WALKING AND THE REINVENTION OF SPACE

BY

ROBERT J. TOPINKA

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_______________________________
Chairperson Frank Farmer

_______________________________
Philip Barnard

_______________________________
Dave Tell

Date Defended: April 14, 2011
The Thesis Committee for ROBERT J. TOPINKA
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

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Chairperson Frank Farmer

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Through the figure of the walker, this thesis considers the relationship between rhetoric and space, where rhetoric is understood as embodied, performative action and space is considered both as a material artifact and an ideological production. While it is a basic tenet of rhetoric that it always occurs in a given location, only recently have scholars of rhetoric begun to privilege space both as a theoretical lens and as part of everyday rhetorical practice. By positioning the walker as an embodied rhetorical agent in two spaces typical of everyday life in capitalist societies—suburban Iowa Street in Lawrence, Kansas, and a nature park built upon an inoperative coal mine in Newcastle England—this thesis attends to space as it both constrains and enables agency in different spatial milieus.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1: Walking with Kairos: Reclaiming Time in Suburban Space............................................. 19


Conclusion: (Re)walking Spatial Ideologies..................................................................................59
Introduction

Project Overview

In this thesis I argue that space and rhetoric are mutually illuminating concepts. Rhetoric is always spatial because it must be performed, and this performance always entails material presence in a given location (or space). Space is rhetorical because its production includes not only physical features but symbolic representations and lived experiences of those features. These representations and experiences are negotiated rhetorically. Thus rhetoric and space engage theory and praxis simultaneously: Theoretical and interpretive frameworks inform our understandings of lived experience, and lived experience in turn informs theoretical and interpretive frameworks.

Investigation of performative rhetorics in everyday life reveals the extent to which both rhetoric and space constitute ways of knowing, thinking, and being in the world. My argument thus joins a discussion inaugurated by Roxanne Mountford’s notion of rhetorical space, which she defines as “the geography of a communicative event,” a geography shaped by a particular “cultural and material arrangement” (42).

To examine these geographies, I position the walker as an embodied, performative rhetorician in two spaces typical of late capitalism: A suburban commercial zone in Lawrence, Kansas and a nature reserve built upon an inoperative coal mine in Newcastle, England. Drawing on primarily Marxist theories of space and everyday life as well as the topics, kairos, decorum, and invention, this thesis argues that the embodied performance of the walker negotiates and potentially interrupts the ideological workings of space. Since the latter is produced through a dialectic among material environment, symbolic representations, and lived experience, the walker simultaneously intervenes on the level of the material, the historical, and the everyday. The topics, or ideological commonplaces, clarify this connection between the rhetorical and the spatial. When understood with
recourse to the commonplace, the topics can be seen as places marked by ideologies that provide rhetoricians with equipment for invention. The spaces of everyday life are infused with commonplaces that inform rhetorical action in space. Focusing on how capitalism produces space, rhetoric, and everyday life—and the potential for altering or disrupting this production—this thesis argues that walking is rhetorical and spatial, and that attending to the ideologies of everyday life requires attention to both rhetoric and space.

**Practical Rhetorical Theory**

In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines rhetoric as the “faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (181). These available means of persuasion are always determined in part by the discursive situation. As discussions of discourse have assumed a central role in postmodern theories, discursive persuasion has been given new potency. Aristotle did not couch his discussion in terms of discourse, but the postmodern shift to the powers of language can illuminate what he had to say about rhetoric. Discourse channels power relations, discourse inflects constructions of identity, and discourse inscribes itself onto the body itself. Study of any of these manifestations of discourse requires attention to where discourse happens—to context, which always includes bodies that are shaped by discourse. This focus on bodies and embodiment, championed by Foucault and Judith Butler, among others, raises questions about the location of discursive ideologies. I will argue here that embodiment always exists spatially, and if discourse inscribes itself onto the body, then discourse inscribes itself into space as well.

Discussion of the role of discourse has been central to much of postmodern thinking. While discourse contributes to the production of ideologies informing everyday life, there is not always a text to read or a speech to hear. Sometimes rhetoric can be read in the shape and form of material and spatial environments. As I will elaborate below, I define space in this thesis as the dialectic
among linguistic or symbolic understandings, lived experience, and material environment. In other words, space is never only figurative, or only a site for action, or only a set of material constraints. Rather, it is the interplay among symbols, experiences, and materiality that produces space. Because rhetorical invention depends so heavily on context, attending to the production of space reveals the possibilities and problems for embodied invention in everyday spaces.

Yet Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* does not explicitly attend to spatial understandings of rhetoric. Fortunately, polymath that he was, Aristotle does address the concept of place in *Physics*, where he admits that “the question, what is place? presents many difficulties.” Part of Aristotle’s answer to this difficult question lies in the rejection of the void. It is a cliché (although a useful one) to remind ourselves that nothing occurs in a vacuum. Similarly, for Aristotle, everything has a place; no thing exists in a void. He writes that “the existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement. Where water now is, there in turn, when the water has gone out as from a vessel, air is present.” What once contained water now contains air; the vessel is never empty, so it never becomes a void. But for Aristotle, the vessel is still a vessel; place, in other words, is still a separate entity from the thing it contains. Aristotle distinguishes between place and form. An object has a given shape or form, and this form is inseparable from the object. Matter (say, a plastic beach ball) takes a form (spherical, flat, or round, depending on how much air it contains). Still, the form and matter of the beach ball are inseparable. Place, on the other hand, can always be separated from the thing it contains: “The form and the matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated…Hence the place of a thing is neither part nor a state of it, but is separable from it. For place is supposed to be something like a vessel—the vessel being a transportable place. But the vessel is no part of the thing.” In this conception, place is a container that can contain anything but never nothing. It is never empty, because then it would be a void, but neither is it part of the thing it
contains. Running water might be in one place at one moment and an entirely different place at another, but it is always in a place. No thing can exist without place.

There is much more to discuss in Aristotle’s understanding of place, but it is clear from this brief discussion that Aristotle did in fact attend to emplacement, if in a quite different place than Rhetoric. To be sure, Aristotle’s Physics are far removed from the familiar terrain of invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. Yet Aristotle did in fact emplace rhetoric, largely through the topics or topos, which he elaborates most fully in Topics. The term appears frequently in Rhetoric as well, highlighting the connection between persuasion and location. Indeed, the word topos means “place” in Greek. While I do not wish to draw facile connections among Physics, Topics, and Rhetoric, it is worth emphasizing that these works do share an emphasis on place. Rhetoric (like everything else, Aristotle might argue) does not exist in a void. It always has a place. Rhetoricians, then, ought to be interested in place and space, and what location means for persuasion. Thus whenever I refer to the commonplace, I mean the word both in the rhetorical sense of the topoi and in the everyday sense of the obvious, the expected, the usual. The everyday meaning points to generally accepted truths. The rhetorical commonplace offers the rhetor tools for persuasion, and these tools are based on the expectations of the audience. Frequently audience expectations fall in line with what is commonplace, or what is generally accepted as true. Thus the commonplace is both a site for invention and a site of ideology.

The topics are an important rhetorical starting point for understanding space and place. Quintilian defined the topics as “the secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth” (V x 20). The topics are thus a tool for invention. By going to a topic, rhetoricians can generate arguments. Although there are mental spaces where rhetoricians can figuratively go to make an argument, in this thesis I mean that rhetoricians quite literally go to and

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physically move in topics. The topics take us to commonplaces, or ideologies readily available to everyone in a given community. In other words, they point us to common sense. In this thesis, I argue that these ideologies always exist materially. To move in material space is to trace the contours of ideologies. When we act within a given space, we must invent within the constraints of that space. Going to a topic is not always the same as exerting mastery over a topic. Ideologies often precede action, and topics constrain action even as they make it possible. Common sense makes action communicable by squaring away intelligible terms for action, but these terms also limit invention, even if these limits often go unacknowledged. Indeed, common sense can become pernicious precisely because it resists questioning.

A theoretical framework that asks questions of common sense would provide a basis for understanding how the topics inform and influence everyday life. Yet problems emerge for any theoretical treatment of the topics. Aristotle’s conception of the topics might be likened to a neatly organized tool box; faced with a given situation, the rhetorician simply selects the appropriate topic and deploys it. Understood in this way, the topics seem geared more toward praxis than theory. As many scholars have argued, rhetoric “is, in Aristotle’s scheme of things, a narrowly circumscribed set of skills” (Gross 35). Yet embodied, performative action in space complicates this narrowly circumscribed toolbox: In a given spatial milieu, the embodied rhetorician encounters limits and possibilities, room for movement and material constraints, all of which are articulated by common sense. Theory can usefully interrogate this common sense, uncovering its ideological production. Still, this performative rhetorician presents problems for theorists. In a 2006 issue of Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Michael Leff’s brief essay relates his “conversion” from a scholar interested in developing an interpretive theory out of Aristotle’s *Topics* into a scholar more interested in “performance” and “action” than in theoretical schemas. It is worth quoting Leff’s description of the topics and their possible (and always practical) uses at length:
They are precepts that have potential application to specific cases, and their most important function is as a training device. Proper use of the topics helps develop a capacity for arguing in precisely those situations where theory offers the least guidance. Consequently, the effort to discover or produce a theory of topics seems totally misdirected, and more generally, the whole program of turning rhetoric into a theoretical discipline has lost its appeal. To train rhetoricians as theorists is much like attempting to train basketball coaches not to pay attention to the game as it is actually played but to prepare them to produce treatises on the theory of the jump shot. (208)

The sports analogy is interesting and, on the face of things, quite intuitive. It would be a poor coach indeed who only taught players how to discuss a jump shot and not how to take one. But this analogy also makes a separation that does not exist in practice: The “theory of the jump shot”—or ideas about how best to take one—is not separate from “the game as it is actually played.” Good coaches watch the game as it is played and then “theorize” about it, looking for ways to improve their players. After all, the game used to be played with only set shots; it took some interpretation and theorization to arrive at the jump shot, a much more effective and powerful way of throwing a round ball toward a round hole.

I do not wish to stretch this basketball analogy too far, but it does point to at least two central problems any scholar of rhetoric faces. First, ancient rhetoric was something quite different from contemporary rhetoric, and the one does not directly connect with the other. Second, it is difficult to define what rhetoric actually is. Aristotle claims it is “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (181) Similarly, Cicero argues that “the orator must speak to persuade” (xv). Quintillian called it “the art of speaking well” (362). These definitions seem to
support Leff’s argument that rhetoric is in fact a practical, performative activity, one centered on the production of discourse rather than the interpretation of it.

Yet the topics also point to more than practical activity. Carolyn Miller, for example, argues that the topics demonstrate the “generative potential of the familiar” (134). Ralph Cintrón links the topics to Aristotle’s *energia*, defining the topics as “storehouses of social energy” (101). It is the social nature of the topics that calls for theory. To be sure, a rhetorician deploying a topic in context is engaged in a practical activity, but this activity can also be understood with recourse to theory. For example, when a government enacts legislation that contravenes the will of the people, protestors will often travel to the government’s capitol building, ready to chant slogans and wave signs. These signs and slogans are clearly rhetoric designed to persuade a public audience. Yet perhaps more important than the signs is the sight of bodies in space. By occupying the symbolic space of the government, protestors embody their opposition. For the protestors, it is thus practical to travel to the capitol as the site of governmental power. For the theorist, though, this site of governmental power calls for investigation, for inquiry into its articulation as power, and for examination of how the practical activity of the protestors re-articulate that power. Focusing on how Ecuadorians attempt to assert themselves as legitimate national citizens by embodying an indigenous subject position, Christa Olson argues that these appeals to legitimacy made “performances increasingly corporeal and animated the rhetorical force of the commonplace as embodiable” (302). Olson, in other words, examines how embodied action marshals social energy. Any search for the source of this social energy forces an encounter with the space through which this energy courses.

The transmission of energy through social space is a fundamentally rhetorical concept. Rhetoric emerges everywhere. John Bender and David E. Wellbery describe the adroitness of rhetoric and rhetoricians with their term *rhetoricality*, which describes the formlessness of modern rhetoric. They argue that rhetoric
is bound by no specific set of institutions. It manifests the groundless, infinitely ramifying character of discourse in the modern world…Rhetoric is no longer the title of a doctrine or a practice, nor a form of cultural memory; it becomes instead something like the condition of our existence. (25)

Although I hesitate to accede to any characterization of rhetoric as “groundless”—rhetoric always happens someplace—the notion of rhetoricality captures much of the postmodern focus with the role of discourse understood as the circulation of ideas, representations, and power. Instead of a practical pursuit or a mere means to an end, the notion of rhetoricality positions rhetoric as constitutive of a pervasive postmodern ontology. For scholars of Leff’s ilk, who position the topics and other classical rhetorics as performative rather than interpretive, inserting rhetoric into ontology may seem like a gross misuse of a primarily practical skill set. Yet many rhetoricians work with the same assumption as Bender and Wellbery, looking to rhetoric as it constitutes and is constituted by the classroom, digital technology, memory, and public space, just to name a few. To provide one example, Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair and Brian L. Ott “take rhetoric to be a set of theoretical stances and critical tactics that offer ways of understanding, evaluating, and intervening in a broad range of human activities” (3). In this conception, rhetoric is a theoretical pursuit that can provide insight into just about anything. There are no textual or practical limits to rhetoric. Again, rhetoric emerges wherever meaning does. If we accept Bender’s and Wellbery’s claim about rhetoricality, then rhetoric is ontological as we all practical.

