How Planning Works in an Age of Reform:
Land, Sustainability, and Housing Development Traditions in Zanzibar

A dissertation submitted to the graduate degree program in Geography and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

by

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Chairperson Dr. Garth A. Myers

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Dedication

To my daughter, the beloved late Jamila; and to you Tuma, Faa, and Kulthum. With your mom's endurance, I owe you all of my love while continuing missing your late sister. I won't forget the passing away of Jamila at the critical time while I was in the US writing this dissertation and unable to attend her funeral. I miss you all.
Abstract

This is a geographical study of urban planning focusing on the on-going neoliberal land reform practices introduced in Zanzibar since the end of the 1980s as a major effort to improve the land sector. Throughout the application of these reforms, the land and environmental management projects were unable to sustain their adopted sustainability agenda that was based on democratic, collaborative, and participatory principles. The government finds it difficult to simultaneously cope with the reform results characterized by multiple overlapping policy changes in the urban land development sector. Based on fieldwork, interviews, and critical archival analysis of government papers, my narrative explores how planning works in this reform era. In line with Habermas's (1984) theory of communicative action and its subsequent influence on collaborative and sustainability planning theories in works by Healey (2006), Forester (2009), and Myers (2010), among others, this dissertation also conceptualizes what is happening in formal and informal housing contexts during the last two decades. I am answering the question of whether the sustainability strategy, which lacks excitement among the targeted local people, has been able to break through state controlled planning practices. The culturally-inspired traditional patterns of the people's land and housing development operations keep on normalizing informal processes which risk repeating the limitations of previous strategies during the years before the reforms. Finally, I examine practical reasons for these identified limitations via case study examples. The case study findings have helped to understand the disjointed element of the sustainability model, based on theoretical, empirical, and local analyses, which can itself be a step forward for further research.
Acknowledgments

A number of people have provided me with support and encouragement in my quest for completing this dissertation research. Some began even earlier to support my decision to come back to school in this very complex technological age. All of them deserve specific mention in this regard. I begin with my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Garth Myers, Professor at the Departments of Geography and African and African-American Studies and Director of the African Studies Center at the University of Kansas (KU). Dr. Myers tirelessly supervised this dissertation and facilitated the needed advisory and logistical support during my whole studentship period at KU. Garth, I am yet to come across a particular word in the English language to express my heartfelt gratitude to you, my friend, mentor, and advisor. I am, therefore, saying this in my own KiSwahili so that you will hear me much better: Asante sana Garth kutoka ndani ya moyo wangu, kwa ushauri, mapenzi, na wema wako ulonitendea; wewe binafsi na familia yote kwa jumla!

Your support and love was everywhere: home, office, our trips to soccer games, our regular chats, attending church services each Christmas season, etc, etc, etc. I always felt indebted to you Garth for something that could not be delivered back except perhaps this way – completion of this dissertation – a promise that I gave to myself since we met more than twenty years ago. Your devotion for me from the beginning was really encouraging and continually pushed me to strive for a higher purpose in this academic manner to this level. And, to Melanie, Phebe, and Atlee (for your welcoming and loving supportive hugs) - I remain thankful to you all with all of my heart. Nilipenda sana chakula na zawadi zote zile. Na zaidi ya yote kujisikia niko nyumbani - Asanteni sana, nasi tunakupendeni pia, sote walioko huku na wa huko nyumbani.
I also owe a huge debt of gratitude for each one of my advisers and other colleagues who have provided their advisory support, encouragement, and even hospitality, along the way. Toping the list are my dissertation committee members: Professors Dr. J. Christopher Brown, Dr. Shannon O’Lear, Dr. So-Min Cheong, all from the Department of Geography, and Dr. Stacey White of the Urban Planning Department of the University of Kansas for contributing their knowledge and advice while writing this dissertation and while attending their graduate classes in the respective geographical and planning courses. I thank you all professors for your constructive contributions and valuable insights to broaden my knowledge in this endeavor. Thanks also go to my sponsors, the National Science Foundation, for the two years funding as a research assistant under Professor Myers and the Graduate Scholarship Center at KU that supported my 2008 and 2010 summer research periods, for fieldwork in Zanzibar, Tanzania and for the development of my research proposal, and for its writing and other follow-ups and feedback, respectively. I could not have finished this project without their constructive funding.

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I know I will never be able to articulate the depth and breadth of my gratitude to all individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions that each made the completion of this dissertation possible. I am fortunate to have received countless advice both from the faculty and from the staff of the two above mentioned departments throughout my stay in Kansas. To this note, I could not forget the welcoming supportive role played by Dr. Terry Slocum and Dr. Johannes Feddema who respectively served in the chairmanship and the acting-chair positions in Geography during my time in the department. They both helped to facilitate and process my study-related applications in a timely and humane way. Well, it is from here where the role played by the two Bevs (the two administrative assistants in Geography – Bev Koerner and Bev Morey) cannot pass without mention, for their assistance in the course of my studies at KU.

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The list of my interviewees is long and is contained as part of my references, but to them all my gratitude goes. I am deeply indebted to all of those people that were contacted and offered their assistance for this dissertation at Welezo-Darajabovu, Chukwani, and in Stone
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKTC</td>
<td>Aga Khan Trust for Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Amani Industrial Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST</td>
<td>Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Computer-aided Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRP</td>
<td>Community-Based Rehabilitation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td><em>Chama cha Mapinduzi</em> (Party of the Revolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Chief Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLE</td>
<td>Commission for Lands and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/TA</td>
<td>Chief/Technical Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFP</td>
<td>Departmental Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoSUP</td>
<td>Department of Surveys and Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Daily Subsistence Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPM</td>
<td>Environmental Planning and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPZ</td>
<td>Economic Processing Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euro (European currency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food Agricultural Organization</td>
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<td>FIM</td>
<td>Finn Marks</td>
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<td>FINNINDA</td>
<td>Finnish International Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographical Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Geographical Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSP</td>
<td>Historic City Support Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOR</td>
<td>The House of Representatives</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Planning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
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<td>LTA</td>
<td>Land Tenure Act</td>
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<td>MACEMP</td>
<td>Marine Coastal Environment Management Project</td>
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<td>MKURABITA</td>
<td><em>Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyoge</em> (Program to Formalize the Property and Business of the Poor), Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
<td>Project Management Team</td>
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<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCLP</td>
<td>Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sustainable Cities Program</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>Sebleni Muungano Sogea</td>
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<td>SMZ</td>
<td>Serikali ya Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Government of) Zanzibar</td>
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<td>Stone Town Conservation Center</td>
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<td>STCDA</td>
<td>Stone Town Conservation and Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>STHS</td>
<td>Stone Town Heritage Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Three-Acre Plot</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPO</td>
<td>Town Planning Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASAF</td>
<td>Tanzania Social Action Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>TZS</td>
<td>Tanzanian Shilling</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDCA</td>
<td>Urban Development Control Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMMM</td>
<td>Umoja wa Mradi wa Maji na Maendeleo (Cooperative Project for Water and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN/CDF</td>
<td>United Nations/Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>United States Aid for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>UVP</td>
<td>Urban Village Project</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<td>German Advisory Council on Global Change</td>
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<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>Waqf and Trust Commission</td>
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<td>Zanzibar Land Information System</td>
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<td>ZAYEDEZA</td>
<td>Zanzibar Youth, Education, Environment and Development Support Association</td>
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<td>ZILEM</td>
<td>Zanzibar Integrated Land and Environmental Management Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZMC</td>
<td>Zanzibar Municipal Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSP</td>
<td>Zanzibar Sustainable Program</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“By far the best part of writing a [dissertation] is the personal relationships that form in the process” (Matthew Specter, 2010: x)

1.1 An Overview

Urban Planning is both a professional construct as well as a dialogic and community activity. It involves evaluating, mobilizing, and processing land for housing and infrastructural services and uses. It is about generating knowledge and actions and their procedural ideas for determining attainable development standards and policy options (please see Faludi, 1973; Freidmann, 1974; and Hall, 1975/2002). Urban planning is also about the interpretation of theories of urban structures and institutions and introducing tasks and roles that contribute to and sustain the security of land management and its organizational and environmental system and context. Geographically, urban planning is about studying a quality of place or the improvement of the built, economic, and social environments of the communities for present and future interests (see also Scott, 1981, Yiftachel, 1989; Myers, 2002).

This practice in Zanzibar1 has been a century long process introduced during the British ‘protection’ in the post First World War period. It has gone through a number of overlapping reform phases over its century of existence. It began with a ‘colonial study’ approach to tropical town planning introduced in 1923 by the British planner Henry Vaughan Lanchester. This

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1 Zanzibar is an autonomous insular state which forms one part of the United Republic of Tanzania on the east coast of Africa. It is an archipelago formed mainly by two major islands, Unguja and Pemba. It is populated by close to a million people, about 40% of whom are urbanised (Population and Housing Census, 2002). Its capital, which also bears the same name, is dominated by traditional housing informality which overwhelms the official land management authorities that do not have adequate capacity to control them. The political system in the island is from the socialist (revolutionary) background with the government being the sole landowner, though individuals are given rights for its occupation. Zanzibar was once a separate country which went through a bloody revolution on January 12, 1964 that promulgated the union with Tanganyika to form the United Republic
planning approach was followed by a government-backed (and what Myers (2003: 102) calls a “public relations aspect of planning”) scheme, in the form of ‘utility housing’ and a ‘new city’ planning strategy, respectively embraced by Reginald Wheatley and Cumming-Bruce in post-Second World War times for reconstruction of the Swahili city’s other side. A comprehensive Zanzibar ‘town planning scheme’ supported by zoning by-laws was developed in 1958 by Geoffrey Mills and Henry Kendall but was “abandoned soon after its publication” (Myers, 2003: 109) following the socialist-influenced 1964 revolution.

An ‘urban renewal scheme’ dominated the first eight revolutionary years under President Abeid Karume that created a “socialist city” environment (Myers, 2003: 107) backed by the first post-colonial planning scheme prepared by the East Germans (Scholz, 1968). The last socialist ‘master planning’ approach was prepared by a Chinese City Planning Team under President Aboud Jumbe, Abeid Karume's successor, in 1982; and it took 20 years to implement its strong demographic and quantitative analysis, neighborhood development, and subdivision earmarks. This master plan was injected, borrowing Robinson's (2006: x) phrase, to promote “investment in the modernity of [Zanzibar] city.” It also culminated decades of 20th century town planning practices in Zanzibar by subdividing the city into different but unfinished planning areas or under-serviced neighborhoods. By 1990, the “capitalist West”, as coined by Myers (2003: 108), represented by the Finns, replaced the traditional and ‘socialist’ town planning scheme approaches in Zanzibar. They instead introduced their umbrella version of ‘sustainability planning’ modeled from the Brundtland (1987) ‘sustainable development’ proposal for the urbanizing Global South. This shift coincided with what Robinson (2006: xi) calls a “conceptual apparatus of developmentalism” for institutionalizing the reform agenda of neoliberal and of Tanzania four months later on April 26, 1964.
structural adjustment policy programs in most of the Global South’s developing countries, including the continent of Africa. As a result, at the end of all these approaches, the majority of Zanzibaris rarely were connected to the centrally-administered land and planning reforms - even those from our own revolutionary history.

All six approaches arose from an official technocratic control system, with a very small participatory dimension in the last sustainability engagement. During the late 1990s, the collaborative planning approach, through localized subdivision planning processes and the emergence of urban village housing rehabilitation projects in the early 2000s created some paradigmatic hope that dialogic planning in Zanzibar could be a possibility, although the 'apparatus' as actually practiced did not end up doing much to solve governance and planning problems in the city. These two latest land, housing, and planning reform approaches faced unexpected government stoppages in the middle of their implementation processes and, due to the departure of supportive donors, are no longer running as effective programs as they once were.

The past two decades have therefore seen rather a mixed outlook for both the comprehensive (master planning) and poststructuralist (sustainability and collaborative planning) approaches. While the latest influences and results of collaborative, communicative, and deliberative planning practices of this sustainability paradigm for the developing countries are still in doubt (please see Hayward, 2003; Myers, 2005, and Mitullah, 2010), my case study examples, with vignettes from a peri-urban subdivision policy reform and in the form of the housing rehabilitation program of the Stone Town district (a key elite area of the Zanzibar), offer suggestions for pragmatic and inclusive ways of working around the severe problems of state-society relations in African cities - that is, until one looks a little more closely as to how planning
reforms were practically politicized.

1.1.1 Purpose and Focus

This introductory chapter outlines the structure of my dissertation work based around a case study of land and housing reform practices in Zanzibar. I question how urban planning is exercised in this sustainable reform age of neoliberal and structural adjustment policy programs as practised in Zanzibar. From a spatial planning viewpoint, I seek to investigate and explain how modern (formally planned) and traditional (informally organized) housing systems work within the sustainability planning programs for land reform projects being undertaken in Zanzibar’s peri-urban zones since the 1990s. In this investigation, I look at the possibilities for convergence of the formal and informal housing systems through accustomed public negotiations, or what I call here social dialogue. The bilaterally supported projects to be investigated are the Zanzibar Integrated Land and Environmental Management (ZILEM) project (implemented between 1990 and 1996) and the Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE) project (on-going since 2003) which have been supervised by the Finnish government in the Zanzibari islands over the last two decades.

I write about people's own experiences regarding those reform projects in Zanzibar, and on how (or to what extent) their execution has (or has not) impacted the traditional management of native housing practices in the city of Zanzibar. I describe the cultural geography of these projects which have taken place in Zanzibar as major administrative efforts to improve land use planning, land registration, environmental management, and institutional development activities mostly carried out within land-related institutions.² There are three case studies at Welezo-

² I spent most of my professional life dialoging for a unified urban planning practice in Zanzibar. I began my
Darajabovu, Chukwani, and the historic Stone Town district which unfold people's experiences (including both ordinary residents and government implementers) regarding those reform projects in Zanzibar.

1.1.2 Theoretical Foundation

I make reference to the spatial constructions in imaginative geographies of cultural studies, social theory, and human geography as advocated in Gregory’s (1994) Geographical Imaginations, among other notable cultural geographical texts. Prominent influences on this dissertation, not limited to Africa-centered work, include Healey (1993; 2006), Fisher and Forester (1993), and Hayward (2003). Other consulted critics in African environmental studies, political history, and urban planning in this regard include George Ayittey (2005); Tumsifu Nnkya (2007); and Garth Myers (1993, 2005, and 2008) whose works were referred to for analyses on the collaborative future of Africa's urban sustainability geographies. With reference to Bronwyn Hayward’s (2003) essay on Deliberative Planning and Urban Sustainability in particular, I compared Zanzibar as an island state to her assessment of the existing institutional and professional perspectives applied in New Zealand for the sustainability of land management and development, and how applied reform project activities in Zanzibar are disconnected from...
the reality of ordinary or average people's lives. This is because linking theoretical base and empirical analysis is paramount, since, as argued in Yin (1994: 46), “the findings and conclusions of the theory base potentially could be replicated when the same project approach is applied [or repeated] all over again.”

The two Finnish-supported land reform projects were implemented in Zanzibar in different components, in four phases that have taken more than 20 years. The ZILEM project was executed under the short-lived Commission for Lands and Environment (COLE), itself in existence from 1989 until 2001. The ZILEM project phase included land-use planning, land administration, environmental management, and capacity building components. Notwithstanding COLE’s abolition in 2001 and an overall revision of the government’s policy goals to support Zanzibar’s structurally adjusted poverty reduction strategy in the SMOLE project phase, the two reform activities were linked through their shared “awareness raising” component. There is also some measure of commonality through a forestry project which was technically added into the SMOLE program after the turn of the new government phase in this decade. This SMOLE project phase was, therefore, the outgrowth of forestry development aid from the same donors during the 1970s and 1980s and that aid, in turn, had given birth to ZILEM.

Throughout these projects' periods of operation, Zanzibar's land reform practices were instituted based on what Myers (2005) jokingly calls the environmental planning and management gospel that involves an integrated and strategic sustainability model, whose so-called 'participatory and interactive' set of principles have not been able to penetrate to the ground to help change people's social ways of doing things (see also for example, Ayittey, 1998; Hayward, 2003; and Ferguson, 2006).

My contention suggests that this inability of the 'gospel' to penetrate to the ground,
including other shortcomings, has come about because it was deployed within a system that lacks communicative social dialogue, involving appreciation of community contributions to participatory and integrated approaches. In line with the “duality of structure” model (please see Derek Gregory, 1994: 112-113), this social dialogue would encourage listening and flexibility and would cover negotiations, consultations, and moral suasion, among other social requirements framed within the duality of the political (including administrative) and societal systems that are inclusive towards achievable common goals (see also McKenzie, 1999 and Taylor, 2002). It would also include education, conversation, and consent-building in the land and housing development sectors. The end result should also include an exchange of information that does not create confrontation among project representatives, the government, and other partners on issues of common interest.

With this in mind, I agree with the contention that the reform practice has not matched or been able to break the traditional patterns of the people in their culturally-inspired informal flexible system of land development, especially within a cultural environment that is dominated by people housing themselves. As a consequence, both projects have suffered through a number of entangled actions, compounded by a lack of excitement from the self-housing communities and a demoralized support staff, clearly scarring the authenticity of the adopted reform practices, especially within the SMOLE project phase.

I also argue that despite remarkable land reform efforts employed in the islands over the years, the still purely state controlled and socially neglectful new system (which is focused more on planning designs than unplanned negotiations) risks repeating the limitations of previous strategies during the years before the reforms. This is mainly because the reform program, which opted for participatory sustainability strategies, has not yet been socially debated or legally
structured within an attainable and unified organizational network that considers the existing traditional housing modalities (resources and norms). Hence, if the applied reform practices are competing against development traditions that encourage housing informality to mushroom in Zanzibar city with limited practical guides to stop them, then the employed land reform policy’s viability is less connected to people's lives, and likely to continue to fall short as a viable planning framework.

The choice of Zanzibar is made for three main reasons. First, because Zanzibar is in a transitional democratic stage, after having been historically dominated by socialist processes for over four decades, it has become an important place for this type of research. Understanding to what extent (how or how much) practical housing development traditions and land management practices are potentially organized in Zanzibar can provide a significant contribution for the future of cultural geographical research on land use sustainability and housing development during democratic transitions. Second, in recent years there has been some increasing interest in sustainability-based initiatives geared towards improving the performance of housing and land management for settlement development and services delivery at the local level within Africa and in some other parts of the developing world. It is important to evaluate their performances for Zanzibar as an example among other cases. Third, Zanzibar was chosen based on my personal experience and local knowledge of the issues in this research within the city and in the countryside, both as a resident of the islands and as an employee for over 20 years of the Department of Planning and the now defunct COLE. I relay and communicate this experience alongside my fieldwork and observation results in the dissertation.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

The last two decades have seen the emergence of the new environmental sustainability model, often embracing the structural adjustment programs based on neoliberal principles aimed to democratize planning and land management systems of the government functions in most developing countries, Zanzibar included. Given the escalation of an international (bilateral and multi-lateral) support system by donor countries towards the end of the Cold War in late 1980s, a number of planning projects were designed at the government and institutional level for the improvement of urban living conditions, land control, and environmental management in compliance with this model. The instituted projects in Zanzibar include the short-lived Zanzibar Sustainable Project (ZSP), the Zanzibar Integrated Land and Environmental Management (ZILEM) project, and its subsequent sibling, the on-going Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE) project. However, rather than being confined to detailed, participatory schemes, the projects were seen to be unable to sustain reform policies based on integrated development and management goals.

It has not been easy to phase-out the traditional land management and housing development practices operating outside the government-controlled (top-down) technocratic system. Government finds it difficult to simultaneously cope with coordinated multiple and overlapping policy changes in the urban land development sector, with the sustainability model being one of these changes. Informal practices have been predominant throughout many African cities, separately operating either in the form of popular community attitudes involving individual negotiations between potential developers with land owners, or popularly-recognized land selling practices - both of which prove difficult to interlink with blueprint planning and legalized land management provisions within sustainability strategies. It is within these contours
that the lack of a unified planning system is closely discussed in this dissertation on recent planning history of Zanzibar.

Zanzibar is a modest secondary African city of about 420,000 people but with a respectable potential in Tanzania's historical and cultural heritage tourism industry. It is the capital city of the Zanzibar polity, which has about a million people. This island community is currently passing through a very difficult transitional planning and land management phase, influenced by a number of fragmented reform initiatives to promote urban/land sustainability which are yet to be incorporated as part of the informal housing development traditions in the city. Over the past 20 years, the Zanzibar government has focused its attention on a highly public and statutory urban land management approach at a time when virtually the entire globe was moving in favor of participatory, community-based, and sustainable principles. Within this period, the government has embarked on an integrated land and housing management reform effort that calls for a fresh approach to sustainable development, based on participatory (collaborative, deliberative, and communicative) principles and increased ownership of the programs by recipient communities to comply with neoliberal structural adjustment provisions, and more recently, poverty reduction strategy paper requirements. However, as seen in practice, the reform approach looks more like a tactical political campaign tool than an implementable planning strategy. If well executed, the program would have involved a fundamental shift, both

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3 Zanzibar's population and its city dwellers on Unguja island mostly follow indigenous Islamic traditions and are housed within poorly-located, densely populated native Swahili settlements in the city and its suburbs. Within the present union constitution, Zanzibar retains its own presidency (now in its seventh presidential phase as compared to four for the union government) and government ministries, and, since 1984, its own legislature of which the portfolios regarding lands, environment, and urban development still stand as non-union matters. This means that the Zanzibar government develops and implements its own politics in these areas, distinct from and autonomous of the United Republic of Tanzania's government, but with significant political intervention. The ruling revolutionary government (in control since 1964) still retains power in the ongoing post-independence multi-party democracy which emerged in Zanzibar in 1992. Zanzibar follows a public-owned land tenure system, in which individuals are given user rights to land in the form of right of occupancy deeds for the Zanzibaris and
in its attitudes and methodology, to break decades of top-down practice, but this is not actually
the case. An international donor community contributed its support to this initiative, recognizing
that the problems are mainly caused by centralized, non-participatory management approaches,
and yet donors seem to have done little in practice to alter the existing centralized governance
traditions.

There is another enormous general challenge, in somehow linking the two systems of
land and housing development (formal and informal) traditions, in order to achieve a framework
which is strategically acceptable and accountable at all levels. A question which may be asked is:
how can this be possible without fully communicating and reaching consensus with the people
concerned and other project actors? One may also begin to wonder whether the applied
approach might ever comply with the wishes of the targeted people and at the same time fulfill
the institutionalized goals and objectives of the donor community connected to such a reform.
Whether this challenge can be met or not, it is argued, depends on the government's willingness
to start appreciating the power of communicative social dialogue among the local housing
development traditions associated with native housing actors within its model reform projects. In
this proposition, all the responsible institutions (governmental and non-governmental),
communities, and individuals must operate together and listen to each other within the newly
reformed management framework, since planning is not just a physical undertaking but also an
inclusive and conserving cultural geographic movement that requires planners to listen to the
people concerned. If planning is a conversation, then such communication or listening should
also be the planner's conversational responsibility.

However, the scope to achieve this socially-inspired but practically based conversational
undertaking is still narrow and/or relatively rarely recognized by planning and land management authorities in Zanzibar. The power of planning involvement is to a large degree not a response to a public outcry, but an influence from the rules of democratic elements introduced in the Zanzibar islands over the last 20 years. Through partisan electoral politics, this phenomenon of planning as a unified responsibility involving the planning authority and the actors whose places are being planned is slowly being locally detected at all sector levels. It is, in some ways, hard work to then imagine why the still centralized mentality of the slowly democratizing bureaucracy in Zanzibar is actually not ready to embrace such an approach wholesale. Without this recognition, it is also hard to believe that the cartography of local housing development traditions will ever be scraped out of the messy city mosaics that continue to be replicated wherever the conversion of agricultural peri-urban lands occurs.

This is because the existing official system is manifested in a uniform lack of visionary direction over imposed projects that fail to promote a philosophy of consultation. Regardless of its coddled participatory component, this system is reluctant to embrace and promote people's initiatives due to the prevalence of overly centralized methods which lack social connections. In reverse, the informal system also becomes reluctant to respond to instituted planning standards. The end result is the mushrooming of informality which lacks legitimization or authentication by the government even within a donor initiative such as in the case of these imposed ZILEM and SMOLE reform projects. Perhaps it is important at this juncture to cite, as follows in the subsection below, one of my lead stories in this context, one that demonstrates a simple but sensitive land adjudication case where peoples’ traditions collided with one of the sustainable land management exercises introduced in Zanzibar.
1.2.1 Research Context

This initial story takes place during the ZILEM project period, where a number of informal land allotees objected to the implementation of a pilot land subdivision scheme in their peri-urban area at Welezo, situated some four miles away from the city, in favor of their own plan. Those people claimed that their land was already parceled and privately sold to them by its original caretaker. Although this private subdivision was disorganized, overcrowded, and coordinated by the local ruling party branch and far below the officially recognized planning standards in lacking important sanitary and other accessibility services, a piece of this village land was already earmarked for a sports ground and other community or religious services (symbolizing the preferred service utility required by the people in their area) - until this piece was reclaimed by its original landowner.

There was an initial reluctance by the villagers upon the arrival of the contracted government people, who wished to survey their informally allotted lands without offering their collaboration to the villagers or revoking these people's informal entitlement – indeed, to recognize them, instead. Because of their lack of trust in this government intervention, these people initially thought that the land authority had just deliberately intervened to stop them (rather than confirm them) in their building processes, in collaboration with expatriate donors, to formalize their informal practices over their lands. Realizing that the land authority was still determined to continue with this subdivision exercise in their area, they decided to deploy their political influences, which debilitated this intervention at the authority level and led to pointless subsequent donor costs. As a consequence, the citizens and government talked past each other (Figure 1.1).
This was because the reform project was not institutionally prepared to cope with such local political sensitivity, modeled within its own isolated operational requirements and community influences. Such experiences at Welezo-Darajabovu, alongside the negotiated struggle for land accessibility at Chukwani and in the collaborative urban village project at the Stone Town area – all evaluated in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this dissertation - are related to the shortcomings of the two reform project implementation frameworks that aimed at holistically unifying institutional land and environmental management activities in the islands.

This initial story indicates that the prevailing community customs have been arguably misinterpreted and the realities of this sustainable approach have been largely misunderstood. The appropriately named 'sustainability gospel' is filled with added bullets and addenda continuously being edited around the globe on overcrowded flow charts (Myers, 2005), but without the incorporation of local realities. It has been unable to predict and understand the
dynamics of the local informal settlements' complexities and cultural diversity within young 
African democratic politics, overwhelming such informal communities in Zanzibar. I argue that 
the scope of the projects put in place to achieve land and environmental sustainability in 
Zanzibar is still narrow, and is less equipped to cope with unpredictable local events unless it is 
unified and includes the people's own socio-cultural values and contributions into the formal 
system.

Indeed, in the existing system of integration in the central, municipal, and local 
government units through the sustainable development model, government institutions are still 
finding it difficult to be more effective and efficient and to divide responsibilities among 
themselves on the one side; and the community's individuals, from the other side, are also facing 
difficulties in being cooperative or responsive to restrictive development control conditions 
applied in the delivery of land and other services, which are still regarded as the government's 
responsibility by most citizens. This is as if the power of the system and its injected resources 
becomes insufficient to satisfy land allocations around an informal property management base. 
The authorities as well find it difficult to be judicious in the allocation and utilization of their 
limited resources and to develop a consensus building vision and its supportive structure, 
working together with citizens through responsible and legitimate social institutions. At the 
center stage of the above cited local housing community case, I could not see organized efforts 
by governmental institutions from the beginning of the latest land reform project to look for any 
positive modalities within such informality.

By contrast, there was, at a slightly later date, a parallel intervention involving 
negotiation and communication with ordinary people, and the informal allotment was 
reorganized and reconfirmed by the authority concerned at Kijichi, utilizing a piece of testable
rules and socially acceptable indigenous (perhaps rurally influenced) resource based alternatives offered by the people themselves (collectively modelled in Gregory's book as interactive schemes). This later experience seems to actually drive most land and settlement dynamics on Zanzibar's rural influenced informality of housing communities within the urban fringes, but planners seldom take this into account or take it up into the operative planning framework. 

Here is one hint of the evidence that the scope of the reform projects put in place to achieve Zanzibar's land is still narrow and poorly equipped to cope with unpredictable local events. The integrated COLE, an authority founded in 1989 to coordinate land, urban planning, and environmental matters, only lasted for basically a decade. Abolished in January 2001, its Act of Establishment (Number 6 of 1989) was ultimately repealed by legal Act Number 15 of 2003 to give room for its three dissolved and discontinued directorates to be placed under two separate ministries. As it happened, it is like the resources granted to COLE were wasted, because the state relied on its own supremacy and ignored the voices of the donors and the targeted staff community to abolish this institution. A chain of seven reform laws which were enacted during the ZILEM reform program are now more than 10 years old and, regardless of the SMOLE project management team's call for their review, are still said to be at their principal legislation stages without having subsidiary regulations to guide the process of implementing them. Hence, they have “not yet been properly tested in practice” according to the legal advisor of the SMOLE project's second mission report (2004: 39).

1.3 Case Study Outline

Combined with fieldwork observations and interviews, an emic ethnographic approach as
detailed in Chapter 2 was taken for this dissertation in examining how the existing system, with its highly centralized socialist institutional framework and limited resource base, is forced to rely mainly on uncertain donor assistance. Donors withdrew their support from Zanzibar for over five years following disputed election results in 1995. Even with a renewed donor presence since 2003, the achievements have brought forth a mixed record in transforming planning and land management processes in Zanzibar, since the building of new relationships between the people and the government has not really been achieved in any practical sense. As argued by Myers (2005), most of these donor-supported urban planning initiatives have “operated in a historical vacuum, seemingly without recognition of long and problematic histories”, and without cultural/political knowledge of urban environmental governance and delivery of community service arrangements. It is upon that historical vacuum and local knowledge of urban environmental governance and housing delivery that this research is focused.

