COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: HOW UNIONIZATION IMPACTS EMPLOYEE’S ATTITUDES, BEHAVIORS, AND VALUES

By

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Submitted to the graduate degree program in Public Administration and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: HOW UNIONIZATION IMPACTS EMPLOYEE’S ATTITUDES, BEHAVIORS, AND VALUES

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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of public sector labor unions on member attitudes, beliefs, and values. I expect that as union members commit to the values of labor organizations they will perceive lower levels of bureaucratic red tape, exhibit higher public service motivation (PSM), and become more satisfied with the nature of public sector work. I devise and test nine hypotheses by analyzing qualitative data generated from interviews with 40 randomly selected union members in two large Kansas cities, and quantitative data collected from a survey instrument distributed to over 300 municipal union members in a single Kansas municipality. The qualitative findings indicate that the union context significantly influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape and the motives that give rise to PSM. The findings from a series of structural equation models suggest that commitment to union values decreases perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, enhances all four component dimensions of public service motivation, and indirectly increases public sector job satisfaction via bureaucratic red tape and PSM. While this study supports the assertion that labor unions significantly influence the public sector workplace, I rebut the argument that unions primarily decrease organizational performance. Rather unions could increase the performance of public sector organizations by encouraging members to more favorably perceive the work context, promoting member actions designed to benefit others, and facilitating member job satisfaction.
Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

Introduction

After over fifty years of dramatic growth, labor unions represent a significant presence in the public workplace (Freeman, 1986; Kearney, 2010). Prior to the mid-twentieth century labor unions organized only a small proportion of the government workforce, but in the 1960s and 1970s union activity shifted toward the public sector (Klingner, Nalbandian, & Llorens, 2010). The dramatic growth in public union membership began in 1962 when President John F. Kennedy issued executive order 10988, which legally guaranteed collective bargaining rights to federal employees. Although Kennedy's order covered only federal employees its effects increased the prevalence of bargaining rights in state and municipal government organizations as well.

While changing environmental conditions in the twentieth century encouraged public union growth, unfavorable economic and legal characteristics reduced the prevalence of unionized workers in the private sector. Four primary factors reduced levels of unionization in the private sector. First, broad economic changes altered the composition of the workforce from male dominated, blue-collar occupations to more diverse, service oriented occupations. Furthermore, these economic changes encouraged employers to relocate to unfriendly union environments in southern and southwestern states. Second, increasingly prevalent “right-to-work” laws created legal conditions that stifled private union growth. Third, public support for unions dwindled during this time. Finally, in the latter part of the twentieth century private unions devoted fewer resources to organizing new members and held fewer union certification elections (Kearney, 1992).
As a result of environmental changes public union members now outnumber members in the private sector. Membership statistics, however, do not account for all employees represented by union contracts. Collective bargaining agreements often cover union members as well as non-members in the same occupational category. As such, unions often represent more workers than reflected by membership rolls. Today the number of workers represented by union contracts in public organizations also outstrips represented workers in the private sector. As figure 1.1 illustrates, since 1973 both union membership and union representation has shifted drastically toward the public sector.

[INSERT FIGURE 1.1]

These sector differences between union membership and representation are significant given that in 2009 there were five times more wage and salary workers in the private sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b). When standardized to percentages, only approximately 7% of the private workforce pays dues to labor organizations, whereas just over 38% of public employees belong to unions. This drastic difference is compounded even further in municipal government organizations, where approximately 43% of the workforce claim union membership status (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b). Although the proportion of public union members exceeds levels of union membership in private organizations, public sector ratios remain relatively stable. On the other hand, the proportion of private unionized workers continues to

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1 Kearney (1992) points out that the increased union membership and representation at the municipal level stems from a few highly unionized occupations. Among them are fire fighters, teachers, police officers, sanitation workers, welfare workers, highway workers, and hospital employees. I focus solely on city government.
decrease. Figure 1.2 provides nearly thirty years of membership and representation statistics by sector, as a percentage of the total workforce.

[INSERT FIGURE 1.2]

Statement of the Problem

Although comparatively large numbers of public employees belong to unions, and are represented by collective bargaining agreements, scholars have devoted relatively little systematic attention toward understanding public union membership from an organizational psychology perspective (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). This gap in knowledge is a significant omission given that scholars have speculated on a wide range of union outcomes for organizations, public and private. Studies suggest that unionization can divide member loyalties between the union and work organization (Angle & Perry, 1986; Barling, Wade, & Fullagar, 1990), diminish intrinsic job satisfaction by emphasizing extrinsic rewards (Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Heywood, Siebert, & Wei, 2002; Kearney, 1992), and increase sources of employee stress such as role conflict and ambiguity (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Additionally, some public administration scholarship suggests that collective bargaining can lead to a decreased emphasis on traditional public values, such as social equity (Kearney, 1992; Klingner, et al., 2010; Riccucci, 1988, 1990).

These assertions, while providing valuable insights toward understanding the impact of unionization on public employees, are limited in three ways. First, public administration studies on unionization typically employ middle range theories associated with human resources management. Although the development of middle range theories advances the exchange of
knowledge between public administration and other disciplines, they do not provide a unifying framework for seemingly unrelated findings. Second, public administration studies on unions often emphasize the search for practical applicability. As such, public administration scholars have provided valuable recommendations to practitioners engaged in collective bargaining, but have tended to shy away from the more abstract intellectual challenge of examining unions as sources of member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values towards their public employers. Finally, the absence of a unifying theoretical framework has both limited the number of empirical studies devoted solely to public sector unions, and generated conflicting evidence regarding the impacts of union membership.

To address these shortcomings this research will use institutional theory – oriented around an organizational psychology framework – to examine the impacts of unionization on public union members. Unions represent a normative system that shapes social interactions between union members and other individuals within the organization (Kearney, 1992; Nisbet, 1976; Parboteeah & Cullen, 2003). Normative systems or institutions impose constraints on social behavior by providing the values, rules and routines, and norms that define and homogenize member behavior (March & Olsen, 1989; Peters & Pierre, 1998; W. R. Scott, 2008). Values can be defined as “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors can be assessed,” while norms “specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott, 2008, p. 54-55). Viewed as social institutions, unions represent sets of norms and values that can influence member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values related to organizational behavior.

Conventional wisdom suggests that public union values may contradict the values of the broader public organizations in which they are embedded. Managing personnel in the public
sector involves the interaction between four traditional public values – political responsiveness and representation, efficiency, employee or individual rights, and social equity (Klingner, et al., 2010). Collective bargaining, the human resources management system favored by unions, values individual rights while minimizing the other traditional public values (Klingner, et al., 2010). Unions, as social organizations, then transmit these values to their members via the socialization process. Socialization can be defined in terms of both institutional and individual mechanisms (Fullagar, Gallagher, Gordon, & Clark, 1995). On the one hand, institutional socialization occurs when members attend formal union functions that provide “newcomers with a common set of experiences that are likely to elicit standardized responses,” on the other hand “individual socialization practices are idiosyncratic and informal” (Fullagar et al., 1995, p. 147). Institutional socialization occurs when members participate in meetings, and individual socialization occurs through informal encounters with other members. Each of these socialization experiences helps define member values. Although there is widespread belief that union values may contradict broader public values – such as responsiveness, efficiency, and equity – little empirical evidence supports this claim.

**Research Questions**

Guided by the tenets of institutional theory, I expect union membership to influence public employees by: shaping perceptions rule quality, influencing public service motivation, and altering job satisfaction.\(^2\) These three areas deserve theoretical attention because they have

\(^2\) It is important to clarify that these three concepts are not, strictly speaking, behaviors. However, perceived rule quality, public service motivation, and job satisfaction contribute to important work related behaviors such as turnover intentions, absenteeism, and rule bending behavior.
strong links to individual and organizational performance, as well as the psychological contract between employee and employer. Research findings suggest that those with higher public service motivation perform better in public settings (Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Crewson, 1997; Naff & Crum, 1999), while other studies suggest that bureaucratic red tape is a significant impediment to organizational performance (Pandey & Moynihan, 2005). Alternatively, studies provide mixed findings regarding the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance, but evidence suggests that job satisfaction and performance are moderately positively correlated (Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001). Together, these three areas of organizational behavior significantly contribute to understanding high performing public sector workers and organizations. As such, it is important to understand how union membership impacts these areas of behavior.

First, from an institutionalist perspective, union members may be more likely to favor formal organizational rules. Formal rules and standard operating procedures represent a major determinant of organizational behavior by shaping the routine ways in which people act (March & Olsen, 1989). Union members often attempt to structure the interactions between management and labor by influencing personnel procedures via the collective bargaining process (Kearney, 1992; Klingner, et al., 2010). Unions seek to protect the value of individual rights by developing formal rules and processes that limit managerial discretion over personnel matters (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Moe, 2009). Because formal rules and standard operating procedures protect unionized employees from arbitrary treatment, unions may socialize members into believing that formal rules and procedures are beneficial. The potential for unions, as social institutions, to shape members’ perceptions of rule quality is important because rules perceived as good elicit stakeholder acceptance of rule requirements (DeHart-Davis, 2009b).
Although public administration scholars have devoted significant attention to pathological formal rules, or red tape, defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” (Bozeman, 2000), relatively little research has been conducted on stakeholder perceptions of red tape (Bozeman, 1993; Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Feeney & Bozeman, 2009; Walker & Brewer, 2008). Although individual assessments of rules are difficult to tap, institutional theorists frequently acknowledge that social organizations impact members' perceptions of their surroundings (P. L. Berger & Luckman, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; W. R. Scott, 2008). Based on these studies the first major research question is:

1. Do unions, by emphasizing rule-oriented protection of union values, encourage members to perceive less organizational red tape?

Second, public administration scholars often argue that public institutions and organizations value benevolence, compassion, self-sacrifice, and social equity (Frederickson & Hart, 1985; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982). On the other hand, unions emphasize individualistic values, such as employee rights and member solidarity (Klingner, et al., 2010). Due to their emphasis on individualistic values unions are often portrayed as self-interested organizations designed to protect members at the expense of clients (Freeman, 1986; Moe, 2009). These studies suggest that public union values may contradict broader public values, thereby attenuating public service motivation. As such, the second key research question is:

2. What is the nature of the relationship between unionization and public service motivation?
Finally, the human resource management system of collective bargaining may have a negative effect on employee satisfaction by characterizing the employee-employer relationship as one of separation rather than partnership (C. J. Berger, Olson, & Boudreau, 1983). March and Olsen (1989) point out that organizational behavior stems in part from specific beliefs about organizational roles, and empirical findings suggest that union members are likely to perceive the roles of management and labor as conflicting (Barling, Kelloway, & Bremermann, 1991), or at least with suspicion and caution. Increased managerial discretion over personnel policies and procedures frequently comes at the expense of employee rights, the fundamental value of unions, because union members believe managerial discretion often leads to favoritism and unfair labor practices.

Union norms may also encourage employees to voice dissatisfaction with management and the workplace, thereby leading to job dissatisfaction (C. Brown & Medoff, 1978). Several empirical studies illustrate that union membership can negatively influence overall satisfaction (Angle & Perry, 1986; C. J. Berger, et al., 1983; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1984; Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Heywood, et al., 2002). Many scholars, however, depict the relationship between union membership and job satisfaction as simple and direct, and fail to account for unique sources of satisfaction found in public service organizations. The final major research question draws together the streams of literature on bureaucratic red tape, public service motivation, and job satisfaction to ask:

3. Does commitment to union values influence job satisfaction through PSM and perceived red tape?
Contributions to the Literature

This research will contribute to public administration scholarship in three ways. First, it will provide one of the first concentrated efforts to analyze the influence of union values on public union members’ attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values. As Barling et al. (1992) point out relatively little social scientific research examines unions from a psychological or organizational behavior perspective; public administration studies reflect this bias. Although public administration scholarship significantly contributes to understanding union influence on budgets, efficiency, and politics (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Kearney, 1992, 2010; Moe, 2006, 2009; Riccucci, 1990), we still know relatively little about psychological influence of union values on members in public settings. By more fully examining the influence of unionization on public union members, this research will provide valuable insights into managing employees in heavily unionized public organizations.

Second, this project supplements the increasing public administration literature on both public service motivation (PSM) and bureaucratic red tape. PSM and bureaucratic red tape are two important concepts unique to public administration, but knowledge on how specific stakeholder groups construe these phenomena is limited. To address this limitation I present a broader perspective on the social construction of PSM and rule quality, by closely examining one particular stakeholder group – public unions. Past research indicates that both PSM and bureaucratic red tape influence the behavior of public employees in important ways, and a more comprehensive understanding of how union membership shapes perceptions of red tape and PSM could contribute to creating a workplace environment where employees can be more productive and satisfied.
Finally, from a practical perspective, this project can provide recommendations to advance the quality of the collective bargaining process and labor-management relations. Current recommendations suggest that participative decision-making can enhance relationship quality between unions and management (Kearney & Hays, 1994). This research adds to those recommendations by providing specific points of discussion for participative decision-making, such as negotiating the content of organizational rules and balancing the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits of public employment. As such, it provides recommendations for managing collective bargaining in such a way that managers and labor leaders can develop a common understanding of achieving the public interest.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

In this chapter I acknowledge that the preeminent value of labor unions – employee and individual rights – can contradict the broader value sets of public institutions and organizations. Union values, when transmitted to members through the socialization process, play an important role in the developing public organizational behavior. Although the process of unionization in the public sector has been well documented, knowledge regarding the impact of union values on member attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values remains limited. In the chapters that follow, I address these gaps in the literature by examining the relationships between union values and 1) perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, 2) public service motivation, and 3) job satisfaction.

Chapter two provides a detailed account of the research design and methodological approach I employ in this study. To explore the role union membership status plays in shaping organizational behavior this research will employ a mixed method research design. Mixed method research designs capitalize on the benefits of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, enhance the credibility of research, and add flexibility in the search for solutions to practical
problems (Ricucci, 2010; Yang, Zhang, & Holzer, 2008). I employ qualitative analysis to explore if the union context influences public service motivation, perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, and job satisfaction, whereas quantitative analysis examines the significance and direction of relationships between these variables. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of the public sector union context. The second chapter also provides a detailed explanation of the statistical methods utilized – confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling – and discusses modern procedures for analyzing missing data.

Chapters three, four, and five empirically test the research questions outlined above. Chapter three explores the relationship between union values and perceived rule quality. Chapter four examines how union values influence public service motivation. Chapter five investigates the mechanisms that influence the relationship between union values and job satisfaction. To address these questions, each chapter conducts empirical tests to explore several hypotheses related to each research question. First, I analyze qualitative data gathered from several semi-structured interviews to explore the context of public unionization. Second, I examine the responses from over 300 union members to evaluate the impact of union socialization experiences, the primary mechanism for communicating union values, and the degree to which members internalize union values, on perceptions of red tape, PSM, and job satisfaction.

The sixth, and final, chapter discusses the statistical results, provides concluding remarks, and comments on directions for future research. First, I provide a detailed discussion of the quantitative and qualitative findings interpreted in the previous three chapters. Next, this chapter provides statements on the significance of findings, as well as practical recommendations for public managers engaged in collective bargaining negotiations. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of directions for future research, and unanswered research questions.
Illustrations

Figure 1.1: Union Membership Statistics by Sector

Retrieved November 13, 2010 http://unionstats.gsu.edu/
Figure 1.2: Union Representation Statistics by Sector

Chapter 2
Methodology, Data, and Data Analysis

Since the origins of public administration as a self-identified field of inquiry, scholars have devoted attention to questions of both theoretical and practical significance. By addressing theoretical and practical concerns, the field of public administration encourages substantial variation in research designs and methodological approaches (Riccucci, 2010). Although most empirical work in public administration adheres to the logic of either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, emergent research approaches allow scholars to collect, analyze, and integrate quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. This research strategy, known as mixed methods or mixed research, benefits researchers in applied fields by drawing from multiple data types to aid practical decision making processes (Greene, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).

As Riccucci (2010) points out, public administration scholars have begun to apply mixed methodologies to several of the field’s important questions. Mixed methods have been applied to research on public management reform efforts (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004), organizational rules (DeHart-Davis, 2009b), street-level bureaucracy and discretion (Maynard-Moody, Musheno, & Palumbo, 1990), and the tools of governance (Sandfort, Selden, & Sowa, 2008). This project further extends the application of mixed methods in public administration to address questions of public organizational behavior and management. I employ a mixed methods research strategy in this project for two reasons. First, mixed research enhances research validity because the strengths of one approach counteract the other’s weaknesses (Creswell, 2009). Second, mixed methods research combines quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide a more nuanced understanding of complicated research problems (Patton, 2001).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research design I employ, and to describe the data I use to address the core research questions. In the first section, I explain mixed methods research designs and outline the variant of mixed methods research used here. Specifically, I provide a rationale for conducting quantitative dominant mixed research. I argue that quantitative dominant mixed research seeks to integrate quantitative and qualitative data to add nuance to observed statistical relationships. The second section describes the data collection procedures for both the quantitative and the qualitative data. Additionally, I explain the data analysis techniques I employ to address the research questions presented in the previous chapter. Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of the chapter.

