

COALITION OF THE LEAVING: WHAT CAUSED THE DISINTEGRATION  
OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN IRAQ (2003-2009)

By  
C2011  
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Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate  
Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Date defended: April 13, 2011

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Date approved: April 13, 2011

**Abstract**

This mixed-methods dissertation investigates the countries of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq (2003-2009) to identify the determinants of defection and of fluctuation in troop numbers. It makes theoretical contributions to the literature on alliance and coalition defection and speaks broadly to the question of international cooperation in the field of security. The major conclusion in this study is that the long-term reliability of military commitments of countries, particularly ones made within ad hoc coalitions, is fragile because it depends considerably on the domestic political process.

### **Acknowledgments**

I'd like to thank the members of my committee for all of their help and assistance. Julie Kaarbo, my chair, has been patient, encouraging, and kind throughout this entire process. I owe a debt of gratitude to my friends, who tolerated my disappearing into the library for days and still talked to me afterwards. Most of all, I'd like to thank my family, who were always supportive and loving.

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## Chapter 1

On March 11, 2004, the Madrid commuter train system fell victim to a number of explosions that were later tied to Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. At the time, more than one thousand Spanish troops were in Iraq as part of the “Coalition of the Willing.” The domestic unpopularity of Madrid's involvement, as well as the terrorist attack, contributed to the defeat of the ruling conservative People's Party shortly thereafter. The troops soon left after the newly-anointed Socialist Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero fulfilled his campaign promise of withdrawing from the coalition. Just a few months prior, Nicaragua had withdrawn its small contingent from Iraq as well, claiming financial problems.

This slow trickle of withdrawals continued as Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, and other countries lifted their troops out of the coalition, much to the dismay of the United States and the United Kingdom. Even staunch supporters of the United States left; although Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso suggested that Prime Minister Zapatero's decision to withdraw troops meant giving in to terrorist threats,<sup>1</sup> his country soon left Iraq as well. Many others stayed, but reduced the number of troops on the ground, sometimes to a symbolic number; toward the middle of 2008, the Czech Republic had about 20 soldiers left in Iraq after its initial contribution of 300.

The unexpectedly quick breakdown of the coalition and the unceremonious withdrawals of close United States allies like Spain and Italy have received considerable coverage in the mass media. Editorialists and news agencies gave a significant amount of space to describing the problems of the Coalition of the Willing and the withdrawal of the various allies.

In contrast, the topic has been understudied in the academic community. Most of the

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<sup>1</sup> Portugal and Spain Vow to Boost Ties Despite Differences in Iraq, AFP, May 4 2004.

research about the “Coalition of the Willing” (CW) since 2003 has focused on why certain countries joined while others did not. For example, Bugajski and Teleki (2005) suggested economic reasons like debt recovery, since many CW countries like Romania had loaned large sums of money to Iraq before of the fall of the Iron Curtain. Newnham (2008, 192) suggested the presence of certain incentives provided by the United States to potential allies, like the status of “market-based economies.” Schuster and Maier (2006, 239) focused in on desires of CW members to appease the United States as the only superpower, while Mouritzen (2006, 153) averred that various countries engaged in behaviors like “proximate balancing” against their regional rivals by developing closer ties to the United States.

This focus on coalition entry is unsurprising for two reasons. First, IR scholarship on alliances has been dominated by studies on alliance and coalition formation; with a few exceptions, the focus has been almost exclusively on why a country would join an alliance in an anarchic international system. As a result, students of coalition dissolution have been hard-put to find any previous theoretical work on the matter. The breakdown of the “Coalition of the Willing” has cast light on the fact that the alliance literature was ill-prepared to offer any cogent theoretical explanations for this empirical problem.

Second, the alliance literature has typically overlooked the impact of domestic politics on decisions to join and defect, hence the numerous articles on the CW members “balancing” or “bandwagoning” in the coalition. The suggestion in these articles is that the bulk of motivations for a country's alliance behavior is driven by factors external to the country's internal politics, like an alteration in the balance of power.

The current dissertation does not follow in the footsteps of previous writing on the topic

and attempts to fill three theoretical gaps and one empirical gap. The research question is what factors led to changes in the behavior of CW members, particularly defection and changes in troop numbers. First, the study incorporates variables suggested by the previous alliance literature, but also adds previously unstudied or under-studied domestic-level factors into the analysis of state behavior in the Coalition of the Willing. The dissertation identifies four clusters of variables (informed by four different theoretical perspectives) and compares their relative worth in explaining alliance behavior in the Coalition of the Willing.

Such an approach is very rare in the study of alliances because most proponents of a particular cluster of variables (and, therefore, of a theoretical approach to studying this topic) only investigate their effect without looking at the others (Bennett 1997). Moreover, if such a comparison does exist (e.g. Bennett 1997; Kimball 2010), the variables informed by the domestic variable approach are rudimentary and involve nearly no engagement with the rich foreign policy analysis literature. These four clusters are security, autonomy, costs and benefits, and domestic politics. Each of the concepts is operationalized with a number of variables that will be described in greater detail in Chapter 2 and 3.

Second, the dissertation focuses on alliance defection, an understudied subject in the alliance literature. It therefore pits competing theoretical arguments against each other and then contrasts their empirical utility in the case of the Coalition of the Willing. Finally, this study extends Putnam's (1988) two-level games framework, designed initially for the study of international treaty ratification, to a security setting and seeks to cast light on the process by which executives in CW members kept their commitment to the United States while ensuring domestic cooperation to continue this commitment.

Since cabinet heads in many countries were the ones who were the primary negotiators with the U.S. regarding coalition troop commitments, and since national legislatures had to approve these pledges (usually once a year), this portion of the study will analyze the interaction between governments and parliaments in foreign policy making, a topic that remains severely understudied (Keggin and Kaarbo 2010) and has significant implications for both the study of domestic institutions and foreign policy, as well as security studies.

The empirical gap filled in the study is the analysis of an ad hoc coalition, a type of multilateral institution which has become more prominent after the Cold War and whose functioning we do not yet understand as well as that of alliances.

### **A short note on definitions**

Although theoretical work on alliances and coalitions dates back to the 1960s (see, for example, Liska 1968 and Small and Singer 1966), we do not yet have a single definition of the term (Bergsmass 2001, 26). Authors often use “alliance” and “coalition” interchangeably, generating even more confusion (Bensahel 1999, 6). Generally speaking, a number of major differences emerge in the literature between the two terms (Bensahel 1999, 9).

First, an alliance is usually defined as a more formal and more institutionalized type of inter-state cooperation (Kober 2002, 2; Leeds and Anac 2005, 184; Snyder 1997). By implication, coalitions tend to be less less institutionalized and more transitory, often created for a single purpose (Bensahel 1999, 9; Lai and Reiter 2000; Pudas 1993/1994; Reiter 1996; Gartner 2001). Second, alliances are normally formed before a conflict begins or as a means to anticipate or manage future hostilities (Bensahel 1999, 9; Small and Singer 1966; Weitzman 1997),

whereas coalitions are generally created ad hoc and are tailored to a conflict that has begun or is already impending.

Some authors are less rigid about creating a distinction between alliances and coalitions, suggesting that the terms are interchangeable; they normally define their concept as “either formal or informal” institutions (Walt 1997; Tetrais 2004; Weitzman 2004, 34; Barnett and Levy 1991). Bensahel stresses that coalitions and alliances “can be conceptualized as different ends of a broader continuum of military cooperation” (1999, 9), while Weitzman says that the two “are not wholly analytically distinct” from each other (2010, 8). The use of “alliance” and “coalition” in this dissertation is in agreement with Kober (2002), Leeds and Anac (2005), Weitzman (2010) and others who argue that there are differences between the two terms. In particular, alliances normally exist long before the onset of a conflict and are more institutionalized than coalitions. At the same time, the two are indeed part of a “continuum” (Bensahel 1999) of inter-state cooperation. This second theoretical assumption has one distinct advantage, particularly for this dissertation. It implies that the literature on alliances can be used to understand coalitions. Indeed, most authors have used the rather extensive alliance literature to study how and why the CW was formed. They were forced to do so because few have written exclusively on coalitions, and even fewer have attempted to do so theoretically. This dissertation will go farther and use some of the insights in the alliance literature to develop hypotheses for both the large-N and the case studies in the case of coalition dissolution.

Coalitions, therefore, are defined here as “informal arrangements for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (Walt 1997, 157). They are slightly analytically distinct from alliances, but are still types of cooperation between states. As a result, insights or

hypotheses developed for one can be extended to the other because, at their core, they both imply a commitment a state makes to another state or to a group of states, and the question of what determines some to renege on their obligations is equally important in both cases. In this particular case, each member of the Coalition of the Willing made a commitment to the United States to commit troops to Iraq and to keep them there.

### **Why does the “Coalition of the Willing” matter?**

There is both an empirical and a theoretical reason for investigating the CW. First, “coalitions of the willing” are becoming more prominent fixtures in post-Cold War multilateral security arrangements. Most of the scholarship on alliances was developed before the end of the Cold War and its conclusions rely on samples heavily skewed in favor of pre-1989 cases. Likewise, the alliances that are still in existence today were created and consolidated during the Cold War, when they relied on the ability of states like the United States to intervene rapidly in case of an invasion of an ally by rivals like the Soviet Union or China (Campbell 2004). These alliances, like NATO, tended to exist for a very long time and become fairly institutionalized. Most military cooperation took place within the bounds of alliance rules.

After the Cold War, a number of scholars documented an increase in the number of ad hoc coalitions formed to pursue foreign policy goals, most of them security-related (Bensahel 1999, 32; Bowie et al. 2004; Campbell 2004, 151; Tertrais 2004, 183; Weitsman 2003, 80). This rise in the number of coalitions is attributed to a number of factors that became more prominent after the Cold War. First, the nature of the post-Cold War world is much more complex and dangerous (Rogers 2010, 5). As a result, nations need flexibility in the pursuit of their foreign

policy goals and have felt constrained by certain multilateral institutions to which they have made pledges and which require rule compliance (Zavarelli 2008). In the case of Australia's intervention in East Timor, a Coalition of the Willing went in without a United National Security Council mandate to stabilize the region. A more conventional approach would have delayed the intervention at a time when immediate action was required (Rogers 2010).

Challenges like the war on terror and the management of instability in an array of developing countries have determined states to sometimes pursue their goals without prior approval from allies because alliance commitments can serve as brakes on the “agility and flexibility” allowed by ad hoc coalitions (Stewart 2009, 83; Forman and Segaar 2006). Moreover, particularly in the case of the United States, traditional allies no longer feel the need to support Washington, D.C. in its foreign policy endeavors as they have asserted more independence in the post-Cold War world (Tertrais 2004, 140). D.C. has to look to more temporary allies that are interested in helping it based on the security issue.

A second factor that has led to an increase in ad hoc coalitions is the emergence of a unipolar world. Most of the literature on alliances and coalitions is based on a multi-polar or a bipolar international system (Walt 2009), and few have looked at whether this rather revolutionary change in international relations has had an impact on security cooperation between states (Rickli 2008). In a world in which United States military power remains unrivaled, Washington “is more inclined to align with states for which it feels a strong ideological affinity (for example, its fellow democracies) or with states that demonstrate a clear willingness to follow its lead” (95). Unrestrained by another superpower, the United States seeks to either act alone or with a group of highly cohesive countries on which it could rely and which it could influence.

In short, coalitions of the willing are becoming more prominent in the post-Cold War world. Although the United States tends to be the initiator of such security arrangements, other countries like Australia have engaged in actions that were not endorsed by longer-standing alliances and multilateral organizations. Considering the rise of this phenomenon, the alliance literature should be extended to deal with an empirical occurrence from which it has thus far stayed away.

Finally, there is a theoretical reason for studying the Coalition of the Willing. The CW is a prime example of defection from international security commitments, about which, as has been argued above, we know relatively little. Much of the work on alliance formation does suggest a number of variables that may be of relevance to defection, but the scholars usually only work with one cluster of variables or, when they include more, ignore the richness of the domestic political process. This dissertation is not only a study of coalition defection, which seeks to fill a gap in knowledge, but is one of the first comparative analyses of the relative worth of four theoretical perspectives on alliance behavior: security, autonomy, costs and benefits, and domestic politics. The Coalition of the Willing exhibits significant variation in state behavior and respect for alliance commitments, which provides a good opportunity to analyze whether variation in state behavior within the CW is associated with variation in the four clusters of the independent variables.

### **A mixed methods approach**

The topic at hand lends itself to both quantitative and qualitative study. IR scholars disagree about the relative causal weight of a large set of variables on a state's behavior in

coalitions, as well as whether the domestic political process mediates that effect. The first part of the dissertation addresses this disagreement by proposing four theoretical perspectives and contrasting their relative worth in a large-N dataset. The security, autonomy, and benefits models all black-box the state and assume any country will act relatively similarly to various cues, like decreases in power or security. The fourth theoretical perspective introduced in the dissertation – the domestic dimension – challenges this view and suggests that domestic political factors and events are also important in state behavior. As the statistical tests show, the introduction of this domestic dimension provides a strong indication that domestic political characteristics and events do, in fact, matter.

Even though the study of state behavior in a coalition has benefited significantly from the introduction of domestic variables, the large-N analysis is only capable of providing certain static snapshots of the aggregate effect of a set of variables. The domestic variables do include some dynamic elements, like the number of elections, but the analysis is very sparse on untangling the processes by which variables led to decisions. One of the findings in chapter 3 is that higher levels of legislative party opposition led to decreases in troop commitments, but it is unclear how exactly that process unfolded. As mentioned earlier, scholars not only disagree on what variables matter in state behavior, but also on the importance of the domestic decision-making process in the ultimate decision. We may find that a coalition cabinet has an aggregate effect that reduces troop commitments, but a large-N study does not provide a list of the mechanisms by which that happens. Carefully-constructed case studies provide a way to identify those mechanisms (Levy 2002).

This mixed methods approach has become more popular and more prominent, both in the

field of international relations and comparative politics. Lieberman (2005) suggests that such an approach to studying a subject allows one to focus in on issues like appropriate conceptualization and measurement. In the context of this dissertation, the operationalization of the “political party opposition to Iraq” variable was difficult considering the fact that parties are not monoliths and that intra-party rebellion was often an important factor in decision-making. Such an issue is more easily understood and investigated in a case study, which the dissertation does, because it is not only difficult to measure numerically, but is also so dynamic and dependent on daily events within a particular country as to render conclusions based solely on a quantitative study difficult to pin down.

While large-N studies based on general theories of politics would allow the progress of political science (Bates 1996), would bolster the development of theory (Geddes 2003, 173), and would allow political scientists to answer “big questions” (Geddes 2003), certain problems like conceptual stretching (Collier and Mahon Jr. 1993) emerge. Moreover, some factors analyzed in the aggregate may not be uncovered until a more detailed case study allows one to identify a particular mechanism (Levy 2002; Granato and Scioli 2004, 314; Tarrow 2004). On the other hand, an exclusive focus on case studies could steer political scientists toward paying more attention to unique and unusual events, rather than toward seeking regularities in political life (Bates 1996).

Aware of the disadvantages and disadvantages of both qualitative and quantitative methods, many political scientists have advocated the use of mixed methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, Levy 2002, Poteete et al. 2010) in order to guard against the disadvantages of both methods and make use of their advantages. In addition, some have argued that a mixed method

approach would also provide more confidence in the results of a study (Lieberman 2005). For this reason, the chapters that follow the large-N study analyze the process of decision-making in Iraq in three countries in order to look beyond aggregate findings to understand how the numerous factors considered important by the four theoretical perspectives played out in the domestic political arena, where leaders and institutions had to constantly update or reinforce their decisions regarding participation in Iraq.

### **Roadmap and research design**

The dissertation proceeds as follows. The second chapter includes a literature review of the alliance/coalition literature, followed by a summary of the contributions and relevance of domestic-level variables on foreign policy decision-making. This part sets up the four competing theoretical perspectives that make contrasting predictions about the relative weight of different concepts and variables in a country's alliance/coalition behavior. The third chapter describes the new dataset that was created to investigate the power of the four perspectives and then turns the concepts identified in the four theoretical perspectives into four clusters of variables and describes how they were coded. A large-N analysis of alliance and coalition behavior then looks at how well the four theoretical perspectives fare against the empirical data in two cases: defection from the Coalition of the Willing and the level of troop commitments.

The chapter concludes with the theoretical framework used for the case studies. It introduces the three case studies that explore the executive's balancing act between making commitments to the United States and ensuring legislative domestic consensus to keep these commitments. This interaction actually becomes visible in the large-N study, which shows that

domestic institutional variables like coalition cabinets and legislative opposition had a statistically significant impact on a country's behavior in Iraq. Putnam's two-level games framework is the most appropriate tool for the analysis of executive-legislative relations in foreign policy, and the dissertation uses Lantis' (1997) update of Putnam's work to look at the role of Parliaments and Governments in the decisions Italy, Denmark, and Bulgaria made while in Iraq. The three cases were selected because they were among the only parliamentary countries in which the executive leader did not change throughout the country's participation in Iraq, therefore allowing the identification of a leader's preferences regarding the country's participation in Iraq and the analysis of how those preferences changed because of the domestic conditions that restricted ability to keep international commitments. Chapter four looks at Italy, chapter five looks at Denmark, and chapter six looks at Bulgaria. Chapter seven concludes and provides areas for further study.

The main research question throughout the entire dissertation is what caused changes in a country's commitments to the Coalition of the Willing. The defection/no defection analysis dichotomizes change to investigate whether any factors point to why a country would decide to renege on an international commitment. The analysis of troop number variation refines the change variable to determine if different types of changes are associated with certain variables included in the models. The dissertation speaks to the broad literature on the causes of international cooperation and defection, and provides insights to students of security, alliance behavior, and foreign policy analysis. It is particularly relevant for security studies because of the attention it dedicates to parsing out how countries respond both to international and domestic pressures during involvement in a military operation and whether any of those pressures make

their defection or troop reduction more likely.

## Chapter 2

The study of alliances or coalitions between states is as old as the field of international studies itself (Liska 1968, 3). Insights into state behavior have often had to take into account the fact that countries frequently create alliances, especially when faced with conflict or outright war. Conventional theories of international relations (henceforth IR), realism in particular, have always tried to reconcile the empirical occurrence of alliances with the theoretical assumption of an anarchic international system. That is, assuming anarchy, why and how do states join together when they should be competing against each other in a zero-sum game of maximizing power and security? This question – and the various attempts to answer it – has essentially dominated most of the work on alliance or coalition behavior.

### **Alliance literature**

Alliances are ubiquitous in world politics, but the topic has suffered from little comprehensive theorizing. There are few unified approaches and few attempts to provide a comprehensive theory on alliances (Snyder 1991). Although scholars have worked on the topic since at least the 1960s, the two more ambitious attempts at explaining alliance politics (Snyder 1997 and Weitsman 2004) are fairly recent.

Three topics within the alliance literature have received the largest amount of attention: alliance formation (how and why countries join alliances), alliance cohesion and maintenance (how alliances are maintained and intra-alliance conflict), and the effect of alliances on conflict and other dependent variables. Defection is rarely treated as a subject by itself and the authors that have been interested in why alliances break down and why countries may leave them (e.g.

Bennett 1997; Catalinac 2010) have usually extrapolated hypotheses from the alliance formation/cohesion literature. This dissertation follows a similar path. It provides a literature review of the alliance literature, identifying four basic strands in the formation/cohesion literature, whose insights are used in the next chapters to develop a series of hypotheses which will be tested with the Coalition of the Willing data. Briefly, the four approaches to the study of alliances exhibit an over-emphasis on security- and power-seeking motives and either ignore domestic politics or use very rudimentary domestic variables like regime type.

### **Four categories**

The literature on alliances falls in four general categories (Bennett 1997).<sup>2</sup> As mentioned earlier, although the primary concern of most of the work reviewed here is with why alliances are formed in the first place, certain variables can be derived from this literature that can speak to alliance duration and defection. The categorization begins with a very narrow definition of the motivation for joining alliances (maximizing security by aggregating capabilities) and is then loosened by various other scholars who bring in motivations like autonomy, historical learning, a combination between status quo and revisionist goals, interests, and a number of domestic factors (e.g. Eaton 1998; Gibler 2008, 435; Morrow 2000, 75; Narizny 2000, 185; Palmer and David 1999; Snyder 1984).

### **Capability-aggregation**

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2 This chapter uses the four theoretical models developed by Bennett (1997) and updates them. It will not address the use of alliances as independent variables in the determination of the incidence of war (e.g. Gibler and Vasquez 1998; Sprecher and Krause 2006; Siverson and King 1980; Gibler and Wolford 2006; Siverson and Tennefoss 1984; Kim 1991; Kimball 2006; Leeds and Mattes 2007; Smith 1995; Levy 1981; Long et. al 2007; Sprecher 2004) or other factors such as reliability, military strategy choice, defense spending, deterrence, alignment choice (Leeds and Anac 2005; Wallace 2008; Morgan and Palmer 2003; Sorokin 1994; Werner and Lemke 1997). Also see institutionalist approaches to alliances, which focus on their impact as institutions (Weitsman 2004 has a fairly comprehensive review).

Most schools of realist thought argue that states join alliances in order to aggregate their capabilities against a common enemy, based on judgments of a power or a threat imbalance (Snyder 1984). The ultimate goal of these states is to increase their own security given the existence of a threat (which is either objective<sup>3</sup> or subjective). Beyond this general agreement regarding the basic motivation in the formation and termination of alliances, the various realist schools of thought disagree primarily about the *ways* in which states will seek to maximize their security (Conybeare 1992, 54). In short, a long-standing debate in the realist school has centered around whether states will balance against a rising power or bandwagon with it.

The balance-of-power theorists (Waltz 1979; Vasquez and Elman 2002) contend that in an anarchic world, security-seeking states seek a balance of power that can ensure their own survival. When a state grows capable enough of altering the balance, the security of others is threatened. Consequently, the other states pursue internal or external balancing to fend off the danger (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1959).<sup>4</sup> Internal balancing involves an increase in military capabilities – states react to a rising threat to the balance of power by increasing their defense budget, purchasing better military equipment, and providing better training or more troops to their military defense system. External balancing involves the creation of alliances with other states, which is simply another method of augmenting one's power. Most states will engage in a combination of both internal and external balancing, and there is a community of scholars that addresses the conditions under which one reaction is more likely than other (see Sorokin 1994).

The primary purpose of creating or joining alliances is to aggregate the capabilities of their

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3 Structural realists like Waltz (1979) believe that the power balance in the international system will determine state behavior because its make-up exists no matter what leaders think about it. Other realists are more willing to admit that the *perception* of threat demonstrates the subjectivity of evaluations about the state system (Walt 1987).

4 This paper does not address when states decide to do one instead of the other – see Morrow (1993) and Sorokin (1994) for a discussion of this topic.

members to fend off a powerful enemy (Waltz 1979; Fedder 1968, 67). In essence, driven by the primary desire to maximize security, a state will behave defensively and balance power (Wivel 2005, 356; McGowan and Rood 1975).

In contrast, the balance-of-threat school (Walt 1987) suggests that states do not necessarily form alliances to balance the most powerful member in the international system, but behave based on the threat such states pose. Perceptions of threat affect a state's sense of security and are based on a number of factors, such as aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions (Walt 1987, 22). In short, the rise of a country that may endanger the balance of power in the international system will not create an inevitable reaction, but will be affected by the threat such a rise is considered to be causing.

Walt's focus on threat allows him to address a question that has puzzled balance-of-power theorists for a long time – why states bandwagon with the most powerful member in the state system instead of balancing against it (Walt 1987, 19; Levy and Thompson 2005) – stressing that various perceptions of threat will lead to either balancing or bandwagoning behavior (Walt 1987, 29). For example, he suggests that during wars, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency to bandwagon (Walt 1987, 33). Weitsman (2004) refines the discussion of threat perception in balancing or bandwagoning by investigating the impact of threat levels and internal and external threat on four types of state behavior (hedging, tethering, balancing, and bandwagoning) that are tied to alliance formation and alliance cohesion.

Schweller (1994) suggests that balancing may occur because of security threats, while bandwagoning appears when countries seek profits from a change in the status quo (Sprecher 2006, 364). Others suggest that “critical points in the power cycles of states could lead to an

interest in alliance creation because states are dealing with uncertainty regarding their security” (Chiu 2003, 127).<sup>5</sup>

Whatever the internal disagreements within this school of thought about what constitutes threat and how states perceive it, the basic argument is that states will form alliances in order to aggregate capabilities and increase their own security (Bennett 1997, 851; Barnett and Levy 1991, 371). This conception of security maximization is not only visible in realist schools of thought, but is suggested as the primary reason for joining alliances in rationalist approaches to alliance formation (Niou and Ordeshook 1994, 170; Goldstein 1995; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). Others, like learning theory scholars, also assume that alliances are meant to primarily maximize security, but say that these are formed not because of external threat, but because of formative historical experiences (Reiter 1994).

Consequently, some realist scholars have suggested, alliances stop being relevant once a particular threat to security is gone (Baltrusaitis 2008, 68-69; Morrow 1991, 904; Tuschoff 2002), or when a state believes its security situation is no longer improved by the alliance (Gibler and Rider 2004, 309). For example, John Mearsheimer, a leading realist, suggested that once the threat of the Soviet Union was gone, NATO could disintegrate because its *raison d'etre* disappeared (1990).

Although most of the work cited above is concerned with motivations for alliance formation, Bennett (1997) extrapolates from this model of alliance politics three hypotheses on alliance termination. First, an alliance is more likely to end if the security positions of allies improve over time (851). Second, the more security states would lose through the termination of

5 Along similar lines, Christensen and Snyder (1990) argue that, under multipolarity, states will either chain-gang (drag allies into a conflict because of so many alliance commitments) or buck-pass (free ride on balancing efforts). These decisions, the authors say, will depend on technology, geography, and perception of strategic incentives.

the alliance, the less likely the alliance is to end (Bennett 1997, 852). Finally, the greater the mutual threat to the members of an alliance, the less likely an alliance is to end (Bennett 1997, 852).

This dissertation takes a similar approach and includes the concept of **security** as an independent variable in the analysis of defection patterns Coalition of the Willing. This concept is the first dimension that will be tested against the behavior of coalition members in Iraq. In other words, the security dimension will investigate whether the behavior of states within the Coalition of the Willing could be explained well by looking to security rationales.

From this perspective, one could say that the reasons why the Coalition of the Willing was created was to reduce the threat terrorism, the Iraqi regime, and its alleged possession of WMDs posed to the domestic and international security of individual states and the system as a whole. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, for example, that the Iraq intervention was justified because Saddam Hussein had ties to terrorist organizations and therefore posed a threat to international security.<sup>6</sup> Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar similarly suggested that the Coalition of the Willing was fighting terrorism in Iraq.<sup>7</sup> Virtually every other leader whose country contributed troops to Iraq made similar statements.

If the realist argument is that alliances stop being necessary once the threat disappears, this was certainly not the case with the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq, where the threat of terrorism in both the discourses of leaders and on the ground in Iraq continued to be high (and actually went up for some countries because they became more visible targets for terror groups by virtue of participating in Iraq). That is, countries did not leave the coalition because they had

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6 Danish Government Feels the Heat Over Iraq Claims, IHS Global Insight, July 18, 2003

7 Spain is Fighting International Terrorism in Iraq, Premier Says, BBC Monitoring, December 20, 2003.

destroyed the threat of terrorism to their national security and to the security of the international system.

Nonetheless, in order to analyze the comparative utility of the concept of security with other variables suggested in the literature, the concept is operationalized with three measures adjusted to the country's participation in the war in Iraq and the lingering threats to security that terrorism posed<sup>8</sup>: the number of casualties the country suffered in Iraq, domestic terrorist attacks related to the country's participation in the war, and kidnappings and kidnapping deaths (see chapter three for a more detailed discussion of how these variables were operationalized). These variables are meant to point out the impact that a country's participation in the CW had on its national security and vulnerability abroad because the threat of terrorism to its nationals is the most direct measure of whether this threat is going up or down. They are also a measure of the costs countries have incurred as a result of their involvement in the war and stand in contrast with the benefits that might have been available. As will be seen later, the dissertation will also include a set of benefits based on theoretical insights from a costs-and-benefits school of alliance behavior. The three indicators noted above will tap into both the question of security and the question of the costs of war.

### **Security-autonomy trade-off**

A second approach in the alliance literature suggests that states are not only motivated by maximizing security when they join alliances, but that they also seek to maximize their autonomy (Bennett 1997, 849; Gibler 2008, 432; Gibler and Rider 2004, 310; Morrow 2000;

8 The notion of security is generally defined based on identifying a formula that includes a state's capabilities and enemies. Since the war in Iraq has become closely tied to the war on terror, this dissertation uses a more flexible conceptualization of security and provides a wider array of indicators to measure both domestic and external security.

Palmer and David 1999). Autonomy is most frequently operationalized in terms of national capabilities, with the most common variable being the Correlates of War six-item index of capabilities. Altfeld proposes that a government's utility function in alliance formation is made up of three commodities: national security, civilian wealth, and autonomy (1984, 524). Morrow (1991) finds that the capability aggregation model of alliance formation and duration (based on realist work) does not explain significant variation in alliance behavior, and proposes a security-autonomy trade-off model. Unlike Altfeld, he thinks that some countries in an alliance will lose security to maximize autonomy and vice versa, but his findings essentially say that asymmetrical alliances last longer than symmetrical ones (that is, alliances where one member dominates), and that the greater the change in members' individual capabilities, the more likely breakdown is. This allows the derivation of a number of hypotheses about alliance breakdown.

Bennett (1997) develops two major hypotheses from this model: that the more the capabilities of alliance leaders change, the more likely the alliance is to end, and that symmetric alliances are more likely to end than asymmetric alliances. Leeds (2003) and Leeds and Savun (2007) find partial support for these hypotheses: changes in capabilities predict the failure to follow alliance commitments, for example. Leeds and Savun (2007) also look at the notion of asymmetry and find that alliances between major and minor powers are less likely to be broken. Locatelli and Testoni (2009) similarly argue that NATO's main source of stability is the asymmetry of capabilities (see also Morrow 2000).

This dissertation draws on the literature in this school to include a second **capabilities dimension** to be tested against the dataset on the Coalition of the Willing. The primary question here will be whether members of the coalition were influenced by growth or decreases in their

capabilities. The capabilities dimension will include the COW dataset's national capabilities index, as well as a disaggregation of the six elements. It will not include a discussion of symmetry vs. asymmetry for the simple fact that throughout the entire duration of the Coalition of the Willing, the United States dominated both in terms of troop numbers and economic aid offered to Iraq. This domination was stable throughout the duration of the coalition.

### **Benefits (the collective action problem)**

A third group of scholars look beyond security and autonomy as motivations for alliance behavior to suggest that alliances are commonly formed as a solution to particular collective action problems (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), for example, suggest that countries will join alliances if their expectation is that benefits will outweigh costs (Chiu 2003, 124; Leeds and Savun 2007, 1119). Generally speaking, alliances can be profitable if a dominant power will carry most of the burden, allowing members to free ride to, at the very least, profit more than contributing to the alliances (Kupchan 1988, 325; Walt 2009, 90).

In the context of the war in Iraq, the problem of free-riding seems to have been fairly widespread considering the fact that many members made insignificant numeric contributions to troop numbers on the ground. At the same time, free-riding took a diverse number of forms, such as troop withdrawal, troop decreases, or initial contributions of an insignificant number of troops.

Furthermore, the public good that the United States was providing in Iraq by contributing most of the troops would suggest that defections would be unlikely since the provision of the public good remained stable throughout. Based on some of the suggestions in the literature, this

dissertation will include a third dimension to the analysis of alliance behavior in the war in Iraq, called the **benefit dimension**. The impact of this theoretical prediction about state behavior will be measured by an analysis of whether the country's presence in Iraq gave it benefits that might have outweighed the costs it incurred in Iraq (which are measured in the security dimension). The two most important benefits are United States military and economic aid. These are by no means the sole benefits a country may get from contributing to the war in Iraq. Other factors might include receiving reconstruction contracts in Iraq, repayment of Iraqi debts, and others. These factors were disappointing to the members that joined the war because few important contracts were awarded to coalition members and many countries ultimately had to cancel most of the debts Iraq owed to them (Newnham 2008).

Other benefits are much more difficult to measure, but will be mentioned in the case study chapters. The United States took a fairly active role in rewarding the political leaders who supported the war in Iraq and punishing or snubbing leaders who did not. President George W. Bush was the first sitting United States President to visit the country of Albania, where Prime Minister Sali Berisha, a vocal supporter of the war and head of one of the few countries that constantly increased the number of troops in Iraq, called Bush “the greatest and most distinguished guest we have ever had in all times.”<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the United States President had, according to some media outlets, not been interested in meeting with Czech President Vaclav Klaus after he expressed opposition to the war. Instead, Bush met with the pro-Iraq war Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla (he did ultimately meet Klaus as well, after the Czech head of state had been in office for two years).<sup>10</sup>

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9 Bush Finds Comfort in Albania, International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2007.

10 Stapleton Believes Klaus Will Meet Bush in USA Next Year, CTK Daily News, September 3, 2003.

Such international behaviors are difficult to code in a large dataset, but they will be mentioned when relevant during the case studies.

### **Domestic politics**

In contrast with the three previous groups of scholars who have written on alliances, where a focus on certain concepts and variables like security, autonomy, and benefits has provided a certain degree of theoretical and empirical sophistication, domestic political factors are, at best, included atheoretically on a case-by-case basis without much consideration of and engagement with the foreign policy literature, or, at worst, are altogether ignored. This state of affairs has begun to be criticized by realists and non-realists alike, and there is now a trend toward including domestic political factors in the analysis of alliance politics. As will be seen below, even the more sophisticated approaches like Snyder's (1997) volume largely ignore the bulk of work in foreign policy analysis, whose primary purpose is to find theoretical ways of conceptualizing the impact of internal factors on foreign policy decision-making.

Questioning neorealist contentions about the existence of a strict separation between international politics and domestic politics – which implies that different theories are needed to explain international behavior and foreign policy behavior (Schmidt 2004, 429) – a new group of so-called neoclassical realists have argued that the pressures of the international system are, in fact, mediated by the domestic structure of a country (Frankel 1996; Rose 1998, 161; Taliaferro 2006) and the perception of individual leaders (Rose 1998, 158; Legro and Moravcsik 1999).