Indeed, the land reform policy might have started to build and sustain a new legislative framework for thinking holistically towards spatial and land management processes, but even with the recently revised model of a poverty reduction strategy, the currently transcendent political-cultural context does not seem to allow for the agenda of radical changes in the land and urban management in a young democracy such as Zanzibar, unless new inputs are employed by the project designers to actually and resiliently adapt to the existing land and housing development traditions. Without having socially connected building traditions as a part of the formal process, the applied sustainable land management approach will still be regarded as suspiciously unrealistic by most of Zanzibar's informal housing developers, and as being a form

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4 Zanzibar entered into multi-party democracy in 1992 with two dominating political parties, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF), which enjoy almost equal political support. However, CCM has officially won all four contested (and heavily controversial) elections since 1995 with a tiny majority of
of quickly fixed reform intervention that is repeating the same old-fashioned control tactics by the state on top of the unauthorized housing actors. The government, even under the new land legislation, structural and land-use plans, wants to have more power over land ownership and regulatory urban planning, making participatory or reformist legislation difficult to enact without a new relationship between the society and the planning systems.

It is worth citing another collaborative example at *Chukwani* (Chapter 8) separately tested by the government technicians in the form of negotiable subdivision planning, in order to substantiate my story. At the technical institutional level, there was an experimental initiative in the 1990s to promote a land sharing approach to peri-urban subdivision planning in the form of negotiating on a 60/40 percentage basis in favor of the land owners/occupiers. In other words, as the government designated land areas for parceling, 60% of the parcels remained under the control of the occupiers, and the government controlled 40%. The initial pilot project objective of this subdivision planning exercise was aimed to improve accessibility due to shortages in the allocation of land experienced by the concerned departments and the citizens applying for land. It was applied with limited technical and financial support from the donors but was mostly carried out independently, under the supervision and willingness of the technicians and land occupiers themselves, until a parliamentarian and other state actors and structures violated the process. As noted in the annual Government Budget Report, 1995-6, the experiment improved the initial number of plots allocated by the responsible departments of lands and urban planning by about one third, but nothing more of the experiment was continued to improve on the process.

With such phased-out promissory note goes the current sustainable collaborative planning project which was tested to improve large multi-family residential buildings inhabited by votes. The latest one was held on October 30 2010, as described in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
generally poor and disadvantaged tenants who are the majority in the Stone Town (Chapter 9). This collaborative planning project of community-based urban village and tenancy improvement was showing some positive responses and outcomes which were expected to build durable administrative systems to sustain those buildings in the long-run. The project was providing the disadvantaged and poor tenant majority greater responsibility for managing their building environment in this historic part of Zanzibar, until the process was hit by an unexpected state intervention which terminated it, followed by the donors' departure.

There exist pieces of evidence of how local planning could resiliently work in this age of land and housing management reforms in Zanzibar. I traced the root cause behind these socio-culturally-engineered initiatives as part of the practically based examples in this dissertation. Such collaborative planning approaches were investigated to help us to understand the reasons behind the initiatives which entailed the government planners subdividing people's lands or providing housing services with a flexible, agreed consensus and some modestly improved planning and administrative processes alongside minimum interference by the state until after the projects were about to mature. My research uncovered the most useful points from these past practical efforts towards a new social dialogue (which at times encountered some resistance or interference from higher authorities). Based on my analysis of their dynamics, I believe they hold possibilities for a better framework of social-institutional connectivity in future urban planning and land management practices for Zanzibar despite some unresolved shortcomings.

These limited project examples as cited above would not allow the informal system to ultimately achieve a socialized land and housing management solution without somehow being adapted into an official system. As it appears, without such a technically and socially supported initiative, the existing reform arrangements showed a weak base for effectively responding to
various grassroots demands for land and housing provisions. This led to frustrations in the performance of land and service allocation process that the people tended to blame on the government, which led to favor informality. The speed of official land allocation and housing availability is not enough to meet the local demand, and the informal delivery of land still overrides the legal system. Nearly 75% of Zanzibar’s urban land is developed informally. Only about 14% of plots are formally developed (Zanzibar Environmental Profile, 1999). (The remaining 11% of urban land is either classified as military, state, or elites' private lands.) Additionally, the fragmented decision-making pattern also causes environmental management problems in peri-urban areas and complicates essential service provisions for the city. If 75% of the land is developed informally, then at least 75% (over 260,000) of the more than 400,000 people living in Zanzibar city and its periphery are living within informal settlements that are poorly serviced.

As a consequence, since it is usually a difficult task to acquire permission to develop land parcels without official recognition, informal land seekers continuously manage to escape from the official process in favor of their own solutions. These are among the good indicators of under-performing policy reforms in the urban land management system, necessitating a fresh understanding of why such a situation prevails before advocating for its improvement and assistance. Furthermore, as the informal lands are mostly set within recently transformed rural zones and many residents are of rural origin, most development that has taken place in the urban peripheries shares some characteristics with its indigenous rural heritage (Field Research by Author, 2006 and 2008).

The concentration of pre-surveyed development in these peri-urban areas is interspersed with limited services and a general lack of realistic planning guidelines. When providing formal
sub-divided lands, development standards remain incompatible with local requirements. Hence, the current attraction in favor of informal initiatives by newcomers seems to be unstoppable even with the introduction of a series of donor-supported plans and a land legislation framework to control them. The questions which arise then are whether this situation can improve, and how that improvement might be accomplished. Can the existing system be framed to positively respond to the above demands? Chapter 7 begins to offer one objective case study response in this dissertation providing a good applied response to these questions for Zanzibar. There are other related questions which are respectively communicated as outlined in Chapters 8 and 9. An extended preview of what my other chapters include appears at the end of this chapter. The operational goal and objectives for the dissertation are summarized in the following subsection.

1.4 Dissertation Goals and Objectives

The overall goal of this dissertation is to reveal how planning works in the reform age of land, sustainability, and housing development in Zanzibar, in the years since the sustainability ideals were introduced to achieve a social and effective unified management framework of informal housing processes within a mainstreamed formal land regulatory system. Along the way towards achieving this broad objective, three related specific objectives for this dissertation were proposed, namely:

1. To consult relevant theories from urban planning theory, cultural studies, social theory, and human geography to facilitate the argument for communicative and consultative social dialogue in this dissertation;

2. To investigate and produce a critical evaluation and analysis of the people's ongoing
experiences in land management processes relative to their housing status in the improvement and consolidation of unified settlement planning and development practices; and

3. To analyze the contributing factors for how the reform projects are either connected to or disconnected from the real housing activities of the people on the ground for further research suggestions that fulfil the requirement of both formal and informal housing sectors.

Based on those objectives, my analysis focuses on the way the land reform projects and the practical housing development traditions separately work in Zanzibar in this age since the introduction of structural-adjusted programs. My analysis on the one hand aims at investigating operational and procedural levels of the settlement development and land delivery systems in Zanzibar and whether the communities are directly or indirectly (sufficiently or insufficiently) involved in the reform process, either at the planning and land administration stages or through the respective social processes or other forms of representation at different forums. In this regard, my work focuses on the existing system, with reference to the prevailing institutional framework and informal social related conditions.

1.5 Research Significance

The significance of this research study on Zanzibar is three-fold. First, many Tanzanian academic researchers involved in sustainable urban land management have been much more concerned with the overall policy implications of land tenure studies, often from political ecological perspectives, rather than from the vantage point of socio-cultural geography or of
planning evaluation research at local levels. Similarly, the related local literature extensively evaluates the urban land management systems and service delivery process on the continental side of the United Republic of Tanzania without analyzing relevant situations in Zanzibar (see for example Kombe, 1994, Kyessi, 2000, Lupala, 2002, and Nnkya, 2007).

Secondly, even with those research experiences that have been recorded so far, the historical emphasis has been more on urbanization and its land use impact rather than on the analysis of locally generated approaches to urban land policy reform undertakings. My research, as a local practitioner, explores and conceptualizes what is happening in the formal and informal housing context of the sustainability of land management program adopted in Zanzibar in the last two decades.

Thirdly, Zanzibar has had a sustained political history of socialist land management and planning systems since the achievement of independence and the subsequent revolution in 1964. It is therefore important to evaluate the impact of that history especially within this age of reforms from the 1990s onward. This is mainly geared toward revealing a contemporary history that governs the land and housing development sectors since the establishment in 1989 of the former COLE. The dissertation ultimately contributes towards a social land management framework built on community dialogue that can assist in developing a unified policy-making and legislative system to guide land and housing development practices both within the formal and the informal urban setting without pushing for unattainable overall responsibility to reside with the state.

On the broader research significance, Zanzibar may be only a small secondary city in Tanzania, one of the world's poorest countries. However, its experiences with land management and land reform initiatives hold useful examples applicable in a wide array of comparable cities.
Attempting to assess how Zanzibar's cases operate or match up with trends in Africa and in developing countries more generally may contribute to finding ways to integrate formal and informal systems, and build innovative deliberative (unified) processes across the world.

1.6 Research Hypotheses

Through the theoretical and empirical analytical findings of the dissertation, I attempt to answer the following hypotheses. My key contention is that practical (socio-culturally-based) initiatives in housing development and land management traditions in Zanzibar are not merely proclaimed for their publicity but recognized, promoted, and coordinated, yet these initiatives then meet with the lack of inclusive land reform policy connections. Because of continued central state domination, influenced by the lack of social dialogue within sustainable land management and urban planning reform practices in Zanzibar:

- the applied sustainability strategy has not been able to match or break the practical, socially-inspired traditional patterns of the people's land and housing development engagements;

- the operational land policy reform program suffers from a lack of excitement from the targeted local people who form the majority in the peripheral urban housing developments in Zanzibar and continue to challenge the planning standards and hence consolidate the dominance of informal housing on the landscape; and

- despite remarkable reform efforts employed in Zanzibar over the last two decades, the still purely state controlled and socially neglectful new system risks repeating the limitations of previously instituted strategies during the years before the reforms.
1.7 Conclusion and Dissertation Structure

This chapter introduces my dissertation structure, questioning the way planning is executed via the informal and formal management systems that are working in parallel with donor-supported land policy reforms instituted in Zanzibar under the banner of sustainability since the early 1990s. Theories pertaining to the duality of structure models in cultural geography and the potentiality of communicative and collaborative planning processes in urban land management and sustainability studies are highlighted for analyzing the consequences of reform projects adopted by the authorities in Zanzibar to govern land and environment over the last 20 year period of localized neo-liberal development.

The key area of land policy reform led by its land use planning component is the main reference point for the dissertation. The activities of this component are detailed in the main text within the context of my theory base. This will be pursued through the lens of collaborative planning and urban land sustainability with more emphasis on geographical and social theory analysis. The reason for this mix of theories is to review as well as to reveal a balanced argument about the deliberative socially-based approach in planning for Zanzibar. This is because the islands of Zanzibar are still dominated by informal housing patterns within a state-controlled socialist planning system amidst a democratic transitional phase where political stability and good governance have proven to be a challenge to maintain. The detailed analysis from the case studies is intended to show that the lack of continuity in logical and communicative social dialogue through the sustainability projects has set back the success of the applied policy reform agenda both in land, urban planning and collaborative housing improvement in Zanzibar. The
centrally-controlled reforms have consequently not been able to penetrate to the ground to help change people's social ways of doing things, thereby challenging its projected sustainability goals.

The remaining chapters are structured as follows: Chapter 2 details the research methodology, covering the data collection process, interviews, and fieldwork results. Chapter 3 lays the theoretical perspectives and its conceptual models for this dissertation, while Chapter 4 reviews city sustainability models in the context of local sub-Saharan African land, planning, and housing development settings. While Chapter 3 provides initial responses on the theoretical perspective of sustainable and collaborative planning limits and the role of the people within informal housing communities, Chapter 4 answers how communicative social dialogue may offer a viable option for the increased access and efficiency of Africa's land management and improvement of informal housing development for Zanzibaris. On the other hand, in order to discuss the consequences of the ongoing planning system, the existing theoretical as well as empirical framework, which were respectively studied at length and historical depths for those two chapters, provide baseline conditions for dissertation analysis. This empirical African analysis underscores the need for a dialogic social alternative as proposed in this dissertation.

Chapter 5 begins to unfold the historical and political context of Zanzibar's land reforms and their collaborative planning and housing development features for the project cases. It also shows how the ruling party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), and its main opposition, Civic United Front (CUF) have dominated local politics in Zanzibar and impacted urban planning, land administration, and housing distribution thereof. Chapter 6 deals with the policy and legal context of land, housing and sustainability planning framework as applied in Zanzibar. Both Chapters 5 and 6 sum up the empirical challenges and prospects that
exist in the implementation of the neoliberal land and urban reform projects and what the existing system faces in this reform endeavour. While the first case study (Chapter 7) offers an analysis of the informal land accessibility struggle for the peripheral urban housing developments in the Welezo-Darajabovu area of the city, it is also about the failures experienced in post-revolutionary land and housing policy development that generated massive settlement informality in the city’s peripheries. The second case study on Chapter 8, to a large extent, details planning negotiations and their implications as experienced over collaborative visioning at Chukwani’s negotiated land subdivision alternative. The last case study in Chapter 9 addresses some collaborative successes with some noted consequences in the implementation of the community-based Urban Village (and Tenancy Improvement) Project in Stone Town of Zanzibar. Chapter 10, the conclusion, outlines the concerns that were raised in the writing of this dissertation. This closing chapter also offers my final reflections on the study’s implications, identifying areas for further research.
Chapter 2
Research Methodology: Data Collection Process, Interviews, and Outline of Fieldwork Analysis

2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used in the case study research on Zanzibar's peri-urban land subdivision, informal development, and collaborative tenancy improvement and housing management practices. Figure 2.1 below explains the methodology used in my comparative literature review of African urban planning analysis, fieldwork observations, reflections on personal experience, document review, interviews, and all data gathering processes within the identified case study contexts. The end results were linked to the theory and analyses of the research questions, objectives, and outlined hypotheses.

2.2 Theoretical Review

The main argument of this dissertation is that reducing the dualism of formal and informal land and housing management systems may improve urban sustainability planning for Africa. I consulted a vast body of literature for this dissertation discussing sustainability planning in land reform issues, but only a few of them come from urban sub-Saharan African perspectives. Recognizing this shortcoming in urban geography and planning studies, with the large exception of South Africa's vast urban literature, the duality of structure model cited in Gregory's (1994) structuration theory, though introduced in sociology by Anthony Giddens (1984) seemed a place to start theoretically for my dissertation. Given that in many ways this theory has unfortunately faded from favor, Habermas's (1984) theory of communicative action and its subsequent
influence on collaborative and sustainability planning theories in works by Healey (2006) and Forester (2009), among others, proved more influential in my thinking, in terms of framing the dissertation, despite the relatively limited literature in geography as a discipline.

Figure 2.1: Research Methodology: Fieldwork Surveys, Interviews, and Analytical Process

Research Assumptions

Research Design

Problem Statement & Research Questions

Research Management Process:
- Case Study Choice
- Data Analysis
- Dissertation Writing
- Reporting

Literature Review & Empirical perspectives

Research Objectives & Hypotheses

Model Overview

Personal Experience

Data Collection Procedure
- Determine Selected Variables/Indicators
- Review Secondary/Primary Data

Fieldwork & Other Empirical Study
- Unit of Analysis
- Site Observation
- Targeting & Interviewing

Analysis of Results for Further Research

Source: Author, 2011

Still, I intend to revive one aspect of the geographers' take on the theory of collaborative
thinking in relation to planning. According to Gregory's (1994) review of structuration theory, the model “depends on reflexivity, recursiveness, and regionalism .... People know a great deal about social practices in which they are involved, although their stocks of knowledge are not always discursively formulated” (Gregory, 1994: 112). Forester (2009: 5) took this as evidence of the need to “chart a middle course” between, in essence, top-down and bottom-up routes to understanding, or between privileging structure and prioritizing agency. In his words, “we need to beware of presumptions of either exaggerated view and instead, very carefully, very practically, to inquire and to learn, knowing that much of what we will hear in any given case can so easily reflect political posturing and gamesmanship, yesterday's outrage rather than tomorrow's possibility” (Forester, 2009: 5).

For planning scholars like Healey (2007), since “participation is not easily achieved,” (Freeman and Thompson-Fawcett, 2003: 18), collaborative and communicative approaches for sustainability planning “offer a way forward” (Bryson and Crosby, 1992). The key to that way forward for Healey (2006: 5) is communicative action planning’s “ethical commitment to enabling all stakeholders to have a voice.” This commitment is “more pragmatic in orientation” (Freeman and Thompson-Fawcett, 2003: 19) than the more airy structurationists, but it can also be valuable for geography, because it may give us a path for understanding how people and social structures co-create urban landscapes. I follow these contentions throughout my case study analysis on Zanzibar.

This theoretical perspective justifies the relationships between three case studies chosen for this dissertation analysis. With reference to Yiftachel (1991: 63), the comparison of the chosen case studies (in chapter 7 through chapter 9) is “strictly qualitative, historically contentious, and theoretically replicable,” and derived from the assessment of those planning
contentions “which are very much the brain-child of social theories characterized by a number of complex procedural methods [of planning practices]” (Yiftachel, 1991: 63). In so doing, my research methodology is intended to achieve “clarity of objectives, … explicitness of evaluation, [and where possible],… a qualification of values for purposes of analysis” (Muller, 1992 quoted in Yin 1994: 46). “[T]he findings and conclusions of the potentiality of theory base could be replicated when the same project approach is applied all over again” (Yin, 1994: 46). By studying conditions under which collaborative and communicative action is likely (or not likely) to work in sustainability planning, my chosen case studies might become the vehicle for analyzing it more broadly.

While I did not ignore the growing urban geography literature for Africa, I took most of my theoretical base from studies in political history and urban planning, primarily though not exclusively focused on African cities, appreciating works earlier done by scholars such as Garth Myers, (1993/2003/2005/2008), Achille Mbembe (1994), and Bronwyn Hayward (2003, on New Zealand) just to name a few. For example, Achille Mbembe, as quoted in Gregory (1994: 196), was consulted as a foremost post-colonial theorist working on African issues who questions the assumptions and revisions of the idea of power sharing in African politics, even when post-electoral bipartisan collaboration has now become a growing phenomenon in many struggling democracies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, or Guinea - and in Zanzibar and Cote de'lvoire, more recently. His suggestion that “the post-colonial subjects become publicly visible at the point where two sets of social practices overlap...” (Gregory, 1994: 196) was useful for the unified planning evaluation suggested in this dissertation since “formal” and “informal” social practices, overlapping, become another means of envisioning this visible post-coloniality (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008).
Furthermore, I was also intrigued by Frank Fischer and John Forester’s (1993) deliberative arguments that “it is possible for democratic and rational human beings to reach consensus, and coordinate actions [within the public arena] through the process of communication” (in Nnky, 2007: 278). As will be apparent further into my dissertation, this deliberative argument was not applied in the formal Zanzibar projects of sustainability planning. The piece by Myers (2008a) on “Peri-Urban Land Reform, Political-Economic Reform, and Urban Political Ecology in Zanzibar” in Urban Geography and Nnky's (2007) book both speak directly to what has been happening to Zanzibar's land reform policy and in Tanzania in general. As Nnky (2007: 278) put it, the inspiring Habermasian discourse holds “[t]hat the force of better argument [within the society] will determine the final validity of a particular decision, provided the process of communication is guided by the following set of criteria or discourse ethics: inclusiveness, empathy, transparency, and neutralization of the existing power difference between participants.”

I matched these insights to my observations of the social character of people who were (or were not) involved in the project implementation processes I analyzed, in order to highlight their reform policy's anti-social results on the ground. This was also a way to assess whether they were not just new attempts to generate a quick fix for chronic planning problems of the developing Global South. Garth Myers's (1993) Reconstructing Ng'ambo: Town planning and development on the other side of Zanzibar was also part of my theoretical base for generating a more historical discussion. Many of his ensuing publications focused on the African regional organization of political ecology, poverty, and culture and on historical research of the role of social forces such as faith, power, and customs (cited in KiSwahili as imani, uwezo, and desturi) in Zanzibar's urban management and housing reconstruction from the 1920s to the present. These
were heavily utilized in my analysis of the Zanzibar cases. Myers (2005b) helped me confirm my social theoretical and methodological foundation in what can be considered an 'emic' (insider's) approach to land reform for Zanzibar.

One of the most important influences of urban planning studies from outside of Africa for the dissertation is Bronwyn Hayward (2003), who calls for deliberative planning in urban sustainability. Remembering her call for a “more pragmatic orientation” to sustainability planning (Hayward, 2003: 19), I examined the existing institutional and professional perspectives on the sustainability of land management and development, and how reform project activities in Zanzibar are connected or disconnected with the reality of people's lives. Based on her New Zealand experience, Hayward (2003: 124) argues in favor of reform “practices that enhance inclusive decision making, encourage consensus building, and improve social learning.” These are three of my main arguments for social dialogue within the planning system for Zanzibar. Each one of these arguments connects to a specific area of my case study at the administrative, technical, and individual decision making levels for land delivery and housing development practices. As discussed in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this dissertation, the stories of key local actors involved in each case study at all levels were traced based on their level of engagement.

I examined the concept of sustainability and the desire for deliberative planning approaches, as pointing to the important role that traditional housing culture would have in these particular collaborative and dialogic sustainable themes. This is with respect to both the Local Agenda 21 of the World Commission of Environment and Development’s so-called Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) adopted at the Rio De Janeiro's Summit on Environment and Development (1992) and the subsequent UN-Habitat Agenda (1996) from the Cities Summit in
Istanbul in order to place my research within the scope of neoliberal and globally significant policy reform trends geared for solving issues surrounding sustainable urban land and housing management in developing countries. My review of other related materials and critics such as Kombe and Kreibich (2000a), Veijalainen (2000), and Manji (2006), each within Tanzania, provided very useful insights in terms of the lessons learned from those UN and World Bank models as applied in Tanzania, easily comparable to the narratives of my case studies.

Of course, except for Myers' long time research about Zanzibar, much (though not all) of the Tanzanian urban planning literature that I relied on comes from the scholars of the mainland side of the country (formerly called Tanganyika), which has had a rather different political experience. Analyses of land policy reform of the transitional African neoliberal phase are available from Myers (2005 and 2008), and I utilized Kombe and Kreibich (2000a) for their arguments supportive of the consolidation of grassroots institutions and knowledge building at the neighbourhood level. As noted above, Myers' (2008) piece on “Peri-urban Land Reform, Political Economic Reform and Urban Political Ecology in Zanzibar”, for example, is a valuable piece for theoretical analysis on the Zanzibar setting. His observation that “peri-urban residents have never known democratic governance” was not surprising, but was also an interesting insight that helped to spark my case study analyses. Kombe and Kreibich's (2000b) work on “Informal Land Management in Tanzania” based on their empirical research into the performance of informal social institutions regulating housing, land development, and settlement growth in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania helped provide an assessment of the potential and limitations of what they called “hidden systems” in reconciling private and public with community interests. These scholars stress that the search for a new partnership between the public (formal) land sector and its latent informal counterpart has to be based on detailed knowledge about the trade-off between
the two systems. Their observations were highly useful in displaying the problems and potentials of practice-based cultural geographic research for Zanzibari planning system. Their work also helped to substantiate a shortage of literature about informal land management operations for the Zanzibar case.

Myers (2001), Torhonen (1998), and Veijalainen (2000) were useful mostly for empirical investigation in Chapter 4. These references were mostly consulted to guide me in land tenure studies and provided insights onto the existing institutional discussions on formal and informal urban land use management in Zanzibar, and in an urban African setting in general for the case of Myers (2001). For example, in her material on uncontrolled land delivery in Zanzibar, Veijalainen (2000) discusses the need for cooperation with experts to improve the process of land delivery at the local level. The problems incurred in land use planning, land allocation and the security of tenure are also discussed in her licentiate thesis. The critical work of Scholz (2008) was also a key reference for my empirical review. His research confirms that informal settlements provide the space for housing and urban livelihoods in this era when the formal planning is not able to cope with their demands. Other scholars such as Lupala (2002) and Yahya (2003) provided valuable empirical studies on land and housing management issues in Tanzania. Their argument about unified urban planning and land and housing management policy within sustainability planning proved important to my review of neoliberal aspects of land and urban management reform and the effectiveness of approaches in guiding development planning in peri-urban conditions of the country.

Post (1997: 347-366) makes the important distinction “between various areas of sustainability planning (its concept and its attributes), collaborative, and communicative action theories on urban land management per se, the reformed policy approach (its principles essential
to the successful working of the concept) and overall neo-liberal ideology [on sustainability] embedded in current urban development thinking.” He uses that distinction to build an argument “for confronting the sustainable participatory approach and its ideology with the harsh realities of African states facing many democratic dilemmas.” With Post, I argue that to confront the sustainable participatory approach and its ideology, rather than attempting to reform the entire planning and centralized administrative machinery at once, “an incremental outlook” is more appropriate, in accordance with the practised urban sustainability planning, housing, and land management principles, in search of positive trends that can be strengthened within unruly settings like those of most sub-Saharan African cities (Post, 1997: 347). Yet, “with the harsh realities of African states” we often find that “sweeping reforms the system cannot handle” fail to take root, a contention that matches well with my findings in this dissertation (Post, 1997: 347-366).

Obviously, the purpose in reviewing all of the above references related to sustainable urban and land management studies is to suggest how their research objectives and related hypotheses inform mine. Indeed, understanding all of these various contentions helped me to reshape my thinking towards the ultimate goal of this research, and to find out how sustainable planning and its related land reform framework would work for Zanzibar.

2.3 Fieldwork Research Process: Techniques, Methods, Data Gathering, and Analysis

This dissertation mainly utilizes qualitative research analytic techniques drawn from cultural - geographical, urban planning, and social scientific principles. My analysis involves mapping and interviewing techniques within the case study areas in peri-urban and inner-city
contexts to illustrate their characteristics and connections with related housing development systems and planning agendas. As shown earlier in Figure 2.1, these methods employed to design and generate the research questions and to provide answers for them were built on contemporary evaluation techniques, aided by Steve Borbatti’s (2004) *Grounded Theory*. This approach combines an empirical (documentary) investigation of the local institutions involved during my fieldwork in Zanzibar, personal contacts with the people involved in my comparative stories of project administration in the case study, reflections on my professional experiences, and interventions with targeted individuals both institutionally and within informal housing and subdivision areas of Zanzibar city. My review of other related literature on how to conduct urban social or cultural geography research has helped me to consolidate the roles social forces played in my own argument about socially constructed dialogue in land reform processes in Zanzibar. This points to how I describe and analyze the Swahili people's housing culture in Zanzibar, and the characteristics of the politics of place in those islands.

Pamela Shurmer-Smith's (2002) *Doing Cultural Geography*, Dydia DeLyser et al (2005), and Herbert, Gallagher, and Myers’ (2005) piece on “Fieldwork and Ethnography,” in *Questioning Geography: Essays on a Contested Discipline* provided research guidance for the dissertation alongside fieldwork and interview techniques applied in consultation with my advisor. Most notably, Shurmer-Smith’s (2002: 3) insistence that “culture is practiced, not owned; [i]t is what people do, not what they [just] have”, proved very relevant to my research work in Zanzibar. She went on to argue that “people often think of 'culture' and 'tradition' as being synonymous, but they are not; much culture is new and conscious of its newness (and much of tradition only pretends to be old...)” (Shurmer-Smith, 2002: 3). This quotation is important because of the fact that much of my dissertation evaluates dualistic planning culture in
the areas of land and housing development traditions in Zanzibar.

Hence, decisions regarding what constitute culture and tradition are the central issues of my research design. That is to say, my research design is very much in line with the logical framework or sequence of doing, collecting, and analyzing data and conclusions that Shurmer-Smith argued for in cultural geographical research. Since “a concept of culture as... a performance” [rather than just a static possession of community or planning activity “allows a movement towards innovative communication” (Shurmer-Smith, 2002: 4), it is a conceptualization well suited to collaborative or dialogic planning based around communicative action theory.

As a long-time Zanzibari planning practitioner who was literally at home in my fieldwork for dissertation research, but coming from a foreign institution, the concluding statement by Myers (2010: 385) about doing qualitative research, in this case in my own homeland, suggested a way for me, with personal insider's look on land, housing and planning activities in the city, to draw “inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation.” Myers’ (2010: 371) piece was mostly about his struggle with “representing the Other” in “foreign fieldwork.” But his recognition that Zanzibar is a “complicated place” where one needs “to manage one's loyalties, in balancing empathy and distance,” alongside his argument that “there are philosophical, personal, and political issues that crop up before the fieldwork starts and continue through the writing, revision, and publication,” lingered in and helped to strengthen my qualitative fieldwork methodology in Zanzibar (Myers 2010: 374-75).

Indeed, I followed his concluding words of advice that “we must see research relationships as ongoing, make efforts to consciously connect work and [studentship or academic] life, make room for more open, honest, or dialog-driven publications and think
critically about reflexivity, and reciprocity throughout the entire research process” (Myers 2010: 385). This is how my fieldwork-based dissertation research was essentially built, on a contemporary ethnographic evaluation that involved an empirical (observational, comparative, and case study) investigation using multiple information sources, as also suggested in Herbert's et al (2005) chapter on ethnography and fieldwork. This combination of a multifaceted fieldwork survey and my own personal experience enabled my interpretation on how people live, build, and consult each other within housing and working cultures of Zanzibar.

