Local Law Enforcement Implementation of National Anti-terrorism Policy

By:

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Abstract:

This study examines the role of local law enforcement officers in the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy within the context of Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy. Interview and survey responses are used to analyze the research question, how does local law enforcement implement this national security policy? The researcher finds that police officers provide valuable intelligence to this effort but that these officers are being underutilized.
Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction 1 – 4
Chapter 2: Background 5 – 12
Chapter 3: Theory 13 – 21
Chapter 4: Research Design 22 – 30
Chapter 5: Results and Analysis 31 – 57
Chapter 6: Conclusion 58 – 65

Figures 66 – 72
Figure 2-1 66
Figures 5-1 – 5-6 67 – 72

Tables 73 – 83
Table 2-1 73
Tables 4-1 – 4-2 74 – 75
Tables 5-1 – 5-12 76 – 83

Appendices 84 – 98
Appendix A 84
Appendix B 85 – 90
Appendix C 91 – 97
Appendix D 98

References 99 – 105
Chapter 1: Introduction

“On Tuesday, our country was attacked with deliberate and massive cruelty. We have seen the images of fire and ashes and bent steel. ... I can hear you. I can hear you, and the rest of the world hears you, and the people – and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.” – President Bush, 14 September 2001

(www.PBS.org)

“Let us renew our resolve against those who perpetrated this barbaric act and who plot against us still. In defense of our nation, we will never waver. In pursuit of al Qaeda and its extremist allies, we will never falter.” – President Obama, 11 September 2009

(www.CBSNews.com)

The events of September 11, 2001, are indelibly burned in the collective psyche of the people of the United States. For most citizens, that day is one that parallels the “do you know where you were when” sentiment of the Kennedy assassination and the moon landing. Fear, anger, empathy, and sadness are just a few of the emotions felt by many who witnessed those tragic events live on television. And the repercussions of those events continue to reverberate today.

Terrorism has always been a concern of the American public and government, but never as pronounced as the days following the events in New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. President Bush signed a $40 billion antiterrorism appropriations bill into law on September 14, 2001, with $5.8 billion designated for homeland security. May, 2002, saw the passage of a sweeping border security bill that increased the capabilities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as well as changed visa and passport protocols. Potential
targets such as airports and government installations increased security and other threats like bioterrorism received additional funding. The government responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with aggressive legislation resulting in immediate changes in how the United States approached the problem of terrorism both abroad and, as these examples illustrate, domestically (www.cqpress.com).

The Kansas City region has not yet been attacked by any known terrorist individual or organization. However, there have been terrorism investigations in the area in recent years. There were at least two such investigations in 2010. The first was reported in May, 2010, and was an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) case resulting in the arrest of a Kansas City man who plead guilty to providing material support to Al Qaeda (www.ice.gov). The other investigation was conducted by the FBI in Kansas City and resulted in the arrest of a former congressman from Virginia who had been raising funds for terrorist organizations through the Missouri Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) (kansascity.fbi.gov). These cases are not as significant as the events of September 11, 2001, and did not result in legal changes, but they do indicate that terrorism activities are not limited to the East coast.

Congress, through the power of the purse, was not the only governmental entity to be involved in making changes in how the United States fights domestic terrorism. The executive branch also made some important changes. The most significant change was probably the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was created in 2003 and assumed organizational control of more than twenty different agencies ranging from the INS to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Ostensibly, the purpose of this realignment was to provide a
more effective organization focused on protecting the American public from a variety of potential threats, including terrorism (www.dhs.gov).

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has also revamped their terrorism efforts. The number one priority of the FBI is now terrorism: if there is a terrorist event, all necessary resources will be diverted from other operations to aid counterterrorism efforts. Joint terrorism task forces (JTTF’s) have been created, staffed, and utilized in cities and regions around the country with the intention of improving response time and effectiveness as well as improving communications with other law enforcement organizations already on the ground when a terrorist event occurs. JTTF’s are lead by the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) but local police departments contribute with manpower and intelligence to these entities (www.fbi.gov).

Herein lie the critical link to local law enforcement. Stealing a phrase from military lexicon, the “boots on the ground” are those persons who are the first to respond to any terrorist event. These “boots” may be line officers from the Lawrence, Kansas, police department or a task force in Overland Park, Kansas. Regardless of the location of the specific department, local law enforcement is usually best poised to interpret situations and take the first steps in either responding to, or, ideally, preventing, a terrorist event. They are responsible for initial intervention, collection of intelligence, and collaboration with other state or federal law enforcement entities. Their role is seldom well known as the FBI or other national agencies generally receive the credit, or blame, but their importance cannot go unrecognized. For better or worse, the United States’ first line of defense against terrorism is the local law enforcement officer.
This study analyzes local law enforcement’s implementation of national anti-terrorism policy. Recognizing the perspectives of this first line of defense is crucial to understanding their role in anti-terrorism efforts. These perspectives also provide national law enforcement officials and policy makers with information regarding how to better implement their anti-terrorism policies at this local level. Understanding the perspective of the “boots on the ground” will allow the generals in Washington, D.C., to better execute the “War on Terror.”

These local level perspectives will be illuminated through the use of interviews and surveys of police officers from a variety of departments throughout the greater Kansas City, Missouri, region as well as other “benchmark” cities around the country. Nineteen officers were interviewed and over 400 surveys completed providing a substantially large data set for analysis. This data will be analyzed thus providing the desired insight into the role and function of local law enforcement in the national anti-terrorism effort.

The next chapter will discuss in greater detail the terrorism threat to the United States, specifically highlighting the federal government’s responses to this threat, as well as of the role of local law enforcement as part of this response. Chapter three will consider the theoretical implications of this study with particular emphasis on Michael Lipsky’s theory of “street-level bureaucracy.” Subsequent chapters will explain the methodology used for this study and the specific analytical techniques used to arrive at the reported results and conclusions. Finally, implications for theory, policy development, and implementation will be discussed.
Chapter 2: Background

Local law enforcement departments have a significant and meaningful role to play in the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Smith et al 2001; Rubin 2004; Docobo 2005; Bellavita 2005; Clovis 2006; Caruson and MacManus 2007; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; Eack 2008; Morreale and Lambert 2009; Atkinson and Wein 2010; Jones and Supinski 2010). However, there is debate regarding the specific role local police departments do and should play in this effort. This chapter will focus on illuminating the different ways local law enforcement officers are viewed with regard to preventing terrorism.

The first task, then, is to define terrorism. Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism, in part, as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Domestic terrorism, the primary subject of this paper, is defined as “activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” according to title 18 of the United States Code. These definitions, created by Congress, are only as meaningful as the interpretations and applications of those words by the officials charged with fighting terrorism within the United States.

The role of local police officers in combating terrorism is only significant, however, if terrorism is actually a threat worthy of fighting. The Oklahoma City federal building bombing and the first attack on the World Trade Center buildings in the early 1990’s are examples of this threat and also illustrate that this is not a new phenomenon (Rubin 2004). These two major terrorist events were not as galvanizing as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., and New York City. Currently, there is still the perception of a threat within the United States (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Hoffman 2002; Bergen
and Hoffman 2010). In 2009, 43 Americans, associated with militant Sunni groups, were charged or convicted of participating in terrorist activities (Bergen and Hoffman 2010). International terrorist organizations, specifically al Qaeda, have also increased their efforts to recruit and utilize American citizens as active participants in terrorist plots or as members of their support network responsible for fundraising and providing other services and supplies as needed for their jihad (Bergen and Hoffman 2010). Building off the formal definitions described above, terrorism can be generalized to be an instrumental attempt by an individual or group to inflict both physical and psychological harm to the intended target country or group of people (Hoffman 2002).

Nineteen officers were interviewed for this study and all of them had slightly different definitions of terrorism. One subject gave what could be considered a general, even generic, definition, stating that “terrorism is the act of creating fear within a society in order to accomplish some type of goal that an individual or a group may have.” Another officer defined terrorism within a specifically United States context:

“Terrorism is any overt act, any planning of an overt act, that would be specifically targeted against U.S. citizens or the government, to either destroy, kill, maim, or change policy.”

Yet other subjects took an even more hard-line perspective, such as one officer who believes that terrorism is “an act of war.” But one officer succinctly described the formidable task of defining terrorism, saying, “Defining terrorism is difficult. You have to realize that one man’s terrorist is another man’s patriot.” As these definitions and explanations illustrate, there is no consensus on a precise definition of terrorism. However, there are some common themes worth mentioning: (1) there is at least the threat of violence; (2) there is generally some type of ideology prompting the decision to take violent action; and (3) there is some specific goal of influencing the government or, at least, society in some manner. For the purposes of this study, when referencing terrorism, it is this loose definition that
is being utilized for this study as it conforms most closely to those provided by the officers themselves while still maintaining key elements of more formalized definitions described earlier.

The next important task is to define anti-terrorism policy. Domestic terrorism will be the focus of this study since that is the only type of terrorism that local law enforcement can realistically help prevent. Additionally, anti-terrorism is understood to be terrorism prevention while counter-terrorism is will be treated as responses to an actual act of terrorism. What, then, is anti-terrorism policy? One way to define anti-terrorism would be to choose a particular federal policy, such as the Patriot Act, or set of guidelines or regulations, such as the priorities of the FBI. Considering the relative uniqueness of this study, such a definition is too specific. Instead, all anti-terrorism policy, regardless of the type or nature of said policy, will be regarded appropriate. This definition of anti-terrorism policy may be confusing to participants in this study. The interviews indicated that this concern may be accurate, however, after explanation, all interview subjects had no difficulty answering the questions posed. The impact of this definition on the surveys may be more profound, and unknown to the researcher, but as the results chapter will demonstrate, the similarities between interview and survey responses indicates there is less of a problem in this regard then may have been predicted.

Numerous agencies are involved in the national anti-terrorism effort, but a few are more directly responsible for carrying out this mission. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are both directly involved in this effort. Figure 2-1 provides a general flow chart that illustrates some of the responsibilities carried out by these two agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is the primary terrorism-fighting agency within the DOJ. The FBI has always been responsible for protecting the United States, domestically, from terrorist threats. However, this national security imperative has not always been the top priority for the FBI. A look at the change in the FBI’s appropriations between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2004 illustrates how the priority of the FBI was altered following the events of September 11, 2001: In FY 2001, 49% of FBI appropriations were
designated to criminal investigations while 32% of the appropriations were designated to national security (defined, per the FBI, as counterterrorism and counterintelligence). By FY 2004, a dramatic change occurred in these appropriations with 34% designated to criminal investigations and 40% to national security efforts (The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, 2004, page 10). In addition, the FBI website states that the current top priority for the FBI is to “Protect the United States from terrorist attack” with the second priority, indirectly related to the first, to “Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage” (www.fbi.gov, Quick Facts).

The federal government of the United States also created the DHS following the events of September 11, 2001, and part of this department’s responsibility is to protect the United States from terrorism, as well as other threats. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Secret Service are examples of agencies falling under the umbrella of DHS that have, as part of their focus, the imperative to assist with anti-terrorism efforts (see Figure 2-1). The TSA provides airport security, ICE assists with handling foreign nationals in the United States illegally, and the Secret Service investigates financial crimes, many of which are tied to terrorism activities.1

Local law enforcement has been viewed as being both a responsive entity and as a preventive force (National Preparedness Guidelines 2007). Local police departments are widely recognized as being part of the first responders to a terrorist incident (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Rubin 2004; Caruson and MacManus 2007; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009; Morreale and Lambert 2009). These local agencies are frequently tasked with target hardening and response activities. Target hardening essentially is making potential targets more difficult to attack through the implementation of appropriate security measures. Response activities take place after an attack has occurred and include, but are not limited to, the following actions: (1) securing the scene to

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1 See the TSA, ICE, Secret Service, and DHS websites for more details.
keep non-emergency personnel from entering; (2) rescue of injured persons; and (3) neutralization efforts intended to apprehend the perpetrators or to limit additional damage. Target hardening and response are being considered similar because they both involve reacting to a specific risk resulting in strategic, reactionary actions (Rubin 2004; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009). New York police officers, for example, on September 11, 2001, were some of the first responders to the World Trade Center. This role by local law enforcement officials and departments necessitates recognition of potential targets, strengthening defenses against attack against these targets, and developing contingency plans in the event of a terrorist attack on these targets or any other entities within their jurisdiction (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Rubin 2004; Caruson and MacManus 2007; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009; Morreale and Lambert 2009).

Additionally, law enforcement is called on to cooperate and collaborate with other jurisdictions (to include relevant federal, state, regional, and local agencies). Such interactions are a necessary condition for rapid response to a terrorist event (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Caruson and MacManus 2007; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009). Responding to terrorist incidents and hardening potential targets is a reactionary function local police departments do need to actively participate in for local, state, and federal agencies to effectively deal with terrorist events.

The media and public frequently focus on this reactionary function of local law enforcement. However, little attention has been given to the preventive role of these officers. Essentially, prevention of terrorism is conceptually defined as engaging suspects prior to an actual act of terrorism (Donohue and Kayyem 2002; Bellavita 2005; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and Cannon 2007; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Atkinson and Wein 2010; Jones and Supinski 2010). There are a number of ways this can be accomplished. Police officers, through investigations of other crimes, may bring to light terrorism plots. For example, terrorists have a need to fund or supply their missions and often engage in other
crimes (such as robbery) that are tangentially related to their larger goals (Smith et al. 2001; Donohue and Kayyem 2002; Docobo 2005; Atkinson and Wein 2010). Police officers also can contribute intelligence to a broader anti-terrorism information network, sometimes simply by reporting suspicious, but not necessarily illegal, activity (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Eack 2008; Jones and Supinski 2010). Collaboration with federal agencies on specific investigations is another way local law enforcement officers can help prevent terrorism (Docobo 2005; Clovis 2006; *National Preparedness Guidelines* 2007; Eack 2008; Atkinson and Wein 2010; Jones and Supinski 2010).

Through investigation, intelligence gathering, and collaboration, local law enforcement is, or can be, significantly involved in national efforts to prevent terrorism events.

Figure 2-1 illustrates how local law enforcement fits into this national anti-terrorism effort. As this flow chart demonstrates and as was explained briefly above, local law enforcement is an integral part of national anti-terrorism policy implementation. Police officers are the “front lines of the war against terror” and, as such, have a prominent place in this nationwide effort (Jones and Supinski 2010). They fulfill this role by working closely with numerous federal agencies. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the U.S. Attorney’s office, ICE and the Secret Service are examples of federal agencies that occasionally collaborate with local law enforcement departments. These collaborations are relatively infrequent but police officers do have more contact with other federal agencies.

Local police departments actively participate in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF’s), Fusion Centers (also known as Terrorism Event Watch [TEW] centers), and Community Oriented Policing (COP). JTTF’s are cooperative organizations bringing together local, state, and federal agencies to investigate suspected terrorist activities. These task forces are headed by an FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and are comprised of executive boards and other committees that include state officials as well as officers from area and regional law enforcement departments. JTTF’s are central locations for collecting information and acting on terrorism-related leads. Information is also provided to local departments
about current terrorist threats and related officer safety concerns. JTTF’s are poised to respond directly to terrorism events in a timely manner anywhere within the JTTF’s jurisdiction. There are over 100 JTTF’s nationwide with at least one located in every state (information found on the FBI website).