This desire to explain foreign policy has been accompanied by an atheoretical addition of various domestic variables, selected based on the case studies or the preferences of the

researcher, which has caused a vivid discussion about whether realists have given up their core research program (Wivel 2005; Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Feaver et al. 2000). It is not the goal of this dissertation to discuss the debates between the various schools of realism on the utility of domestic variables, but this phenomenon of looking increasingly into the country for explanations about state behavior has become visible in the alliance literature as well.

For example, Christensen and Snyder (1990, 144) say that in order to understand alliance behavior under multipolarity, one must look at geography, technology, and the perception of strategic incentives. The authors admit that this addition is based on their investigation of particular cases (World War I and World War II), and there is little interaction with the foreign policy literature to explain why these variables were included. Snyder (1984, 464) admits that alliance formation can be influenced by both the anarchic structure of the system and “ideological, ethnic, economic, or prestige values.” In a later review of Walt's (1987) book, Snyder (1991, 141) stresses that we still know very little about alliance dissolution and the impact of domestic politics on alliances. Walt (1997) himself recognized that alliances can disappear because of “irrational” reasons like demographic and social trends, domestic competition, regime change, and ideological divisions. It is unclear how these variables will matter; they, in fact, seem like residual explanations when realist approaches prove to be incomplete.

### *Regime type and change*

Of the domestic factors that have now made their way into analyses of alliances, the most prominent is regime type, normally defined along a dichotomous democracy/non-democracy

variable (Bennett 1997; Cowley 1993; Gaubatz 1996; Gartzke and Gledisch 2004; Kimball 2006; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 2003; Leeds and Savun 2007; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991). This variable has resulted in a vibrant conversation about whether democracies or non-democracies tend to form alliances with each other or to be more reliable allies (see Gartzke and Gledisch 2004 for a review). Gibler and Wolford stress that “overall, the literature confirms a link between alliance formation and regime type, but this relationship is not consistent across time, space, or research design” (2006, 132).

Others have urged scholars to move beyond looking at regime type and conceptualize other domestic factors (Lai and Reiter 2000, 223). Some have investigated the effect of regime change, which is usually coded as a swing of more than two points in the Polity IV democracy coding (Siverson and Starr 1994). Barnett and Levy (1991) suggest a number of political and economic constraints that would “limit a state's ability to mobilize internal resources for external security without adversely affecting the domestic political interests of the elite in power and thus may provide powerful incentives for leaders to prefer external alignments to internal mobilization as a strategy to provide for their security in the face of external threats” (370). The issue of internal security also comes up in David (1991), who says that developing states align themselves with other countries based on how sensitive their regime is at home.

Bensahel (1999, 20) also suggests that domestic political constraints can prevent the effective aggregation of capabilities because of the electoral incentives of officials and executive-legislative conflict. Eaton (1998) says that alliances might be formed because of asymmetric interests, and that interests are largely driven by the domestic political process.<sup>11</sup> Consequently,

<sup>11</sup> Interests are defined according to a measure of “alliance patterns” by Gibler and Rider (2004, 317), who pay less attention to the domestic political process than Eaton (1998). Gibler and Rider (2004, 326) explain that alliance termination is based on a curvilinear relationship between alliance and interest similarity – the most long-lived alliances are those with medium-level interest similarity. Kimball (2006) also defines interests in a manner that is

alliances may fall apart when states start believing that they can better pursue their (security and non-security) goals by means other than their current alliance. The analysis is mostly based on a few case studies and does not engage the domestic politics literature at length, either.

Hendrickson (1999) mentions domestic political factors such as leadership and favorable political conditions, as well as lobbying activities. Kupchan (1988) suggests public opinion, electoral constraints, as well as economic and demographic factors as determinants of alliance cohesion. In perhaps the most ambitious attempt to provide a theory of alliances, Snyder (1997) looks at system structure, strength differences, and conflicts between states to understand alliance formation (133). He does stress that these factors are mediated by the domestic political process, and mentions a number of factors like leadership change, party ideology, and individual beliefs.

These elements of the domestic political process are not theorized properly. For example, Snyder's book makes no mention of foreign policy scholars like Hagan (1993) and Margaret Hermann, who have made significant efforts to provide more theoretical clarity to the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy. That is, although he recognizes the importance of domestic factors, he does so largely atheoretically. In a recent article in which she argues that she is providing the first theoretical treatment of the impact of domestic factors on alliance behavior, Kimball (2010) includes three crucial variables: demand for social policy (operationalized as infant mortality rates), minimum winning coalitions (a W/S ratio constructed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita that measures domestic independence), as well as direct and indirect threats to the country. It is unclear why these factors would be the only relevant domestic factors in alliance

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removed from the domestic political process – based on the number of rivals that a rival shares. Sweeney and Fritz (look at “alliance portfolios”).

behavior.

This concern with domestic factors clearly exhibits the interest that scholars have in finding a way to formulate the effect of the internal political process on alliance behavior, and constitutes the fourth dimension – **domestic politics** – that will be included in the analysis of Coalition of the Willing behavior. The current alliance work in this field is not very sophisticated and does not engage the foreign policy literature at any serious length. Consequently, in order to conceptualize what domestic factors matter and when, the next portion of the literature review will include a description of the foreign policy analysis literature, which will provide a number of indicators and hypotheses that will be included alongside the three other dimensions mentioned earlier.<sup>12</sup>

### **Domestic determinants of foreign policy decision-making**

The field of foreign policy analysis emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a challenge to the dearth of analyses that looked inside the state to explain its behavior (Hudson 2005, 7). Until that period, and many decades after, most of the systematic research in the field of foreign policy decisions had largely treated the state as a black box and ignored the decision-makers and the domestic settings in which they operated as crucial factors that would explain choice (Smith 1986; Gerner 1995; Putnam 1988).

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<sup>12</sup> Inevitably, some alliance literature does not fall into the three categories described above. Some argue that alliance size matters in alliance survival – Collard-Wexler suggests that the larger an alliance is, the more likely it is to survive, while others suggest otherwise (Bennett 1997, 856). Common culture makes states more likely to ally (Lai and Reiter 2000). Along similar lines, Powell (2010) suggests that states with similar domestic legal systems are more likely to form military alliances. Ideology is mentioned as a reason to ally, as well (Owen IV 2005). Major powers are also considered to be more likely to defect (Leeds 2003). Some of these factors will be subsumed in the further analysis of domestic politics.

FPA suggested variables that ranged from broadly-defined regime type (democracy vs. non-democracy) (Benoit 1996) to individual-level characteristics like leadership style (Hermann 2003), arguing that international systemic factors are insufficient to explain wide variation in the behavior of states subject to the same international constraints. This dissertation summarizes and describes some of the literature that is of direct relevance for the current study and draws theoretical expectations for both the large-N analysis and the case studies. As a rule, there are few FPA studies that investigate the domestic determinants of coalition defection, but the work allows an extrapolation of expectations about what would make countries more or less likely to defect or reduce troop numbers. As will become clear below, in many cases the findings are inconclusive and contradictory. For example, scholars continue to disagree about whether coalition cabinets are more or less likely to initiate conflicts (Kaarbo 2008; Clare 2010). As a result, this dissertation will include variables such as “coalition cabinet” to become part of these ongoing debates and to contribute to tipping the scales in favor of one set of findings.

### *Regime type*

The “democratic peace” literature has made an important contribution to the study of the impact of regime type, particularly on war and conflict more broadly. This research program is too broad to describe here, but the debates that have followed – on the endogeneity of the relationship between democracy and war, on the impact of democratization, and feedback loops, to name a few (Harrison 2010; Bayer and Bernhard 2010) – have continued to assert that regime type, or the level of democracy, have an impact on a state's behavior in war or should at least be a significant variable to take into consideration.

Of particular interest for this dissertation are the theoretical expectations for the impact of a country's regime type on the duration of a conflict and on a country's likelihood of defection from an international commitment. There is some degree of consensus in the literature that democracies are less likely than autocracies to continue fighting for an extended period of time (Filson and Werner 2004; Bennett and Stam, 1996, 2009; Slantchev 2004), especially against each other (Buono de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson 2004) because domestic pressures tend to weaken the resolve of both leaders and society in the face of increasing casualties and other war costs.

This finding dovetails with war-weariness theory that suggests democracies are more likely to lose sight of long-term goals in a war and grow less committed to a military campaign (Garnham 1986). The duration of a democracy's war is particularly shorter during counter-insurgency campaigns, where a combination of shocking events and near-constant mass media attention weakens the desire of leaders and public opinion to keep the course (Berrebi and Klor 2008, but see Lyall 2010, who finds no relationship).

In the context of defection, empirical results have thus far been contradictory and inconsistent. Some authors have argued that democracies are less reliable allies and are therefore more likely to defect from alliances or not follow through on their international pledges (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). On the other hand, others have found that democracies in fact tend to follow through on their commitments more than non-democratic regimes (Leeds 2003), or that compliance with international will depend on the impact such commitments will have on domestic constituencies.

Theoretically, the expectation in the dissertation follows the more frequent empirical

finding that the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to cut participation in wars short and to defect from commitments. The variables below unpack the rather broad democracy ranking to identify sub-regime factors that may have an impact on a country's defection or troop reduction likelihood.

### *Legislative control over foreign policy*

The literature on democratic conflict behavior has until recently treated democracies as a set of homogeneous political units (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009; Ireland and Gartner 2001). Scholars have been looking increasingly within these regimes to identify variables that may explain variation in the behavior of democratic states. Leblang and Chan (2003) unpack democratic regimes and find that there is no significant difference between parliamentary and presidential regimes when it comes to war involvement, as do Reiter and Tillman (2002), while Auerswald (2000) finds presidential regimes to be more likely to initiate conflict.

Of more direct interest to this dissertation, the study of legislatures in foreign policy has witnessed a relatively small amount of attention from scholarship. Some scholars interested in democracy and conflict behavior have integrated variables on legislative constraints. Clark and Nordstrom (2005) and Reiter and Tilmann (2002) find that more legislative control over foreign policy is associated with a smaller likelihood that a democracy will initiate conflict. On a much broader scale, any article that uses the Polity IV democracy measures indirectly looks at legislative constraints on the executive because this factor is one of the four components of the indicator (Pickering 2011).

In addition, the voluminous literature on veto players has as one of its central pillars the contention that legislative veto power over the executive's policy-making abilities reduces the latter's leeway to implement and change policy; significant volumes of empirical data support this argument, including in fields like foreign policy (Choi 2010). The general consensus in the literature is, however, that Parliaments are somewhat insignificant actors in foreign policy-making, especially when it comes to matters of security, because they are commonly controlled by the executive branch and consequently act more like a rubber-stamp for the cabinet's plans.

Some authors have more recently challenged this idea. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) argue that the impact of legislatures on foreign policy-making has been underestimated, and that scholarship in the field of political opposition, two-level games, and democratic peace theory shows that the institution's role in foreign policy reveals an actor with significant influence. This argument is confirmed by the extensive literature on the United States Congress, which has grown more powerful since the end of the Vietnam War and has gotten more involved in foreign policy-making (Ambrose and Brinkley 2011). Brule and Williams (2009), for example, aver that cabinet type and party cohesion can augment the legislature's power over the executive's conflict initiation likelihood.

Others, however, have noticed a trend toward a weakening of legislative control over security matters or at the very least have not seen a move toward more parliamentarization of foreign policy (Peters and Wagner 2011). Considering the emerging debate on whether parliaments matter in foreign policy-making, this dissertation joins the conversation by adding two indicators of parliamentary power in security policy (troop deployment in particular) and investigates in greater detail the actual process by which legislatures may have influenced Iraq

policy in the case studies. The theoretical expectations based on the literature are that parliamentary control over troop deployment should make both defection and troop reduction more likely.

### *Coalition cabinets*

A recent sample of 34 OECD countries and new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe points out that the median country in the sample has coalition cabinets about 65 percent of the time (Armstrong and Duch 2010, 310). Consequently, inhabitants of more or less consolidated democracies tend to live under multi-party cabinets more frequently than not. Another sample of 17 Western European countries point to the fact that coalition cabinets are also the norm (Hobolt and Karp 2010, 300). In a broader sample that includes both developed and developing countries, coalition cabinets are also a frequent occurrence in India, Bangladesh, Japan, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Turkey (Kaarbo, in press).

Despite the prominence of these forms of government, especially in Europe, we know relatively little about the impact of coalition cabinets on foreign policy (Ozkececi-Taner 2005, 255). Kaarbo (1996, 1998) has studied the impact of junior coalition partners on the foreign policy decision-making process and outcomes, identifying factors like the locus of power and resource sharing as sources of conflict over foreign policy. Parties like the Greens in Germany have had significant influence over the SPD-dominated cabinet's position on the war in Iraq in 2002-2003 (Kaarbo and Lantis 2003). Within coalition cabinets, a critical junior party, especially if it is a single-issue political organization, may steer coalition policy in its favor (Warner and Walker 2011). Others have proposed theoretical frameworks that incorporate coalition cabinets

and predict various outcomes like “stable deadlock” (Hagan and Hermann 2001) based on the decision rules within the coalition.

A small, but vibrant, research debate has emerged in the last decade to answer whether coalition governments are more or less likely to initiate or reciprocate conflict than other forms of government (Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Some authors, like Leblang and Chan (2003) have found no difference between single-party and coalition cabinets when it comes to war involvement, while Prins and Sprecher (1999) argue that coalition cabinets are *more* likely to reciprocate disputes.

Clare (2010) attributes these inconsistencies in the literature to the fact that previous studies have not incorporated the ideological heterogeneity of cabinets in their study. Having done so, he finds that the conflict behavior of more ideologically homogeneous coalition cabinets is not different from single-party cabinets, while coalitions in which parties are farther from each other on the partisan continuum tend to exhibit either more aggressive behavior (when there are parties that are farther right than the rest of the coalition partners) or more peaceful behavior (when there are parties that are farther to the left of the coalition partners).

Along these same lines, Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) conclude that coalition cabinets are not inherently more peaceful or more aggressive, but that they do exhibit more “extreme” foreign behavior, which either means that they behave more cooperatively or more conflictually than other types of cabinets. The difference is, then, one of character instead of content (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, 79), and in order to understand when a coalition cabinet is more likely to be peaceful or aggressive, we would need to know the preferences of the parties in the cabinet.

Although the debate on the exact impact of coalition cabinets on foreign policy is

ongoing, a few theoretical expectations can be derived for the goals of the dissertation, especially from some of the more recent writing in this area. Consistent with Kaarbo and Beasley's (2008) arguments, coalition cabinets would, in the aggregate, be more likely to defect from a coalition, which constitutes a more extreme form of behavior than “staying the course.” At the same time, when it comes to troop numbers, coalition cabinets would be more likely to either decrease the number of troops or increase them, since both of these behaviors constitute both more peaceful and more aggressive policies than keeping the number of troops stable. Whereas the large-N study will look at whether there are any broad systematic differences between coalition cabinets and single-party cabinets, the case studies will look more deeply at the preferences of these coalition members to investigate when they are more likely to be more aggressive or more peaceful.

#### *Political opposition and domestic unrest*

In the search for the domestic determinants of foreign policy, the study of the influence of opposition was initially systematized by the comparative foreign policy (CFP) community in the 1950s and 1960s, which attempted to fashion a scientific theory of foreign policy. Rosenau (1966) included what he called governmental and societal factors in his pre-theory of foreign policy, which conceptualized the possibility of elite and party pressure and opposition as having a potential impact on foreign policy-making. In addition to these two factors, he also included what he called idiosyncratic (individual characteristics of leaders), role, and systemic factors as potential influences on foreign policy-making.

The opposition variable continued to develop with Dahl's (1973) volume on Regimes and

Opposition (Hudson 2005, 12) and was then picked up by Hagan (1993), who authored the first systematic attempt at conceptualizing the impact of opposition on foreign policy. Hagan's independent variables included the extent of regime fragmentation (defined by group configuration, actor predominance, and policy polarization) and four types of opposition to the regime (intraparty dissenters, other political parties, military actors, and regionally based actors). Their effect was then mediated by the political system structure and regime vulnerability. His dependent variable was foreign policy behavior, defined by levels of commitment, independence, and affect in foreign policy (Hagan 1993, 98).

Although his findings were admittedly tentative, Hagan notes that some patterns are identifiable in his study. For example, strong political opposition can lead to minimal foreign policy behavior (Hagan 1993, 203) because of the restricted possibilities for uncontested action. In regimes where military opposition to the regime is high, foreign policy behavior shows a pattern of highly assertive foreign policy behavior (Hagan 1993, 204). This approach was innovative at the time, when the literature on political opposition and foreign policy was sparse, but its contribution is still relatively rudimentary, in part because Hagan's initial plan was to simply correlate opposition types with foreign policy behavior to look for patterns.

This project to theorize the role of the opposition has been continued by students of conflict, where scholarship has focused on the impact of the opposition on a country's conflict behavior (Buono de Mesquita and Lalman 1990). The popularity of the opposition variable can be attributed to the variable's centrality in the debate on “diversionary war” (see Levy 1989; Hendrickson 2002), which has become a central research program in the field of international relations (Levy and Mabe 2004, 65).

Rooted in sociological literature on in-group and out-group identities, “diversionary theory” suggests that when leaders face domestic woes like economic crises, domestic unrest, or significant political and popular opposition, they will attempt to divert attention from these by engaging in conflict (Kisangani and Pickering 2009, 487). Such choices would allegedly strengthen in-group feelings within the country and consolidate support for the leader via a “rally-around-the-flag” effect (Baum 2002).

Until the 1990s, empirical results correlating domestic unrest variables and opposition to diversionary behavior was sparse and inconsistent, but better data and more theoretical refinement of the theory led to the conclusion that there is, indeed, evidence of some diversionary behavior (Kisangani and Pickering 2009, 489), in major powers and in non-great powers (Pickering and Kisangani 2005), in both democracies and autocracies (Pickering and Kisangani 2010), and even during the medieval period (Sobek 2007). The literature has turned away from asking whether diversionary behavior exists to analyzing what conditions make such behavior more likely (Nicholls, Huth, and Appel 2010).

In the United States, Presidents are more likely to initiate disputes during periods of economic hardship combined with significant congressional opposition (Brule 2006). When congressional opposition is high, Democratic presidents tend to initiate conflicts as a response to high levels of inflation, while Republican presidents do so in response to high levels of unemployment (Brule and Hwang 2010). Oakes (2006) finds diversionary behavior when domestic unrest is high, but that behavior is mediated by the state's extractive capacity. Nicholls, Huth, and Appel (2010) support this finding, but stress that the circumstances that matter have to do with the political salience of the opposition groups. On the other hand, Ghosn (2011) argues

that high levels of domestic unrest actually increase the likelihood of negotiations between warring parties.

In contrast, other scholars have found that an increase in legislative constraints and high levels of legislative opposition tend to reduce the likelihood of an executive initiating conflicts (Choi 2010; Howell and Pevehouse 2010; Prins and Sprecher 1999; but see Brule, Marshall, and Prins 2010; and Young and Levy 2010, who find the exact opposite). Others have even found that high levels of partisan support actually make the initiation of conflict by the executive more likely if public opinion support is low (Foster and Palmer 2006), while Park (2010) notes that more opposition in the United States House of Representatives led to more conflict initiation by the executive, while the exact opposite was the case with opposition levels in the Senate. Despite the increasing number of such studies, five decades of “diversionary theory” analysis have not yielded any conclusive results and long-standing empirical results are rare (Tir 2010).

Outside of the diversionary war debate, other scholars have sought to determine whether political opposition affects the cabinet's behavior at the international stage. Arena (2008) finds that bad war outcomes are more likely to be punished by the electorate if the opposition was against the continuation of a war. Below (2008) argues that United States presidents constantly paid attention to the degree of political opposition during the development of environmental policy, which confirms Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1990) suggestion that an executive's initial beliefs about the magnitude of events will influence decision-making during crises.

This rather large literature on opposition and unrest is inconclusive, but it does point to the importance of looking at factors like political opposition and domestic unrest as possible variables affecting the executive's decision-making calculus. At the very least, it is clear that

opposition groups will try to use foreign policy issues that make executives vulnerable to obtain political gains (Carbone 2007). Theoretically, cases can be made for mutually exclusive predictions. On the one hand, some of the work cited above provides evidence that high levels of opposition will convince leaders to use foreign conflicts as a means to recover some of the power lost domestically. On the other hand, other authors argue that high levels of opposition act as constraints upon a leader's propensity to engage in conflict.

Consequently, this dissertation is agnostic about the effect of both political opposition and domestic unrest on a country's conflict behavior but their centrality in the literature makes inclusion absolutely necessary. As will be seen later, in contrast with diversionary theory expectations, countries with higher degrees of political opposition to the Iraq war were actually more likely to reduce troop numbers and therefore reduce their participation in the conflict.<sup>13</sup>

### *Elections*

One strand of the diversionary war research has looked at the impact of elections and electoral periods as a possible explanation for conflict initiation. The theoretical argument in this regard is that if a leader is subject to high levels of unpopularity or seeks to gain an advantage over a political competitor, a conflict during an electoral campaign would be more likely.

Empirical results, just like in the case of other parts of diversionary war theory, have been mixed. On the one hand, elections seem to make countries and leaders more aggressive. Gaubatz

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<sup>13</sup>The literature on political opposition and domestic unrest implicitly engages the scholarship on the impact of political parties on foreign policy. Students of international relations have argued that political parties can be holders of institutionalized ideas (Ozkececi-Taner 2005) on the country's foreign policy orientation. The ideological orientation of political parties also made a difference in foreign policy: left-wing parties tend to have an indirect impact on the increase in foreign aid (Therien and Noel 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2010) and humanitarian intervention (Rathbun 2008). In essence, the orientation of political parties has an impact on how they view foreign policy and even their country's role in the world (Cantir and Kaarbo 2011), as a result of which their presence in a cabinet or in the opposition will influence the foreign policy process.

(1991) finds that in the last 200 years, democracies have tended to get involved in more conflicts earlier in the electoral cycle. Nincic (1990) says that United States foreign policy-makers became more hostile during an electoral period toward the Soviet Union and then grew gradually peaceful on off-election years. Important decisions are frequently made during electoral periods, and democracies are even considered to be less reliable partners because electoral cycles provide considerable incentives for vote-seeking leaders to push for policy discontinuity (Nincic 2004).

On the other hand, Cotton (1986) finds that leaders associated with entry into a conflict tend to lose political support during wartime elections. Leblang and Chan (2003) suggest that despite the fact that the timing of an election does not influence a country's decision to initiate a conflict, democracies are, in fact, less likely to continue a conflict during an election year. Along these lines, Quandt (1986) argues that electoral cycles in the United States actually constrain leaders and prevent them from conducting consistent foreign policy.

Others find no relationship between an election year and a propensity for a country to cooperate (Krause, Suzuki, and Witmer 2006; but see Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendoff 2002, who find the exact opposite result), the evolution of bilateral ties (Nossal 1980), the success of international negotiations (Trumbore 2001), the timing of military conflict (Oneal and Tir 2006), or the length of a conflict (Koch 2009). From a theoretical standpoint, this dissertation will include elections as a variable in determining patterns of defection or troop commitments because previous literature suggests the importance of this variable. Empirical evidence is, however, inconsistent, and the expectation is simply that elections may play a role in how executives decided to behave in Iraq.

*Casualties*

The literature on diversionary war has often struggled with the degree to which it should pay attention to the impact on casualties on the decisions made by leaders and on their popularity. That is, even if a diversionary pattern is found in the conflict behavior of some countries, “casualty aversion” and a so-called “bodybag effect” may dampen the success of the diversionary endeavor and even weaken a leader (Mueller 1973). Just like in the previous cases, the debate on the effect of casualties on decision-making has evolved from an initial debate about whether such an effect exists to identifying the conditions that make its impact more likely.

Boettcher III (2006) finds that the United States public is less likely to support a conflict with high casualty rates, while Geys (2010) finds evidence that higher levels of casualties decrease the popularity of leaders associated with the conflict. The finding is confirmed by Karol and Miguel (2007), who find that higher casualties in United States states decreased the incumbent president's popularity, and by Kriner and Shen (2007), who found that support for Republican candidates between 2000 and 2006 decreased based on casualty rates suffered by local communities where these candidates ran.

The relationship between casualties and popularity may not, however, be direct (Shirayev and Sobel 2003); it could depend on elite casualty tolerance, expectation of success, and even support given by other countries in the intervention (Glisic 2003; Potter and Baum 2008). Kreps (2010) argues that elite consensus over participation in an intervention like the one in the war in Afghanistan has dampened the impact of casualties on pressures for withdrawal. Gelpi (2010) suggests that the public usually relies on new and surprising cues to update their casualty tolerance based on a costs-and-benefits analysis that focuses on the likelihood of success. This

calculus affects decision-makers, as well – Freedman (2000) says that United States decision-makers were afraid of high levels casualties and adjusted their choice of NATO attacks in Kosovo accordingly. A conclusion with regard to the exact impact of casualties on foreign policy decisions is difficult considering the ongoing disagreement about whether and when casualty aversion has an impact on how leaders make decisions. It is clear, however, that there is an expectation in the literature to suggest that casualties should be part of an analysis of war participation. This dissertation includes measures of casualties to join this conversation.<sup>14</sup>

### *Public opinion*

A lot of the previous literature includes both implicit and explicit references to the effect and importance of public opinion and how it affects foreign policy-making. The systematic study of public opinion and its impact of foreign policy-making, most of it in the United States, initially began after World War II with an assumption that the public was poorly informed, that it responded emotionally to foreign policy issues, and that it had inconsistent and short-sighted views (Holsti 2002, 514). This belief, which became known as the Almond-Lippmann “consensus,” was focused on arguing that the public's views on foreign policy were not structured or well-informed, as a result of which voters were ignored by decision-makers because of their irrelevance (Rottinghaus 2008, 140).

Almond argued that the United States public's views on foreign policy were like “mood swings” and were often incorrect (Aldrich et al. 2006, 479). Campbell et al. (1960). also found that the United States public's foreign policy beliefs were inconsistent from an ideological standpoint and that they did not seem to follow any patterns (Aldrich et al. 2006, 479). In

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<sup>14</sup> There is, of course, a theoretical reason to include casualties as part of the security school of alliance defection.

essence, the argument was that public opinion on foreign policy was so incoherent and unstructured that it constituted a series of “non-attitudes” (Holsti 1992, 442). Consequently, it had no impact on foreign policy-makers.

This consensus began to be increasingly challenged after the Vietnam War, as scholars began to find that United States public opinion regarding foreign policy issues was stable instead of volatile (Foyle 2003, 165). Scholars found that despite the public's low degree of information regarding foreign policy issues, its opinions were relatively structured and coherent (Holsti 1992, 448). The electorate was also found to change opinions, but for rational instead of emotional reasons (Mueller 1973, quoted in Hudson 2005, 12).

Another strong challenge to the Almond-Lippmann model was related to the contention that public opinion did not matter in foreign policy-making. Into the 1960s, scholars believed that the public was incapable of influencing foreign policy, but this consensus once again began being eroded after the Vietnam War (Holsti 1992, 452). Some research has shown, for example, that public opinion on foreign policy in the United States can impact electoral outcomes under certain circumstances (Aldrich et al. 2006, 491).

The conventional wisdom has, therefore, been challenged – the United States public holds some consistent views and does have an influence on foreign policy in certain circumstances. The literature on public opinion and foreign policy has subsequently been focused on making theoretical sense of these empirical findings and identifying certain intervening variables within the United States (and in other countries) that have played an important role in mediating the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. In short, the focus has been on finding the exact causal mechanisms that account for the beliefs of regular citizens and the frequent correspondence

between public opinion and elite foreign policy behavior (Shapiro and Jacobs 2000; Jacobs and Page 2005).

A lot of the literature that attempted to answer this question has focused on the debate about whether public opinion is a constraint on the foreign policy actions of United States decision-makers, or if important figures like Presidents can lead public opinion (Foyle 2004, 270). Some scholars have found that public opinion can set basic limits within which policy-making can be conducted, in part because of electoral pressures, the desire for presidential popularity (which can be lost as a result of the pursuit of an unpopular foreign policy), and other factors (Rottinghaus 2008, 141).

Leaders can scrap unpopular plans (Sobel 2001) or can attempt to manipulate and lead foreign policy. Jacobs and Shapiro (1999) mention President Lyndon Johnson's attempts to manipulate opinion on foreign policy, especially with regards to the Vietnam War. Although many such attempts failed, President Johnson was nonetheless generally unresponsive to foreign policy opinions. In addition, bolstered by the end of the Cold War and media coverage, presidents and governments have become more likely to attempt manipulations of public opinion in the recent years (Shapiro and Jacobs 2002).

A potential synthesis of this rather recent debate in the literature has been found in the investigation of the relationship between leader preferences and personalities, as well as their consideration of public opinion. It is entirely possible that public opinion can act as both a constraint and can be manipulated, depending on various factors like decision-maker personality. This area of work has engaged the literature on the individual psychological characteristics of leaders and has benefited from the development of this research in the foreign policy analysis

field (e.g. Walker and Shafer 2006).

Rivlin (2008) notes that the importance leaders place on public opinion when making a foreign policy decision depends on presidential approval among members of his own party in the preceding months and the attention the United States population are dedicated to the international realm. It matters, therefore, if the President is popular or constrained by a bout of unpopularity in his actions. Foyle (1997), in an early article on the importance of leadership characteristics and the context in which leaders find themselves, asserts that the particularities of individual policy-makers can mediate the impact of public opinion on foreign policy-making. The author suggests that President Dwight Eisenhower's and United States Secretary of State John F. Dulles' reactions to public opinion were found to be significantly related to predictions inspired from an analysis of their beliefs.

More recently, Keller (2005) has argued that public opinion or political opposition will only create potential constraints on leadership if they are “activated” by a leader's responsiveness. Some leaders respect constraints while others do not. Based on Hermann's (1987) leadership trait assessment system, Keller established that President John F. Kennedy was a “constraint respecter” while President Ronald Reagan was a “constraint challenger,” which explained, at least in part, why the former was more responsive to certain domestic constraints.

Clearly, some advances have been made in the study of public opinion and its impact on foreign policymaking via institutions and leaders. Most of the cases are, however, based on the United States case and it is unclear if the insights can travel to other settings. The only exception to this lack of comparative studies has been the democratic peace literature (Kaarbo 2003, 158), which makes a theoretical argument about the relevance of public opinion for the propensity of

democratic regimes to go to war. Generally speaking, the assumption in the literature has been that democratic citizens will be reluctant to go to war, as a result of which they will vote against leaders who choose belligerence (Chang and Safran 2006, 139). Given this institutional problem, decision-makers in democracies will tend to avoid going to war unless they have huge support in favor of their endeavor.

This conventional wisdom in the democratic peace literature, however, merely suggests that public opinion “matters“ in democracies. It is unclear whether it is possible for public opinion in democratic regimes to vary in influence and impact on a leader's propensity to go to war or engage in conflictual actions with other countries. It is necessary to investigate whether these factors mediate the degree to which democracies are more or less peaceful.

For example, Chan and Safran (2006) find that public opinion can have a significant impact on the likelihood of democratic leaders going to war. Such impacts are, however, mediated by electoral institutions. Schuster and Maier (2006), however, conclude that the variation in public opinion could not explain variation in the likelihood of some European countries joining the Coalition of the Willing. Ripsman (2007) challenges the very notion of the impact of public opinion as an automatic constraint on democracies engaging in aggressive actions. He finds that public opinion can sometimes be more belligerent than democratic leaders, which will affect the degree to which these leaders can exhibit peacefulness. Along the same lines, Kinsella (2005, 2) argues that the assumption of a pacific public, which is an implicit suggestion of the literature that argues democracies are less likely to go to war because of public pressures, has also been questioned by scholarship in the field. Moreover, the very notion that publics will be reluctant to go to war is often false considering the fact that only a small subset of

people in a democracy, usually volunteers in the army, will be affected by the decision to go to war (Rosato 2003, 595).

The war in Iraq was extremely unpopular in most of the countries that both joined or refused to join the Coalition of the Willing. With minor exceptions, consistent majorities were against both the United States intervention there and their country sending troops into Iraq. As a result, it is important to include an analysis of whether this public opinion had an impact on how the CW members behaved during their participation, and whether certain institutional factors affected the interaction between public opinion and decision-making. The dissertation includes a measure of *public opinion* regarding the war in Iraq, although the theoretical expectations for its impact are once again mixed. Overall, however, the theoretically-informed orientation of the literature is toward arguing that higher public opinion opposition would act as a constraint on the executive.

Some scholars have already written on the topic, usually in single case studies. Ishibashi (2007), for example, argues that Japan's ruling Liberal Democrats were not affected by public opposition to their having deployed troops to Iraq because of a number of other factors: the electorate cared more about domestic issues, the Iraq participation was manipulated by certain cabinet members, the opposition was not a viable alternative, the public was worried about security threats from North Korea, media framing, and support for the so-called Yoshida doctrine, one of the most important pillars of which is a strategic alliance with the United States.

Vassilev (2006) finds that public opinion did not play a role in Bulgarian decision-making to join the Iraq war as well. Schuster and Maier (2006) find that public opinion could not account for whether European country joined the CW or not, and that leaders generally did not seem to

follow this factor when deciding on their Iraq policy.

This dissertation not only takes public opinion polls, where available, into consideration in analyzing the decision-making process of CW members, but also investigates whether public opinion considerations came into play in the case studies, where the interaction between leadership and public opinion is more easily analyzable. Finally, as another measure of public opposition, the dissertation has included *protests* in the large-N studies and the case studies.

### *Leadership and leadership change*

One of the most significant theoretical contributions to the study of foreign policy analysis, in the tradition of scholars like Sprout and Sprout (1965), has been the investigation of the impact of individual leaders on foreign policy decision-making (Hudson 2005, 11). Bolstered by progress in automated content software, operational code analysis (Walker and Shafer 2006) and leadership trait analysis (Hermann et al. 2001) have emerged to refine understanding about the effect of individual agency on foreign policy (see Carlsnaes 1992 and Hollis and Smith 1994 for a more extended discussion on the role of agency in international relations).

Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate the impact of each individual leader on alliance behavior in the Coalition of the Willing,<sup>15</sup> the relevance of leaders is included in the analysis via two variables – changes in Prime Minister and changes in Presidents. Students of conflict behavior have increasingly included leadership turnover variables to refine their analyses of the institutional determinants of conflict initiation, duration, and termination

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15 Not because of any theoretical reluctance, but because of the sheer time and work this would entail with dozens of leaders in 38 countries. Some leaders will be discussed in greater depth in the case studies. Students of defection themselves have lamented the lack of leadership studies. See Kober (2002, 6), Papayouanou (1999), and Snyder (1999). The study of individual leaders is important for multiple reasons, including for the fact that leader characteristics can explain variation in foreign policy behavior when there is no significant variation in the international setting or in domestic institutions (Dyson, 2007).

(Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). Aside from the possible incentives of leaders to initiate conflicts (like diversionary war theory would suggest), scholars have also been curious whether turnover in leaders affects a country's aggressiveness or its willingness to cooperate. Moreover, if leaders change, so might their incentives to cooperate or engage in conflict with other countries.

Although this strand of leadership turnover research is in its relative infancy (Smith 2009), some international relations scholars have begun using these variables more rigorously and have engaged early attempts at their systematic analysis (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994; Goldmann 1982). McGillivray and Smith (2004) found, for example, that leadership change reduces trading ties between states. McGillivray and Stam (2004) argue that changes in economic sanctions imposed by one country on another tend to be associated with leadership changes. On the other hand, Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) find that leadership change alone does not explain defection from alliances. Theoretical expectations are, therefore, once again mixed with regards to the impact of leadership turnover, but few scholars question the importance of including such a variable in the analysis of coalition behavior.

### **The Coalition of the Willing literature**

Before proceeding to the large-N analysis, this chapter will conclude with a discussion of the work on the Coalition of the Willing and will place the dissertation within it.

By and large, the emerging literature on the CW mirrors the broader work on alliances and coalitions. A number of scholars have looked at this topic from the perspective of formation, trying to answer the question of why countries might have joined the coalition. Bugajski (2005) hints that economic motivations might have been behind some of the participants' choices, since

countries like Romania and Bulgaria were seeking to get back the immense debt Iraq owed to them (Vassilev 2006, 476). Some countries may have been seeking other economic advantages, like post-war contracts and more connections with the United States (via the designation as a market-based economy), while others may have been responding to United States threats of economic sanctions (Newnham 2008).

Some countries may have been looking for United States bases on their land (Fawn 2006, Rhodes 2004), or to appease the United States as the only superpower in the world (Schuster and Maier 2006, 239). Closer to the realist argument, Mouritzen (2006) has attributed joining behavior to factors like proximate balancing, while Grigorescu (2008) has focused on “soft balancing” vs. “soft bandwagoning” as reasons. Vassilev (2006) argues that Bulgaria decided to join because of “bandwagoning” reasons, having found that public opinion – which was against Sofia's intervention – did not impact decision-making. Schuster and Maier (2006) have said that Eastern European states responded more favorably to involvement in Iraq because of their more precarious security situation, whereas the ideological make-up of Western European governments was a crucial determinant in that region. Some have focused on cultural reasons, like pro-Americanism (Fawn 2006; Rupnik 2005) and historical experience with totalitarianism (Fawn 2006).

Overall, the topic of alliance formation in the case of the “Coalition of the Willing” has received quite a lot of attention, and scholars have used a combination of the four clusters of variables to answer their questions (albeit the discussion of domestic factors is, once again, rather sparse). On the other hand, the question of defection has remained understudied. Mass media outlets were full of reports on frequent defections from the CW, suggesting variables like public

opinion and domestic opposition, but we do not yet know how exactly the process of defection worked. A few scholars have attempted to answer this question, albeit incompletely.

Tago (2009) has approached this question from the regime angle. He asks whether democratic countries are more unreliable in coalitions, and finds that a few factors are, in fact, important in influencing unilateral withdrawal from the CW. For example, during a national election month, a leader is eight times more likely to exit a coalition than during a non-election month, because of domestic political reasons. The number of casualties, the presence of other defectors, and former Communist countries were also significant. Parliamentary systems, veto players, parliamentary constitutional control over troop deployment, and leadership change were not significant. Whereas this is a certain advance toward finding the answers for defection, Tago's (2009) article has a number of problems that the current dissertation intends to correct. First, he only looks at defections until May 2006. Considering the fact that ten more countries defected from the coalition after this date, his sample is incomplete. Tago looks at 16 cases, which means that he overlooks nearly 40 percent of the universe of cases. Moreover, some countries that he coded as having defected, like Bulgaria, later on rejoined the "Coalition of the Willing." Others, like Moldova, did not actually defect until 2008, unlike his argument that Chisinau left in 2005.

Second, Tago largely ignores competing realist hypotheses. He mostly looks at a number of domestic elements like veto players and their impact on decisions to withdraw, but notions of power and security remain understudied. Third, even though Tago's consideration and inclusion of domestic-level factors is a welcome change from the more conventional approaches to alliance studies, they do not take significant factors the literature says are crucial, like public

opinion, political opposition, and the interaction between various branches of government. Finally, his dependent variable (withdrawal) overlooks the very interesting phenomenon of troop increases and troop reductions in which many countries in the Coalition of the Willing engaged. For example, Albania continued upping the number of its troops until departure in December 2008. By comparison, South Korea continued cutting its troops until withdrawal.

Broadly speaking, Tago (2009) makes a significant contribution to the literature on coalition defection, but leaves many important factors out of his study. This dissertation seeks to offer a more complete dataset, more competing expectations, more refined domestic-level variables, and a more complex dependent variable.

Baltrusaitis (2009), although he focuses on the impact of domestic politics on coalition burden-sharing and participation, also has a significant contribution to the study of coalition defection, if not for the fact that his case study on South Korea suggests a dynamic interaction of domestic-level variables that influenced Seoul's behavior in the CW. This author argues that President Roh, despite his important influence over foreign policy-making, could not act as an autonomous actor in the case of involvement in Iraq because of a rebellious Parliament and in the face of domestic displeasure with troop deployment. Baltrusaitis (2009) other two case studies – Germany and Turkey – were not part of the Coalition of the Willing and are not, therefore, good examples of coalition defection. His case study of South Korea is, however, a useful example for the conduct of a country while the coalition.

The author's own (Cantir 2011) investigation of Bulgaria's defection from the Coalition of the Willing also suggests a number of variables that will be of significance in the rest of the dissertation. In a comparison between Romania and Bulgaria, the study holds constant a number

of domestic-level and international-level variables and finds that high domestic opposition and a high number of casualties determined Bulgaria to leave Iraq after it became an important electoral issue. Romania, in contrast, remained committed to the peacekeeping operation and was one of the last to leave, in the face of low opposition (until 2005) and a low number of casualties.

Some of this work dovetails with the few scholarly contributions to alliance defection unrelated to the Coalition of the Willing, which includes Kober (2002), Catalinac (2010), Kreps (2010), and Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009). Most of these authors do, in fact, take domestic factors into consideration, but continue to provide such variables without serious engagement with the foreign policy literature. Kober (2002) uses a combination of realist and rationalist variables to explain coalition defection, which include a country's (self-perceived) power, polarity, and coalition cohesion. Other factors such as leader evaluations of the possibility of the coalition's success also play a role (Kober 2002, 186). Kreps (2010) suggests that elite consensus mediates the effect of negative public opinion pressures to withdraw from a coalition, particularly when it is embedded in a long-term alliance like NATO.

Catalinac (2010) suggests that New Zealand defected from the ANZUS treaty with the US because of an overriding domestic desire for autonomy. In contrast, realist variables had not changed significantly and could not, therefore, explain the change in the country's behavior. Authors who have looked at defection in other contexts have found the importance of domestic factors to be significant. Crawford (1996) finds that Germany's surprising unilateral recognition of Croatia was largely influenced by a norm of self-determination and "elite bandwagoning" (484), which were domestic factors facilitated by external factors such as Berlin's growing power, weak multilateral regimes, and lack of consensus on norms (Crawford 1996, 521).

Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) argue that leadership changes and changes in a leader's supporting coalitions can affect defection from an international commitment, but the conceptualization of domestic politics essentially takes leadership and party change as the primary variables, and no significant effect is found. Only non-democratic systems are more likely to renege on their security commitments if their social base of support changes. The focus on the support coalition seems to be as advanced and detailed a conceptualization of domestic politics performed in the study of alliances in the bulk of the literature (see Morrow 2000's review of the literature). Narizny (2003) says that political parties (and the respective sectoral groups they represent) played a key role in Britain's alignment between 1905 and 1939, while Palmer (1990) explains that small allied states changed their defense budget after internal changes in government and therefore free-rode on the larger allied states (he uses NATO as an example).

In summary, the study of the Coalition of the Willing reflects the broader literature on alliances: an overemphasis on studying formation and a relative neglect of defection. This dissertation will try to make a contribution to understanding defection by offering the most comprehensive and complete dataset on the matter, by providing rival hypotheses, as well as conceptualizing and including some domestic-level variables that the literature on foreign policy analysis has suggested are important, but that no other scholar has thus far included.

## **Conclusion**

The study of alliance defection has been somewhat neglected by international relations scholars, especially in contrast with the volume of scholarship on alliance formation and

cohesion. Consequently, the field was caught unprepared to answer why exactly some countries left the Coalition of the Willing while others stayed. Even theoretical expectations that can be derived from the alliance formation literature provide a skewed picture because they emphasize security, autonomy, and costs-benefits factors and frequently ignore the domestic political process as a possible explanation for a country's decision-making process in an alliance or a coalition.

This dissertation seeks to both add to the sparse studies on alliance defection and to bring more theoretical complexity to the study of alliance behavior by bringing in insights from foreign policy analysis. This chapter sets up the theoretical expectations from the literature. It is followed by a chapter that turns the concepts into measurable indicators to measure their impact on coalition behavior.

## Chapter 3

### Introduction

For the purpose of this dissertation, an entirely new dataset was created using primary and secondary sources. All the data have been inserted into a spreadsheet and contain information on all 38 members of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq. The data were mostly collected from newspaper articles accessed via Factiva and LexisNexis, and scholarly articles. The first part of this chapter provides detailed information about the make-up of the Coalition of the Willing. The second part connects the variables for which data was collected with the concepts and the theoretical expectations in chapter two. Statistical analyses of the determinants of defection and troop commitments follow.

### The Iraq War

After the first Gulf War (1990-1991), a defeated and weakened Iraq became the subject of economic sanctions and no-fly zones in both the north and the south of the country. Operation Desert Fox (1998) involved the bombing of a number of military installations in the country as Iraq's long-standing leader – Saddam Hussein – became increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the international community with regards to the development of a wide array of weaponry. A situation of relative calm, during which Baghdad remained isolated from international society, was altered considerably after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The George W. Bush administration looked to Afghanistan first and invaded the Taliban-controlled country with mass international support.

In 2002, intimations of Iraq becoming the second target of Washington's new preemptive war policy culminated in the United Nations Security Council Resolution Nr. 1441. The Resolution deplored the fact that “Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and

unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [...] and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, accessed on October 29, 2010, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org), p. 2). The Bush Administration's main concerns were related to Iraq's alleged development and partial possession of weapons of mass destruction, as well as Baghdad's alleged connection with terrorist organizations, including the al-Qaeda network that organized the 9/11 attacks.

Unlike the intervention in Afghanistan, the mention of a possible Iraq intervention almost immediately drew opposition, even from Washington's traditional allies. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder expressed his opposition to a war in Iraq, stressing the need for a more proactive role for the U.N. in the resolution of the crisis. Both Berlin and Paris stressed the need for peaceful disarmament of Iraq, and refused to throw their support behind a new UN Security Council resolution backed by the United States. Toward the middle of March, however, it became clear that the United States, the United Kingdom, and a number of other countries were intent on forcing regime change in Iraq. On March 20, 2003, a largely United States-British-Australian invasion force entered Iraq, marking the beginning of the war. Poland and a number of other countries contributed non-combat assistance as well. After the end of hostilities in May 2003, the United States announced the arrival of a number of troops from numerous countries that were defined as a “Coalition of the Willing.” Their basic task was to provide help during peacekeeping and stabilization operations to rebuild Iraq and help turn it into a democratic country.

### **The “Coalition of the Willing”**

The origin of the expression, at least its use by the administration, is unclear. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell initially used the term to urge the creation of a Muslim-led multinational force to keep the peace in Afghanistan. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said that he envisioned a “Coalition of the Willing” that could coordinate an IDF withdrawal from the West Bank during instability in the region. The term became part of U.S. and world consciousness in reference to Iraq, however. George W. Bush threatened in November 2002 that if Saddam Hussein chose not to disarm, “we will have a Coalition of the Willing” to do so.

Right away, however, the exact membership of the Coalition of the Willing was unclear. United States Secretary of State Colin Powell said on March 18, 2003 that “we now have a Coalition of the Willing that includes some 30 nations who publicly said they could be included in such a listing, and there are 15 other nations, for one reason or another, who do not wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.” This number generally hovered below 50, including unnamed allies, but the administration was slow at specifying what exact contribution each member would make. Moreover, some countries denied being on the list and resented being named publicly; the Solomon Islands, for example, were apparently surprised to be coalition members.

Whatever the case may be, this project will only count the countries that were publicly part of the Coalition of the Willing and sent troops to Iraq. According to this standard, the number of members amounts to 38 countries: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal,

Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Tonga, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The United States, the initiator of the invasion and the country with the most significant commitments, was not included in the count and in the analysis that follows, for a number of reasons. First, the project is concerned with the behavior of coalition members and their following the pledge they made to the United States to help stabilize post-war Iraq. That is, the United States is the country to which coalition members made a pledge. Second, the United States was subject to an entirely different system of incentives because it was the country that initiated the war for its own security reasons, and it would therefore be better studied separately from the other members.

Every single country listed by media institutions as having troops in Iraq as part of the Coalition of the Willing was included in the dataset. This reached 38 countries (excluding the United States). The temporal dimension in the dataset is the month, and there is data available for each month a country was in the war in Iraq (resulting in 1,800 data points). The dataset considers the beginning of the Coalition of the Willing peacekeeping operation in Iraq to be May 2003; it does not include data on countries that sent troops prior to this month because official hostilities were still undergoing. If a country did send troop prior to May 2003, the calculations for its contribution began in May. The end-point of data analysis is December 2008, which is when the United Nations Security Council Resolution allowing a mandate of the Multi-National Force-Iraq expired.

This deadline did not mean that every single coalition member left, but they did have to seek approval from the Iraq Parliament to remain after the expiry of the mandate. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and a handful of other countries did stay behind.

However, the endpoint of December 2008 was chosen because the countries that left before this month did not fully use the mandate that they had to stay in Iraq and defected from the coalition. That is, they could not claim the expiry of a mandate as an event that marked the end of the coalition and, therefore, the need for further military cooperation. In short, any country that left before December 2008 has been coded as a defector.

The beginning of a country's presence in the war was established as soon as news accounts or other sources announced the official arrival of troops into Iraq. This approach was more reliable than coding troop presence and levels based on decision-maker statements because words were frequently unreliable when it came to troop commitments in Iraq. Changes in the number of troops or complete defection were also coded in a similar manner, and an effort was made to establish the actual month during which changes were made. No changes in troop numbers seem to have been made on a weekly basis, which suggests that the month is probably both the most disaggregated and the most useful time unit in this analysis

### ***Dependent variables***

Troop commitments in the war in Iraq (the dependent variable) have been coded in two ways, which were analyzed in two stages. First, the models looked at determinants of defection. Second, the same models looked at determinants of troop numbers. This decision was made because the defection model did not fully fit empirical reality. Four countries defected from the coalition and then returned, while others preferred to alter troop numbers and leave a symbolic presence in Iraq. This allowed them to claim that they were still part of the coalition and provide declaratory support to the United States without actually making any significant contributions.

*Troop numbers*

The number of troops in Iraq have been counted using a series of news media organizations. At times, Reuters, AP, AFP, Xinhua, and others released comprehensive reports on the number of coalition troops present in Iraq. This served as the initial basis for data collection. Once this data was entered, inconsistencies and problems were verified by conducting detailed searches on troop numbers in each individual countries. Normally, the approach focused on doing a word search in the style of “troop\* AND albania\*” in Factiva, LexisNexis, World News Connection, and a few other databases, and wading through hundreds and sometimes thousands of news stories that covered this topic.

A number of think tanks such as Brookings, the State Department, and various defense ministries in the members of the coalition have also, on occasion, released reports on troop levels, although these releases (with minor exceptions like the United States and the United Kingdom) were inconsistent temporally (they did not provide reports every month or every year, for example) or made a series of errors. As a result, the individual country searches, although time-consuming, proved to be the most reliable and consistent source for troop levels because they allowed a comparison between a number of sources, both local and international. In addition, errors in the troop level compilations released by Reuters, the AP, and others were found. It is unclear if these would have affected the analysis, but sometimes the errors were significant and the author erred on the side of the local media organizations. All of these decisions on troop number coding were duly noted in the dataset.

In other cases, certain media organizations provided contradictory information on the troop levels. In most cases, the differences were negligible and the author averaged out the troop numbers. Absolutely each month for each country has an entry for troop levels, which means that

no data gaps exist in this regard. Table 1 provides a summary of the peak level of troop commitments countries made to the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq.

**Table 1 (troop numbers, peak level, contrast to 160,000 United States troops)**

United Kingdom	18,000
Italy (D)	3,200
South Korea	3,200
Poland (D)	2,400
Georgia (D)	2,000
Ukraine (D)	1,700
Australia	1,400
The Netherlands (D)	1,300
Spain (D)	1,300
Japan	1,000
Romania	830
Denmark (D)	500
Bulgaria (DR)	470
Thailand (D)	422
El Salvador	380
Honduras (D)	370
Hungary (D)	300
Dominican Republic (D)	300
Czech Republic	300
Nicaragua (D)	230
Albania	215
Singapore (DR)	180
Mongolia (D)	180
Azerbaijan	150
Norway (D)	150
Latvia (D)	130
Portugal (D)	128
Slovakia (D)	105

Lithuania	105
Philippines (D)	100
Bosnia	85
Macedonia	80
New Zealand (D)	60
Estonia	55
Tonga (DR)	55
Armenia (D)	46
Moldova (DR)	42
Kazakhstan (D)	25

Overall, the troop contributions of the members of the Coalition of the Willing were negligible in comparison with the commitments made by the United States (with the minor exception of the United Kingdom and a few other countries). Throughout the United States's stay in Iraq, Washington had anywhere between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Overall, boots on the ground stood at between 140,000 and 160,000 soldiers. Coming in at a distant second, The United Kingdom had a peak of 18,000 troops in Iraq, but dropped its contribution down to about 8,000 shortly after the intervention. Only eight other countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, and Italy – sent more than 1,000 troops to fight in Iraq (at peak level). Most of the other CW members sent a few hundred troops, and they were frequently in the tens for countries such as Bosnia, Tonga, and Moldova. The situation is different when it comes to the degree of commitment based on the proportion of the number of troops sent to Iraq from the total size of the army (see Table 2). Based on this measure, the peak commitments of Georgia and Tonga made up 17.6 percent and 13.7 percent of their total military personnel, a significant relative contribution. For example, Tbilisi had 2,000 troops in Iraq from September 2007 to August 2008, which, until December

2007, made up 17.6 percent of the size of its total military personnel and 9.4 percent of its total military personnel beginning January 2008. For a short period at the beginning of the war, the United Kingdom's troop contribution reached 8.66 percent, but fell to four percent after May 2004. About seven other countries committed more than two percent of their total military personnel to Iraq, and about eight more sent more than one percent. The rest were less engaged, including Kazakhstan (0.05 percent of their total troops) and the Philippines (0.09 percent).

**Table 2 (troop numbers relative to military personnel size, at peak levels, in percent)**

Georgia (D)	17.6
Tonga (DR)	13.7
United Kingdom	8.4
Honduras (D)	3.08
Australia	2.7
Latvia (D)	2.6
El Salvador	2.4
The Netherlands (D)	2.4
Denmark (D)	2.3
Mongolia (D)	2.09
Albania	2
Poland (D)	1.69
Italy (D)	1.6
Nicaragua (D)	1.6
Dominican Republic (D)	1.2
Estonia	1.1
Bosnia	0.9
Bulgaria (DR)	0.9
Hungary (D)	0.9
Romania	0.86
Spain (D)	0.8
Ukraine (D)	0.8

Lithuania	0.8
Macedonia	0.7
Moldova (DR)	0.6
New Zealand (D)	0.6
Slovakia (D)	0.5
South Korea	0.5
Czech Republic	0.5
Norway (D)	0.5
Japan	0.4
Portugal (D)	0.28
Singapore (DR)	0.24
Azerbaijan	0.2
Thailand (D)	0.13
Armenia (D)	0.1
Philippines (D)	0.09
Kazakhstan (D)	0.05

### *Defection*

The “troop numbers” dependent variable has served as the basis for the creation of another measure of troop commitment – defection. This variable is particularly necessary because the literature the project engages largely speaks about defection and is set theoretically in this scholarship. The procedure for coding defection was simple: for each month a country remained in Iraq, it was assigned a 0 (zero). For the month it left, it was assigned a 1 (one). As will be mentioned earlier, this makes for a rare event – there are 112 months of defection (the four countries that went back and forth were kept in the dataset even after they left because they returned) out of slightly more than 1,800 months covered. The distribution of ones and zeros is,

therefore, highly skewed. Table 3 provides a list of defectors, defectors and returners, and countries that stayed the course. Countries have been classified geographically.

**Table 3 (Defections)**

<p><b>Central/Eastern Europe</b> Albania; Bosnia; Bulgaria (DR); Czech Republic; Hungary (D); Macedonia; Poland (D); Romania; Slovakia (D)</p>	<p><b>Former Soviet Union</b> Armenia (D); Azerbaijan; Estonia; Georgia (D); Kazakhstan (D); Latvia (D); Lithuania; Moldova (DR); Ukraine (D)</p>	<p><b>Western Europe</b> Denmark (D); Italy (D); the Netherlands (D); Norway (D); Portugal (D); Spain (D); United Kingdom</p>
<p><b>Central America</b> The Dominican Republic (D); El Salvador; Honduras (D); Nicaragua (D)</p>	<p><b>Australasia</b> Australia; New Zealand (D); Tonga (DR)</p>	<p><b>Asia</b> Japan; Mongolia (D); the Philippines (D); Singapore (DR); South Korea; Thailand (D).</p>

Key: (D) = defector; (DR) = defector, then return.

### **Independent variables**

The dependent variables have been classified into four categories, based on the discussion in chapter two: security, autonomy, costs and benefits, and domestic political factors. They are also presented as such in the models to make a reading of the results easier.

#### ***I. Security.***

This theoretical perspective suggests that states join coalitions to maximize security. The expectation is that if a coalition does not achieve that goal, defection or a reduction in commitment become more likely, which leads to hypotheses 1 and 2.

#### **Security hypothesis 1**

If the presence of a country in a coalition does not maximize its security or makes it

worse, then that country is more likely to defect.

### **Security hypothesis 2**

If the presence of a country in a coalition does not maximize its security or makes it worse, then that country is more likely to reduce troop commitments to the coalition

### *Casualties*

To engage the literature that emphasizes that a worsening security situation for a country may make defection more likely, this dataset includes three measures of this concept. First, casualties were coded based on media reports, icasualties.org (which compiles casualty data for Iraq and Afghanistan), and cnn.com's Home and Away: Iraq and Afghanistan War Casualties database ([www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.casualties/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.casualties/index.html)). These three sources have provided a fairly comprehensive list of casualties in Iraq. The death of contractors and other civilians was not included in this count (see the kidnappings variable).

The variable was coded in two ways. First, the number of casualties in a particular month was inserted in the cell. If there were no casualties, a zero was inserted. Second, the cumulative number of casualties was inserted into the cells. That is, if Australia lost one soldier in November 2005 and another soldier in April 2006, the cells between November 2005 and April 2006 all had a “1” inserted (compared to the first way of operationalizing the variable, which included a “1” in November 2005 and then a zero beginning December 2005). Both measures were tested alternatively in the models since there are reasons why both could measure the impact of casualties in decision-making. In the first case, a casualty may cause political party and public outcry in the days following the event, but may then taper off. In the second case, both politicians and the general population may take into consideration the cumulative number of

casualties in their perception of the country's participation in Iraq. Ultimately, the decision was made to use the cumulative measure of casualties because both case studies and familiarity with the various countries involved in Iraq showed that the memory of casualties in Iraq lingered and had continuous effects on public opinion and domestic politics.

Overall, slightly fewer than 300 coalition troops died in Iraq, compared to more than 4,000 United States soldiers who passed away between 2003 and 2008. Of these 300, approximately 175 casualties were British. Italy lost 33 soldiers, followed by Poland (23), Ukraine (18), Bulgaria (13), and Spain (11). A number of other countries lost less than ten troops. Half of the countries involved in the war in Iraq – 17 out of 38 – lost no soldiers in Iraq. Most soldiers passed away in 2003 (66) and 2007 (57), followed by 2005 (54), 2004 (49), and 2006 (48). About eight casualties were registered in 2008.

#### *Domestic attacks*

Second, domestic attacks were coded as any terrorist event or credible threat (that is, a bomb threat or the actual presence of an explosive) within the country that was either explicitly related to the war in Iraq or was mentioned by authorities as potentially relevant. Considering the relatively small number of such attacks (16 total), it seems as though this broad definition did not yield more results. This variable does not include domestic attacks that were unrelated or unconnected to Iraq. Two databases were used to ensure the reliability of data and a comprehensive approach: RAND's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents ([www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/](http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/)) and the National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System ([wits.nctc.gov](http://wits.nctc.gov)). The two databases seem to be the most comprehensive, and have been confirmed by individual searches for countries. As a result, the

number of events seems to be generally reliable.

A second way of coding this variable is with the use of the cumulative number of attacks. That is, if Denmark experienced a domestic attack in December 2004, the cells after this month were all coded with a “1” (for one event), in contrast to the first manner of coding, which would have included a “1” in December 2004 and zeros after that. This provides more variation in the variable and may actually get closer to measuring the impact of domestic attacks on the internal political process. The impact of a domestic attack is not only perceived in the month it happened, but continues in the consciousness of the population and politicians afterwards. The second coding was ultimately used in the models (analyses involving the first type of coding are also available).

These attacks were not as frequent, but they did have a significant impact on the departure of countries like Spain, where terrorist attacks played a role in the ultimate election of a Socialist government that withdrew troops from Iraq. The members of the coalition suffered 16 domestic attacks, ten of which were registered in Spain on March 11, 2004. In Albania, police defused a bomb outside of an U.S. employee's house in Tirana in January 2004 and found a number of bombs in Tirana right before George W. Bush visited on May 31, 2007. In Denmark, on May 17, 2004, a home-made explosive device exploded outside the Danish defense ministry in Copenhagen, with authorities saying that the attack might have been related to the country's involvement in Iraq. In Italy, on March 28, 2004, a Moroccan national blew himself up in protest of Italy's participation in Iraq. In a few months, in October 2004, a small explosive device blew up in Italy in protest over participation in Iraq. In Japan, on February 18, 2004, two explosions were registered near the Japanese Ministry of Defense, in apparent protest over the country's

participation in Iraq. Overall, however, the number of attacks was minor and with no civilian casualties, with the exception of Spain. Moreover, these attacks did not have a significant effect on the decision-making process over troop deployment in the countries that were affected by them.

### *Kidnappings*

Finally, the dataset includes a variable for kidnappings, which counts the number of occurrences of kidnappings of a country's nationals in Iraq. The databases used here include RAND's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and the NTCC's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, as well as individual research in each country.

Once again, the kidnapping variable was also recoded for an alternative measure. Most of the kidnappings that occurred during a country's stay in Iraq tended to have the effect of unifying the country to release the prisoners, and most political parties tried to abstain from calls for withdrawal. On the other hand, kidnapping deaths had an extremely deep impact on public opinion in the respective countries and most likely affected politicians as well. Consequently, an alternative measure of kidnappings included the cumulative number of deaths of nationals kidnapped in Iraq. The same sources were used to code this variable. The cumulative variable was used in the models because it closer resembled empirical reality.

A number of countries went through kidnapping and hostage crises. These events were extremely significant in the domestic political process within the members of the Coalition of the Willing because the organizations that kidnapped these countries' nationals frequently asked for troops to be withdrawn in exchange for the release of hostages. Such requests often mobilized public opinion and political parties, although not necessarily in opposition to Iraq. Generally,

kidnappings led to expressions of solidarity and requests for their unconditional release. In most cases, such threats did not work, and some hostages were killed. Others were released. Only in one case - the Philippines – did the government explicitly leave Iraq to appease kidnappers who later released the prisoner.

Out of the 38 members of the Coalition of the Willing, 13 went through a total of 34 hostage crises. Of these 34 hostages, 19 were killed. The United Kingdom had the largest number of kidnappings (13), of which six were killed. Italy was the second most affected by kidnappings; of the nine nationals that were kidnapped, three were killed and six were released.

## ***II. Autonomy***

This theoretical perspective suggests that countries join coalitions to maximize security and autonomy. The security expectation has already been addressed in the security model. The expectation in terms of autonomy is that if presence in a coalition does not increase one's autonomy, the country will defect or cut down on its commitments.

### **Autonomy hypothesis 1**

If a country's presence in a coalition does not maximize its autonomy, then the country is more likely to defect.

### **Autonomy hypothesis 2**

If a country's presence in a coalition does not maximize its autonomy, then the country is more likely to reduce troop numbers.

### ***Power variables***

The project uses the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset, which has developed an index of power made up of six indicators. The latest iteration of the dataset has

data until the end of 2007, which means that the countries that had troops in Iraq in 2008 – 23 out of 38 – lacked data for this year. These changes were, however, negligible. For the purpose of verification, the COW measure was disaggregated into the six elements and these variables were included individually in the models. Models were estimated with the six separate measures of power, with negligible changes from the composite number. Consequently, only the composite COW National Material Capabilities was used in the models.

In addition, two other measure of power were used. First, a country's defense budget was calculated from the IISS database. Second, GDP per capita was also included in the analysis.

### ***III. Costs and benefits***

This theoretical framework predicts that countries join coalitions to collect benefits. If those benefits are not forthcoming or if they are reduced, countries are more likely to defect or reduce troop commitments. This generates two hypotheses.

#### **Benefits hypothesis 1**

If a country's presence in the coalition does not provide benefits or decreases them, then it is more likely to defect.

#### **Benefits hypothesis 2**

If a country's presence in the coalition does not provide benefits or decreases them, then it is more likely to reduce troop numbers.

Given the discussion in the second chapter, two measures of the possible benefits that varied during a country's stay in Iraq included United States military aid and United States economic aid. The data was coded from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants Database. It was provided yearly, as a result of which every cell for the months of the same year remained unchanged.

United States economic aid went to a large number of Coalition of the Willing members, with the exception of advanced industrial countries, which received little assistance from the United States. The average amount of United States economic aid stood at 32.54 million dollars, with a standard deviation of 54 million. The largest amount of economic aid during the stay of coalition countries in Iraq amounted to 327.4 million dollars, which went to Mongolia. United States military aid averaged at about 6.56 million, with a standard deviation of ten million. Many countries, such as the United Kingdom, did not receive any military aid, while Poland received the largest amount (90 million dollars in 2005).

#### ***IV. Domestic politics***

A large number of variables were coded based on the suggestions and hypotheses in the literature on domestic politics and foreign policy analysis.

##### *Domestic-level variables (regime characteristics)*

To measure democratic legislative control over troop deployment, this dataset uses two alternative indicators. First, it utilizes Tago's (2009) own measure of constitutional control. Tago (2009) investigated the constitutions of each member of the Coalition of the Willing, and coded 1 for constitutional control and 0 for ambiguous constitutional provisions or for no constitutional control. According to Tago, 25 of the members of the coalition did not have legislatures that held control over the deployment of troops, while 13 did.

An alternative measure that is significantly different in terms of the breakdown of countries is parliamentary vote. The variable is coded as a 1 for whether a country's legislature voted to deploy troops to Iraq and a zero if there was no vote on the matter; the decision was made based on news reports. This variable shows that 25 members of the Coalition of the Willing had legislatures that voted, at one point or another, on troop deployment, while 13 did not. The

two measures were included as alternative measure of legislative control over foreign troop deployment because there is no consensus in the literature yet about how exactly to measure this concept.

The democracy measure was taken from the Polity IV democracy rankings, where any country rated from 7 to 10 is considered to be democratic. Nearly every country in the CW was ranked as a democracy. Two countries were unranked – Bosnia and Tonga. Although in the case of the former, an argument could be made about the country's partial democratic credentials, Tonga is, by most standards, a non-democracy. The country's 32-member legislature has only nine seats open to competitive election, while the rest are either assigned to nobles (nine seats) or appointed by the King (14 seats). Armenia (a score of 5), Azerbaijan (0), Kazakhstan (0), Singapore (2), and Ukraine (mostly a 6, with a seven during the month it withdrew) were the only non-democracies or partial democracies, according to Polity, that joined the Coalition of the Willing.

The dataset also includes a variable on whether the government was ruled by a coalition. A 1 was assigned if a coalition led the cabinet, and a zero if it was a single party or if the country was authoritarian. This data was gathered from Reuters reports on cabinet composition, as well as individual research in various countries. Generally speaking, no problems were encountered in coding this variable. Although the coalition literature is very rich in detail and suggests a number of other possible variables (such as the presence of a critical junior partner and the number of parties in the coalition), this project only includes a general coalition variable to investigate whether it even makes a difference. A further research project would include a considerably larger number of variables regarding coalitions, in part because some of the countries went

through a number of intra-coalition conflicts about Iraq. Of the about 1,800 months coded in the dataset, nearly 1,200 were months during which a country had coalitions. Since the literature is still debating whether democracies and/or coalition cabinets are more or less reliable allies (Tago 2009; Kaarbo 2008), there are competing hypotheses in this regard:

**Democracy Hypothesis 1**

The more democratic a country, the more likely it is to defect or reduce troops.

**Democracy Hypothesis 2**

The more democratic a country, the more likely it is to reduce troops.

**Alternative Democracy Hypothesis 1**

The more democratic a country, the less likely it is to defect.

**Alternative Democracy Hypothesis 2**

The more democratic a country, the less likely it is to cut troops.

**Coalition Hypothesis 1**

A coalition cabinet is more likely to defect from a coalition.

**Coalition Hypothesis 2**

A coalition cabinet is more likely to cut troops.

**Alternative Coalition Hypothesis 1**

A coalition cabinet is less likely to defect.

**Alternative Coalition Hypothesis 2**

A coalition cabinet is less likely to cut troops.