From the nature of the research issues and the main questions raised earlier, the variables involved were studied in order to observe the research outcomes. These variables or indicators include accessibility to land both in terms of physical street network pattern and number of the titles issued to assure people's rights of occupancy, levels of community trust and respect, political/institutional support, joint agreements respected, and improved community engagement and their representation. The evaluation for this research was focused almost exclusively on land management and residential housing development traditions of two peri-urban settlements, including my analysis from field visits and related map review within the fringe areas of Zanzibar city in 2006 and 2008 at Welezo-Darajabovu and Chukwani. I also include one comparative inner-city collaborative housing improvement case study to assure improved tenancy arrangement in Stone Town for locational comparison on differing outcomes from each case study setting. Figure 2.2 below displays the location map of these three case study areas.
Alongside interviews and fieldwork observations, archival survey was also conducted at the Zanzibar National Archives and within the land and planning institutions of the former COLE to provide relevant historical facts for this dissertation. My other empirical inquiries were made mostly through oral discussions and semi-structured interviews conducted in summers of 2006 and 2008 while serving as a research assistant to my advisor's (Garth Myers’) National Science Foundation Grant entitled “Peri-Urban Land Reform and Political-Economic Reform in Zanzibar, Tanzania.” I also tested initial research findings and sought feedback with different informants interviewed in Zanzibar, by telephone in summer 2010. Those interviews were aimed
at answering research questions laid out earlier in Chapter 1. The sub-section that follows displays data gathering methods and techniques used to achieve the results of my three case studies and the key material of chapters 5 and 6 as well.

2.4 Case Study Choices and Fieldwork Approach

Based upon my hypotheses and their successive research questions outlined in Chapter 1, the primary concern of this section is to display data gathering methods and techniques used to achieve the results of my three case studies on how land and housing development traditions work in relationship to their dimensions, nature, basis, tools, and contents. My conclusion indicates that both the housing informality and associated land subdivision and housing conservation planning cases within the peri-urban and inner city zones of Zanzibar had possibilities for dialogic planning opportunities. The stoppage point for these possibilities, however, lay in the ineffectiveness of reform strategies put in place in Zanzibar, which created some doubts as to what extent neoliberal sustainability planning and land policy reform frameworks, processes, and procedures connect to the on-going land and housing development traditions and informal practices.

While I placed a lot of self-reflexive analysis of my personal professional experience into this dissertation research, my first case study at Welezo-Darajabovu revealed a mix of formal and informal housing types, which connects to the other two cases – the one at Chukwani (a shared subdivision planning scheme) and the improved tenancy project in Stone Town. This first case study shows the ultimate impact of the informal subdivision case partly within an unresolved land distribution case in a *waqf* (Islamic dedication/inheritance) trust property. The area was
poorly looked after, but also acquired in confusion via revolutionary legal provisions.

Traditionally, according to *Waqf* Property Decree #12/1965, family *waqf* properties are exempted from the overriding nationalization of land that was exercised in Zanzibar following its 1964 socialist revolution. Before this legal provision was created, *waqf* properties were controlled by wealthy patron families who used endowments to foster bonds of dependence and loyalty and to maintain their patron's social representation (Oberauer, 2008). Following the enactment of the Zanzibar's Presidential Decree #13/1965 (which actually came into effect in March, 1964) all land on Zanzibar belonged to the state (Scholz, 2008: 73). This legal declaration was in accordance with the provisions that both the nationalized land parcels and their confiscated properties were declared in the government gazette respective to the colonial Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Decree Cap 96/1949 and its subsequent Property Confiscation Decree of 1964.

By 1966, the Land Distribution Decree #5/1966 granted the confiscated plantation lands as three acre plots (TAPs) for agricultural purposes to landless families, borrowing from an interpretation of Swahili indigenous chiefly tenure (where land was distributed by the *watu wanne*, the four elders of the quarters of a settlement), Islamic precepts (such as the imperial declaration of *iqta*, or sultan’s control), state socialism, and “also the British Crown land model” (Scholz, 2008: 73). By 1967, a series of amendments were done to the original revolutionary Land Distribution Decree (#10/1967, #1/1968, and #1/1969) to facilitate residential land distribution in urban areas which were supervised by the ruling party –including the reign of the Afro-Shirazi Party, or ASP (1964-77) into the early CCM years (1977-1988) - for more than two decades within local branch leadership ranks.

It was observed, however, that legal amendments towards land alienation somehow
messed with the *waqf* property provisions after the revolution, including land at Welezo, where one portion of the area covered in this research was allocated to one revolutionary leader without cross-checking its 'nationalized' legal status – since nationalization was supposed to skip *waqf* lands. Indeed, most of the ruined buildings in Stone Town are classified as *waqf* properties; their redevelopment is arguably constrained by their unknown ownership status, loss of interest on the part of *waqf* holders, or the existence of fuzzy legal alternatives that undo the trusts. This disrupted traditional pattern of land violation for housing goes beyond these *waqf* lands. The revolutionary ideals insisted that landless people must benefit from indigenous resources and individual use rights to lands whereby the overall land ownership was a responsibility of the state, a provision that created confusion among other community owners. As Ibrahim Shao (1992: 3) put it “the concept of ownership here [which also perhaps contributes to this confusion] was that the soil [e.g. land] belonged to the government but the crop planted [or whatever was built on the land] belonged to the individual and could not be transferred.” However, Shao (1992: 3) also noted that “there were elements of private ownership creeping in” by the late 1980s, but “these elements were articulated and subordinated to communal ownership” (Shao, 1992: 3).

Obviously, a lot has been changed to bypass some of the miscellaneous provisions of the nationalized land law, thereby neglecting the status of its traditional provisions that were followed “as long as [people] needed land for cultivation, [grazing] or housing purposes” (Shao, 1992: 3) – the “private ownership” claims creep in dependent upon people’s legal ability to gain approval. A dispute in which the daughter of former President Amani Karume is “contesting ownership of a community (church-owned) piece of land” in Zanzibar is an open example of this observation. According to Mwinyi Sadallah (2011) of the Guardian on Sunday
(http://www.ippmedia.com/ January 2011), this daughter claims to have been given a commission for a piece of church graveyard land close to her family’s ‘private’ land at Mbweni for house construction purposes; “but it has transpired that she doesn’t have official building permits. The Church, on its part, claims that it is the long-time, rightful owner of the piece of land” (Sadallah, 2011). Sometimes, elites like the Karume family are able to completely subvert both law and custom, but it is also the case that both legal and customary understandings still hold value for many Zanzibaris; since customary practices are difficult things to sweep away, the elites change the laws.

Relative to my first case study, the government controlled *waqf* administration has classified endowments as either possessed by ‘family’ or ‘religious *waqf*’ trustees which were not subjected to any form of property manipulation. Traditionally, as we are reminded by Shao (1992: 14), “[i]n the past, if any stranger wanted to take up land for cultivation [or any other purpose], he would ask for permission from what he called *Mvyale* [indigenous or native settler/holder], but with the advent of the British colonial government, it was the British Resident who was to give such permission. A number of those measures were used by the British colonial government in order to stabilize the land acquisition” (Shao (1992: 14). Protection of *waqf* properties were among the initial land administrative measures which were fully invented in favor of the founder's communities/families, while the latter was turned into revenue for public religious upkeep (Oberauer, 2008). As a result, *waqf* ceased to be an economic base for patron-client relationships and clients were transformed into a modern working class entirely dependent on wage labor (Ibid).

Historically, however, before the 1964 revolution, indigenous, Islamic (including *waqf* trustees), and the British Crown land laws governed property ownership systems in Zanzibar. By
1965, the colonial *Waqf* Property Decree of 1920s was amended by the *Waqf* Property Decree #12/1965 to respond to revolutionary political and economic ideas, which were socialist in nature. According to the Land Distribution Decree #10/1967, the revolutionary 'three acre plots' (TAPs) system was introduced to provide and distribute land to the revolutionary supporters for agricultural purposes. It guaranteed “not [to] assign, subdivide, sublet, mortgage charge, or change use of the *waqf* possession or any other land granted” (Scholz, 2008: 74). This provision was overwhelmingly neglected throughout the city expansion towards the peripheries. The negligence of this legal provision became a magnetic influence in the formal and informal land development processes that was mirrored in Welezo-Darajabovu. The second case study shows the results of land subdivision practices that might have offered increased access to land delivery, levels of trust, engagement or representation, and respect, political support, and joint agreement achieved between the community and their responsible land institution. The third case assesses the performance of collaborative urban housing and level of tenancy improvement in Stone Town's urban village project, derived from the propositions of collaborative planning. In all three cases, though, my research required this sort of attention to legal history.

### 2.4.1 Unit(s) of Inquiry and Analysis

There is, according to Yin (1993), no issue more important than defining the unit of analysis (in Kunfaa, 1996: 49). Within this approach, the originality of each case study was evaluated to demonstrate its qualitative characteristics based on the information available from interviews, observation, and field survey. I began by developing case study profiles, analyzing how they came into being and the ways interviewees were involved in the housing development process - locally, institutionally, or through donor involvement. The analysis of Welezo-
Darajabovu was based on questions about localized socially-created land management, governance, and planning, while in Chukwani questions focused on the joint community-institutional subdivision project, and in Stone Town on the donor-funded, collaborative tenancy improvement project. These are debated in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this dissertation, respectively.

I want to emphasize here that my fieldwork was not an ambitious attempt to evaluate the whole of sustainability, collaborative, and communicative action theories on how to develop a pro-poor planning dialog, but rather, to answer the hypotheses that I developed. The case studies selected were chosen to help explain the planning practices, whether they were sustainable, dialogic, or collaborative in nature. Indeed, the first case study was also generally chosen to explore how mixed land subdivisions and housing development traditions have fared during this neoliberal era in service delivery within both formal and informal areas. This is not an ambitious attempt to apply current theories in preparing a “how-to-do-it manual” (Kunfaa, 1996:49) on formal and informal urban land and housing delivery systems for Zanzibar. This case study analysis was also looking for the examination of the descriptive variables that explain the informal housing development phenomenon in Zanzibar based on the outcomes of mishandled waqf land trusteeship and its in-depth consequences.

2.4.2 Fieldwork and Data Analysis Procedures

Because of the availability of relatively recent empirical analysis by Myers (2008 and 2010) based on his 2006-2008 research on the same case study area – a project in which I was also his research assistant - his detailed analyses and mapping techniques are acknowledged where appropriate. Together with this, I was also able to conduct my fieldwork in three separate phases: 1) an archival survey of documents (ethnographic studies, field reports, policy
statements, correspondence, and both government and community group files) collected for more than 20 years during my personal/professional experience mostly as a planner and later as the Director of the Surveys and Urban Planning Department in the former COLE\(^5\); 2) my own interviews, field data collection, and observations during my research assistantship role for Professor Myers; and 3) my telephone interviews conducted in summer 2010 to verify, update and assess the accuracy of the data that I had collected earlier, with my key respondents. My intention for this part was to add the new data if it provided additional insights into analysis of the old (2006 and 2008) data and if it fit well into and added to the dissertation. This was also the case with unsystematic use of a broad range of both newspaper and online media news sources from Tanzania during 2009-11. I also used this period to improve the cartographic work that covered mapping the case study areas, with assistance from the cartographic unit in geography at the University of Kansas.

My survey to obtain feedback on the work done so far from land and planning authorities in Zanzibar and other key informants from the NSF research was facilitated through a 2010 Summer Research Fellowship from the University of Kansas. This enabled me to keep track of the current activities in my case study areas and gather relevant documentation from respective land institutions which were not available electronically, without having to return to Zanzibar for further field research.

My evaluation technique focuses on the way the adopted land reform projects and the practical housing development traditions work in Zanzibar, in this age since the introduction of structural-adjustment programs over the last two decades or so. I investigated operational and procedural levels of the informal settlement development and land delivery systems in Zanzibar.

\(^5\) I use much of this research material, in fact, in chapters 5 and 6.
I looked at whether the one-sided, centralized reform approach at the government level has hampered or has directly or indirectly affected social housing development interests at the informal community level, either at the planning and land administration stages or through respective social processes or other forms of representation at different forums.

My methodology was built from and continued throughout my work as a graduate research assistant (January 2007-August 2008) on Professor Myers’s NSF research, a geographical evaluation of the Zanzibar land reform program through on-the-ground cartographic assessment, geographic information systems analysis, and in-depth interviewing. It was also complemented with his 2006 and 2007 NSF fieldwork research in Zanzibar, as I have been his in-country collaborator in a number of other research projects in Tanzania. Consequently, I followed a similar research approach to Professor Myers's 2007 fieldwork, albeit as an insider to urban planning in Zanzibar, to evaluate the performance of planning in an era of significant reform. I also provided feedback on the work done so far, by Professor Myers and by me, to land and planning authorities in Zanzibar and to the key informants contacted during the NSF project.

2.5 Data Collection, Interview Processes, and Designed Research Testing Techniques

The June and July 2008 fieldwork was facilitated by Myers’ NSF grant. Additionally, my empirical surveys, complemented by my fieldwork and personal professional experience, were also supported by observation of social phenomenon back before the interview results of the fieldwork period. I tried not to remain a one-sided investigator or become an outsider on what Myers (2010: 381-82) calls research on “representing the Others.” Rather, I worked as an insider
carefully remembering the need for “doing fieldwork research on many levels at once” (Myers, 2010: 384); this varied from being a resident of the city, an active local-based practitioner, and director involved with land and housing management responsibilities for nearly a quarter of a century of my planning career, and then a researcher trying to explain or “map out the terrain” for my dissertation.

I tried to “not be more reflexive” (Myers, 2010: 382) but rather followed logical sequence of data collection techniques to avoid choosing case studies that I had no basis for analyzing or that offered only partial understandings of the issues or subjects in question. I created a routine working schedule for talking to people every working day during my fieldwork, either in the office, on the streets commuting for my routine fieldwork activities, or during my interviews with the people concerned within their localities. Beyond this regular daily fieldwork schedule, I also regularly shared views with various officers at the departments of lands, planning, and Stone Town offices, with whom I had enough time (especially in the afternoon hours with respect to their availability for our discussions) before proceeding, with my own assistant, for our own scheduled interview with sampled residents at the case study areas.

The purpose of this fieldwork was to solidify my data about the dialogic, collaborative, and sustainability planning reform experiences in the three contrasting case studies both at the societal and institutional decision-making structures. To this purpose, I interviewed three different groups of respondents involved in the development of these settlements in the peri-urban and urban areas of Zanzibar.

Firstly, I interviewed senior officials (such as planners, surveyors, and land managers) involved in the deliberations for land sharing subdivision schemes, at their offices. As recommended by Yin (1984, 1993), I strongly respected the existing local protocol, and an
“intuitive path” was followed “along defined broad issues” to prevent me from “wandering through the fieldwork” (Kunfaa, 1996: 52). Questions like 'what do people do, for example, to acquire land for housing' or who does what, at what time/cost and under what circumstances' were asked, especially in the assessment of involvement/collaborative levels of targeted project stakeholders and potentiality of the available resources and their indigenous/institutional local organizations in terms of their limitations and opportunities. There were other questions raised whether the situations in case study areas might improve, and how that improvement might be accomplished. I also asked how and whether communicative social dialogue might offer a visible option for the increased access and efficiency of land management and planning for housing development and improvement of tenancy arrangements of Zanzibaris. Can the existing planning system be framed to positively respond to the above demands?

In answering such questions, my data collection instruments were in the form of non-structured informal interviews and discussions to complement available secondary (documentary and archival) reviews and other fieldwork observations with an obvious emphasis toward qualitative and descriptive analysis (Kunfaa, 1996). Moreover, the direct quotes from the subjects involved are provided to add value onto the study context in the appropriate sections of this dissertation. A few tables and figures are also shown where appropriate to refer back to the argument being projected, as observed from both Kunfaa (1996), Scholz (2008), and others.

My interview guide was developed from the research questions listed as part of my provisional study proposal prepared under the supervision of my advisor, who was also in the field before I interviewed local technicians involved in the case studies, at their work places. At the institutional level, I was interested to learn why the professionals had opted for a new (more inclusive and less formal planning) approach to making land accessible to the people for
settlement development in Zanzibar contradicting legal provisions. This group involved those who had formed opinions for this strategy based from their own everyday working experiences and interactions with native settlers in the informal housing management processes.

Secondly, I was also interested to learn more about the opinion of the people who benefit(ed) from those exercises as well and whether the approach contributed to speeding up access to land or whether it helped reduce long term conflicts that had been experienced before their new strategy for collaborative housing improvement and applied subdivision planning went into effect. This group of interviewees involved those scheme beneficiaries who are both in the government’s recorded land and housing management entitlement list and those who are excluded from the official housing/land allocation system. The latter contingent included people who obtained properties by virtue of their relationships with entitled property owners in Stone Town.

Thirdly, the fieldwork entailed interviewing selected settlers engaged in the development of Swahili housing excluded from official land entitlements. The purpose of interviewing this group of settlers was to assess their attitudes parallel to those engaged in official land transactions. To assess leaders' responses about housing development with informal dimensions, I was also able to talk to the local government officials involved and other political agents whose government or quasi-governmental role (via political affiliations and local government representation – for example, CCM Branch leaders, Shehas, and Diwanis (councilors) led to their direct engagement with informal housing development. I wanted to know how they perceived their settlements in terms of ownership, development pattern, and access to facilities. (Religious buildings such as mosques in Zanzibar are the urban nucleus of any city's settlement or neighborhood unit, and therefore every neighborhood developed should be based on their close
proximity to such facility availability. Motorized access to individual houses is not a significant requirement since majority of dwellers are in the poor income bracket and most use public transport, walk, or cycle to and from their homes, and hence the closest to homes for such a facility the better.)

All these three groups of interviewees referred to above revealed different opinions and views of what was happening in their peripheral housing development and land delivery traditions that were interesting to note for each case study analysis. Finally, interviewing such groups helped me to understand the medium for land/housing delivery and their intended beneficiaries. My research framework shown above outlines all of these aspects of my research methodology from my research design and data analysis, to complement the details of my fieldwork results.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter summarized my research methodology based around my research design, statement of the problems and the sampled questions, literature reviewed, interviews conducted during the fieldwork period, and the results outlined for further research. Findings, including my personal experience on Zanzibar urban planning, housing development traditions, and land management practices, were tied up with other observations and archival/document survey for the three case studies. I deal with each case study in successive chapters later in the dissertation. The poorly-handled Welezo waqf trusteeship in Chapter 7 reveals how formerly peripheral farmland possessors became caught up in a typical scenario of the mixed sources of formal and informal housing systems as they combined within peri-urban city areas. I do not deal with the
settlement’s political consequences but focus on its impact on the existing human settlement pattern that strives to cope with the reality of urban service delivery and accepts new development challenges. Some elements of political-ecological features of research findings are displayed when evaluating the sub-division planning and housing improvement examples in the other two cases, but “without necessarily choosing the least or the most successful practice,” but rather, “by following some logical reasoning for my identified questions” Kunfaa (1996: 50).

The second case study described in chapter 8 is a narrative based on the dialogic attitude of the founding participants both from the government as well as the local community. The narrative reveals a phased negotiated planning practice performed via a logical common sense approach in one of the peri-urban villages involved in sub-division planning which took into account the informal ways to improve the area since the formal system proved to be inactive. It seems to provide a suitable realistic approach to guide such informal processes. This shared land subdivision approach was not meant to be a total change of the current practice, but rather “a model to test” my hypothesis about how to improve collaborative urban planning practice for Zanzibar (Scholz, 2008: 148). I was also able to assess the level of land access and how its delivery process was appropriated since 1996 both through relaxed planning guidelines, short-lived political support, and state-community agreements without being fully mainstreamed within the existing planning and land management requirements.

The third case study on Stone Town, in Chapter 9, was chosen to support the main dialog-driven proposition for this dissertation, through analysis of the collaborative tenancy improvement project that officially came to an end in 2005. My project analysis talks about urban housing conservation and preservation alongside reformed tenancy rhetoric with reference to my interviews and the experience gathered while managing the project from 2001 to 2005. My
performance evaluation survey on this project was meant to validate my argument about its shortcomings based around the collaborative planning approach applied in this project. In my analysis of this case study, I present the opinions of the people involved through interviewing and a questionnaire survey, to examine different angles for reforming planning at the lowest local level toward more dialogic (inclusive, participatory, grassroots, deliberative) or argumentative processes. The Stone Town case is a rather donor-driven community-based rehabilitation program for an “urban village” apartment complex. However, it unveils significant contributions made by the respective inhabitants in the project and also brought about insightful recommendations on how to solve the housing problems through a new type of participatory partnership between tenants, house owners, and the donors within the community-based and government supported conservation, which arguably enabled the people to temporarily improve their housing situations.
Chapter 3
Reconsidering Urban Sustainability and Collaborative Planning Practices: Theoretical Perspectives for the Case Study of Zanzibar

Because “a divided city is an unsustainable place” (Lawrence Murphy et al, 2003: 110), “[p]lanning [...] is central to sustainable management” (Geoffrey Kearsley, quoted in Michelle Thompson-Fawcett and Claire Freeman, 2003: 12). “So, rather than thinking about [dualisms] as in some form of binary opposition it is much more helpful to think about how they are [or could be] interconnected and use this understanding to comprehend and critique why certain types of environment are deemed worthy of protection and why” (Graham Haughton, 2003: 230).

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the multi-disciplinary literature analyzing urban sustainability theory and collaborative and communicative action theory. Since planning theory emanates from the reconstructed history of socio-spatial analysis, I do not aim at creating a grand conceptual breakthrough. Rather, the major task of this review is to utilize the available debate for analyzing key sustainable and collaborative approaches that have evolved and are situated around the neoliberal policy reforms within urban planning and land management in the last 20 or so years in Zanzibar.

Divided into seven sections, the review of this literature is all set in the context of the combined institutional and dialogic planning opportunities for the sustainable use and development of urban and peri-urban land and housing management systems in Zanzibar. I examine participatory theories of collaboration, deliberation, and communication that have emerged in the latest paradigm breakthrough in planning theory to reinforce sustainability thinking. In this case spatial planning is divided into three planning traditions: “[t]hese are the economic, physical, and the combined management strands of public administration and policy
analysis which are all focused on their development in a European and American context” (Healey 2006: 7). Within this intellectual map, planning is central to the project of modernity (Ibid: 9). Planning worldwide has also gone through a deliberative turn over the past 20 years. The focus of this dissertation falls within the areas of physical development planning, shaped for many years by “what cities could be” (Ibid: 17) in the form of land use zoning and other institutional, structural, and traditional policy bases for management processes related to local communicative action and sustainable planning regimes.

Among these planning approaches, the chapter specifically focuses on what is considered “argumentative theory,” which Haynes (1969) first discussed for sociology and Gregory (1994) best articulated for geography. Also associated with the social theory of Habermas (1984), it was brought into the realm of urban planning through the scholarly works of Fischer and Forester (1993), and Healey (1997, 2006), and improved more recently by Forester (2009). This is especially relevant for my dissertation work in defining and explaining how communicative action theory evolved and how it was utilized to improve sustainability planning in developing world cities, such as those in Africa.

Following this introduction, the chapter’s next section aims to briefly link the existing works by several other authors with my case study research of Zanzibar. Section 3.2, therefore, stresses the importance of understanding neoliberal models through the perspectives of peoples' organizational or community initiatives and their historical and cultural links in their urban land and housing development traditions, especially within peri-urban informal situations. I also examine how sustainability planning practice was adopted to manage housing systems worldwide and for the Sub-Saharan context in particular. Section 3.3 defines sustainability in the context of the linked collaborative, deliberative, communicative, and dialogic processes,
followed by the examination of neoliberal planning concepts in section 3.4. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 evaluate the framework towards communicative social dialogue within the sustainability planning debate for land and housing policy reforms. At the end of my literature analysis in section 3.7, the review connects with a sustainable conceptual background about modernity versus traditionalism in formalizing informality, as discussed through recent reform strategies applied in developing countries. The conceptual and contextual framework of this literature review is structured as shown in Figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1: Literature Review Structure

Source: Author, 2010.

3.2 Linking the Conceptual Framework and the Research Methodology

It is common practice nearly everywhere to utilize the latest theoretical or intellectual discourses for scholarly analysis. Urban planning is not an exception regarding this professional
habit. Advocacy in favor of sustainability planning models promoted over the last 20 years has been one of the most notable planning engagements towards effective land, housing, and environmental management worldwide. However, there has not been a smooth implementation path linking the disciplinary literature of environmental sustainability models in global planning, considering the continued lack of analysis of its practical conventional processes in developing countries, particularly those in Africa. A number of conceptual strategies have been applied or tried (mostly through the bilateral and multilateral support of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), including the United Nation agencies) in various countries under different localized environmental programs towards achieving urban sustainability goals. Widely reviewed and commonly applied strategies alongside sustainability planning include: participation, deliberation, decentralization (or localization), and democratization.

Although related, each element is a bit separate in that list of four terms. To be more participatory generally means that planning processes are typically expected to include more people in forums, meetings, discussions, plan-making, and implementation strategies. Deliberative processes are part of that participation; typically this aspect involves an argument that decision-making should result from collaborative deliberations between planners, politicians and the citizens which are transparent and open to a wide range of opinions. Since cities often contain very diverse populations living in different neighborhoods and distinct environments, the trend toward decentralization is meant to accommodate participatory, deliberative processes that are localized to area-specific needs, along with the notion that decision-making itself should be decentralized. Finally, planning as a democratic process is a summation of the other three – the more people participate in deliberative, decentralized processes that are open, diverse, and
transparent, the more democratic the planning becomes, such that urban plans reflect the will of the urban citizenry more than the whims of a political or economic elite.

One chief way of understanding this trend, in its totality, is in relation to communicative action theory. Communicative action planning is most associated with the social theory of Jurgen Habermas (1984), brought into the realm of urban planning through the works of Patsy Healey (1997, 2006), in particular. These intellectual social scientific works have provided “moral support” (Specter, 2010: ix) into urban planning practices “[...] on both sides of the Atlantic over nearly [two] decades.” Fischer and Forester's (1993) work, *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* is another strong voice that stood in favor of this communicative action planning. John Forester (2009), on his own, is another recent voice articulating this type of deliberative action planning. Therefore, at least methodologically, I take ideas from these planning scholars, with an imaginative geographical perspective by Gregory (1994) as one of the leading theoreticians of communicative or “argumentative” planning in Western geography, as well as Nnkya (2007) and Myers (2008; 2010), to name but a few, for African city perspectives.

Forester argued for the analysis of what he termed “practice stories” gathered from activist urban planners in a public lecture in 2005 in Johannesburg, in which he took inspiration from post-apartheid South African planners. “By doing careful, critically probing studies of practitioners – practitioners facing the critical issues of our day, local and global, environmental and economic, inter-ethnic and political – we will find that not only can we come to see the work of planning and design in fresh ways, not only can we learn about new opportunities to seize practically, but we will discover how better to teach planning and architecture as well” (Forester 2006: 570).

Ananya Roy (2007: 623) took issue with Forester’s lecture for its apparent failure to deal
with the “rich theorization of urban planning practice that is emerging from the South African context.” While this criticism seems fair enough on one level (Forester largely offered “practice stories” from Western cities as examples that South African planners might build from), and Roy (2007: 623) admitted that she could not herself “claim any special knowledge of the South African context,” her argument neither does justice to Forester’s insights nor engages fully with the suggestive hints she offers about the “rich theorization” from South Africa. Like Roy, Forester made no claim of special expertise about South African planning or the South African planners who invited him to give the lecture. His intention was to offer his perspective on what he conceived of as a set of shared challenges activist planners face “as they work in between diverse and conflicting stakeholders” and to see what “techniques and approaches” might help “engaged practitioners” (Forester 2006: 570).

Roy suggests that what she tailors as “South African” theorization of “piracy” as a mode of rule in cities and “deep differences” embedded in clashes of cultures between planners and informal majorities has “profound implications for urban theory.” Yet she explores neither the counter-arguments to these theorizations from within South African urban studies nor the implications of her eliding “South African” urban theory with theory on “African urbanism.” She says in a footnote that she does not “mean to suggest that there is one homogeneous geographical fact or theoretical legacy that is Africa/South Africa” (Roy 2007: 624). But with that slash between Africa and South Africa she does exactly that. She is taking from the well-known works of Abdoumaliq Simone on piracy and informality in Douala and Johannesburg, Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall on Johannesburg (but Mbembe’s prominent writings are centered on Douala as well), and Vanessa Watson on Cape Town, to challenge Forester, and by extension western planning theory, on whether “planning (as a formal and ordered urban practice) is interested in
hearing these ‘practice stories’” that emerge from the “outsider” and the “pirate” (Roy, 2007: 627). I argue that these challenges lie not in a simple championing of outsiders and pirates, but in thinking their practice stories together with those of formal, ordered planners.

In that formal, ordered planning world, indeed, participatory, deliberative, decentralized and democratic forms of urban planning became very common in Africa on paper and in rhetoric. Since this idea of sustainability was advocated by the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) and through the UN-adopted Local Agenda 21, the routes and pathways for the new planning’s transcendence on the continent are complex. The first generation of professionally-trained African planners typically received their training either in European or American planning schools, or in African planning schools dominated by Euro-American professors and ideas. These planners (with some of their works detailed in Chapter 4) then typically taught the planning approaches that they had been taught to the next generation. This usually meant top-down master planning that was generally non-participatory, non-deliberative, highly centralized, and non-democratic. To be sure, this approach to urban planning can still be found across the continent in the mindset of many planners.

