EDUCATING THE ARMY’S JEDI
The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into
U.S. Army Doctrine
1983-1994
BY
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Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT


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This dissertation examines the decisions taken during the development of the concept for the School of Advanced Military Studies and its subsequent refinement in the first ten years of its history. The other line of inquiry in the dissertation is the development, introduction and refinement of the concept of operational art and the operational level of war into U.S. Army doctrine, primarily in the 1982, 1986 and 1993 versions of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.
Acknowledgements

There are far too many people to acknowledge in this short space. To all of the men and women who allowed me to interview them, bombard them with questions and requests for support all I can say is thank you.

I wish to thank my wife, Kate, and my daughter, Sharon, for standing by me these long years while I worked on this effort, retired from the Army, bought a home and made the transition from public to private life. I promise that I will fix the back yard fence.

Professor Ted Wilson encouraged me to pursue this goal and assisted me along the way. Professor Roger Spiller reminded me that I was pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in History and to broaden my interests and my mind.

I am also grateful to Professors Harvey Sapolsky, Barry Posen, Steve Van Evera, Dick Samuels, Ted Postol, Dr. Owen Cote, and Dr. Cindy Williams for inspiring me to pursue the course of study that led to this work and my degree. These people, along with the other men and women of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, showed me a blend of academia and government and how both can profit from each other. These great people also prepared me for the greatest challenge of my life, the preparation of the war plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002-2003. I learned the value of critical thought from these wonderful people and applied these lessons in the service of our Republic.

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Ed Burgess, the director of the Combined Arms Research Library opened up the resources of the library for me, as well as allowing me to use one of his special, and sought after, study rooms. Cathy Buker and Rusty Rafferty, along with the other research librarians of the Combined Arms Library, aided me along the way from finding rare interview transcripts and out of date field manuals to eagerly assisting on every wild request I had. I could not have completed this task without their help.

Finally, I want to remember my friend Colonel Thomas Felts, U.S. Army. Tom Felts was the first graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies to die in combat. Tom was killed by Iranians on 14 November 2006. He embodied the goals set forth by BG Huba Wass de Czege, the founder of the school. Tom was killed on patrol in Iraq, leading his men into action, and leading by force of personal example.
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Chapter One
An Elite of Obligation and Contribution

“Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough, I sent a message in early September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners. A four-man team of graduates from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the elite year-long program at Command and General Staff College that concentrated on campaign planning, arrived in the middle of the month. We briefed them on our thinking to date and then I instructed: “Assume a ground attack will follow an air campaign. I want you to study the enemy dispositions and the terrain and tell me the best way to drive Iraq out of Kuwait given the forces we have available.” I gave them two weeks to come up with an answer.”

In the fall of 1990 General Schwarzkopf called for a team of Army officers educated at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to energize the thinking in his headquarters. Schwarzkopf and staff planners in his headquarters, U.S. Central Command, faced the challenge of how to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Why did he ask for SAMS educated officers? The school established at Fort Leavenworth to enhance education in large unit, division and corps, operations had been in existence for only seven years and, while a few of its graduates had participated in the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, the larger U.S. Army and defense establishment did not know much about the school or its alumnae. Now a group SAMS graduates faced the challenge of planning a huge campaign.

This dissertation tells the story of SAMS, and of the remarkable reputation so quickly acquired by its graduates, educated in a pre-World War II horse cavalry stable at Fort Leavenworth. It is also the story of the doctrinal revolution in which SAMS played an important role, a doctrinal shift that energized how the U.S. Army thought about and fought its wars. It may be claimed that the combination of a new, offensively oriented doctrine and educated practitioners significantly raised the level of tactical and

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operational understanding in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 1994.

This study explores the interrelationship between the School of Advanced Military Studies, the introduction of operational art into the doctrine of the U.S. Army, and how the graduates of the school sought to translate education and doctrine into action.

Chapter One will highlight the decisions leading to the founding of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Chapter two will review the conditions at the end of the Vietnam War and the challenges the Army faced at that time. Chapter three focuses on the development of operational level of war as the bridge between linking tactical actions on the battlefield with strategic objectives derived from security policy. Chapter four looks at the School of Advanced Military Studies immediately before Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm, and how the school was changing with the times.

Chapters five and six focus on the first two wars faced by graduates of the school and how the graduates used operational level doctrine to frame the fights conducted during these combat operations. Chapter seven focuses on three events in the turbulent period that followed the end of Operation Desert Storm, events that took place during the expected time of peace that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and during which graduates of the school applied doctrine to new challenges. Chapter eight focuses on the School of Advanced Military Studies and how the school was under internal and external pressure to change in response to combat operations and operations other than war. Chapter nine, the conclusion, juxtaposes the guidance of the first director with the guidance of the sixth director to highlight the changes in the school and how the school changed. A central hypothesis of the dissertation is that the fundamental purpose of the school remained relatively unchanged during the first ten years of its existence. Exploring why that was the case provides a basis for understanding the contributions of the school and its graduates’ improvement of tactical and operational understanding within the Army.
The U.S. Army depends upon an explicitly-defined lexicon and a common understanding of the lexicon to ensure directives are translated into action. Before the level of operational understanding could be raised in the Army, the term itself required definition. The concept, “operational level of war,” was introduced into U.S. Army doctrine in the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The operational level of war was called the “theory of large unit operations.” In the 1986 version of the field manual the term was further described as the use of, “available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war.” The term, operational art, was first defined in doctrine in the 1986 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Operational art is, “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” A campaign is, “a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war.” A major operation comprises, “the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle.” The word “joint” in the definition of campaign means that the actions of more than one service; Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force, are a part of the campaign. War itself is both simple and complex, and given the preceding array of definitions even a casual reader can understand the need for some form of schooling to put the definitions into both common use and common understanding. The need for a unifying doctrine to face the conditions of the post-Vietnam era was reinforced by the complex conditions the Army and the nation faced at the time.

The impetus to craft a new doctrine clearly derived from painful memories of the withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent defeat of South Vietnam by the North, the

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Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and the need to rebuild the U.S. Army in the post-Vietnam era. But what were the circumstances that led the U.S. Army's senior leadership to authorized establishment of a school of advanced studies in warfare at Fort Leavenworth rather than seeking to modify the curriculum offered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College? The world was growing more and more complex, and the conduct of warfare was changing just as dramatically. American power in the world was perceived by allies and enemies to be at a low point, and Soviet clients such as North Vietnam, had defeated the U.S. military. During these years the U.S. Army was wracked by inter-racial strife, poor morale and drug use. The Warsaw Pact forces in the central region of Europe looked formidable. In the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles indicated a change in the conduct of warfare. Decisions had to be taken regarding how to rebuild the Army, how to equip it for high intensity conventional combat against a Soviet army that outnumbered North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. These events and questions of strategy and force development had to be answered in order to determine what must be done to restore the Army of the Republic. There were differences of opinion though on what ought to be done.

The Review of Education and Training of Officers, or RETO was a study done in 1978. There was no clear mandate or expression of the intent of the officer corps to increase the amount of time spent in school. While Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, first director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, and others concluded that the pace of change in the conduct of warfare was so rapid that the Army needed to invest more time in educating its officers others in the officer corps did not. The RETO study, while

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5 Wass de Czege graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1964 and was commissioned in
establishing a short staff officer course for captains had also taken a survey of officers in the Army ranging from lieutenants to colonels. The survey showed that most colonels and lieutenant colonels did not believe more time in school was necessary, that the Army needed more doers not thinkers.

The RETO study--and it should be noted that Wass de Czege was a part-time member of this group--surveyed the Army officer corps in 1977 and 1978. One of the questions on the survey asked the question of whether or not the U.S. Army should “select a small percentage of a given USACGSC-level (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) class to remain for an additional year of professional development in military thought, philosophy, and application.” The survey results showed that 21.1 percent of officers selected the response “The Army can’t afford this luxury; we need more do-ers,” and 17.9 percent feared the creation of an “elitist group,” condemning the proposal as a “bad idea.” The survey results showed though that three times as many lieutenants favored the proposal than did colonels. The survey results also showed that the more senior the officer the less likely he/she was to support the idea of additional military education. The Army officer corps was not opposed to sending officers to advanced civil schooling for technical degrees but was wary of creating perceived elites. In his report on staff college level training Wass de Czege countered this concern by writing that while the Army did not think it extraordinary to send an officer to school for two years to study the complexity of being a comptroller some officers “would hesitate to prepare those at the heart of the profession for service

the Infantry. He served two tours of duty in Vietnam where he was decorated for valor three times. He earned a Masters’ degree in Public Administration from Harvard and taught at the U.S. Military Academy in the Social Science Department from 1972 to 1975. Wass de Czege commanded an infantry battalion from 1979 to 1981 and in 1981 he was selected to attend the U.S. Army War College. Wass de Czege career information is drawn from the Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. The Register is published annually by the Association of Graduates, 698 Mills Road, West Point, NY, 10996-1607. Hereafter cited as Register of Graduates.

RETO, p. L-1-58. USACGSC is U.S. Army Command & General Staff College.

RETO, p. L-1-7.

RETO, p. L-2-16.
in a much more complex field, the conduct of war under modern conditions.” As persuasive as Wass de Czege’s report was he needed the support of Army senior leaders to move from concept to action.

Instead of attending the Army War College, Wass de Czege was assigned to the Army War College as a War College Research Fellow and detailed to Fort Leavenworth. Wass de Czege was directed to write a study of the Army Staff College. His findings were published in the U.S. Army War College colloquium on war and, at least unofficially, distributed to selected senior officers. This colloquium was established in the late 1970s and lasted as a forum for discussion until the mid 1980s. Wass de Czege and others wrote papers that were based on personal experiences in Vietnam and studies of war in general. These essays were significant influences on the development and refinement of the use of historical case studies in educating officers for war. Wass de Czege’s report, “Army Staff College Level Training Study,” released in final form in 1983, was influential in establishing what eventually would be named the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies.

The report focused on the changing complexity of warfare and the need to understand the theory of warfare. Wass de Czege outlined the changes in warfare from World War II to the present time and noted that the pace of change was growing increasingly rapid. He juxtaposed this increasing complexity with the amount of time other “first rate” armies took to educate their general staff officers. At the time of the report the U.S. Army suffered in comparison.

Wass de Czege reported that the Israelis sent officers selected for staff college education to school for 46 weeks. The Canadians sent all officers to school for 20 weeks but then specially selected a smaller number for an additional 45 weeks. The British and Germans sent their officers to school for “about 100 weeks …” and the

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Russians “put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education.” The U.S Army sent officers to staff college level schooling for 42 weeks. Wass de Czege wrote, “the Army with the toughest missions in the world possesses the most austere school system of all first-rate armies.” This had not always been the case in the U.S Army.

In the paper Wass de Czege reminded the senior leaders of the Army that three times before in the history of general staff schooling the course had been two years in length. From 1904 to the U.S. entry to World War I, 1919 to 1922 and finally from 1928 to 1936, just prior to the great expansion of the U.S. Army for World War II the course of instruction at Fort Leavenworth was two years long. Wass de Czege highlighted the graduates of the two year Leavenworth course that made a difference in staff and command positions in the U.S. Army, ranging from J. Lawton Collins and Ernest Harmon (Class of 1933) to Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor (Class of 1936). Wass de Czege concluded this short section of his report by noting that at some point in World War II every division (90) and corps (24) were commanded by, “2 year Leavenworth men.” Wass de Czege proposed that a second year of study for selected officers provide a “broad, deep military education in the science and art of war” that went beyond that provided by the existing Command and General Staff College course. This new course would serve the Army by developing a group of officers better prepared for the demands of general staff work at division, corps and higher levels of command and “seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will provide a leavening influence

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11 WdC Report, p. F-3. J. Lawton Collins commanded a division and a corps in WWII and served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Ernest Harmon commanded two divisions and a corps in WWII. Matthew Ridgway commanded a division and a corps in WWII and also served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Collins, Harmon and Ridgway were all West Point classmates. Maxwell Taylor, also a West Pointer, served as a division commander in WWII as well as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Information drawn from the Register of Graduates.
on the Army by their competence …”\textsuperscript{12} Wass de Czege’s report went directly to key senior leaders in the Army.

On 28 December 1982, based on Wass de Czege’s report, General Glen Otis, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, took the decision to approve a one year extension of the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) course for specially selected officers. The first course, a pilot program, began in June 1983.\textsuperscript{13} The efforts leading to the founding of the school were based on the vision of many men, but principally came about due to the persistent energy and personal relationships with senior general officers of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege.

Nothing in life is inevitable and in the Army especially regarding establishing a new school and finding funds for it this is doubly true. There is an element of chance involved in any successful endeavor and regarding the establishment of SAMS this is also true. Many officers and Staff College faculty members were thinking along the lines of improving the curriculum and the quality of the education provided the majors attending the course. Call the element fate, chance or luck, whatever favored establishing a school at this particular time Wass de Czege was in the correct place at the correct time. The need for officers to be able to plan for and execute large unit maneuvers in Europe was seen by senior officers looking at their staffs. As will be shown in chapter two the question of defending Europe, raising the nuclear threshold and even fighting with tactical nuclear weapons supported the need for officers schooled at a higher level in regards to the handling of large units, corps and armies. A decision on how to address the need was taken by senior leaders in the Army.

Many officers were involved in the decision to establish the School of Advanced Military Studies in 1983. However, the establishment of a school of advanced military

\textsuperscript{12} WdC Report, p. F-4.
\textsuperscript{13} A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983. Edited by Dr. John W. Partin, Combined Arms Center Historian, 15June1983 found at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl
studies needed powerful patrons, general officers that agreed with the requirement for advanced military education and were in positions to ensure that once the decision was taken there was sufficient follow through to sustain the effort. Fortunately once these initial decisions were taken there were senior officers in key positions with the force of will and character to give life to the vision and produce action as a result of decision. Three U.S. Army general officers were key decision makers and early supporters of the establishment of the school and these senior leaders were in command or served at Fort Leavenworth between 1979 and 1983. These men are; Generals William R. Richardson, Jack Merritt, and Crosbie “Butch” Saint.

General William R. Richardson served as the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center from 1979 to 1981. Richardson was the son of a missionary couple and had lived in China as a young boy, completed high school in the United States, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned in the Infantry in 1951. By the time he assumed command of Fort Leavenworth he had been to war twice; in Korea and Vietnam.14 His service in command and high level staff positions led him to conclude that the increasing complexity of warfare demanded more intense study. Richardson also knew the decision for more study would receive only lukewarm acceptance in the Army without senior officer support. He supported the decision to establish the School of Advanced Military Studies. He described the course of studies as, “a step up from the normal CGSC (Command and General Staff College) curriculum and study war at the operational and strategic levels.”15 Richardson approved the structure of the course and the method of selection of officers as both instructors and students, saying,

14 Register of Graduates.
"We used carefully selected fellows from the Army War College as facilitators and then hand picked the students out of the preceding CGSC class. Students were officers who had the potential to go on to high positions in the Army and who had a broad view of things, not a specialized but a fairly broad view. Most of them were in the combat arms, but there would be some from combat support and combat service support branches."\textsuperscript{16}

Richardson saw the need for an extended course of study and insisted that the course be designed to return a level of study in the staff college that was dropped from the program of instruction before World War II, "an enhanced study of the art and science of war for young officers who were imaginative, could conceptualize, and whom the Army felt would go into staffs at Division and Corps immediately thereafter and stand apart by virtue of this additional year of training."\textsuperscript{17} Richardson felt that this would be the equivalent of a Masters’ degree in war fighting. Richardson left command of the Combined Arms Center but moved on to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS) on the Army Staff. This influential position enabled him to watch over the development of the course and ensure it remained on solid foundations. He described these efforts, "It required my attention while I was the DCSOPS … to continue to argue that case with the personnel managers and the Chief of Staff to be sure that it was sold. By getting started and our foot in the door with a pilot course, we made the case."\textsuperscript{18} This active support by a key general officer on the Army staff ensured that succeeding Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army would accept the school as a required program that was vital to the success of the Army. Richardson was able to continue his support for the school as the Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command, the position he held until his retirement in 1986. Not stated but generally known was the reality that there would also be resistance to the school from the Army officer corps as

\textsuperscript{16} Richardson Interview, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{17} Richardson Interview, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{18} Richardson Interview, p. 340. Parenthetical added by the author.
well.

General Richardson realized that there would be resistance to the establishment of a second year program at the Command & General Staff College. The RETO study had clearly shown that the Army officer corps did not think additional study was required. There was a degree of resistance from elements within the Army. Regarding the RETO study and the decision to establish SAMS he said, “This was an idea between Huba Wass de Czege and myself. It had nothing to do with the RETO study.” The Army officer personnel assignment system did not take into account this school and the managers of the system resisted the decision. The personnel system is designed to monitor the time officers spend away from troop unit assignments as well as ensuring the requirements of the larger Army are met by qualified officers. Officers stepping out of this orderly flow for more schooling and then going immediately back to key troop assignments would upset the system. Richardson’s counter argument, and one that carried weight in the arguments within the Army staff was, “they were speaking with a forked tongue. On the one hand the Army sends officers off to get a graduate degree for engineers, West Point instructors, ORSA (Operations Research/Systems Analysis) needs … [so] ‘Why don’t we send some off for a year to graduate schooling in war fighting’? They really didn’t have an argument against me on that score.”

General Richardson left command of the Combined Arms Center just after the decision was taken to establish the pilot program of the school. General Jack Merritt followed him to Fort Leavenworth, taking command of the Combined Arms Center.

General Merritt was commissioned into the Army from Officer Candidate School. Merritt served in the Field Artillery. He served two tours of duty in Vietnam and just prior to taking command of Fort Leavenworth he had commanded the U.S. Army War College. He served as the commander of the Combined Arms Center from July 1982 to

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19 Richardson Interview, p. 340. Parenthetical added.
June 1983. This was a short time to be in command of the center but General Merritt participated in the key decisions on the developing curriculum of the school. The decisions on the development of the curriculum were not easy. Merritt had a very powerful individual serving him as the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College, then Major General Crosbie “Butch” Saint. Merritt later described the command climate at Leavenworth, “I was commandant of the Command and General Staff College and the deputy commandant at the staff college was Butch Saint. Butch Saint kind of presided over the bulk of the people with this class and so forth. I had to wrestle Butch every day to maintain command of the post because he was always figuring out ways to run the post for me.”

Administering the post also extended into the decisions on the direction the curriculum for the new school of advanced military studies would follow. Lieutenant Colonel Hal Winton, one of the officers assigned to assist Wass de Czege establish the school described one encounter between the Commandant, Merritt, and the Deputy Commandant, Saint. Winton recalled that Merritt “was a White House Fellow,” and “… wanted sort of a junior Henry Kissinger kind of course,” whereas Saint preferred “a super dooper tacticians course.”

General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was commissioned into the U.S. Army and armored cavalry from West Point. He served in Vietnam twice. Butch Saint was a powerful character with an ego to match. Prior to coming to Fort Leavenworth he commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany and also the Seventh Army Training Center. He served as the deputy commandant of the Command and General

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21 Merritt Interview, p. 157.

22 U.S. Army Military History Institute. Senior Officer Oral History Program, LTC Harold R. Winton, USA, retired. Conducted by LTC Richard Mustion, 5APR01 at Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 7. Hereafter cited as Winton Interview. Actually, Merritt was a finalist for a White House Fellowship, but was not selected; see the Merritt oral history transcript, p. 75.
Staff College from June 1981 to October 1983. He was responsible for implementing the decision to establish SAMS. He was engaged in updating the Staff College and refining the purpose of the College. Saint arrived at Fort Leavenworth and asked the staff about the purpose of the College. Saint determined that the purpose of the College was “Train war fighters.” He also concluded that the College was not doing that, rather, “We were training individuals on certain staff procedures.” Saint was determined to change that about the Staff College. He also began to think about a two year program.

General Saint described the Army effort to develop operational and strategic level planners in the Army from the time he served as the deputy commandant. He said, “When I was the deputy commandant at Leavenworth, General Richardson used to beat me up all the time about strategic planners and we don't have any.” Saint had definite ideas on what it took to become a strategic planner. In his view, “a strategic planner is one that has to understand region, has to understand the joint force capabilities, and understand the national decisionmaking system in order to come up with a strategic plan that involves the national military structure.” Saint also knew there were other elements necessary in developing a corps of officers that could effectively serve at higher staff and command levels. Saint knew that there was also a requirement to have an understanding of the interagency process that was a key part of the development of strategy and policy.

Saint described his thoughts on this process and its inclusion into the course of studies in SAMS. He said that a strategic planner “needs to know the inner agency capabilities because you don't do anything in a strategic plan without the other players. Now the military can be a major or a minor player. It's just like I was talking about the system, if you don't know the levers to pull, and you don't understand how they interact,

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then you can't come up with a strategic plan." Saint’s articulation of the requirements for a strategic planner was somewhat at odds with the guidance that Winton recalled receiving from Saint, the “super-dooper tactician’s course.”

Based on this guidance and what he heard from Merritt, Winton developed “a super duper tactics course plus an operational art course appended onto what I called a preparation for war course … built with the broad issues army leaders have to think about before they design an army to go over and fight.” The outline of the course was a mixture of military theory and history, with courses on Army doctrine. Winton followed the outlined proposed by Wass de Czege in his study but fleshed out the concepts based on the guidance from the generals. Saint pondered the questions of how to prepare officers for these missions as well as what officers perform these types of tasks at higher levels of command. Saint decided that SAMS was a necessary part of this process.

Saint intended that SAMS should be designed “to give people the basic underpinnings so they can become strategic planners in addition to operational planners.” Saint recognized that following schooling there had to be an assignment mechanism in place to ensure graduates of the school gained experience in operating at division and corps, as well as in a joint and interagency environment. The development of strategic planners and leaders required career choices on the part of the officers involved in the process. As Saint put it “That's how you get them, whether we have enough of them or not it has to be a conscious process on whose going to be one of these guys.” The decision on the process and the curriculum came down to one briefing given by Winton to Saint and Merritt.

In January 1983 Winton gave a presentation to Generals Merritt and Saint.

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24 Saint Interview, p. 122. The preceding quotation was also from the Saint interview, p. 122.
25 Winton Interview, p. 7.
26 Both quotations from the Saint Interview, p. 239.
Winton prepared a curriculum overview that attempted to find the balance between Merritt’s desire for “junior Henry Kissingers” and Saint’s “super duper tacticians.” The presentation outlined a course that balanced division and corps tactics with operational art. Winton recalled that “Merritt was a little bit displeased,” but the Saint stepped in and said, “This is the kind of course that I said I wanted. So if you have a problem, it’s not with the briefer, it’s with me.”27 The end result of the presentation was an outline of a broad based curriculum that began with military theory and ended with courses on preparing for war, a logical progression through the complexities of warfare. Winton said that, “This was the rationale that satisfied both General Merritt and General Saint.”28

The vision required the support of influential generals. The development of the vision and the energy to implement the decision required the combined force of intellect of three dedicated officers.

The three men directly responsible for articulating the vision for the school and then completing the hard work to develop the school and its curriculum, selecting the officers for the first class and then teaching them are; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Johnson, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Winton. These three individuals developed the School of Advanced Military Studies and placed the school on a path to successfully bringing the vision to life. These three men took material Wass de Czege developed through research and advanced the notion of a school that would improve the understanding of warfare throughout the Army. Wass de Czege was an Army Research Fellow charged with studying Staff College level schooling. He was the visionary that saw the need for the school. Winton and Johnson were assigned to Fort Leavenworth and were selected by Wass de Czege to assist him in refining the concept into reality. More than this these three men developed the first

27 Winton Interview, p. 8.
28 Winton Interview, p. 9.
curriculum, selected the officers to attend the school, and taught it to the first two classes at this new Army school.

Wass de Czege described how he came to begin thinking about the complexities of warfare. He said the idea began even before he was named a research fellow, the first glimmer began, “... back on a hill in Vietnam wondering why all the field grade officers above me hadn't a clue about what they were sending me out to do.” He was appointed to a study group established by then Lieutenant General (LTG) Richardson on combat decision-making and judgment. Wass de Czege described this next point toward the idea of SAMS as, “... the "how to teach judgement" working group LTG Richardson established at CGSC, of whom I was the most junior member, and none of the "old" Colonels thought there was a problem.”

Finally, in June of 1981 Wass de Czege accompanied Richardson on a trip to the People’s Republic of China. Wass de Czege described a conversation he had with Richardson on the fantail of a river boat, “Then the moment in China on the Yangtze River with LTG Richardson when SAMS became the beginnings of its future reality. There may be other theories of how SAMS got started, but before that moment in China, SAMS was in no one else’s mind that I know of, at least no one I knew would even support my idea before I took it to LTG Richardson that day.”

Wass de Czege’s vision for this school was not to create a “privileged elite” or educate officers to do select key jobs better but rather “to create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers would teach others.”

Articulating the notion that a strategy to manage uncertainty in future wars must be developed, Wass de Czege urged the Army to develop officers “able to apply sound military judgement across the entire spectrum of present and future U.S. Army missions

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29 Personal electronic mail from BG (ret) Wass de Czege to the author, 18 October 2006.
30 Wass de Czege e-mail.
during the preparation for and conduct of war.”\textsuperscript{32} Wass de Czege believed that the Army required officers educated in the practice of the operational art, the level of war at which tactical successes were connected to strategy in the attainment of policy objectives.

The RETO study reinforced this line of thinking in many ways. The RETO study surveys indicated the officer corps favored education to a degree and had mixed feelings about extra education that could set up an elite or even a “General Staff” in the Army.\textsuperscript{33} Wass de Czege was realistic though as he wrote, “We are a pragmatic army. Education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession), is not highly valued.”\textsuperscript{34} The notion of avoiding the taint of an elite group was taken very seriously. The step that was taken, based on discussions between Wass de Czege, Richardson, and Lieutenant General Becton, was to educate the officers in SAMS and then not directly track the officers throughout their subsequent careers. Becton and Richardson felt that there were too many developing elites in the Army.\textsuperscript{35} There would be no Army approved additional skill identifier (ASI) that would mark the SAMS graduate. The result of this decision was that the graduates of SAMS would not receive an ASI and would either “sink or swim” based on their individual performance during their first utilization assignment after graduation. In order to continue the education of the graduates, putting doctrine into practice under the tutelage of general officers Wass de Czege insisted that the graduates be assigned to division and corps planners’ positions immediately following graduation even if, in some cases, that conflicted with potential command assignments.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{32} WdC Report, p. F-5. Emphasis in original text.  
\textsuperscript{33} RETO, p. L-1-7.  
\textsuperscript{34} WdC Report, p. F-34.  
\textsuperscript{35} In the late 1970s and early 1980s the U.S. Army had the Special Forces, so-called “Green Berets,” the Army Ranger battalions were just being formed and the so-called “Delta Force” of counter-terror special operations forces were being recruited and trained.  
\textsuperscript{36} Personal electronic mail note from LTC (ret) Doug Johnson, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, to the author on 9SEP06. Hereafter cited as Johnson e-mail.
Wass de Czege, supported by key general officers in the Army senior leadership, prevailed in establishing the School of Advanced Military Studies. The effort to obtain support from the senior leadership of the Army was one part of the effort. Once this decision was taken there was the hard work of getting a curriculum developed and approved. This work was conducted by Lieutenant Colonels Hal Winton and Douglas Johnson.

Lieutenant Colonel Hal Winton was commissioned into the Infantry after graduating from West Point in 1964. He served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earned a Ph.D. in History from Stanford and taught in the U.S. Military Academy history department in 1974/77. Just prior to being assigned to Fort Leavenworth he commanded an infantry battalion in Europe.\(^{37}\) Winton was assigned to the Command and General Staff College in 1981 as a member of the initial faculty of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). This staff officer course for Army captains was developed as a result of the RETO study. The requirement for becoming a member of the faculty was successful battalion command. He joined the effort of developing SAMS in the late summer of 1983. Winton described this event as “sort of an accident of history.”\(^{38}\)

Looking back, Winton described his role in the development of SAMS in modest terms, “I referred to myself and Lieutenant Colonel Doug Johnson as curriculum carpenters. We were not the visionaries.”\(^{39}\) Winton named Wass de Czege, among others, as one of the visionaries who developed and sold the idea of the school. Wass de Czege was not assigned to Fort Leavenworth though, he worked for General Richardson. Richardson appointed Wass de Czege as an Army War College Fellow to develop the idea of the school. Wass de Czege did not “belong” to Saint due to this

\(^{37}\) The Register of Graduates.  
\(^{38}\) Winton Interview, p. 5.  
\(^{39}\) Winton Interview, p. 2.
assignment, but Winton did. Winton said, “… General Saint wanted somebody who belonged to him to do the spade work, if you will, to translate this [vision of SAMS] into reality.” Winton’s road to the job as a curriculum carpenter was, as he called it, “an accident of history.”

Winton believed that this assignment was the result of two accidents of history. The first was that he and Wass de Czege were West Point classmates. The second was that Wass de Czege knew that Winton was a Ph. D. in History and was a former instructor at West Point. Winton said that he believed Wass de Czege, “whispered in General Saint’s ear, “If you want someone who belongs to you to start doing the curriculum carpentry, that’s the guy you ought to get. So I was duly invited and I duly accepted.”

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Johnson graduated from West Point in 1963. He served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earned a masters’ degree in history from the University of Michigan and taught in the history department at West Point from 1974/77. Johnson was assigned to Fort Leavenworth after a tour of duty in Germany. He arrived in 1981 and was assigned to the Fort Leavenworth office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for resource management. Speaking of the assignment Johnson said, “I was tasked to do a lot of off-the wall things, such as rewrite the entire Ft. Leavenworth and CGSC Mobilization Plan. The IG (Inspector General) had just failed the Installation on that bit. I was also assigned the task of the Installation Master Development Planner – partly because the Chief of Staff did not personally like or trust the Installation engineer. In fact, the Installation Engineer was prohibited from signing contracts in excess of $10,000 without my personal approval – and I’m an Artilleryman – I only blow things to

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40 Winton Interview, p. 5. Parenthetical added.
41 Winton Interview, p. 5.
42 Register of Graduates.
Johnson was busy but not doing anything that really taxed him or drew on his experiences as a history professor at the U.S. Military Academy. Johnson was also an avid horseman and this hobby brought Johnson into contact with Wass de Czege.

Johnson was coordinating the construction of buildings all over Fort Leavenworth--from the prison to the new bachelor officers’ quarters. He was also a member of the Leavenworth Hunt Club. Asked what brought him to SAMS Johnson wrote, “What got me involved was the HUNT! I was riding about one day with Huba and he asked me where I had my Master’s and on what.” Johnson gave Wass de Czege his masters’ thesis and then events took a faster pace. Winton also knew Johnson and believed his assignment on the installation staff was “an incredible waste of talent.” Winton also played a role in securing Johnson’s role in the development of SAMS.

Winton reviewed the requirements established by Training and Doctrine Command regarding the establishment of a curriculum. He determined that he would need forty-four people to get the work done in the time available, five months. He also knew he really wanted Johnson as a part of the SAMS team. Winton went to brief Saint on the process to develop the curriculum concept into reality. Winton told Saint “there’s good news and bad news.” Saint said to give him the bad news first. Winton said “If we get forty-four people starting the first of February, we can have it all done by June.” Saint said, “Disapproved. What’s the good news?” Winton said “The good news is we can get it done with two if we get the right guy.” Saint asked who was the right guy and Winton said Johnson. Johnson was a member of the team as of that moment.

Johnson recalled, “The next thing I knew, Hal Winton called me and told about the budding idea of SAMS and asked if I would be interested in joining as he and Huba

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43 Johnson e-mail.
44 Winton Interview, p. 11.
45 Winton Interview, p. 12.
felt they needed a third who was an experienced instructor etc … [then] we three are standing before “Butch” Saint … I was a known quantity to Saint. When the three of us walked into his office he threw up his hands and asked if it was the three Wise-Men or the Three Stooges? … and that is how I joined this mob.” Joining the “mob” was just one step on the path to developing and executing the curriculum of a school that did not have a classroom. Referring to the school Johnson wrote, “Hal Winton and I had talked about that idea for some years, but Huba [Wass de Czege] was the guy who had done the work to establish that as a defensible proposition.”46 The approach to refining the concept into action was anything but routine.

Johnson and Winton had taught together in the History Department of the Military Academy. They realized that Wass de Czege prepared the ground for the development of the school with his study, as well as garnering key general officer support for the idea of the school. Turning the idea into a reality required the hard work of developing a curriculum that would educate officers in the theory of warfare. The first decision taken in the development of the curriculum was to start at the division level of command and staff. Johnson described the efforts, “We [Johnson and Winton] then took up what tools we had and established the “Curriculum Carpentry Corporation.” We decided to work from the ground up – the fundamental theory of ground combat as far upward as time would allow, but focusing ultimately on the operational level – at that time very badly understood and not on the tips of the tongues of more than a very few people. That meant we were going to develop planners at the division level and or above.”47 The Curriculum Carpentry Corporation now had an objective and a methodology. The hard work of building the school remained.

Johnson joined Winton near the end of February 1983. The two started the

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46 Both quotations from the Johnson e-mail.
47 Johnson e-mail.
process of hiring an administrative non-commissioned officer, a secretary, ordering books, and writing the actual curriculum. The two had four months, from March to June, to complete this work. Winton did a short study of the exact requirements for this effort, the requirements established by Training and Doctrine Command. After this study of the development of tasks, conditions, standards, course goals and learning objectives, Winton decided to “deliberately divorce …” themselves from the established process. His rationale, “First, because we didn’t have the time… The second thing we said was that there’s some Auftragstaktik involved here. You hired us to do this job. You trust us to do this job.” This was another important moment in the development of SAMS. Winton and Johnson established an element of trust in the school among the senior commanders at Fort Leavenworth. They decided to establish a goal of developing character traits and knowledge areas for the school and its’ students. The next step in the unique process that defined SAMS, as Winton said, was to trust the “genius, if you will, the savoir faire of the seminar leader to adjudicate that interaction between the students and the material.” Winton and Johnson also put a burden on the SAMS’ student. “We’re going to leave it to the enthusiasm and vigor of the students to dig into this material and learn stuff out of it that they think is important.” This decision was the proximate cause of the streak of independence in SAMS that continues to the present time in the history of the school. Winton and Johnson resisted the military’s bureaucratic tendency toward rigid bureaucratic control. Winton said, “We didn’t insist that every single lesson begin with an exact articulation of how these twenty pages connect to this particular objective.”

Curriculum development consumed Winton and Johnson from February through 48

All quotations in this passage from the Winton Interview, p. 14. Auftragstaktik is a German military term that loosely means mission orders. The concept requires a senior officer to provide a mission and the means to accomplish the mission to a subordinate and then allow the subordinate to accomplish the mission without interference.
June of 1983. Once they decided to start conceptually from the division level of command and staff work and then move up to corps and army level the development of curriculum moved into refinement as the two had defined a path forward. Johnson noted that, “We knew, intuitively, that we needed to get some travel into the program …” to avoid too much classroom time.\(^49\) An integral part of the education of general staff officers and commanders, the two decided, included observing not only the Regular army in training but also the National Guard. Johnson recalled, “We had done something of a survey and found that almost none of the CGSC students had any real contact with the ANG (Army National Guard). We ended up sending the entire class out to visit two divisions in training – it was an eye-opening experience for them.” The travel also included trips to visit U.S. based senior level headquarters with a focus on contact with officers in the Plans sections of the headquarters. Finally Winton and Johnson decided that SAMS should also go to Europe to “get the guys involved in some kind of a real Army exercise.” The trip to Europe included an Ardennes Battlefield Staff Ride as part of the NATO exercise trip.\(^50\)

Trips were a necessary part of the curriculum and were directly related to the broad guidance Wass de Czege received when told to build the school. Winton and Johnson clearly understood that Wass de Czege’s mission as the first director was to develop a program that would produce “broadly educated, tactical and operational planners and thinkers.”\(^51\) Wass de Czege’s vision on how to accomplish this mission was influenced by another officer with whom Wass de Czege had worked on a previous project, the development of the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual FM 100-5 \textit{Operations}.

\(^{49}\) Johnson e-mail.
\(^{50}\) Drawn from the Johnson e-mail. A staff ride involves officers studying a particular battle and the roles played by key commanders during the battle. The staff ride then traces the battle on the actual battlefield so students can see the ground and understand how terrain influences battle.
\(^{51}\) Winton Interview, p. 18.
The officer was then Lieutenant Colonel L. Don Holder. Winton, Johnson and Holder all had taught together in the History Department at West Point. Holder’s collaboration with Wass de Czege on FM 100-5 convinced Wass de Czege of the utility of using military history along with military theory, doctrine, and hands on experience in some form as the best mixture of subjects for a broad based military education.\(^{52}\) Hands on experience, absent some form of large scale maneuvers, required a form of simulation.

Winton and Johnson knew that many of the officers in the Army at that time had never been a part of exercises larger than battalion-size unless they’d been stationed in Germany. They knew some means was needed to show the scope of division level maneuvers. The means that Winton and Johnson tested ranged from very new and untried computer war games to table top war games, the Dunn-Kempf war game, to sand tables.\(^{53}\) Johnson, Winton, and Wass de Czege tested each kind of war game they could find to see which type could be readily adapted into the SAMS curriculum. As Johnson wrote, “We just kept coming up with ideas and, not having much in the way of adult supervision, we went out and tried one thing after another.”\(^{54}\)

Trying one thing after another, along with strong support from General Saint, enabled the SAMS team to have a fairly well-developed curriculum by the time the first class reported in late June 1983. Winton though recalled two incidents that highlighted the enormity of the task the three faced. SAMS did not have a dedicated building or

\(^{52}\) Winton Interview, pp. 18, 19, Johnson e-mail. Holder was a SAMS Fellow and then served as the third Director of SAMS. He ultimately retired as a lieutenant general. Holder was the highest ranking SAMS graduate until 2006 when Charles C. “Hondo” Campbell was selected for promotion to General.

\(^{53}\) The Dunn-Kempf war game consisted of plastic sheets molded into terrain forms that represented Central European terrain with lead micro-armor tanks, armored vehicles, and trucks molded as detailed replicas of U.S./NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact vehicles. The scale of the models vis-à-vis the terrain boards was such that the micro armor sets were actually in size the same number of vehicles as a U.S. and Soviet division. These sets were still in use in SAMS until the mid 1990s. A sand table is just that, a large box on a table that contained sand. The sand could be formed to represent terrain features thus allowing officers to visualize attack and defense formations of vehicles, and how an attack and defense would progress. Johnson worked with one of the inventors of the Dunn-Kempf war games, Colonel Steve Kempf while he was assigned in Europe.

\(^{54}\) Johnson e-mail.
even class rooms in the 1983 to 1984 academic year. The teaching team, Winton, Johnson and Wass de Czege, had to coordinate for class rooms on a daily basis. Johnson and Winton taught the bulk of the military history and theory courses. The curriculum concepts were “pretty well developed,” but there were times in that first year of SAMS that “the students would come out of class and be handed a sheet of paper and a book, and told read this for tomorrow.” Winton recalled that while this did not happen too often it did happen and that the “students were very patient.”

This type of circumstance also applied to Wass de Czege and his teaching of tactics.

Winton and Johnson depended on Wass de Czege for the development of the tactical courses and exercises for the students in SAMS. Wass de Czege’s work on tactical dynamics made this a natural fit and played to everyone’s strengths, something absolutely required in that first year of SAMS. Wass de Czege was also involved, as Winton recalled “in a lot of politics and a whole lot of other things …” necessary for the continued survival of the school. This need to divide his time had an occasional effect on the conduct of tactical exercises. On one memorable occasion, as Winton and Johnson recalled, Wass de Czege met the students one morning with an armful of maps. Wass de Czege directed the students to follow him into the basement of Bell Hall (the main academic building of the Command and General Staff College) to find an empty corridor. Wass de Czege split the students into two group; Red Forces and Blue Forces. The directive was to put the maps together and then, “Red plan a defense and Blue plan an attack and I’ll be back in two hours and see how you are doing.” The students were also reminded that if a fork lift was seen coming by to make sure the maps were rolled up and secured so they could be re-used by future classes. As Winton

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55 Winton Interview, p. 16.  
56 Winton Interview, p. 16.  
57 Winton Interview, p. 17.
put it, “It was a little bit on the fly and everybody put up with that and understood it.”

Testing the understanding of the material was the final hurdle the team faced in the completion of the development of the initial curriculum of SAMS.

The officers selected as students for SAMS were required to write a masters’ thesis. Wass de Czege, Johnson and Winton thought that this would be enough of a test and measure of the students understanding of the course material. The director of graduate studies in the college at the time, Dr. Phil Brookes, told them that a form of final examination was also required in order to meet the accreditation requirements for permission to award a graduate degree. Johnson proposed an oral examination that would cover the entire year. His proposal was, “we put every concept we had exposed the students to during the course of the year on a 3X5 card. One concept per card.” The students would be examined one at a time and would be handed a deck of cards and directed to an examination room. The requirement was to arrange the cards in the most logical manner and then present a rational oral defense of why the concepts were arranged so with all supporting logic. The time limit was 90 minutes. The following oral defense also lasted 90 minutes. Johnson recalled, “You could see how differently they each approached the task, but what similarities emerged as well. We could tell from that exercise who was most likely to make it in the world to come and who wasn’t likely to get beyond second base.”

Curriculum and final examination formed a critical part in the development of the school. The final critical element was the selection of the students.

General Richardson’s guidance for selection was straightforward. The students had to be, “officers who had the potential to go on to high positions in the Army and who had a broad view of things, not a specialized but a fairly broad view.” The majority of officers in the school should be selected from, “the combat arms, but there would be

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58 Winton Interview, p. 17.
59 Johnson e-mail.
some from combat support and combat service support branches."\textsuperscript{60} Winton recalled that in the first year of the school General Otis, the Training and Doctrine Command commanding general directed that officers selected for SAMS had to have the additional specialties of Operations (54), logistics (92), personnel management (41) or intelligence (35).\textsuperscript{61} Winton and Johnson both recall that the debates over selection lasted a long time. Winton made the point that he, Johnson and Wass de Czege wanted officers who were "really hungry and thirsty to learn ... we would have preferred more Sam Damons than Courtney Massengales."\textsuperscript{62} The procedures of the selection process were also outlined in the period February to June 1983.

The framework of the selection process for admission into SAMS is still in use. Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson’s first decision was that they would not request a review of an officer’s performance file and they would not look at evaluation reports. Officers that wanted to apply were required to fill out an application and state why they wanted to attend the school. The officer’s academic advisor was asked to give an evaluation of performance and a recommendation. Since the application and selection process was conducted early in the academic year of the Staff College course the academic advisor comments were not really useful, save in a negative way. All applicants were required to take a two part test. The first part of the test was objective and tested the applicants’ knowledge of doctrinal terms, map symbols and unit organizations. The second part of the test was subjective. Applicants had to answer essay questions that included answering a tactical question that included a moral dilemma. The intent was to see how an officer could answer a question to which there

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  \item \textsuperscript{60} Richardson Interview, p. 322.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Winton Interview, p. 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Winton Interview, p. 49. Sam Damon and Courtney Massengale are the two key characters in a book that was very popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s titled \textit{Once an Eagle}, written by Anton Myrer. Damon was the archetype of selfless service and valor. Massengale was the virtual opposite and was portrayed as a schemer and social climber willing to do anything for promotion.
\end{itemize}
was no correct or text book answer, and how well the officer could articulate a decision 
and the supporting rationale. The final element of the application process was a twenty 
minute interview with the Director. The purpose of the interview was simple, does the 
officer have the fortitude to “stand up as a major in front of a two star or a three star and 
say, “General, I recommend this course of action because …” The results of the test 
and interview were reviewed by a panel of officers made up of the department heads of 
the Staff College and the Director of SAMS and chaired by the Deputy Commandant of 
the College. The list of the officers selected to attend SAMS was then sent to 
Washington, DC for a final review by the Army Personnel Center. Selection of the 
officers for the school was the final part in the preliminary development of the school. 
The performance of the officers while in school and more importantly upon arriving in 
their units after graduation would prove the principle.

Winton was present when General Edward “Shy” Meyers the Army Chief of Staff 
visited SAMS during that first academic year. Meyers said SAMS was important to the 
Army because “When I was the DCSOPS [deputy chief of staff, operations] I was getting 
M1A1 kind of planning out of my Leavenworth graduates. I wanted something more 
imaginative and creative than that, people who saw the planning process in a broader, 
wider format.” As senior, three and four star, generals would come to visit the school 
comments were remarkably similar, Winton recalled that almost universally these 
generals would remark, “Spot on, the Army should have done this 20 years ago.” The 
views of Army one and two star generals, the generals that led Army divisions, were 
much different. Prior to actually getting SAMS graduates into Army divisions these 
generals were vocal about asking if the Army either needed or could afford to be

63 Winton Interview, p. 49, Johnson e-mail, and Wass de Czege e-mail. SAMS still uses this 
process to select officers for the Advanced Military Studies Program.
64 Winton Interview, p. 3. “M1A1” is an Army peculiar term used to denote the expected 
bureaucratic standard answer to any problem.
spending this money and time in extra education, echoing the results of the RETO study. The observations would change once officers educated at SAMS proved themselves as valuable members of division and corps staffs, but this was in the future in 1983.

Hard work resulted in decisions taken by senior generals that sustained the development effort required to build the school. Further hard work produced a radical departure from stultifying format but set the basis for a broad education in military history, theory, doctrine and hands on experience in the art and science of war. A rigorous selection process and graduation process ensured that the best suited officers were selected for this education and the best of that group graduated from the course of study. The visionary work of Colonel Wass de Czege, supplemented by the “Curriculum Carpentry Corporation” of Lieutenant Colonels Winton and Johnson combined to put sinew and muscle to the skeleton of the plan for the School of Advanced Military Studies. The benefit to the Army at large would be seen in the performance of these graduates. Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson laid the foundation of a school that would produce an elite of sorts, not an elite of privilege and accelerated promotion. The elite produced by SAMS would generally prove to be an elite of capability and contribution, officers that made valuable contributions to the U.S. Army.

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65 Winton Interview, p. 43.
Chapter Two
The Context of the Times

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.”

There has been a long debate among students of the U.S. Army about the lessons of Vietnam especially in the immediate aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Historians and theorists, inside and outside the services, have carried on this dialogue. The purpose of this chapter is to review what historians and theorists thought were the important questions concerning U.S. Army doctrinal reform in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, from roughly the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. This chapter explores what these historians and theorists have said about the lessons from Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars and investigates how and why they have formulated such contrasting “lessons” about that conflict and its implications for shaping doctrine. It also seeks to make clear how the Army AirLand Battle doctrine, the concept that, when put into practice by graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies influenced by and, as well, repudiating the experience of Vietnam, redefined the Army’s approach to warfighting. A lesson is not a lesson learned until it is acted on and embodied in action. The major portion of the chapter will look at post Vietnam U.S. ideas about military reform. Given focus in this review are works by Stephen Rosen and Barry Posen to Russell Weigley, among others. Each arguably contributed to a crucial reorientation of American military doctrine as well as to the U.S. Army’s education on war. Other major contributors to the overall strategic scene in this period were Thomas Schelling and

Kenneth Waltz. These specialists in nuclear weapons theory while not contributing
directly to the debate on reforming the Army did help establish the strategic framework in
which the Army had to fit. The chapter will also explore U.S. Army officers’ thoughts on
the role of the post-Vietnam Army. The different schools of thought will be identified and
reviewed. The basis for these schools of thought were founded on the writings of
historians and political scientists and the experiences of the officers who fought in the
war and thought about the impact of the war on the Army. The thrust of the schools of
thought was presented in terms of either incorporating the lessons of Vietnam into
discipline or putting the “small war” behind the Army and focusing on conventional war.
There was also a debate on the source of change in discipline and whether the Army
could change itself or required civilian interference to overcome organizational inertia.
All of this debate contributed to the decisions taken in this period after the Vietnam War
and answering the question, what should be done to refocus the Army?

This is not to say that all of these works were directly contributive to the
development of both the School of Advanced Military Studies and the introduction of
operational art into U.S. Army discipline. Some works illustrate the debate on what to do
with the lessons of Vietnam and how to recast strategic thinking in the U.S. Army as well
as the role of the Army in attaining policy goals. Others framed the great debates on the
use and non-use of nuclear weapons in Europe, which fueled the need on how to raise
the nuclear threshold with conventional force. All of these debates; the lessons of
Vietnam, the use of the U.S. Army, nuclear weapons use on the European battlefield,
and the role of conventional force as both additive to the deterrent in Europe and the
larger role of the Army in strategy framed the debates of the 1970s and 1980s. The use
of force as an extension of policy in the post-Vietnam period of American policy was the
overall environmental context of the debates and set the stage for a renewed level of
intellectual effort in and out of the Army. The books presented in this chapter are
illustrative of the depth of the thinking and writing going on in this turbulent period.

Colonel Wesley Yale, Major General ID White, and General Hasso von Manteuffel wrote, *Alternative to Armageddon*, in 1970. This book written by retired officers proposed a modern version of “blitzkrieg” as a means of avoiding lengthy conflicts like Vietnam. These three officers had broad experience in war, the mobile war that characterized combat in Europe. Their view was that the advent of the nuclear age had made war too terrible and presented a concept of war that would preclude the use of nuclear weapons. The alternative they proposed was that the West and the United States develop a conventional means of war that would rely on a refined form of blitzkrieg. They wrote, “If the nuclear deterrent is not to be used, then a credible and effective deterrent must replace it…the most practical deterrent…is a capability to wage immediate, decisive and highly mobile, or “lightning” warfare.” The book was also a glimpse of future internal and external arguments concerning the role of the Army as a deterrent. Concerning Army doctrine they wrote, “…doctrine is largely shaped by the static battle and jungle experience of Korea and Vietnam.” The emphasis on Special Forces and counter-insurgency was dismissed as, “a type that has its place but is based on conditions the geopolitical and military policies of the western world must seek to avoid.” Finally, the authors contended that this emphasis on “small wars” was, “unproductive in the larger sense but also it detracts from efforts to build a real deterrent to major confrontations.” The thrust of the book was tactical in nature. The authors did not make a strong link between tactical actions, the conduct of modern “blitzkrieg” and attaining strategic objectives.


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68 Alternative, p. 308.
was hailed as the definitive expression of a historical view on how America made war. 
This book was and remains widely used in all military history programs from ROTC and 
USMA to the Staff and War Colleges. Weigley had a profound influence on the schools 
of thought within the military on how to proceed in reforming and refocusing the Army.

Weigley’s work came at a momentous time in the history of the U.S. Army. The 
Army was struggling to come to grips with its bitter experience in the jungles of Vietnam. 
Weigley pointed out that prior to 1945, “the United States possessed no national 
strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends…”

Weigley’s review of the history of military strategy and policy from 1775 to 1973 led him 
to conclude that since the Cold War and especially after the Korean War there had been 
a trend toward the formation of a national strategy to further American interests as well 
as defend the Republic. This review informed the internal and external debate about 
Army reform.

In Weigley’s view the broadening of the concept of American strategy from purely 
military to a consideration of all elements of national power came about at the time when 
advances in technology, the atomic and hydrogen bombs in particular, were depriving 
modern war of its ability to produce decisive results. Military strategy had to produce 
results that worked in accord with other elements of national power to attain a decision in 
war. Nonetheless the Army had to consider how it would fight and even against whom it 
would focus because, as Weigley wrote, “the preservation of national values demands 
that the use of combats …still be contemplated by the makers of national strategy…”

Weigley outlined the movement of American military strategy from that of attrition, used 
primarily when the nation did not have the means to reach a quick decision in warfare to 
one of annihilation after the nation became a Great Power. Weigley concluded his tour

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70 Weigley, p. xviii
of the development of American military strategy and policy in a sobering fashion by
summing up the nature of nuclear deterrence that was the basis for strategy at that time
between the contending super powers, the U.S. and USSR. He concluded that should
deterrence fail a strategy of annihilation would be catastrophic. He also wrote that
nonnuclear limited wars could not produce a favorable decision in a short enough time or
at an acceptable cost. Warfare or a resort to violence, it appeared to Weigley, was
becoming less and less useful to attain national objectives. At the conclusion of his work
Weigley wrote, “Because of the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable
decisions at tolerable cost…the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its
end.”71 Weigley’s thinking on combat provided an historical basis for the start of the
development of the concept of operational art.72

At the same time Russell Weigley published his history of American military
strategy and policy two events took place that shaped thinking about the Army’s role in
the wars of the future. First, the Congress of the United States passed the War Powers
Act, over the veto of President Nixon. The second event was the Yom Kippur war
between Israel and the Arab States in the Middle East. The development of the new
doctrine for the Army and the establishment of a school for advanced military studies
took place in light of study and reflection on this policy designed to limit the use of force
by the executive branch and study of this war that highlight the high rate of losses when
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles were introduced into the calculus of war.

The War Powers Act sought to limit the role of the President in committing
American forces to war. Specifically designed to force the President to report to the
Congress on the use of military forces the act also stated,

71 Weigley, p. 477.
72 This conclusion is based upon my interviews with Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder as
they all mentioned reading and thinking about what Weigley proposed in his book. As they were
influential in the writing and refinement of FM 100-5, 1982 and 1986 I took this as a clear indicator of
Weigley’s indirect influence.
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted…the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.  

The War Powers Act entered into the calculations of how to reform the Army from the physical means to get a mission done within 60-90 days cited in the act, how to ensure the support of the people and Congress for action when required and even whether or not the Army engages in national strategy or simply adheres to its Title X, U.S. Code responsibilities to train and prepare Army units for war.

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 demonstrated the lethality of the first precision guided munitions, the strength of anti-aircraft missile defenses, and the continuing need for the coordinated use of armor, infantry, artillery, and aircraft in achieving victory on the battlefield. This war pitted American weapons against Soviet weapons, a war by proxy to an extent. This was a conventional war and the tactics of this war, on both the Israeli and Arab side, were deeply studied by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO for their potential impact on how a war of massed armies would be fought in Western Europe.

Many works of international relations and political science influenced the debate on the use of force in the nuclear age and the need for both the operational level of war as well as a school to study the linkage of tactical and operational art in this period, setting the tone for the use of conventional forces in a nuclear age. Two are particularly relevant to the debate on Army reform; Thomas C. Schelling and Kenneth Waltz.

73 The entire War Powers Act is found at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/statecraft/warpow.html
Schelling wrote *Arms and Influence* in 1966. Kenneth Waltz wrote *Theory of International Politics* in 1979. Waltz outlined the nature of international politics as one of anarchy in which the major powers would seek to balance each other. In the aftermath of World War II he predicted that the U.S. and USSR would dominate the world for the foreseeable future. Balance would require raising the nuclear threshold higher and the means of doing that was a conventional military force that could operate in a state of anarchy and accomplish policy objectives without resort to nuclear weapons. Waltz defined the Realist school of thought in diplomacy, only policy objectives that directly contributed to balance were worthy of effort.

