE 2c**




**FIGURE 2d**




**FIGURE 2e**




**FIGURE 3a**




**FIGURE 3b**




**FIGURE 3c**




**FIGURE 3d**



**FIGURE 3e**




**FIGURE 4a**




**FIGURE 4b**




**FIGURE 5a**




**FIGURE 5b**




**FIGURE 5c**




**FIGURE 5d**




**FIGURE 5e**




**FIGURE 5f**




**FIGURE 6a**




**FIGURE 6b**




**FIGURE 6c**




**FIGURE 6d**




**FIGURE 6e**




**FIGURE 6f**




**FIGURE 7a**




**FIGURE 7b**




**FIGURE 7c**




**FIGURE 7d**



**FIGURE 7e**



**FIGURE 7f**



**TABLE 1**  
**Levels of Analysis in Existing Research**

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<b>District Level - not broken down by school</b>	
Brantlinger	1991
Children's Defense Fund	1975
Dunbar and Villarruel	2002
Garibaldi	1992
Gordan, Piana, and Keleher	2000
<b>State Level - between states or between districts within states</b>	
Cooley	1995
Krezmien, Leone, and Archilles	2006
<b>Single School - case study</b>	
Bowditch	1993

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**TABLE 2**  
**Descriptions of Measures for the Study**

Offense and Discipline Type	Firearm		SSOCS label	CCD Label	Description
	Firearm	%Remove	Q22a		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a firearm or explosive device resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year - a firearm/explosive device is defined as any weapon that is designed to (or may readily be converted to) expel a projectile by the action of the explosive. This includes guns, bombs, grenades, mines, rockets, missiles, pipe bombs, or similar devices designed to explode and capable of causing bodily harm or property damage.
		%OSS	Q22a		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a firearm or explosive device resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year
		%Transfer	Q22a		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a firearm or explosive device resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons
		%ISS/Detention	Q22a		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a firearm or explosive device resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)
		%No Punishment	Q22a		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a firearm or explosive device resulting in no disciplinary action
	Weapon	%Remove	Q22b		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a weapon other than a firearm resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year - a weapon is defined as any instrument or object used with the intent to threaten, injure, or kill. This includes look-alikes if they are used to threaten others.
		%OSS	Q22b		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a weapon other than a firearm resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year
		%Transfer	Q22b		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a weapon other than a firearm resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons
		%ISS/Detention	Q22b		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a weapon other than a firearm resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)
		%No Punishment	Q22b		percentage of students involving the use/possession of a weapon other than a firearm resulting in no disciplinary action
	Drugs	%Remove	Q22c		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year
		%OSS	Q22c		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year
		%Transfer	Q22c		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons
		%ISS/Detention	Q22c		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)
		%No Punishment	Q22c		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs resulting in no disciplinary action
Alcohol	%Remove	Q22d		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of alcohol resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year	
	%OSS	Q22d		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of alcohol resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year	
	%Transfer	Q22d		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of alcohol resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons	
	%ISS/Detention	Q22d		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of alcohol resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)	
	%No Punishment	Q22d		percentage of students involving the distribution, possession, or use of alcohol resulting in no disciplinary action	
Fights	%Remove	Q22e		percentage of students involving physical attacks or fights resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year - a physical attack or fight is defined as an actual and intentional touching or striking of another person against his or her will, or the intentional causing of bodily harm to an individual.	
	%OSS	Q22e		percentage of students involving physical attacks or fights resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year	
	%Transfer	Q22e		percentage of students involving physical attacks or fights resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons	
	%ISS/Detention	Q22e		percentage of students involving physical attacks or fights resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)	
	%No Punishment	Q22e		percentage of students involving physical attacks or fights resulting in no disciplinary action	

**TABLE 2 continued**  
**Descriptions of Measures for the Study**

	Insubordination	%Remove	Q22f	percentage of students involving insubordination resulting in removals with no continuing school services for at least the remainder of the school year - insubordination is defined as a deliberate and inexcusable defiance of or refusal to obey a school rule, authority, or a reasonable order. It includes but is not limited to direct defiance of school authority, failure to attend assigned detention or on-campus supervision, failure to respond to a call slip, and physical or verbal intimidation/abuse
		%OSS	Q22f	percentage of students involving insubordination resulting in an out-of-school suspensions lasting 5 or more days, but less than the remainder of the school year
		%Transfer	Q22f	percentage of students involving insubordination resulting in transfers to specialized schools for disciplinary reasons
		%ISS/Detention	Q22f	percentage of students involving insubordination resulting in other disciplinary action (e.g., suspension less than 5 days, detention, etc.)
		%No Punishment	Q22f	percentage of students involving insubordination resulting in no disciplinary action
Violation Density			sprop	Ratio of the number of students involved in a given offense (e.g. firearm, weapon, drug, alcohol, fight, insubordination) relative to the population for 2007-2008
Race/Ethnicity			bh406080	Percent of current students who are Black or Hispanic for the 2007-2008 school year. This variable is broken down as follows: 1)less than 40% minority; 2)40-60% minority; 3)60-80% minority; 4)80% or more minority
Poverty			bhlunch406080	Percent of current students who are Black or Hispanic and receive free/reduced lunch prices for the 2007-2008 school year. This variable is broken down as follows: 1)less than 40% free/reduced lunch; 2)40-60% free/reduced lunch; 3)60-80% free/reduced lunch; 4)80% or more free/reduced lunch
School Level			slevel	School level with 1)elementary school; 2)middle school; 3)high school; 4)mixed grades school for the 2007-2008 school year
Community crime			Q30	Crime level in school location (1=high level of crime; 2=moderate level of crime; 3=low level of crime)
School size			Member07	Average daily membership for the 2007-2008 school year
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			Puptch07	Pupil/Teacher ratio for school year 2007-2008
SPED			Q25c	Percent of current special education students - a special education student is defined as a child with a disability, defined as mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities, and who needs special education and related services and receives these under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
Male			Q25d	Percent of current male students for 2007-2008 school year
Choice School			Q31	Regular public school; charter school; has a magnet program for part of the school; exclusively a magnet program; other
Rural			ULOCAL	This variable is based on the ULOCAL variable with several specified locational attributes for the 2007-2008 school year, (1=rural; 0=nonrural)
Classroom Changes			Q27	Number of classroom changes most students make in a typical day (Going to lunch and then returning to the same or different classroom is counted as two classroom changes; morning arrival or afternoon departure is not counted)
Special transfer school			Q21c	Whether a specialized school is available for disciplinary issues (0=no; 1=yes) - a specialized school is defined as a school that is specifically for students who were referred for disciplinary reasons. The school may also have students who were referred for other reasons. The school may be at the same location as your school.
Outside involvement	Parent		Q6a	Parent groups involved in school's efforts to promote safe, disciplined, and drug-free schools (Yes or No)
	Civic		Q6f	Civic organizations/service clubs involved in school's efforts to promote safe, disciplined, and drug-free schools (Yes or No)
School Practices/Programs	Check-in Procedures		Q1a	Require visitors to sign or check in (Yes or No)
	Controlled Access		Q1b,c	Controlled access to school buildings during school hours (e.g. locked or monitored doors) and controlled access to school grounds during school hours (e.g. locked or monitored gates) (Yes or No)