But over this same 25 years or so of the transformation of planning in other parts of the world, Africa has not been isolated. A new generation of planners trained in the newer approaches brought those new ideas back from training abroad, and in certain cases an active effort is underway to transform the ways planners are trained in African planning schools and their knowledge being articulated toward more communicative action planning. By far the most significant transformation of urban planning thought and deed in the East African part of the Sub-Saharan region has been in Tanzania, whereby the initial emphasis of its applied sustainable planning strategy was more in terms of getting rid of physical than societal or institutional
challenges, rather than “think[ing] as to how they are interconnected” (Haughton, 2003: 230).

In the section that follows, I describe what all of these terms mean within the concept of sustainability as outlined under the United Nations' Agenda 21 adopted in 1992. The definition of sustainability is followed by a discussion of participatory collaborative and deliberative theory that, using Healey's (1998: 1) words, “promises a more sustainable approach to addressing contemporary concerns with qualities of place in a stakeholder society.” It proves hard to separate the sustainability model from neoliberal philosophy, since its adoption in Africa’s debt ridden countries was inspired by economic readjustment policy programs of the mid-1980s. Sustainability planning often actually came in the form of concessions to the previously static, command and control approaches to planning undertakings (Halla 2003). For example, in 1992, Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital city of Tanzania, was selected as the first among 19 pilot cities, multi-laterally motivated by the United Nations, to host and pilot the UN Sustainable Cities Program world-wide. A few years earlier (in 1989), Zanzibar had already introduced its own version of a reform-oriented land and environmental sustainability program, based on the same approach. This was employed as part of the economic and political liberalization and democratization processes and become central to them. Much debate about this Tanzanian neoliberal sustainable planning case appears in my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 for the case of Zanzibar.

3.3 Defining Sustainability, and Deliberative and Collaborative Planning Thinking

Sustainability theory is probably among the most researched subjects in the literature of urban development during the neoliberal era of the last two or so decades. Originating in the
1960s scientific conservation, Kates et al (2001) show that the “concept of 'Sustainability Science' “seeks to understand the fundamental characteristics of interactions between nature and society” (see also Haughton, 2003: 129-130). Such an understanding was expanded by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) to encompass the integration of global development and management processes with the ecological and societal characteristics of particular places and sectors (WBGU, 1996). Willis (2005) contends that this theory was then thought of in the 1970s as the basis for a policy response to the deepening environmental crisis before it became a more intrinsic part of human development theories in the 1980s. Over all this period, however, there has not been a single and smooth implementation path towards a well defined environmental sustainability model; instead, a number of different approaches have been tried. Still, participatory, deliberative, decentralized and democratic forms of urban planning retain their rhetorical importance in African planning literature.

The sustainability model grew in popularity as it became sanitized as a part of the post-managerial philosophy of neo-liberalism from the mid-1980s to the present time. “An independent World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was set up [in 1983] to examine environmentally sensitive developments facing the world and consider their possible solutions not just for the current generations, but with an awareness of long-term issues” (Willis, 2005: 258). At this stage, “sustainable development” was viewed as an exploratory action of an interactive sustainability science (Kates et al 2001). Following its deliberations in what came to be popularly known as the 'The Brundtland Commission', a report was published entitled 'Our Common Future' in 1987 that was mostly concerned with the urbanization of land and environmental hygiene in its human settlements policy directives (Myers, 2005). The so called Brundtland Report defined 'sustainable development' as “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43).

Agenda 21 of this Commission's report was adopted from the proceedings of the UN international conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Earth Summit. In Agenda 21, implementing the idea of sustainable development became obligatory and it was seen horizontally, in terms of time, through which the concept covers several generations (Reid, 2003). Sustainable development, therefore, aimed to replace “the traditional 'Big Man' system where an individual's prestige or [an institutional] position [is] contingent upon the distribution of goods and [services]” (Welch, 2003: 26). It also would require a positive change that would need to incorporate significant local involvement if decision makers opt to act within an institutionally responsible manner (Ibid). The report also stressed the importance of sustainable development as a “deliberative undertaking of the 21st century [...] where government worked in partnership with previously marginalized groups” and do so collaboratively to achieve a sustainable goal (Hayward, 2003: 113).

Since this dissertation identifies practical projects in planning involving collaborative and deliberative processes, more elaborations of these two intellectual concepts are also vital. 'Deliberative planning' means the process that involves deliberation between planners and citizens through “inclusionary argumentation and the way this can contribute to building social and intellectual capital” (Healey, 2006: 241). Referring to Hayward (2003: 114), this planning school “promotes inclusive democratic discussion about planning problems and urban issues [...] through a process of uncoerced public debate. [It] is sometimes known as 'communicative planning' [...] , 'participatory or critical planning' or [collectively as] 'collaborative planning' (Ibid). 'Collaborative planning' is a related process that emerges from those deliberations in
collaborations between civil society and planners. Both are part of what Fisher and Forester (1993) call the “argumentative turn” in planning, where plans result from argumentation among stakeholders. This argumentative turns envisions citizens engaged in collective reasoning about common urban problems (Hayward, 2003: 114).

Watson (2007: 71) also argues that communicative action theory “could be described as the current dominant approach in planning theory [where in] planning decisions should be reached through collaborative processes involving all stakeholders, and conforming to particular rules which ensure that participation is fair, equal, and empowering. Embedded in this approach are the assumptions that the existing local differences can provide a learning environment and build social capital within the community.” This goes with the assumption that, “at times of encountered differences and conflicting decisions, they can be overcome through debate in a consensus-seeking [mutually understanding] environment” (Ibid)

Sustainability thinking has gained significant recognition within urban development, land, and environmental management practices. The neoliberal approach to 'sustainable development' emphasizes enablement, assisting underfunded states in shifting their role in development management and coordination from a technocratic one to a facilitator within an integrated, community-conscious, and strategic management machinery. Neoliberal sustainable development came to many developing-world cities in the form of the UN’s environmental planning and management (EPM) principles, to improve city governance and promote property formalization alternatives to establish a localized sustainability agenda (also see De Soto, 2000). By the 1990s, the emphasis for dialogic 'sustainable development' had arrived, emphasizing allied discussions and community representation at local project management levels and their implementation processes. These two forms - the more dialogic form and the neoliberal form of
envisioning sustainable development – do not always work well together.

'Neoliberal sustainability' typically involves unwavering faith in the private sector to find the appropriate balance of environment and development in any society. It comes in a one-size-fits-all model that includes a severely diminished role for the state in a 'good governance' rubric that is democratized sufficiently to facilitate foreign investment and debt repayment. By contrast, 'dialogic sustainability' involves an unpredictable and even changing alliance of local forces, including the state, private sector, and community stakeholders. Through argumentation and discussion, it seeks to build and maintain consensus on planning politics and programs that are best-practice compromises between stakeholders. Under government controlled initiatives in African settings, and in contradiction to this sustainability provision the process was rarely exposed freely to local communities but it was applied with a massive political or centralized institutional bias characterized by the assistance it received for the strategy it applied rather than by the problems it addressed. A question remains as to how this environmental sustainability concept really works to service urban land and housing development traditions in African countries.

Within this environmental sustainability agenda, a participatory or partnership\(^6\) approach is highly emphasized, which “envisioned a 'global civil society' engagement where governments [struggled to] work in partnership with previously marginalized groups (women, youth, indigenous peoples), local councils and the business community to identify environmental problems and develop strategies to promote sustainable development” (Dryzek, 1997: 127). Even if it has been dominated by a bias towards institutional and technocratic leadership (Oakley and

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\(^6\) Gray (1989: 5) defines partnership as “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their difference and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited visions of what is possible.” The concept of participation will be discussed later in this chapter.
Marsden, 1984), the participatory approach helped to influence and enhance stakeholder representation and guide community development within those sustainability projects. Myers (2005, 3-4) recalls such a strategic approach influenced the “germination of the sustainable cities program [SCP]”, a management approach piloted in African cities experiencing increasing urbanization rates.

Collaborative visioning, deliberative planning, and communicative action planning were promoted economically to guide integrated sustainability sector (land/water/urban/etc.) policy reforms as part of strategic poverty reduction papers in some developing countries (please see, for example, Hayward 2003, Myers 2005, and Tibaijuka, 2009). All of these approaches call for greater participation and/or collaboration to address planning issues through localization of the global agenda for sustainability. There are also primarily three ways to evaluate such approaches. The first is to talk about the definitional theme of the sustainability model and its conceptual origin. The second is to talk about the emergence of the collaborative/deliberative theories in sustainability thinking. The third way is to look at the emergence of dialogic/communicative rationality familiar to the society under evaluation for the combination of the most effective approach possible (Fischer and Forester, 1993). My approach in this chapter is inclined to the latter, to understand its adoption in Zanzibar. I also caution against the adopted models as applied under land reform and housing development traditions in Zanzibar.

In that perspective, I utilize some observations from Gwendolyn Hallsmith (2003: 141) to promote the idea of “self-organization” within the city sustainability debate that “exhibits the capacity..., structure, and responses that fit the time and circumstances.” In her words, “‘[s]elf-organization' comes easily when the actors in the system are free to do things that help meet their needs” (Hallsmith 2003: 141) in transforming their communities. Communicative rationality
within this sustainability planning option emphasizes social action processes through which everyday life and economic activities are accomplished in self-organized urban communities (Ibid).

“[A]s an institutionalist approach to spatial change and environmental planning” (Healey 2006: 31), communicative action theory … “advocates interactions with the stakeholders or interest groups communicating ideas, forming arguments, and debating differences in understanding and finally reaching consensus on a course of action” (Nnkya, 2007: 278). The foundational distinction between communicative, collaborative, and strategic action is that they are all built from the rationality of democratic fundamentals (Niemi, 2005). As cited by Watson (2007), and quoted in Nnkya (2007: 277), Habermas (1984) “holds that within the public arena it is possible for democratic and rational human beings to reach a consensus and coordinate their action through the process of communication […] provided that the process of communication is guided by the following set criteria or discourse ethics: inclusiveness, empathy, transparency […], and neutralization of the existing power differences between participants” (Nnkya, 2007: 277).

Communicative action theory thus far has focused more on planning in the Western cities, rather than in planning in developing countries, with isolated African references (Robins, 2006 and Myers, 2011). In this dissertation I examine to what extent and in what ways communicative action theory is advocated in Tanzanian urban development, along with South African cities; these are the most cogent settings so far for debate and application of communicative action theory in Africa. These approaches arrived in most developing countries within neoliberal packages to enable reform of institutionalized tasks in the planning sector. However, as commonly acknowledged, the technocratic approach to sustainability, in projects with whatever given names, traverses across a 'strategic' sustainable base which became too
selective and polarized, rather than being voluntary and/or dialogic in most cases (see, for example, Myers 2008). In chapter 5, I consider an evaluation of the land reform programs in Zanzibar as a contribution towards this strategic urban sustainability case, debating how a more dialogic communicative action approach could have helped to improve planning and land management activities for Zanzibar. Since this dissertation is in part an analysis of localized neoliberal urban land development and housing management reforms, the next section examines urban sustainability and related collaborative planning processes within neoliberal philosophy.

3.4 Examining the Urban Sustainability and the Deliberative Planning Model

Advocates of neoliberalism associate the concept of urban sustainability with their economic development policy regime (Friedmann 2000). Using the rhetoric of the freedom manifested in ideals of liberalization, democratization, and institutionalization, “neoliberal policy interventions have been inseparable from an urban environmental sustainability agenda for the developing world throughout the last 20 years” (Ahmed, 2010: 622). As argued by Freeman and Thompson-Fawcett (2003: 15), “[t]he focal point in sustainable development literature as it pertains to the urban built environment, is concerned with its 'nature and society' interaction on sustainable cities or at the very least on collaborative urban development.” But neoliberal economic philosophy often rests side by side.

This description is supported by one of the earliest seminal works on urban sustainability, which contended that “[s]ustainable urban development must aim to produce a city that is 'user-friendly' and resourceful, in terms not only of its form and its energy efficiency, but also its functions as a place for living” (Elkin and McLaren, 1991: 12). This would be an urban place
living “within an interactive and pluralistic polity and” a central part of a “decision-making system” (Healey, 2006: 27). In her introduction to the edited book entitled Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies, Healey contends that “[t]he physical development planning tradition has moved both to recognize the social processes underpinning spatial organization and urban form, and the range of complexity of the demands for local environmental management generated by interconnecting social, economic, and biospheric processes” (Healey 2006: 28).

This concept of urban sustainability was “...rooted from the Northern streams of environmentalism, [which ... do] not always reflect perceptions of environmental crisis held by people of the global South” (Power, 2003: 13). This is essentially so in Africa, in which about one third of the total population live in dire poverty in fragile urban settings (Myers and Owusu, 2008). Power (2003) emphasizes that there are arguments about how sustainability planning may be aggravating conditions of poverty and other causes of environmental degradation which are not in line with particular management capacities of most African countries. Inter alia, the approach has been donor-dependent and slow to influence a meaningful development path in most developing countries (Myers 2005).

Thompson-Fawcett (2003: 15) emphasized that the common goal of sustainable development is to achieve “environments which are: 1) in harmony with the natural environment, 2) clean and healthy, 3) resource efficient, 4) socially equitable (agreed upon by the concerned parties), 5) participative, 6) vibrant (and some would add spiritual) regardless of how the city is structurally divided”, perhaps in terms of formal or informal housing zones supposedly within the developing city's conditions. As will be seen later in this dissertation, all these goals are in doubt in Zanzibar's applied planning and urban land management reforms; the ideals of
communicative action theory for urban sustainability are lacking in the two housing development systems that will be outlined in the case study analyses.

For Myers (2010: 6) “[t]his suggests the need for African studies to explore possibilities for theorizations of place construction that draw on or build from non-Western conceptions [...] as a means to build towards alternative planning possibilities.” Otherwise, the division between planned and unplanned areas would not be sustainable. This is because “a divided city is an unsustainable place” (Murphy et al, 2003: 110) as highlighted in the lead phrase of this chapter. Since collaborative planning rejects the idea that sustainable development applies only to a [planned] city environment (Thompson-Fawcett and Freeman, 2003: 221-225), there must be a balanced strategy for both formal and informal human settlement development to make more sustainable places as opposed to applying sustainable strategies that can lead to improved urban social informality – dividing institutional sustainable efforts from the society's own informal actions. This is a bit of a challenge since environmental sustainability rhetoric is a place-based social construct (Jacobs, 1997, Mazza and Rydin, 1997) as well as “a physical base for human existence” (Welch 2003: 27) regardless of its applicable location either within planned or unplanned areas.

Even if we begin to talk about this sustainability model being initiated from the Western ideals of modernization principles (Power, 2003), as the word 'development' itself was initially framed, once again the importance of 'sustainable development' is stressed as a goal towards which the international donor community should 'work together' with local people basically to protect the environment. Practically speaking, this has not been the case. Neoliberal policy employment in the developing world has been more an enterprise of the central rather than the local authorities. For Ahmed (2010: 623), “such neoliberal policy interventions increase [...]
freedom through conditionalities imposed by [...] international financial institutions and because
of the number of contracts between them and national politicians which enhance the transfer of
knowledge [it also becomes] far-fetched in the form of national sovereignty and independence of
the [developing] nations to make choices.” In other words, because central governments
dominate neoliberal policy application, it is actually international donors who dominate through
them. In some senses, “the physical development planning tradition has moved to recognize the
social processes underpinning spatial organization of urban form” (Healey, 2006: 28). But this
recognition is “decorated with communicative action or collaborative planning theory
assumptions” (Nnkya, 2007: 277) that often prove problematic in Africa given state and donor
power inside the dynamics.

Healey’s (2006) research documents the flows in the applicability of the sustainability
model in developing world situations. One impact is that neoliberal visions of sustainability have
generated a shift of direction towards a body of techniques and evaluation criteria which is now
used extensively by government agencies, particularly where neo-liberal policy interests
predominate (Healey, 2006). “It deliberately eschews a co-coordinative role with respect to
public policy [e.g. planning], leaving any necessary coordination to voluntaristic action through
the dynamic market processes and community self-help” (Healey, 2006: 28). These ideas provide
a foil not only on sustainability or collaborative approaches to planning but also against which
the communicative approach referred to in this dissertation is developed.

Implementing outsiders’ visions of communicative action planning still is a big challenge,
especially considering how South African urbanist Edgar Pieterse (2008: 2) describes the
outsider scholarship on African cities: “a relentless catalogue of the utterly devastating
conditions that characterize the daily lives of the majority.” Africanists such as anthropologist
James Ferguson (2006) also believe that Africa is still doomed to be stuck forever in the “global shadows.” However, some insist that discourses such as these are “seeking a range of possibilities” emphasizing how they might help bridge partnership representation at all environmental management levels and implementation processes among the key concerned groups in society (Thompson Fawcett and Freeman (2003: 223). It may also be an easy critique of the Western viewpoint of development in Africa without looking in depth about other local reconsiderations on one hand, and on the totality of community life on the continent, on the other.

Hence those strategies that are associated with neoliberal 'sustainable development' as noted by Willis (2005) are highly debatable. As Jenny Elliott (1999: 6) argues, “the attractiveness [and the dangers] of the concept of sustainable development may lie precisely in the varied ways in which it can be interpreted and used to support a whole range of interests and causes.” This chapter considers the importance of communicative planning's cultural and traditional considerations in the execution of sustainability theory. In general, what should also be noted in this conceptual sustainability model is that it embraces the existing technocratic approaches which do not allow radical changes in the current economic and political systems of the host institution (Halla 2003). This may be in the form of improved management and human resource capacity building through a gradual institutional participatory development approach. In this approach, a more dialogic planning philosophy could be built from within radical transitional structures, but this is seen as being slow – e.g. too argumentative - and hence not very effective.

Regardless of all these observations though, the sustainable development model has been appreciated world-wide for its supposed enablement in assisting poor countries, such as those in Africa, to shift to their role in development management and coordination from a technocratic
approach to an integrated (but still government controlled) management strategy that is somehow more centered on the marginalized communities than any planning that they have ever experienced before (Abrahamsen, 2001; Power, 2003: 86). However, the suggestion which still strikes the above quoted development thinking is that “the poor were denied a chance to define themselves, changing their names and identities such that all backward peoples were united by being labeled and lumped together as underdeveloped” (Rist, 1997: 79).

As Power (2003: 86) has noted, “Rist quickly noticed that their identities were fortified [along with their autonomy in the form, for example, of land ownership and their neighborhood leadership positions] and they were now forced to travel a 'development path' mapped out for them by others.” In consequence, since the poor and their settlement communities still remain incapable of managing their own environment through homegrown, non-interfering solutions, they inadvertently contribute to environmental degradation, for example in the use of resource rich lands for uncontrolled informal housing development in many city peripheries. The elite formal processes are also left unchecked in these dual management systems, creating doubt whether such city land and housing development and management is sustainable (Power 2003).

Building on this sustainability debate between local and foreign-based solutions, and in people-centered versus nature centered initiatives, we find relationships of how to integrate or unify the two systems, formal and informal, as a big fundamental planning challenge confronting Zanzibari urban planning throughout its modern history. For example, the islands have experienced four city master plans which have been implemented with minimal formal development outcomes. This raises questions of the effectiveness of the approaches adopted within the dual (formal and informal) land management systems.

What arises from the ongoing intellectual debate reveals “the mainstream understanding
of 'sustainable development' [that] has moved on from a primarily 'environmental' focus, to one which emphasizes the need to integrate the so called three legs of sustainable development – the economic, social, and environmental” (Haughton, 2003: 227). However, since this dissertation places its main emphasis on communicative social dialogue, I return to Murphy et al.’s (2003: 110) contention that “a divided city is an unsustainable place” and to identify and confront three major “elements” of false dualisms which underpin and undermine the effectiveness of contemporary [sustainability] thinking [and its] discourse [solutions] in most Sub-Saharan African cities.

The first “long-standing elements of dualistic thinking around planning” (Haughton, 2003: 230) are displayed in the form of the formal versus informal dichotomy that separates urban planning activities, with a bias towards the former and often with little or no compassion at all for the latter. I discuss this dichotomy in African planning experience in detail in Chapter 4. The second is about the emergence of the modern versus traditional divide, where the former “had [dominated and] 'compartmentalized' the field of urban studies [and] kept scholars from sharing their understandings of cities, from learning from one another” (Robinson 2006: xi). The existing polarity between top-down versus participatory/grassroots divide is a third dichotomy that hampers the performance of the applied urban sustainability discourses, much like in the “separation of town and country” planning (Haughton, 2003: 230) that exists around sustainability planning practices worldwide.

“[T]o move across the[se] divides” (Robinson 2006: xi), I see in the practical performance of theories of urban sustainability that it is crucial to “think about how they [could be] interconnected” (Haughton, 2003: 230), in order “to belong to all [areas of the] cities and their citizens” in a world of “ordinary cities” (Robinson's 2006: xi). For this way of thinking to
succeed, it is appropriate to look at the emergence of dialogic/communicative rationality familiar to the society under evaluation for the combination of the most effective approach possible (Fischer and Forester, 1993).

Dialogic sustainability is called to overcome these differences and dichotomies. Urban sustainability discourse’s performance can be improved and its existing gaps reduced in a post-neoliberal sustainability age. This is because “these dualisms have been woven into attempts to create crisis-myths, which generates insufficient public concern” (Haughton, 2003: 229). I therefore insist “on the need to rethink and rework [...] these dominant dualisms which persist in debates around wider sustainability planning debates” (Ibid). Drawing from these theoretical inspirations, I will now move forward to elaborate about this thinking in the context of collaborative and communicative social dialogue.

3.5 Collaborative Models in the Context of Communicative Social Dialogue

The need for collaborative and communicative action approaches in urban development is arguably unavoidable now, but it is still a very challenging enterprise. For example, we are reminded by John Bryson and Barbara Crosby (1992), as quoted in Nnkyaa (2007: 278), that “we all live in a world where no-one is in charge.” This means that there is no dominant superpower, for example, or overarching power structure, that can force-feed collaborative and communicative action planning at the local level. “In order to marshal the legitimacy, power, authority, and knowledge required to tackle any major public issue, organizations must join forces in a 'shared power' world” (Ibid). Nnkyaa (2007: 176) extended Bryson and Crosby’s (1992) contention to argue that “the complexity of a bureaucratic policy design or a decision
making approach is associated with the traditional hierarchical rational planning which begins with a problem-solving strategy to achieve its targeted goals.”

In an essentially non-bureaucratic system, “there are fluid and somewhat chaotic networks of organizations with overlapping domains and conflicting authorities.... Therefore, in order to coordinate actions and make progress against the problems, the organization involved must also engage in political, issue oriented, and therefore messy planning and decision-making.” In contrast, the political decision-making approach is inductive, for it begins with issues which by definition are embedded with conflict and not consensus. However, “if efforts to resolve the issues produce policies and program [activities], they will be politically rational, [and] that is acceptable to the involved or affected parties of stakeholders” (Nnkya, 2007: 179). My analysis of the Zanzibari case studies assumes a position in support of this contention.

This is because, “as we look out on the world, and on the environments through which we move,” we view our alternatives from the point of view of our life strategies, asking what the “opportunities, constraints, and resources available to us are” (Healey 2006: 36). And on this contention, “[t]he [collaborative] approach emphasizes that as individuals, we are formed and live our lives in social contexts, in interaction and continual communication with others.” These perspectives are encapsulated in Habermas's concept of “the lifeworld,” which Healey (2006: 96) characterizes “as one where 'systems' and 'structures' take over much of the work providing for our existence, but at the cost of increasingly penetrating our 'lifeworlds’” (see also Habermas 1984). Even though these perspectives are basically thoughts from the 'modern society' perspective, more traditional communities are also affected through global policy standardization. The withdrawal of the state “through economic restructuring and neoliberal policies” leaves many bereft, lacking both the economic means of survival and the social
supports of the family and kin, demonstrating how “we live in multiple relational webs which constitute our lifeworlds” ((Healey, 2006: 96). Philosophically, Healey concludes that:

“[o]ur attitudes and values, and the interests we have in our local environments, in where things and our demands and needs with respect to how we move around in space and make use of the built and natural environment, are defined in the context of our relational world. Through these, too, we develop interests in, and ways of, collaborating to do something about the problems we face as we co-exist in shared spaces and seek to turn spaces into places” (Healey, 2006: 97-98).

I will show that Zanzibar’s shared land subdivision project of negotiations with peri-urban landowners fits well with Healey’s collaborative contentions ... but her contentions are quite lofty when compared with planners' realities.

While some see sustainability as one of the most unifying models of human development applied in the last two decades, others see it as empty theorizing and too abstract, just “statements without universal meaning” (Welch, 2003: 15). Indeed, Welsh (2003: 15) continues, “despite widespread reference to sustainability in development planning [and management of day-to-day activities], the task of translating powerful rhetoric into effective actions has proved more complex than even the most skeptical observers predicted. Because of widespread and often indiscriminate use, the term sustainability is not unequivocal: the gulf between the Brundtland Commission 'definition' and practical reality is as great as ever.”

This is so in part because sustainability has such power in the world of words. As Fischer and Forester (1993: 1) have written, “public policy is made of language.” Following their quotation from Deborah Stone's Policy Paradox and Political Reasoning, they write that “whether in writing or [in] oral form [or it may be in mapping/cartographical form], argument is central in all stages of the policy [or planning] process.” They go farther to contend that “policy-making [which includes planning practice] is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of
social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, inter-subjective interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definition of ideas that guide the way people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act” (Fisher and Forester, 1993: 2) This coincides very well with Forester's latest argument that recognizes planning as an instrument of power in “dealing with real differences of interests, values, [...] and more” (Forester (2009: 6).

For Forester (2009: 6), “planning is the organization of hope [...] that works practically in the face of power and value differences to achieve [a sustainable] outcome.” But, since hope has no method, there is still the question of the distribution of power. Myers (1993: 487) argues that “[i]n the absence of support and guidance towards equitable distribution of power (in KiSwahili: uwezo)” it is faith (iman) and customs (desturi) that dominate the local ways, and these may “simply come to embody and reproduce the material inequalities of the [planned] city.” In this 'reorganization of hope' rhetoric, planning is also an experimental, political, and dialogic activity which relies on “learning from practice” (Forester, 2009: 9) involving five major steps in the process: negotiation, facilitation, moderation, mediation, and pro-activation. For promoting dialogue, in what Forester calls “three strategies of action,” he argues that it is necessary to “facilitate conversation; to promote a debate, we must moderate an argument; to promote a successful negotiation, we must mediate proposals for pro-active action [...] that in turn produce an outcome, for after negotiation can come the cyclic work of monitoring implementation and evaluation” (Forester, 2009: 7, italics mine).

Is Forester’s (2009) idea applicable to Africa? This question takes us back to Roy's (2007) argument introduced earlier, about Forester’s (2006) way of thinking. To some degree, the responses Forester (2009) in effect gave to Roy provide an affirmative answer, although it also
depends on how locally truthful the democratic situation actually is and how effectively vigorous
democratic practice has trickled-down through essentially unguided decentralized imperatives.
After all it would be naïve to expect a complete first-world standard of progress within a short
time given the challenges to democratization in the developing world. What I mean here is that
Forester’s work might, to some degree, offer possibilities for communicative dialogic thinking,
despite Roy’s critique, if it is left to germinate within its local capacity. In his book, *Dealing with
examples to argue for a “middle ground” between those who see differences in planning conflicts
and assume them to be impossible to solve, and those who naively assume simple dialogue will
solve all of the existing deep differences between stakeholders. The two camps Forester
describes appear quite applicable to the debates that have taken place on 'dealing with
differences' in Zanzibari planning practices. I explore the possibilities for working toward the
'middle ground' that he aims for in the Zanzibar case study context, asking what possible
parallels exist between this theoretical perspective and its applied practice in the islands' capital
city planning institutions.

This broad dialogic planning assessment takes us back to Deborah Stone's (1988)
*Paradox of Political Reasoning*, in particular for her perspective on local involvement. She
suggests two specific insights - learning and agreement - in order to achieve a common
understanding for the sustainability of the intended planned activity (Nknya, 2007). The first
insight relates to how the policymaking process could be linked with understanding land and
planning reform activities at localized and institutional levels; and secondly, on how to achieve
localized policy making and planning consensus that incorporates argumentative characteristics
as applied within the case studies of chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this dissertation based on
sustainability and collaborative planning. As these case study exercises involve more than
t“manipulative rhetoric” (Stone's, 1988 words quoted in Fischer and Forester, 1993: 2), these
theoretical insights may help to show how Zanzibari planning evolved from the top-down master
planning and socialist *Ujamaa* (familyhood) era to where it now stands.

On the other hand, since the transformation of planning in Zanzibar has a long way to go,
this theoretical analysis helps to empirically connect Zanzibar's planning history with broader
academic analyses of planning experiences, and with other Tanzanian professional work and
scholarship explained in chapter 4. Situating my analysis within debates in these scholarly
works, which have been only marginally engaged in Tanzanian planning analysis (which is itself
generally somewhat informal and outside of the system) can hopefully bring us much closer to
the kind of participatory, deliberative, decentralized and democratic planning that idealists of the
new planning theory envision, for the Zanzibari case. Zanzibar has had several examples of more
or less off-the-books successes with forms of communicative action planning, offset by serious
struggles with the more formal version, as I show in the case studies.