Schelling’s book really defined the realm of deterrence as a strategy. In the nuclear age Schelling described military strategy and that it could no longer be viewed as the sole province of military victory. Policy makers and military officers had to deal with the “art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence.” Schelling described the path the United States and Soviet Union followed in fashioning the dialogue of nuclear diplomacy. Schelling defined deterrence and compellence, essentially deterrence was both a threat and a promise. If an adversary does something we will counter but if the adversary does not act in a manner contrary to what we desire there is a promise of cooperation on another topic. Compellence involves an act of punishment that continues until the adversary acts to stop the punishment. Schelling wrote of war saying, “War no longer looks like just a contest of strength. War and the brink of war are more a contest of nerve and risk-taking, of pain and endurance.” In a reference to Vietnam and possibly

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75 I first read Waltz book at West Point and then on subsequent occasions in Army schools as well as at MIT when I was a fellow in the Security Studies Program there. Personally, I accepted Waltz’s argument as the one nest suited for linking the use of force to policy.


77 Schelling, p. 69-72.
the wars of the future Schelling wrote, “Small wars embody the threat of larger war; they are not just military engagements but “crisis diplomacy.”” Schelling’s seminal work on the theory and language of deterrence in the nuclear age informed the debate on the development of force and the use of force. Waltz and Schelling were describing a new language of politics and as Clausewitz wrote at the end of Book Eight, Chapter Six of ON WAR, “the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.”

The transformation of the art of war and politics included the language of deterrence, both nuclear, as Schelling and Waltz wrote, and at the operational level, the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Strategic nuclear weapons would serve to deter war to the ultimate limit, but how would tactical nuclear weapons be integrated into both the defense of Europe, primarily, and if deterrence failed then how would these weapons actually be used in the conduct of a defense. This concept was, to put it mildly, studied very deeply. In the view of a theater level of war, Europe, there was both nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence.

Nuclear weapons were an integral part of the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. NATO Forces needed to conduct a successful defense long enough for reinforcements from the United States to arrive. This defense of Western Europe required a balance of early detection/alert and mobilization, forward conventional defense, conventional deterrence and the integration of tactical nuclear weapons. The challenge of balance was chiefly an issue of political control. The release and the ultimate authorization for use of these weapons was a political decision. Charles Daniel, in his work, Nuclear Planning in NATO Pitfalls of First Use, wrote about Secretary of Defense McNamara’s proposal for a “flexible response” strategy. The purpose of

78 Schelling, p. 33.
Flexible Response was to state that the alliance is willing to use nuclear weapons but will work to avoid situations that provoke aggression and the dilemma of either appeasement/surrender or use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{80}

The Flexible Response strategy sounded good as a public statement but the detail underpinning the actual execution of the strategy required a great deal of work within NATO, Europe and the U.S in the form of the development and rehearsal of plans as well as tactical exercises. Writing in 1989, Stephen Cimbala’s work, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Escalation, cited deficiencies in the Flexible Response strategy. These deficiencies, covered in further detail in chapter three, ranged from an understanding of terms between U.S. and European leaders to conventional force ratio discrepancies. NATO planners also had rising concerns over the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Operational Maneuver Group, OMG. The real challenge of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was, according to C.N. Donnelly, it presented NATO with a problem, “at precisely that level with which it is at present least well organized to cope – the operational level.”\textsuperscript{81} The OMG was a concept coming into practice that could disrupt NATO defenses and preclude nuclear strikes.\textsuperscript{82} Donnelly’s warning flags over the OMG and the operational level of planning highlighted the need for officers who could plan for and execute large unit operations, and contributed to the impetus for SAMS. The concern over the OMG led to the development of the NATO concept of Forward Defense.

In 1987 Charles Daniel reviewed a series of works on nuclear planning and concluded that a Soviet/Warsaw Pact first strike on U.S. theater nuclear forces and

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command & control facilities could so disrupt the overall political control over nuclear release that a deliberate escalation would be impossible.\textsuperscript{83} The NATO concept of Forward Defense focused on a strong defense along the inter-German border that would blunt a Warsaw Pact attack. The NATO concept fit well into the U.S. active defense doctrine but did not sit well with professional officers who felt that defense, while the stronger form of warfare was not decisive and could not achieve conditions of victory for NATO. The Forward Defense concept was accepted by the political leaders in NATO. The European Security Study, a committee convened by NATO defense ministers in 1982, endorsed the doctrine of Forward Defense. The study concluded that the NATO alliance could not trade space for time given the geographic distribution of the NATO population, especially in the Central Region.\textsuperscript{84} Just as there was controversy within the U.S. Army over the concept of active defense there was similar controversy within European armies over Forward Defense.

The controversy over Forward Defense was the impression that it was Maginot line like and static. Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, preferred to think of operational level counter-offensives with corps and armies.\textsuperscript{85} The challenge contained within AirLand Battle doctrine was in conducting offensive and counter-offensive operations that crossed the inter-German border and strike deep into Warsaw Pact territory might provoke Soviet nuclear reaction.

Follow-on Forces Attack stirred its own controversies again mainly focused on the nuclear threshold and NATO alliance stability. Charles Daniel made a case that Follow on Forces Attack, FOFA, the NATO version of deep attack would not raise the nuclear threshold but rather increased the likelihood of nuclear exchange in Europe as

\textsuperscript{83} Daniel, p. 5. According to Daniel the U.S. maintained over 5000 nuclear warheads in Europe for use by NATO.

\textsuperscript{84} ESECS, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{85} ESECS, p. 163.
command & control targets, delivery systems and storage sites would be high on the target list for NATO non-nuclear attack. The fundamental essence of Charles’ argument was NATO must ensure nuclear weapons remained under policy maker/political control while conducting a political military engagement with the Warsaw Pact to build confidence to resolve crises. NATO should also continue to reduce nuclear stock piles. Removing nuclear warheads from mines, division level artillery and antiaircraft missiles would streamline planning and enhance civil control. Daniel recommended using NATO funds to harden command & control facilities, aircraft shelters, build redundant communications systems and increase stock piles of spare parts and ammunition. These moves along with confidence building measures with the Warsaw Pact would be a better investment in conventional deterrence. Daniel was not in favor of early release of nuclear weapons or FOFA. He advocated more in depth conventional defensive means as a measure of deterrence. Daniel was rather pessimistic about the chances of FOFA. The European Security Commission had a different view.

The European Security Commission study saw deficiencies in the NATO doctrine of Forward Defense, despite endorsing it. ESECS found that FOFA differed from AirLand Battle, ALB, in that the Soviet interpretation was that ALB equaled pre-emption which potentially heralded the early use of nuclear weapons. U.S. forces seizing the initiative by crossing the inter-German border into East Germany when the Soviets crossed into West Germany would also potentially disrupt the NATO alliance as some nations viewed the alliance as a strictly defensive in nature. Forward Defense had to be strengthened as a NATO concept to both blunt an initial Warsaw Pact attack and degrade the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move second echelon forces. The ability to mount a strong forward defense and conduct effective deep attacks rested on NATO,

86 Daniel, pp. 195-196.
87 Daniel, p. 167.
88 ESECS, p. 167.
specifically U.S. modernization initiatives.

Stephen Cimbala, a critic of Flexible Response and Forward Defense wrote that U.S. modernization measures enacted in the 1980s (the “Big Five” weapons systems) would significantly threaten the Soviet land lines of communication running from the western Soviet Union through Poland and East Germany. The combination of linking Apache attack helicopters with Air Force strike aircraft followed by ground units equipped with M1 tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles crossing into East Germany, all coordinated by a doctrine that focused the purpose of deep strike operations troubled Cimbala and, he supposed, the Soviets. Cimbala postulated that the Soviet lines of communication would be so disrupted by deep attack/FOFA that these operations would preclude the smooth movement of Warsaw Pact resupply and reinforcements. Land battles would allow time for maritime forces to assure NATO sea lines of communication remained open and assure the arrival of US reinforcements in France.89 He also wrote that there was some deterrent value in the declarative Army doctrine, FM 100-5, 1982. Cimbala wrote that Army doctrine was, “remarkably realistic and straightforward.” He described Army doctrine as, “Exemplary,” and that the, “...recent set of Army tactical doctrinal refinements known as AirLand Battle,” was based on securing and retaining the initiative by striking blows at the coherence of enemy formations and operations vice bringing fires only on the tip of the spear of a Warsaw Pact penetration of a forward defense.90 The ability to exercise command and control of the close fight, at the tip of the enemy spear, and the deep fight that attacked the coherence of follow on enemy formations was the essence of the concept of the operational level of war and the operational art.

The leadership of the Army set in motion the intellectual movement toward

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89 Cimbala, p. 195. The modernization measure included the fielding of new main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, attack and troop carrying helicopters, and anti-aircraft and missile systems.
90 Cimbala, p. 167.
inclusion of the operational level of war into its doctrine in response to this full range of concepts of defense in Europe, as well as concepts on how to fight in light of the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Pressures from NATO countries to adopt a doctrine of defending in the central region of Europe, forward defense, while dovetailing well with the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, did not satisfy the experience of the Army officer corps that led it to demand counter-offensive operations and offensive operations against the Warsaw Pact and other potential adversaries as the best means of conventional response and to raise the nuclear threshold. In chapter three this feeling within the officer corps will be further discussed. This effort would prevent the use of nuclear weapons during the course of actual combat, if this event took place in Europe, while retaining the deterrent value of the weapons.

Demonstrated competence with the Army “Big Five” family of weapons systems coming into the European theater was enhanced by the unveiling of the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5. The defensive was the stronger form of war, but the combination of these new weapons systems, employed by an officer and non-commissioned officer corps trained and educated in the execution of defensive and offensive operations would reinforce nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence, and this fact would indeed “raise” the nuclear threshold.

The Army needed to focus on fighting the Soviet Union and developing a strong conventional Army. The focus on Vietnam had robbed the Army of spirit. As Robert Scales wrote, “Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly hashish; a significant minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin.”91 Faced with this reality and the growing Soviet threat the focus on the potential battlefield of Europe it was necessary to revitalize the Army. The first step in doctrine toward this revitalization

was the release of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations of Army Forces in the Field*. This manual firmly focused the Army on Europe and the complexities of fighting a numerically superior Warsaw Pact force. The manual promulgated the notion of “active defense,” that is identifying the enemy main effort on the battlefield and maneuvering forces to defeat it. The statement of the doctrine was widely understood throughout the Army. The doctrine also caused unease as the results of war game after war game showed, as Huba Wass de Czege wrote, commanders could, “beat the leading Soviet echelons using the ‘active defense’ but that the initial battles would render our units ineffective…”92 The first battles in war games allowed second echelon forces freedom of action, despite air interdiction. These war games, as well as a considerable number of articles published in Military review and Parameters led to the rewriting of FM 100-5. The weight of articles also required a theoretical underpinning for any effort to re-write the key operational doctrine of the Army. A new translation of Clausewitz’ classic, *ON WAR*, made the German philosopher’s theory of war widely available to the U.S. Army officer corps.93

Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation of Carl von Clausewitz book, *ON WAR* was published in 1976. A widely read translation of Clausewitz with explanatory essays, this work put Clausewitz in the hands of the American officer corps. This work from the 19th century on a theory of war as an extension of policy informed the debate on Army reform and guided the ideas of those working on refining the curricula at the Army Staff and War College. The opening essays in this translation, by Peter Paret,

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93 I joined the Army in 1977 and clearly recall the influence of this manual. Officers in my first division, the 5th Infantry Division, were exhorted to learn how to “fight outnumbered and win.” My own very clear recollection of all war games I participated in from 1977 to 1981 is a vicious fight against the first echelon of the Warsaw Pact forces with no force left to defeat the follow on forces and all war games ending with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. We would then adjourn to the officers’ club. The junior and mid-grade officers of the division all felt that there had to be a better way to fight.
Sir Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie and especially Brodie’s closing essay, A Guide to the reading of ON WAR, were equally useful in making Clausewitz understandable for a broader audience within the American Army officer corps.

Peter Paret wrote The Genesis of ON WAR, the opening essay of this translation of Clausewitz’ work in which he explained the theoretical underpinning of the work. The audience was both civilians and military officers involved in the development of strategy. Paret wrote in his essay, “The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective performance rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the essential, timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them from its temporary features.” He went on to focus this theory, and how Clausewitz used it, on the nature of war itself writing, “Violence and political impact were two of the permanent characteristics of war. Another was the free play of human intelligence, will, and emotions. These were the forces that dominated the chaos of warfare…” Paret also focused the reader of ON WAR on the dual nature of war as explained by Clausewitz. The dual nature of war is expressed in two potential pairs of conflicts. These are; war waged to destroy the enemy and force him to accept any terms or war waged to acquire territory in order to either retain it or use it as a bargaining offer in peace negotiations.

Sir Michael Howard’s opening essay in ON WAR was titled “The Influence of Clausewitz,” it is a history of Clausewitz’ influence on the study of war. Howard also cautioned the student on reading too much into ON WAR. He wrote that Clausewitz was a soldier writing for soldiers and not for “world statesmen conducting international politics in an age of nuclear plenty.” Howard did conclude that although the times in which Clausewitz wrote were long past it was still appropriate to study ON WAR as it offered insights into problems Clausewitz could not have foreseen, the world of “nuclear plenty.”

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94 ON WAR, p. 11.
95 ON WAR, p. 12.
96 ON WAR, p. 44.
Bernard Brodie contributed two essays in this translation of *ON WAR*, an opening essay on the continuing relevance of *ON WAR* and the concluding essay a guide to the reading of *ON WAR*. Brodie begins his essay citing a retired British officer of exalted rank and not lacking in intelligence who told Brodie he had once tried to read Clausewitz but got nothing out of it. Brodie explained how to avoid this misunderstanding of Clausewitz. The reader must be willing to invest time for reflection on “Clausewitz’s ideas, though densely packed in...are generally simple and...clearly expressed in jargon-free language.” Brodie assures the reader that “he will not be hindered by abstruse language or difficult-to-fathom ideas.” Brodie’s guide to reading *ON WAR* provides a path toward the dual goal of reflecting and understanding enroute to achieving wisdom. The utility of *ON WAR*, as pointed out by all of these historians, is it provided a theoretical framework for the study of war and the development of strategy.

Colonel Harry Summers wrote a critical review of Vietnam in 1978. Summers used a Clausewitzian analysis of Vietnam to explain why when the U.S. Army accomplished all of its tactical tasks in Vietnam and still failed. The answer to this question was according to Summers due in part to the fact that, “we (the Army) saw Vietnam as unique rather than in strategic context.” Summers believed that this strategic misconception “grew out of our neglect of military strategy in the post-World War II nuclear era.” Summers work reintroduced the American Army officer corps to the concept that war is an extension of policy. This work had a profound impact on the officer corps. Summers argued that the Army must not just do what it knows, namely tactics and logistics, leaving policy to the President and the people around him. Summers major point was that the American Army and its’ officer corps must study strategy, and participate in the development of national strategy. He wrote, “The

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97 *ON WAR*, pp. 45-46.
98 Summers, p. 2.
quintessential “strategic lesson learned” from the Vietnam war is that we must once
again become masters of the profession of arms.”\textsuperscript{99} Summers used Clausewitzian
theory to frame his analysis and the quotation that guided the discussion, indeed all
relevant retrospectives of Vietnam and its lessons learned is in Book One of Clausewitz’
\textit{ON WAR}, “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the
statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they
are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to
its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”\textsuperscript{100}
Continuous tactical battlefield victories are not in and of themselves the guarantor of
overall victory. War is an extension of policy by other means, and war is more than the
application of military might. War must be the reasoned application of all the elements of
national power to attain a policy goal. Summers was a combat proven Soldier from
Korea and Vietnam, he was not viewed as an outside intellectual who had never walked
in Army boots.

Rigidity of thought and interpretation of policy and strategy was Summers’ focus
but can also be inferred from Waltz, Schelling and Weigley as a dangerous component
within military circles. Edwin Yoder, writing in \textit{Diplomatic History} in 1996, cites Robert
McNamara speaking of the complaints against civilian interference in running the war in
Vietnam and civilian or policy restrictions. Yoder also wrote a critique of the senior
unformed military that goes to the heart of Summers’ argument,” It is perhaps a defect
of their rigorous dedication to the doctrine of civilian supremacy that some generals and
 admirals take no sympathetic interest in the larger political and strategy issues that
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\textsuperscript{99} Summers, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{100} ON WAR, p. 88.
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haunt their civilian superiors…” Rigidity of thought has its roots in the doctrines used by the military, another subject of debate on how to reform the Army in Vietnam's aftermath.

Barry Posen's book, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, was published in 1984 and was widely read inside and outside the Army appearing on the required reading lists in CGSC and SAMS, as well as security studies programs at Harvard and MIT. This book was used by the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to force change on the Army from the outside. Posen drew heavily from the interwar period, between WWI and WWII for examples of lasting change on methods of war, mostly German, and fleeting change, mostly British and French. He used two theories to review case studies of battles in 1940, organizational theory and balance of power theory. Coming during a period of reflection on where the Army fit into the national security structure Posen's book offered harsh judgments of the nature of militaries and how they innovate.

Based on his review of history in the interwar period Posen wrote that with the growing specialization of military profession and a corresponding lack of understanding of the military within policy makers coupled with the tendency of the military to seek as much independence as possible from civilian interference true political-military

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102 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused major defense reorganization, the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders. This act also required that before promotion to general or flag officer rank an officer must have served in a joint duty position, that is one that is outside the service, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, etc., world. This was a significant change in the promotion paths for officers in all the services. From [http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html](http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html)
integration was extremely difficult. Posen also noted, “As a rule, soldiers are not going to go out of their way to reconcile the means they employ with the ends of state policy.” Posen argued that without civilian intervention, in accord with his analysis of organization theory, “Each service will prepare for its own war. Forces will not cooperate effectively.”

Military innovation is only possible, Posen wrote, under two circumstances, “military organizations innovate when they have failed—suffered a defeat—and...they innovate when civilians intervene from without.” The review of military doctrine from the perspective of balance of power theory reinforced Posen’s assessments. In short balance of power theory applies in bi-polar and multi-polar international situations. Balance of power theory requires that statesmen engage in “balancing” actions that sustain the effectiveness of deterrence. Military organizations will not balance unless made to do so, as military organizations prefer offensive doctrines as these doctrines reduce uncertainty presumably by retaining initiative in battle and forcing one’s opponent to react to the offensive power’s actions. Posen wrote, “Military doctrines are important because they affect the stability of the international political system and the security of states.” Posen wrote, “Stagnant doctrines may lead to disintegration. They may also lead to defeat on the battlefield.” Given the perceived state of the balance of power in this time and Posen’s skillful use of the history of the interwar years up to 1940, his book influenced the debate of what should be done in the Army.

Stephen Rosen wrote, Winning the Next War, in 1991. While it entered into the debate on Army reform just outside the period of the mid 1970s to mid 1980s it was

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104 Posen, pp. 53 and 54.
105 Posen, p. 57.
106 Posen, p. 220.
107 Posen, p. 221.
nonetheless influential as the debate on refining the influence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that was still underway. Rosen, in a counter to Posen, proposed that innovation in developing doctrine comes best from within an organization like the Army and in concert with civilian leaders. Rosen looked at innovation in peacetime, wartime, and technological innovation and the influence of all three areas on a military’s ability to achieve victory. At the start of the book Rosen wrote, “This book focuses on successful innovations, not on failure to innovate, because in bureaucracies the absence of innovation is the rule, the natural state.”

In a reference to Vietnam Rosen wrote, “Defeat by itself does not tell a military organization what future wars will look like, only that its preparations for the war just ended were inadequate.” Army reform would entail what Rosen called an “ideological struggle” as the face of future wars would define what the branches within the Army would look like in the future, which would also determine the monies these branches would receive. This is a smaller scale of the interservice rivalries, Army, Navy, and Air Force that such future visions involve. Rosen wrote that innovation, “redefines the values that legitimate the activities of the…military organization…” The ideological struggle Rosen wrote of would, “revolve around a new theory of victory, an explanation of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be war.” The need for “a new theory” required an effort to educate officers in order to develop such a theory of victory and how to implement it throughout the Army.

Rosen also reflected the thoughts of Yale, et al in a description of the Army

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109 Rosen, p. 9.
110 Branches in the U.S. Army refer to the combat, combat support and combat service support functions of the Army and range from Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery to Military Intelligence, Engineer and also Quartermaster, Transportation and Medical Service Corps. The Army is made up of these branches all of which educate and train soldiers and officers to perform the functions of an Army at peace and war.
111 Rosen, p. 20.
failing to react to a directive to develop a capability to conduct counter-insurgency operations. Ordered to develop this capability by President Kennedy the Army chose not to put is full weight behind the effort because in part the Army “believed in the superiority of conventionally trained infantry and that conventional wars would continue to dominate the army’s strategic requirements.” Rosen concluded that solely civilian interference was not the best path to ensure innovation in the military. The best path forward to ensure a vision of the future that informed both the development of forces and the use of force to attain policy objectives was a mutual civilian and military solution. Rosen recommended the development of a strategy that focused on, “the management of uncertainty,” and one that would, “look beyond war with the Soviet Union.” Rosen’s work contributed to attempts to modify portions of the Goldwater-Nichols reform that mandated specific change in diminishing service roles in strategy development.

The world in which the question of Army reform was debated was framed by the withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent defeat of South Vietnam by the North, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the War Powers Act of 1973, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. These events and questions of strategy and force development had to be answered in order to determine what must be done for the Army of the Republic.

This line of thinking was reinforced in many ways by the RETO study, as well as by Summers, Weigley, and even Rosen and Posen. Wass de Czege was realistic though as he wrote, “We are a pragmatic army. Education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession), is not highly valued.” Wass de Czege, supported by key general officers in the Army senior leadership, prevailed in establishing the School of Advanced Military Studies. This Army decision combined with the development of new

112 Rosen, p. 11.
113 Rosen, p. 259.
114 WdC Report, p. F-34.
doctrine that was influenced by Weigley, Posen, Rosen and others indicated which school of thought won in the debate over what should be done.

The purpose of this chapter was to review what historians and theorists thought the important questions were concerning U.S. Army doctrinal reform in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, from roughly the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. The answer to the question should Vietnam lessons learned from the basis of Army doctrine was a resounding NO. Preparing for small wars was left behind as the Army turned its focus to Europe and the challenge of dealing with the massive army of the Soviet Union. The theory was that if the Army could contend with the Red Army it could then deal just as well with small wars. The future would demonstrate the weakness of the theory.

The answer to the question of how best to reform the Army, by civil direction alone or in concert with senior Army leadership was civil direction. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, developed in the early 1980s, directed sweeping change for the entire defense establishment. The leadership of the Army developed a new approach to education, and decided to focus on the Soviet Union and a potential battle in the central region of Europe, informed by the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The need for serious thought on the use of conventional force to raise the nuclear threshold contributed to the Army’s thinking on follow-on forces attack or deep battle. Posen was correct here as civil leadership was not interested in single service doctrine, hearings were held on Goldwater-Nichols compliance and the development of Army weapons
systems, but not on the development of the doctrine for the use of the weapons. The leadership of the Army appeared to decide to concentrate on the realms of tactics and operational art and left the realm of strategy to civilians. In his book, Summers pointed out this as an error in the pre-Vietnam era and argued for the Army officer corps to pay attention to strategy. The school of thought that dominated the direction of reform in the U.S. Army focused the Army on those areas in which the Army could dominate the discussion and claim subject matter expertise, namely tactics, operational art, and weapons system design. This decision continues to influence that Army as officers educated under these conditions are now in positions of command and influence in the Army and Department of Defense.

Historians, international relations specialists, and active and retired officers joined in the intense debate over what should be done. The history and theory of the time informed the debate. The results remain to be analyzed in the course of time and in light of the course of the Army of the Republic since this tumultuous period. Doctrine became a real engine of change in the Army, promulgated by practitioners from SAMS.

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115 During this time period the Army senior leadership took decisions on what came to be called “The Big Five” weapons systems; the M1 tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and the Patriot anti-aircraft/missile system. These systems were hotly debated in the Senate and House but no hearings were ever held on the significant change in Army doctrine called AirLand Battle which was introduced to the Army in 1982. The Army also developed its system of Combat Training Centers in 1982 starting with the National Training Center at Fort Irwin CA, much like Yale et al called for in 1970 in Alternative to Armageddon. The Army also instituted the Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, during this period. This program was designed to train general officers and general staffs in the decision making process and in the handling of large formations.
Chapter Three

The Operational Level of War and U.S. Army Doctrine

The post-Vietnam years in the U.S. Army were, among other things, a time of reflection. In addition to answering the question posed by some within the force and many outside, “Why an Army,” those charged with the responsibility of anticipating future conflicts were also asking, “How should the U.S. Army prepare to fight?” In pursuit of an answer to this question, Army doctrine writers looked chiefly at how to fight the armies of the Warsaw Pact in the central region of Europe and also considered such related issues as the use of tactical nuclear weapons, decisions affecting major weapons systems, and analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Taken together, these concerns were of pivotal influence in the move toward the introduction of the operational level of war as a central component of U.S. Army doctrine. The miasma arising from the ashes of America’s strategic defeat in Vietnam created an atmosphere conducive to the reconsideration of the role of the Army in strategy and operational art. As discussed previously, this ten year period was tumultuous with major decisions taken regarding Army major weapons systems acquisition, rebuilding of the Army education system, and refocusing of the Army on fighting conventional wars. This chapter will focus on a review of the trends in the Army in the late 70s and early 80s. These trends included a consideration of limited war, theater nuclear war, the move to “raise the nuclear threshold,” and conventional forces as a part of overall deterrence. The “capstone events” of this era was the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 Operations.

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116 For a superb discussion of this period and the inner workings of the development of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 see Major Paul H. Herbert’s brilliant work published as Leavenworth Papers Number 16, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Herbert describes how General William Depuy, commanding general US Army Training and Doctrine Command developed a doctrine that focused the Army, and by extension the US Air Force, on NATO, Forward Defense, and fighting the Soviet Union.
Significantly, several of the key people involved in founding what was to become the School of Advanced Military Studies also participated in writing this seminal doctrinal manual.

One key to this transformation of thinking was a book written by Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., a Vietnam War veteran then serving on the faculty of the Army War College. In 1982 Colonel Summers, Jr. published a short book that looked at the question of what went wrong in Vietnam. Though the events in Vietnam were somewhat distant from a focus on operational art and a school to teach this subject, Summers’ work was important to the overall tenor of the times. His critical analysis of the war in Vietnam argued that the Army did not view the war as a part of an overall strategy. He further asserted that the strategy of flexible response, proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara for war fighting in Europe, was developed by civilians without any substantial military participation. The Army, specifically uniformed officers, did not participate in the development of this strategy because senior Army leaders felt that the Army’s proper role was in preparing the Army for war. The Army, in Summers’ view, confused the requirements between the administrative demands of training and sustaining the Army with the requirement to employ the Army in attaining national security objectives. The Army failed to consider the requirements and demands of strategy. Applying a neo-Clausewitzian formulation, Summers stated bluntly, “we failed to properly employ our armed forces...to secure our national objectives...” 117 Summers did not claim that the civilian systems analysts and political scientists whom McNamara had relied were wrong in their articulation of flexible response or the national security policy, but that military officers were obligated to be involved in the development of these strategies. Linking the analysts’ means to the political scientists’ ends required an informed officer corps

and knowledge of the ways of war at the strategic level. The protection of world-wide American interests is most often the cause for the commitment of American armed forces. Active participation by military officers, acting as full participants in the development of policy and from that strategy, would lead to the development of policy objectives that were more than platitudes.  

Military advice and participation in the development of policy and strategy would provide the bridge to solidly reasoned and clearly articulated policy statements. Although there is some distance between the arrival of Summers book and the Army doctrine of AirLand Battle Summers efforts started the process of thinking on the linkage of policy and strategy to tactics, which is the operational level of war and operational art.

An indication of the depth of the thinking on war going on in the Army and at Fort Leavenworth at the time was the issue of the relationship between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. In order to develop strategists the Army required officers who understood the tactical level of war while retaining a grasp on the art and science of war as it was executed at the operational and strategic levels. In 1981 General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was assigned as the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College. Saint inherited the challenge of finding and educating these officers upon his assignment to the Command and General Staff College from 1981 to 1983. Saint was an energetic officer. It was likely that he was assigned to Leavenworth to energize the school. In his retirement oral history interview General Saint described the “help” he received in the area of developing strategic planners.

Saint recalled that, “When I was the deputy commandant at Leavenworth, General Richardson used to beat me up all the time about strategic planners and we don't have any.” In Saint’s mind a strategic planner needed to understand the regions of

\[118\] Summers, pp. 183-187.
the world and how a region influenced the development of strategy. Saint also said that a strategic planner had to understand the full range of the capabilities of the joint force, which was what the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy bought to warfighting. Strategic planners also needed to understand the national decision-making process in order to develop a strategic plan that makes best use of joint force capabilities as well as attaining military conditions that led to attaining the national objectives of strategy and policy. The development of strategy and operational level plans as well as the education of officers who could develop strategy and strategic plans was a part of the refinement of the Army’s view of warfare in the post-Vietnam years. Summers articulated the Army’s failure to understand the process. Saint, Richardson, and other senior generals were taking decisions to put into place an educational system that would ensure that the Army had officers with a solid grounding in the tactical realities of warfighting and upon that foundation then to develop a cadre of officers who could step up from tactics to the operational and strategic levels of war. This deliberate decision, one in a series of decisions during this period, stressed selecting the officers suited for this career path, educating them, and then following up on the education by placing them into positions where they would come to understand the totality of the strategic system. Summers, Richardson, and others started the Army on this path.

In 1982 Summers’ book was adopted into the teaching curricula at both the Army War College and Command and General Staff College. While some disputed the specific arguments about Vietnam he set forth, the treatise did establish the conditions for a more enlightened discussion of the development of strategy and the military’s role in the process. This strategic discussion also prompted a deeper discourse about linking strategy to tactics and regarding the formal introduction of the operational level of war into the lexicon of the Army.

119 Saint interview, pp. 218/219.
In an essay published in Military Review introducing the 1986 version of FM 100-5 GEN Richardson clearly linked the execution of operational art to the army, army group and NATO command level, identifying the Army corps as a transitional headquarters capable of command at the tactical and operational level. In this essay Richardson also encourage the officer corps of the U.S. Army to study the operational art irrespective of the level of command in which they served. He said that there were officers, and by inference he included general officers in his statements, who mistakenly “equated the notions of forward thinking, anticipation and maneuver solely with operational-level endeavors while relegating fire and movement to only tactical undertakings.”

Forward thinking, anticipation and maneuver were central ideas in the new doctrine and all officers, in Richardson’s mind, had to attain a deep level of understanding of the doctrine to effectively execute operations in accord with doctrinal principles. The Command and General Staff College and SAMS would assist in the education of officers on these principles.

The term “operational art” was not used by any of the initial sponsors of SAMS. Generals Richardson, Saint and Merritt held different ideas about the type of general staff officers that school would produce and how the school would hone the skills of the officers selected to attend. They were in full agreement, however, with regard to their desire to have officers in the Army who were schooled in the handling of large formations, divisions, corps and armies. In the 1970s as the U.S. Army was struggling to recast itself the senior leaders of the Army looked across the area called the inter-German border and saw Warsaw Pact and Soviet armies and army groups. To fight those large formations successfully, the U.S. Army needed to know how to plan and execute maneuvers at that level.

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Dr. Roger Spiller, then a member of the CGSC faculty recalled the Department of Command, a department of the college that was disestablished in the late 1970s. The Department of Command listed courses, “evidently of pre-WW2 vintage, directly addressed what was called "Large Unit Operations." These courses, as Spiller recalled dealt with the command, as opposed to the staff control of corps and higher level formations. Spiller also recalled that during his tenure at CGSC the Army corps was the highest level of formation the Department of Tactics covered “and then only infrequently.” Spiller believed, as Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder did, that the College was suffering from a lack of understanding the nature and conduct of war and thus turned to, as Wass de Czege described, “cookie cutter” solutions to tactical problems. These solutions were easier to grade for an inexperienced faculty and, as Spiller asserted, marked the tendency to “to look at war through the lens of the staff (mainly planners) and to ignore the role of the commander and his art. The underlying assumption seemed to be that if you had bright planners, the commanders didn't matter so much. It was an attitude Jomini would've instantly approved.”

The conclusion these generals, Richardson, Saint, and Merritt, drew was the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was not educating officers in the art and science of the maneuver of large units over distance. The College was faced with a zero sum game in terms of what to add to the curriculum. As the interests of the Army moved towards force development, weapons systems development and acquisition, etc, time focused on the tactics of large units was squeezed from the curriculum. The Army had not maneuvered corps and armies in battle since Korea so other education requirements were taking priority. As senior generals looked across the inter-German border they saw

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121 All quotations drawn from a personal e-mail from Dr. Roger Spiller to the author, received on 7OCT09. For another look at this time see Michael Stewart’s "Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1946-1986," an unpublished dissertation for the University of Kansas. Stewart investigated the pressures on the curricula of the Staff College during this 40 year period.
Soviet Army operational level formations and knew there was a need to face those formations with similar NATO formations. The inclusion of the operational level of war and the notion of operational art was a significant moment in the development of Army doctrine.

The Red Army of the Soviet Union, specifically Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii, conceived and refined the idea of Deep Operation theory and the overarching concept of the operational level of war. Reacting to the waste on the eastern front of World War I as well as the poor performance of the Red Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Tukhachevskii placed the Red Army on the path to develop, refine, practice and ultimately perfect a system of the operational level of war that linked strategic objectives to the tactical actions of armored corps and armies. The path of Red Army refinement led to the formulation of the concept of the Operational Maneuver Group, OMG, developed by Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov. Operational art, in the Soviet view, is the level of military art below strategy. It deals with combat by armies and fronts, which are theater-level forces. Operational success is based on the correct application of tactics, much as strategic success is based on the sum of operational results. Perceived Soviet tactical rigidity was the basis for operational agility as the operational level commander knew with a degree of certainty where his forces would be and what they would be doing at specific points on the battlefield. Soviet Army doctrine and theory was based on a scientific approach to warfare.122

This culmination of Soviet/Russian thought produced changes in NATO’s defensive doctrine. The Soviet Red Army leadership, according to Isby, Naveh, and others believed that mass and momentum would preclude a nuclear exchange in

Europe. Later studies of Tukhachevskii’s works and other Red Army theoreticians and practitioners of operational level warfare influenced U.S. Army as well as NATO thought on warfare at this level.\textsuperscript{123} One of the first theorists to articulate this level of warfare in western thought was Edward Luttwak.

In 1980 Edward Luttwak wrote an essay for \textit{International Security} titled “The Operational Level of War.” This timely essay focused the thinking of the officers involved in the writing and refinement of the proposed Field Manual 100-5, \textit{Operations}. Luttwak introduced the term operational level of war as the level of command and intellectual effort that linked the objectives of strategy to tactical tasks assigned to corps and divisions. Luttwak defined strategy as the balance of political goals and constraints with available resources to determine outcomes. The art of tactics dealt with specific tasks assigned to units at this level of war. Luttwak then proposed that the operational level be built on concepts such as blitzkrieg or defense in depth to “attain the goals set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics.”\textsuperscript{124} The Luttwak essay stimulated the thinking of the officers writing new doctrine concerning the linkage of campaigns and the operational art.

The 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5 focused thinking Army-wide on winning the first battle of the next war. While this manual shook the cobwebs from the thinking of military officers about war the perception that the manual fostered was that the Army focused exclusively on battles. The manual caused a great deal of debate within the Army and eventually caused the development of the notion that tactical battles did not win wars alone; rather, as Luttwak, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder among others


stated a series of successful campaigns wins wars. Lieutenant General (retired) L. Don Holder, then a lieutenant colonel, a member of the FM 100-5 (1982) writing team later recalled: “The Luttwak article was influential and timely. We in the Army were discussing the subject at the time and Ed Luttwak's paper added a lot to that discussion.”

The “how to win battles” debate within of the U.S. Army at this time also included arguments about how to prosecute war with tactical nuclear weapons. This debate thinking was essential to deterrence in Europe.

Nuclear weapons were an integral part of the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The number of Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact divisions vastly outnumbered the divisions fielded by NATO. A critical reality was that the forces in NATO had to defend the alliance’s territory long enough for reinforcements from the United States to arrive. This defense of Western Europe had to balance early alert and mobilization, forward conventional defense and the integration of nuclear weapons. The challenge of integrating the planning for conventional, non-nuclear defensive measures and nuclear weapons involved many complex issues chief of which was the issue of political control. Nuclear weapons, their release and the ultimate authorization for use were political decisions. The path to operational level doctrine included coming to grips with nuclear planning.

In 1962 during a conference in Athens, Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed to Alliance defense ministers that NATO improve its ability to respond to a crisis without resort to nuclear weapons. Five years later, in 1967 NATO adopted a “flexible response” strategy.126

126 Charles Daniel, Nuclear Planning In NATO Pitfalls of First Use. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987, p. 15. There were many people, such as Stephen Cimbala and John Mearsheimer, writing about Flexible Response, Daniel’s work though, in my view, most clearly articulated the challenges of relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence when the decision chain for their use was so convoluted. Hereafter cited as Daniel.
The Flexible Response strategy sounded good as a public statement, but the detail underpinning the actual execution of the strategy required a great deal of work within NATO, Europe and the U.S. Charles Daniel wrote that “the need to raise the nuclear threshold is a decisive reason for the development by NATO of a more robust, imaginative, and effective conventional capability.” The purpose of Flexible Response was to make clear that the alliance is willing to use nuclear weapons but would work to avoid situations that provoked aggression and the dilemma of either appeasement/surrender or use of nuclear weapons.

Writing in 1989, Stephen Cimbala cited deficiencies in the Flexible Response strategy. First of all, there was a different understanding of the term among U.S. and European armies and political leaders. In the U.S. the strategy meant that the theater conventional forces were a viewed as a “denial weapon,” which meant the mission of ground forces in theater was to buy time against a Soviet invasion and thus were to preserve response options even after the initiation of hostilities. In Europe, conventional forces were seen as a trip wire that triggered nuclear release which was the ultimate deterrent of the Soviet forces. Second, Cimbala pointed out that Flexible Response surrendered the initiative to the Warsaw Pact as the Soviets could select the time and place for an attack into Western Europe. Finally, Flexible Response did not compensate for conventional force deficiencies by substituting nuclear weapons for them.

NATO planners also had rising concerns over the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Operational Maneuver Group, OMG. The real challenge of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was, according to C.N. Donnelly, it presented NATO with a problem, “at precisely that level with which it is at present least well organized to cope – the operational level.” The OMG was a concept coming into

127 Daniel, p. 9.
128 European Security Study (ESECS). Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe:
practice that could disrupt NATO defenses and preclude nuclear strikes.\textsuperscript{129} This concern led to the development of the NATO concept of Forward Defense.

In 1987 Charles Daniel reviewed a series of studies on nuclear planning and concluded that a Soviet/Warsaw Pact first strike on U.S. theater nuclear forces and command & control facilities could so disrupt the overall political control over nuclear release that a deliberate escalation would be impossible.\textsuperscript{130} The NATO concept of Forward Defense focused on what the name implied, namely a strong defense along the inter-German border that would blunt a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. The NATO concept fit well into the U.S. active defense doctrine but did not sit well with professional officers who felt that defense, while the stronger form of warfare was not decisive and could not achieve conditions of victory for NATO. The Forward Defense concept was accepted by the political leaders in NATO. The European Security Study, a committee convened by NATO defense ministers in 1982, endorsed the doctrine of Forward Defense. The study concluded that the NATO alliance could not trade space for time given the geographic distribution of the NATO population, especially in the Central Region.\textsuperscript{131} Just as there was controversy within the U.S. Army over the concept of active defense there was similar controversy within European armies over Forward Defense.

The essence of this controversy lay in the concept of defense and the role of offensive operations played in the defense. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 was perceived to be exclusively focused on the defense and restoring the inter-German border, a notion to which some nations in NATO also held. The basis of Forward Defense for some NATO officers, factions in the German Army mainly, was defense

\begin{multicite}
\textsuperscript{130} Daniel, p. 5. According to Daniel the U.S. maintained over 5000 nuclear warheads in Europe for use by NATO.
\textsuperscript{131} ESECS, p. 10.
\end{multicite}
only.

The controversy over Forward Defense was the impression that it was Maginot line-like and static. In actual fact, Forward Defense incorporated mobile defense and local tactical counter-attacks with deep attack, Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA), which is air power focused on interdiction of Warsaw Pact second echelon forces and counter-air. Many officers in the Federal Republic of Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, preferred to think of operational level counter-offensives with corps and armies. The perceived challenge regarding AirLand Battle doctrine was that conducting offensive and counter-offensive operations that crossed the inter-German border and struck deep into Warsaw Pact territory might provoke a Soviet nuclear reaction.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war also provoked thought in NATO professional military circles. A concept developed from this thought was the so-called Follow-on Forces Attack, or FOFA.

Follow-on Forces Attack stirred its own controversies again mainly focused on the nuclear threshold and NATO alliance stability. Charles Daniel made a case that Follow on Forces Attack, FOFA, the NATO version of deep attack would not raise the nuclear threshold but rather increased the likelihood of nuclear exchange in Europe as command and control targets, delivery systems and storage sites would be high on the target list for NATO non-nuclear attack. Daniel argued that NATO must ensure nuclear weapons remained under policy maker/political control AND that NATO engage with the Warsaw Pact to build confidence to resolve crises. The other part of the argument was NATO should also continue to reduce nuclear stock piles. Removing nuclear warheads from mines, division level artillery and antiaircraft missiles would streamline planning and enhance civil control. Daniel recommended using NATO funds to harden

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132 ESECS, p. 163.
133 Daniel, pp. 195-196.
command & control facilities, aircraft shelters, build redundant communications systems and increase stock piles of spare parts and ammunition. These moves along with confidence building measures with the Warsaw Pact would be a better investment in conventional deterrence.\(^{134}\) Daniel was not in favor of early release of nuclear weapons or FOFA. He advocated more in depth conventional defensive means as a measure of deterrence. Daniel was rather pessimistic about the chances of FOFA. The European Security Commission had a different view.

A European Security Commission study completed in 1983 saw deficiencies in the NATO doctrine of Forward Defense, despite endorsing it. ESECS found that FOFA differed from AirLand Battle, ALB, in that the Soviet interpretation was that ALB equaled pre-emption which potentially heralded the early use of nuclear weapons. U.S. forces seizing the initiative by crossing the inter-German border into East Germany when the Soviets crossed into West Germany would also potentially disrupt the NATO alliance as some nations viewed the alliance as strictly defensive in nature. The ESECS concluded, though, that these deficiencies could be partially off set by FOFA but defeating the second echelon would not win battles if the Warsaw Pact first echelon broke the NATO defense.\(^{135}\) Forward Defense had to be strengthened as a NATO [concept] to blunt an initial Warsaw Pact attack and to degrade the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move second echelon forces. The ability to mount a strong forward defense and conduct effective deep attacks rested on NATO, specifically U.S., modernization initiatives.

Stephen Cimbala, although a critic of Flexible Response and Forward Defense conceded that by the 1990s, if modernization measures (the U.S. “Big Five,” Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle, Apache armed helicopter, Blackhawk troop carrying helicopter, and Patriot air defense missile system) were enacted, the Soviet

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\(^{134}\) Daniel, p. 167.

\(^{135}\) ESECS, p. 167.
land lines of communication running from the western Soviet Union through Poland and East Germany would be so disrupted by deep attack/FOFA conducted by air and land forces that these operations would preclude the smooth movement of Warsaw Pact resupply and reinforcements. Land battles would allow time for maritime forces to assure NATO sea lines of communication remained open and assure the arrival of US reinforcements in France.\textsuperscript{136} He also wrote that there was some deterrent value in the declarative Army doctrine, FM 100-5, 1982. Cimbala wrote that Army doctrine was, “remarkably realistic and straightforward.” He described Army doctrine as, “Exemplary,” and that the, “…recent set of Army tactical doctrinal refinements known as AirLand Battle,” was based on securing and retaining the initiative by striking blows at the coherence of enemy formations and operations vice bringing fires only on the tip of the spear of a Warsaw Pact penetration of a forward defense.\textsuperscript{137} The ability to exercise command and control of the close fight, at the tip of the enemy spear, and the deep fight that attacked the coherence of follow on enemy formations was the essence of the concept of the operational level of war and the operational art.

During this period of study and intellectual reflection on war a number of works of fiction were published that explored what effect a modern war in Europe would have on Soldiers to the civilians of central Europe and generals to policy makers. Prominent among these works was General Sir John Hackett, Jr.’s \textit{The Third World War}, published in 1982. Hackett commanded the British Army of the Rhine and the NATO's Northern Army Group from 1965-1966. He drew on his World War II combat experience as well as his NATO command experience to tell a story of fierce combat and the maneuver of large formations of armored units. Hackett argued two points in his book; the necessity for Western Europe to have a strong and coordinated conventional

\textsuperscript{136} Cimbala, p. 195.  
\textsuperscript{137} Cimbala, p. 167.
military, and given a strong conventional defense it could be plausible that nuclear weapons would not be used in the next world war. His story did include a limited nuclear exchange. Hackett and other writers argued for strong conventional defenses.\textsuperscript{138}

Senior commanders in the U.S. Army set in motion the intellectual movement toward inclusion of the operational level of war into its doctrine in response to this full range of concepts of defense in Europe, as well as concepts on how to fight in light of the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Pressures from NATO countries to adopt a doctrine of defending in the central region of Europe, forward defense, while dovetailing well with the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, did not satisfy the desires of the U.S. Army officer corps. This heat generated by the debate led many in the U.S. Army officer corps to demand counter-offensive operations and offensive operations against the Warsaw Pact and other potential adversaries be included in Army doctrine as the best means of conventional response and to raise the nuclear threshold.

The Army needed to focus on fighting the Soviet Union and developing a strong conventional Army. But in reality the U.S. Army of the 1970s was broken. The focus on Vietnam had robbed the Army of spirit. As Robert Scales wrote of this period, “Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly hashish; a significant minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin.”\textsuperscript{139} Furthermore the core of the non-commissioned officers, the sergeants a functioning Army depended upon, was hurt by the Vietnam experience. The officer corps of the Army, and other services, was also dispirited by the strategic defeat suffered in Vietnam. Faced with this reality and the growing Soviet threat, the focus on the potential battlefield of Europe it was necessary to


revitalize the Army.\footnote{For a superb history of the period from the end of Vietnam to the end of the first Gulf War see James Kitfield’s \textit{Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War}. New York: Brassey’s, 1997.}

The first step in developing doctrine to guide this revitalization was the release of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, \textit{Operations of Army Forces in the Field}. This manual firmly focused the Army on Europe and the complexities of fighting a numerically superior Warsaw Pact force. The manual promulgated the notion of “active defense,” that is, identifying the enemy main effort on the battlefield and maneuvering forces to defeat it. The statement of the doctrine was widely understood throughout the Army. The doctrine also caused unease as the results of war game after war game showed, as Huba Wass de Czege wrote in 1982, commanders could “beat the leading Soviet echelons using the ‘active defense’ but that the initial battles would render our units ineffective…”\footnote{Huba Wass de Czege and Holder, L.D., ‘The New FM 100-5,’ in \textit{Military Review}, Vol. 62, No. 7, 1982, p. 53.} The first battles in war games allowed second echelon forces freedom of action, despite air interdiction. These war games led to the rewriting of FM 100-5. Commanders in the Army became convinced that they could not defeat the Warsaw Pact with units trained in the active defense doctrine. The limits of active defense doctrine were also recognized by civilian theoreticians.

As discussed previously in chapter two, Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen wrote about the development of military doctrine and its lack of coordination with the development of national policy. Posen offered harsh judgments about the nature of militaries and how they innovate. Posen reviewed the history of the interwar period between the conclusion of World War I and the start of World War II. Based on this study, he concluded that the growing specialization of the military profession and a corresponding lack of understanding of the military on the part of policy makers, coupled with the tendency of the military to seek as much independence as possible from civilian...
interference, ensured that true political-military integration proved extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{142} Posen also noted, “As a rule, soldiers are not going to go out of their way to reconcile the means they employ with the ends of state policy.”\textsuperscript{143} Posen argued that without civilian intervention, in accord with his analysis of organization theory, “Each service will prepare for its own war. Forces will not cooperate effectively.”\textsuperscript{144} The discourse on the Army and Air Force views of AirLand Battle, as well as Forward Defense and Follow-On Forces Attack reinforced Posen’s views. Stephen Rosen took a somewhat contrasting position, and reached different conclusions. Referring to Vietnam, Rosen wrote, “Defeat by itself does not tell a military organization what future wars will look like, only that its preparations for the war just ended were inadequate.”\textsuperscript{145} Rosen opined that any far reaching effort to achieve reform would also entail an “ideological struggle” as the face of future wars would define what the branches within the Army would look like in the future.\textsuperscript{146} This is a smaller scale of the inter-service rivalries, Army, Navy, and Air Force that such future visions involve. Rosen wrote that innovation “redefines the values that legitimate the activities of the…military organization…” The ideological struggle, Rosen wrote, would “revolve around a new theory of victory, an explanation of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be war.”\textsuperscript{147} John J. Mearsheimer, a West Point graduate and academic analyst based at the University of Chicago, was also a close observer and critic of doctrine and conventional power.

Mearsheimer wrote about the proposed application of “active defense” and lateral maneuver to fight a Soviet invasion in an essay in 1982 and a book published a year

\begin{flushright}
143 Posen, p. 53.
144 Posen, p. 54.
146 Discussed in Chapter 2.
147 Rosen, p. 20.
\end{flushright}
later. The bold strategy based on a mobile defense of the central region of Europe, he argued, would require an agile force that is willing to allow penetration of its forward lines and the counter-strokes of forces with a mobility advantage over the opposing force.\textsuperscript{148}

The application of either applying active defense or AirLand Battle under the NATO doctrine of Forward Defense required maneuver for a purpose; a tactical purpose and an operational purpose that would be linked to a larger strategic and policy objective. Conventional deterrence would be best served by presenting a potential attacker with no chance of a rapid, decisive victory but the prospect of an attrition strategy with “associated exorbitant costs and…the difficulty of accurately predicting ultimate success in a protracted war.”\textsuperscript{149} Eschewing maneuver for maneuver’s sake, Mearsheimer wrote that his examination of a maneuver oriented defense was a, “fundamentally flawed idea.” Plans and training at the time resulted in, “At best…a vague prescription so lacking in substance that its impact on future policy will be negligible. At worst, it is a formula for disaster.”\textsuperscript{150} Richard Lock-Pullan, in his book \textit{US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation}, interpreted Mearsheimer’s essay as a NATO wide application of an inadequate mobile defense against a large Warsaw Pact/Soviet force.

The U.S. Army focus on refining Active Defense into AirLand Battle was a necessary refinement in the effort to put into place both a solidly based tactical and operational level mindset, based on well reasoned doctrine.\textsuperscript{151} The move toward ensuring a viable doctrine of maneuver in balance with firepower was the point of developing the 1982 version of FM 100-5. Conventional deterrence would indeed raise

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\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Conventional Deterrence}, pp. 206/207.


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the nuclear threshold because it would present the potential attacker, the Warsaw Pact, with the prospect of a protracted war. Application of the doctrine of AirLand Battle would also present a dilemma for the Warsaw Pact as tactically agile American units armed with “Big Five” weapons systems would put teeth into attacking deep into the rear area of the Warsaw Pact and disrupt forward movement. The Army needed a viable doctrine to act as its engine of change.

The basic thrust of the Army effort behind the writing of the 1982 version of FM 100-5 was to put in place the capstone of all Army doctrine. The effort at getting FM 100-5 right started in motion the changes within the Army in terms of how the Army would fight and understand the art of war fighting at the tactical and operational levels of war. The effect of the new doctrine was experienced almost immediately throughout the Army. The concept of AirLand Battle answered the questions of unease that the 1976 version had caused in that first attempt to wrench the Army from the doldrums of the post-Vietnam years. This process of change shook the entire Army as the effects of new doctrine, the “Big Five,” and the Army training centers began to affect the field and institutional Army.

General Richardson, Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command at the time said, “Well, the feelings, I guess, are pretty strong in insuring that the Army had a viable doctrine, that it was well expressed in our publications, and that the field knew what to do with it.” The Army, under Richardson’s guidance, published the basic capstone field manual in 1982. Once “on the street,” the Army began to respond to the doctrine and to adopt it as its own. It appeared that this was the right doctrine at the right time. The senior leadership of the Army was very pleased to see the depth of the acceptance of the doctrine and how quickly elements of the U.S. Army moved to incorporate the guidance in the doctrine into field exercises during 1983-1984.

In 1985 General Richardson and others realized the guidance in the doctrine
needed some fine tuning, especially in regards to the development of the concepts that underpinned the operational level of war. Richardson and other senior Army generals wanted to ensure that there was “sufficient jointness” in the manual as the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was being felt in the services. There was also had occurred some feedback from field commanders, especially in Europe, to reinforce the precise balance between offensive and the defensive operations.

Richardson requested that his fellow general officers and their staffs review the field manual and other writings coming out at the time to ensure that “people who had some real concerns or questions about clarification…” were heard. Richardson recalled to Fort Leavenworth the original threesome who wrote the 1982 version of the field manual; Huba Wass de Czege, Rick Sinnreich, and Don Holder, and these officers went through several iterations of a revision. The effort included both new doctrinal concepts and a repackaging of ideas introduced in the 1982 version of the manual. However, the refinement process retained the dynamic of the first effort under Richardson’s control.

The writing team developed a draft and sent the document to General Richardson. Richardson commented on the draft and returned it for update in early 1986. The writing team, by this time so in tune with Richardson, then would include some of his scrawled recommendations and discard others. Once a final draft was ready for a wider review, Richardson sent the manual out for comments from the field and wider institutional Army. The circulation of the draft prompted more responses throughout the Army and the writing team received some good comments to be incorporated in the manual. This penultimate draft was sent to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. John J. Wickham, for his approval. The draft was also sent to General

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152 U.S. Army Military History Institute. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 87-18, General William R. Richardson, USA, retired. Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Ackerman. Interview conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA. undated, pp. 448-451. All quotations on this page come from this portion of the interview. Hereafter cited as Richardson Interview.
Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for his approval. This was a key step in the process as Rogers was serving not only as an Army general but the commander of NATO forces. U.S. Army doctrine had to be applicable to Europe as the key area on the planet where NATO forces faced Warsaw Pact forces. Doctrine as well as equipment had to be interoperable. Richardson obtained the approval of both Rogers and the Army Chief and sent the new manual to the presses in March of 1986. To ensure wide acceptance and understanding of the new doctrine, Richardson wrote an essay for *Military Review* in its March 1986 issue.  