Methodology

Although many applied researchers agree that mixed methods research is beneficial in practical fields, its conceptual definition is still developing. In fact, mixed methodologists continue to delineate the core components of mixed research designs. Mixed methods research has been broadly defined as, “research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both quantitative and qualitative approaches or methods in a single study or program of inquiry” (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, p. 4). As this definition illustrates, mixed methods research seeks to integrate findings from opposing data analytic strategies (Bryman, 2007; Woolley, 2009). Mixed methodologists consider findings integrated when quantitative and qualitative data are, “explicitly related to each other within a single study and in such a way as to be mutually illuminating, thereby producing findings that are greater than the sum of parts” (Woolley, 2009, p. 7). The procedures for integrating mixed methods research occur along five dimensions: integration of research questions, units of analysis, sampling, instrumentation and data collection, and analytic strategies (Yin, 2006). The
best mechanisms for data integration, however, depend on the type of mixed methods the researcher employs.

Variants of mixed research emphasize either quantitative or qualitative approaches more heavily. In practice, mixed methods research ranges from qualitative dominant strategies to quantitative dominant approaches, with pure or balanced mixed methods research falling in the center (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Johnson, et al. (2007) argue that qualitative dominant approaches can be described as, “the type of mixed research in which one relies on a qualitative, constructivist-poststructuralist-critical view of the research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches are likely to benefit most research projects,” while quantitative dominant mixed research is best understood as, “the type of mixed research in which one relies on a quantitative, postpositivist view of the research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of qualitative data and approaches are likely to benefit most research projects” (p. 124).

This dissertation employs a quantitative dominant mixed methods research design to evaluate the impact of union socialization and union commitment on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, public service motivation, and job satisfaction. To compare my findings with the extant literature, here I employ a quantitative dominant mixed methods research design. The vast majority of research on bureaucratic red tape and public service motivation has been conducted in the quantitative mold, but the qualitative addition in this project will enhance previously developed understandings of both bureaucratic red tape and PSM. Furthermore, the qualitative approach may uncover additional testable hypotheses for future research. The following section explains the collection strategy and analysis techniques for the qualitative data, which come from
a series of semi-structured interviews from randomly selected respondents, and the quantitative data, which is based on a survey instrument.

Data Collection and Analysis

Qualitative data and analysis. In the qualitative data collection phase researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with randomly selected employees in the two Midwestern cities in the Summer and Fall of 2009. Appendix A provides the questions contained in the interview protocol. Researchers attempted to maintain the random selection of interview respondents. Although researchers conducting interviews devoted substantial effort to randomly select participants, several individuals neglected to participate in the interview process. Several random samples were drawn until researchers exceeded the ultimate goal of 100 interviews. When the interview phase concluded researchers collected a total of 106 interviews from employees across the two municipal governments. Generally, the characteristics of interviewees deviate slightly from the population characteristics. Females and non-unionized employees were more likely to participate in the interviews, whereas the survey sample is more representative of the organizational population.¹

Researchers recorded interview information using two methods. First, the vast majority of interviews were audio recorded. Second, researchers collected field notes in situations where respondents expressed discomfort with recordings. Based on the audio recordings, researchers transcribed the interviews to maintain accuracy of respondent statements. In situations where

¹ To ensure confidentiality of interviewees, researchers did not intentionally record identifying characteristics of respondents. As such, it is impossible to generate a full summary of the demographic characteristics for all interview respondents. However, based on information freely given in many interviews union membership status and gender is identifiable in many cases.
field notes were taken, researchers cleaned the notes to communicate the intent of respondent statements. Because multiple researchers participated in the interview process, each interviewer was responsible for generating accurate transcripts based on the interviews conducted. Each researcher then coded interviews for concepts of interest. Qualitative researchers point out that the perspectives of researchers influence the interpretation of data throughout the analysis, as such it is important to acknowledge conceptual frameworks from which the research draws in an effort lend credence to the findings (Weston et al., 2001). In an effort to generate qualitative data I drew from literatures on perceived rule quality, public service motivation, union commitment, and union socialization to analyze respondent comments (see Woolley, 2009 for an example of concept driven coding in mixed research).2

I coded and analyzed interviews using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data software package designed to compare respondent statements. First, respondent statements were coded broadly to reflect each concept of interest according to category. Second, the narratives were broken down further by coding pieces of stories according to more specific sub-categories. Third, I examined each subcategory determine if it reflected the presence or absence of a given attribute. Finally, I used Atlas.ti to isolate instances where specific conceptual codes overlapped. For example, I was able to recall any narratives that simultaneously cited the absence of institutional union socialization and the presence of perceived bureaucratic red tape. To determine if the union

2 It is important to note that the entire research team did not evaluate the coding schemes or qualitative data generated by others. For the purposes of this project the qualitative data is analyzed to determine if the union context could have influenced perspectives on the dependent variables. The qualitative analysis suggested that the union context warranted further quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis, on the other hand, is designed to evaluate broader probabilistic arguments regarding patterns in the attitudes, beliefs, and values of union members.
context influenced members, I chose to search for respondent statements that both supported and contradicted existing theory. The tendencies of union members uncovered in the qualitative analysis were supplemented with quantitative tests of the research questions outlined in chapter 1. The following section describes the quantitative data analysis techniques used to explore the nature of relationships between union values, bureaucratic red tape, public service motivation, and job satisfaction.

Quantitative data and analysis. The quantitative data were collected from a survey of employees in a single city in the state of Kansas. Kansas was chosen as the survey state as a matter of convenience. The survey was distributed in the Spring and Summer of 2010, and all correspondence with survey respondents was based on the tailored design method for mixed-mode surveys (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009). Municipal managers provided employee information from which researchers constructed a contact list of 1,115 potential respondents. Each respondent in the sample received a pre-notification letter from the city manager or assistant city manager that introduced the study. Although the city manager introduced the survey to municipal employees, researchers did not provide information to management about participants. By ensuring respondent confidentiality from management researchers hoped to minimize potential response bias. Following the pre-notification letter those employees with municipal email addresses received invitations to participate in electronic surveys, and those without email addresses received mail questionnaires. Electronic surveys were supplemented by

3 For the purposes of data collection a research team was assembled. The members of the research team included multiple professors and graduate students from the Department of Public Administration at the University of Kansas.
paper surveys in the event that 1) employees did not have access to a city email address, or 2) respondents indicated that they preferred paper surveys.

The invitation correspondence highlighted that participation was voluntary and confidential. Following the initial communication researchers conducted follow up methods to contact respondents who had not yet participated. When the study concluded 602 of the possible 1,115 respondents completed the survey, for a response rate of 53.99%. Table 2.1 provides the demographic characteristics of survey respondents.

I use multiple items from the questionnaire to operationalize bureaucratic red tape and four latent constructs – public service motivation, job satisfaction, union commitment, and union socialization – my key dependent and independent variables. Scholars have validated several of the survey items used for the purposes of this project in previous research. First, I operationalize perceived bureaucratic red tape using a single survey item asking respondent to assess the level of organizational red tape on a scale from 0-10, also known as the general red tape scale (Bozeman & Feeney, Forthcoming). Second, considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to developing the PSM measurement scale (Coursey, Perry, Brudney, & Littlepage, 2008; Perry, 1996). Twelve of the PSM measures I use were validated by Coursey et al. (2008), while the

4 Latent constructs differ from observed constructs because they are defined by the shared variance between multiple observed variables presumed to tap a common underlying phenomenon (T. A. Brown, 2006; Kline, 2005).
remaining measures were validated by Perry (1996). Third, I use three survey items to assess the presence of job satisfaction. Fourth, to tap variation in commitment to union values I use 13 items that have been shown to display strong psychometric properties (Kelloway, Catano, & Southwell, 1992). Finally, I constructed two measures to tap union socialization.

I also employ a series of sociodemographic controls for the purposes of ruling out alternative explanations. Previous research indicates that three demographic characteristics – race, gender, and education – are necessary model controls when conducting PSM research (DeHart-Davis, Marlowe, & Pandey, 2006; Perry, 1997). These variables, although often insignificant, are also included in research on organizational rules to limit possible alternative explanations (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, Pandey, & Bozeman, 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000). Additionally, some studies argue that social position in the organization can influence the way people perceive bureaucracy (Walker & Brewer, 2008). For the purposes of this project I use organizational role as a proxy for social position. Because they are the most heavily unionized areas of municipal government, I also included two variables to control for

5 The Coursey et al. (2008) study validated twelve measures related to compassion, commitment to public interest, and self-sacrifice. The Perry (1996) study validated a total of 24 items across all four PSM dimensions. For the purposes of this research I employ the measures validated by Coursey et al. (2008) as well as the attraction to policy making items validated by Perry (1996).

6 As I illustrated in chapter one unions communicate values, norms and behaviors to members via institutional and individual mechanisms (Fullagar, et al., 1995). As such, I constructed one survey item to tap institutional socialization and one item to tap individual socialization experiences.

7 Many studies illustrate the positive impact of professions on PSM, and some argue that professionalization significantly influence perceptions of bureaucratic red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a). I assume here that education level serves as a reasonable proxy for professional status for the purposes of model control.
membership in police and fire unions. A discussion of all measures used in this study can be found in Appendix B.

Although a preliminary screening of the data revealed minimal missing data, all missing data were recovered with modern missing data analysis techniques. Modern missing data techniques, such as multiple imputation or full information maximum likelihood (FIML), are preferable to traditional missing data techniques (e.g. listwise deletion or mean imputation) for two reasons. First, they produce unbiased estimates with MCAR data; and second, they are more powerful because data are not needlessly discarded (Baraldi & Enders, 2010). For the purposes of this project I analyzed all data Mplus version 6 with FIML missing data analysis techniques (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010).

The statistical methods I employ to analyze the quantitative data, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM), possess several advantages over other statistical techniques. First, these techniques control for measurement error by using multiple measures to tap underlying latent constructs. These models create latent constructs by separating the unique variance for observed items from the shared variance between items presumed to measure the same construct (Kline, 2005). Second, CFA and SEM allow for specifying models with multiple dependent variables. Third, these techniques allow researchers to determine the equality of constructs across social groups (Little, 1997).

Although CFA and SEM provide distinct advantages over other data analytic techniques, there are some important points to discuss in terms of model estimation and identification. First, although researchers often treat survey responses as continuous they are actually ordered categorical variables. Current research shows that robust weighted least squares estimation is theoretically appropriate when examining models with ordinal data (Flora & Curran, 2004). To
address the nature of these survey responses I analyzed all variables as ordered categorical. When using categorical variables Mplus employs a robust weighted least squares estimator (WLSMV) with delta parameterization (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-2010). Second, there are only two indicators for the union socialization construct. When the number of estimated parameters for a latent construct exceeds the pieces of known information the construct is under identified, which poses problems for model estimation (T. A. Brown, 2006). As such, I constrained the factor loadings associated with union meetings and union interaction to equality for model identification purposes.8

Summary

The purposes of this chapter were twofold. First, I sought to provide an explanation of the mixed methods research design I employ. In an effort to build on previous research findings, I address each research question utilizing a quantitative dominant mixed methods approach. Based on the quantitative dominant approach qualitative data are used to add depth to quantitative findings, inform development of future survey instruments, and potentially uncover new testable hypotheses. Second, I provided a detailed description of the data collection and analysis procedures. The quantitative data were collected based on established survey items from employees in a single Midwestern city in Kansas, and the qualitative data were collected based on over 100 semi-structured interviews from employees in those two cities in Kansas.

8 Practically speaking equating factor loadings assumes that each of the manifest variables are equally good predictors of the latent construct. Given that each manifest variable should tap a specific aspect of union socialization this assumption is reasonable.
These data were integrated at the analysis and interpretation stages to help interpret the individual influences of the union context.

This chapter more broadly argues that mixed methods research approaches can enhance validity, increase practical usefulness, and facilitate a deeper understanding of research problems. Enhanced validity of findings stems from the interaction of quantitative and qualitative approaches. This is because the benefits of each approach complement the drawbacks of the other. Likewise, mixed methods increase practical usefulness by drawing from multiple data types. In particular, practical experience and statistical analyses are united to more deeply understand the relationship between research problems and practical recommendations. Due to these benefits mixed methods research can be extremely beneficial for researchers in practical disciplines.

The following chapter begins to empirically examine the relationship between union membership, union socialization, and perceived rule quality based on the mixed methods approach described above. In particular, I seek to determine how union socialization and the degree to which members internalize union values influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.
Illustrations

Table 2.1: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School/GED</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Graduate School</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Union Member</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Role</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department Head</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/Policy Staff</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Worker</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3

Unionization and Organization Structure: The Influence of Unionization on Stakeholder Red Tape

Although union membership continues to dwindle in the private sector public unions, particularly in municipal government, remain healthy (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b; Kearney, 1992, 2010). As such, over the past thirty years scholars have devoted significant attention to the organizational outcomes arising from collective bargaining agreements in the public sector. Collective bargaining, and the resulting labor contract, significantly influence organizational performance (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009), political and organizational lines of authority (Chandler & Gely, 1996; Moe, 2006), managerial discretion over personnel processes (A. K. Donahue, Selden, & Ingraham, 2000; Klingner, et al., 2010), and the content of formal work rules negotiated through collective bargaining (Freeman, 1976; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Katz, 1993). Despite advances in understanding the organizational outcomes of collective bargaining public management studies have largely neglected the role public unionization plays in shaping union members’ attitudes toward formal organizational rules.¹

¹ Although collective bargaining affords union members the opportunity to influence only those workplace rules negotiated as a part of labor contracts, substantial numbers of non-negotiated rules also impact union members. As such, union members may view collectively negotiated rules as beneficial, because they actively participate in formulating those rules, whereas non-negotiated rules may be viewed as either neutral or pathological. For the purposes of this project the term “formal organizational rules” refers to the totality of workplace rules, both negotiated and non-negotiated, union members regularly confront in the course of completing work obligations. This chapter comports with previous research on organizational rules by examining perceptions of organizational rules from “multiple actors … responding to an arguably similar set of administrative rules, procedures, and
Several empirical studies in public management, however, have analyzed the causes and consequences of pathological organizational rules - or bureaucratic red tape (Bozeman, 1993, 2000; Bozeman, Reed, & Scott, 1992; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, Coursey, & Moynihan, 2007; Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Pandey & Moynihan, 2005; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2005). During this time scholarly research has largely emphasized red tape as an objective organizational characteristic. On the other hand, more recent scholarship calls for examining bureaucratic red tape from a multiple stakeholder perspective (Feeney & Bozeman, 2009). This chapter examines perceptions bureaucratic red tape from the perspective of one particular municipal government stakeholder group, union members.

It is important to examine unions as a source of stakeholder red tape because, by emphasizing contractually established, rule-oriented protections of employee rights, unions may socialize into members the belief that formal organizational rules are beneficial and necessary. Many studies depict unions as an important rule making body in both public and private organizations (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Ingraham, 2006; Jackson, Schuler, & Carlos Rivero, 1989; Klingner, et al., 2010). Several scholars, however, view union established rules as an impediment to individual and organizational performance (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000; J. D. behaviors within a shared relationship,” (Feeney and Bozeman, 2009, p, 711). In this case the shared relationship is membership in labor organizations.

2 Although Bozeman (1993) elaborates on the concept of stakeholder red tape, he does not explicitly define the term stakeholder. Rather he provides several types of stakeholder types including, the parent agency, political institutions, intraorganizational coalitions, and organizational clients. In line with previous red tape research, I use the term stakeholder in reference to a specific intraorganizational coalition. In this case however, stakeholder refers more specifically to an intraorganizational coalition, the labor union, characterized by a social system that encourages shared attitudes, beliefs, and values.
Donahue, 2008), but when individuals perceive rules as good they are more likely to voluntarily comply with rules’ formal requirements (DeHart-Davis, 2007, 2009b). Voluntary rule compliance, in turn, is likely more efficient and less costly for the work organization compared to forced compliance (DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006).

This chapter explores the influence of union socialization and member commitment to union values on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape by drawing from organizational psychology, public human resources management, and bureaucratic red tape theory. I begin by connecting the literature on labor unions and bureaucratic red tape to develop two hypotheses regarding the relationships between union socialization, commitment to union values, and perceptions of red tape. The next section presents qualitative results based on several semi-structured interviews conducted with randomly selected union members in two municipal governments, and quantitative results based on information collected from over 300 municipal union members. Next, I briefly discuss the empirical findings presented in the chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical arguments and concluding statements regarding the relationship between unionization and perceived red tape.

**Union Socialization, Union Commitment, and Stakeholder Red Tape**

Research examining the effects of unions on organizations took shape with the identification of primary and secondary collective bargaining outcomes (Kochan, 1980; Kochan & Helfman, 1981). Kochan (1980) characterized the primary outcomes of collective bargaining as the rule oriented employee protections that often dominate union agendas (e.g. higher compensation levels, increased job security, and better working conditions), whereas secondary outcomes reflect union member attitudes and behaviors that evolve from the contractually defined relationships between management and unions (e.g. employee productivity, turnover
intentions, absenteeism, and job dissatisfaction) (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Importantly, it is the social activities of unions that link organizational characteristics to member attitudes and behaviors.