*Poverty Capital*, and Forester’s (2009) *Dealing with Differences* can be interpreted differently
within different contexts of local ways between developed and developing countries. Most of the
organizations entrusted with continued responsibility for supporting the implementation of the
sustainability approach deploy rhetoric about participatory inclusion of the major actors from the
political, institutional, and cultural contexts that will reduce conflicts among the concerned
players. Others such as Serves (1996: 16) blame communication outflow which requires that
“there should be more integration, [more time and] more dialogue taking place between actors in
the development process.” He goes on to contend that “[s]ince dialogue and face to face
interaction is inherent to participation, the development communicator will find him/herself spending more time in the community” (Ibid). Community involvement, therefore, becomes another key tool to enable communicative social dialogue to be experimented with locally. This ties with the argument for “more time spent in the field among the responsible players of a project to learn how their lives intersect development of the place” ... though this can be seen both as a 'virtue and a vice' of participatory and sustainable development” (Serves, 1996: 17). As argued in Pieterse (2005), participatory partnership connects the institution with community, although it also always strains resources and takes more time and effort.

Here begins the argument whether such a partnership initiative can be a valuable site for experimentation in alternative ways of undertaking urban development in lower-scale development planning practices without it being merged into other more technocratic management processes (Pieterse, 2005). What Pieterse (2005) could have disclosed is the fact that “participatory partnerships in planning, as part and parcel of the sustainability model, should help us to take spatial, political, and community conflicts seriously, to understand better their accompanying gamesmanships and traps, as well as their hidden possibilities, and opportunities to live well together with” local differences (Forester, 2009: 16). The dynamics of participatory community partnerships are one of the most thoroughly researched subjects in the literature of traditional urban development (and even rural development schemes), but not as much in analyses of sustainable planning geographies. Participatory community partnership’s contextual ideals go back to the earliest days of the empirical–positivism age as a consequent re-thinking of 'development theory' of the 1960's 'modernization' approach that stressed capital injection from outside rather than an inside input, as well as a response to the ultimate pessimism of the 'dependency theory' employed thereafter (Hettne 2008). I turn to this point in the following
paragraphs, to close this sub-section of the chapter.

Initiated in the late 1940s and the early 1950s in Latin American studies, 'Dependency Theory' wanted to de-link from other global economies. Essentially, Blomstrom and Hettne (1986) argue that the colonial enterprise and international trade had not been necessarily useful for economic development - as neoclassical theorists implied. As these authors argued, this economic development approach has important roots from the Latin American countries, among other countries of the developing world. However, it also spread its wings in other parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, such as Iran, Vietnam, and Tanzania. Walter Rodney (1972) from Guyana argued against the exploitation of Africa by the West which led to the poor state of political and economic development of the former evident in the late 20th Century. Rodney contributed to the spread of the dependency school philosophy in socialist Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s.

The model of de-linking Africa from the Western world is now part of the historical past, but it is of patent importance as regards to development policy discussions from Tanzania's perspective even to the present. Rodney's book entitled *How Europe Under-developed Africa*, which spread 'Dependency Theory' in Africa, was initially published in Tanzania, when Rodney was a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam. It was very popular and was regarded by many socialist African leaders, like the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, as the political bible for the country's development path. Tanzania was not alone in favoring dependency theory. “[A] wave of socialism swept across the continent as almost all the new African leaders succumbed to the contagious ideology” (Ayittey, 2005: 61). However, the idea was heavily institutionalized in Tanzania as part of the country's educational curriculum for high schools and for university students with political science and sociology majors.
Initially, dependency theory was considered an ideal post-colonial development model “since many African nationalist leaders were suspicious of capitalism” (Ayittey (2005: 61). Its socialist philosophy, however ended up being “understood to mean the institution of a plethora of legislative instruments and controls” (Ibid). By the early 1980s, Ayittey emphasized, “the notion of 'development' was widely misconstrued by the nationalist leaders [and] was misinterpreted to mean the adoption of 'modernity', a rejection of the existing [traditional] ways” (Ayittey, 2005: 87). Dependency theory's failure to deliver in Tanzania's development opened the door for neoliberal planning in the mid-1980s. I now move to describe the challenges encountered in the process of neoliberal policy institutionalization in Tanzania in the following section.

3.6 Applicability of Neoliberal Agenda Institutionalization in Tanzania

In Tanzania, the dependency approach was employed in the form of the government’s Ujamaa (family-hood) development philosophy and advocacy of self-reliance, as guided by the socialistic Arusha Declaration of 1967. Technically, the Arusha Declaration and Ujamaa philosophy were the official policy guides for all development planning (including urban planning) from 1967 to 1985, but its legacy, ironically echoing colonialism, has lasted much longer. Samir Amin (another key dependency theorist in the African context influential in Tanzania from the publication of his “Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa” article in 1972 onwards) articulated another key dimension of Tanzania’s attempt to implement a dependency-influenced development framework. This is best encapsulated in Amin’s (2000) call for de-linking the periphery from the core (industrialized nations) in order to get economic independence – a crucial tenet of Ujamaa’s self-reliance principle. In his analysis, Amin (2000)
found, among his other widespread arguments, that the process linked to neoliberalism, associated with privatization and democratization encourages monopoly by donors which creates dependency, underdevelopment, polarization, and ultimately inequality in income and service distribution, bureaucracy, dictatorship, and corruption, and finally cultural ethical divisions.

Back in the 1980s and 1990s, however, nearly all development donors opted in favor of African political, economic, and institutional reforms. According to Ayittey (2005: 329), “nearly all the development models assumed that all other things were equal and all Africa needed to take off” was a “massive infusion of foreign aid or capital.” There were even more arguments made by local thinkers in the years beyond Ujamaa’s formal demise which were economically rather than technically inclined, but included the flavor of dependency thinking as well. Power (2003: 81) noted that the economic program pursued by many developing countries even into the 1980s and 1990s (Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania included) “reflected many of the ideas on 'de-linking' and self-sufficiency propagated by dependency theorists such as Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank” (see also Bernstein, 2002). Most interestingly, more recent theoretical reflections on Africa's neoliberal development policy reforms have been more centered on sustainable and grassroots participatory questions (Manji, 2006).

Since the arrival of the economic liberalization strategies of the 1980s in Zanzibar and in its sister country, the mainland Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, there have been many analyses on the geography of housing formalization applied from the Latin American experiences. Within this rhetoric of urban environmental planning and management, Myers' (2008: 283) piece on Zanzibar has uncovered “the non-participatory character of much of the reform agenda, in contrast to its rhetorical claims.” Myers observes that “[t]he way in which uneven dual reforms and uneven land reforms reinforce each other “can serve as” a reminder that even neoliberalism
needs an effective [unified] state – or at least a functioning of a regulated private sector to foster a productive incursion [for] urban land management processes” (Myers, 2008: 283).

Having this Africanist theoretical contention in mind, I revisit the need to consider the idea of “institutionalizing” the informality' (Bohannan & Curtin (1995: 112) at an agreed level of bureaucratic channels. And, as discussed in Myers (2011: 70-103), this involves putting the term “(i)n(f)ormalization” into our debate on institutional planning deliberations until such time as non-participatory characteristics and related complications are erased from the reform agenda and its conceptual framework. In such an approach, this suggests the re-engagement of social issues within the localised sustainability model into the government's management system through collective decision making arrangements. To use Bohannan & Curtin's (1995: 118) phrase, “we need to 'provide paths of communication' between the dual [formal and informal] sectors rather than just let their own expertise or attitudinal desire dominate the other’s management system or stick only to unevenly structured, non-participatory management approaches.”

An inclusive legal/institutionalization alternative is increasingly utilizing much of what Trefon (2009) call a 'hybrid governance' framework. This hybrid governance strategy “combines global approaches to local problems while blending traditional belief systems and behaviours with their own unique forms to modernity” (Trefon, 2009: 17). In Trefon's (2009: 23-29) terms, “[t]he hybrid order of law, is commonly known as 'legal pluralism' which is defined as a situation whereby two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field.” In this regard, this framework might be seen to bank more on rule relaxation than on dialogic promotion, while both are needed in communicative action planning processes. For example, the legally-supported institutionalization attempt of the government-controlled Zanzibar Sustainable Project (ZSP) to
the municipal council failed to materialize as it was applied in the early 1990s. This is because it lacked agreed communication action techniques among the concerned stakeholders. As argued by Scholz (2008: 83), “[o]n the institutional side, there is a constraint in terms of the range and applicability of government laws and regulations [which are urban biased] while in the rural areas [...] decision-making is in the hands of the community or traditional local leaders.”

Trefon's (2009) work is a product of continuous peri-urban research investigating the lifestyles and new livelihood strategies that city dwellers and villagers in which are engaged in the urban peripheries. Accordingly, the hybrid framework is drawn from the central African peri-urban governance research in the twin cities of Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo and in Brazzaville, Congo, where like Zanzibar's peri-urban housing pattern “the two forms of justice (urban vs. rural) overlap; [i]nteraction between European legal structures and indigenous legal systems [are] common in most of the post-colonial states in Africa” (Ibid: 21). What is not so common though is the promotion of the dialogic planning processes within these African city settings. In response to the neoliberal and policy implementation dynamics in most of the African cities, the two overlapping forms of justice (modern vs. traditional) have not been able to blend the informality into the formal processes because of what Manji (2006: 34) argued for land law:

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7 Outlined in Trefon (2009: 15) “peri-urban' means [...] 'fringe' areas [that] lie both at the edge of the city and at the limit of the hinterland.” They are characterized by proximity to densely populated urban settlement, rapid population growth, severe environmental degradation, hybrid governance, structures that jut poses state agencies and traditional authorities, extractive and productive economic activities for subsistence and trade (heavy dependence on natural resources and agriculture), and a 'hinge' dimension linking peri-urban areas to both cities and rural hinterlands (Trefon, 2009: 17-18). Because of their location “[p]eri-urban spaces are [regarded as geographies of psychological transition 'hinging' village to a neighbouring city and sometimes beyond” (Ibid: 17).

8 With reference to Trefon's (2009: 16) research, “the naming of the terms 'city dweller' and 'villager' entails some contradictions and ambiguities. The straddling or 'rurbanization' can also be viewed in terms of the linguistic paradox” (Ibid: 16). In the KiSwahili language “the words jiji or mji mean 'city' or 'town' whereas shamba signifies rural hinterland or countryside where the village (kijiji) is situated. Popular city sprawl follows major roads from the urban dwellers' rural home origin. Regardless of the demarcated but outdated city boundaries, it is also true in Zanzibar that the worlds of city and rural hinterland overlap [within peri-urban areas] and “intermingle, making it difficult to establish where the city ends and where the rural space begins” (Ibid: 15).
“the applied land reforms have been focused more on tenurial [rather than social] reforms,” in which the role of social dialogic processes was overshadowed by the economic investment policies promoted institutionally throughout the neoliberal period.

This lack of social dialogic planning is confirmed in Trefon's research, whereby “[l]ittle work has been done on defining what is meant by the broad concept of peri-urbanity, especially from the social science perspective. Even less work has been done trying to characterise how people living and working in these areas perceive themselves and their environment” (Trefon, 2009: 19). This extends, most importantly, to how they perceive or are perceived by their government institutions. “Demographic pressures caused by outside actors such as urban elites, traders, and rural migrants” are major sources of conflict in peri-urban areas. “The good intention of development schemes often fall awry in peri-urban areas because the complex land tenure and social determinants that govern these spaces – and consequently the projects that are based there – are frequently overlooked in the project design phase” (Ibid: 20). In order to revisit this tenurial reform bias within peri-urban or urban neoliberal development as a whole, we need to capitalize on “the relationships that people have with figures of authority [...] similar to the relationships that they have with neighbours, co-workers, even extended family members” (Trefon, 2009: 23) that characterizes the peri-urban and even the urban environment in conditions of mutual agreement and social dialogue. I now turn to review the economic aspects of Africa's neo-liberal policy discussions in the next sub-section as they impact land and housing formalization processes in Zanzibar.

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The typical Swahili word used for 'suburb', Kiunga, literally means a thing attached, or a hinge.
3.7 Neoliberalism within Land Policy Reform Debates

The idea of borrowing from the Latin American development policy experience continued in the “‘new wave’ of agrarian [as well as land and housing] reforms in the age of Africa's neo-liberalism” (Manji, 2006: 34). Among the recent popular neo-liberal Latin American strategists has been Hernando de Soto (2000); he is widely regarded for showing the importance of formalized property rights to bring the assets of the poor people into the legal system so that they can qualify as collateral for loans. In other words, he calls for the formalization of informality through a capitalistic economy, with his stress on land and housing reform. De Soto's proposal, which is enticingly elaborated in his book, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Falls Everywhere Else*, has met with considerable interest from international financial institutions and bilateral donors to guide various formalization projects in developing nations, including Tanzania. For this reason, his version of neoliberalism connects the Latin American experiences with the main contours of donor support for the sustainable land reform projects in Zanzibar.

Propagated by the World Bank, “joined … by bilateral donors”, de Soto’s idea of land/property reforms was spread around the world (Manji, 2006: 32) with Finland, acting through its Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA)\(^9\), being the donor agent in Zanzibar. As I will show later in Chapter 6, the sustainability reform approach in Zanzibar was “first in the form of small scale technical institutional support and later in the form of the Zanzibar Integrated Land and Environmental Management (ZILEM) project” and then in the Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE) project, with both operating

\(^9\) Technically, FINNIDA is no longer. All international development cooperation goes now through the Finland Ministry for Foreign Affairs directly.
through legislative land administration, integrated land use planning, and management of the environment (SMOLE Strategic Plan 2005-2009, 2004). It is mentioned in SMOLE's Strategic Plan that the projects were “built on the history and foundation of cooperation in the fields of land and environmental management between the Government of Zanzibar and Finland that started as early as 1989 to support the government's poverty reduction strategy. In this case land reform was committed “to improved security of land [...] through sound land management and socio-economic reforms [that] ensure and achieve sustainable use of land and environmental management practices” (SMOLE Strategic Plan, 2004: 10). According to Manji's (200: 32) contention, this broad objective is based on development discourse by the World Bank or other international aid agencies “explicitly linked to access to secure property rights and poverty reduction” (Manji, 2006: 32).

The ZILEM project is one of the earliest initiatives to contribute to the overall neoliberal legacy in Tanzania's land and environmental management practices. De Soto’s property formalization project in Tanzania was among the other initiatives at the level of national poverty reduction policy goals. Started in 2004 through his Peruvian-based Institute for Liberty and Democracy, de Soto’s model played a key role in the establishment of the program in two major cities in the country, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. It was anticipated that de Soto’s work would bring a “revolution in the housing sector”, according to Christopher Magola of the Guardian (Tanzanian) newspaper of September 12, 2008. As part of the National Development Vision 2025 funded by the World Bank, his findings for Tanzania are contained in what is called 'The Diagnosis Report' of the Property and Business Formalization Program, Tanzania (the Kiswahili acronym for this is MKURABITA).
This proposal is very economically-oriented and capitalistically-framed, without looking at other socio-economic and political aspects of the country. According to de Soto's findings, Tanzania is estimated to have assets in the informal sector including unregistered land and housing which cannot be transformed into cash - defined as dead capital - worth 29.3 billion US dollars, equivalent to more than ten times the amount of foreign investment in the country since independence (Magola, 2008). It was also admitted, according to Magola (2008), that in improving human settlements, the country’s legal system was undermining land development efforts as it failed to recognize property ownership in the so-called squatter areas. Therefore, the aim of this program was to officially recognize such property rights and finally create security of tenure. De Soto, as a WB/IMF consultant, was regarded to be one of the best advisors that the country has ever had in this sector (Manji, 2006). Regardless of Magola’s (2008) report of achievement of about 219,000 registered properties out of 400,000 that were initially earmarked in Dar es Salaam, the program has experienced a very rough terrain in its implementation in Zanzibar – and even in Dar es Salaam, all is not as rosy as it might at first seem.

Under this program in Dar es Salaam, formalized land and housing in unplanned areas and villages was aimed to be registered and given certificates or title deeds (right of occupancy) which would enable owners to use them as collateral to secure loans for poverty reduction or housing development/improvement schemes. Most of the projects based on de Soto’s thinking have aimed toward the displacement of the informal in favor of formal cities, often in the process encouraging the informal settlements of the poor to mushroom in the periphery, hence causing re-informalization (Myers 2011). Instead of reducing poverty, what this neoliberal sustainability era has done under de Soto’s influence, as Manji's (2006: 139) analysis contends, is “to increase
the mystery of poverty.” The mystery is greatest in the ways that the de Soto model has influenced gentrification\(^\text{10}\) across the cities. This creates questions as to why this proposal has come to prominence at this neoliberal time as a solution to the problems of both land control and poverty, why its exploration has been politicized, and why it is being promoted between international financial institutions, the African governments, and assigned consultants, without input from the community-based or civil society groups within respective local settings.

Most regrettably, the selling out of poor peoples’ properties through gentrification has encouraged corruption and nepotism among the political and business elite through a kind of ‘money talks’ syndrome that is damaging the communal life of the people and eroding common cultural values in Dar es Salaam. Thus, urban land and housing development patterns can be described as not so much a mere product of overall regulatory systems, but also as a dynamic field of interaction for economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental management processes.

It is undeniable, however, that there is a close relationship between poverty, informal housing, and informal income generation. Hansen and Vaa (2004) suggest that the role of community opinion and respect of people for traditional regulatory frameworks and their social practices are important themes to consider in any housing policy development activity. This may be especially so in this internet age, influenced by grassroots intellectuals’ contributions. Equally, progressive scholars or ordinary residents often express a desire to comprehend issues in a more

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\(^{10}\) The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary ((2000: 494) defines ‘gentrification’ as a passive process “to change an area [...] so that [it is] suitable for, or can mix with, people of higher social class than before.” This process actually occurs less passively in urban areas where prior disinvestment in the urban infrastructure creates neighborhoods that can be profitably redeveloped, according to Neil Smith (2002). To the extent that “gentrification has now [become a] ‘global’ urban strategy” (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005: 1), it raises questions about whether the ‘strategy’ was profitable for the residents of the inner city areas of Dar es Salaam like it appears for the Western cities “in terms of the formation of profitable tenant or neighborhood communities.” For the case of Dar es Salaam, it was mostly beneficial to elite business practitioners.
harmonized, organized, and collective manner whether they are within or outside their settlement environments and regardless of their city’s administrative structures.

All these changes and characters have had major effects on the respective definition of formal and informal sectors of the developing world. In the past, the colonial CBDs were the focus of ordinary urban life; now the center of gravity has shifted towards the peripheral settlements where all types of new settlements occur (Pacione, 2005; Simone 2010). Similarly, “more of the population has moved to the urban periphery where land is cheaper and more accessible, shelter can be constructed economically using [cheaper] available materials, and where official planning regulations are rarely enforced” (Pacione, 2005: 120). The peri-urban zone in Southern cities has become an area of dual economic and social change, characterized and dominated by pressures on natural resources, changing employment opportunities and constraints, and the changing pattern of land uses in all settlement areas, formal and informal. Therefore, as it applies, urban encroachment on rural areas on the edge of cities where both formal and informal housing systems locate leads to both social and environmental conflicts that demand to be given specific attention in these sectors’ analytical processes.

3.8 Reflections on the Literature Review

Most of the above literature has been critically considered towards either the improvement of the earlier model or looking at their weaknesses on guiding formal settlement development processes with the informal sector. Among the model approaches, Hernando de Soto has created a housing formalization strategy modeled to eliminate the ‘dead capital’ status of those informal settlements through the improvement of their ownership status. However, due to the “continuous decline of public resource availability “and massive dependence of donor-
funded or multinational corporation input” into the process (Robinson 2006: 97), perhaps we have got to respond much more realistically to analyses that promote home-based institutional development initiatives to partner with multilateral contributions for improving urban governance and help to manage the urbanization process that keeps on haunting urban land and housing development.

It is potentially useful to remember Richard Hartshorne’s ‘Nature of Geography,’ with its call for “recognition and analysis of the logical problems associated with the objective study of the specific place and region” (Entrikin and Brunn, 1989: 1). Logical study of a specific place may help us examine how we might unify the two urban systems (formal and informal) more wisely, rather than continuing to differentiate between them. This is what I tried to answer in my fourth subsection, where I conclude in favor of communicative rationality to help unify the formal and informal housing development systems for my Zanzibar case studies.

That subsection is also where I came to utilize the importance of a participatory approach for the construction of communicative social dialogue. But how can we achieve such communicative engagement or collaborative goals without conforming to particular institutional guidelines? In my opinion, it could well be thought of through the application of common sense techniques that appreciate the available local strengths (either in the form of local or civil society relationships, political inclination, or any other avenues possible) within communicative action arrangements. And here is where I seek to connect my idea of social dialogue within the sustainable urban development model for developing countries.
3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has endeavored to outline a multi-dimensional literature review surrounding the histories of collaborative and communicative action theories, and it has outlined the fractured strengths and limitations in unified planning approaches in urban sustainability. The review follows the multiple analytic approach adopted for this dissertation in outlining aspects of the identified framework that includes linking the conceptual definitions of sustainability and its applied research methodology that led to the examination of its deliberative planning model as applied and adopted during the neoliberal era of the last quarter of the 20th century.

The foundation and source for subsequent geographical and social scientific research analyses in communicative action planning is Habermas (1984). His prominent followers and analysts such as Bryson and Crosby (1992), Fischer and Forester (1993), Freeman and Thompson-Fawcett (2003), Healey (2006), Robins (2006), Nnkya (2007), Myers (2008), and Ahmed (2010) were also reviewed to uncover their collaborative and argumentative approaches on what might be done to improve sustainable urban planning, land, and environmental management practices for the environments of developing-world cities. Linked with rhetorical ideals of liberalization, democratization, and institutionalization, neoliberal policy intervention is highly problematic for any framework for communicative social dialogue intertwined within a unified collaborative approach, especially one that might break the duality of local community actions and government engagement through institutionalized housing development processes.

The emphasis in this chapter is, however, not so much concerned with achieving perfect generality but to critically obtain from the consulted concept(s) the theoretical contributions
needed for analysing the models outlined. In order to provide specific examples of the above theoretical models and arguments, the following chapter outlines an African perspective on implementation of the models.
Chapter 4  
Land Management Reforms and (Re)informalization of Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Placing Urban Sustainability in the Local Context

“When one leg is missing, the seat is unstable; and when no legs are available, the state is as good as a failed state. No development can take place in a state either. Instead conflict ensues” (Maathai, 2006: 294).

4.1 Introduction

It was once regarded as the nicest concept to ever land in African city planning authorities; but the performance of the neoliberal sustainability model has made it one of the most highly controversial governance approaches on the continent in land, planning, and environmental management. Whereas this model is about two decades old, Africa's land management, housing, and urban planning research dates back many decades, with both colonial and post-colonial imprints. However, among the notable Africanist researchers, only a few have been concerned with addressing urban planning and land management issues from the dialogic sustainable viewpoint of Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan contexts. The impressive literature on urban planning and land management in the southern Africa region is exceptional in this regard (for example, please see Pieterse, 2005; Myers, 2005/2008; Watson, 2006; and Robins, 2006).

As Myers (2008: 5) has noted, “a great deal of the existing” sustainable literature “has focused on Euro-American or Latin American cities.” Since it is “rooted from the northern streams of environmentalism,” as Power (2003) put it (in Myers 2005: 13), the analysis of this concept has shown that it “[...] does not always reflect perceptions of environmental crisis held by people of the global South;” this is especially so for Africa, where about one third of the total population live in critical poverty and fragile environments. “Rio was just rhetoric” (Power
2003) continues, and there are arguments about the concept’s applications actually aggravating conditions of poverty and other causes of environmental degradation which are not in line with particular management capacities of most of the countries in Africa (Myers (2004: 13).

In this chapter, my emphasis lies on unveiling what went wrong with harmonization of the sustainability model and how it was localized in African city settings over the last two decades. The empirical analysis demonstrates why the sustainability model and related collaborative planning theories have not worked in the improvement of unified land management systems and planning, especially in bridging housing informality with formal processes in African cities.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The following section 4.2 begins with an overview of the urban sustainability model in Africa and its conceptual origin. It includes an assessment of how the neoliberal framework came into being within the housing policy arena, followed by empirical observations about African urban housing informality. While section 4.3 evaluates sustainable action planning within Africa's informal contexts, section 4.4 and the conclusions of the chapter reveal my own reflections over the issues identified in this analysis for the Zanzibar case studies.

4.2 An Overview of Sustainable Land Management Systems and Housing Informality in African Cities

There has been excitement over the sustainability approach in some specific African cities, but in general the response to this agenda has not been impressive (Welch, 2003). Based on their attachments to the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP) and other local replications
in Tanzania, Ardhi University scholars like Professors Wilbert Kombe (1995), the late Francos Halla (2002), and Tumsifu Nnkya (2007), for example, have been among the few influential commentators and planners who have been impressed with the environmental sustainability model from its onset in the early 1990s. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Kumasi, Ghana, and Lusaka, Zambia, are cities in the region that have been regarded among the 'best practitioners' in their initial application of the model in Africa. But even within these few recorded African pilot successes, the model’s performance has been called into question by other observers – and even Nnkya and Kombe, over time, became somewhat critical voices.

In the case of SDP, limited continuous technical support, coordination or government commitment, insufficient capacity building, contentious sensitization or stakeholders' mobilization strategies, and “over reliance on donor funding undermine[d], rather than enhance[d] local initiatives” (Nnkya, 2007: 24). Most other trial cities in Tanzania for sustainable cities program engagement, as in Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, or Malawi, have been terminated or have faded out of the state authorities’ budgets – to say nothing of fading appreciation of the intended culture of collaboration and partnership in planning and management supposedly built over the implementation timeframe of this model (Ibid). Three reasons are given: 1) that the agenda was difficult to address politically, intellectually, socially, and economically in African contexts; 2) that it inevitably led to a questioning of the broad direction of the society; and 3) that it was a statement of moral principles rather than a set of operating instructions (Dovers and Noorton, 1994). Put another way, “the agenda was too hard, challenged by too many vested interests, and there was no map” to guide the process (Welch, 2003: 24).

Indeed, unlike those few scholars excited (at least initially) with the concept of urban
sustainability, Ayittey (2005: 330) observed that the infusion of a vast amount of foreign aid projects associated with the 1990s liberalized development models into Africa (the sustainable urban planning model included) achieved little result. Alongside this contention, the early 2000s, in particular, saw scholarly research about economic liberalization and the environmental sustainability agenda in Africa. Much of this research came from scholars evaluating the foiled attempts to destroy technocratic governmental institutional management. These attempts occurred at the same time as the introduction of democratic systems at the insistence of the international donors that subsidized governments' budgets, held their debts, and supported multi-party politics (Myers, 2005; Maddox, 2005).

I will refer to the lively example of Tanzania for much of the following evaluation. Myers (1997b) was one of the first scholars to review the localization process of this sustainability agenda from a Tanzanian perspective. In that country, the new democratization process brought by the economic liberalization and environmental sustainability agenda was called Mageuzi, or reforms, which had both political and economic repercussions. Myers (1997b: 260) noted that “[f]ormerly taboo topics became subjects for open debate.” Historically, Maddox (2005) argued, in Wagogo Leo: The Production of Rural Culture in Urban Dar es Salaam, that the early 1990s saw the destruction of much of the commitment to socialism on the part of the government and hence the introduction of economic and political reforms, at the insistence of the international donors that subsidized Tanzania's government budget. This created some paralysis as it was being implemented due to the poor resources of the Tanzanian treasury and related government financial constraints. By 1984/85, in fact, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) combined for two-thirds of the government's funding. The so called ‘Washington Consensus’ led by the ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions inspired structural adjustment programs in
order to look for new ways to attract more reform within their lands and environmental management sectors (Myers, 1997b; Ayittey, 2005).

Over the implementation of the political reform agenda, “the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, [for example], came under increasing scrutiny,” and some even called for 'Majimbo', the development of a more federal type system in which the region would be almost ethnically defined (Myers, 2005: 60). Myers (1997) equates this concept of regionalism in Tanzania as a way of marginalizing the Zanzibar authority within the existing union government's political and reformed institutional arrangement and related tension between the two Zanzibari parts: Unguja and Pemba. The ongoing political dissatisfaction remained controlled during the time of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Kiswahili for Party of the Revolution, or CCM) supremacy, until a recent (2010) public referendum that brought Zanzibaris’ local anxiety and sensitivity back into the union’s political debate. This latest political debate on the 2010 Zanzibar power sharing referendum and its impact will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

What has prevailed, however, in Zanzibar, Tanzania, and many African settings, are political circumstances that are “antithetical to development,” in the words of economist George Ayittey (2005: 330). The Washington consensus for democratization and liberalization “has shifted its focus to 'governance’”, but its fatal flaw, Ayittey emphasizes, is its presumption that each “‘broken' republic, will or is capable of reforming itself” (Ibid: 330). Although this concern needs broader discussion elsewhere, Ayittey (2005: 316) also noted that “in the neoliberal era African governments have not proven themselves to be more competent at managing resources more efficiently than the private sector.” Perhaps most noticeable among Ayittey’s concerns has been a lack of competitive local private or community contributions to governance and a lack of
management by the responsible governments for donor funded neoliberal development initiatives.

Conceptually, from the early days of neoliberal reform projects on Africa, this orthodoxy “entail[ed] a four step reform process,” Ayittey (2005: 330) noted. The first step involved democratization, liberalization, and privatization or as Ayittey calls it “changing the driver”- replacing the corrupt, incompetent, “life presidents” [or ruling parties] (Ibid) rigidly opposed to reform or review of their long-cherished institutional and development programs, unable to handle more dynamic and capable leadership systems. The second step required repairing dysfunctional systems by the rebuilding of key state institutions in order to ensure secure property rights, the rule of law, and accountability (Ibid). With respect to urban planning and land management, this would entail the overdue replacement of the central controlling management systems that preceded this neoliberal period. The third step would entail “cleaning up the environment [through specific action plans] to ensure a reliable supply of social amenities such as clean running water, ...health care,” solid waste and sanitation services “through organized stakeholders that include community working groups, responsible private companies and/or concerned civil societies” (Ibid). After completion of these three key steps, the fourth step would require “laying down a consultative strategic development framework” (Ibid) for guiding a city's development and land management activities.