Fusion centers, by comparison, are solely intended to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. These intelligence centers, while sponsored and funded by DHS, are decentralized. Local and regional law enforcement officials provide manpower for these centers with very little direct input from DHS or any other federal agency. DHS funds these centers but they are otherwise operated by local and regional personnel. They are horizontal in nature, meaning that intelligence is collected at any Fusion Center, analyzed, and then made available to any other center. Any agency can provide information to fusion centers, or alternately they can retrieve intelligence. A piece of intelligence discovered in Kansas City, for example, may be utilized for an ongoing terrorism investigation in New York City. Fusion centers do not directly engage in investigations; rather, they function as an intelligence repository and make this intelligence available to agencies that do investigative work. Currently, only a handful of Fusion Centers exist, but the long-term goal is to increase the number of these centers in the coming years (Eack 2008; DHS website).

COP efforts are less directly tied to anti-terrorism efforts. Instead, Community Oriented Policing is geared towards increasing the presence of police officers in local communities and developing stronger relationships with these neighborhoods (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and Connon 2007; Jones and Supinski 2010). Although these relationships may not always have anti-terrorism implications, they provide the foundation for closer ties between local communities and police officers. The stronger this relationship, the more likely that suspicious terrorist activity will be noticed and, more importantly, reported to the police. This potential of increased reporting by citizens increases the “eyes and ears” capabilities of local law enforcement thereby improving the overall anti-terrorism
effort (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and Cannon 2007; Jones and Supinski 2010; DOJ website).²

Local law enforcement clearly has a role to play within the national anti-terrorism effort. Therefore, it is useful to consider the perspectives of these officers when considering the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Their beliefs about terrorism, the federal government’s policy, as well as their role in this effort all impact the execution of this policy. Ignoring their opinions is unwise and thus this study will examine in detail these perspectives.

Terrorism, while difficult to define, is considered a serious ongoing threat to the United States. Federal agencies have been charged with gathering intelligence and investigating suspected terrorists and these efforts require the assistance of local law enforcement departments. This study, therefore, provides an important contribution to this literature in that it looks at local level involvement from the perspective of line and command officers. The next chapter will discuss the theory being employed in this study thereby providing the final foundational piece needed for analyzing the role of local law enforcement as implementer of national anti-terrorism policy.

² The COP program is not directly considered in this study; rather this program is examined in terms of the relationship between the police and local citizens, as elicited in the interviews, and in terms of the “front line” role of local law enforcement officers.
Chapter 3: Theory

Understanding bureaucratic institutions, including police departments, and their behavior is the topic of much theoretical discussion. A fundamental concern within this literature centers on how politically elected officials ensure that non-elected personnel implement their policy decisions. This is the familiar principal-agent conundrum: how do principals, elected officials in this example, get the agents, non-elected employees, to carry out the mandates called for by policy (Shepsle and Bonchek 1973; Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005). This implies that bureaucratic institutions have discretion to make decisions regarding the implementation of policy. Often this is analyzed from an institutional perspective where an entire bureaucratic agency is examined and trends regarding compliance with policy are considered (Shepsle and Bonchek 1973; Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005). Information asymmetry is a primary assumption of this theory which assumes that the bureaucrat has information or knowledge that the policy decision maker does not possess (Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005).

John E. Chubb, in 1985, examined the relationship between principles and agents with regards to the awarding and distribution of grant monies. Two key findings from Chubb’s study are particularly relevant to this discussion. The first conclusion is that there are often multiple principles, such as Congress and the President, and the second is that there are frequently different goals between principles and agents resulting in distribution of grant money that is not necessarily congruent with the original intent (Chubb 1985). Sean Nicholson-Crotty (2004) concluded that goal conflict between federal principles and state agents is central to understanding the effectiveness of Medicaid and antinarcotics funding. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) built on Chubb’s work by stating that analyzing separate parts of the principle-agent structure is not as useful as considering the entire process. This approach contends that to fully understand the dynamics of the principle-agent relationship it is imperative that the researcher analyze the problem from both perspectives (Nicholson-Crotty 2004). This relationship of information asymmetry, goal incongruence, and multiple principles is not necessarily static. Rather, these
characteristics of principle-agent interaction are dynamic and subject to change over time (Waterman and Meier 1998). The principles may change, learning may take place, and ultimately goals may change resulting in a relationship that evolves over time (Waterman and Meier 1998).

This discussion of the principle-agent theory provides an explanation to the fundamental question underlying this area of study: how do principles hold agents accountable? Michael Lipsky (1980) provides more specific analysis of this explanation by closely analyzing the agents in this relationship. Lipsky (1980), in his seminal work, examines the distribution of goods, services, and regulations by “street-level bureaucrats”. These bureaucrats may be teachers, health care workers, social security employees, building inspectors, and even police officers all responsible for providing the public with specific resources ranging from education to financial assistance (Lipsky 1980). Regardless of the policy, “street-level bureaucrats” are tasked with its implementation and these individuals are the subject of Lipsky’s (1980) book.

The underlying theme of Lipsky’s (1980) book is based on the concept of goal incongruence from the principle-agent theory. Lipsky (1980) described this incongruence in terms of street-level discretion. Fundamentally, street-level bureaucrats often have different motivations and incentives than managers and other principles (Lipsky 1980; Moore 1990; Gianakis 1994; Clark-Daniels and Daniels 1995; Daniels et al 1999; Anagnostopoulos 2003; Walker and Gilson 2003; May and Wood 2003; Keiser et al. 2004; Evans and Harris 2004; Bergen and While 2005; Dickson-Gomez 2007; Hupe and Hill 2007; Goldstein 2008; Proudfoot and McCann 2008; Satterlund et al. 2009). For example, a manager may want a bureaucrat to be fiscally responsible while the agent may be more interested in providing her clients with as much benefit as possible. Presumably, the principle’s primary motivation is to have an effectively implemented policy. Street-level bureaucrats, on the other hand, may be motivated by job security, satisfaction, or other factors independent of actual implementation outcomes (Lipsky 1980).
The ability of agents to exercise this discretion is due to their relative autonomy in the execution of their respective jobs (Lipsky 1980). Street-level bureaucrats frequently are left to implement policy independent of direct oversight from management (Lipsky 1980). Teachers, for example, are given conditions they are expected to satisfy yet are typically isolated from management while providing services for their clients (the students in this case). This autonomy allows the street-level bureaucrat to act based on their own motivations and incentives.

Policy ambiguity is another circumstance that allows for street-level discretion regarding implementation (Lipsky 1980). This ambiguity can be a symptom of a policy being overly specific so as to be contradictory or being too general and vague (Lipsky 1980). Decisions made within this context require the street-level bureaucrat to act based on her own interpretation of the policy which again allows for discretion (Lipsky 1980; Lynxwiler 1983; Worden 1989; Satterlund et al. 1994; Daniels et al. 1999; Hill 2003; Evans and Harris 2004; Bergen and While 2005). Veteran’s Affairs employees responsible for allocating educational benefits often are faced with choosing between several different legal mandates when making their decisions. The complexity of the policies, and the confusion this complexity can cause, allows the street-level bureaucrat to apply the policy options he prefers irrespective of the bureaucracy’s preferences.

Information asymmetry can also add to policy ambiguity and confusion. The agents may have information that the principles lack or vice versa (Lipsky 1980; Winter 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). Lacking accurate and timely information can change how a policy is implemented since street-level bureaucrats can only act based on the information they have available (Lipsky 1980).

Finally, street-level bureaucrats are often responsible to multiple principles (Lipsky 1980). Political elites in Congress or a state legislature represents one possible principle, bureaucratic leadership represents yet another principle, and direct management represents still a third principle to any one agent (Lipsky 1980). Additionally, street-level bureaucrats also find themselves responsible to
still another principle: their clients (Lipsky 1980). Street-level bureaucrats, depending on the nature of their job, must please the principles previously mentioned as well as satisfy their clients (Lipsky 1980). Police officers must always be cognizant of the citizens they serve when they make decisions. Sometimes, these concerns may actually outweigh those of their supervisors since they may interact with the community more than with the commanding officers.

Lipsky’s (1980) work clearly augments other principle-agent studies. The key elements of these other theories are present in Lipsky’s (1980) book. But, Lipsky (1980) has applied these concepts to the street-level bureaucrat in an attempt to explain why implementation of policy is not always congruent with the stated goals.

This theory has been applied to numerous situations where street-level bureaucrats are charged with implementing policy. Four general classifications of relevant professions are most prevalent for the purposes of this study: education, regulation, health and social work, and policing. Previous research in each of these professions utilizing the street-level bureaucracy framework will help to clarify the theory and provide guidance for this specific study of the implementation of national security policy by local law enforcement.

Policy is created by the federal government, the state government, as well as the local government with the expectation that street-level bureaucrats will carry out this policy (Meier 1984; Anagnostopoulos 2003; Silin and Schwartz 2003; Goldstein 2008). Whether trying to implement a federal mandate like “No Child Left Behind” (Goldstein 2008) or a school district policy (Anagnostopoulos 2003), teachers must first interpret the policy expectations and then decide how to enact these requirements within their classroom. Teachers are, in a practical sense, free to make decisions regarding this implementation in a manner consistent with their personal preferences (Meier 1984; Anagnostopoulos 2003; Silin and Schwartz 2003; Goldstein 2008). This discretion is constituent with the expectations of Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucratic behavior (Lipsky 1980).
Regulators are another class of bureaucrat where this theory has been applied. Industry regulators (Lynxwiler et al. 1983), environmental regulators (Fineman 2000) and housing inspectors (May and Wood 2003) are examples of this theoretical application. As would be expected, these bureaucrats have considerable discretion in the execution of their duties (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 2000; May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). Intuitively, these jobs appear to be fertile ground for street-level discretion and the literature shows this to be true (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 2000; May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). These bureaucrats interact with citizens directly, in many cases, and how they choose to assess penalties for violations or assist those citizens will have a direct impact on how communities develop over time (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 2000; May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). This influence based on street-level decision-making has clear policy implications, especially when the actions of these regulators are aggregated to the local, state, and national levels (Proudfoot and McCann 2008).

A third broad area of research employing Lipsky’s theory is the field of health care and other related social work. Welfare policy (Keiser et al. 2004), social security disability policy (Keiser 2001), and nursing (Walker and Gilson 2003; Bergen and While 2005) are all instances where the theory of street-level bureaucracy has been applied. As would be expected, these bureaucrats are all expected to carry out specific policies yet they have considerable autonomy and discretion regarding how to implement these policies (Moore 1990; Clark-Daniels and Daniels 1995; Keiser 2001; Walker and Gilson 2003; Evans and Harris 2004; Keiser et al. 2004; Bergen and While 2005; Dickson-Gomez et al. 2007). The opinions, values, and beliefs of these individual bureaucrats will have a direct impact on how they interpret and implement policies and there is little actual accountability that supervisors can have given the autonomy of these professionals (Moore 1990; Walker and Gilson 2003; Evans and Harris 2004; Keiser et al. 2004; Bergen and While 2005).
Studies have also analyzed police officer behavior and decision-making from the Lipsky perspective. Some of these research inquiries have focused on the decision making process used by police officers when deciding how to handle violators of the law (Worden 1989; Donahue 1992; Meehan 1993; Novak et al.; Wilkins and Williams 2009). Another strand of research has investigated the means by which police officers can be held accountable to supervisors and the community (Brehm and Gates 1993; Gianakis 1994; Daniels et al. 1999; Cheung 2005). A third dominant theme considers race in terms of profiling as well as representation within the profession itself (Seron et al. 2004; Wilkins and Williams 2009). Studies within this field provide supportive evidence of the expectation that increased rules may actually lead to more discretion (Daniels et al. 1999) and that there are differences between supervisors and patrol officers in their perception of what their respective job’s entail (Gianakis 1994). Yet, there has been very little analysis of how these street-level bureaucrats implement federal policies.

This discussion of the principle-agent theory, Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory, and the applications of Lipsky’s theory lead to several theoretical expectations. First, the goals of street-level bureaucrats may differ from those of their supervisors. Second, principles and agents may not have knowledge of the same information. Third, there may be more than one principle overseeing the implementation of policy. Fourth, street-level bureaucrats have discretion in making decisions regarding the implementation of policy. Finally, the implementation of policy may ultimately be different than what was originally intended.

Lipsky’s theory suggests that national anti-terrorism policy will only be as effective as those charged with its implementation. The previous chapter demonstrated the role local level law enforcement has to play in this effort thus suggesting that this national security policy depends on these specific street-level bureaucrats for successful policy implementation. As a result, local-level law enforcement officials are a necessary piece of this policy and are an equally necessary unit of analysis if understanding of anti-terrorism policy is to be complete.
Federal anti-terrorism policy filters down to line officers through agencies like the FBI and DHS, through state agencies, and then through the hierarchy within their own department. Regardless of the mandates within these policies, these local officers may have different goals and, given their discretionary capabilities, they may choose to act on their own goals rather than those of their superiors. According to one officer interviewed for this study, “police officers of law enforcement agencies ... don’t necessarily wake up every morning saying, ‘How am I going to prevent terrorism today in my jurisdiction.’ That’s not where their daily activities take them.” Regardless of federal mandates regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation, officers may have different goals that involve carrying out other duties, as implied by the above quote.

Information asymmetry is particularly relevant to this research. National security classifications often limit the amount of information and feedback given to local police departments, particularly line officers. An officer commenting on the survey used for this study stated that “policy is not as much the problem as is the lack of information sharing by the federal government.” This lack of information sharing can strain the principle-agent relationship while also perhaps discouraging implementation in accordance with federal mandates.

Police officers have many principles attempting to hold them accountable. Supervisors within their department are one level of principles. Local politicians are yet another. Federally, there are FBI, DHS, and even ICE officials to whom line officers must answer, specifically with regards to anti-terrorism policy implementation. These different principles may, or may not, share similar policy goals therefore creating a climate of ambiguity and confusion allowing for even greater levels of discretion by the officers as they must choose which goals to represent.

The previous paragraphs indicate some of the opportunities for police officers to act based on their own goals or interests. This discretion is utilized by police officers daily, irrespective of the policy being implemented. Whether a traffic stop where the officer decides to give a warning instead of a
ticket or an investigation of a suspected terrorist, officers have ample opportunity to make decisions based on their interpretations of policy or based solely on their own goals.

Information asymmetry, goal incongruence, multiple principles, and officer discretion can lead to implementation of policy that may differ from the original intent. Regardless of what the FBI desires of local law enforcement, for example, individual police officers have the discretion to act in a manner inconsistent with those FBI goals. The reasons for this implementation deviation may differ from officer to officer, but the end result is similar: implementation that may not conform to the mission of the federal government.

This application of Lipsky’s theory to local law enforcement officials prompts several specific questions that require an answer. How is national security anti-terrorism policy implemented by local law enforcement? This question serves as the overarching research question for this study. Based on the previous discussion regarding the importance of local-level police officers and departments in this larger anti-terrorism effort, coupled with a greater understanding of how street-level bureaucrats actually implement policy, it is necessary to examine this specific case of street-level bureaucratic implementation of national policy. This question, therefore, is the foundation and backdrop for this investigation.