In fact, some scholars theoretically establish unions as institutions that are “at bottom social structures and hence responsive in their activities to the same basic needs, interests, and loyalties which we find in the relationships of individuals to all major groups” (Nisbet, 1976, p. 13). Social structures homogenize member beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors by communicating institutional values to members (March & Olsen, 1989; Peters & Pierre, 1998; W. R. Scott, 2008). In particular, collective bargaining, the human resources management system favored by unions, is strongly tied to values associated with individual and employee rights (Klingner et al., 2010). Unions, in turn, protect these values by establishing formal organizational rules in the labor contract that limit managerial discretion (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kearney, 1992; Klingner et al., 2010; Moe, 2009). It is also important to note that social structures are maintained, in part, by inculcating members with institutional values through the socialization process (P. L. Berger & Luckman, 1967; W. R. Scott, 2008).

Unions socialize members through two mechanisms, institutional and individual (Fullagar et al., 1995). Institutional socialization reflects participation in formal union functions (e.g. union sponsored meetings) that provide “newcomers with a common set of experiences that are likely to elicit standardized responses,” whereas “individual socialization practices are idiosyncratic and informal” (Fullagar et al., 1995, p. 147). As Barling et al. (1992) point out; the extent to which members participate in union activities influences organizational performance as
well as member behaviors. Although union socialization experiences strongly encourage member commitment to union values (Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson, & Spiller, 1980), it is also important to account for the varying degrees to which members internalize and accept union goals and values (Newton & Shore, 1992).

Commitment to the union specifically involves “a definite belief in, and acceptance of, the values and goals of the organization” (Gordon, et al., 1980; Porter & Smith, 1970). Union members display differing levels of commitment to union values that range from member alienation to internalization of union values (Newton & Shore, 1992). As Newton and Shore (1992) suggest, unions possess the capacity to influence the perceptions and attitudes of members. As such, it is important to examine internalization of union values as a major determinate of workplace perceptions (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Although labor unions represent an important social structure within municipal government, research has yet to investigate labor union’s preference for rule-oriented value protections, and the degree to which members accept those values, as a determinate of member attitudes toward formal organizational rules.

Research on the causes and consequences of red tape, defined as ineffective formal organizational rules, occupies a dominant place in public management literature. Public management scholarship examining bureaucratic red tape originated with Kaufman’s book

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3 Barling et al. (1992) focus on the strike as the primary element of union participation. They illustrate that strikes can lead to negative psychological consequences (e.g. stress and role conflict) for unionized employees. There are multiple avenues, however, for participating in union activities. Rather than focusing on strikes this research examines participation in formal union meetings and informal social activities as the major elements of union participation.
length treatment (Kaufman, 1977), but empirical red tape research increased dramatically following Bozeman’s efforts to develop a theory of government red tape (Bozeman, 1993). In contrast to Kaufman’s work, which points to potentially beneficial elements of red tape, Bozeman’s (1993, 2000) scholarship theoretically establishes red tape as bureaucratic pathology. Bozeman conceptualized bureaucratic red tape in two ways.

Bozeman’s first conceptualization, based on the organizational elements of red tape, was defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules’ functional object” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 283). Later theory development incorporates the inability of a rule to “advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” as a component of bureaucratic red tape (Bozeman, 2000, p. 12). The second conceptualization, termed stakeholder red tape, accounts for individual variation in perceived red tape. Stakeholder red tape was defined as “organizational rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden, but serve no object valued by a given stakeholder group” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 284).

Although the construct has been operationally defined in multiple ways (Bozeman & Feeney, Forthcoming; Chen & Williams, 2007; Pandey, et al., 2007; Pandey & Garnett, 2006; Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2005), theoretically bureaucratic red tape always reflects rules with a compliance burden that inhibit organizational performance or purposes (Bozeman, 2000; DeHart-Davis, 2007; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 2007).

Although the bulk of empirical red tape work in public management examines organizational red tape, more recent research explores red tape as a subject-dependent construct (Brewer & Walker, 2010a, 2010b; Feeney & Bozeman, 2009; Walker & Brewer, 2008). Red
tape, when defined as a subject-dependent phenomenon, is tied to specific value sets associated with coalitions of interests (Bozeman, 1993). Because stakeholder red tape is closely tied to institutional values, social structures (e.g. markets and professions (Brewer & Walker, 2010a)) possess the capacity to influence individual perceptions of organizational rules. The following sections examine how one particular social institution, the labor union, directly shapes the way members experience bureaucratic red tape through socialization, and how the degree to which members internalize union values affect member perceptions of red tape.⁴

**Union Socialization and Bureaucratic Red Tape.** Bureaucratic red tape cannot exist in the absence of burdensome rules that inhibit organizational purposes (Bozeman, 1993, 2000; DeHart-Davis, 2007; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 2007). However, it is possible for different stakeholder groups to perceive varying degrees of bureaucratic red tape (Bozeman, 1993). If unions, as social institutions, influence the attitudes and values of members through socialization the question remains: How do unions influence the degree to which members perceive formal organizational rules as burdensome and detrimental to organizational purposes? The labor relations literature in public management and related fields provides conflicting answers to this question.

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⁴ I argue that unions are an important source of red tape perceptions for two reasons. First, similar to the argument presented by Feeney and Bozeman (2009), unions represent one of several stakeholder groups interacting within public organizations. Unions and management must respond to identical administrative rules and procedures, which are collectively established as a part of the bargaining process. Second, as much of the research on union socialization and commitment suggests, unions effectively influence member attitudes and perceptions (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992)
On the one hand, labor unions use the collective bargaining process to develop formal work rules and procedures to protect valued employee rights (Ingraham, 2006; Klingner, et al., 2010). In fact, several empirical studies validate the formal rule making capability – particularly related to human resources policies and procedures – of union’s bargaining activities. For example, Jackson, Schuler, and Carlos Rivero illustrate that unions effectively shape personnel practices for hourly employees (Jackson, et al., 1989). Thus, unions establish workplace rules to provide members with greater control over workplace issues, which limit feelings of exploitation and alienation (Barling, et al., 1991). Based on these research findings unions may socialize into members the belief that organizational rules are neutral – perhaps even good – because they are integral for protecting union values. Alternatively, other groups (e.g. managers) may view these rules as red tape, because they value different organizational objectives.

On the other hand, union members are likely to perceive the relationship between management and labor as conflicting (Barling, et al., 1991). This observation suggests that, while unions influence organizational rules via collective bargaining, not every rule has union blessing. In fact, some scholars point out that unionized employees can be inherently skeptical toward organizational rule purposes, even in the process of creating them. For example, unions have historically opposed rules, regulations, and procedures designed to encourage minority employment (e.g. Equal Opportunity Employment and Affirmative Action) (Ricucci, 1988, 1990). Additionally, unions often perceive personnel rules and regulations, such as pay-for-performance plans, as invalid because they rely too heavily upon arbitrary managerial discretion in the decision making process (Meyer, 1975). Union opposition to these organizational rules may stem from member perception that, because they contradict union member rights, rule purposes are not legitimate. Based on these studies unions may socialize into members the belief
that organizational rules that are not the product of formal negotiations are more likely to be pathological thereby generating red tape. Although conflicting theoretical expectations make it difficult to determine the directionality of the relationship between union socialization and perceived red tape, due to potentially contentious relationships between union members and management, I do expect that:

**H₁:** More socialized union members will perceive higher red tape than less socialized union members.

*Union Commitment and Bureaucratic Red Tape.* Bureaucratic red tape, when examined from a multiple stakeholder perspective, reflects specific value sets associated with several stakeholder groups including intra-organizational coalitions (Bozeman, 1993). However, in his theoretical explanation of stakeholder red tape Bozeman (1993) argues that, “a rule that is red tape for one group may not be red tape for another group, even for one in the same category” (p. 285). Although collective bargaining, by protecting values that unions perceive as necessary, provides a framework by which members can understand the validity of organizational rules union members often vary substantially in the degree to which they internalize union values (Newton & Shore, 1992). Because some union members accept union values more completely it is important to examine how union commitment influences member perceptions of rule pathology, not distinguishing between organizational rules that are negotiated and those that are not. The labor relations research in public management, however, is much clearer on the directionality of the relationship between union commitment and perceived red tape.
As Klingner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010) point out, collective bargaining is a human resources management sub-system that expresses the abstract value of employee and individual rights. The protection of union values, in turn, is always rule or process oriented. In fact, heavily unionized work environments operate under work rules that are more numerous and precise compared to nonunion work environments (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gallagher, 1983). Some studies even illustrate that union-advocated work rules limit the capacity of public human resources managers to make personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000). While these studies indicate that unionized work environments have a greater rule sum\(^5\), they do not provide evidence illustrating how union members perceive organizational rules, both negotiated and imposed.

The degree to which union members view these rules as red tape is dependent upon the degree to which they perceive the values of the union as legitimate. Union commitment conceptually reflects the degree to which union members internalize and accept the values, goals, and purposes of the labor organization and legitimate (Gordon, et al., 1980).\(^6\) Furthermore, research findings empirically link union commitment to member perceptions of organizational climate (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Furthermore, many public management scholars argue that bureaucratic red tape is an important component of public organizations’ climate (Bozeman & Loveless, 1987; Rainey, et al., 1995). As such, it is reasonable to conclude that

\(^5\) Early efforts to theoretically describe bureaucratic red tape introduced the term rule sum in reference to “the total number of written rules, procedures, and regulations in force for an organization” (Bozeman, 1993, p. 280).

\(^6\) Successive research provides psychometric support illustrating that union commitment can be conceptualized as a higher order construct comprised of three component dimensions, willingness to work for the union, loyalty to the union, and responsibility to the union (Kelloway, et al., 1992).
commitment to union values is inextricably bound to perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. Based on evidence suggesting that the union’s value protections are always rule-oriented, and that union commitment influences attitudes toward organizational climate it is reasonable to expect that:

**H₂:** Union members who are more committed to union values will perceive less red tape in the organization as a whole than union members less committed to union values.

*Model Controls.* Although the primary emphasis of this chapter focuses on the relationship between unionization and bureaucratic red tape, it is also important to control for potential alternative explanations. First, some suggest that women perceive bureaucracy and formal rules differently from men (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). Although much of the literature on bureaucratic red tape finds that race and gender are often insignificant (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000), those demographic characteristics should be included in research on organizational rules to limit possible alternative explanations. Second, recent research treating red tape as subject-depended finds that the professions and social position in organizations are important characteristics that shape perceptions of red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008). I assume here that education level serves as a reasonable proxy for professional status, and that organizational role serves as a proxy for social position.7 Finally, it is important not to assume all unions display the same behaviors and

---

7 For the purposes of this research the education variable was dichotomized to separate individuals with bachelor’s degree from those individuals without. Likewise, the organizational role variable was dichotomized to separate those individuals in management roles from rank-and-file employees.
attitudes. Police and fire departments are the most heavily unionized areas of municipal government. As such, I include two dummy variables to control for membership in police and fire unions. The following section presents qualitative findings that suggest the union context influences perceptions of red tape, as well as statistical tests of the research hypotheses.

Findings

Analysis of Qualitative Data. To explore whether the union context had any bearing on perceptions of organizational rules before conducting quantitative tests, I analyzed qualitative data generated from semi-structured interviews conducted with 40 union members. Overall, more than 100 interviews were collected from several randomly selected municipal employees who were both unionized and non-unionized. While the interviews focused primarily on employee perceptions of rule quality, many employees were also asked to comment on attitudes toward unions. Because the purpose of this chapter is to examine bureaucratic red tape from the perspective of union members, I analyze interviews from those who commented specifically on organizational rules and freely offered information regarding their affiliation with municipal labor organizations. The vast majority of interviews were conducted with unionized police officers and firefighters, because those are the most heavily unionized departments. Although unionization status was clear in these interviews, it is not always explicitly stated to which union the interviewees belong. In the respondent statements provided below I provide union affiliation when it is possible. I do not provide union affiliation and rank when that information would reveal the identity of a specific individual.

In accordance with the argument that unions serve important rule-making functions from the perspective of members, some unionized employees viewed the union as a mechanism for ensuring that of organizational rules serve important purposes. Furthermore, union members
view many organizational rules as necessary for ensuring equity among employees. For example, a unionized administrative assistant described her perspective on the municipal sick leave policy by saying that,

“We get about a three [hours of sick time] per pay period. Sometimes they doctor that at the city, but usually if you call them on it they'll stop because of the union. I have known them to let somebody use sick time because they were out of vacation [time]. Well, I really have an issue with that, because [supervisors] single out their favorites to let do this. Sometimes I will use vacation for an appointment if it's it two hour appointment, because I have more vacation time. [The city] tried to tell me I can’t do that, but I said I can use my vacation for anything I want. I had to show them the [union] contract on that one.”

This employee suggests that, while sick leave could only be used under specific circumstances, the labor contract specified that employees could use vacation leave at their discretion. For her, the union contract was designed to ensure that the leave policies achieved these purposes, and to guarantee that those rules were equitably applied.

The perspective that formal rules serve important purposes tends to resonate with both rank-and-file union members as well as union leadership. In fact, some union leaders tended to emphasize that formal rules advanced union, as well as public, values. To illustrate this perspective a vice president of a public employees union lamented the lack of formal organizational rules to govern the municipality’s use of health insurance funds. He stated that,
“One of the big [rules] issues is health insurance. There are no rules in writing for how the health insurance fund will be administered. It’s worth several million dollars right now and there is no standard procedure as to how that fund should be managed, administered, or how funds should be deposited. … We [the union] have an ordinance under consideration for establishing parameters that specify how the [insurance] fund will be managed. …We need rules for transparency.”

While some union members tend to hold rules established in the labor contract in high regard, they also tended to view rules advocated by management with some suspicion. The public employee union steward also noted that disputes over the content of organizational rules can create a rift between labor and management. He explained that management uses a “divide and conquer” strategy to create “a norm of them against us.” Due to this divide the union steward perceived the union’s proposed policy on the health insurance fund as “good for the employees and citizenry,” but noted that the municipality was reluctant to implement the union’s preferred rule provisions. In fact, with respect to the municipality’s current procedures regarding the maintenance of the health insurance fund the union steward wondered “what’s taking place underneath the table? … Is this a fact of the way [the city] government has run for years and wants to keep it running? Or are there some other reasons?” Because union and management were unable to agree upon formal rule terms, this union vice president called into question the legitimacy of current rules governing the insurance fund, perhaps to the extent that they generated red tape.

Although contentious negotiations between labor and management can color perceptions of rules and red tape, some unionized employees perceive a strong link between union
membership status and respect for rules. A unionized engineering technician, also discussing the city leave policies, described her perspective toward the rules by stating, “I know I have to give at least two days notice if I want to take vacation, and I think that's in the union contract. So being a dues paying member, I respect that rule.” In fact, a field employee in a municipal water department succinctly summarized the positive relationship between collective bargaining contracts and union member perceptions toward organizational rules when he stated, “we [water department employees] are governed by union contract, which is for the most part cut and dried, black and white. I can’t bash [those work rules] because the work rules in the contract are jointly set [by labor and management] and have been negotiated at the table.”

Negative perspectives of work rules established in the contract were somewhat less common, but the comments of unionized employees revealed that union work rules usurping the authority of the municipality could be an important source of red tape. For instance, a field worker in a horticulture department, who is protected by the union contract but chooses not to pay dues, expounded on union’s negative influence over organizational rules by saying,

“The [city’s] rules are fair, and I really didn't see much change in what may be done in bargaining. I just I didn't know if [collective bargaining] was necessary, so that’s probably why I didn't vote for the union.

This particular employee, like the office assistant, valued equity, but viewed organizational rules as a mechanism to obtain equitable treatment. Because he perceived that rules were already equitable, he did not view the union as a necessary protection for employee rights. In fact, the
water employee cited above also suggested that union contracts could develop rules that encouraged, rather than suppressed, preferential treatment. He stated specifically,

“Preferential treatment I see all across the city, whether it’s in other divisions, other departments, or union contracts. [There is a] lot of resentment in this town over [two other departments], who pretty much walk on water. When it comes to negotiating union contracts [in those departments] there is a lot of stuff that seems given. Those contracts seem to get preferential treatment.

These examples illustrate that there is some variation in the way union members perceive organizational rules. Specifically, union member’s perception of rules can change based on both the content of the rules and the stakeholder group advocating the rules. First, the union members cited here tend to emphasize equitable treatment as an important protection offered by organizational rules. Second, union members differ on whether they perceive the union or the work organization as the primary advocate of equitable treatment. Although the qualitative findings I present cannot be considered generalizable to all union members, these stories suggest that the union context may shape attitudes toward organizational rules and bureaucratic red tape. The next section conducts a quantitative analysis to examine the nature of relationships between unionization and perceptions of bureaucratic red tape.

Analysis of Quantitative Data. Before describing the statistical results, there are some important points to discuss in terms of model specification. First, previous research suggests that it is best to conceptualize union commitment as a higher order construct comprised of three component dimensions (Kelloway, et al., 1992). As such, I constrained each of the pathways
between the component dimensions of union commitment and bureaucratic red tape to zero. This allows for analysis of the relationship specifically between union commitment and bureaucratic red tape. Second, there are only two indicators for the union socialization construct. As such, the construct is considered under identified, which occurs when the number of estimated parameters exceeds the pieces of known information (T. A. Brown, 2006). Because this can pose problems for estimation, I constrained the factor loadings associated with union meetings and union interaction to equality for model identification purposes.\(^8\) Finally, in the diagram bureaucratic red tape is depicted as a box because it represents a single questionnaire item.