*Domestic-level variables (social opposition)*

The project uses three measures of social opposition to the Iraq war. First, it looks at protests against the war in Iraq. This variable was coded as dichotomous, with a 1 for months

during which protests took place and a 0 when they did not. One of the reasons why this decision was made was because the project seeks to investigate whether there was public social expression of disagreement with the deployment of troops to Iraq. While it is certainly possible that the size of protests, the number of people who turned out, and the organizers might have mattered, what this project is more interested in is the timing of these protests and whether that timing had an impact. Moreover, data on such elements of protests is unreliable and varies across cases, which would make generalizations across 38 cases problematic. Most countries had at least one protest during their participation in Iraq, with South Korea, Japan, Denmark, Poland, and the United Kingdom seeing the most protests across time.

The variable of public opinion measures responses to public opinion polls about whether local troops should be withdrawn from Iraq. If available, coding started with polls in May 2003 and beyond, but sometimes had to be used from an earlier month. In some cases, such questions were unavailable, and public opinion was coded as a measure of opposition to the Iraq war in general. Since public opinion data varies across cases, the author decided to write the number of people opposed to troop deployment (between 0 and 100 percent), and include that number for the following months until a new poll was published. There might be problems with such a decision because public opinion is certainly not static, and it most likely was not given the highly controversial Iraq war intervention. However, generally speaking, new polls are usually conducted on an issue if there is perception by pollsters, politicians, or analysts that something is changing in society about a topic. Consequently, this seems to have been the best way to fill monthly cells.

Public opinion data on Iraq was unavailable for Azerbaijan, the Dominican Republic,

Georgia, Honduras, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua (August 2003-November 2003), Singapore, and Tonga. In three of these cases (Azerbaijan, Singapore, and Tonga), the regime was non-democratic and there might have been difficulties in polling. The three Central American Republics were in Iraq for a very short period of time, and public opinion, according to news reports (that did not, however, cite any polling), was opposed to the war. It is unclear why polling lacks for the other countries, although one possible explanation could be the fact that the issue was uncontroversial in these societies. It would most likely be safe to assume that Georgians, especially after the Rose Revolution, were fairly pro-American in their outlook. Based on this previous variable, the dataset includes an alternative measure of public opinion that looks at whether most people were against the deployment of troops or not. Majority opposition is coded as a 1, while minority opposition is coded as a 0. The models include the numeric public opinion because the nominal alternative did not make a difference in the models.

Overall, most countries had majorities that were fairly consistently opposed to the war. Australian public opinion was initially supportive of the deployment of troops in Iraq, but grew increasingly opposed to participation after the middle of 2005. The Czech public, based on the available polls, were also less opposed to the Iraq war (opposition stood at less than half), as was the Danish public. In the latter case, however, the Danish people grew increasingly opposed to intervention in 2006 and 2007. At certain times, some polls indicated that less than half of the Italian public was opposed to the Iraq intervention, along with the Slovakian and the South Korean public. Public opinion in the United Kingdom seems to have hovered below 50 percent until the middle of 2005, after which polls indicated majority opposition. In general, however, public opinion was almost always opposed to the Iraq war. At the very least, considerable

portions of the public were for the withdrawal of troops from the “Coalition of the Willing.”

*Domestic-level variables (political opposition)*

The dataset includes two variables on political party opposition. Only the political parties with seats in Parliament were considered, and there was no case of which the author is aware in which this rule of thumb proved to eliminate a strong party that expressed opposition but was outside of Parliament. The first measure was developed in two steps. First, it investigated which parliamentary parties expressed opposition to troop deployment as parties. That is, the party's leaders had to speak in the name of their party as expressing opposition. There were some cases in which certain rebel members of a political party disagreed with troop deployment in Iraq, but whenever there seemed to be intra-party disagreement, a note was made on the matter and the party was not coded as being officially against the war. Second, the percentage of votes the party received during the previous elections was calculated to show the size of opposition. That is, if Party A expressed opposition to Iraq and won 20 percent during the last election, it was coded as a 20 for the month when this announcement of opposition was made.

The percentage the party received was coded in the first month opposition was expressed and from then on the party was considered to be opposed to troop deployment unless it publicly expressed another viewpoint. Percentages changed after new elections were held. It is important to note that the percentage a party received nationally was calculated irrespective of the electoral system in the country, where such percentages were available. This choice was made because certain electoral system obscure the actual national-level popularity of a party. Of course, such a choice does not take into consideration the issue of strategic voting, wherein voters do not express their sincere preferences with regards to a party because they are aware of the potential losses they could suffer. Nonetheless, the indicator of national-level popularity is a good

indicator of the spread of opposition to the war. Where such numbers were unavailable, calculations were based on the percentage of the seats held by the parties opposing the Iraq war.

A second measure of legislative opposition was coded based on the percentage of votes in Parliament against continuing troop deployment. At one point or another, 25 legislatures out of 38 voted on troop deployment, many yearly. Consequently, whenever this data was available, opposition to troop deployment was coded as a percentage of the votes against in the total attendance on the day of the vote. Until a new vote was held, the percentage of opposition stayed similar. For example, if Party A voted against the war in January 2005 and January 2006, its vote percentage on January 2005 was coded for every other month until January 2006.

Generally speaking, there is a rather large spread of legislative parties that publicly expressed opposition to the war, from none in Albania to five in Romania (which together made up for nearly 70 percent of the vote received and more than 70 percent of seats in the legislature). The average popularity of the parties that expressed opposition to the war in Iraq is nearly 24 percent. Overall, the second indicator of opposition – legislative votes against the war in Iraq – has the same averages, although the minimum numbers for legislative opposition are generally higher than zero for one simple reason: even if a political party did not express public disagreement with troop deployment, some M.P.s voted independently of their party against the war. This seems to have occurred in a number of cases (where roll call votes were available) in places such as South Korea and the United Kingdom.

### **Opposition Hypothesis 1**

The more opposition there is to the Iraq war, the more likely defection is.

## **Opposition Hypothesis 2**

The more opposition there is to the Iraq war, the more likely troop reduction is.

### *Domestic-level variables (events)*

The dataset includes a number of domestic political events that could have played an important role in changing decision-makers and the configuration of power in the members of the coalition. The election variable codes a 0 for every month no election was held to 1 for every national-level full election, either in the legislature or in the presidency. For this purpose, the author used news stories and the databases belonging to IPU Parline and IFES. Some local Central Electoral Commission data was also used. When possible, at least two sources were contrasted with each other for reliability. The variable does not include partial national elections or local elections, especially because the latter are frequently influenced less by national-level issues than by local issues. If partial elections altered the structure of power in government, this change would be caught in the afore-mentioned political opposition variables. They were not included here because the country as a whole was not involved in a national-level election, when the issue of Iraq would have been more likely to surface.

An alternative measure of elections looked at the cumulative number of elections in a country, in order to measure the effect of the number of opportunities for change a country had on its decision-making process in Iraq. This involved coding a “1” for the month an election took place and thereafter. The cumulative measure was used in the models to investigate the impact of the rate of domestic change on defection and troop numbers.

When it comes to changes in governmental make-up and electoral pressure, most countries in the Coalition of the Willing went through at least one election during their

participation in Iraq. In many cases, the Iraq case was an important electoral issue and resulted in a change in power that resulted in a leader that withdrew troops from Iraq. Interestingly, six nations did not hold elections during their stay in the war, and all of them still defected from the war – Honduras, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Thailand.

Seven countries held one election (six legislative and one presidential), while 16 held two elections and 8 countries held three elections. Only one country – Georgia – held three legislative elections and two presidential elections. Two countries – Ukraine and Georgia – went through significant political change as a result of “color” revolutions that deposed quasi-authoritarian rulers. One President – Roh of South Korea – went through an impeachment process, as did Romanian President Traian Basescu. In short, domestic political life continued unabated during the Iraq war and the issue was frequently a significant part of domestic political discourse.

A second and third variable codes a zero for every month when there was no change in either the Prime Minister or the President of the country and a 1 for when such changes existed. The two positions – Prime Minister and President – were disaggregated into two variables in order to allow more significant variation and to investigate the separate impacts of Prime Minister or presidential seat changes. The 1 was generally assigned when the new Prime Minister or the new President was sworn in and could act as a leader. This provided some lag between the election of a leader and his or her actually taking power. An alternative measure of the second and third variables was the cumulative number of changes in prime ministers and presidents, in order to assess whether the number of times leadership changed in a country had any impact on the decision-making process in Iraq. The cumulative measures were used in the model. The expectation for all of these domestic events suggest that the more changes there are in elections

and the more leadership turnover there is, the more likely change in policy becomes.

In most of the cases, elections generally led to some change in leadership. Eight countries did not have a change in leadership, either in the head of state or head of government – Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Thailand. About 50 Prime Ministers about 19 Presidents were in power while their country was in Iraq.

### **Events Hypothesis 1**

The more changes there are in domestic political events, the more likely defection is.

### **Events Hypothesis 2**

The more changes there are in domestic political events, the more likely troop reduction is.

### *Miscellaneous*

Finally the dataset includes the names of countries for each month, as well as a unique numerical ID. There is also a number of dummy month variables for each month between May 2003 and December 2008 to make the models workable.

### *Proportion of military contribution*

This variable was calculated as a proportion of the troops on the ground during that month in Iraq from the total size of the country's military during that month. The size of the military was determined using the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) The Military Balance Reports. The IISS released yearly reports on the size of the military of most countries in the world, and the database provided a consistent measure across all of the cases. The literature does not provide any theoretical expectations on defection and troop numbers

given the proportion of a country's contribution, but the expectation would be that a larger commitment to the coalition of the war proportional to the military's size would make departure more difficult because of logistical reasons and because the initial commitment is so large. This leads to the following hypothesis:

### **Proportion of Contribution Hypothesis 1**

The larger the proportion of a contribution, the less likely defection is.

### **Proportion of Contribution Hypothesis 2**

The larger the proportion of a contribution, the less likely troop reduction is.

### **Analysis**

This dissertation looks at two main dependent variables. First, it investigates the determinants of defection from the Coalition of the Willing with a Cox proportional hazards model. This analysis is largely compatible with the behavior of countries in the Coalition of the Willing, but it provides an incomplete picture of empirical reality because, as mentioned earlier, four countries defected and then returned to the coalition, and many others fluctuated the number of their troops. However, given the theoretical interest in defection and the defection of a number of countries from the coalition, the first part of the analysis will focus on this question. This analysis does not include the four countries that defected and then returned.

Four defection models were estimated: the full model, the model without security variables, the model without power variables, and the model without benefits variables, in order to check the robustness of the findings and to verify whether the removal of certain theoretically-informed variables from the model significantly alters the results. The conclusion is that these removals did not alter the results significantly. Each individual model with a short description

and analysis follows. Table 4 provides a summary of significant variables and can be consulted first as a roadmap. Further details on each individual model follow. Second, the chapter looks at determinants of troop numbers with a negative binomial regression model.

## I. Defection

**Table 4 – Comparison of significance (defection)**

<b>DEFECTION</b>				
	Model 1 (full model)	Model 2 (no security var)	Model 3 (no power)	Model 4 (no benefits)
Security (casualties)	x	n/a	x	x
Security (domestic attacks)	x	n/a	x	x
Security (kidnapping deaths)	x	n/a	x	x
Power (COW capabilities)	x	x	n/a	x
Power (GDP per capita)	x	x	n/a	x
Power (Defense budget)	x	x	n/a	x
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	x	x	Significant (-)	n/a
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	x	x	x	n/a
Domestic (constitutional control)	x	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (democracy level)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (protests)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (public opinion)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (% party opposition)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (legislative vote)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (nr. Of P.M. changes)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (nr. Of President changes)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (nr. Of elections)	x	x	x	x
Other (Proportion of contribution)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	x

As is visible in the analysis, there are three consistently significant variables that have an impact on defection. Domestic factors perform the best out of the four theoretical perspectives, although both display counterintuitive results. Contrary to theoretical expectations, if a country's legislature has constitutional control over troop deployment, defection becomes less likely (since defection was coded as a “1” and staying in Iraq was coded as a “0”). Similarly, the higher the number of changes in the Presidency, the less likely defection is. The higher the contribution of a

country as a proportion of its military size, the less likely defection becomes.

It is unclear why these models would show results contrary to expectations, but one possible explanation is that a dichotomous defection/no defection dependent variables obscures frequent troop number changes short of defection that are not picked up. In fact, the troop numbers model shows that legislative control over troop deployment actually makes troop decreases more likely, while presidential changes make troop increases more likely. Only in one model (where power variables were removed) is United States economic aid significant – the more economic aid a country receives, the less likely it is to defect. Security and power variables were largely insignificant. Below are the individual models showing significance and direction.

**Table 5**

Model 1 (all variables included)			
	Hazard ratio	Std. Errors	Coefficient
Security (casualties)	1.081	0.067	1.260
Security (domestic attacks)	1.538	1.939	0.340
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.879	0.535	-0.210
Power (COW capabilities)	0.000	0.000	0.480
Power (GDP per capita)	1.000	0.000	1.060
Power (Defense budget)	0.999	0.000	-1.310
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	1.014	0.007	1.810
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.988	0.032	-0.340
Domestic (constitutional control)	0.104	0.121	-1.940
Domestic (democracy level)	1.623	0.488	1.610
Domestic (protests)	0.002	0.028	-0.520
Domestic (public opinion)	1.010	0.036	0.290
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	0.329	0.419	-0.870
Domestic (% party opposition)	1.033	0.038	0.880
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	1.026	0.026	1.010
Domestic (legislative vote)	2.540	2.851	0.830
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	1.584	0.882	0.830
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	0.069	0.076	-2.42**
Domestic (nr. of elections)	1.745	1.241	0.780
Other (Proportion of contribution)	0.000	0.000	-2.03**
N = 1,369 // Log-likelihood = -33.12			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

The first model (table 5) includes all of the variable collected, distributed by the four theoretical perspectives taken into consideration in the analysis. The only two significant variables in the model are the number of changes in the presidency and the proportion of the country's contribution relative to its military's size, both of which make defection less likely. Tests of multicollinearity were performed and did not alter the results.

The second model (table 6) does not include the three security variables (casualties, domestic attacks, and kidnapping deaths). This removal makes one more variable significant: if a

country's legislature has constitutional control over troop deployment, defection becomes less likely.

**Table 6**

Model 2 (without security variables)			
	Hazard ratio	Std. Errors	Coefficient
Security (casualties)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security (domestic attacks)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security (kidnapping deaths)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (COW capabilities)	0.000	0.000	1.140
Power (GDP per capita)	1.000	0.000	1.560
Power (Defense budget)	0.999	0.000	-1.620
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	1.012	0.007	1.630
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.995	0.032	-0.130
Domestic (constitutional control)	0.107	0.108	-2.22**
Domestic (democracy level)	1.556	0.396	1.740
Domestic (protests)	0.123	0.226	-1.140
Domestic (public opinion)	1.012	0.034	0.380
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	0.282	0.313	-1.140
Domestic (% party opposition)	1.046	0.036	1.300
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	1.026	0.024	1.100
Domestic (legislative vote)	3.040	2.669	1.270
Domestic (nr. Of P.M. changes)	1.710	0.900	1.020
Domestic (nr. Of President changes)	0.080	0.078	-2.58*
Domestic (nr. Of elections)	1.521	1.016	0.630
Other (Proportion of contribution)	0.000	0.000	-2.04**
N = 1,369 // Log-likelihood = -35.13			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

The third model (table 7) does not include the power variables (COW composite capabilities, defense budget, and GDP per capita). Constitutional control remains significant, and United States economic aid has a negative impact on defection. The other two significant variables have kept their direction and relevance.

Table 7

Model 3 (without power variables)			
	Hazard ratio	Std. Errors	Coefficient
Security (casualties)	1.033	0.036	0.940
Security (domestic attacks)	2.929	2.873	1.100
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.541	0.409	-0.810
Power (COW capabilities)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (GDP per capita)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (Defense budget)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	1.014	0.006	2.17*
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.984	0.027	-0.550
Domestic (constitutional control)	0.193	0.162	-1.96*
Domestic (democracy level)	1.392	0.359	1.280
Domestic (protests)	0.000	0.000	-1.040
Domestic (public opinion)	1.004	0.033	0.130
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	0.591	0.801	-0.390
Domestic (% party opposition)	1.044	0.037	1.220
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	1.029	0.246	1.230
Domestic (legislative vote)	1.681	1.517	0.580
Domestic (nr. Of P.M. changes)	1.256	0.559	0.510
Domestic (nr. Of President changes)	0.142	0.139	-1.98*
Domestic (nr. Of elections)	1.237	0.725	0.360
Other (Proportion of contribution)	0.000	0.000	-2.09*
N = 1,369 // Log-likelihood = -33.99			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

Finally, the fourth model (table 8) does not include the benefits variables (United States economic aid and United States military aid). The proportion of contribution variable ceases to be significant in this model, with constitutional control and the number of changes in the presidency having, once again, a negative impact on defection.

Table 8

Model 4 (no benefits variables)			
	Hazard ratio	Std. Errors	Coefficient
Security (casualties)	1.094	0.086	1.140
Security (domestic attacks)	1.229	0.889	0.290
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.952	0.554	-0.080
Power (COW capabilities)	0.000	0.000	0.970
Power (GDP per capita)	1.000	0.000	1.060
Power (Defense budget)	0.999	0.000	-1.850
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Domestic (constitutional control)	0.103	0.113	-2.06*
Domestic (democracy level)	1.409	0.354	1.370
Domestic (protests)	0.017	0.112	-0.640
Domestic (public opinion)	1.012	0.035	0.350
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	0.288	0.339	-1.060
Domestic (% party opposition)	1.026	0.036	0.720
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	1.030	0.026	1.140
Domestic (legislative vote)	1.480	1.551	0.370
Domestic (nr. Of P.M. changes)	1.052	0.489	0.110
Domestic (nr. Of President changes)	0.082	0.083	-2.47*
Domestic (nr. Of elections)	1.889	1.256	0.960
Other (Proportion of contribution)	0.000	0.000	-1.780
N = 1,369 // Log-likelihood = -34.99			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

### Summary<sup>16</sup>

In the four models analyzed in this chapter, domestic factors perform the best out of the four theoretical perspectives, although it becomes clear that the full model is relatively weak in accounting for what exactly drives defection. Only the Proportion of Contribution Hypothesis is

<sup>16</sup> Results do not change after collinearity tests and after estimating the models without the United Kingdom, the strongest partner of the US in the coalition. The same applies to the troop numbers models.

confirmed in the right direction. That is, the larger a country's contribution to Iraq as a proportion of its army size, the less likely defection is. One of the elements of the Regime Hypothesis (constitutional control) is significant but in the unexpected direction – constitutional control actually makes defection less likely. Finally, one of the elements of the Domestic Events Hypothesis (turnover in Presidents) also makes defection less likely. This finding points to a number of elements to take into consideration. First, the presidency variable may indicate that turnover in the heads of state in a country actually has a dampening effect on defection. That is, despite changes in the presidential seat (both as an event and as an amount), defection is less likely.

From one standpoint, this could suggest that countries with an institution of a presidency provided more stability in policy-making toward Iraq and secured the country's commitment to the coalition. For example, in the case of Romania, both President Ion Iliescu and Traian Basescu were the main actors in policy-making toward the Coalition of the Willing. Mr. Basescu even weathered a hostile legislature and Prime Minister to keep the troops in Iraq. A similar situation was encountered in Poland, where presidential control over foreign policy-making in Iraq provided both Alexander Kwaniewski and Lech Kaczynski with the ability to keep troops in Iraq despite opposition and domestic conflict over troop deployment and maintenance.

On the other hand, Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio prevented Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso from sending combat troops to Iraq because of his opposition to the war. Instead, Barroso sent a contingent of 128 National Guard members to Iraq for a year, a decision that did not require the approval of the President. Moreover, Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko, although initially supportive of his country's participation in the Coalition of the

Willing in Iraq, eventually pulled out the troops by the end of 2005.

In short, the finding that changes in the presidency made defection less likely accord with the behavior of some countries in the CW, but also obscures the very important element of individual preferences and decision-making. That is, even though the institution of the Presidency may have played a role in stabilizing a country's commitment to the coalition in Iraq, it matters what leader is in power and what that leader believes about his or her country's involvement in the coalition (see e.g. Kaarbo 1997 on the impact of a leader's individual characteristics on decision-making). Although an analysis of the impact of individual characteristics on decision-making in Iraq is beyond the scope of this dissertation, results show that such an endeavor would be a fruitful addition to the findings of the defection models.

The second robust finding pointing to the impact of the domestic political process on decision-making regarding participation in Iraq is the dampening impact that a legislature's constitutional control has on defection. Although this variable may suggest that Parliament control over foreign policy also stabilizes a country's international commitments, such a conclusion does not provide a full picture.

Constitutional control over foreign policy does not necessarily mean that legislatures will play a proactive role in foreign policy-making. In countries in which the executive has a relatively strong majority in Parliament, the cabinet generally holds power over policy making, particularly in parliamentary systems in which executive-legislative fusion may be common. This variable, then, points to the fact that legislatures may play a role in decision-making regarding alliance commitments, but obscures the very important interaction between executives and legislatures in foreign policy-making.

Although in the aggregate constitutional control may dampen defection, there are cases in which such constitutional control will make defection more likely, depending on the nature of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. This finding points to the need for a more thorough analysis of executive-legislative interactions in foreign policy-making and fits with the literature on legislative control over foreign policy. The results of the troop numbers models (see below) strengthen this interpretation because the domestic factors that exhibit significance in influencing troop numbers are all related to executive-legislative interaction. As a result, the following chapters investigate executive-legislative interactions in the war in Iraq in three countries in order to illustrate the various ways in which both the executive and the legislature can interact in foreign policy-making, as well as what makes legislatures more powerful. The case selection process and reasoning will be explained in greater detail in the next chapter.

## **II. Troop numbers**

The analysis of the determinants of troop numbers in Iraq is a better fit with empirical reality, as mentioned earlier. Many countries increased and decreased their troop numbers while some kept them stable. Consequently, the same variables that were used to analyze defection were also used to analyze troop levels. Table 9 provides a comparison of the four models and the variables that were significant. Individual models follow.

**Table 9 (Comparison of significance)**

<b>TROOP NUMBERS</b>				
	Model 1	Model 2 (no security)	Model 3 (no power)	Model 4 (no benefits)
Security (casualties)		n/a		
Security (domestic attacks)	Significant (-)	n/a	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Security (kidnapping deaths)	Significant (+)	n/a	Significant (+)	Significant (+)
Power (COW capabilities)			n/a	
Power (GDP per capita)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	n/a	Significant (-)
Power (Defense budget)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)	n/a	Significant (+)
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)				n/a
Benefits (U.S. military aid)				n/a
Domestic (constitutional control)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (democracy level)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (protests)				
Domestic (public opinion)				
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (% party opposition)	x	x	x	x
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (legislative vote)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	x	Significant (-)
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)	Significant (-)
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)
Domestic (nr. of elections)	x	x	x	x
Other (Proportion of contribution)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)	Significant (+)

The full model (Table 10) displays the comparative impact of the four theoretical approaches, and their effect on troop numbers in Iraq. Domestic factors perform very well, although both security and power variables are also significant and robust in all the four models. In the security variables, domestic attacks make troop decreases more likely, although this could be an effect of the ten attacks that shook Spain and played a role in its complete withdrawal from Iraq (the attacks in Spain make up 10 out of the 16 registered events). Interestingly, kidnapping deaths actually make troop increases more likely, which could most likely be explained by the fact that such shocking events can have the opposite effect from withdrawal and actually unite

both leaders and the general population in their resolve to stay in Iraq. At the same time, it is difficult to assess the impact of kidnapping deaths in individual countries because they are frequently tied very closely with other factors, like the opposition's willingness to use these events as windows of opportunity to call for withdrawals. Furthermore, kidnapping deaths could lead to a country's decision to slightly increase the number of troops in Iraq in order to improve security for the peacekeepers deployed there. Consequently, such an increase in the number of troops is not necessarily an uptick in the country's commitment in the coalition, but actually a correction of this commitment that implies the acknowledgement that troop presence has grown less safe.

Of the power variables, the higher the GDP per capita, the more likely were troop numbers to be decreased, while the higher a country's defense budget, the more likely were troop numbers to be increased. The latter finding is intuitive because it could point to the military's significance in the total budget and its possible desire to remain in Iraq and finish its mission there. Neither United States economic aid nor military aid seem to have had an effect on troop numbers.

A very large number of domestic variables seem to have played a role in determining troop numbers. Levels are likely to go up in countries with changes in the presidency, while they are likely to go down in countries with constitutional control, higher democratic levels, coalition cabinets, higher percentages of legislative votes opposed to the Iraq war, in countries where the legislature voted on troop deployment, and where more Prime Ministers changed office. These findings show that an important element in decision-making regarding alliance behavior takes place in the domestic political process, a finding that points out the necessity of including such

variables in the alliance literature. In the aggregate, the variables show that higher degrees of domestic political opposition to the war tend to lead to troop reductions (although public opinion and protests were not significant), as do certain institutional factors like coalition cabinets. In order to better understand how these variables worked in the decision-making process in Iraq, the next three chapters include three case studies that provide a process-tracing analysis of how the variables functioned on a day-to-day basis in a number of countries. The focus is particularly on executive-legislative interaction, since most of the significant domestic variables are related to this dimension and since Putnam's (1988) two-level games approach provides a theoretical reason to focus on this aspect of the country's international behavior.

In terms of the hypotheses, findings were largely inconsistent along the security, autonomy, and benefits variables, and largely consistent along the domestic variables. The security hypothesis prediction that troop numbers are more likely to go down if security worsens was only true in the case of one indicator (domestic attacks). It was insignificant for the casualties indicator, and was significant in the other direction for kidnapping deaths. That is, threats to security did not have consistent effects on a country's troop commitments.

The autonomy hypothesis is also inconsistent. Only the defense budget indicator is significant in the right direction—the higher a country's defense budget, the more likely it is to increase troop numbers. Higher GDP predicts fewer troop numbers, while COW capabilities are insignificant. The benefits variables were not significant in any of the models. Finally, the domestic hypotheses were largely significant and in the right direction, although there were some surprises here as well. The democracy hypothesis showed that the three variables used to measure the concept (democracy level, constitutional control, and legislative vote on troop

deployment) had a negative impact on troop deployment. The coalition hypothesis was significant – coalition cabinets were more likely to cut troop levels. The opposition hypothesis was not confirmed with one exception – only the percentage of legislative party opposition to troop deployment had the effect of reducing troop numbers. The other three indicators – public opinion, protests, and percentage of party opposition-were not significant. The opposition hypothesis was therefore only partially confirmed. The events hypothesis was the most inconsistent of the domestic variables. The number of turnovers in prime ministers had a negative impact on troop numbers, while the number of turnovers in presidents had a positive impact. The number of elections was insignificant. Finally, the Proportion of Contribution hypothesis was confirmed-the higher a country's commitment, the more increases in troop numbers.

Each individual troop levels model is provided below to indicate a larger number of details in terms of the direction and significance of each individual variable (Table 11, 12, and 13).

Table 10

Model 1 (full model)			
	Coeff.	SE	P-values
Security (casualties)	-0.002	0.001	0.162
Security (domestic attacks)	-0.054	0.025	0.034**
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.078	0.023	0.001*
Power (COW capabilities)	-4.349	7.124	0.542
Power (GDP per capita)	-0.000	0.000	0.000*
Power (Defense budget)	0.000	0.000	0.000*
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	-0.000	0.000	0.154
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.002	0.002	0.179
Domestic (constitutional control)	-0.273	0.104	0.009*
Domestic (democracy level)	-0.082	0.024	0.001*
Domestic (protests)	0.046	0.030	0.131
Domestic (public opinion)	-0.000	0.001	0.456
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	-0.282	0.062	0.000*
Domestic (% party opposition)	0.001	0.001	0.427
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	-0.005	0.001	0.000*
Domestic (legislative vote)	-0.299	0.112	0.008*
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	-0.293	0.024	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	0.144	0.033	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of elections)	0.040	0.022	0.069
Other (Proportion of contribution)	27.531	1.321	0.000*
Constant	3.145	0.236	0.000*

N=1405 // Log-likelihood = -8502.0904  
Significance tests were two-tailed. \* p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05

Table 11

Model 2 (no security variables)			
	Coeff.	SE	P-values
Security (casualties)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security (domestic attacks)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security (kidnapping deaths)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (COW capabilities)	-5.162	5.529	0.350
Power (GDP per capita)	-0.000	0.000	0.000*
Power (Defense budget)	0.000	0.000	0.000*
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	-0.000	0.000	0.180
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.002	0.001	0.186
Domestic (constitutional control)	-0.212	0.102	0.001*
Domestic (democracy level)	-0.078	0.023	0.001*
Domestic (protests)	0.033	0.029	0.266
Domestic (public opinion)	-0.001	0.001	0.330
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	-0.279	0.061	0.000*
Domestic (% party opposition)	-0.000	0.001	0.993
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	-0.005	0.001	0.000*
Domestic (legislative vote)	-0.305	0.111	0.006*
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	-0.284	0.024	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	0.159	0.033	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of elections)	0.032	0.021	0.128
Other (Proportion of contribution)	26.228	0.961	0.000*
Constant	3.138	0.234	0.000*
N=1405 // Log-likelihood = -8510.0129			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

Table 12

Model 3 (no power variables)			
	Coeff.	SE	P-values
Security (casualties)	0.000	0.001	0.945
Security (domestic attacks)	-0.075	0.026	0.005*
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.107	0.023	0.000*
Power (COW capabilities)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (GDP per capita)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Power (Defense budget)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	-0.000	0.000	0.275
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	0.005	0.001	0.003*
Domestic (constitutional control)	-0.312	1.076	0.000*
Domestic (democracy level)	-0.130	0.024	0.000*
Domestic (protests)	0.035	0.032	0.162
Domestic (public opinion)	-0.000	0.001	0.915
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	-0.241	0.063	0.000*
Domestic (% party opposition)	0.001	0.001	0.484
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	-0.007	0.001	0.000*
Domestic (legislative vote)	-0.101	0.111	0.363
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	-0.272	0.024	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	0.152	0.034	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of elections)	0.022	0.021	0.291
Other (Proportion of contribution)	31.677	1.076	0.000*
Constant	3.119	0.246	0.000
N=1405 // Log-likelihood = -8529.7053			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

Table 13

Model 4 (no benefits variables)			
	Coeff.	SE	P-values
Security (casualties)	-0.002	0.001	0.185
Security (domestic attacks)	-0.053	0.025	0.034**
Security (kidnapping deaths)	0.076	0.023	0.001*
Power (COW capabilities)	-3.591	7.082	0.612
Power (GDP per capita)	-0.000	0.000	0.000*
Power (Defense budget)	0.000	0.000	0.000*
Benefits (U.S. economic aid)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Benefits (U.S. military aid)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Domestic (constitutional control)	-0.262	0.104	0.012**
Domestic (democracy level)	-0.077	0.023	0.001*
Domestic (protests)	0.045	0.030	0.137
Domestic (public opinion)	-0.000	0.001	0.555
Domestic (coalition cabinet)	-0.290	0.061	0.000*
Domestic (% party opposition)	0.000	0.001	0.603
Domestic (% legislative opposition)	-0.005	0.001	0.000*
Domestic (legislative vote)	-0.301	0.109	0.006*
Domestic (nr. of P.M. changes)	-0.295	0.024	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of President changes)	0.148	0.033	0.000*
Domestic (nr. of elections)	0.032	0.020	0.125
Other (Proportion of contribution)	27.337	1.309	0.000*
Constant	3.102	0.225	0.000
N=1405 // Log-likelihood = -8503.8705			
Significance tests were two-tailed. * p<0.01; **p<0.05			

## Conclusion

The analysis of the determinants of defection and troop numbers point out the relative importance of the four clusters of variables in coalition behavior in Iraq. In the case of defection, domestic factors performed the best out of all four and revealed that changes in the presidency and constitutional control had a robust impact on dampening the likelihood of a country's

defection. Although the deeper analysis of why the presidential factor played a role in reducing defection is beyond the scope of this dissertation, one of the important suggestions for further work in this area would be to look at individual presidents and their role in Iraq foreign policy-making. In some cases they may have indeed prevented defection (like in Romania), while in other cases (like Portugal) they actually reduced the country's commitment there, much to the chagrin of a pro-United States Prime Minister and legislature. The crucial variable accounting for the difference here – since Presidents had veto power over troop deployment – is the individual preferences and personalities of the leaders.

The finding that constitutional control actually makes defection unlikely also suggests a pattern in which legislative control over foreign policy may secure a country's commitment, but overlooks the possibilities of executive-legislative conflict. In some cases, both the executive and the legislative would speak with one voice over Iraq, in part because the cabinet's control over policy-making and secure majority in Parliament did not provide many opportunities for legislative assertions of independence. On the other hand, legislatures were fairly proactive in influencing foreign policy, sometimes in opposition to the executive's preferences, which the following case studies will reveal.

The analysis of troop number determinants is more ambiguous about the relative success of the four clusters of variables. It is clear that benefits played no significant role in decision-making, and, with one exception, they did not play a role in the defection model, either. This could point to two issues. First, it is possible that a focus on United States economic and military aid may not reveal all the benefits that the countries in the Coalition of the Willing were seeking. At the same time, investigations of individual countries and secondary literature points out that

the CW members did not actually get much in return for being reliable allies to the United States. No country received significant reconstruction contracts, debt recovery from Iraq, or even visa facilitation regimes with the United States (an extremely sensitive subject for Eastern Europe). Second, it is possible that the members of the coalition were simply not interested in the benefits that they obtained from the United States and were driven largely by other reasons in the development of Iraq policy. The costs may have also included in the cluster of security variables may have also played a role because they outweighed benefits in most cases.

The security and power theoretical approaches fare better in the troop levels models than in the defection models. These findings confirm some previous arguments and suggestions in the literature and stress the continuing importance of traditional IR theories in the analysis of state behavior. At the same time, the significant findings that domestic politics plays a central role in coalition participation decisions points to the fact that scholars may be overemphasizing the importance of security and power variables because they do not pay attention to many domestic-level factors. Consequently, the results in this chapter suggest more engagement with domestic-level variables and their comparison with security and power variables.

This is a difficult proposition. In the current dissertation, data on domestic politics was the most time-consuming and difficult to collect, in part because it required extended use and processing of primary and secondary documents. The results of the models show, however, that such an effort is necessary. There is a possibility that the current alliance literature makes spurious arguments about the utility of security and power variables because it ignores the domestic political process. The inclusion of domestic political variables would both show when security and power matter, and when they do not.