Richardson’s purpose was to urge the Army, “to study the doctrine, understand it, practice it, and then for the school systems to take the doctrine and apply it to all the subordinate manuals that were a follow-on from that Capstone manual.” The advocacy by the Commanding General carried considerable weight with the institutional Army. Richardson saw the publication of the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 as the doctrinal base for AirLand Battle and for all other doctrinal manuals in the Army, from tactics to helicopter operations, intelligence collection to supply distribution. As TRADOC’s commander, Richardson viewed FM 100-5 as a good publication, and all those involved with the rewrite thought it really gave a much strengthened AirLand Battle doctrinal base for the Army. He took steps to ensure that the Army would embrace and refine the concepts of the operational level manual at all levels. Subordinate Army schools took up the effort at ensuring the concepts of AirLand Battle were incorporated into the totality of Army doctrine.

Writing, publishing and then promulgating the new doctrine, with its emphasis on the operational level of war as the bridge between tactical units and strategic objectives

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154 Richardson Interview, p. 451. The quotation and the following passage are drawn from this page of the Richardson Interview.
was the first step in getting the concepts to take hold in the minds of the Army officer corps. As shown earlier, U.S. allies in NATO were studying the doctrine; indeed, they were asked to comment on it during the development process. How the U.S. Army answered its self posed question, how to fight, had huge ramifications for NATO. The Red Army and Warsaw Pact were also studying this doctrine and observing the manner in which the U.S. Army incorporated its doctrine into exercises and plans. Doctrine became the engine of change in the U.S. Army.

Very closely related to FM 100-5 was the effort to ensure that all U.S. Army doctrinal manuals were current and were supportive of FM 100-5. The essence of Richardson’s vision for the promulgation of FM 100-5 was that all U.S. Army schools, including the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, would be responsible for developing “How to Fight Manuals.” The Command and General Staff College in accord with its focus on educating general staff officers for Army divisions and corps, received the task to write the manual on corps and divisions operations as well as the manual for operations for echelons above corps. The other Army schools—ranging from Fort Knox, the Army Center and School, to Fort Eustis, the Quartermaster School—developed and wrote supporting brigade and below manuals. The schools also executed a corresponding effort by reviewing and updating the Army Training and Evaluation Plans (ARTEP).

The Army adopted a focused approach to training units in 1973 and 1974. The basis of the approach was a rational approach to the complexity of training for war. Army units had only so much time, money, and resources for training. Unit commanders needed guidance on training focus and Army wide standards for training. The Army Training and Evaluation Program, ARTEP, provided this focus. The publication of FM 100-5 required an across the board reassessment of the ARTEP and how to evaluate

155 Richardson Interview, pp. 448-451.
the effectiveness of training as well as discerning effective execution of concepts in training. The framework provided by ARTEP and its associated Mission Training Plan afforded commanders guidance and freedom of action to develop unit specific training plans which were in accord with doctrine as well as effectively using the allocated resources. The revised ARTEP and associated documents enabled Army units to develop a management scheme for the conduct of training based on a commander’s appreciation of the state of readiness of his unit and in accord with the specific doctrine for his unit, combat brigade to maintenance group. This detailed program, in accord with doctrine, provided the tasks, conditions, and standards in the various areas of tactical application of AirLand Battle doctrine for a particular unit. The necessary bridge to acceptance and wide spread use within the Army was incorporation of the doctrine in the curricula of key Army school. The Command and General Staff College was the key educational component school in this effort. As noted earlier, at the time of publication of the doctrine then Major General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College. He was charged with updating the curriculum at the Staff College and supporting the development of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Thus, Saint was the deputy commandant during a very interesting time.

General Saint came to Fort Leavenworth in June, 1981. Saint came from a reinvigorated European based U.S. Army that took war fighting very seriously. Saint previously commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the V U.S. Corps commanded by then Lieutenant General Donn Starry. He arrived with a mandate to revive the Staff College. He asked a question along the lines of the Army asking itself how to fight by asking what is the purpose of the institution? Saint provided the answer, “Train war fighters.” This was Saint’s motivation and what he challenged the College to do, train war fighters.

Saint’s perception of curriculum management was the cynical observation that
“Every Tom, Dick, and Harry who wanted to get something into the Army, called up Leavenworth and said, "Put it in the curriculum." The example Saint cited in his oral history interview upon his retirement from the Army was a case study on the acquisition of helicopter blades he was told to incorporate into the Staff College curriculum as a means to illustrate the Army acquisition process. Saint admitted that the use of the Staff College curriculum to illustrate everything but how to fight wars, "tipped me over the edge." Saint’s assessment was that the Staff College was not in fact training war fighters but training individuals in certain staff procedures. 156 This assessment led Saint to conclude that more was needed to ensure that the Army knew how to fight at the division and corps level. This assessment also led him to conclude that the Army needed a school such as that being envisioned as the School of Advanced Military Studies because the curriculum of the regular course at the Staff College was not providing educated division and corps level war fighters. The division and corps level of command was conducted at the tactical level in accord with Army doctrine of the time.

The Army that came out of Vietnam was a very directive Army. The expression of this tendency was highlighted in the perception of brigade commanders, based on reading the 1976 version of FM 100-5, that they were required to position each company in their brigades. Orders based on this doctrine were lengthy, specific, and very directive. This atmosphere was conducive to the acceptance of German concepts such as “Auftragstaktik.” This concept, translated in English as mission orders was promulgated in the 1982 version of FM 100-5. With the advent of the National Training Center, NTC, in 1980 and the results of the first fights against the Opposing Force, OPFOR, showed that the tendency to over control forces led to swift defeat. The first battles at NTC demonstrated that U.S. forces knew Army doctrine but did not “know”

how to really execute the concepts of the doctrine through tactical techniques. A notable effort to promulgate tactical techniques within the structure of a corps battle was written by Brigadier General John M. Kirk.

Kirk had a sign in his assistant division commander’s office that said, “Attack a Pissant Today.” Kirk demanded that every officer and soldier in the division, as well as any unit to which he was assigned, be serious about training for war. He demanded that from company to division level commanders share a common tactical language as well as a common philosophical and tactical base. For Kirk the framework of the 1982 FM 100-5 revealed a chasm between theoreticians and tacticians. The theory articulated in FM 100-5 lacked a link to tactics that were suited for the armored warfare the writing teams envisioned occurring in the Central Region of Europe. War, for Kirk, and by extension the officers under his command, was a tough, thinking person’s game that had to be reduced to “Pavlovian simplistics.” These simple things were; fighting to win, with the combined arms available in the units at the time, against a realistic threat that outnumbered the friendly unit, and to modernize technically, tactically and intellectually every day. Kirk insisted on adherence to tough, demanding standards for individual and unit training, as well as officer professional development seminar. Kirk focused these efforts through interpreting doctrine.157

Kirk wrote a pamphlet about these concerns while he was the assistant division commander of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1981 called Panzergrenadiers. The pamphlet, which he started while serving in Germany as a brigade commander and Chief of Staff in the 1st Armored Division from 1977-1980, contained an overview of the

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157 BG John M. Kirk, Panzergrenadiers, on the opening page an unpublished pamphlet distributed during 1981-1983 as a means of promoting self-study of war, the Russians, and military history. I am citing my personal copy of the pamphlet. I used this pamphlet to guide my own tactical thinking from 1982 until I retired from the Army in 2007. Kirk, in his use of the term Panzergrenadiers, was following the influence of GEN Depuy and the efforts of the 1976 FM 100-5. Depuy closely coordinated with the Germans in his development of the 1976 version of Army doctrine. Panzergrenadiers fought mounted in their combat vehicles until they had to fight dismounted. Hereafter cited as Kirk.
strategic and operational structure of a war in Europe, and then linked the tactical techniques to this strategy. He reinforced Saint’s position that the staff college was not teaching warfighting. He wrote, “the Army has done a fine job of teaching battalion/company commanders to draw grand goose eggs, arrows on acetate. Symbols bore little relation to ground, enemy, next war.”

In 158 pages of text with ten additional pages in two enclosures, Kirk outlined a series of techniques for both offensive and defensive battles within the tactical battle space of a corps and division. Kirk began with an overview of the strategy for war in Europe.

This overview of a strategy for war in Europe reflected the influence of the ongoing strategic debates on tactical implementation. The interpretation on the ground in U.S. Army units in Germany was that the national strategy called for a defense of Western Europe. The conundrum, according to Kirk, was that the strategy also implied the goal: beat the Russians. Defeating a Russian/Soviet invasion of Western Europe required victory and to attain victory, the U.S. Army had to attack and take the tactical, operational and strategic initiative away from the Russians. From Kirk’s perspective few writers, military or civilian, put the challenge of defense into an “attack/win continuum.” He wrote, “Simplistically put, strategic defense must be tactical attack so that we strategically win.” Kirk’s pamphlet reflected a tension between the execution of tactics and the strategy of the time.

Kirk deconstructed the active defense model. The widely held perception of active defense was a one echelon cordon or area defense. On the tactical level, this form of the defense of Western Europe did not present the Warsaw Pact with any difficulties; indeed, with a one echelon deep cordon the Soviet preference for

158 Kirk, p. 3.
159 Kirk, p. 4. In his constant efforts to instill an offensive outlook in our division, BG Kirk would tell us that the purpose of an attack was to restore the international border during a war in Europe. He would then tell us that the only border worth restoring was the Polish-Soviet border of pre-WWII.
penetration and exploitation to operational depths, with the objective of disrupting
depths, with the objective of disrupting political structures, was the best choice for an offense. Kirk realized that the new
operational doctrine required a new form of thinking about the tactics of the U.S. Army.
To Kirk, a good strategic defense was fundamentally offensive in orientation at the
tactical level. The execution of offensive tactics would defeat the Russians by taking
away the initiative, imposing NATO/U.S. forces will on the Russians, and most
importantly destroying the Russians’ psychological dependence on attaining their daily
objective and maintaining a precise operational tempo. This last was more important
that defeating the Russian force structure and weapons systems. 160 This line of thinking
was also reflected in Saint’s European experience.

  From 1976 to 1978, Saint served in the VII U.S. Corps, which was commanded
by then Lieutenant General Donn Starry. Starry led the U.S. lessons learned teams in
talks with the Israeli Defense Force in the aftermath of the 1973 war. Starry, who would
in turn command Training and Doctrine Command, was also wrestling with the
conundrum of strategic defense and tactical offense. Saint commanded Starry’s corps
cavalry regiment, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which formed the nucleus of the
corps covering force. If war came to Europe Saint would meet the Russians first and
force them to deploy their forces. In his historical interview Saint said, “Under General
Starry, we did a lot of warfighting and built the GDP [General Defense Plan] from the
bottom up. I’d say we didn’t invent the term but we invented what a covering force really
did for a very large corps.” 161 Saint’s cavalry regiment would take the first step in

   160 Kirk, p. 6
   161 Saint interview, pages 76/77. Saint’s interview contains a remarkable view of the tension in
this time between how the Army would fight. He related one particular story relating to the structure of
how V Corps would fight the covering force battle. He said, “I remember General Paul F. Gorman and his
frustration with me, because I was under the protection of the corps commander. Here is this colonel under
the protection of the corps commander negotiating with a two-star general. If you can imagine the scene
and they had different personalities. So General Gorman stood up in a meeting and said, “You know
General Starry, you have told me to negotiate the covering force handoff line with the regimental
defeating the Russians, as Kirk wrote, by disrupting the tempo of battle on which the
Russians relied. Saint said that he was, “in a tactical renaissance on how you fight a
large force.” This tactical renaissance in the U.S. Army in Europe and subsequently
in Army units in the United States continued as the new doctrine was introduced
throughout the Army and the Army came to grips with how to fight. While the Army in
Europe, at least initially, faced the challenge of tactical offense with a strategic defense
framework U.S. based Army units were the reinforcements to the Army in Europe and
NATO. The challenge for these units was how to integrate tactical formations into the
fight when their purpose was to go on the counter-offensive with large units; corps and
possibly armies. This level of discourse within the framework of the 1982 version of FM
100-5 forced the Army to consider the tactical formation of the corps and its place within
the operational framework.

General Saint commanded the III U.S. Corps from 1985-1988. At this time, and
based on his experiences at Leavenworth and in command of an armored division in
Europe he was charged with turning the III U.S. Corps into a truly strategically and
operationally mobile armored corps. Saint had to develop concepts and train an entire
corps so it would have the knowledge and capability to deploy after it got to where it was
going, either with its own equipment or with Pre-positioned Overseas Materiel
Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS). He envisioned a corps that could then road march
over 100 miles; and fight from the march. This vision fit into how the Army saw it would
fight within the strategic defense-tactical offense conundrum of NATO strategy that Kirk
wrote about in his pamphlet. An entire of corps of 90 to 100,000 Soldiers was a true
offensive weapon. The corps fit into standing operational plans in Europe and Korea,
but the mission of the corps would be the same; get to the fight and then fight as an entire corps. This vision required changes in everything Saint’s corps did, from individual tactical level training to corps tactical level training and how the corps fit into the operational level plan.

The III Corps, and the remainder of the Army, was coming to grips with the totality of the requirements of fighting in accord with the concepts in FM 100-5, 1982.

Army units will fight in all types of operations to preserve and to exploit the initiative. They will attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the objective. They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces and fires to the points of enemy weaknesses. Our operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorientating the enemy. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions. Operational planning must be precise enough to preserve combined arms cooperation throughout the battle...\textsuperscript{163}

The canvas of the battlefield upon which operational art was applied grew in scale and scope. Army units were rediscovering the art required to move and sustain large formations across long distances. Logistical units had to figure out how to sustain tank and mechanized infantry units while securing themselves on a fluid battlefield. Intelligence sections thought through how to gather information on a moving enemy force while moving at the same time. Signals units grappled with the challenge of command and control on the move. Units all over the U.S. tried to expand the distances used during field training and especially command post exercises by entering into agreements with local towns and farmers to use their fields thereby stretching the distances between headquarters and forcing commanders to deal with the real problem of transmitting their intent to subordinates. Saint, for example, started a program of training in the fields out in West Texas. He linked headquarters with his simulation

\textsuperscript{163} FM 100-5, 1982, p. 2-1.
center and played out electronic war games. Overall, the effect of this training and the corresponding education was to put the entire corps into the mind set, as Saint put it, “to shoot the enemy in the back.” Saint intended that the large scale level counter-offensives launched by III U.S. Corps would, in a paraphrasing of George Patton, provide the enemy the opportunity to die for his country so III Corps Soldiers would not die for theirs. The focus was the maneuver of large units to a place of significant advantage over the enemy. To accomplish large scale maneuver, the Army needed well educated commanders and general staff officers.

The lethality of the modern battlefield was demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Generals like Starry, Richardson and Saint recognized that there was a requirement to link the tactical actions of the company level, the point of the spear of combat, to the requirements of strategy. Saint captured this feeling and the purpose of operational art when he said the following.

> The concept that everybody above the company can lose the battle, but only the company can win the battle. That is, everybody above the company has only one purpose in life -- to get companies in the right place with the right material and the right training to do the battle. You can have the best organization in the world, but if it's not where the enemy is or you are in a bad place, you can lose. But when you're in the right place and you close in combat, the company is the only one -- where it all comes down to the bottom line -- that can win the battle.

Kirk also pointed the way for the linkage of company through division tactical actions, linked with a common tactical language and philosophy that addressed the conundrum of fighting in Europe of strategic defense that required a tactical offense to ensure a strategic victory. Kirk wrote that there was a chasm between theoreticians and

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164 Saint interview, page 138.
165 Saint interview, p. 140. Saint was famous for printing and distributing posters of an M1A1 sight picture of the back end of Russian T-72, with the caption that this was the proper sight picture to have after effective maneuver.
166 Saint interview, p 140.
tacticians. Kirk put a fine edge on the need to study the complexity of warfare by writing, “You must give the same level of effort to studying war that we have Sexism, Environment…etc.”\textsuperscript{167} Wass de Czege, recalling his days of company command in Vietnam and how it was apparent that the field grade level of command did not know how to string company level tactical victories into a larger success, wanted to ensure that the bar of tactical and operational excellence was raised throughout the Army. Saint while he was at the Command and General Staff College wanted to ensure that the graduates of the college were ready to fight in wars as general staff officers within divisions and corps. These complementary visions highlighted the necessity for educating officers in the finer arts of the tactical, operational and even strategic levels of war.

These men and other senior leaders sensed the need within the Army to have selected officers schooled in this higher order of warfare. The complexity of war, always a truism, was even more complex as the struggle to raise the nuclear threshold met with the need to balance strategic defense with tactical and operational offense. During this time there was even a growing recognition that Army leaders had to understand the workings of policy makers and policy making councils. Saint, even in his quest to focus the Command and General Staff College on war fighting, understood that there was a need for the bridge from the tactical to the strategic. In his final history interview before retirement, Saint said that Army planners needed to know interagency capabilities and players at that level, “because you don’t do anything in a strategic plan without the other

\textsuperscript{167} Kirk, p. 7. Kirk was famous, some would say infamous, for being blunt and insisting on tactical excellence above all. He told a story of going to general officer “charm school” a pejorative he used to describe the series of short courses the Army requires newly selected brigadier generals to attend. He would say that he’s endured the lectures on which fork to use at a dinner party and how to flatter a congressional aide, then at the cocktail party that followed, while others were drinking “wine spritzers” he would have a double martini and walk up to a large group of people and introduce himself by saying, “Hi, my name is Kirk and I came here from Europe to teach you people how to say, F*%&%!”. Kirk was a hard, tough man, and a great tactician. He was forced to retire from the Army as a Brigadier General.
players.” Whether or not the military was a major player in a policy or a minor player, without the education and experience of working within the strategic and operational level, who to talk to in the policy making councils, how to put changes into effect, an executable strategic plan would not be possible. The challenge was how to find such officers, educate them, and put them back into the Army for the necessary experiences so that in 10 to 15 years when the Army needed strategic and operational level commanders and planners they would be there. As Saint said,

So, how do you get people to do that and who does it? Well, SAMS was part of that. It’s to give people the basic underpinnings so they can become strategic planners in addition to operational planners. Then there is a requirement that you have to put them someplace where they have to operate jointly and in the interagency environment…If you want to have strategic planners, you have to go through those steps and at some point of time they are going to have career choices to make. That’s how you get them, whether we have enough of them or not it has to be a conscious process on whose going to be one of these guys.  

The creative tension caused by the introduction of a radically different doctrine, FM 100-5, 1982, the struggle of raising the nuclear threshold, and the defense-offense conundrum in Europe set conditions for the recognition that the Army needed officers who could lead large formations and plan for comprehensive campaigns.

The Army War College might have been a place to look for the leaders of large formations and the staff officers who would plan and execute large unit maneuvers. The curriculum of the War College at this time though was focused on the strategy and policy levels of war. Beginning in 1976 the War College reorganized its curriculum into six phases, orientation, National and International Security Affair, Domestic Affairs Symposium, Individual Selective Concentration, Group Project Analysis of Contemporary Military and National Security Problems, and Symposium on Contemporary National Security Problems. Save perhaps in the Individual Selective

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*Saint Interview, pp. 218/219.*
concentration period during the academic year the War College and depending on the preference of individual officer/students, the War College did not offer courses in commanding and controlling large units in battle. 169

The period of reflection that was a part of the post-Vietnam years in the U.S. Army put in motion a great renaissance of thinking about war; from operational level of war doctrine to tactics, from weapons systems development and acquisition to the role of nuclear weapons on the battle field. The Army had to ask itself how to fight. The pursuit of finding answers to this range of questions led Army doctrine writers to look at how to fight the armies of the Warsaw Pact in the central region of Europe. The practical political, strategic and tactical considerations of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, integration of major new weapons systems into Army formations, and the demonstration of the lethality of the modern battle field shown during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war influenced the move toward the introduction of the operational level of war to U.S. Army doctrine. This chapter focused on a review of the trends in the Army in the late 70s and early 80s. The linkage of limited war, theater nuclear war, the move to “raise the nuclear threshold,” and conventional forces as a part of overall deterrence highlighted the introduction of the operational art into U.S. Army doctrine and lexicon. The ashes of the defeat in Vietnam created an atmosphere conducive to the reconsideration of the role of the Army in strategy and operational art. Linked to this renaissance in military thinking was the need for a school to educate the practitioners of this art of war. “What is the purpose of the institution? Train war fighters…that’s where the SAMS [School for Advanced Military Studies] course came from,” as General Saint stated. 170

170 Saint Interview, page 108.
Chapter 4

The Tension of Expectations

The U.S. Army was at a cross roads in the early 1980s. The swirling waves of debate unleashed by the assessments of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the lethality of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, the movement toward the introduction of the operational maneuver group as a viable concept within Soviet Red Army and Warsaw Pact armies, and ultimately the introduction of a new doctrine for the U.S. Army in 1982 forced senior leaders to wrestle with how best to promulgate doctrinal concepts throughout the Army. The new approach required general staff officers and commanders who embraced the concepts and who could take action to implement these concepts as soon as possible. On the front lines, so to speak, was the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, which had to come to grips with the new doctrine and then quickly to determine how to teach it to the field grade officers selected to attend the college. It was an interesting time in the Army, as Colonel F.W. Timmerman, editor in chief of Military Review wrote, “Several years ago, the words “operational art” would scarcely received any attention much less be considered a major area of study by US Army professionals.” In confronting the question of how to teach this doctrinal concept, there emerged tension of expectations between the field and institutional Army.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) had a difficult time in

settling on a methodology for teaching tactics. The already-present “wrestling match” over how to present the active defense articulated by the 1976 version of FM 100-5 shifted into open combat when the 1982 version of the manual was released. The concept of the AirLand battle proved even more difficult to teach for the Command and General Staff College, CGSC, Department of Tactics. The active defense outlined in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, while widely disdained was in fact easier to understand. The tactics of a divisional defense, for example, required a detailed knowledge of how the Soviets would echelon their forces. The U.S. Army would then move units laterally on the battlefield to blunt a Soviet penetration. AirLand Battle doctrine was more offensive in outlook. The teaching and execution of this doctrine required tactics instructors to articulate a form of offensive operations that demanded on the ground experience in these forms of maneuver. The number of instructors in the College Department of Tactics that had recent troop experience, from either U.S. or Germany based units was not enough to ensure a uniform approach to teaching the basics of the doctrine. The Tactics Department of CGSC faced the conundrum of teaching doctrine it did not write and did not have instructors familiar with its execution.172

This difficulty came into sharper focus when the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, directed Major General Guy “Sandy” Meloy to conduct an assessment of the Command and General Staff College as a training

172 The Meloy report went into extensive detail regarding the number of “branch-qualified” majors and lieutenant colonels assigned to the Department of Tactics and Logistics, as well as the manning level of the teaching departments within the College. Branch qualified officers were those with at least one year of experience as a battalion/brigade level operations officer or executive officer. The report showed in great detail that the number of truly qualified officers was less than needed to effectively teach this doctrine. No real effort was made to address this lack either. The Army made the study and essentially did nothing to correct the lack.
and educational institution. Meyer further directed Meloy to use a 1933 letter from then Colonel George Marshall to Major General Stuart Heintzelman as the basis of his assessment. Marshall outlined 17 criticisms of the Command and General Staff College in 1933. Marshall’s criticisms were based on his years at the Infantry School and work with a National Guard division. Marshall wrote that the methods of teaching at the Staff College had to be modified in order to avoid “the chaotic state of affairs in the first few months of a campaign with a major power.” Marshall criticized the College for setting up marking and grading techniques that were so meticulous that they caused instructors to develop problems from a view point of exact grading as opposed to tactical problems that reflected the rigor of the battlefield. The ripple effect of grading over reality drove the 1933 Department of Tactics to focus on the lowest tactical level with the result that graduates of the Staff College were unable to properly estimate a situation other than tactical. Marshall observed that topics such as mobilization, deployment and sustainment, subjects that were hard to grade, were neglected in favor of simpler, tactical level instruction. Finally, the focus on the tactical coupled with the lack of troop duty at actual corps and army level, in 1933, did not produce officers with the ability to understand the maneuver of large formations.

Almost 50 years later the Chief of Staff Army wanted Meloy to determine if Marshall’s criticism were still valid. The result of this assessment was the so-called “Meloy Report” of 1 February 1982.

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174 Meloy Report, Tab B.
Major General Guy Meloy visited Fort Leavenworth and the Command and General Staff College from 17-21 January 1982. He was accompanied by four “troop-seasoned officers” to evaluate the College curriculum. Meloy reported that Marshall’s criticisms were still valid. He reported that the college was “teaching form more than substance,” and the diversity of the course material being presented allowed, “little opportunity for much more than superficial treatment of any given subject (to include command, staff and tactics)...”

The report caused a great deal of discussion between General Glenn Otis, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, General William Richardson, then Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, and General Max Thurman, then Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. This discourse ranged from how to fill the Staff College faculty with more experienced officers to arranged greater stability for the Deputy Commandant (who, typically, held the position for 12-18 months); but the focus of this assessment was summed up in two comments; one by Meloy and the other taken from an unnamed officer/student’s comment sheet. Regarding the Staff College curriculum, Meloy wrote that “there is insufficient in-depth coverage of those subjects that contribute directly to killing Russians.” The officer/student wrote, “There tends to be a dogmatic approach to tactics.”

The “dogmatic” or cookie cutter approach to tactics was a prime motivation on the part of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege to recommend the development of SAMS. The Meloy report was submitted to the

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176 Meloy report, page 2 and 6 respectively. As far as I could determine based on a review of documents in the Combined Arms Research Library and the electronic files available through the Center for Military History there is no record of considering how to “fix” the problems cited by the Meloy report, other than the effort pursued by Wass de Czege to establish SAMS.
Chief of Staff Army. As discussed in chapter one Wass de Czege’s report on Staff College education went to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, DCSOPS. These senior leaders were primed for a proposal to “fix” the perceived problem of cookie cutter tactics, promulgating a new doctrine and doctrinal approach to fighting wars.

The Combat Studies Institute, CSI, was established in 1979. CSI’s purpose was to energize the study of military history as it related to the development of tactical and operational practices. The role CSI played was supposed to assist the Center for Army Tactics in developing a deeper understanding of tactics in the CGSC student population. Roger Spiller recalled, “a fair amount of what we were teaching always seemed to get down to tactics, but also with what was already being referred to as the operational level of war. I doubt very much whether any of what we taught eased CTAC’s burdens or mitigated its lacklustre reputation.”  

The resort to “cookie cutter” solutions to tactical problems was difficult to overcome. Ultimately the effort required a senior Army leader as a champion.

General Donn Starry commanded the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1977 to 1981. Starry was a champion of the Army reform movement from the time he worked for GEN Depuy on the Army Staff. Starry knew that path to real change in an organization like the Army was through a change in its educational system. Thus a real change in doctrine and how the Army would fight in the future had to be led by a change in the approach to

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177 Quotation taken from an electronic mail note from Professor Roger Spiller dated 10 OCT 2009.
teaching. Starry wanted to make the Command and General Staff College course of instruction two years long, as it had been for a time in the 1920s and 1930s. Eight of the Army corps commanders in World War II were graduates of the two year course, as well as many senior division, corps and army principal staff officers.\textsuperscript{178} Starry ran headlong into resistance from officeholders at the Army personnel system (then known by its acronym MILPERCEN or Military Personnel Center) who asserted that the Army could not afford to keep all its very brightest majors in school for two years. Balked by their opposition, Starry undertook—as a fallback position-- to persuade the Chief of Staff to allow him to establish a pilot program of CGSC graduates pursuing advanced military studies. Starry intended that his second year of study would focus on, “command and staff at higher echelons--Corps, Army, Army Group, Theater…” Starry had planted the seed. Although this effort took until 1983 to come to fruition, Starry had faith that the experiment would pay dividends for the Army. Having worked with Wass de Czege during the development of FM 100-5, 1982, Starry supported the then LTG Richardson’s decision to have Wass de Czege installed as the first director.\textsuperscript{179}

As a result of intervention by many people acting for various reasons, the School of Advanced Military Studies was founded in 1983. The founder and first


\textsuperscript{179} Letter from GEN (ret) Donn A. Starry to Dr. Richard M. Swain dated 7 June 1995. In this letter to Swain, then writing a work titled “Filling the Void,” Starry described his personal path from command of a battalion through command of TRADOC to Readiness Command and his involvement in the implementation of FM 100-5, 1976 and his decision to re-write the doctrine in 1982. The letter is held in the Special Collections section, third floor of the Combined Arms Research Library. The quotation cited in this paragraph and the paragraph itself is drawn from pages29/30 of the letter. Hereafter cited as Starry Letter.
director of the school, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, envisioned the school providing specially selected and educated majors, following a year of intense study, to Army divisions and corps. These majors would accomplish two purposes. They would raise the general level of understanding of the increasing complexity of warfare. They would also improve the quality of planning and executing operations across the Army. To educate these specially selected majors, Wass de Czege proposed that the Army staff the school with highly qualified active duty lieutenant colonels or colonels. Wass de Czege realized that he and the other initial faculty members could not remain at the school permanently, but he assumed that they would be allowed to get the school up and running before receiving orders for a new assignment.\footnote{180} Wass de Czege stipulated the three prerequisites needed for a quality faculty; at least a master’s degree from a “good” school, previous teaching experience, and a demonstrated ability to command.\footnote{181} As a non-negotiable demand, Wass de Czege insisted that the Army provide faculty members who met these criteria. The minimum tour of duty at the school for these specially selected officers had to be three years. The first year would be in an understudy role to learn about the curriculum and to team-teach a seminar of twelve to fourteen majors with a more seasoned

\textsuperscript{180} The U.S. Military Academy at West Point instituted a program whereby selected officers would remain as permanent faculty members in the 1950s. Wass de Czege did not want permanent military faculty at SAMS but he did want assurances that the military seminar leaders would be high caliber officers.

\textsuperscript{181} U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Senior Officer Oral History Program, LTC Harold R. Winton, USA, retired. Conducted by LTC Richard Mustion, April 5, 2001 at Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 36. Hereafter cited as Winton Interview. The original faculty members, Winton, Wass de Czege, and Douglas Johnson all had advanced degrees from Stanford [Winton, Ph.D. in history], Harvard [Wass de Czege, M.A. in public administration], and Michigan [Johnson, M.A. in history] respectively. All three men served in combat in Vietnam and taught at West Point. Wass de Czege and Winton commanded infantry battalions and Johnson had extensive service in field artillery units and general staffs. A “good” school meant a school of similar caliber as these three officers attended.
instructor. The officers would lead seminars during the final two years of the tour of duty, and act as mentors for newly arrived faculty members. Even though he had support from senior general officers, he could not persuade the Army personnel management division to sustain a three-year tour for very high quality officers whose only task was teaching majors. The Army, in the view of the personnel managers, could make better use of such high quality officers in Washington on the Army and Joint staffs.

Because he expected resistance from the personnel department of the Army Wass de Czege had a Plan B. He proposed establishing an additional program within the School of Advanced Military Studies. This program would be a two-year long war college course called the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship. The program started in 1985. During the first year, officers assigned to the Fellowship would study the same curriculum as the Advanced Military Studies Program, the majors’ course. This focused study would serve as instructor preparation because in the second year of the program the fellows served as the principal instructors of the majors. The fellows’ curriculum also exposed them to the policy making process and how the major commands in the Defense Department executed strategy therefore the fellows also traveled to the global combatant commands of the Department of Defense as a part of the

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182 Officers selected for war-college-level schooling, especially those from the Army’s combat arms (those focused on fighting and coordinating battles), are former battalion commanders. A battalion is an organization of between 650 to 1,000 Soldiers. Successful command of a battalion is a recognized level of accomplishment that marks an officer for higher level command. Completion of the war college level of schooling is another prerequisite for higher level command and promotion. The program is now called the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship; the change in the name took place in 1995.
Plan B introduced an element of turbulence into the school as the principal instructors for the majors would constantly turn over. Assignment to the Fellowship was dependent on those that volunteered for the program. Teaching the fellows (and providing a measure of institutional stability) led to the appointment of several civilians to the faculty. Wass de Czege received broad authority General Richardson to hire the people he needed to start the school. Speaking of this time Wass de Czege said, “I was given to authority to hire whomever I wanted. I made the decision, but Hal and Doug and I were a close knit trio and I always consulted them. We may have had an informal group sit down with them. But I found them and I hired them based on the specific topics of their work and their potential for growth within the school.”

The first two civilians hired to teach in the newly organized School of Advanced Military Studies were Robert Epstein and James Schneider. Epstein held a Ph.D. in European history and had never served in the military. Schneider, who was not a Ph.D. at the time he was hired, had served in the Army in Vietnam as a young man. Epstein recalled the formation of the Fellowship as a challenge. The challenge to define what was needed in the fellows’ curriculum and

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183 The global combatant commands are military commands designed by the Defense Department to focus on specific regions of the world. At the time the Fellowship began the commands were European Command, Central Command, Southern Command, Atlantic Command, and Pacific Command. In 2007 the number of commands now includes Northern Command and Africa Command. Atlantic Command no longer exists; it became Joint Forces Command in 2000. A global combatant command is a headquarters and commander—a four-star general or admiral—that focuses on a specified group of countries. The headquarters is charged with developing military plans for operations in the region and an engagement strategy designed to further the interests of the U.S.

184 Electronic mail note from BG (ret) Wass de Czege to the author, 15OCT09.

185 Robert Epstein earned his Ph.D. in history at Temple University where he studied under Russell Weigley. Epstein was hired on a one-year contract with the Combat Studies Institute, the history department of the Army Staff College, in 1982. In 1984 he joined SAMS. James Schneider also joined the faculty of SAMS in 1984. Schneider took his Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas in 1993. Schneider turned down a full doctoral studies grant from Rice University to remain at Leavenworth and teach in SAMS.
took time to overcome. Epstein recalled that at first the fellows took trips. Later in subsequent refinements of the program, the fellows were required to take Epstein’s Military Classics Colloquium. In the late 1980s military theory and strategy courses were added to the curriculum and were taught by either Epstein or Schneider.\textsuperscript{186} Schneider had moved to Leavenworth in 1980 and initially worked in an analysis center. His educational background was a mix of history, science, mathematics, and military and scientific theory. Schneider was hired as the military theorist in SAMS in 1984. He, too, would instruct the fellows. After Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson left the school Schneider and Epstein wrote the SAMS curriculum and led the instruction of that curriculum for the fellowship.

Schneider’s recollection of the startup phase in 1984 was that “the seminar leaders had to gain something professionally for spending two years as instructors …” Schneider asserted that the fellowship was always an integral part of the original concept for SAMS. From Schneider’s perspective, the Fellowship was a key element in successfully teaching the majors, as the Fellowship “provided educated (by the course authors) and experienced former battalion commanders” as the principal teachers of the majors in SAMS.\textsuperscript{187} The first faculty members of SAMS realized that the fellows were a key element in the success of the school and arguably contributed as much to its success as did the performance of the majors.

\textsuperscript{186} This quotation is taken from a personal e-mail from Epstein to the author on 5 October 2006. The original e-mail is in my possession and in a personal file. Hereafter cited as Epstein note, 5OCT06.

\textsuperscript{187} This quotation is taken from a personal e-mail from Schneider to the author on 25 October 2006. The original e-mail is in my possession and in a personal file. Hereafter cited as Schneider note, 25OCT06.
Wass de Czege’s initial focus was on providing the Army specially educated majors, led and taught by highly qualified lieutenant colonels and colonels. The introduction of a designated a war college equivalent school caused two second-order problems. The first was how to craft a curriculum that met the standards of a war college level program while preparing these officers to teach the majors. The second was how to resolve the issue of appropriate assignments for the lieutenant colonels and colonels following their completion of the two-year Fellowship. Were they assigned into selected positions as SAMS graduates just like the majors? Majors were specially assigned to Army divisions and corps headquarters. Although this appears to be an obvious solution, the fellows had no such special assignment status. The Fellows not selected for colonel level command typically went to regional combatant commands. There was no deliberate assignment policy for the Fellows. This remained so until the late 1990s. Plan B also introduced other elements of uncertainty, most importantly the changing level and type of experience of the Fellows.

The decision to establish SAMS and its purpose, at least initially, was “to raise the bar of tactical understanding throughout the Army.” Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder defined tactical understanding as the ability to “see” how a battle would unfold in terms of forces, terrain, weather and time. The internal tensions with which the early Directors of SAMS contended ranged from just what type of officer the school would produce to how fast the school would

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188 Taken from an interview with BG Huba Wass de Czege conducted by the author on 14 January 2009 at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. The transcript is available through the Special Collections Section, Combined Arms Research Library. Hereafter cited as Wass de Czege interview, 14JAN09.
expand and even whether the school would be an independent entity or a school underneath the College. Then Major General Saint, the deputy commandant, believed as late as January 1983 that there would be no establishment of a new school but rather an extended course of study for selected officers. This extended course of study would be run by the directors of the departments of the College. Saint’s idea did not come to pass.

As previously discussed General Richardson decided that SAMS should be a new school reporting directly to TRADOC.\textsuperscript{189} As previously shown, the U.S. Army in the late 1970s and early 1980s was contending with the introduction of new weapons systems, new training concepts and locations—the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California—and a new doctrine, AirLand Battle, as well as dealing with questions on how to employ these new weapons systems in accord with this doctrine. The doctrine itself needed to be promulgated (indeed, some would say proselytized) throughout the Army. SAMS, as another new idea, came into its own during this time and was subject to all these tensions.

The first three directors of SAMS, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder were all, to one degree or another, dissatisfied with the manner in which tactics was taught at the Command and General Staff College. The basic objection was the translation of Army doctrine into a curriculum designed to meet the needs of the lowest common denominator in CGSC seminars and how doctrinal instruction was presented. At the time the Army selection process for attendance at the

\textsuperscript{189} Taken from an Annual Historical Report, SG: CAC/FLVN 84, MH-010/001, VF CGSC-departments-SAMS, 1982-84 held in the Special Collections section of the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, page 177. No author is listed. The section is titled, The Operational level of War and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Hereafter cited as AHR 1982-84.
Command and General Staff College outwardly selected the top 50% of each year group of officers. Practically, this meant that in addition to the top 50% of combat arms officers a Staff College class also had officers from the combat support and combat service support branches, as well as lawyers, doctors, veterinarians, physical therapists and other fields in the Army. Attendance at the Staff College was a prerequisite for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel thus every branch and field in the Army insisted that its fair share of offices attend Leavenworth.

Another serious difficulty was that the instruction in doctrine at CGSC was being done by less than ideal instructors. This was not a comment on the quality of these officer instructors as people; rather, it was in the manner of their previous assignments. There were not many instructors, as shown by the Meloy report, who were conversant in the latest field applications of doctrine. Thus, the method of instruction defaulted to rote doctrine and checklists. The tactics of large units; divisions and corps, was essential in the execution of operations in accord with AirLand battle. CGSC was supposed to educate the majority of the general staff officers in the Army at a sufficient level to assist division commanders in the execution of AirLand battle. This was not happening, although the College was trying.

As noted by the Meloy report the challenge of teaching AirLand Battle tactics was acerbated by the fact of the assignment process to the Command and General Staff College. Unlike the 1920s and 1930s assignment to Fort Leavenworth was not viewed as career enhancing. Any combat arms officer
assigned to CGSC was presumed to be able to teach and to teach tactics. This reinforced the tendency toward approved solutions, lesson plans, and an extendable pointer as the tools of the instructor.

Wass de Czege and Sinnreich stressed the theory and history of tactics in the instruction presented at SAMS. The advantage SAMS had over the CGSC Department of Tactics was that they, along with the SAMS Fellows, were former battalion commanders and thus were more familiar with the application and execution of recent tactics.

Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich served as the second director of SAMS from 1985 to 1987. Sinnreich had also been involved in the writing of FM 100-5, both the 1982 and 1986 versions. Sinnreich wrote an end of tour report in 1987 after his tenure as Director. In this report, he highlighted several of the internal and external tensions he believed that SAMS and especially AMSP as the school continued to mature, faced. He wrote that he had told the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono, that “virtually all the dangers facing SAMS are associated with its success, not its failure.”\(^{190}\) The Army as a whole and the College in particular also came to view SAMS as a useful experiment.

Sinnreich recognized this in his end of tour report. He commended the College and the senior leaders of the Army for not interfering in the development and continuing refinement of the SAMS curriculum. For example, Sinnreich

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\(^{190}\) School of Advanced Military Studies memorandum for Commandant. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, dated 10 June 1987, Subject: End of Tour Report. Written by COL Richard Hart Sinnreich, page 2. Held in the Special Collections section, Combined Arms Research Library, 3rd floor. An end of tour report is written by a commander or director that sums up the experiences, observations and recommendation of the person who led an organization. It is largely an historical document although it can serve many purposes. Hereafter cited as Sinnreich End of Tour Report.
retracted the prerogative of refining the curriculum internally and without external review and approval. This end of tour report was an effort on his part to shortstop any future outside interference as the school continued to evolve. By and large Sinnreich was successful in this effort.

Sinnreich and following directors faced the question of when to expand the size of the Advanced Military Studies Program within SAMS. Wass de Czege proposed that the school expand after the third year; from two to four seminars, based on the expected successes of the graduates. In support of Sinnreich’s position against expansion was a general officer who told Sinnreich that there would always be “guys who never do anything much more than jump out of airplanes, go anywhere, expose themselves to death and are capable of inspiring and leading young soldiers.”

This general officer declared that there is an important role for these officers in the Army, but the purpose of SAMS is to educate officers with a broader vision, and to produce officers who could lead corps and armies. This placed another burden on the program, since increasing instruction on the operational level of war would supplant instruction on the tactics associated with the maneuver of corps and divisions.

Sinnreich approached the introduction of more operational art in the AMSP and Fellows’ program in unique ways. Sinnreich envisioned extending AMSP into the second semester of the course of instruction in the Command and

\[191\] U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Collection, Group Combat development SG 1986, SSG SAMS-012/013, Interview with Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, Director of the School for Advanced Military Studies at CGSC, by Dr. Michael Pearlman, 8 April and 26 June 1986. Held in the Combined Arms Center historical files, third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, page 18, SAMS-012. Sinnreich did not name the general officer in this report, and when asked during my research confessed he’d forgotten the name. Hereafter cited as Sinnreich interview and SAMS-012 or 013.
General Staff College. This second semester focused on tactics, at that time. This extension of AMSP would ensure tactics was fully covered in the second semester of CGSC and the first semester of AMSP thus allowing additional campaign studies in AMSP. The Fellowship of SAMS would also focus on the operational art over tactics as the Fellows were experienced former battalion commanders and would build on their familiarity with higher level tactics and use this perspective to gain a deeper appreciation of the operational level of war. At this time in the life of the school the experience the Fellows had in command came from rigorous training exercises, war experience came later on. Sinnreich also wanted to formalize the War College program in SAMS, AOSF, to include follow on internship assignments to directed field army and higher level staffs, much as the majors’ assignments were directed following AMSP.192

Under Sinnreich’s direction the curriculum retained its focus on military history and theory. Sinnreich also continued the program of scheduling trips to various commands and especially an extended trip to Europe. The trip to Europe combined seconding AMSP students to division staffs during an exercise, to expose the students to the challenges of division level execution and tactics with a series of staff rides to European battlefields, mostly battlefields over which American forces fought in World War II. The students and faculty would walk the ground on which American forces had fought in order to experience the relationship of terrain to time and distance, as well as the effect of weather on the

pace of operations. Though costly, the combination of staff experience and staff rides reinforced the lessons of the class room. These experiences came back to the class room as students and faculty related the shared on the ground experiences to the warfighting concepts under discussion during class.

Sinnreich stated that the discourse on the development of FM 100-5, 1982 prior to taking the helm at SAMS as director did not so much inform the development of the curriculum and the overall SAMS program as the class room discourse informed the development of the 1986 version of FM 100-5. Sinnreich believed that the class room discussions were the most dynamic he had experienced in his military career. The focus during Sinnreich’s tenure was not to produce practitioners of FM 100-5 but informed thinkers schooled in the theory and practice of war at higher levels of tactics and operational art. The students were exposed the basic theories of war and drew their own conclusions on the practice of war, taking theory and the evidence of history and war-gaming as the basis for informed action rather than rote application of doctrine.

Sinnreich stated that the fundamental difference between the approach of the Command and General Staff College and the teaching of tactics with the approach SAMS took in exploring the theory of tactics resulted from differing insights offered by the philosophers of war Jomini and Clausewitz. Sinnreich’s appreciation of the CGSC approach was the College took a Jominian approach, in his words, “…you could reduce the complexity of war to principles that the average man could apply. That school (CGSC) is dedicated to that proposition.”

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193 Developed from an interview with Sinnreich conducted by the author, 6JAN09. The transcript of this interview is held in the Special Collections Section of the Combined Arms Research Library. Hereafter cited as Sinnreich interview 6JAN09.
On the other hand, Sinnreich and the other early directors of SAMS followed the Clausewitzian approach that, “rules were the death of sound soldiership. This school (SAMS) is dedicated to that proposition.”

Sinnreich continued the iconoclastic spirit he inherited from Wass de Czege by deciding to change the name of the program from the department of Advanced Military Studies, the name of the initial experiment at a second year program to the School of Advanced Military Studies. Sinnreich did this without seeking approval from the leadership of the College. By this act he established SAMS as a school under the College rather than a department within the College. It was a significant decision and one that ensured a large degree of freedom for future directors. The next director of the school also followed this path while putting his own mark on the school.

Colonel Don Holder followed Sinnreich as the third director of SAMS. Holder, too, had participated in the writing of the 1982 version of FM 100-5, and later, while serving as one of the first SAMS Fellows, the 1986 version. The fifth and sixth years of the development of SAMS was marked with the decision to put on hold the Wass de Czege vision to expand AMSP to 96 officers. Holder also directed the development of a separate curriculum for the SAMS Fellows. Finally, Holder directed the continued dialogue in both programs about the nuances under girding AirLand Battle doctrine.

Holder viewed the state of SAMS when he arrived as basically sound. There were 48 majors in AMSP and eight lieutenant colonels in the Fellowship. He later acknowledged that this early in the development of SAMS attending the Sinnreich interview, SAMS-012, side 3, page 1.
school was still regarded as, “a slightly chancy thing to sign up for…” Holder did feel, though, that the “iconoclast spirit” of the early days was still evident. Infrequent reports from field commanders and his experience as the operations officer for the 2nd Armored Division persuaded him that acceptance of graduates was generally good for majors. At this time in the history of the school, there were fewer than 100 AMSP graduates, but they were—on the basis of anecdotal evidence [informal reports from commanders after Battle Command training Program exercises]—making a difference in the divisions and corps to which they were assigned. With regard to assignment of Fellows, Holder admitted that the Fellows were not clearly differentiated from other War College graduates in the minds of most field commanders.\footnote{This paragraph and the quotations were drawn from a personal e-mail from LTG Holder and the author on 26 March 2008. Hereafter cited as Holder e-mail, 26MAR08.}

The plan to expand to 96 AMSP students was on hold based on a decision taken between Holder and Sinnreich and in consultation with Wass de Czege. The question of expansion was juxtaposed with arguments about keeping the high quality of majors selected for the program as well as retaining the favorable student to teacher ration; two instructors to 12 officer students. Holder, “decided very early…to keep enrollment at 48 majors.” The program was growing in popularity and other services were becoming interested in having officers attend AMSP. All four AMSP seminars had USAF officers at the time. The size of the seminar remained at 12 though. The decision to include USAF officers came at the cost of reducing the number of U.S. Army officers, again to retain the high level of quality within the AMSP seminars. The discussion about
expanding the program and including officers from other services was heated. In addition to the issue of selecting “quality” U.S. Army officers, there arose the question as to how the officers from other services would be selected. Additionally, the size of the seminar also came up for debate. Sinnreich and then Holder thought that the optimal size of a seminar was 12. Adding other service officers, they argued, must not increase the overall size of the seminar and the student to teacher ratio. But that would mean decreasing the number of U.S. Army officers selected for SAMS.

In support of remaining at a total of 48 officers in AMSP Holder wrote a memo for the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College informally called the “No Free Lunch” memo. In this memo, which was rewritten into a back channel message to the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations of the Army Staff, Holder made the case that quality and the selection process were the key ingredients in ensuring that the Army received the best possible officer from AMSP. Holder used the message to inform these key general officers that inclusion of officers from other services came at a price; seats for U.S. Army officers in AMSP and a requirement for high quality officers from the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. Holder also decided not to have foreign officers considered for inclusion in AMSP for fear of losing control of the admissions process.

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196 U.S. Army. Personal For Message from Major General Gordon Sullivan, deputy commandant, USACGSC and Major General Glynn Mallory, Deputy Chief of Staff-Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The so-called “No Free Lunch” message, it states that the inclusion of USAF and USMC officers into an Army program, in the name of “jointness” would come at the cost of seats for US Army officers in a US Army school. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

197 Holder e-mail, 26MAR08
AMSP was a major point of contention for Holder.

Over his tenure, Holder did not change the admissions process for AMSP. Indeed he fought to ensure selection remained under the control of the Director, SAMS and not go to Washington and the Army Personnel Center. Eventually, the compromise between SAMS and the Personnel Center was to send the final list of selected officers to the Personnel Center for a “quality” scrub that would ensure none of the selected officers were at risk for promotion. The Leavenworth-based selection process called for first year students in CGSC to apply for admission, take an entry exam that assessed their grasp of basic tactical knowledge but also called on them to write opinions on doctrinal issues. Holder, the director and other key staff selected by Holder conducted interviews for everyone who showed promise and selected the class based on the recommendations of interviewers, CGSC performance, and test performance. At the time SAMS had around 100 applicants for the 48 available seats. The standards for selecting officers to AMSP were applied more stringently to combat arms officers.

Admission was slightly tougher for combat arms officers because more combat arms officers applied for the program, and because Holder and his faculty felt they needed one Military Intelligence, MI, officer and one logistician per seminar. Holder believed that the combined arms team approach to the application of tactics and operational art required a combination of the combat arms, military intelligence and logistics. While there were many applications from combat arms officers the applications from those branches-MI and logistics- were
not as numerous. Controlling admissions allowed faculty to choose some uniquely qualified students. During Holder’s tenure as director, he admitted an Adjutant General Corps officer because he was also a Russian Foreign Area Officer, FAO and was an especially bright applicant. The net result of the admissions process started by Wass de Czege and carried on by Sinnreich and Holder was a very select, bright group of officers who were eager for the SAMS experience.198

Part of this experience was an exploration of the basis of the new Army doctrine, theory and military history. Officers selected to attend AMSP had to take a course in military history as one of their CGSC electives. Dr. Robert Epstein of the SAMS faculty taught this course in the final CGSC semester. Holder, who had taught military history at West Point, believed strongly that learning the history of warfare was essential in developing critical thinking in officers.

Holder did adjust the curriculum of AMSP during his tenure as director. During his tenure AMSP was organized into over 20 sub-courses. Holder felt that the courses were far too short, and, thus, he consolidated the sub-course into eight courses. Holder also began with a substantial block of tactics instruction, based on the continuing assessment that the tactics instruction in CGSC was weak and focused on the lowest common experience in a CGSC seminar. Holder’s assessment of tactical instruction in CGSC deserves some comment.

198 Drawn from an interview with LTG (ret) Holder conducted by the author on 12JAN09. Hereafter cited as Holder interview, 12JAN09.
Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all felt that the instruction of tactics in CGSC was lacking. This assessment was substantiated by the Meloy report, especially in Meloy’s finding that there were not enough recently “branch qualified” officers in the Department of Tactics to teach CGSC students on the execution of tactics in accord with doctrine. In a March 1986 essay in Military Review General Richardson, Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command, introduced the 1986 version of FM 100-5. In this essay Richardson stated that mastery of AirLand Battle was a key ingredient in preparing for war. Richardson also announced several initiatives to instill the doctrine into the total officer corps. One of these initiatives was the establishment of a Center for Army Tactics within the Department of Tactics of the Command and General Staff College. The purpose of the center was, “To instill the tenets of the AirLand Battle in the officer corps.” Richardson intended that the center be “on the cutting edge of tactical study, teaching, doctrinal writing and evaluating lessons from those recently assigned to combat units.” Richardson also wrote that the center would ensure standardization of tactical instruction throughout TRADOC and set standards for excellence in tactical training for the entire Army. Given the importance of the Center, Richardson wrote, “Only the Army’s finest combined arms tacticians will be assigned” to it, ensuring that “students will learn the most current and sound doctrine and tactics from the Army’s best.” While no the focus of my research I found little evidence to support Richardson’s assertion. This change would be in SAMS benefit as well as the Army’s, but my research did not turn up evidence that supported Richardson’s statement. Holder
prudently kept a focus on tactics and tactical instruction in AMSP while awaiting evidence of a change in CGSC.\(^{199}\)

Holder kept the terrain model exercises, designed to make students aware of weapons characteristics and the effects of ground. He also added emphasis to tactical movements and maneuver through the use of actual movement planning. Holder felt this needed to be added to the tactics instruction based on his year of service as the G3, operations officer, of the 2\(^{nd}\) Armored Division as well as his professional judgment based on the study of war.\(^{200}\)

Prior to coming to SAMS Holder served as the operations officer of the 2\(^{nd}\) Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. The 2\(^{nd}\) Armored was under command of the III U.S. Corps, which was commanded by LTG Crosbie Saint. Saint focused on the role of the corps as a mobile force that would conduct counter-attacks upon employment in Germany under a NATO scenario. As the division operations officer Holder studied the movement of large formations. He insisted that SAMS incorporate the study of the movement of large formations based on this experience in III Corps and due to an incident with the SAMS faculty. Holder was searching for historical case studies of corps sized movement and called SAMS while he was the operations officer. Holder said that the answer he received from the faculty was words to the effect that SAMS did not foresee the need for corps maneuver in the near future. Holder arrived at SAMS determined

\(^{199}\) William R. Richardson, “FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986,” in \textit{MILITARY REVIEW}, Vol LXVI, No. 03, MARCH 1986, p. 10. In a conversation with LTG (ret) Holder in April 2010 Holder told me he’d written the essay for Richardson and that at the time he did not expect that the Army would make the effort to assign its best tacticians to the Center. He felt that this was due to the impact of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that mandated joint service for every officer in the running for consideration for flag rank. This requirement reinforced the feeling in the officer corps that teaching at CGSC took you out of the hunt for consideration for command and higher rank.

\(^{200}\) Holder interview, 12JAN09.
that SAMS would indeed study this form of maneuver. ²⁰¹

The other basic block of the AMSP curriculum as revised by Holder was Dr. James Schneider’s demanding theory course. The theory course followed tactics and set the foundation for the remainder of the AMSP year of study. Holder, Sinnreich and Wass de Czege all believed that linking the theory of war with military history would best prepare AMSP graduates for the rigor needed to analyze warfare in the late 20th century and empower them to adapt the concepts of AirLand Battle into executable form in war exercises and war. Theory ranged from Clausewitz and Jomini to Sun Tzu and Mao, as well as Russian theorists such as Tuchachevskii, one of the practitioner/theorists of the operational level of war.