**TABLE 2 continued**  
**Descriptions of Measures for the Study**

	Preventive Training	Q3a	Prevention curriculum, instruction, or training for students (e.g. social skills training) intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Behavior Modification	Q3b	Behavioral or behavior modification intervention for students intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Counseling Therapy	Q3c	Counseling, social work, psychological, or therapeutic activities for students intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Mentoring	Q3d	Individual attention/mentoring/tutoring/coaching of students by students or adults intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Student Involvement	Q3f	Student involvement in resolving student conduct problems (e.g. conflict resolution or peer mediation, student court) intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Community Programs	Q3g	Programs to promote sense of community/social integration among students intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
	Hotline	Q3h	Hotline/tipline for students to report problems intended to prevent or reduce violence (Yes or No)
Teacher Training	Safety Training	Q12c	Safety procedures training for teachers or aides provided by the school or district during the school year (Yes or No)
	Violence Training	Q12d	Recognizing early warning signs of students likely to exhibit violent behavior training for teachers or aides by the school or district during the school year (Yes or No)

**TABLE 3**  
**Pearson Correlations of Different Violation Types**

	<u>1)</u> <u>Coef.</u>	<u>2)</u> <u>Coef.</u>	<u>3)</u> <u>Coef.</u>	<u>4)</u> <u>Coef.</u>	<u>5)</u> <u>Coef.</u>	<u>6)</u> <u>Coef.</u>
1) Density of Firearms	1					
2) Density of Weapons	0.428 ***	1				
3) Density of Drugs	-0.003	0.104 ***	1			
4) Density of Alcohol	-0.008	0.042 **	0.292 ***	1		
5) Density of Fights	0.029	0.156 ***	0.125 ***	-0.008	1	
6) Density of Insubordination	0.018	0.152 ***	0.146 ***	0.114 ***	0.291 ***	1

Note: \*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 4**  
**Results of Left-Truncated Tobit Regressions**  
**Predicting Effects on Different Violations**

	Firearm		Weapon		Drug		Alcohol		Fight		Insubordination	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.								
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	0.005	(0.003)	0.002	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)	-0.002 **	(0.001)	0.004	(0.005)	0.024	(0.013)
60-80% Minority	0.008 **	(0.004)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)	0.006	(0.006)	0.016	(0.015)
80+% Minority	0.016 ***	(0.005)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.006)	0.010	(0.015)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.002	(0.003)	0.001	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.009 **	(0.004)	0.023	(0.011)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.002	(0.004)	0.003 **	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.002)	0.014 **	(0.005)	0.034	(0.014)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.001	(0.004)	0.000	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.001)	-0.002 *	(0.001)	0.013 ***	(0.005)	0.034	(0.014)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community	-0.002	(0.002)	0.002 ***	(0.001)	0.002 ***	(0.001)	0.002 ***	(0.001)	0.013 ***	(0.004)	0.022	(0.008)
School Size	0.000 ***	(0.000)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	0.000 **	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio	0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	0.001 *	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.001)
Percent Special Ed	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000 **	(0.000)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.001	(0.001)
Percent Male	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000 **	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Choice School	0.000	(0.006)	0.000	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.001)	-0.003	(0.007)	0.004	(0.019)
Rural	0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	0.003 ***	(0.001)	0.002 **	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.003)	0.014	(0.009)
Parent Involvement	-0.005 **	(0.002)	0.000	(0.001)	-0.002 **	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.009)
Civic Involvement	0.004 **	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.001)	0.002 ***	(0.001)	0.001 *	(0.001)	0.001	(0.003)	0.015	(0.009)
Checkin Procedures	-	-	-	-	-0.001	(0.008)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Control Access	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.001 **	(0.000)	-0.001 *	(0.001)	-0.001 ***	(0.000)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.015	(0.006)
Preventive Training	-0.008 **	(0.004)	-0.002 **	(0.000)	-0.003 ***	(0.001)	-0.002 **	(0.001)	-	-	-	-
Behavior Modification	-0.000	(0.003)	-	-	-	-	-0.001	(0.001)	-	-	-	-
Counseling/Therapy	-0.001	(0.004)	-0.000	(0.002)	-	-	-0.000	(0.002)	-	-	-	-
Mentoring	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.001	(0.002)	-	-	-	-
Student Involvement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.007	(0.008)
Community Program	-	-	-	-	-0.001	(0.001)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hotline	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.001	(0.003)	-	-
Safety Training	-0.002	(0.004)	-0.000	(0.001)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Violence Training	-	-	-0.000	(0.001)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.011	(0.008)
<b>Constant</b>	<b>-0.022 ***</b>	<b>(0.008)</b>	<b>-0.011 ***</b>	<b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.019 ***</b>	<b>(0.008)</b>	<b>-0.009 ***</b>	<b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.045 ***</b>	<b>(0.012)</b>	<b>-0.068</b>	<b>(0.028)</b>