The various domestic factors that were important in the analysis – constitutional control, democracy level, coalition cabinets, the percentage of legislative opposition, a legislative vote, the number of changes in the Prime Minister and the President – indicate how much coalition behavior is influenced by internal wrangling over how the country should follow through on its commitments. It also suggests that much of the decision-making process takes place in the legislature, or in the interaction between the executive and the legislative.

With the quantitative study, however, it is difficult to point out how exactly all of these variables mattered on a day-to-day basis in the numerous members of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq. Chapter four fills this gap and seeks to perform a process-tracing analysis of the influence of domestic institutions on foreign policy-making in Iraq. The theoretical framework that ties all of the domestic-level factors with the country's behavior on the international stage is Lantis' (1997) modification of Putnam's (1988) two-level games.

### **Two-level games**

This dissertation argues that a version of the two-level games (Putnam 1988) framework is the most appropriate for the investigation of the participation of countries in the Coalition of the Willing, for one major reason. The large-N study reveals the important effect of a number of domestic institutional variables on decision-making regarding defection and troop numbers. That, in fact, was the most robust finding in the large-N study and the variables (constitutional control, parliament vote, coalition cabinet, and democracy level) that measured the democracy hypothesis of the domestic factors were all significant in the expected direction. These variables point out that the executive and the legislature both played a role in the country's development of policy in Iraq. It is clear that parliaments and cabinets interacted in one way or another to affect

troop commitments, and the next step in the study is to establish how exactly that happened. This is particularly important because executive leaders started out having made commitments to the United States as an ally, but it looks as though legislatures and coalition cabinets played a significant role in undermining the executive's ability to keep those promises or changed the executive's mind as time went by. It is important to understand how this process happened.

Importantly, the executive leaders that shaped policy in Iraq did not only have to maintain their commitment to the United States, but also had a number of domestic actors to interact with in order to keep those commitments. An empirical revelation from the large-N study, as well as the reality of the executive's involvement along two levels – the international and the domestic – make two-level games an appropriate framework for analysis. It also allows for attention to turn to how parliamentary republics in which legislatures and executives had split decision-making powers in Iraq maintained their troop commitments or defected.

Putnam's (1988) seminal article and book essentially made the argument that countries engage in diplomacy along two levels when it comes to negotiations. Level I involves an interaction process between chief negotiators, usually heads of state or their representatives, regarding a particular issue. These negotiators do not interact in a vacuum, however, because they have domestic constituents whom they have to please in order to be able to negotiate for a particular outcome. The result of negotiations is normally determined by the interaction between the two levels.

This dissertation will not review the literature that has followed Putnam's (1988) influential article and subsequent book, but will instead focus on a particular criticism of his work that is of direct relevance to the case studies that will follow. Although Putnam's inclusion

of the domestic political process in the analysis of foreign policy-making was a significant advance in a literature dominated by realist emphases on the effect of the international system on state behavior, he ended up focusing more on the strategies individual leaders use at the negotiations table, overlooking the process of ratification of international agreements, as well as the theoretical development of the domestic factors that mattered in that process (Lantis 1997, 4). Kaarbo (2001, 173), for example, argues that Putnam's (1988) article and later work undertheorizes the relevance of state structures and political processes.

Lantis (1997) provided one of the most articulate response to these weaknesses, arguing that Putnam was right in noting the interaction between the domestic and the international levels in international negotiations. On the other hand, an international agreement, Lantis explained, is only the “the beginning of a post-commitment politics ratification phase” (1997, 5). Putnam's theoretical framework did not take these important elements into consideration, as a result of which the domestic political process, although deemed important, is undertheorized in his work.

Lantis (1997) proposes to fill this gap by arguing that executive leaders initially make international commitments with relatively little knowledge of how they will garner support for the implementation of that decision at home. Five domestic political conditions will determine whether the executive can make a foreign policy decision to cooperate or defect from international cooperation: major party unity, ruling coalition consensus, symmetry of effects, election results, and public support. In all of these cases, if the executive is favored by these five conditions, the international commitment made is more likely to turn into cooperation and continue as such.

Although Lantis uses his framework to talk about commitments to cooperate in various

international agreements, his framework is flexible enough to be used in the case of the Iraq war. As mentioned earlier, this approach is justified because of the findings in the large-N study about the interaction between parliaments and executives in foreign policy-making toward Iraq, as well as the balancing act that executives played between their commitment to the United States and their ability to convince domestic actors to maintain this commitment. In a number of parliamentary countries (where Parliaments had to approve troop deployment and renew their mandate), the executive made certain promises and commitments to the United States that later had to be confirmed by the legislature. Even if that commitment was initially approved by the legislature, the nature of a country's participation in Iraq was sequential (it continued in time), and conditions changed to influence the ability of the executive to keep his promises.

Using Lantis' (1997) framework, this dissertation looks at three case studies to analyze the nature of the two-level games executives played in their troop commitment to the United States. Denmark, Italy, and Bulgaria were selected because they are among the countries where executives made certain initial commitments to the United States that later had to be confirmed by the legislature. They were also the only countries, along with the Netherlands, where decisions on Iraq were made by the same executive for the country's entire duration in the Coalition of the Willing. This allows the author to set up the preferences of the Prime Minister from the beginning of the commitment to the United States and witness how they changed based on variation in the domestic variables Lantis mentions. Four hypotheses have been derived from Lantis' work, all referring to the ability of the executive to continue the commitment made to the United States in terms of troop numbers. The symmetry of domestic effects factor was not included in the analysis because it suggests that commitments are more likely to survive if they

are made in a security instead of an economic area. Since all of the decisions in this regard were security-related, this hypothesis is unnecessary.

## **Hypotheses**

### *Hypothesis 1 (major party unity hypothesis)*

The stronger major party unity over the executive's position on Iraq, the more likely will participation in the coalition continue unaltered.

### *Hypothesis 2 (ruling coalition consensus hypothesis)*

The stronger ruling coalition consensus over the executive's position on Iraq, the more likely will participation in the coalition continue unaltered.

### *Hypothesis 3 (electoral incentives hypothesis)*

The stronger electoral incentives there are to change the status quo, the more likely status quo is to be changed by the executive.

### *Hypothesis 4 (public opinion opposition hypothesis)*

The higher public opinion opposition, the more likely status quo is to be changed by the executive.

These four hypotheses will be analyzed throughout the country's entire participation in the war in Iraq. The first step will involve the identification of the executive's position on Iraq. There are serious difficulties in the revelation of the Prime Minister's true preferences over this matter, but one major rule of thumb was used that provide reliable interpretations of the cabinet's positions. First, the dissertation looked at early statements made by leaders (going as far back as September 2002, when George W. Bush first asked the United Nations to be more forceful with Saddam Hussein's Iraq) and then investigated how much they changed these statements as the

conflict reached the high point in March 2003.

Overall, from about September 2002 until January 2003, executive heads could make statements regarding Iraq and the degree of support for the United States in its endeavors without having to get legislative confirmation or support for these positions. These few months provided a period of time during which Prime Ministers expressed their viewpoints on Iraq and gave general information about the possible degree of their support. It is with these preferences that the government turned to legislative support, which then lead to a number of conflicts and adjustments. Overall, this approach did not pose any serious problems because it revealed the main rifts between the cabinet and the legislature over the Iraq policy-making process during various episodes. It also allowed a baseline of comparison against which to verify how the opinions of the executive changes as the variables mentioned in the hypothesis changed.

The next few chapters will proceed as follows. The war in Iraq will be set within the large parameters of the country's foreign policy in order to provide context for the analysis of intervention. The preferences of the executive will be identified, and then the participation of the three countries in Iraq will be separated into a number of decision episodes during which the four hypotheses will be analyzed in great detail. Second, each chapter will conclude with a summary of the country's participation in Iraq and summarize the ability of the executive to maintain control of foreign policy-making.

## Chapter 4 – Italy

### *Italian foreign policy and the war in Iraq*

During the Cold War, Italian foreign policy-makers played a careful balancing act involved in being a member of the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as exhibiting some openness toward members of the Socialist bloc (Andreatta 2001). While the European Union provided economic and diplomatic integration, membership in NATO offered security and augmented Italy's attempts at increasing its power. The fall of the Soviet Union provided more leeway for Italian foreign policy assertiveness, with Rome considerably increasing its participation in multilateral military interventions (Andreatta 2001), like Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and I-FOR in Bosnia. Instability in the Balkans and the Middle East have made security issues more central to Italian foreign policy because it is one of the countries that has been most affected by some of the unrest generated in the post-Cold War world (Walston 2007; Croci 2008).

Although Italy's ties with Brussels and Washington, D.C. have always been strong, an emerging tension between Atlanticism and European integration has become more prominent after the Cold War and has exposed divisions between the center-right and the center-left, ending a long-standing foreign policy consensus over the major orientations of the country that emerged in the 1970s (Walston 2007). The center-left in the country has tended to support French and German projects for further European integration, while the center-right has been more euroskeptical and has stressed closer ties with the United States (Carbone 2009).

The war in Iraq was couched in these terms both by foreign policy makers and scholars, generating a rather large body of literature that debated whether Prime Minister Berlusconi's choice to join the Coalition of the Willing signified a sharp turn toward Atlanticism and away

from Europeanism. Croci (2005, 2008) disagrees with the notion that such a sharp turn has actually occurred, emphasizing that both the right and the left, despite some differences over the deployment, have pursued the same policies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Aliboni (2003), on the other hand, saw the new cabinet's arrival as a sign that a new form of neo-nationalism and neo-Atlanticism dovetailed to make up a new priority project for Rome's foreign policy.

Whether the change was significant or not, the debate over Italy's participation in the war was clearly framed in the context of what it meant for the balance between the country's support for the United States or the European Union. Considering the fact that Italy's traditional Europeanists lamented the rift Rome contributed to between the United States and France and Germany, the domestic disagreement over Italy's membership in the Coalition of the Willing centered around the question of whether Berlusconi was tipping the balance too much in favor of one strategic partner as opposed to another, and what that meant for Italy's foreign policy independence.

### ***Decision-makers***

Italy held a general election on May 13, 2001, which resulted in a strong victory by a group of center-right parties that later formed a ruling coalition (Ignazi 2002, 992). This coalition included Forza Italia (FN), Alleanza nazionale (AN), Lega nord (LN), the CCD, and the CDU, two minor Catholic parties. The coalition – which held 351 seats out of a total of 616 in the Chamber of Deputies and 175 seats in the 315-seat Senate – was given the name of House of Freedoms or House of Liberties. FN leader Silvio Berlusconi became its Prime Minister. The Senate gave its vote of confidence to the House of Freedoms coalition on June 20, 2001, followed by the Chamber a day later. Within the cabinet, the FI dominated with 40 percent of the

seats (it held nearly 30 percent of seats in both houses), followed by the AN with 20 percent (it won 16.1 percent of seats), the LN with 12 percent (it won 4.9 percent), and the CCD-CDU with eight percent (it won 6.5 percent). The CCD-CDU was later succeeded by the Unione Democratica di Centro (UDC) (Ignazi 2005; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Newell 2006).

Given the significant instability in the Italian political system and the significant turnover in cabinets, newly-installed Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, bolstered by a strong majority in both houses, pledged to stay in power for a full term (Carbone 2007). He was successful in this plan since he managed to hold on to power for five years, an impressive feat in a country that witnessed changes in Prime Ministers fairly frequently.

#### ***First decision – nature of support for Iraq invasion***

From the outset, Berlusconi's new cabinet was visibly more pro-American than its center-left predecessor, basing one of its foreign policy pillars on a more enthusiastic Atlanticism than the “tradition of lukewarm or qualified Atlanticism” (Brighi 2006, 286) of left-of-center cabinets in the 1990s. Berlusconi himself believed his country needed to develop stronger ties with the United States and felt close ideological affinity (Romano 2006) and even friendship (Giacomello et al. 2009) with President George W. Bush.

One of the most important tests of this newly-found friendship between Rome and Washington, D.C. came during the second half of 2002, when it was becoming clear that the administration in the United States was, at the very least, preparing for the possibility of a war in Iraq. On September 12, 2002, just a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Bush gave a speech in front of the U.N. Assembly, in which he stressed that “Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in the country.” “Are we to assume,” the

United States head of state continued, “that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion. Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.”<sup>17</sup>

Silvio Berlusconi applauded the speech and held his own in front of the Italian General Assembly, in which he emphasized that the international community would have to act “within the framework of the United Nations” to get rid of Saddam Hussein's threat to global security. On September 11, 2002, the Italian cabinet head published a letter in conservative daily *Il Foglio*, saying that “it is necessary to act determinedly, using all diplomatic and political means possible, and without excluding the option of military force” in Iraq.<sup>18</sup> On September 14, 2002, just two days after Bush's U.N. speech, Berlusconi arrived in Camp David (he was the second Italian Prime Minister to ever visit the location) to speak with the United States President about Iraq, suggesting that if Baghdad continued to obstruct U.N. arms inspectors, possible military action could be forthcoming in the country at the beginning of 2003.<sup>19</sup>

Berlusconi therefore emerged as an early supporter of George W. Bush's plans in Iraq, along with Tony Blair, who had visited Camp David a few days before the Italian Prime Minister to speak with the United States head of state about Iraq as well. This position began causing an increasingly visible rift within the European Union, which was struggling to find a common position on a possible war in Iraq (Smith 2009). During an EU-Asia summit in September 2002, French President Jacques Chirac asked Brussels to come up with a unified statement on Iraq

17 Text of Bush Iraq Speech to U.N., CBS News. Available here:

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/12/national/main521781.shtml>. Accessed on December 20, 2010.

18 Italy's Berlusconi offers support for United States on Iraq, September 11, 2002, Reuters.

19 Action against Iraq possible in January: Italy, September 14, 2002, Reuters.

condemning possible unilateral military action by the United States Berlusconi opposed this plan, urging his European Union colleagues to “understand American feelings after September 11.”<sup>20</sup> The statement that resulted from the summit did not mention Iraq or US unilateral action, but did emphasize the need for a United Nations approval of any military action. Two days later, during a legislative debate on Iraq, Berlusconi paraphrased one of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's famous phrases - “the Americans have learned with Roosevelt that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself” - and once again called for both domestic and international support for United States actions regarding Iraq, mentioning that “our way of life, our destiny, both as Europeans and Italians, is tied to that of the United States.”<sup>21</sup> He then asked for a United Nations resolution that would threaten Saddam Hussein's regime with force if he did not comply with demands for disarmament.

Berlusconi's vocal support for George W. Bush's efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein's Iraq – and his willingness to endorse the use of force if such disarmament was not forthcoming – ran against significant public opposition, as well as some ambiguity and hesitation within the ruling coalition. These factors intensified as a war with Iraq became more likely and as conflict peaked in March 2003; they played an important role in Berlusconi's position toward the invasion and limited his commitment (Davidson 2008). Based on Berlusconi's earlier statements and interactions with George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Italian Prime Minister initially sought a single United Nations resolution on Iraq that would ask Saddam to disarm or face consequences.

Large-scale anti-war protests began fairly early in the process of the increase of hostilities

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20 Italy backs United States in spat with France as European Union bickers over Iraq, September 23, 2002, AP.

21 Italy fully supports United States over Iraq: Berlusconi, September 25, 2002, Reuters.

toward Iraq. On September 28, 2002 thousands of anti-war activists demonstrated in Iraq against any United States plans to invade and against Berlusconi's support for such efforts.<sup>22</sup> Similar protests were held on October 5, 2002 in the city of Florence.<sup>23</sup> That same day, young anti-war protesters climbed onto the British consulate in Venice to express opposition to the conflict, and demonstrators in Rome handcuffed themselves to the United States Embassy gate.<sup>24</sup> Fifty women chained themselves at a military air base in Rome on November 5, 2002, as well, marking the beginning of a four-day protest against the war in Iraq.<sup>25</sup>

The protests were accompanied by some degree of ambiguity within the ruling coalition, where some members expressed reservations about Italian support for the United States in Iraq. In contrast with Berlusconi's aggressive speech urging Saddam Hussein to disarm or face a forceful reaction, AN representatives praised the Iraqi President's "rapid" and "open" agreement to the inspections.<sup>26</sup> The statement was praised by center-left opposition M.P.s, who expressed satisfaction with what they saw as significant differences between Berlusconi's and the AN's speeches.

Another rift emerged within the coalition, bolstered by the Vatican's opposition to the war in Iraq. Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, the Holy See's Foreign Minister, said on September 9, 2002 that if any force was used against Iraq, it needed to be part of a decision made by the U.N.<sup>27</sup> A few days later, the Vatican's U.N. Observer, Archbishop Renato Martino, said in comments published in a weekly that a war in Iraq would be "useless" and would pose a series of ethical

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22 Italian anti-war activists in Rome streets over Iraq, September 28, 2003, Reuters.

23 Several thousand march in Italy against Iraq war threats, October 5, 2002, AFP.

24 Demonstrators climb on top of British consulate; protest outside United States Embassy gate in Rome.

25 Anti-war protests kick off in Italy with sit-in, November 6, 2002, Reuters.

26 Italy's National Alliance cautious on Iraq, September 26, 2002, Reuters.

27 Vatican says no strike on Iraq without United Nations approval, September 9, 2002, Reuters.

and legal issues.<sup>28</sup> The Pope himself reiterated opposition to the war during a speech in front of the Italian Parliament in November 2002, where he urged leaders not to “allow themselves to be imprisoned by a logic of conflict incapable of offering real solutions.”<sup>29</sup> Given the UDC's ties to the Vatican (Davidson 2008; Diamanti and Ceccarini 2007), the party was yet another element to take into consideration as Berlusconi shaped his support for the United States's plans in Iraq.

Faced with significant opposition and some intra-coalition disagreement over the nature of support Italy could provide to the United States, Berlusconi himself oscillated between outright support for George W. Bush and a series of qualifications and statements that confused Washington and Brussels. During a visit to Moscow in October 2002, he stressed that that he now wanted to see a second United Nations resolution on Iraq<sup>30</sup> after expressing support for just one strongly-worded resolution a month prior. He also opined that Saddam Hussein may no longer have weapons of mass destruction because he could have hidden or destroyed them in the face of international pressure.<sup>31</sup> A day later, Berlusconi explained his statements, saying that, along with Blair, he was still the closest United States ally in Europe, but reinforced the fact that Iraq may not have WMDs any longer and that a second United Nations resolution would be necessary for the use of force.<sup>32</sup> This qualified position – much more restrained than Berlusconi's initial vocal support for Bush and one United Nations resolution – became the Italian Prime Minister's official position regarding Iraq. Nonetheless, rumors that he was holding negotiations in secret with the United States over Iraq abounded as he continued making contradictory statements in which he said Rome was still one of D.C.'s closest allies and then asked for

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28 Vatican says preventive strike raises ethical, legal questions; majority of Italians oppose war on Iraq, October 2, 2002, AP.

29 Pope deploras “fearful” terrorism in historic parliament address, November 14, 2002, AFP.

30 Italy's Berlusconi, in apparent reversal, backs double resolution on Iraq, October 16, 2002, AFP.

31 Berlusconi distances himself from Bush over Iraq, October 17, 2002, AFP.

32 Berlusconi denies changing stance over Iraq, October 17, 2002, ANSA.

evidence of WMDs in Iraq.<sup>33</sup>

As 2002 was coming to an end and the United States was becoming increasingly impatient with Saddam Hussein's regime, Berlusconi told Italian paper *La Stampa* that even though Italian direct participation in a possible war against Iraq was “pretty remote,” Rome did have in its possession a corps of alpine soldiers who could “prove highly effective” in winter conditions.<sup>34</sup> Berlusconi then emphasized that the United States promised not to engage in any military action in Baghdad without United Nations approval.<sup>35</sup> In November 2002, in one of the first official announcements of Italy's position toward a possible war in Iraq, Defense Minister Antonio Martino announced that military contributions had not yet been requested, but that Rome was willing to provide access to its airspace and military bases should the United States military decide to go into Iraq.<sup>36</sup> The support was granted officially in January 2003, without prior legislative approval after Martino explained that previous agreements with the United States already allowed United States warplanes to fly through Italian airspace.<sup>37</sup>

Perhaps encouraged by this expression of support, Bush's spokesman Ari Fleischer said that opposition to any war in Iraq by France and Germany could be balanced with support from the United Kingdom, Spain, Central and Eastern Europe, and Italy. This announcement was followed by a 15-minute phone conversation between Bush and the Italian Prime Minister. After news of the conversation leaked out, Berlusconi tried to calm down increasing opposition in the country by saying that “there's been no call to war.”<sup>38</sup> A poll that came out toward the end of

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33 Berlusconi on Iraq tightrope, tries to calm fears, January 26, 2003, Reuters.

34 Italian PM Berlusconi thinks war with Iraq can be avoided, November 25, 2002, BBC Monitoring.

35 Italy working to ward off war against Iraq: Berlusconi, December 17, 2002, AFP.

36 Italy would offer air space and bases for possible United States war against Iraq, government says, December 17, 2002, AP.

37 US asks Italy for overflight permission, Italy agrees, January 12, 2003, AP.

38 Berlusconi on Iraq tightrope, tries to calm fears, January 26, 2003.

January 2003 pointed out that 83 percent of Italians believed a war with Iraq would be a “defeat for humanity,”<sup>39</sup> however, as Italy announced another step toward helping the United States in a possible conflict with Iraq by allowing United States planes to use Italian bases for refueling and other “technical” purposes in case of war.<sup>40</sup> Confused by Berlusconi's exact position on Iraq – he had said that Italy would “play its part” in a conflict with Iraq, but that any operation needed to be approved by a second United Nations resolution – the center-left opposition asked Berlusconi to provide a clear position on the matter.

As Defense Minister Antonio Martino announced that Rome would most likely not provide troops for an invasion of Iraq because of a shortage of numbers that would make its contribution symbolic, Berlusconi signed the Letter of Eight, a message from eight European leaders that called on Brussels to support Washington in its efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein's regime.<sup>41</sup> The most visible absentees from the signatories of the letter were the leaders of France and Germany and included the heads of the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic (the Slovakian Prime Minister later asked that his name be included on the list, as well). The letter emphasized that “we cannot allow a dictator to systematically violate those resolutions [referring to a number of them in the 1990s and Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002]. If they are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result.” The message brought to the surface an emerging rift within the European Union over the war in Iraq (Pond 2005; Lewis 2009) and was considered as an indicator of what countries sided visibly with the United States in its intentions in Iraq. Berlusconi's support for the United States became even clearer after his

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39 Italians angry at close US links, January 25, 2003, *The Times*.

40 Report: Italy allows US of bases for technical landings.

41 Eight European leaders rally behind US over Iraq, January 30, 2003, *Reuters*.

name was added to the list.

Public opposition in January remained high, with 72.7 percent of Italians expressing opposition to a war in Iraq and 68 percent opposed to a conflict even with U.N. Security Council approval.<sup>42</sup> Another poll, published in *Corriere della Sera*, showed only eight percent of Italians suggesting that Rome ally “unhesitatingly” with the United States in case of a war in Iraq. The percentage remained unchanged since December 2002. A larger number wanted Italy to align with the United States if the United Nations approved the operation (44 percent compared to 42 percent in December 2002), while 34 percent of Italians said that Rome should “under no circumstances” ally itself with Washington over Iraq. There were considerable differences in willingness to ally with Washington between the supporters of various parties. About 62 percent of FI voters and 57 percent of AN voters wanted Rome to side with the United States if there was a UN-authorized conflict with Iraq, while minorities in the center left expressed similar viewpoints. It was clear, however, that even Forza Italia and AN members were skeptical about Italian assistance for Iraq in the case of unilateral US action there – only 17 percent of AN supporters, for example, wanted Rome to do so, compared to two percent of the opposition Democrats of the Left supporters.<sup>43</sup>

To further complicate things, the Vatican's newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* slammed Defense Minister Antonio Martino's statement that preventive war had some degree of wisdom to it by suggesting he did not have enough wisdom himself to hold his post.<sup>44</sup> Berlusconi reinforced his call for a new United Nations resolution, but stressed that Rome would provide troops and

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42 Polls show European public opposed to Iraq war, January 30, 2003, Reuters; Berlusconi says he supports a second United Nations resolution to give 'legitimacy' to any attack on Iraq, February 4, 2003, AP.

43 Poll shows public opinion demands United Nations authorization for attack on Iraq, February 3, 2003, BBC Monitoring.

44 Vatican newspaper slams Italy's defense minister, February 1, *Kitchener-Waterloo Record*.

hardware for a potential Iraq war after the initial invasion.<sup>45</sup> Protests in a number of Italian cities were organized to demonstrate against a possible conflict in Iraq, culminating in the massing of an immense crowd in Rome, which gathered more than one million people.<sup>46</sup>

In the middle of intensifying public opposition and resistance from the Vatican, Italy extended support for the United States by providing access to ports, highways, and other types of infrastructure in a move that Defense Minister Antonio Martino said did not require legislative approval because it was part of Italy's NATO membership duties.<sup>47</sup> Both legislative houses then approved Prime Minister Berlusconi's appeals that Saddam Hussein comply with United Nations resolutions and disarm in order to avoid the use of force.<sup>48</sup> The plan did not commit any Italian troops for an invasion force and Berlusconi echoed his request for another United Nations resolution. Protests continued in February and March with attempts to disrupt United States military trains circulating in the country<sup>49</sup>, with public opinion still extremely opposed to any support for the United States invasion of Iraq. A poll published at the beginning of March 2003, just a few days before the war began, showed 69 percent of Italians opposed to war under any circumstances, with 53 percent opposed to any Italian participation in military action against Iraq.<sup>50</sup>

Public opinion seemed to be turning against Berlusconi's Forza Italia party, as well, as polls showed a smaller number of Catholics being willing to vote for the party because of its

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45 Italy would contribute troops and hardware to Iraq war: PM, February 4, 2003, AFP.

46 Demos in Italy target US concerns, February 13, 2003, AFP; Massive crowd floods Rome in peace protest, February 15, 2003, AP.

47 Italy gives United States use of its infrastructure, February 14, 2003, AP.

48 Italy's parliament supports pro-US stance on Iraq crisis, February 19, 2003, AP.

49 Italian protesters try to stop US military trains, February 21, 2003, AP; Anti-war activists hit US military trains bound for Iraq, February 26, 2003, AFP; Italian priest and activists block arms train, March 7, 2003, Reuters.

50 Two thirds of Italians oppose war on Iraq: poll, March 10, 2003, AFP.

stand on Iraq.<sup>51</sup> The Catholic party that joined Berlusconi's coalition in 2001 – the UDC – also emphasized that it refused to support any deployment of Italian troops in Iraq without a United Nations resolution (Davidson 2008, 44). The Northern League, another coalition member, explained that a war without United Nations approval would be illegal, while the AN and the cabinet tried to be as ambiguous as possible; the Italian Telecommunications Minister suggested that this silence was “prudent.”<sup>52</sup>

On March 19, 2003, amid jeers from the center-left opposition, both legislative houses approved Berlusconi's request to allow the US-led coalition to use airspace and military space, but not for direct attacks on Iraq. This decision was made with widespread support from the center-right coalition, which disagreed on possibilities for Italian participation in the initial invasion, but was willing to provide logistical support to the United States. As United States planes flew toward Baghdad to invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein, Berlusconi and his center-right coalition were finalizing their first important decision on the Iraq war.

Initially a vocal supporter of George W. Bush's statements and urges that Iraq disarm, Prime Minister Berlusconi moderated his message and began walking a fine line between providing outright assistance to D.C. while attempting to minimize high degrees of public opposition and endless protests in Rome and other major Italian cities. This opposition began affecting his own ratings as Forza Italia lost portions of its Catholic electorate. The Vatican's staunch opposition to any intervention in Iraq, along with the President's emphases that a war unauthorized by Iraq would be illegal, also affected the ruling coalition's unity over Iraq, as the UDC and the Lega Nord said unilateral intervention in Iraq would be illegal, and as the AN

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51 Italian Catholics turned off by Government's Iraq stance: poll; February 26, 2003, AFP.

52 Italian minister sees government silence on Iraq as prudent, March 17, 2003, BBC Monitoring.

praised Saddam early on for his willingness to work with negotiators. La Stampa called Berlusconi's see-sawing positions on Iraq an attempt to “square the circle,” and with the first days of the invasion over, the Prime Minister seemed to have weathered the first major decision he made on Iraq by carefully balancing opposition to the war with support for the United States.<sup>53</sup> Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini provided a good summary of the Italian cabinet's position in Iraq by saying that Italy was not participating in the war, but that it was also not neutral since it wanted the United States to win it.<sup>54</sup>

### **Summary of the first decision**

#### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Although a vocal supporter of a single United Nations resolution on Iraq in September, Berlusconi announced in mid-October that he wanted two United Nations resolutions and that the country would not contribute to an invasion force in Iraq. From September 2002 until March 2003, Berlusconi continued providing declaratory and logistical support to US efforts in Iraq, while, at the same time, refraining from sending invasion forces. The four factors listed below had a moderating effect on Berlusconi's positions on Iraq and displayed the influence of the legislature on the executive's decision-making. The main effect was the moderation of an initially enthusiastic policy of support.

#### *Hypotheses*

Party unity (H1)<sup>55</sup> in Italy was strong. Berlusconi's Forza Italia did not show visible rifts

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53 Berlusconi manages to “square the circle” in Iraq crisis: Italian paper, March 21, 2003, BBC Monitoring.

54 Frattini defends government's stance on Iraq, April 2, 2003, ANSA.

55 Shorthand for Hypothesis 1.

over Iraq, and the Italian Prime Minister was the main policy-maker regarding this topic within his own party. Ruling coalition unity (H2) over how to develop a position on Iraq was relatively weak, and was made even more vulnerable by the center-left's unity in opposing the war. The Vatican played a role in dividing the ruling coalition by providing cues for Catholic voters, who generally voted center-right, and especially to the UDC. Berlusconi was, therefore, constrained by his ability to provide more support for the United States despite his earlier enthusiastic statements in favor of Washington's plans. No visible electoral incentives (H3) existed, although polls began showing some losses in the electoral bases of Forza Italia, for example. Italy registered a high degree of public opposition (H4) to the war in Iraq and to Italy's participation in the war, as well as public protests. Even opinions expressed by the supporters of the ruling coalition showed a reluctance to provide unconditional support to the United States, which limited Berlusconi's options.

### **Second decision – deployment of peacekeeping troops in April 2003**

As the first week of the intervention in Iraq ended, protests in Italy continued and Prime Minister Berlusconi was accused of providing direct support for a United States intervention in Iraq after 1,000 U.S. paratroopers that were stationed in Italy moved into northern Iraq. Berlusconi denied the accusations and the issue slowly disappeared from the public eye.<sup>56</sup> Opposition to the war – 76 percent - was still at an all-time high, but Italians said they wanted the United States to win quickly.<sup>57</sup>

In April, arguing that “the war is over,” Prime Minister Berlusconi announced that Italy

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<sup>56</sup> Deployment of troops in northern Iraq does not violate terms of Italy's involvement, government says, March 27, 2003, AP.

<sup>57</sup> Italians opposed to war, but want rapid United States victory, March 28, 2003, AFP.

was ready to send a peacekeeping contingent to Iraq if Parliament approved. He had announced this intention before the war started, and domestic political conditions in the country were much more favorable for his ability to implement his preferences than before the conflict began. Compared to 21 percent of Italians who were in favor of an Iraq intervention on March 21, 37 percent of Italians now expressed their support for such an endeavor. A slimmer majority – 56 percent – were now against the war, with 13 percent saying that they had changed their mind in the previous week.

Opinions of the United States and of the Italian cabinet's handling of the situation went up, in the latter case from 41 to 45 percent.<sup>58</sup> The UDC announced its support for Berlusconi's plan to send peacekeepers to Iraq in mid-April (Davidson 2008, 45), although there were some discussions about whether the troops should be under a U.N. banner or be embedded into the coalition forces. European Affairs Minister Rocco Buttiglione said that if the Italian peacekeepers were placed under United States command, that would be a “problem.”<sup>59</sup> These differences were not enough to create a rift within the coalition, however, particularly since the United Nations later issued resolutions each year that allowed coalition countries to claim their presence in Iraq was endorsed by the international community.

The relative consensus of the ruling coalition stood in contrast with the divided opposition. The Olive Tree – a center-left coalition of parties created to coordinate opposition activities in the legislature – abstained from voting for the deployment in the absence of a United Nations mandate for the troops, while a few small far-left parties like the Refounded Communists, the Italian Communist Party, and the Greens voted against.<sup>60</sup>

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58 Anti-war sentiment on the wane in Italy, poll finds, April 14, 2003, ANSA.

59 Italian lawmakers to vote on sending police force to Iraq, April 14, 2003, AFP.

60 Italian left's moderate stance on Iraq damaging premier: daily, April 17, 2003, BBC Monitoring.

The Vatican was no longer a source of specific opposition to Italian foreign policy choices as the center-right kept its solid majority in both houses and voted to deploy 3,000 carabinieri to southern Iraq. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approved funding for the troops in July 2003, which is when the peacekeepers arrived. As Italy became used to its peacekeepers' presence in Iraq, public opinion turned favorable – 45.5 percent of Italians said they were in favor of extending the presence of Italian troops while 41.4 percent said they were completely against it.<sup>61</sup>

### **Summary of the second decision**

#### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Berlusconi announced before the March 2003 intervention that although Italy would not provide troops for an invasion force, it would help with a humanitarian deployment. He was able to implement this preference with few problems given little political and public opposition, as well as unity within both his major party and coalition.

#### *Hypotheses*

Major party unity (H1) in Italy was strong with no visible rifts over the decision to deploy peacekeepers. Ruling coalition unity (H2) was stronger than during the first decision-making episode as the UDC expressed support for sending peacekeepers to Iraq. Some cabinet members (who also happened to be UDC members) said they were concerned with the lack of a United Nations mandate for the Italian troops, but these differences were smoothed over. No visible electoral incentives (H3) existed that would constrain decision-making regarding Iraq. A small

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61 Polls show Italians favor extending Iraq peacekeepers' mandate, October 14, 2003, BBC Monitoring.

number of local elections in May and June showed the center-right weakening slightly, but holding on to power. In contrast with the first episode, public opinion (H4) was in favor of deploying peacekeepers to Iraq and keeping them there. Opinion on the war in Iraq also became more tolerant of the US, and views of Washington improved.