Student evaluations of these courses revealed a broad range of responses to the effectiveness and utility of the SAMS focus on theory. In the SAMS internally directed end of course survey done in 1985 one AMSP student remarked that there needed to be an even tighter link between the military classics colloquia and theory, writing, “Use it to show a continuity between theory, principles, and the military experience throughout the ages.” The same survey included a statement requesting greater exposure to Jim Schneider, “Jim Schneider needs to be used more.” The conclusion of the survey indicated a degree of comfort on the part of the SAMS faculty regarding the utility and acceptance of theory as the initial course within AMSP. ²⁰²

²⁰¹ Holder interview, 12JAN09. Holder did not tell me with whom he spoke and in a follow-up electronic mail exchange on 15MAY2010 Holder wrote, “I’m not sure enough of the source of the reply to attribute it to an individual but the message was clearly, “we can’t imagine that being necessary”.”

²⁰² All quotations taken from Student narrative Comments, End of Course Survey, AY 84-85,
The results of the internally directed end of course survey done in 1986 revealed a more maturing course and a more discerning student population. Officer comments regarding theory indicated that the officers saw a real need for a theoretical base from which a SAMS graduate would operate when back in the field Army. An officer wrote, “The real benefit of the course is the theoretical study...The study of theory is not conducive to individual study and almost requires interaction.” Another officer wrote that the faculty should reemphasize theory throughout the academic year, writing, “Not enough time within the curriculum to [reinforce] concepts developed in Course 1 throughout year.”

Every officer-student in AMSP participated in these surveys but not every officer comments on every course. The overall tenor of the comments made on the theory block of instruction indicated that while it was a tough course there was a widespread feeling that it was a necessary course.203

During Holder’s tenure, after theory students alternated topical seminars covering division, corps and army level doctrine. Each echelon-oriented seminar concluded with an exercise at that particular echelon of command. Lieutenant Colonel David McConnell was the SAMS exercise director for Holder. As directed by Holder, McConnell set up a series of manual and computer-assisted exercises that required students to plan then conduct tactical and operational level actions. In the largest of these exercises, corps and army level, SAMS had

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203 All quotations drawn from Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, Subject: Narrative Comments on AMSC Student End of Course Survey, AY 85-86, dated 26 June 1986 found in the SAMS files, Room 212, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth. In the second quotation the author deciphered the word “reinforced, placed in brackets, from the fuzzy Xeroxed copy. All AMSP students participated in the survey but not all made comments on every course.
several planning groups prepare operations plans. Holder made it a practice to receive staff briefings from the student planning groups and then selected the boldest of the proposed plans for implementation.

The program of instruction begun by Wass de Czege continued under Holder, essentially the schedule of four seminars sessions per week—Wednesday generally being a study day-- with exercises running five days a week. The trips for AMSP students ran about a week in length. The year he arrived at SAMS as the director, the Army cut European travel from the program as it was too costly. AMSP students did continue to travel to the East coast for visits to U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, SOCOM, U.S. Atlantic Command, LANTCOM/SACLANT, and the Pentagon. Trips to the NTC to view tactical training also continued. AMSP conducted a number of local terrain exercises as a part of the exercise program which was part of the tactics sub-course. As the reputation of the school grew the number of speakers coming to the school increased in number and stature. SAMS, as Holder recalled, “had wonderful speakers including Luttwak, Lind, and many senior retired people like Emerson, McCaffrey, Starry and Cushman.”

The speakers challenged conventional wisdom and reinforced the lessons on critical thinking.

Under Holder, SAMS shifted from requiring the students to write one masters’ thesis to writing two monographs. The reasoning behind this shift was that two monographs would allow for focus on the tactical and operational domains. The first monograph was due at the end of the first semester of SAMS

204 Holder e-mail, 26MAR08
and would be focused on a tactical topic. The second monograph, due at the end of the second semester, but before the oral final examinations, was focused on an operational level topic. Both monographs went through an acceptance process from the monograph director through the director of SAMS to the College Director of Graduate Studies. Dr. Phil Brooks. Dr. Brooks was deeply involved in assuring that SAMS met the College standards for earning a Master of Military Arts and Sciences, MMAS.205

The major change that Holder made to the overall program of SAMS regarded the handling of the officers in the SAMS Fellowship, or Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship. Holder recalled that, “When I became Director, the Fellows attended AMSP seminars and were allowed to choose one day per week to skip seminar and do as they pleased.” Holder changed that method of operation and directed that the fellows form a separate seminar of their own with a suitable (operational level) curriculum. Holder thought that “one of my best contributions to SAMS was regularizing the Fellowship by making it a separate seminar.”206 Holder recalled that he “intended to separate the Fellows from the AMSP students and to focus them on theater warfare.” Holder assigned the Fellows a seminar room of their own and selected one of the previous year’s Fellows to serve as their seminar leader. Holder, Epstein, and Schneider were the principal teachers of the Fellows.207

The major problem with the Fellowship had to do with the perception of it

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205 Dr. Phil Brooks was an institution at CGSC. He served as the Director of Graduate Studies for many years and also advised on the selection process for AMSP. Dr. Brooks died in 2005.
206 Holder e-mail, 26MAR08 and Holder interview, 12JAN09.
207 Holder e-mail, 26MAR08 and Holder interview, 12JAN09.
among eligible Army lieutenant colonels and colonels. While Wass de Czege had initially thought this group should be hand selected officers from good schools, many eligible officers were not willing to volunteer to come to Leavenworth, at least not in the early years of SAMS. If AMSP was a dicey option for majors two years at Leavenworth away from the mainstream Army was seen as a major risk among the officers selected to attend the War College. As Holder recalled, “Most of the Fellows came to the School unwillingly.” A very few officers volunteered to come to SAMS, going so far as to contact the school to ensure that the director knew of their preference. In a concession to the school, the Army Personnel Center accepted school input with by-name preferences as soon as the selection list for War College level schooling was announced. However, at that time—[early to mid] 1980s when the reputation of the school was not so well established---most officers coming to the Fellowship were sent by the Army without much preparation. Holder observed many years later that it was a 90 day process to bring the Fellows “out of their collective sulk…” and make them active participants of the class and the school.

While there was reluctance on the part of the early directors to allow international officers into AMSP, Holder was the first director to have an international officer on the faculty as a Fellow and seminar leader. In 1988 British Colonel Gage Williams was assigned to Fort Leavenworth to study SAMS and then to return to launch the British Army’s Higher Command and Staff School. Williams was such a manifestly talented officer that Holder put him to work on a staff ride to Vicksburg for the Fellows. The focus of the trip was to
study the operational and strategic aspects of Grant’s 1863 campaign. Williams’
efforts paid off, and the Fellows commented so strongly on the benefits of the trip
that this staff ride remained a part of the Fellows curriculum in the following year
as well. In a very clever bureaucratic move Holder included members of the
Combat Studies Institute, CSI, on these staff rides. The staff ride program was
the bailiwick of CSI and by having CSI members facilitate the staff ride Holder
avoided an interdepartmental fight. He also gained an ally.

The Fellows travel program also included overseas travel to regional
combatant commands; Southern Command, SOUTHCOM, Pacific Command,
PACOM, and European Command, EUCOM. The focus of the travel was to
reinforce lessons on theater level warfare and the interaction of policy, strategy
and the operational level of war. This year of study and travel reinforced the
preparation of the Fellows to teach the majors in AMSP.

Holder continued to refine Wass de Czege’s “Plan B” as all seminar
leaders were second year Fellows. In Holder’s first year as director, 1987, one of
the seminar leaders was selected for brigade command and due to
circumstances beyond school control this officer had to depart to take command
immediately. A second Fellow was activated from the alternate brigade
command list as well.\footnote{The Army selects twice the number of officers it needs for brigade commands, among other
selection lists, for example if there are ten available commands in a Fiscal Year the first ten officers
selected are on the “primary list,” and the second ten are on the “alternate list.”} This unforeseen circumstance led to assigning one
seminar to Colonel Williams, the visiting British officer. As Holder recalled,
Williams proved to be “a brilliant seminar leader.”\footnote{Holder e-mail 26MAR08.}
The curricula of AMSP and AOSF did not exclusively center on the Army doctrine FM 100-5, 1982 or 1986. However Holder intended that SAMS graduates would return to the operational Army as “advocates for and experts in AirLand Battle…” especially in the school’s first years, which coincided with the release of this new doctrine. Both programs of SAMS educated these selected officers beyond the basics of the doctrine so that they could explain and properly implement the doctrine in Army divisions and corps as well as higher echelon headquarters. This was Holder’s aim as director of the School until 1989 when he departed for a brigade level command. Holder’s goal was to establish doctrinal understanding for the graduates’ next assignment and, equally important to give graduates enough understanding of theory to allow them to change doctrine as their careers advanced. SAMS graduates education would allow them to more deeply understand the doctrine, implement the doctrine throughout the Army, and when it came time to revise the doctrine be able explain the need for change and participate in the writing and development process.

Under the first three directors and continuing into the future, SAMS started a process of immediate student surveys as a class neared graduation. The SAMS administration also set up arrangements for continuing contact effort between graduates and the school to ensure SAMS retained awareness of how graduates performed their duties and for feedback on what was helpful to

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210 The 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 introduced and refined the tenets of AirLand Battle; Agility, Initiative, Depth and Synchronization. As noted these manuals were written by the first three directors of SAMS and were also influenced by discussions held with students in SAMS, especially the 1986 version. The focus of instruction was not on the doctrine rather the underpinnings, theoretical and historical.
graduates. A review of the comment sheets from graduating officers from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) class of 1984/85 revealed telling comments on the effectiveness of the curriculum and its focus on division and corps level tactics as well as the operational level. One officer wrote that based on his education in AMSP he finally learned that “war is much more than a tactical battle of attrition…” Other comments on the effectiveness of the curriculum were straightforward from, “You have a good thing going – don’t screw with it!!!” to “SAMS needs to find viable alternatives to the ‘fire hydrant’ approach to education.” There was also a comment calling for limiting student and especially faculty war stories, “Four hours in class is bad enough, if seminar leader allows it [telling war stories] to ramble he is wasting taxpayers’ money.”

The fact that the first three directors of SAMS were also intimately involved in the development and refinement of the centerpiece of U.S. Army doctrine was not serendipitous. Reflecting circumstances perhaps unique in the history of the U.S. Army, senior leaders of the Army, Starry, Richardson, Vuono and Sullivan, to name a few, were deeply involved in the refinement of doctrine as well as the selection of the director of the school that would ensure a broader understanding of the nuances and underpinnings of the doctrine would go out to the field Army. Doctrine would link the Army’s new combat systems with a method of how to employ these systems.

Professor Frederick Kagan has called the period from 1975 to 1986 the

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211 End of Course Survey Student Narrative Comments, AY 1984/85, undated, pages 1 and 11. Hereafter cited as AY 84/85 Student Comments.
“Rebirth of Military Doctrine.” This period was marked with a focus on winning the first battle of the next war to thinking about theater level warfare, from the tactical movement of battalions to the point of penetration to how to disrupt the follow-on echelons of an attacking force. Sinnreich said that FM 100-5, 1982 allowed the Army to “think about victory and winning the war again…” The combination of new doctrine entering the Army school system and component units in the field as well as new weapons systems led many officers, especially those in Europe, to no longer view their General Defensive Plan positions as Kagan highlighted, as the place where “I was going to die,” but where the Army was going to defeat the Russians. The doctrine of the mid 1980s required a link between the tactics of corps and divisions and the strategic objectives of the theater commander.

Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all expected that the graduates of SAMS would return to the Army and raise the level of understanding of Army doctrine to new levels through more competent execution of operations. The new doctrine clearly pointed out that the political purpose of the war be established before strategic and tactical objectives could be developed. A deeper understanding of the nuances of the development of strategy, gained by a study of military theory and history would provide the basis for this improvement in execution. This reflected the unstated but clear influence of Clausewitz’s On War, that war is an extension of policy by other means.

213 Sinnreich interview, 6JAN09.
The practitioners of the new doctrine SAMS was educating understood that reasonably clear political objectives and policy statements were the key to establishing attainable operational level objectives. The bridge between strategy and tactics was the operational level of war. Although later critics would question the understanding of the interaction required between military and policy makers to state a clear policy and strategy, at the time the enthusiasm for the course, one that came from the focus on what SAMS graduates called a real study of war was indeed carried out to the field Army.215 The graduates had to get to the field Army and for the first two classes from SAMS it took some extraordinary efforts.

LTG (ret) David R. Palmer was the deputy commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College from late summer of 1983 to June 1985. He recalled that he arrived at Fort Leavenworth to serve as the deputy commandant after the decision was taken to establish the School of Advanced Military Studies. The first year, 1983-84 was the pilot program and LTG (ret) Palmer said that it was clear to him that a part of his job as deputy commandant was to ensure that the first year went well. In particular he recalled how the assignments for the first and second classes were made, the Chief of Staff, Army personally approved the assignments.

LTG (ret) Palmer said that he understood there was, “a rule--maybe unwritten…” or form of guidance that the graduates would go to either Army divisions or corps to serve as planners. This assignment was to ensure that the

215 Richard Lock-Pullan, *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation*, New York: Routledge, 2006, pages 102-108. Lock-Pullan wrote that made an argument that U.S. military officers used the operational level doctrine to evade questions of strategy; much like Summers did, and allowed strategy and policy to be the exclusive domain of civilian thinkers.
graduates would put their knowledge of higher level tactics and the operational level of war to use. LTG Palmer related that in the spring of 1984, February or March, the Chief of Staff, GEN John Wickham, came out to Leavenworth to speak to various courses then in session. As an adjunct to this visit LTG (ret) Palmer recalled that he and the Chief of Staff sat in the deputy commandant’s office in Bell Hall and that the Chief went over the list of the graduates and personally approved each officer’s post-SAMS assignment. This was to ensure that no one would take another decision without checking with the Chief personally. LTG Palmer said, “The Army is a large organization, and like all large organizations it has trouble digesting new things. SAMS was a new thing. As there was no regulation or guidance on SAMS it was important for the Army to understand that the assignment of SAMS graduates was important to the Chief of Staff.”

LTG Palmer said that he did not recall exactly how the list of names and preferred assignments made it to his office but was sure that then COL Wass de Czege polled the students and did other coordination with the Army G1 before this list arrived in his office. LTG Palmer said that he was “90% certain” that GEN Wickham took the same level of personal interest in the assignment of the second class of SAMS graduates.

The senior leaders of the Army were not only personally involved in the decisions to establish the school but were also personally invested in ensuring that the graduates of the school’s first classes were assigned in accord with the proposed third phase assignment close to general officers in division or corps
The first years of SAMS’ existence was marked by tension between contrasting expectations. Internally, there was the tension of establishing the independence of the school and the retention of the iconoclastic spirit that led the first classes to believe that they were a part of “a cabal plotting major changes in the way the Army operated.” The period was marked by establishing the method of student selection for AMSP, the refinement of the Fellows’ curriculum and how the Fellows would be received by the Army, as well as when and how to integrate officers from other services into AMSP. The highlight, though not viewed so at the time, was the change in the name of the program from department to School. Sinnreich, wrote in his end of tour report that the cost of SAMS was less than the cost of one M1 tank, but the return on the investment was great and the Army benefited from the education and ability the graduates brought with them to the field Army.

There were indications as well of internal tension between the greater Staff College faculty and administration and SAMS. By and large these tensions were not unusual as all bureaucracies have a degree of tension. For example, SAMS was reaching a peak of popularity as LTG Holder, the third director recalled. The SAMS faculty and director arranged for different speakers to come into SAMS as they fit into the SAMS curriculum. These speakers did not ordinarily speak at the larger Staff College. At the time SAMS was housed in

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216 The preceding paragraphs and quotation were drawn from a telephonic interview with LTG (ret) Palmer and the author on 3 August 2009.
217 Drawn from a conversation with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot, member of the second class in AMSP and the sixth director of SAMS, 14JAN09.
Flint Hall, a small renovated former cavalry stables. The combined seminar room, as it was called, could barely accommodate the guest speaker and the population of SAMS thus CGSC faculty were not invited to attend these lectures. The reason was a lack of space but the exclusion bred a feeling of antipathy. Given the special relationship SAMS enjoyed with senior Army leaders it was easy for the CGSC faculty to presume aloofness on the part of SAMS. This imagined slight and other tension were a part of the growing pains of an institution within a larger institution. The first test of the graduates and the source of the external tension was the expectation of greatly improved performance of divisions and corps when the graduates of SAMS arrived on those staffs.\textsuperscript{219}

External tensions came in the form of where to place the graduates of the school on division and corps staffs, how to overcome the Army’s disposition against perceived and real “elites,” and, most importantly, how would this experiment in retaining officers for a second year of schooling when the Army felt it needed more doers than thinkers, would fare as these officers joined the staffs of divisions and corps. The senior leader advocates of the concept of SAMS had very high expectations of the graduates. The dictum of Moltke the Elder to “be more than you appear to be” was a guiding principle for the first graduates of SAMS, as well as Wass de Czege’s more practically focused advice to “max the PT test and get your hands dirty in the motor pool. You will succeed if you do those things and heed the motto of the German general staff to ‘be more than you appear to be…,” before the graduates could talk about new doctrine and the

\footnote{219 Based on an electronic mail exchange between the author and LTG (ret) Holder on 14MAY2010.}
theory than formed the supporting structure of the doctrine. The good news for
the Army was, in Wass de Czege’s words, “The new manual was followed almost
immediately by the disciples and translators of the manual…” SAMS played a
pivotal role in seeing that transformation occur.

The unofficial SAMS’ policy of earning one’s spurs on the staff or going
through “prop blast” was practical in an Army that was measuring success at the
tactical level through performance at the National Training Center. Even though
the small portions of the Army had been tested in combat in Grenada SAMS
graduates had not yet demonstrated their worth, and the worth of a second year
of advanced military education, in facing the real purpose of the Army--which was
to win the nation’s wars. This first test came in the summer and fall of 1989,
during an operation called “Just Cause” in the tiny nation of Panama.

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220 Both quotations from Wass de Czege interview, 14JAN09.
Chapter Five

The First Test
Panama and Operation Just Cause

The Army’s new doctrine, AirLand Battle and the graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies were tested in battle in late 1989. Using the tenets of AirLand Battle, agility, initiative, depth and synchronization, this chapter will examine the influence of the doctrine and how it was used by graduates of the school to adjust plans to tactical realities and link tactical actions to operational objectives.

In late October, 1989, the principal commanders of the potential U.S. invasion of Panama; Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, designated commander of the Joint Task Force, Major General Gary Luck, commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and Brigadier General William Hartzog, Operations officer, J-3, of Southern Command flew to Washington to brief the mission Operations Order, OPORD, 1-90 to General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, Joint Staff Operations officer, J3, gathered in the Pentagon. Loaded down with charts and graphs, and, even more important, superbly prepared after months of total focus in the planning effort, Hartzog knocked the ball out of the park. General Kelly later called Hartzog’s presentation as one of the best operations briefings he had ever heard. The work of LTG Stiner’s XVIII Airborne Corps planners had paid off. General Powell left the presentation convinced that the plan allowed for agility, adaptability and, barring an
unforeseen accelerating event in the near future, also allowed ample time for
rehearsals. General Powell especially liked the emphasis on using enough force
to overwhelm the Panamanian Defense Force in the shortest time possible. On 3
November, General Hartzog briefed the plan in “The Tank” to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. They agreed to it as written.221

Stiner, as the joint task force commander, established the conditions for
his subordinate commanders to exercise initiative by a series of rehearsals and
ground reconnaissance missions in Panama. As well, his plan, written by SAMS
graduates, took advantage of the distance between military bases in the United
States and Panama to expand the area available for U.S. forces to maneuver
beyond the ability of the Panamanians to observe. Stiner, as will be seen, used
U.S. bases to stage his forces for the invasion, a depth beyond the
Panamanians’ ability to monitor.

Before 1990, the common experience of battalion commanders had been
a training exercise at one of the Army’s combat training centers. The combat
training centers were designed to simulate high-intensity modern warfare. This
“close to war” experience was the most intensive tactical training the Army
offered. Battalion commanders faced a live opponent who knew the terrain of the
battle area. Both sides were equipped with laser devices that simulated the
direct fire weapons, rifles, machine guns, tank cannons, etc., used by U.S. and
Soviet equipped forces. The battalion commander had to develop and execute a
series of plans and orders and adjust them to the realities of fighting against an

221 Ronald H. Cole, OPERATION JUST CAUSE The Planning and Execution of Joint
intelligent and flexible opponent. Specially selected teams of officers and non-commissioned officers served as observers and controllers. These soldiers controlled the battles to ensure a level of safety. They also observed the planning and execution cycles within a battalion and ran the after action review conducted after each battle with the opposing force. The system of after-action reviews, during which observers dissected every mistake, was brutal but contributed to an increased understanding of the realities of warfare. Battalion commanders who won battles at the combat training centers could walk with a swagger. This changed in 1989 when the Army went to war. This war was also the first real conflict for the fourteen graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies assigned to the forces involved in the operation, many of whom played important roles in the Panama intervention, Operation Just Cause in 1989.

The SAMS curricula prior to the start of focused planning for Operation Just Cause remained basically the same as outlined from the beginning of the school’s existence. The extant doctrinal centerpiece was Field Manual 100-5, 1986. The development of this field manual was very much a result of the discourse within SAMS during the tenure of COL Rick Sinnreich, the second director. As previously discussed, Sinnreich recalled that he and then LTC Don Holder were not so much influencing SAMS with the doctrine but taking advantage of the discussions about the theory and history of war that took place during the conduct of the AMSP seminar to refine concepts that then went into the field manual. The scope of the discourse within the seminars reflected this
The broad focus of each program within the school was: tactical to operational - AMSP, and operational to strategic - AOSF. In the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) within the School of Advanced Military Studies, tactics instruction was specifically focused on battles and engagements. Holder recalled that the level of the tactics block of instruction on which AMSP focused dealt with “the combat operations of corps, divisions, brigades, and that’s about as low as we took it.” Holder did use the operational level of war as a framework, and he found that helped the students and the faculty in distinguishing tactics from operational art. Holder said, “We looked at tactics as that - battles and engagements below the level of major operations in campaigns which is the operational field.”

The Fellows, with their own unique curriculum instituted by Holder, focused at the higher echelons of command, and, as well, prepared themselves to teach the majors in the AMSP seminars.

The focus of the Fellows program came into its own with Holder. Regarding the fellows, he said, “my general guidance to John Mills who was the first Director of the Fellows was to emphasize operational art, cut out the tactics course, and start with a theoretical and historical overview. Essentially they got an advanced version of the operational level instruction that the majors received.”

The fellows were also exposed to visiting lecturers, William S. Lind and Edward Luttwak among others, and were sent on field studies that Army War

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222 Interview conducted by the author with COL (ret) Richard Hart Sinnreich, second director of SAMS on 6 January 2009. Hereafter cited as Sinnreich interview, 6JAN09.
223 Both quotations from an interview conducted by the author with LTG (ret) L. Don Holder, third director of SAMS on 5 December 2008. Hereafter cited as Holder interview 5DEC08.
224 Holder interview, 5DEC08.
College students, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania did not get as a part of that curriculum.

The majors in AMSP and its graduates numbered just over 100 in 1989. These majors and the limited number of SAMS fellows represented the core of the greater officer corps who possessed full knowledge of the doctrine, FM 100-5, and the theoretical underpinnings of that doctrine.

By that time, SAMS was definitely emphasizing the teaching of doctrine. As Holder recalled, “In fact, the school had the charter, which we the early Directors all agreed upon, of teaching the theory, history and the thinking behind doctrine.”225 The students in the school discussed the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, agility, depth, initiative, and synchronization, and how these tenets were developed. Each sub-course in AMSP concluded with an exercise that would reinforce various doctrinal tenets as the majors developed plans and orders for the exercise and then actually play out the war game, either on a terrain board with small lead models of tanks and other armored vehicles or in computer assisted simulations. For example in the early 1980s not many officers had the opportunity to train at the National Training Center therefore SAMS used the Dunn-Kempf war game to give a sense of the size of a brigade combat team in terms of vehicles and space. The use of this war game reinforced the simple fact that movement over distance takes time as well as emphasizing the need to take decisions based on developing conditions and less than perfect information. The Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, supported a division level exercise for SAMS. This computer assisted exercise allowed SAMS students to “see” the

225 Holder interview, 5DEC08.
scope of a division in combat through the use of large computer screens to display the subordinate units of a division operating over distance, European or Korean terrain, and in electronic combat supported by complex algorithms that generated results in terms of combat casualties, ammunition and fuel consumed, and all of the other damage done in combat.

The 1982 version of FM 100-5 described levels of war as strategic, operational, and tactical.226 The 1986 version of AirLand Battle embodied in FM 100-5 refined the definitions of military strategy, operational art, and tactics. A subtle difference in the two manuals was the change from “levels of war” in the 1982 version to the “Structure of Modern Warfare,” in the 1986 version, which also officially introduced the term operational art as the bridge between strategy and tactics. FM 100-5, 1986 defined military strategy, operational art, and tactics as follows:

Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force…Strategy derived from policy must be clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis of all operations.

Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

Tactics is the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.227

The 1986 version of the FM specified that operational art also included the

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“fundamental decisions on when and where to fight,” “whether to accept or
decline battle,” and continuing a theme that was extant throughout the manual
concerning the criticality of identifying the enemy’s center of gravity, calling the
essence of operational art the ability to identify and attack the enemy’s
operational center of gravity. The 1986 manual articulated four basic tenets of
AirLand Battle doctrine. These doctrinal tenets were: Initiative, Agility, Depth,
and Synchronization.

Initiative involved setting or changing the conditions of battle by positive
action on the part of the U.S. force, essentially actions to ensure freedom of
action. Tied to initiative was the tenet of agility. Agility referred to the ability of
U.S. forces to act faster than the enemy on the battlefield and required
commanders to have a continuous “read” of the battlefield to anticipate and
overcome friction, a concept carried over from Clausewitz. The tenet of depth
contained a larger view of the battlefield to the battle space, which is an
extension of operations in space, time and resources. The doctrinal definition
elaborated on the description of depth in terms of space and time, “space to
maneuver, time to plan, arrange and execute, and resources to win.” Finally,
and perhaps the most difficult to execute, was the concept of synchronization.

Synchronization was a hotly debated tenet. Indeed, the first thought was
to use the word “Orchestration” as the tenet. The writers faced amazement

\[\text{\textsuperscript{228}}\] FM 100-5, 1986, p. 10.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{229}}\] Cynics quickly developed the acronym AIDS, a faint attempt at humor and a criticism of
sloganeering a serious topic. Cynicism aside the tenets, as will be shown, were used to frame approaches
to crafting plans.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{230}}\] FM 100-5, 1986, p. 16.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{231}}\] Wass de Czege interview, 12JAN09.
and laughter by those with whom they consulted while trying to define this word in terms Army officers would accept. Thus, the word was discarded. Synchronization was selected, and this word was also difficult to explain to the wider Army. The definition in the manual was, “arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to provide maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.” As a result of the extensive conversations about the choice of words and the nuances the authors were trying to get across, the Fellows and AMSP graduates left Fort Leavenworth with a sophisticated understanding of the nuances of the tenets. Authors and SAMS graduates even came to grips with the difficult term synchronization through lengthy discussions of the theoretical underpinning of the doctrine. Hours discussing the Jominian and Clausewitzian concepts in seminars were about to be tested as the graduates moved out to the Army and joined their units as planners. This translation of doctrine into action was done during operations in Panama.

The principal U.S. Army units involved with the development of the plans and execution of Operation Just Cause were the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light). The corps headquarters formed the nucleus of the Joint Task Force South (JTF) headquarters working for General Max Thurman, the commander of U.S. Southern Command. The planners for the Corps/JTF were LTC Tim McMahon (Director); LTC Charles Bergdorf; MAJ James Delony; MAJ David Hunton; MAJ David M. Rodriguez; MAJ Lloyd Sherfey; and CPT(P) Edward J. Dillenschneider. The lead planner for the 82nd Airborne Division was MAJ William Caldwell and

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232 FM 100-5, p. 17.
the lead planner for the 7th Infantry Division was MAJ Steven Barbero. All of these officers were SAMS graduates.

Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator, declared war on the United States on 15 December 1989. On 16 December in Panama, U.S. Marine Corps 1LT Robert Paz and three other officers were going out for dinner in Panama City when they were stopped at a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) roadblock in the vicinity of La Commandancia, the headquarters of the PDF. The PDF soldiers at the check point attempted to pull the officers out of the car. The American officers feared for their lives and tried to escape. As the Americans sped away in their car, the PDF soldiers began shooting and Paz was killed. A US Navy lieutenant and his wife were nearby and witnessed this shooting. The couple was taken into custody and removed to another building somewhere in town. He was brutally beaten and his wife was threatened sexually. She was put into a leaning position against a wall where she was made to stand until she collapsed on the floor.

The next day, 17 December 1989, two military policemen at Torrijos-Tocumen Airfield were detained by the PDF. They were beaten and their weapons were taken away from them. These incidents, combined with intelligence which indicated that the threat was increasing to American lives there caused President Bush to take the decision to execute the plan for an invasion. The four doctrinal tenets articulated in the 1986 version of FM 100-5 are a useful framework for reviewing Operation Just Cause. These tenets; depth, initiative,

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233 Rodriguez, Caldwell, Barbero and Huntoon are, at the time of this writing, general officers in the U.S. Army; Rodriguez, Huntoon, Caldwell, and Barbero are lieutenant generals.
agility, and synchronization, are evident in the design of the campaign and in the execution.

The opposing sides in this operation had two distinct views of the depth of the battle space involved in Operation Just Cause. The PDF could only focus on the tactical depth it could see, the US forces in Panama, and to a limited extent on what was available on U.S. news reports. Joint Task Force South used the operational depth provided by United States-based forces to extend the operation in space, time and resources.

**Operation Just Cause** (figure 1)\(^{234}\)

Operation Just Cause began during the evening of 19 December 1989. A joint force of over 11,000 Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deployed from

bases across the U.S. (Forts Bragg, Benning, Polk, Hood, Lewis, and Ord) and within Panama to launch Operation Just Cause. XVIII Airborne Corps formed the nucleus of JTF South, which conducted the operational-level forcible entry operation into Panama. The use of the operational depth available to U.S. forces also allowed JTF South the time to synchronize the execution of the campaign.

The JTF capitalized on the capabilities of assigned joint forces by simultaneously attacking throughout the battle space. General Carl W. Stiner, commander of JTF South, described the concept, “[we] go in at night with overwhelming combat power on multiple, simultaneous objectives to force the PDF to surrender very quickly.”

JTF South executed an integrated plan that directed forces against twenty-seven separate objectives throughout Panama at virtually the same time, a prime example of synchronization. Objectives included the locks along the length of the Panama Canal, securing US family housing while striking three key PDF targets in the same area, and the Commandancia, headquarters of the PDF. Stiner said the key was “hitting all objectives [quickly] . . . [to] overcome the enemy’s ability to effectively organize his forces.” The plan attacked all PDF battlefield operating systems, two key systems being command and control (C2) and maneuver.

At H–hour, forward-deployed US forces attacked La Commandancia, the

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235 Taken from a speech given by LTG Carl W. Stiner to the Cincinnati Club, 9 March 1990.
central PDF Command and Control facility. The attack destroyed the PDF C2 with fire. The rapid destruction and disruption of C2 established a fluid situation in which the PDF could not operate effectively. Disruption of the C2 system also crippled the PDF’s ability to maneuver. These simultaneous attacks also denied the PDF the opportunity to maneuver without interference.

Battalion 2000, an elite PDF unit, was based at Fort Cimarron. The battalion had to cross a bridge over the Pacora River to reinforce the PDF in Panama City or counterattack the JTF airhead at Torrijos/Tocumen airfield. Army special operations forces (SOF), supported by AC–130 gunships, secured the Pacora river bridge prior to any PDF movement, blocking potential reinforcements.

The PDF also had two companies based at Rio Hato, within reinforcing distance of the PDF forces in Panama City. Preceded by F–117 air strikes, Army Rangers attacked these two PDF companies at Rio Hato. Because of these and other attacks on its units, the PDF could not maneuver its forces to mount effective counterattacks against the JTF.

Just Cause was a coup de main, an operation that achieved strategic, operational and tactical objectives in a single operation. The overwhelming success of the JTF attack against key PDF strong points required a combination of infiltration by SOF, attacks by conventional units already in Panama and forcible entry by both Rangers and the 82d Airborne Division. These operations were also coordinated with the actions of the forward deployed forces of US Southern Command—the 193d Separate Infantry Brigade and elements of the 7th
Infantry Division (Light) and 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), along with a small contingent of Marines. Mission orders, combined with decentralized execution contributed to the success of the operation. Setting the conditions for initiative required coordination among commanders and planners at the JTF and division level.

The process of communicating the plan down to the major subordinate commanders depends upon the basis of confidence between the commanders in any military operation. The senior commander may describe to subordinate commanders the overall joint operating area, their areas of operation within the larger joint area and how they are mutually supporting or not, what their objectives are, and give the subordinate commanders maximum independence at developing their supporting major operations plans. If there is not enough time to do this, or the commanders are unfamiliar with each other the senior commander may be more directive and suggest to his subordinate commanders the methods he prefers them to use to assault selected key objectives. LTG Stiner had sufficient time to take the first path and gave his subordinate commanders broad latitude to develop their plans and execute operations.

For the crucial initial assault, Stiner assigned objectives to his subordinate commanders, gave them areas of responsibility and then, “told them to develop a plan and brief me back on it. And they did that.” For this operation Stiner’s selected method of empowering subordinate commanders worked very well, from his perspective. Stiner said, “It worked great!”

Stiner, his commanders and their planners spent time together on the

ground in Panama prior to the start of the operation. From August to November of 1989, JTF South conducted three iterations of these planning excursions in Panama. Traveling in military jets to avoid Panamanian customs but wearing civilian clothes Stiner took his commanders with him and they briefed each other on the respective plans. During these visits they were able to develop the outlines of their plans as well as present them to the theater commander, General Max Thurman. Stiner said his commanders were, “briefing me and they were briefing GEN Thurman. So we knew each other’s plans.” Stiner and his commanders brought their planners, all graduates of SAMS, with them on these trips. This allowed the briefing sessions to be working sessions as well. When the inevitable “glitches” would arise, the effect of Clausewitzian friction, the planners would develop solutions to these problems on site. This luxury of advance reconnaissance and on the ground planning sessions with the captured audience of planners and commanders ensured widespread common understanding of the plan and how each subordinate command played a role in the accomplishment of the overall mission.238

By stressing meticulous planning, Stiner set the conditions for the exercise of initiative in Operation Just Cause. This effort paid off during the execution of the multiple attacks, as in all operations and in warfare in general, engagements are executed in the realm of chance. The XVIII Abn Corps operations officer, then Colonel (promotable) Thomas Needham said, “A corps is a big outfit, JTF is a big outfit, and you never know who puts out what, and how it gets out or doesn’t get out because you’d be relying on a lot of people or ... we’re all human,

238 JCT 024, p. 14.
and I tell Major X something and he tells somebody else and it gets mistranslated…” This is the professional acceptance that in warfare even the simplest thing is difficult to accomplish. Developing a series of plans with the tenets of AirLand Battle in mind empowered commanders to overcome friction and seize advantages when they arose.

The plan for Operation Just Cause, given the operational depth and multiplicity of units involved, was complex. There were 27 initial objectives to be simultaneously assaulted and captured on D-Day, the opening day of the operation. The principal operations officer for the operation, COL Thomas Needham, was responsible to the commander, LTG Stiner, to develop methods to overcome this complexity and the friction that was possible in the execution of the plan. COL Needham reported that he was not concerned about this fact.

Recognition of complexity is one step toward resolving the challenges of simultaneously assaulting a number of objectives throughout the battle space. Practice of these tasks during training, even when the training is not directly related to the operation at hand is one method of exposing commanders and staffs to the challenges of synchronization and the expectation that their initiative will overcome obstacles due to friction as they arise. In the case of the XVIII Abn Corps and its subordinate command, the 82nd Airborne Division, circumstances allowed for practice of a parachute assault on multiple objectives over an

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extended battlespace. COL Needham recalled that the Corps “had run an operation March of [19]89, and previous to that November of [19]87 that had multiple targets.” XVIII Abn Corps and its planners, as well as the 82nd Abn and 7th Infantry Divisions and their planners were familiar with the coordination required to execute a complex operation at great depth, how to synchronize actions within complexity, insofar as actions in war can be synchronized. The SAMS curricula stressed the theoretical underpinning of doctrine so SAMS graduates knew about friction, the fog of war, and simple things being difficult to execute in war both in a classroom perspective and from the actual execution of operations in exercises. The exercises that preceded Operation Just Cause gave everyone a feel for the scope of operations in depth, operations with multiple objectives and targets.

COL Needham, along with his planners and operations staff, realized that this was no exercise and there were a great deal of targets to seize on D-Day. Needham knew that he had four subordinate task forces; Atlantic, Bayonet, Semper Fidelis and 82nd, as well as a Joint Special Operations Task Force working in accord with the Joint Task Force South campaign plan. Needham recalled, “I mean, we had the subordinate headquarters to execute. It wasn't like we at the JTF were taking down all these targets simultaneously. We had subordinate headquarters that had the responsibility of executing the missions.” LTG Stiner got across to planners and the combat units his personal war-fighting philosophy of using overwhelming combat power, fighting at night to take

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240 JCIT 027, p. 3.
241 JCIT 027, p. 3.
advantage of the technology available to his forces, and striking in a
synchronized manner to completely disrupt his opponent’s ability to command
and control his forces. This tendency to swift and synchronized operations was
also evident in the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Abn Division.

The 82\textsuperscript{nd} Abn Division planning staff and commanders developed an
equally complex and challenging plan of operations. On D-Day the division
emplaned at Fort Bragg/Pope Air Force base in North Carolina, executed a
combat parachute assault, and a link-up operation with Army Rangers, under fire
and at night. This first day of operations was followed by the execution of three
separate helicopter assaults over a period of a few days. This was in the plan,
and the plan was developed mindful that events in combat rarely unfold exactly
according to plan. All SAMS graduates knew the dictum of Moltke the Elder, a
Prussian General Staff officer, that no plan can look with certainty beyond initial
contact with the enemy main body. The development of the plans within the 82\textsuperscript{nd}
Abn Division certainly had this dictum in mind.

The 82\textsuperscript{nd} Abn Division, under command of Major General James Johnson,
used established procedures to develop its plan for the initial invasion and
forcible entry. Called the “backward planning process,” the first step in
conceptualizing the assault was to view the ground tactical plan which then led to
the development of the plan to establish the actual airhead formed by the initial
parachute assault.\textsuperscript{242} Johnson summed up this approach as follows: “that's the

\textsuperscript{242} The airhead encompasses the area required to land Soldiers and equipment by parachute. A
combat parachute assault is executed with Soldiers parachuting at 800 feet or less above the ground. The
purpose of the parachute assault is to put a large number of troops on the ground as rapidly as possible and
as close together as possible. This allows parachute units to assemble swiftly and move into their attack
way we dropped our soldiers and that's the way we dropped our equipment, to put the equipment and the people so that troops could be assembled and quickly moved to pickup zones on the taxiway to the west of the main runway at Torrijos.\(^{243}\)

The synchronization of the 82\(^{nd}\) Abn Division’s plan was apparent in the sequencing of parachute drops of equipment and assaults by paratroopers. The division’s paratroopers landed to the east of the airport runways with the equipment dropping to the west. Troops would conduct a ground movement to contact, and open up a main supply route [MSR] to the divisional objective areas. Division level tactical synchronization included attention to the detail of the positioning and cross-loading of equipment in the heavy equipment parachute drops so the paratroopers could quickly “de-rig” the heavy equipment then put it into operation so that the division could move the equipment off the runway. This attention to detail also assisted in setting conditions for agility for divisional units.

Agility was evident when one examines the division’s ground tactical plan. To establish the conditions for the movement of the division’s paratroopers the divisional planners coordinated the initial airhead linkup with the Rangers that preceded the parachute assault of the 82\(^{nd}\) Abn. The coordinated link up facilitated a very dangerous maneuver, called a forward passage of lines while in positions. The essence of backward planning is beginning at the final objective and thinking through what it takes to get to this final objective, identifying the steps required along the way as well as required supplies, evacuation and care of wounded, etc.

contact. The parachute assaults were conducted at night to take advantage of the technological advantage U.S. troops held over the PDF, widespread night vision devices. The divisional plan called for a link up then the Rangers escorting 82nd Abn paratroopers through the airhead the Rangers had established. Once through the passage lane, the division would be on the main highway leading into Panama City and the Panama Viejo/Tinajitas area, San Miguelito. Divisional planners did the necessary coordination and liaison with Rangers in advance of D-Day to help facilitate the rapid movement of the ground convoys.\textsuperscript{244}

General Johnson, his key commanders, and staff planners also took advantage of the XVIII Abn Corps sponsored planning trips to Panama. Central to the execution of the 82nd Abn Division’s plan in support of JTF SOUTH was a series of helicopter assaults following the parachute assault and establishment of the airhead. In addition to the ground tactical plan the division staff and aviation brigade staff conducted air mission planning at Fort Bragg and then refined these plans on the ground in Panama during the planning trips.

The division planner, MAJ William Caldwell, took advantage of the opportunity to see the ground in advance of battle and was able to focus on flight routes for the helicopter assaults from the airhead to the objective, how many lifts would be required to take the number of paratroopers required for each objective and the number of aircraft required for each helicopter assault.

Further complicating the plan for these helicopter assaults was the fact that there would be a number of landing zones near each objective and that these helicopter assaults would be done at night. The division planners and the

\textsuperscript{244} These paragraphs drawn from JCIT 026, pp. 2-6.
air mission commanders who were based in Panama went into great detail on this planning effort. The air mission commander and the aviation battalion commander also made a trip to Fort Bragg during a divisional Battle Command training Program (BCTP) exercise held just prior to the execution of Operation Just Cause. This deep familiarity with the concept of the operation enabled the Panama based aviation units to conduct rehearsals of the operation before D-Day.\(^{245}\) Rehearsals in Panama and at Fort Bragg, among other places, established conditions for agility, which is the ability of friendly forces to act more swiftly than the enemy, and also to overcome the elements.

On the evening of 19 December 1989 the weather was deteriorating rapidly. A cold front with sleet and rain closed in on Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force base. The paratroopers were dressed for the cold and wet weather and loading aircraft headed into the 90-degree temperatures in Panama. Agility, the tenet of AirLand Battle depended upon the physical fitness of the paratroops. Physically fit Soldiers can adjust to any kind of environment. Regarding this event, MG Johnson said, “It takes a physically fit man or woman, I think, to be able to make that kind of adjustment. And even so, it’s tough. It’s going to take you two or three days once you’re down there.”\(^{246}\) Once on board the aircraft, the paratroops removed their cold weather clothing. The aircraft had heat on board allowing the troops to dry out. The cold caused more problems for the loading and air flow.

The cold weather and sleet did not happen until after the heavy out-load,

\(^{245}\) Drawn from JCIT 026, pp. 2-3.
\(^{246}\) Drawn from JCIT 026, pp. 12-14.
the loading of equipment onto the assault aircraft. That part of the plan went very well, along with the movement of those aircraft to Charleston. The freezing rain and sleet would cause problems for the air flow from Fort Bragg to Panama. The aircraft had icing problems on their wings at about the time the paratroopers were loading the personnel aircraft. The de-icing process would cause a problem with the flow of the assault aircraft carrying the troops to Panama.

The aircraft carrying the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Abn Division’s paratroopers left Pope Air Force base in formations of threes. MG Johnson was in the lead aircraft. Once his plane was aloft, the USAF air mission commander who was also on his aircraft told him about the icing problem. Johnson told the mission commander he wanted to get the maximum number of planes off the ground in order to keep the operation on track as closely as possible to the plan, which called for simultaneous assaults. The initial lift of eight or ten aircraft took off with others, as Johnson recalled, “ Came in increments of six or eight, five or six at a time, as they could get airborne and catch up.”\textsuperscript{247}

War is conducted in the realm of chance, one of the factors that must be considered when developing a plan that depending on synchronization over time and distance. The Air Force did everything it possibly could to de-ice the planes of the assault echelon. Pope Air Force base started with four de-icing trucks and ended up with six to ten trucks. All were in use during the loading stage of preparing for the flight to Panama.

The operational planners, both Army and Air Force worked around the clock to deal with the effect that the freezing rain and subsequent icing problem

\textsuperscript{247} JCIT 026, pp. 12-13.
could have on the execution of the plan. Air planners and operators were also
drawing on other Air Force bases and the civil airport for de-icing trucks.
Johnson said that he had “nothing but the highest respect for Military Airlift
Command and those that were involved in the out-load of us from here, both the
heavy equipment and the personnel aircraft.”

The intervention of chance, in the form of the icing problem faced by the
task force challenged the agility of the force as well as the attempted
synchronization of the initial assault. In accord with the tradition of the airborne
and 82nd Airborne Division operating procedure the first aircraft off the ground
had the assault brigade and battalion commanders Johnson, the USAF air
mission commander and the assault brigade leadership could communicate while
aloft through the aircraft radio systems. Johnson could also speak with the JTF
commander, Stiner. The combination of tradition and operating policy ensured
that the assault phase could begin when scheduled. Johnson was able to talk to
the commanders and make in flight adjustments to the plan. The advantage of
rehearsal, on ground reconnaissance and high quality training enabled the plan
to continue. Johnson knew he had the leadership in the air thus he had what
was necessary to get on the ground and begin to build combat power, establish
the airhead and accomplish the division’s mission. Johnson, his commanders
and his planning staff, crafted a simple plan that established conditions for agility
and initiative that could be accomplished in the face of the intervention of chance.
Johnson said he was, “very confident that we had what it took to get the job

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248 JCIT 026, p. 12.
done, even though it may be done incrementally instead of simultaneously.”

The development of a simple plan that was rehearsed extensively and war-gamed thoroughly allowed execution with staggered parachute assaults instead of the planned air drop from a single air column of twenty C-141s. Continuous in-flight communication allowed the commanders to coordinate the assault and determine whether or not to execute on time or continue the assault. Once Johnson realized that the air flow was going to be a staggered into the operations area he spoke with the joint task force commander, Stiner, who was on the ground in Panama. Johnson preferred to drop the entire force which would entail a delay in the assault. He knew it was possible to conduct the assault incrementally; dropping paratroopers when the aircraft arrived. Johnson told Stiner that he did not want to execute the assault incrementally if it was possible to wait until all aircraft were assembled for a simultaneous assault.

The guidance Johnson received from Stiner was short and to the point. Stiner told Johnson to go with what he had. Stiner trusted in the ability of his forces to act faster than the PDF could react. The advantage in agility would outweigh any risk associated with smaller forces executing operations, at least at first. The 82\textsuperscript{nd}’s assault was only one part of the overall assault in Panama. Johnson did not know that Stiner determined that the execution of the plan might have been compromised thus speed was required. Johnson preferred to delay so he could put his whole force on the ground at the same time, but this was not an option. The entire operation had already begun.\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{249} JCIT 026, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{250} JCIT 026, pp. 14-15.
The success of Just Cause offers a vision of future battles. The face of battle continues to change with new technologies, the interest and influence of the mass media, and the sheer destructive power found in today’s military organizations. Political realities, including public expectations for quick wins with minimum casualties, underscore the emphasis placed on depth and Synchronization. In this light, FM 100-5 further refines these concepts.

Depth, a tenet of Army operations, is defined in FM 100-5 as the “extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose.” Operations, in terms of depth, require the commander and staff to anticipate enemy actions so the enemy can be attacked throughout the depth of the battle space. The battle space of a unit is greater than its area of operations. The area of operations is a geographic area assigned to a commander. Battle space, a term essential to understanding depth, is defined as “a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy.”

Simultaneous attack, which takes place within the battle space, is a companion concept of depth. It is defined as “concurrent application of combat power throughout the depth of the battlefield.” Simultaneous attack of enemy formations or critical points throughout the battle space will cause the enemy to lose the coherence of his attack or defense. The goal of simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the battle space is the establishment of a fluid situation in which the enemy’s attack or defense breaks down under constant and unexpected attack from every side.\(^{251}\)

Richard Lock-Pullan, writing in 2006, raised the point that the planning and

\(^{251}\) Drawn from Shelton, pp. 57-59.
execution of Operation Just Cause focused solely on the tactical task of
defeating the Panamanian Defense Forces and capturing Noriega without taking
a longer view on what Panama would look like in the aftermath of the fighting.
This argument is somewhat revisionist (possibly reflecting concerns about Iraq
fifteen years later), because at the time there were plans in place for post-hostility
operations that were executed by U.S. Army South and the 7th Infantry Division.
An alternative case could be made that the best educated planners, the SAMS
graduates, were focused on the perceived most difficult tasks, namely the
execution of operations launched from multiple bases across distance to seize
multiple objectives in a synchronized operation. LTG William Caldwell, then a
major and lead planner for the 82nd Abn Division, said of transition to post-
hostility operations, “We did not consider recovery, it was not our job.” When
the major combat units were withdrawn, the remaining headquarters, U.S. Army
SOUTH which developed the post-hostility plan, BLIND LOGIC was unable to
adjust as rapidly to the ever changing conditions on the ground. U.S. Army
SOUTH did not have any SAMS graduates assigned.

Lieutenant General Carmen Cavezza, then a major general commanding
the 7th Infantry Division assumed command of JTF Panama when LTG Stiner
and the XVIII Abn Corps left the country. He recalled feeling that he was at a
disadvantage in Panama because he did not speak Spanish and thus he was,
“not communicating directly with Herrera, who was running the police, and with
the other officials.” Cavezza spoke through Major General Mark Cisneros,

252 Interview of LTG William Caldwell by the author, 27 April 2009, at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
253 Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq,
commander of U.S. Army South, a native Spanish speaker. Cisneros was also stationed in Panama and knew the major players in the region and in the country, and they knew him which was equally important. Cavezza felt that the theater commander should have made Cisneros the JTF commander, but that was moot. While Cisneros was a commander in the region he did not have a large staff. This is what the 7th Division could add to the conduct of operations, as well as three infantry brigades. This likely caused some problems that affected the transition of operations from combat to post-hostilities. LTG Stiner brought the fully manned XVIII Abn Corps staff with him and took over the running of operations in country. When LTG Stiner and the corps staff left country there were many difficulties U.S. Army SOUTH and the 7th Infantry Division had to face. As Cavezza recalled, “Stiner came down with his staff, he brought a lot of people in and virtually took over the whole organization. Then when he left, they left with him, and boom, there are all kinds of voids.” This staff integration did work, though, and the 7th Division was able to complete the operation in Panama.

Cavezza and the 7th Infantry Division spent more time on the ground in Panama than the rest of the task force. Cavezza and his staff, (MAJ Mike Barbero was his SAMS planner) wrestled with the difficulties of transitioning from combat operations to post-hostility operations. In his interview at the end of the operation, Cavezza said that he believed that the next iteration of FM 100-5

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should give more thought to the planning and conduct of post-combat operations. Cavezza said, “I don’t think we can stop our manuals at combat operations, because even the tactical units are going to continue to be involved after that.” Cavezza believed that the Army needed to talk more about the challenges of low-intensity conflict, (LIC), the term in doctrine at the time. FM 100-5, 1986 briefly mentioned the challenges of low intensity conflict as one of the challenges the Army would face, saying that “Leaders at all levels must develop a broad view of…conflict…”²⁵⁵ Based on his experience in Panama Cavezza felt that the Army needed to think more about these challenges and that it should be a part of the doctrine. Cavezza knew that, once the challenges of LIC became a part of doctrine, “the force structure will be developed to support that part. I think that’s been a weakness, but I think we’re getting a handle on it.”²⁵⁶

LTG, then MAJ, David Huntoon was one of the planners on the XVIII Abn Corps staff. A mechanized infantryman, he was serving his first airborne assignment at a momentous time. He was also in a unique position to see the power of the SAMS network of graduates respond to the pressures of planning for combat. In a speech at the 25th anniversary celebration of SAMS he said that during both campaigns the SAMS networks across all services contributed significantly to the success of those campaigns. Huntoon went on to say that the shared cultural bias, familiarity with language and doctrine of operational art, and most importantly of all the relationships that graduates built in their seminars, on exercises and trips proved to be a powerful addition to the planning and

²⁵⁵ FM 100-5, 1986, p. 5.
²⁵⁶ JCIT 097Z, p. 6-7.
execution of these campaigns. He said that this point came most vividly to mind on the night after the Ranger Regiment and the 82d Abn Division jumped into Torrijos-Tocumen Airport in Panama City. The circumstances were interesting for, as he said, he was flying in a Blackhawk helicopter from the XVIII Abn Corps tactical operations center or TOC to the 82d Abn Division’s tactical command post, TAC. He was to meet with then Major Caldwell about establishing new operating boundaries between the subordinate commands. SAMS graduates had worked on the Operation Just Cause campaign plan for many months paying great attention to detail, overseeing full scale rehearsals, and the requisite synchronization of and collaboration with all services and special operations forces. Huntoon said:

That planning was SAMS centric, and reflected the very essence of this program in its scope, vision, end state, and mostly importantly, in the exceptional quality of its graduates. And as I looked out on that dark night at the millions of lights in Panama City with the fires still burning in the Comandancia and near the airport, I thought about this coup de main executed for the right reasons, with maximum force and minimal loss.\(^{257}\)

The short campaign in Panama came to a successful conclusion. The lessons learned teams descended on Fort Bragg and Fort Ord to try to codify what went well and where the Army needed to improve. The new doctrine and the planners from the new school in the Army had done well. The extra year of schooling had paid off in the form of plans that embodied the tenets of AirLand Battle. Rehearsals and war-gaming played a significant role in establishing conditions for the exercise of initiative and agility. The depth provided by the use

\(^{257}\) Drawn from a transcript of the key note speech given by LTG David Huntoon on 20 May 2009 at the Commanding General’s reception for the 25th anniversary of the School of Advanced Military Studies.
of bases within the continental United States, as well as bases within Panama, extended the operation in distance, time and resources. This depth also allowed for the adaptation of the plan when friction and chance entered the execution phase of the plan in the form of the icing problem at Pope Air Force base. All of these tenets allowed for a synchronized plan to be executed relatively smoothly. The XVIII Abn Corps/JTF SOUTH conducted a synchronized assault at night, over multiple objectives, and overwhelmed the enemy forces in the theater of operations. While the “lesson learned” effort was going on in the United States, the Army in Europe was planning on a reduction in force. Everything pointed to the fact that the Congress and the American people expected a “Peace Dividend” from the end of the Cold War. The great Soviet armies were withdrawing to Russian soil. The Germans were asking why so many Americans were needed in their country now that the Berlin Wall was down and the entire German nation was reestablished. It was an interesting time in the Army.