However, as this sustainable planning framework came to be deployed in most of Africa, the entire responsibility to implement the plans remained under central government control and, as Nnkya (2007: 6) put it, “[b]ased on case methods and narratology” that focused on the concept of locally chosen action plans according to a government's own preferences and within its top-down decision-making hierarchy. It was, in a way, what I would call a wishy-washy new version
of disjointed long-term strategic development planning, or what Ayittey (2005) calls, “the blueprints for Africa” that included blueprints for its cities, which stopped short of any independent environmental planning and land management reform processes, albeit sometimes with slightly reduced government domination. The new government position for the new planning method was only half-inspired by the fact that “policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification and policy analysis” (Nkuya, 2007: 5).

Strategically, neoliberalism that gave birth to the sustainability model was introduced in Africa by the West as an answer to the oil shocks of the 1970s which put many countries in severe economic stress and public debt (Myers, 2005: 5). The debt crisis, Myers (2005) continues, led to the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programs (or SAPs) by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) beginning in 1981. As these programs’ implementation advanced, some leaders were changed almost immediately without much resistance to the new democratic wave: for example, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda was replaced by Fredrick Chiluba in 1991, Konan Bedie by Robert Guie in Cote d'Ivoire in 1999, and Abusallam Abubakar by Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 in Nigeria (Ayittey, 2005), just to name but a few. For the case of Nigeria, the late Umaru Yar'Adua, who succeeded General Obasanjo, was on May 6, 2010, succeeded by his Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, now preparing to stand election for the upcoming presidential term that will begin in 2011. This may help Nigeria “to resort to a 'zoning' system that prescribes that presidential terms should rotate between the Muslim north and Christian south every two terms” (http://www.africanews.com/site/Nigeria; August 13 2010). For the case of Zambia, the current Present Rupiah Banda succeeded the late Levy Mwanawasa after the removal of President Chiluba. Chiluba, who left office in 2001, was haunted by corruption accusations but was acquitted of all charges at the end of a landmark six-year trial in 2009 (The
For the case of Tanzania, there have been three more presidents (Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin Mkapa, and ongoing Jakaya Kikwete) since the retirement of President Julius Nyerere in 1985. Nyerere remained the chairman of the still socialist-minded CCM and was also promoted to *Baba wa Taifa* (Farther of the Nation) status even after multi-party democracy was introduced in 1992. President Nyerere's regime “constituted a one-party state [which] at times became highly oppressive” (Moss, 2007: 42). He also spearheaded the 1964 mainland's union with Zanzibar, though he left behind a peaceful and relatively unified country before his death in 1999.

Later on in the 1990s, some modifications to liberalization and structural adjustment were made. Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs) were required to orchestrate modest debt relief from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) held in their sway (Ibid). Since the beginning of the 21st century, Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has seen those strategies being advanced more through globalization in the form of competition for African resources between the Western and the Eastern economic powers, with China currently holding a newly acquired edge in resource exploitation within the region. However, as quoted in Myers, (2005: 5) “Africa is often figured to have experienced an exceedingly limited impact of economic globalization because of the paltry percentages of the global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to it.” In the larger scheme of things, what is now happening, is sometimes startlingly close to what was once called “the privatization of everything” (see: Myers, 2005: 5; Watts, 1993). In this light, it is worth noting that the adopted neoliberal ideologies in Tanzania were collectively referred to in Kiswahili as

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11 Available Online at: [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6799424.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6799424.ece); August 18, 2009).
Mageuzi na Ubinafsishaji (literally meaning 'reforms and privatization' together) (Myers, 2005). The following subsection questions this neoliberalism in Africa's housing development context.

4.2.1 How the Neoliberal Framework emerged in Housing Policy

In Tanzania, for example, this neoliberal framework was promoted through a highly politicized and centralized good governance strategy that led to “high rates of urban unemployment” in concert with “rollbacks on government jobs which led to a spreading informality of urban development beyond the control of formal planning systems” (Burra, 2004: 143). Alongside its implementation, the strategy was declared by President Ali Mwinyi in the form of a slogan known as ruhsha (permission), as in permission to do whatever someone can explore to improve her/his living standard. However, during the heyday of the sustainable development debate, this framework was facilitated under a joint initiative by the UNDP and UN-Habitat and came into being nearly a decade after the idea of neoliberalism was introduced for Africa (Myers, 2005). The society rushed for economic opportunities, and hence the outcome was an ‘informal city’ that is not regulated by public planning authorities and is hardly covered by the urban services (Kironde, 1995). City governments were often severely hit by neoliberal policies, particularly in regard to fiscal matters (Kironde, 2001a). Urban informal settlements provided the space for housing and urban livelihoods in this time when formal planning was not able to cope with the people's needs and demands (Scholz, 2008).

Sustainable development was supposed to rescue the situation, in guiding urban

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12 There are in essence three types of settlements in urban Africa: the old traditional areas, modern planned settlements, “and an informal sector that is stuck between them” (Ayittey, 2005: 332). Most of the newer informal developments reside within peri-urban African city environments. Whereas the planned areas are home to the elite residents, traditional settlements host most of the informal activities which, “however, do function, albeit at low level of [service] efficiency” (Ibid). Please also note that the earliest African informal cities were developed, in most situations, from the engulfment of the native villages and surrounding private lands within
governance, service provision, and environmental cleanliness within informal city areas. The basic idea was that “no one would be willing to invest within a rugged terrain” of municipal mismanagement and “power struggles; [and] it makes no sense to supply foreign aid” to improve service provisions only to have them disrespected (Nnkya, 2007: 6). Nor does it makes sense to invest in countries where “lawlessness and open plunder of the treasury are the hallmarks of the ruling regimes” (Ayittey, 2005: 330). Therefore, “[t]he establishment of a [democratic] mechanism or system for peaceful transfer of political power addresses the root cause” of the environmental sustainability model in urban Africa (Ibid). Consequently, “an environmental cleanup would require attending to the system breakdown by fixing malfunctioning institutions” if the government in place allows (Ibid). Yet, in the typical mainstream literature on environmental sustainability model this political dimension of environmental governance is rarely emphasized.

What should have been required was for the newly introduced approach to have been able to lay down sequential steps for allowing this governance to gradually crop up from within the local environment. This would also have facilitated serious debate among the concerned parties in all strategic development levels rather than in selected political, environmental clean-up, or employment generation issues. The democratized sustainable development ideology was applied in Africa more frequently as an urban environmental management solution rather than a rural land use planning solution (Simone, 1999a). As a result, “peri-urban residents have never known democratic governance” in Zanzibar/Tanzania, for example (Myers 2008b: 277). Hence, as argued in Mabogunje (1990), in the Habitat II Agenda (1996), and in more recent informal land management texts such as Scholz (2008), the substitution for the lack of democratic governance...
in Africa is not a simple task whereby the locally defined solutions and community organized
initiatives in such situations have to be advocated and left to evolve within systematic and
continuous reform processes in order to start getting informal settlements harmonized and
effectively incorporated into city life.

Nonetheless, as Myers (2005: 9) also recalls, “good governance is a fairly slippery
concept [...] that usually implies a whole range of issues and not necessarily a neat confluence of
capitalism, bourgeois democracy, and efficient technology.” Based on research on garbage
collection, Myers continues that “[community] empowerment, political openness, broader
popular press freedom, and non-control of associational life” experienced in his Tanzanian and
Zambian case studies did result in a “proliferation” of non-governmental organizations, or what
is characterized as civil society, even under government controlled systems (Ibid). This sort of
critique against the good governance strategy is sweeping across most of the urban development
and land management studies in Africa. That suggests, in Myers’ (2008b: 278) view, “the need
for a new wave of democratization” that is locally legitimated, “coupled with a broader idea of a
good governance agenda.” This could become an improved version of people's own
collaborative planning, as will be exemplified in my three Zanzibar case studies in this
dissertation. This goes with my view that collaboration is necessary when everyone is ready, but
it cannot be forced on the people.

Contentions such as these recognize the urgency of turning a unified dialogic planning
and land management ideal into an urban governance strategy for land and human settlement
development in Africa. This is no longer utopian thinking. For example, in a 1997 journal article
entitled Urban management in an unruly setting: the African case, Johan Post provided a theory
for confronting the sustainable participatory approach and its ideology with the harsh realities of
African states that are facing many overlapping dilemmas in transitions to democracy. Post's (1997) work distinguishes between urban management per se (the concept and its attributes), the urban management approach (the principles essential to the successful working of the concept) and neo-liberal ideology (on sustainability) embedded in current urban development thinking. According to this theorist, to be effective, locally initiated proposals must be able to generate sufficient institutional support, and therefore, not to be too threatening or complicated.

Post (1997) contended that even though such state institutions are usually not completely representative, or internally democratic, their involvement in urban policies can be seen as a first step in the direction of a more meaningful popular and community participation. Similarly, in strengthening local governments, strategic choices have to be made. Rather than attempting to reform the entire administrative machinery at once, the appreciation of some key developments - say, for one example, establishment of the planning office or waste management department of the Zanzibar Municipal Council - would need to be given top priority.

There is one other very good reference to connect Post’s urban governance contentions with my study. In her licentiate thesis on uncontrolled land delivery in Zanzibar, Veijalainen (2000) discussed the need for cooperation with experts to improve the process of land delivery at the local level to overcome the problems of land insecurity and the slowed process of their allocation. She saw these problems as the major causes of urban informality during the reign of sustainability in Africa. Indeed, such innovations are in accordance with urban management principles, yet do not require any sweeping reforms the system cannot handle. Understanding all 

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Post’s (1997) examples are from the Sudan and Ghana, which substantiate his argument that in urban [land] management the state should have a clear role to play, particularly by providing the proper framework for sustainable development by reducing externalities and by fostering the fair distribution of wealth. He also entails an incremental outlook in the search for positive trends that can be strengthened or designing proposals that amount to gradual modifications of the customary ways of doing things.
of these various contentions helps me reshape my thinking towards the ultimate goal of this research, which is to find out how an applied sustainable planning and land reform framework might work in Zanzibar. The Zanzibari cases in chapters 7 to 9 provide some empirical measures for these contentions.

4.3 Sustainable Urban Planning and Informal Housing

What Myers (2005) calls the *environmental planning and management (EPM) gospel* came to Tanzania prior to the 1992 UN-Agenda 21 with the Dar es Salaam Sustainable Project (SDP) in 1990. This project involved the five step solution of the EPM process that then became part of the UN's Agenda 21. These steps involved development of the city's environmental profile, then a city consultation done through a series of workshops to promote an urban environmental planning agenda, followed by a series of mini-consultations that committed working groups of stakeholders to zero in on the issues promoted in the city consultation. The fourth step was the development of action plans by the working groups for demonstration projects aimed at solving the prioritized issues for small areas of the city, under donor funding or alternative funding for their implementation. Finally, the project office prepared a strategic urban development plan for the city that integrated the agreed strategic interventions and provided the coordinating mechanisms to replicate successful demonstration projects city-wide (Myers, 2005).

For Myers (2008), this whole employment of the *sustainability gospel* was involuntary and lacked democratic governance, which generated massive informality in the process of its replication within peri-urban areas. And, according to Ayittey (2005), there should have been enough accommodation of commonalities and inculcated differences in approaching reform
initiatives and in delineating what should or should not be done for each African city environment. Kombe and Kreibich's (2000b) book, *Informal Land Management in Tanzania*, provides an assessment of other potentialities and complexities alongside democratic limitations of what they called “hidden systems” in reconciling private and public (or government) with community interests. These scholars stress that the search for a new dialogue and partnership between the public (formal) land sector and its latent (informal) counterpart has to be based on detailed knowledge about the trade-off between the two systems for helping animation of the discussion about peri-urban management of land and other relevant issues.

Therefore, those usually complex hidden issues should have been part of the wider doctrine of urban planning in the sustainable development framework, across the board. Accordingly, the model was to facilitate “orderly and lawful allocation, transfer, utilization, distribution, and conservation of physical land uses in urban areas for the benefit of all the actors” (in Kreibich and Olima, 2002: 219). The actors include the owners of the land, managers, and other agents in the various stages of development, environmentalists, and the general public (Ibid). Inherent in this is the necessity that each phase of urban land development is undertaken by different but related authorities or personalities that communicate with each other. This is because the conceptual rationale of the urban sustainability debate in the context of developing countries is a controversial subject, especially when the question of land and housing is raised (see Kreibich and Olima, 2002: 152). Land is an important issue in housing development and constitutes a major factor without which shelter cannot be provided (Ibid).

This line of urban sustainability thinking has been concerned more about the on-going urbanization process and its critical consequences within peri-urban areas. Hence, “it is primarily the urban poor who have to adapt to crisis [and] the way [peri]urban populations have
reconfigured the complex relations that inexorably link them to the hinterlands” (Trefon, 2009: 15). Alongside Trefon's (2009) contention for hybrid governance within those peri-urban areas, mutuality of understanding between the parties involved is advocated which theoretically suggests more inclusive policy attention that leads to better organization of activities among the responsible players. The importance of expanding this potential of having unified dialogic control over planning and urban land management of developing cities is paramount. However, there is a mismatch with what is happening on the ground in urban Africa. In some East African urban areas, planning and control of land uses have been centrally monopolized, are not adhered to, or are completely lacking local attention within informal areas (Swazuri, 2002). It is in some informal housing areas where the collaborative focus of environmental sustainability has received some nations' attention, but there are still unresolved disputes over land conflicts (Ibid). The following section turns into how this informal housing occurs in Africa.

### 4.3.1 Formal and Informal Housing Context in Africa

Writing about informal housing areas in urban Africa, Myers (2008: 26) claims that “so much of the character of these places is rooted in history.” This connotes the traditional and popular practice of self-help based activities in which “individuals, groups of people or local communities provide land rights, undertake spatial structuring or land subdivision, land transfers, and service provisions [by themselves] without deferring to the administrative or legal state structures” (Burra, 2004: 143). Quoting Rakodi (2002), Burra (2004:143) adds that this informal sector “is one where employment or development is generally off the books and out of the purview of the state or beyond its regulatory reach.” There are strong connections between poverty and environment within these places, something which was not emphasized earlier on
within the sustainability ideals. We cannot take this poverty issue out from informal reality. It needs broader evaluation.

Sustainability planning thinking was in a way a revision of the earlier imported planning strategies such as the master plans, which retarded credible utilization of locally-grown self-help initiatives within land management and housing development systems. The only difference is that the sustainability approach was mounted with some pre-prepared or blueprinted enablement conditions for the recipient governments, and framed within the environmental sustainability gospel. It required a clean handout of reforms to succeed within poor African city areas. This was supposed to be built upon the relationships between various actors, including civil society, in service provision, provided that resource utilization and political harmonization do not exceed the local capability.

As Ayittey (2005: 331), argues, “civil societies need to be galvanized as the motivating force” behind reforms to support appropriate development strategies to be put in place. “The prescription, therefore, is new leadership in tandem with reformed institutions, since the former alone will not suffice” (Ibid). But there is a rhetorical loop about this 'new change of leadership' that seems to be coming around every ten years in Africa since the installation of the so called ‘appropriate development strategies’ to fix what Ayittey (2005: 330) calls “dysfunctional systems or broken states.” As he himself realizes, “fixing the 'broken' [or what Robins (2006: 97) calls “unruly’] state” may be nigh on impossible (Ayittey, 2005: 331). “Reform of political, economic [and environmental] systems as well as the country's institutions, is anathema to the ruling vampire elites,” he says (Ibid). It takes time, and typically would require the relinquishing of power by the ruling parties of those “broken or unruly societies” within the ongoing involuntary democratization process, such as in Tanzania. However, abandoning power in Africa takes too
long to fulfil if it is not next to impossible. Instead, in order to let things still stay running, Myers (1994: 208) puts a suggestion that “part of the task of ‘revitalizing geographic practice’ in the former Third World” that Africa forms a major part of “is to seek ways of seeking and conceptualizing those viable patterns of social relations [available] in the Other Sides of African cities.”

Yet, as Myers (1994: 209) observes, “there is at least one way in which a more African-centered approach might work towards broader progressive goals.” This is “in the interaction and dialogue with African-based geographers, African development planners, policy makers, and urban dwellers” – particularly land-seekers in the city. In essence, he emphasizes a “turnabout,” or what Robins (2006: 112) refers to as “hybrid and improvisational” planning styles that would require a rapid expansion of progressive “engagement with practical matters in African cities and other changes in direction that would inevitably emerge from a more two way exchange” (Myers, 1994: 209).

Robins (2006: 111) quarreled with what he coined “(re)informalization of cities” whereby “progressive stakeholders” need “to realize their utopian and technocratic plans and blueprints,” whatever framework or form they originated from, “are heavily challenged in the face of everyday struggles by the urban economic underclasses. Instead of planned, formal development based on home ownership and dreams of (sub)urban living, housing schemes are captured by informal housing and economic activities that deviate dramatically from 'the plan'. ” Robins' research is mostly based on the South African government's subsidized housing schemes. South Africa's economy is above the normal status of most of Sub-Saharan Africa. But his (re)informalization of city characteristics by the poor urban dwellers observed from the “backyard shacks, shabeens, and spaza shops of Slovo Park's core brick structures” in Cape
Town (Robins, 2006: 97) fits very well with other poorly stricken but economically active areas across urban Sub-Saharan Africa. Kariakoo is a commercially active inner-city areas undergoing intensive property (re)informalization processes, in Dar es Salaam, where a formally planned residential neighborhood has steadily been replaced by high rise developments as part of the city center's densification project of the 1990s, but the built form and lived environment of the high-rises have come to reproduce patterns in informal areas.

However, there are minor localized characteristics in uncontrolled settlements which vary according to city traditions, geographic, and political conditions, differentiating them from the (re)informalizing in South Africa. Most informal settlements arise on vacant/abandoned or poorly controlled land, usually uncultivated and owned by the government entity on the outskirts of cities. Some popular east African informal city examples include Mathare and Kibera in Nairobi; Tandale and Vingunguti in Dar es Salaam; and Kivulu and Kinataka in Kampala. In general, most of those informal settlements were to a greater extent developed by the overspill urban population joined by newly-arrived rural migrants who seek new life in the cities. Because of their difficult economic and family backgrounds most of the new settlers end up being innovative, adapting their own skills in building simple make-shift (or sometimes permanent) structures - depending on their economic performance - to shelter themselves within those settlement areas.

Coined by Keith Hart in the early 1970s in African studies, this idea of formal/informal dualism was also taken up, sometimes with different terminology, in the 1960s and 1970s by Latin American researchers (notably John Turner, 1963, Charles Abrams, 1966, William Mangin, 1967, and the Brazilian geographer Milton Santos, 1979, who saw them as the ‘lower and upper circuit’). These scholars set out to disprove some of the earlier but then reigning assumptions of
the so called Chicago School of Urban Sociology. Their works were showing that modernization or any “similar path” development strategies, in Drakakis-Smith's (2000: 65) words, were not benefiting large numbers of the urban poor who mostly squatted or located within informal or slum settlements of the city, but also that the urban poor contributed significantly to the 'formal' city or the 'upper' circuit.

By the first UN conference on human settlement, held in Vancouver, Canada in 1976, Drakakis-Smith (1987: 65) recalled that “the terms, 'formal/informal sector' had superseded other alternative terminologies such as bazaar/firm sector, lower/upper circuit, or traditional/modern activities.” What then followed was “a series of further investigations that began to build up the character of the city lifestyle, primarily through the employment of settlements upgrading and service improvement schemes of the then “merits of self-help” approach within the fields of economic and environmental management activities” (Chari and Corbridge, 2008: 207). Over time, the activities associated with formal and informal sectors have been undergoing different scrutiny in different places by different scholars. Among them, the Africanist scholars such as Okpala (1979), Mabogunje (1990), and Myers (1993; 1997; and 2010) have been highly concerned with development policy issues in those settlements which are connected to urban culture, socio-economic behavior, and environment.

But in general, the degree to which these settlements are spatially or socially organized varies dramatically from place to place depending on their socio-economic and political environments. In “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary” poor city residents “slowly colonize urban space” and organize for everything from water systems, markets, labor division, and groups to raise money to buy the land on which they live, as was first observed in Latin American cities in the 1960s and “as in Bombay, Cairo, and Tehran” (Chari and Corbridge
But in some African cases such as in Zanzibar and in most towns in continental Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, utility mobilization within the settlements is mostly an individual responsibility performed with mutual understanding between the authority concerned and the small group of people involved (typically one or two households). However, the internal/social organization of these settlements is usually very strong, and despite minor individual differences, and their varying approaches over their land purchase (some through buying from the dealers, some from the original owners, and some as friendly grantees) during the original occupation of land, the general attitude of the residents is that they show great respect for each other's lots and in their uses of land once they are settled with shared spaces and other commonalities within or between their settlements.

Myers (1997a) calls for respecting the informal areas of African cities, for their organic hybridism, their self-contained nature, the way in which they use small scale, even recycled materials to produce small items that sold cheaply to the urban poor themselves, but even for their “extra-legal” (outside legal control or authorized) character that surrounds land availability and organization of their lifestyles within those settlements. This viewpoint differs from much previous opinion about those settlements worldwide. The Northern and elite views of informal, 'slums', or squatter settlements typically entail seeing them as places of irrationality and domination (Devas, 2001). But within African city settings, Myers (2008) observed that informal communities were active subjects in their own rights, not passive subjects of domination, at least for their preparedness in knowing how to house themselves or navigate around/within their lands. This *Urban Geography* piece observes that the vast majority of Mwera residents in Zanzibar are informal self-developers and by extension “many residents of the West District of the city became quite knowledgeable about land use planning, and about their land markets in the
process of learning to navigate or put up with them” (Myers, 2008: 274). What their knowledge suggests, he goes on to contend, “is not that they prefer the informal system” but that since the government does not have discussion with them, they see no alternative but to both distrust the government's version of official land control and to continue “operate informally” (Ibid: 282).

In their book, *Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban Africa*, Karen Hansen and Mariken Vaa (2004), considered “extra-legal” housing and unregistered economic activities as constituting the informal city character. Accordingly, these scholars also argue that “[i]nformal activities and practices may be illegal or extra-legal but are not necessarily perceived as illegitimate by the actors concerned” (Hansen and Vaa, 2004: 8). Their call for the need for knowledge of life and planning within these settlements was well answered by Myers's works (2008 and 2010), among others. It is in this situation that most of the informal urban residents and their collaborators consider different forms of the formal practices, as the informality to them is not illegal or irregular regardless of the official standpoint. They are not only functioning within their understood limits, but in their opinion they are also normal, active, if not pro-active, and legitimate urban practitioners.

The formal system is the one that is permitted or governed by law. It “consists of the urban government and its agents, institutions, and rules and regulations that over time have been introduced in order to control urban space and economic life.... The formal and the informal cities meet at a series of interfaces,” Hansen and Vaa (2004: 8) observed, for instance when regulatory frameworks are “adjusted and readjusted in response to powerful citizens' demands for flexibility, or when government agents arbitrarily enforce some rules and not others.”

Although some activities may be extra-legal in formal terms, the actors concerned consider them normal and legitimate (Hansen and Vaa, 2004: 7-8). Sometimes formal
authorization may be obtained or provided under informal pressures, as observed in Burra's (2004: 143-157) peri-urban formalization research in Makongo Juu in Dar es Salaam. Within this project, community initiatives in land use planning and management related to the donor-funded urban sustainability program (SDP) provoked a positive response from the government to local efforts. This was aimed to facilitate “and manage the growth and development of the city in partnership with other public, private, and popular sectors on a 'sustainable bias' [...] and then recognize the settlement,” based on the community's own contributions, “regardless of their land ownership status” (Burra, 2004: 144).

Thus urban settlement patterns can be described as “not so much a product of an overall regulatory system as it is a dynamic field of interaction for economic, social and cultural, and political processes” (Hansen and Vaa, 2004: 8). This includes informal settlements that have developed outside the official land development process and planning procedures, the emphasis being “not on the illegality of land ownership or occupation, but rather on the nature of the land development process that is employed” (Burra, 2004: 144). It is, in this case, undeniable that there is a close relationship not only between poverty, informal housing, and informal income generation within informal settlements (Hansen and Vaa, 2004) but also between governance and politics in any particular urban place.

All these changes have had major impacts on the respective definition of formal and informal sectors of the developing world in general and in Africa in particular. It is important, however, to note that to some degree the government also operates informally especially because “formal authorization may be obtained or provided informally” (Hansen and Vaa, 2004: 8) and when people or the government may interfere on housing affairs as political agents. For example, the edited collection by Al Sayyad and Roy, *Urban Informality* (2005) shows that Latin
Americanists earlier on saw “informal settlements as sites of politics” (Chari and Corbridge, 2008: 248). This was partly because Latin American states were engaging in populist politics that “required them to reach out to vast squatter settlements who might use their vote against the party in power” (Ibid: 248). Indeed, separating formal from informal process can be challenging as this “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” gains political might.

Servicing both types of settlements, formal and informal, within urban areas of the developing world has become a challenging task in planning and land management. Most previous projects have not helped to bridge the informal and formal processes. In the last chapter, I discussed the de Soto program in Tanzania, MKURABITA.¹⁴ Let me discuss it in a little more detail here. Presenting the initial findings of the program at the launch of a High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor in New York in 2005, the third president of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa endorsed the proposal outright (Magola 2008). But MKURABITA was capitalistically framed, without looking at the country’s other socio-economic and political factors.

De Soto’s “dead capital” estimate, noted in the last chapter (29.3 billion US dollars), could perhaps be true. It is also true that over 70% of 44 million Tanzanians today do not have decent houses because they do not have money in their pockets to build or buy them. But what they all need is not just decent homes as stipulated in the National Development Vision 2025. This document admits that they need the improvement of the country’s legal system in the people's favor to stop undermining indigenous land development efforts, as the system fails to recognize property ownership in the so-called squatter areas. Therefore, de Soto's aim was not complete off-base: to officially recognize such property rights and finally create security of

¹⁴ Available online at http://groups.google.com/group/mkurabita_debate/web/about-mkurabita.
tenure. His program was able to register the properties of some one-fifth of the city population of about three million people. But this program was not continued in the same manner after the completion of President Mkapa's term in 2005. It changed direction towards a land policy review, putting Dar es Salaam at odds with de Soto's objectives.

Most regrettably, the de Soto approach has been aimed towards the displacement of the informal in favor of the formal city areas (as the Kariakoo example in Dar es Salaam has shown). Ironically, MKURABITA encouraged poor informal areas to mushroom in the periphery and caused settlement (re)informalization to proceed even within planned communities, hence creating poor urban enclaves, or what Atkinson and Bridge (2005: 12) call a “new urban colonialism” within the city environment. Ambreena Manji's (2006) analysis agrees with this contention. Critiquing de Soto's Tanzanian outcomes in her book *The Politics of Land Reform in Africa*, Manji (2006) also argues that “we need to begin to analyze the relationship between law and politics that characterizes contemporary land reform” (Manji, 2006: 82). From this legal perspective on land reform in Tanzania, however, Manji (2006) cut short her well analyzed findings for the need to revisit the way African development assistance has been facilitated legally, irrespective of their institutionalized government structures, and without looking at other locally-grown and easily adaptable legal provisions. In order to do so, while quoting Latour (1983), she argued that it is important to understand whether technical legal consultants are “acting on society' and to ask how and why they have come to be 'credible' spokes peoples representatives for land law reform” (Manji, 2006: 139).

Hence, there is not much difference in social achievements recorded with either sustainability planning or de Soto’s property formalization model of neoliberalism. This conundrum was characterized by Watson (2003: 395) as a case of “clashing cultures” and
“conflicting rationalities.” Indeed, Robins' interrogation of city (re)infomalization processes suggests that the neoliberal sustainability model falls short in African city settings. Instead, informalization, through commercialization, has promoted privatization of properties that encourages previous native settlers to be bought off in that process of gentrification from their only reliable inheritance within their cities. In the process, (re)informalization has stiffened, within prime city areas, the interest of prominent commercial beneficiaries that include established political and business elites and their international corporative partners, balking at the servicing costs of poor native settlers (please see Kironde, 1992; Lerise, 2007; Tacoli 2007). For Robins' (2006: 97) South African case, “these elements of (re)informality have nonetheless come back to haunt planners, [and state authorities] who envisaged ... neat and orderly low-income suburb[s].”

Where can we turn for more constructive suggestions? What ways exist to promote the effectiveness of sustainable models harmonized within home-based initiatives? These are the questions that I try to assess in my three Zanzibar case studies, concluding in favor of dialogic communicative action theory to help unify the formal and informal housing development systems. Building on this unified approach between formal and informal, local and foreign assistance, people-oriented and nature-oriented initiatives, we can display the relationships between poverty and environmental destruction in most African situations. The next section concludes how to identify the rationale behind communicative action for the case studies.

4.4 Issues Identified for and Initial Background to the Zanzibar Case Studies

Instead of the dominance of the neoliberal sustainability model of the 1990s, the turn of
this century witnessed the advancement into the argumentative age of the 'communicative action
debate' that seems to represent the realities in policy analysis and plan-making processes across
the board. A trend has emerged favoring, in Fisher and Forester's (1998: 2) words, “the
conceptual [re]framing of the problems, and the [re]definitions of ideas that guide the ways
people create ... shared meanings which motivate them to act.” Coupled with the widening
horizons of this line, no wonder Fisher and Forester (1998) began their book asking “what if our
language does not simply mirror or picture the world but instead profoundly shapes our view of
it in the first place?”