I have left out of this discussion thus far a major focus of many rhetoricians: Social justice. Even as he argues for a more practical emphasis drawn from classical rhetoric, Alan Gross writes that the end “of rhetoric, then, its ultimate telos, is the good of the polis” (33). So rhetoric as a practical endeavor still has the good of the polis in mind. But what is good for the polis? How does one know? Dickinson, Blair and Ott define rhetoric in an ostensibly impractical way: Their focus is
on critical theory. But if critical theory is understood as a means of interrogating ideologies with the end goal of uncoupling coercive and oppressive power formations—something like Freire’s problem-posing method—then rhetoric as critical theory and rhetoric as practical pursuit do not seem so different after all. Rhetorical interpretive theory and rhetorical performative action both serve the good of the *polis*. Of course, pinning down what good of the *polis* is raises its own problems of definition and of power relations, but theory and practice can work together toward a common good even as that good remains open to question. As theory seeks to define the good of the *polis*, practice can move us closer to that good, even as our understandings of it are constantly revised and updated.

There are scholars of rhetoric who would resist such a definition focused on social justice. In a 1992 article in *College Composition and Communication*, Maxine Hairston famously argues that the writing classroom “should not be *for* anything or *about* anything other than writing itself, and how one uses it to think and learn and communicate” (181). Ultimately, this is a claim about the definition of rhetoric, one that positions it as purely practical skill set. However, as many have argued, it is never an option to “just” write. John Trimbur puts it thusly in his reply to Hairston: “What I think is really going on is that rhetoric, that ancient trickster, once again is resurfacing in the teaching of writing and raising hell by calling on students and teachers to look at how the language we use constitutes the world we live in” (248). Trimbur is pointing to rhetoric as an artifact of ontology. As I will argue below, the world we live in—the spatial stage of our everyday rhetorical production—influences our commonsense ontologies enormously. As Ellen Cushman has argued, “social change can take place in daily interactions when the regular flow of events is objectified, reflected upon, and altered” (12). In other words, social change is not a diversion from everyday life but part of its unfolding. The notion of rhetoricality places rhetoric squarely in this day-to-day unfolding of events. I am suggesting here that these events always unfold in space. Thus rhetoricians
interested in the the telos of rhetoric ought to be interested in how practical rhetorical interactions play out in the commonsense spaces that generate the ideologies of everyday life.

This overlapping of the theoretical and the practical informs the definition of rhetoric I will use in this thesis. Rhetoric is a performative act that always intervenes ideologically and ontologically, forcing a confrontation with both theory understood as the negotiation of ways of knowing, thinking, and being and practice understood as those negotiations manifested materially in text, speech, and bodies. Rhetoric does not take theory and apply it to praxis, or move from praxis to theory. Rhetoric is always both.

**Walking in Space-Time**

Aristotle argued in *Physics* that to be was to be in *place*: “that, without which no other thing is, but which itself is without the others, must be first (for place does not perish when the things in it cease to be).” Place needs to exist for all things to exist, so place is that without which no thing can be. Although it must contain a thing, place continues to exist when the thing moves. Its boundary is that of the thing, but the two are separable: “Hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable from it” (Aristotle). The thing and the place share the same contours. Thus the world, and the shape and forms of things in it, cannot be understood without recourse to place. I want to suggest here that the same is true of rhetoric: It always exists in space. I use the term space rather than place, because, as I will detail below, space encompasses time and the interconnections of all locations in a way that place cannot, despite some of the advantages the term offers.

The philosopher Edward Casey has argued at length for place to replace the primacy of space and time—or Space and Time, as he often refers to them. Although there is not enough space or time to do justice to his arguments here, it is worth highlighting some of his arguments about place. Casey attempts to counter the overriding of place by time. He offers the example of a street
that people would call either long or short, referring not to the physical distance of the street but to the time it would take to traverse the distance. Time thus steals from place. Casey argues that “time is an extension of the extensiveness of place itself as superimposed, or subincised on time—so forgetfully so that we do not realize how many of time’s supposedly ingredient properties are borrowed from place to start with” (13). In other words, when we think of time we are often thinking of a way of understanding place that substitutes an abstraction for a material reality. As Casey posits, there “is no (grasping of) time without place” (21, emphasis in original).

Casey’s work clarifies Aristotle’s assertion that no thing—even time—can exist without place. Indeed, the Greek word “atopos (literally, ‘no place) means ‘bizarre’ or ‘strange)” (Casey ix). Yet Casey’s privileging of place relies on a Cartesian conception of space as continuous and homogeneous. This is what David Harvey calls absolute space, or space that is not lived or experienced. But space need not be Space. Instead of being an absolute, it can refer instead to the dynamic interconnections among lived experience, symbolic representations, and physical environment. Although place has the virtue of signaling the particularities of location, it carries the danger of isolation. It is difficult to demarcate the limits of a given place. Space has the advantage of signaling the scales and flows of existence without carving out separations that do not exist in practice. Michel de Certeau, for example, defines place as a “configuration of positions” (117). Space, on the other hand, “is a practiced place” (117). In this thesis, I understand space with Certeau as a practiced place. This practice encompasses not only physical features but symbolic representations of those features and the everyday lived experience that emerges out of the dialectic between physical and symbolically represented space.

To elaborate how I will use space in this thesis, I will rely primarily on four theorists of space: Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, David Harvey, and Edward Soja. These theorists have developed a complex critical vocabulary to signal the production of space and what this production
means for experience in space. This vocabulary is often byzantine, and Lefebvre is perhaps the
greatest offender. In his *Production of Space*, he introduces three terms to elaborate his trialectic of
space only to introduce three more terms elaborating the three original terms. Thus the terminology
quickly becomes unwieldy. Yet some terminology is necessary to discuss space accurately and to
avoid the problems Casey finds in space understood as absolute. In order to track the critical
terminology and find a focus within it, I will begin with a brief discussion of Soja’s thirdspace
before moving on to a discussion of the terms Harvey and Lefebvre employ before turning to
Certeau and lived experience in space. Although it seems counterintuitive to introduce my own
terms into the already teeming set of spatial vocabularies, I will do so in order to draw connections
among the theories of space I will discuss. My goal is flexible conceptual clarity, precise terms that
remain open to muddling and imprecision.

All of these thinkers, it is important to note, position their work against the overwhelming
dominance of historical-dialectic thinking. Part of their collective project was thus to privilege space
as much as thinkers have longed privileged time. This is why Casey, for example, rejects analyses of
time that pay no attention to place. The thinkers I draw on here all attempt to shift the ground of
inquiry from time to space. This does not mean that they are unaware of time, but rather that they
wish to resituate it spatially. In *Thirdspace*, for example, Soja begins his project by citing the
longstanding privileging of history and sociality over spatiality: “the closely associated historical (or
temporal) and social (or sociological) imaginations have always been at the forefront in making
practical and informative sense of the subject at hand” (2). Soja seeks to correct this overreliance on
historical and social analysis with a focus on thirdspace, a term that engages the interconnections
among “spatiality-historicality-sociality” (3). Soja purposefully leaves the term open, calling above all
for attention to a “constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events, experiences and
meanings” (2). It is this perpetual reshuffling of ideas, events, and experiences that makes space
simultaneously compelling and complex. Lefebvre, whom Soja turns to in his first full chapter in *Thirdspace*, prefers to deal in threes as well, employing a trialectical analysis that “doesn’t lead to a *synthesis* in accordance with the Hegelian schema” (12). The terms in a trialectic always remain in motion, actively challenging, contesting, and redefining one another. They never fuse.

Lefebvre peppers his work with terminological triads, and while I do not wish to track all of his many terms here, Lefebvre’s perceived-conceived-lived triad can illuminate how space operates. Lefebvre elaborates this triad with spatial practice, or how space is lived and experienced; representations of space, or the systems of signs that work to conceptualize space; and representational space, or space as it is lived through that perceivable system of signs (38–39). None of these terms is separable from the other. Spatial practice emerges out of the intersection between representations of space (a system of signs) and representational space (how those signs impinge upon lived experience). Thus all the forms of space are constantly at work on one another. Although Lefebvre does not expressly address time in this triad, the interrelation of time and space forms the basis of his project in *Rhythmanalysis*, where he argues that “time and space, the cyclical and the linear, exert a reciprocal action: they measure themselves against one another” (8).

David Harvey develops his own tripartite discussion of space in his 1973 work *Social Justice and the City*, where he describes space as absolute, relative, or relational, terms he uses throughout his prodigious scholarship on space. Absolute space is the fixed space of Newton or Descartes, “and it is usually represented as a pre-existing and immovable grid amenable to standardized measurement and open to calculation” (Harvey 121). This is the space of maps, private property, and urban grids. Of course, a map of private property is not the same thing as private property itself, so absolute space alone cannot explain what space is. Relative space demonstrates “that there are multiple geometries from which to choose and that the spatial frame depends crucially upon what it is that is being relativized and by whom” (Harvey 122). In this conception, space changes according to the
frame of reference of the observer. To develop this point, Harvey references the Steinberg cartoon that shows the typical New Yorker’s view of the world: New York City appears in the forefront in full detail, New Jersey is a strip of dirt just across the Hudson River, and the rest of the US is represented by a box in which place names—Nebraska, Kansas City, Utah, and Los Angeles—are scrawled without any attempt to represent their actual position in space. For the New Yorker, the cartoon argues, New York dominates all space, and everything else is peripheral. Relative space thus introduces the perspective of the individual into space. The notion that space can be a simultaneously stable entity disappears, and time enters the framework. Space becomes space-time.

Expanding upon relative space, relational space takes the notion of perspective and carries it into all events: “An event or a thing at a point in space cannot be understood by appeal to what exists only at that point. It depends upon everything else going on around it” (Harvey 124). Each event, then, instantiates “a wide variety of disparate and swirling influences” from the past, present, and future at one point in space (Harvey 124).

None of these forms of space can be cleanly separated from the other. Absolute space, for example, might chart a property relation: A parcel of land in a given town is carved off for its owner, and a new line appears on the absolute space of the map. This parcel thus assumes quite different significance from the perspective of relative space: The parcel becomes the starting point for the owner, who now measures the space of the town from the perspective of that point. For others, though, the parcel of land is in a sense removed from the town because they do not own it or have access to it. Relational space highlights this connection and expands it, placing property relations in the context of not only the town but of the broader historical and social perspective of property relations as they exist throughout all spaces. The owner’s new land is not separate from this broader framework; it is one point of instantiation among all of those swirling influences.
I have now discussed Certeau’s space as practiced place; Soja’s thirdspace; Lefebvre’s perceived-conceived-lived triad; and David Harvey’s absolute, relative, and relational spaces. Although these terms all work to uncover space, trying to hold these terms in place while attending to their particular meanings would bury space below a flurry of jargon. I will therefore set out my own terms for discussing space. Here I do not wish to introduce new jargon but rather to synthesize some of the key ideas from the above discussion in an accessible (although not oversimplified) analytical framework. What Certeau, Soja, Lefebvre, and Harvey all share is a focus on space that does not seek to isolate any one element but rather to examine how the different forms of space interpenetrate. All of these thinkers also recognize the importance of the history of space, the connection between time and space, societal representations of space, and lived experience in space. Whenever I use the term space, I refer to a physical environment produced by and producing time, symbolic representations, history, and everyday life. When I wish to discuss space as it is conceived of and represented in society, I will refer to symbolic space. This term merges Lefebvre’s perceived and conceived categories. To refer to how space is experienced at the level of the everyday, I will refer to lived space. To signal the histories at work in space, I will use the term historical space. When I wish to refer to physical space, I will use the term material space. In other words, I will use common adjectives to modify the term space. These adjectives have the advantage of being readily understandable (unlike much jargon), but I do not wish to substitute simplicity for complexity with these terms. As Lefebvre, Soja, and Harvey demonstrate, space is never merely historical, symbolic, material, or temporal. It is, rather, that which emerges out of the dialectical interplay of all of these things. When I point to a specific aspect of space, then, I do so not to separate say, lived space from symbolic space. Instead, I wish to sharpen the focus on one aspect of space without completely blotting out the other.
It is this intermingling of interpretive framework and practical experience that space shares with rhetoric. Theorizations of space and practical experience in space simultaneously produce space. The same is true of rhetoric, which merges theory and praxis. Those who argue for a practical focus for rhetoric have a strong argument: Rhetoric is not rhetoric if it is unpracticed. The same is true of space: As Certeau argues, space is a practiced place. If space is to be understood rhetorically, then the user of space is also a rhetorical agent. There are many ways to use space—planes, trains, and automobiles among them—but the walker, whose body traces its own pattern, marks its own rhythm, and keeps its own time performs an inescapably rhetorical spatial interaction. Rhetoric cannot be understood separately from practice, and space cannot be understood separately from movement. In Aristotle’s words, “First then we must understand that place would not have been thought of, if there had not been a special kind of motion, namely that with respect to place.” The walker’s moving, embodied performance places rhetoric in space.