The last of the storied REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany Exercises) was conducted in Germany January, 1990. These maneuvers were now an anachronism as the thrust of planning was how to return forces to the United States, units as well as their families, pets, and household goods to posts in the United States. A great number of U.S. Army units in Europe were preparing to fold their colors and return their tanks, armored vehicles, and trucks to the United States. SAMS continued to educate selected Army officers in the theoretical concepts behind the approved doctrine.

One may assert that the School of Advanced Military Studies was not in
static mode at this time. It did not indulge in self-congratulation. The staff, faculty and students were engaged in reading after-action reports generated by Just Cause and thinking through the Implications of these reports for the curricula of SAMS. In an end of course survey done by the AMSP class of 1988-89, containing some of the officers who planned Operation Just Cause, and containing faculty thoughts on the results in light of the operation in Panama, student officers and faculty concluded that “LIC [low intensity conflict] needed more emphasis,” and that the course needed “more joint participation.” The survey, published in July, 1990, reflected similar concerns of previous classes over the perception of elitism and intellectual superiority others would harbor towards SAMS graduates, but tellingly also raised concerns about the meaning of the full spectrum of warfare. The faculty noted that while the XVIII Abn Corps and 82nd Abn Division departed Panama rather quickly after the end of hostilities the 7th Infantry Division and U.S. Army South were left to execute plans for the recovery, to a limited extent, of Panama.258

With Just Cause the Army and SAMS faced a test of battle and the new Army doctrine. This new group of highly educated planners appeared to have passed the examination of their qualifications with flying colors. The Army turned back to preparing for war and the routine of the peacetime Army. Training schedules were revised and field exercises and tank gunnery exercises were

258 School of Advanced Military Studies, End of Course Survey AY 88-89, dated 27 July 1990, written by LTC Harold R. Winton, Ph.D., Deputy Director. This survey, with five enclosures, contained an executive summary of findings, statistical analysis, and officer student hand written comments. Margin notes, author(s) unknown indicated faculty consideration of lessons learned from Panama and informal reports from recent graduates who participated in the operation. The report was not paginated. It is held in the SAMS files, School of Advanced Military Studies.
scheduled. On the other side of the world an American officer went to sleep in the Sheraton Hotel in Kuwait City. While he slept his world and the focus of the Army changed. He wrote, “I awoke to gunfire at about 4:15 on the morning of 2 August 1990...That sounds like shooting…I wonder who could be shooting at this time of the morn-Shooting! Oh shit!” The next test of SAMS and the Army was about to take place in the deserts stretching away from the Persian Gulf.

Chapter Six

The Arrival of “The Jedi”
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

While small in number the graduates of SAMS did play an effective role in the planning for the invasion of Panama. They incorporated the latest Army doctrine into the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause. The 14 SAMS graduates who participated in the Panama operation set a very high standard of performance for the other graduates around the Army. In the summer of 1990 there were some 203 total graduates of the program; from the Advanced Military Studies Program and the Fellowship. The graduates ability to apply and adapt doctrine and turn doctrine into action would be tested in the coming months of 1990 and 1991.

Any hope for a return to what passed for “normality” at the end of the Cold War and the conclusion of “Operation Just Cause” was shattered in late July, 1990. The Iraqi regular Army and Republican Guard invaded the Emirate of Kuwait in a lightning attack. The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, declared that Kuwait was now an eternal part of Iraq, its nineteenth province. For SAMS faculty and students, there was little time to consider lessons learned from Operation Just Cause, as the stunning and unexpected immediacy of the invasion captured the focus of the Department of Defense and the Army. What since has become known as the First Gulf War proved to be a much larger war and provided a stern test for both the U.S. Army in general and graduates of SAMS in particular. During this war SAMS graduates would serve at all levels of
war and echelons of command from the strategic, U.S. Central Command, operational, Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Command, through the tactical, both Army corps (XVIII Abn and VII) and all Army divisions. What follows treats with this second combat test of graduates of the school--Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991--and how well they incorporated the doctrinal tenets of FM 100-5, 1986 into the plans and orders they drafted. The test began in August 1990.

General Schwarzkopf’s headquarters received a small team of SAMS-educated officers in mid-August 1990. Schwarzkopf was not satisfied with the planning effort in his headquarters. Schwarzkopf felt that he and his staff were “stumped” and could see no imaginative way to stretch the forces at hand into a winning offensive. Consequently he asked the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis Reimer for augmentation of his planning staff. Reimer directed that a team of officers, educated at SAMS, be sent to Riyadh to assist Schwarzkopf. The task they received from Schwarzkopf was highly classified and access to these men was tightly controlled, as well as the access these planners had to other sources of information. Posing as a team from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas studying desert warfare, this team developed the basis for the final plans to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.

The emphasis on secrecy stemmed from the fact that the President, George H.W. Bush, and his National Security Council, were establishing the

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260 The U.S. Army divisions involved in Operation Desert Storm were: 1st Infantry, 24th Infantry, 82nd Abn, 101st Abn (air assault), 1st Armored, 1st Cavalry, and 3rd Armored. The 1st and 24th Infantry Divisions were mechanized formations. The 1st Cavalry Division was an armored division.

international and national political conditions for an offensive. War is an extension of policy by other means, but the conditions for that policy were not in place. Planning for the offensive was kept top secret for these reasons.

The team consisted of Colonel Joe Purvis and Majors Greg Eckert, Bill Pennypacker, and Dan Roh. Purvis and Eckert were Armor officers, Pennypacker an infantryman, and Roh was a logistician.

Colonel Joe Purvis was assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii following his graduation from the Fellowship at SAMS in 1989. Earlier in his career, Purvis served in Vietnam as a helicopter pilot and then served as an Armor officer. He had staff experience at the division level and had commanded a cavalry squadron. Prior to assignment as a SAMS Fellow, he spent a year as the executive officer to the LTG Robert Riscassi, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. Thus, he possessed substantial experience dealing with senior officers and a background in armored warfare. He arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in late August, 1990. When Purvis reported for duty at Schwarzkopf’s headquarters, he did not know any of the other SAMS graduates who would serve under his direction.

Major Greg Eckert, who graduated from SAMS in 1986, was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division at the time the call came to report to Riyadh. Already selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel and for command of a tank battalion in the 4th Division, he was serving as the division G3 Training officer and was also informally acting as the division G3, operations officer. Eckert recalled learning of his impending assignment to Central Command in late August, 1990.
Eckert was meeting with MG Neal Jaco, his division commander to review the results of brigade training meetings and to receive the commander’s training guidance when the Jaco’s private phone rang. A general officer from the Army Personnel Center was calling. After a brief conversation, Jaco “looked at me and said, ‘Is there any reason you can’t be in Riyadh in about a week in CENTCOM HQs.’” He did not tell me anything more (of course we were all aware of what had just happened in Kuwait). I told him, no, as far as I’m concerned [and] two weeks later there I was and met Joe Purvis then for the first time.”

Following his graduation from SAMS in 1988 Major William Pennypacker was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley. This was his phase III assignment, the apprentice year working on a division staff and learning how a division commander takes decisions. Because of this pattern of assignments he had recent experience at the tactical level, from division through battalion. Pennypacker served as a division planner and then a battalion S3 and a brigade executive officer. Pennypacker was excited about going to Saudi Arabia, but he said that, ultimately, “It cost me a CIB and a 1st Infantry Division combat patch.”

Major Dan Roh was a logistician and at the time was assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. After graduation from SAMS in 1988, Roh served as a division planner in the 8th Infantry Division and then served in a series of logistics assignments within the division. When he was called for reassignment he was serving as the Division Support Command’s executive officer.

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262 Personal electronic mail, dated 20 March 2009 from Eckert to the author.
263 Personal e-mail, 20 March 09 from COL (ret) Bill Pennypacker to the author. A CIB or Combat Infantryman’s Badge is awarded to Infantry Soldiers who served in direct combat with an enemy force. It is the ultimate outward device that an Infantryman has been to war, thus it is highly prized. This is not careerism on Pennypacker’s part merely an expression of his desire to serve in direct combat.
The team also included a British officer, Brigadier Tim Sullivan. Sullivan wore U.S. desert camouflage uniforms in an attempt to avoid coalition concerns about favored treatment of the British. There was concern that the Arab members of the coalition, Syria in particular, would object to offensive operations. Schwarzkopf did not want to upset other western allies either. The British recognized that the SAMS cell was going to plan the counter-offensive and wanted to be a part of the effort. Schwarzkopf accepted this help to his plans team because Sullivan, attuned to coalition sensitivities on equal treatment, wore a U.S. uniform to blend in to Schwarzkopf’s headquarters. Sullivan was a true asset to the team, as Purvis recalled, and provided the team with information about British forces and capabilities because the team was not allowed to openly ask questions that would lead to the conclusion that offensive planning was ongoing. Every officer in this group was very experienced at the division level of planning and operations and this experience coupled with the SAMS education and understanding of FM 100-5 was powerful.

The four man team, led by COL Purvis, was sequestered from the CENTCOM staff and put to work planning the campaign that would eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. Schwarzkopf kept this team separate from the bulk of his headquarters staff owing to concerns over security and sensitivity to considerations of offensive operations being planned before the President took a decision to expand the operation. Eckert was charged with learning about the

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coalition ground forces and lead the group in thinking through the challenges of large unit maneuver in the desert. Pennypacker coordinated with the CENTCOM intelligence section and focused on learning about the Iraqi force disposition, fighting capabilities, and the terrain. Roh, the logistician, began the calculation of what it would take to sustain a corps in the attack, and later on two corps, as well as coalition forces.

Approximately ten CENTCOM personnel had knowledge of the Purvis Group’s activities and plans. The group’s purpose was kept highly classified as CENTCOM staff was focused on the arrival of forces and the defense of Saudi Arabia. The political and military conditions for an offensive to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait were not in place. The SAMS group would plan the offensive operations under Schwarzkopf’s direct control. For Purvis, Eckert, Roh and Pennypacker, that meant that getting information was often difficult to say the least. Schwarzkopf was ferocious about guarding the secrecy of the planning effort.

As Purvis and Eckert recalled it was not permissible to tell other staff officers exactly why a piece of information was required. Given this reality, the network of SAMS graduates assigned throughout the theater proved most useful because all occupied key operational and planning positions throughout the levels of Army command. The range of positions that SAMS graduates held ensured that the shared experience of the school established the basis for an information sharing network. Graduates serving at division through corps and army level reached out to each other, sharing information and ensuring a wider
appreciation of the overall campaign plan and the interrelationship between corps and divisional plans.\footnote{265}

Moreover, due to the shared experience at SAMS these officers either knew each other or heard about each other. They were willing to study questions and respond to their caller from CENTCOM without spending a great deal of time asking why he needed to know.\footnote{266} (See the figure below) The common view of plans at the time, generally assumed based on a common CGSC experience, was there were two different types of plans; those that worked and those that did not. SAMS graduates, as demonstrated in Panama, were in the business of crafting plans that worked. Army divisions relied on SAMS educated officers for plans during Battle Command Training Program exercises. The whole Army knew about the SAMS planners and Operation Just cause. A standard was established in translating doctrine into plans that would work, plans tested in evaluated exercises and in combat.

\footnote{265} This statement is based on conclusions drawn from interviews with SAMS graduates assigned to the U.S. Army divisions and corps in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These officers are; LTC (ret) Mike Burke, LTC (ret) Pat Becker, COL (ret) Greg Eckert, MG (ret) James Marks, LTGs Mark Hertling, Dave Huntoon, Bill Caldwell, COL Lance Betros, and COL (ret) Gordon Wells.

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<th>CENTCOM (Purvis Group)</th>
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Distribution of SAMS graduates. G-2/-3/-4, respectively intelligence, operations and logistics

Various officers and civilians serving on the Joint Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and even in the White House later claimed credit for the so-called “Left Hook,” the central feature of the Central Command campaign plan. Senior policy makers and military leaders; including Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Joint Chiefs head, Gen. Powell, and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, were intrigued by the notion of moving the U.S. Army’s heavy forces farther to the west, deeper into the Saudi desert, and attacking around the Iraqi defenses, but the concept needed the underpinnings of the science of war to make it feasible; how much fuel would be needed to move the thousands of vehicles deep into the desert and then attack.
north and east into Iraq, how much ammunition was required, how long would this move take to execute, and how could this movement of large forces be hidden from the Iraqis. All of these details had to worked out through war games and hard planning work. Not until late August 1990, when Purvis’ group of SAMS graduates began working with Schwarzkopf’s regular planning staff and trading ideas with General Kelly’s planners on the Joint Staff, did “a true war plan began to emerge.”

Officers on the staff at Central Command and Third U.S. Army had mixed feelings about the arrival of SAMS graduates to reinforce planning efforts already underway, and the bad feelings grew worse as SAMS graduates took on the key advisor roles and enjoyed close access, called “face time” with general officers. This caused some jealousy and gave rise to the use of the term “Jedi Knight” as a derisive moniker for the arrival of “special” officers educated at SAMS.

Headquarters above the level of division and corps did not have SAMS graduates routinely assigned to the staff so it appeared that they just arrived on the scene to save the day. This perception was reinforced by the Army staff in Washington, D.C. which directed the assignment of SAMS graduates to units deploying to Saudi Arabia.

The leadership of the Army combed the divisions and corps that were not deploying and sent SAMS graduates to the theater until there were 82 “Jedi”

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268 The origin of the moniker, Jedi Knight, is lost in SAMS lore. Some maintain the title was generated from within SAMS before the Gulf War. Others maintain the term was used, derisively; to describe SAMS graduates during the Gulf War. The first “official” use of the term took place after the Gulf War in the statement of Rep. Ike Skelton, and this is cited in chapter nine.
serving in the Iraq theater of operations. This process was directed by the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis Reimer. Research did not uncover a specific reason why this was done however based on the track record to date of SAMS graduates, in divisional exercises and during Just Cause and a real feeling throughout the Army that this campaign had to be done correctly, it was not surprising. The Army had to do well during this war and if SAMS graduates could help they would go to the war. The Army personnel center, assisted by the staff of SAMS, identified SAMS graduates throughout the Army and assigned them to CENTCOM and Third Army. For example, then MAJ John Frketic was assigned to the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska following graduation from SAMS in 1990.

Frketic was placed on a temporary duty assignment to Central Command in January 1991. He subsequently served on a coalition liaison team during combat operations.\textsuperscript{269} This temporary assignment process began in September 1990 and continued till January 1991. Many of the SAMS graduates were well received and went to work refining plans. Purvis and his team was well received initially but not everything went well for the team.

On October 11, 1990 Purvis, USAF BG “Buster” Glosson and MG Robert Johnston went to Washington, DC to represent GEN Schwarzkopf and present the campaign plan, as it was at the time, to the National Security Council and the President. Schwarzkopf directed Purvis to present the one corps plan of attack that is just the forces at hand in Saudi Arabia. He ordered Purvis to not stray from this plan or offer his opinions at all. The essence of the ground plan at the time was a direct strike into Kuwait and the teeth of the Iraqi defense.

\textsuperscript{269} Interview with COL (ret) John Frketic by the author on 14MAY2009.
The National Security Advisor, retired USAF LTG Brent Scowcroft, expressed strong criticisms of the proposed ground plan. Scowcroft felt that the ground offensive plan was not bold enough and worse, it was unimaginative. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also expressed reservations on the ground portion of the plan. All of the planners felt that more forces would be needed but no decision was taken at the time to send more troops to the desert. Shortly after Purvis returned from Washington, DC, his team of planners prepared an update to GEN Schwarzkopf on the courses of action for the use of one and possibly two US Army corps.\textsuperscript{270}

One member of the planning team, Greg Eckert, was newly promoted to lieutenant colonel. Purvis decided that LTC Eckert would brief GEN Schwarzkopf on the two corps options. The options were, at the time, very rough and amounted to no more than proposed course of action (COA) sketches. Up to that time the plans team was very restricted with regard to their dealings with the larger CENTCOM staff. This limited the detail the team could incorporate into the plan, thus they had to make a number of assumptions on forces, supplies, and sustainment. The presentation was to not only Schwarzkopf but his lieutenant general component commanders and major general level staff officers. To Eckert’s best recollection there were 33 stars in the room. This was the very first formal presentation of the plan to the component commanders and senior staff. This briefing took place shortly after the 11 October presentation to the President

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Triumph without Victory}, p. 166 and Purvis interview. See also \textit{The Generals’ War}, by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, \textit{Crusade}, by Rick Atkinson, and \textit{It Doesn’t Take A Hero}, by Norman Schwarzkopf for descriptions of this key meeting that set the basis for many subsequent decisions on the conduct of operations during the first Gulf War.
and his security advisors.

The CENTCOM war room was fairly small, and there was very little space in which a briefer could move, this meant that Eckert stood directly across a desk from Schwarzkopf. Eckert began the briefing, but after about ten minutes the phone rang. It was GEN Powell. Schwarzkopf had everybody leave and after ten minutes of private conversation with Powell he called everybody back into the war room. Schwarzkopf looked at Eckert and said, "Continue," with a degree of frustration in his voice. Eckert was also getting a sense of great tension within the room and noticed some of the flag officers were starting to look at the floor and ceiling. Eckert started back into the presentation and after about ten minutes the phone rang again. GEN Powell once again was calling. Everybody left the room and once again was called back in about 15 minutes later.

Eckert was standing just across the table and very close to Schwarzkopf. Shortly after the second call from Powell, Eckert heard Schwarzkopf mutter, "They want an Inchon and there is no fucking Inchon here...they don't understand..." There were other grumbled comments Eckert could not make out. The flag rank shoe and ceiling gazing increased in the room as Schwarzkopf snarled, "Continue." As Eckert started to speak, Schwarzkopf, pointed to the map and told me to put my hand where he was pointing. I extended my mechanical pointer to the map. The CINC shouted "I said your fucking hand!" Then he came over the table and grabbed my hand. For the next few minutes Schwarzkopf used my hand as his pointer. I don't recall what he was saying as I was apparently going into mental defilade. When he was done he told everyone the brief was over and to get out.}

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\[\text{Drawn from an electronic mail note and telephone conversation with COL (retired) Greg Eckert to the author, 15 May 2009.}\]
Schwarzkopf, who was working under tremendous pressure, was never an easy man to work for. Publicly, Schwarzkopf displayed an avuncular mien, but privately his rage would explode on hapless staff officers. Dating from his second tour in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was known to have an explosive temper. In the course of the preparation for the start of operations Schwarzkopf threatened to relieve from duty or even court-martial all of his component (air, sea, and ground) commanders and both Army corps commanders. The planners soon discovered that he possessed a volcanic temper. Eckert was counseled not to take what had occurred in that session personally. Based on this incident Purvis decided that only he would formally brief Schwarzkopf for the remainder of the campaign. These “reconnaissance by fire” sessions with GEN Schwarzkopf continued throughout the period while the planners were sorting out the ground campaign.\footnote{272}

Purvis later recalled that the final determination for the date of the ground attack did not rest on battle damage assessment or the arrival of artillery as frequently repeated elsewhere but the arrival of a fuel transportation truck company.\footnote{273} The question of the operational level of war in the desert came down to how many trucks were available to sustain the corps grand maneuver. The desert was a tactician’s dream and a logistician’s nightmare, a saying attributed to famed German Field Marshal Rommel.

\footnote{272} Drawn from the Purvis and Eckert interviews, see also Gordon and Trainor, Atkinson, and Triumph without Victory. “Reconnaissance by fire” is a term that is used to describe how units making contact with an enemy force develop the situation. In this instance it was used to describe how staff officers would learn how Schwarzkopf would react to a proposal. Since no one really knew a staff officer would be verbally “fired upon” by Schwarzkopf.

\footnote{273} Purvis interview 25MAR09.
The Purvis group also had cover in the form of Brigadier General Steven Arnold. Arnold, previously assigned as the Assistant Division Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, was assigned to Third Army as the operations officer. Arnold also had a second job, as he said, “I acted as a sounding board and provided general officer top cover to Joe and his group because the group was not really all that well accepted. They were somewhat derisively called “Jedi Knights.” Arnold and Purvis presented concept briefings to GEN Schwarzkopf. These presentations were designed to gain concept approval of the joint approach for ground operations. Arnold recalled that the Air Force developed its own operations plan for the air war. Purvis and Arnold presented the concept for all ground operations; Army, Marines, British and Arab coalition forces, including the Egyptians and Syrians. Arnold recalled an amusing part to this action saying, “as a planner for GEN Schwarzkopf I would present a joint ground concept then as G3 (of Third Army) I would receive this guidance and develop a plan for Army ground force operations.”

The Third Army/ARCENT mission.

ARCENT forces continue to establish a defense in sector and, on order, conducts offensive operations to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) and defeat Iraqi (IZ) forces in Kuwait.

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274 Interview LTG (ret) Steven L. Arnold, 23APR09, by the author. Hereafter cited as Arnold interview, 23APR09.
The Third Army/ARCENT Commander’s Intent.

Victory will be achieved through the destruction of the RGFC, preservation of the combined forces offensive capability, and restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait. ARCENT forces will penetrate and bypass static defensive forces to complete the physical and psychological isolation of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The 1st operational echelon reserves will be fixed and blocked to secure flanks and LOCs. Follow-on operations will then be conducted to complete the destruction of the RGFC. Thereafter, ARCENT will consolidate to prevent Iraq from re-seizing Kuwait and use a combination of TACAIR, artillery and PSYOP to defeat remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait and limit further losses to friendly forces. This will establish the military conditions for the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti government and the establishment of law and order in Kuwait by Islamic and other friendly forces.²⁷⁵

On 30 January 1991 the Iraqis attacked into Saudi Arabia and captured the small town of Khafji, along the coast road toward the Saudi oilfields. The "Battle of Khafji" was the first major ground contact between Iraqi and coalition forces. Eckert and the other SAMS planners were refining the plans for the ground operations at the time. He recalled that thinking at the time that this battle was evidence that the Iraqis had no intention of leaving Kuwait without a fight. The major operations plan, in Eckert's mind, was not influenced by the battle as, "It did not materially effect how I thought the actual campaign would unfold." The major advantage the U.S. and coalitions forces enjoyed over the

276 Triumph without Victory, p. 289.
Iraqis, air supremacy, was clearly evident as a result of this battle. This advantage though meant, to Eckert, that to really eject the Iraqis from Kuwait and win this war, “we would have to put boots on the ground to get them to leave Kuwait.”

The Third U.S. Army and Army Forces Central Command headquarters also had a cell of SAMS educated plans officers. Third U.S. Army did not act as the field Army for Central Command since Schwarzkopf retained the position of Commander, Land Forces as well as the Joint Force Commander. Nonetheless, Third Army coordinated the development of plans for Army forces and crafted the two corps attack that Schwarzkopf called the left hook or “Hail Mary.” These officers, whom Arnold called the “long ball hitters,” were: LTC Dave Mock, and MAJs Paul Hughes, Dan Gilbert, and Rick Halblieb. These officers all came from Army divisions that were not deploying to the desert. Mock was a cavalry officer, Hughes a signal officer, Hughes an infantryman and Halblieb an intelligence officer; these men formed the hub of the planning effort at Third Army/ARCENT. The addition of SAMS educated planners improved the quality of the planning effort. They were sent to Third Army because of their SAMS education and their demonstrated competence.

LTG Yeosock, Arnold and the Third Army planners crafted a truly operational level plan that included operational movement, maneuvers, fires and sustainment, the art of operational level warfare. The corps of the Third Army both moved hundreds of kilometers to get into position for the attack. The corps

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277 Personal electronic mail, dated 20 March 2009 from Eckert to the author.
then attacked into the depth of the Iraqi defense, again a maneuver of hundreds of miles. The SAMS planners understood the art and science of war that made this movement and maneuver possible. The long ball hitters translated their education into action. By taking on this task they allowed Yeosock to exercise command of Third Army.

Yeosock considered the strengths of the two corps in theater; XVIII Abn Corps and VII Corps. In September 1990 GEN Schwarzkopf outlined his guidance for the refinement of his concepts into operational and tactical plans. In this presentation Schwarzkopf named the Iraqi Republican Guard as the focus of main effort for VII Corps. VII Corps was to destroy the Republican Guard. XVIII Abn Corps would conduct a supporting attack on the left or western flank of the main attack executed by VII Corps.

The concept of operations drawn up by Arnold and his planners was a single envelopment. How Third Army would complete the envelopment was based on the enemy situation at the time of making first contact with the Iraqi Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf’s guidance to Yeosock, Third Army commanding general, Franks, commanding general of VII Corps, and Luck, commanding general of XVIII Abn Corps, and then refined in the planning effort by Arnold and Purvis was a force oriented objective as opposed to a terrain objective. This meant that Schwarzkopf wanted the Army ground forces to attack and destroy Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units, not attack to hold ground. Arnold called this “the big thought,” and he felt that Franks really had this concept correct, namely to hit the Republican Guard with an armored fist of massed
divisions as opposed to poking it with small, uncoordinated attacks.

Arnold drew the figure below to illustrate the nature of the battlefield and the force oriented objective assigned to the VII Corps. The Republican Guard had three general options; it could remain in place, move in response to the attack of Third Army, or it could counter-attack once the Iraqi command identified the point of the breach conducted by Third Army and VII Corps.
Arnold recalled that Franks believed that a slight operational pause prior to hitting the Republican Guard would be required. No one in the U.S. Army had maneuvered an entire corps in a long while thus no one really understood that

Arnold Sketch

Sketch drawn by LTG (ret) Steven Arnold during an interview conducted by the author on 23APR09.
unit columns get stretched out over time and distance. Here the inclusion of the Dunn-Kempf terrain board exercises with lead models of tanks and other vehicles, as well as Holder’s insistence on the study of large unit maneuvers paid off for the SAMS graduates in all the divisions and corps. In exercises at SAMS they saw, in miniature formations, a replication of the length of armored columns. This experience assisted in visualizing the battlefield. The idea of a slight pause was not a suspension of combat but the time needed to close up columns of vehicles, refuel these vehicles, resupply the units with ammunition, and ensure that intelligence was passed and understood, then enter into the attack.\(^{280}\)

XVIII Abn Corps planners and LTG Luck, the commanding general, crafted a mission statement and commander’s intent that embodied the tenets of AirLand Battle.

Mission. On order, XVIII Abn Corps attacks to penetrate IRAQI forward defenses and to interdict IRAQI LOCs along the EUPHRATES RIVER in order to prevent reinforcement of and escape from the KUWAITI Theater of Operations (KTO) by IRAQI forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the destruction of the RGFC.

Commander’s Intent. The purpose of XVIII Abn Corps operations is to interdict rapidly the IRAQI LOCs in the EUPHRATES RIVER valley, and to assist in the destruction of the RGFC. Corps operations are characterized by a rapid operational tempo that employs complementary heavy and light Corps forces supported by massed fires. We accept risk in the depth of Corps operations to surprise the enemy and gain positioning advantage and flexibility for our forces. Success is interdicting IRAQI LOCs on the EUPHRATES RIVER, blocking of IRAQI reinforcements into or escaping from the KTO, and the destruction of the RGFC ICW joint and combined forces.\(^{281}\)

\(^{280}\) Drawn from the Arnold interview, 23APR09.  
\(^{281}\) Department of the Army. Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, APO NY 09657.
The XVIII Abn Corps operation consisted of three phases; Phase I (Logistic buildup); Phase II (Force prepositioning); Phase III (Offensive operations). The Corps planned that the entire operation would be conducted concurrently with the theater major air operations conducted by the Joint Force Air Component Command, JFACC. While the coalition air forces were attacking strategic and operational level targets the XVIII Abn Corps planners expected that the ground operation and subsequent consolidation would take eight weeks to complete.

The first phase was a logistics buildup that assumed a, "short duration, high tempo, high consumption ground offensive." The logistics build-up was also designed to support Corps level operational and tactical deception operations, an element of the plan that set conditions for both the agility of corps’ forces and the synchronization of all ground force efforts with the larger theater (CENTCOM) deception plans. Phase II covered the movement of the corps from assembly areas in eastern Saudi Arabia to the west and attack positions for the ground offensive into Iraq. Phase II was the offensive into Iraq and the series of attacks conducted by the divisions assigned to the corps.

Phase III focused very closely on executing the supporting attack the corps conducted while playing on the strengths of the disparate divisions assigned to the corps. The 82nd Airborne Division, which naturally pressed for airborne assaults (which Schwarzkopf prohibited), was assigned a supporting

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282 XVIII Abn Corps OPLAN, p.4.
role and the mission of guarding supply lines and containing bypassed packets of Iraqi forces. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault, AASLT) was given a wide zone of operations in order to take advantage of the inherent battlefield mobility of this division and its extensive numbers of helicopters. The 101st AASLT would strike deep into Iraqi territory to dislocate Iraqi defenses, set up operating bases for its three battalions of Apache attack helicopters, and prevent Iraqi reinforcements and supplies from entering Kuwait. The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had five mechanized infantry battalions, four armor battalions, and a cavalry squadron. This powerful force would open up ground lines of communication and supply for the 101st AASLT and destroy Iraqi divisions in zone. As XVIII Abn Corps was on the outside of the “Hail Mary” maneuver to get on the flanks of the Iraqi Army, the 24th Mech would cover a great deal of distance in order to enter the battle. The corps plan was developed by the corps planners but was decentralized for execution in accord with LTG Luck’s manner of command. Luck allowed his division commanders a great deal of latitude in execution, he did not direct actions.

XVIII Abn Corps executed Operation Just Cause in December 1989. VII Corps had not seen combat since the end of World War II. Lieutenant General Fred Franks, the corps commander, recalled the dark years of the post-Vietnam Army when he addressed his commanders as they began preparations for deployment to Saudi Arabia. He had seen the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Now, VII Corps would depart Germany for war in the desert.

Schwarzkopf felt that dropping paratroopers into the desert was a waste of effort and air assets. There was also a feeling in the 82nd that Schwarzkopf simply did not like the division. No definitive reason was ever found for not using the 82nd in the role as parachute assault troops.
The corps, which was the largest armored force the U.S. Army had ever assembled, was the main effort force for the offensive into Iraq which would eject the Iraqis from Kuwait and destroy the Republican Guard.

VII Corps planners and Franks crafted a mission statement and concept of the operation that embodied the tenets of AirLand Battle.\(^{284}\)

**Mission.** On order, VII (US) Corps attacks to penetrate Iraqi defenses and destroy the Republican Guard Forces in zone. Be prepared to defend northern Kuwait to prevent Iraqi forces from re-seizing Kuwait.

**Concept of the Operation.** We will conduct a swift and violent series of attacks to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command and minimize our casualties. Speed, tempo, and a continuous AirLand campaign are key. We want Iraqi forces to move so we can attack them throughout the depth of their formations by fire, maneuver, and air. The first phases of our operation will be to get maximum forces moving toward RGFC with minimum casualties in minimum time. These phases will be deliberate and rehearsed; the later phases will be METT-T dependent and will be battles of movement and depth. We will get maximum forces through Iraqi positions by conducting a deliberate breach and an envelopment around the western flank through gaps in the obstacle system concurrently, to force the enemy to fight a non-linear battle. The deliberate breach will be done with precision and synchronization resulting from precise targeting and continuous rehearsals. Point of main effort initially is to ensure success of the penetration and passage of the 1 (UK) AD through to defeat the tactical reserves to the east. Point of main effort then shifts north to the enveloping force consisting of 2ACR, 1AD, and 3AD moving in zone toward RGFC. Initial movement of combat support/combat service support elements for rapid build-up of combat power on the far side. Once through the breach, we will defeat forces to the east rapidly with an economy of force, and pass the point of main effort to the west of that action to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command in a fast moving battle with zones of action and agile forces attacking by fire, maneuver, and air. Combat service support must keep up because there will be no pause. We must strike hard and continuously, and finish rapidly.\(^{285}\)

\(^{284}\) As shown in chapter five the tenets of AirLand Battle are Agility, Initiative, Depth and Synchronization.

\(^{285}\) Desert Saber, pp. 5/6.
The VII Corps plan envisioned a five phase ground offensive operation. The first phase covered the corps movement from the ports of debarkation to tactical assembly areas where the subordinate divisions and other units of the corps prepared for combat. Phase II was the movement from tactical assembly areas to forward assembly areas or defensive positions in the corps zone. During this phase Franks used the movement of the units of the corps as a rehearsal of the long distance movement the corps would make into Iraq. Over the protests of his commanders he directed that all units self deploy to the forward assembly areas. This was the largest movement of U.S. armored units since World War II, until the actual attack. Phase III was the breach of forward Iraqi defenses and the corresponding enveloping maneuver led by the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Phase IV was the attack by the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and the 1st (UK) Armored Division to defeat Iraqi tactical reserves near the breach site and the continuing envelopment of the remainder of the corps forces. Phase V was the corps setting conditions for an attack to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions wherever they were on the battlefield. Finally, phase VI was the defense of northern Kuwait.\footnote{Drawn from Desert Saber, pp. 7-9.}

The phasing of this complex corps operation fit into Franks’ vision of the battlefield and how the corps attack would unfold. Franks knew, as did Luck, that he could not look beyond initial contact with the main body of the Iraqi forces with any certainty. The initial phases of the operation were rehearsed in detail to ensure that actions across the corps were synchronized. Once the Iraqi local
tactical reserves were defeated though Franks had a series of concept plans that the corps would execute depending upon what the Iraqi Republican Guard might do in response to the corps attack. As Arnold, the Army operations officer at the time, said the corps had a force oriented objective, namely the Republican Guard. Franks, a cavalry officer, wanted to follow the hoary advice of the World War II German tank expert, Heinz Guderian. Guderian told his Panzer troops that in the attack they should boot not spatter the enemy.

Franks focused his planners on the task of hitting the Republican Guard not with a wild cavalry charge across the desert but with an “iron fist” of three armor heavy divisions, 1st Armored, 3rd Armored, and 1st Infantry, supported by the British 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. This called for a plan synchronized and sustained at corps level and executed with agility and initiative by Franks’ divisions and cavalry regiment. The main plan developed by Franks’ planners did not have branches plans as described by Army planning doctrine but rather had what Franks called a range of “audibles” or FRAGPLANS that Franks and VII Corps could execute as Franks and his staff read the battlefield and determined how the Republican Guard would respond to the corps attack. A FRAGPLAN or fragmentary plan by doctrine is a brief outline of a potential situation for which some planning is done. It is generally enough planning to provide a solid start point.

Major Pat Becker, a SAMS graduate and planner at VII Corps wrote many of the VII Corps “FRAGPLANS.” Becker described these as, “a situation worth planning for but possibly not a logical extension of the current battle set - so it’s
different from a contingency plan.” These VII Corps FRAGPLANS formed the basis for the agility of the VII Corps as the commander and his planners tried to foresee potential enemy actions and a corresponding corps response to each. Developing the situation depended upon the corps covering force, the 2nd Cavalry, finding and fixing the Iraqi force for the main attack delivered by the armored divisions.

The origin of Franks’ “audibles” or FRAGPLANS were the result of map studies that began in September 1990, shortly before the VII Corps was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia. Based on initial reports from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Franks determined that the only tactical option was a breach of the Iraqi defenses. The planners wargamed this option and found that a breach would be a lengthy operation in terms of time and casualties. The planners translated Franks football terminology into doctrinal language with no loss of effect. The assigned divisions of the corps would be in column behind the breach force. The corps planners and commanders were unsure of the sophistication of the Iraqi defense and its length and depth. Franks did not like having one option. He told his planners. “Let’s do this like pro football, continue to plan for the breach but if the Iraqis give us an opening we are going to call an audible.” The audible would be to place forces beyond the western edge of the Iraqi defenses and go around them. Franks would call this audible when he was convinced the Iraqis had gone as far west as they were able. Franks said, “To put the entire corps through the breach was going to take too long. I did not want to do that…” He postured his corps to exploit the opportunity the Iraqis presented him in the design of their

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287 Personal electronic mail, dated, 20 March 2009, from Becker to the author.
Franks and his SAMS educated planners used the language of FM 100-5 to convey exactly what the commander wished to happen in the zones of operation assigned to the subordinate divisions and the cavalry regiment of the corps. The 1st Infantry Division breach would be executed with, “precision and synchronization.” The later battles the corps commander expected to fight after the breach would depend upon how the enemy forces reacted to VII Corps actions and battles of “movement and depth.” Franks described the relationship with his planners as one that underscored the wisdom of establishing

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288 Franks Interview, 25NOV09.
289 *Triumph without Victory*, p. 327.
290 Desert Saber, p. 5. METT-T is an acronym meaning: Mission, Enemy, Terrain (and weather), Troops, and Time available.
SAMS. Franks said he was confident in their abilities to grasp the entire strategic concept and translate this into an operational concept for the corps. Of the SAMS team he had at the corps and in his assigned divisions Franks said, “Their tremendous knowledge allowed us to speak in a form of short hand based on a common language, a doctrinal language.”

Map 3

The operational plans and orders of VII and XVIII Abn Corps manifested the tenet of initiative in the construct of the orders and the personalities of the respective commanders, LTGs Luck and Franks. Luck established wide zones for his subordinate divisions and allowed the division commanders maximum

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291 Interview with GEN (ret) Fred Franks on 25NOV09. Hereafter cited as Franks interview.
292 Triumph without Victory, p. 337
latitude in the execution of his corps plan. His mission statement, intent and concept of the operation established conditions that allowed the exercise of initiative. Luck knew the strengths of his three U.S. divisions and the political limitations on the use of his French division. Luck’s planners knew each other and used the doctrinal language to communicate precisely what Luck wanted. The power of Luck’s corps resided in the 24th Infantry Division’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and the Apache attack helicopters of the 101st AASLT. Luck’s plan of attack maximized the use of these forces. Luck’s approach to command empowered his subordinate commanders.

Franks did much the same in VII Corps. He personally explained the corps plan and associated “audibles” to his subordinate commanders. He even encouraged wide debate about the corps plan listening to the proposed modifications of his commanders, especially Holder, and incorporating these proposals into the plan. Holder acted as a sounding board for Franks.

Based on multiple interviews with Holder and from reading secondary sources Holder played a large role in the development of the VII Corps plan. Aside from being the former director of SAMS and thus having an influence on the graduates assigned throughout the corps Holder had Franks’ confidence. Holder suggested that the corps not only breach the Iraqi obstacle belt but move to the west and beyond the Iraqi fortifications. The breach would shorten the distance for the corps artillery units and supply columns while unencumbering the corps’ two armored divisions and armored cavalry regiment. Franks, Holder and the division commanders executed the commanders’ role envisioned in doctrine.
and shared a vision for the fight ahead.

Franks’ communication efforts ensured a wide understanding of his commander’s intent. The network of SAMS graduates in the corps facilitated wide acceptance of the corps plan. Within the zones of operation in the corps zone the commanders of the divisions and brigades had the maneuver room to exercise initiative. By developing corps audibles, Franks also retained the ability to exercise initiative at the corps level in keeping with his expressed intent to hammer the Iraqi Republican Guard with an armored fist.

The clearest manifestation of agility during the execution of the VII Corps plan occurred on 27 February 1991 during a battle between the 1st Armored Division’s 2nd Brigade, called the “Iron Brigade,” and the 2nd Brigade of the Republican Guard Medina Luminous Division. The battle took place on a low ridgeline just a few kilometers northwest of the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Soldiers of the Iron Brigade called it the “Battle of Medina Ridge.” In 40 minutes the Soldiers of the Iron Brigade destroyed the 69 tanks and 38 armored fighting vehicles of the Iraqi 2nd Brigade, with no US losses. This was the largest tank battle of the war. The Iron Brigade took advantage of its superior technology and training and acted faster than the Iraqi forces could, despite rolling into the Iraqi planned kill zone. The thermal sights of the M1A1 tanks allowed the Soldiers of the Iron Brigade to identify Iraqi tanks at 4000 meters, well beyond the engagement range of the Iraqi T-72 but within the effective killing range of the M1A1. A captured Iraqi sergeant told his captors that the American tanks were invisible and that the Iraqis were shooting at the muzzle flashes of the American
tank cannons. Sergeant Jeffrey Reamer, a tank commander in the Iron Brigade’s 1st Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment recalled that the battle itself lasted but a short time and near the end of the battle the targets were dwindling. He heard a spot report, a short report sent over command radio networks to inform all of enemy activity, saying that a truck was trying to get away. The voice of the brigade commander, Colonel Montgomery Meigs, came up on the radio and ordered that if the enemy was not surrendering continue killing them. As Reamer recalled the battle he said, “you know, for a while there, you didn’t feel like you were in a war. But…when you heard the brigade commander say to take someone’s life, it made you remember this was war.”

This was tactical agility at its best and rested on the shoulders of very well trained American Soldiers. See map 4.

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293 The paragraph was developed from Triumph Without Victory, pp. 384-386.
Map 4

The 24th Mech demonstrated great tactical agility in the XVIII Abn Corps zone through the conduct of its attack. The 24th, under the command of Major General Barry McCaffrey conducted multiple brigade level attacks across its zone of operation in order to keep Iraqi forces off balance and to seize opportunities to destroy these same Iraqi forces thus protecting the flank of the main effort, VII Corps. The attack on Jalibah air base was one such attack. The 24th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade attacked Iraqi forces defending this base from an entirely unexpected direction not only routing the defending force but also destroying a number of Iraqi Air Force aircraft on the ground.

The concept of depth manifested itself in the entire plan; from strategic and operational to tactical. The US and its coalition partners made use of the

Triumph without Victory, p. 381.
strategic depth offered by bases in the United States and Europe to extend the battlefield in space. The operational movements conducted by the XVIII Abn and VII Corps extended the operational battlespace beyond the limits of Iraqi command and control. Finally, the deep tactical assaults conducted by the helicopter borne brigades of the 101st Airborne Division extended the tactical battlespace in the favor of the tactical agility and mobility of US forces vis-à-vis the Iraqi forces. Luck reviewed and approved the attack plan of the 101st Abn Division, saying that the division would be making air assault history with its deep air assault of 120 kilometers. Both corps made movements of operational depth in preparation for the attack.

These movements allowed the corps to rehearse the intricate movements required of them in the attack, especially VII Corps. XVIII Abn Corps also made use of tactical airlift. These movements were enabled by the air forces of Central Command’s complete dominance of the air. What information the Iraqis were able to gain from these moves was disguised under a cloud of deception operations conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division’s operations also extended the depth of the battlefield for the two corps by focusing Iraqi attention on one small area near the Wadi al Batin. This area near the tri-border area of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq was a natural avenue of approach into Kuwait. The wadi began in Saudi Arabia and extended along the western border of Kuwait and Iraq moving from the southwest to the north-northeast. The wadi was wide enough for a brigade maneuver within and moving along side the

\[ \text{In the verbal lore of the XVIII Abn Corps and 101st Abn Division Luck allegedly said, “You are going to make air assault history…don’t fuck it up.” This comment was typical of the laconic Luck. He was a direct and forceful commander who believed in giving his subordinate commanders wide latitude.} \]
wadi offered a landmark upon which to guide an attack into Iraq and Kuwait. Operations executed by the 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division so focused the Iraqis attention on this area that Iraqi forces essentially froze in place expecting the coalition main effort to attack on this axis.\footnote{The explanation of the Wadi al Batin is based on personal reconnaissance by the author in 1994 and 1995.}

Franks also took the depth of his battlespace into consideration, in terms of friendly capability and the array of enemy forces. The UK 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division had to be given a mission within its abilities. At the time there was some concern over the mechanical reliability of the British main battle tank, the Challenger. Franks decided that passing the UK 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division through the 1\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Division’s breach, “allowed me to fix Iraqi forces in depth behind the first line of defense and keep these forces away from the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Armored Divisions and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} ACR.”\footnote{Franks Interview, 25NOV09. Breaching the Iraqi defenses also allowed Franks’ logisticians to reduce the distance corps fuel tanker trucks would travel thus sustaining the corps main effort. The Challenger proved to be a mechanically reliable vehicle, sustained in part by the placement of UK maintenance facilities and the ability to use the lanes through the Iraqi defenses to reduce the time for repair parts to move forward to the UK 1st Armored.}

There was some effort at the CENTCOM, the Purvis team, and Third Army level, Arnold’s SAMS graduate “long-ball hitters,” to synchronize the activities of the joint force, especially the land forces. LTG Yeosock viewed synchronization at the army level as assigning tasks to the corps, allocating forces, setting objectives and boundaries, conducting deep fires and monitoring progress. Also, due to Yeosock’s appreciation of the command climate within Central Command he felt that he contributed most to the campaign by remaining near Riyadh and Schwarzkopf thereby allowing his corps commanders to execute the fight.
Synchronization was evident in the plans of Third Army as the Army coordinated the movement of both corps into an attack that would destroy portions of the Republican Guard. As VII Corps prepared to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Franks’ primary concern was to hit the Republican Guard with a mailed fist made up of his two armored divisions, the 1st “Old Ironsides” and 3rd “Spearhead” Armored Divisions. The battle was synchronized at the corps level through the use of objectives, phase lines, and command and control. The same was true at the division level as the major generals commanding these divisions; MG Ron Griffith and MG Paul “Butch” Funk respectively, synchronized the attacks of their brigades in attacking the divisions of the Republican Guard.

The synchronization efforts on the part of the division commanders and their SAMS educated planners allowed the division commanders to coordinate the main fight against the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions in the corps zone making use of artillery and air support to augment divisional reconnaissance forces in finding and fixing the Iraqi divisions. Once these divisions were fixed, that is the attention of the Iraqi forces were so focused on surviving the onslaught of artillery and air delivered fires that they could not effectively maneuver against the brigades of the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions these U.S. brigades could maneuver tank and infantry battalions to bring extremely lethal direct fire against the Iraqi forces.

The Iraqi Tawakalna Division was in the center of the Republican Guard defensive area facing the US VII Corps. The division commander of this unit was focused to his division's front where he was being attacked by the 3rd Armored

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298 Swain, p. 145.
Division. As this attack was unfolding the Iraqi division’s right flank was attacked by the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Ron Griffith. While the 1st Armored Division’s focus of main effort was on the Republican Guard’s Medina Division the Iraqi divisional defensive zones and U.S. divisions’ zones of operation overlapped, to the detriment of the Tawakalna. One battalion of the Tawakalna’s 29th Mechanized Brigade occupied defensive positions in the 1st Armored Division's zone of operations. The division’s 3rd “Bulldog” Brigade, commanded by Colonel Dan Zanini, attacked this lone Iraqi battalion.

As historian Stephen Bourque subsequently described the action, “Colonel Zanini synchronized the fight to maximize his fire power and minimize battlefield confusion.” Zanini’s synchronization of artillery, Apache attack helicopters and mechanized infantry fire suppressed the Iraqi defenders as his tank battalions maneuvered to within effective tank cannon range of the M1A1s. Task Force 1-37 Armor maneuvered toward the Iraqi defenses. The brigade commander synchronized the fight at his level allowing the battalion commander to direct the close fight, tank on tank. 299

Mark Hertling, a SAMS graduate and at the time of Operation Desert Storm the operations officer of the 1st Armored Division’s cavalry squadron, summed up the influence of his SAMS education and how it influenced him during the planning and execution of his tactical operations. His main point was how he focused on an end state for the operations and how his squadron would fit into the overall division plan. He said that, “At the end of the day, what should

our stance be, how should we be positioned, and what did we want to accomplish.” The military history portions of the AMSP curriculum, from the wars of Napoleon to Vietnam, demonstrated to Hertling that “nothing is a first on any battlefield...you can always find examples of what you're doing -- or trying to do -- in the history, and you ought to look there first.” SAMS education influenced the planners across the Army.

The difficulty of viewing war from the operational level is that success can come to be seen as forward movement. The operational level of war is the bridge for linking tactical success to strategic and policy objectives. The tactical synchronization conducted by Franks, coupled with his intent to hit the Iraqis with concentrated forces as opposed to a wild cavalry charge was not well understood at the operational-strategic level, especially at Central Command headquarters in Riyadh. Rick Swain, the historian of the Third Army believes that Schwarzkopf fell “victim to chateau generalship” since he remained so tied to his headquarters and did not go forward, even to the Third Army headquarters, to get a better sense of the state of the battle field.

For example, Schwarzkopf quickly became enamored at how quickly McCaffrey and his 24th Infantry Division was moving vis-à-vis VII Corps. The 24th Mech was also moving unopposed, over very difficult ground to be sure, but

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300 Personal electronic mail note from MG Mark Hertling, commanding general, 1st Armored Division to the author, 26 March 2009. Hereafter cited as Hertling e-mail. Franks also related the story of the replacement of his lead planner, Tom Goedkoop by LTC Bob Schmidt. Goedkoop was sent forward to assume command of a tank battalion just prior to the attack in JAN91. Schmidt, a planner at Third Army, came forward as Goedkoop’s relief and according to Franks, “Schmidt could come in and not miss a beat due to common background and common education, to make the jump from the operational level of war to the high level tactical as the new corps chief of plans. This underlined the wisdom of the commonality of education, the cohort of the planners in the professional family of SAMS educated planners.” Franks Interview, 25NOV09.

301 Swain, p. 250.
unopposed nonetheless. Commanding from Riyadh also shielded Schwarzkopf from the conditions extant on the battlefield at the time. Arnold recalled that what Schwarzkopf did not realize was, “We had a huge thunderstorm in the desert right as we were conducting the breach.” The water from the storm washed out the breach lanes cleared by the 1st Infantry Division for the 1st (UK) Armored Division and subsequently the re-supply convoys of the major units of VII Corps. This fact made extremely difficult to navigate through the minefields. Not being there and relying on reports alone, Schwarzkopf dismissed the mines as a problem, but tired troops, rain, no easily recognizable lanes in mine fields, and long columns slowed the pace of the VII Corps advance. VII Corps and even XVIII Abn Corps still had units in forward assembly areas and not through the breach lanes while others were far forward and engaged with Iraqi forces.\textsuperscript{302}

In the VII Corps operations order Franks emphasized, “Combat service support must keep up because there will be no pause.”\textsuperscript{303} However, terrain, weather, and the enemy coupled with tired troops upset this desire twice. Arnold thought that Franks’ notion of a pause was realistic. Franks and Yeosock knew that VII Corps attacking formations would get strung out and would need some sort of pause before entering the main battle with the Iraqi Republican Guard. This is an instance where doctrine needed improvement.

Arnold and Purvis put this notion very clearly. Arnold stated that he felt that the Army needed to find a new doctrinal term because operational pause does not play well in Washington. The Army had not maneuvered large

\textsuperscript{302} Arnold interview, 23APR09.  
\textsuperscript{303} Desert Saber, p. 6.
formations often enough for people in uniform and out of uniform to have a clear understanding of just how long the columns of divisions and a corps really are, it was hard to imagine even for SAMS graduates who saw columns of micro-armor on a terrain board. There was no substitute for the actual experience in seeing large formations move and maneuver. Due to this fact, an operational pause was not received well in Washington. Politicians and policy makers had no frame of reference for the complexity of mounted warfare and the conditions in the Saudi and Iraqi desert at the time thus they did not really understand that columns were strung out and combat power needed to be re-set before engaging the main body of the Republican Guard. The military advisors to the policy makers also did not have the experience of maneuvering large formations and thus had a difficult time explaining this kind of operation.

In the last analysis Arnold believed, “Freddy Franks knew what he was doing, hit the Republican Guard with a fist, not fingers. The pressure to keep driving on was terrific.” Arnold did acknowledge though that even GEN Schwarzkopf was under tremendous pressure to move rapidly and conclude the war swiftly. The Israelis were under missile attack, there were doubts about the strength of the Arab coalition members' staying power, especially the Syrians, and even on the as yet unknown influence of 24 hours per day news coverage. This was a new factor that the Army, as well as other services needed to come to grips with in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

Rick Swain, in his book *Lucky War*, believed that General Schwarzkopf dominated the entire theater of war on the Arabian Peninsula by force of

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304 Arnold interview, 23APR09.
personality. Swain wrote, “No act taken had meaning except in reference to his mercurial and unforgiving personality.” The overall effect of Schwarzkopf’s mercurial personality and his tendency to “shoot the messenger” was one of reluctance to even approach the “CINC” with anything that could remotely be seen as bad news.\textsuperscript{305} Schwarzkopf had an equally tempestuous relationship with Purvis and his planners. Initially enthusiastic to receive planners from SAMS later on the group fell in and out of Schwarzkopf’s favor, largely based on Schwarzkopf’s need to blame someone for the perceived disaster of the briefing to the President and his war advisors. Michael Gordon, a reporter for the New York Times, wrote that after the war Schwarzkopf “considered the Jedi plan “garbage,” but he [Schwarzkopf] had not produced a better plan.”\textsuperscript{306}

The planning for and conduct of Operation Desert Storm established SAMS in the minds of the leadership of the Army as the place to turn to for superb planners. The level of planning at all echelons of command was thorough and incorporated the tenets of AirLand Battle. The doctrinal underpinning of the planning and execution was sound as the U.S. Army defeated the fourth largest army in the world in 100 hours of combat. The Army spent the years between Vietnam and August 1990 preparing for a war in the central region of Europe against a similarly equipped Warsaw Pact army and found itself fighting the last great armored war of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. The world watched this war, and studied the outcome. SAMS also studied

\textsuperscript{305} Swain, Chapter 9

\textsuperscript{306} Gordon, p. 128. In his own book, \textit{It Doesn’t Take a Hero}, Schwarzkopf plays down the role in the planning of the campaign done by the SAMS team. He barely mentions the group, save in a discussion of the fateful briefing to the President.
this war.

Following the successful conclusion of the Gulf War, SAMS faculty and students settled back in their class rooms to study the significance of the First Gulf War upon changing conduct of corps and army level operations. Obviously, the execution of plans by operational commanders had not been perfect, and there were important lessons to be studied. Even though Arnold and the Purvis group presented “joint” options to Schwarzkopf, these options were ground force options alone. SAMS and other advanced studies schools that were established in the aftermath of the Gulf War investigated the conflict found it was necessary to grapple with the implications of a truly joint campaign, not merely a division of labor between the ground, sea, and air arms.

There were other issues, e.g. conventional battle dominance, asymmetric advantage, regarding which SAMS, its students and faculty would discuss both during and after the war. If the U.S. was so dominant in the conventional realm of combat, how would the next threat manifest itself? With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, how would the United States use its Army in this post Cold War era? The lid had been kept on simmering regional and inter-ethnic struggles but now that the Red Army was gone and the super power struggles were over cracks in the façade of civility were appearing.

LTG Fred Franks was promoted to General when he left command of VII Corps and put into command of Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC. One of Franks’ first tasks was to design the effort to update FM 100-5, based on both his command experience in Desert Storm and his appreciation of the
changing world. He asked the Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Gordon Sullivan, for SAMS graduates to be assigned to his headquarters. Sullivan supported the request.\textsuperscript{307}

Over the next several years SAMS graduates found themselves learning how to adapt a warfighting doctrine based on the premise of a conflict with the Red Army or surrogates thereof to the “wars” of the Peace Dividend era.