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. Estimates for predictors that have no significant effects are left blank. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 5**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Firearm Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	-4.633 ***	(1.469)	-11.767	(10.267)	4.963 ***	(0.659)	2.393 ***	(0.000)	-8.550 ***	(2.787)	0.000	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	0.158	(0.185)	0.375	(0.374)	0.103	(0.126)	0.190	(0.305)	-0.002	(0.170)	0.232	(0.161)
60-80% Minority	-0.025	(0.154)	-0.132	(0.286)	0.200	(0.146)	0.313	(0.406)	-0.150	(0.170)	0.354 **	(0.145)
80+% Minority	-0.099	(0.116)	-0.411	(0.260)	0.351 *	(0.189)	0.569	(0.586)	-0.036	(0.168)	0.661 ***	(0.169)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.142	(0.110)	0.078	(0.326)	0.016	(0.102)	0.074	(0.171)	0.062	(0.127)	0.093	(0.100)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.077	(0.125)	0.068	(0.287)	-0.108	(0.146)	-0.086	(0.228)	0.080	(0.188)	-0.039	(0.146)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.074	(0.128)	-0.279	(0.309)	0.081	(0.180)	0.119	(0.146)	-0.079	(0.159)	0.091	(0.124)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			0.352	(0.227)			0.465 ***	(0.148)			0.398 ***	(0.108)
High School			0.942 ***	(0.290)			0.285 **	(0.136)			0.257 **	(0.126)
Mixed Grades School			0.441	(0.900)			0.274	(0.247)			0.263	(0.212)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			-0.008	(0.128)			-0.080	(0.113)			-0.099	(0.075)
School Size			-0.000 *	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			-0.038 **	(0.018)			0.019	(0.013)			0.016 *	(0.009)
Percent Special Ed			-0.006	(0.010)			-0.005	(0.010)			-0.005	(0.003)
Percent Male			0.011 *	(0.007)			-0.002	(0.004)			-0.001	(0.003)
Choice School			0.224	(0.512)			-0.098	(0.230)			-0.062	(0.212)
Rural			0.111	(0.323)			0.046	(0.102)			0.007	(0.087)
Classroom Changes			-0.054	(0.048)			-0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.434	(0.277)			-0.001 ***	(0.000)			0.000 *	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			0.230	(0.325)			-0.213	(0.201)			-0.206 ***	(0.078)
Civic Involvement			-0.372 *	(0.205)			0.199	(0.155)			0.165 **	(0.076)
Control Access			-0.165	(0.167)			-0.021	(0.102)			-0.051	(0.061)
Preventive Training			-0.144	(0.205)			-0.169	(0.366)			-0.223	(0.140)
Behavior Modification			0.254	(0.447)			0.043	(0.237)			0.157	(0.157)
Counseling/Therapy			0.655 **	(0.287)			-0.144	(0.247)			-0.280	(0.183)
Safety Training			0.054	(0.193)			0.024	(0.125)			0.035	(0.114)
<b>Constant</b>			2.571 ***	(0.701)			-1.589 ***	(0.381)			-1.447 ***	(0.351)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 5 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Firearm Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	11.511 **	(5.609)	8.578 ***	(2.674)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	0.046	(0.128)	0.098	(0.186)	0.038	(0.051)	0.059	(0.057)
60-80% Minority	0.372 **	(0.193)	0.486 **	(0.220)	0.084	(0.058)	0.114 *	(0.070)
80+% Minority	0.148	(0.198)	0.610 ***	(0.151)	0.156 ***	(0.058)	0.218 **	(0.090)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.399 ***	(0.096)	-0.235 **	(0.120)	0.006	(0.039)	0.031	(0.041)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.294 ***	(0.114)	-0.255	(0.225)	-0.009	(0.080)	0.025	(0.083)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.248 **	(0.123)	-0.095	(0.164)	0.006	(0.061)	0.046	(0.068)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			0.047	(0.098)			0.155 **	(0.076)
High School			-0.103	(0.214)			0.072	(0.052)
Mixed Grades School			-0.280	(0.186)			0.052	(0.088)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			0.006	(0.109)			-0.028	(0.039)
School Size			0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.004	(0.011)			0.006	(0.004)
Percent Special Ed			-0.007	(0.007)			-0.003	(0.002)
Percent Male			-0.002	(0.003)			-0.001	(0.002)
Choice School			0.165	(0.299)			-0.007	(0.089)
Rural			-0.099	(0.151)			0.028	(0.040)
Classroom Changes			-0.010 ***	(0.003)			0.000	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.088	(0.120)			-0.000	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			-0.243 **	(0.097)			-0.064	(0.054)
Civic Involvement			0.169 **	(0.089)			0.066	(0.068)
Control Access			-0.037	(0.115)			-0.041	(0.036)
Preventive Training			-0.167	(0.161)			-0.091	0.071
Behavior Modification			0.038	(0.124)			0.036	(0.052)
Counseling/Therapy			0.077	(0.121)			-0.047	(0.068)
Safety Training			-0.236	(0.183)			0.010	(0.053)
<b>Constant</b>			-0.676 **	(0.334)			-0.599 ***	(0.146)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 6**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Weapon Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	-2.264 **	(1.129)	-2.259 *	(1.325)	-1.673	(5.510)	0.000	(0.000)	-2.933	(3.175)	0.000	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	-0.031	(0.023)	-0.012	(0.023)	-0.012	(0.083)	0.195 **	(0.102)	0.151 **	(0.069)	0.215 ***	(0.067)
60-80% Minority	-0.005	(0.030)	0.022	(0.033)	-0.016	(0.095)	0.103	(0.120)	0.102	(0.090)	0.120	(0.088)
80+% Minority	-0.029	(0.029)	-0.014	(0.035)	-0.021	(0.085)	0.051	(0.110)	0.085	(0.067)	0.072	(0.071)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.009	(0.024)	0.002	(0.023)	0.019	(0.069)	0.026	(0.070)	0.043	(0.055)	0.025	(0.048)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.001	(0.027)	0.013	(0.027)	-0.014	(0.084)	0.128	(0.108)	0.010	(0.069)	0.084	(0.074)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.004	(0.031)	0.017	(0.034)	-0.074	(0.086)	-0.029	(0.086)	-0.119 *	(0.064)	-0.063	(0.065)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			0.100 ***	(0.024)			0.427 ***	(0.053)			0.272 ***	(0.037)
High School			0.175 ***	(0.032)			0.395 ***	(0.072)			0.234 ***	(0.043)
Mixed Grades School			0.022	(0.029)			0.285 **	(0.127)			0.231 **	(0.102)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			-0.019	(0.022)			0.140 ***	(0.049)			0.124 ***	(0.040)
School Size			-0.000 **	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.001	(0.003)			0.011	(0.008)			0.008	(0.005)
Percent Special Ed			0.000	(0.001)			0.005 *	(0.003)			0.004 *	(0.002)
Percent Male			0.001 **	(0.001)			0.003	(0.002)			0.004 **	(0.002)
Choice School			0.071	(0.044)			-0.010	(0.105)			-0.044	(0.067)
Rural			-0.023	(0.023)			-0.001	(0.068)			0.012	(0.041)
Classroom Changes			0.001	(0.003)			-0.000	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.072 ***	(0.024)			-0.000	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			0.045 **	(0.019)			0.021	(0.061)			0.007	(0.040)
Civic Involvement			-0.012	(0.018)			-0.010	(0.056)			0.005	(0.039)
Control Access			0.022 **	(0.012)			-0.072 *	(0.042)			-0.052 *	(0.029)
Preventive Training			-0.021	(0.028)			-0.050	(0.071)			-0.049	(0.054)
Counseling/Therapy			0.002	(0.037)			-0.008	(0.106)			-0.060	(0.070)
Safety Training			-0.011	(0.024)			-0.013	(0.089)			-0.023	(0.059)
Violence Training			0.019	(0.018)			-0.011	(0.054)			-0.013	(0.036)
<b>Constant</b>			0.024 ***	(0.076)			-1.498 ***	(0.226)			-1.113 ***	(0.152)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 6 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Weapon Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	0.105	(5.039)	-0.264	(4.932)	7.015 ***	(2.703)	7.074 ***	(2.615)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	-0.005	(0.095)	-0.074	(0.077)	-0.004	(0.032)	-0.002	(0.027)
60-80% Minority	0.015	(0.107)	-0.061	(0.089)	-0.017	(0.022)	-0.021	(0.022)
80+% Minority	0.057	(0.093)	-0.027	(0.088)	-0.038 *	(0.022)	-0.040 *	(0.022)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.005	(0.084)	-0.044	(0.063)	-0.023	(0.019)	-0.032	(0.024)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.047	(0.097)	-0.023	(0.082)	-0.009	(0.033)	-0.017	(0.031)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.177 *	(0.099)	0.081	(0.080)	-0.027	(0.018)	-0.028	(0.018)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			-0.406 ***	(0.066)			0.009	(0.018)
High School			-0.457 ***	(0.071)			0.040	(0.031)
Mixed Grades School			-0.106	(0.148)			-0.037 *	(0.020)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			0.102 ***	(0.039)			-0.000	(0.014)
School Size			-0.000	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			-0.004	(0.007)			-0.002	(0.002)
Percent Special Ed			0.001	(0.003)			0.001	(0.001)
Percent Male			-0.003	(0.003)			0.001	(0.001)
Choice School			0.063	(0.080)			-0.006	(0.024)
Rural			0.023	(0.058)			-0.002	(0.023)
Classroom Changes			0.024 **	(0.011)			-0.004	(0.003)
Special Transfer Facility			0.011	(0.060)			0.015	(0.021)
Parent Involvement			-0.071	(0.048)			-0.045 **	(0.023)
Civic Involvement			0.041	(0.047)			0.023	(0.019)
Control Access			-0.015	(0.034)			-0.000	(0.015)
Preventive Training			-0.015	(0.065)			-0.000	(0.022)
Counseling/Therapy			-0.066	(0.099)			0.017	(0.020)
Safety Training			0.004	(0.082)			0.008	(0.038)
Violence Training			0.007	(0.046)			-0.016	(0.018)
<b>Constant</b>			0.714 ***	(0.259)			0.044	(0.099)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 7**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to Drug Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	1.723	(1.560)	0.834	(1.272)	2.173	(2.141)	2.229	(2.395)	-2.922	(2.536)	-1.590	(2.483)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	0.018	(0.033)	0.063 *	(0.034)	-0.122 **	(0.048)	-0.149 ***	(0.051)	0.101 **	(0.047)	0.125 ***	(0.047)
60-80% Minority	0.066	(0.057)	0.102 **	(0.050)	-0.178 ***	(0.068)	-0.233 ***	(0.075)	0.057	(0.062)	0.115 *	(0.061)
80+% Minority	0.026	(0.039)	0.058	(0.051)	-0.123 *	(0.072)	-0.168 **	(0.074)	0.065	(0.052)	0.114 **	(0.060)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.023	(0.023)	-0.033	(0.025)	0.002	(0.047)	0.011	(0.047)	0.046	(0.043)	0.051	(0.041)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.089 *	(0.054)	0.085 *	(0.050)	-0.006	(0.068)	-0.015	(0.065)	0.013	(0.061)	0.037	(0.060)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.010	(0.031)	-0.018	(0.030)	0.056	(0.070)	0.022	(0.067)	-0.102 **	(0.047)	-0.056	(0.045)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			0.018	(0.084)			-0.182	(0.197)			0.049	(0.218)
High School			0.052	(0.091)			-0.219	(0.214)			0.008	(0.257)
Mixed Grades School			0.072	(0.093)			-0.394 **	(0.204)			0.294	(0.217)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			-0.014	(0.023)			-0.022	(0.037)			0.021	(0.039)
School Size			-0.000 **	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.004	(0.004)			0.002	(0.006)			-0.004	(0.006)
Percent Special Ed			-0.000	(0.002)			0.001	(0.003)			-0.001	(0.002)
Percent Male			-0.001	(0.001)			0.003	(0.002)			-0.001	(0.001)
Choice School			0.120 **	(0.061)			-0.022	(0.086)			-0.044	(0.063)
Rural			-0.006	(0.024)			-0.084 **	(0.043)			0.163 ***	(0.035)
Classroom Changes			0.004	(0.005)			0.000	(0.010)			-0.002	(0.008)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.033	(0.032)			-0.072	(0.056)			0.306 ***	(0.027)
Parent Involvement			-0.033	(0.024)			0.020	(0.040)			0.003	(0.034)
Civic Involvement			0.029	(0.021)			0.017	(0.037)			-0.025	(0.031)