Any discussion of walking in space raises the figure of the flâneur; this is particularly true when that walking is intended to critique capitalist spaces. Indeed, capitalism gave rise to the flâneur, the well-heeled gentleman loner strolling the streets of the market in search of meaning. These streets were often in Paris. This is true in Luis Aragon’s Paris Peasant, in which the protagonist meanders through the Passage de l’Opéra, a moribund street in the Parisian arcades, scanning the “human tapestry” in this street of barbers, prostitutes, and cafés, reveling in the seediness because “in everything base there is some quality of the marvellous that puts me in the foot for pleasure” (37). This effort to extract the marvelous from the base echoes Baudelaire’s earlier description of the flâneur in The Painter of Modern Life. Baudelaire writes, “He makes it his business to extract from fashion whatever element it may contain of poetry within history, to distill the eternal from the transitory.” Given this description, it is no surprise that Walter Benjamin, whose ragpicker salvages insight or “profane illumination” from the refuse of history, would find in the flâneur a powerful
tool for understanding and critiquing capitalism. Benjamin describes how the flâneur gives himself over to the crowd: “Empathy is the nature of intoxication to which the flâneur abandons himself in the crowd. He...enjoys the incomparable privilege of being himself and someone else as he sees fit. Like a roving soul in search of a body, he enters another person whenever he wishes” (Benjamin 55).

Clearly, the flâneur occupies a privileged position—even a parasitic one—and this roving critique is enabled by wealth, education and gender. The flâneur is traditionally a privileged, often aristocratic, male figure. Although I am interested in walking as an everyday practice, I am not interested in walking as a pastime reserved for the rich, educated, and male.

There are other models for bodily experience of space that are less bound in privilege. The Situationists and Guy Debord offer another model for embodied critique with psychogeography, the study of the laws and effects of urban environments which, among other tactics, uses observations made while walking to critique capitalism and search for pleasure outside of relentless manufactured pricks of joy capitalism produces. Psychogeography thus positions itself as resistance to capitalism. Walking thus provides means of bodily resistance; for the psychogeographers, this entails stepping outside of capitalism. Instead of looking for pleasure or agency outside capitalism, Certeau locates agency within capitalism, searching for “ways of using the products imposed by the dominant economic order” (xiii). Certeau locates this production spatially. In his famous chapter on walking in The Practice of Everyday Life, Certeau demonstrates how using spaces produced by capitalism entails a kind of production of its own—a productive consumption. Certeau considers the walker as a rhetorician, tracing the figures the walker carves within and against dominant space.

It is thus Certeau’s model, which privileges walking while avoiding the trappings of upper-class male privilege, that most informs the walking at the center of both of the case studies in this thesis. Throughout this thesis, I refer to “the walker,” describing the experience of the walker in
space, what the walker might confront in space, and how the walker might use space. Although I am not describing who exactly this walker might be, my goal is not to offer a disembodied walker, and I do not hesitate to admit that my discussion of Iowa Street and the Rising Sun Country Park will draw significantly on my own experiences walking in those spaces. I do not wish, however, to reflect on my personal experience but rather to consider walking as a generalizable practice—much like rhetoric—which offers practical experience of and theoretical insight into the possibilities for using and reinventing space.

With the walker, then, we enter two spaces typical of late modern capitalism: Iowa Street in Lawrence, Kansas, the homogeneous suburban commercial strip that is reproduced throughout the United States, and the Rising Sun Country Park in Newcastle, England, the former site of industrial production that now offers a consumable experience of the natural. These spaces are banal, humdrum, everyday. They are, in other words, commonplace. This is precisely why they call for investigation. The everyday is often the ignored. Yet dominant ideologies exert themselves on the level of the everyday. These ideologies both constrain and enable embodied action. Decorum calls for adherence to dominant ideologies, while invention searches for new ways of using these ideologies. The walker confronts these constraints bodily. As both case studies will show, space produces itself in part by regulating movement and timing action. Because the walker carves out time with the body, walking is a kairotic act, one that can contest the spatial regulation of time. The greatest virtue of walking, though, is that it is both theorizable and practical. Walks can be planned by the individual body, and space can be organized so that it is walkable by civic bodies. To privilege walking over driving is to make an ideological—even symbolic—choice, although this choice indicates different perspectives in different spaces. Walking is also a public act. This is true no less of walks on Iowa Street than it is of walks (or marches) to capitol buildings. The walker is an embodied user of space, and the lived experience of each step writes the particularity of the single walker onto
dominant ideologies that are materially manifest in space. Simultaneously a symbolic, lived, and material act, walking is a public announcement of personal human agency within a rhetorical space governed by ideological commonplaces.
Walking with Kairos: Reclaiming Time in Suburban Space

Iowa Street in Lawrence, Kansas, starts near the Kansas River, just north of Interstate 70, and runs south to 33rd Street, after which it becomes Highway 59, a two-lane passage through the prairie, southward to Baldwin City. In the city of Lawrence, though, Iowa Street plays a number of roles—most out of town visitors to Lawrence’s downtown or to the University of Kansas get off Interstate 70 on exit 202, where they are quickly funneled to Iowa Street. Apart from connecting the driver to Lawrence’s major east-west streets, Iowa Street bisects the city creating a temporal axis between new suburbia and the old neighborhoods and student housing, although these distinctions begin to blur by 23rd Street. This street serves as the dividing line between residential space and a consumer space dominated by massive retail outlets of the big-box variety. After 23rd Street, Iowa Street quickly loses its connection to all things Lawrence and becomes nearly identical to a kind of street that can be found in almost every city in the United States—to find it, look for Target, Wal-Mart, Best Buy, or Applebee’s. These streets, which form the heart of suburban commercial zones, employ minutely regulated systems of order. In the United States, where consumerism reigns, the Iowa Streets of the nation and the spatial order they entail contribute significantly to the ideologies of consumption in everyday life. Because these streets rely entirely on driving, the walker opens a space of difference and rhetorical invention within these homogenous spaces.

I use Iowa Street in this paper to refer simultaneously to the strip in Lawrence, Kansas, and to any similar strip anywhere in the United States, where Iowa Streets have become commonplace, both in the sense of their ubiquity and in their diffuse rhetorical influence. These spaces are overwhelmingly banal, but, as Aristotle would remind us, no space (or place) is ever empty. Iowa Street is a commonplace infused with ideology. This space encourages consumption and calls for automobile traffic. Indeed, most users of this space would find it impossible to manage without a
car. This is why embodied use of this space is particularly important: It is impractical to walk on Iowa Street and, therefore, to walk on Iowa Street is to resist its ideological ordering of space. As embodied users of space engage the material space of Iowa Street, they reveal its reliance on automobile traffic, forcing a confrontation with the production of space on all levels—symbolic, lived, material, and historical. While Iowa Street is what Lefebvre would call an abstract space, or a homogenous space that dominates all resistance, the tactical movements of the walker can resist this space. Although for Certeau tactics are always fleeting, I suggest that they can become more durable when they strike at that which dominant space seeks to suppress—in this case, time. Iowa Street seeks to remove kairos from the user. Walking, though, can reclaim kairos for the user. Thus the walker’s contestation of time is of primary importance because of Iowa Street’s focus on automobile traffic, which brings with it systems of order designed to time drivers’ movements. Walkers on Iowa Street embody a commonplace that was never intended for them. As such, the corporeal performance of the walker contests the production of this space.

To develop this point, I work to extend Certeau’s famous reading of the rhetoric of walking, adding to his discussion of synecdoche and asyndeton with the trope of polysyndeton, “the use of several conjunctions or, more usually, the same conjunction several times, in swift succession” (*The Oxford English Dictionary*). Polysyndeton thus alters the rhythm of space. I also add paramologia, “the figure of partial admission; a strategy in debate in which minor points are conceded to an adversary in order to strengthen one’s own position” (*The Oxford English Dictionary*). Through paramologia, walkers cede the fixed ground to cars in favor of rhetorical agency. The dominant trope of Iowa Street is *extension*. This trope has a rhetorical history that dates back to Erasmus, whose essay “Copia: The Foundations of the Abundant Style,” is dedicated to extension in the symbolic realm. Rhetorical spaces such as Iowa Street demonstrate that this trope can also be material. This space relies on a proliferation of systems of order, including turn lanes, traffic arrows, frontage roads, and parking
lots. These systems both increase the distance between locations in this space—neighboring stores are often hundreds of feet apart—and intensify the regimentation of this order—drivers can choose destinations, but the route they take is largely, although not entirely, determined in advance by timed stoplights and frontage roads. Thus Iowa Street is a rhetorical space that extends itself toward the goal of efficient consumption. Yet walkers can turn the dominant trope of this space. They introduce new conjunctions in space by, say, rejecting the loop of the frontage road and carving a direct path from store to street. In this sense, walkers extend Iowa Street by finding new usable space that the system ignores. At the same time, walkers make legible Iowa Street’s over reliance on extension, creating an opening for critique. By inventing through embodiment a different way of experiencing space, walking through these commercial zones forces a confrontation with the timing of the space, and, in so doing, challenges the commonplace ideology of time-dominating extension that governs Iowa Street.

The extension on Iowa Street is everywhere apparent. The so-called big box stores that populate Iowa Street are surrounded by large parking lots, the roots of a tangled protrusion of frontage roads. Rarely can one turn directly from street to store; turns lanes, frontage roads, and parking lots always intervene. Target and Wal-Mart are directly opposite one another, but Target is invisible from the Wal-Mart parking lot. The many frontage roads on Iowa Street intervene between Iowa Street itself and the parking lots crowding either side of the street. The unimaginatively named Iowa Street Frontage Road in particular demonstrates that Iowa Street’s order extends itself to facilitate car travel. There are actually two Iowa Street Frontage Roads: they both begin on 27th street, both half a block east and west of Iowa Street. From there these dual frontages take a forty five degree angle toward Iowa Street before straightening out to run parallel to Iowa Street until 29th street, where the frontage road disappears. The Iowa Street Frontage Road, in short, duplicates Iowa Street for two blocks. The only purpose of the frontage road is to move cars closer to stores. In so
doing, frontage roads introduce not only distance but systems of control into the space of Iowa Street. Like rungs on a ladder, short stretches of pavement connect the Iowa Street Frontage Road and Iowa Street where the two run parallel. Each of these intersections includes a stop sign, a right turn lane, a left turn lane for cars returning to Iowa Street, and one lane for cars entering the frontage road from Iowa Street. The entrance and exit to each parking lot also includes a stop sign and a similar proliferation of lanes. Although Iowa Street itself allows passage in and out of Lawrence, frontage roads allow passage only in and out of stores. Thus they are forms of extension in service of consumption. The walker, though, does not require a frontage road or a stop sign or a turn lane to move on Iowa Street. The walker simply makes the turn.

The extension of Iowa Street can be understood with recourse to the notion of the *topos*, or commonplace. While I have worked to suggest in this thesis that the commonplace, or the *topos* always reproduces a certain ideology, this reproduction does not determine in advance the possibilities for invention. As Carolyn R. Miller demonstrates, *topos* “suggests a conceptual shape or realm where one may find—or create—a detail, a connection, a pattern that was not anticipated deductively by the *topos* itself” (141). The commonplace restricts and enables. The rhetorical walker cannot invent a new order out of a vacuum; it is the walker’s embodied location in a material space that allows for agency and invention. The walker who moves directly from Iowa Street to a store creates a shortcut precisely because the walker ignores the existing frontage road and its attendant systems of order. Decorum and invention are both at work here: The walker must accommodate to a situated material space, and is thus bound by decorum. Yet the walker also creates a new way of using space, one that was not envisioned in the planning. The shortcut emerges through interaction with planned space. The walker, then, invents in the double sense of rhetorical invention, that of “coming upon what exists already (discovery) and that of contriving something that never existed before (invention)” (Miller 130). By walking in a space designed for car, the walker makes use of
_Kairos_, or opportune timing. _Kairos_ first appeared in the _Iliad_, where it carries a spatial meaning, referring to a place on the body that is susceptible to injury and therefore in need of special protection (Sipiora 2). Iowa Street’s extension is vulnerable to the timely maneuvers of the walker, who comes upon a system of order designed for the car and seizes opportunities to use it in new ways.

_Kairos_ thus provides heuristic force to the walker’s embodied movements in a rhetorical space. The term clearly shares kinship with Certeau’s notion of tactics, or opportune timing that provides agency in spaces dominated by hegemonic orders. When these tactics are deployed in a Lefebvrian abstract space, they reveal weakness within hegemony. By not submitting to the macrologic extension of pavement, the walker _turns_ this extension, both extending spaces and requiring that they be contracted. The tropes of polysyndeton and paramologia clarify this argument. For example, where the frontage road forces the car to travel in a sweeping arch, the walker can pass directly from a store to the street to reach the same destination. Thus by inserting conjunctions that are not included in the grid designed for traffic, the walker deploys polysyndeton, extending spaces that the planned grid ignores. Rhetorical invention discovers new things in a given situation. The walker thus invents through extension, inserting conjunctions and finding new useful spaces in an existing rhetorical space. The extension of Iowa Street elides agency, but the extension of the walker creates it. By revealing the ways in which Iowa Street’s extension elides agency, the walker also calls for contraction of this rhetorical space. Thus the walker deploys paramologia as well, by ceding the fixed grid to the car and exploiting the agency latent in Iowa Street’s rhetorical space. Although rhetorical spaces such as Iowa Street are mundane, they are not insignificant. By turning the tropes of these rhetorical spaces, the walker can revise a rhetorical understanding of the everyday that acquiesces to ready-made destinations and preset routes while ignoring agency and invention.
Entering Iowa Street

For the pedestrian, making the trip from one end of Iowa Street to its sudden end just after Wal-Mart can be a trying one. Iowa Street has two lanes of traffic heading straight in either direction, although the street widens at intersections to accommodate extra left and right turn lanes. Seen from Google’s satellite view, the commercial zone of Iowa Street distinguishes itself clearly from other parts of the city: Where the rest of the city is leaf-green, Iowa Street is pallid; where most buildings are difficult to pick out among the trees, grass, and narrow streets, the buildings of Iowa Street are clearly visible as they squat among parking lots, creating a precise geometric order—quadrilaterals surrounded by quadrilaterals. A network of winding frontage roads links the parking lots to Iowa Street, the spine of the space. The entire system exists to pass cars from store to store.