The research question posed above, however, illicit other, more specific questions regarding the role of local-level law enforcement in the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy. Do local-level law enforcement officials have an understanding of this policy, both nationally and locally? How do local police officials interpret this policy? What role do they see themselves filling in this implementation process?

These questions necessitate the investigation of even more specific inquiries. What is the nature of the relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement? Do local police departments have the resources necessary to implement anti-terrorism policy? Have there been any
consequences of this relatively recent emphasis on anti-terrorism? For example, have the daily tasks of police officers changed? Have job duties and responsibilities changed? Are other crimes now being under-investigated in favor of terrorism-related cases?

Finally, what is the way forward in the minds of local level police officers and anti-terrorism policy? In what ways do these local-level officials feel they can be better utilized? And, from the perspective of these officers, how can anti-terrorism policy be improved?

Answering this litany of questions will serve as a test of Lipsky’s theory and will provide practical information and analysis for officers tasked with preventing terrorism in the United States. Lipsky’s assumption of street-level bureaucratic discretion and the expectations that follow this assumption will be examined through the use of surveys and interviews of numerous police officers from the greater Kansas City, Missouri, area and other similar communities. The analysis, results, and conclusions will also likely provide insight into what is being done well and what may require additional work on the part of local-level law enforcement as well as federal agents responsible for implementing anti-terrorism policy.
Chapter 4: Research Design

This chapter will outline, describe, and detail the process by which the questions posed in Chapter 3 will be answered. Fundamentally, these answers will be found through surveys and interviews. The process of creating the questions for the interviews and the surveys will be explained in detail and the decision making process regarding subject selection for both the surveys and interviews will also be described. The process of conducting the interviews and administering the surveys will also be explained in detail. Finally, basic descriptions of the analyses to be undertaken will be presented but much of this discussion will be saved for Chapter 5.

Interviews:

The original intent of this study was to conduct interviews with police officers from the Lawrence Police Department, the University of Kansas Campus Police, and the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department. The questions to be asked were intended to illicit responses that would illuminate the perspective of these local law enforcement officers regarding national anti-terrorism policy. Below is an explanation for why some of the questions were included and what prompted the specific structuring of these particular questions of interest. A complete list of the planned questions can be seen in Appendix A.

The first few questions are just basic demographic and background questions. The intended purpose for including these questions is that they allow the researcher to better determine comparable relationships between different subjects. For example, gender, age, ideology, position/rank, training, and service time with their current department provide the opportunity to see if patterns emerge among different subjects with regards to their responses to other interview questions. Subjects were asked their names but only for acknowledgement of their willingness to participate in the interview.

Creating a comfortable interview setting was of importance as people are more likely to share if they are at ease. Questions like “Why did you want to become a police officer?” were crafted for this
explicit purpose. Not all subjects were asked this question as a good rapport was already developed prior to the actual interview. Regardless, this question was available to the interviewer to help create an environment conducive to a productive interview experience.

The above mentioned questions, and those like them, do not lend themselves well to eliciting information and opinions about the role of local level law enforcement officers relative to the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Before delving into questions directly related to this issue, other background questions regarding anti-terrorism policy were asked of all subjects. “What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy?”, “How often have you had cause to investigate a suspected terrorist incident?”, and “How much of a threat is terrorism within your community?” are questions designed to accomplish this goal of illuminating local level law enforcement knowledge of anti-terrorism policy. Answers to these questions would help provide a baseline for understanding the current role of local law enforcement officers.

For example, answers to the question “What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy?” would provide information about what the subject knows about anti-terrorism policy. These answers may provide information on the subject’s view of how anti-terrorism efforts are, or should be, implemented at the local level. The variety of potential answers to this one question provide opportunities for learning more about how police officers understand anti-terrorism policy, a necessary prerequisite for fully appreciating, understanding, and analyzing responses to other questions.

Demographic, background, and basic knowledge questions are relatively straight-forward and can be limiting in the scope of possible responses. Questions such as the following were also asked of each subject: “What is terrorism?”, “How do you view your role in the broader anti-terrorism effort nationwide?”, and “How would you change the national anti-terrorism policy?” These questions require the subject to apply their understanding of anti-terrorism policy to their current position as a local police
officer. This synthesis of concepts can result in responses that will be more frank and will reveal their genuine opinions regarding the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy.

The interview questions were submitted to the Human Subjects Committee for the University of Kansas, Lawrence Campus (HSCL) in November of 2010. In addition to the proposed interview questions, a consent form and description of the study were also submitted to the HSCL. This study, to include the consent form and interview questions, was approved by the HSCL on November 23, 2010. This approval validated that protocols for working with human subjects were adhered to and would be implemented by the researcher throughout the interviewing process. The primary protocols of interest for this study involve confidentiality and accuracy. Each subject signed a written consent form and stated their willingness to participate in the interview audibly. All interviews were digitally recorded (audio only) and these recordings are stored in a safe location. Subjects will not be referenced by name in any written product in accordance with the confidentiality agreement. These protocols help ensure accuracy of the information provided and also provide the subjects with the confidence that their responses will never be used to harm them professionally, emotionally, or intellectually. In the event a subject’s response is to be quoted directly, a pseudonym will be used for identifying the subject thus allowing for the publication of their response without compromising their anonymity. A copy of the consent form and other HSCL documentation is available upon request.

Nineteen officers were interviewed for this study. These officers came from different police departments throughout the greater Kansas City, Missouri, area. The police departments include Topeka, Lawrence, Leavenworth, Shawnee, Gladstone, North Kansas City, Overland Park, and Kansas City, Missouri. These departments were selected based on a combination of practical considerations as well as representation of the rural and urban jurisdictions that exist in this region. These departments, however, do provide some representative samples of the greater Kansas City area as well as characteristics shared in other jurisdictions.
Table 4-1 provides some demographic information for each of these communities in addition to similar data for the United States as a whole. This information illustrates that the communities being analyzed for this study, while regionally uniform and not necessarily representative of the entire United States, do have similarities to the United States as a whole. In addition to these basic demographic similarities, the jurisdictions included in this study also encompass a number of other interesting characteristics: the Kansas City metropolitan area is a larger city; Kansas City, Missouri, has what may be considered attractive terrorist targets (professional sports teams, international airport, federal building, etc.); Overland Park, Shawnee, Gladstone, North Kansas City, and Leavenworth would all be considered suburbs of Kansas City, Missouri; Leavenworth has within its city limits the Army installation of Ft. Leavenworth, a Veterans Affairs Hospital, and a Federal Penitentiary; Lawrence, Kansas, is home to the University of Kansas (fall, 2010, enrollment of more than 26,000); and Topeka is the state capital of Kansas. Combined, these communities provide a diverse glimpse at numerous types of communities and these characteristics can be found in cities and states around the country.

The interviews were scheduled typically through a liaison from each department. These liaisons were generally accommodating regarding requests for interviews with street-level and command-level officers. Ultimately, however, the researcher was at the discretion of the department regarding which officers would be made available for interviews. As a result, the interviews may not have been representative of the entire police force. However, officers of varying positions and ranks were interviewed from a diverse cross-section of the greater Kansas City area.

The interviews typically lasted approximately 40 minutes (although they ranged from 30-90 minutes) and were all digitally recorded (audio only) for accuracy. The questions discussed above and listed below served primarily as a guideline for each interview. The demographic and background questions were asked of every subject but other questions were only asked as needed. For example, some questions, such as “What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy?” prompted answers that covered
multiple questions. In these cases, clarification follow-on questions were sometimes asked. In addition, some responses prompted additional inquiry from the interviewer. These additional inquiries resulted from instances where unique questions were prompted by ideas presented by the subject.

Following the interviews, the researcher spent time analyzing the audio tapes. Each interview was reviewed and summarized in a standard form (see Appendix D). These summaries included general themes of the interview, basic demographic and/or background information, and specific quotes of note. The interviews are used to augment the survey data providing nuance and detail not captured by the relatively blunt survey tool. In addition, consistent themes found throughout the summaries are also utilized for more specific consideration throughout this study, especially where the survey data appears to be incomplete or incongruent with expectations. In these cases, interview data was instrumental in filling in the gaps and allowed for a broader understanding of the perspectives of local level law enforcement officers.

Surveys:

As stated above, the original intent of this particular study was to just conduct interviews of police officers from Lawrence, Kansas, Kansas City, Missouri, and the University of Kansas. However, after being approved by the HSCL in November, the researcher found it difficult to make the contacts necessary to conduct these desired interviews. The researcher then determined that to help increase the amount of data available for this study it would be helpful to develop and administer a survey to as many officers in the greater Kansas City area as possible. The survey discussed here was, therefore, originally created simply to increase the amount of available data.

The survey questions, unlike interview questions, were more focused and less open ended. Interview questions can be open ended so as to increase contributions from the subject. Any lack of clarity can be addressed by the researcher during the interview. Surveys, on the other hand, involve the participant individually completing the interview with no opportunity for the researcher to follow up
with any additional questions. As a result, it was imperative that each survey question focus on one, and only one, topic so that the responses can be unequivocally tied to that particular concept. If more than one concept is covered in a particular question, it cannot be determined precisely which element of the question the participant is responding.

Different types of questions were designed to keep the survey at a manageable size. Multiple choice options, scales, and open-ended questions were included in the survey. The multiple choice questions were used for all demographic and background questions (such as age, years of experience, and gender). Substantive multiple choice questions were also included. The options provided for each multiple choice question differed depending on the topic covered in the question. For example, knowledge questions had options such as “I know all of the policy”, “I know most of the policy”, “I know some of the policy”, and “I know none of the policy”. These choices allow for respondents to more accurately describe their self-assessed level of knowledge compared to answering a question with either a “Yes” or “No” response. The scale questions, for example, allowed respondents to rate the threat of terrorism in their jurisdiction on a scale from 0-10 (with 0 being low and 10 being high). Finally, one open-ended question was included. This question gave the respondents the opportunity to provide additional information they felt important to include. These responses, however, were inconsistent and were used more for anecdotal and supplemental evidence in support of other data. Ultimately, the final survey was compiled of 34 questions.

To improve the clarity of the survey, a pilot version was administered to five individuals. All five are male, four are white and one is African-American. They range in age from 28-50 and have military connections ranging from current Colonel to civilian senior leader. Two have political science backgrounds. They all have bachelor’s degrees and either already have earned, or are working towards, graduate degrees. Finally, these individuals currently reside in either Lawrence, Kansas, or Leavenworth, Kansas. The feedback provided by these individuals ranged from basic identification of grammatical
errors to concerns about redundancy of the questions and topics that may have been left unasked in the original survey. This process took approximately one week to complete but was invaluable to creating a survey that would be more effective at providing relevant and meaningful data for this study. A copy of the distributed survey can be found in Appendix B.

Selecting departments to survey was done using a mass email campaign to the jurisdictions in the greater Kansas City area. The email communication was sent to the police chief’s address found on online websites for the various departments. The message stated the researcher’s name, profession, and academic pursuits in addition to the requested assistance of officers to respond to the survey. Electronic copies of the survey were also attached to the initial email message to allow the chiefs, or their subordinates, to evaluate more effectively whether or not they would be willing to participate in this study. Initially, the Lawrence, Shawnee, Gladstone, and North Kansas City departments responded favorably. Appointments were made by the researcher with liaisons from each department to visit and discuss the particulars of this research project. In these cases, copies of the survey were left with the liaison who then distributed them to officers within their respective departments. Arrangements were made to pick up these surveys after they had been completed. Leavenworth and Independence, Missouri, also responded to the mass email and completed surveys electronically, submitting them to the researcher via email. Overland Park, Kansas, responded in a more proactive manner than any of the other departments. The Police Chief of Overland Park requested a meeting with the researcher to discuss the intentions and needs of this particular study. After a brief meeting, the Overland Park Police Chief agreed to assist the researcher by uploading the survey into an online format to be distributed, at the specific request of the police chief, to all the major jurisdictions in the greater Kansas City area. In addition, surveys were also distributed by the Overland Park Police Department to other, “Benchmark” departments.
The “Benchmark City Coalition” was formed in 1997 under the direction of the Overland Park Police Chief. Cities were selected based on one of two criteria: they were in the immediate Kansas City area or they were cities Overland Park competed with for business. Originally there were more than 20 cities that were part of this coalition. However, this number has been trimmed to 15 cities due to self-removal from the coalition or because the group deemed them to dissimilar. The original intent of this coalition was to find cities of comparable demographics and to share “best practices” information to help improve law enforcement efforts in all of the communities within the coalition (all information regarding the “Benchmark City Coalition” was provided by Officer Tallman from the Overland Park Police Department). The cities that are part of this coalition can be found all over the country and Table 4-2 lists each of them and provides some basic information about population, violent crimes, and median income. The survey that Overland Park put online was sent to all of these cities in addition to the communities within the greater Kansas City area. This distribution increased the data available for study and provided for additional perspectives from around the country. However, one significant limitation occurred. The construction of the survey did not allow for the researcher to know the origin of each response. Although this is a limitation of this study, it should not interfere with the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 or with the conclusions reached in this study.

All survey responses were inputted into an Excel worksheet, whether automatically through the online program or by hand in the cases of those surveys received either in person or via email. The data was then converted into numerical values as needed. Each survey question was made a variable. For example, the first question about experience in law enforcement was labeled as the “YEARSEX” variable. The codebook listing all of these variables and other pertinent information can be found in Appendix C.

Analysis:

The surveys, after being imported into R, were manipulated to produce descriptive analysis and, in some cases, logistical regression was performed. The descriptive data proved to be useful for
providing answers to many of the research questions mentioned in Chapter 3. The logistic regressions allowed the researcher to make statements about predictions regarding responses to certain questions based on responses to other questions on the survey. The analysis of the data will be more explicitly described in Chapter 5.

The interview responses were not statistically analyzed. Rather, these responses provided detail and nuance to support or fill in gaps found in the survey data. For example, the surveys appeared to indicate that relatively few police officers know their department’s anti-terrorism policy; yet, the interviews illuminate that they may, in fact, know more than they realize. As with the analysis of the survey data, examination and interpretation of the interview data will be further examined in the next chapter.

**Conclusion:**

This chapter has outlined the research design for this study. The rationale for conducting interviews and administering surveys was explored, the process and logic used in constructing all questions was explained in detail, and the process for selecting subjects was also described. Information about the communities and police departments chosen was provided and rationale for their inclusion was presented. The next chapter will analyze the data collected thereby more fully answering the questions posed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5: Results and Analysis

This chapter presents analysis and conclusions for several topics. Police officer knowledge of anti-terrorism policy and their interpretation of this policy are examined. The relationship between local police departments and federal agencies is scrutinized. This chapter analyzes whether or not local law enforcement is capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy. Officer perspectives regarding improvement of anti-terrorism implementation is offered. Finally, police opinions are juxtaposed to those of citizens of the United States. Survey and interview responses provide the data and impetus for reaching conclusions that create the foundation for answering the research question of this study: how do local law enforcement officers implement national anti-terrorism policy?