Checkin Procedures			0.270 ***	(0.084)			-0.022	(0.164)			-0.160	(0.167)
Control Access			0.017	(0.018)			-0.015	(0.027)			-0.001	(0.022)
Preventive Training			-0.034	(0.029)			0.026	(0.045)			-0.013	(0.040)
Community Program			-0.018	(0.026)			0.049	(0.046)			-0.032	(0.039)
<b>Constant</b>			-0.161	(0.164)			0.718 **	(0.397)			0.214	(0.595)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 7 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to Drug Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	4.577 **	(2.012)	0.000 *	(0.000)	0.354	(0.788)	0.398	(0.634)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	-0.021	(0.037)	-0.036	(0.043)	0.032	(0.020)	0.031	(0.020)
60-80% Minority	-0.008	(0.048)	0.024	(0.062)	0.066	(0.055)	0.046	(0.052)
80+% Minority	0.056	(0.058)	0.068	(0.069)	0.015	(0.028)	0.000	(0.025)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.030	(0.037)	-0.008	(0.034)	-0.026 *	(0.014)	-0.024 *	(0.014)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.021	(0.049)	-0.048	(0.047)	-0.027	(0.027)	-0.028	(0.026)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.003	(0.064)	0.040	(0.062)	0.039	(0.034)	0.034	(0.028)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			0.671 ***	(0.055)			-0.085	(0.076)
High School			0.783 ***	(0.066)			-0.093	(0.081)
Mixed Grades School			0.565 ***	(0.078)			-0.107	(0.074)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			0.115 ***	(0.031)			-0.019	(0.012)
School Size			0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.008 **	(0.004)			-0.002	(0.002)
Percent Special Ed			0.002	(0.002)			0.000	(0.001)
Percent Male			-0.001	(0.002)			0.001 *	(0.001)
Choice School			-0.083	(0.058)			0.048	(0.049)
Rural			0.031	(0.034)			-0.017	(0.016)
Classroom Changes			0.000	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.004)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.000	(0.000)			-0.012	(0.024)
Parent Involvement			0.018	(0.029)			-0.031	(0.021)
Civic Involvement			0.021	(0.028)			-0.004	(0.015)
Checkin Procedures			0.252	(0.201)			-0.037	(0.052)
Control Access			-0.011	(0.023)			-0.001	(0.007)
Preventive Training			-0.034	(0.038)			-0.007	(0.020)
Community Program			-0.058 *	(0.035)			-0.014	(0.019)
<b>Constant</b>			-1.419 ***	(0.245)			-0.202	(0.121)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 8**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Alcohol Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	-1.948	(1.656)	-2.570	(1.896)	-14.498 ***	(5.623)	-6.100	(5.130)	-6.646 ***	(2.610)	-10.728 ***	(3.378)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	-0.009	(0.023)	-0.011	(0.026)	-0.116	(0.075)	-0.028	(0.099)	0.058	(0.050)	0.078	(0.053)
60-80% Minority	0.049	(0.036)	0.046	(0.037)	-0.070	(0.106)	-0.162	(0.104)	0.206 ***	(0.070)	0.238 ***	(0.069)
80+% Minority	-0.002	(0.017)	0.000	(0.029)	-0.133	(0.099)	-0.197 *	(0.120)	0.071	(0.051)	0.136 **	(0.065)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.003	(0.018)	-0.003	(0.021)	-0.102 *	(0.062)	-0.111	(0.068)	0.025	(0.042)	0.015	(0.038)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.024	(0.027)	0.025	(0.029)	-0.061	(0.102)	-0.078	(0.107)	-0.053	(0.052)	-0.042	(0.054)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.027 *	(0.015)	-0.027 *	(0.016)	0.090	(0.092)	0.075	(0.092)	-0.140 ***	(0.047)	-0.106 **	(0.046)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			-0.003	(0.038)			-0.313 *	(0.170)			0.025	(0.051)
High School			-0.014	(0.033)			-0.507 *	(0.274)			-0.014	(0.049)
Mixed Grades School			0.019	(0.051)			-0.464 **	(0.234)			0.151	(0.124)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			0.001	(0.021)			0.042	(0.056)			-0.038	(0.032)
School Size			-0.000	(0.000)			-0.000 **	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.002	(0.002)			0.021 ***	(0.008)			-0.015 ***	(0.005)
Percent Special Ed			0.001	(0.002)			0.006	(0.004)			-0.004 **	(0.002)
Percent Male			-0.000	(0.001)			0.004 **	(0.002)			-0.003 **	(0.001)
Choice School			-0.015	(0.039)			0.342 ***	(0.115)			-0.053	(0.051)
Rural			0.009	(0.021)			-0.040	(0.061)			0.054	(0.035)
Classroom Changes			0.001	(0.003)			0.032 ***	(0.013)			-0.003	(0.007)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.009	(0.017)			-0.059	(0.061)			0.149 ***	(0.028)
Parent Involvement			-0.027	(0.017)			0.086	(0.062)			0.015	(0.032)
Civic Involvement			0.015	(0.013)			-0.084	(0.055)			-0.024	(0.028)
Control Access			0.009	(0.008)			0.053	(0.043)			0.061 ***	(0.019)
Preventive Training			-0.006	(0.018)			0.010	(0.074)			-0.031	(0.047)
Behavior Modification			0.023	(0.016)			0.012	(0.115)			-0.017	(0.053)
Counseling/Therapy			-0.009	(0.029)			-0.063	(0.115)			-0.039	(0.070)
Mentoring			-0.001	(0.017)			0.159	(0.108)			-0.012	(0.056)
<b>Constant</b>			0.021	(0.059)			0.513	(0.508)			0.698 ***	(0.147)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 8 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Alcohol Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	12.945	(8.013)	0.000	(0.000)	11.023	(6.990)	9.185	(4.977)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	0.072	(0.081)	-0.080	(0.941)	-0.032	(0.037)	-0.024	(0.035)
60-80% Minority	-0.006	(0.096)	0.038	(1.319)	-0.104 *	(0.056)	-0.081	(0.047)
80+% Minority	0.129	(0.102)	0.015	(0.285)	-0.045	(0.041)	0.004	(0.039)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.049	(0.062)	0.046	(0.423)	0.013	(0.033)	0.012	(0.028)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.049	(0.121)	0.026	(0.122)	0.136	(0.094)	0.122	(0.068)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.013	(0.091)	0.026	(0.441)	0.033	(0.036)	0.027	(0.030)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			0.523	(6.789)			-0.084	(0.061)
High School			0.948	(8.917)			-0.122	(0.073)
Mixed Grades School			0.522	(5.918)			-0.120	(0.067)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			0.123	(1.304)			-0.051	(0.022)
School Size			0.000	(0.001)			0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.003	(0.067)			-0.001	(0.003)
Percent Special Ed			-0.011	(0.103)			0.004	(0.003)
Percent Male			-0.000	(0.014)			-0.002	(0.002)
Choice School			-0.225	(0.930)			-0.015	(0.031)
Rural			0.030	(0.685)			0.036	(0.028)
Classroom Changes			-0.000	(0.000)			0.005	(0.006)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.000	(0.000)			0.021	(0.032)
Parent Involvement			-0.021	(0.543)			0.026	(0.025)
Civic Involvement			0.061	(0.320)			0.028	(0.023)
Control Access			-0.084	(0.699)			-0.011	(0.017)
Preventive Training			-0.002	(0.077)			-0.000	(0.027)
Behavior Modification			-0.142	(1.890)			-0.038	(0.035)
Counseling/Therapy			0.113	(0.390)			-0.063	(0.054)
Mentoring			-0.087	(0.327)			0.052	(0.054)
<b>Constant</b>			-1.290	(2.432)			0.214	(0.122)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 9**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Fight Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	0.003	(0.060)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.612 ***	(0.191)	-0.000 ***	(0.000)	-0.176	(0.131)	-0.000	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	0.003	(0.005)	0.013 **	(0.007)	0.022	(0.033)	0.069 **	(0.032)	0.015	(0.019)	0.028	(0.020)
60-80% Minority	0.002	(0.005)	0.015 **	(0.007)	0.019	(0.038)	0.076 **	(0.037)	0.012	(0.014)	0.032 **	(0.016)
80+% Minority	0.012	(0.010)	0.018	(0.013)	0.012	(0.034)	0.031	(0.034)	0.012	(0.014)	0.022	(0.019)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.001	(0.003)	0.005	(0.004)	-0.028	(0.023)	0.003	(0.021)	0.017	(0.013)	0.022 *	(0.012)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.013 *	(0.008)	0.019 **	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.033)	0.044	(0.031)	0.001	(0.013)	0.019	(0.014)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.008	(0.005)	0.007	(0.005)	-0.022	(0.035)	0.071 **	(0.034)	0.003	(0.013)	0.032 **	(0.014)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			0.031 ***	(0.005)			0.214 ***	(0.018)			0.068 ***	(0.008)
High School			0.046 ***	(0.011)			0.346 ***	(0.026)			0.089 ***	(0.012)
Mixed Grades School			0.014 *	(0.008)			0.099 **	(0.046)			0.035	(0.029)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			0.000	(0.005)			0.046 ***	(0.017)			0.013	(0.008)
School Size			0.000	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.001 ***	(0.001)			0.006 **	(0.003)			0.000	(0.001)
Percent Special Ed			0.000	(0.000)			0.002	(0.001)			0.000	(0.000)
Percent Male			0.000 **	(0.000)			0.002 **	(0.001)			0.000	(0.001)
Choice School			0.005	(0.014)			-0.050	(0.043)			-0.044 ***	(0.015)
Rural			-0.002	(0.004)			0.008	(0.023)			-0.010	(0.009)
Classroom Changes			0.000	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.000 *	(0.000)			0.000	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			0.000	(0.005)			0.020	(0.019)			-0.008	(0.010)
Civic Involvement			0.003	(0.004)			0.021	(0.018)			0.009	(0.009)
Control Access			0.003	(0.003)			0.000	(0.014)			-0.011	(0.009)
Hotline			-0.005	(0.004)			0.005	(0.019)			0.005	(0.011)
<b>Constant</b>			-0.095 ***	(0.014)			-0.471 ***	(0.071)			-0.106 ***	(0.036)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.  
\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 9 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Fight Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	0.558 *	(0.307)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.158	(0.259)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	-0.016	(0.042)	-0.072 *	(0.043)	0.019	(0.027)	-0.032	(0.030)
60-80% Minority	-0.039	(0.048)	-0.107 **	(0.049)	0.054 *	(0.033)	-0.014	(0.034)
80+% Minority	-0.035	(0.043)	-0.042	(0.050)	0.049	(0.031)	-0.009	(0.035)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.008	(0.033)	-0.039	(0.032)	0.015	(0.024)	0.020	(0.025)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.008	(0.042)	-0.072 *	(0.043)	0.000	(0.028)	-0.011	(0.029)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.044	(0.042)	-0.079 *	(0.044)	0.013	(0.029)	-0.006	(0.029)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			-0.217 ***	(0.023)			-0.072 ***	(0.021)
High School			-0.412 ***	(0.033)			-0.040	(0.027)
Mixed Grades School			-0.123 *	(0.072)			-0.030	(0.056)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			-0.063 ***	(0.023)			0.009	(0.016)
School Size			-0.000 ***	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			-0.005	(0.003)			-0.003 *	(0.002)
Percent Special Ed			-0.001	(0.001)			-0.001	(0.001)
Percent Male			-0.003 **	(0.001)			0.001	(0.001)
Choice School			0.091 *	(0.053)			-0.029	(0.031)
Rural			0.018	(0.030)			-0.014	(0.021)
Classroom Changes			-0.000	(0.000)			0.003	(0.005)
Special Transfer Facility			-0.000 ***	(0.000)			-0.012	(0.022)
Parent Involvement			-0.012	(0.027)			-0.008	(0.018)
Civic Involvement			-0.041 *	(0.025)			0.021	(0.017)
Control Access			-0.008	(0.020)			0.014	(0.014)
Hotline			0.026	(0.025)			-0.012	(0.017)
<b>Constant</b>			1.475 ***	(0.100)			0.098 *	(0.060)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 10**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Insubordination Violations**