\textsuperscript{307} Phone conversation with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot, 14OCT09. Fontenot recalled that along with his own assignment to GEN Franks’ initiatives group, LTCs Dave Mock and Mark Hertling were also assigned to TRADOC headquarters.
Chapter Seven

The Wars of the Peace Dividend

In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union the American people and their political representatives expected, indeed sought, a “Peace Dividend.” After all, the Cold War had ended and the looming threat of the Soviet Union had disappeared from the world scene. The Army was directed to shed a substantial part of its manpower and components and thus went from 18 active Army divisions and five corps headquarters with associated corps level troop units (ranging from aviation to military police) to a force of ten divisions and four corps. In accord with historical traditions the United States would reduce its Army and the armed forces overall following the successful conclusion of three wars, two hot, Panama and Desert Storm, and one cold, the 50+ years of containing the Soviet Union, in fact the reduction of the Army began before the start of Desert Storm. The United States “tradition” of not maintaining a large standing army can be seen for example, from the Civil War to the end of the Cold War. William T. Sherman wrote in his memoirs that at the close of the Civil War the Union Army had just over 1.5 million men under arms, and by act of Congress in 1866 this Army was reduced to 54,641.\(^\text{308}\) In his memoir, *My American Journey*, Colin Powell recalled testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1990 concerning the size of the defense establishment.

Powell wrote, “But with the Soviet military shrinking, we faced a likely stampede by members of Congress arguing there was no threat, hence no need for a large military. “Peace Dividend” had become a fashionable phrase.” Powell described his argument that while the U.S. might no longer face “the 8th Guards Army across the Fulda Gap,” the nation still needed the capability to project power to unpredictable trouble spots around the world.\(^{309}\)

For anyone who looked beyond the Soviet Empire’s collapse, however, world conditions did not bode well for realizing a “Peace” dividend. The record of the proceedings of the U.S. Senate show that from the end of the Gulf War in March, 1991 through February, 1999 there were 21 deployments of 500 or over U.S. troops with durations ranging from 30 days to several years. The pace of operations did not abate for either the armed forces in general or the U.S. Army in particular. Deployments ranged from responses to continued Iraqi acts of aggression, such as Vigilant Warrior in 1994, to Sea Angel, the US humanitarian response to a typhoon in Bangladesh to the hurricane recovery response to Hurricane Iniki’s devastation of the Hawaiian island of Kauai, to the military’s support for firefighting operations in the western US.\(^{310}\)

The extant doctrine in the aftermath of Just Cause and Desert Storm remained FM 100-5, 1986. However, conditions around the world were clearly changing and SAMS was preparing for a doctrinal update in response to new national security policies, force reductions, and innovative information


\(^{310}\) MAJOR OVERSEAS SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS—Continued [Involving the deployment of 500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel—March 1991–February 1999] October 30, 2000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE S11355
technologies. It seemed that Moltke’s dictum would be re-written as no doctrine can look with certainty beyond changing policy and technological conditions.

Dr. Jake Kipp of the U.S. Army Soviet Army Studies Office, later renamed the Foreign Military Studies Office, gave a presentation at SAMS in February, 1992 entitled, “Whither the Red Army.” During this lecture Dr. Kipp suggested that the new world beyond the demise of the Red Army as enemy number one would be filled with new/old challenges as U.S. policy makers grappled with a rapidly changing world. Kipp further suggested that Army units would be called on to separate warring factions, restore order in lawless regions, and operate in areas that would not be, in the Cold War sense, seen as vital national interests. These interests would change.311

In a memorandum dated 29 July 1991 the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Gordon Sullivan wrote to incoming Training and Doctrine Command commander, then LTG Fred Franks that he viewed doctrine as the engine of change for the U.S. Army. In Sullivan’s view the world was changing and this change meant that the Army had to change its mode of operations in order to best serve the Nation. Sullivan’s aim along with Franks was to capitalize on Army successes during the Panama operation and Desert Storm and refocus the Army through rewriting the operational doctrine of the Army to reflect post-Cold War circumstances. That proved to be a gradual process as the operations that were conducted in the immediate post-Cold War era were done in accord with the

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311 Based on my personal notes from Dr. Kipp’s lecture during my year of study at SAMS 1991-1992.
extant doctrine, put into practice by SAMS graduates.\textsuperscript{312}

In light of the successful operations conducted in Panama and the Persian Gulf, Army divisions and corps, as well as headquarters above these tactical echelons, sought SAMS educated officers based on the superior performance of SAMS graduates during these operations. Examples ranged from GEN Franks establishing an initiatives group at Training and Doctrine Command headquarters in Fort Monroe, VA and sending “by name” requests for SAMS graduates to work for him, to LTG Gary Luck insisting that the XVIII Abn Corps maintain its allocation of three to five SAMS graduates per year to be assigned to the corps plans section. SAMS graduates played a key role in the planning of operations along the spectrum of conflict as the range of military operations were changing in the later years of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This chapter will examine three such operations planned by SAMS graduates. These are; Joint Task Force - Los Angeles and the aftermath of the Rodney King riots in 1992, Joint Task Force Andrew and the recovery efforts following Hurricane Andrew, also in 1992, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia at the end of 1993 and early 1994.

These operations tested the Army as it entered the post-Cold War period, a time when its officer corps was introduced to the concept, Operations Other Than War, and how to use U.S. military forces in what traditionally had been viewed as non-military roles to achieve results that fulfilled the policy objectives of the U.S. Faithful to its founding precepts, the Army and SAMS attempted to refine the concepts of operational art and how this level of war linked tactical

\textsuperscript{312} Memorandum from GEN Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army to LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr., dated 29JUL91, subject Reshaping Army Doctrine, cited in John Romjue’s TRADOC Historical Monograph, \textit{American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War}, 1997.
actions to strategic and policy objectives in these operations. The operations
tested SAMS graduates ability to think while facing conditions that were not
foreseen during their year of study. The SAMS curriculum did not begin to
change, as will be seen in chapter eight, until 1992. SAMS graduates from
classes prior to 1992 adapted the tenets of AirLand Battle in each of these
operations as they applied the familiar tenets of doctrine to the unfamiliar
situations they faced as planners in Army divisions and corps.

The first example of the changing conditions affecting the use of force is
Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA). On the morning of 1 May 1992, Majors
Gordon Wells and Lance Betros, newly graduated from SAMS and assigned to
the 7th Infantry Division were preparing to do physical training. The television in
their office was tuned to CNN, and Marlon Fitzwater; the President’s press
secretary came on the air to announce that in response to a request from the
governor 7,000 federal troops would be committed to reinforce the National
Guard then facing massive civil disturbance in Los Angeles. Betros looked at
Wells and said, “I think that is our warning order!” Then they ran to the division
operations officer’s office. 313

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313 Conversation with COL (ret) Gordon Wells, 10 June 2009. A warning order is the first order
a unit receives in advance of action. After Operation Desert Storm all major units kept a television tuned to
CNN to ensure the leadership heard what was being announced in Washington, DC.
On the afternoon of 29 April 1992, the worst civil unrest since the riots of the 1960's erupted in the streets of Los Angeles. Forty-four people died, and hundreds of injuries occurred before order was restored. One billion dollars of property damage because of rampaging looters and the thousands of fires that they set. There were many deep-seated grievances in the black community of Los Angeles, but the catalyst of this extended riot was the outcome of the criminal trial of the police officers who had been taped beating Rodney King after a traffic stop in Los Angeles. The officers were acquitted of all charges by an all-white jury. The riot began as a small disturbance in south central Los Angeles, but it quickly escalated and rapidly spread throughout the city and county of Los Angeles. The mob violence swiftly overwhelmed city law enforcement authorities, although some thought that the police failed to act swiftly to contain
the violence, resulting in the burning of large swaths of the city. Early in the
morning of 30 April, Governor Pete Wilson made the decision to commit the state
police and two thousand California Army National Guard soldiers to assist in
restoring law and order. A California National Guard military police company
arrived in the area on the afternoon of 30 April and immediately began operations
to support local police. This initial state reinforcement of city law enforcement
was not adequate to deal with the widespread rioting, arson and looting. The
commitment of even more California National Guard troops to the area appeared
to stabilize the city and brought about a return to a semblance of law and order.
However, state and national officials believed that federal troops were needed,
as there were many criticisms of the performance of the California National
Guard.

Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a
Presidential Executive Order 12804 on the evening of 1 May. The Executive
Order federalized selected units of the California Army National Guard
(CAARNG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law
and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within twenty-four hours, assembled
from California based U.S. Army and Marine forces. It operated in a unique
domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, federal
agencies and the CAARNG.

315  Susan Rosegrant, “The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots” parts
A, B, and C written in 2000 for Richard Falkenrath, Assistant Professor in Public Policy, and Arnold
Howitt, Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, for use at the Executive
316  Section 1 of the Executive order stated, “Units and members of the Armed Forces of the
United States and Federal law enforcement officers will be used to suppress the violence described in the
The U.S. 7th Infantry Division headquarters, located at Fort Ord, was ordered to form the JTF. The division headquarters and one of the divisional brigades were committed to conduct operations in the Los Angeles area. Simultaneous with the commitment of U.S. Army troops, a special Marine Air-Ground Task Force was formed from the 1st Marine Division and also sent to Los Angeles. JTF-LA’s mission statement was: "JTF-LA assumes command and control of federalized National Guard, active duty Marine and Army forces, establishes liaison with local law enforcement agencies, and conducts civil disturbance operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area." The mission, while straightforward, required great care in execution because of political, racial, and organizational sensibilities.

When the orders reached Fort Ord, LTC James Marks was serving with the 7th Infantry Division on his post-SAMS assignment during which Marks served as the G2 planner. Marks recalled that the plans and operations staff of the division had been paying attention to what was going on in Los Angeles but that it was not a priority. Marks and the remaining members of the division tactical command post team had barely 12 hours notice from initial alert to arrival in Los Angeles. The tactical command post accompanied the commanding general to the riot-torn city."

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317 Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletters, No. 93-7, NOV 93, Operations Other Than War, Vol. III, Civil Disturbance LA Riots, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 3

The Joint Task Force commander, Major General Marvin L. Covault, commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division, arrived in Los Angeles shortly after the Presidential order was issued. MG James Delk, military force commander for Los Angeles and the staff of the 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard briefed Covault on the situation in Los Angeles. He then moved to the tactical operations center (TOC), established by the 7th ID divisional assault command post. Covault’s first act was to name MG Daniel J. Hernandez, commanding general of the 40th Infantry Division as the Army Force commander, and placed his 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division under the operational control of General Hernandez. Covault’s decision went a long way toward restoring the morale of National Guardsmen, for the Guard—both its leaders and soldiers--had expected to be supplanted by active component officers.319

The Marine Force (MARFOR) made up the other portion of the joint task force. The MARFOR consisted of approximately 1,500 Marines from Camp Pendleton, CA, commanded by Brigadier General Marvin T. Hopgood, deputy commander of the 1st Marine Division. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, MAGTF, staged out of Tustin Marine Corps Air Station. All in all, the Joint Task Force--active duty U.S. Army troops, Marines, and federalized California National Guard soldiers--worked well together, and quickly accomplished the mission of assisting in restoring order to greater Los Angeles. Vitally important, in light of the continuous media coverage, no troops were killed or seriously injured and no

innocent bystanders were injured by the Soldiers or Marines.\textsuperscript{320}

The basis for action by federal troops when committed to conduct of civil disturbance operations was in what was designated the “Garden Plot” series of standing operations plans. Every division and corps in the continental United States maintained a plan, under Garden Plot, that detailed how Army forces would be committed to contain civil disturbances, as well as to defend critical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{321} The divisions and corps might have had the required plans for Garden Plot operations “on the shelf” but training in civil disturbance operations was not high on the priority of Regular Army units. For example, the 7\textsuperscript{th} Division’s most recent operations had been in Panama as a part of Operation Just Cause.

The soldiers of the division were well trained in combat operations and small unit tactics. However, the staff and troop units lacked expertise in the nuances of civil disturbance operations. Covault and his SAMS planners had to adapt offensive and defensive operational experience into the conduct of an operation other than war, one conducted within the United States. According to Marks and Wells, the foundation of the execution of operations relied on the knowledge that the soldiers of the division were well trained, well disciplined, and


\textsuperscript{321} The Garden Plot series of plans, some of which remain classified, guided U.S. Army responses to a range of domestic situations ranging from fighting wild fires and responding to earthquakes to controlling riots that escalated beyond the ability of a state to control. The plans also contained guidance on how federal forces would be used to guard critical infrastructure sites; bridges, nuclear power plants, etc.
The JTF mission required federal forces to assume command and control of federalized National Guard, active duty Marine and Army forces, establish liaison with local law enforcement agencies, and conduct civil disturbance operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area. The federal forces also had to bear in mind the requirements of Posse Comitatus and operate within these restrictions. The Posse Comitatus Act within Title 18, U.S. Code states,

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.\(^\text{323}\)

The President’s executive order was carefully crafted in accord with his authority outlined in the Constitution and the U.S. Code. The President delegated appropriate authority to the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General to restore law and order to the greater Los Angeles area.\(^\text{324}\) The President’s executive order was exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, a fact not immediately known by Covault or his advisors.

Martial law was not declared; thus, federal forces had to carry out operations that would—in theory—support local and state law enforcement actions. According to both Wells and Marks, the staff determined that the

\(^\text{322}\) Marks and Wells interviews and Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletters, No. 93-7, NOV 93, Operations Other Than War, Vol. III, Civil Disturbance LA Riots, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

\(^\text{323}\) U.S. Code, Title 18, Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, Part I, chapter 67, paragraph 1385, 8 January 2008.

\(^\text{324}\) The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the Insurrection Act of 1807 limit the ability of the federal government to use federal military forces to enforce civil law.
analogous tactical mission was follow and support. The follow and support
analogy applied a familiar doctrinal term to an unfamiliar situation. Marks,
Wells, and Betros as well as other SAMS educated officers serving on the 7th
Infantry Division staff believed that the doctrine of AirLand Battle could be applied
to this mission.

The 7th ID applied the concept of depth in a unique manner but one
consistent with all relevant legal authorities and constraints. Regular troops and
federalized National Guard units secured areas already under control of local and
state police. This allowed the federal and state police to extend operations into
areas not under control. This application of military force in support of civil law
enforcement extended the area of operations in time and space. The presence
of troops in neighborhoods reassured the people that law and order was a priority
and that they would not be threatened in their homes by disorder, arson and
looting. Military forces also established traffic control points to enforce the dusk
to dawn curfew ordered by the mayor of Los Angeles. Traffic control points
expanded the area under control of the police and continued the expansion of
secure areas in the city, providing depth for operations.

The tenets of agility and synchronization were evident in the conduct of
the JTF operations, for the JTF forces undertook as a first step to establish
liaison with state and local police forces. The basis for the conduct of operations
in accord with these tenets was grounded, one should emphasize, in the superb

325 Drawn from the Wells and Marks interviews. I put this question to each of these officers,
how did they apply current doctrine to the situation of being committed to restore order in a U.S. city. How
did they communicate both the commander’s intent and the appropriate tactical tasks?
discipline demonstrated by the federal and National Guard troops. The best example is that only three incidents involving an exchange of gunfire between National Guard troops and armed criminals occurred. The first involved the 40th Military Police Company from the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which was the first Guard unit on the streets of Los Angeles. Military Police assisted in the arrest of an armed burglar who twice turned his weapon on the MPs. The criminal surrendered after four rounds were fired. No one was injured. The second shooting incident was the most significant. A gang member taunted Guardsmen, telling them he was coming back to kill them that night. This was a common threat faced by Guardsmen and regulars, but in this instance the threat was followed up with almost lethal action. The gang member returned in his car after curfew and attempted to run the Guardsmen down. All but one of the Soldiers was able to jump out of the way of the speeding car. That National Guard soldier was hit, but not seriously injured. The gang member later returned for a second attempt. When he refused to stop, the Guardsmen fired about 10 rounds at the tires of the car in an attempt to stop it. When it was clear the gang member was determined to run Guardsmen down, they finally used deadly force and killed him with one bullet in the shoulder and two in the head. The final shooting incident involving Guardsmen began when another criminal attempted vehicular homicide. The criminal involved first hit a car and then ran down a Los Angeles police officer, breaking his leg. When the gang member refused to stop, two Guardsmen each fired one round each. The gang member suffered a serious wound in the buttocks and groin and was placed in custody. The
California National Guard fired a total of 20 rounds in these three incidents.\textsuperscript{326}

Marks was the senior staff officer serving in the division tactical command post. One of the main concerns of the division command group and JTF commander was how to handover operations to civil authorities. Marks looked into the level of violent crime that had taken place prior to the riots. Concluding that these pre-riot levels of criminal activity were within the capability of the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff Department to handle, Marks tracked the level of violent crime post Rodney King trial and since the arrival federal troops in Los Angeles on 1 May 1992. He found that the level of violent crime was dropping to pre-riot levels. Marks graphed this data and presented it to MG Covault. Based on the obvious course of action generated by this data, Covault directed that if the level of violent crimes continued to drop or at least hold at pre-riot levels for three days conditions would be set for a handover of operations to civil authorities. Army troops and Marines began to redeploy to home stations on 10 May 1992.\textsuperscript{327}

The conduct of operations by JTF-Los Angeles was not flawless and was the subject of considerable post-riot criticism and debate. Regarding Army doctrine, MG Covault found that “the civil disturbance doctrine in place at the time to be unapplicable and explicitly rejected employing his forces as suggested

\textsuperscript{326} Delk.

\textsuperscript{327} Marks interview. Marks also told the story of how he was able to procure maps of Los Angeles for the 7th Division. He received an AAA map of the city from the chief of staff, 1st Marine Division. He told his division collection manager to find the map warehouse. Marks called the mapmaker who said his warehouse was in Compton, the center of the riots. Marks told the man that he, Marks, had $45,000 available and wanted to give the mapmaker as much of it as he could. The map maker met Marks at the warehouse 15 minutes later. Marks bought $28,000 worth of maps.
by the doctrine. This decision led to Covault’s planners and operations officers to use FM 100-5 doctrinal tenets to develop plans and orders. This decision tested the critical thinking abilities of Covault’s SAMS graduates.

The decision to federalize the California Army National Guard had both costs and benefits. The cost of federalization was in the time of response as Los Angeles city and county officials used to working with the Guard while under state control had to be educated during operations on the legal limits placed on federal forces.329

Lou Cannon, Los Angeles bureau chief for the Washington Post asserted that the federalization order slowed military responses to police requests for support. Regular Army and Marine Corps commanders and legal advisors reviewed all police requests for support “in terms of whether troops were being asked to perform “military” or law enforcement” functions. Cannon stated that this was due to both military and civilian unfamiliarity with Presidential authority and Posse Comitatus.330

MG Delk wrote that the call for federal troops was a mistake and contributed to the complexity of the operations to establish law and order in Los Angeles. The decision to deploy federal troops and place National Guard troops under federal control slowed the response time to the point that few were ever

329 CRM 94-42, p. 141.
acted on; this was due to the need for a legal review. Delk believed though that in the long term this decision would bode well for the National Guard as police forces would argue against the use of federal troops and federalization, and ask for National Guard troops under state control if the need for support over what a city police force had at hand arose again.\textsuperscript{331}

The major subject of criticism of the military forces committed to support of civil authority was the speed of response by both National Guard and federal forces. Response times were articulated in the Garden Plot series of plans. Regarding speed of response the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, received orders to move at 0415 hours on May 1, 1992. Fort Ord is 322 miles from Los Angeles. Upon notification of deployment, the first aircraft load of 7th Division Soldiers lifted off just in just over 12 hours. The Army portion of the JTF, division headquarters and a brigade combat team, completed air movement and staging for action at El Toro Marine Corps Air Station approximately 25 hours after the division was alerted for duty. That is well within the standards described in Garden Plot. California National Guardsmen arrived on the streets 18 hours after being notified for mobilization. None of the military units involved received much advanced warning for action.

Assorted stories of miscommunication between military and police units were reported. The most widely cited of these “urban legends” being a police request that a Marine unit “cover” the police as they approached a building where a suspected sniper was located. To the police "cover" meant having weapons at

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Fires & Furies}, p. 305.
the ready. To the Marines, however, cover meant covering fire--which the Marines delivered much to police consternation. By and large, discipline enabled the effective conduct of operations, as the division staff applied familiar doctrinal terms to unfamiliar missions.

In sum, MG Covault and his staff conducted AirLand operations without a familiar framework of battle. Covault rejected the civil disturbance doctrine extant at the time thus turned to the familiar doctrine, AirLand Battle. The SAMS educated officers on Covault’s staff materially assisted in the planning and execution of an extremely complex operation under very unfamiliar conditions. They did so by apply familiar AirLand Battle concepts and adapting as required. This effort conducted by JTF-Los Angeles/7th Infantry Division was the first major test of doctrine intended for combat applied to an operation other than war, really a civil support operation. The second major test occurred in southern Florida a little more than three months later.

Marks told me this story during the phone interview. This incident was also cited in Rosegrant, The Flawed Response, Part C, p. 21 and in Delk’s Fires and Furies, p. 221.
Satellite Image of Hurricane Andrew

Hurricane Andrew struck South Dade County, Florida, at about 4:35 AM, 24 August 1992. The aftermath of Hurricane Andrew was catastrophic. President Bush declared four Florida counties disaster areas; Dade, Monroe, Collier and Broward. In these counties an estimated 250,000 people were left homeless by the effects of the hurricane. In Dade County alone one in ten people were homeless. Blown down trees, telephone and power lines blocked roads throughout these four counties. The counties lacked power, running water, sewerage and working medical facilities. Acerbating this situation was an uncontrolled mosquito population that hampered relief efforts and attempts to return to normality.  

In response to the widespread devastation, the U.S.

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Government committed the largest number of troops to civil support operations in American history. Army troops made up the bulk of the committed forces. Second U.S. Army headquarters, located at Fort Gillem, Georgia, was designated the Joint Task Force that directed military operations. LTG Samuel E. Ebbesen, Commanding General Second U.S. Army, was named the JTF Commander. The mission, commander’s intent, and concept of what was to be accomplished outlined the flow of the operation. These documents were developed under direction of COL Roger E. Popham, Chief of Staff, Second U.S. Army. Again, as we shall see, planners applied familiar doctrinal terms to unfamiliar situations.

The JTF mission was straightforward and focused on the key and essential tasks required to provide relief to the population of the area affected by the hurricane. The mission statement read:

Beginning 28 AUG 92 Joint Task Force Andrew establishes Humanitarian Support Operations vicinity Miami, FL in the relief effort following Hurricane Andrew. The Task Force will establish field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transferring operations, local/line haul transportation ops, and other logistical support to the local population.334

The LTG Ebbesen’s commander’s intent provided guidance to begin operations by specifying a priority of effort for the initially deploying troops that ranged from an area focus as well as a task focus for logistical troops. He also

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334 Aerial Spray Operations as Part of the FEMA Hurricane Andrew Relief effort in Florida, and XVIII Abn Corps Operations Order 92-1 (HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF), dated 28 August 1992, found in files held on the third floor, Combined Arms research Library, CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

334 Taken from Joint Task Force Andrew overview briefing, dated 12 OCT 92. The briefing was held on the third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Hereafter cited as JTF overview.
stated very clearly what JTF troops could not do without his specific approval.

Finally, the end state he provided spoke in terms of time, the near term and the far term. The far term was especially important as the commander’s intent also envisioned the conditions for a handover of operations from federal troops to the level of normality required for routine operations executed by local and state officials.

JTF Commander’s Intent:

Immediately begin to operate feeding and water facilities; priority to the cities of Homestead and Florida City. After assessment, expand operations throughout the affected area. Provide assistance to other federal agencies, state/local governments and organizations in receipt, storage and distribution of supplies and equipment. Do not engage in law enforcement actions/operations without approval of CG, JTF. End State is to get life support systems in place and relieve initial hardships until state and local agencies can reestablish normal operations throughout the AO.335

The XVIII Abn Corps, commanded by LTG Gary Luck, provided the Army Force headquarters for the JTF formed by Second U.S. Army. At the time the hurricane made land fall the XVIII Abn Corps headquarters was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas overseeing the Battle Command Training Program exercise of the 29th Infantry Division, Virginia and Maryland National Guard. The corps headquarters split with a controlling element remaining at Fort Leavenworth to complete the exercise and the main headquarters returning to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to begin a rapid planning effort to commit corps units to the relief and recovery effort.336 The corps staff crafted a plan of operations

335 JTF overview. The underlined portions are on the original charts of the overview.
336 Drawn from the personal journal and memory of the author. I was assigned to the XVIII Abn Corps G3 Plans at the time. I kept a journal of my time on the corps staff.
based on the corps commander’s guidance and developed this plan while the
corps commander went forward for a reconnaissance of the stricken area.

Based on personal reconnaissance and coordination with local, state and
federal authorities Luck directed his assigned forces to deploy to Florida. He
approved the mission statement written by his planning staff, led by COL Robert
Barefield, a SAMS Fellow. Barefield crafted the mission in broad terms to enable
Luck’s subordinate commanders the latitude to use assigned and attached units
as they saw fit vis-à-vis the situation in their own zones of responsibility. Corps
units would conduct “military disaster relief operations in support of civil
authorities.” In his intent, which provided personal guidance to subordinate
commanders, the Luck stressed speed of execution of assigned tasks and
professionalism. The corps would be the visible presence of the U.S.
government response that supported the people of southern Florida. Luck
ensured in his guidance that his Soldiers knew they were there to support and
sustain the people. The corps mission and Luck’s intent are below.

MISSION.
As directed by CINCFOR, XVIII Abn Corps conducts military
disaster relief operations in support of civil authorities in FLORIDA
to assist in the recovery from the effects of HURRICANE
ANDREW. On order, units redeploy.

COMMANDER’S INTENT.
The keys to success in this operation are speed of execution and
professionalism. The Corps will respond to taskings for support as
quickly as possible and matching the unit with the proper
capabilities to the task as required. At all times, stress unit integrity
and the day-to-day chain of command. Short of deployment for war,
no other activity has more priority. Success in this operation is
prompt and effective support to the civil authorities as tasked by
GEN Edwin Burba, the Commander-in-Chief of Forces Command directed the XVIII Abn Corps to provide selected Army assets under a Joint Logistics Task Force (JLTF DRAGON) for disaster relief to federal and local authorities in Florida. The units came from the Corps Support Command. These types of units were best suited to conduct logistics, humanitarian relief, clean-up, engineer construction, and reconstruction. Military Police and infantry units were sent to provide security for federal-facilities and property. Given the images of the devastation, provided initially from CNN, the corps staff anticipated that the entire range of forces within the corps; logistic, engineer, military police, aviation, signals communications and infantry forces would also be needed. Barefield and the Corps G3 Plans section developed the troop list and coordinated the sequence of deployment to Florida.

Upon arrival into the designated operations area, XVIII Abn Corps elements operated under the control of Second U.S. Army/JTF-Andrew, although in the development of the corps mission and commander’s intent XVIII Abn Corps planners, directed by Luck identified the commander-in-chief of Forces Command as the senior headquarters. During Operation Desert Storm LTG Luck did not hold Third U.S. Army in high regard and it is quite likely that this carried over to the Second U.S. Army. Second U.S. Army was a holdover headquarters from the Cold War with primary responsibility for oversight of Army

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337 Headquarters, XVIII Abn Corps, Operations Order 92-1 Hurricane Andrew Relief, Fort Bragg, NC 28 August 1992. Pages unnumbered. CINCFOR is Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Command. Hereafter cited as OPORD 92-1. I had a hand in developing these two statements.
Reserve units and coordinating with National Guard units in the Army area. The headquarters was not manned and equipped to the level of the XVIII Abn Corps. The Corps plans section and the plans sections of the 82nd Abn and 10th Mountain Divisions were filled with graduates of SAMS. The Second U.S. Army did not have any SAMS graduates assigned.

Luck and the corps staff felt that current campaign planning procedures were transferable to disaster assistance operations, but the specific criteria for mission success and completion had to be war gamed, defined, and disseminated as widely as possible to all corps units involved in the operations. The corps staff focused on this effort. An element within the corps planning section also began planning for mission handover to federal, state and local civil authorities. The corps staff coordinated the definition of end state, success and handover criteria with the principal subordinates of the corps; the 82nd Abn Division and the 10th Mountain Division.

One of the two main elements of Army ground forces committed to the hurricane relief operation was the 10th Mountain Division. Major General Steven Arnold commanded the Mountain Division. During Desert Storm Arnold was the principal operations officer of Third U.S. Army. A few days after Hurricane Andrew made landfall Arnold received a phone call from the XVIII Abn Corps.

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338 The assignment of SAMS graduates was monitored closely by the Army DCSOPS and DCSPER. The DCSOPS of the Army developed the list of units that would receive SAMS graduates on their first tour of duty after graduation. This list consisted exclusively of Army divisions, corps, and specially selected functional headquarters such as Air Defense commands. A second list of units where SAMS graduates would be assigned on a second plans tour was also developed. This list included Army headquarters in Europe, Korea, regional combatant command headquarters and the Army and Joint Staffs in Washington. The DCSPER directed the actual individual assignments. Assignments to US based armies like 1st, 2nd, or 5th Army was not deemed a SAMS assignment by the DCSOPS or the DCSPER. This “rule” remains in effect today, 2010.
commander, Luck. Luck told Arnold that, “we needed to get to Homestead Air Force Base to do an assessment as the President was going to commit federal troops to assist in the relief operations.” Luck arranged to send an airplane to Fort Drum, a C-130, for division’s reconnaissance team. Arnold flew down to Homestead Air Force base, Florida and met Luck there. Luck established boundaries for the 10th Mountain and 82nd Abn Divisions. He instructed the command groups that they owned the ground in their operating areas. Arnold conducted his reconnaissance and then called the needed troops forward. The 82nd Abn Division, under BG Carl Ernst, was conducting a similar reconnaissance in its zone of operations. During the reconnaissance Arnold saw no evidence of looting or anarchy. He allowed his troops to deploy to Florida with their personal weapons and later on took the decision to store the weapons in secure areas in his divisional base camps. Both divisions realized the scope of the problem and called forward troops to deal with the challenges. Arnold and his 10th Mountain Soldiers experiences are illustrative of the post-Andrew relief operations.

Based on his reconnaissance Arnold realized there were many things to do to restore a level of security to his zone of operations. Arnold used his SAMS educated planners to answer his questions of how would the division leadership know it was doing the right things for the people of the area. He asked the planners to determine how he would measure success. In essence he asked his

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339 Interview with LTG (ret) Steven L. Arnold, 24APR09. LTG Arnold commanded the 10th Mountain Division during it’s commitment to operations in Florida and later on in Somalia. The 10th Mountain was one of the busiest divisions in the U.S. Army in the mid 1990s. Hereafter cited as Arnold interview.
planners to determine how to define victory in this type of operation. Arnold and his planners set goals on how to complete the tasks they set for themselves and means to assess progress toward attaining the goals. Arnold’s prime example was getting the schools in his area back open. In support of measuring this effort Arnold’s planners looked at what the schools would need such as: water, power, materials, some rebuilding, and then made school rebuilding a community event. Arnold also coordinated with the mayor of Homestead, Florida on this and all tasks with the area.

Arnold looked on a larger scope and determined the division should:

Establish distribution sites for food, water, and ice. Ice was important as it was really hot down there.
Establish shelters for people who could not go back to their homes or who had lost their homes.
And, establish a system for working with volunteers in a coherent way.  

Arnold and his planners also worked out criteria for re-establishing the public health systems and hospitals. Arnold and the mayor of Homestead determined that one indicator of success was when the power grid was back on so the division could remove military generators from the hospitals.

To further coordination with the local civic leadership, Arnold put his headquarters in the Homestead, Florida City Hall. He attended the city manager’s meetings to ensure the manager knew that Arnold and his troops were there to help and to make certain that both Arnold and the city manager knew where the division could do the most for the manager and the city. XVIII Abn Corps directed that all units use local civic boundaries where it made sense

340 Arnold interview.
to delineate units’ areas of operations and linked up unit commanders with local civic leaders. The corps and divisions also coordinated with the National Guard in a similar manner that the units coordinated with non-governmental organizations, NGOs. The Guard was not federalized so coordination was appropriate.341

Arnold established a system of coordinating with the NGOs and other volunteer organizations that came to Florida to help. There was a challenge in working with the 25-30 non-governmental organizations/volunteer organizations, none of which would accept military orders. Arnold and his staff held a nightly meeting and invited the NGOs to attend. The 10th Mountain division staff used these nightly meetings to share information or barter opportunities to match needed work with the best organization for that work. Arnold recalled that a church group that came down from another state and wanted to set up a feeding station. Through this meeting this group linked up with a local church of the same denomination. The staff was guided by the tenets of AirLand Battle of synchronization and depth, as well as the principles of war economy of force and mass. The staff used the nightly coordination meeting to focus the correct group to the correct task thus ensuring the division used its troops to tasks for which the military was best suited. Arnold recalled two other examples:

The Seventh Day Adventists came down with 1000 people to repair roofs. These people were great and we were able to put them into one of our battalion zones to do that work. They were self-sufficient, did the job and then left.
The Salvation Army, another wonderful organization. These people told me they were there for the long haul as it took a great deal of

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341 Arnold interview. Arnold went back to Homestead in September 2009 and was shown a plaque in City Hall dedicated to the Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division.
time to truly recover from a hurricane. The only thing they asked me for was a helicopter to fly a possible donor around the area so the donor could see the devastation. We did this. The donor was Ross Perot. He wrote a check to the Salvation Army and quietly left.  

The absence of a higher level plan and a coordinated "end state" can lead to overdependence on military forces by local government. In developing transition criteria planners had to consider a number of competing interests. The local people, especially the less well off people in Homestead and Dade County, wanted the military health care units to stay as long as possible. Local dentists and doctors were trying to reestablish their practices thus they wanted military hospital and dental units removed. Schools wanted to retain military power generation units to remain as long as possible, mainly because the county was not paying for the power. On the other hand the local power company wanted the military generators to be pulled out and the schools as well as private homes to come back on the power grid. Trash removal companies complained to the LTG Luck about the amount of debris military engineer units were hauling out of the county. Every truck load of debris an Army unit removed was money not going into the pockets of the contractors who were trying to reestablish their businesses. Citizens of the stricken area and Soldiers must know when emergency military operations will cease and local civil authorities assume complete control of the assistance operations. In the absence of any higher guidance, other than help the people, in this instance the JTF and corps proposed what the transition would look like and the specific circumstances of

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342 Arnold interview.
the handover.

JTF-Andrew, XVIII Abn Corps, 10th Mountain and 82nd Abn Divisions all attempted to articulate handover criteria or transitions from military efforts to civil. The military units had an advantage of planning expertise and experience. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), along with Mr. Robert Card, the personal representative of President Bush, did not have a definitive plan with an established end state or transition criteria. In the absence of this type of guidance JTF-Andrew’s Chief of Staff, MG Rich Griffitts, directed the development of a new operations plan called OPLAN GOLD. Griffitts told the assembled planners of JTF-Andrew’s subordinate commands that GOLD was an acronym for “Get Out of Lower Dade.” Griffitts did not ask questions about transition criteria but instead sent what his view of transition conditions were to FEMA. FEMA accepted this without many questions.343

Arnold also got a glimpse of the need to respond swiftly when Army forces are committed to assist the American people. He recalled that the people of Florida were looking for the cavalry. Arnold observed that while the Soldiers and leaders of the division thought the response was very quick, “the people in Homestead were sort of bitter at the lack of all levels of government response. We had to work hard to overcome this feeling.”344

SAMS graduate Colonel (ret) Robert Drumm, then assigned to the 10th Mountain, compared and contrasted Florida with what was lying ahead for the

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343 Drawn from my personal journal of my experiences as a planner for XVIII Abn Corps during the recovery efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. I was present when MG Griffitts explained what he was doing with OPLAN GOLD.

344 Arnold interview.
division, Somalia. Drumm said that Florida, “was simple operationally - divide the area into sectors, go get the resources (shovels, axes, chain saws, dump trucks, etc.), and start cleaning up.” Somalia was to be a much different proposition.

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345 Personal e-mail from COL (ret) Robert Drumm, AMSP graduate and AV Bde S3 and D/G3, 10th Mountain Division, 1992-94 to author, dated 18APR09. Hereafter cited as Drumm e-mail, 18APR09.
MG Stephen Arnold described the situation in Mogadishu to visitors as: “It

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may not be war, but it sure as hell ain’t peace.” The 10th Mountain Division had been back at Fort Drum for no more than six weeks when it was alerted for deployment to Somalia. Conflicts were brewing in many places around the world. The situation in the Balkans was growing worse every day. In Haiti, the military removed the elected president from power. When the Mountain Division returned to Fort Drum in late October 1992 after the handover of operations in Florida LTG Luck, the Airborne Corps commander called MG Arnold. Based on this talk Arnold told his staff that he was sure that the division would deploy again soon. The Mountain Division staff and commanders focused on the conduct of a peacekeeping mission. Arnold told the commanders and staffs to start figuring out how to do a peacekeeping operation under near combat like conditions. As he said, “I had the right mission, but the wrong continent!” In November 1992, the division commanders and staffs conducted a “rock drill”, a large scale rehearsal of a peace-keeping mission under near combat conditions, at Fort Drum. Arnold told the brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs to study Sarajevo, because he was certain that that was where the division would be going.348

In October, 1992, President Bush, in a speech at the United Nations, and said that the United States and its military were ready to play a wider role in the “new world order.”

The concept was interpreted differently within the U.S. government. This “new world order” was not viewed by the Defense Department or the armed

348 Arnold interview.
forces as a commitment to open ended operations but, rather, selective operations in support of national interests. The national interest in Somalia was not well articulated although the deluge of media reports and more tellingly images of starving children had an effect on the Bush administration. On 30 November 1992, Luck called Arnold with a warning order. Although President Bush lost the election in November, he decided to conduct the Somalia operation because of the overwhelming media attention paid on the starvation facing the Somali people. The situation in Somalia was grim. The government collapsed and there was no order. Warlords were using food as a weapon by withholding food from regions not loyal to them. Non-governmental organizations relief convoys were hijacked. Arnold wrote, “It was my first introduction to total chaos, complete anarchy and the collapse of a society. The greed and bickering of the warlords had ground the relief operations to a halt.  

Somalia news dominated the front pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post and CNN.

On 23 November 1992 President Bush convened a meeting with key security advisors on how to respond to the crisis in Somalia. GEN Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a plan titled “Operation Restore Hope,” to the assembled group. The purpose of the plan was ensure food got to starving Somalis. The plan called for putting “a substantial number of American troops” on the ground in Somalia. Powell wrote that Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor was uneasy and asked about getting out of Somalia. The president wanted the mission to be concluded by 19 January. Powell and Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense told the president that a

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349 Arnold, p. 27.
deployment of troops would not be completed until the middle of December and that a mission of this scope could not be completed prior to the inauguration of President-elect Clinton. Nonetheless, President Bush approved the mission.

U.S. Central Command, led by General Joseph Hoar, USMC, named Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC and commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force as the headquarters around which Hoar formed JTF-Somalia. U.S. Forces Command ordered the 10th Mountain Division to join the JTF. Johnston’s JTF then ticketed the 10th Mountain to act as the Army Forces headquarters, ARFOR, for the operation. This meant that Arnold’s division was responsible not only for the operations and sustainment of divisional forces but also for all U.S. Army forces in theater and fulfillment of the U.S. Army Title X responsibilities to a joint force. Complexity ruled.

As the ARFOR headquarters the division was responsible for supporting all U.S. Army forces in Somalia, as well as conducting its own operations. The division planners derived the mission from information received from corps planners, as well as CNN. As noted in the division after action report while there was a great deal of information available from television and news reports there was very little official guidance concerning the conduct of operations in Somalia beyond, “stop the dying.” MAJ Dave Stahl, SAMS graduate and the lead planner for the Mountain Division relied on the network of SAMS graduates serving at

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351 Under title X of the US Code the Army Force headquarters has the responsibility, among others, to support the entire force with common repair parts items, fuel, mail, and graves registration. Repair parts, fuel and mail also include the storage and delivery of these items. There are many more requirements under title X but these are representative of the responsibility placed on Arnold and his division.
Fort Bragg, Central Command headquarters in Tampa, and in Washington, DC for up to date information regarding expectations for the operation.

The division’s mission statement read as follows:

Task Force Mountain deploys, serves as ARFOR, and conducts military operations in Somalia to secure the airfield in Baledogle as well as other key installations and to provide security for operations in support of relief distribution sites in assigned humanitarian relief sectors in order to provide secure passage of relief supplies.352

Initially, the division did not receive any guidance that led the planners to focus on specific areas in the country, save Baledogle. The planners and commander assumed that the focus would be in the southern part of the country. Arnold directed Stahl and the other planners, not all of whom were SAMS graduates, to develop a plan that accomplished this mission by patrolling lines of communications used by aid agencies, providing security for the storage and distribution sites, developing and maintaining coordination with coalition forces and non-governmental organizations, and lastly, establishing liaison with local clan leaders, elders, and United Nations forces.

The focus of main effort within the division area, physically and psychologically, was to break the hunger cycle in the country, establish some level of security, and then handover the operation to the UN at a level that UN forces could sustain. Unstated, but relevant to planning was the fact that the outgoing Bush administration wanted this mission accomplished before the end of the Bush term and the transition to the incoming administration of President-

elect William J. Clinton. This proved impossible. While the division had an alert order and a derived mission statement it also had no firm deployment date.

Somalia is a big country. Arnold wanted to bring as many helicopters and trucks as possible. Arnold and his planners were convinced that the division would need a great deal of transportation. The planners worked very hard on the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL). The time phased force deployment list process was devised in the 1950s and revised throughout the Cold War as more updated automation became available. The process matched deploying units’ equipment with the required trains to get to a sea port of embarkation and buses to bring Soldiers to air ports, airplanes to bring unit Soldiers to a theater of operations, matched against the shipping time from ports of embarkation to ports of debarkation in the theater of operations.

In the end the TPFDL drove the development of courses of action for Somalia. Divisional planners met twice a day for ten days, adjusting their proposed deployment and operational plans to respond to last minute changes to the mission profile, anticipated force caps and corresponding cuts in space allocated on aircraft and ships going to Somalia. A prime example of a last minute change to both mission profile and deployment occurred on 10 December 1992. The deployment of Mountain Division units began on 7 December, D-2, when the first of seven trains departed for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. On 9 December 1992, D-day, the first Marines landed in Mogadishu. On 10 December, D+1, the JTF commander, Marine LtGen Robert Johnson decided that the first Army units needed to arrive at Baledogle on 12 December, D+3.
This was seven days earlier than Stahl and the Mountain Division planners initially forecast. A Company, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry and the Task Force 2-87 Infantry Tactical command post deployed by three C-141s directly into Baledogle to conduct a relief in place of Marine units in that town. On 13 December 1992, D+4, the division’s assault command post consisting of BG Lawson Magruder, the Assistant Division Commander for Operations and 34 Soldiers deployed to Mogadishu. On 19 December 1992, D+10, the division’s main deployment began. TF 2-87 Infantry under the command and control of 2nd Brigade, the 10th Aviation Brigade and TF 5-158 Aviation (from Germany) occupied Baledogle airfield. TF Kismayo was established in the southern Somali city of Kismayo with TF 3-14 Infantry and the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion. The Division support command and the 548th Combat Support Battalion began to set up operations in Mogadishu. TF Kismayo and the 2nd Brigade immediately began operations to expand their areas of operation. The DISCOM began planning and establishing marshaling areas for the reception of equipment in Mogadishu.\(^{353}\)

The more the division’s space allocations were cut, the more challenging it was for the Stahl and the division’s planners had to decide what and who to take to accomplish the mission. This effort did not quite fall into accord with any established planning or decision making process; again, planners had to adapt the familiar to the unfamiliar.

Two of the planners involved in the effort, COL Drumm and LTC Stahl

\(^{353}\) U.S. Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (LI), After Action Report, 2 January 1993, page 1. Found on the third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Hereafter cited as 10th Mountain AAR.
later asserted that the entire approach was backwards, one that required the division planners to propose a definitive mission and then to argue for forces to accomplish the mission. Other factors that were mostly political; adhering to UN resolutions, the reluctance to commit too many troops to an open ended mission with an implied end time but no end state, drove decisions. The division’s After Action Review elaborated on the apparent disconnect between the tactical level planning conducted by the division staff and the strategic level planning conducted in Washington. MG Arnold approved the AAR which stated that during the division’s planning process and development of courses of action for both deployment to Somalia and the conduct of operations in country, “it seemed as though the crisis action planning accomplished at the strategic level was based on an artificial force cap of 10,200, not based on a mission analysis.” The challenges faced by division planners were further acerbated by a lack of collaborative planning between Fort Drum, Fort Bragg, Tampa and Washington. The operational and strategic level headquarters were not taking the challenges of the tactical headquarters into consideration.\textsuperscript{354} Drumm, then a major and SAMS graduate assigned to the division recalled that “all we were told was take a bit of everything and figure it out once you get there.”\textsuperscript{355}

The problem with “taking a bit of everything” and waiting until arrival in theater to figure out what to do was complicated by the fact that, initially, the planners assumed the entire division would deploy to Somalia. In fact, and unknown to Arnold and his planners until late December, 1992, the Joint Staff

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\item [\textsuperscript{354}] 10th Mountain AAR, pp. 4/5.
\item [\textsuperscript{355}] Drumm e-mail, 18APR09
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and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had imposed a cap on the U.S. forces that could be deployed. In his address to the American people on 4 December President Bush stated that 28,000 American troops would be sent to Somalia in accord with UN Security Council resolution 794. The exact process of how this number was reached is unknown but reflects members of the National Security Council staff and Defense Department reluctance to commit forces to what was viewed as an open ended and ill defined operation.\textsuperscript{356}

The planners faced competing demands regarding the tasks assigned to the division, the potential operating area of some 21,000 square miles, and the need to sustain the division and other Army forces, and they were constrained to make use of no more than 10,200 Soldiers with which to accomplish these tasks. Given the critical nature of logistics to the accomplishment of what became designated Operation Restore Hope, Drumm was amazed that, “The most critical piece of equipment in the deployment to Somalia was the forklift - it got bumped to the third serial...”\textsuperscript{357} Clearly, limited space on air and sea-lift drove what the division deployed with and not the needs of the mission.

In their book, My Clan against the World, Drs. Robert Baumann, Larry Yates, and Versalle Washington described the higher level political, strategic and

\textsuperscript{356} See Powell, My American Journey, Baumann et al, My Clan, Stanton, Somalia on $5.00 a Day, Arnold and Stahl, and Arnold. As related by Powell the Bush administration was unsure of how to get out of Somalia once U.S. forces got in. This, coupled with an incoming Clinton administration that campaigned on vigorous action in the Balkans contributed to the unstated feeling in the Pentagon, Central Command and Fort Bragg that this operation in Somalia could likely become a lower priority mission. According to Dr. Roger Spiller, an historian working for GEN Sullivan’s initiatives group at the time, “The reluctance was very keen within the higher ranks of the ARSTAFF (Army Staff), all of whom seemed to be looking in the direction of the Balkans. Once the mission was framed, I heard more than once the hope expressed that if the Army went into Somalia, perhaps it would not be called on to go into the Balkans. Even so, the ARSTAFF was already looking at possible courses of action for a Balkan intervention at the time.”

\textsuperscript{357} Drumm e-mail, 18APR09.
operational settings that constrained this mission. Operation Restore Hope was a prime example of the Clausewitzian world of post-Cold War military operations. In this environment the military’s needs were clearly subordinate to policy and political concerns. The Department of Defense was not enthusiastic about the use of military force to carry out a humanitarian mission. The White House was moved by humanitarian concerns but was also cognizant of the conditions that affected the start and finish of such an operation. The use of force was an extension of policy through other means.

Exacerbating this situation was a lack of real intelligence on the situation in Somalia. Again, as Baumann and his co-authors point out in their book, while the Somali people are of the same ethnic group, over centuries the Somalis developed an allegiance to their clan over any national form of government. Clans also competed for political power within the country. Food and the means to deliver and distribute it became weapons and the underlying reason for the cycle of starvation in the country. None of this though was known by deploying U.S. forces until they arrived in theater.

Without being apprised regarding any of these issues, the 10th Mountain Division approached this assignment like any other mission. Planners applied the doctrinal military decision making process, (MDMP). Arnold’s SAMS-educated planners laid out the tasks, developed courses of action; conducted rehearsals, all in accord with the familiar doctrine that was extant. The key,

\textsuperscript{358} My Clan, p. 9. Regarding intelligence on the actual situation while the command group and staff of the 10th Mountain might not have known about events in Somalia, again from Spiller, there is an indication that “some people in the JCS J-3” understood the situation very well. Clearly, based on interviews with Arnold and Drumm, this did not get to the people charged with executing the operation.
Arnold decided, was looking for indicators of longer term solutions and how to measure success. Arnold said, “We had to do this because the President’s mission, frankly, did not make much sense. We had to break the starvation cycle and leave by 20 January, the inauguration of the new President, Clinton.” The task to complete the mission before the inauguration of the new administration was problematic—to say the least—due to challenges with the ever changing TPFDL, the division did not arrive in Mogadishu until 20 January.  

Shortly after the division arrived in Somalia, commanders and staffs realized that the food needed to break the “cycle of starvation” was there on the ground. The essential dilemma was bandit trouble. Bandits under the control of local warlords choked off the means of distribution. Food was a weapon for the warlords, and they established check points along the limited road network where they levied “taxes” in the form of taking food from the NGOs and aid agencies. The taxes ranged from with a few bags of food to seizing entire shipments.

This was the easiest problem Arnold and his planners had to solve. The Mountain Division simply out-gunned the bandit check points. The Mountain Division established armed convoys with overhead cover from attack helicopters. Additionally divisional units such as Task Force 2-87 Infantry made use of “flying check points.” The Task Force used its motorized anti-tank platoon to conduct mounted patrols and set up check points at random. These would remain in place for only a few hours and then move. Somali bandits were never able to discern a pattern of activity. These random check points coupled with armed

359 Arnold interview.
convoy escorts and air support broke the back of the bandit problem.\textsuperscript{360} As Arnold recalled, by April 1993, almost no one in Somalia was dying from hunger. The mission was so successful that the “country was glutted with relief supplies.” Baumann wrote that by implementing a range of measures designed to establish a more secure environment in southern Somalia the US force and the United Nations Task Force in Somalia ensured that “that humanitarian aid reached Somalis in the famine belt.”\textsuperscript{361} This part of the mission was successful.

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\textsuperscript{361} Stanton, p. 259 and \textit{My Clan}, p. 76 respectively.
\end{flushright}
Arnold and his commanders, as well as the JTF commander, determined that the first and best condition the division could establish in its zone was security. Arnold directed his planners to come up with four simple rules that the war lords and people could understand. These were:

- No road side check points
- No visible weapons. We realized that everyone was armed but did not want to allow people to carry them openly.
- No bandits
- No technicals

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362 10th Mtn Somalia AAR, p. iv.
363 Arnold interview, Arnold, p. 31, and My Clan, pp. 64/65. Arnold’s 4 No’s became the basis
These were simple rules that the people could rely on and the bandits clearly understood.

The vast majority of the people shared a common religion, Islam, although they were not devout per se, they shared a common language throughout the country and they knew their tribal lineage. Arnold's instinct was to work with the tribal chiefs and elders to get a feel for what was needed for security and breaking the cycle of hunger. These tribal chiefs were the key to stability in Somalia. This was a potentially powerful group that could provide some stability for the country, at least in the south where the Mountain Division operated.

The division plan, according to the after action report, recognized two different types of cultural awareness required for operations in Somalia; the Somali culture and the Non-governmental organization culture. The Somali society was in chaos. Division planners and commanders learned early that a key element in gaining some form of control of the security situation required close coordination with Somali clan elders. The elders in Somali society retained a sort of authority within towns. Early recognition of these sources of authority assisted in maintaining some limited control once an American or coalition presence was established in the areas around Somali towns. Dealing with the culture of the NGO was a major factor in establishing security and delivering supplies to starving Somalis. The division planners and commanders established a Civil-Military Operations center in Mogadishu. Through this center efforts of U.S. Army forces were coordinated with NGOs, to either stay out of the...

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for future JTF and UNITAF proclamations on controlling weapons in Somalia. A technical was the term used to describe the pick-up trucks outfitted with machine-guns that were used by Somali armed groups.
way of each other’s operations or to take advantage of security provided by military forces. The experience gained during operations in Florida served the division staff well during the Somalia operation. Stability also depended upon the ability to the Mountain Division to operate over extended distance.

One of the most challenging aspects of Restore Hope was the distance involved in conducting operations. From Mogadishu (ARFOR headquarters) to Kismayo is over 250 miles. It was 65 miles to Baledogle and another 125 miles to Baidoa. At one point the ARFOR was controlling operations over 500 miles from Belet Uen to Kismayo. (See map 2) These distances called for extended communications capabilities, both high frequency radios, HF and tactical satellite radios, TACSAT, which stretched the capabilities of the divisional signal battalion. Forward area refueling and re-arming points, FARP, operations became critical for the use of attack and reconnaissance aviation assets and extended range fuel tanks for UH-60 helicopters. The ARFOR operated over an area in excess of 21,000 square miles.\(^\text{364}\)

The 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division’s aviation assets were very limited and thus the scope of its operations was limited. The division’s aviation brigade modified the classic planning process as the need for flexibility, agility, depth, and synchronization was required in the conduct of operations. Drumm, Stahl and the other planners and operations officers in the division had to meticulously determine how to logistically support and sustain operations. There were no functional airfields outside Mogadishu, thus the aviation brigade had to establish FARPs to conduct operations. Establishing FARPs allowed extended helicopter

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\(^{364}\) 10th Mtn AAR, p. 24.
operations as these aviation “gas stations” enabled the helicopters to carry more weight; Soldiers and equipment, armament, etc. Establishing these “gas stations” also required additional forces to secure these sites.365

The division planners based their operations in the tenets of AirLand Battle. Agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization were evident in the conduct of 10th Mountain Division plans and operations. In general, division operations to extend the reach of security for aid agencies were conducted in accord with a five-phase concept. During Phase I, Ambassador Oakley, the representative of the President and the UN Secretary General in Somalia would visit the selected area and tell the tribal elders and people that coalition forces would arrive soon. Oakley was always escorted by a combat air patrol of attack helicopters and a security detachment. Immediately following Oakley’s visit, Phase II, the division used its psychological operations (PSYOP) and aviation units to drop leaflets and post of handbills throughout the intended area of operations. The use of leaflets and handbills was limited by the fact that the U.N. estimated, in 1990, that the Somali literacy was 24% and the location of these literate people was not clear outside Mogadishu.366 Phase III was marked by the introduction of forces to secure the area. Phase IV of the overall operation called for a continuation of the PSYOP campaign and establishing conditions for sector handover to other coalition forces. These conditions were set by the use of mounted patrols, check points to disrupt bandit operations, and continued coordination with Somali village elders and NGOs. Phase V was the redeployment of forces or the

365 Drawn from Drumm e-mail, 18APR09 and the 10th Mountain AAR.
366 My Clan, p.9.
transition of operations to coalition forces.\textsuperscript{367} Airland Battle doctrine, as adapted to the situation, worked, at least for the first stage of the overall operation.