Demographic information:

459 surveys were completed for this study. Many of the surveys were from communities in Eastern Kansas and Western Missouri. Additional surveys were completed by officers in communities from other parts of the country ranging from California to Virginia (see tables 4-1 and 4-2 for information about these communities).

Figure 5-2 graphically illustrates some basic demographic information of the survey respondents. Most of the respondents range in age from 26 to 50 years old; 419 are white; and 404 are male. The majority of these officers have been officers for more than 11 years (300 of 459) but most have fewer than 11 years experience at their current position (349 of 459). Finally, the majority of officers consider themselves to be a Republicans who ascribe to a conservative ideology.

White males are definitely over sampled in this study, but this is a function of the process for selecting these subjects. The researcher had little ability to select interview and survey subjects as was described in Chapter 4. This does not change the fact that the results from the survey and interviews may not necessarily be generalizable beyond the immediate scope of this study. Regardless, the results
do still have the ability to illuminate previously under-studied concepts regarding the role of local law enforcement in the implementation of anti-terrorism policy.

Table 5-1 provides some similar information about the nineteen interview subjects. Eighteen of these subjects are white; the average age is 46 ½ years old; and all were male. The average police experience was just more than 24 ½ years per subject. Fourteen consider themselves to be conservative and five consider themselves moderates.

In addition to the basic demographic information provided above, it is also useful to understand the role officers play in implementing anti-terrorism policy. The amount of experience officers have implementing anti-terrorism policy is an important characteristic for analysis of the various topics discussed in this chapter. This role can be measured in terms of the job an officer has within their department as well as the amount of time spent engaged in anti-terrorism activities.

Figure 5-2 and Table 5-5 display the role police officers believe they play in anti-terrorism efforts. The “Role in Preventing Terrorism” graph in Figure 5-2 shows that local law enforcement officers are divided on whether or not they have a role in preventing terrorism. 45.1% of officers believe that they are not directly involved in preventing terrorism while 41.8% believe the opposite. Yet, the amount of time spent on actual anti-terrorism activities per week and month seems to indicate that the respondents overwhelmingly do not have frequent cause to be engaged in terrorism prevention. The vast majority of officers claim to spend less than five hours per week on such activities (see Figure 5-2, “Time Spent on Anti-terror per Week”). Similarly, most officers do not engage in more than five anti-terrorism activities per month. The amount of time spent on anti-terrorism efforts appears to contradict the role officers believe they have considering more than 40% of respondents identify their role as being directly related to preventing terrorism yet more than 90% of respondents claim to spend little or no time actually involved in anti-terrorism activities. This can logically be resolved, however, by simply recognizing that how much time is actually spent on preventing terrorism does not depend on how
officers define their role. Rather, officers can certainly believe that one of their primary responsibilities is to prevent terrorism while at the same time perceiving that they are not actually involved in anti-terrorism activities with any significantly frequency. Later in this chapter, this perception of the will be more thoroughly examined.

The interview subjects were not explicitly asked these same questions. They were asked what their position within their department is and whether or not they have ever investigated any terrorist incident. Nine of the nineteen subjects hold, or held, positions that were directly involved in terrorism response and/or prevention. These positions range from Chief of Police to Terrorism Liaison Officer. Twelve of the nineteen subjects stated that they had, at least once in their careers, been directly involved in a terrorism investigation. The nature of these investigations ranged from a single submission of a suspicious activity intelligence report to daily analysis of intelligence gathered within their jurisdiction. The majority of these twelve respondents had limited experience with anti-terrorism investigations making it reasonable to assume that they would have responded on the survey in a manner consistent with those collected thus making their interview answers comparable to those surveyed.

Do police officers know the national, state, and/or local anti-terrorism policy?

Before considering how police officers implement national anti-terrorism policy, it is useful to consider whether or not they actually know this policy. Of equal relevance is their knowledge of state and local anti-terrorism police. This knowledge serves as a baseline for understanding how officers perceive their role in this broader anti-terrorism effort. If police officers have knowledge of these policies, then that may indicate that they, or at least their departments, have made anti-terrorism implementation a priority. Failure to know these policies may suggest that these officers either do not see themselves as critical to the anti-terrorism effort or that their departments (or the other agencies) do not value their role in this regard.
There are three questions on the survey that directly ask if respondents know the federal, state, and their department anti-terrorism policies. Table 5-2 shows the percentage of responses answering “I do not know the policy”, “I know some of the policy”, “I know most of the policy”, “I know all of the policy”, and “My department does not have a policy” (as applicable) and Figure 5-1 graphically compares the raw data for these variables. The overwhelming majority of respondents know little of the federal anti-terrorism policy. Similar responses can be seen regarding state policy. Knowledge of departmental anti-terrorism policy is more diverse but a majority of respondents still claim to not know or only know some of this policy. In addition, 17% of respondents claim that their department has no policy.

Furthermore, most officers do not know whether or not their department’s anti-terrorism policy is similar to federal policy (see Figure 5-1, “Is department policy similar to federal policy?”). This result is logical considering most of the officers do not know the federal policy or their department’s policy.

The survey results provide clear evidence that police officers are not knowledgeable of anti-terrorism policy. The interviews provide a little different information. Interview subjects, when specifically asked what their department’s anti-terrorism policy is, generally claimed to not know what the policy is or stated that their department has no such policy. However, further questioning of these subjects provided evidence that these statements, and the survey results, are likely misleading.

Only six of the nineteen officers interviewed stated that their department actually has an anti-terrorism policy. One officer who indicated knowledge of his department’s policy admitted that “until that [the survey used for this study] came about, I did not know it. I had to look it up. And there is one, and it’s actually pretty thorough.” This, however, indicates a different sort of dilemma: department’s may, in fact, have a policy, but this policy is not fully understood by the officers. This, too, may not be an accurate description of officers’ understanding of such policies.

Knowledge of a policy does not necessarily have to mean understanding of a written, official document that can be pulled off a shelf and held in hand. In fact, policies that are simply understood
and followed without necessitating a hard copy may actually be more meaningful. If an officer has to
look up a particular policy every time he needs to act it can be problematic for obvious reasons.
However, if an officer simply acts in accordance with some type of standard operating procedure,
regardless of whether or not knowledge of written authorization to act in such a manner is present,
these procedures are de facto policies of the department. The interviews indicate that this may be the
case with anti-terrorism policy implementation.

For example, one officer stated the following when asked about his department’s anti-terrorism
policy:

“The only function I had was to get up to speed with respect to that [terrorism], to develop
relationships within the region and with our federal partners, to become aware and to bring
back the message, develop the capability to respond on the local level. And so, I think, while we
may not necessarily have a written document that spells this policy out, it’s been very clear for
the last eight, nine years now, that it is a high priority of the chief and of our local leaders to
develop that knowledge base and that capability.”

Another officer stated:

“We’ve integrated ourselves into the national efforts, at least as best as we understand. We
have dedicated resources to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, but, more importantly, we train,
and we continue to train, in small ways, not in any great, grandiose plan or strategy, but efforts
at trying to identify suspicious behaviors that might be terrorist-related.”

These responses indicate what yet another officer described as an anti-terrorism “mindset”. The
interviews indicate that this mindset involves a recognition that local police officers need to be
observant of abnormal behavior and “not dismissing something as being completely benign.” In
addition, every officer interviewed knew the procedures they should take if they encountered a
terrorism incident: what immediate actions to take, what type of report to file, and who to contact with
this information. It may be true that most of the officers surveyed do not know any anti-terrorism
policy. But, as the interviews illustrate, not knowing a specific, written, official policy does not
necessarily equate to a lack of understanding regarding how to handle a terrorist incident.
How do local police officers interpret anti-terrorism policy and what role do they believe they have in this national effort?

These two questions will be considered together because they are inextricably related to each other. An officer’s perspective of his role in combating terrorism is dependent on his interpretation of an anti-terrorism policy. If an officer does not believe that he is an integral part of anti-terrorism policy implementation, he will likely be interpreting the policy in a way that downplays the importance of local law enforcement officers. Conversely, a belief that local law enforcement is important in the implementation of anti-terrorism policy necessitates an interpretation of this policy that values the role of local police officers.

The belief of officers regarding the threat terrorism poses their respective communities is a concept that forms the foundation for this discussion. If officers believe that terrorism is a threat to their community, it is plausible to assume that they may have a different interpretation of anti-terrorism policy compared to those who do not believe terrorism is a threat to their community. It is also possible, however, that these beliefs are independent. Regardless, it is prudent to first consider how officers perceive the threat to their community before proceeding further.

The survey specifically addresses this issue by allowing respondents to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10 (0 being “Strongly disagree” and 10 being “Strongly agree”) whether or not they agree with the statement, “Terrorism is a threat within your community”. Figure 5-3 graphically represents the responses and Table 5-4 provide raw and percentage data of the results to this question. Interpreting the scale it seems reasonable to assume the following: selection of choices 0-3 indicate the respondent does not feel terrorism is much of a threat to their community; selection of choices 7-10 indicate the respondent feels that terrorism is a threat to their community; and selection of choices 4-6 indicate the respondent feels that terrorism is a moderate threat to their community. Based on this understanding of the scale, only 21.8% of respondents seem to feel that terrorism is not a threat to their community,
34.4% of respondents feel that there is a moderate threat, and 43.8% of respondents believe that terrorism is a relatively significant threat. If respondents who chose “6” on the scale are added to the “threat” categorization the percentage of those who believe that terrorism does pose a threat to their community rises to 53.6%. A conservative summary of this data clearly indicates that most of the respondents to the survey perceive terrorism as at least a moderate threat to their community.

Twelve of the nineteen subjects interviewed for this study definitively stated that they believe terrorism poses a threat to their community. According to one officer, the threat is “significant”; another made the statement, “I don’t know why it hasn’t been played on before”; and yet another summed up this perspective with the following, “I believe it’s a huge threat”. One respondent was particularly poignant in stating the following: “There’s a threat to us. I can’t put a score or a value on it as compared to other folks, but Kansas City is in danger ... I think that Kansas City is on someone’s radar.”

A couple of the dissenters did not feel terrorism poses a threat in the traditional sense. Instead, these subjects assert that it “depends on how you define threat” as stated by one officer. “I think it’s a possibility that it could occur [terrorism attack], but I think that we are more likely the place where terrorists may live” is how one officer began his explanation of this definition. Another officer offered this additional explanation, “I think what we have in the Midwest, on the international side, are fundraising opportunities to finance international terrorism efforts.” An officer who admitted that terrorism poses a threat to his community did have this to offer this broader discussion about defining the threat: “Kansas City has fundraising, it has safe housing, it has training.” These perspectives add significantly to this discussion by suggesting that the threat posed by terrorism may not be imminent in these communities, but that terrorist activities may be occurring none-the-less. The implication of this conclusion is that officers may not believe their community is a target but that terrorism activities are still occurring within their jurisdictions.
These differing perspectives regarding the threat of terrorism serve as the backdrop for more closely analyzing the questions in this section. Answers to these questions can be seen in several of the interview responses when officers were asked what role local law enforcement can or should have in this effort. One officer stated, “I don’t really think we fit into it [anti-terrorism efforts] at all.” Another agreed with that sentiment, claiming, “I am below plankton. I have no authoritative role whatsoever, if they ask us to go do something, we just follow their orders. So, I am very, very low on the food chain.” On the other hand, several of the subjects hold a different perspective, such as an officer who said, “I think we can play a very large role. We play, in my opinion we play kind of the same role of what our citizens play for us; that is, the eyes and ears of a larger, coordinated response.” Yet another officer claimed that local police officers are “squarely on the front lines” of the effort to fight terrorism in the United States. This small sample of interview responses illustrates the ways an officer may interpret policy and, therefore, how they perceive their role implementing anti-terrorism policy.

The majority of interview respondents believed that local law enforcement has a role to play in fighting terrorism. However, this belief was generally expressed in terms of simply doing their jobs but being cognizant of potential connections to terrorism implications. One officer stated this perspective particularly succinctly: “Terrorism prevention is basically, in large part, just doing good law enforcement: paying attention, running people through the appropriate databases, documenting things, paying attention and not dismissing something as being completely benign.”

Figures 5-3 and 5-5 include graphs that illustrate responses from the survey that are relevant to the questions considered here. Asked to rank on a scale whether or not anti-terrorism efforts is a worthwhile endeavor for local law enforcement, respondents selected “10”, or “Strongly agree”, 116 out of 459 times, more than any single other choice. 322 respondents (70.2%) chose 7-10 on the scale. These results indicate that more than two-thirds of all the respondents believe that implementing anti-terrorism policy is an important responsibility for local police departments.
Officers believe that there is at least a moderate threat of terrorism in their communities. Moreover, even officers who do not believe terrorism poses a threat to their community agree that other terrorism activities are likely occurring. There is also general consensus among officers that participating in anti-terrorism activities is a worthy activity. These beliefs lead to a natural next question: are local police departments doing everything they can to implement anti-terrorism policy? Figure 5-5 ("Dept. does all it can" graph) indicates that most of the respondents either didn’t know (236) or believe their department is doing all it can to aid with the anti-terrorism effort (146). This result could provide some insight into whether or not officers view anti-terrorism policy implementation as important or not. But, it likely supports the idea that officers generally do not know their department’s policy. Considering this possibility has, at the very least, been qualified based on interview responses, it is most likely that the “Don’t know” responses inadequately represent the views of officers. However, the fact that, despite the inclination of respondents to claim ignorance of departmental policy, nearly one-third of all officers believe that their department is doing all it can to support anti-terrorism policy provides evidence that they also believe that it is an important function for local law enforcement. It is also possible that officers who do not believe this is a job of local law enforcement may believe that their department is doing little and that that is precisely what they should be doing. The interviews, as described above, provide evidence that this is the less likely perspective. Another conclusion to reach based on these findings is that officers really don’t know how their departments are involved in preventing terrorism.

Further support for the conclusions reached above is provided when analyzing the beliefs of officers regarding usage of department resources. Figure 5-5 ("Good use of resource” graph) shows that most officers believe that using department resources for anti-terrorism efforts is worthwhile. 58.6% of all respondents (269 out of 459) answered that they “Agree” that taking steps to prevent terrorism is a good use of departmental resources. Those who responded with “Agree” and “Strongly agree” totaled
333, or 72.5% of all responses. This result confirms the statement that police officers believe they are important to preventing terrorism and that they are the “front line of defense” when it comes to this national security effort.

What is the relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation?

The relationship between local law enforcement and federal anti-terrorism agencies is another component of policy implementation. Figure 5-4 illustrates the responses from survey respondents on this issue and Table 5-3 provides percentage data. The “Good relationship w/feds” graph illustrates what the raw data indicates: the majority of officers surveyed do not know whether or not their department has a good relationship with the federal government (273 of 459, 59.5%). 21.6% (99 out of 459) of respondents did “Agree” or “Strongly agree” with the assertion that there exists a good relationship with the federal government while 19.0% (87 out of 459) responded with selections of “Disagree” or “Strongly disagree”. This variable indicates that it is likely that line-officers may not have much interaction with federal agencies, particularly when it comes to anti-terrorism investigations.