### **Third decision – withdrawal from Iraq**

Between the decision to deploy troops in April 2003 and the decision to withdraw them in March 2005, approximately two years of relative decision-making stability passed, during which the center-right preserved its strong legislative majority and Prime Minister Berlusconi emphasized repeatedly that troops would stay in Iraq as long as would be necessary: he did so in December 2003,<sup>62</sup> April 2004,<sup>63</sup> and May 2004,<sup>64</sup> for example. Public opinion in 2003 remained favorable for the extension of the peacekeeping mandate in Iraq – at the beginning of November, 60 percent of Italians approved the deployment of troops to the Middle Eastern country.<sup>65</sup>

The situation began shifting after a November 12, 2003 bomb attack on Italian peacekeepers in Nassisiyah killed 19 members of the contingent, the largest single-episode military loss for the Italian armed forces since World War II.<sup>66</sup> The attack shocked Italian public opinion and politicians. The center-left became more adamant about the need to either place Italian troops under a United Nations mandate or leave. In a poll conducted just a few days after the tragedy, a slimmer majority of Italians – 50.9 percent – said they still wanted troops to stay in Iraq a few days after the tragedy.<sup>67</sup>

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62 Italy may face more sacrifices in Iraq: Berlusconi, December 20, 2003, Reuters.

63 Italians will stay in Iraq: Berlusconi, April 19, 2004, AFP.

64 Italian foreign minister offers dialogue, Italians increasingly favor pullout of troops, April 16, 2004, AP.

65 40 pct of Italians oppose sending troops to Iraq, November 13, 2003, ANSA.

66 Berlusconi says Italy won't be intimidated by bomb, November 12, 2003, Reuters.

67 Most Italians want troops to remain in Iraq: poll, November 14, 2003, AFP.

The tide in public support began changing in March 2004, when a poll showed 67 percent of Italians opposed to the extension of the troops' mandate if the worsening security situation in Iraq did not change and unless a multi-national United Nations force took over. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid, which played a role in the demise of the pro-Iraq right-wing Government and led to the victory of the Socialists, who promised to withdraw troops, Italians grew more anxious and the Interior Minister had to make public statements that rumors of an “imminent” attack in Italy were baseless.<sup>68</sup> In mid-April, the number of Italians who supported the extension of the mandate for troops in Iraq dropped from 47 percent to 38 percent in just one day, right after Fabrizio Quatrocchi, a 35-year-old security guard, was kidnapped and then killed. The percentage of Italians who wanted troops to stay no matter what dropped from 34 to 24 percent, and only 48 percent of the center right's electorate wanted the cabinet to implement this policy, down from 59 percent.<sup>69</sup>

During that same month, the first echoes of a unified left-wing opposition stand on the war in Iraq began to emerge. The center-left abstained the first few times deployment and funding for the peacekeeping troops was provided, while the far left voted against and attacked both the center-right and the center-left for supporting United States presence in Iraq. On March 27, 2004, however, European Commission head Romano Prodi, who was vying for the position of unified opposition leader, made the promise that if his coalition won the next elections, the center-left coalition would withdraw peacekeepers from Iraq.<sup>70</sup>

Italian troops in Iraq were also in a dangerous location – they were almost permanently fighting off attacks. Eleven soldiers were injured in clashes in April while a soldier was killed in

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68 Italy's interior minister says rumors of imminent attacks in Italy are 'baseless,' March 17, 2004, AP.

69 Italian foreign minister offers dialogue, Italians increasingly favor pullout of troops, April 16, 2004, AP.

70 If in government, Prodi would pull Italian troops out of Iraq, March 27, 2004, AFP.

a battle with Shiite militias. Two polls in May showed, just like in the case of the first decision episode in Iraq, the consolidation of a strong majority opposed to the cabinet's plans in Iraq – one poll said that 61 percent of Italians wanted their troops out of Iraq, while another one showed 63 percent against, including 42 percent of the center-right coalition's voters.<sup>71</sup>

Along with the worrying polling numbers and the increasing center-left unified message on Iraq, certain rifts began to appear within the ruling coalition itself as well. The far-right Lega Nord (Northern League) expressed its support for troops remaining in Iraq until June 30, 2004, when the coalition was expected to hand over sovereignty to the Iraqi authorities, but Senate Deputy Speaker Roberto Calderoli (who was the LN's national coordinator), contradicted Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's statements that Rome would stay in Iraq beyond that date no matter what happens. Calderoli stressed that such a decision would only be made after sovereignty was transferred to a transitional government recognized by the United Nations and upon a request for assistance from the Government.<sup>72</sup> The League's position blocked the creation of a joint motion by the coalition on Iraq, which Prime Minister Berlusconi sought before he went in front of Parliament to defeat an opposition motion to withdraw troops from Iraq.<sup>73</sup>

Tension grew both within the coalition and between the center-right and the center-left after European Parliament elections on June 12-13, 2004, which were seen as a referendum on the ruling coalition after Berlusconi came to power in 2001. The election was characterized by three important events that weakened the current cabinet and increased electoral pressure on its survival for the upcoming national legislative poll (which was expected to happen in the middle of 2006). First, the major center-right groups united in a single list called the Olive Tree, which

71 Six in 10 Italians want troops pulled out of Iraq: poll, May 18, 2004, AFP; Italian poll shows majority support for Iraq pullout, IHS Global Insight, May 24, 2004.

72 Berlusconi faces down opposition on withdrawal of Italian troops in Iraq, AFP, May 20, 2004.

73 Berlusconi coalition ally voices reservations on keeping troops in Iraq, May 19, 2004, AFP.

included the Democrats of the Left (DS), the Daisy Party, the SDI, and the European Republicans. The list was a success of Romano Prodi's, who became its official leader and would square off against Berlusconi during the national legislative elections. Second, for the first time, the center-left surpassed the center-right in voting popularity, albeit by one percent (Ignazi 2005, 1065). This pointed out, however, that the center-left could win elections if it stayed united and had a relatively coherent message. Finally, the Prime Minister's Party – Forza Italia – lost rather heavily (about four percent) compared to the previous European elections and the 2001 general election. Its alliance partners either maintained or increased their score, therefore challenging the major party's claim to be the dominant political group within the ruling coalition. This weakened Berlusconi's hold over the coalition and made consensus on such matters as Iraq more difficult to obtain.

Certain events solidified the domestic factors that were emerging regarding Iraq by March 2004 – high public opposition, tension within the ruling coalition, increasing coordination on the left, and the center-right's fears of an upcoming loss in the national elections. The large-N dataset in Chapter three does not take into consideration such unique events because of the inherent problems with formulating a reliable cross-country coding rule for them. The inclusion of a few events – like Saddam Hussein's capture in December 2003, Iraqi elections in 2005, the U.N. building bombing – were included in the models and were not significant. At the same time, it is difficult to predict the effect of such events in the aggregate because they frequently interact with other variables such as public opposition and cabinet politics. The Italian case shows the importance such individual events can have on foreign policy-making.

In September 2004, two Italian aid workers were kidnapped, leading to rallies and cabinet

and opposition cooperation for their release. Although the large-N analysis in chapter three points out that kidnapping deaths actually increased the probability of countries adding troops to the war in Iraq, that overlooks the impact of such events on the public and on the political process. Italy had a number of such kidnapping crises during its stay in Iraq, and one of the effects of such events was the solidification of the impression that Iraq was becoming increasingly unstable and unsafe for Italian troops. This impression most likely decreased the initial support of the Italian public for the presence of peacekeepers in Iraq, giving further legitimacy to opposition calls for withdrawal. For example, after the two aid workers were finally released at the end of September and themselves called for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, some far left parties proposed a motion for an immediate withdrawal of troops, but was met with ambiguous attitudes expressed by the center-left.

Although the larger left-wing parties were consolidating their position on Iraq, there was still some degree of disagreement and internal debate on how exactly to formulate that attitude; by that time, however, the discussion was no longer about whether the center-left would abstain and silently tolerate the presence of peacekeepers in Iraq (like it happened after April 2003), but whether withdrawal needed to be immediate or performed gradually in consultation with the Iraqi authorities. The transformation was extremely significant because it meant the left could finally agree on a lowest common denominator that no longer involved the choice between keeping troops or withdrawing them, but the choice between the speed of withdrawal. In any case, the kidnappings provided a window of opportunity for the opposition to bring up troop withdrawal at a time when public opinion was fully aware of the dangers involving the presence of Italians peacekeepers in Iraq.

Another event was extremely significant in making Berlusconi's insistence on staying in Iraq more problematic. At the beginning of February 2005, Italian reporter Giuliana Sgrena was abducted near a mosque in Baghdad. The group that kidnapped her gave Rome 72 hours to withdraw troops from Iraq. At about the same time, a poll published on February 12 pointed out that 40 percent of Italians wanted peacekeepers returned home immediately, while an additional 25.8 percent said such a withdrawal should depend on a United Nations resolution. Nearly half of Italians said it was wrong to send troops into Iraq, while 44 percent agreed with the deployment.<sup>74</sup> Romano Prodi also announced on February 15 that the center-left opposition would vote against continuing to fund troops in Iraq, but explained that he did not seek immediate withdrawal.<sup>75</sup>

On March 4, after Giuliana Sgrena was released from captivity, the car in which she was transported was fired upon by U.S. soldiers. The Italian agent escorting Sgrena – Nicola Calipari – covered the reporter's body with his own and died from gunshot wounds. The announcement sent shockwaves through Italian society as the cabinet attempted to do damage control and prevent the event from developing into anti-American protests. Previously friendly discourse between Rome and Washington, D.C. took on a more acrimonious tone. Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini asked that the United States “identify and punish” the soldiers who did the shooting and emphasized that America's version of the events contradicted those of Italian experts.<sup>76</sup>

The opposition staged a rally to protest the shooting, and the situation grew increasingly more tense after Giuliana Sgrena accused the United States soldiers of shooting upon the car on

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74 40% of Italians want Italy out of Iraq, survey says, February 12, 2005, ANSA.

75 Prodi says opposition against refinancing Iraqi mission, February 15, 2005, ANSA.

76 Rome points to differences with US over account of Iraq shooting, March 8, 2005, AFP.

purpose. Italian society was also shocked to find out that Nicola Calipari had been involved in negotiations to release the reporter and had been an experienced negotiator in a number of conflict zones, making his death even more tragic.

In short, the cabinet was dealing with a perfect storm and in March 2005, Prime Minister Berlusconi made an about-face, issuing his first statement about withdrawal from Iraq. “Italian troops will be withdrawn gradually as Iraq's ability to use its own men to defend public order comes into its own,” Berlusconi explained.<sup>77</sup> Two days later, Berlusconi even provided a date to begin withdrawal – he said that Rome would begin leaving in September. The announcement was made just two weeks before regional elections in Italy, seen as the last national-level competition before the legislative elections in mid-2006. The center-right contested the elections in the same format as the 2001 national legislative elections and lost heavily, which created a rift between the Forza Italia and the Lega Nord on the one hand, and the AN and the UDC on the other. The last party's ministers resigned over internal disagreements about reorganizing the coalition seating distribution and its message, and Berlusconi decided to resign. He then proceeded to have another cabinet invested on April 28, 2005, which included a redistribution of cabinet seats to the same coalition, but provided more ministries to the AN and fewer to Berlusconi's own Forza Italia. The Prime Minister was hoping to keep the cabinet going until legislative elections in mid-2006, which proved to be successful.

In the middle of this instability, the cabinet suffered another blow as the United States announced that it was absolving the soldiers who shot Nicola Calipari.<sup>78</sup> Cabinet minister Roberto Calderoli, a member of the Lega Nord, stressed that Italian authorities needed to think

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<sup>77</sup> Italy to withdraw troops from Iraq “gradually” if situation improves: premier, March 13, 2005, BBC Monitoring.

<sup>78</sup> Premier Silvio Berlusconi wins confidence vote in Italian Senate, April 28, 2005, AP.

more seriously about the country's withdrawal from Iraq, while an M.P. from Berlusconi's own Forza Italia requested a reevaluation of the mission. Berlusconi once again rejected opposition calls for immediate withdrawal, but reinforced his plan for gradual withdrawal, due to begin in September. Romano Prodi repeated his promise to withdraw what he called Italian "occupation" forces from Iraq and possibly replace them with a civilian force.<sup>79</sup>

Toward the end of 2005, the center-left agreed on a formula for gradual pull-out from Iraq, which essentially echoed Berlusconi's announcement. Immediate withdrawal was taken off the table despite pressure from far left parties, and the general expectation was that the cabinet that won legislative elections would see the gradual withdrawal through. In April 2005, Romano Prodi claimed victory at the polls and won a vote of confidence in May 2005, taking over power. Gradual troop withdrawal began one month earlier than scheduled, in August 2005, and continued in batches of hundreds until the last Italian soldier left in December 2006. Italy was out of the Coalition of the Willing.

## **Summary of hypotheses**

### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Until March 2005, Berlusconi simply reinforced the fact that his country wanted to stay in Iraq as long as needed. Right around that period, however, in the face of growing intra-alliance opposition, hostile public opinion, a unified opposition, and terrible events that kept the Iraq war issue in the public eye, he backed down and changed his country's policy. Following Putnam's(1988) terminology, Berlusconi could not keep his Level I commitments because of his increasing inability to keep his Level II constituents happy.

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<sup>79</sup> Italian opposition leader says he would replace troops in Iraq with civilian force if elected, September 2, 2005, AP.

*Hypotheses*

Although Forza Italia generally preserved its unity (H1) over supporting Berlusconi's plans in Iraq, its losses during the European Parliament elections and the regional elections weakened its dominance as the major party and, therefore, weakened Berlusconi's ability to push through his agenda in Parliament. Internal dissent became more visible after the United States announced that Nicola Calipari's shooters were absolved from any blame. Ruling coalition unity (H2) grew increasingly tenuous as it suffered more and more defeat during the European and the regional elections. The UDC's initial departure from the cabinet because of disagreements over seat distributions and its return in the next Berlusconi cabinet signaled increasing disagreement within the coalition. A cabinet minister from the Northern League asked for a reconsideration of the mission of the troops after the Nicola Calipari ruling, as well, which showed some disagreement over Iraq policy as Berlusconi insisted on strong US-Italian ties despite disagreement over the shooting.

In contrast with the first and second decisions Berlusconi made, electoral incentives (H3) to change Iraq policy grew as European and regional elections showed the Prime Minister's center-right coalition losing ground in the face of an increasingly united and coherent opposition (at least with regards to the Iraq issue). Furthermore, polls showed the growing popularity of the center-left parties and their harmony with popular opinion when it came to Iraq policy. From this perspective, Berlusconi's announcement of a withdrawal a year before scheduled elections and a few weeks prior to regional elections were a wise strategy that took away the Iraq issue from the center-left. Since both Prodi and Berlusconi began holding increasingly similar positions on Iraq – a gradual instead of immediate withdrawal – the debate on Iraq mostly centered on Prodi's

accusations that the war was unjustified.

Although public opinion (H4) was behind Berlusconi's plans to keep peacekeeping troops in Iraq for a year after deployment, the tide turned slowly after the Nassiriyah tragedy and especially after the Nicola Calipari shooting and the reluctance of the United States to prosecute those guilty of the shooting.

### **Summary**

Prime Minister Berlusconi was one of the most vocal supporters of George W. Bush, especially until October 2002. He initially sought only one United Nations resolution on the use of force in Iraq, but changed his mind in the face of public and political opposition at home. The premier began his Level I commitment of troop deployment fairly confident of his ability to ensure Level II compliance, but events on the ground eroded public opinion support, antagonized opposition groups, and created problems within his own party and his coalition. Faced with increasing problems over implementing his Level II commitments, Berlusconi pulled troops out of Iraq.

The findings in this case study dovetail with some of the results of the large-N analysis and question the utility of others. Few variables were statistically significant in the defection model, but this dichotomous approach to studying behavior in the Coalition of the Willing, as became obvious in the case study, obscured the relevance of a number of variables whose significance becomes more visible in the troop numbers model. That is, decision-making in Iraq was not cast in stark defection/no defection terms, but implied more subtle approaches for gradual troop reductions and slow changes in policy. Although the troop numbers analysis

showed that casualties did not affect decision-making in Iraq, this finding is questioned by the Italian case, where the Nassiriyah attack was a pivotal moment that indicated to both the elites and the public that Italy's stay in Iraq would not be simple. In the aggregate, the attack most likely weakened Italy's resolve to stay in Iraq. Domestic attacks, shown to reduce troop numbers in the aggregate, did not play a significant role in Italian decision-making. One puzzling finding in the Italian case is the fact that, contrary to the large-N predictions, kidnapping deaths did not, in fact, lead to an increase in troop numbers. On the contrary, the controversy surrounding the death of Nicola Calipari was yet another episode in Italy's participation in Iraq that weakened its commitment on the ground. Overall, security variables did play an important role in Italy's departure from Iraq, particularly its casualty rate and the controversies surrounding the kidnappings and the friendly fire death.

Italy's power (COW capabilities, GDP per capita, and defense budget) did not undergo any major changes, as a result of which these variables played a negligible role in Rome's decisions about Iraq. The same can be said of the benefits variables (U.S. Economic aid and U.S. military aid); there were few changes in the assistance Italy received from the United States (in fact, it mostly received zero dollars, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars in assistance in 2005 and 2007. Consequently, there was very little talk of the impact of such benefits on Rome's participation.

Domestic variables, as became clear both in the quantitative and the qualitative analysis, were central in explaining Italian behavior, and corresponded both with the direction and the significance found in the large-N study. Constrained by a coalition cabinet in which crucial members expressed their skepticism about Rome's participation in the invasion and even the

legality of war, the Prime Minister did not want to risk a potentially divisive issue from being brought up in Parliament, particularly since the center-left opposition, after a long period of disarray and disorganization, seemed energized in its opposition to Washington's plans in Iraq. The divisiveness within the ruling coalition was particularly affected by the Vatican's opposition to the war, which still held an important degree of influence over center-right voters, especially those in the UDC. Berlusconi even met with Pope John Paul II at the beginning of March 2003 to talk about Iraq.<sup>80</sup> The legislature's ability to rule on troop deployment was a primary constraint in Berlusconi's development of Italian policy in the months before the invasion. The decisions that extended the clearest support to the United States – access to airspace, military bases, and even highways – were only made with the consultation of the legislature and involved no direct vote that would reveal any rifts within the center-right coalition.

Although none of the models presented in chapter three pointed to the significant impact of public opinion on decision-making, the finding obscures the process by which public opinion most likely played a role in this regard. Berlusconi was clearly constrained by a high degree of public opposition to intervention in Iraq during the first episode, which even began eating away at his base of support. Although elections were not expected to take place for at least a few years, the overwhelming opposition – both from the center-left and the center-right electorate – moderated the Italian Prime Minister's initially enthusiastic support for the US.

During the second episode, the problematic domestic conditions that made decisions during the first episode more problematic, disappeared. Berlusconi had the advantage of a friendly public opinion and support from his coalition cabinet members, whose consensus turned the legislative into a rubber-stamp for this particular decision. This finding, revealed by a careful

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<sup>80</sup> Italy's Berlusconi, pope, discuss Iraq crisis.

case study analysis, shows one possible flaw in the quantitative section. On the one hand, the analysis shows that legislative control over troop commitments is correlated with a decrease in troop numbers. On the other hand, this ability to influence the number of troops varies not only between countries, but within various episodes in the country. In the first episode, the legislative preserved control over Iraq policy because some parties in the ruling coalition and the left-wing opposition could have made up a majority that would have then rejected Berlusconi's proposal for support for the U.S. invasion. Consequently, Berlusconi anticipated this risk and reduced his commitment to the United States. In the second episode, however, the executive essentially made Iraq policy because it had the support of its coalition partners and because of the internal divisions within the left-wing opposition. Consequently, the risk of rejection was extremely small.

The legislature regained power over Iraq policy in the third episode, for a number of reasons. The large-N model shows that casualties were not correlated with either defection or alterations in troop numbers, but this security variable most certainly affected decision-making in Italy. The Nassiriyah episode and the constant attacks at the Italian base consolidated the impression in public opinion that Iraq was becoming dangerous and risky for the troops. Berlusconi witnessed a near-constant decrease in support for the Iraq war, and every time there were reports of casualties or of kidnappings, Italians became less enthusiastic about participation in the coalition. Contrary to the finding in the quantitative analysis, kidnapping deaths (found to increase troops) actually lowered public support for the war and provided more incentives for authorities to begin taking departure into consideration. Power and benefits variables, as mentioned, did not change significantly and were not found to affect Italian decision-making.

Parliament's power was not only augmented by the worsening security situation, but also because of the domestic factors the large-N analysis revealed as significant. The very fact of legislative control over troop deployment made Berlusconi dependent on securing a majority to keep troops in Iraq. Although this was easy during the second episode, the process became more difficult during the third. Faced with worsening public support for the war, the coalition began showing rifts about Iraq. On the other hand, the opposition presented a united front, which increased the likelihood of a troop decrease or of defection. Although the large-N study does not show the number of elections as a significant variable, Berlusconi clearly made his announcement to withdraw from Iraq based on the disappointing results of the European Parliament elections in 2004 and to anticipate Prodi's criticism of Iraq policy in the run-up to the 2006 elections.

These three episodes also display the advantages of a mixed methods approach to studying Italian participation in the war in Iraq. While the quantitative analysis identified some patterns that correlated variables with the likelihood of defection or troop reduction, it overlooked the fact that the strength of these variables can vary considerably not only between countries but also across time in one country.

The large-N study also overlooks the interaction of the numerous variables and the importance of singular events. Although casualties do not have an impact in the aggregate, they reduced public support for the war, which was then accompanied by a united opposition and a divided coalition, which strengthened parliamentary control over foreign policy. The combination of low public opinion, a coherent opposition, and a divided cabinet was amplified by events like the friendly fire killing of Nicola Calipari. As elections were getting closer,

Berlusconi was in a bind, and the announcement of withdrawal in 2005 allowed his cabinet to avoid entering the electoral campaign burdened by Italy's terrible experience in Iraq.

## Chapter 5 – Denmark

### *The Iraq war in Danish foreign policy*

After World War II, Danish foreign policy had four separate “cornerstones” that fulfilled different aspects of the country's relationship with the world (Larsen 2009). The European Community fulfilled Denmark's market needs, NATO provided security (Peterson 1990), the United Nations helped it promote universal values (Srsen 2008), and Nordic cooperation (Neumann 2007) was a central locus for the projection of Danish values abroad. In the wake of the Cold War, the European Union and the United States/NATO have become the two central directions of Danish foreign policy, and Copenhagen has always tried to walk a fine line between these by compartmentalizing (Peterson 1990) the goals these two directions can help the country achieve.

On the one hand, NATO provides the security that Denmark believes the European Union cannot yet offer (Stahl et. al 2004), and ties with the United States are emphasized because of common historical connections and culture (Larsen 2009, 218). On the other hand, the European Union is promoted as the main framework for the conduct of Danish foreign policy and occupies a central role in Copenhagen's economy. In terms of the country's general relationship with the world, Denmark has always been a proactive participant in multilateral peacekeeping (Lawler 2007) and has emphasized the benefits of using military force for humanitarian interventions (Gorm and Pilegaard 2005).

Although the degree of domestic foreign policy consensus has ebbed and flowed in the country (Peterson 1990), there has been a general trend toward the need for broad agreement in decisions regarding the country's ties with the outside world. In the last 15 years, consensus over foreign policy was relatively consolidated across both mainstream political elites and public

opinion (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2003), particularly when it came to the legitimacy of using military force abroad (Kristensen and Orsten 2007).

The Iraq war ended this consensus (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2003) and widened the rifts between the ruling right-wing coalition, which was a much more vocal supporter of Atlanticism, and the left-wing opposition, which emphasized Denmark's membership in the European Union and commitment to multilateralism (Petersen 2005; Ringmose and Rynning 2008). Some scholars even said that the ruling coalition transformed Denmark into a “super-Atlanticist” supporter of the United States (Mouritzen, 2007). This disagreement was particularly visible during the Rasmussen administration's decision to support the Iraq invasion, while peacekeeping operations after the end of the major battles in Iraq were temporarily marked by some consensus between the government and the largest opposition parties. In essence, however, participation in the war exhibited the tensions within Danish foreign policy between Atlanticism and European multilateralism and intervention was largely associated with the right-wing.

### ***Decision-makers***

Denmark held a general election on November 20, 2001, which resulted in the end of a coalition cabinet between the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals that had been in power since 1993. The center-right Liberal ('Venstre') Party gained 31.2 percent (56 seats out of 175) and decided to form a coalition cabinet with the Conservative People's Party, which gained 9.1 percent of the vote and 22 seats. Although the far right Danish People's Party (DPP) was not an official member of the cabinet, it provided informal support for the coalition and was an important element in decision-making regarding Copenhagen's participation in Iraq. The DPP's populist anti-immigration agenda also played a role during its bargains with the ruling coalition

over Iraq policy (Lawler 2007, 111).

Within the cabinet, the Liberals held 12 seats out of 18, with the Conservatives holding the others (Bille 2002). Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was a member of the Liberal Party, while Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller was a Conservative. The Liberal-Conservative cabinet was in power when the initial decision for participation in the Iraq coalition was made and Rasmussen was the one who decided to pull troops out. Consequently, just like in the case of Italy, leadership remained unchanged throughout the duration of the country's participation in Iraq.

The main opposition groups in Parliament were the Social Democratic Party, the Center Democrats, the Socialist People's Party, and the Unity List. The heterogeneity of opposition was one of the primary factors why Prime Minister Rasmussen managed to largely direct foreign policy toward Iraq with relatively few impediments from the opposition. It was, in fact, the Danish People's Party that supported the deployment of troops. Although this group was ostensibly in the opposition, it provided frequent legislative support to the ruling coalition and was the major group outside of the cabinet with whom the Liberals and the Conservatives communicated (Bille 2003, 931).

***First decision – participation in the invasion (2002 – March 2003)***

In the run-up to the decision to invade Iraq, Prime Minister Rasmussen was a vocal supporter of a tough line against Iraq. At the beginning of September 2002, Rasmussen said during a foreign policy committee meeting that he had no doubt that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.<sup>81</sup> A few days later, the Prime Minister noted that a new U.N. resolution was not

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81 Danish Premier Convinced Iraq Has Weapons of Mass Destruction, BBC Monitoring, September 6, 2002.

necessary for military action against Iraq since Iraqi head Saddam Hussein had already violated a number of resolutions that were undermining the organization's authority.<sup>82</sup> The harsh criticism of Saddam Hussein's regime was also accompanied by numerous statements about the friendship between the United States and Denmark and the need for Copenhagen to be a reliable ally. In March 2002, Rasmussen said that “the relationship between Denmark and the United States is the best it has been since the second world war.”<sup>83</sup> For the entire duration of the conflict, Rasmussen's insistence for his country to remain in Iraq was always accompanied by the need to remain good friends with the United States

The Prime Minister had to walk a fine line in his statements because Denmark held the presidency of the European Union at the time, where a significant rift was emerging between the capitals that supported the United States tough stance on Iraq and those that wanted to give the United Nations more time. He used this position to attempt to build bridges between Washington, D.C. and capitals like Berlin and Paris, which were much more skeptical about the wisdom of the use of force in Iraq. It was clear, however, that Denmark preferred to stand by the United States in adopting a more belligerent attitude toward Baghdad.

On November 19, 2002, Danish officials arrested Nizar al-Khazraji, a former Iraqi army head who was accused of war crimes against the Iraqi Kurds during conflicts in the 1980s.<sup>84</sup> At about the same time, Rasmussen announced that Copenhagen would be willing to send troops and hardware to a UN-supported military force to disarm Iraq, but was vague about whether the country would be willing to send troops into combat. Rasmussen explained that “the government has not taken a position on using military force, which everyone hopes to avoid... but the aim is

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82 Existing United Nations mandate enough for Iraq actions: Denmark, Reuters, September 12, 2002.

83 Chilly in the west, warmer in the East: Europe is lukewarm towards George Bush, *The Economist*, May 25, 2002.

84 Denmark arrests former Iraqi army chief for Kurdish war crimes, AFP, November 19, 2002.

to be prepared for it if necessary.”<sup>85</sup> The vague statements left enough room for Rasmussen to potentially involve the country's troops in an invasion of Iraq, and toward the beginning of 2003, Danish authorities began giving the anthrax vaccine to some members of its military that “could be considered in connection with an assignment in the Gulf area,” according to the country's Surgeon General.<sup>86</sup>

This raised domestic suspicions about Denmark's policy in Iraq, and the ruling Liberal-Conservative coalition met with the Social Democratic Party, the largest opposition group, on January 24, 2003 to discuss the country's next steps. The coalition reached an agreement with the Social Democrats that any intervention against Iraq needed to be supported by the United Nations Security Council. Importantly, the coalition and the Social Democrats did not explicitly agree that intervention would require a new United Nations resolution on Iraq, which was, at the time, a position that was being supported by France and Germany.

Consequently, the opposition was split in its views of the country's attitude toward the conflict, as the Social Democrats lined up with the ruling coalition, while left-wing groups like the Socialist People's Party requested that Copenhagen explicitly say that it supports France and Germany's position on Iraq.<sup>87</sup> This initial position – which argued that action against Iraq needed to be supported by the United Nations Security Council – proved to be extremely important two months later because Rasmussen made a point out of not asking for a second United Nations resolution on Iraq and later claimed that the United Nations had already passed a resolution in 1991 allowing the use of force in case of non-compliance.

That is, by being vague about what exactly he meant by an “endorsement” on the part of

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85 Denmark offers military support to enforce United Nations disarmament of Iraq, AFP, November 20, 2002.

86 Denmark, which hasn't pledged troops for Iraq, giving some anthrax vaccine, AP, January 20, 2003.

87 Denmark agrees Iraq policy: United Nations mandate required, BBC Monitoring, January 24, 2003.

the United Nations for participation in Iraq, Rasmussen pacified part of the moderate opposition in Parliament, as well as public opinion, while also remaining a steadfast ally to the United States. Although he lent some rhetorical support for the importance of United Nations endorsement of the use of force, that support was vague enough to allow him to later make the argument that a second Security Council was not necessary. Rhetorically, this meant using notions like the need for a decision to be “anchored” in the UN, for example (Friis 2010, 36).

Furthermore, Rasmussen's vague policy of support for the Iraq intervention also allowed him to draw on broader support for his policy in Iraq. Since the Liberals and the Conservatives did not hold a majority in Parliament, they depended on other parties to be able to pass their agenda. The Danish People's Party was a vocal supporter of the Bush administration's policy in Iraq, but dependence on a single opposition party was tenuous and potentially risky. As a result, Rasmussen consistently attempted to draw in support from the center-left, especially from the Social Democrats, in order to gain more solid support for his Iraq policy in Parliament.

This strategy worked fairly well into the end of 2006, when the Social Democrats stopped cooperating on the Iraq issue. At that point, the risks inherent in basing the consistency of a policy on a single opposition party emerged, as the DPP attempted to blackmail the Rasmussen cabinet over Iraq by asking for concessions on asylum policies. Hypothesis 2 suggests that the stronger coalition agreement is over a particular policy, the less likely is that policy to change. For the first few years of the country's involvement in Iraq, the Liberals and the Conservatives managed to keep the support of the Danish People's Party and of the Social Democrats, which allowed for stability and gave Rasmussen enough power to continue his Iraq policy unabashed. That changed after the Social Democrats refused to cooperate and made Rasmussen much more

dependent on the DPP for his Iraq policy. The coalition, therefore, weakened considerably.

One of the first polls of the year showed a wide difference between Rasmussen's rhetoric against Saddam Hussein and Danish public opinion. A poll by the Vilstrup Research Institute showed that 87 percent of Danes were against any intervention in Iraq without a U.N. mandate, and a majority (56 percent) was even opposed to their country's involvement even if a mandate existed.<sup>88</sup> The polling numbers did not inspire caution on the part of the Danish executive as Rasmussen was one of the eight signatories of the famous Letter of Eight, in which the leaders of eight European countries urged Saddam to allow United Nations inspectors in his country and supported Washington's tough line.

The Social Democrats called the letter “very dangerous,” while the Socialist People's Party asked that Rasmussen come in front of Parliament to explain his position on Iraq.<sup>89</sup> On January 31, 2003, Denmark announced that it was willing to send combat units and submarines for an Iraq invasion if an attack were approved by the United Nations, which, once again, was a vague statement considering clearer requests for a second United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq made by countries like France. The Danish People's Party expressed its willingness to back such an action, which signaled to the cabinet that this policy could easily pass in Parliament despite opposition from the Social Democrats and the other smaller opposition parties.

On February 6, 2003, however, after Colin Powell spoke in front of the United Nations and accused Saddam of holding WMDs, Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller said that Saddam's time was running out to comply with United Nations resolutions, and expressed his hope that the

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<sup>88</sup> Most Danes oppose taking part in US-led war in Iraq, AP, January 27, 2003.

<sup>89</sup> Danish PM accused of helping split Europe over Iraq, AFP, January 30, 2003.

Security Council would approve a decision for a possible war. After Powell's speech, Danish public opinion also turned more favorable toward an intervention in Iraq – 53 percent of Danes said they would support Danish participation in Iraq with U.N. approval, compared with 38 percent the previous week.

During a 10-minute conversation with George W. Bush, PM Rasmussen stressed that his country would support the United States in Iraq as long as the action was endorsed by the UN, explaining that “a possible military action against Iraq must be rooted in the U.N. Security Council.”<sup>90</sup> This statement was still vague enough to allow some flexibility in how Denmark would construct its support for the United States, but it was certainly more vocal than the French and German positions, which rejected a military conflict from the outset. Rasmussen even offered to send 70 elite troops and a submarine for a possible invasion of Iraq. A new poll on February 11, 2003 showed about 51 percent of Danes against their country's participation in a war in Iraq, while three days later 70 percent of Danes expressed fear in a poll that terror attacks could be organized in Europe if a war in Iraq began.<sup>91</sup>

On February 17, 2003, Parliament approved the cabinet's plans to begin planning for a military invasion of Iraq as a Danish submarine set sail for the Gulf, and Rasmussen warned the European Union not to take any options – including the use of military force – off the table. “It is of the utmost importance that we do not exclude any reaction,” the Danish leader said, adding that the international community needed to be ready for “serious consequences” against Iraq if the country failed to comply with disarmament requirements.<sup>92</sup>

Rasmussen even went as far as to criticize the European Union by saying that the

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90 Bush, Danish PM discuss Europe's widening rift over Iraq, Dow Jones, February 10, 2003.