Perhaps, this question is well answered within the scope of their book. But, if this trend
towards the communicative action approach for policy development culture is in fact occurring,
what does this picture entail with regards to the actual African land reform programs or urban
planning practices? This will be profoundly tested in my cases on Zanzibar. As suggested by my
lead statement from Wangari Maathai (2006) for this chapter, the ‘missing leg’ in the Zanzibar
case is the dialogic pillar of collaboration – it might generate inconvenience in planning practices
and yet can prevent conflicts from occurring. African cities need development assistance to be
able to stand on their own feet, but they need to navigate through the process via dialogue with
all sectors involved.

Guided by the EPM process, an initial commitment to sustainability ideology locally in
Zanzibar satisfied bilateral and multilateral donors and generated the beginnings of a
government-coordinated community dialogue, but was cut short by the institutional and cultural
realities in the field. The ZILEM/SMOLE projects were formed to coordinate an umbrella for the
neoliberal land reform project which survived administrative and political misfortunes for nearly
20 years. This is because unlike the Zanzibar Sustainable Project (ZSP) of the 1990s that was
implemented as an imperial fashion to denounce prevailing socialist foundations, the ZILEM/SMOLE projects, as elaborated in the following two chapters, were able to cope with prevailing political favoritism under the current revolutionary leadership in Zanzibar.

The ZILEM project was initiated as part of the restructuring programs of the late 1980s which favored foreign investment as opposed to previous socialist programs anchored in the pillars of Ujamaa (familyhood) philosophy. Tanzania's Nyerere-era leadership scared away investors and ruined the country's economy during this time. It also increased centralization under his ruling party, breeding CCM supremacy. As provoked under his leadership, before the arrival of the existing weak multi-party democracy in 1992, Nyerere (who died in 1999), wanted (and succeeded) to bring all parties together, and to run his country's economy from the center. With a British female personal assistant, Nyerere retained good relations with some Western powers, and he knew how to deal with international lending institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, especially during the economic crisis of the 1970s.

Nyerere and Ujamaa were, however, only indirectly influential in the early years of the revolutionary era in Zanzibar. Zanzibar has had seven presidents under the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar which formed Tanzania in 1964. Development is described according to the presidencies, using the KiSwahili term awamu, meaning phases. The first, Abeid Amani Karume, served from 1964 until his assassination in 1972. He was replaced by Aboud Jumbe, who served until his 1984 ouster amid intra-party squabbles. Although Jumbe was much less extreme than Karume, his regime continued the repressive socialist order of his predecessor. Ali Hassan Mwinyi served as the 3rd revolutionary President of Zanzibar. Although the 'phase' of

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development Mwinyi oversaw was the shortest of the seven, it was the most important, arguably, for my dissertation, because he ushered in, almost singlehandedly, greater unification of the Zanzibar and mainland intelligence systems, neoliberal economic planning (with his ruhsa (permission) philosophy, and sustainability thinking. Although he was in power for less than a year, the fact that he moved in Fall 1985 to be Nyerere's successor as Tanzanian President, actually strengthened the hold of his ruhsa ethos in Zanzibar too.

The rather ineffectual 'phase' led by Idris Abdul Wakil (1985-1990) initiated the political trauma that has gripped Zanzibar ever since, because of his rivalry with his Chief Minister, Seif Sheriff Hamad. Hamad attempted to succeed Mwinyi in order to carry on the ruhsa legacy since he was his Chief Minister, but his efforts were soured by his regional bias towards his home island of Pemba. Hamad's ouster in 1987 and house arrest in 1988 assured the alienation of his followers from then until 2010. President Wakil's humble leadership led to the emergence of President Salmin Amour (1990-2000), who was succeeded by President Amani Abeid Karume (2000-2010), the son of the first President. Under the newly seated President Ali Muhammed Shein since December 2010, Hamad is currently the First Vice President of Zanzibar, a position created following the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) that he agreed to in negotiations with the immediate former President Karume. President Shein is the immediate former Vice President of Tanzania. However, under Nyerere's Tanzanian presidency16, and its subsequent three other phases, Zanzibar grew steadily more repressive, which disturbed local politics and economics until this recent GNU agreement. Table 4.1 summarizes these phases of Tanzanian (Mainland and Zanzibar) leadership since 1961.

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Table 4.1: Phases of Tanzanian Leadership, 1961-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zanzibar Presidency</th>
<th>Union Presidency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phases/Dates</td>
<td>Presidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Idris A. Wakil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>Salmin Amour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>Amaan A. Karume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-Present</td>
<td>Ali M. Shein</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Detailed elaborations of these phases and their corresponding events in both parts of The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, otherwise known as Tanzania, are tabulated in Table 5.2 (a and b) in Chapter 5.

Source: Author, 2011

Because of Mwinyi's craftiness, he was able to improve his people's quality of life more during his very brief time (1984-85) than had occurred during the previous regimes; this helped him to consolidate his political legacy (Bakari, 2000). It is rumored that Mwinyi relied on the political belief that if he *fed, dressed, and perfumed* the Zanzibaris he would secure their confidence in him. This belief also dominated his *ruhsa* policies in his Tanzanian presidency (1985-95). President Amour's phase had a contradiction: Amour was once seen as benevolent, charismatic, and inspiring, but he behaved differently in office. He was able to reconstruct the islands to take advantage of their potential in tourism and trade, the two key environmental and historical fundamentals of the Zanzibari economy, until he was completely caught up in the trap
of regionalism. This damaged his local reputation and frustrated his policies, to the
disappointment of most of his admirers - including the donor community, which stopped funding
his development projects throughout the entire second five year phase of his presidency. The next
chapter provides further details on this subject.

Having been following the recent debates which culminated with the political
reconciliation between the ruling CCM and the main opposition party CUF in Zanzibar, the
election in October 2010 was expected by optimists to be fair, for the first time since the
introduction of multi-party democracy in the islands. Although the election was peaceful for the
first time, and resulted in a new government of national unity (GNU) for Zanzibar, no scrutiny
would be needed to show that they were not “fair,” but rather “pre-cooked” to insure a CCM
victory and a pliant CCM rival, with CUF under Hamad chafing in the new “First Vice
President” position.

This forced other locals to question the role of competitive partisan democratic politics as
a necessary condition for post-colonial development progress in Africa. Corruption has become
embedded within the host systems that are supposed to facilitate democratization, privatization,
and localization under the neoliberal sustainable initiatives. It creates negative feelings among
actors enabling these projects. These breed dangerous attitudes for all partners involved. Many
critical commentators have a feeling that the enablement strategy which came with neoliberalism
created some kind of dependency syndrome that is loosely administered and hard to account for – hence corrupted.

Samir Amin (2000), who is one of those critics, calls for de-linking of the periphery from
the core (industrialized) nations in order to gain economic independence. In his analysis, he
found that the process of liberalization through globalization is based on the process of capital
accumulation across the globe, which he says is exploitative and destructive in many third world countries. He also reiterates that this process, associated with privatization and democratization, encourages monopoly (by the transnational corporations), which in turn created dependency, underdevelopment, marginalization, disintegration, exclusion, stagnation, polarization, and ultimately inequality in income and poorly performing service distribution, bureaucracy, dictatorship, mismanagement, corruption, and cultural, or ethical divisions (Amin, 2000).

It is hard to believe everything that comes from such Afro-pessimistic viewpoints about neoliberalism and its associated strategies (also reflected in Ferguson, 2006, and Pieterse, 2005). However, to get rid of corruption, for example, one needs to create and enforce a law abiding environment that does not mature under the prevailing circumstances of improper service provision, but the present approach encourages massive resource expenditure beyond the local capacity and sometimes generates violent politics through the involuntary democracy that has been established.

Here is another Tanzanian example. The union government entered into a controversial contract with Richmond Development Company to generate power in 2006 for the commercial capital city of Dar es Salaam and its environs. Behind this controversial contract, a report by the parliamentary select committee has said government violated the bidding process to generate 100 megawatts of electricity and connect it into the national grid at a cost of 172.9 billion Tanzanian shillings. A stake of this may have come from the donors who contribute about 40 percent of the country's national budget for development projects. This parliamentary committee was formed in 2007 by the National Assembly to investigate circumstances on how the tender was awarded that led to this Richmond saga. As reported by this committee chair, the bidding process was violated and the whole issue smelt of corruption (The Guardian [Tanzania] Newspaper, February 7,
clearly Richmond Company did not deserve to be awarded the tender.

The resignation of the country's Prime Minister and two other ministers responsible for energy and legal affairs followed, leading then to the formation of a “counter-probe” committee by the ruling party, led by the retired President Mwinyi, which cautioned the first committee's parliamentarians and the House Speaker who had initially approved that committee’s formation. While a majority of the citizens were in disbelief, the Mwinyi committee's tasks were not transparent; none of the accused Richmond scandal culprits faced any further legal inquiries, including the parliamentarian (and ruling party treasurer) who was reported to be the “company” owner. Instead, after the 2010 election, the speaker and his initial parliamentary committee's chair were relieved of their positions and given less influential ministerial posts to silence them. Additionally, “the government has [also] resolved to pay Dowans [Richmond's subsidiary] company $65 million (about TZS94 billion) as ordered by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration after losing a case against the company in November last year” (Mugarula, 2011).

However, because of weak financial situations in most African countries, incidents such as this will not make African leaders, like Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, shy away from traveling around the world seeking more donor assistance - until such incidences disable their governments from being funded, which may be a long way away. I see this most notably in the implementation of the ZILEM/SMOLE projects in Zanzibar, that the administrative mindset is still incapable of making such an about-face. Instead, the more the system has a grasp over donor support the more they show off to the opposition their capacity for self-enrichment.

Zanzibar is not only showing good signs of guiding economic recovery; it is also suffering from the undermining of genuine local dialogue (Myers, 2010). Accordingly,
Abrahamsen (2003: 209) argues for “a recognition that a change of economic and political structures of domination and inequality require a parallel and profound change of their epistemological and psychological underpinnings and effects.” Hope about the recently conducted Zanzibar referendum suggests that the required reconciliation might help to spearhead the islands' economic development and good governance. Drawn from those two (development and governance) indexes, future positive performances may help to legitimize the ongoing democratic process, if the prevailing peace in Zanzibar holds. Either way, however, Zanzibaris would also have to rewind back to their pre-2010-reconciliation local achievements (however minimalist they may be) for practical improvement of their urban environment.

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed neoliberal sustainability planning’s performance in Sub-Saharan African cities. Throughout this review, the projects being established to improve the performance of participatory city governance, for example, or sustainable public service provision, including land and environmental management systems, the highly centralized version of the neoliberal approach has received local challenges from city residents. As exemplified from the Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambian experiences, the model has been deliberately misinterpreted by central authorities to have been empowering the communities and their civil societies without actually achieving much satisfaction. Retaining their political powers, state authorities distrust the neoliberal empowerment of civil society and community groups. They deliberately misrepresent this empowerment dimension as being greater than it is. They also look for ways to undermine community groups, and the autonomy of government planning units that work with
them. Most of the time, the state and its agents are not sympathetic to neoliberal donor demands for fiscal accountability, nor genuinely supportive of the targeted beneficiaries at the community level in these initiatives.

By integrating the housing (re)informality in what is referred to by Robins (2006: 100) as a “homogenizing strategy,” we see a dynamic picture of an urban human settlement development that ended up being a huge management liability to the political and government authorities due to their poorly applied approach and (dis)organization. In the center of this settlement planning approach lies the question of misunderstanding local culture, both at political and traditional angles, where resistance to the environmental sustainability model is strongly felt. For example, in the recipient African sustainable cities, the Tanzanian SDP in particular, many people noted that project activities went stagnant soon after the end of their pilot stages, or were seen as similar to earlier top-down initiatives, modified to suite the donor or recipient institutional interests.

The Tanzanian government ambition to financially stretch the “National Programs for Environmentally Sustainable Urban Development” nationally under the coordination of the Urban Authority Support Unit (UASU) in the Tanzanian Prime Minister's Office also contributed to its stagnation within the first five years of the SDP pilot schemes. The sustainable model is no longer seen to work for locally-situated community interests. Because Zanzibar is a sensitive society and, until the previously noted recent referendum was held, politically divided more than it is culturally or religiously united, the difference in the management of ZSP and ZILEM/SMOLE projects was rarely noticed by ordinary folks. How they operated within their relatively small political and geographical but highly bureaucratic spaces is a serious observation that requires more specific focus in the next two chapters.
Despite Amin's or Ferguson's approaches, however, Africa is hungry for a new development strategy that is dialogic and grounded in a new conscious ideology that creates trust among the local partners with full and effective consideration of people's own knowledge and independent participation in the local and global development arena; one that need not be scared of failings from localized low-key experiments; one that is tolerant, agreeably transparent and democratic. One needs to accept mistakes while motivated to keep on trying by rectifying those mistakes. It is there where one learns, out of mistakes that one makes. This suggests an appreciation of the hybrid or the traditional nature of our societies that needs to be achieved with incremental improvements involved to achieve efficiency. Africa needs to be supported organically, to be able to start from where it can stand by itself rather than just being encouraged to jump onto something fancy beyond local capacity or a program that will cease to exist just after the collaborating donor's departure.

My emphasis here is that the unpredictable collaborative partnerships we engage in need to be within people's own local limitations, in order to be able to cope with local realities upon the donor's absence. In this way, the strategies employed in those old master plans and newer sustainable ideology could make a difference to guide urban land uses and related service provision. Africa needs to refer back to its traditional leadership’s strengths to be able to unify management and planning activities. One aspect of President Julius Nyerere's political achievements (despite his other failings), for example, was that he was ready and able to lead and was a unifier. He was also a kind of independent-minded person whom the donors found hard to manipulate. He was able to implement his socialist teachings with very limited fighting from the West. Because of his courageous attitudes and convincing communicative abilities, the donor community accommodated to his leadership.
Returning to this chapter's objective, what is being experienced now with regard to sustainability, land management, and planning for urban housing development in Africa is the opposite of what was intended. Democratization, liberalization, and privatization are not bad things, but if wrongly introduced, specifically in transitory situations such as in Tanzania, they can widen differences and create political disunity beyond the reach of the societies or authorities to control. The current revival of Zanzibar’s democratizing society and liberalizing economy needs to be extended, to cover the practices in much of its planning, land, and housing sectors. Otherwise the state of our incomplete initiatives will be as bad as our failed intentions. Although the question implied by Maathai’s sentiment with which I began this chapter is perhaps referring to the author’s own Kenyan experience, it could also apply to any nearby situation such as Tanzania or Zanzibar: we need all four legs of the chair to make development occur. Housing (re)informalization and other development conflicts or differences on land and urban planning questions can only be avoided through mutual agreements, as I try to show in my three Zanzibar case studies.
Chapter 5
Zanzibar's Political Context for Urban Planning

“On the eve of revolution, [Zanzibar] was a microcosm of the continent. Some perceived it as a melting pot of cultural diversities; others saw it as hotbed of political divisions. All were correct, if one takes the position of the proverbial blind men and the elephant, but none could explain the elephant. To be able to explain, we need to see 'the elephant as a whole,' to explore the connection between diversities and divisions. The premise of this study is that diversities become divisions precisely when they are politicized” (Issa Shivji, 2008: xvii).

5.1 Introduction

Issa Shivji\textsuperscript{17} is a well-respected scholar of Tanzanian law who has spent much of his recent retirement time reviewing Zanzibar’s political and constitutional affairs, particularly regarding the union structure. A close relationship exists between the land management and urban planning histories of Zanzibar and the political divides Shivji identifies in the quotation above. Land management and urban planning have been regularly thwarted by the political divides. An out-of-control management system has worked more to control indigenous housing development than to explore the connections between formal and informal conventional realities. The quotation from Shivji comes from his recent publication on Zanzibar's political squabbles, and admittedly not on any unification of formal and informal housing ways in planning deliberations. But there are some important parallels between the questions of disjointed local politics or urban governance, and sustainability or collaborative planning processes.

Even in this relatively small African city which is associated with various forms of

\textsuperscript{17} Issa G. Shivji is the retired Professor of Law and Pan-African Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. He is also the author of *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lesson of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union*; (2008), among other legal and human rights related books and monographs under his name. Since 1977, Shivji has been serving as advocate of the high court and the court of appeals of Tanzania and advocate of the high court of Zanzibar since 1989.
uncontrolled informal housing, some of the morphology emanated from a number of formal interventions, and planning was ideologically deployed in the land and housing sectors (Sinclair, 2009). It is in this historical context that this chapter seeks the sources of Zanzibar’s land and planning practices, within three streams or types: (1) an administratively controlled (whether Swahili, British, and Arabic) planning heritage, (2) the revolutionary socialist heritage, and (3) the contemporary polarized mix of the first two. It is from these three streams, as reflections of both political and economic influences, that the existing disconnection between formal and informal processes\(^{18}\) is discussed within this historical planning review of Zanzibar.

In this context, I present my viewpoints, tracing the historical origin of spatial planning in Zanzibar and how this history has influenced the consolidation of the division between formal and informal (or traditional) housing and land management practices in the islands. In other words, I seek to address most of the planning elements experienced by government officials or land owners to segregate land and housing development into formal and informal processes in the city and what could be possible to unify the situation. The look of this possibility is rooted in communicative action policy options employed within the concept of urban sustainability intertwined within the collaborative planning principles introduced earlier in the dissertation.

Three other propositions shape this chapter. First, I want to refer to the notion that “a divided city is an unsustainable place” (Murphy et al 2003: 100). Second, I argue that the attainment of sustainability is a social dialogic construct that depends on how modern (formally planned) and traditional (informally organized) housing systems work collectively through (or in

\(^{18}\) The informal processes, as opposed to the formal practices, are usually characterized as those where the operators are in small scale community initiatives, unrecognized, and do not pay tax (Amponsah, 2007). In Zanzibar it spatially includes housing activities that are largely labor intensive, depending mainly on rudimentary technology and involving only marginal societal or traditional rules (Myers, 2006). Informal operators can emerge in almost any urban and economic development field, as a response to unmet needs, and thriving on their own instincts for housing and development survival (please also see Drakakis-Smith, 2000). This system has
convergence with) customary public negotiations “involving deliberative urban planning practices” (Hayward 2003: 113) to create mutual understanding in land management. Finally, my initial empirical review in this chapter suggests insufficient will in the political system associated with the paralysis of the governance environment to support the latest planning, housing, and land management procedures in any socially representative form. The following section begins to evaluate Zanzibari planning history, with a focus on the way its associated schemes, political projects, and practical development traditions have been (or have not been) working together in Zanzibar. The chapter concludes with an assessment of why the present frustrations have occurred.

5.2 Zanzibar’s Planning History: The Controlled Planning Heritage

The indigenous Swahili and administratively controlled (British and Arabic) heritage of planning in Zanzibar city has been a tradition of urban settlement development that has mixed and matched cultural references for more than three hundred years. The early foundation of the city as a fishing village, by at least the 1400s, is rarely discussed, but this legacy is still embedded in its built environment (Sinclair, 2009: 71-97). The first formal step towards administrative land use control and urban planning in Zanzibar, though, was established in 1890 when Britain formally established its rule. From the introduction of the first planning scheme thirty years later to improve the city from its uncontrolled Swahili coastal village origin, Zanzibar has experienced a remarkable array of other planning schemes outlined over many years of its planning history. Thanks to the island’s prominence in the earlier phases of the international trade and plantation economies of the 18th and 19th centuries, Arab and Indian

gained wide acceptance but also generated much political intolerance.
influences dominated the formation of Stone Town (Sheriff 1987), the original historic center of the town, while the areas surrounding Stone Town - collectively known as Ng’ambo (Swahili for 'the other side') - display African, colonial, Eastern European, and Chinese socialist influences.

The population of Zanzibar’s Urban District (the official Municipality) has increased by a factor of six since the turn of last century, from 34,922 in 1910 to 58,000 in 1948 and 206,292 in the 2002 census (Myers, 1999). The population of the West District, the city’s suburbs, expanded from 53,000 in 1988 to 184,710 in 2002. By 2003, 45% of the 400,000 residents of the Urban-West Region, the entity that combines the two districts, resided in under-serviced and unplanned neighborhoods in the West District, beyond the municipal boundary (Myers 1999; 2005; ZSP 1998). In contrast, Stone Town's population has shown a declining trend from around 18,000 at its peak in the 1950s to about 15,300 in the 2002 census. Gentrification, replacement of residential buildings for hotels, and other tourism, housing and infrastructure breakdowns have been blamed for the decline in population. Table 5.1 below displays the 2002 Zanzibar population numbers by districts based on the census results.19

While the ongoing rapid urban growth of Zanzibar is, as in most African cities, a phenomenon of the last few decades, its urban history and settlement patterns date back much further. Stone Town has its origins in the 15th century and Ng’ambo in the 19th century. These two sides of Zanzibar city were separated by a tidal creek that is now an open space and roadway. While Stone Town became a World Heritage Site in 2000 and a tourist destination, Ng’ambo and the West District are the areas of urban growth and city expansion (Aga Khan 1996: 15).

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19 There is one municipal council for Zanzibar, nine district councils (five in Unguja and four in Pemba) and three Town councils, all in Pemba. This municipal council of Zanzibar is formed by 24 wards and 40 shehias (Legal Government Reform Strategy, 2003).
Table 5.1: Zanzibar Islands Population by Districts (Population Census, Tanzania, 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unguja Districts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Pemba Districts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mjini/Urban</td>
<td>206,292</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>Chake</td>
<td>82,998</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magharibi/West</td>
<td>184,710</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>Kusini</td>
<td>31,853</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kati/Central</td>
<td>62,391</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>Mkoani</td>
<td>92,473</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaskazini 'A'</td>
<td>84,147</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>Micheweni</td>
<td>83,266</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaskazini 'B'</td>
<td>52,492</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Wete</td>
<td>102,060</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The separation of Stone Town from Ng’ambo was relatively fluid in socio-cultural terms through Zanzibar’s early years of Omani rule, 1690-1890 (Sheriff 2002). A broad mixture of South and Southwest Asian ethnic groups formed the majority population in early Stone Town and they guided its development alongside the indigenous traditions of the Swahili population (Veijalainen 2000: 55). Due to the physical limitations of the peninsula on which Stone Town began, its urban expansion was limited to vertical densification and replacement of small huts with multi-story stone buildings. However, the “basic configuration and street pattern of Stone Town” would change only a little from that which was established in its early days (Aga Khan 1996: 23). The fact that landowners around Stone Town were also owners of slaves settling there and “were reflected in the housing arrangement in urbanizing Ng’ambo” (Myers 1993: 79). “[O]wners allowed their slaves and other employees to build their homes on their land, initially without planning control or compensation” (Veijalainen 2000: 55). Natives settled in villages.

From 1890 to 1963, Zanzibar was a British protectorate. The British developed two master plans for the city and orchestrated a substantial ten-year development plan that in effect
formed a third master plan (Lanchester 1923; Kendall 1958; Myers 2003). The first planning Scheme (Henry Vaughan Lanchester’s in 1923) had very little immediate impact on urban development, but it set the tone for colonialism’s running theme of racial segregation made manifest in the rigid separation of Stone Town from Ng’ambo (Sheriff 2002; Muhajir 1994). “[T]he first town planning decree for Zanzibar was […] officially signed into law [in] 1925” (AB 39/203, ZNA; Sinclair, 2009: 93). In 1955, anticipating the approval (in 1958) of the second master plan, the British Protectorate approved a broad town and country planning decree, which was merely a modified copy of British legislation meant to consolidate pre-existing building rules or land codes created separately for Stone Town and Ng’ambo (Veijalainen 2000: 60). However, neither the 1955 planning law nor the 1958 planning scheme had the guiding impacts intended. Informal urban development was, as a consequence, as much a colonial-era phenomenon as an Omani or a post-colonial one: it came in tandem with inappropriate, extensive, and expensive planning methods and procedures regardless of the regime imposing them (Myers 1993; Muhajir 1993).

According to the first advisor for Zanzibar’s conventional planning schemes in the 20th century, the disorderly nature of the city condition and its winding street patterns exist[ed] since that time whereby the consultancy was commissioned “in setting forth proposals calculated to improve these conditions without much injurious impact to its more characteristic [informal] features ” (Lanchester, 1923: 1). Likewise, Oberauer (2008: 3) also observed that “[w]hen Lanchester was hired to develop a more systematic approach to urban development in Zanzibar, the British colonial administration realized that a substantial proportion of the urban space was indeed [an informal] property setting.” While political power in Zanzibar was a historical “reflection of economic power,” the origin of planning practice then basically flowered within
the pattern of formalized governance that depends on loyalty and support within a system of protracted political domination (Oberauer, 2008: 5). For instance, remembering Shivji’s (2008) metaphor from the beginning of the chapter, the activity of planning within traditional informality was not seen within the specific administrative elephant as a whole. This was the case, without there being any exploration of the connection between the divisions within the existing land and housing development institutions and the defining truth in their administrative system. What do I mean by this defining truth? In his 1961 study on land tenure in Zanzibar, John Middleton (in Oberauer 2008: 3) described the defining truth: “the foundational bedrock of traditional life in Zanzibar as an inalienable plot of land in the hands of a family, that reflects a social order whose member inherits traditional usufruct rights as well as rights to build or be buried on it.”

How did the Western notion of land titling find its way into the inherited family land ownership system? This is a question for another line of research on Zanzibar’s informal housing processes. However, it does matter to my overall argument for how an improved social order between formal and informal land institutions could best be done through prompt communicative action among concerned collaborators, in the search for breakthroughs to reduce the disconnects in land and housing management practices in Zanzibar.

More specifically, how did modern Zanzibar’s land reforms incorporate (or reshape) the customary land and housing management system in the islands? History shows that the original planning reform attempt came at a time of initialization of land administration which started shortly after the establishment of the British protectorate in the 1890s (Abdulla, 2005: 1). The land administration process of the early colonial era extended into issues such as the “location of the institution in the governance structure, its capacity in fulfilling goals required, and human
resources development plan, including development of policies and their supportive legislation, staff training, and equipment purchase,” the key imprints of the present sustainability or collaborative planning in the contemporary city (Ibid: 1). Emphasis, however, was put on planning schemes to direct or guide the local land and housing processes in the city.

Institutionalized land administration started in 1909 when the British established the first land survey section in the Public Works Department20 in order to regulate disorganized land administration activities in the country (Abdalla, 2005: 3). In the past 102 years, Zanzibar has experienced some remarkable interventions toward the formalization of land administration and planning practices, but often in conflict with its own Swahili cultural and architectural features. Lanchester’s 1923 plan “represented a watershed moment in urban planning in Africa” at that time (Sinclair, 2009: 93). Lanchester came with the ambition to change the city's form. As he noted in his study, his consultancy was commissioned to incorporate methods originally extracted from Ebenezer Howard's (1898) 'garden city movement' that had been promoted in England nearly a quarter of a century before (Lanchester, 1923).

Having “not yet returned to England” from Madras and Lucknow, India for similar planning consultancies, Lanchester agreed to work on Zanzibar's planning project en route to home (Sinclair, 2009: 91). His resulting report, Zanzibar: A Study in Tropical Town Planning (Lanchester 1923) contains a review of existing conditions in the city “along with suggestions for dramatic alterations to the urban fabric including the incorporation of the Vuga neighborhood as

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20 In 1936, the Land Survey Section was transformed into a fully-fledged Department of Surveying and Registration under the Sultanate Government of the British Protectorate (Abdulla, 2005). This transformation happened because the government wanted to introduce a land registration system in order to register undocumented properties. The establishment of this department was a product of a renowned expert advice of Sir Ernest Dawson who was commissioned in 1934 to advise the government on how best to execute a land management program without incurring high costs. The government was advised to use aerial photographs to earmark boundaries of properties, and especially those of clove plantations, which were easily visible in the photographs and the most valuable lands to the Protectorate.
the garden suburb” (Sinclair, 2009: 80). However, this report had little impact on people's daily practices in other housing areas outside of Vuga and Stone Town. His few limited proposals included “changes to the harbor” through land reclamation and “the [...] creation of the broad boulevards” and a ring road going around the edges of Stone Town (Sinclair, 2009: 91-92), which was to connect at both ends with a new road that replaced the tidal basin that divided Stone Town from Ng’ambo (Figure 5.1).

Nevertheless, his study was one of the first town planning works ever done for a city of its scale in Africa. It was prepared during the time when the planning processes for colonial African cities like Nairobi (which only produced its first official plan in 1926) were also in their infant stages, and conversations about building a ‘garden city for Africa’ in Lusaka had barely begun. Ever since the Lancheser plan, most of the planning schemes in Zanzibar have remained the same in one important respect: they have borrowed principles that have been invented by foreigners ignorant about most of Zanzibar’s own housing traditions. Their prime consequence has remained a dual historical city (between formal and informal areas now, much more than between Stone Town and Ng’ambo) and poor performance by all major master plans that succeeded the original planning scheme.
The city has also been associated with the prioritization of planned areas and elite zones at the expense of poorly recognized unplanned settlements. This was certainly the case with the second formal planning scheme for the city, the 1958 Master Plan (Bissell 2011). The colonial government did emphasize planning for Ng’ambo in its 1946-55 Ten-Year Development Plan for the islands, but this was not officially a plan for the city, and it too replicated the Lanchester plan’s alien design goals and mostly ignored Swahili traditions. In fact, the political developments corollary to the Ten-Year Plan, which created separate elected councils for Stone
Town and Ng’ambo (with the former being a “Town” and the latter being a “Native Location”) strengthened the dualistic character of the city. Building rules established with the Ten-Year Plan under Chief Secretary Eric Dutton, for example, codified Stone Town as the only legal place for a “stone house”, and Ng’ambo for a “native hut”, within the Urban District (Myers 1993).