This assessment may be correct but it is also possible that it is overly simplistic. Officer opinions on how well federal policy is communicated to their departments and how much intelligence these local departments receive from the federal government are other measures of this relationship. The perceived quality and effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy is also a valuable indicator of the nature of the association between local and national agencies. The belief by police officers that federal agencies are effective in their anti-terrorism efforts likely corresponds with a relatively strong relationship between the local law enforcement and federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS. Finally, the strength of this partnership can be evaluated based on how well federal policy has aided local police departments with their anti-terrorism efforts.
Looking at Figure 5-4 and Table 5-3 several aspects of the relationship between local
departments and federal agencies are interesting. The majority of officers clearly claim that they “Don’t
know” whether or not federal policy has helped their departments prevent terrorism. This result adds
credence to the suggestion that officers really do not have much interaction with the federal
government on matters of terrorism prevention. However, other responses seem to indicate that this
assertion is not entirely accurate.

According to Table 5-3, 36.7% of respondents believe that federal anti-terrorism policy is
effective and 37.3% believe that intelligence is shared with their departments in a timely manner by
federal agencies. These findings indicate a greater amount of knowledge of the relationship their
department has with the federal government on matters of terrorism than the previously discussed
topics would indicate. However, the table still shows that more than 40% of respondents, in both cases,
still claim that they “Don’t know” whether or not the federal government and their department are
cooperating.

More interesting are opinions regarding how well the federal government has communicated
their policy to local departments and how well they have been prepared by federal agencies to
implement this policy. Nearly the same percentage of respondents claimed that the federal government
has not done a good job of preparing their department (38.9%, 178 out of 458) as those claiming
ignorance (39.5%, 181 out of 458). Additionally, 42.4% of officers do not believe that federal anti-
terrorism policy has been well communicated to their departments. These results have several
meaningful implications: (1) some of the officers surveyed seem to be implying that they believe the
federal government could be doing more to prepare their departments; (2) similar to number one, there
appears to be some dissatisfaction with relationship between the federal government and their
department; (3) these officers also seem to be indicating that they believe that implementing this policy
is important at the local level; and (4) more of the officers appear to be knowledgeable of the relationship between the federal government and their department than other variables indicate.

The findings described above seem to show inconsistent and contradictory opinions. However, acknowledging that the federal government is doing an effective job of preventing terrorism does not necessarily mean that they are doing well working with local departments for this same purpose. Similarly, receiving intelligence from the federal government does not necessarily equate to a positive relationship between local and national agencies. It is possible that respondents differentiated between receiving intelligence reports from the federal government and having an overall constructive relationship with them. Regardless of this complexity, these results provide support for the fourth conclusion reached above postulating that local police officers are more knowledgeable of this relationship than the more direct survey question responses indicate.

All of the interview subjects indicated at least some level of knowledge of the relationship between the federal government and their department. In addition, they also all acknowledged that this relationship has, at least in terms of information sharing, improved since the events of September 11, 2001. However, the opinions diverge on other relationship matters.

Several of the subjects emphatically claimed that there is a positive and strong relationship between their department and federal agencies. One command-level officer stated:

“We’re getting far more bang for our buck, we’re getting better outcomes when it comes to putting people in custody and those sorts of things. Very professional organizations we’ve dealt with: the FBI, the attorney’s office, the ATF, and the DEA, those are the people we probably deal with the most.”

A police chief added, “The message came down loud-and-clear to the Bureau that the one-way door of information could not continue because it had disastrous consequences. I think, for the most part, they’re [the FBI] really trying to change that culture.” And still one more command-level officer offered the following perspective:
“I would have to say that the focus now on information sharing is a dramatically different animal from the 1970’s ‘till now. Where before the FBI was known as an agency that you briefed but never got back anything, now it’s a two-way street and now, from time-to-time, they’re calling us to do things that before they would either not have accomplished or done themselves.”

Other interviewed officers, however, had a different perspective. “The FBI is hard to work with,” stated one officer. Another claimed, “I don’t know what the Department of Homeland Security is doing in [his community], if anything. I just don’t.” Yet another added, “We’re somebody they [the FBI] have to deal with. Deep down inside the agencies you’re going to find personnel there that say, ‘I don’t want to deal with them.’” A patrol officer said, “It’s been my experience, with few exceptions, that the federal government will come in and when they need something they’ll be nice to you and let you play and then off they go and take the credit for everything.” And one more asserted the following:

“I would describe it [relationship with federal agencies] as adequate. I think the relationship could be strengthened just through what we’re talking about here: having a more stable, specific program in place for local police departments that obviously does not exist now.”

It is worth noting, again, that every subject interviewed at least conceded that the relationship between federal agencies (such as the FBI and DHS) and their departments is better now than it was prior to September 11, 2001. Equally relevant, however, is the fact that all of the officers interviewed also stated that more progress needs to be made to improve this relationship. It is also important to recognize some differences between the officers quoted above: (1) the majority of those who made predominantly positive remarks were in positions where they were privy to more terrorism-relevant information (such as police chiefs and specific anti-terrorism positions); and (2) the majority of those holding more negative opinions on this subject were line, or patrol, officers and less likely to be directly involved in terrorism investigations. Regardless of these differences, however, all of those interviewed were familiar with their department’s relationship with federal agencies on matters of terrorism, clearly in opposition to the findings of topics discussed in this section. This is significant because it indicates
that the survey questions directly applicable to this issue may not have adequately captured the true
opinions of the participating officers.

Considering all of the data collected, both from the survey and from the interviews, some
conclusions can be reached. First, officers likely are aware of this relationship. Second, information
sharing, specifically, is improving and is the most noticeable manifestation of this relationship. Third, this
relationship has improved over time. Finally, there is considerable work left to be done to strengthen
this relationship.

This final conclusion bleeds into other topics already covered in this chapter as it depends on
officers believing that preventing terrorism should be a function of local law enforcement. These two
beliefs, police departments have an important role to fill in this effort and that the relationship between
the federal government and local departments needs to improve, indicate that police officers likely
believe they have more to offer this national effort than simple reporting of suspicious activities. It
appears that they believe they can be better utilized in conducting investigations of suspected terrorist
activity. These conclusions are certainly inconclusive but do, based on the data gathered, appear
plausible and therefore worthy of attention.

Are local police departments capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy?

To answer this question, it is important to consider the resources available to departments and
how implementing anti-terrorism policy may impact their ability to carry out other duties. These
questions help to determine if local police officers are actually able to implement anti-terrorism policy.
Failure to have the proper resources will obviously make it difficult to prevent terrorism. Balancing anti-
terrorism efforts with other duties is equally necessary. These other duties involve investigating other
crimes as well as interacting with the community. If implementing anti-terrorism policy interferes with
these tasks then the ability of local policy to carry out all of their responsibilities, to include fighting
terrorism, is compromised.
Table 5-6 offers an initial analysis of this issue. The results show that 69.2% of respondents believe that federal policy does not prevent them from investigating other crimes and 74.9% believe that federal policy prevents them from completing other tasks. Clearly, the vast majority of officers do not believe that federal anti-terrorism policy interferes with their ability to carry out their other duties. These results are consistent with the findings for how much time officers spend engaged in anti-terrorism activities per week and month. Most of the respondents do not actively engage in preventing terrorism weekly or monthly, therefore, it seems unlikely that their limited anti-terrorism activities would prohibit them from attending to other responsibilities. These results imply that officers could devote more time to anti-terrorism activities considering how little impact terrorism prevention appears to have on the execution of their jobs. It should also be noted that any increase in anti-terrorism efforts would invariably require compromise regarding allocation of officer time. Therefore, if local officers were required to be more actively engaged in terrorism prevention their beliefs on how such efforts impact their ability to carry out other job-related functions.

Opinions regarding how cost effective anti-terrorism efforts are coupled with perspectives on resource allocation reveal insight into how capable a department is to prevent terrorism. Belief that anti-terrorism efforts are cost effective clearly implies that the officer feels that her department has the financial ability to engage in anti-terrorism implementation. Additionally, if an officer believes that preventing terrorism is a worthwhile use of department resources it is logical to assume that she believes they have the resources available to engage in such activities. Figure 5-5 and Table 5-7 show the opinions of police officers regarding these issues. The surveyed officers are unsure as to whether or not anti-terrorism efforts are cost effective as 352 out of 457 respondents chose the “Don’t know” option. This finding is consistent with other results indicating officers lack knowledge of their department’s anti-terrorism policy. Officers who do not know their department’s policy likely do not know how costs are allocated for anti-terrorism efforts. It is also possible that most of the officers
surveyed actually have little knowledge of the budget for their respective departments therefore making it difficult for them to answer questions about cost effectiveness satisfactorily. Despite the possibility that participating officers are not well informed regarding costs associated with anti-terrorism policy implementation, the majority appear to feel that such efforts are worthwhile (72.5%, 333 out of 459 responses selected “Agree” or “Strongly agree”). These findings make it difficult to provide a definitive answer to the question as to whether or not local police departments have the capability to implement anti-terrorism policy. Having such a capability necessitates financial resources and the respondents appear to be largely ignorant of whether or not their departments have such resources available. However, these officers seem to feel that devoting resources to anti-terrorism efforts is worthwhile. This conclusion is not directly supported by the data but the implication seems reasonable.

The subject of resource availability was only mentioned in a handful of the interviews. Generally speaking, the subjects who addressed this issue seemed to believe that the resources were present to help them respond to terrorism incidents. This is distinctly different from preventing terrorism, but most of the interview subjects seemed to categorize any and all anti-terrorism activities similarly when discussing resource allocation. Regardless of this distinction, when the topic of resources was mentioned, none of the interview respondents indicated that it was a cause of any concern.

Finally, the impact of anti-terrorism policy implementation on community-police relations is needs to be considered. Results seen in Table 5-8 clearly illustrate that the majority (71.2%) of all respondents agree that anti-terrorism policy has not interfered with their ability to perform their other duties. Conclusions reached for the other variables analyzed in this section can also be applied to this variable. There is one additional possibility that should be accounted for: officers believe that implementing anti-terrorism policy is part of their law enforcement duties.

This conclusion is supported by some of the interview responses as they indicate that preventing acts of terror is simply another responsibility. For example, one officer stated that “most police officers
do not consider themselves to be agents of national security. But, the fact is that we all have to be”.

Another subject believes that,

“Police officers in the United States are the first line of defense against domestic terrorism or international terrorism. That is a true statement. But these officers of law enforcement agencies ... don’t necessarily wake up every morning saying, ‘how am I going to prevent terrorism today in my jurisdiction.’ That’s not where their daily activities take them.”

Yet a different officer described the job of local law enforcement in terms of intelligence gathering, regardless of the situation: “Police officers are about building relationships and being able to gather intelligence information, whether it be about little Johnny who broke the window on the block or it’s going to be about the guy who’s selling dope the next street over or the house down the street”.

Perhaps this quote best expresses the sentiment regarding how police officers view anti-terrorism policy implementation: “Terrorism prevention is basically, in large part, just doing good law enforcement.”

What all of these quotes imply is that most police officers do have a role to play in preventing terrorism but that it does not necessarily involve changing their behaviors too dramatically; rather, if means they just have to be aware of this additional responsibility. This change in mindset does not mean that officers necessarily believe anti-terrorism policy implementation has interfered with their ability to execute job-related duties. Instead, it is highly plausible that police officers simply believe it is part of their duties and therefore cannot interfere with law enforcement efforts. This also may help to explain why the interview subjects did not specifically reference terrorism prevention when discussing the availability of resources: if officers believe that preventing terrorism is “just doing good law enforcement,” then it is probable that they don’t feel there are any resources that need to be specifically allocated to this effort.

The impact of terrorism prevention efforts on citizen-police relations is a crucial aspect of anti-terrorism policy implementation. Figure 5-6 and Table 5-9 provide graphic and numeric results illustrating the beliefs of police officers regarding this sensitive issue. Nearly 65% of all respondents do
not believe that anti-terrorism efforts have had a negative impact on their relationship with the community. Looking back at the discussion of how much time officers spend on terrorism prevention, this seems like a logical outcome given that few officers claim to participate in anti-terrorism activities with significant frequency. Limited anti-terrorism activity makes it difficult for such activities to negatively impact police-community relationships.

It is typical for people to consider the relationship between police officers and the community they serve in a one-way manner: police officers are the only ones to have an impact. Survey respondents were asked to consider how helpful the community has been in preventing terrorism thereby looking at the relationship as a two-way street where the community does have an effect on this national anti-terrorism effort. Results can be seen in Figure 5-6 and Table 5-10 and show that the majority of respondents selected 4-6 which corresponds to having no strong opinion. What is notable, however, is the relatively low percentage (17.3%) of respondents who selected 7-10. Conservatively speaking, this result allows for the interpretation that police officers generally do not believe that the community has been helpful in preventing terrorism. A closer look at the data for selections 9 and 10 only supports this assertion as only 8 out of 457 respondents selected either of these options. Clearly very few survey participants believe strongly that their community has been helpful in preventing terrorism.

The general sentiment of the interview subjects is that citizens are important to preventing terrorism. Some subjects described this in terms of balancing civil liberties with security and how it is necessary to have an understanding public: “You have to not take extreme measures, but you have to take effective measures and sometimes that means when you collect information, for the good of all, you may violate or intrude on someone’s personal rights ... when it comes to terrorism, I believe the good of all should be what we’re all interested in, to protect our country and our way of life. So if we have to inadvertently intrude on some people’s personal rights, I think that’s a small price to pay.” And other subjects focused on how citizens can actively assist law enforcement in preventing terrorism: “It’s
my theory that it’s not local law enforcement that’s important, it’s the garbage man, the postal worker, it’s the people who are delivering the papers at 5 o’clock in the morning: see something out of whack, report it, and all of a sudden, cascade effect. How we understand our community is more important than anything.” Regardless of the specific perspective, the interviews illuminate the importance to local law enforcement that community assistance can play in preventing terrorism. Whether relinquishing some freedoms or reporting suspicious activities, police officers appear to believe that community involvement is important to successful prosecution of the war on terror and the survey results indicate the belief of officers that the community is not fulfilling this potential role.

Determining anti-terrorism capabilities of a police department is not as simple as looking at a budget or balance sheet. The variables considered in this section demonstrate how other factors must also be considered. Obviously, having the resources available and the willingness to deploy them in efforts designed to prevent or respond to terrorism is essential and the data presented here indicates that officers believe this is reasonable. But, it is also important to consider how anti-terrorism efforts may detract from other police duties and the relationship departments have with their communities with regards to this effort. If anti-terrorism efforts take away from other responsibilities or if the community is resistant to implementing these policies, can it truly be said that the department is capable of effectively implementing this policy? The ability of a police department to integrate anti-terrorism needs with other responsibilities and to foster a positive community support network is important to preventing acts of terror.