	Expulsion				Suspension				Transfer			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	-0.022 *	(0.012)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.089 ***	(0.026)	-0.150 ***	(0.031)	-0.000 **	(0.000)	-0.000 ***	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>												
40-60% Minority	0.019	(0.014)	0.023	(0.015)	-0.012	(0.014)	0.002	(0.015)	-0.001	(0.014)	-0.003	(0.015)
60-80% Minority	0.001	(0.002)	0.009	(0.006)	-0.018	(0.016)	-0.009	(0.016)	0.006	(0.018)	0.002	(0.018)
80+% Minority	0.012	(0.008)	0.014 *	(0.008)	-0.005	(0.020)	-0.000	(0.025)	-0.006	(0.016)	-0.014	(0.022)
<b>Poverty</b>												
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.005	(0.006)	0.004	(0.004)	0.014	(0.012)	0.014	(0.011)	0.006	(0.011)	0.015	(0.012)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.005	(0.003)	0.004	(0.004)	0.021	(0.019)	0.027	(0.018)	0.029	(0.020)	0.038 **	(0.021)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	0.004	(0.004)	0.008 *	(0.005)	0.006	(0.018)	0.012	(0.015)	0.033 **	(0.015)	0.044 ***	(0.017)
<b>School Level</b>												
Middle School			0.017 ***	(0.005)			0.070 ***	(0.015)			0.042 ***	(0.009)
High School			0.019 ***	(0.005)			0.068 ***	(0.014)			0.043 ***	(0.011)
Mixed Grades School			0.032	(0.028)			0.071 **	(0.028)			-0.016	(0.017)
<b>School Characteristics</b>												
Crime in the Community			0.010	(0.007)			0.017 *	(0.010)			0.014	(0.012)
School Size			0.000 **	(0.000)			-0.000 *	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			0.001	(0.001)			0.001	(0.002)			0.000	(0.001)
Percent Special Ed			-0.000	(0.000)			0.001	(0.001)			-0.000	(0.000)
Percent Male			-0.000	(0.000)			0.001	(0.000)			0.001	(0.000)
Choice School			0.008	(0.017)			0.034	(0.023)			-0.026	(0.017)
Rural			0.005	(0.007)			0.015	(0.012)			-0.000	(0.011)
Classroom Changes			-0.000	(0.000)			0.000	(0.002)			-0.000 **	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			0.000	(0.000)			0.001	(0.011)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			0.001	(0.005)			0.004	(0.011)			-0.020 *	(0.011)
Civic Involvement			0.005	(0.005)			0.016	(0.011)			0.014	(0.009)
Control Access			-0.001	(0.003)			0.004	(0.006)			-0.009	(0.009)
Student Involvement			-0.005	(0.004)			0.010	(0.009)			0.006	(0.011)
Violence Training			0.002	(0.003)			0.013	(0.009)			-0.010	(0.009)
<b>Constant</b>			-0.050	(0.034)			-0.078 **	(0.038)			-0.095 ***	(0.033)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT (“final weight”) used as regression weight.  
\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 10 continued**  
**Results of Heckman Model Predicting the Effects on Disciplinary Responses to**  
**Insubordination Violations**