Mired in this maze of concrete, the walker will fail to appreciate the rigid structure of Iowa Street. There is, for example, a concrete sidewalk to aid the walker’s passage, although it makes a habit of disappearing unexpectedly in the middle of the block, forcing the walker to tread on the landscaped lawns that cushion the frontage road from the main road. This gives the walker the opportunity to admire more closely the landscaping. About every eighty feet, the view includes two small trees spaced about twenty feet apart—a sparse arboretum. But driving by these same trees again at 45 miles per hour gives one the impression that clusters of trees begin to dot the suddenly leafy landscape—the timing of the trees changes when viewed from the car. Following the walking path, which usually reappears about fifty feet after disappearing, the walker will pass a variety of stores with signs that beckon to consumers. The discount furniture store one-ups them all with a disco ball rotating on an axis over the entrance. Yet almost none of these stores is directly accessible from the path, and crossing the lawns between the path and the parking lots often entails mounting steep berms or crawling through shrubbery. The alternative is to walk hundreds of yards away from the storefront to find a frontage road which leads back to it. In fact, in ten blocks of stores, only one
has a sidewalk connecting the parking lot to the path along Iowa Street. At these intersections, the walker will find ten foot high signs that signal the stores lurking behind the parking lots. These signs are angled diagonally toward the street and come equipped with a sidewalk that passes at the foot of the sign, forming a Bermuda triangle of sidewalk travel at the corner of two streets. The sidewalk here assumes the role of mere decoration, a path to nowhere. It would make little sense for the walker to follow the triangle below the signs, especially when the signs are angled toward street traffic. At times, the path will follow the frontage road instead of Iowa Street, which is convenient if the walker desires to shop at the stores along the frontage road but inconvenient if the walker wishes to walk straight ahead. Just before the intersection of 31st Street and Iowa Street, the path veers from Iowa Street to follow the frontage road, which loops out to provide cars with passage onto 31st Street. There is no crosswalk at this passage, because it is back at the intersection of 31st and Iowa Street. Unfortunately, no path leads to this crosswalk. The walker must therefore rely on polysyndeton and create new conjunctions where the extended order of Iowa Street offers none.

Indeed, between the unpredictable sidewalk gaps, the moat-like landscaping designed to please the driver’s eye, and the gratuitous bits of sidewalk in front of signs directed at passing traffic, the walker may begin to question whether the footpath really has the foot traveler in mind at all, to which question the answer must be no. Of course, the more complete answer is that not only the footpath but the entire space is bent solely on the flow of traffic between the main road, the frontage roads, and the parking lots; the pedestrian is only expected inside, shopping. Car traffic shapes this system of order, subjecting everything to the hegemony of the car and excluding pedestrians from footpaths. Yet streets like Iowa Street play an important role in the everyday life of a large number of people in this country, many of whom rely on stores like Wal-Mart for everything from groceries to car batteries. And since consumption and styles of consumption play a role in daily interaction, communication, and thinking, streets like Iowa Street exert considerable influence
over everyday existence. Thus the overwhelming fixity of Iowa Street, which is rigidly structured to allow the unimpeded flow of traffic, extends to the most minute and mundane (and therefore often untheorized) experience. But the walker, merely by using the sidewalks, reveals Iowa Street’s reliance on extension. Although drivers certainly might notice the extension of Iowa Street, the embodied movements of walkers directly engage and thus reveal this extension in a way driving cannot. Through its power to reveal ideology informing the production of rhetorical space, walking itself becomes not only a form of critique but a means of experiencing everyday life in new ways.

**Kairotic Resistance in Space**

Space is always simultaneously symbolic, lived, material and historical. Although this is true of all spaces, not all spaces manage these simultaneous connections identically. Iowa Street attempts to homogenize all forms of space. It is thus an example of what Lefebvre calls abstract spaces, or “the dominant form of space” that seeks to “reduce the obstacles and resistance it encounters” (49). Similarly, Certeau calls these spaces such as Iowa Street strategic space, asserting that “a strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it” (xiv). Iowa Street perpetuates itself through extension: As the system of pavement becomes ubiquitous, car travel seems to be the only viable option. Differences are reduced and homogeneity reigns. By reducing resistance to its system of order, Iowa Street regenerates homogeneity.

Iowa Street thus demonstrates how the material brings the lived and symbolic in line: Because extension reigns on Iowa Street, lived experience there adapts to car travel, informing, in turn, symbolic representations of the space. This is not a neat linear process—as car traffic increases, city planners might react by reshaping material space and adding new lanes for traffic—but all forms of space are always engaged in a mutually productive dialectic. Precisely because space emerges out
of this interwoven matrix, it can seem impossible to resist. Yet users of space can participate in this matrix, primarily on the level of lived experience. Since none of the forms of space is separable from any of the other forms, to intervene in lived space is also to engage symbolic, material, and historical space. The intervention of the walker is tactical. Certeau argues that a “tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base…because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time” (xix). In the face of dominant forms of space, the user wields tactics. For Certeau, however, tactics are by definition fleeting: They *insinuate* themselves into the space of the other, but this insinuation does not durably reconfigure dominant space.

Iowa Street, though, relies on the dominance of time. Because tactics deploy time to their advantage, they can on Iowa Street become a more potent weapon than Certeau envisioned. Tactics reclaim time for the user. Since Iowa Street dominates time, tactics launch a direct challenge on the ideology of the space. The jaywalker makes use of opportune moments to cross the street, making impotent the traffic lights that proliferate at every intersection, hovering like sentinels daring the cars to challenge their power to order this rhetorical space. To be sure, the driver can run a traffic light, but the walker can cross the road at any point, lightly treading from grass to sidewalk to street and back again. Such a movement deploys polysyndeton by creating a new passage through space, thus extending the room for agency within Iowa Street and revealing Iowa Street’s reliance on extension. Instead of acceding to turn lanes and frontage roads (examples of Iowa Street’s extension), the walker tactically crosses the street at opportune moments. Using paromologia, the walker grants the driver speed in favor of agency. Through polysyndeton and paromologia, the walker can create new styles of consumption that would split open a new rhetorical way of experiencing agency. In the rhetorical space of Iowa Street, the walker cannot avoid decorum, or the recognition of the material
situation in which the walker operates. Yet this situation creates space for invention as well: Tactics, by making use of *kairos*, invent from within material constraints.

A return to Iowa Street will demonstrate how the walker challenges the timing of Iowa Street’s space. Every stop light from 23rd Street onward has a left turn arrow, preventing the driver from timing a turn during a gap in traffic. These left turn arrows stop tactics before they start. In case any walker or driver should make the mistake of thinking that they can make use of available time, every stoplight on Iowa Street also includes a timer which counts down from twenty; at zero the light turns red. It is as if the stoplight wishes to signal ownership of time itself. Within such a space, the user seems hopelessly restricted by planning. This is how dominant space maintains itself: it closes the gap between the system of order and the possibilities for manipulating that system.

All of the buildings on Iowa Street between 23rd street and 31st street are commercial buildings. All sell things. It is safe to say, then, that the space of these seven blocks is a decidedly commercial space, bent toward the single-minded *telos* of consumption. The walker treads upon this reproduction. One striking example of Iowa Street’s movement toward consumption is the signage: Everywhere one looks on Iowa Street, one is confronted with oversized signs advertising oversized stores. World Market, TJ Maxx, Michaels, Bed Beth and Beyond all share one long building roughly divided into four parts for each of the four stores. Each store also has its own sign large enough to be clearly visible from the road. Even passing at the speed limit of 45 mph (or higher) car drivers and passengers will clearly see the signs. In fact, they are peripherally visible even if one is not actively looking at them.

To further examine how the signs operate rhetorically, I measured the distance they cover with my stride. Each step I take covers approximately three feet (this when walking at a measured pace, not sauntering or speed-walking). To walk from the edge of the Bed Bath and Beyond sign to the edge of the World Market sign took 171 paces. Measured by my stride, this is approximately 513
For this thesis, the more significant number is the number of strides. I provide the number of feet only to offer a more generalizable metric, as not all strides are the same. This means that each sign was in my immediate vision for approximately forty-two strides. Of course, all of the signs were visible for all of the 171 strides because of their size. My point here is that the size of these signs—the amount of material space they occupy—is directly related to the timing of Iowa Street. These signs are designed to be seen at 45 mph, not at the pace of the walker, which is more like four mph.

In Lawrence’s downtown shopping district—an area designed with the walker in mind—signs appear much more frequently. In 171 paces (about one block), I passed twenty-one signs. It is obvious that the signs on Iowa Street are large so that they can be easily seen by the occupants of passing cars, but only by walking past these signs can one embody this change in timing. Walking through this space, one gets the sense of having been dropped in space scaled for giants.

Even without this imaginative leap, it is clear that the space is not scaled for walkers. The path that leads between the Bed Bath and Beyond and World Market sign is serpentine, although there is no clear reason for this as the ground appears to be level. By carving a straight line and treading on grass and the path instead of following the curves of the path, I shaved five strides off my route. This might not seem like much, but five strides is approximately fifteen feet. In terms of the distance it adds, following the curves of the path instead of walking straight is the equivalent of crossing the street in the opposite direction of one’s intended destination. None of this—the timing of the signs, the curves of the path, the general scale of the space—is readily apparent to the driver. This is not because drivers are dupes. It is because drivers are operating within the terms of the commonplace. The ideology is contoured for car traffic. Walkers cross these contours in opposition.

What is unremarkable to the driver is tread upon by the walker, who resists the timing of Iowa Street by embodying it differently.
The weakness of rhetorical spaces such as Iowa Street is their attempt to dominate time. By making new use of an already-existing order, the walker invents a new way of using rhetorical space. Because tactics rely on timing, or *kairós*, they create a different experience of temporality. Certeau argues that tactics do not have their own base. Similarly, the rhetorician is bound by decorum, or in this case the material situation. Yet this material situation also provides the resources for *turning* the order and reconfiguring its dominant tropes, as in the example of the walker deploying polysyndeton by crossing the street at opportune moments. It is precisely the *kairotic* nature of tactics that can endow them with lasting heuristic force in abstract, homogenous rhetorical spaces. Tactics are only fleeting if we accept that Iowa Street is eternal.

*Fixing the Rules of the Road*

Of course, the Iowa Streets of the United States are not eternal. They are, like all spaces, products of history. As Harvey notes, common wisdom about cities in the United States began to change after World War II, when “suburbanization and the total re-engineering of not just the city but the whole metropolitan region” solved the problems relating to “how surplus capital could be absorbed” (27). We thus might also call the Iowa Streets of the United States capital sponges, as they exist as zones entirely dedicated to absorbing surplus capital. This suburbanization has repercussions beyond infrastructure investment and design; as Harvey asserts, this change “entailed a radical transformation in lifestyles,” not only making modern conveniences more readily available but radically altering the ways of purchasing those conveniences (27). Material space thus informs lived experience, and suburbanization brought with it a radical change in *styles* of consumption. With this transformation came the ascendance of one particular commodity that provided the means of obtaining other commodities in the new suburban capital sponges: the car.
The emergence of the primacy of the car over walking did not occur without difficulty, however, and the roots of this change can be located well before post-World War II suburbanization. In *Fighting Traffic*, Peter D. Norton, historian of engineering and traffic, relates the clash of cultures wrought by the ascendance of the automobile in the United States. As cars became more common on city streets designed for slow-moving pedestrians and horse-drawn carriages, conflicts between the new and old means of transportation were inevitable. As Norton succinctly puts it, “Old streets plus new automobiles equaled disaster” (19). A fight followed between pedestrians, who saw car drivers as arrogant “speed freaks” who hogged the road, and car drivers, who saw pedestrians as relics of transportation’s past. At stake in this battle was the definition of the street itself: was it an open path that could be entered and exited at any time, and so did not require rigid rules dictating the timing and location of access? Or was it a thoroughfare, a means to an end, and therefore in need of regulation to remove impediments to travel? According to the Norton, by the 1930s, the car had won a decisive victory, and the notion “that street uses that impeded automobiles were misuses of the street” became a new commonplace (7).