The findings illustrated in the structural model suggest that the model fits the data well. General guidelines suggest that \(RMSEA \leq .08\), \(CFI \geq .90\), and \(NNFI \geq .90\) indicate good fitting models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). The model illustrated in figure 3.1 equals or surpasses the cutoff criteria for all three fit measures. Because all three measures indicate good model fit it is reasonable to proceed with analysis of specific parameters related to the hypothesized relationships.

[INSERT FIGURE 3.1]

Although the model I present in figure 3.1 illustrates the nature of relationships between union socialization, union commitment, and bureaucratic red tape it does not provide

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\(^8\) Practically speaking equating factor loadings assumes that each of the manifest variables are equally good predictors of the latent construct. Given that each manifest variable should tap a specific aspect of union socialization this assumption is reasonable.
significance tests for each regression parameter. Both of the hypothesized regression parameters significantly contribute to overall model fit. To determine significance, I tested each of the hypothesized relationship using the $\chi^2$ difference test option for categorical variables in Mplus. The results of $\chi^2$ difference testing indicate that constraining either of the latent regression parameters to zero would cause a significant decrease in model fit. Table 3.1 illustrates changes in model fit and associated significance levels for each regression parameter. It is also important to note that while each of the beta paths are significant, the model explains a relatively modest proportion of variance in red tape, 6.1%.

[INSERT TABLE 3.1]

Given that each hypothesized parameter is significant, the results I present in figure 3.1 illustrate the nature of relationships between union socialization, union commitment, and bureaucratic red tape. First, the bidirectional (psi) path between union socialization and union commitment can be interpreted as a zero order correlation. Union socialization and union commitment are highly correlated, which suggests that greater participation in union socialization is accompanied by greater internalization of union values. Second, the unidirectional (beta) paths between 1) union socialization and red tape and 2) union commitment

\footnote{The table illustrates the change in model fit when the beta paths between bureaucratic red tape and both union socialization and union commitment were constrained to zero. Due to the use of categorical variables the difference test is not distributed as a $\chi^2$ value. The $\Delta \chi^2$ column provides an accurate depiction of overall change in model fit.}
and red tape can be interpreted as standardized regression coefficients.\(^{10}\) Consistent with expectations employees who report more engagement in union socialization activities also report significantly higher perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. Also consistent with expectations, those union members who report greater commitment to union values perceive significantly less bureaucratic red tape. Although union socialization and commitment to union values are highly correlated \((r = .782)\), they influence perceived red tape differently. This may occur because socialization through meeting attendance and informal gatherings encourages members to complain to one another about the content of rules. Commitment to union values, however, is a more individualistic process. Those individuals committed to union values are more willing to work for the union’s benefit, display loyalty toward the union, and feel responsible for advancing the union. As opposed to casual union members who simply attend meetings and informal gatherings, committed union members may be more likely to be directly involved in the bargaining process. When members are directly involved in bargaining they may feel more autonomous with respect to the work organization, and, in turn, viewing organizational characteristics more favorably.

Finally, the model controls reveal no significant relationships between sociodemographic categories and bureaucratic red tape. Similar to previous research (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000), the findings I present suggest that neither gender nor race directly influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. Additionally, education

\(^{10}\) Because this article hypothesizes about the regression parameters between union socialization, union commitment and red tape I did not include covariates in the diagram. Although none of the model controls were significant, all were left in the model to rule out alternative explanations. Table 3.2 provides the estimates related to model controls.
and organizational role do not influence respondents’ perceptions of red tape. This finding is contrary to previous empirical tests suggesting that professions and social position in the organization shape perceptions of red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008). Table 3.2 provides the parameter estimates and associated significance levels for the relationships bureaucratic red tape control variables.

**Discussion**

Some scholars examining bureaucratic red tape have pointed out that red tape is best understood as a subject-dependent construct (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008). As such, researchers have called for a renewed research emphasis on exploring bureaucratic red tape from the perspective of various stakeholder groups (Feeney & Bozeman, 2009). This chapter examined one stakeholder group that possesses the capability to influence perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, the labor union. I argue that labor unions are, at their foundation, social institutions that shape the way members perceive bureaucracy and formal rules.

The labor relations literature in public administration provides conflicting expectations regarding the influence of union socialization and commitment to union values on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. A significant amount of empirical research suggests that unions establish formal work rules to protect valued employee rights (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Klingner, et al., 2010), but that the relationship between labor and management could potentially be characterized by conflicting views on organizational purposes (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway,
1992). These findings suggest that casual union members may become disillusioned by perceived contentious relationships between union and management, leading to the belief that formal work rules amount to red tape. On the other hand, the value protections unions favor are always rule or process oriented. However, union members vary in the extent to which they view the values of the union as legitimate (Gordon, et al., 1980; Newton & Shore, 1992). As such, members who more fully commit to union values are more likely to view formal rules as beneficial protections of employee rights.

The evidence I report here, both quantitative and qualitative, illustrates that unions serve as an important social institution that influences the way members perceive organizational rules. While the qualitative findings do not formally test the research hypotheses, they provide two important insights that contribute to understanding stakeholder perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. First, the qualitative findings support the argument of Feeney and Bozeman (2009) that stakeholder groups acting under the same organizational rules can perceive those rules fundamentally differently. In this case, the stories provided my municipal union members illustrate that many union members perceive rules as necessary protections of employee rights. In particular, many union members cited the rule’s ability to ensure equitable treatment of employees as the major benefit of most organizational rules. However, some union members, protected by the same collective agreements, perceived that the existing work rules advocated by management facilitated equity. Thus, from the perspective of these members, union rules were perceived as needless and duplicative.

Second, the qualitative findings support the argument that participative decision-making in labor relations can have important and positive consequences for employee attitudes (Kearney & Hays, 1994). In these examples, union members who tended to emphasize the collective
bargaining process as an opportunity to establish common interests viewed organizational rules more favorably. On the one hand, the municipal water employee commented that he perceived the rules governing his department as legitimate because they were jointly established by the union and management. The story provided by the public employee union vice president, on the other hand, suggested that the rules governing the insurance fund were illegitimate. The illegitimacy of those rules stemmed partially from the reluctance of management to solicit union input while developing the rules formal requirements. For these union members, bureaucratic red tape originates from not only the legitimacy of the rule’s functional object, but also from the mechanism by which rules are created. Future research could seek to uncover not only the differing levels of red tape perceived by specific stakeholder groups, but also how collaborative rule-making influences the amount of red tape perceived by stakeholder groups.

While the qualitative results provide evidence suggesting that the union context significantly influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, they do not provide evidence regarding the nature of relationships between union socialization, union commitment, and bureaucratic red tape. The structural model I report suggests that both union socialization and union commitment play an important role in inculcating members with values and beliefs tied to perceptions of red tape. It is important to note that while the model explains a relatively modest proportion of variance in bureaucratic red tape (6.1%), the fit indices suggest that this model is an accurate representation of population characteristics. Furthermore, the model results confirm the hypotheses that union socialization and commitment to union values significantly influence members’ perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, both in the direction expected.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that union socialization and union commitment influence perceptions of bureaucratic red tape differently. Whereas more socialized union
members perceive significantly higher levels of bureaucratic red tape compared to less socialized members, those union members who more fully accept and internalize union values perceive significantly lower levels of red tape. The finding that union socialization encourages members to perceive higher levels of red tape supports the thesis that casual union members can become disillusioned by contentious relationships between labor and management (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992), which may contribute to negative perceptions of bureaucracy. This finding also supports the argument that more interaction with the union may cause members to voice dissatisfaction with the organization (Freeman, 1980), thereby facilitating negative perceptions of the work climate. On the other hand, the finding that commitment to union values encourages members to perceive lower levels of bureaucratic red tape supports the thesis that unions seek to protect valued employee rights by establishing formal rules in the labor contract (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Klingner, et al., 2010), which can cause more favorable perceptions of the work climate.

The magnitude of these relationships, however, provides additional insights into the overall influence of unionization on member perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. In these data the negative consequences of union socialization on perceived bureaucratic red tape is more pronounced than the positive influence of union commitment. At first glance, these findings seem to suggest that unionization is harmful to employee perceptions of the work climate. However, it is important to note that these data do not account for the interdependencies between union member characteristics and union socialization experiences. In fact, the findings may illustrate the importance of union members’ individual characteristics as a moderating variable between union socialization and perceptions of red tape. As suggested by Newton and Shore (1992), understanding the relationship between union socialization and the degree to which
members perceive union goals as beneficial could further explain the negative relationship between union socialization and perceived red tape.

Lastly, no control variables significantly influenced perceptions of red tape. This is interesting given previous red tape research suggesting that professionalization and social position in the organization should influence perceptions of red tape (Brewer & Walker, 2010a; Walker & Brewer, 2008). For these union members, the social influence of unions may trump the effects of other social structures on perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. These results should be interpreted with caution, however, for two reasons. First, although the quantitative data collection was designed specifically to tap perceptions from individuals throughout the hierarchy, it examines perceptions in a single organization. Broader research should assess these findings to additional contexts. Second, this research uses education as a proxy of professionalism and management duties as a proxy for social position. More research should seek to assess if these findings hold with more intricate measures of professionalism and social position in organization. Even with these limitations, however, it is important to note that public employees concomitantly belong to several work related social groups, and the effects of some social structures may be more pronounced than others.

Summary and Conclusion

Given that a significant portion of public administration scholarship examines the contextual variables that complicate managing employees in the public sector, it should not be surprising that many studies portray unions as a contributor to an underperforming public workforce (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009). Perhaps, as Moe (2006) illustrates, this assertion stems from the observation that union members are beyond the control of their organizational superiors. What these studies neglect, however, is an in depth analysis of the potentially positive
beliefs and attitudes tied to unionization that could enhance organizational efficiency and effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter was to fill this gap by empirically testing the relationships between union socialization, commitment to union values, and perceptions of bureaucratic red tape. I argued that unionization influences perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, because unions strongly value employee rights that are protected by formal rules and procedures established in the labor contract.

The findings I present here suggest that while casual union members view public organizations as bound in red tape, those individuals who internalize and accept union values are more likely to view work rules favorably. As such, unions may encourage voluntary rule compliance, which, in turn, is more efficient for the organization compared to forced compliance (DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006). Based on these findings, future public sector research should not assume that eliminating labor unions would enhance public organizational performance. In fact, limits on collective negotiations could diminish organizational efficiency and effectiveness by decreasing commitment to organizational rules. The following chapter continues to examine the potentially positive effects of unions on members by investigating the relationship between unionization and public service motivation.
Illustrations

Figure 3.1: SEM Standardized Parameter Estimates (Unionization and Red Tape)

Model Fit: $\chi^2_{(190, n=326)} = 581.927, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .080_{(.072, .087)}; \text{CFI} = .975; \text{NNFI(TLI)} = .972$
Table 3.1: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Unionization and Red Tape)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Model</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trimmed Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Socialization</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>7.329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Commitment</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>6.312</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2: Standardized Regression Parameters for Control Variables (Red Tape)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$SE$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
<td>0.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>0.339</td>
<td>-1.023</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>1.612</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>-0.475</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>-1.173</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4

Unionization and Employee Motives: How Union Membership Shapes Public Service Motivation

Another area of public organizational behavior potentially influenced by unionization is the motivation of public employees. The existing scholarly literature on unionization and public employee motivation is implicit and largely indirect, occurring primarily through an emphasis on the civil service protections advocated by unions. These protections are construed as reducing motivation for employees to work in an organizationally desirable manner. For example, the elaborate civil service protections advocated by unions have been cited for limiting the effectiveness of disciplinary actions for poor performing employees (Behn, 1995; Rainey, 2003). Unions have been construed as “steadfast supporters of the multiple protections now offered by the civil service” that have “vociferously opposed the performance focus and the move away from traditional processes and procedures” (p. 489). Unionization has also been seen as creating a “safe harbor” for public sector employees, that guarantees job security and undermines employee motivation because employees face little threat of discipline or termination (J. D. Donahue, 2008).

This chapter presents research on unionization and public employee motivation that differs in three ways from previous scholarship on unions and motivation. First, it transcends the middle range theories typically associated with human resources management to explore unions as social institutions that shape member values. Second, the chapter empirically tests the claim that union membership dampens employee motivation, an approach employed by only a handful of other studies (Bok & Dunlop, 1970). Finally, the chapter examines for the first time the link between public unions and a form of motivation distinct to public service institutions and
organizations, public service motivation. Looking at union motives and values through the lens of PSM expands the limited understanding of social institutions that give rise to publicly oriented motives.

The concept of public service motivation (PSM) emerged in 1990 (Perry & Wise, 1990), and scholars have made substantial progress in understanding the psychological states that give rise to PSM as well as PSM’s behavioral consequences (Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Houston, 2000, 2006, 2008; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Pandey & Moynihan, 2006; Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1997; Wright, 2007). Relatively little research exists, however, on how specific social institutions impact PSM (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). Unionization may influence PSM because many studies imply that, by communicating individualistic values that contradict broader public values, unions encourage members to suppress the publicly oriented motives tied to PSM (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009; Riccucci, 1987, 1988, 1990). For example, unions often oppose personnel policies such as equal opportunity employment and affirmative action that are strongly tied to compassionate values. On the other hand, as Newton and Shore (1992) point out, when members internalize union values they likely apply self-imposed pressure to display attitudes that accord with union expectations. Commitment to union values, in turn, is likely to elicit attitudes and behaviors that advance the collective good, as defined by the union (Newton & Shore, 1992).

Given the potential for commitment to union values to contradict PSM, this chapter explores the impact of commitment to union values on public service motivation by drawing from organizational psychology, public human resources management, and PSM theory. First, I connect the literature on labor relations and public service motivation to construct four hypotheses exploring the nature of the relationships between commitment to union values and
each component element of PSM. Second, I empirically test the hypotheses by analyzing qualitative data generated from several semi-structured interviews conducted in two municipal governments, and quantitative data based on a questionnaire distributed to over 300 municipal union members. Third, I will discuss the findings presented in the chapter. Finally, I will conclude with a summary of the theoretical arguments I make, and a statement on the relationship between union commitment and PSM.

Commitment to Union Values and Public Service Motivation

Research on union commitment originated with the work of Gordon and colleagues (Gordon, et al., 1980). Commitment to the union specifically involves both a belief in the goals of the union, as well as congruence between union and member values (Gordon, et al., 1980; Newton & Shore, 1992; Porter & Smith, 1970). Since the pioneering work of Gordon et al. (1980) numerous studies have outlined the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of union commitment. Those members who are more committed to union values are more likely to participate in union activities (Gordon, et al., 1980), file grievances (Fullagar & Barling, 1989), and strike (Barling, Fullagar, Kelloway, & McElvie, 1992). In addition to observable behaviors, union commitment also shapes member attitudes toward the industrial relations climate (Klandermans, 1989), political action and political candidates (Chandler & Gely, 1995, 1996; Fields, Masters, & Thacker, 1987; Moe, 2006), and turnover intentions (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992).

Commitment to union values, however, varies substantially between union members, ranging from member alienation to complete acceptance of union values (Newton & Shore, 1992). Although labor unions represent a source of member values within municipal government, research has yet to investigate the psychological effects of potentially contradictory
union and public values on members of public labor organizations. Because unions emphasize individualistic values, such as protection of individual rights and member solidarity, commitment to union values may undermine publicly oriented member motives. The reduction in publicly oriented member motives occurs because the individualistic values associated with union membership may contradict emotions and values such as benevolence, self-sacrifice, compassion and social equity. Alternatively, commitment to union values may to elicit attitudes and emotions (e.g. loyalty and selflessness) that encourage behaviors that advance the collective good of the union (Newton & Shore, 1992).

Public management research on motives to serve the public took shape in 1990 with the conceptual development of public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990). Perry and Wise defined PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded uniquely in public service institutions and organizations” (Perry and Wise, 1990, p. 368). In line with previous motivation research, PSM was operationalized as a higher order construct with four component dimensions across three categories of motives (Perry, 1996). Rational motives correspond with one’s attraction to the policy making process, affective motives relate to compassion, and norm based motives correspond with both self-sacrifice and commitment to the public interest. Recent trends in PSM theory, however, have broadened the term. Today PSM refers to more than an individual’s aspiration to work for government. Rather PSM describes an individual’s desire to serve the public good, sacrifice for the benefit of others, and promote the

1 Although psychometric studies support three of four subdimensions - commitment to public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice (Coursey, et al., 2008), this chapter examines all four of Perry’s (1996) original sub-dimensions. Additionally, due to direct interest on the impact of labor unions on an individual’s predilection toward the policy making process, I analyze each component dimension independently.
well-being of the collectivity (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b). As such, PSM is closely related to other constructs such as the service ethic, public service ethos, altruism, and prosocial behavior (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Rainey, 2003).

Although a significant amount of empirical research examines the positive behaviors that result from high PSM levels (Brewer, 2003; Brewer & Selden, 1998; Houston, 2000, 2006, 2008; Kim, 2005), some scholars have called for increased attention to the institutional foundations of PSM (Perry, 1997, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). As Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) point out, “Institutions can be understood as social structures infused with values and rules. These values and rules are embedded across societies in religion, family, and other social structures (p. 58). However, Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) also acknowledge that intuitions will influence members’ PSM differently depending on the degree to which individuals are committed to the institutional identity. Because public service motivation originates from institutional values, social structures, such as labor unions, possess the capacity to shape members’ predispositions to respond to public service motives. Union member PSM levels, however, likely differ based on the degree to which they are committed to union values. The following sections explore the relationship between member commitment to union values and the categories of motives associated with PSM.