91 Gallup releases poll on Iraq, IPR Strategic Information Database, February 11, 2003.

92 Danish PM: European Union leaders must not rule out use of force vs. Iraq, Market News International, February 17, 2003.

organization's "common and security policy exist more in theory than in practice,"<sup>93</sup> while Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller rejected a French proposal to give Iraq more time to disarm, saying that "you shouldn't give the impression that negotiations are taking place."<sup>94</sup> This criticism – essentially suggesting that the European Union could not provide security to its members (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2003) – was a common point made by the Rasmussen administration before and after the Iraq war. Rasmussen wrote an editorial in the *Berlingske Tidende* in 2003, arguing that Brussels could not serve as a basis for Danish security, for example (Larsen 2009, 211).

Decision-making during these days was secret, because even the opposition was split over whether talks needed to be held in private or not – the Danish People's Party, the Social Democrats, the Christian People's Party, and the Radical Liberals were all in favor of private talks.<sup>95</sup> In the meantime, Rasmussen emphasized that the United Nations Security Council needed to allow the invasion of Iraq, and officials expressed support for a new version of a draft resolution to tell Saddam to disarm within ten days, beginning on March 10.<sup>96</sup> This resolution had been put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom and was immediately opposed by France, Russia, and China.

On March 17, the Danish premier finally clarified what he meant by United Nations "endorsement" of a military operation in Iraq, arguing that resolution 687, adopted by the United Nations in 1991, allowed the use of force against Iraq in 1998, during Operation Desert Fox, and that "since then there has been another one [resolution] which has an even sharper tone – 1441.

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93 PM defends Danish military participation in war on Iraq, AFP, February 18, 2003.

94 Danish foreign minister rejects French move on Iraq, BBC Monitoring, February 24, 2003.

95 Danish contribution to Iraq war to be discussed in private, BBC Monitoring, February 18, 2003.

96 Ten days should be enough for Iraq to disarm: Denmark, AFP, March 7, 2003.

So if there was a basis in 1998, then there is also one now.”<sup>97</sup> Surprised by this position, the Social Democrats met with Rasmussen and accused him of seeking to get the country involved in the Iraq war invasion without additional United Nations support, after the Government announced plans to send a submarine, a corvette, and elite soldiers to help the United States.<sup>98</sup>

On that day, a poll showed that 61 percent of Danes were against the country's involvement in the Iraq war, but Rasmussen emphasized that a conflict in Iraq was a “fight between dictatorship and democracy” and that the country would support the invasion. The PM did stress, however, that he decided not to send any ground troops in order to convince the opposition to support his decision, but he expressed disappointment at the Social Democratic Party's refusal. “We chose to leave out the Rangers to make a compromise with the (parliament) opposition, but unfortunately it didn't make them give us their support,” Rasmussen noted.<sup>99</sup> The Social Democrats criticized the cabinet's decision to move to send a submarine and an escort ship, and the motion to participate in the invasion narrowly passed with Danish People's Party support (Bille 2004, 990). A poll on March 19, 2003 showed 56 percent of Danes opposed to the country's participation in the war in Iraq, as Greenpeace staged protests outside the Danish Parliament.<sup>100</sup>

On March 21, after a 10-hour debate, Parliament narrowly passed the deployment of a 24-member submarine and a 91-member escort for the invasion of Iraq. The Social Democrats voted against this deployment, emphasizing that it effectively meant Denmark was involved in the war, while a Conservative M.P. criticized their decision, saying that “foreign policy is again being

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97 Danish Parliament split on Iraq, BBC Monitoring, March 17, 2003.

98 Denmark wants to participate in Iraq war, opposition says, *AFP*, March 18.

99 Despite no United Nations support, Denmark to offer military support against Iraq, AP, March 18, 2003.

100 Greenpeace stages anti-war protest outside Danish Parliament, *AFP*; Majority of Danes against country taking part in US-led war on Iraq, *AFP*.

used for domestic political tomfoolery” by the Social Democrats.<sup>101</sup> Only the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the DPP voted for the deployment, which was a unique even in a country in which foreign policy consensus was extremely valued (Kosiara-Pedersen 2008, 1047). As mentioned earlier, the vague definitions of what exactly the administration meant by United Nations support for the intervention in Iraq initially convinced the Social Democrats to be supportive of the Liberal-Conservative cabinet, and Social Democratic and Social Liberal decision-makers even explicitly said that they actually thought the ruling coalition agreed to wait for a second United Nations Security Council decision before going into Iraq (McKay 2006, 884).

Despite the acrimonious debate over the country's initial participation in the invasion, public opinion shifted considerably almost immediately after Copenhagen became a member of the invading force. A Gallup poll released on March 26 said that 54 percent of Danes now supported the war, while only 39 percent opposed it, and 46 percent of Danes wanted troops in the country.<sup>102</sup> In the middle of more street protests, Rasmussen announced that his country sought to send a peacekeeping force to post-war Iraq and that Copenhagen wanted to donate about 50 million Euros for Iraq's reconstruction.<sup>103</sup>

### ***Summary of the first decision***

#### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Rasmussen was one of the most vocal supporters of the war in Iraq, and echoed Bush's rhetoric not only in terms of the need to get rid of Saddam because of his lack of respect for

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101Heated debate in Danish Parliament on Iraq war, BBC Monitoring, March 21, 2003.

102Danish supporters of Iraq war now in majority: poll, AFP, March 26, 2003.

103Denmark ready to send peacekeeping force to post-war Iraq, AFP, April 8, 2003.

United Nations resolutions but also because the Iraqi people deserved to live in a democratic country. The executive's preference in this case was to provide military support for the US in the run-up to the Iraq war, but he was constrained in this regard by the opposition's refusal to endorse the country's participation without a United Nations mandate. Rasmussen seems to have changed his position on sending troops by attempting to make a concession to the Social Democrats, but the opposition party still refused because it wanted United Nations support for the action. Consequently, the PM pushed through this first decision by moderating his position on Iraq, but he failed to moderate it enough to get broad support for the policy.

### *Hypotheses*

The Liberals were the major party in the coalition and held a plurality of seats in Parliament. There was little to no internal opposition to the party's stand on Iraq (H1), as a result of which Rasmussen's position had the endorsement of his party. The junior coalition partner (H2) – the Conservatives – were also a vocal support of the United States in Iraq, and there was little internal dissent regarding the party's position. Rasmussen had the advantage of a divided opposition that ranged from the far right to the far left. Consequently, he turned to the Danish People's Party for support regarding the deployment of the submarine and the corvette to Iraq. This informal coalition was tenuous, however, because it meant the DPP held the key to the stability of policy-making toward Iraq. As a result, Rasmussen tried to convince the Social Democrats and a number of other smaller parties to throw their support behind the cabinet's position on Iraq.

He used two major strategies in this regard. First, from the end of 2002 until March 2003, Rasmussen's rhetoric was vague enough to appease the Social Democrats' requests that any

action against Iraq be approved by the United Nations while also permitting him to criticize Saddam and insist that he disarm. Rasmussen refused to call for a second United Nations Security Council resolution as a precondition to his country's participation in the war in Iraq, and, in March 2003, said that that resolution had actually already been passed in 1991. Although he managed to strengthen his coalition's Iraq war position between January and March 2003 by including a hesitant Social Democratic Party in the decision-making, his announcement in March that the Security Council did not need to adopt a second resolution to allow invasion led to the Social Democrats refusing to endorse participation in the invasion.

The second way in which Rasmussen tried to get support from the Social Democrats was the decision not to send in ground troops, a concession he admitted was directly targeted at the opposition. Even this action did not, however, manage to enroll the Social Democrats in Rasmussen's plans. It did change his behavior, which confirms the second hypothesis suggesting that the weaker ruling coalition consensus over the executive's position on Iraq is, the less likely will the executive be to implement that position.

Electoral incentives (H3) played an insignificant role in Rasmussen's decisions on Iraq. Fresh from a strong victory at the polls, the Liberals and the Conservatives has a few years in office before they had to go up for reelection. In comparison with Italian public opinion, which was consistently opposed to the war in Iraq, the attitude of the Danes (H4) ebbed and flowed as decision-makers tried to make sense of how to develop Iraq policy. Although there was significant opposition, with many polls showing weak majorities against Danish participation in Iraq, public opinion did not have a significant impact on Danish decision-making because it did not reveal a strong rift within Danish society against any form of participation in Iraq.

***Second decision – deployment of peacekeeping troops and relative consensus (April 2003 – January 2006)***

On April 11, Rasmussen announced that Denmark sought to send about 380 soldiers and 20-25 police officers to Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance and to perform police activities. A few days later, the United States asked Copenhagen to double its commitment and head a unit of about 3,000 soldiers in Iraq.<sup>104</sup> Rasmussen replied that “the request is a recognition of our experiences with peacekeeping forces under Danish management in the Balkans”<sup>105</sup>, but rejected it three days later because only the Danish People's Party accepted the proposal and Rasmussen sought broad support for the policy among the political parties in Parliament.<sup>106</sup> The rejection came in the wake of a revelation by Danish daily Politiken, which said that even the proposed 700 troops Denmark was going to send to Iraq was much less than an initial United States request of 5,000 soldiers. Because of the reluctance of authorities in Copenhagen, the number kept being reduced until they reached fewer than 1,000.<sup>107</sup>

Since the Danish Parliament had to renew the mandate of the troops each year, Rasmussen was most likely reluctant to depend fully on DPP support to continue extending the mandate, which would have given the far-right party considerably more power to negotiate for concessions in other policy areas, especially immigration and asylum policies. Consequently, the Prime Minister decided to settle for a much smaller contingent in order to show itself as a steadfast supporter of the United States while also preserving a degree of foreign policy consensus over deployment at home.

Parliament voted in favor of deployment on May 15, 2003, and the first Danes arrived in

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<sup>104</sup>US requests more Danish troops for postwar Iraq, Reuters, April 15, 2003.

<sup>105</sup>US requests more Danish troops for postwar Iraq, Reuters, April 15, 2003.

<sup>106</sup>Denmark says no to running unit in postwar Iraq, Reuters, April 24, 2003.

<sup>107</sup>Denmark seen sending “far fewer” peacekeeper troops to Iraq than requested by US, Copenhagen Politiken, April 22, 2003.

Iraq at the beginning of June. They were located in Basra, the second largest Iraqi city and became part of the occupying force with the adoption of Parliamentary Resolution B118 (Hoffmann 2009). This was the first Danish operation in a majority Arab state since the 1956 Suez crisis (Hoffmann 2009, 35). Throughout the summer, opposition M.P.s insisted on Rasmussen's response to why WMDs were not found in Iraq, but the Foreign Minister stressed they could have been destroyed before the end of the conflict,<sup>108</sup> while the PM replied that the war had been a justified conflict and that Copenhagen had to support the United States to repay a “debt of honor” for all the assistance the country provided to Europe.<sup>109</sup> During a debate in Parliament, where the Social Democrats and Socialists asked to see the evidence the Liberal-Conservative used to justify joining the United States in the war in Iraq, Rasmussen said that “these weapons were somewhere in Iraq... everything indicates that Saddam Hussein possessed such weapons.”<sup>110</sup> The Parliament rejected an independent investigation into the reasons for Danish involvement in war a few days later, on June 23, 2003, with Foreign Minister Moeller saying the investigation was not necessary.

As Denmark reinforced its commitment to Iraq by about a dozen Military Police officers, investigations into the cabinet's reasons for going to war with Iraq continued. Foreign Minister Moeller got into a spat with former United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix after he suggested that Copenhagen used Blix's reports to go into Iraq. The former United Nations official retorted that “your foreign minister jumped, like they did in the United States and Britain, (to the conclusion that) since they are not accounted for, they exist.”<sup>111</sup> The foreign minister then changed his statement, apologizing for misquoting Blix and stressing that Denmark was justified

108Iraq's banned weapons may have been destroyed: Denmark, AFP, May 12, 2003).

109Danish PM: Denmark's Iraq war role to pay US 'debt of honor,' *Politiken*.

110Danish government under fire over intelligence on Iraqi weapons, AFP, June 20, 2003.

111Blix says Denmark ignored his advice on Iraq, Reuters, July 15, 2003.

in joining the war against Iraq because Saddam had ties with terrorists.<sup>112</sup>

The embarrassing debates over the justification for the war continued into 2003 (Bille 2004, 990), but did not affect the short-term and tenuous consensus between the Liberal-Conservative cabinet, the Danish People's Party, and the Social Democrats over Danish commitment to Iraq. As the first Danish casualty was brought back from Iraq in August 2003, the Social Democrats announced that they were behind the cabinet's addition of 85 soldiers to its contingent in Iraq to improve security in the area,<sup>113</sup> even though a month later, in the wake of a CIA report that said no WMDs had been found in Iraq, they asked Rasmussen to apologize for saying that Denmark went into Iraq because it had weapons of mass destruction. The PM refused to do so, emphasizing that the major reason for Denmark's assistance for the US was Saddam's non-compliance with United Nations resolutions.<sup>114</sup>

The Social Democrats did manage to influence the cabinet's decision-making on Iraq after Foreign Minister Moeller attempted to combine an extension of the troops' mandate for a longer period of time (June 2004 instead of December 2003) with the increase in troop numbers. The Social Democrats blocked the extension, requesting a United Nations Security Council resolution on the matter before accepting it. Once again, the consent of the Social Democrats was not crucial to passing the extension of the troop mandate because the DPP was a reliable ally in this regard, but Rasmussen was extremely careful about including the center-left in decision-making.<sup>115</sup> The Social Democrats also voted to approve the extension of the Danish army's

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112Denmark, in hot water, maintains Iraq had links to terrorists, AFP, July 17, 2003.

113Denmark sending 85 more soldiers to Iraq, BBC Monitoring, August 29, 2003.

114Denmark says it was justified on Iraq despite WMD report, AFP, October 3, 2003. Similar requests for discussion about the WMD issues or demands for apologies came again in October 2003, November 2003, February 2004, October 2004,

115Danish government's effort to extend military role in Iraq blocked by SDP, Politiken, October 7, 2003; Danish Parliament votes to send 90 more soldiers to Iraq, AFP, October 9, 2003.

mandate in Iraq in June 2004,<sup>116</sup> November 2004,<sup>117</sup> and all the way into January 2006.<sup>118</sup>

Public opinion continued to be favorable to the country's involvement. A poll released on October 28, 2003 showed only one country in which a majority continued to support the war in Iraq – Denmark.<sup>119</sup> A poll conducted between May 12 and 13 showed that 46 percent of Danes were in favor of Danish involvement in the war in Iraq, while a similar number was against. Support had gone down slightly – from 52 percent in favor – compared to the month, but the cabinet still had public support for its policy.<sup>120</sup> Another poll in September showed that 54 percent of Danes wanted troops out of Iraq if the January 2005 elections weren't successful in handing over power to local authorities,<sup>121</sup> while a poll in January 2005 showed 44 percent supporting the deployment, with 50 percent against.<sup>122</sup>

Rasmussen also continued making statements in favor of Danish troops staying the course. On November 18, 2003, the premier urged “the world's democracies not to leave Iraq because “if they abandoned the country, it would be the same as letting tyrants, fundamentalism, and terrorism have free rein.”<sup>123</sup> He made similar statements – many of them sprinkled with rhetoric about democratizing Iraq – in March 2004,<sup>124</sup> April 2004,<sup>125</sup> and nearly every month after that. Rasmussen also rejected an inquiry into the reasons for going into war in Iraq in February 2004, arguing that it was unnecessary, and noted during an Iraq-related hearing in Parliament that Denmark could not wait for evidence in the case of Iraq and that it had to help dismantle the

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116Danish lawmakers approve extending troops in Iraq six more months, AP, June 2, 2004.

117Danish Parliament extends troop missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, AFP, November 25, 2004.

118See Rasmussen (2005) for a discussion of why the Social Democrats changed their mind.

119Support wanes; Iraq, The Times, October 28, 2003.

120Minor blast at Danish defense ministry, said to be Iraq-related, AFP, May 17, 2004.

121Poll: Half of Danes want country's troops out of Iraq if elections not held by January, AP, September 20, 2004.

122Poll: two thirds of Danes say government should be more critical of US terror policies, AP, January 27, 2005.

123Danish PM says forces in Iraq for the duration, AP, November 18, 2003.

124Danish PM says Denmark would keep troops in Iraq, Dow Jones, March 14, 2004.

125Denmark to keep troops in Iraq: PM, AFP, April 29, 2004.

regime.<sup>126</sup> This idealistic rhetoric suggested that Denmark was part of an alliance of democracies fighting to bring universal values to the people of Iraq, and focused on criticizing the left-wing for being too “adaptationist” and neutral in the face of evil (Friis 2010).

In the public sphere, a Danish intelligence agent who leaked intelligence reports used by the administration was fired and accused Rasmussen of lying that Iraq had WMDs.<sup>127</sup> Although Denmark held European Parliament elections on June 13, 2004, where the Liberals lost two of their previous seats and the Social Democrats won two, the results did not alter the balance of power in Copenhagen, nor were they a rejection of the center-right cabinet's policies (Bille 2005).

The intransigent tone of the Rasmussen administration changed slightly after the Abu Ghraib torture scandal emerged, and the PM urged the US to “make amends” after the Iraqi abuses committed,<sup>128</sup> but policy effectively remained the same. This slight change in the rhetoric also sought to appease some objections at home, where a number of Danish soldiers were charged with abuse in a case that made headlines for months in the local Danish media until they were charged throughout 2005.<sup>129</sup> There was also a shift in Rasmussen's reasons for going into war toward the end of 2003, when he started mostly talking in terms of intervention for value promotion and democracy (Friis 2010).

In September 2004, the consensus over Iraq was rocked by a request by the Danish People's Party that the cabinet send back Iraqi citizens who had been denied asylum in Denmark. Otherwise, they threatened, they would refuse to vote for an extension of the troops' mandate in Iraq. The Liberals and the Conservatives could not turn to the Social Democrats for support

<sup>126</sup>Danish premier tells Iraq hearing: We cannot wait for firm evidence, *BBC Monitoring*.

<sup>127</sup>Former Danish intelligence officer and journalists charged over Iraq leaks, *BBC Monitoring*, April 14, 2004.

<sup>128</sup>Danish PM hardens tone against US ahead of visit with Bush, *AFP*, May 27, 2004.

<sup>129</sup>Denmark charges 5 soldiers with Iraqi prisoner abuse, *Reuters*, January 21, 2005.

because the party was also growing increasingly impatient with Danish presence in Iraq because of the worsening security situation.<sup>130</sup>

Danish authorities did manage to strike up a deal with the DPP over the status of asylum seekers by offering the ones who were denied their applications large sums of money to return home. Out of about 20,000 Iraqis who were granted asylum in Denmark, about 600 were up for expulsion and a big majority of them refused to go voluntarily. The number was insignificant, but the Danish People's Party derives support from Danes who are against immigration.<sup>131</sup> In addition, the countries that refused to receive the rejected asylum seekers would get Danish aid suspended or cut.<sup>132</sup>

Although the crisis was averted, this was one of the first times when the ruling coalition realized how flimsy its pro-Iraq coalition was inside Parliament despite its attempts to diversify this support across the political spectrum and the opposition. The DPP was also influential in getting the cabinet to dismiss the Defense Minister after he was accused of releasing information from a top-secret meeting during an intelligence committee meeting regarding Iraq (Bille 2005, 999).

Although opposition parties hardened their rhetoric in the run-up to the national legislative elections on February 8, 2005, the poll came and went without affecting either the balance of power in Parliament or Iraqi policy. The Liberals and the Conservatives continued with their coalition cabinet, with informal support from DPP. On January 30, 2005, opposition parties like the Social Democrats pledged to withdraw troops from Iraq if they won elections, and polls showed anywhere between 53 and 63 percent of Danes supporting some form of

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130Danish government faces threat to Iraq mandate: Reuters, September 13, 2004.

131Denmark and Iraq reach deal on refugees denied asylum, AFP, September 29, 2004.

132Asylum agreement paves way for adoption of 2005 budget, WMRC daily analysis, November 9, 2004.

withdrawal from Iraq.

But although the Socialists and the Red-Greens tried to make the Iraq war a campaign issues, polls showed that only about four percent of Danes thought Iraq was the main topic of the campaign.<sup>133</sup> The ambivalence of both the public and the biggest opposition groups in Denmark also played a big role in why the Iraq issue never became a major topic (Pedersen 2005, 1105). In fact, Rasmussen's popularity numbers went up in the fall of 2004, which was one of the reasons why the elections were called early (Andersen 2006, 393). Moreover, the Social Democrats were largely incapable of making the war in Iraq an issue because soldiers were in a relatively calm area, had support from the locals, and were seen by the public as a peacekeeping force (Andersen 2006, 394).

After talks with the Social Democrats in the new Parliament, Rasmussen announced that he expected for a new mandate for the Danish troops in Parliament. The center left opposition group promised to support the cabinet's plans as long as the Iraqi government asked for the troops to stay, while the DPP insisted that it would allow the extension of the troops in Iraq as long as there was an agreement with the Iraqi cabinet about the reception of 700 Iraqis who were denied asylum.<sup>134</sup> Although the vote to extend the mandate went smoothly on May 31, 2005, with support from the DPP, the Social Democrats, and the Radicals, the last two parties stressed that they expected Danish troops to leave Iraq completely by July 2006. The cabinet, however, refused to set deadlines, and Rasmussen reconfirmed that the troops would stay as long as they were needed.<sup>135</sup> As events unfolded after this decision, the May 2005 vote was one of the last examples of relative Danish consensus over Iraq, and the elements that allowed this consensus

<sup>133</sup>Danish government steers clear of thorny Iraq war issue ahead of elections, AFP, February 5, 2005; Danish opposition says it will withdraw troops if wins elections, AFP, January 30, 2005.

<sup>134</sup>Denmark to extend troops mandate in Iraq for another eight months, AFP, April 26, 2005.

<sup>135</sup>Danish troops to stay "as long as Iraqi government wants them": PM, AP, October 25, 2005.

slowly began unraveling.

### ***Summary of the second decision***

#### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Rasmussen and other cabinet officials, Moeller most notably, largely continued their rhetoric of support for keeping troops in Iraq. Even in the wake of the international controversy over Abu Ghraib, and the domestic coverage of the involvement of Danish soldiers in the abuses, there was very little change in how the leadership perceived the Iraq issue. In addition, the administration refused to allow an independent investigation into the decision to get involved in Iraq, and tried to avoid mentioning the WMD motivation after it became clear that was no longer tenable.

#### *Hypotheses*

The Liberals continued to support Rasmussen, and there was little indication of dissent in his decision-making on Iraq (H1). Conservatives continued to be supportive of the war in Iraq, and their most visible leaders – Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller – was as vocal as Rasmussen in supporting the cabinet's continuing participation in Iraq (H2). Rifts began to appear, however, between the Liberal-Conservative camp and the DPP and Social Democrats. The Danish People's Party decided to use the Iraq mandate renewal as a bargaining chip in implementing its tough asylum policy. Although the cabinet was cooperative in this regard, it became clear that the DPP was much more reluctant to throw its support without getting benefits in exchange. On the other hand, the Social Democrats continued their ambiguous policy in Iraq, supporting the renewal of the troop mandate while also criticizing the administration for its justification for going to war. Although the party promised to pull troops out of Iraq during the electoral campaign, a few

months later it went on to approve an extension of the mandate. Some of the first echoes of a call for complete withdrawal began emerging afterwards, however.

Although Denmark held national elections (H3) in February 2005, the Iraq issue was a relatively minor element in the campaign, and the Liberals and the Conservatives largely avoided talking about the issue. The European Parliament elections in the middle of 2004 did not provide much cause for concern to the center-right cabinet because the balance of power was preserved fairly well. Consequently, there was little electoral pressure on decision-making in Iraq during this period. For most of the period described above, public opinion (H4) was largely split in half over Iraq, and the cabinet had enough support to be able to continue its policy.

### **Third decision – withdrawal (January 2006 – January 2007)**

On October 1, 2005, the first Danish soldier died in Iraq after an explosion in south Iraq. Rasmussen explained that the country would stay in Iraq as long as needed. Foreign Minister Moeller announced that Denmark would stay in Iraq at least until the end of 2006, as was requested by the Iraqi government,<sup>136</sup> but, in one of the first announcement about a possible date for withdrawal, explained that troops could leave after 2006.<sup>137</sup> The Danish People's Party echoed the foreign minister's statements, saying that it expected troops to return after the end of 2006.<sup>138</sup> Local elections on November 15 ended with the victory of the center-left opposition, signaling an eroding base of support for the center right (Bille 2006, 1090), although even that loss was not significant enough to warrant an overhaul of the ruling coalition's policy (the Liberals lost about one percent of the vote).

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<sup>136</sup>Denmark to keep troops in Iraq throughout 2006, BBC Monitoring, November 4, 2005.

<sup>137</sup>Denmark “may withdraw from Iraq next year,” BBC Monitoring, November 24, 2005.

<sup>138</sup>Danish troop withdrawal from Iraq expected in 2006, *Xinhua*.

On January 2, 2006, the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals, two of the opposition parties that had provided some support to the cabinet's Iraq policy, withdrew from negotiations over the renewal of the troop mandate after the Liberals and the Conservatives refused to put forth a timeline for withdrawal. Despite this controversy, the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, and the DPP voted for an extension of the mandate until July 2006. The first two parties, however, emphasized that they expected withdrawal after this date and that they would no longer vote for an extension.<sup>139</sup>

Shortly after the renewal of the mandate, Denmark went through one of its more difficult periods in Iraq. After Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten began publishing a series of cartoons depicting Muhammad, an Iraqi terror group called for attacks on Danish troops in Iraq and a fatwa was issued against troops there.<sup>140</sup> As protesters set fire to the Danish embassy in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran (Bille 2007, 939), Iraq's Transportation Ministry suspended contracts with Denmark and Norway over the cartoon controversy.<sup>141</sup> The ministry also declined to continue receiving any reconstruction money from the countries, and the security situation for Danish troops worsened considerably in February and March 2003. By this period, officials announced that the Danes had been attacked 222 times.<sup>142</sup> The Danish People's Party reacted to the Iraqi ministry's announcement with surprise and emphasized that the country needed to think about withdrawing its troops.<sup>143</sup>

On February 14, 2006, the Basra city council, where many Danish troops were stationed, asked the troops to leave unless they apologized for the cartoons, and as the DPP began

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139Danish government gets support to keep troops in Iraq, Reuters, January 19, 2006.

140Danish defense minister on Iraq fatwa, BBC Monitoring, January 31, 2006.

141Iraqi ministry halts deals with Denmark, Norway, Reuters, February 5, 2006.

142Danish Iraq forces attacked 222 times since 2003, BBC Monitoring, March 16, 2006.

143Iraqi ministry halts deals with Denmark, Norway, Reuters, February 5, 2006.

threatening not to support the extension of the mandate, the Iraqi central government confirmed it wanted Copenhagen to stay.<sup>144</sup> The city council, however, did not cooperate with the Danes between October 2005 and May 2006 (Hoffman 2009, 23). Conflicts within the ruling coalition were becoming more visible as well. The Conservatives were unhappy with the Liberals' reliance on the DPP to pass most of the important legislation, which meant Rasmussen had to make concessions like the dismissal of the Ministry for Family and Consumer Affairs at the DPP's request. Furthermore, the Liberals began infighting about Rasmussen's top-down leadership style and the degree to which the party was dependent on the DPP (Bille 2007, 942).

The first faint mention of a change in policy came toward the end of April, when Danish TV station TV2 reported that a cabinet plan sought the gradual withdrawal of about 100 troops from Iraq. Foreign Minister Moeller declined to comment, but PM Rasmussen confirmed that the cabinet wanted a gradual withdrawal of troops from Iraq.<sup>145</sup> A poll published on May 7, 2006 pointed out that about 41 percent of Danes were still in favor of troops staying in Iraq, while 30 percent wanted an immediate withdrawal and another 25 percent wanted a gradual pullout.<sup>146</sup> Another poll indicated that 51 percent of Danes wanted troops to be withdrawn from Iraq, while 40 percent wanted them to stay.<sup>147</sup>

A reduction was indeed forthcoming during the legislature's vote to extend the mandate at the end of May 2006. Parliament voted to cut the number of troops on the ground by 80 soldiers, but there was a major shift in the voting patterns regarding this decision. For the first time since 2003, the Social Democrats refused to vote for the extension because of a lack of a date for withdrawal, which considerably weakened the coalition that made foreign policy in Iraq. A

<sup>144</sup>Baghdad officially asks Danish troops to stay in Iraq, AFP, February 16, 2006.

<sup>145</sup>PM says Denmark plans to "gradually" cut Iraq contingents, but no decision yet, AP, May 2, 2006.

<sup>146</sup>Danish support for Iraq commitment remains strong: poll, AFP, May 7, 2006.

<sup>147</sup>Danish poll suggests 51 percent want troops out of Iraq, AFP, June 4, 2006.

disappointed Foreign Minister said that “a date doesn't set the agenda for the events but the events can set a date. I am sad to see that our ways part now.”<sup>148</sup>

The period between June and December 2006 was particularly difficult for the Danish army in Iraq; three soldiers were killed in the line of duty during this period, and about a dozen were injured. In a significant move away from his confident “stay-the-course” rhetoric, the Danish premier admitted in October that the Iraq mission was “more difficult than expected,” and recognized that a new strategy was needed in Iraq.<sup>149</sup> On November 1, 2006, Danish troops were relocated to a base within the Basra airport, where officials said they would be more “unobtrusive.”<sup>150</sup>

Public opinion seems to have shifted significantly around this period, after a poll published on November 3, 2006 showed that 60 percent of Danes wanted troops pulled out of Iraq. Another poll published a few days later showed a similar percentage opposed to the country's participation in the conflict.<sup>151</sup> Support for withdrawal rose to 64 percent opposition at the beginning of February,<sup>152</sup> and to 67 percent at month's end.<sup>153</sup> The polling numbers were also problematic for the parties that supported the troop deployment to Iraq. About 50 percent of Conservative voters and 57 percent of DPP voters wanted troops to be pulled out of Iraq in a poll released in January 2007.<sup>154</sup>

The Social Democrats, former allies of the administration, also began consolidating an anti-Iraq stance. On November 16, 2006, the party announced that it was going to submit a draft

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148Danish Parliament trims Iraq contingent by 80 troops, sends staff to United Nations force, AP, May 30, 2006.

149Danish Premier says Iraq task was 'more difficult than expected,' AP, October 24, 2006.

150Denmark to move troops to base at Basra airport, Reuters, November 1, 2006.

151Some 60 percent of Danes want pullout from Iraq: poll, AP, November 3, 2006; Danish poll shows growing opposition to Iraq troops, AP, November 14, 2006.

152New survey shows 64 percent of Danes oppose keeping troops in Iraq, Politiken, February 6, 2007.

153Majority of Danes back Iraq withdrawal, AFP, February 27, 2007.

154Majority of DPP, Conservative Parties' voters favor Iraq pullout, Politiken, January 19, 2007.

resolution to urge the cabinet to prepare a plan for withdrawal. Rasmussen rejected a timetable,<sup>155</sup> but his opposition to Social Democratic resolutions was much milder than it had been in the past. The PM said at the end of November 2006 that “we expect there will be an adjustment of our forces” in Iraq, but declined to provide any details.<sup>156</sup> He then said in a TV interview that “I would like to admit that I have underestimated the difficulties of creating a democracy in Iraq. What I in particular have underestimated is the religious fanaticism, which is so strong that it is used to try to block the way ahead toward democracy.”<sup>157</sup>

This shift, which marked what some have called a “pessimistic” turn in Danish discourse on Iraq (Friis 2010, 54), seems to have consolidated toward the beginning of 2007 and culminated in Rasmussen's announcement in January 2007 that Denmark would begin the gradual pullout of troops from Iraq that year and that troops would be brought home by August 2007. At the end of March 2007, Parliament reached an agreement without a vote to pull the troops out. Shortly after the troops left in August, polls showed that the ruling coalition winning with a slim majority once again.<sup>158</sup>

On October 24, 2007, Prime Minister Rasmussen called national elections for November 13, one year earlier than scheduled. The decision to pull troops out of Iraq in a context in which both the opposition and public opinion had become more adamantly against the country's participation, seems to have helped the Liberals and the Conservatives do better at the polls (Kosiara-Pedersen 2008, 1040). After the November 2007 elections, the Liberal-Conservative cabinet managed to hold on to power, but had a majority of one only because one of the Faroe Islands representatives decided to join the Liberals. Shortly after, a Conservative M.P. quit the

<sup>155</sup>Denmark, key Washington ally, under pressure to pull out, AFP, November 16, 2006.

<sup>156</sup>Danish premier expects to 'adjust' his country's troops in southern Iraq next year, AP, November 28, 2006.

<sup>157</sup>Danish premier says he underestimated difficulties in Iraq, AP, December 12, 2006.

<sup>158</sup>Danish polls show left, center-right “closing gap” ahead of general election, AFP, November 11, 2007.

party, but promised to vote with the coalition. Even with DPP support, the coalition was extremely weak (Bille 2008, 961).

#### *Prime Minister's preferences*

Rasmussen changed his rhetoric considerably during the third episode of decision-making on Iraq. His rhetoric switched from the confident argument that Denmark would stay the course, to qualifying the country's participation and admitting that the security situation on the ground was much worse than expected. A possible reason for this was the worsening security situation on the ground for Danish troops, who became much more visible targets after the cartoon controversy. More Danish troops died during this period, and the number of casualties increased considerably.

#### *Hypotheses*

The Liberals continued their consistent support for the war in Iraq (H1). However, infighting became a problem in the party in 2006, as some members complained that Rasmussen was too forceful in his leadership of the party and relied too much on the DPP as an informal coalition partner. The Conservatives continued their policy of supporting the ruling coalition's policy-making in Iraq and did not provide any roadblocks for Rasmussen's plans (H2). On the other hand, two major events weakened the coalition that made policy on Iraq. First, the DPP became much more skeptical of Danish participation in Iraq after the cartoon controversy, when its representatives said they did not see why Denmark needed to be in Iraq if local authorities did not want it there. The party also continued pressuring the cabinet to toughen asylum policies. Second, the Social Democrats refused to cast a vote in favor of extending the troop mandates after July 2006 and turned to a more vocal opposition to the country's involvement in Iraq. It is

unclear why the shift occurred at that time, but there is a possibility that the party was trying to tap into the growing unpopularity of the country's involvement in Iraq, especially in the wake of the attacks following the cartoon controversy.