With this victory came a new discipline dedicated to equipping the streets for expedient travel—traffic engineering. Norton describes how traffic engineering emerged as a discipline in the 1910s and 1920s, relying on the pursuit of efficiency “as the fundamental principle justifying their work” (105). This pursuit of efficiency is inseparable from capitalism itself, which relies on the constant circulation of commodities to maintain the flow of capital. Thus as lived experience changed and people began driving rather than walking, shared understandings of space shifted and the ideological commonplace of the streets was rewritten around automobile traffic. This shift in the definition of streets brought with it a shift in ownership over the streets, as only those able to afford a car had a right to gain access to this new cult of efficiency, to follow the others “into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there hangs the notice ‘No admittance except on
business” (Marx 279-80). Streets became places to get things done, not to linger. All of these actions would interfere with the business of transportation. In order to make this change clear, the advocates of the efficient street turned to the rhetorical trope of the jaywalker, a word that we continue to use today, though it has lost its original connotation. Norton writes that “according to one early, more general definition, jaywalkers were ‘men so accustomed to cutting across fields and village lots that they zigzag across city streets, scorning to keep to the crossings, ignoring their own safety’ and ‘impeding traffic’” (72-3). A jay was also a “rustic,” or a person not accustomed to modernity (The Oxford English Dictionary). Thus jaywalkers were anachronistic bumpkins left hopelessly behind by the speed of modern life who endangered themselves and others as they floundered in progress’ wake. In short, the term jaywalker carried extremely negative connotations, and these connotations derived from new spatial commonplaces. The jaywalker symbolized an antiquated understanding of space—a person who lived space through an outdated ideology. City officials went so far as to use the term to shame walkers into compliance with new rules, erecting mock-courts on city streets to harangue jaywalkers in public (Norton 75). The danger of jaywalking was real, though, not only for individual lives but for the notion of progress itself. If car traffic was the future of city streets, then jaywalkers had the power to stop this progress by “impeding traffic,” as a 1923 Cincinnati Enquirer editorial put it. Indeed, the word impede comes from the Latin imped, which literally means “to shackle the feet” (The Oxford English Dictionary). As the early advocates of motorized transportation well knew, in the light tread of the pedestrian lurks the power to shackle the feet of the automobile.

Although Norton claims that drivers had eventually won a decisive battle over pedestrians for the right to the streets by the 1930s, pedestrians and drivers continue to clash. Accidents between cars and pedestrians occur frequently. According to the statistics the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration released in 2007, 4,654 pedestrians were killed in traffic accidents that
year alone. Many of these accidents involved left-turning vehicles. Turning left at a green light requires turning in front of oncoming traffic. The driver of the car has to slip in the gaps between traffic. In addition to timing oncoming traffic, the driver has to be aware of pedestrians attempting to cross the street. Traffic engineers call this the “permissive scheme” of the left-hand turn (Lord, Smiley, and Haroun 2). On the other hand, under the “protected scheme…a driver can turn without oncoming vehicles disturbing the manoeuvre” (Lord, Smiley, and Haroun 2). Viewed from another perspective, the protected scheme removes kairotic agency from the driver, who must passively wait for the change in light instead of seizing the opportune moment to turn. Of course, traffic engineers want to design streets that are both efficient and safe, so protected schemes are attractive to the designer if not to the user. Thus the designer is tasked with anticipating the possible mistakes a driver might make and preventing those mistakes beforehand. Following this logic, a group of civil engineers assert that “traffic control devices, including traffic signals, should be located and designed according to drivers (sic) expectations” (Lord, Smiley, and Haroun 2). This reveals the contradictory logic of the car. The car is often considered one of the greatest enhancements in personal mobility of the modern age. Indeed, in the United States, car ownership is often a prerequisite for travel, particularly in locations with no public transportation. But because car crashes can be deadly, the driver’s moves must be planned and decided in advance by safety belts, speed limits, traffic signals, lane lines, and the direction of the road itself. Along with any freedom it opens up, the car asks the user to submit to at least as many rules, regulations, and restrictions.

Walking does not pose this problem. Without a 4,000 pound steel cage wrapped around it, the human body can maneuver without the foresight of engineers. Human feet can turn left as safely as they can turn right, and, while bumping into a stranger on the sidewalk can cause tension, it is rarely fatal. The car, that remarkable advancement in free movement, has also constrained human movement. Norton paraphrases the argument of early car advocates, who claimed that we should,
“Let the free market decide!” instead of pointing out the dangers with cars (6). Yet cars restrict freedom as well. Of course, the proponent of the car would here interject, reminding us of the car’s ability to take us farther than our feet ever could on the United States’ vast network of interstate highways. The problem with this logic, though, is that because cars can extend the reach of our travel, our cities have begun to be planned in such a way that they require extensive travel. As one travels south on Iowa Street, for example, there are fewer stores, but they become much larger, finally reaching their largest size in stores such as Target and Wal-Mart. According to the Wal-Mart Watch, the average Wal-Mart Supercenter store like the one on Iowa Street occupies 200,000 square feet. To be sure, owning a car frees one to shop on Iowa Street, but it also requires one to submit to a system that builds in extensions through frontage roads, parking lots, and turn lanes, all of them designed assist in consumption.

Iowa Street’s topography demonstrates this teleological logic. Where it intersects with Iowa Street, for example, 29th Street is really no street at all: it is a passage to parking lots, merely an extended driveway. Upon leaving these parking lots, one has no choice but to go back onto Iowa Street, reentering the carefully constructed web of commerce once again. Even calling 29th Street a passage goes too far, for it leads only back to itself. As the street continues south, the stores become larger and further apart from one another, which, as I mentioned above, justifies the logic of the car. But this extension also represents an intensification of this logic. At the beginning of the commercial section of Iowa Street, there are a variety of niche businesses—electronics stores, clothing stores, cellular phone distributors, nail salons, pizza places, and office supplies stores—by the end, though, this amalgamation is subsumed by the twin anchors of Iowa Street: Wal-Mart Supercenter and Target. These stores hold an inexorable control over commodities, offering a selection of almost every conceivable commodity. The consumer can shop for groceries, motor oil, computers, and clothing all in one store. Thus the “free” market presents us with the convenience of “one-stop”
shopping. But the Wal-Mart parking lot requires a frontage road *of its own* just to provide access to the twenty rows of parking with ten “streets” to allow passage between these roads and an additional “street” at the front of the store. The parking lot of Wal-Mart is a kind of city unto itself, complete with stop signs, turn lanes, one-way streets, and cross-walks. The system of order follows the consumer everywhere, from the left-turn arrow that allows the car to turn off at 33rd Street, to the four-way stops on Wal-Mart’s frontage road, to the clearly marked parking spaces. In short, the system of order attempts to erase the space of the user. Faced with such omnipresent ordering, with this ostensibly ineluctable victory of planned space over lived space, a turn to the walker may seem like a weak countermove indeed. Yet to walk Iowa Street is to live it in a different way, and as small as this living appears when compared to Iowa Street’s oversized scale, it still intervenes in the dialectical production of space. Since Iowa Street relies on dominating difference, the differential moves of the walker obtain significant power in this hegemonic context.

**Figuring Walking**

A return to walking, then, is particularly powerful in this car-dominated space. Although people do walk on Iowa Street, walkers are few and far between. Yet when I walk down Iowa Street—even when I jaywalk—drivers routinely see me and courteously allow me to pass. Precisely because walkers are so rare on Iowa Street, to walk on Iowa Street is to be public, to announce one’s presence and to highlight bodily different ways of using space. Modern walkers can reclaim the notion of the jaywalker for the present and turn this insult to their advantage. In the early days of the automobile’s ascendance, to call someone a jaywalker was to call them a historical relic. At this opportune moment when automobiles have achieved their supremacy so perfectly as to dominate certain forms of space, I suggest that modern walkers can deploy kairos to seize once this historical relic and repurpose it into resistance. This ideological domination of space by the car-driven
consumerism is a weak point because it has become so banal, so obvious, and so commonplace that it is invisible. The walker—the modern jaywalker—makes ideology visible not by stepping outside the space but by occupying it in new ways. The commonplace always carries unforeseen connections. The walker makes those connections seen.

Resistance to the hegemony of Iowa Street thus begins with a footstep. In his rhetoric of walking, Certeau does not attempt to lay out a plan for revolution, but he does theorize the rhetorical resistance inherent in walking. He describes the “triple enunciative” function of walking. First, like the speaker making use of words, walking appropriates topographical systems; secondly, it acts out the practice of place; and finally it implies relations among positions, just as to speak is to imply the existence of the other (97-98). In this conception, walking becomes a subtle manipulation of systems of order. Each step is a selection that has repercussions in everyday life, because to take a step is to practice place. Recall that space, for Certeau, is a practiced place. In Wal-Mart’s extended system of order, the walker practices place by rewriting the curves and loops of frontage roads into a more direct path. Again, the walker inserts new conjunctions, new passages in space, thus critiquing the extension of Iowa Street and simultaneously extending the space for agency within it.

Certeau’s enunciative understanding of walking is appealing in no small part because of the agency it builds into everyday practice. Certeau describes the formal structure of this agency using the rhetorical tropes of synecdoche, or substituting part for the whole, and asyndeton, or omitting a conjunction. In the practice of space, Certeau tells us, synecdoche “expands a spatial element” by creating a “more” out of a fragment (101). Conversely, asyndeton creates a “less” by opening “gaps in the spatial continuum” (101). These movements occur in walking as storefronts, for example, become representative of a neighborhood (synecdoche) or as the walker steps on certain parts of the concrete and not others (asyndeton), unlike the car whose wheels never leave the pavement. Thus, through synecdoche and asyndeton, the steps of the walker constantly reshape space. These
movements are tactical in nature, because they operate within the dominant space of the city grid, making use of available moments. For Certeau, these tactics do not permanently change the grid; they reshape it invisibly, but this reshaping remains in the practice. It leaves no traceable residue. Yet Certeau’s chapter focuses on New York City, where walkers abound. In this case, one person walking down 5th Avenue leaves no residue; indeed, this person is largely invisible, lost in the crowd. There is no crowd on Iowa Street though. The walker on Iowa Street is thus highly visible, highly public, and highly recognizable as a rhetorical actor inventing a different way of using space. Tactical walking on Iowa Street does not disappear as it does in pedestrianized areas; it announces itself as an intervention in space.

The walker on Iowa Street thus visibly and publicly alters the time of space. The walker practices asyndeton by stepping here and not there, but this practice also entails polysyndeton, or the addition of conjunctions. To ignore given conjunctions by, say, jaywalking, is also to create a new conjunction: the walker passes here and not there, simultaneously omitting a conjunction and creating a new one. This alters the rhythm of the space. Such an alteration is a strike at the heart of Iowa Street, which relies on extension in support of efficient consumption—routes that lead inexorably to destinations. Abstract spaces, Lefebvre reminds us, react negatively to time. By creating rigid, fixed structures, abstract spaces seek to harness time, like the stoplight counting down to red. But walkers do not need stop lights. A street of walkers renders stop lights utterly useless, destroying their ability to harness time and feeding the seeds of differential rhetorical space. This is a particularly potent weapon in spaces designed to exclude the walker. To begin his chapter on walking, Certeau describes seeing Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center. This view reveals the city’s grid, but it does not reveal the rhetorical space available to Manhattan’s walkers. New Yorkers, of course, walk everywhere. Almost no one walks on Iowa Street. Instead, the “free” market rules, and walkers stop practicing space to enter their cars, where, for safety’s sake,
they must submit completely to Iowa Street’s system of order. To be sure, a walker cannot travel nearly as quickly as a car. But a car needs a fixed space to operate successfully: Cars cannot turn without a turn lane, or reverse direction without stopping, or travel on uneven terrain. The walker does all of these things. Indeed, the walker marks out space and time with every step. Thus the walker turns Iowa Street’s dominant trope of extension by inventing new spaces for movement and denaturalizing the distance Iowa Street builds in to its order.

Thus we can add another trope to Certeau’s rhetoric of walking: paromologia, the strategy in debate of conceding minor points in order to concede one’s own position. The car can have speed; the walker has space and time. Moreover, the walker carries revolutionary critique in each step. Iowa Street’s logic works so long as it can suppress difference. So long as users agree to drive, Iowa Street’s order enjoys complete domination. But the walker turns Wal-Mart’s mini-city into self-parody. Thus walking on Iowa Street carries more potency than in New York City or in other pedestrian-friendly spaces (including Massachusetts Street in downtown Lawrence). On Iowa Street, walking publicly announces ideological alternatives. Walkers create difference in every step, not only on the level of personal lived experience but on the symbolic level. By publicly using space in unexpected ways, walkers nurture the seeds of difference that abstract spaces must suppress to sustain themselves. The actions of the walker become more than fleeting moments of resistance: They become the durable first steps of a revolutionary spatial practice.

Oddly enough, appended to Iowa Street is a nature path specifically designed for walkers, bikers, and runners. The path begins on 34th Street and Iowa Street, right by the Holiday Inn Express. It seems as if a much different ideology obtains on this path where walking and other embodied uses of space are celebrated and welcomed. Yet it is impossible to consider this path separately from Iowa Street. Because Iowa Street does not consider walking in its production, the space for walkers has been moved elsewhere, to a more ostensibly natural setting. In this sense, the
nature path reinforces a division in styles of consumption: Iowa Street is organized around automobile traffic consumption of consumer goods; the nature path is organized around embodied movement and the consumption of nature, where nature is consumed through recreational use. Thus both the car and the walker are aligned with consumption, albeit in different ways. In the next chapter, I will consider another natural space designed for the walker, although one far removed from Iowa Street. This space I will consider is the Rising Sun Country Park in Newcastle, England. Unlike Iowa Street, where invention is suppressed, the Rising Sun Country Park offers itself as a blank slate for invention. Yet this blank slate carries its own ideological production of space, one that the walker can again engage and contest with each footstep.