The data presented here does not conclusively answer this research question. Insight is offered into how officers perceive their department’s ability to implement anti-terrorism policy. Generally speaking, officers appear to be confident that terrorism prevention activities do not interfere with their other responsibilities. In fact, it appears they view anti-terrorism efforts as just being part of good policing. It also seems that officers believe the resources are available to respond to terrorism events
and that the application of these resources to anti-terrorism measures is worthwhile. Police officers also seem to feel that the local community is important in this effort, but that citizens are not necessarily doing everything they can to help. Taking all of these results together, it seems fair to say that local law enforcement agencies are capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy, even if they are only able to do so imperfectly.

What is the way forward?

This question, in one form or another, was posed to both the survey respondents and interview subjects. Survey respondents were allowed space to offer their own thoughts on anti-terrorism policy implementation in the form of an open-ended question. Interview subjects were specifically asked what changes they would make at the federal, state, and local level regarding anti-terrorism policy. Responses in both cases provide some insight into how officers see improvement occurring in the future regarding anti-terrorism policy. There may not be any numerical data, but there is plenty of information to consider.

51 out of 459 (11.1%) survey respondents included comments and these responses ranged from “no policy” to more detailed thoughts and ideas concerning the current and future state of affairs for local law enforcement regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation. Numerous ideas were mentioned in response to this question, but four main concepts repeatedly appeared: (1) the borders of the United States need to be secured; (2) there needs to be greater information sharing between the federal government and local law enforcement; (3) there needs to be greater emphasis and training at the local level; and (4) eliminate the politics from anti-terrorism efforts. These themes are echoed in the interview responses as well, with one noticeable contradiction: one interview subject specifically stated that border security and anti-terrorism policy are not related.

Some examples of responses from the surveys and interviews discussing these themes are as follows: One officer wrote, “Policy is not as much the problem as is the lack of information sharing by
the federal government.” Another agreed saying, “Until you close the border, any federal efforts at preventing terrorism is [sic] an absolute laughable joke.” One more line-officer succinctly state, “We must control our borders.” A different suggestion was offered by an officer who works directly on homeland security issues, “I hope to see more training and awareness programs set in place in the near future.” A police chief offered, “You need to eliminate the political components that slow us down.” And a patrol officer concurred, saying, “In an ideal world, utopia if you will, all politics would be eliminated from the war on terrorism.” An officer who also works directly on analyzing terrorism-related leads offered an intriguing opinion, stating, “Intelligence should drive our actions ... there needs to be better intelligence sharing and with better intelligence gathering and sharing we’ll be able to prevent more things from occurring.”

Clearly, officers do have opinions about how to proceed in preventing terrorism in the United States. Two of the four dominant themes (number 2 and number 3) indicate local level police officers believe they could be better utilized in preventing terrorism. The comments about information sharing emphasized that the federal government needs to share more information with local police officers because these officers are in a position to make an impact. One survey response directly addressed this issue in a succinct and cognizant manner:

“Federal policy is, for the most part, driven from the top down. This means local implementation of federal policy will always fall short. Anti-terrorism policy driven from the local level up will likely be more effective since it will be better tailored to the metropolitan or regional area it is derived from. Policy derived in this manner will balance local with federal needs. When anti-terrorism efforts are integrated into progressive community-oriented policing efforts and criminal investigations the results will become more effective.”

This particular comment brings together several concepts discussed throughout this chapter: local law enforcement has a role to play in preventing terrorism; information sharing needs to be improved; and good policing tactics and techniques allows for effective incorporation of terrorism prevention into everyday officer activities.
**Public opinion compared to officer opinion:**

This study has revealed the opinions of some officers regarding various anti-terrorism policy implementation issues. It may be interesting, though, to compare these findings to that of the general public. It is likely that police officers will hold different opinions regarding the issues covered in the survey and interviews of this study compared to the public at large but it is worth examining to ensure that this assumption is accurate. Additionally, where public opinion and officer opinion is similar may actually be of greater interest and relevance: if both the public and police officers agree that changes need to be made, for example, then it provides credibility to this suggestion and perhaps warrants greater attention from anti-terrorism policy makers. Equally important is the consideration that police officers are “employees” of the public and if these officers have drastically different views than the public at large it may be a concern worthy of closer scrutiny. As anti-terrorism policy evolves, it is inevitable that public opinion will play a role in the budgetary and doctrinal decision making process. Therefore, it is worthwhile to at least consider these opinions when discussing the role of local law enforcement in this effort.

Gallup poll data was used for the public opinion piece of this analysis. Seven poll questions were considered and Table 5-12 lists information about these questions including the most recent year the question was asked, the question itself, and the response options for each question. Table 5-11 shows responses from the officer survey for select topics as well as responses from the relevant Gallup polling questions.

Questions concerning the threat of terrorism were asked of both groups. Police officers were asked to rate, on a scale of 0-10 (0 being “Strongly disagree” and 10 being “Strongly agree”), whether or not they agreed that terrorism poses a threat to their community and 43.8% of these officers selected 7-10. Similar questions were asked of the populace by Gallup in three different questions. These questions had results of 42%, 45% and 36% believing there was a threat of an attack to a family member or in the
near future. Comparing the officer and public responses indicates similarity between them therefore making it reasonable to conclude that police officers are indicative of the public regarding their perception of the threat. However, it is important to note that the officer survey was conducted in 2011 while the Gallup surveys were conducted in 2010, 2005, and 2004. Therefore, it is possible that public opinion may not currently be consistent with the results reported here. Poll results regarding the level of worry respondents have that a family member will be a victim of terrorism have remained relatively constant over time ranging from 28% to 47% since 2004. For this reason, it is probable to expect that these results would be similar today thereby supporting the conclusion that the officers surveyed are indicative of the general public regarding their perception of the threat.

Interview data provides a slightly different perspective. The majority of the subjects interviewed for this survey did not believe that there was a particularly great threat to their specific community, but several stated that “it isn’t a matter of if, it’s a matter of when” another terrorist attack will occur and others expressed similar sentiments. This implies that the officer survey data may be somewhat misleading. A more accurate interpretation of the data collected, based on survey and interview data, may be to state that only 43.8% of officers surveyed believe terrorism is a likely threat to their community, but they do believe that a terrorist attack will occur in the future. This conclusion, while not definitive, may indicate that the officers interviewed and surveyed believe that terrorism is a greater threat to the United States than other citizens. One officer articulated this opinion relatively succinctly when asked whether or not terrorism is a threat within his community:

“We think that it is and it falls in that category of not if, but when. Primarily, it falls in that category of we know terrorists are on our shores, it’s arrived in other locations in our nations, and we think that there is significance still remaining in the terrorist camps to strike the heartland and we consider ourselves to be very much a part of the heartland so we think that it falls into that category of it’s going to happen, but when?”

The Gallup poll question asking respondents where they believe terrorists are likely to attack in the future does not directly correlate to a survey question asked of officers. Rather, there were
interview responses that provide insight on the perspectives of police officers regarding this issue. Interestingly, 67% of respondents replied that they believed smaller communities were more likely to be targeted by terrorists. Numerous interviewees concurred with this belief, as illustrated in the quote above. While many interview respondents did not all believe that their community was a likely target, they concurrently believed that it was only a matter of time before terrorists launched attacks on malls, sporting events, or other similar targets that are in atypical locations.

A final category of data for comparison concerns the effectiveness of the government in preventing terrorism. The Gallup polls asked several variations of this question that correspond with survey questions asked of officers for this study. Generally, as shown in Table 5-11, the public seems satisfied with how well the government is doing protecting them from terrorism. The officers surveyed, on the other hand, seem less convinced.

What is of interest, and seemingly a bit contradictory, is the result for the Gallup poll question about making changes to federal agencies responsible for protecting the United States from terrorism. This question asks respondents if they believe changes are needed and 63% believe that either a complete overhaul is necessary or major changes are needed. The reason this result seems to be contradictory is because satisfaction with government efforts should logically imply that respondents believe the agencies charged with protecting them from terrorism are operating at least satisfactorily and not in need of significant changes. This result is consistent with the beliefs of police officers. No question was specifically asked on the survey that mirrors this poll variable, but officers were asked if they believe federal government is effective in its anti-terrorism efforts. Additionally, they were asked about how well federal agencies help local departments prevent terrorism as well as how well their individual departments are doing with this implementation. Table 5-11 shows that officers do not seem to believe that federal anti-terrorism policy is especially effective. Police officers also do not seem to believe they have a strong relationship with the federal government. Additionally, the results show that
only 35.3% of respondents believe that their department is doing all that it can to prevent terrorism but that more than 70% of officers believe that preventing terrorism should be a responsibility of local law enforcement. Analyzed together, it is reasonable to conclude that officers believe that terrorism prevention efforts could be improved and at least one way it could be improved is through greater local level involvement. As described in other sections of this chapter, the interviews support this conclusion. Therefore, it is probably accurate to state that both the public and police officers believe that the way the United States attempts to prevent terrorism is in need of change and greater local law enforcement involvement with this effort is at least one preferred method of improvement.

This conclusions reached in this section are in need of additional research. The same questions were not specifically asked of the police officers, the Gallup survey data, in many cases, is dated, and the police officers surveyed may not be representative of officers across the country. Despite these shortcomings, these results are still provocative and imply that work still needs to be done to improve the way in which the United States fights terrorism domestically. It may be wise for decision makers to examine this type of data, conduct further research, and consider the possibility of giving local law enforcement a more significant role in the anti-terrorism effort.

General Discussion:

This chapter has provided evidence that local law enforcement officers believe that they are in a position to aid with the national anti-terrorism effort. Many officers believe there is a threat of terrorism within their communities, they see prevention of terrorism as a role they can fill, and they believe the capabilities exist for them to successfully undertake this additional responsibility. These conclusions are certainly not conclusive, but are representative of the results found in survey and interview responses.

These conclusions also imply that local law enforcement officers believe that they currently are underutilized in this effort against terrorism. In fact, Interview responses as well as survey comments explicitly state this position. The results of the survey also point to the accuracy of this implication,
particularly when one compares how much time officers engage in anti-terrorism activities to the beliefs expressed regarding the role they could play. The majority of officers claim they seldom engage in anti-terrorism activities yet they overwhelmingly believe it is something worth doing at the local level. This augments some of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 promoting the idea of greater local level law enforcement in anti-terrorism efforts. Particularly, this chapter has provided some evidence that Docobo’s (2005) assertion that community policing would be an effective strategy may have validity, at least within the minds of police officers. As seen in numerous quotes throughout this chapter, at least some local law enforcement officers share this belief. To most of them the key is intelligence gathering and intelligence-based actions. Developing positive relationships within a pro-active citizenry is essential to gathering intelligence and then sharing this information with all relevant parties will help facilitate this type of behavior. These concepts fit in with many of the comments and data examined within this chapter and appears to be an area for both future research by academics and for analysis and consideration within the domestic anti-terrorism community.

The findings of this study are provocative and informative, yet the question remains regarding the generalizability of the conclusions reached in this chapter. This study is limited in this regard primarily because of the pool of participating officers in both the surveys and interviews. One officer, when asked why he believed his department had such a good working relationship with other law enforcement agencies in the greater Kansas City area (including other police departments as well as state and federal agencies) responded, simply, with “Midwest values.” It may be difficult to determine how “Midwest values” differ from those of other regions of the United States. However, the survey was administered to officers from other regions of the country ranging from Washington to Florida which may help mitigate this difference.

The next chapter will apply the findings described in this chapter to the broader research question of how local law enforcement implements national anti-terrorism policy. This will be
accomplished by connecting the results and conclusions reached here with previous literature and theory. These connections will reveal the significance of this study within the field of political science as well as provide practical applications for those charged with defending the United States from terrorism.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The findings of the survey and interviews imply that local law enforcement serves a vital role in implementing national anti-terrorism policy. However, these police officers often are unaware of their importance. This chapter will expand on the role of police officers implementing this specific national security policy. Additionally, implications for theory, policy, and future research will be proposed.

How are police officers implementing national anti-terrorism policy?

The results presented in Chapter 5 indicate that police officers have a critical role to play in the implementation of anti-terrorism policy but they are being underutilized in this capacity. Line officers generally do not see themselves as being actively involved in anti-terrorism efforts. However, their supervisors and other officers who are assigned to matters of homeland security tell a different story. These officers generally stated that the information provided them from the “front line” are integral to successful implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Therefore, police officers implement this policy through diligent police work. Their daily attention to detail, particularly the details that are out of the ordinary, provides the leads and intelligence necessary to build terrorism investigations.

The ability to carry out this mission, however, depends on other conditions being present. First, as confirmed by the interview and survey responses, officers must be adequately trained. This training needs to prepare the officers for the possible terrorist activities they may encounter. As intimated by several police chiefs, simply preparing for bomb threats and hijackings do not help officers prevent terrorism before it occurs. Instead, officers need to have training that helps them identify suspicious terrorist activity.

A second condition that must be met by officers to be effective in anti-terrorism is a clear understanding of their role. If officers do not recognize their importance to implementing anti-terrorism policy then they are less likely to actively engage in the necessary intelligence gathering. This failure would be extremely detrimental to all domestic anti-terrorism efforts.
Third, there must be a reporting system in place that is both effective and well understood by local law enforcement. The interviews, in particular, as well as the survey responses indicated that police officers are aware of the fusion centers and the JTTF’s. In addition, most of the officers are aware of suspicious activity reports, how to file them, and how they are utilized by analysts. This condition can be achieved through training since it is essential for officers to have a thorough understanding of the agencies and reporting mechanisms in place to assist with terrorism investigations.

Finally, in order to best capitalize on their positions as the “boots on the ground” for this anti-terrorism effort, local police officers need to be aware of suspicious activities within their communities. The results of this study tell a conflicting story regarding whether this condition is met. While most officers believe there is some sharing of this type of information with local law enforcement, they also believe that it is inadequate. Many officers are of the opinion that information does not necessarily get to those officers who are best equipped to act on it, nor is it always received in a timely fashion. This timely information would be useful to local officers as they try to focus their intelligence gathering efforts.

**Implications for policy:**

The surveys and interviews provide a variety of perspectives of the officers and suggest some ideas for improvement of anti-terrorism policy implementation. Virtually every officer interviewed stated that their involvement in terrorism prevention has improved since September 11, 2001, but improvements are still needed. Additionally, as seen in Table 5-11, public opinion is also in favor of having changes made to government agencies responsible for protecting them from terrorism. Therefore, possible modifications to this policy and its implementation appear to be justified.

Improving information sharing was a common theme articulated by survey and interview respondents. One police chief and another officer working specifically on homeland security issues specifically mentioned intelligence-based policing as a means of effectively integrating local police
officers into the anti-terrorism effort. In this system, officer actions are based solely on the most recent intelligence. For example, if credible information indicates there is a terrorist cell that is planning to purchase large quantities of explosives, the police would act on this intelligence and plan an operation to intercede and prevent this acquisition. Essential to this concept of policing, however, is accurate and timely information. If officers are routinely receiving false intelligence reports, the process breaks down and if the intelligence is received by officers after the event has occurred, the process is equally fruitless. Therefore, to make this type of policing effective, four conditions must exist: (1) intelligence must be gathered; (2) this intelligence needs to be analyzed; (3) the information needs to be disseminated in a timely fashion; and (4) officers must take action in accordance with the received intelligence.