	ISS/Detention				No Punishment			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>Violation Density</b>	0.245 ***	(0.068)	0.000 ***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>								
40-60% Minority	0.025	(0.037)	-0.002	(0.041)	0.008	(0.037)	-0.007	(0.033)
60-80% Minority	-0.077	(0.051)	-0.085	(0.052)	0.111 **	(0.051)	0.092 **	(0.046)
80+% Minority	-0.039	(0.042)	-0.036	(0.052)	0.061	(0.055)	0.042	(0.043)
<b>Poverty</b>								
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.060 *	(0.032)	-0.070 **	(0.034)	0.021	(0.029)	0.046 ***	(0.030)
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.037	(0.038)	-0.091 **	(0.041)	0.023	(0.034)	0.052	(0.035)
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch	-0.034	(0.039)	-0.092 **	(0.042)	0.018	(0.035)	0.046	(0.036)
<b>School Level</b>								
Middle School			-0.137 ***	(0.024)			0.063	(0.022)
High School			-0.135 ***	(0.029)			0.056 **	(0.025)
Mixed Grades School			-0.063	(0.070)			0.007	(0.057)
<b>School Characteristics</b>								
Crime in the Community			-0.035	(0.027)			0.013	(0.022)
School Size			-0.000 ***	(0.000)			0.000 ***	(0.000)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			-0.006 *	(0.004)			0.006 *	(0.003)
Percent Special Ed			-0.002	(0.001)			0.002 *	(0.001)
Percent Male			-0.001	(0.001)			0.001	(0.001)
Choice School			0.027	(0.055)			-0.053	(0.042)
Rural			0.014	(0.028)			-0.024	(0.023)
Classroom Changes			0.000 *	(0.000)			-0.000	(0.000)
Special Transfer Facility			0.000	(0.000)			-0.000 **	(0.000)
Parent Involvement			0.023	(0.027)			-0.017	(0.023)
Civic Involvement			-0.046 *	(0.025)			0.025	(0.021)
Control Access			0.016	(0.019)			-0.019	(0.016)
Student Involvement			-0.015	(0.026)			0.015	(0.022)
Violence Training			0.013	(0.024)			-0.018	(0.021)
<b>Constant</b>			1.319 ***	(0.097)			-0.226 ***	(0.080)