Visitors to the Rising Sun Country Park in Newcastle, England can take walking trails that pass by fields of horses, wooded areas, and recreation fields. They can purchase organic produce from the organic farm. They can get a tea or coffee and a scone, or perhaps a bowl of soup and a sandwich. Thirty years ago none of this would have been possible. Instead of walking trails and tea shops, visitors would have found a moribund coal mine and an infirmary. The Rising Sun Country Park was once the site of the Rising Sun Colliery. Before it was a country park or a colliery, it was pastureland until 1861, when the Rising Sun Quarry opened. In 1906, it became Rising Sun Colliery. The colliery closed in 1969, taking 1,180 jobs with it (History). Land reclamation began in 1971, and by 1987 a Countryside Centre opened.

Like many mines in England, the Rising Sun Colliery was equally a site of industrial production and political tension, although the colliery closed well before the iconic miner’s strikes of 1984-1985, when Margaret Thatcher emerged as the arch-nemesis of the miners, whom she once called “the enemy within.” The defeat of the strike by Thatcher has come to symbolize the end of the industry, but tensions between miners and the government began almost as soon as the mines were nationalized, and strikes were called against Labour and Tory officials alike. There were strikes at the Rising Sun Colliery as early as the 1940s, and its closure was fiercely contested. The strikes were part of larger British class conflicts that are older than industrialization, although industrialization made these conflicts more visible, as the working-classes were forced into factories and mines. The economy in the north of England ran on coal, and mining became part of the north’s self-image, although the image is also often applied as a stereotype from the south. Mines obviously reshape the physical landscape, but mining also influenced the symbolic space of northern England.
The landscape of the Rising Sun Colliery has again been reshaped as the Rising Sun Country Park. In this chapter, I will examine how this reshaping of material space has recalibrated symbolic understandings space and informed lived experience in that space. Unlike Iowa Street, which presents a minutely regulated system of order that restricts agency, the Rising Sun Country Park is ostensibly open for bodily movement. When the mine was still operative, this space was organized around industrial production. Now, it is a space for recreation. The space of the Rising Sun Colliery-cum-Country Park materializes the oft-noted shift in capitalist societies from production to consumption, although I hope to complicate both terms, particularly the latter. The Rising Sun Country Park is now a consumable space. I will demonstrate this consumption below with recourse to gentrification, a term that originally referred to blighted urban areas being rebuilt to meet the demands of middle-class consumption but has now spread to refer to any reconstruction of space around consumerism. To gentrify is to reshape material space to meet the demands of consumption. I hope to complicate both the notions of consumption and gentrification through the contemporary figure of one who know walks this transformed space. This consumption is clearest from within the park itself. Today, the best view of the Rising Sun Country Park can be found on top of a hill that rises in the center of the park, where spectators can look out to the suburbs, the city centre, and business parks. The most immediate sight is the ostensibly natural fields that stretch out below in the park itself. But thirty years ago, visitors would have found not a hill but a slag heap, a combustible pile of unusable coal. Walkers on slag heaps can fall in and die among the minerals of the earth. The slag is now safely buried beneath soil and grass, but the history of the colliery is not. Indeed, the park stands upon the slag, the material embodiment of an industry irrevocably tied to northern English culture. Thus the physical history of the land and the cultural history of northern England impinge upon the space of the Rising Sun Country Park. This history also undermines the space as it is today lived; it contests the new commonplace organized around consumption.
On Iowa Street, the extended systems of order attempt to eliminate kairos by regulating every movement in space. The Rising Sun Country Park attempts to preclude kairotic invention not by regulating timed action but by removing constraints upon it. This is not to say there is no system of order in the park. Footpaths, for example, guide the routes walkers take. While these paths carve out routes, they do not seek to regulate the foot traffic upon those routes. There are no turn lanes, stoplights, or left turn arrows. There is, instead, an open expanse. While Iowa Street is marked by the extension of systems of order, the Rising Sun Country Park is marked by the extension of openness. This openness calls for the walker. Thus to walk this space is to consume it. On Iowa Street walking moves against the commonplace; it is a resistive act. To walk in the park is to accede in part to the demands of the commonplace. Yet the material history is unavoidable: The walker negotiates the material artifacts of historic space, which undercuts the naturalized arrangement of the space as it is currently lived. Walking in the Rising Sun Country Park thus simultaneously adheres to the commonplace and reveals its historical production.

Although the park is a delimited space on the map, it of course does not exist in isolation, and examining how the space operates—how it insinuates itself rhetorically—can illuminate the ways in which deindustrialization and consumerism impinge upon everyday life. Relying on the figure of the walker as rhetor, I will examine the gentrification of the natural that has occurred in the Rising Sun Country Park by outlining the history of the space and the milieu out of which it arises. This historical outline will entail a brief discussion of conceptions of class in Britain and a synopsis of the events that lead to the miners' strikes of 1984-1985. Class is a notoriously difficult category to pin down. The roots of the 1984-1985 strike are historically complex, and the events continue to have repercussions today. It is not my intention to develop a theory of class or to offer a definitive history of the strikes. Rather, I will investigate class and the strikes as formative and founding events of the space of the Rising Sun Country Park, which can be read rhetorically. None of these founding
events are final events, however. As I will elaborate below, space is produced by history even as it produces the same. The walker as rhetorical agent will tread upon this dual production, tracing its workings and testing its possibilities for invention.

The hill in the middle of the Rising Sun Country Park demonstrates the dialectic between historical space and lived space. As I mentioned above, the hill is now covered with grass. There are a few footpaths that lead up the hill, but the grass is short enough that a path is not really necessary, and the extant paths were clearly made by repeated footsteps, evidence of the walker’s ability to reshape material space. On top of the hill there is a sign that identifies prominent features on the landscape, including the organic farm, the business park, the Wal-Mart subsidiary Asda, the suburbs, and Newcastle’s city center. Over 4,000 miles separate Iowa Street and The Rising Sun Country Park, but Wal-Mart crowds both spaces. The sign also identifies features that were once prominent on the landscape, including the original site of the pit, which is now filled. As mentioned above, the hill itself is a slag heap, a site for refuse from the earth. It is now a lookout point, a place where walkers can cast their gaze outward to the park and the city. Here the gaze falls in line with practices of consumption: The park exists precisely to be enjoyed. It calls for walkers to partake in the comfort of the natural, and the hill, with its short grass and gentle slope, beckons walkers to consume the entire landscape at a glance. In this sense, the hill invites invention. It is the spatial instantiation of a freewrite, an opening to create and to consider, to let one’s thoughts meander. Because the space invites invention, it subsumes kairos, or the sense of timing that allows rhetors to make use of opportunities. When every moment presents itself as an opportunity, there is no need to seize the opportune moment. One only has to exist within it. By subsuming kairos, the Rising Sun Country Park denies not only timing but time as a historical artifact. The slag heap was a collection of the unconsumable; today, that same heap is a hill that calls for consumption. Yet as walkers pass through space, they act not only upon the immediate physical presence of space but upon the
histories, representations, and ideologies that inhere in space. In other words, the walker need not be subsumed with kairos into an ostensibly timeless consumption. Rather, the walker can read and act critically in space. The current site invites a kind of transcendental forgetting of the history of the space—and thus its production—by offering up the natural as an openly consumable item. It is also possible, though, to walk this space with a critical understanding of its history and attendant ideologies.

On Iowa Street, the walker’s rhetorical moves can turn the dominant tropes of space, thereby creating a new lived experience in space. The walker does not directly challenge lived space in the Rising Sun Country Park. Indeed, the space is designed for the walker. Here the rhetorical power of the walker lies not in the walker’s ability to turn dominant tropes in practice but to consider how these dominants tropes were created in the first place. On Iowa Street, walking challenges the practice of space; in the Rising Sun Country Park, walking works to theorize space, uncovering its production. Walking, like more traditional forms of communication, is a performative act that engages with material constraints. Walking is always delivery. When located spatially, walking can be understood both practically (how walkers negotiate a given space) and theoretically (what possibilities for action exist in this space). In this sense, understanding the walker as a rhetor fills the gap Dilip Gaonkar identifies between rhetoric as interpretive theory and rhetoric as a practical art. Gaonkar argues that classical rhetoric was never intended to be anything more than practical: “It is my contention that, by and large, our critical studies are sustained by the vocabulary of classical rhetoric, a vocabulary primarily fashioned for directing performance rather than facilitating understanding” (32). Yet scholars of rhetoric need not chose between understanding and acting, interpreting and performing. Deborah Hahwee argues that “the discovery, use, and effects of such ‘available means’ of rhetorical action transpires through bodies, spaces, and the visual as much as it happens through the presumed twin-media of rhetoric—the written and spoken word” (163). In
other words, embodied action discovers (or interprets) the ‘available means’ of persuasion and acts upon them (performance). Thus both ends of spectrum from interpretation to performance combine in walking. Moreover, walking fulfills the “the three different ends that guide rhetorical scholars,” which can be a useful way of thinking about the rhetorical tradition (Ceccarelli 47). These are aesthetic, which builds an appreciation for artistry; epistemic, which inquires into the nature of things; and political, which values the practical affairs of the polis (Ceccarelli 47). Walking is most certainly an aesthetic practice, one that varies across lines of gender, ethnicity, class, and nationality. Its epistemic and political functions are less immediately clear. These ends of rhetoric are best understood with recourse to space, which exists simultaneously in the physical, symbolic, and historical realms.

To discuss the workings of space is inevitably to invite conceptual confusion. Space is depicted on maps, conceived of in the cultural imagination, and experienced through embodied interaction. The word space can refer to one particular form of space or to multiple forms of space at once. Anyone who has followed a map while driving or walking through space knows this. Anyone who has traveled to an iconic city knows this. Walking around the Statue of Liberty is different than seeing it in a postcard. These crude examples demonstrate that the fact that we live in and understand our lives through space is in some ways common sense. It is assumed. By making this assumption, we fold space into the ideologies of our daily lives in capitalist societies. As Harvey has argued, drawing on Gramsci, “Given the fetishisms that attach to and the opacities that mask capital accumulation, we cannot expect anything other than ‘common sense’ conceptions of the world to regulate the conduct of daily life” (84). This commonsense reproduction of daily life occurs in space, and space itself contributes to this reproduction. While the walker in the Rising Sun Country Park follows the commonsense ways of using the park, walking can also reformulate this commonsensical way of using space. The lived space of Rising Sun Country Park can also delve into
the history of the space. Lived and historical space meet on the level of the material, where footpaths now designed for the walker once were used for shipments of coal and industrial materials. Still, this commonsense understanding does not always translate clearly into extended analysis of how space operates and how it is produced.

Walking in this park, then, requires simultaneous attention to all forms of space. In Rythmanalysis, Lefebvre employs a trialectical analysis that “doesn’t lead to a synthesis in accordance with the Hegelian schema” (12). The terms in Lefebvre’s trialectic always remain in motion, actively challenging, contesting, and redefining one another. They never fuse. Although we can focus on material, symbolic, historical, or lived space, none of these terms is separable from the other. Spatial practice emerges out of the intersection between representations of space (a system of signs) and representational space (how those signs impinge upon lived experience). Thus all the forms of space are constantly at work on one another.

As I will discuss below, this interconnected spatiality exists in the Rising Sun Country Park, which has a history bound up in class relations and industrial production. Yet, it is represented as an uncomplicated, natural space. Current representations tend to omit the area’s troubled history. Although the park has its own specific dimensions and configurations when viewed from a map, it cannot be considered separately from England’s industrial history. Lived experience in this space engages the tension between the history of the space and its ostensible naturalness.

The walker, then, simultaneously encounters the productive ingredients of space with each foot step. Historical space assumes particular importance in Rising Sun Country Park, where the histories of class tension are buried beneath the material surface of the park even as they continue to inform the north of England as it is understood symbolically. Mining is still part of the north’s identity, even though the mines are largely gone, and the area is a solidly working-class area, so much so that the Tory government rarely hopes to win a seat in the north. Labour did poorly in the 2010
elections, but almost every parliamentary seat in northeast England went to Labour. It is, quite simply, a working-class area, and in England, the working-class votes Labour. The Rising Sun Country Park is thus part of a larger symbolic space, and although lived experience in the space of the park calls for a forgetting of those broader historical and symbolic connections, walking can also remember that history through engagement with the material.