Union Commitment and Attraction to Policy Making. The initial description of PSM suggests that civil servants are often drawn to the policy making process to influence policies they personally value or advocate for the interests of groups with which they identify (Perry & Wise, 1990). Collective bargaining, the human resources management system favored by unions, is designed to protect employee rights from arbitrary personnel decisions of managers (Klingner, et al., 2010). Unions frequently interact in political settings to shape public policies
that affect employee rights, such as legislation designed to limit collective bargaining (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Kearney, 2010). In fact, empirical research illustrates that unions are successful in electing candidates that support their contract positions (Moe, 2006).

While some scholars argue that “public sector unions … can influence employer behavior through the political process” (Freeman, 1986, p. 42), union’s attraction to policy making may not be limited to electoral activity (Chandler & Gely, 1996). In fact, the political activity of unions occurs primarily through two mechanisms. Chandler and Gely (1996) point out that electoral politics involves voting for candidates that support union positions, but legislative politics involves lobbying already elected legislators to influence appointed administrators.

Although unions are active in politics, the factors that shape member perceptions toward political activity are relatively unexplored in the literature. Research suggests that commitment to union values influences perceptions toward both electoral activity and political advocacy (Fields, et al., 1987; Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990). For example, Fields, Masters, and Thacker (1987) suggest that a large group of union members oppose the political activities of unions, but show that those members who are more committed to the union tend to support the political activities of the labor organization. Later research by Thacker and colleagues corroborated this finding (Thacker, et al., 1990). Based on evidence suggesting that non-committed union members may be skeptical of union political activity (Kochan, 1979), but that committed members strongly support the political positions of the union I hypothesize that:

\[ \text{Hypothesis} \]

2 Chandler and Gely illustrate that form of government significantly influences the form of union political activity. Because appointed officials cannot be influenced via electoral mechanisms, unions seek to advance contract positions by persuading legislators to limit managerial discretion over personnel processes. This type of activity is more prevalent in city manager forms of government.
**H1:** Union members who are more committed to union values will be more attracted to the policy making process.

*Union Commitment and Compassion.* The second dimension of public service motivation stems from an individual’s compassionate motives. In their initial theoretical explanation Perry and Wise (1990) suggest that the compassion dimension of PSM involves a combination of values, perhaps the most crucial of which is benevolence. Citing Frederickson and Hart (1985), Perry and Wise indicate that the “patriotism of benevolence” is an integral component of the compassion dimension, which includes “an extensive love of all people within our political boundaries and the imperative that they must be protected in all of the basic rights granted to them by the enabling documents” (Frederickson and Hart, 1985 cited in Perry and Wise, 1990, p. 369, emphasis added). As Klingner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010) point out, public personnel management involves balancing four conflicting value sets, political responsiveness, efficiency, social equity, and employee rights. Collective bargaining, the human resources management practice associated with labor unions, is bound to PSM’s compassion dimension because it explicitly emphasizes protecting individual rights as the fundamental value.

Collective bargaining contracts are designed to protect the rights of employees by establishing regulations that specify the terms of employment and limit the ability of managers to make arbitrary personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gallagher, 1983; Klingner, et al., 2010). In fact, some of the basic functions of unions include affording workers the opportunity to participate in workplace decisions, preventing manipulation and exploitation of the working class, and fostering democracy in societies that champion it as a
fundamental value (Hochner, Koziara, & Schmidt, 1980; Sinyai, 2006). The degree to which union members display higher levels of compassion, however, depends on the degree to which they view their values as congruent with the union’s values.

Some empirical findings support the claim that committed union members should display higher levels of compassion. For example, Marxist work beliefs significantly influence attitudes toward unionization (Barling, et al., 1991; Buchholz, 1978). As Barling et al. (1991) point out, due to their Marxist belief systems, unions “assert that workers should have a greater span of control over the workplace as a means of avoiding exploitation and alienation” (p. 726).

Although these findings run contrary to some public management studies suggesting that union members are less compassionate, perhaps even discriminatory (Riccucci, 1987, 1988, 1990), I expect that:

**H₂:** Union members who are more committed to union values will be more compassionate.

*Union Commitment and Commitment to the Public Interest/Self-Sacrifice.* The final two dimensions of PSM fall under the category of norm based motives.³ In the initial assessment of PSM, Perry and Wise (1990) argue that values such as nationalism, loyalty to country, serving the public interest, and altruism provide the normative pillar of PSM. Recent work further emphasizes these values in an attempt to theoretically establish PSM as an alternative to theories

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³ Although commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice are presumed to be two distinct dimensions of public service motivation, empirical research suggests that they are highly correlated (Perry, 1996). As such, I examine the commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice dimensions together.

Due to their emphasis on individual rights, much public management research on unions begins with assumptions of member self-interest (Moe, 2006, 2009). The individualistic values harbored by unions incorporate the protection of employee rights and member solidarity (Klingner, et al., 2010), which can lead to feelings of loyalty toward the union. In fact, strong commitment to these union values can lead to acts that union members view as advancing the collective good as opposed to self-interested (Newton & Shore, 1992). Some public management studies also suggest that union members in the public sector often act in ways that contradict assumptions of self-interest (DiIulio, 1994). For example, in his study of culture at the bureau of prisons, DiIulio (1994) illustrates that unionized prison guards displayed extraordinary acts of selflessness, during the Atlanta prison riots. Because internalization of union values causes some union members act selflessly, the degree to which members internalize values varies significantly (Newton & Shore, 1992). Based on evidence suggesting that norm-based motives vary across unions and members, but that commitment to union values elicits acts designed to benefit others, I expect that:

\[ H_3: \text{Union members who are more committed to union values will be more committed to the public interest.} \]

and:

\[ ... \]
**H₄:** Union members who are more committed to union values will be more self-sacrificing.

*Model Controls.* Although this chapter focuses on the relationship between commitment to union values and the component dimensions of public service motivation there are three sets of alternatives that could suppress the relationship between commitment to union values and PSM. First, research suggests that union socialization significantly influences both union commitment (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992) and the dimensions of public service motivation (Davis, 2010). As such, I include a construct in the model designed to tap union socialization. Second, several individual characteristics play a role in union commitment and PSM. Demographic categories such as age, tenure, education, gender, and race all influence union commitment (Angle & Perry, 1981; Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Likewise, three of these demographic categories – race, gender, and education – significantly influence public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1997). I include these variables as covariates of both union commitment and the component dimensions of PSM. Finally, not all unions display similar motives and attitudes (Visser, 2006). Because they are the most heavily unionized areas of municipal government, I also included two variables to control for membership in police and fire unions. The following section presents qualitative

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4 For the purposes of this analysis I control for age, but do not have information on employee tenure. Although this is a limitation of the analysis it is reasonable to expect that age and tenure would be highly correlated. As such, it may not be necessary to include both measures.

5 Several PSM studies illustrate the positive influence of professionalism on PSM (see Pandey and Stazyk, 2008 for a comprehensive review). I employ the education variable here as a proxy for professional status.
findings that suggest that the union context influences PSM, as well as statistical tests of each research hypothesis.

Findings

Analysis of Qualitative Data. Prior to statistically analyzing the influence of member commitment to union values on PSM, I sought to determine if the union context meaningfully shapes publicly oriented motives by examining employee perspectives gathered through several semi-structured interviews. More than 100 randomly selected employees, both unionized and non-unionized, from two municipal organizations in Kansas offered perspectives on the motives attached to union membership. Because this chapter explores potential linkages between the union context and member motives, I examine 40 interviews that freely commented on motives in the context of public sector unions. The qualitative analysis is limited to only those interviews provided by public sector union members.

In accordance with the argument that the union context shapes public service motivation, union members tend to view the union as source of publicly oriented motives. For example, many union members tend to emphasize the union as an outlet to participate directly in municipal politics. To illustrate, one member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) pointed out that “[some] unions are very strong, and have a lot of political clout. … They can swing commission votes because of their numbers”. Another union member, who was also vice president of a Kansas public employees union, indicated that when “one of new council members [was] elected” the “union had meet and greet with him.” The union questioned whether new officials would support ordinances that would make employment regulations more transparent. The union members interviewed tended perceive the
union as an important mechanism to influence politics, but also tend to view union political activity as complimentary to collective bargaining positions.

Although many unionized employees view the union as an outlet for political activity, some members perceive the interchange between elected officials and city employees as undesirable under some circumstances. This is particularly the case when elected officials attempt to structure the nature of work. When discussing municipal politics in the context of his unionized position, one water department employee communicated this point by saying,

“I dislike the political aspects, which are heavy in this city … even though I’m unionized. … We have nine council members and at any given moment, they can and go pick up the phone and say ‘I want this done.’ That’s not their function, but I’m smart enough to know that’s how the real world works. In an ideal world, the city manager should be directing the workforce. Council should set policies and procedures and let [workers] put them in place.”

This perspective was echoed by a firefighter who said, “I don’t like dealing with politics. I would much rather be there for the people that I work for, [as opposed to] having some [council member] buddy downtown tell me how things should be run.” For these members, political activity is an important component of unionization, but elected officials should not overstep their authority by directing the nature of work.

The perspective that unionization tends to increase feelings of compassion for other members also seems to ring true with public union members. In fact, some unionized employees emphasize the interdependencies between union members, particularly when the overall quality
of work life is at stake. One female police officer clearly articulated her perspective on feelings of compassion, connectedness, and dependency with other members of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) by saying,

“The majority of police officers are [FOP] members but it’s not mandatory. Whatever the union fights for becomes your benefit. You can ask to be released from the union, but it’s not very practical. … If I dropped out the union, some attitudes would change towards me because [union membership] is an all-for-one and one-for-all type [of] thing. I wouldn’t want to get out of the union.”

Increased feelings of compassion and connectedness toward fellow union members extend to other public sector unions as well, but feelings of connectedness are often tied to paying dues. For example, the vice president of the public employee union cited earlier suggested that paying dues is important for receiving adequate representation, but even those who don’t pay dues will receive representation if their grievance adversely affects all union members. The vice president said specifically,

“By law, as an elected union official, I have to represent you in your grievance. But you get what you pay for. If you’re not paying [dues], you’re not getting the greatest representation. But if your case involves something against the contract, yes, I will fight it, because it’s hurting me and others.”
One firefighter corroborated this assertion by pointing out that those firefighters who choose not to pay union dues are often ostracized by other unionized firefighters, and an FOP member even suggested that while representation by the union is a major benefit of membership the social interactions are equally important. He stated that,

“Membership in the police union is voluntarily, not automatic. Your dues cover legal fees, representatives for grievance issues, contract negotiation, and a death benefit. It’s a buddy system. It’s beneficial, I would never dream of not being in union.”

While these findings suggest that the union context influences compassionate motives, feelings of interdependency and connectedness are often tied to paying dues in an effort to enhance the quality of work life.

While union member commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice could be inferred from the above statements, explicit comments from public sector union members on the link between unionization and commitment to the public interest/self-sacrifice were much less common. However, the stories provided by some public union members support the argument that public unionization is qualitatively distinct from private sector unionization. The Kansas public employee union vice president, who was an outspoken advocate of union protections, suggested that increased commitment to the public interest was a unique component of public unionization. He specifically argued that, “public sector unions are more for the people, the citizenry, than your corporate union types are.” The unionized water department employee cited above also recognized the relationship between public unionism and public service. He pointed out that the union “has afforded me other opportunities,” and that he enjoyed “helping people
and being public servant.” He also expressed significant “satisfaction in delivering a quality service, such as when people turn their faucets on and get high-quality water.” The perceptions of these individuals suggest that the public sector union context is unique when contrasted to private sector unions.

Whereas public union members tended to attach compassion to other dues paying members, these interview respondents appear to suggest that public union members anchor commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice in terms of the broader population served by government. In fact, one firefighter described how he came to understand his role as a public servant after he joined the department. He states that, “I was more for, myself and my family before [I joined the fire department], and now I’m out to [do] whatever the public needs us to do.” When asked if he belonged to the fire union he responded, “Yeah. I do it because of all the department’s across the country that I visit you know how they treat you being a union member.” While this member attached significance to public service, he was not extremely attached to the values of the union. His perspective partially contradicts the views of others because he did not explicitly link the intrinsic value of public service to unionism.

While these perspectives cannot be considered representative of all public union members, they do illustrate that many members perceive the union as a source of publicly oriented motives. These examples illustrate that many union members view the union context as important for shaping publicly oriented motives, but there is variation in the perspectives of

6 An extensive examination of the qualitative data did not reveal any instances where union members explicitly state they were willing to sacrifice personally for the benefit of the union. However, many members implied that they were willing to do so. Rather than impose meaning on respondent statements I more thoroughly examine union member self-sacrifice in the quantitative analysis.
unionized employees. The next section complements the qualitative analysis by conducting statistical tests of the above stated hypotheses to determine the nature of the relationship between commitment to union values and public service motivation.

Analysis of Quantitative Data. There are some important points to discuss in terms of model specification before delving into the findings. First, just as in the previous chapter, there are only two indicators for the union socialization construct, so the factor loadings are constrained to equality for model identification purposes. Second, also like the previous chapter, I model union commitment as a second order construct to comport with previous research (Kelloway, et al., 1992). Finally, public service motivation researchers have expressed some degree of concern regarding the relationships between the attraction to policy making sub-scale and the other dimensions of public service motivation. As Perry (1996) points out, the concern with the attraction to policy making subscale stems from its composition “entirely of negatively worded items” so “it confounds whether the subscale taps the attraction to policy making dimension…” (p. 20). Although not depicted in the diagram, I loaded each negatively worded PSM item on a separate construct. This is designed to separate the shared variance in the attraction to policy making items due to negative wording from the variance shared due to the

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7 In fact, some PSM researchers have excluded the attraction to policy making dimension from attempts to validate construct measurement (Coursey, et al., 2008). I include the attraction to policy making dimension here for two reasons. First, a substantial number of research studies continues to validate union activity in the policy making process. Second, public policy making, whether formal or informal, is an important component of public sector work environments, particularly for street-level workers (Lipsky, 1980).

8 The negative wording construct is defined by five items, all of which are negatively worded. It includes the three attraction to policy making items and two other negatively worded items from the compassion sub-dimension.
attraction to policy making construct. As such, the remaining variance more closely taps the true attraction to policy making construct.

The findings drawn from the confirmatory factor model and structural equation model indicate that the overall model fits the data well. Some studies suggest that $RMSEA \leq .08$, $CFI \geq .90$, and $NNFI \geq .90$ indicate good fitting models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, et al., 2004). This model surpasses all three of those criteria. The bidirectional (psi) paths between the PSM sub-dimensions can be interpreted as zero order correlations, whereas the unidirectional (beta) paths between union commitment and the PSM sub-dimensions can be interpreted as regression coefficients. On the other hand, the paths between union commitment and its component dimensions can be interpreted as factor loadings. Table 4.1 presents the factor loadings associated with all manifest variables, and figure 4.1 presents the standardized parameter estimates and the overall model fit statistics for the SEM.

[INSERT TABLE 4.1]

[INSERT FIGURE 4.1]

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9 Although the overall model fits the data well, the factor loadings associated with the attraction to policy making construct are relatively poor. This suggests that the concerns of many PSM researchers, beginning with Perry (1996), that the negative wording of the attraction to policy making items compromises the construct is partially true. Even though the factor loadings are relatively low I proceed with the analysis to examine, as best as possible, the effects of union membership on attraction to the policy making process.

10 Because this chapter hypothesizes about the regression parameters between union commitment and PSM I did not include covariates in the diagram. Many of the model controls were not significant, but were left in the model to rule out alternative explanations. Table 4 provides the estimates related to model controls.
All four of the hypothesized relationships significantly contribute to the model. I tested each of the beta paths for significance using the $\chi^2$ difference test option for categorical variables in Mplus. The table illustrates the change in model fit when the beta paths between union commitment and each dimension of PSM were constrained to zero. Due to the use of categorical variables the difference test is not distributed as a $\chi^2$ value. The $\Delta \chi^2$ column provides an accurate depiction of overall change in model fit. The results of $\chi^2$ difference testing indicate that constraining the latent regression parameters between union commitment and the four component dimensions of PSM to zero would cause a significant decrease in model fit. Table 4.2 illustrates changes in model fit and associated significance levels in the event that a regression parameter was constrained to zero.

[INSERT TABLE 4.2]

The results presented in figure 4.1 illustrate the nature of relationships between union commitment and each sub-dimension of PSM. Employees reporting a greater degree of commitment to union values also report higher levels of all four component dimensions of PSM. Additionally, the relationships between commitment to union values and PSM are all in the hypothesized direction. Unlike traditional regression models, which calculate one $R^2$ value to indicate variance explained in a single dependent variable, there are multiple $R^2$ values in structural models that correspond to each dependent variable. The findings illustrate that the model explains 21.4% of the variance in attraction to policy making, 28.8% of the variance in
compassion, 21.6% of the variance in commitment to the public interest, and 13.0% of the variance in self-sacrifice.