Note: All estimates based on unstandardized scores. The selection step included all predictors shown in the table except for violation density. FINALWGT ("final weight") used as regression weight.

\*\*\*p<0.010. \*\*p<0.050. \*p<0.100.

**TABLE 11**  
**Summary of Findings for Disciplinary Reactions by Violations**

	<b>Firearm</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Drug</b>	<b>Alcohol</b>	<b>Fight</b>	<b>Insubordination</b>
<b>Violation Density</b>	S, D					D
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>						
40-60% Minority		S, T	T		E, S	
60-80% Minority	T, D		E	T	E, S, T	
80+% Minority	T, D		T	T		
<b>Poverty</b>						
40-60% Free/Reduced Lunch						
60-80% Free/Reduced Lunch					E	T
80+% Free/Reduced Lunch					S, T	T
<b>School Level</b>						
Middle School	S, T	E, S, T	D		E, S, T	E, S, T
High School	E, S, T	E, S, T	D		E, S, T	E, S, T
Mixed Grades School		S, T	D		S	S
<b>School Characteristics</b>						
Crime in the Community		S, T, D	D		S	
School Size	T, D	S, T	D		S, T	E, T
Pupil/Teacher Ratio			D	S	E, S	
Percent Special Ed						
Percent Male		E, T		S	E, S	
Choice School			E	S		
Rural			T			
Classroom Changes		D		S		
Special Transfer Facility		T	T	T	T	T
Parent Involvement		E				
Civic Involvement	T, D					
Check-in Procedures			E			
Control Access		E		T		
Counseling/Therapy	E					

Note: E=expulsion; S=suspension; T=transfer; D=detention; (NP=no punishment, is not shown).