Challenging the naturalness of the Rising Sun Country Park requires tracing the history (however briefly) of the Rising Sun Colliery and northern England. Immediately, though, societal representations interrupt historical accounts. One cannot be understood without the other. It seems worthwhile, then, to turn to an explicit discussion of the colliery’s history. Ron Curran, who worked in the Rising Sun for twenty-five years, details his experience at the colliery in his book *Wallsend Best: A Personal Experience of the Rising Sun Colliery*. Curran became a union official at only twenty-one years of age, and his book proudly relates his coming of age as a miner and union activist. The colliery is the star of the book though, and it was also the star of Newcastle. As Curran relates, it was a “showcase colliery,” and visitors to the area often went to the colliery to demonstrate their support for local industry. Curran does not catalog every visit, but he does mention visits as diverse as those from the Venezuelan air force and the movie star Patricia Medina. As a union activist, Curran was a staunch advocate of local industry. In 1965, prime minister Harold Wilson’s Labour government began to shut down all of the mines that were not economically efficient. Recognizing the threat to his own colliery, Curran threatened to challenge the seat of Ted Garret, the Labour member of parliament representing Newcastle. The challenge was a bluff—as Curran relates, he had no idea if even his co-workers would support him—but his threat carried the weight of the colliery, and his message was delivered directly to the prime minister. In the end, the efforts of Curran and others could not save the colliery, but the notion of a political no-name being taken as a serious political threat simply by calling on the mine demonstrates the importance of the mine to the community
(and its voters). Despite this support, the mine was still threatened, as the miners were well aware. During one 1965 meeting of the National Union of Miners, Curran gave in impromptu speech (in violation of meeting rules), which is worth briefly quoting here:

Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates…almost every week we hear of another pit being closed, not because it has ran out of coal, but because it is deemed to be uneconomic. The benchmark for being uneconomic of course, is set down by the Coal Board in alliance with Government policy, which is set against the background of international competition…Are we to allow this capitalist monster to kill off our only natural resource?...I do not accept that we are unable to protect this resource which is our only mineral wealth. (99)

Curran attempts to marshal national pride around the earth’s resources, setting the coal minerals against the capitalist monster. This is an argument based on the connection of a citizenry to its space, to the scene of their everyday lives. Curran argues that this local connection is more powerful and more important than abstract, rationalized, capitalism and the cult of efficiency.

The hardship that the cult of economic efficiency wrought on the north of England is a central theme of Tish Murtha’s photographic essay, *Youth Unemployment in the West End of Newcastle*, which features photographs taken between 1979-1981. The essay was on display in the 1980s, and it was part of the 2008 exhibition “Unpopular Culture,” the guiding question of which was: “What is Britishness?” The photographs capture the restless desperation endemic not only to Newcastle but to northern England at the time. In one photo, a dirty-faced young man—possibly a teenager—squats in a window frame. There is no glass in the window, but the raised pane provides an arm rest. The camera is looking up at the young man, but his gaze, which is simultaneously intense, sullen and detached, is cast down and away, toward the street below. He looks to be scanning the streets, perhaps for something to do. Other images include a cross-armed young woman glowering at the
camera, a girl dragging a tattered couch passed graffiti-covered buildings, and some young men lounging against a brick wall with the words “Cops Piss Off” scrawled upon it. In short, the images focus on the misery that accompanied deindustrialization in Britain’s industrial core. The depiction of misery was also one of the chief complaints of critics who questioned whether Murtha had staged the scenes (Murtha 59). Of course, no photograph is entirely natural, and any manipulation on Murtha’s part does not alter a dominant theme of the images: Policies of deindustrialization wrought hardship in the economies, communities, and people of the north of England. As the collieries closed, landscapes changed, and new ways of experiencing place, space, and everyday life emerged.

As the title of the exhibition that featured these mining era photographs suggest, the history of mining opens into questions about “What Is Britishness?” Mining is inextricably connected to Newcastle and indeed the northeast of England in general. During the 19th and 20th centuries, coal was the major traded commodity in the region (Milne 27). Although the area’s coal production increased during the Industrial Revolution, this history goes much deeper than that. Indeed, the first records of coal shipments from Newcastle to London date back to 1269 (Milne 18). Of course, mining rips the landscape open, altering its surface in readily visible ways. Perhaps the greatest impact to the region’s topography came not from mining itself but from shipping, which was done almost exclusively through waterways. To the many dog walkers, surfers, and sea-salt-air-seekers who now enjoy the shorelines of the northeast, the North Sea and its beaches look as timeless, endless, and natural as any other sea. But much of the impact of mining on nature is now submerged. In addition to the bridges and piers built to facilitate shipping, rivers were dredged, deepened, and straightened and coastlines were reshaped in order to make the water useable. By the twentieth century, “the river systems, coastlines, and harbours of the North East had long ceased to be natural land forms created by millennia of wind, rain and waves. They were thoroughly
manufactured landscapes” (Milne 82). Production did not stop with coal. Indeed, the entire region was shaped to meet the demands of industrial production.

Northern England was thus literally shaped around industrial production. This shaping extended into the figurative as well, informing how northern communities imagined themselves. Residents of Newcastle, or Geordies as they are called, are known for a number of things, including drinking, fighting, and their impenetrable dialect. This is clear in many Geordie folk songs, including “Cushie Butterfield,” which features the refrain, “She’s a big lass and a bonnie lass / and she likes her beer / And they call her Cushie Butterfield / and I wish she was here.” One verse refers to her hard-working man, “She says the chap that gets her / must work every day. / And when he comes home at nights / he must gang and seek clay,” or go and seek clay to build household items. Most of all, though, Geordies are known as working-class union-supporters. This is a region that nearly always votes Labour. Geordie schoolchildren in the eighties used to draw a picture of conservative icon Margaret Thatcher on one hand, scribble on the other, and sing “Here’s Maggie Thatcher, throw her up and catch her.” Then, miming a toss in the air followed by a catch, they would grind their hands together and say “Squish squash squish squish there’s Maggie Thatcher,” as they proudly displayed their scribbled upon palms. In the north, children grow up knowing how to mobilize for the union.

Indeed, the National Union of Miners held considerable influence. This was made clear in the strike of 1972, when union workers won their pay increase, trumping the will of parliament. But they also hardened the resolve of the Conservatives, who were determined that “extra-parliamentary flouting of government decisions by the deployment of union muscle” should never happen again (Wilsher et al 15). When the Conservative government, lead by Prime Minister Edward Heath, imposed a ban on paid overtime in the mines in 1974, the unions imposed another strike. Heath responded by upping the ante and calling for a general election, running under the slogan “Who
Runs Britain?” He did not like the answer. The election resulted in a hung parliament, and the Labour party assumed leadership. By winning, Labour paved the way for its eventual defeat, as Heath was removed as Conservative party leader and replaced by Margaret Thatcher, who was the prime minister from 1979-1990. Thatcher sought to break the unions, eliminate state support of the public sector, and establish the conditions for free markets. Although Thatcher became the symbol of the conflict between the unions and the government, the troubles were brewing before her rise to power as nationalized industries in England came under scrutiny from Tory members of parliament in the early 1970s. These industries enjoyed a monopoly on energy production in England, and their strong unions meant that workers could cripple the national economy if their demands were not met. Politicians on the right had a number of ideas for divesting the unions of their power, ranging from splitting the corporations into “leaner, profit-centred” outfits to outright privatization (Wilshere et al 16).

It is tempting to describe the strikes solely as a battle between the working-classes and a government bent on profits at the expense of the people, but the causes of the strikes—including the famous 1984-85 strike—are heterogeneous and conflicting. Indeed, as the strikes wore on, public opinion in Britain was increasingly divided. The leader of the National Union of Miners, Arthur Scargill, was revealed during the strikes to have connections to the Libyan government (and its oil reserves), undermining his role as champion of British energy production. Conservatives were likely to point out that the unions often operated at a deficit, that they were too powerful, and that their pay demands were unreasonable. For many of the miners, though, the reasons for striking were simple: “to be able to keep working, and not come to the pit and [be told] ‘that’s it, your job’s finished’—the right to work” (miner at Denby Grange, quoted in Richards 118). While many of the miners recognized that they could not “completely defy the market” and expect all pits to run to exhaustion, the strikers clearly rejected Thatcher’s free market philosophy that included importing
coal from abroad while deindustrializing at home (Richards 119). Still, Thatcher was largely successful. In the eight years after the strike, 135,000 miners left the industry (Richards 207). Today, the industry hardly exists in England.

Although there are still a few active collieries in England, there are no longer any in Newcastle. The pits may be closed, but their history is not buried. Instead, they continue to influence the production of space in England. Some of the mines are museums, others are residential neighborhoods, and still others have been reconstructed as sites of the natural. As geographer Ray Hudson puts it, “through a mixture of gentrification and comprehensive physical redevelopment, these areas are reworked as sites of middle class residence and consumption” (9).

Although gentrification commonly refers to affluent residents moving into working-class neighborhoods in the urban core, driving up property prices, and driving the original inhabitants of the neighborhoods out, geographers have recently developed a more open definition of gentrification. Neil Smith has argued that gentrification is “a highly dynamic process…not amenable to overly restrictive definitions” and that therefore “we should strive consider the broad range of processes that contribute to this restructuring” (3). This restructuring does not necessarily occur in the urban core. Gentrification can refer to “rural areas…the link between new middle-class settlement, socioeconomic and cultural transformations of the landscape, and the subsequent displacement and marginalization of low-income groups” (Lees 129). The Rising Sun Country Park is thus an instance of gentrification of the natural. Formerly a site of working-class industrial production, the park is now a site of middle-class leisure activities.

This gentrification of the natural troubles our understanding of the natural itself. As Lefebvre writes, “Take national or regional ‘nature parks’, for instance: it is not at all easy to decide whether such places are natural or artificial” (83). The park presents itself as a space of nature, yet this natural is interlaid with artificiality: the industrial history of the northeast, the history of
suburbanization (which combines class tensions), and the production of the natural in a consumable form. The Rising Sun Country Park demonstrates how time—both historical and temporal—works on space. Here the walker confronts the tendency of space to naturalize itself—to become common sense—thus obscuring its own production. The lived space of the park, which the walker engages through embodied action, offers a leisurely experience for the walker. This space is seemingly free of constraint. In this sense, kairos, which relies on opportune timing, a sense of the rhetorically momentous, is neutralized. Since the space presents itself as an un-demarcated opportunity, it precludes kairotic invention in the part of the walker. In other words, by offering a blank slate for invention, the space robs the rhetor of the necessary tools for invention.

The Rising Sun Country Park is in suburban Newcastle, although suburbs in England have quite a different feel than in the United States. Walking is a reliable means of travel in England’s more compact suburbs. The park is only about four miles away from the city center of Newcastle, and the suburban sprawl characteristic of Iowa Street simply does not exist in England, the most crowded country in Europe according to its own Office for National Statistics. To be sure, American-style shopping centers, with large parking lots (or car parks) and massive stores abound, although the stores rarely reach the size of an American Wal-Mart Supercenter, for example. This is not to say Wal-Mart’s influence is not felt in England: Indeed, anchoring the west end of the Rising Sun Country Park is Asda, a Wal-Mart subsidiary that sells groceries, clothing, electronics and more. It is not uncommon to see walkers carrying shopping bags through the park or to see grocery carts abandoned in the ditches the run parallel to the walking paths. Presumably with Asda’s permission, the park advertises Asda’s parking lot for the use of visitors. The store itself is visible from nearly anywhere in the park.

Asda is not the only major corporation crowding the natural landscape. The A19, or the Tunnel Road as it is commonly known, serves as the northeast border of the park. In 1997, Siemens
opened a memory chip manufacturing plant just across the A19. Siemens closed the plant in 2000—yet another blow to the region’s manufacturing base—and sold it to Atmel, an American corporation that produces semiconductors. Seven years later, Atmel sold the plant, resulting in more job losses. A business development group purchased the buildings and renamed them Cobalt Business Park. The site, the largest UK office park, houses a variety of multinational corporations, including the Orange mobile telephone company, Hewlett Packard, Proctor and Gamble, and Fujitsu, as well as local businesses like the Newcastle Building Society and government agencies like the National Health Service Trust. It is difficult to say whether naming the business park after cobalt, a mineral mined for such uses as super alloys and batteries, was a conscious nod to the region’s mining history. All the same, the business park presents a nagging, if subliminal, reminder of Thatcher’s victory: Britain is now deindustrialized, and even manufacturing centers like Newcastle no longer produce much of anything; instead, service jobs at Asda or with multinational corporations are available. And looking out their windows at work, employees are confronted with the graveyard of Newcastle’s manufacturing history.

Most entrances to the park are from the suburban neighborhoods surrounding it, Hadrian Park to the northeast (closest to Cobalt Business Park) and Battle Hill, just south of Hadrian Park. Although many of the neighborhoods around the park were built after mines were closed, even these newer developments are much less sprawling than most American suburbs. Houses in Britain are usually either terraced; semi-detached, or what in America would be called a duplex; and detached, which tend to have a passage of a few feet between neighboring buildings. Every house is built out of brick. The gardens are all quite small (relative to American expectations), and they are frequently carefully manicured, with trimmed shrubs and neatly planted flowers.

There are clear cultural and economic differences between Hadrian Park, which is named for the Roman emperor who built Hadrian’s Wall in order to keep the Scots out, and Battle Hill.
Hadrian Park is the wealthier neighborhood, while Battle Hill is largely composed of council estates (government housing) and known for its higher crime rate. This is immediately clear from the website of the British police, which offers a breakdown of crime statistics according to the addresses of the criminals. According to the map, in December of 2010, forty-eight crimes were committed by Battle Hill residents compared to only eight from Hadrian Park residents. The further north (and thus the further away from Battle Hill) one travels into Hadrian Park, the larger the houses tend to be. Closer to Battle Hill, the houses tend to be terraced.