Baumann and his co-authors concluded that Operation Restore Hope was an unqualified success. Baumann used the criteria developed by Central Command and JTF-Somalia as promulgated in the CENTCOM and JTF operations orders, to make this determination. The JTF operations ended the worst of the famine in southern Somalia. The security situation established by the U.S. led coalition allowed for an acceleration of humanitarian relief operations. By the time the JTF handed over operations to the follow on United Nations mission, UNOSOM II, the international aid community had declared the “emergency” in Somalia over.\textsuperscript{368}

This challenging operation was not executed perfectly. There were gaps in planning and in conducting the mission analysis required of a very complex political-military operation. The 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division commanders and planners were handicapped from the start due to late notification, and distance from the I MEF/JTF headquarters. The 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain was a light infantry division and thus was not equipped with enough trucks and helicopters to ensure the sustained mobility differential needed for extended operations in Somalia. The reason for the decision to dispatch the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division was, apparently, that U.S. Forces Command and XVIII Abn Corps, while supportive of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain, were still in the grips of retaining better equipped and manned divisions, such as the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Abn or 101\textsuperscript{st} Air Assault Divisions for “a real”

\textsuperscript{367} 10th Mountain AAR, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{368} My Clan, p. 88.
The arbitrary cap on U.S. forces established by a process unknown to the division planners also influenced the decision to deploy a “light” division. Ultimately though the operation ended badly as forces were replaced, missions became confused, and there was no clear policy guidance from Washington or command guidance from Central Command. Without this direction tactical effects were wasted as they were not linked to some strategic or policy objective.

JTF-Los Angeles’ civil support operations, JTF-Andrew’s hurricane relief operations and Operation Restore Hope are prime examples of post Cold War operations conducted by U.S. Army units. Taken together, these three operations, categorized as operations other than war, and conducted in the United States and overseas, came to typify the range of operations the U.S. Army would face for the remainder of the 20th century. The operations were in line with the Clausewitzian adage that war is an extension of policy by other means. In the post Cold War era the use of military power was an extension of policy by other means. The decisions taken to begin these operations were influenced by human events, natural events, and the pressure of a 24 hour a day news cycle. These operations influenced SAMS’ curricula as well as the developing new version of FM 100-5.

369 Drawn from my personal journals of my service at XVIII ABN Corps. The sentiment that operations other than war were not on the Mission Essential Task List of the 82nd Abn and 101st AASLT prevailed on the Corps staff. The 10th Mountain, a division with only two active Army brigades, the other brigade coming from the New York National Guard, was more suited to these type missions, according to the prevailing attitudes of the Corps staff and command group. This was never written down in official message traffic or orders, but the attitude drove the selection of forces for these types of operations, especially Somalia. There was an expectation that combat operations would be required to restore the situation in the Balkans and thus more combat ready divisions were held in readiness for this anticipated operation. During the mid-90s the 10th Mountain would become known as the most deployed division in the Army as it deployed to Florida, Somalia, and Haiti.
The school continued to influence its graduates as they returned to the field Army. Not surprisingly, the combat experiences of officers entering SAMS also influenced the school. Combat experience also shaped doctrine as well as the continuing discourse within the school as the writing teams therein began the process of writing the next version of FM 100-5. The infusion of combat experienced officers into SAMS will be explored in the following chapter.

From the end of Operation Desert Storm and the uneasy peace that settled in Southwest Asia and the Balkans, School of Advanced Military Studies graduates on division and corps staffs adapted existing doctrine to the new set of circumstances they faced. Conditions in the world were changing rapidly, and the ability of the SAMS graduates to apply the familiar tenets of AirLand Battle to this era of operations other than war served the Army well. None of these operations were perfect, but they met the requirements and objectives set by policy. Despite the fact that SAMS graduates, as shown in the three highlighted operations, adapted the doctrine the 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine was losing relevance. Conditions and missions were changing in light of the changing political, social and ethnic forces that affected the worldwide security situation. The Army turned to SAMS to write the doctrine that would mark the end of the era of AirLand Battle and bring the Army into the era of operations other than war, the continuing “Peace Dividend,” and a changing world.
Chapter Eight
A Return of Tensions
Dealing with the Changing Conduct of War

Just before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Hal Winton, newly retired from the U.S. Army and now a member of the SAMS faculty, completed a “back of the envelope” analysis of the assignment patterns for the first five AMSP classes. Winton was concerned about the completion rate of the third phase of the SAMS educational experience: assignment as a general staff officer to a division or corps for a year. Winton noted that the attention paid to this third phase of SAMS was “generally functioning well,” but that the visibility of those taking part in the phase three assignment was waning. Winton related the story of LTG Colin Powell, while serving as commanding general of V Corps in Europe in 1986, sending a message to the Army deputy chief of staff, personnel, LTG Robert Elton, requesting permission to assign a field artillery AMSP graduate to the V Corps artillery instead of the corps G3 plans section. The Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN John Wickham, denied Powell permission to do so. This was significant evidence that the follow-on assignment of SAMS educated officers to general staff positions in the plans section was very important to the senior leaders of the Army. Wass de Czege succeeded in convincing these leaders that the completion of the SAMS education took place while interacting with general officers in command of Army divisions and corps. In his memorandum to the director, Winton recommended that the assignment packet for each AMSP graduate’s orders explicitly state that the officer was to be assigned to the
general staff, that SAMS and the personnel center were then to review
assignments two months after graduation and to use “moral suasion” to correct
assignment errors. Finally, Winton proposed that phase III assignments (the
AMSP experience was viewed as a three phase process; first was the regular
course of CGSC, second AMSP, and phase three being the assignment to an
Army division or corps as a planner) of AMSP graduates be a topic of discussion
at the next Chief of Staff Army corps and division commanders’ conference. Following Winton’s advice, the SAMS leadership concluded that it was necessary
to assess the institution’s visibility and presumed value in light of what occurred
during Operation Just Cause.

In the aftermath of two major combat operations and a series of
peacekeeping operations, the School of Advanced Military Studies faced a series
of tests. These ranged from a downturn in volunteers, a reduction in the size of
the Army that placed career pressures on majors in the U.S. Army, the effect of
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, and a growing hostility
toward a perceived “SAMS elite” on the part of some in of the officer corps. The
downturn in volunteers also lead to a perception of a lack of “quality” in SAMS
graduates on the part of previous graduates of the school. No real evidence
supported this save anecdotal stories relayed by graduates back to the school
and within the SAMS network as it existed. Additionally, the leadership of

370 School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for Director, SAMS, Subject, AMSP
Phase III Completion, dated 29 June 1990 held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
371 I encountered this perception personally when I assumed command of my battalion in 1998.
My brigade commander, a SAMS graduate, told me that he would not hire any of the current SAMS
graduates on the division staff as they were not resident CGSC graduates and were, in his words, damaged
goods.
SAMS confronted a proposal to refine the Fellows’ program to produce doctors of Military Art & Science. According to its advocates, among them General Frederick M. Franks (newly appointed commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command); the doctoral program was designed to meet a perceived need for officers with a deeper appreciation of strategy and campaigning.\(^\text{372}\)

Further complicating the issues facing SAMS (and the U.S. Army), dramatically changing conditions in the world dictated that there be a reconsideration of the doctrine of AirLand Battle. The Army was rediscovering new “old” missions in support of civil authorities, stability operations overseas, and the requirement to rapidly shift from stability operations to combat operations and back again, all in the same campaign. FM 100-5, 1986, having served the Army well in two combat operations, was now seen as no longer relevant, given perceived new demands on the Army, a changing national security strategy, and an increase in the operating tempo due a range of challenges in the U.S. and overseas. In response to this challenge, the director of SAMS established a Campaign Operations Group in 1992. The major task of this group was to write the next version of FM 100-5. The director established this group based on guidance received from Franks correctly anticipating SAMS’ involvement in the development of the next version of FM 100-5.

This chapter explores the changes and tensions facing the three directors

\(^{372}\) In an e-mail sent on 3NOV09 GEN (ret) Franks wrote, “I remain convinced we need a PhD program in military arts. Military arts is the heart of our profession. It deserves development of a continuing core of officers educated in the full dimensions of our profession...We have such in many other disciplines in and out of the Army. But we have none dedicated to the military arts.”
of the school who served during this turbulent period with a backdrop of two hot
wars and operations other than war. The directors were; COL William Janes,
COL James McDonough, and COL Gregory Fontenot. Hal Winton remained the
deputy director in uniform and as a retired officer until he abruptly departed the
school in 1991.\footnote{Winton left the school abruptly, as there was some controversy over the process of his retirement and subsequent hiring as the deputy director with the grade of GS-15. COL Janes had the unfortunate duty to inform Winton that his hiring was revoked and the position of deputy director was re-opened for competition within the civil service. Winton had done much for SAMS yet left without ceremony. He moved to the Air University and assisted in the establishment of the USAF School of Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies, SAAS.}

COL Janes became the director of SAMS in 1989 immediately after
completing the two years of the SAMS Fellowship. Janes was selected as
director for a number of reasons—the most obvious being the fact that he was at
the School when COL Holder left. This was the easiest course of action for the
assignment officers in the Personnel Center. Janes was also acceptable to the
Army’s leadership of the time. Janes had served as an operations officer and an
Opposing Force battalion commander at the National Training Center. He also
had worked with Holder during an exercise in Germany. He was selected for
brigade command in his last year of the Fellowship. As Holder later said, “That
experience, his excellence as a trainer and operator, and his knowledge of how
the School ran all qualified him for the position.” Holder nominated Janes, and
GEN Maxwell Thurman, the TRADOC commander, approved the assignment.
Holder inferred from this approval that there was no worry on the part of the Army
senior leaders regarding any “inbreeding” as Janes had long experience in the
Army before he was assigned to SAMS. Janes expected to serve as the director
for two years prior to assuming command of an armor brigade. Events would dictate otherwise, and Janes served as the director for only 18 months, from June 1989 to December 1990. Janes was the director during Operation Just Cause and the opening stages of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The tests Janes faced were due to SAMS success as predicted in Sinnreich’s almost prophetic assessment at the end of his tenure as director. The success also came on the heels of the departure of the final director, COL Don Holder, having a personal relationship with any of the generals leading the Army. Janes, an outstanding armor officer with great Army experience, had not been a member of the FM 100-5 writing teams as Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder had been. COL (ret) Rick Swain, Ph.D., who was then serving as the director of the Fellowship, later termed the beginning of Janes’ term as director the beginning of the “bureaucratization” of SAMS. From Swain’s perspective, Janes had to deal with the immediate fallout from SAMS’ successes. As shown below, the Command and General Staff College as well as the Army leadership began to ask SAMS to do things outside its charter of educating majors and lieutenant colonels for the field forces.

At the same time, the College demanded more attention to academic bureaucratic requirements as a start to gaining more control over SAMS. The prime example of this interventionism was an attempt by the CGSC Directorate

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374 Electronic mail note from LTG (ret) Don Holder to the author, 23NOV2009. Holder stated that Janes assignment was approved by the TRADOC commander and the Chief of Staff, Army. Janes also had a family medical reason to remain at Fort Leavenworth. Drawn from an interview with Mrs. Candace Hamm, 17NOV09. Mrs. Hamm served with SAMS in various office positions from travel clerk to office manager since 1985. Janes departed SAMS early to assume command of a brigade in Germany when it’s commander was relieved from duty. Janes did not take the brigade to the Gulf War though.
of Academic Operations, DAO, to inject its Standards Division into the SAMS curriculum development process. The Director of Academic Operations at the time was COL Lewis I. Jeffries. There is no indication of malice or jealousy of the independent status of SAMS in any records. The DAO Standards Division was primarily interested in the adherence to the requirements of academic bureaucracy. As discussed in chapter one the SAMS’ faculty really did have a pattern of disinterest in the more mundane aspects of academic bureaucracy.

Prior to his Army retirement in 1989, Winton conducted an annual internal after action review and assessment of what had transpired during that academic year. Winton’s reports were 12 pages long on average. The report was done and evaluated quickly enough to influence the next academic year, 1989-1990. After Winton left the DAO stepped in to perform this task. The Standards Division began its first review in January 1990 with a briefing to Janes. The survey was conducted in May 1990 and the report was finalized and sent to Janes as well as the entire Combined Arms Center chain of command, the Deputy Commandant and Commandant in October 1990, rather late to influence the academic year. The report was 54 pages long. It assessed the effectiveness of each course in AMSP. The administrators of the report found that the course met student expectations.375

Janes also received very painstaking guidance concerning the preparation

375 The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Department of Academic Operations, Standards Division, Internal Evaluation of the Advanced Military Studies Program (October 1990), held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Standards Division, now titled Quality Assurance Division, continues to render long assessments of the programs within SAMS. Winton’s reports are also held in the SAMS files. The methodology used posed statements to the students such as, “Ability to assess the moral, physical, and cybernetic domains from the small unit through corps,” and then were asked to evaluate how well a particular course in AMSP prepared the student in regards to the statement. The ratings were; very effective, effective, neutral, ineffective and very ineffective.
of the Academic Evaluation Report, Department of the Army Form 1059. Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all paid appropriate attention to the form as it was placed in an officer’s official file. These men wrote personal accounts of an officer’s work during the academic year, but that approach was not in accord with CGSC standards. The required standard was “achieved course standards.” Since SAMS was conducted on a pass/fail basis as the CGSC policy was no one could exceed course standards. Janes made the change to be in accord with CGSC policy. Janes did retain the authority, as previous directors had done, to issue personal curriculum development guidance.  

Janes promulgated SAMS’ course planning guidance for academic year, AY, 1991/92 on 1 January 1991. The DAO had not fully extended its influence into SAMS, for Janes retained the authority to develop and refine his own guidance for the school. As with the previous directors, Janes retained the prerogative to take the school in a direction that he, along with faculty input, discerned from a review of the conditions facing the Army. Janes was guided by his personal experience and wisdom. He challenged the students in SAMS to think through problems from the Red/enemy perspective as well as Blue/friendly. This guidance reflected an appreciation of the changing conduct of war. Janes wrote that the AY 91/92 curricula would build upon the changes in the AY 90/91 curricula and expand upon the “significant political changes taking place globally.

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376 Based on a discussion with Janes, 25 May 2009. Janes was not the only director to receive such guidance. McDonough also received such a memorandum, dated 25FEB93. This memorandum was eight pages long and included three enclosures. This memorandum required that “a standard boiler plate statement will appear on all AMSP AERs.” The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Department of Academic Operations, Standards Division, Internal Evaluation of the Advanced Military Studies Program (15 February 1993), held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
and reflecting current budget constraints.” Further, Janes directed that the course directors place additional emphasis on deployment and employment of forces, a greater consideration of the economic element of national power, and “an investigation of the role of religion and ideology in modern war.” Janes’ reading of intelligence data, open source reporting on the demise of the Soviet Union, combined with input from Schneider, Swain and Epstein, led him to believe that the conditions the Army would face in warfare at the end of the 20th century required an exploration of the re-introduction of these ancient motivations for warfare. He started the process of moving SAMS beyond US-Soviet confrontations. This was the only formal, written guidance Janes would issue as director. Janes also faced budget challenges with which previous directors did not have to deal.

In the aftermath of two hot wars, the Army was beginning to face the historical national desire for a “peace dividend” as the end of the Cold War dawned. Swain recalled that Janes had to go to the Commanding General on a monthly basis in order to ensure he had the funds to keep the school functioning. Swain suspected that the TRADOC commander and the Army staff required the Combined Arms Center to pay its own bills out of its own budget. Janes left no notes in the SAMS files about this trying event. Janes kept much of the external pressure on himself in order to keep it away from the faculty and the students. There is one copy of a briefing chart on budget in the SAMS files. This chart

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377 School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s Memorandum No. 3, School of Advanced Military Studies Course Planning Guidance AY 91/92, dated 1 January 1991, not paginated. Hereafter cited as Director’s Memo No. 3. Held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
outlines proposed budget cuts for the fiscal year 1994 budget. The total proposed cuts totaled $90,000. Proposed cuts ranged from reducing faculty professional development funds to reducing funds for guest lecturer travel. The upshot of the reduced SAMS budget was the elimination of the AMSP east coast trip to the Pentagon and the trip to Europe. On the positive side the Janes substituted a bus trip to Vicksburg and the study of Grant’s Civil War campaign. This trip became the highlight of the AMSP year, a capstone event where students put together all they learned in the course of the academic year.  

The Combined Arms Center budget was being squeezed in part because the Battle Command Training Program was being established, and “the College was getting gutted for that both financially and in personnel.” Janes worked hard to retain the range of trips both AMSP and the Fellows took as a crucial element of the education process offered by SAMS. Swain said that this was a hard time for SAMS and that, “Bill Janes was my hero just for keeping the doors open.” Swain served as the director of the Fellows in SAMS and thus knew Janes very well. Other faculty members, by design, were shielded from this turmoil as Janes wanted the faculty to focus on teaching. What did all of this mean for SAMS?  

SAMS was successful thus the greater College wanted to bring SAMS into the fold. Janes exerted efforts to retain SAMS independence and he was successful to some extent. Two major combat operations took place while Janes was the director. He began the attempts to bring the curriculum into position to...

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378 Undated chart titled SAMS Proposed Cuts (FY 94 Budget) found in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Janes took part in long range budget discussions since the Army had to project costs for the annual Five Year Defense Plan.

379 This quotation and the one preceding drawn from a personal electronic mail note from Dr. Rick Swain to the author, 29 May 2009.
face these changing conditions. Finally Janes faced the problems of a shrinking budget and made tough decisions to continue the quality of the SAMS education. There were other issues that Janes and his successors had to face given the changing world conditions. The most urgent was the troubling issue that arose with the successful conclusion of the first Gulf War; the perception of elitism on the part of SAMS graduates during the conduct of planning and execution of combat operations. The director that faced this issue and others was Colonel James R. McDonough.

McDonough was appointed the Director of SAMS in April, 1991. A 1969 graduate of West Point, McDonough had served in Vietnam as a lieutenant and had been decorated for valor in combat. McDonough had earned a master’s degree in Political Science—with an emphasis on security studies—from MIT. As a captain, he taught at West Point in the Social Sciences Department with Wass de Czege and Sinnreich. He was a fellow in SAMS from 1986 to 1988 and served as a seminar leader. Upon arrival at Fort Leavenworth and SAMS McDonough was almost immediately confronted by the issue of SAMS elitism. The gauntlet was thrown down by Colonel (later Major General) Carl Ernst of the Battle Command Training Program.

Ernst served as the deputy G3 of Third U.S. Army/ARCENT during the later planning stage and execution phase of Operation Desert Storm. Ernst came to Fort Leavenworth to take charge of the Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, and in that capacity had seen the performance of all the divisions in the Army in the year before the invasion of Kuwait. He went to Saudi
Arabia to assist in the combat preparation and then remained in the theater.

Ernst’s BCTP officers served in all Army divisions and corps, mainly in the operations and intelligence sections. These positions afforded Ernst unique insights as his officers served as “directed telescopes” into the operations within the staffs. Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, Ernst reported to the commander of the Combined Arms Center, LTG Wishart about his observations concerning Army division and corps operations in general and SAMS graduates in particular.

Ernst believed that while the concept of SAMS was sound the special treatment that SAMS graduates received during the war was bad for the officer corps. Worse, some SAMS graduates acted as if they were the ones wearing the stars of their commanders. The fact was that the Army did comb non-deploying units for SAMS graduates to send to headquarters that were without them. These officers gained immediate access to senior generals simply because they were SAMS graduates. This caused the perception among other officers in these organizations that the SAMS educated officers constituted a self-serving “elite.” From this perspective, the moniker “Jedi” was used as a pejorative.

Ernst proposed to McDonough and Wishart that the follow-on assignment of SAMS graduates be changed from division and corps level to brigade level.

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380 A directed telescope is a term used to describe a team of officers within a headquarters that reports on the operations within the unit to a higher headquarters. Ernst’s officers, trained to evaluate the functions of the division and corps staffs during BCTP exercises were naturally still reporting to him about what was going on within the units to which they were assigned.

381 In fact the ARMY Times newspaper ran a story about SAMS in the summer of 1992 with a picture of McDonough captioned, “Obi-Wan” McDonough. McDonough did not think this was good for the school as it reinforced the image of an elite. From the McDonough interview, 11 June 2009.
He reasoned that the last experience with troops of most SAMS graduates were as company grade officers, captains. They had no practical experience as field grade officers, majors, with troops. These graduates were well versed in theory but had trouble converting theory into practice. Ernst proposed that after one year in a brigade the graduates would be better suited for service at division and corps level. This proposal was not acted on, but the reports of the perception of elitism among and about SAMS graduates were troubling.382

Certainly, SAMS graduates did have a range of access to general officers that was extraordinary. These officers had to produce at a high level, and by and large did so. The fact that SAMS graduates were reassigned, for example, to round out the Third Army plans section from Army divisions that were not deploying to the fight caused resentment among officers that missed what they perceived was “THE” war of their careers. It galled that SAMS educated officers upon arrival in Saudi Arabia were immediately put into responsible positions with access to generals that other officers who were assigned to the Third Army and had been in the desert from the start did not enjoy. Ernst and his officers saw this situation as disruptive and evidence of a growing elitism.

The egalitarian tendencies of the U.S. Army officer corps would not

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382 This paragraph was based on a conversation with MG (ret) Carl Ernst on 31 March 2009 at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Carlisle Barracks is the home of the Army War College. I was a SAMS student in 1991/92. The students at the time understood that Ernst accused SAMS graduates of being obstructionist in the planning process due to blind adherence to doctrinal precepts. McDonough related that this was a tempest in a tea pot and no one in the commanding general’s office took notes, the conversation was a disagreement among professionals. No decision meant that SAMS would continue as it had, as well as the assignment process.
tolerate even the perception of elite and examples of privilege. McDonough dealt with this problem with a re-emphasis on the dictum of Moltke (originally proposed by Wass de Czege) that SAMS graduates should be more than they appeared to be. McDonough also moved to refute criticisms of SAMS graduates from other more senior officers.

Then MG Barry McCaffrey returned from the first Gulf War with the deserved reputation as a highly effective division commander. He quickly moved up in rank into the senior leadership of the Army. McCaffrey did not write about his Gulf War experience but he was talking about his feelings regarding overly intellectual SAMS graduates to fellow general officers. McDonough said that he “spoke with MG McCaffrey, whose critique could have been more condemning…” McDonough convinced McCaffrey to become “muted on his criticisms of SAMS, perhaps as much out of friendship than as a result of being convinced by my arguments…” Due to these efforts McDonough felt that the criticism of SAMS and its’ graduates faded quickly to the “normal underswell of anti-intellectualism which the Army has been long noted for.”

The discourse on SAMS value became more balanced due to McDonough’s efforts and the passage of time. This allowed McDonough to address other efforts on behalf of SAMS.

The long service faculty, Epstein and Schneider, felt that the curriculum remained applicable even as world conditions were changing and Army

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383 As previously cited in chapter one the Review of the Education and Training of Officers, RETO, study completed in the early 1970s, clearly showed that the U.S. Army officer corps did not favor the actual establishment of an elite corps of officers based on education and training. This fact is the reason why the Army uses a central selection process with a board of impartial and randomly selected senior officers for choosing subordinate officers for promotion and school attendance.

384 Drawn from an 18 June 2009 McDonough e-mail.
responses to these conditions were adjusting. Jim Schneider said that “In virtually all cases curriculum refinement was INCREMENTAL,” based on the course authors’ personal assessment during the preceding academic year. Course authors were not teaching the majors in AMSP, second year Fellows were the instructors. The incremental changes in the curriculum were thus based on the past year and director guidance. If for no other reason, however, conditions within the school had to adjust due to a change in the makeup of the student body in the aftermath of Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. McDonough and his faculty, none of whom had served in Operation Desert Storm, found themselves confronting the implications of the arrival of combat-experienced officers at Fort Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{385}

Until 1989, the only combat experience most Army officers had was as junior officers-lieutenants and captains-in the Vietnam War. This changed in 1989 with military operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf. In the aftermath of these conflicts, many of the officer-students in both of the programs in SAMS possessed combat experience. Indeed, the Fellows, beginning in 1991, had unique combat experiences, for this group consisted of officers who had commanded battalions in battle. The initial vision for the school as articulated by Wass de Czege and his colleagues did not anticipate what changes might be needed in the curricula as a result of combat experienced officers. The arrival of such officers had an effect on the school, the curricula, and doctrine. The leadership and faculty of SAMS struggled to adapt to a changing world. The first test of the adaptability of the school came with the arrival of the Fellows class of

\textsuperscript{385} Drawn from an electronic mail note from Dr. Jim Schneider, 25OCT06.
The first class of majors with combat experience arrived with the AMSP class of 1994.

Looking back on 1991, it is clear that the faculty did not realize that the approach to education had to change, given the combat experience of the officer/students and changing world conditions. McDonough was influenced by his assignment in Europe during which he saw the beginning of the fragmentation of the continent with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. McDonough wanted to look beyond the war just fought in Kuwait and Iraq. The new Fellows, recently returned from fighting that war, expected the importance of their recent combat experience to be taken into account in the curriculum and instruction. This situation in SAMS represented an example of the traditional dichotomy in the Army, the tension between the warrior and the intellectual. The RETO study of 1978 highlighted this tension.

As discussed in Chapter 1 just over 21% of the officer corps felt that the Army needed more doers, less thinkers and while not opposed to more schooling were opposed to a perceived elite. The Army officer corps equated a perceived elite with line officers who were advanced based on education alone and not field performance. McDonough’s experience as a Fellow and as the military assistant to General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, influenced the approach he would take as the director of the school.

When McDonough arrived at Fort Leavenworth in April, 1991 he found a program in some disarray. The school, while not rudderless, in McDonough’s assessment, was subject to the independent direction of the seminar leaders.
McDonough’s assessment was that the seminar leaders “had grown very big for their britches.” These officers, successful up to that point but concerned because they had missed Operation Desert Storm, were giving more attention to their subsequent assignments rather than the majors in their seminars. This was McDonough’s assessment of the immediate situation. McDonough’s assessment of the Fellows from the class of 90-92, was more positive. These officers were preparing properly to lead seminars and accomplish the other tasks they would face in his first full academic year as the director.  

McDonough’s assessment of the world situation drove the direction he took with the curriculum of the school. This direction set conditions for the tension of expectations. When he arrived in April, 1991, the majors were conducting the end of course exercise. Supported by a team from the Battle Command Training Program, they were analyzing a battle set in the central region of Europe. McDonough was dismayed to see this exercise being conducted, a defense of the Fulda Gap in the former West Germany, especially given the fact as the Berlin Wall had come done in 1989. He worried that SAMS was in danger of “falling into the normal trap of preparing for the last war.”  

McDonough moved aggressively to correct this situation.  

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386 McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07. Fellows from the class of 89-91 would not go “on the record” to discuss this but in general denied being focused on their own assignments at the price of neglecting the majors. MG Joe Martz and COL (ret) Mark French, AMSP students at the time, recalled that there was a general feeling among the majors that everybody in school was concerned about how they would be received in units that had been in combat when they were in school.  

387 The Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, was the training center for U.S. Army division and corps headquarters. The focus of the program was to prepare these two and three-star command headquarters to execute and sustain high intensity combat operations. At the time the opposing force was based on the latest interpretation of Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine and used the latest Soviet military equipment.  

388 McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07 and interview 11JUN09.
McDonough’s tour of duty as the military assistant to General Galvin exposed him to the coming military problems the United States Army faced in the latter part of the 20th Century. He observed the political dissolution of Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact nations. The successful conclusion of the fighting to eject Iraq from Kuwait demonstrated the dominance of the U.S. military on conventional battlefields. The question that arose following this demonstration of dominance was what would be the form of war in the future.

The literature of the time explored the forms and functions of future war. For example, Heidi and Alvin Toffler wrote an influential book, War and Anti-War, in 1993. This book was widely read, especially in the Army. The Toffler’s suggested that the world was not facing the end of history rather “the end of equilibrium.” The Tofflers wrote, “Ethnic vendettas generate ethnic battles that generate ethnic wars larger than a given region can contain.” Ken Booth wrote Strategy and Ethnocentrism in 1979. This book explored the link and potential utility of ethnocentrism in the development of national strategy, and how to recognize this trait in strategists. Paul Kennedy wrote The Rise and Fall of Great Powers in 1987 in which he explored the notion of strategic over reach on the part of great powers. Finally, Michael Walzer wrote Just and Unjust Wars in 1993. Walzer explored the utility of just war theories in light of changing world
conditions and, possibly, the need for external intervention to stop genocide. Reflecting current thinking, McDonough intended to take both programs “into possible scenarios for future wars.” He encountered resistance from faculty and some high-ranking supporters of SAMS but pushed ahead.

McDonough’s answer to overcoming what he saw as, “some bit of bureaucratic inertia and staid intellectualism . . .” was to bring in a variety of speakers and thinkers on war. The list ranged from historian Martin van Creveld to journalist Robert Kaplan. At the time, van Creveld had recently published The Transformation of War, a review of the changing conduct of war during the latter part of the 20th century. Kaplan, a journalist, was traveling extensively and had just published Balkan Ghosts, his review of the forces involved in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In 1991, BG William Steele, deputy commandant of CGSC, began to issue very broad guidance as to the direction the college would take in education. McDonough wrote his own guidance for inclusion into this broad statement and subsequently issued further guidance to the SAMS faculty. From the beginning of SAMS to this point, the directors enjoyed the unique privilege of determining the direction the school would take in terms of educating the Army’s planners.

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390 All quotations from the McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07. McDonough would not name the high ranking supporters of SAMS who opposed his direction for the curricula.

391 McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07.


393 Memorandum for School Directors from the Deputy Commandant, CGSC, dated June 1991, Subject: Guidance for AY 91/92, held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. McDonough told me in an interview on 11JUN09 he wrote his own guidance for this memo.
The director issued guidance based on his interpretation of the current conditions facing the Army. McDonough was uniquely qualified in this regard given his previous assignment serving GEN Galvin.\footnote{As amazing as this appears the privilege of the director of SAMS issuing guidance based on his own experience continues to the present. When I served as the director I received no detailed guidance on how to lead SAMS. The closest guidance I received was from GEN Peter Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff, Army. On 14 June 2004 I briefed him on the direction SAMS would take and after showing him just one chart he stopped me and said, “Kevin, I trust you. Do what you think is right.”}

In 1992, McDonough had both the Fellows and majors programs conduct exercises in the Balkans, far in advance of any U.S. involvement in the region. McDonough said that he did not seek permission to conduct an “operation other than war” exercise in the Balkans. During an interview in 2009, he stated that he figured that once the directive was written and staffed for approval the AMSP class of 1997 might be able to conduct such an exercise. In the tradition of Winton and Johnson, McDonough sought forgiveness as opposed to permission.\footnote{McDonough interview, 11JUN09.}

McDonough himself taught a course to the entire student body on the subject of ethics and command. The purpose was to go into greater detail regarding the ethical and moral concerns of leadership in war. McDonough felt that since the Army would be conducting more and more operations other than war Army units would face ethically challenging situations. The course McDonough taught was on leadership, from platoon and company to the division level. The key element of the course was how the actions of the general commanding a division set the tone for the leadership climate throughout the division. The course material included readings from the Peers Commission
The key demand on McDonough was the need for a new version of FM 100-5 in light of the changing conditions of warfare in the latter years of the 20th century. McDonough knew that he was going to be deeply involved in the development and writing of the 1993 version of the FM. To sustain this effort McDonough established the Campaign Operations Group on 1 June 1991. This group’s purpose was to act as the “operational art spokesman for SAMS.” One of its 20 functions was, “Develop, coordinate, write and publish the next generation FM 100-5, Operations.”

GEN Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army directed that LTG Thomas Carney, his deputy chief of staff for personnel, DCSPER, assign officers to Fort Leavenworth in support of this effort. These officers would work for McDonough.

McDonough related that shortly after he arrived at Fort Leavenworth he received a call directly from LTG Carney. Carney asked McDonough for a list of officers he wanted to work for him in the re-writing effort. McDonough said that had he been savvier he would have asked Carney for some time to reflect and then checked in with his immediate superior, LTG Wishart, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center. As it was McDonough said that since

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396 All quotations on this page are from the McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07. The My Lai massacre occurred in March, 1968 and became public knowledge in November 1969. The Peers Commission Report investigated the breakdown of leadership and command responsibility that allowed the incident and subsequent attempt at a cover-up to take place. The author was in SAMS at that time and very clearly remembers this class. McDonough made us think about what it really meant to be an officer and what the burden of command and being a leader really meant.

397 Director’s Memorandum Number 5, dated 1 June 1991, Campaign Operations Group Purpose, Mission and Functions. Held in the SAMS papers, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

398 Principal Army staff general officers at this time in Army history were the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics. These general officers were known informally as the DCSPER, DCSINT, DCSOPS, and DCSLOG, or “des-per,” des-ops,” etc.
Carney was calling in the name of the Chief of Staff he should answer the question at that moment. LTG Wishart was not very pleased, as McDonough recalled when he found out that incoming officers were diverted from positions in the college to work in the SAMS campaign operations group.  

McDonough’s initial efforts in the development of a précis of FM 100-5 included everybody in the school from the majors in AMSP to the Fellows. He established ad hoc writing teams to flesh out ideas that may or may not enter into doctrine. He felt that future doctrine should be expanded to incorporate our evolving missions in areas such as stability operations, nation assistance and assisting in the interruption of the flow of contraband and illegal drugs into the U.S. Indeed McDonough wrote an essay for Military Review in which he said, “The Army may well participate in each of these as our nation seeks to assist emerging nations, instill democratic values and establish legitimate political and economic institutions in the process.” McDonough implied that the era of AirLand Battle was over as the Army sought to change doctrine in light of changing world conditions and a change in the national security policy.

The National Security Strategy of 1991 stated: “Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an understanding of the extraordinary trends at work today -- a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an accurate sense of the opportunities that history has put before us and a sober appreciation of the dangers that remain.” The NSS posed a series of questions ranging from: “What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular,

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399 McDonough interview, 11JUN09.
poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities?” to, “How should we think about these new military challenges and what capabilities and forces should we develop to secure ourselves against them?” Consideration of these questions led McDonough to adjust the curriculum of SAMS.401

Further, President Clinton reviewed Presidential Review Directive #13, an adjustment of U.S. policy regarding U.S. participation in UN led peacekeeping operations, and then issued Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 25, on 3 May 1994. The PDD established U.S. policy on reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The directive was the product of a year-long interagency policy review “and extensive consultations with dozens of Members of Congress from both parties.” The policy represented a comprehensive framework for U.S. decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement “suited to the realities of the post Cold War period.” The policy stated that peace operation could not be the center piece of U.S. foreign policy but recognized that this type of operation could serve U.S. interests in preventing small regional conflicts from spreading into a wider conflict. The directive outlined specific steps to ensure the U.S. could engage in selected UN operations and make these more effective. Consideration of the questions posed in the 1991 National Security Strategy and the steps outlined in the Presidential Decision Directives played a role in the refinement of FM 100-5.402

Overseeing the drafting of this new doctrine was a major effort for McDonough, and it consumed a great deal of his time as director. This was an important task as this new doctrine would, conceivably, take the Army to the end of the century and guide it through the uncertain period that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. McDonough built a case for the new doctrine in a series of articles for Military Review. In one he wrote that Army doctrine was no longer simply AirLand Battle. This doctrine was, “steeped in the Cold War assumptions of a forward defense (such as forces in place, a predictable threat, supporting infrastructures for resource buildup and movement…” McDonough’s essays introduced new concepts to the Army such as, full-dimensional operations, a force–projection Army and reminded all that Army units will, “normally act in conjunction with air, naval and space assets and seldom be involved in operations outside the United States separate from the forces of allied nations.”

The new version of the doctrine introduced five new concepts in the conduct of operations. Franks insisted on introducing the concept of battle command. Based on his experiences as a corps commander during Operation Desert Storm, Franks' intent was that this concept ensure that a commander-not command post-centered construct was the focus of combat power. This was a signal to research and development efforts that wherever the commander was on the battlefield the commander would have the ability to command. Franks and McDonough believed that the demands of the modern battlefield required the

http://www.comw.org

ability to rapidly shift “from a process-oriented control system within a tightly structured and linear battlefield framework to a commander-oriented method of commanding forces.” Franks envisioned a form of warfare where a commander and a smaller staff had immediate access to information and intelligence. This access would be from wherever the commander and his staff felt they needed to be on the battlefield to exercise command.\textsuperscript{404} The second concept expanded the concept of the battlefield to the battle space.

Franks and McDonough felt that post-Desert Storm operations required a new way to view the area of operations. The concept of battle space was needed to expand Army thinking beyond the linear constructs of the Cold War. Based on his experience in Desert Storm Franks believed that “battle does not have to be linear or contiguous and that concentrating effects, not necessarily always forces, is the aim of mass.”\textsuperscript{405} The other concepts reflected both Desert Storm experience and a realization that the Army would be reduced in size as a result of the end of the Cold War and the apparently successful conclusion of Desert Storm.

The final doctrinal concepts were depth and simultaneous attack and force projection and early entry. Decisive victory, the doctrine asserted, required simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the battle space. This concept built upon the notion of strategic shock through the combined effect of tactical and operational efforts that would overwhelm an enemy’s ability to respond with effective command and control. Force projection and early entry reflected the


\textsuperscript{405} Franks, p. 9.
reality that as the Army was reduced in size the Army would come back to the continental United States and thus had to consider going to the war as a matter of fact; rather than the forward stationing in the central region of Germany. Since a deployment might take the Army anywhere, the Army had to be able to project power everywhere. This also realized that the Army needed to fight with the Air Force and the Navy to get to the conflict zone. The doctrine recognized the importance of intelligence and logistics to both set conditions for success and to sustain operations over distance. In an effort to reduce the size of deployed headquarters the idea of split based operations was also introduced into doctrine. This was the concept of keeping analysts at a home base relying on links to the forward deployed headquarters.

McDonough proposed the addition of a fifth tenet to the four that defined AirLand Battle. Full Dimension Operations would require versatile Army units—thus the tenet of versatility. The concept was defined as:

Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements. Versatility is the ability of tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on the unit mission-essential task lists (METL). Versatility denotes the ability to perform in many roles and environments during war and operations other than war. It allows for the smooth transition from one mission to another.  

McDonough cited the experiences of the Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division as the essence of versatility. As discussed earlier, the Mountain Division assisted in the recovery from the effects of Hurricane Andrew then a few weeks following the return of the division to upstate New York the division was sent to disarm warlords and assist in the delivery of food to starving people in Somalia.

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Based on the efforts required of the Mountain Division Franks said, “We needed to include operations other than war in our doctrine…it was apparent [after Andrew] that the Nation expected us…as a servant of the Nation…to serve the Nation and conduct a range of operations that don’t exactly look like combat...”

The effort to write this new doctrine involved the entire school; faculty and students. The SAMS push to write the pivotal FM 100-5, 1993 was a success for the Army, for this doctrine would guide the Army into the uncertain era of the Peace Dividend and that period when U.S. Army units were employed in a range of operations other than war. The final major test that McDonough faced in this turbulent tenure as director was an extension of the bureaucratization of SAMS and again a result of the successes of SAMS and its graduates. GEN Franks and GEN Sullivan came to believe there was a need for officers educated at the doctoral level in the military arts and science, and that SAMS was the perfect place for this to happen.

On 1 July 1992, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Command, LTG Wilson A. Schoffner, received a formal memorandum from the commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command, GEN Frederick Franks. The memo directed Schoffner to study the feasibility of establishing a doctoral level program in military arts and science. Franks’ intent in establishing this program was to develop a body of officers who possessed an in-depth education in military arts and science beyond that offered in the Advanced Military Studies curriculum. Franks also directed that Schoffner coordinate this effort with the

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407 Franks interview, 27NOV09.
commandant of the Army War College. Franks’ memo was not unexpected as interest in such a program had manifested itself much earlier.

Dr. Robert H. Berlin, deputy director of SAMS, provided documentation of a meeting that took place on 27 February 1992 to consider the idea of developing a doctoral program in military art and science at the Command and General Staff College. This memo detailed the origins of the effort to develop a doctoral or professional degree program. On 27 February 1992 Berlin met with Dr. Phil Brookes, director of the graduate degree program at CGSC, and Brookes told Berlin of the results of an earlier meeting with GEN Saint, LTG Schoffner, BG Steele, and COL McDonough during which Steele asked Brookes to sketch out a plan by May 1992. Berlin and Brookes were both skeptical of this notion from the start. They were not convinced that the idea was fully thought through but worked with CGSC leaders to explore the concept. This would be a two-year effort.

The Army had long sent selected officers to obtain graduate schooling at the doctoral level. One example was the Military Academy’s permanent professor program that began in 1963. Officers selected for this program remained at the Military Academy for the remainder of their careers. Officers who opted to become “intellectuals” remained at the War College or the Military Academy. The Army gained from their knowledge, but these officers did not lead

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the Army. Wass de Czege hinted at the history of the Army placing officers into masters’ degree and Ph.D. programs in his study of the Command and General Staff College. He wrote that while the Army thought nothing of sending an officer to school for years to learn the intricacies of the comptroller specialty the Army would balk at equal time learning the intricacies of warfare. For the Army war was best learned in the field.410

Brookes and Berlin, working with McDonough, sorted out the details of a proposal for Schoffner to send to Franks. The ad hoc group looked into the requirements for establishing a doctoral program. The major points of the effort would be meeting the requirements of national level accreditation of the program and a broadening of the disciplinary backgrounds of the faculty. Based on this perceived need, SAMS hired two political science professors; Dr. William Gregor and Dr. Ernest Evans. The ad hoc group decided that the best possible candidates for this program would be the Fellows. The Fellows for the pilot program year would be specially selected for officers who were certain to be selected to promotion for colonel but would not likely be selected for brigade command.411

LTC Ben Elley, a second year Fellow at SAMS at the time, wrote the memorandum that contained the outline of the plan to implement a pilot doctoral program for a course of studies in military art and science. The document contained a synopsis of the steps required to reach accreditation, facilities,

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410 See Wass de Czege’s paper CGSC Advanced Studies Program held in the Combined Arms Research Library. For information on the USMA Permanent Professor Program see http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=3&LinkCategoryID=23#57
411 McDonough interview, 11JUN09 and found in handwritten notes done by Dr. Bob Berlin in a file labeled AOASF Semester program, in the SAMS files, room 271, Eisenhower Hall.
potential students, and a cost estimate. At this time, there was no record of any interaction with local civilian universities regarding the management of Ph.D. programs, nor any input from the CGSC Advisory Board. All work was done within Army channels. Schoffner accepted this proposal and forwarded it up the line. He believed that the program would fill a “current void” at the military strategic level by providing a “bank of experts who can operate at the strategic level in a political-military environment that faces an uncertain future.” The potential students for the program would be lieutenant colonels who were successful battalion commanders but would not likely be selected for brigade level command. Nonetheless, these individuals would have the potential for service on regional combatant commander staffs or on the Joint Staff. The staff and faculty of SAMS estimated the start up costs to be $750,000 and proposed to launch a pilot program in academic year 1993/94.412

GEN Franks accepted the proposal as transmitted. Franks presented the concept to GEN Sullivan, the Chief of Staff, Army and received his approval. Franks then directed the Combined Arms Center and Command and General Staff College to begin the process to establish a doctoral program. The deputy commandant, BG Steele, instructed the assistant deputy commandant, COL Dick Gibson, to run the coordinating office and named McDonough as the leader of the doctoral program. Steele sent an electronic mail note to Gibson saying, “CSA bought into our proposal to have a doctoral program…CG, TRADOC told us to do it.” The intent was to begin with an unaccredited program with the

412 Official message from Commander, USACAC to Commander TRADOC, dated 26 August 1992. Subject Doctorate of Military Art and Science Program. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Fellows class of 1992-94. Gibson was to coordinate “an execution timeline within the DA staff, TRADOC and CGSC” to ensure the program started in 1992. Steele concluded by writing that he saw Gibson “as the coordinating office with Jim McDonough as the spear point.”

The program effort began with McDonough but faded away as the principals initially involved in the effort retired or were transferred. In the end SAMS never did develop a doctoral program in military art and science. It is interesting to speculate on the potential pros and cons of a SAMS doctoral program. There was real potential for senior officers with Ph.D.’s in strategy and operational art to serve at the regional combatant command level. The Fellows program would receive the same treatment as the majors regarding the special handling of the follow-on assignments. The planning directorates of these headquarters would have received extremely well educated officers specially selected for staff work at higher levels of command. It is not too far a stretch to imagine that the regional war plans would be written at a much higher level and with a greater appreciation of the nuances of policy. The downside of that future was AMSP would lose its connection with the Fellows.

SAMS would have to cajole the Army personnel system for seminar leaders of

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Office of the Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. Electronic mail note dated Monday, 24 August 1992, subject: Doctoral Program. Sent to COL Dick Gibson, assistant deputy Commandant, Dr. Phil Brookes, Dr. Roger Spiller, and COL Jim McDonough. The e-mail is the initiating document for the execution of an unaccredited program in the coming academic year and naming McDonough as the lead agent, supported by Drs. Brookes and Spiller. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Body of the note is below, original all in lower case. dick: csa bought into our proposal to have a doctoral program within oes; cg, tradoc told us to do it. based upon sams work up cg, tradoc told us we could start an unaccredited program next year with the incoming aosf officers for 75-1m. general franks said to move out. now need to get on an execution timeline with an integrated program within the da staff, tradoc and cgsc to get the program going beginning next year. call together director sams, phil brookes, dao, and roger spiller to lay the campaign plan to execute. will need to see the campaign plan and present to the cg for approval mid-september. keep me informed as you work the plan; happy to participate along with you or give additional guidance as necessary. i see you as the coordinating office with jim mcdonough as the spear point. held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
the same caliber as the Fellows in order to retain the high quality of education the Army expected. As discussed earlier, Wass de Czege realized this was a battle he could not win and was one of the reasons why he persuaded Army senior leaders to establish the Fellows program. In the end this program was not launched as the interest at the senior leader level was not sustained and multiple difficulties were uncovered not the least was the issue of accreditation. McDonough also had to judge the effect of two wars on the curricula and how to adjust it.

Operation Just Cause was a coup de main and was concluded, in the eyes of some of the participants, very quickly and successfully. The first war against Iraq, Operation Desert Storm, was over very quickly, four weeks of air operations followed by 100 hours of ground operations. The initial analysis was based on a feeling of complete success, success that could breed passivity. McDonough recognized this intuitively in his appreciation of the staid (some would say arid) intellectualism within the school.

His experience with the second-year Fellows in the school when he arrived in early 1991 likely reinforced his impression that he needed to move quickly to shake up the school and refocus on future fights the Army might face. The new Fellows brought an appreciation of high-intensity combat and the confusion of battle that comes from experiencing the fact that no plan can look with certainty beyond initial contact with an enemy. Wass de Czege’s initial vision for the school was to produce majors who would return to the Army and raise the general level of understanding of war within the officer corps.
The operations other than war that the Army conducted at this time were beginning to have an effect, as shown, on the changing doctrine that would guide the Army and in the curricula of the school.

As a measure of the changing conduct of war and the changing considerations of the concepts underpinning operational art in the fall term of academic year 1991/92 Professors Bob Epstein and Jim Schneider held a debate on the origins of operational art. While both men were educated as historians, Schneider was the theorist in SAMS. Epstein traced the roots of operational art to the campaigns of Napoleon. Napoleon communicated his operational design through instructions to his Marshals and the use of the battalion carré or battalion square of corps. Acting as the head of state and commander-in-chief in the field Napoleon and his Marshalls conducted policy at the point of the bayonet. Napoleon, as Epstein put it, used war to extend the French Empire and conclude treaties favorable to France. Schneider held an alternate view. He believed that the origin of operational art was a Russian refinement on the campaigns of U.S. Grant during the American Civil War. Grant, acting as the commanding general of the armies instructed the Union armies in the west and east to operate in accord with his intent, to constantly attack the armies of the Confederacy. Grant made use of the command and control technology of the time, the telegraph. The Russian Red Army leadership in the 1920s, according to Schneider, studied the campaigns of Grant and incorporated the execution of modern campaigns with the radio, the airplane and the tank. Schneider’s argument was operational art was a 20th century
phenomenon as the true expression of operational art required sustained
duration campaigns linked from the lead tank to the operational level
headquarters all acting in accord with a common intent and with the ability to
adjust as conditions dictated. The students in SAMS at the time were split
regarding who “won” the debate. The origin and the changing nature of what
constituted operational art and the operational level of war carried over into the
tenure of COL Greg Fontenot, the sixth director of SAMS.

Fontenot was the first AMSP graduate to become the director of SAMS.
He was a member of the second class in AMSP and studied under Wass de
Czege, Sinnreich and Holder. Fontenot commanded a tank battalion during
Operation Desert Storm and was decorated for valor. He served as the initiatives
group director for GEN Franks and was intimately familiar with the development
and writing of the 1993 version of FM 100-5. His tenure as director of SAMS
included the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the school. Fontenot faced a
decreasing pool of officers willing to volunteer for AMSP due to the pressures of
a shrinking Army and the majors’ timeline and becoming qualified in a branch of
service in key field grade positions; battalion operations officer, S3, executive
officer, XO, and brigade operations officer, S3. Fontenot, as his predecessors,
retained the four seminar structure in AMSP. He worked very hard to fill the
seats with the kind of quality officers he felt the Army required as SAMS
graduates. His most immediate difficulties though were deconstructing the
doctoral program, acting as a planning staff adjunct during saber rattling

I favored Schneider as I felt his was the more persuasive argument. Sadly the tape of this
debate was destroyed in a routine cleaning of a storage closet. It was taped in an old version of a VHF tape
and was incompatible with more modern machines. Not knowing what was on the tape it was destroyed.
conducted by Saddam Hussein, and providing support to the CGSC exercise Prairie Warrior and the Army Warfighting Experiment on future division designs.

Overall the SAMS flirtation with a doctoral program faded away but there were practical elements left over that Fontenot had to deal with as the director. First of all there were several Fellows who had been specifically recruited into the program to be the first Army doctors of military arts and science. Fontenot’s solution to this was to propose a trial whereby these Fellows would focus on a regional combatant command through in depth study and also service while a Fellow as an intern on the regional commander-in-chief’s personal staff or J5 Plans and Policy staff section. Over the course of the two years of the Fellowship these officers would also attend the Joint Professional Military Education level II schooling at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia. This effort had the second order effect of requiring permanent seminar leaders for AMSP.

This effort did not last. As Wass de Czege predicted from the beginning of the program the Personnel Center could not sustain an effort of selecting well

\[\text{Dr. Bob Berlin left three key memoranda for record, MFR, in the SAMS files as well as his handwritten notes on the demise of the doctoral program in 1993 and 1994. In his handwritten notes dated 27April93 Berlin recorded a meeting on AOASF and penned “Many, many administrative and curricular programs, not thought out - no real regard for implications.” In an MFR dated 2FEB94 Berlin recorded his notes from a conversation with Prof. Ted Wilson of the University of Kansas. Wilson and Berlin spoke about Wilson’s meeting with KU administrators regarding a possible affiliation with KU for granting a Ph.D. Berlin recorded that while no one at KU said no they were very concerned about the costs involved. On his handwritten notes from this conversation, and significantly not recorded on the official MFR was “in some way has to be a KU program.” This was the deal breaker as SAMS and CGSC would not relinquish control of an Army program to a civilian university. In an electronic mail note dated 03/09/94 Dr. Phil Brookes related a conversation he had with Prof. Wilson on that date regarding setting up a meeting at KU, the purpose of which was to garner KU support for the Ph.D. initiative. The final MFR was dated 29 March 1994, almost two full years after the concept was first proposed. In this MFR Berlin related a conversation with Wilson in which Wilson advised that he had received “negative comments concerning affiliation between KU and CGSC on and AOASF Ph.D. program. Wilson recommended that a meeting scheduled for 5 April be delayed for two weeks. The files have no other reference to the Ph.D. program.} \]
educated, well experienced lieutenant colonels for three years assignments as teachers at the School of Advanced Military Studies. The competing demands for this type of "quality" officer were too great. The risk of having a "slightly above average" officer teaching the caliber of officers in AMSP was too great and after the initial two year trial of Fellows as joint interns the school went back to using second year Fellows as seminar leaders for AMSP. While some senior leaders in the Army, Franks and Sullivan, perceived a knowledge gap and a need for more highly educated officers in the particular discipline of arms this program was doomed to failure from the start. The real difficulties of getting this program accredited by the civilian academic community and then accepted even within the Army never allowed for conditions of success to develop.\textsuperscript{416} Fontenot had other problems to deal with, one in particular in the world of operational planning.

Operation Desert Storm appeared to end decisively, but Saddam Hussein was still in power in Iraq. Moreover, with the perceived decisive finish to the war the Army personnel system went back to assigning officers in accord with the needs of the Army. The needs of the Army placed SAMS graduates, by and large, in Army divisions and corps and on staffs that enjoyed a much higher priority than the Army component of U.S. Central Command, the Third U.S. Army. The team of "long ball hitters" that assembled in Third Army during Desert Storm had moved on. Saddam, however, was still in place.

In 1994 and again in 1995 Saddam rattled his sabers and the U.S Army was directed to send a reinforced brigade to Kuwait. Third Army was the

\textsuperscript{416} Interview with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot on 1 June 2009. The original tape of this interview and the transcript are held on the third floor of the Combined Arms Research library. Hereafter cited as Fontenot interview, 1JUN09.
controlling land force headquarters and faced the problem of developing sound plans with a limited planning staff. The commander of the Third Army at the time, LTG Steven Arnold, asked for help from the school. Fontenot responded by going to Third Army himself, accompanied by students from AMSP and the Fellowship. This event set a precedent that was not seen at the time. Where McDonough had used the student body of SAMS as adjunct support for the writing effort on FM 100-5, Fontenot now used the study body as ad hoc planners for actual headquarters engaged in planning operations that had the potential of being executed.