Electoral incentives (H3) became a stronger determinant of foreign policy regarding Iraq during this period because polling started showing not only an increasing general opposition to the war in Iraq, but also resentment from within the ranks of the ruling coalition supporters. For example, about half of the Conservative voters were now against the country's involvement in Iraq, which was becoming a liability for a possible legislative poll in 2007. Although the ruling coalition was still doing relatively well in the polls, its margin of victory was considerably narrower and the incentive to begin pulling troops out was much higher than during the previous decisions.

Public opinion (H4) changed considerably during this decision-making episode. Normally, support for the country's participation in Iraq hovered at about 50 percent or more, but toward 2006, the percentage of opponents increased to 60 percent and stayed there. Although Rasmussen could ignore the changing tide in public opinion, the worsening security situation on the grounds and a more intransigent opposition made it more difficult for him to weather the resistance of the population to the war.

## **Summary**

Prime Minister Rasmussen was one of the most staunch allies of the United States intervention in Iraq. From the beginning, he stood by George W. Bush and sought to extend support to him as frequently as possible. Before the invasion, Rasmussen left open the possibility

of an invasion force, but later backed out from this Level I commitment because of his desire to reach Level II consensus. This insistence on strong Level II consensus encouraged his reaching out to the opposition Social Democrats as well. Conditions at home, however, started changing as public opinion turned against Iraq and as the left-wing opposition refused to provide assistance in mandate extension. Consequently, Rasmussen's rhetoric grew considerably more moderate and pessimistic, and culminated in troop withdrawal. Initially able to maintain his Level I commitments unimpeded, Rasmussen grew increasingly weaker at home and his Level II constituents became more rebellious, as a result of which the premier decided to quit Iraq.

Just like in the Italian case, the findings in the Danish case study both confirm some of the results in the quantitative analysis and question others. During the first decision-making episode regarding Iraq, legislative control, as expected based on the troop numbers results, played a role in reducing the executive's commitments in Iraq. Rasmussen was constrained by high degrees of public opinion and by a united opposition that refused to vote for Denmark's participation in the invasion. Consequently, the Liberal-Conservative cabinet had to turn to the DPP for support, which made them dependent on just one legislative party. During the second episode, the power of legislative control in constraining Iraq policy continued.

Social Democratic support for the peacekeeping contingent was based on an agreement with the cabinet to provide a smaller number of troops than requested by the United States. As a result, the executive changed its policy to secure more support from Parliament. In addition, the DPP began to demand more benefits from the ruling coalition in exchange for Iraq war support, which again increased the power of Parliament as an institution. The Liberal-Conservative executive was constantly constrained in its actions by a desire to get broad support for troop

deployments (by including the Social Democrats) and by a partner that conditioned its support on policy benefits.

Public opinion did not play an important role in policy-making because it remained at a stable level and did not pose problems for the executive until the third episode. Unlike in the case of Italy, where electoral considerations were clearly visible during the third decision-making episode, the 2005 election in Denmark was rather unaffected by the Iraq war issue. Security, power, and benefits were minor factors taken into consideration in the development of Iraq policy during this episode. The second decision also displays the role of unique events, which are difficult to measure in a quantitative analysis. The controversy over torture accusations launched against Danish soldiers kept the Iraq war in the attention of the public and began picking away at public support for the intervention.

Unique events also affected decision-making in the third episode. The Mohammed cartoon controversy severely worsened the security situation of Danish troops in Iraq and made them central targets of insurgent and terrorist groups. Although the quantitative analysis shows no impact of casualties on decision-making in Iraq, this was not the case in Denmark, where increasing casualties led to statements that Iraq was more difficult than expected. Public opinion, contrary to the quantitative findings, also decreased considerably in support. The center-left parties and the DPP strengthened the institutional power of Parliament by putting forth conditions in exchange for support of the executive's policy in Iraq. Finally, unlike in the second episode, electoral considerations played a role in decisions to reduce and ultimately withdraw troops because Rasmussen's support was decreasing.

The Danish case displays some of the advantages of a qualitative study mentioned in the

conclusion to the Italian case. Although the quantitative analysis has identified a number of patterns in the relationship between variables and decisions in Iraq, it has overlooked the fact that significance and importance can vary across time and by episode. That is, while legislative power could, indeed, be associated with troop decreases (or with the counterintuitive result of reducing the likelihood of defection), it could vary given the presence of other factors, like public opinion, the coherence and degree of public opposition, as well as the ability to preserve consensus within the coalition.

## Chapter 6 – Bulgaria

### *Bulgarian foreign policy and the Iraq war*

Until the end of the Cold War, Bulgarian foreign policy was largely determined by the Kremlin, with Sofia having relatively little leeway in the pursuit of an independent line abroad. For the first few years after Bulgaria democratized, the Socialist-dominated cabinet maintained relatively strong ties with Russia (Nedeva 1994), while more pro-Western counterparts sought out European Union and NATO membership, along with the development of strong ties with Washington, D.C. Toward 1997, general consensus emerged regarding Sofia joining the Euro-Atlantic community (Barany 2002, 146), and consensus over NATO membership only appeared around the year 2000 (Tashev 2004). European Union membership has been, however, a consistent policy since early on (Lefebvre 1994; Kostov 2001).

The country perceives ties with NATO as central for its security and the European Union as both an economic and cultural setting in which it belongs (Dimitrov 2000). Consequently, like Denmark and Italy, it has placed a great deal of emphasis on finding some degree of balance between preserving ties with D.C. without hurting its relationship with Brussels and with other crucial European countries like Germany and France (Tashev 2004).

The Iraq war emerged at a time when Bulgaria was engaged in this sensitive balancing act, and the timing of the conflict brought difficulties to local decision-makers because Sofia was not part of the European Union or of NATO in 2002 and 2003. Bulgaria's involvement in the conflict and visibility in the run-up to the invasion (Sofia was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2002-2003) also ended the recent foreign policy consensus that had emerged, dividing political forces into pro- and anti-Iraq camps. The Socialists and most of the left-wing groups in the country were opposed both to the invasion and to Bulgaria's participation in

peacekeeping operations in Iraq, while the right was generally supportive. On the left, critics argued that Bulgaria's position was too pro-American and showed that the country would be an undisciplined and problematic member of the European Union. In addition, the fear of ruining ties with France and Germany was a frequent critique. On the right, defenders of Sofia's pro-Iraq policy emphasized that NATO membership brought with it both benefits and responsibilities, and that the country needed to prove it was a worthy ally. Echoing similar domestic battles in Denmark and Italy, Bulgaria's participation in Iraq brought with it significant political disagreements and debates on what its support for the United States meant for its foreign policy standing.

### ***Decision-makers***

Bulgaria held a national legislative election on June 17, 2001. Four parties won seats in the legislature: the National Movement Simeon II (NMSII), the United Democratic Forces (UDF), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). With 42.7 percent of the vote, NMSII gained 120 seats out of 240, one vote short of a majority. The right-wing UDF followed with 18.2 percent (51 seats), the BSP with 17.2 percent (48 seats), and the MRF with 7.5 percent (21 seats). NMSII formed a coalition with the MRF, a party that represents the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

Simeon II, a former exiled king who lived outside of Bulgaria for most of his life, became Prime Minister and was the primary decision-maker during the country's involvement in Iraq. The ruling coalition cabinet was dominated by the National Movement. The UDF largely supported the cabinet's position in Iraq and even encouraged more participation (Grigorescu

2008), but it generally criticized the cabinet from the right, while the Socialists were the most vocal opposition group. The BSP's position as the most vocal opposition party was bolstered by its candidate's victory during the Presidential election on November 18, when Georgi Purvanov gained 54.1 percent in a second round. As head of state and commander-in-chief, Purvanov was a visible source of opposition to the cabinet's more pro-American stance in Iraq.

***First decision – deployment of peacekeeping troops to Iraq***

In the run-up to the intervention in Iraq, Bulgaria, like many other Eastern European countries that had to decide on their position regarding Iraq, tried to play a balancing act between the European Union they wanted to join and the United States, whose support for joining NATO was crucial. Bulgaria was especially visible during this period because it was a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council; it also held the rotating presidency in September 2002, right around the time the United States was switching its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq.<sup>159</sup>

Political elites reached relative consensus about the nature of Bulgarian participation in case of a invasion of Iraq by arguing that no invasion troops would be provided. Disagreement appeared, however, in the degree to which Bulgaria should help the United States in other regards. On February 6, 2003, the Bulgarian Parliament unanimously voted to allow the United States to use Bulgarian airspace for a possible conflict with Iraq, as well as the possible deployment of a 150-person nuclear, chemical, and biological unit. The BSP was the only legislative group that abstained because the cabinet refused to adopt a resolution to pledge that Bulgaria would not participate in a possible war against Iraq unless a new United Nations

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<sup>159</sup>For a full list, see here: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/data/Membership%20in%20the%20Security%20Council%20by%20country%201946-2010.pdf>. Accessed on February 8, 2011.

resolution passed.<sup>160</sup> At no point was the conversation about Bulgaria's participation in the war with an invasion force, but the cabinet and the presidency did disagree on whether the February 6 vote meant Sofia was part of the Coalition of the Willing or not. President Parvanov stressed that a war against Iraq would not be legal without United Nations support, and that Sofia was not part of the coalition, while the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister disagreed (Tashev 2004, 80).

Bulgarian public opinion was relatively split on the decision to allow overflight rights and on Bulgaria's participation in it. A poll released on February 10 showed that 47.8 percent opposed transit rights for the United States,<sup>161</sup> while another one on February 14 pointed out that 49 percent wanted Sofia to grant partial support to the United States in Iraq.<sup>162</sup> On March 1, a poll showed 55 percent of Bulgarian opposed to the war without a prior United Nations approval,<sup>163</sup> while on March 4, a poll indicated that 38 percent of Bulgarians were against the country's participation in Iraq, with 42 percent supportive of an action endorsed by the United Nations and 13 percent endorsing help under any circumstances.<sup>164</sup>

Unlike in the cases of Italy and Denmark, where the executive had to make a number of early concessions to various parties within Parliament and moderated their position on Iraq, there seemed to be a certain degree of relative harmony between the executive's position on granting transit rights to the United States and its parliamentary coalition. The opposition was also relatively weak since the BSP was the second smallest faction in Parliament and since President Purvanov, despite his symbolic status as commander-in-chief, did not have the power to influence policy-making regarding Iraq. Moreover, the Socialists were ambiguous about their

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160Bulgaria says it will allow United States to use airspace, AFP, February 6, 2003.

16147.8 percent of Bulgarians oppose granting transit rights for Iraqi war, BBC Monitoring, February 10, 2003.

162Bulgarian public opinion supports partial cooperation in war against Iraq, BND, February 14, 2003.

163Most Bulgarians against Iraq war without United Nations sanction: poll, BBC Monitoring, March 1, 2003.

164Survey shows Bulgarians do not support strike against Iraq, BND, March 4, 2003.

opposition to Iraq, condemning the war in Iraq as illegal while, at the same time, refusing to completely oppose Bulgaria's favorable response to some United States requests. The disagreement was more about how vocal Bulgaria needed to be about its support for the United States, and both President Purvanov and the BSP criticized the administration for being too pro-American.<sup>165</sup>

As the war approached, the Bulgarian public grew much more opposed to the conflict and to Bulgaria's involvement in it. Two polls released in the second half of March showed about 70 percent of the Bulgarian public disagreeing with the cabinet's position in favor of a war in Iraq.<sup>166</sup> The polling numbers came at a time during which the ruling coalition was doing very poorly in opinion polls. NMSII stood at a shockingly low nine percent, compared to the 42 percent it had garnered in 2001, while the BSP was popular among 25 percent of Bulgarians.<sup>167</sup>

On May 29, 2003, as the Bulgarian authorities negotiated with the US about the nature of the country's troop commitment, D.C. proposed the replacement of the decontamination unit Sofia initially proposed with about 500 peacekeepers that would help guard Karbala. On that day, Parliament voted for the deployment, with the Socialists abstaining once again. From the day of their arrival, Bulgarian soldiers were attacked so many times that the Defense Minister had to say that soldiers were undergoing a "baptism of fire" in Iraq.<sup>168</sup> There were few casualties, however, and Bulgarian troops entered December 2003 tense but relatively safe.

### *Executive's preferences*

The Prime Minister and other cabinet members consistently provide verbal support for

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<sup>165</sup>Bulgarian President, Government at loggerheads over Iraq stance, BND, March 5, 2003; Bulgarian opposition demands foreign minister's replacement over Iraq policy, BND, March 7, 2003.

<sup>166</sup>Most Bulgarians disapprove of government's support for war on Iraq: poll, AFP, March 19, 2003; Only 11 percent of Bulgarians support US stance on Iraqi crisis: poll, BND, March 20, 2003.

<sup>167</sup>Bulgarian opposition party launches campaign against Iraq war, AFP, March 24, 2003.

<sup>168</sup>Bulgarian troops in Iraq undergo baptism of fire: Defense Chief, BBC Monitoring, October 16, 2003.

the United States and its plans in Iraq, providing logistical support and volunteering a decontamination unit. The executive was also clear that it would not participate in the invasion, and that it would send peacekeepers at the end of hostilities. Prime Minister Simeon was largely able to implement this preference since the domestic debate in the country was more related to how vocal Sofia needed to be in its support for the United States

### *Hypotheses*

Party unity in Bulgaria was strong (H1). Simeon did not have to manage any dissent and his position was harmonious with the party leadership. Ruling coalition consensus over Iraq was also strong (H2), particularly because the coalition had support from the right-wing opposition. Furthermore, although the Socialists were opposed to Bulgaria's participation in the war, their initial objections were ambiguous and there were no requests for any form of pullout from Iraq. The Bulgarian President, who was a vocal opponent of the legitimacy of the war, supported the deployment of peacekeepers.

Although the ruling coalition was doing extremely poorly in polls, there were no electoral incentives (H3) for them to change their Iraq policy since regularly scheduled legislative elections were going to take place mid-2005. Furthermore, the coalition was strong enough to fend off any requests for new elections from the Socialists, who were doing very well in the polls. Public opposition to the war (H4) was split in half toward the end of 2003, with some polls showing most Bulgarians being against their country's deployment. At the same time, a sizable portion of the electorate was also in favor of Sofia's participation in Iraq, which made public opinion pressure much less formidable.

***Second decision – withdrawal of troops***

On December 27, 2003, an attack on the Bulgarian military base in Kerbala killed five Bulgarian soldiers and seriously wounded around 30 of them.<sup>169</sup> Although the main decision-makers in Sofia, including the President and the Prime Minister, vowed to stay the course, the tragedy brought the country's involvement in the public's attention and intensified the BSP's opposition to the war and to Bulgaria's participation in it. On January 7, 2004, the Socialist leader blamed the executive and army leaders for the accident – which was later coined Black Christmas (Kavalski 2006, 40), and later criticized a report presented by the defense ministry on the matter.<sup>170</sup> Furthermore, the Bulgarian army, whose soldiers were urged by desperate family members to return home, began having problems retaining the volunteers who went to Iraq. Soldiers began trickling out and going home – 62 left in January alone, a significant portion considering the 500-member deployment.

As attacks on Bulgarian troops continued in January, new polls showed the popularity of the ruling NMSII at only 5 percent, with the BSP leading with 25 percent. Bolstered by high polling numbers, the Socialists called for early elections, criticizing the cabinet's stance over Iraq.<sup>171</sup> Despite the lingering controversy over the December 2003 attacks, leaders reinforced the fact that authorities would stay the course in Iraq nearly every single month after that. The Bulgarian President, one of the initial sources of opposition to the war in Iraq, was also adamantly supportive of keeping troops in Karbala.

Leaders began qualifying their stance on Iraq around April 2004, when a Shi'a militia group asked Bulgarian troops to leave and after the United States had to rush 120 military police

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<sup>169</sup>Bulgarian premier warns against withdrawing troops after Iraq attack, BBC Monitoring, December 28, 2003.

<sup>170</sup>BSP leader blames tragic accident in Karbala on the executive, army's general staff, BNA, January 7, 2003.

<sup>171</sup>Popularity of Bulgarian ruling party shrinks to 5.3 percent: poll, *BND*; Bulgarian opposition pushes for early elections, *WMRC*.

officers to improve the army's security situation in the area.<sup>172</sup> Both the defense minister and other cabinet officials began voicing the possibility of a troop pullout if security worsened.<sup>173</sup> While President Purvanov once again reinforced his support for keeping troops in Iraq, he began mentioning the need for the mission of the peacekeepers to be reorganized, which would have involved moving them away from Karbala.<sup>174</sup> Prime Minister Simeon II, which largely stayed away from public statements on Iraq unless he reinforced Sofia's insistence to stay in Iraq, also became more ambiguous about whether a departure of the troops was possible, refusing to answer a question in this regard in April 2004.<sup>175</sup>

Explicit demands for a troop pullout in Parliament also surfaced in April 2004, when five leftist legislators, most of them from the BSP, initiated a motion to withdraw troops from Iraq.<sup>176</sup> Although this demand was not endorsed by the party leadership, which continued its critical stance but avoided asking for a flat-out withdrawal, this was the first time the issue was put on the table. The right-wing opposition group UDF, which had until then been a reliable supporter of the administration's policy in Iraq, also asked for more United Nations and NATO participation in Iraq in exchange for its continuing support for the cabinet's Iraq policy. Although the UDF's support was not essential for the ruling coalition's ability to pass laws on troop deployment or to prevent an opposition request for withdrawal from passing, it did weaken the executive because it made it wholly dependent on the MRF for its Iraq policy. Soldiers continued trickling out of Iraq, as about 25 of them left the mission in May 2004.<sup>177</sup>

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172Bulgaria will not pull troops out of Iraq: poll, AFP, April 9, 2004.

173Bulgarian minister says troops could withdraw from Iraq "if lives threatened," BBC Monitoring, April 9, 2004;

Bulgaria government considers options for troops in Iraq, BBC Monitoring, April 11, 2004).

174Bulgarian president opposes pulling troops out of Iraq, BBC Monitoring, April 13, 2004.

175Bulgarian premier tight-lipped on possible Iraq pullout, BBC Monitoring, April 23, 2004.

176Five opposition MPs call for troops to leave Iraq, AFP, April 23, 2004.

177Two dozen Bulgarian soldiers sent home from mission in Iraq, AP, May 3, 2004.

Toward June 2004, amidst cabinet and presidential confirmations that Bulgaria would stay in Iraq as long as necessary,<sup>178</sup> some ministers began mentioning certain dates and deadlines for departure, something that had not been done previously. The Defense Ministry mentioned the end of 2005, while the Foreign Ministry said troops could leave even earlier than that “if things develop favorably”<sup>179</sup> The discussion temporarily stopped on July 9, 2004, when the Foreign Ministry confirmed the kidnapping of two Bulgarians in Iraq. Confused and ill-informed about the situation on the ground, authorities scrambled to negotiate with the kidnappers, but the two hostages were killed on July 13 and July 15. Shortly after an impressive show of political unity – Parliament passed a statement on the hostage crisis that was approved by 187 MPs (with two abstentions) – a poll showed that 70 percent of Bulgarians wanted withdrawal from Iraq and the BSP asked the cabinet to evaluate the risk to which troops in Iraq were subject.<sup>180</sup>

On July 28, 2004, the Socialists made their first official request for withdrawal of troops, asking the cabinet to present an exit strategy for gradual withdrawal by January 2005. At around the same time, both the Defense Minister and the President also began talking about a troop pullout plan,<sup>181</sup> which was, once again, the first time public official discourse mentioned anything about departure. A poll on September 15, 2004, showed only 24 percent of Bulgarians supportive of Sofia keeping its troops in Iraq, and the BSP leading strongly with 23 percent of the vote (the ruling party was still lingering in the single digits).<sup>182</sup>

At the end of September 2004, Bulgarian officials relocated troops from Kerbala to al-

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178President says Bulgarian troops to stay in Iraq 'until job is done,' BBC Monitoring, June 28, 2004.

179Bulgarian ministers differ over Iraq troop pullout, BBC Monitoring, June 27, 2004.

180Stunned Bulgarians begin to question Iraq policy, Reuters, July 14, 2004; Bulgarian opposition Socialists question safety of troops in Iraq, BBC Monitoring, July 15, 2004.

181Bulgaria committed to Iraq coalition but seeks end date, Dow Jones, September 3, 2004.

182Poll shows nearly half of Bulgarians oppose troops in Iraq, BBC Monitoring, September 15, 2004.

Quasidiyah, a safer place for its soldiers.<sup>183</sup> In November, the Defense ministry announced that Bulgaria would cut some of its troops in Iraq and stressed that authorities would decide in January what to do with Bulgarian troops in the future. As the June 2005 legislative elections were nearing, the Socialists made their most vocal statement about Iraq on January 9, 2005, when they promised to pull troops out of Iraq immediately after coming to power as a result of elections. This promise was significant considering the fact that every poll released all the way into the day of the election showed the Socialists leading significantly.<sup>184</sup> The President followed up a few days later, asking that troops be pulled by the end of 2005.<sup>185</sup> The premier then promised that authorities would decide on the deployment at the end of 2005, essentially trying to delay the issue and to prevent it from becoming an electoral topic during the campaign.<sup>186</sup>

Although it looked like the Iraq issue would be important, but not central during the electoral campaign all the way into March (Vassilev 2006, 480), the death of a Bulgarian soldier on March 4, 2005 and the controversy that followed made Iraq a central topic of the campaign. The cabinet's initial announcement was that the soldier died from an insurgent attack, but an anonymous letter to the media revealed that he had been shot by United States troops. The United States later apologized for the shooting, but polls showed that more than 60 percent of Bulgarians now sought immediate withdrawal.<sup>187</sup>

The Defense Ministry then moved quickly to propose troop withdrawal by the end of the year, and as the bill was making its way to the cabinet, a helicopter carrying three Bulgarians was shot down on April 21, 2005. One Bulgarian member of the crew actually survived the crash, but

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183For the controversies surrounding this move, and the civil-military rifts that it revealed within the Bulgarian leadership, consult Kavalski (2006) and Borissova (2006).

184Bulgaria's Socialists to withdraw troops from Iraq if it wins June vote, *AFP*.

185Bulgarian president wants to see troops out of Iraq before end of the year, *AFP*, January 21, 2005.

186Bulgaria will decide on troops in Iraq at the end of the year: premier, *BBC Monitoring*, March 4, 2005.

187Bulgarian official defends Iraq mission, but poll shows widespread opposition, *AP*, March 11, 2005.

a video recording circulated in the Bulgarian media showed him being pulled out of the helicopter and executed on site (Vassilev 2006, 480). On May 4, after the cabinet approved the Defense Ministry's proposal, Parliament voted to pull troops out of Iraq just before it was supposed to adjourn for the elections.

The vote breakdown was surprising because the ruling coalition voted in favor of withdrawal, while the Socialists and the right-wing opposition voted against. Analysts and media outlets complained that the vote was electioneering, and it might in fact be one of the crucial reasons why the BSP did not do as well at the polls after the ruling coalition took away one of its main points of criticism as the electoral campaign began (Vassilev 2010). On June 25, 2005, the Socialists gained 31 percent of the vote and 82 seats, followed by the NSMII with 20 percent (53 seats). These top two parties eventually formed a grand coalition with the MRF. The new cabinet followed through on its promise to pull troops out of Iraq by December 2005, but in 2006 made the announcement that it would send 120 non-combat troops to guard a prison base in Iraq. The decision was supported by every political force in the new Bulgarian legislative, with the exception of the right-wing populist Ataka (Ghodsee 2008) and encountered few problems until its withdrawal in December 2008.

### ***Executive preferences***

The cabinet (and the President, despite his lack of power over policy-making) consistently spoke about the troops staying in Iraq all the way into April 2004, when some cabinet ministers began mentioning dates. Even after this month, however, statements were generally supportive of a continuation of the country's commitment. The preferences of the executive changed around March 2005, around the time of the “friendly fire” incident. The

executive was then able to impose its preferences on the legislature, which voted for withdrawal.

### *Hypothesis 1*

Party unity (H1) during this episode continued to be strong, and the executive was largely in control of its decision-making process. Ruling coalition unity (H2) was also relatively strong. The UDF, however, grew more skeptical about the country's troop commitment and made demands for more NATO and United Nations participation. This weakened the strength of the coalition that made foreign policy regarding Iraq, and reduced the major party's control by making it dependent on support from its junior coalition partner.

Electoral incentives (H3) seem to have played the most important role in the Bulgarian executive's decision to pull troops out of Iraq. As elections were nearing in June 2005, the cabinet made the decision to exit Iraq in May as the controversy over the friendly fire incident and the helicopter crash shook the public's resolve over Iraq. This decision was particularly important since it removed one of the main points of criticism by the BSP, which was doing very well in the polls.

Public opinion (H4) turned strongly against the war in Iraq after December 2003, but until 2005 the cabinet did not have an incentive to take this opposition into consideration. As public opinion consolidated in opposition and was bolstered by the tragic events of March and April, this became an important element in the executive's decision to pull troops out.

### **Summary**

Bulgaria's initial commitment to the United States was made with relative domestic consensus. The executive was able to cooperate with the United States by deployment troops in

the face of ambiguous public opinion, weak political opposition, and strong ruling party and ruling coalition cooperation. Events on the ground made the Bulgarian public more adamant about their troops' departure from Iraq and provided the opposition with an opportunity to criticize the executive right before elections they were slated to win. Consequently, the executive's ability to make due on promises made at Level I were made increasingly problematic by Level II reluctance for cooperation. The decision for withdrawal was made by the same Prime Minister who ordered troops to go in, and was significantly influenced by changing domestic circumstances that made domestic consensus to continue Level I commitments much weaker.

The Bulgarian case is a good complement to the previous two cases because it illustrates the advantages of a mixed methods approach. In the first episode, the case study confirms the large-N finding that public opinion was insignificant in decision-making regarding Iraq, but that was clearly not the case in both Denmark and Italy. The opposition was also powerless in influencing decision-making in Iraq because it was weak and divided over the Iraq war. These factors also weakened Parliament's institutional control over foreign policy in Iraq. The executive largely controlled the process because it had the support of Parliament in its decision to deploy a number of peacekeepers to Iraq. The legislature's control over troop deployment also did not make it the central player in decisions regarding withdrawal from Iraq in the second episode. That is, the executive was not constrained by significant opposition in Parliament over Iraq, nor was the coalition cabinet shaky. It was the Prime Minister that ultimately made the decision, and Parliament acted as a rubber stamp on the decision.

The factors that played the most important roles in this decision were the very low levels of popularity of the ruling coalition and the likelihood of the BSP coming back to power, the

worsening security situation in Iraq, and the upcoming elections. That is, the factors that the large-N study showed to be insignificant (casualties, elections, and public opinion) were actually the most important elements in the executive's withdrawal calculus. This incongruence was noticeable in the Italian and the Danish case, and shows the importance of conducting both quantitative and qualitative studies. Furthermore, unique events played an essential role in mobilizing both public opinion and opposition groups against intervention prior to elections.

While the large-N analysis showed some interesting patterns in the data, it was sparse on the impact of the domestic political process and its response to worsening security situations. Even if casualty rates were insignificant in the aggregate, they were significant in decisions to withdraw or cut troops during some episodes in some countries. This finding points to the complicated interaction between numerous variables in the executive's Iraq policy, and the temporal variation in their significance that could only be revealed by a close look at the country's domestic political process.

## Chapter 7 - Conclusion

The initial impetus for this project came from the negligible attention international relations scholars were paying to the breakdown of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq. In part, this disappointing neglect could be attributed to the lack of a strong theoretical framework to study defection from an alliance or a coalition. Instead, scholarship on alliances tends to focus on alliance formation and, more rarely, cohesion. Consequently, although journalistic accounts of why countries like Spain or Bulgaria decided to defect from the coalition abound, we have few systematic explanations for why that might be the case.

The dissertation began with a critique of this situation and drew a series of theoretical insights from the existing literature that could be extended to understanding why coalition members renege on their commitments. One particularly visible gap in this literature was the non-existent or, at best, simplistic treatment of the relevance of the domestic political process in the behavior of countries within multilateral military institutions. The project therefore summarized the theoretical insights of three existing schools of thought on alliance formation (security, autonomy, and benefits) and shaped the theoretical insights of foreign policy analysis scholarship into a fourth – domestic politics – dimension.

A quantitative analysis of the determinants of defection revealed few statistically significant results. Of the findings, the domestic politics dimension fared the best out of all four, although the results were counterintuitive – both constitutional control over troop deployment and presidential turnover made defection less likely. Theoretically, there are more reasons to expect that the two variables would make defection more likely. The dependent variable was then refined to allow for more significant oscillation in troop numbers, and considerably more

statistically significant results emerged. The benefits theoretical approach was mostly irrelevant to troop fluctuations, as were some indicators of power. Security and domestic politics variables were the most significant, although some counter-intuitive results emerged here as well. For example, the analysis shows that an increasing number of kidnapping deaths actually makes troop increases more likely. In general, the domestic politics variables were significant in the correct direction, and followed a general rule – the most constraints there are on the executive (public opinion, political opposition, legislative control) – the more likely are troops to decrease.

The second part of the dissertation tries to untangle some of the aggregate findings and to contextualize them. The quantitative study does not take into consideration the fact that executive leaders in all members of the Coalition of the Willing spoke to two audiences – the United States and the domestic political setting. As a result some of the more puzzling political dynamics observed in the large-N study could be explained by a careful set of case studies. Lantis' (1997) variation of Putnam's (1988) two-level games theory is the most appropriate framework for the case studies because it incorporates the major domestic political institutions into a theoretical whole, while preserving attention to how executives interact with their foreign partners.

The case studies have uncovered a series of findings that speak to the advantages of a mixed methods approach to the study of international relations, as well as to the broader literature in the field. The separation of decisions regarding Iraq into decision-making episodes revealed that variables included in the model did not have a constant effect on Iraq war participation. In some instances, public opinion was a major reason why politicians like Rasmussen or Berlusconi cut back on their commitments to the United States. In other cases,

public opinion allowed Rasmussen to largely conduct his own foreign policy goals in Iraq. In the aggregate analysis, such effects are particularly difficult to notice and the results may show no statistical significance when it does exist.

The findings also show the utility of a sequential approach to the study of foreign policy decision-making. The process of foreign policy decision-making rarely involves one single decision which solves a problem entirely (Kuperman 2006, 537). In fact, most foreign policy problems tend to continue for a long time, and decision-makers have to constantly return to address them (Ozkececi-Taner 2006, 545). Some literature that is of relevance to foreign policy analysis, such as cybernetics, game theory, escalation of commitment, and risk taking has considered the dynamic nature of decision-making into consideration, although most of the work in the field still tends to look at a maximum of two iterations (Beasley et al. 2001, 235).

The biggest problem with treating decisions regarding foreign policy issues as isolated events involves overlooking the impact of prior history in a continuous process of decision-making (Billings and Hermann 1998, 54). It is unlikely that the outcome of a single decision, for example, has no influence on a further decision regarding the same issue (Kuperman 2006, 539). In fact, decision-makers often think about an issue in terms of prior success or failure in dealing with it.

The cases of Italy, Denmark, and Bulgaria illustrate the utility of such an approach, and the insights it can generate if it is placed within a broader theoretical framework like Lantis (1997). Variables fell in and out of significance during the decision-making process in these countries, depending on a number of circumstances like single events, casualties, and domestic controversies. In addition, some of the variables that were found to be insignificant in the

aggregate actually played a crucial role in the decisions these countries made about Iraq.

### **Limitations and future projects**

The dissertation has a number of limitations that will need to be addressed to increase confidence in the final results. In the large-N study, some missing data for countries such as Tonga and Bosnia could have altered the final results. The coding methods were largely unproblematic, but classifying parties as being in favor or against their country's intervention in Iraq was, at times, rather difficult. A more accurate approach would use interviews with experts in all 38 members of the coalition or even interviews with party members. The dissertation includes only three case studies. Ideally, the project would include a detailed case study analysis of each member of the coalition. The three cases did illustrate, however, the importance of qualitative analyses of the variables included in the aggregate models and uncovered some processes that would have otherwise been obscured.

The dissertation may also be subject to what Moravcsik (1993) called the additive problem – explaining some of the variance with international factors and another part with domestic factors (see also Knopf 1993), in contrast with the two-level game framework that looks at the interaction between the two levels. Although the first part of the dissertation could fall victim to an additive approach because it looks at the comparative value of the four theoretical clusters of variables, the Lantis (1997) framework attempts to look at the interaction between the domestic political process and the executive's international commitments. Even this approach could be considered to be more additive by virtue of the fact that the international dimension of the Iraq war two-level game was understudied in this project. However, given the

dearth of studies regarding the utility of domestic variables in understanding alliance and coalition behavior, this possible limitation is balanced by a better formulation of the role of domestic institutions in international behavior. A more detailed analysis of the interaction of the executive office with the United States and with domestic partners and rivals would be a solid second project.

The dissertation casts light on a series of possible future projects that can speak to the broad international relations literature and to its sub-fields. A study of the determinants of defection is, implicitly, a study of cooperation, a central subject in IR. If certain domestic political factors interact with events and security threats to make cooperation in the field of security (and, possibly, others) more or less likely, these factors need to be theorized properly. It is necessary to understand the role of domestic politics in interventions such as the ones in Afghanistan, where increasing instability may make alliance commitments flimsier and may lead to the departure of important NATO allies.

In the field of foreign policy analysis, this study demonstrates the central role of legislatures in foreign policy-making and moves beyond studies on the U.S. Congress by looking at two Western European countries and one Eastern European country. It also speaks to the importance of studying the impact of political opposition on foreign policy; in Italy, Denmark, and Bulgaria, the opposition was a major reason that strengthened legislatures in their interaction with executives. Finally, the dissertation provides some reasons for optimism with regards to the impact of public opinion on foreign policy-making. Although extensive scholarship has shown that public opinion does have an impact on a country's international behavior, the war in Iraq was an opportunity for hand-wringing over the fact that the will of the majority does not matter when

it comes to a country's war involvement. After all, most countries in the coalition had solid majorities that were against the war. The case studies do illustrate the fact that public opinion did play a role in how leaders decided the level of their country's commitment in Iraq, as did the entire political process. In the case of Iraq, politics definitely did not stop at the water's edge.

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