The walker does not need government statistics to realize this separation along class lines, however. The clearest physical dividing line between Hadrian Park and Battle Hill is the black path that provides entrance to the eastern edge of the park. On one stretch of the path, the black path bisects the back gardens of semi-detached private homes on the northern side of the path and terraced council estates on southern side. The walker thus treads upon the dividing line, experiencing the divide in lived space. Yet this division is also clear from the space of the map, as indeed the black path takes on the appearance of a line drawn to separate one class from the other.

It is not quite as simple as that, since the black path is officially in Battle Hill, the neighborhood with the bad reputation, but cultural definitions can overwrite official lines on the two-dimensional space of the map. Walking this space thusreveals the distinction between private and public. The park, of course, is public property, available to all. The path leads in a westerly direction toward the park. The semi-detached houses on the north side of the path give way to the green fields of the park, and after a few hundred more feet, the terraced houses on the southern side of the path disappear as the path leads into the woods. Viewed from above, the woods appear quite sparse, but the trees are dense enough that the walker on the path will feel completely submerged in the forest.
The black path ends at the Waggonway, now a much wider path than when it first opened in 1762. The Waggonway served as the site of first steam engine tests in 1813. Unlike the divisions based on class, this industrial history is now invisible to the walker on the Waggonway. Thus lived space does not always entail recognition of historical space. The Waggonway connects the black path and the north-south road that leads toward the Rising Sun Farm, an organic farm that sells produce and offers lessons in horticulture and horse riding. The farm is the oldest human construction in the park. It existed before the Industrial Revolution and has lasted into deindustrialization. According to the Rising Sun Farm’s informational brochure, “The Rising Sun Farm’s organic practice is not simply about doing away with chemicals, it is about recognising that the landscape is a dynamic, living system, where all the plants, animals and micro-organisms are interconnected.” It is this interconnectedness that the walker engages with each step. To the farm’s discussion of plants and animals, the walker adds history and symbolic representation. To travel on foot through the gentrified natural space of Rising Sun Country Park is to negotiate the history of the space. The Waggonway is a material symbol of industrialization reworked into consumable form. Once a passage for goods, it now moves bodies in leisure. The path exists now to be consumed by the walker. It is not the only such path—many sidewalks were built largely to shuttle shoppers to and fro between Target and Applebee’s—but the Waggonway was not built this way. Industrial production once generated its bustle. Time is different on the path now, uninflected by cross-country shipping routes, respondent to the absence rather than the presence of work. Walking in this space, then, entails a fundamentally different rhetorical interaction at the level of the everyday, but not one separate from the long history of what is now the Rising Sun Country Park.

I have suggested that walkers engage the dual production of history, which is revised from the perspective of the past even as it informs the present. At present, the Rising Sun Country Park calls for consumption. The widened Waggonway, the slag heap-turned-lookout point, the black path
that cuts through class, all of these elements of the park subsume kairos by offering a seemingly blank slate for invention. None of this is final, though. History may literally be buried beneath the lookout point, but it also created the lookout point. Today, Geordies (and visitors to Newcastle, myself included) enjoy the park. It’s a nice place to take a stroll. This does not automatically make park-goers passive objects in the grand scheme of capitalist accumulation. Nor does it mean that “enlightened” walkers—perhaps those who know their history—can make a clean break with gentrified consumption practices as they spread through the natural. Just as space cannot be separated into merely lived space or symbolic space, users of space cannot be separated into agents and objects. Walkers in the park follow history, but they are also walking in lived space. To enter space is to enter the unending dialectical (or, with Lefebvre, trialectical) tension between its multiple forms, whether built, lived, or historically represented. There can be no synthesis. Ultimately, the impossibility of synthesis is what makes space rhetorical. Rhetoric is guided by both theory and praxis. It is simultaneously a set of heuristic principles and an interpretive schema. Walkers make decisions in space—sometimes deliberately, sometimes less so—but these decisions are always in conversation with the production of space. In the Rising Sun Country Park, walkers trod the wreckage of industry repackaged as a lookout point for weekend afternoons. Time unfolds itself to the rhetor, who consumes leisure, deindustrialization’s product. But the walker is never passive. As we walk through space, we realize that we do not have to choose between passive and active, theory and practice, symbol and performance, past and present. In fact, we cannot make such a choice, because we are always walking with our feet on both sides of un-synthesizable dialectic.

In the final pages of his book, Ron Curran briefly moves from what he calls the collapse of a dream—the Rising Sun Colliery’s closure—to the construction of the Rising Sun Country Park. On one page, Curran includes pictures of the colliery’s demolition. Below these images of exploding mine shafts, he writes “We were hoodwinked on a bewildering scale…the industry didn’t die, it was
murdered!” (112). Directly across from the images that he couches in terms of violence and betrayal, Curran describes the peaceful Rising Sun Country Park. He does not comment much on the park, except to include a picture of the hill that rises in the center of the park with the caption: “What is left of the memories. A mole hill that was a pit heap. But we have in its place a nice Rising Sun Country Park” (113). Indeed, the park is nice. But it sits upon a space with a troubled history. Fittingly, Curran held a launch party for his book, which was released by a small Newcastle publisher, at the Rising Sun Country Park. The manager of the park “was very surprised at the number of people who turned up” at the small room he provided for the book launch (114). Despite the cramped space they were offered, Curran writes that he was grateful that their room had “a wonderful view looking toward the old pit heap” (114). Addressing the attendees, who included among them Ian Lavery, the president of the National Union of Mineworkers, Curran said, “It is below the ground where we now sit, that the Wallsend miners toiled and sometimes died” (114). Walking through the park today, it is easy to forget this simple fact. But it is also within the power of the walker—the embodied user of space—to return these memories to everyday life, forcing a confrontation with the common sense ideologies that infuse the commonplace.
Conclusion: (Re)walking Spatial Ideologies

The theater functions from behind the fourth wall, a symbolic space that has no material existence. Paradoxically, the actors and the audience avoid “breaking” the nonexistent fourth wall by avoiding any acknowledgement of its existence. When the wall is kept intact, the theater proceeds as if the stage were the whole world, or at least the world the actors claim it is. This imaginary wall, though, signals to the audience how to understand the material space of the stage, casting its symbolism onto the stage itself. Hanna Scolnicov describes the stage as a “magic circle” wherein actors can achieve freedom from everyday limitations: The stage is “a delimited space…the audience then feels the theatrical effect of being drawn in” (14). Because it is marked off from other space, the stage beckons to the audience, calling the attention of the audience to the world presented on stage. Theatrical stages are relatively small, and usually capable of being contained in one building, although sometimes, as in the case of the early modern York Nativity plays, the material stage encompasses an area as large as an entire town. Yet the symbolic space of the theater extends far beyond the material limits of the stage. Shakespearean plays are frequently set in the Denmark of *Hamlet*, or in the Cyprus of *Othello*, or in the New World of *The Tempest*. All of these plays, of course, were originally staged in England for a popular audience that had likely never been many miles outside of London. The theater allows us to symbolically experience spaces far removed from our everyday existence. By the same token, then, these far removed spaces inform how we symbolically understand the material space that acts as the stage for our everyday life.

In the theater, to acknowledge the fourth wall is to destroy the working of this symbolism—pointing to the fourth wall reveals the production behind the theater, but magic circles are not meant to be produced, they are simply meant to be. Similarly, to explain a joke is to ruin the joke. Comedians do not describe the process that went into their joke-telling; they simply present the product. The same basic premise that guides the theater and the joke operates in everyday life, which
is always produced in such a way as to obscure its own production. The self-obscuring production of everyday life occurs in space. Everything happens somewhere (in space). This fact is so obvious as to be taken for granted. Calling attention to this space, though, reveals the processes that produced that space. Jokes work because we allow them to do so. The same is true of space: It works because we accept it as a given. Yet to accept the working of space is also to accept without resistance the ideologies staged in space.

As we have seen, these ideologies spread throughout all forms of space. We conceive of space symbolically and act according to the dictates of this symbolism. Symbolic space thus impinges upon lived experience in space as we embody symbolic representations. This embodiment occurs in material space, which emerges as a product of history and continues to contain that history in historical space. And all of these symbolic conceptions and material actions engage the timing of space. None of this happens in any predetermined order, and it is impossible to argue that symbolic space creates material space, or that material space leads directly to symbolic space, or that lived experience in space exactly follows symbolic or historical understandings of space. As I have argued throughout this thesis, space is always simultaneously historical, material, symbolic, lived, and temporal. It is impossible to cleave one from of space from another; all the ingredients of space continually inflect and inform one another.

This makes it difficult to signal the production of space or to single out any of the individual productive ingredients for sustained analysis. This is also the difficulty the rhetorical commonplace presents: It enables many of our actions, thoughts, and rhetorical moves, but it also obscures the provenance of these acts, thoughts, and moves. In part, this is how rhetoric works: To put it in Aristotelian terms, one does not persuade the audience by announcing that one intends to persuade that audience. One simply draws on all the appropriate resources for invention. But if we want to understand how this persuasion becomes persuasive, or how the appropriate resources become
appropriate, we need to break the fourth wall of rhetoric and call into question the space that always provides the site for rhetorical production. Rhetoric is a practical endeavor because it calls for performative, embodied action. Yet it is also theoretical because this action always intervenes in ideology and ontology. The theater works because the audience agrees to a shared understanding of the space of the stage. Jokes work because they touch on a shared understanding of the audience. Rhetoric draws on these shared understandings as well; attending to the space of rhetoric reveals how these understandings were produced and allows rhetoricians to produce new understandings.

On Iowa Street, space is organized to meet the demands of consumption. The order of the space is marked by extension: Systems of order intended to regulate and time the flow of automobile traffic everywhere penetrate the space. In the Rising Sun Country Park, the order of the space is also marked by extension, but in this space the extension is of a lack of systems of order. The space offers itself as timelessly open to the walker. Again, this openness facilitates consumer demands as the natural becomes a consumable item. In both of these spaces, the walker embodies lived experience in space, treading the historical, material, symbolic, and temporal ideologies that inform the production of space. The walker is therefore empowered through this embodiment to recalibrate how space is produced.

In Physics, Aristotle argues that everything is always in place. This is true of rhetoric: Everything occurs in a given place, or, in the terminology of this thesis, in a given space. Despite the ubiquity of space, it is a surprisingly fleeting and amoebic concept. This is why walking offers a unique means of experiencing and theorizing space: Each step confronts space materially. There can be no evasion. If the sidewalk ends, the walker does not pass by without noticing: The walker must stop, find a new route, or create a new sidewalk. Bodies trace the material contours of space, reacting to its constraints and its possibilities, and manipulating its features. To engage material space is also to engage the symbolic, historical, and temporal spaces that informed how that material
space was shaped. Thus walking is always rhetorical delivery. It calls upon the commonplace and seeks new ways of understanding it. At times, the walker can challenge the commonplace.

The order of spaces, the commonplace ways of understandings these spaces, both constrain and enable. Yet no binary exists that separates constraint from possibility; rather, constraints are enabling. Orders may appear to set the terms for action, but rhetorical agents can turn those terms. Investigation of rhetorical spaces and the material tropes, turns, and actions that exist within them can lead not merely to a redescription of everyday practices but to a more complete understanding of the rhetorical choices available to everyday actors. As Certeau reminds us, we are constantly at play with orders that seeks to constrain us. By locating rhetoric in everyday, material spaces, we can trace the figure of that play and adumbrate the potential it offers to alter extant orders.

Walking, then, can be a means of understanding and resisting spaces. Still, it is difficult to draw a clear political project from walking. Walkers on Iowa Street, for example, will struggle with the sheer distance of the space. To be sure, walking is a sustainable alternative to driving from CVS to Wal-Mart, but unless one lives near an Iowa Street, walking the street might not always be a viable day-to-day option. Although walking can attend to the history of the Rising Sun Country Park, it is also what is expected in the park. So walking sustains ideology as well, even if it engages alternative ways of experiencing the space. This is also true of rhetoric, which invents by engaging decorum. No one can invent without engaging extant ideologies, but this does not mean invention should be dismissed from rhetoric. Neither can anyone walk without engaging extant (and often coercive) ideologies, but neither should walking be dismissed. Instead, rhetoricians ought to claim walking and its embodied invention as a privileged site of production, one that simultaneously engages theory and praxis, and one that forces confrontation with ideologies as they are materially manifest.

Faced with what he saw as the ideological decay of Western theater, Antonin Artaud (who was briefly a surrealist), called for a theater of cruelty. In this theater, nothing would be understood
as mere symbolism, mere language, or mere action; nothing would be sanitized and removed from lived experience. Artaud called for “the mass and extent of a spectacle [to be] addressed to the entire organism” (87). Only such a spectacle could “succeed in organically re-involving man, his ideas about reality, and his poetic place in reality” (92). Walking can effect such an organic re-involvement with the spaces around us. In everyday life, we are confronted with spaces that attempt to situate our bodies for us, or that ask us to submit our bodies to mechanized movement. These spaces ask us to forget the artificiality of space and to acquiesce to the ideologies that swirl within space. Walking refuses such a forgetful submission. Every step unites the body with symbolic, historic, lived, material, and lived space. In this unity, in this contact, there is always space for resistance.
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