Finally, the model controls reveal a few significant relationships between sociodemographic categories and the component dimensions of PSM. First, differences between unions account for some variation in the elements of PSM.¹¹ Firefighters report less attraction to the policy making process, less compassion, greater commitment to the public interest, and more self-sacrifice.¹² Police officers report significantly less attraction to the policy making process and compassion and self-sacrifice, but they do not differ from others in terms of commitment to the public interest. Second, employees with bachelor’s degrees report higher levels of commitment to the public interest, but do not differ significantly from non-college educated employees with respect to any other dimension of PSM. Finally, female employees report significantly greater compassion, more commitment to the public interest, and higher degrees of self-sacrifice, while white respondents do not differ significantly from non-white respondents with respect to any dimension of PSM. Table 4.3 provides the parameter estimates and associated significance levels for the relationships between PSM and all control variables.

[INSERT TABLE 4.3]

¹¹ To assess the effects of different unions I included two dummy variables that control for membership in fire unions and police unions. It is critical to control for police and fire unions because they represent the most heavily unionized departments in the municipal governments examined here.

¹² For the purposes of model controls I interpret the effects if the relationship between the control variable and associated PSM dimension significant at the .10 level or greater.
Discussion

In public management and administration literature scholars have implicitly argued that unions, by emphasizing the protection of individualistic values through civil service regulations, can diminish employee motivation (Behn, 1995; J. D. Donahue, 2008). This implicit assumption, however, has received limited empirical attention (Bok & Dunlop, 1970), and even less attention has been paid to the effects of unions on a form of motivation unique to public institutions and organizations, public service motivation (PSM). By conceptualizing unions as social institutions that influence member values, this chapter sought to answer calls to examine the institutional foundations of publicly oriented motives (Perry, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). I argued specifically that the values harbored by labor unions accord with broader publicly oriented values. As such, when union members internalize union values they are likely to display higher levels of PSM.

The labor relations scholarship in public management, as well as other disciplines, points out that protection of employee and individual rights constitutes the fundamental value associated with unions and collective bargaining (Gordon & Lee, 1990; Klingner, et al., 2010). When members internalize union values, they tend to exhibit feelings of loyalty, responsibility, and connectedness toward the labor organization (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992). When viewed this way, member internalization of union values encourages feelings of compassion, benevolence, and selflessness associated with PSM within the union’s boundaries. Although the findings suggest that union members display higher PSM, the degree to which these attitudes and emotions extend to others outside the union’s boundaries remains unclear. As Perry and Vandenabeele (2008) point out, an individual’s identity links social institutions and motives, in this case union membership provides a forum for
members to realize a specific identity. While findings I present here contradict the implicit assumptions that unionization dampens public service motivation for fellow union members, I cannot assess the degree to which publicly oriented motives extend beyond institutional boundaries. In fact, it is possible that higher PSM toward union members could create an “us versus them” mentality, thereby dampening PSM with respect to other social groups. Additionally, I argue that committed union members can view the employment protections associated with civil service regulations as complementary to, and necessary for, expressing the attitudes, behaviors, and emotions associated with public service motivation.

The qualitative and quantitative evidence reported here illustrates that unions serve as a social institution that influence members’ publicly oriented motives by transmitting the value of employee rights. The qualitative findings I present do not formally test the research hypotheses, but rather they suggest that the union context influences member motives. In particular they provide two important insights that contribute to better understanding the origins of public service motivation. First, the qualitative evidence supports the expanded theoretical argument of Perry and Vandenabeele (2008), which argues that PSM has institutional foundations. In this case, the narratives provided by municipal union members suggest that the institutional values of unionism causes individuals harbor the attitudes, beliefs, and values that give rise to public service motivation. In particular, some of these union members perceive public unions as distinct from private unions. Public union members tend to view public unions, and the protections they offer employees, as a primary avenue to promote the public interest, whereas private sector unions are based on foundations of self-interest.

Second, while the qualitative findings support the institutional argument that unions, as social structures, influence member motives, they also suggest that some dimensions of PSM
may be best evaluated with reference to specific social groups. In the examples of union perspectives provided in this chapter, union members tended to anchor feelings of compassion to other dues paying union members. The stories provided by the police officer and firefighter provided above suggest that dues paying members exhibit a “one-for-all and all-for-one” attitude that is closely tied the feelings of interdependency associated with PSM’s compassion dimension. While these stories imply self-sacrifice with respect to the union, no member specifically referenced instances where they personally sacrificed their interests for the benefit of the union. Alternatively, the union members interviewed were inclined to conceptualize commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice in terms of the broader population served by government. In fact, the story of one firefighter suggested that he did not fully realize his commitment to the public interest until he joined municipal government.

While the qualitative results suggested that the public sector union context may influence public service motivation, they cannot provide evidence illustrating the nature of the relationships between commitment to union values and PSM. The statistical results I present, however, suggest that public sector unionism serves as a mechanism for communicating to members institutional values, attitudes, and beliefs that enhance public service motivation. The model fit indices presented in figure 4.1 illustrate that the theoretical model is an accurate representation of population characteristics. Furthermore, when controlling for a few commonly acknowledged sources of PSM (e.g. gender, professionalism, and union socialization) the model explains relatively large proportions of variance in the component dimensions of PSM. The model explains 21.4% of the variance in attraction to policy making, 28.8% of the variance in compassion, 21.6% of the variance in commitment to the public interest, and 13.0% of the variance in self-sacrifice. Additionally, the model results confirm the research hypotheses that
commitment to union values influences the motives that give rise to PSM, all four of which are in the direction expected.

The standardized regression parameters in figure 4.1 also provide a few additional insights into the relative importance of commitment to union values on the component dimensions of PSM. First, commitment to union values most prominently affects union member’s attraction to the policy making process. This finding supports the vast literature that labor unions are, at their foundations, political organizations (Chandler & Gely, 1995, 1996; Delaney, Fiorito, & Jarley, 1999; Fields, et al., 1987; Kearney, 2010; Thacker, et al., 1990). This chapter builds on those studies by illustrating that union political activity encourages members who adopt union values to be more attracted to the policy making process. The second most pronounced influence of commitment to union values is on member compassion. As such, this chapter provides evidence that the union value of employee rights protection translates into feelings of connectedness and dependency on other union members. Finally, although weaker compared to other relationships, commitment to union values significantly affects the normative components of PSM (commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice). The findings I present here partially reject claims that unions are primarily self-interested organizations designed to protect members at the expense of clients (Moe, 2009). Rather, many public union members view the protection of employee rights as fundamentally necessary for serving the public interest.

Some control variables also significantly predicted variation in the component dimensions of PSM. First, the model results support the argument that PSM is a gendered construct, and that women should report higher scores on some elements of public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006). In these data female respondents reported significantly
more compassion, commitment to the public interest, and self-sacrifice. Second, this research partially supports the common argument that professionalism increases PSM (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). The findings I present here suggest that professionalism influences respondents’ commitment to the public interest. These findings, however, should be interpreted with caution because I use a proxy for professional socialization, education level. Finally, the findings illustrate that police officers and fire fighters differ significantly from other members of the organization on many component elements of PSM. While unionized members of the fire department report lower levels of attraction to policy making and compassion, they report greater commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice. Likewise, unionized police officers also report less attraction to the policy making process and compassion, but they also report less self-sacrifice. Police officers do not differ from other employees in terms of commitment to the public interest. These findings provide some evidence that organizational mission may shape overall motivation (Wright, 2007). It may be that the unique missions of these departments, in addition to their heavily unionized status, influences PSM levels.

Summary and Conclusion

Given that a significant amount of public management and administration literature assumes that public unions diminish member motivation (J. D. Donahue, 2008; Moe, 2009), and questions of employee motivation in the public sector are paramount (Behn, 1995; Rainey, 2003), it is striking that few studies have sought to empirically examine claims that unionization undermines employee motivation. It is possible that, as Behn (1995) points out, we can attribute the limited understanding of unions’ motivational context in public management to an over reliance on economics as the underlying paradigm for understanding the behavior of public
employees. While studies of unions based on economic theories contribute to understanding some elements of union member behavior, they neglect an in-depth analysis of the institutional and psychological factors that give rise to specific forms of motivation. The purpose of this chapter was to fill this research gap in two ways. First, I sought to advance the study of public sector unions by applying institutional theory, particularly as it relates to social psychology, to better understand public unions as social structures that define member attitudes, values, and beliefs. Second, this chapter moves beyond implicit assumptions of the dampening effect of unions on motivation by empirically testing a model of public service motivation that incorporates member internalization of union values. I argued that member internalization of the primary union value, protection of individual and employee rights, facilitates the publicly oriented motives that define PSM.

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that committed union members are more attracted to the policy making process, compassionate, committed to the public interest, and self-sacrificing. Based on these findings future research cannot simply assume that public sector unions are solely self-interested organizations that diminish individual motivation and job performance. In fact, by enhancing the component elements of public service motivation, unions may actually enhance some forms of organizational and individual performance (Brewer, 2008; Brewer & Selden, 2000; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999). Alternatively, placing strict limits on collective bargaining in the public sector may detrimentally influence public employee motivation and related job performance. The following chapter draws together the empirical findings that member commitment to public sector union values diminishes perceptions of red tape and enhances public service motivation to hypothesize a theoretical model of the positive, but indirect, effects of public unionization on overall job satisfaction.
Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Items</th>
<th>Standardized Estimates</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union Socialization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEETINGS</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIONINT</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Willingness to Work for the Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWU1</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWU2</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWU3</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loyalty to the Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY1</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY2</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY3</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY4</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY5</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOY6</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsibility to the Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTU1</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTU2</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTU3</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTU4</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attraction to Policy Making</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM1 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM2 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM3 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compassion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM1</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM2</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM3 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM4 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM5</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment to the Public Interest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI1</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI2</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI3</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Sacrifice</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS1</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS2</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS3</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS4</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Items</th>
<th>Standardized Estimates</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative Wording</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM1 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM2 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM3 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM3 (Reversed)</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM4 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.1: SEM Standardized Parameter Estimates (Union Commitment and PSM)

Model Fit: $\chi^2_{(508, n=329)} = 980.389$, $p < .001$; RMSEA = .053 (.048, .058); CFI = .973; NNFI(TLI) = .969
Table 4.2: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Union Commitment and PSM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Δχ²</th>
<th>Δdf</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Model</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Union Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attraction to Policy Making</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>10.128</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>14.388</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to the Public Interest</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>7.525</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Sacrifice</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>8.944</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3: Standardized Regression Parameters for Control Variables (PSM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attraction to Policy Making</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$SE$</th>
<th>$EST/SE$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Socialization</td>
<td>-0.506</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>-2.013</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>-2.658</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>-1.795</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>0.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>-1.435</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compassion</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Socialization</td>
<td>-0.587</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>-3.246</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>-2.573</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>-0.438</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-4.495</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>3.358</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>-1.032</td>
<td>0.302</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to the Public Interest</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Socialization</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>1.915</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>2.511</td>
<td>0.012</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>-1.109</td>
<td>0.267</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Sacrifice</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Socialization</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>-1.038</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighter</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>5.035</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>3.362</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>-0.658</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>-1.924</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>-0.886</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5

Unionization and Job Satisfaction: How Union Membership Influences Public Sector Job Satisfaction

A final area of organizational behavior potentially influenced by unionization is employee job satisfaction. The labor relations literature frequently argues that unions’ representative political function within organizations, paradoxically, decreases member job satisfaction. Perry and Angle (1979) describe collective bargaining as organizational politics in the sense that labor negotiators “manage influence to obtain non-sanctioned ends or … employ non-sanctioned means of influence” (p. 488). They go on to argue that job satisfaction is one employee attitude, among many, influenced by the organizational politics of collective bargaining (Perry & Angle, 1979). The organizational politics of collective bargaining has been cited as a primary source of union member job dissatisfaction because it unrealistically raises job expectations for higher wages and better working conditions, cues members to the less desirable aspects of work, and provides a forum for unionized employees to voice discontent, (C. J. Berger, et al., 1983; Borjas, 1979; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Ross, 1948).

While this literature provides significant insights into the psychological effects of unionization on members, it has limited generalizability for union influence on public sector job satisfaction because it draws primarily from observations in the private sector. Two aspects of the public sector work environment potentially limit the applicability of private sector union research on job satisfaction: higher levels of red tape and greater public service motivation among employees. With regards to red tape, research suggests (1) that public sector managers perceive higher red tape than private sector managers (Baldwin, 1990; Bozeman & Rainey,
1998; Rainey, 2003; Rainey, et al., 1995) and (2) that red tape is persistently and negatively correlated with job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983). Similarly, research (1) detects higher public service motivation among public, compared to private, employees (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000, 2006, 2008) and (2) consistently correlates PSM with greater job satisfaction (Cerase & Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 2003). Considering this scholarship in light of the evidence presented in previous chapters, that union commitment appears to lower perceptions of red tape and increase public service motivation, public sector union membership may indirectly increase member job satisfaction.

In order to explore these complex indirect effects, this chapter devises and tests three hypotheses based on two areas of scholarship. The first hypothesis, that unionization directly decreases job satisfaction, is based on literature suggesting that the organizational politics of collective bargaining provides members an avenue to voice dissatisfaction (Perry & Angle, 1979). The second hypothesis, that union commitment indirectly increases job satisfaction by lowering perceived red tape, is based on theory suggesting that organizational limits on employee autonomy reduce job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976), and red tape limits employee autonomy (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Pandey, et al., 2007). The third hypothesis, that union commitment increases job satisfaction by increasing PSM, stems from

\[1\]

Unfortunately there is no unifying theoretical framework to the author’s knowledge from which to draw that guides the development of research hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect link between union commitment and job satisfactions. As such, I draw from research in multiple disciplines, but findings across disciplines are inconsistent in terms of specifying the directional relationship between unionization and job satisfaction. This ambiguity complicates specifying the direction of hypothetical relationships in this study.
theory suggesting that individuals with high PSM are more satisfied with work in the public sector (Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982) because it affords the opportunity to sacrifice for others (Le Grand, 2003). All hypotheses are tested using quantitative data collected from over 300 public sector union members in a large Kansas municipality. ²

Commitment to Union Values and Job Satisfaction in the Public Sector

Union Commitment and Job Satisfaction. Locke (1976) described job satisfaction as the “pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experience” (p. 1300). Although several factors influence job satisfaction, Wright and Davis (2003) point toward two components of the overall work environment that influence public sector job satisfaction. First, organizational characteristics, or the work context, influence job satisfaction by shaping the way employees interact with the work organization. The work context affects overall job satisfaction by affording employees greater autonomy at work, thereby increasing the degree to which individuals perceive work outcomes as a direct result of their effort (Hackman & Oldham, 1976). Second, job characteristics, defined as “the collection of tasks that comprise the job” (Perry & Porter, 1982), includes the degree to which the job positively influences others (Hackman & Oldham, 1976). Jobs that positively influence the lives of others encourage workers to perceive work as more meaningful, which contributes to higher overall job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).

² While previous chapters examined qualitative data from union members in two jurisdictions, interview respondents did not specifically address job satisfaction. Additionally, qualitative evidence exploring the link between unionization, bureaucratic red tape, and public service motivation is documented in previous chapters. As such, I examine only quantitative data from union members in a single jurisdiction here.
Job satisfaction represents one of the most frequently studied correlates of unionization (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). The most common result in the scholarly literature on labor unions illustrates that union commitment and collective bargaining processes increase union members’ dissatisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gordon, et al., 1980; Kochan, 1980; Kochan & Helfman, 1981). This finding is frequently explained in terms of the “voice hypothesis,” which suggests workers with less attractive and rewarding jobs internalize union values because unionization provides opportunities to rectify less desirable work elements (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). A complimentary political explanation attributes member dissatisfaction to the activities of union leaders. This interpretation suggests that union leaders build members’ salary and benefits expectations beyond what is reasonable, and fail to deliver promised outcomes, thereby facilitating discontent (Hammer & Avgar, 2005; Ross, 1948). While these studies do not specifically examine the public sector context it is reasonable to expect that:

**H₁:** Member commitment to union values will have a direct, negative effect on public sector job satisfaction.

3 It is difficult to collectively interpret findings on the link between union commitment and job satisfaction because the directionality of the relationship is confounded. While some studies argue that job dissatisfaction causes commitment to union values (Gordon, et al., 1980), others argue that unionization causes job dissatisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Ross, 1948). To complicate matters some argue that the relationship between commitment to union values and job related attitudes is likely a reciprocal process (Redman & Snape, 2005). I argue here, from an institutionalist perspective, that the social groups to which individuals belong shape attitudes, beliefs, values, and ultimately behavior. As such, the institutional perspective suggests that commitment to union values causes job dissatisfaction rather than the opposite.
Union Commitment, Bureaucratic Red Tape, and Job Satisfaction. In their sector-specific theory of job satisfaction, however, Wright and Davis (2003) point out that “the key to understanding any potential sector differences in employee job satisfaction is to consider ways in which the public sector work context differs from the private sector” (p. 75). Drawing from Buchanan (1975), Wright and Davis (2003) argue that more prevalent elements of the public sector work context, such as bureaucratic red tape and increased procedural constraints, reduce job satisfaction. Research consistently shows that bureaucratic red tape, defined as pathological organizational rules, reduces overall job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983; Wright & Davis, 2003). Public employees experience several negative psychological consequences, such as purposeless and alienation, when exposed to high levels of bureaucratic red tape (DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005). These negative emotions decrease job satisfaction by limiting the perceived degree of responsibility employees have over work outcomes (Hackman & Oldham, 1976). Furthermore, bureaucratic red tape encourages hardening of work routines and can confine employees to strictly following the organization’s formal rule requirements (Pandey & Scott, 2002). Routine work, in turn, encourages employees to perceive work as less socially meaningful, thereby decreasing job satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).