Successful execution of this method of policing is dependent on the inputting of intelligence into the system. The previous section discussed how local police officers are already providing this intelligence to regional and federal anti-terrorism agencies. Therefore, the first condition is being satisfied.

The next two conditions, analysis and dissemination of information, are still not fully developed. A strong intelligence repository is essential to this process and the fusion centers appear to be the best system currently in place. Fusion centers need to have analysts capable of making rapid and accurate judgments regarding terrorism activities. These judgments will often have to be made based on imperfect information making this task especially challenging. Despite this difficulty, this role is fundamental to successful implementation of intelligence-based policing. Equally important is the dissemination of this information to officers. Obviously, action based on intelligence requires the officers to have the intelligence. However, discretion and guidance also must be part of this process. Terrorism intelligence should be provided only when specific action needs to be taken. Additionally, the type of action to be taken should also be specifically stated. For example, some situations may require officers actually arrest certain individuals while other scenarios only necessitate further surveillance. The
analysts and their compatriots are the persons in the best position to make these evaluations. To accomplish this goal, political actors at the state, regional, and federal levels should provide ample resources to intelligence repositories like the fusion centers and access to this information needs to be enhanced. The inclusion of local law enforcement in this manner needs to be a priority of anti-terrorism policy makers.

A coherent training program should be developed and implemented by the federal government regarding the gathering of terrorism-related intelligence. Rather than having every department pick and choose how to teach this skill, standard instruction needs to be developed that can be utilized by all departments regardless of their location or budget. An online training course could be developed initially and made available to every department in the United States. Basic awareness of recent tactics, techniques, and other behaviors of terrorist organizations within the United States could serve as the foundation of this type of instruction. Over time, more extensive blocks of instruction could be developed. One officer interviewed described a training program he leads that lasts one week and involves classroom and live exercises that help to hone observational skills and intelligence gathering capabilities. Ideally, this type of program could be standardized and administered to all departments.

Federal anti-terrorism policy needs to be centralized and streamlined. As described in Chapter 2, numerous federal agencies currently have a role to play in the anti-terrorism effort. All of these organizations have their own sets of procedures, jurisdictions, and priorities and these differences only serve to complicate implementation efforts. As one interview subject pointed out, the federal government needs to define the roles between these agencies regarding anti-terrorism implementation. This type of clarification would likely streamline efforts and simplify matters for federal agencies as well as local departments.

The suggestions presented here are certainly not exhaustive. These recommendations do offer a starting point for discussions regarding the direction of anti-terrorism policy. Regardless of the actual
outcomes reached in the future, acknowledgement of the importance of local law enforcement in the implementation of such policy is essential and their inclusion in the decision making process would be beneficial.

Theoretical implications:

Several of Lipsky’s (1980) theoretical expectations have been supported by the results of this project. The first of these expectations is satisfied since the goals of police officers are not necessarily congruent with the goals of officials responsible for the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. A couple of interview respondents mentioned that the primary focus of local law enforcement is not on preventing terrorism a reality that is in stark contrast to the goals of anti-terrorism policy implementation. Information asymmetry, the second expectation of Lipsky’s (1980) theory, is also clearly present. In the case of anti-terrorism policy, local level officers seldom have as much information regarding terrorism investigations and analysis compared to their superiors and other anti-terrorism personnel. There are definitely multiple principles overseeing the implementation of anti-terrorism policy confirming Lipsky’s third expectation. The FBI, DHS, and ICE are all federal agencies responsible for preventing terrorism. Additionally, local police chiefs and department homeland security officers are also tasked with implementing anti-terrorism policy. This creates a situation where line-level officers have a myriad of principles to report to regarding anti-terrorism activities. The fourth expectation, that local law enforcement officers have discretion regarding the implementation of anti-terrorism policy, is also met. All terrorism intelligence gathering efforts necessitate local police officer assistance yet these officers have considerable leeway in this process. Finally, as Lipsky (1980) predicted, the presence of these factors can result in implementation that is different from the original intent of anti-terrorism policy. Integration of local and federal agencies in the anti-terrorism effort may not be as effective as desired because of the goal incongruence, multiple principles, information asymmetry, and police officer discretion.
This study reinforces the need for specifically investigating the relationship between street-level bureaucrats and policy implementation. To understand how these street-level bureaucrats are impacting anti-terrorism efforts it is necessary to obtain their opinions and understanding of the process and situation. Conclusions reached based on these opinions are vital to accurately portraying the implementation landscape, at least with regards to national anti-terrorism policy. For example, this policy area is particularly difficult to analyze. There are no dollar figures that can provide insight into how well terrorism is being prevented. Even arrest records only tell part of the story. Therefore, several limitations exist when assessing the efficacy of local anti-terrorism policy implementation.

The results and conclusions reached in this study provide evidence that information asymmetry is likely the dominant expectation predicting police behavior. The interviews and survey responses indicate a willingness among local law enforcement agents to engage in anti-terrorism efforts, and a belief that it is important for them to take an active role. However, many officers express an inability to assist in this manner due to lack of information. A difference in goals between police officers and other anti-terrorism agents does not greatly impact their decisions regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation. The number of principles requesting or requiring terrorism intelligence also does not appear to greatly influence decisions made by line officers. Rather, the lack of information appears to be the primary reason local police officers seldom focus on anti-terrorism efforts. This suggests that information asymmetry should be more closely examined within other policy arenas when testing Lipsky’s (1980) theory.

Emphasis on accountability may also be misplaced, at least based on the conclusions of this study. Certainly police officers are held accountable to their superiors, but anti-terrorism policy implementation is a little unique in that federal agencies do not appear to conduct such rigorous oversight of local police departments. Local police departments are not within any kind of chain of command that really allows for this type of oversight by the FBI, DHS, ICE, or any other federal law
enforcement agency. As a result, implementation of federal policy through local police departments does not adhere to typical accountability standards. Researchers interested in studying street-level bureaucrats should consider this implication when developing their studies by considering the complexity of this relationship between local bureaucracies and their federal counterparts.

Finally, this study looked at a broad policy area. Rather than looking at one specific policy, anti-terrorism policy in its entirety was considered and analyzed which allowed for broader interpretations and perspectives from the respondents. Researchers interested in studying complex policies where street-level bureaucrats may not be aware of specific details of the policy should consider analysis of the general policy area.

Future research:

The research done for this study has been informative regarding how police officers implement national anti-terrorism policy. Several important theoretical and policy implications were derived from the results of this research. However, there is much work that should be done to further develop and strengthen these findings.

First, the scope of the research conducted in this study should be broadened. Interviewing and surveying more police officers from several other communities around the country would make the results more generalizable to the entire country. Cities such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles should be included. But, smaller communities should also be analyzed from various regions of the United States. Similarities and differences between these communities would be valuable to determining the universality of certain opinions and perspectives.

Secondly, including specific analysis of federal agencies should be included. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) emphasized the importance of analyzing the federal and street-level perspectives of a policy in order to have a thorough and complete understanding of the mechanisms involved in the decision-making process by both principles and agents. In this case, interviews and surveys of FBI and DHS
personnel would be extremely informative. The perspectives of these principles would provide greater understanding of the rationale behind the original policies therefore allowing for accurate interpretation of the original intent. This information could then be compared to the specific goals of the street-level bureaucrats tasked with implementing the policy.

Another avenue for future research would be to more closely link public opinion and police officer perspectives. Asking questions of local law enforcement that is identical to those asked of the public on various polls would be helpful to determine the differences, or similarities, between these perspectives and opinions. The public, whom police officers ostensibly serve, is an important component of the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. If the public is supportive of these efforts and in agreement on the importance of such policies, the implementation should, at least in theory, be more effective. Understanding these opinions and differences would add yet another layer of insight into this complex issue.

Finally, future research should attempt to link action to beliefs. Arrest rates, active investigations, and other anti-terrorism activities should be compared to the beliefs of officers. This may be challenging considering how few officers believe they are actively involved in anti-terrorism efforts, even though their beliefs may have a direct impact on anti-terrorism policy implementation. Obtaining these types of records is, however, problematic considering the classified nature of many of these investigations. Regardless, any evidence of this linkage that could be found would be useful to see if the results and conclusions found in this study are supported. This study has provided a glimpse into the role of street-level bureaucrats within anti-terrorism police implementation and serves as a strong foundation for future research.
Collaboration with local law enforcement

Investigate terrorism incidents

Investigation collaboration on terrorism incidents

Investigate and prosecute

Intelligence gathering and analysis

State and local creation and input

Immigration enforcement

Investigation of financial crimes

Alerted by state and local law enforcement

State and local assistance as needed

FBI

DHS

US Attorneys

COPS

TSA

Intelligence

ICE

Secret Service

JTTFs

Investigations

NCTC

Local law enforcement and Community Collaboration

Airport Security

Fusion Centers

Collaboration with local law enforcement

Note:
- Chart based on information from DOJ, FBI, DHS, and Secret Service websites and interview responses
- Chart does not represent organizational charts for any; rather, this is descriptive of anti-terrorism role of agencies involved
Figure 5-1: Terrorism Policy Knowledge

Do you know the federal policy?

Do you know the state policy?

Do you know your department's policy?

Is department policy similar to federal policy?
Figure 5-2: Demographics/Background

Age

Gender

Race

Party Identification

Ideology

Years in Law Enforcement

Number of Years at Current Position

Role in Preventing Terrorism

Time Spent on Anti-terror per Week

68
Figure 5–3: Terrorism Problem

Is terrorism a threat?

Ranked on scale of 0–10: 0=Strongly Disagree, 10=Strongly Agree

Should police investigate terrorism?

Ranked on scale of 0–10: 0=Strongly Disagree, 10=Strongly Agree
Figure 5-4: Federal Anti-terrorism Policy Impact

Policy is effective

Policy well communicated

Good relationship w/feds

Receive intel from feds

Feds prepared dept.

Helped prevent terrorism
Figure 5–5: Department Implementation

Cost effective

Good use of resources

Dept. does all it can

Dept. policy has changed

Adequate training
Figure 5–6: Interaction with Community

- Doesn't prevent invest. crimes
- Does not prevent other jobs
- Negative relations w/community
- Community helpful

Have not interfered widuties
Engage in anti-terrorism per mon!
Frequently Investigate terrorism

72
## Table 2-1: Local Law Enforcement Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity/Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Fed Agencies</th>
<th>Local Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTTF's</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Task Forces</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Provide intel; aid with investigations; assist with analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Centers</td>
<td>Intelligence repository</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Operate fusion centers; provide and analyze intel; disseminate intel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing</td>
<td>Dept. of Justice</td>
<td>Networking with local communities to increase intel gathering capabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-1: Community Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>307,006,550</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>$25,029</td>
<td>1,318,398</td>
<td>706,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, Missouri</td>
<td>484,684</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>$37,198</td>
<td>6,303</td>
<td>1,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gladstone, Missouri</td>
<td>28,454</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>50.70%</td>
<td>$46,535</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kansas City, Missouri</td>
<td>5,876</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>52.50%</td>
<td>$28,674</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overland Park, Kansas</td>
<td>173,688</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
<td>51.60%</td>
<td>$62,116</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawnee, Kansas</td>
<td>62,508</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>50.80%</td>
<td>$59,626</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence, Kansas</td>
<td>91,703</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>50.30%</td>
<td>$34,669</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topeka, Kansas</td>
<td>123,449</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>52.00%</td>
<td>$35,928</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leavenworth, Kansas</td>
<td>34,993 (2006)</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
<td>47.10%</td>
<td>$40,681</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources: www.census.gov and www.fbi.gov

According to the FBI website, violent crimes are “composed of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Violent crimes are defined in the UCR [Uniform Crime Reporting] Program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force” (www.fbi.gov).
Table 4-2: Benchmark Cities (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overland Park, Kansas</td>
<td>173,688</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>$62,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellevue, Washington</td>
<td>125,054</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>$62,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise, Idaho</td>
<td>206,437</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>$42,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda, California</td>
<td>70,372</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>$56,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fremont, California</td>
<td>202,714</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>$76,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chula Vista, California</td>
<td>224,841</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>$44,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulder, Colorado</td>
<td>100,035</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>$44,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakewood, Colorado</td>
<td>140,618</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>$48,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln, Nebraska</td>
<td>254,438</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>$40,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olathe, Kansas</td>
<td>123,321</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$61,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Arrow, Oklahoma</td>
<td>94,415</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>$53,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmond, Oklahoma</td>
<td>80,889</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>$54,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman, Oklahoma</td>
<td>108,152</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>$36,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving, Texas</td>
<td>202,447</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>$44,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Angelo, Texas</td>
<td>92,269</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>$32,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, Texas</td>
<td>102,675</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>$62,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garland, Texas</td>
<td>218,872</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>$49,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plano, Texas</td>
<td>272,747</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>$78,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield, Missouri</td>
<td>156,659</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>$29,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar Rapids, Iowa</td>
<td>128,779</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>$43,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naperville, Illinois</td>
<td>144,731</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>$88,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesapeake, Virginia</td>
<td>223,261</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>$50,743</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boca Raton, Florida</td>
<td>85,956</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>$60,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral Springs, Florida</td>
<td>125,656</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>$58,459</td>
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</table>

Data sources: www.census.gov and www.fbi.gov
Table 5-1: Interview Subjects Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th># of Interviews</th>
<th>Avg Age</th>
<th>Race(s)</th>
<th>Gender(s)</th>
<th>Avg Exp</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gladstone, MO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Wht, Lat</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10 1/2</td>
<td>0:46:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence, KS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26 1/3</td>
<td>1:22:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leavenworth, KS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28 2/3</td>
<td>1:50:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, MO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20 1/2</td>
<td>2:07:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overland Park, KS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>55 1/3</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33 1/3</td>
<td>2:22:46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kansas City, MO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23 1/4</td>
<td>1:01:57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawnee, KS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18 1/3</td>
<td>1:44:28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topeka, KS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0:38:45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2: Respondent Knowledge of Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge Level</th>
<th>Fed Policy</th>
<th>State Policy</th>
<th>Dept Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know some</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know most</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know all</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No policy</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-3: Relationship with Federal Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>% Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Strongly Disagree &amp; Disagree</th>
<th>% Don't Know</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Strongly Agree</th>
<th>% Agree &amp; Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dept works well with feds</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed policy well communicated to dept</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feds have prepared dept well</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed policy is effective</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed policy has helped dept prevent terrorism</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept receives intel from feds</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5-4: Terrorism Threat & Local Police Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Raw Data for Terrorism Threat</th>
<th>% of Respondents Making Choice for Threat</th>
<th>Raw Data for Local Officer Worthiness</th>
<th>% of Respondents Making Choice for Worthiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disagree, 0-3 100 21.8% 30 6.5%
Mixed, 4-6 158 34.4% 107 23.3%
Agree, 7-10 201 43.8% 322 70.2%

Scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree

### Table 5-5: Anti-terrorism Activities per Month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times/month</th>
<th>Raw Number of Responses</th>
<th>% of Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26+</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5-6: Impact of Federal Policy on Job Execution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>Fed Policy Does Not Prevent Other Investigations</th>
<th>Fed Policy Does Not Prevent Other Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree and Disagree</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree and Agree</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5-7: Resource Availability within Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>% Responses for Cost Effectiveness</th>
<th>% Responses for Good Use of Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree and Disagree</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree and Strongly agree</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-8: Anti-terrorism Implementation has not Interfered with other Duties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Options</th>
<th>Raw Data of Responses Selecting Options</th>
<th>% of Total Responses Selecting Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, 0-3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed, 4-6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree, 7-10</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree

Table 5-9: Anti-terrorism Efforts have had Negative Impact on Community Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Options</th>
<th>Raw Data of Option Selections</th>
<th>% of Total Responses Selecting Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree and Disagree</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree and Strongly Agree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-10: Community Has been Helpful with Anti-terrorism Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Options</th>
<th>Raw Data of Response Selections</th>
<th>% of Total Response Selections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, 0-3</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed, 4-6</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree, 7-10</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 0 = "Strongly Disagree", 10 = "Strongly Agree"
Table 5-11: Police Opinions and Public Opinions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Survey Responses:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed policy is effective</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept and feds work well together</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept does all it can to implement policy</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-terrorism policy worth implementing by local police</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism is a threat to the community</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Survey Responses:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very/somewhat worried someone in family will be victim of terrorism</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have confidence in govt to protect from terrorism</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely there will terrorist attack in 2006</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt agencies have made country safer from terrorism</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There will be an attack in next year</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists are likely to attack smaller cities</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major changes needed in govt agencies that prevent terrorism</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Polling data found at www.gallup.com*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORRY</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism?</td>
<td>Very, somewhat, not too, not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENCE</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>How much confidence do you have in the U.S. government to protect its citizens from future terrorist attacks?</td>
<td>A great deal, a fair amount, not very much, none at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006_ATTACK</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Just your best guess, do you think it is likely - or unlikely - that there will be a major terrorist attack in the United States in 2006?</td>
<td>Likely, unlikely, no opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVT_EFFECT</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Thinking now about the government agencies responsible for preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, do you think the actions of these agencies since September 11, 2001, have made the country:</td>
<td>A lot safer, a little safer, no difference, a little less safe, a lot less safe, no opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACK</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Do you think there will - or will not - be a major terrorist attack in the United States over the next twelve months?</td>
<td>Yes, will; no, will not; no opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Which comes closer to your view about where terrorists would be likely to target an attack against the United States:</td>
<td>Only New York City or big cities; any place in the U.S.; no opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Based on what you have heard or read, do you think the government agencies responsible for preventing terrorist attacks in the United States are in need of:</td>
<td>Complete overhaul, major reforms, minor reforms, no reforms at all, no opinion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All data from www.gallup.com
Appendix A:

Interview Questions for “National Security Policy Influence on Street-Level Bureaucrats” Project

1. Demographic Information:
   a. Name, position, gender, party identification, ideology, age, and religious affiliation
2. Professional (law enforcement, political, etc.) training
3. Why did you want to become a police officer?
4. How long have you been in law enforcement? How long with your current agency?
5. What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy (in own words)?
6. How often have you had cause to investigate a suspected terrorist incident?
7. What anti- or counter-terrorism training have you had?
8. Have you made a specific effort to search for terrorists and/or terrorist activity?
9. How has anti-terrorism policy changed during your time on the force?
10. How much of a threat is terrorism within your community?
11. How are resources allocated relative to anti-terrorism efforts?
12. How would you describe the “average” terrorist?
13. What activities would you consider likely to be that of a terrorist or terrorist organization?
14. How much discretion do you have to determine which leads to follow-up and which to ignore relative to possible terrorist activity?
15. How much interaction do you have with local communities regarding terrorism prevention?
16. How important is anti-terrorism policy relative to the execution of your job?
17. How interested are you in pursuing potential terrorism leads?
18. Do you feel additional pressure to pursue/follow-up on terrorism leads from your superiors and/or the community at large?
19. How do you view your role in the broader anti-terrorism effort nationwide?
20. Has federal anti-terrorism policy impacted your work expectations from your superiors, politicians, and the community?
21. Has anti-terrorism efforts impacted your ability to adequately enforce other laws and pursue other crimes?
22. Have anti-terrorism efforts created any conflict between law enforcement and local communities?
23. When considering anti-terrorism policy execution, how important are the feelings and opinions of your local community that you serve?
24. How effectively are you, personally, executing anti-terrorism mandates?
25. What anti-terrorism mandates/orders have you been given?
26. In what ways is it best to determine the success, or failure, of anti-terrorism efforts?
27. What changes would you make to anti-terrorism policy?
Appendix B:

Directions: Please answer the following questions about anti-terrorism policy to the best of your ability. Please do not put your name on this survey. This survey should take approximately 5-7 minutes to complete. Thank you for your time and assistance with this survey.

For questions 1 through 23, please circle the answer that, in your opinion, best answers each question.

1. Number of years as a law enforcement officer (circle one):
   1. 0-5 years
   2. 6-10 years
   3. 11-15 years
   4. 16+ years

2. Number of years at current position (circle one):
   1. 0-5 years
   2. 6-10 years
   3. 11-15 years
   4. 16+ years

3. Do you know the federal government’s anti-terrorism policy?
   1. I do not know the policy
   2. I know some of the policy
   3. I know most of the policy
   4. I know all of the policy

4. Do you know your state’s anti-terrorism policy?
   1. I do not know the policy
   2. I know some of the policy
   3. I know most of the policy
   4. I know all of the policy

5. Do you know your department’s anti-terrorism policy?
   1. I do not know the policy
   2. I know some of the policy
   3. I know most of the policy
   4. I know all of the policy
6. Your department’s anti-terrorism policy is similar to federal anti-terrorism policy (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

7. The federal government has done a high quality job of preparing my department to prevent terrorism (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

8. Federal anti-terrorism policy is effective (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

9. Federal anti-terrorism policy is adequately communicated to my department (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

10. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from investigating other crimes (circle one):
    1. Strongly disagree (1)
    2. Disagree (2)
    3. Don’t know (3)
    4. Agree (4)
    5. Strongly agree (5)

11. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from completing other job related tasks (circle one):
    1. Strongly disagree (1)
    2. Disagree (2)
    3. Don’t know (3)
4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly agree (5)

12. Anti-terrorism policy is cost effective within my department (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

13. Federal anti-terrorism policy has helped my department prevent terrorism (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

14. Your role within your department is directly involved in preventing terrorism (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

15. You have received adequate anti-terrorism training (circle one):
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

16. How much time do you spend on anti-terrorism activities per week?
   1. 0-5 hours
   2. 6-10 hours
   3. 11-15 hours
   4. 16-20 hours
   5. 21+ hours

17. Taking steps to prevent terrorism is a worthwhile use of your department’s resources.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
2. Disagree (2)
3. Don’t know (3)
4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly agree (5)

18. Your department and the federal government work well together with regards to executing anti-terrorism policy.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

19. Your department receives anti-terrorism intelligence form the federal government in a timely manner.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

20. Your department does as much as it should to help the national anti-terrorism effort.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

21. Anti-terrorism efforts you have conducted have had a negative impact on your relationship with your community.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

22. Anti-terrorism policy within my department has changed significantly since 2001.
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly agree (5)

23. You, typically, have the opportunity to actively engage in anti-terrorism activities about how many times a month:
   1. 0-5 times
   2. 6-10 times
   3. 11-15 times
   4. 16-20 times
   5. 21-25 times
   6. 26+ times

For questions 24 through 28, circle the number on the scale that best represents your opinion. 0 = strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree

24. The community you serve has been helpful in your efforts to prevent and/or respond to terrorist activity.
   Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Strongly Agree

25. Anti-terrorism policy is something worth doing at the local level.
   Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Strongly Agree

26. Terrorism is a threat within your community.
   Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Strongly Agree

27. Anti-terrorism policy expectations have not interfered with your ability to carry out your law enforcement duties.
   Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Strongly Agree

   Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Strongly Agree

Questions 29 and 30 are on a different scale, please pay close attention to the scale for each question and circle the number that most closely represents you.

29. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your partisanship (Democrat or Republican):
   Strong
   Democrat
   Strong
   Republican
30. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your ideology (liberal or conservative):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For questions 31 through 33 please circle the answer that most accurately describes you.

31. Gender:
   1. Female
   2. Male

32. Race:
   1. White
   2. African American
   3. Asian
   4. Latino
   5. Other (please specify): __________________________

33. Age:
   1. 20-25
   2. 26-30
   3. 31-35
   4. 36-40
   5. 41-45
   6. 46-50
   7. 51-55
   8. 55+

34. Please use the space below to add any further comments you may have regarding the effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy implementation within your department.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Appendix C:

CODE BOOK FOR SURVEY

(** Bolded names refer to variable names in data set.)

**ID:** number assigned to each respondent. Prefix 19XXX are respondents from the on-line survey. Respondents prefix 18XXX are from Lawrence, KS. Respondents prefix 17XXX are from Shawnee, KS. Respondents prefix 16XXX are from Gladstone, MO. Respondents prefix 15XXX are from North Kansas City, MO. Respondents 14XXX are from Leavenworth, KS. Respondents prefix 13XXX are from Independence, MO. Respondents 12XXX are from Kansas City, MO. Respondents 11XXX are from Raytown, MO.

1. Number of years as a law enforcement officer (circle one): **YEAREX**
   1. 0-5 years
   2. 6-10 years
   3. 11-15 years
   4. 16+ years

2. Number of years at current position (circle one): **YEARS**
   1. 0-5 years
   2. 6-10 years
   3. 11-15 years
   4. 16+ years

3. Do you know the federal government’s anti-terrorism policy? **FED_POLICY**
   1. I do not know the policy
   2. I know some of the policy
   3. I know most of the policy
   4. I know all of the policy

4. Do you know your state’s anti-terrorism policy? **STATE_POLICY**
   1. I do not know the policy
   2. I know some of the policy
   3. I know most of the policy
   4. I know all of the policy

5. Do you know your department’s anti-terrorism policy? **DEPT_POLICY**
1. I do not know the policy
2. I know some of the policy
3. I know most of the policy
4. I know all of the policy
5. My departments does not have a policy

6. Your department’s anti-terrorism policy is similar to federal anti-terrorism policy (circle one):
   - **PARITY_POLICY**
     1. Strongly disagree (1)
     2. Disagree (2)
     3. Don’t know (3)
     4. Agree (4)
     5. Strongly agree (5)
     6. My department does not have a policy

7. The federal government has done a high quality job of preparing my department to prevent terrorism (circle one): **FED_QUALITY**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

8. Federal anti-terrorism policy is effective (circle one): **FED_EFFECT**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

9. Federal anti-terrorism policy is adequately communicated to my department (circle one):
   - **FED_COM**
     1. Strongly disagree (1)
     2. Disagree (2)
     3. Don’t know (3)
     4. Agree (4)
     5. Strongly agree (5)

10. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from investigating other crimes (circle one):
    - **FED_CRIME**
      1. Strongly disagree (1)
2. Disagree (2)
3. Don’t know (3)
4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly agree (5)

11. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from completing other job related tasks (circle one): **FED JOB**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

12. Anti-terrorism policy is cost effective within my department (circle one): **COST**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)
   6. N/A

13. Federal anti-terrorism policy has helped my department prevent terrorism (circle one): **PREVENT**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)
   6. N/A

14. Your role within your department is directly involved in preventing terrorism (circle one): **ROLE**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

15. You have received adequate anti-terrorism training (circle one): **TRAINING**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly agree (5)

16. How much time do you spend on anti-terrorism activities per week? **TIME**
   1. 0-5 hours
   2. 6-10 hours
   3. 11-15 hours
   4. 16-20 hours
   5. 21+ hours

17. Taking steps to prevent terrorism is a worthwhile use of your department’s resources. **RESOURCES**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

18. Your department and the federal government work well together with regards to executing anti-terrorism policy. **RELATION**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

19. Your department receives anti-terrorism intelligence form the federal government in a timely manner. **INTEL**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)

20. Your department does as much as it should to help the national anti-terrorism effort. **HELP**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)
21. Anti-terrorism efforts you have conducted have had a negative impact on your relationship with your community. **COM_IMPACT**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)
   6. N/A

22. Anti-terrorism policy within my department has changed significantly since 2001. **POLICY_CHANGE**
   1. Strongly disagree (1)
   2. Disagree (2)
   3. Don’t know (3)
   4. Agree (4)
   5. Strongly agree (5)
   6. N/A

23. You, typically, have the opportunity to actively engage in anti-terrorism activities about how many times a month: **ENGAGE**
   1. 0-5 times
   2. 6-10 times
   3. 11-15 times
   4. 16-20 times
   5. 21-25 times
   6. 26+ times

For questions 24 through 28, circle the number on the scale that best represents your opinion. 0 = strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree

24. The community you serve has been helpful in your efforts to prevent and/or respond to terrorist activity. **COM_HELP**
   Strongly Disagree       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

25. Anti-terrorism policy is something worth doing at the local level. **POLICY_LOCAL**
   Strongly Disagree       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

26. Terrorism is a threat within your community. **COM_THREAT**
   Strongly Disagree       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
27. Anti-terrorism policy expectations have not interfered with your ability to carry out your law enforcement duties. INTERFERE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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28. You frequently investigate terrorism threats. INVESTIGATE

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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Questions 29 and 30 are on a different scale, please pay close attention to the scale for each question and circle the number that most closely represents you.

29. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your partisanship (Democrat or Republican):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
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30. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your ideology (liberal or conservative):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For questions 31 through 33 please circle the answer that most accurately describes you.

31. Gender: GENDER
   1. Female
   2. Male

32. Race: RACE
   1. White
   2. African American
   3. Asian
   4. Latino (Includes Mexican-American)
   5. Native American
   6. Multi-racial/ethnic
   7. Pacific Islander

33. Age: AGE
   1. 20-25
34. Please use the space below to add any further comments you may have regarding the effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy implementation within your department.

COMMENTS

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________
Appendix D:

**Master’s Thesis Interview Summaries:**

Name of interviewee: _____
Date of interview: [Click here to enter a date.]
Recording Code: _____
Department: [Choose an item.]
Rank/Position/Job: _____
Years as officer: _____
Age: _____
Gender: [Choose an item.]
Race: [Choose an item.]
Party affiliation: [Choose an item.]
Ideology: [Choose an item.]
Religious affiliation: [Choose an item.]
Investigated Terrorism: [Choose an item.]

Terrorism definition:

Department’s terrorism policy:

Terrorism training:

Threat of terrorism in community:

Local law enforcement role in national terrorism effort:

Relationship with other departments/agencies (local, state, federal): 

How to measure terrorism policy:

Balance between security and liberty:

What changes needed:

Other notable comments/information:

Interviewer comments:
References:


Walker, L., & Gilson, L. (2004). 'We are bitter but we are satisfied': nurses as street-level bureaucrats in South Africa. *Social Science & Medicine, 59*, 1251-1261.