This effort, though short in duration and, it must be said wildly popular with the students, became rather widely known in and outside the Army. Planning exercises, Army war-games, and other worthy events were now placed on the school as “educational experiences” for the SAMS students. While it is true that this could be viewed as a natural extension of the experiences of the first few AMSP classes, when Wass de Czege took the class to Europe for annual war games and seconded the students to various corps and division level staffs, this would in fact be a stretch as no one in the Army at the time could recall this fact. It was indeed making use of an available resource, SAMS students, and once the precedent was set other headquarters, strapped for people, would call on SAMS for help. This was another manifestation of the successes of SAMS, highlighted by Sinnreich. The demands of the present trumped the thoughts of preparing the students for the future.\footnote{417} The other event that is evidence of this was the Command and General Staff College wide exercise Prairie Warrior.

\footnote{417} Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09.
The first Prairie Warrior exercise was conducted in 1989 as a division level exercise. By 1991 this exercise grew to the corps and Joint Task Force level. This, most involved believed, was a “good idea” in that it served as the graduation exercise of the Command and General Staff College class in session at the time. Students were placed into command and staff positions of divisions, corps and a Joint Task Force and then planned and executed an exercise supported by the simulations of the Battle Command Training Program. Officers selected for the next AMSP class, 1991/92 were placed in planning positions on the student staffs. The CGSC class made use of an existing BCTP higher headquarters plan for the exercise. The divisional and corps plans drawn up by the CGSC class were based on this BCTP plan and then executed in accelerated time against the BCTP opposing force. The students then participated in after action reviews where the planning and execution were dissected, examined and from which lessons were drawn. It was in fact a good idea, so good in fact that the corporate Army could not resist “improving” upon it.

In 1993, Fontenot was informed that SAMS would act as the staff of the Joint Task Force, JTF, and develop the plan for Prairie Warrior. This required an adjustment of the AMSP and Fellows curricula as the College leadership was interested in the development of the JTF order that the CGSC class would execute in the spring of 1994. The only time available in the curricula was the exercise program, thus the development of Prairie Warrior plans became the SAMS exercise program with milestone presentations established in accord with

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418 I was a member of the CGSC class of 1991. This paragraph is based on my recollections of that time, my CGSC year book, and my personal journal. The transition sentence is my own judgment, based on my experience as an officer.
the military decision making process and the Deputy Commandant or
Commandant’s calendar. The first effort at this was, as Fontenot described it,
okay. The students in SAMS’ programs did learn about the development of a
JTF level order and the effort it takes to promulgate a plan properly to ensure
understanding. This was worth the effort, in Fontenot’s judgment, but that was
about all and was likely not worth the disruption in the SAMS program of
education. The improvement of Prairie Warrior continued though.419

The 1994/95 effort to develop the JTF plan for Prairie Warrior was
“enhanced” by the addition of an Army brigadier general, Geoffrey Miller, to act
as the JTF commander. This was done to avoid scheduling problems with the
Deputy Commandant and Commandant’s calendars. The presence of a JTF
“commander” in SAMS would also, it was thought; materially improve the SAMS
product as the commander could continually interact with the students in the
development of the plan. The educational benefit to the SAMS students was that
they would learn how to interact with a flag officer. This was the rationale.420

The Army does make good decisions in many instances. In this case,
while Miller was an experienced Soldier he was also not the correct person for
the effort. According to Fontenot Miller became caught up in the notion of
command as opposed to teaching SAMS students the intricacies of developing
JTF level orders. The demands of having a flag officer in SAMS outweighed the
benefit. The Army also decided that Prairie Warrior would be the perfect vehicle

419 Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09.
420 MG Geoffrey Miller retired in 2006. He was the officer responsible for running the
Guantanamo Bay enemy combatant holding facility and went to Iraq in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib
scandal.
for an Army Warfighting Experiment.

Here again Fontenot had to deal with the successes of SAMS. While Fontenot had a personal relationship with both the Chief of Staff, Army, Sullivan and the Training and Doctrine Command Commander, Franks, it was not enough to be able to call off the compounding effect of good ideas. The ready pool of staff officers in training and especially the SAMS student body was very attractive for experimentation of new notions of warfighting. Fontenot and SAMS crafted the plans for the employment of the concept of the Mobile Strike Force.\footnote{Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09. The Mobile Strike Force was built around a so called Air-Mechanized Division was a concept based on an extension of the thought of vertical envelopment and the tenet of depth which remained in FM 100-5. The essence of the concept was an Army division supported by aircraft capable of delivering light mechanized equipment at operational depth in an enemy force’s rear area and enabled by digitized information systems. This concept had its roots in the Soviet airborne structure as Soviet paratroop divisions were equipped with light armored vehicles.}

The demands of developing the plans for both the JTF level for Prairie Warrior and the Army Warfighting Experiment on the concept of the Air-Mechanized Division caused culmination in SAMS. The requirements of education were suffering from the demands of exercise and experimentation. In the end Fontenot called the effect as he saw it, and while he might have ruffled some feathers among the ranks of general officers, he successfully convinced Sullivan and Franks that a school house exercise was not the correct vehicle for experimenting with future concepts.\footnote{Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09.}

The era of AirLand Battle was indeed over. This was heralded by more than the inclusion of a new tenet, versatility, into the doctrine. There was a growing perception that with the demise of the Soviet Union and no “near peer competitor” on the horizon the Army would be reduced while being asked to do
more for the Nation, at home and abroad. Chapter 7 explored some examples of these “wars of the peace dividend.” These actions, abroad and at home, were an indicator of a world that enhanced the importance of more than war, but the use of force being seen as an extension of policy by other means. SAMS as well as the Army was refining the understanding of operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy.

The SAMS method of instruction might not have changed outwardly, but the inclusion of different texts and especially, under McDonough first and then Fontenot, the exercises reflected the changing conduct of war. McDonough’s end of course exercise for the AMSP class of 1992 was a Joint Task Force level exercise scenario with a NATO force operating in a peace enforcement role in Croatia. This exercise took place well before the government decided to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina; indeed McDonough was directed that the exercise not take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The liaison officers from European armies, assigned to the Combined Arms Center and the Command and General Staff College attended the exercise and reported back to their respective army leadership. Fontenot continued the refinement of the exercise program, starting from brigade combat team level but ending up with an exercise in the Trans-Caucus region because, as he said, “this was the toughest place to get into and sustain operations that I could find.”

Janes highlighted the role of ideology and religion in his only curricula development guidance. McDonough intuitively sensed that world conditions were changing and SAMS graduates needed different educational experiences to

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423 Fontenot interview 1 June 2009.
prepare them for the new missions and tasks given to the Army. Fontenot continued this movement of SAMS and set conditions for the next ten years of SAMS. The three directors, who brought SAMS up to the completion of ten years of service to the Army, by and large continued in the spirit of the vision of the school established by Wass de Czege. They also added something to that vision by force of their own personalities. Many of these changes were ephemeral and some of them effected change that could only be seen from the vantage of point of the future, looking back. Time would tell whether or not changes would last and improve the school.

COL Sinnreich, the second director, was indeed prophetic when he wrote in his end of tour report that the challenges SAMS would face were a result of its successes. SAMS and its graduates were extremely successful thus the Army wanted more and more from SAMS. The tension of external expectations and internal expectations became a part of the balancing effort that was required of the directors, who were faced with growing demands from the Army and internal pressures from the faculty. In an interview on 17 November 1994 GEN Franks stated that the Army needed to get its leaders into a posture, “where they could take themselves from one particular set of circumstances and quickly adapt themselves mentally, intellectually, and adapt their organizations to a totally new set of operational circumstances.” Franks and Sullivan used doctrine as an engine of change to redirect the Army, and SAMS played a role in this effort through its graduates and the role the school played in re-crafting doctrine.

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question of “Whither SAMS” formed one component of “whither the Army” by 1994. SAMS as an institution was accepted by the Army through being validated by the contributions of its graduates.
Epilogue

Into the Future

The first “official” reference to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduates as Jedi Knights occurred on 12 May 1992, during a meeting of the Committee on Armed Services Military Education Panel in Washington, DC. The panel met at 9:05 a.m. in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building. In his opening statement, the Honorable Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) said:

The panel is quite pleased by the Advanced Military Studies Program concept and I commend the Army Command and General Staff College for its vision in initially establishing the school of advanced military studies at Fort Leavenworth. Of course, we all know that the real stamp of approval came when General Schwarzkopf requested SAMS graduates, sometimes referred to as “Jedi Knights,” be sent to his headquarters in Riyadh to assist in developing the campaign plan.425

On 21 May 1994, SAMS celebrated its tenth anniversary. The guest speaker at this graduation ceremony was BG Wass de Czege. COL Greg Fontenot, the director and a member of the second class to graduate from SAMS, invited Wass de Czege to speak at this graduation both to honor the first director and because of a statement Wass de Czege made in 1985. Fontenot recalled a conversation with Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Steve Rippe in a German Gasthaus during a reconnaissance prior to the conduct of the class staff ride of the World War II battle of the Kall Gorge, one of the battles of the greater battle in the Huertgen Forest in 1944.

During this conversation, conducted over glasses of Moselle wine, Wass de Czege observed that if the school lasted ten years it would be institutionalized; that is, the Army would have accepted the value of the school and its graduates. Indeed, the Army had embraced SAMS by the tenth year of its existence. SAMS graduates, from

425 House Committee on Armed Services, Advanced Military Studies Programs at the Command and Staff Colleges, Hearings on H.A.S.C. No. 102-80, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1993, 5.
AMSP and AOSF, were moving into positions of greater responsibility and being promoted into the senior leadership of the Army. The world was different, the doctrine of AirLand Battle was changing, and indeed SAMS itself was changing. As the Army faced different tasks under rapidly changing conditions, the Army was turning to SAMS graduates for answers.

Operational art and the refinement of the understanding of this level of war spread throughout the Army during the period from its introduction in 1982 through 1994. The graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies facilitated the breadth and depth of the understanding of this level of war through the performance of its graduates in divisions and corps, as well as in subsequent assignments as the graduates proceeded up the chain of command and staffs in the Army structure.

This concluding chapter reviews the initial vision for the school, draws observations on the evolution of the vision, and offers an analysis of the increased effectiveness of general staffs in the US Army, if any, as a result of the placement of graduates of the school. One conclusion is that graduates of SAMS indeed raised the general level of understanding of the art and science of war in our Army, but also became a default group to take on the “hard” problems in the Army. They confronted the task of developing strategy and then linking that strategic/operational vision to successful tactics.

As discussed in chapter two COL Harry Summers’ book on the failure to develop and refine a strategy during the Vietnam War was a guide to strategic thinking. Summers’ aim was to warn Army officers that they cannot ignore strategy. Summers did not, as some have alleged, tell the Army to ignore counter-insurgency; he urged the officer corps to learn the interrelationship of tactics, operations and strategy. The primary failure of Vietnam was that the Army squandered tactical success because the U.S. had no coherent strategy, hence the iconic story at the front of the book about an
exchange between Summers and a North Vietnamese Army colonel. As Summers told the story, the Army officer corps ignored his advice in the aftermath of Vietnam. The officer corps focused exclusively on the tactical domain, and only there at the battalion level. The Army built the National Training Center as a place for battalions to train against superior numbers; only later, in the late 1980s, did the Army send brigade combat teams to train at the NTC. Given the big five decision, the 1982 FM 100-5 AirLand Battle doctrine, and the training centers, the Army focused exclusively on and rewarded tactical success.

However, wars are won at the operational and strategic level. The initial directors of SAMS, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder, all realized the tactical instruction at the Command and General Staff College was not sufficient to ensure widespread understanding of the new doctrine. They were convinced, as well, that the Army needed a group of officers educated at a level above what was presented in the regular course of the Staff College to ensure that increased tactical awareness was not squandered through a failure to link tactical success to operational and strategic objectives.\footnote{This is a continuing concern of senior Army leaders. During a discussion on 12 June 2004 in a SAMS classroom the Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Peter Schoomaker told the author that he wanted me to make sure that SAMS graduates understood that tactical success must be linked with attaining operational and strategic objectives.} The SAMS curriculum was devised to ensure this link would be made in Army plans and operations.

The first curriculum developers of SAMS, the self titled “Curriculum Carpentry Corporation,” of Doug Johnson and Hal Winton worked to ensure that SAMS graduates would see the necessity of this linkage of tactical to strategic as they wrote and refined the lesson plans of SAMS. Johnson described this effort as working from the ground up, beginning with the fundamental theory of ground combat and then moving up the levels of war as far as possible, in the time SAMS had with its officer/students. Johnson later
said that the course would ultimately focus, “on the operational level – at that time very badly understood and not on the tips of the tongues of more than a very few people. That meant we were going to develop planners at the division level and or above.”

The evidence is overwhelming that Wass de Czege, Johnson, Winton, and the faculty members at SAMS who signed on succeeded in this effort. Their influence was also felt well beyond the Army. The U.S. Air Force established a sister school to SAMS, the School of Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies, at Maxwell Air Force Base in 1992. The Marine Corps established a School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico Marine Corps Base in 1994. The British even established a School of Higher Command and Staff for specially selected colonels and brigadiers, based on the work of UK COL Gage Williams at SAMS. SAMS also influenced Army doctrine from the 1982 version of FM 100-5 to the 1993 version.

With the introduction of the 1993 version of FM 100-5, the era of AirLand Battle was over. A fifth tenet, versatility, made its debut in FM 100-5. Versatility was the result of SAMS thinking, as well as others, most notably GEN Fred Franks, about how to represent the changing conditions the United States faced in the world and how the Army would adapt to them. The range of military operations and full dimension operations, other terms introduced in the 1993 FM, attempted to articulate the diverse environments - peace, conflict, and war - in which the U.S. and the Army would seek to attain strategic and policy objectives. The doctrine reflected the Army’s appreciation of the nature of modern warfare and how Army units would conduct operations to achieve the goals of policy. Viewed from the perspective of the post-Cold War/post Operation Desert Storm world, AirLand Battle and the focus on fighting the Soviet Union in the central region of Europe served its purpose. The changing conditions of the world environment and the three broad states of the environment as written in the doctrine

427 Taken from an electronic mail note from Dr. Doug Johnson to the author, 9 September 2006.
described a much different world view than the Cold War. SAMS was changing as well as Army doctrine, and trying to balance change with what worked in the curriculum and the school’s manner of operating.

A comparison of Wass de Czege’s initial guidance and Fontenot’s curricula guidance will assist in better identifying the refinements of SAMS over its first ten years. Comparing visions, guidance and concepts will show the adjustments made by the school as the conditions in which its graduates operated changed. It will also show the changing conditions in which the school itself operated as the Army accepted SAMS graduates and then came to depend upon them for their critical thinking abilities.

Wass de Czege postulated that the growing complexity of war made it necessary for the Army to educate a small group of officers in the theory and practice of war beyond what was done in the one-year regular course of the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Given the pace of operations and flow of information in the early 80s, Wass de Czege observed that the margin for error and corresponding speed of response was much reduced, given the technology of the time, and that this fact would continue as faster and faster information and battlefield systems came available. The requirement for critical thinking and the ability to see an increasingly larger battle space demanded that the Army invest time and money in the development of a school for a selected group of officers. This one-year course would educate this group and then, by sending them back to the field Army, ensure that these officers would have a multiplier effect on the entire officer corps. The hope was that they would teach others to understand the continuously-growing complexity. This “leavening influence” over time would raise the level of competence of the entire officer corps.428

Fontenot, the sixth director of SAMS, was a product of the effort to provide the

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leavening influence Wass de Czege asserted that the Army required, as well as being a thoughtful professional in his own right. When Fontenot took over SAMS, he faced the dual task of how to execute the doctoral program as well as continuing the standard of excellence that previous directors established for the school. It was no small effort. In his curriculum guidance for the 1994/95 academic year, Fontenot only addressed AMSP. The curriculum for AMSP would continue to build upon the previous year, developed under McDonough’s guidance. The broad outlines of the courses of AMSP - Foundation of Military Theory, Tactical Dynamics, The Contemporary Practice of Operational Art, The Historical Practice of Operational Art, and Preparing for War - remained the same and would be subject to update and review as the course directors gave presentations on the lesson outlines to the faculty and director. Fontenot did think about the impressive victory the Army and joint forces achieved in the war to liberate Kuwait. He asked himself and the faculty to think about where the next fight would be and in what form it would manifest itself. He intended to use the SAMS exercise program to stress this point as he directed the exercise section to devise scenarios in nearly inaccessible parts of the world. While Fontenot issued written guidance to the faculty on the development of the curriculum for AMSP, he did not issue similar written guidance for the Fellowship.429

Fontenot took the decision to use informal and unwritten guidance in the development and execution of the Fellows’ curriculum, given the expectation on the part of senior leaders that there would be a test of a doctoral program at SAMS during the execution of the Fellows’ academic year, 94/95. This was a clever move on Fontenot’s

429 School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for School of Advanced Military Studies Faculty, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AY 93/94, 3 May 1993, signed by COL James McDonough and Memorandum for School of Advanced Military Studies Faculty, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AMSP AY 94/95, 22 April 1994, signed by COL Greg Fontenot. Held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall. Hereafter cited as McDonough guidance, 93/94 and Fontenot guidance, 94/95.
part, as the support for a doctoral program was fading with the retirement of the senior leaders who began the effort and the lack of any real effort to attain accreditation of such a program. Still, Fontenot had to deal with lingering expectations for a test run at a doctoral program on the part MG Steele, GEN Franks and GEN Sullivan, and on the part of those Fellows who had been induced to apply for the Fellowship with the understanding that they would be a part of a doctoral program.  

Fontenot's program for the Fellows included a focused study on a regional combatant command area of operations and attending the National Defense University at Norfolk, Virginia. This was Fontenot's best good-faith effort at fulfilling the requirement to test the concept while realizing little ground work was done to sustain the effort. He told the Commandant, LTG John Miller, of his intentions, and Miller approved. Fontenot knew that this program had to be an Army program, but for recognition as a legitimate doctoral program, even as a professional degree, the program had to have a relationship with a university. The final momentum breaker came in a conversation Fontenot had with a professor at the University of Kansas.  

Fontenot learned that in order to have a relationship with the University of Kansas, the fellows would have to be accepted and then enrolled into a University of Kansas doctoral program, and thus he would no longer control the program. Fontenot executed the best possible program for the Fellows without written guidance for this particular academic year. This was a circumstance that Wass de Czege could not have foreseen in his original efforts at establishing the school. Wass de Czege never intended the school to produce an elite or a "shadow general staff, "in the manner of the

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430 Based on conversations with Fontenot and drawn from his interview, 1 June 2009.
431 Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1 June 2009. The professor was Dr. Ted Wilson. Fontenot did not recall the date. Judging from the sequence of notes written by Dr. Bob Berlin the conversation must have taken place in February or March of 1994.
German General Staff.\textsuperscript{432} Those holding doctorates conferred by SAMS would run into the noted Army bias against “intellectuals.” Wass de Czege and Fontenot wanted SAMS graduates to rise on their own merit instead of some perceived advantage of attending a school. In fact, Army divisions and corps as well as higher echelons of command in the Army and joint arena continued to seek SAMS graduates. This was, in part, based on the rigor of the selection process.\textsuperscript{433}

Wass de Czege articulated the requirements for the selection of officers to attend the Advanced Military Studies Program in his originating paper. Wass de Czege counted on the Army to continue selecting the upper 50\% of each year group of officers for Command and General Staff College education. Officers from this pool of the upper 50\% had to be volunteers who received a nomination from the CGSC faculty and who were interviewed and screened through a board selected by the Commandant of CGSC. The Military Personnel Center screened selected officers’ files, and the Commandant provided final approval. Fontenot did not materially change this selection process; thus, over the first ten years of the existence of SAMS, it remained the same and, based on the performance of graduates of the school, worked fairly well. Fontenot continued this search for top quality officers during his execution of the selection process, but with some difficulty.

In his original paper Wass de Czege looked forward to Fiscal Year 95 and projected by that time that graduates of the school would, of their own merit, be moving into the ranks of the senior leadership of the Army and commanding battalions and brigades, as well as holding key principal staff positions in Army divisions and corps. This projection came true as in 1994 e.g.; Wass de Czege and Holder were general

\textsuperscript{432} Wass de Czege report, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{433} Based upon a conversation with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot on 25JUN09. See also MFRs done by Dr. Bob Berlin dated 2FEB94 and 29MAR94, as well as his handwritten notes held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall.
officers, Janes and McDonough were commanding brigades, Marks, one of the 7th Infantry Division planners during JTF-Los Angeles, was commanding a battalion, and Drumm, one of the officers in the G3 of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia, was serving as the deputy G3 of the division. Wass de Czege set the goal of looking for officers with the potential for 30 years of service and who would ultimately serve as colonels in the Army. A condition that Fontenot had to deal with in the tenth year of SAMS, and one that Wass de Czege did not foresee, was the reduction of the size of the Army, the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols bill, and the corresponding timeline pressure on majors. This realization of five years of service as a major had a corresponding effect on applications to SAMS.

Swain, director of the SAMS Fellows, commented that while the Army had always been somewhat anti-intellectual in its overall attitude, in 1987, this reaction really took effect. In 1987, the National Training Center had been in operation for five years. The Army’s Project Warrior, where successful company commanders were assigned to the National Training Center for two years as an observer/controller followed by two years teaching at one of the Army’s branch basic or advanced courses, was attracting many of the Army’s brightest and ambitious officers, especially from the combat arms. During this four year period, many of these officers were selected for promotion to major and thus used up at least one of the five years an officer had in his timeline as a major. The most ambitious officers wanted to remain in contention for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel but, more importantly, battalion level command. In a shrinking Army, between 1989 and 1998 the Army would reduce in size from 18 divisions to ten with a corresponding reduction in the number of battalions available to command. Command of a battalion demanded service as a major in a battalion, as the operations or executive

\[434\] Wass de Czege report, p. 5.
\[435\] Drawn from an interview with Dr. Rick Swain on 23 June 2009. Hereafter cited as Swain interview.
officer, preferably in both positions. The measure of excellence during this time was found at the National Training Center where success at the battalion level was recognized with the rewards an Army could grant: early selection for promotion, service as a senior observer/controller for successful battalion commanders, and Army-wide recognition as one who defeated the Opposing Force. Whereas an ambitious lieutenant colonel with a successful battalion command once looked for service in the Pentagon and on the Army staff, these men now looked to serve at the NTC. With this emphasis on tactical excellence now supplanting service at the operational and strategic level, service as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy was less attractive for captains. This meant that there were fewer and fewer Fellows arriving with previous duty as an instructor and fewer new majors with time to spend in school for another year of their five years as a major.

Fontenot faced this situation and attempted to solve the problem through a concerted effort at recruiting. Fontenot even brought in an association of black Army officers to assist in recruiting minority officers. The students in the CGSC class of 1994/95 told Fontenot that the presentations were terrific, but at the end of the recruiting effort, there were only 87 volunteers for the 54 seats available. Fontenot realized that the particular problem was not easy to solve under current conditions. The type of officer he really wanted to apply for AMSP was not going to apply in the same previous numbers, as this type of officer wanted to remain competitive for battalion command. To do this, the officer needed to have two outstanding officer evaluation reports in two of three positions within a brigade: battalion operations officer, executive, or brigade operations officer. To get into these competitive positions, a new staff college graduate knew he would spend one year on the division staff, and this sequence used up all of the five years an officer promoted on time had as a field grade officer. Officers also needed to deal with the provisos of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Among the requirements articulated in the Goldwater-Nichols bill, designed to improve the quality of joint service officers and the attractiveness of serving on a joint as opposed to service staff, was the Congressional mandate for joint service as a precondition for selection for promotion into general officers ranks. This requirement put additional stress on an officer’s career timeline. Joint service required attending a joint education school and three years of service, waiverable to 30 months, to qualify as a joint service officer. The extra year spent at SAMS put in jeopardy, in most officers’ minds, their timeline-limited chance to get into the correct jobs to ensure they would be on an equal footing with other officers in the competition for selection to battalion command. Successful battalion level command was the hurdle an officer had to overcome to be considered for promotion to colonel.\footnote{Davis, the director who followed Fontenot, filled seats in SAMS with officers who had not been selected for resident CGSC education. The impact of this decision is beyond the scope of this dissertation but the perception in the Army, where many SAMS graduates were entering brigade level commands and general officer positions was that there was a lessening in the “quality” of SAMS graduates. Perception, especially on the part of people in senior and influential positions, can have extraordinary effect.}

Filling the available seats in AMSP seminars, not to mention any thought of expanding the size of AMSP, had to take into consideration the “tyranny of the timeline” resulting from a shrinking Army and Goldwater-Nichols. Finding qualified applicants for AMSP was only one challenge Fontenot faced. Like Janes and McDonough, Fontenot also faced budget limitations.

In Wass de Czege’s 1983 paper he wrote about the logical expansion of SAMS and budget resources as a natural limit on the possible expansion of SAMS. He wrote, “A course over 96-100 students may be too expensive in terms of high quality faculty (meaning uniformed faculty) and travel funding.”\footnote{Wass de Czege report, p. 32. Parenthetical note added by the author.} During the early years of SAMS, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder did not have to worry about the SAMS budget, and the decision these men took to remain at four seminars had to do with retaining quality officers in AMSP and quality education. Fontenot had four seminars of AMSP
officers and one of AOASF. In his guidance for the planning of the academic year 1994/95, Fontenot wrote that AMSP officers would visit the National Training Center and conduct a three-day staff ride to Vicksburg, “as funding and scheduling permit.” The extended Europe trip for AMSP did not survive the budget cuts required of Janes in 1988 and 1989. The AMSP trips were limited to the National Training Center, a Vicksburg staff ride to walk the ground of Grant’s 1863 campaign, and an east coast trip to visit the Joint and Army staff, Central and Special Operations Command. The Fellows trips to all the regional combatant commands were protected as these trips were really an integral part of the operational and strategic focus of the Fellowship. The travel that was an “essential” part of the SAMS education under Wass de Czege’s creation and Winton’s and Johnson’s refinement fell to the sharp pencils of the comptrollers of the Combined Arms Center and AMSP expansion to four seminars.

Wass de Czege likely anticipated pressure on SAMS to do more for the Army but did not write about this in his original paper proposing the establishment of SAMS. Sinnreich foresaw this event in his end of tour report. Fontenot did have to cope with real pressure for SAMS to do more for the Army and the corresponding effect on the curricula. Fontenot was directed to incorporate SAMS into the greater Staff College war game PRAIRIE WARRIOR and Army Warfighting Experiments that tested futuristic concepts such as the air-mechanized division. These war games and experiments demanded time, and this time was taken from the AMSP exercise program.

Wass de Czege initially envisioned the AMSP exercise program as the device through which AMSP students would see the execution of concepts, theory meeting the constrained reality of a war game. These war games would reinforce the conceptual learning. While this was still true as Fontenot’s students participated in PRAIRIE WARRIOR as the higher headquarters for the Staff College, as well as participating in

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438 Fontenot guidance, 94/95.
the Warfighting Experiments, the faculty and students had to mentally stretch to link their education to controlled experiments that were designed to test concepts as opposed to test students. Continuing along the path of Wass de Czege’s initial concept, Fontenot did test his students.

In this tenth year of SAMS’ existence, Fontenot directed the execution of an AMSP curriculum that continued to emphasize the theoretical foundations of war, tactical expertise, operational art, and joint and combined operations. His exercises, given the conditions of participating in PRAIRIE WARRIOR and Army Warfighting Experiments, challenged students to develop theater campaigns and study the development of doctrine. Under Fontenot, the Fellows’ curriculum continued to focus on the operational and strategic levels of war, and provided the best course of study at least on par with the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The Fellows’ first year program assured the provision of high quality faculty for SAMS as the permanent seminar leaders, assigned in anticipation of a long term Fellows doctoral course of studies, left SAMS. The SAMS’ curriculum supported the development of potential senior commanders and General Staff officers thoroughly grounded in tactical, operational and strategic theory and methods. In retrospect, Fontenot met the requirements of his mission statement: “The SAMS mission is to produce military officers with the ability to plan and execute campaigns across the spectrum of war in a changing world.”

SAMS incorporated the tenets of changing Army doctrine into the curricula, as expressed in the 1993 version of FM 100-5.

The 1993 version of FM 100-5 added the tenet Versatility to the now familiar four tenets of AirLand Battle. The end of the Cold War, the apparent decisive victory in the gulf, and the call for a “Peace Dividend,” expanded the range of potential operations the Army would be called upon to conduct and SAMS graduates would be called upon to

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439 Fontenot guidance, 94/95.
plan and execute. Franks and others at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command attempted to find a framework for the Army to apply the familiar, AirLand Battle and the decision making process, to the unfamiliar, Operations Other Than War, stability and support operations, and operations in support of civil authority. The understanding and application of operational art was evolving during this era of change as force in many forms was used as an extension of policy. Operational art was still the means to link tactical actions to strategic and policy objectives, but how to think operationally was changing as the opponents of U.S policy expanded from only state controlled armies to state supported actors and trans-national groups, or regionally based ethnic groups seeking territory of their own or domination of a natural resource. As Fontenot wrote in his curriculum development guidance, SAMS graduates had to plan and execute campaigns across the spectrum of war and under changing conditions.

SAMS directors from Fontenot on would attempt to find the balance of Warfighting and operations other than war by adjusting the curricula in AMSP and AOASF, challenging the officer students in both programs to stretch their ability to think critically and creatively. Of necessity, SAMS would begin to change when Fontenot, the first director with combat command experience not from Vietnam, began to bring into SAMS a combination of his experience as a SAMS educated planner, his battalion command in combat, and his experience as General Franks’ executive officer. Fontenot would set conditions for SAMS to enter its next ten years of service to the Army and in educating future Army leaders.

Senior leaders in the Army sensed that the world was changing and that the Army must understand the depth of the changes and how to operate in this new environment. The environment was bound by new technology, a U.S. drive for smaller yet technologically superior forces, and a growing number of ethnically driven tensions. The conduct of war was changing, but the nature of war - passions, greed, ethnic
animosity, religious differences, etc - were all unchanging and yet even more lethal given the availability of weapons of greater destructive power.

Swain said that the story of the development of SAMS and the introduction of the concept of operational art into the lexicon and thinking of the U.S. Army was a result of multiple agendas and lines of operation. Many senior generals as well as Wass de Czege were involved in the development of both concepts. For example, when he was the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Major General Dave Palmer used to send a letter to each incoming Fellow explaining his vision for SAMS and for the Fellowship. The Chief of Staff of the Army was personally involved in the selection of the Director of SAMS. The senior leaders of the Army continued to look at SAMS and especially SAMS graduates to solve tough problems.  

As SAMS looked to the future, the school faculty, as well as the wider group of similarly concerned officers in the U.S. Army, was searching for a way to define the changing conditions of war in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} and looming 21\textsuperscript{st} century. When the Army came to grips with the definition of war and how to prosecute it in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the Army would know the path to 21\textsuperscript{st} century victory. Rupert Smith’s 2007 book, The Utility of Force, opens with the sentence, “War no longer exists.” More to the point though, the last sentence of his opening paragraph states his thesis more clearly, “Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such wars no longer exist.”

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotenote{Conversation with Colonel Rick Swain, U.S. Army (retired) and Ph.D., former director of Fellows at the School of Advanced Military Studies conducted on 27 October 2007 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr. Swain is the author of Lucky War, a history of the Third U.S. Army during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion. According to Swain the only director who was picked without the concurrence of the CSA was Colonel Danny Davis, the seventh director. Davis served in Alaska with the deputy commandant at the time, BG Randy Rigby. Swain also related that when the Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon Sullivan was informed of the selection he was more than a little upset.}
\end{footnotes}
track as a narrative for coming to grips with the war the United States is presently in and the wars she will face in the future. Clashes of arms will continue, but the path to victory and victory conditions will have to be defined differently given globalization, instant media, blogs, and cellular structured adversaries, to name a few. SAMS in 1994 could only speculate on the way ahead and attempt to educate its officers broadly enough to enable them to take sensible decisions in the uncertain future.

SAMS was also dealing with the beginning of a changing sense of the future of war, indeed the utility of continuing to look at war in terms of state versus state violence. SAMS was coming to view war as less and less a clash of titans, massed armies contending in the central region of Europe or the deserts of Saudi Arabia, and more towards trying to describe war and more broadly the use of force in a more Clausewitzian sense of an extension of policy by other means. SAMS was clearly still on the path its founder, Wass de Czege, originally outlined. SAMS was producing critical thinkers who were raising the bar of understanding within the larger Army of the linkage between tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives.

Wars and uses of force in operations other than war lay ahead for SAMS. At the start of SAMS’ next ten years of existence, the U.S. Army was in Somalia and was also planning for an entry into the war-torn Balkans and the island of Haiti. SAMS graduates were also on the Korean peninsula, facing an old enemy and a war that would be unlike Desert Storm, but as SAMS graduates knew, all wars were similar in nature but vastly different in conduct. Sir Michael Howard, eminent British military historian, articulated the challenge for all SAMS graduates at that time and on into an uncertain future when he said,

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives .... Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly
SAMS at ten years was well on its way to internalizing Moltke’s dictum. The Gulf War of 1991 did in fact nurture the notion that SAMS was producing a privileged elite within the Army. Newly arrived SAMS graduates did have extraordinary access to general officers other staff officers did not enjoy, and some graduates did indeed act arrogantly. The effort to combat this behavior led directors and faculty to stress that the privilege of being selected for SAMS was just that, a privilege. Accompanying the privilege of another year of studying the profession of arms was the commitment to do the very best for the remainder of a career. A graduate of SAMS was always going to be associated with the school and always thought of as a “smart” guy or gal. As LTG David Huntoon said at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of SAMS, “this program is a rare gift that merits an equally exceptional return on the investment.”

The Army demanded a great deal from SAMS graduates. There is persuasive evidence that SAMS graduates raised the level of understanding of Army doctrine, the quality of operational plans and campaigns, and continued the process of refining doctrine to reflect the lessons drawn from operational experience in war, operations other than war, and preparing for war.

Clausewitz wrote, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” The simple thing that SAMS conveyed, from Wass de Czege to Fontenot, was based on another line from Clausewitz’s *On War*, namely that the use of war as an extension of policy, the use of maximum force is, “in no way incompatible with the

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443 Cited from a speech delivered by LTG David Huntoon on 24 May 2009 at Fort Leavenworth, KS at a gathering of SAMS graduates celebrating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the school. LTG Huntoon asked the author to review his speech in advance of its delivery and sent me a copy of his final remarks for the author’s personal files, to be deposited in CARL upon completion of the dissertation effort.
The focus of the SAMS curricula on theory, history and doctrine set a base line of knowledge and a shared educational experience for SAMS graduates. This shared educational experience, and interaction with professors such as Epstein and Schneider, directors from Wass de Czege to Fontenot, and Fellows from Swain to Dubik, established a bond between graduates and fostered links that made the effort directed at the development and execution of plans and orders that much better. The SAMS education established a foundation for continued personal study of the art and science of war. There was somewhat of a downside to this fact. SAMS graduates were sought after, but this fact acerbated a tendency on the part of other staff offices to leave the “deep thinking” to SAMS graduates and focus on the immediate execution of operations.

Doctrine is never easy to read, and thinking about the conceptual constructs that underpin doctrine is even more difficult. The fact that SAMS incorporated not only a study of the theoretical underpinning of doctrine but doctrine itself became a convenient excuse for harried staff officers. They knew that the generals were not going to ask them what doctrine said; these questions would be asked of the SAMS guys. The experience of then Major (now Lieutenant General) Mark Hertling supports this point. Hertling, a 1988 graduate of AMSP, was assigned to the 1st Armored Division as a planner in the G3, Operations staff. Hertling’s first experience as a “SAMS guy” came during a preparation session for a division exercise. Hertling described entering the Plans section’s “expando van” and observing fellow SAMS graduate MAJ Russ Goehring lead the division planning group through a portion of the decision making process. Goehring knew Hertling was his relief and that he would soon be reassigned within the division to a battalion S3 or executive officer position. Goehring greeted

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Hertling by saying, “welcome, Mark, you just got your first lesson as a SAMS grad. You’re the traffic cop of the division, because everyone thinks since you’re a SAMS graduate that you have all the answers for any of their problems...which, of course, you do.” At that moment Hertling realized that the SAMS guy in the division headquarters was the, “go-to person for everyone....not only for the CG in his planning efforts, but for all the staff as they worked through the planning process.”

This experience was, in fact, typical of the experiences of SAMS graduates throughout the Army at that time. The expectations were very high, and the pressure to produce top quality plans and orders was enormous. The directors of SAMS, from Wass de Czege to Fontenot, successfully built and sustained a program that met a goal set for the school by Wass de Czege and approved by Richardson. The influence of the doctrine was also evident as SAMS graduates moved into the field Army.

It is realistic to pose the question of what if the decision to start a school for advanced military studies had not been taken, and what would the Army have done. The senior leaders of the Army; Saint, Richardson, Vuono, and Starry all perceived a need to educate officers in the art of maneuvering large formations. There was the need to look beyond the initial line of contact and deeper into Soviet Army formations. General Saint recounted in his oral history interview that he was being “beaten up” about the need for strategists. The analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war led to the conclusion that there was a need to disrupt the following echelons of forces behind the initial array of forces in contact lest a defense be overwhelmed. With the introduction of the concept of operational art into Army doctrine came a corresponding need for staff officers and commanders who had the intellectual preparation to employ the art and turn concepts into action, which on the battlefield meant movement and maneuver of large formations.

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445 Drawn from an electronic mail note from then MG (now LTG) Mark Hertling, 26 March 2009. This note is in the author’s personal files. Quoted with permission of LTG Hertling.
The time was right for the Army to do something; adjust doctrine, training or tactical procedures senior leaders and thoughtful members of the Army officer corps recognized change was needed. The changes in doctrine led the way in this regard. GEN William E. Depuy, the catalyst of the changes in the Army, wrote about the evolution of doctrine beyond the time of his own efforts on the 1976 version. Depuy said that the awareness of operational art was not at the level of general officers; rather, it was “at the lieutenant colonel level…the Wass de Czege, the Richard Sinnreich and Don Holders.” As shown, these first directors of SAMS were at the heart of the efforts to refine the doctrine of the Army. Doctrine became the engine for change. The doctrinal focus on the operational level had another effect on the Army officer corps.

SAMS rightly focused on the operational and tactical levels of war at its inception, in accord with what Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all felt what was wrong about the education officers received at the Staff College. In this first ten years of SAMS, SAMS graduates and their influence that very operational focus stayed there and actually created a wall between it and strategy and policy. There was actual and perceived success during combat operations and operations other than war, and the Army reinforces success. The focus on the familiar and successful levels of war precluded a focus on the higher echelons. So in a sense the Army has the same problem that it did in the 80s, in trying to get over Vietnam the Army focused overly inward and lost sight of the strategic and political aspects of war. In a sense the Army faces the same problem today.

SAMS and the doctrine introduced in FM 100-5, versions 1982, 1986, and 1993 is a success story. The Army faced difficult tests in the first ten years of the existence of the school and the doctrine, and did extremely well. However, patterns were established

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in these years that would place obstacles in the path of the directors to come in the next ten years. Hertling saw this in his story of becoming the “go to” guy in his division. I saw this pattern emerge in my own service at XVIII Abn Corps when all the generals there turned to the handful of SAMS educated officers for everything from invasion plans for Haiti to the preparation of Senate testimony. The successful conclusion of the first Gulf War became the start point for the second Gulf War of 2003. If SAMS educated officers ensured success how will history judge the second Gulf War? In 1994 all of this was in the unknowable future.

By the tenth year of the school’s existence, SAMS was deeply embedded within the culture of the Army. The officer corps did pay attention to doctrine even if FM 100-5 of any version was not on the best seller list and on night stands for bed time reading. Doctrine was an engine of change for the Army, and the Army continued to meet the requirements of the Nation to deter war and win wars when deterrence failed. The challenge for SAMS as it entered its next decade of service was to maintain its standards and prepare for the wars, and operations other than war, that were an extension of policy by other means in an uncertain future.
Appendix 1

THE DIRECTORS OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Colonel Huba Wass de Czege 1983 - 1985 retired as a Brigadier General

Colonel Rick Sinnreich 1985 - 1987 retired as a colonel

Colonel L. Don Holder 1987 – 1989 retired as a Lieutenant General

Colonel William Janes 1989 - 1990 retired as a colonel

Colonel James McDonough 1990 – 1993 retired as a colonel

Colonel Greg Fontenot 1993 – 1995 retired as a colonel

Colonel Danny Davis 1995 - 1998 retired as a colonel

Colonel Robin Swan 1998 – 2001 on active duty as of 2010 and serving as a Brigadier General

Colonel James Greer 2001 – 2003 retired as a colonel

Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson 2003 – 2007 retired as a colonel

Colonel Stefan Banach 2007- 2010 - retired in 2010 as a colonel

Colonel Wayne Grigsby 2010-
Appendix 2

Staff and Faculty
1983 to 1994

LTC Doug Johnson 1982-1985
LTC Hal Winton 1982-1989
SFC Dan Mills 1985-1990
SPC “Pete” Peterson 1985-1988
Dr. Robert Epstein 1983-2011
Dr. James Schneider 1983-2008
Ms. Candace Hamm 1988-present
Ms. Jackie Kania 1984-2000
Dr. Robert Berlin 1992-2004
Dr. Ernest Evans 1993-1995
Dr. William Gregor 1993-present
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U.S. Army.  Official Message dated 21150ZAUG97, Subject: Marine Corps Participation in the Advanced Military Studies Program.  The thrust of the message requested recommendations and rationale for options regarding the inclusion of two USMC officers to every AMSP class.  Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army.  Personal For Message from Major General Gordon Sullivan, deputy commandant, USACGSC and Major General Glynn Mallory, Deputy Chief of Staff-Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.  The so-called “No Free Lunch” message, it states that the inclusion of USAF and USMC officers into an Army program, in the name of “jointness” would come at the cost of seats for US Army officers in a US Army school.  Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


_____. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 87-18, General William R. Richardson, USA, retired. Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Ackerman. Interview conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA.


_____. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 1997-10, General Jack Merritt, USA, retired. Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Glover. Interview conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA.


Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Records;
Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Archives
Student Papers


Department of the Army. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Memorandum for Lieutenant General Wilson A. Schoffner, Commander U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Subject: Doctorate of Military Arts and Science. Dated 1 July 1992. Official memo from GEN Frederick Franks asking LTG Schoffner to look into the feasibility of starting a doctoral program in military arts and science. Franks’ intent was to create a body of officers who possess an in-depth education in military arts and science beyond that offered in Advanced Military Studies curriculum. He also directed Schoffner to speak with the commandant of the Army War College. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Collection, Group Combat development SG 1986, SSG SAMS-012/013, Interview with Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, Director of the School for Advanced Military Studies at CGSC, by Dr. Michael Pearlman, 8 April and 26 June 1986. Held in the Combined Arms Center historical files, third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s end of tour report, dated 10 June 1987. Report of COL Richard Hart Sinnreich to the Commandant. Sinnreich reported on his three year tenure as the Deputy Director and second Director of SAMS. Held in the Combined Arms Center historical files, third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. Internal Evaluation of the Advanced Military Studies Program, AMSP (October 1993). Office of Evaluation and Standardization, Department of Academic Operations. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s Memorandum No. 3, dated 8 June 1990. Subject: School of Advanced Military Studies Course Planning Guidance AY 90/91. The memorandum states that AY 90/91 will represent an evolution in the Advanced Military Studies Course. The curriculum design guidance refers to the influence of external factors such as the political-military situation in NATO, an upsurge of democracy in Central and South America, and economic expansion in the Pacific Rim. Internal factors include a smaller Army facing a wider variety of missions and the development of joint doctrine. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s Memorandum No. 3, dated 1 January 1991. Subject: School of Advanced Military Studies Course Planning Guidance AY 91/92. Written just before the start of Operation Desert Storm this memorandum states that AY 91/92 will build on the AY 90/91 curriculum, expanding on the significant political changes around the world as well as budget constraints. The curriculum will place more emphasis on deployment and employment of contingency forces, increased consideration of the economic element of power, and “an investigation of the role of religion and ideology in modern war.” Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. 1982-84 Annual Historical Review, SG.CAC/FLVN 84, MH-010/001, VF CGSC-Department-SAMS. The Operational Level of War and the School of Advanced Military Studies, pages 174-187 and 223-225. A portion of a historical study of unknown length. Held in the Combined Arms Center historical files, third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. Copy of a personal letter from Donn A. Starry, General U.S. Army, retired to Dr. Richard M Swain, dated 7 June 1995 and filed in CARL 17 December 1999. This 37 page letter is part history and part reminiscence of a career. It details Starry’s thoughts on the process of development of FM 100-5 1976, 1982 and 1986. Held in the Combined Arms Center historical files, third floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for USAF, USMC, and USN Senior Liaison Officers to the Command & General Staff College, dated 24 February 1987, Subject: Sister Service Participation in the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC), from Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, Director. The thrust of the memorandum was to invite US Navy and Marine Corps participation in the Advanced Military Studies course as the USAF would participate in the program per agreement between the Chief of Staff, Army and Chief of Staff, Air Force in December 1986 at a rate of four officers per year. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for Record, dated 21 April 1987, Subject: AMSP Class Size. The memorandum recorded the minutes of a meeting with Major general Gordon Sullivan, Deputy Commandant, USACGSC on the size of AMSP classes, and his guidance. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies, memorandum for Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 June 1987, Subject: End of Tour Report. A memo written by Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, Director of SAMS reporting on his three year tenure as the deputy and Director of SAMS. Sinnreich used this memo to outline
the accomplishments of the school, to thank the senior leaders of the College for their assistance, and to highlight in Sinnreich’s views that the major dangers facing SAMS, “are associated with its success, not its failure.” Held in the Special Collections Section, Combined Arms Research Library.

Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Army, dated 2 December 1987, Subject: AMSP Class Size. The director, SAMS, sent a note to the Army Chief of Staff requesting resolution of conflicting guidance on the size of the AMSP class vis-à-vis USAF, USN and USMC participation and the student-teacher ratio. In a handwritten note on the side of the memorandum the Chief of Staff’s decision was recorded on 10 December 1987 as overall size 52; 46 US Army, 4 USAF, and 2 USMC. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for Director, SAMS, dated 19 June 1988, Subject: Analyses of AMSP Classes of 1985/86 with 1986/87. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for the Director, SAMS, dated 27 June 1988, Subject: Course End Evaluations, AMSP 87/88. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for the Director, SAMS, dated 29 June 1988, Subject: AMSP Phase III Completion. An analysis of the first five classes from AMSP regarding the percentage of those graduates who completed the phase three of the SAMS education, one year of service on a general staff. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for the Director, SAMS, dated 27 July 1990, Subject: End of Course Survey, AY 1988/89. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies. Director’s Memorandum No. 3, School of Advanced Military Studies Course Planning Guidance AY 91/92, dated 1 January 1991. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, dated 15 May 1991, Subject: Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship (AOSF) AY 91/92 Calendars. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies. Course 4 The Historical Practice of Operational Art, Academic Year 1991/1992. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies. Memorandum for Record. Subject: Doctorate Degree for CGSC/SAMS, dated 27 February 1992. Prepared by Dr. Robert H. Berlin, deputy director of SAMS this memo details outlines the origin of the effort to develop a doctoral or professional degree program at CGSC or SAMS. Berlin met with Dr. Brookes, director of the graduate degree program at CGSC on 27 FEB. Brookes told Berlin of the results of an earlier meeting with GEN Saint, LTG Schoffner, BG Steele, and COL McDonough during which Steele asked Brookes to sketch out a plan by May.
Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, dated 7 April 1992, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AY 1992/93. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Official message from Commander, USACAC to Commander TRADOC, dated 26 August 1992. Subject Doctorate of Military Art and Science Program. This message, written by LTC Ben Elley, a second year Fellow at SAMS at the time, outlines the initial response to the CG, TRADOC memo of 1 July 92 on the same subject. The message contains required steps, facilities, potential students, and a cost estimate. Message was four pages in length. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, dated 1 June 1993, Subject: AOSF Course Planning Guidance for AY 93/94. Memorandum articulated the mission of the senior program as, “To produce senior officers capable of planning and executing military-strategic level theater campaigns and integrating multiple theater campaigns for war and operations other than war.” Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. School of Advanced Military Studies. Concept presentation to develop a degree producing program at the doctoral level in Military Art and Science, undated but likely 18 August 1992. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Office of the Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. Electronic mail note dated Monday, 24 August 1992, subject: Doctoral Program. Sent to COL Dick Gibson, assistant deputy Commandant, Dr. Phil Brookes, Dr. Roger Spiller, and COL Jim McDonough. The e-mail is the initiating document for the execution of an unaccredited program in the coming academic year and naming McDonough as the lead agent, supported by Drs. Brookes and Spiller. Held in the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, 3 May 1993, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AY 93/94. Memorandum articulated the focus of the programs within SAMS; AMSP focus on tactical and operational levels of war, AOASF to focus on the operational and strategic levels of war. Both programs would include study on unconventional warfare as well as conventional. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Chief of Staff, Army, dated 21 July 1993, Subject: Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship. The memorandum from General Gordon Sullivan to General Colin Powell updated the Chairman on changes in the Fellowship program making the Fellowship a true two year educational program designed to produce theater level campaign planners. This was the harbinger of permanent AMSP seminar leaders for the next few years at SAMS. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s Memorandum Number 5, dated 1 June 1991, titled Campaign Operations Group Purpose, Mission and Functions. A copy of the initiating document establishing the SAMS’ Campaign Operations Group, a section within the school established, primarily to write 1993 version of FM 100-5. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for SAMS Faculty, undated, Subject: SAMS Advanced Military Studies Program Academic Year 1985/86 Oral Comprehensive Examination Questions. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for School of Advanced Military Studies Faculty, 3 May 1993, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AY 93/94. This memo outlined COL James McDonough’s guidance for the refinement of the curriculum of SAMS as well as identifying the seminar leaders for AMSP and the course authors for the five courses that made up the curriculum of the SAMS’ programs, AMSP and AOASF. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for School of Advanced Military Studies Faculty, 22 April 1994, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AMSP AY 94/95. This memo outlined COL Greg Fontenot’s guidance for the refinement of the curriculum of AMSP as well as identifying the course authors for the five courses that made up the curriculum of AMSP. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum for record, dated 4 September 1992, Subject: Doctorate of Military Arts and Sciences. The essence of the memorandum sent to the Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Training is an explanation of the proposal for a doctorate degree. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Special Collection, Oral History interview of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege by Dr. W. Glenn Robertson, 27 November 1984. Subject: the development of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Held in the Special Collections Section, Combined Arms Research Library.


School of Advanced Military Studies Briefing undated, subject Academic Year 1992/1993. Presentation used to brief visitors to the school on the curricula of the two programs within SAMS. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Copy of an electronic mail note, undated, from Major General James Steele to Colonels Gibson, McDonough, and Strange and Drs. Brookes and Spiller. The note stated that the Chief of Staff, Army agreed to the proposal to have a doctoral program within the Officer Education system. The note names COL McDonough, then Director, SAMS as the “spearpoint.” Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Briefing, undated but likely 24 July 1992, with a proposal for the development of a doctoral level degree program in SAMS. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Memorandum from General Frederick Franks, Jr. Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command to Lieutenant General Wilson Schoffner, Commanding General Combined Arms Center, dated 1 July 1992, Subject: Doctorate of Military Arts and Sciences. The memorandum directs the Combined Arms Center to investigate the feasibility of starting a doctoral program in the Military Arts and Sciences. The initial assessment was delivered on 24/25 July 1992 on GEN Franks visit to CAC. Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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as a means of promoting professional study of war and how to beat the Russians, the Opposing Force at National Training Center, or any other foe. Kirk insisted on self study because, “…too few of us talk/train seriously to fight,” and, “OPMS (Officer Personnel Management System) sucks because it diverts officers from what should be nearly fanatical pursuit of excellence in leadership and ability to execute/support tactical combined arms operations.” Personal copy held by the author.

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**Articles**


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BG [ret] Huba Wass de Czege (founder and first Director, SAMS)
Interview conducted 12JAN09 at Fort Leavenworth
Dr., LTC [ret], Douglas Johnson
First interview done by electronic mail on 6SEP06
Second interview conducted 2 April 2009 at Carlisle, PA
Dr., LTC [ret], Hal Winton
Received a copy of an oral history transcript from Dr. Winton’s personal papers 2SEP06
Dr. Roger Spiller
First interview done by electronic mail 30APR07
Dr. Robert Epstein
First interview done by electronic mail 12OCT06
Dr. James Schneider
First interview done by electronic mail 25OCT06
COL [ret] Rick Sinnreich (second Director, SAMS)
Interview conducted telephonically 6JAN09
LTG [ret] L. Don Holder (third Director, SAMS)
Two electronic mail exchanges dated 21 and 26 March 2008
Interview 5DEC08 at Fort Leavenworth
MG James “Spider” Marks (7th ID planner during JTF-Los Angeles) Interview conducted 25 May 2009
LTG (ret) Steven L. Arnold (G3 Third Army/ARCENT during Desert Storm, CG, 10th Mountain Division during JTF-Andrew and Operation Restore Hope, 23 April 2009 in Washington, DC
COL [ret] William Janes (fourth Director, SAMS)
Interview conducted 25MAY09
COL [ret] James McDonough (fifth Director, SAMS) First interview done by
electronic mail, 6MAR07, second interview done by telephone on 3 June 2009
COL [ret] Greg Fontenot (sixth Director, SAMS) Interview conducted on 1 June 2009, at Fort Leavenworth, KS
COL (ret) Rick Swain, Ph.D., former Fellow and Director of AOASF, interview conducted at Fort Leavenworth, 23 June 2009
MG Mark Hertling (1st AD planner)
Electronic mail exchange 26MAR09
Ms. Jackie Kania
Ms. Candi Hamm
Interview conducted 9NOV09
LTC [ret] Michael Burke (XVIII Abn Corps planner for Operation Desert Storm) interview conducted at Fort Leavenworth, 12 March 2009
COL [ret] Johnny Brooks Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship class of 1991-93, first interview done via electronic mail 14FEB07
MG [ret] Pat Cavanaugh Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship class of 1991-93, first interview done via electronic mail 13FEB07
COL [ret] Ben Elley Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship class of 1991-93, first interview done via electronic mail 20FEB07
BG [ret] Phil Mattox Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship class of 1991-93, first interview done via electronic mail 14FEB07
COL [ret] Doug Tystad Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship class of 1991-93, first interview done 26MAR07
COL [ret] Joe Purvis (CENTCOM planner for ODS)
Telephonic interview conducted 25MAR09
COL (ret) Greg Eckert
Telephonic interview conducted APR09
GEN (ret) Frederick M. Franks
   Telephonic interviews conducted 25 and 27 NOV 09
LTG (ret) Dave Palmer
   Telephonic interview 12 August 2009
LTG William Caldwell
   Interview conducted 27 April 2009
Sergeant First Class (ret) Dan Mills
   Electronic mail note dated 24 May 2009