Unions, however, may meaningfully influence the public sector work context by reducing perceived red tape for committed union members. As Bozeman (1993) points out, “administrative rules, regulations, and procedures are not … inherently good or bad, but only good or bad from the perspective of values posited and the extent to which they seem to serve or thwart those values” (p. 283-284). Unions seek to protect the fundamental value of individual
and employee rights by establishing rule-oriented value protections through the collective bargaining process (Klingner, et al., 2010). These rule-oriented protections often limit the ability of managers to make arbitrary personnel decisions (A. K. Donahue, et al., 2000), which reduces feelings of alienation and exploitation for members committed to union values (Barling, et al., 1991). Increased purpose and meaningfulness of work, in turn, leads to greater satisfaction (Hackman & Oldham, 1976). Given that red tape is a significant predictor of job satisfaction in the public sector, and that collective bargaining may decrease perceptions of red tape for members committed to union values, I hypothesize that:

**H2:** Commitment to union values will have an indirect, positive effect on public sector job satisfaction by reducing member perceptions of red tape.

*Union Commitment, PSM, and Job Satisfaction.* Wright and Davis (2003) also point out that job characteristics distinct to the public sector can influence job satisfaction. The ability to positively influence the lives of others constitutes one job characteristic often thought to be more heavily emphasized by public employees (Crewson, 1997). Some scholars argue that public employees are more likely to be characterized unique service ethic, or public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982, 2003).4 Perry and Wise (1990) developed the term public

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4 Recent trends in PSM theory, however, employ the term more broadly in reference not to an individual’s aspiration to work for government, but rather to describe an individual’s desire to serve the public good, sacrifice for the benefit of others, and promote the well-being of the collectivity (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b). As such, PSM is closely related to other commonly used terms in public management, as well as other scholarly disciplines, including the service ethic, public service ethos, altruism, and prosocial behavior (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Rainey, 2003).
service motivation to describe individuals predisposed to “respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” (p. 368). Because one major characteristic of public sector jobs is the opportunity to positively impact the lives of others, those individuals who display higher PSM exhibit greater satisfaction with public sector work (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cerase & Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 2003). PSM, however is not void of social context, and the norms and values attached to social structures affect PSM (Perry, 1997, 2000; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008).

While commitment to union values does not specifically influence the characteristics of public sector jobs, it may impact the significance individuals attribute to specific job characteristics by increasing PSM. Unions, as social structures, emphasize protection of employee and individual rights as the fundamental value (Gordon & Lee, 1990; Klingner, et al., 2010; Kochan, 1980). The distinct values tied to unionism stem from the belief that employers wield significant power over employees, and laborers must collectively even the balance of power between labor and management (Parboteeah & Cullen, 2003). Union members often seek to advance the collective good of the labor organization, which communicates many of the same values give rise to PSM (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). Commitment to union values may positively influence PSM by encouraging feelings loyalty, connectedness, selflessness, and pride with respect to the labor organization and working class (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992). Because those individuals who display higher PSM are more satisfied with public sector work, and commitment to union values facilitates the motives and emotions that enhance PSM, I expect that:
**H₃:** Member commitment to union values will have an indirect, positive effect on public sector job satisfaction by increasing public service motivation.

*Model Controls.* Although this chapter focuses on the direct and indirect relationships between commitment to union values and public sector job satisfaction potential alternative explanations exist. First, research suggests that union socialization impacts commitment to union values (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992), bureaucratic red tape (see chapter 3), PSM (Davis, 2010), and job satisfaction (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). To control for the effects of union socialization, I include a construct in the model designed to tap socialization experiences (e.g. attendance at union meetings and informal gatherings). Second, demographic categories including education, gender, and race influence union commitment (Angle & Perry, 1981; Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992), public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2006; Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1997), and job satisfaction (Clark, 1997; Weaver, 1977). I include these variables as covariates of union commitment, public service motivation, and job satisfaction. Some research also illustrates that women perceive bureaucracy and formal rules differently from men (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). Although race and gender are often insignificant in bureaucratic red tape studies (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000; Rainey, et al., 1995; P. G. Scott & Pandey, 2000), I included those demographic characteristics in the model to rule out possible alternative explanations. Finally, not all unions display similar motives and attitudes (Visser, 2006). I also included two variables to control for membership in police and fire unions, because they are the most heavily unionized municipal government departments. The following section

5 Several PSM studies illustrate the positive influence of professionalism on PSM (see Pandey and Stazyk, 2008 for a comprehensive review). I employ the education variable here as a proxy for professional status.
presents statistical tests of the research hypotheses suggesting that unionization indirectly increases job satisfaction by influencing sources of satisfaction unique to the public sector.

Findings

Prior to explaining the statistical findings it is necessary to discuss a few points in terms of model specification and estimation. First, as in previous chapters the union socialization construct is defined by only two indicators. For model identification purposes I have constrained the factor loadings associated with attendance at union meetings and social interaction with union members to equality. Second, public service motivation researchers have questioned the existence of the attraction to policy making dimension as a component of the higher order public service motivation construct. As Perry (1996) suggests, the attraction to policy making subscale, because it is composed “entirely of negatively worded items … confounds whether the subscale taps the attraction to policy making dimension…” (p. 20). Although not depicted in the diagram, I loaded each reverse scaled PSM item on a negative wording construct. The negative wording construct extracts the shared variance in the attraction to policy making items due to negative wording from true attraction to policy making construct. As such, the remaining variance more closely taps attraction to policy making. Third, red tape is depicted as a box in the

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6 In fact, some PSM researchers have excluded the attraction to policy making dimension from attempts to validate construct measurement (Coursey, et al., 2008). I include the attraction to policy making dimension here for two reasons. First, a substantial number of research studies continues to validate union activity in the policy making process. Second, public policy making, whether formal or informal, is an important component of public sector work environments, particularly for street-level workers (Lipsky, 1980).

7 The negative wording construct is defined by five items, all of which are negatively worded. It includes the three attraction to policy making items and two other negatively worded items from the compassion sub-dimension.
diagram because the construct is defined by a single indicator. Finally, the initial model estimates returned one inadmissible solution, a negative residual variance associated with the commitment to public interest dimension of PSM. To address this I constrained the residual variance to zero, and tested for significant changes in model fit. The results of a $\chi^2$ difference test on one degree of freedom reveal that constraining the negative residual variance to zero does not significantly reduce model fit ($\Delta \chi^2 = 3.144, p = .0762$). As such, all subsequent models were estimated with this model constraint in place.

Before interpreting parameter estimates and variance explained it is necessary to determine if the overall model fits the data well. General guidelines suggest that $RMSEA \leq .08$, $CFI \geq .90$, and $NNFI \geq .90$ indicate good fitting models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Marsh, et al., 2004). The findings presented in the model surpass the suggested cutoff criteria for all three measures of model fit. Because the model fits the data well it is reasonable to proceed with analysis of parameter estimates associated with hypothesized relationships. Consistent with previous research, both commitment to union values (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992) and public service motivation (Coursey, et al., 2008; Perry, 1996) are modeled as higher order constructs with multiple component dimensions. As such, the pathways between higher order constructs and associated sub-dimensions can be interpreted as factor loadings. Alternatively, the unidirectional beta pathways between union commitment, red tape, PSM, and job satisfaction can be interpreted as regression coefficients, and the bidirectional pathway between red tape and PSM can be interpreted as a correlation. Table 5.1 presents the factor
loadings associated with all manifest variables\textsuperscript{8}, and the model presented in figure 5.1 provides the model fit statistics and parameter estimates.

\[\text{[INSERT TABLE 5.1]}\]

\[\text{[INSERT FIGURE 5.1]}\]

All five of the hypothesized parameters, both direct and indirect, significantly contribute to the overall fit of the model. Because all indicators in this model are categorical, traditional $\chi^2$ difference testing to determine parameter significance is not appropriate. As such, each beta path was tested for significance using the $\chi^2$ difference testing option for categorical variables in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010). The $\Delta\chi^2$ column provides an accurate depiction of overall change in model fit when a given beta path was absent from the model. The direct path between commitment to union values and job satisfaction is significant at the .05 level, whereas all other parameters are significant at the .01 level or greater. Table 5.2 illustrates the change in model $\chi^2$, and associated significance levels, when a given regression parameter was constrained to zero.

\text{\textsuperscript{8}The inclusion of the negative wording construct substantially reduced the factor loadings for the attraction to policy making items with respect to the attraction to policy making construct. However, after extracting negative wording variance the attraction to policy making dimension represents an important component of the higher order PSM construct.}
The results presented in figure 5.1 illustrate the complex relationship between commitment to union values and job satisfaction in the public sector. First, those public employees reporting greater commitment to the union also report significantly higher job satisfaction. The direction of the relationship, however, is positive, which contradicts the negative hypothesized relationship. Second, the model provides evidence suggesting that union commitment indirectly influences public sector job satisfaction through both red tape and PSM. Those employees reporting more commitment to union values report significantly less red tape, and those employees reporting more red tape also report less job satisfaction. These relationships suggest that member commitment to union values increases job satisfaction indirectly by decreasing red tape. Additionally, union members more committed to the union report greater PSM. Those reporting higher PSM, in turn, are also more satisfied with the nature of public sector work. As such, commitment to union values indirectly increases job satisfaction by increasing public service motivation.

Although figure 5.1 presents several direct regression parameters, it does not provide information on the total indirect effect on job satisfaction. Total indirect effects are estimated as the product of multiple direct effects (Kline, 2005). In this model the indirect effect of union commitment on job satisfaction through red tape is .076 ($p = 0.022$), and the indirect effect of union commitment on job satisfaction through PSM is .215 ($p = 0.001$). The total indirect effect of union commitment on job satisfaction is estimated as the sum of all indirect effects (Kline, 2005), in this case the total indirect effect of union commitment on job satisfaction is .291 ($p < 0.001$). Finally, the total effect of commitment to union values on job satisfaction is calculated
by adding the direct effect to the total indirect effect. The results presented in figure 5.1 illustrate that the total effect of union commitment on job satisfaction is .562.\(^9\) Practically speaking the model suggests that the overall impact of commitment to union values on job satisfaction is relatively strong and positive.

Finally, unlike traditional regression models, which calculate one \(R^2\) value, there are multiple \(R^2\) values in structural models corresponding to each exogenous variable. First, the findings illustrate that the model controls explain 66.4% of the variance in commitment to union values. Second, the model controls and commitment to union values explain 5.9% of the variance in red tape and 17.7% of the variance in public service motivation. Finally, the overall model explains a relatively large portion of the variance in job satisfaction, 33.2%. Although a relatively small proportion of the variance in red tape is explained by the model, the remaining \(R^2\) values indicate that this model has relatively good explanatory capacity.

Although this chapter focuses on the direct and indirect relationships between commitment to union values and job satisfaction, the results suggest that there are some significant relationships between the control variables and other model constructs. First, fire fighters tend to be more dissatisfied with their jobs, but no other control variables are significant predictors of job satisfaction. Second, those individuals who more frequently interact with other union members report higher levels of red tape. Finally, the results indicate that three model controls are significantly related to commitment to union values. Survey respondents who report more interaction in union socialization experiences (e.g. meetings and informal gatherings)

\(^9\) Although Mplus does not provide a p-value associated with the total effect, both the total indirect effect and the direct effect are significant at the .05 level. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the total effect, comprised of both direct and indirect relationships, is also significant.
report significantly more commitment to union values. Additionally, police officers and fire fighters report significantly more commitment to union values. This is not surprising given they are the most heavily unionized municipal government departments examined here. Table 5.3 provides the standardized parameter estimates and significance levels for all control variables included in the model.

[INSERT TABLE 5.3]

Discussion

The literature on labor relations frequently asserts that unionization contributes to job dissatisfaction (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992; C. J. Berger, et al., 1983; Borjas, 1979; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kochan, 1980; Kochan & Helfman, 1981; Ross, 1948), but these studies focus primarily on private sector unions and neglect sources of work satisfaction more prevalent in public organizations. This chapter sought to examine union members’ job satisfaction in public sector work environments. I argued here that unionization in the public sector can increase members’ job satisfaction by favorably altering the work context and reinforcing the attitudes and emotions that give rise to public service motivation within the boundaries of the labor organization.

Perhaps the most interesting result concerns the positive direct relationship between commitment to union values and job satisfaction, which contradicts previous research. Those individuals more committed to the labor organization also report higher levels of overall job satisfaction. Although this findings is surprising in light of substantial evidence pointing to unionization as a cause of member dissatisfaction, unions are integral in minimizing wage
inequality and increasing member autonomy with respect to the work organization (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1990). The findings I present here are consistent with arguments that unions can increase member satisfaction, and support the assertion that favorably altering the work context serves as a mechanism by which unions indirectly influence job satisfaction.

The major element of the work context examined in this chapter is bureaucratic red tape, or pathological organizational rules that fail to achieve their purposes (Bozeman, 1993, 2000). Not surprisingly, those members more committed to union values perceive less bureaucratic red tape. Although formal organizational rules are more numerous in unionized environments (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Gallagher, 1983), members committed union members tend to perceive these rules favorably. Union members’ favorable assessment of organizational rules may stem from the fact that collective bargaining agreements establish rule-oriented protection of employee rights, the fundamental value associated with unionism. One caveat is in order, however, because this chapter examines union member perceptions of organizational rules, broadly construed. Union members might be expected to view those rules specifically associated with the labor contract even more favorably, but that hypothesis cannot be tested here.

Although not specifically an element of the work context, commitment to union values appears to trigger the attitudes and emotions that give rise to public service motivation. Although this finding contradicts assertions that unions are primarily self-interested (Moe, 2006, 2009), it is understandable from the perspective of organizational psychologists exploring the causes and consequences of union commitment. Research suggests that commitment to the union is associated with feelings of loyalty to the labor union, willingness to personally sacrifice for other union members, and a sense of responsibility to advance the collective good of the union (Gordon, et al., 1980; Kelloway, et al., 1992). Although many of these emotions also give
rise to PSM (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008b; Perry & Wise, 1990), scholarship has yet to emphasize role social boundaries play in understanding PSM. An intriguing question for future research would ask: does increased compassion and self-sacrifice with respect to a given social group (e.g. fellow labor union members) translate into increased compassion and self-sacrifice for other social groups?

The direct linkages between union commitment and bureaucratic red tape, as well as union commitment and PSM, have implications for the overall influence of commitment to union values on job satisfaction. First, empirical research finds that a high level of bureaucratic red tape and excessive procedural constraints consistently lower job satisfaction (Baldwin, 1990; Buchanan, 1975; DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2005; Lan & Rainey, 1992; Snizek & Bullard, 1983; Wright & Davis, 2003). This chapter suggests that commitment to union values decreases perceptions of bureaucratic red tape, thereby indirectly increasing job satisfaction. Second, public service motivation scholars have uniformly asserted that those individuals with higher PSM view public employment as a source of intrinsic satisfaction (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cerase & Farinell, 2006; Kim, 2005; Naff & Crum, 1999; Norris, 2003). This research provides evidence that union commitment increases PSM. As such, commitment to union values indirectly increases job satisfaction by increasing PSM.

The magnitude of all effects, both direct and indirect, of union commitment on job satisfaction provide additional insights into the sources of satisfaction in the public sector. First, the direct effect of commitment to union values on job satisfaction (.271) is larger than its total indirect effect through both red tape (.076) and PSM (.215). This suggests that the independent influence of commitment to union values in this research outstrips both indirect relationships. This finding could potentially be explained by other variables not measured here. For example,
Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1990) suggest that unions increase job satisfaction by minimizing wage inequality. Future research should be designed to explore how unionization influences member perceptions of organizational justice, and by extension job satisfaction. Second, the effect of union commitment on job satisfaction via PSM is considerably larger than its effect through red tape. This finding suggests that the psychological impacts of unions on their members may be more important for job satisfaction than the effects of collective bargaining agreements on the work context. Although this claim cannot be explicitly tested in this chapter, and future research could begin to untangle the relationships between the individual and organizational effects of public sector unionism.

The results from this analysis, however, should be viewed with some caution for three reasons. First, although the quantitative data taps employee perceptions throughout the organizational hierarchy, all data were collected in a single municipal organization. The findings I report here may not translate to other municipal organizations or other levels of government. Second, all interview respondents worked in the state of Kansas. Due to vastly different collective bargaining regulations in other states, the generalizability of these findings is limited. Finally, all data were collected at a single time point. Complex indirect, or mediated, relationships take time to unfold, and mediation models are likely biased in cross-sectional data (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Maxwell & Cole, 2007). Future research should seek to assess the causal relationships between these constructs with longitudinal data. These limitations, however, do not prevent this research from taking a first step in examining the complex relationship between job satisfaction and public sector unionism. These findings suggest that the labor union, as a social structure within municipal government organizations, serves as an important source of several work related attitudes and behaviors.
Summary and Conclusion

It is interesting that relatively little research in public administration examines the psychological effects of unionism in the public sector, particularly because the public sector is so heavily unionized. Perhaps this is because public administration, due to its emphasis on government organizations as the object of study, has become more interested in the politics of unionization. Likewise, union members may perceive managerial favoritism by public administration scholars, and may view scholarly efforts to examine public unionism – and collect data from union members – with some skepticism. Nonetheless, labor unions represent a major component of the public sector work environment with the ability to influence the work related attitudes of government employees. Although the power and influence of public sector unions vacillates over time, they are likely to remain an integral component of the public sector work environment (Kearney, 1992, 2010). As such, research on public sector unions can contribute to a broader understanding of how employees behave in public sector settings.