## APPENDIX 1

### Pearson Correlation of all Variables Used in the Study

	Density of Firearms	Density of Weapons	Density of Drugs	Density of Alcohol	Density of Fights	Density of Insubordination
Density of Firearms	1.000					
Density of Weapons	0.428	1.000				
Density of Drugs	-0.003	0.104	1.000			
Density of Alcohol	-0.008	0.042	0.292	1.000		
Density of Fights	0.039	0.156	0.125	-0.008	1.000	
Density of Insubordination	0.017	0.152	0.146	0.114	0.291	1.000
Race	0.053	0.068	-0.002	-0.069	0.154	0.078
Lunch	0.037	0.092	-0.042	-0.091	0.187	0.103
Crime in the Community	0.019	0.089	0.040	-0.004	0.176	0.087
School Size	-0.029	0.002	0.208	0.161	-0.101	0.040
Pupil/Teacher Ratio	-0.032	-0.038	0.105	0.065	-0.020	-0.017
Percent Special Ed	-0.027	0.053	0.037	-0.018	0.076	0.069
Percent Male	-0.092	-0.042	-0.001	-0.021	0.041	0.022
Choice School	0.004	-0.001	0.030	-0.041	0.051	-0.007
Rural	0.016	0.010	0.002	0.025	-0.019	-0.013
Classroom Changes	-0.016	0.056	0.086	0.093	0.041	0.119
Special Transfer Facility	-0.030	0.027	0.101	0.036	0.074	0.094
Parent Involvement	-0.017	0.005	-0.027	0.010	-0.041	-0.075
Civic Involvement	-0.014	-0.016	0.048	0.045	-0.026	0.013
Check-in Procedures	0.009	0.024	-0.025	0.023	0.010	0.006
Control Access	-0.047	-0.040	-0.013	-0.031	0.019	-0.038
Preventive Training	-0.070	-0.035	-0.054	-0.073	0.043	-0.002
Behavior Modification	-0.077	-0.013	-0.011	-0.041	0.041	0.055
Counseling/Therapy	-0.060	-0.030	0.016	-0.041	0.049	0.023
Mentoring	-0.042	-0.018	0.032	-0.030	0.040	0.014
Student Involvement	-0.019	0.011	0.054	0.011	0.026	-0.010
Community Programs	-0.014	0.006	0.008	0.016	0.029	-0.012
Hotline	0.001	-0.011	0.112	0.063	-0.023	0.043
Safety Training	-0.042	0.003	0.024	0.020	-0.005	0.025
Violence Training	-0.016	-0.008	0.034	0.015	0.010	-0.011

	Race	Lunch	Crime in the Community	School Size	Pupil/Teacher Ratio	Percent SPED	Percent Male
Race	1.000						
Lunch	0.561	1.000					
Crime in the Community	0.503	0.389	1.000				
School Size	0.066	-0.167	0.036	1.000			
Pupil/Teacher Ratio	0.010	-0.037	0.020	0.347	1.000		
Percent Special Ed	0.027	0.074	0.076	-0.069	-0.144	1.000	
Percent Male	-0.031	-0.036	-0.022	0.038	0.027	0.011	1.000
Choice School	0.182	0.100	0.122	0.014	0.068	0.003	-0.005
Rural	-0.230	-0.056	0.014	-0.225	-0.162	0.009	-0.005
Classroom Changes	-0.156	-0.128	-0.081	0.096	-0.078	0.055	0.012
Special Transfer Facility	0.001	-0.012	0.034	0.226	0.049	0.013	0.034
Parent Involvement	-0.046	-0.104	-0.040	0.104	0.087	-0.054	0.006
Civic Involvement	-0.026	-0.038	0.002	0.082	0.005	0.006	-0.015
Checkin Procedures	0.007	-0.018	0.028	0.040	0.076	-0.015	0.025
Control Access	0.207	0.100	0.140	0.102	0.118	0.040	-0.001
Preventive Training	0.039	0.015	0.055	-0.045	-0.011	0.010	-0.015
Behavior Modification	0.046	0.010	0.039	0.019	0.003	0.042	0.003
Counseling/Therapy	0.045	-0.009	0.045	0.043	0.031	0.025	0.002
Mentoring	0.030	-0.034	0.014	0.069	0.036	0.008	0.034
Student Involvement	0.084	-0.026	0.081	0.114	0.003	0.046	-0.003
Community Programs	0.033	-0.009	0.030	0.089	0.037	0.031	-0.058
Hotline	-0.009	-0.000	0.015	0.250	0.077	0.028	-0.016
Safety Training	0.025	-0.014	0.009	0.063	0.042	-0.041	-0.047
Violence Training	0.051	0.002	0.041	0.066	-0.001	0.027	-0.049

**APPENDIX 1 continued**  
**Pearson Correlation of all Variables Used in the Study**

	<u>Choice School</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Classroom Changes</u>	<u>Transfer Facility</u>	<u>Parent Involvement</u>	<u>Civic Involvement</u>
Choice School	1.000					
Rural	-0.082	1.000				
Classroom Changes	-0.053	0.040	1.000			
Special Transfer Facility	-0.054	-0.053	0.124	1.000		
Parent Involvement	-0.023	-0.088	-0.052	0.020	1.000	
Civic Involvement	-0.019	-0.051	0.025	0.041	0.259	1.000
Checkin Procedures	-0.063	-0.064	0.026	0.059	0.057	0.030
Control Access	0.057	-0.121	-0.080	-0.007	0.068	0.046
Preventive Training	-0.032	-0.060	-0.069	-0.018	0.130	0.132
Behavior Modification	-0.024	-0.093	-0.012	0.009	0.109	0.114
Counseling/Therapy	-0.014	-0.062	0.053	0.050	0.072	0.097
Mentoring	0.017	-0.052	-0.035	0.053	0.112	0.107
Student Involvement	0.031	-0.097	0.003	0.037	0.137	0.161
Community Programs	0.029	-0.013	-0.067	0.054	0.166	0.185
Hotline	-0.017	-0.057	0.046	0.094	0.083	0.115
Safety Training	0.013	-0.040	-0.037	-0.017	0.150	0.099
Violence Training	0.049	-0.026	-0.002	0.022	0.100	0.184

	<u>Checkin Procedures</u>	<u>Control Access</u>	<u>Preventive Training</u>	<u>Behavior Modification</u>	<u>Counseling/Therapy</u>	<u>Mentoring</u>
Checkin Procedures	1.000					
Control Access	0.099	1.000				
Preventive Training	0.041	0.133	1.000			
Behavior Modification	0.083	0.122	0.429	1.000		
Counseling/Therapy	0.038	0.123	0.248	0.350	1.000	
Mentoring	0.024	0.088	0.203	0.300	0.338	1.000
Student Involvement	0.028	0.134	0.186	0.186	0.156	0.178
Community Programs	0.029	0.119	0.267	0.222	0.184	0.202
Hotline	0.027	0.057	0.050	0.055	0.050	0.068
Safety Training	0.036	0.034	0.122	0.117	0.102	0.139
Violence Training	0.023	0.094	0.163	0.136	0.105	0.120

	<u>Student Involvement</u>	<u>Community Programs</u>	<u>Hotline</u>	<u>Safety Training</u>	<u>Violence Training</u>
Student Involvement	1.000				
Community Programs	0.214	1.000			
Hotline	0.125	0.118	1.000		
Safety Training	0.094	0.119	0.051	1.000	
Violence Training	0.159	0.155	0.116	0.206	1.000