This chapter takes an important step in exploring the influence of public unions on members’ job satisfaction by exploring elements of the work context more prevalent in public organizations. The findings I present here suggest that public union members’ commitment to union values encourages heightened job satisfaction. In addition to the direct relationship between commitment to union values, union commitment indirectly increases job satisfaction by reducing union member perceptions of red tape and increasing member PSM. Based on these findings future research in public administration cannot assume that unions are inherently detrimental to organizational performance. Rather, by encouraging commitment to the nature of work and increased job satisfaction, unionization could potentially increase the performance of public organizations. The following chapter provides some general concluding remarks on the
influence of public sector unions on members, points to some research limitations, and briefly discusses directions for future study.
Illustrations

Table 5.1: Standardized Factor Loadings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Items</th>
<th>Standardized Estimates</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union Socialization</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>MEETINGS</td>
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<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWU1</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWU2</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWU3</td>
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<tr>
<td>APM2 (Reversed)</td>
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<td>APM3 (Reversed)</td>
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<td>COM3 (Reversed)</td>
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<td>COM4 (Reversed)</td>
<td>0.475</td>
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<td>COM5</td>
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<td>CPI2</td>
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<td>CPI3</td>
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<td>SS2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS3</td>
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<td>0.360</td>
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Table 4.1: Standardized Factor Loadings Continued

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<td>JS3</td>
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<td>COM3 (Reversed)</td>
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<td>COM4 (Reversed)</td>
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Figure 5.1: Standardized Parameter Estimates (Job Satisfaction)

Model Fit: $\chi^2_{(658, n=329)} = 1359.592, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .057_{(.053, .061)}; \text{CFI} = .961; \text{NNFI(TLI)} = .957$
Table 5.2: Regression Parameter Significance Levels (Job Satisfaction)

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<tr>
<th>Model</th>
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<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
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<td>Full Model</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.967</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.026</td>
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<td>24.633</td>
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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
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<td>16.174</td>
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### Table 5.3: Standardized Model Control Parameter Estimates (Job Satisfaction)

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<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>( SE )</th>
<th>( Z )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
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<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-0.783</td>
<td>0.377</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6

Conclusions and Directions for Future Research

Although labor unions represent a significant presence in government organizations, recently legislators, managers, and citizens have focused on perceived negative consequences of unions in public sector work environments. For example, in the early months of 2011 Wisconsin Republican Governor Scott Walker, citing massive budget shortfalls, introduced legislation designed to strip nearly all collective bargaining rights from many government employees. Union leaders met Walker’s bill with fierce opposition and ultimately organized massive sit-ins at the Wisconsin state capital. Some Wisconsin legislators – primarily Democratic – sympathetic to union concerns even vacated the state in protest, which temporarily delayed a vote on the bill. The disagreement between organized labor and legislators in Wisconsin represents one of the more contentious collective bargaining deliberations in the country, but other states are experiencing similar debates. Elected officials in Ohio and Tennessee have also introduced legislation that will repeal some collective bargaining rights for public employees.

It is not surprising that state legislatures are proposing measures to limit collective bargaining in the public sector, particularly in a turbulent economic climate. Throughout history the popularity of unions has fluctuated with shifting political and economic environmental conditions (Kearney, 1992). This fluctuation has been attributed to the tendency for legislators and managers to blame unions for increasing the cost of government (J. D. Donahue, 2008). Legislators facing budget crises view limits on collective bargaining as a mechanism to cut the cost of government, because unionized workers often receive higher compensation and more substantial benefits packages (Methé & Perry, 1980). However, the fiscal advantages gained by limiting collective bargaining rights may be accompanied by unintended consequences for
government employees and organizations. While limits on collective bargaining rights may result in reducing direct personnel costs (e.g. salaries and benefits), the empirical evidence I provide throughout this dissertation suggests that there are at least three reasons to question sweeping reforms designed to eliminate collective bargaining.

First, the empirical findings in chapter 3 suggest that committed union members tend to view the organization’s formal rule requirements more favorably. When individuals favorably view organizational rules, they are more likely to voluntarily abide by rule requirements (DeHart-Davis, 2007, 2009b). Voluntary rule compliance likely increases organizational efficiency by reducing the cost of compliance monitoring. (DeHart-Davis, 2009b; Tyler, 2006). Although, as many reformers suggest, eliminating collective bargaining may trim personnel costs, these savings may be partially offset by efficiency reductions resulting from increased compliance monitoring.

Second, the results I present in chapter 4 indicate that committed union members may be more likely to exhibit greater public service motivation (PSM). Among the myriad organizational benefits arising from employing those with high PSM, researchers often point to differences in reward preferences. Those individuals who display higher PSM are inclined to emphasize public service as a more important work reward compared to monetary incentives (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000; Rainey, 1982). As such, severe limits on collective bargaining could unintentionally encourage employees stripped of union membership status to place greater emphasis on monetary rewards, by undermining the motives that give rise to PSM.

Finally, the results I present in chapter 5 suggest that, under certain conditions, union membership can increase job satisfaction. By decreasing perceived red tape and increasing PSM, committed union members tend to be more satisfied with the nature of public sector work.
Because job satisfaction is at least moderately correlated with individual performance (Judge, et al., 2001), unionization may serve to enhance individual and organizational performance under some circumstances. As such, unionization may encourage heightened individual and organizational performance in the absence of additional monetary rewards. While these three conclusions have not been explicitly tested here, a fruitful area of future research includes and in depth exploration of the linkages between unionization, organizational compliance monitoring, union member reward preferences, and individual performance.

**Research Limitations**

With these conclusions in mind, a few caveats are in order. First, I want to point out that making normative claims regarding the appropriateness of public sector unions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A substantial portion of research on unionization takes a biased perspective, and is designed to formulate recommendations designed to facilitate managerial attempts to minimize the prevalence of organized labor (Barling, Fullagar, & Kelloway, 1992). Managerial favoritism has not escaped public management and administration scholarship examining labor unions. As Riccucci (2011) illustrates, the “raison d’être [of the field of public administration] has historically been to promote good management. Thus, the profession as a whole has tended to portray labor unions as an interference with a government’s ability to be efficient and effective” (p. 205). Because many scholars in public administration view unions as an organizational malady, the literature has largely ignored exploring public sector unions from the perspective of members. This research was designed to add depth to public administration research on unions by examining the psychological influence of unions’ on their members, as opposed to previous research primarily emphasizing the managerial perspective.
Second, the research presented here has some important limitations that may confine the conclusions I provide to specific times and places. All data used in this project, both quantitative and qualitative, were collected in Kansas. The regulations that govern collective bargaining vary substantially between states. Kansas is a “right to work” state, which means that employers cannot deny employment to any person due to union membership status, which may color the perspectives of union members toward the work environment. As such, the findings I present here may not be generalizable to union contexts in other states. Additional research should be designed to determine if these findings hold in other states.

Furthermore, all employees participating in the interview and survey processes worked in municipal government. While the heavily unionized context of municipal government makes it ideal for examining public sector unionism, it may not be reasonable to transfer these findings to other levels of government. The cross-sectional nature of the data also make it impossible to examine how the union and its members interact over time to shape values, beliefs, and attitudes. While it is reasonable to view the union socialization process as reciprocal (Redman & Snape, 2005), unfortunately the data do not allow for testing these effects.

A final limitation arises because member perspectives in relation to social boundaries were not explicitly examined here. I examined organizational rules broadly, as opposed to exploring rules specifically associated with the labor contract. How would union member perspectives change if asked about human resources red tape or about only those rules attached to the labor contract? It is logical to conclude that union members would perceive these rules even more favorably, but that question is open for investigation. Likewise, PSM research has proceeded on the assumption that higher levels of PSM translate into prosocial behaviors directed toward all other social groups. As Perry and Hondeghem (2008a) point out PSM is
related to “other-regarding” intentions such as altruism, but “the scope of who the ‘other’ is might vary from individuals to organizations to society at large” (p. 295). Do the increases in PSM I find reflect the labor organization or society at large as union members’ reference point? Do unions facilitate an “us-versus-them” mentality? Again, these questions are open for further investigation.

**Directions for Future Research**

These limitations do not prevent this research from taking an important first step toward understanding the psychological influence of unions in public sector work environments, but I have only scratched the surface of the influence of unions on their members in the public sector. What do the results and conclusions I provide imply for future research on unionization in the public sector? Given the distinctive elements of the public work environment, public administration and management scholarship could contribute to the broader literature on labor relations by developing theories of unionization based on distinctively public issues. Although I focus here on distinctive structural and motivational elements of public organizations, other constructs unique to public administration and management are ripe for study. For example, the research I present here presents a somewhat simplistic view of “public” unionism. The publicness of government agencies, however, is a matter of degree (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). Differences between public unions could potentially be explained by publicness of the organizational environments in which they are embedded.

Further efforts to understand differences between public sector unions may also benefit from examining differences between “social” and “business” unionism. Barling et al. (1992) draw a conceptual distinction between business unions, which focus primarily on workplace issues, and social unions, which “have fundamental societal change as their major bargaining
issue” (p. 197). Although these business and social unionism likely overlap, examples of each can be found in public organizations. For example, the mission of the Fraternal Order of Police reads,

“To support and defend the Constitution of the United States; to inculcate loyalty and allegiance to the United States of America; to promote and foster the enforcement of law and order; to improve the individual and collective proficiency of our members in the performance of their duties; to encourage fraternal, educational, charitable and social activities among law enforcement officers; to advocate and strive for uniform application of the civil service merit system for appointment and promotion; to support the improvement of the standard of living and working conditions of the law enforcement profession through every legal and ethical means available; to create and maintain tradition of esprit de corps insuring fidelity to duty under all conditions and circumstances; to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual helpfulness among our members and the people we serve; to increase the efficiency of the law enforcement profession and thus more firmly to establish the confidence of the public in the service dedicated to the protection of life and property” (The Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, 2011).

Alternatively, the mission of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) includes,

“Organizing workers in general, public employees in particular, promoting the welfare of AFSCME members and providing a voice in determining the terms and conditions of
employment by using the collective bargaining process, as well as legislative and political action, promoting civil service legislation and career service in government, assisting AFSCME members and affiliates through research and education, fostering cooperation among affiliates, cooperating with labor organizations and other groups toward the goals of a just distribution of America’s material riches and a realization of the moral promise of American life, working with union members in other countries toward the improvement of life and work in all countries, reducing the use of armed force in resolving disputes, and toward solidarity of all workers” (AFSCME, 2011)

These mission statements indicate that, while both organizations have both business and social elements, the FOP emphasizes more social elements, and AFSCME focuses more on business elements. Can the knowledge accumulated based on business unionism inform our understanding of social unionism? Is social unionism more prevalent in the public sector? These questions remain unanswered, but they can significantly enhance our understanding of the psychological effects of public sector unions on members.

Additionally, scholars in public administration and management have revitalized research on, and developed an inventory of, public values (Bozeman, 2007; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007). I argued throughout this dissertation, in line with Kilngner, Nalbandian, and Llorens (2010), that individual and employee rights is the fundamental value attached to unionism. However, we know relatively little about how the preeminent union value of individual and employee rights relates to broader constellations of public values. Does unionism facilitate some public values while suppressing others? If so, what fundamental public values are attached to unionism? Do different public and non-profit unions emphasize different constellations of public values?
While this dissertation begins an exploration of union values more research should be conducted to develop an understanding of the broader public value sets tied to public unionization.

A final series of questions focuses on the links between unionization and governance. Public administration and management scholarship has devoted significant intellectual effort to understanding the causes and consequences of the inter-organizational relationships in which public agencies engage. A significant portion of government contracts have been issued to non-profit organizations, and some scholars point out the need a concentrated research emphasis on non-profit unionism (Kearney, 2010; Riccucci, 2011). How, if at all, has the prevalence of government contracting changed the unionized component of the public workforce? Are unions primarily found in non-profits more likely to engage in social unionism? Are non-profit unions more similar to public or private sector unions? All of the questions outlined above would serve as important bridges to link distinctively public issues to labor union research.

**Concluding Thoughts**

While environmental conditions have contributed to decreasing unionization rates in the private sector, public union membership remains relatively high (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009a; Kearney, 1992). However, public unions have been challenged on the grounds that significantly increase the cost of government (J. D. Donahue, 2008). While evidence suggests that unions do facilitate higher wages and benefit levels for members (Methé & Perry, 1980), they also influence members’ attitudes, beliefs, and values. Why has public administration and management literature largely ignored the potentially beneficial psychological outcomes of unionization? Perhaps it is partially due to a pro management bias, but other factors likely contribute to this gap. Unions are inherently difficult organizations to study, because they are skeptical that scholarly research may undermine their bargaining positions. These research
difficulties, however, cannot deter public administration and management scholars from developing a broader understanding of employee unions. Unions are likely to remain a major component of the public sector work environment, and public management theory must acknowledge their presence to develop an accurate picture of the public workplace.
References

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Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Please describe your job with the city.

What led you to work for municipal government?

What have you learned about public service since you have worked here?

Please describe the most and least rewarding aspects of your work.

Please describe a workplace rule you view as good or bad.

Appendix B: Operational Definitions

Bureaucratic Red Tape:

Perceptions of bureaucratic red tape were gauged using a single survey item. Respondents were asked to rate the level of red tape, defined as burdensome administrative policies and procedures that have a negative effects on organizational performance, on a scale between 0 and 10.

Public Service Motivation: Attraction to Policy Making

One’s attraction to policy making was assessed using all three of Perry’s (1996) measures rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items were reverse coded so higher values correspond with greater attraction to policy making. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- APM1: Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)
- APM2: The give and take of public policy making doesn’t appeal to me. (Reversed).
- APM3: I don’t care much for politicians. (Reversed)

Public Service Motivation: Compassion
Compassion was gauged using the five items from the adapted scale proposed by Coursey et al. (2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were scaled so higher values reflect higher levels of compassion. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- COM1: Most social programs are too vital to do without.
- COM2: It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
- COM3: I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don’t know personally. (Reversed)
- COM4: I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. (Reversed)
- COM5: I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another.

**Public Service Motivation: Commitment to the Public Interest**

Individual commitment to the public interest was gauged using the three items from the adapted scale proposed by Coursey et al. (2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Based on the scaling higher values correspond to more commitment to the public interest. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- CPI1: I unselfishly contribute to my community.
- CPI2: I consider public service my civic duty.
- CPI3: Meaningful public service is very important to me.

**Public Service Motivation: Self-Sacrifice**

Self-Sacrifice was gauged using the four items from the adapted scale proposed by Coursey et al. (2008) rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were
scaled so higher values reflect more self-sacrifice. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- SS1: Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.
- SS2: Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
- SS3: I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it.
- SS4: I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.

**Job Satisfaction**

Job satisfaction was assessed using five items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were scaled so higher values reflect greater job satisfaction. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- JS1: Doing my job gives me a sense of personal satisfaction.
- JS2: I am proud to work for this organization.
- JS3: Overall, I am satisfied working for this organization.

**Union Commitment: Willingness to Work for the Union**

Willingness to work for the union was examined using three items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were scaled so higher values reflect more willingness to work for the union. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- WWU1: I am willing to put in a great deal of time to make the union successful.
- WWU2: If asked I would run for elected office in the union.
- WWU3: If asked I would serve on a committee for the union.

**Union Commitment: Loyalty to the Union**
Loyalty to the union was assessed using six items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were scaled so higher values reflect greater loyalty to the union. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- LOY1: I talk up the union to my friends as a great organization to belong to.
- LOY2: The record of the union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done.
- LOY3: There's a lot to be gained by joining the union.
- LOY4: Deciding to join the union was a smart move on my part.
- LOY5: I feel a sense of pride in being a part of the union.
- LOY6: Based on what I know now, and what I believe I can expect in the future, I plan to be a member of the union the rest of the time I work here.

**Union Commitment: Responsibility to the Union**

Responsibility to the union was gauged using four items rated on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. All items were scaled so higher values reflect stronger feelings of responsibility to the union. Respondents were asked to assess agreement with the following statements:

- RTU1: Every member must be willing to take the time and risk of filing a grievance.
- RTU2: It is every member's responsibility to see that the other members 'live up to' the collective agreement.
- RTU3: It is the duty of every member to keep his/her ears open for information that might be useful to the union.
- RTU4: It is every member’s duty to support or help another worker use the grievance procedure.

**Union Socialization**
The construct of labor union socialization was assessed using two measures rated on a 5 point scale ranging from quite frequently to never. Items were reverse coded so that higher values indicate more participation in institutional and individual socialization experiences. Respondents were asked to assess participation in union activities with the following questions:

- **MEETINGS**: How often do you attend union meetings? (Reversed)
- **UNIONINT**: How often do you interact with other union members outside of meetings and work? (Reversed)

**Model Controls**

This project uses a series of sociodemographic variables as covariates, or model controls. The following demographic characteristics were collected in the survey instrument:

- Race was dichotomized to reflect white and non-white employees.
- Education was dichotomized to reflect those with a college degree and those without.
- Role in the organization was dichotomized to include management and non-management.
- Gender
- Police Officer
- Fire Fighter