This kind of historical planning background reminds me of another recently experienced scene, over the new, more inclusive, form of urban management in Zanzibar which shows a similar kind of planning transformation. In the application of the so called bottom-up participatory and collaborative principles which came into the picture in relatively recent decades, it is amazing to understand that such new projects have been implemented similarly to the Lanchester, Dutton, and Kendall plans: with external priorities and mechanisms, absent an appreciation of Swahili customs and practices. One would have hoped that the new approaches would have meant improvement on the strategies. However, it would be naïve to assume such a conclusion, ignoring decades of frustration in land administration and environmental management activities which have shaped Zanzibar’s planning practices over its century-long history.

5.3 The Revolutionary Heritage

The last forty seven years have witnessed a socialist hue to Zanzibari planning and land management. Throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, Zanzibar has also had steadily souring relations with continental Tanzania that have dominated its political and economic experiences and eroded its autonomy in planning and development.21 In December

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21 Bakari (2001: 7) notes: “it is not an easy task to clearly delineate the boundaries of the topic particularly due to the geographical relationship between the Zanzibar islands and Tanzania mainland. Although the Zanzibar
1963, Zanzibar became an independent country. However, the new regime was formed by two Arab-dominated minority parties, sidestepping the election victories earned by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) that claimed to represent the marginalized African majority. The ASP led a bloody revolution in January 1964, and turned the country toward a socialist path. The ASP regime quickly united Zanzibar with Tanganyika (in April 1964) to form Tanzania. Table 5.2 (a and b) summarizes presidential phases in both Zanzibar and Tanzania and their corresponding events from 1961 to 2011. After the revolution and the union, the focus of planning shifted to Ng’amo, and the planning neglect shifted to Stone Town. In 1968, a planning team from East Germany aimed to solidify its diplomatic relations with Zanzibar (leaving West Germany in the mainland side of the country, its former colony) with a new master plan. The East German plan proposed inner city areas in Ng’ambo “as part of a slum clearance program, a new road system and long, tall blocks of modern flats … to form the ‘crown of the new town’” (Aga Khan 1996: 57; Scholz 1968).

During this time of socialist planning, the large apartment blocks of Michenzani were constructed, replacing old buildings of varied quality in Ng’ambo and introducing a new building type: six-story, 300 meter-long apartment blocks. This intervention divided the oldest part of Ng’ambo into four separate quarters and interrupted traditional paths (Muhajir, 1993: 48; Myers 1994a). The main connection from Stone Town to Ng’ambo shifted from an old bridge across the former creek, south to a new four-lane road towards Michenzani.

regime is relatively autonomous in managing the democratic process in the islands, it is obvious that most of the political [and developmental] decisions that have taken place on one side of the union inevitably have a direct influence or indirect impact on the other side.” See also Aboud Jumbe, (1994); The Partner-ship: Tanganyika – Zanzibar, 30 Turbulent Years; Amana Publishers, Tanzania.
Table 5.2a: Phases of Zanzibar Leadership and Corresponding Events, 1964-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase/Dates</th>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Zanzibar Independence, Prime Minister Muhammed Shamte, Monarchy Disputed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1964-1972</td>
<td>Abeid A. karume</td>
<td>1964 Zanzibar Revolution</td>
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<td>1964 Union with Tanganyika</td>
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<td>1967-1971 Leadership debate on how to adapt with the Union and implement the <em>Arusha</em> Declaration</td>
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<td>1972-1984</td>
<td>Aboud Jumbe</td>
<td>1972 Karume's Assassination</td>
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<td>1977 ASP+TANU merger; CCM born</td>
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<td>1983 Zanzibar's House of Representatives Introduced</td>
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<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>Salmin Amour</td>
<td>1990 Abdul Wakil Step-down</td>
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<td>1992 Multi-Party Democracy Approved</td>
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<td>1995 1st Multi-Party Election; Zanzibar President Not Union Vice President; Still CCM Vice Chair</td>
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<td>1999 Vision 2020 framed &amp; Strategy for Neoliberal Poverty Reduction Approved</td>
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<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>Amani A. Karume</td>
<td>2001 COLE Abolished</td>
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<td>2010 Bill for Government of National Unity Approved</td>
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<td>2010-Present</td>
<td>Ali M. Shein</td>
<td>2010 Government of National Unity Introduced</td>
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<td>1st and 2nd Vice Presidential Positions Introduced</td>
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<td>1st Vice President (CUF); 2nd Vice President (CCM)</td>
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<td>2nd VP replaces Chief Minister's Office</td>
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Source: Author, (Based on collected reports), 2011
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<th>Phases/Dates</th>
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<td>1962-1963 Dealing with and controlling Zanzibar which led to the ultimate Zanzibar revolution in 1964</td>
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<td>1964 Union with Zanzibar</td>
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<td>1967 <em>Ujamaa</em> Socialist Policy Introduced by the <em>Arusha</em> Declaration</td>
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<td>1968-1983 Continuous national debate about <em>Ujamaa</em> Socialist Policies that led to the birth of the national political party CCM and consumed most of the national resources to sustain national security which led to Collapse of the national economy</td>
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<td>1984 Political Standoff on Zanzibar's Secession Attempt</td>
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<td>1992 Multi-Party Democracy Approved</td>
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<td>Parliamentary Motion for Mainland Government killed by Father of the Nation</td>
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<td>1995-2005</td>
<td>Benjamin Mkapa</td>
<td>1995 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Multi-Party Election held</td>
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<td>Vice Presidential Running-mate introduced</td>
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<td>Zanzibar President; Not Union Vice President;</td>
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<td>Still CCM Vice Chair</td>
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<td>2005-Present</td>
<td>Jakaya M. Kikwete</td>
<td>2004 Vision 2025 Approved</td>
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<td>2010 Union VP Ali Shein Declared Candidate for</td>
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<td>Zanzibar Presidency</td>
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Source: Author, 2011
In the rest of Ng’ambo, the majority of buildings are still one story, informally-built, and following the traditional layout of Swahili buildings, with a front house, a courtyard and a backyard house as opposed to low-rise buildings in Stone Town (Muhajir, 1993: 48). These blocks of flats symbolize the post-revolutionary socialist planning work done in Zanzibar to improve housing conditions. However, this revolutionary planning can be differentiated into two eras: the period of genuinely Socialist Planning from 1964-1977 and what Myers calls the 'Time of Confusion' since 1977 (Myers 1993, 1994, and 1995). During the socialist planning period that reigned between 1969 and 1979, local party branches were responsible for the allocation of urban housing plots. Together with surveyors, the holders of farm land and settlers, local politicians delivered the land. “The system was fast and flexible”, but it faced problems due to the lack of knowledge of the surveyors, poor registration procedures, and the limited consideration of legal and planning dimensions (Veijalainen 2000: 62).

When Aboud Jumbe took over the Zanzibar presidency following President Karume Sr.’s assassination in 1972, he came willingly with new political ambitions that were signified by a lot of what I am calling ‘self-actualized’ reforms that looked to recognize his own political ambitions within the umbrella of the Tanzanian union political arrangement. This was seen in his contribution to the merger of the ASP and TANU which “seriously eroded Zanzibar’s autonomy” (Bakari. 2001: 114). He will also be remembered for making gradual strides towards Zanzibar’s democratization process alongside the unification of the ruling parties of Tanzania. As Bakari continues, “his gradualist approach began to abate the power of the Revolutionary Council, hitherto a powerful political body.”

The revolutionary council was subordinated to the party and became an organ of the party's National Executive Committee “in charge of running the government on behalf of the
party” (Bakari 2001: 112). However, Jumbe went even further. In 1979, Jumbe led his cabinet to produce a new Zanzibari constitution which “provided, inter alia, that the President of Zanzibar was to be elected by the universal adult suffrage instead of being appointed by the Revolutionary Council” (Ibid: 113). Besides this landmark achievement, the parliamentary House of Representatives was also formed to promote popular participation and counteract the power of the Revolutionary Council. Although the House’s members were not popularly elected under the 1979 constitution, they initially played an important role in demanding the further democratization of the polity, particularly, in putting the government to account for careless revenue expenditures and mismanagement of public projects (Bakari 2001).

Coincidently, the importance of planning for Zanzibar’s national economic and land development sectors was emphasized as a top government affair. The very powerful Economic Planning Commission was introduced at the national level, which supported several sectoral, local, and regional development schemes. Two of the most interesting examples in planning and housing development during Jumbe’s time were the phasing out of the Michenzani apartment projects in favor of low-cost housing schemes which were tried across many rural communities, and the re-introduction of urban planning offices in both Unguja and Pemba islands. Additionally, both bilateral and multilateral donor initiatives encouraged during this time facilitated discussions for the preparation of land and housing policies, the review of land tenure, and Stone Town’s conservation. Plans for each of these were respectively commissioned between 1977 and 1982.

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23 In 1977, the Directorate of Overseas Surveys under the agreement for technical assistance between the United Kingdom and Tanzania facilitated the Government of Zanzibar in preparing topographic maps for both islands at
By 1982 most of Jumbe’s land and housing policy reforms were ready for implementation. It was in this year whereby the most recent master plan for Zanzibar was prepared, by a Chinese city planning team (Kequan 1982; Myers 1998). This 20-year plan (Figure 5.2) proposed to deal with the period up to the year 2002 and covered mainly the issues of housing, land use, and the extension of the urban town boundary. Parallel to the preparation of the Chinese master plan, an integrated strategy for conservation and development of Stone Town was separately prepared, under Royce Lanier’s consultancy for UN-HABITAT, in the same year.

The Chinese planners subdivided the city into fifty existing and proposed neighborhoods in order to guide urban development, increase the potential for improved urban management, and produce a more balanced distribution of services. Like the British master plans before it, the Chinese master plan had only a minor impact on the ground. Urban development took place in areas which were not designated for housing, and density became far higher than proposed in these new areas (most of them in the West District, outside the municipality). The proposed low density areas at the urban fringe, as of 1982, instead became poor suburbs (Alawi 2001). One of the biggest misfortunes of this master plan and the UN-Habitat Stone Town program operating on parallel tracks was to re-divide the city into two parts, governed by two different legislative provisions (for Stone Town and Ng'ambo) without a clear collaborative mechanism set to unify the two city areas.

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A scale 1:10,000 (Abdulla, (2005). In all, 63 sheets were produced. There were also 44 sheets produced at a scale of 1:2,500 to cover all town areas. These maps were very important as those available were long outdated. They were helpful in providing base maps for various planning and other development schemes that followed throughout the last two decades.
Figure 5.2: Zanzibar master plan, 1982

The Chinese also proposed an expansion for the boundary of the municipality to accommodate their version of planned urban growth. While building regulations from the British era still apply in the municipal area (Urban District), outside of it (the West District) urban development is managed in effect as village development without any regulations. The long-
proposed extension of the urban boundary has still not been accomplished as of 2011. The official municipal area is still the same as it was in 1978, while more than 45% of the existing urban area is outside the municipality, according to an analysis of the aerial photographs of 2004. Nevertheless, the Chinese master plan of 1982 remains the last legal reference base for planning in Zanzibar.

Despite the master plan having been modestly supported by the annual development budget over the whole Jumbe’s administration (Government File: UMM/MUN/334/Vol II), a rapid increase of urban population, and the limited capacity of the government of Zanzibar to meet the high demand for building plots, led to the further development of informal settlements. The change in the economic system toward neoliberal policies beginning in the mid-1980s is the main factor driving the large numbers of people into towns. With the limited amount of building land in the Urban District, the net result is an explosion of informal settlements in the West District after the invasion of nationalized buildings found empty by squatters in Stone Town came to an end in the 1970s and 1980s. Before then, Stone Town buildings were privately owned, but many had been vacated by their original owners who left the country after the January 1964 revolution or were killed during the chaotic months between it and the April 1964 Union. Nationalization of their properties had occurred very early in the revolutionary era, with recent rural migrants squatting in their stone houses (Myers 1998).

Those houses were left unattended and continued to crumble around their residents, who originated from different areas of the Zanzibar islands - both from the countryside of Unguja and from Pemba island (Pembans make up the largest tenant community in Stone Town today). The other group of tenant occupiers originates from the mainland of Tanzania; they claim to have played a major role in the revolution. The government did not perceive rapid urban development
as a consequence of the opening of the market with the economic restructuring and trade liberalization policies employed from the mid-1980s. Thus it was not prepared. The “government closed [its] eyes, because it could neither reinstall the controlled economy nor change the whole system” (Awadh, 2008).

Even after all these planning and regulatory efforts were instituted and subsequently implemented, the indigenous influence of traditional housing systems did not come to an end. The indigenous system continued, swarming over the policies and strategies that were put in place. The informal processes were culturally multiplying throughout the whole scope of the city. This was so even when Abeid Karume Sr. and his Group of 14 (those people involved in the revolution) took over Zanzibar in January 1964, regarding the indigenous settlements on the Ng’ambo side as inferior, justifying their replacement in favor of the apartments. The estimated number of beneficiaries of the Michenzani apartments among the affected residents is a much debated issue. In my 1991 analysis of residential claims at Mwembetanga locality, the original neighborhood affected by Michenzani, I documented that one-third of the residents still had claims pending for compensation for lost properties (Muhajir 1991).

The tenth apartment block, slated for construction since the early 1970s, has just been completed through the involvement of special government forces, but the units’ subsequent initial distribution to people with elite influence once again betrayed the original socialist goals of the program. This six floor building block can house about 140 family units but as the October 2010 election fever grew, it became more and more unlikely to imagine those units ever being extended to the deserving people documented in the original waiting list. This is because compensation has not been consistent to those people who lost their houses, with the ratio of true beneficiaries to elites declining decade after decade since the first two blocks of houses were
completed in 1969 (Muhajir, 1993). Nepotism, bribery, and corruption contributed to the derailment of the widely awaited revolutionary promises, which included free services and decent houses for all. Once corruption began to spread both in the government and among the people in the society, the superiority of socialist ideology, of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* (KiSwahili for ‘family-hood and self-reliance’), tended to evaporate in the people’s mindset.

The socialist ideology and socialist planning did not explicitly change the overall housing conditions or service availability. By the late 1980s and early 1990s the trend toward the democratization of government systems revealed a prospective outcome that hung onto the donors playing a continuous, supportive role for iconic governance reforms through their involvement to achieve democratic and institutional competitiveness. This was guided by one major powerful political and economic policy change – the introduction of the structural adjustment programs. This policy change came with more democratization, liberalization, and privatization in a package. Under these neoliberal policies, economic restructuring programs were encouraged alongside privatization of properties as a major policy item. The economic stagnation of the islands began to hinder Jumbe’s idea of gradual self-actualization in favor of a donor-supported economy, through their budget support and encouragement of access to loans and grants for needed infrastructure and other service provision.

5.4 The Latest Polarized Reconciliatory Phase: Planning in between the Peace Agreements

Coinciding with the emergence of neoliberalism, this phase began with the political reconstruction and liberalization of the national economy of the 1980s. It was in this time that
Jumbe’s presidential phase ended unceremoniously in January 1984. This Makerere University graduate in education was unexpectedly reported to have resigned for unclarified reasons. There has been speculation from different sources up until today about why. However, most scholars and political observers believe that his was a forced resignation which came at a time when Jumbe was pushing for making a reconciliatory blanket revolution in favor of different societal interests of the Zanzibaris, then known locally as *Uhuru wa Kiroboto* (literally ‘flea revolution’; (Ghassany, 2010). Others believed that Jumbe was aspiring to replace *Mwalimu* Julius Nyerere as the President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Bakari, 2010; 114). Whatever transpired, the succeeding Zanzibar President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi spearheaded the introduction of the neoliberal reform agenda, in his famous term, *ruhsa* (KiSwahili for ‘freeness or permission’), as a means to improve his leadership’s legitimacy.

President Mwinyi started poorly in his Zanzibari presidency. Having been born on the mainland Tanzania, his emphasis was to improve the scarcity of basic goods to show his empathy with ordinary Zanzibaris. This improved the admiration that he received from a significant group of Zanzibaris of different racial backgrounds (Bakari, 2010). This admiration came to an end when he left Zanzibar to become the Union President on Mwalimu Nyerere’s resignation, after serving for only 21 months as the Zanzibar President (Ibid: 117). President Mwinyi's departure to the Union presidency was succeeded by the difficult five-year term of his friend, former boss, and long-time diplomat and retired Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Idris Abdulwakil.

President Abdulwakil was then succeeded by President Salmin Amour in 1990. Amour oversaw real structural changes in Zanzibar’s economic development and its political re-orientation to the multi-party democracy. As Abdulwakil, who was also a Makerere graduate,
will be remembered for his *mtakula* (I will feed you!) political slogan, his successor, Doctor Salmin Amour, an East German trainee, will be remembered by his *wetu* (KiSwahili for ‘on our side’) political slogan, signifying that he was in favor of the ruling party supporters. The *wetu* slogan literally meant if someone was not “ours”, that is s/he belonged to the opposition, s/he was not qualified for any serious government privileges, which in time extended to unemployment or retrenchment. Amour contributed to the widening of the Pemba-Unguja polarity in Zanzibar’s political affairs that damaged his credibility among the international donor community, especially following the closely contested 1995 election.

There were two foiled peace agreements, one that followed that election and one after the similarly controversial 2000 election. The first came under Amour’s leadership and the second under his successor, President Karume Jr., but both involved Seif Shariff Hamad from the CUF opposition. The election controversies led to a donor boycott of first Amour’s and then Karume’s development programs (the boycott lasted from early 1996 through 2002). Rancor lasted for two more election seasons, so that up until the very end of 2009, Zanzibar continued to experience a tumultuous political tug-of-war between government and the opposition. The ruling party’s unprecedented intolerance of people of Pemba-island origin, who overwhelmingly support CUF, sustained much of the tumult and rancor.

Neither international donors, nor the government of Zanzibar, nor Zanzibar’s poor majority could be said to have their eyes closed now. The last two decades have brought eye-opening changes across the cityscape, and across the planning agenda, but this has happened amidst an ever-deepening political crisis. The political standoff between CCM and CUF defines the context for implementing the contemporary planning reforms that are the focus in this dissertation. In the October 1995 elections, CCM won 26 of the 50 seats in Zanzibar’s House of
Representatives, and CCM’s Salmin Amour retained the Zanzibari presidency, defeating CUF’s Seif Shariff Hamad by less than 0.3% of the vote. CUF won every constituency (then 21) on Pemba by huge margins, and three on Unguja (two in Stone Town). More votes were declared spoiled than the total that separated Amour and Hamad, and voting irregularities were rampant.

CUF refused to recognize these presidential results. In 1998, its representatives in the Zanzibari House were dismissed by CCM; seventeen CUF members, including four House representatives, were charged with treason. The Commonwealth Secretary negotiated the first peace agreement between the disputants in June 1999, providing a brief interlude of calm. All but the four imprisoned CUF House members returned to regular attendance and participated in normal House business. Amour and Hamad often made joint appearances in 1999 and on the surface it looked like the peace would hold if the government would release the detainees. But the treason charges endured, and the 2000 election season recreated the old tensions. Amour attempted to change the constitution to allow himself a third term, and when that failed, the Zanzibar branch of CCM chose his loyal Chief Minister, Muhammed Gharib Bilal, as its candidate for Zanzibar’s President. CCM’s mainland-dominated National Executive Committee bitterly rejected Bilal (eventually for two consecutive election periods) and imposed its choice, Amani Karume. His family name won Karume support from many island CCM stalwarts. However, given how disaffected his selection made Amour’s supporters feel, a divided CCM seemed headed for defeat in October 2000, as confrontations between CCM and CUF supporters escalated.

That October, as votes were being counted, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission declared the city wards to be in chaos and called for a rerun in them a week later. Even though CUF again won almost all of Pemba by huge margins, its leaders called for a boycott of the urban rerun.
This handed CCM a larger House majority and Karume Jr. a more decisive victory margin over Hamad than Amour had enjoyed, but an equally suspect one. CUF again refused recognition to the CCM regime, and its representatives were refused entry into the House. Then, in January 2001, the Tanzanian police confronted a CUF protest rally in Pemba with brute force, saying the rally was conducted without a permit. The incident led to the worst political violence in Tanzania since the 1964 revolution, with more than fifty protesters dead and hundreds more seeking refuge in Kenya. Vigorous negotiations eventually led to a second peace agreement between the parties in October 2001, the release of the original detainees, and the 2002 return of CUF to the House, but this failed to dislodge the bitterness on both sides.

The 2005 election season again brought political tensions and occasional bursts of violence to the city. In October 2005, CCM gained its third heavily disputed electoral victory, with Karume Jr. again defeating Hamad for president (by a declared margin of 5%) and the ruling party earning 60% of the elected seats in Zanzibar’s House of Representatives. CUF again refused recognition to the incumbent regime, and it remained to be seen to what lengths the opposition would go to either stabilize or destabilize the islands until the aforementioned incidents had happened.

During his second and final term in office, with the 2010 elections looming, the reigning President Karume’s regime came to be associated with a negative limelight. Grand corruption and nepotism that were code-named locally, hapa pangu (KiSwahili for 'it's mine here’, or, in essence: ‘this place is mine'). The Tanzanian local newspaper RAI (July 17, 2010) owned by one of the ruling party's CCM parliamentarians and controversial financiers, Rostam Aziz, revealed that the slang, hapa pangu had become a popular phrase everywhere and at any level among all Zanzibari age groups. When making regular visits to attend various social gathering places,
known locally as *maskani*, be they CCM or CUF-dominated, one would be able to interpret its meaning by simply listening to the ongoing conversation that connects people's opinion on local issues.

*Hapa pangu* is an idiomatic phrase used principally in association with the regime’s leadership and its land grabbing practices within potential tourism and prime city areas, alongside its rampant nepotism and embezzlement of the government coffers. In my 2008 fieldwork, one of the anonymous land officials admitted to me that “they take everywhere they want including the People’s Bank of Zanzibar, the Office of the Chief Registrar building at Mambo Msige, and the orphanage home adjacent to *Forodhani* park in Stone Town.” Another anonymous source among land officials noted: “They have possessed tourism lands in Pemba and Unguja at Maruhubi Palace Ruins, Buyu, Matemwe, Paje-Jambiani, Pwanimchangani, and Nungwi and some private lots the size of the reserved residential neighborhood at Tunguu new town, Migombani by the state lodge and Mbweni elite areas and have a stake in most of the gas stations, housing, and petroleum businesses in Zanzibar and in Dar es Salaam.” In total, those taken lands measured more than 230 hectares, which signified a great deal of an issue in a tiny island such as Zanzibar (Fieldwork in Zanzibar, July 2, 2008).

My next chapter shows how many land lease rights were revoked or reallocated for various uses during the Karume, Jr. regime, from when it assumed administrative responsibilities in January 2001 through Karume’s retirement in November 2010. The bad precedent this has created is that corruption and nepotism are norms for whoever is employed in the government's services. The current regime of Ali Mohammed Shein has begun, as of this writing, to investigate the most egregious offenses among the *hapa pangu* seizures and reallocations of property, but it is unlikely to ever bring the real culprits to justice (The Guardian, January 16, 2011). It is also
unlikely to know how any revoked lands will be reallocated. What is done might only end up being posted on WikiLeaks.

Regardless of all of these corruption allegations, President Karume, Jr., was able to legitimate his leadership at the end of his second term, by extending a political handshake with the opposition leader, Hamad, which has reduced tensions. In November 2009, an unexpected political incident was recorded, following the recognition of the incumbent regime by the leader of the opposition. Maalim Seif (as his followers wish Hamad to be called) met his host Amani Karume at the state house. Despite appreciation for this locally-declared, perhaps internationally-engineered, mediation for reconciliation in what would now be called a third peace agreement between CCM and CUF, the roots of it are much deeper than that state house meeting. Notably, some of CCM’s ruling zealots saw this as a suspicious invitation which came at the most down side of his presidency, few months before the October 2010 election time.

Nevertheless, massive political changes sped forward from the secret accord between Hamad and Amani Karume. On July 31 2010, Zanzibar held a popular referendum on power sharing between the ruling and main opposition parties, which paved the way for the formation of a government of national unity, or GNU. Some 66 percent of the Zanzibaris who voted actually voted in its favor. With this referendum came a constitutional dilemma. Zanzibar’s House went on to amend her constitution redefining the islands as a country within the United Republic of Tanzania, a move that reignited controversy over the future of the union (James and Kagashe, 2010). The referendum was lauded both by the local and international communities. U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, congratulated the Tanzanian leaders' “commitment to promoting reconciliation and the rule of law in Zanzibar” as part of the ongoing democratic

reform processes (*The Guardian* (Tanzania), August 18, 2010).

Raised even prior to the referendum, both governments in the union structure – the United Republic (which Zanzibaris often identify as mainland Tanzania’s) government and Zanzibar's government – were stuck in attempts to resolve a number of misunderstandings (politely reduced to *kero za muungano* or union annoyances) that have crippled the two parts to where they are unable to resolve their structural differences. Perhaps the new changes may help to resolve the impasse between the two union partners. Aimed to strengthen the union in a different way, the new constitutional changes may also return Zanzibar back to an equal union footing with its mainland Tanzania counterpart (formerly Tanganyika). As James and Kagashe (2010) reveal, the latest constitutional amendment “redefines Zanzibar as a country formerly known as the People's Republic of Zanzibar with its territory composed of Unguja, Pemba, and all of the small surrounding islands and its territorial waters, as it was before the 1964 merger with Tanganyika. This replaces the 1984 constitutional provision which stipulated Zanzibar as just a mere part of the union.”

Within these constitutional amendments, there are some queries. The Zanzibari referendum was called without intensive research - as was the 1964 union itself - when Tanzania is often taken to be among the top most stable African countries (Khamis, 2010\(^25\)). The reconciliatory democratic agenda stalled the ambition of many leaders in the Tanzanian government for union integration, towards a single government system - a solution desired much more by the mainland Tanzanians than by Zanzibaris.

\(^{25}\) This former Zanzibar district commissioner (DC) was sacked by the outgone Zanzibar president, Amani Karume, for allegedly campaigning against the proposed power-sharing move aimed at ending protracted political tension in the Isles. Sources cited from the Daily News (Tanzania’s official government newspaper) show that this DC led a group of CCM ten-house cell leaders and councilors objecting to the proposed power-sharing deal on the grounds that it was being rushed to the polls without intensive research and adequate public education on the issue (Daily News, Tanzania, August 30 2010).
No one is certain about the final political outcome of this recently conducted referendum. It did, however, confirm existing differences of opinion between Zanzibaris and their mainland Tanzanian counterparts about the union structure. Zanzibar has shown some desire for a more (con)federal type of governance system in which the two parts that form the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) would be autonomous within it. This would potentially loosen the current leadership knot that demotes the islanders to insignificant partners under the present union political structure (http://www.jamiiforum.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/index11.html, August 4 2010). Another possibility that would be favorable to many Zanzibaris would entail the two parts of the union agreeing to devote genuine attention to the promotion of each one’s democratization reforms, provided that Zanzibar remained an equal union partner.

This is not as easy as it sounds, especially when considering Zanzibar’s weakened position in the present partisan politics of Tanzania. Deep speculation surrounds the cautious way this referendum was received on the other (mainland) side of the union of Tanzania and within the ruling party ranks of the CCM. CCM will rarely, if ever do anything but promptly refuse to do the opposite of what its own rank and file support, and the referendum was not politically rooted (or acceptable) from within the party base. Based on its mild reception within CCM and the mainland, the Zanzibar referendum is still a wait and see phenomenon - regardless of its publicly proclaimed support from the Tanzanian President Kikwete, the US State Department, the European Community, and most diplomatic missions in Tanzania. Its impact on housing development issues, however, can be more significant. While general elections might always revive political rivalry between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar, the reversal of the legislated coalition pact might be more damaging for planning and housing development issues, as revealed in the following sub-section.
5.5 Zanzibar’s Planning Relationship and (In)tolerance with Housing Informality

It may be that the CCM and CUF leaders’ 2009-2010 reconciliation helped to reduce political tensions. Nevertheless, the 1995 Zanzibar election alone remains hard to forget, since it was the most damaging one to the developmental, political, and societal affairs of Zanzibar. It was “conceived with an over-emphasis on the promise of external support”, writes Singer (2004: 2) in his advisory white paper for the Government of Zanzibar. Because of the 1995 election, planning began to lose the prominence it deserved; it devolved into a narrow focus on less controversial, donor-backed rural land use planning for coastal tourism zoning - which was after all the government's financial priority.

Likewise, other aspects of the Commission for Lands and Environment (COLE) which were not part of the initial foreign assistance pact received little or no significant attention at all. These aspects include informal settlement improvement, urban poverty reduction, and subdivision planning schemes. For example, urban planning remained part of the government’s department of surveys and urban planning, while its special integrated planning unit (IPU) created to handle rural land uses was directly placed under Finnish advisory authority in the final ZILEM years. Little was done from the project to facilitate “urban planning and development control [which] did not fall directly under the portfolio of the project management team,” recalled Singer (1994: 3). Detailed discussion on COLE’s land reforms follows in the next chapter.

It was because of this handicapped planning situation and divisions cultivated in a polarized political environment that politically-influential administrators were able to capitalize on their connections to work ideologically against 'planning' deliberations, especially within the
land and environmental sectors. Thus the newly democratic system, which was supposed to be facilitated through the neoliberal sustainability model, collaborative planning, and participatory strategies, was struggling with hostile political projects at the same time (following the 1996 donor freeze) such that the international community was entirely helpless to extend their support to the needed institutional reforms. I will provide two tangible housing demolition cases to justify this argument in the following few paragraphs.

On the verge of the 1995 election, a number of informally built houses (nearly 400 in total) were forcefully demolished around the power station at Mtoni in the periphery of the city, and the city’s nearby water source situated some five miles north-northeast from the city center (Myers and Muhajir 1997). The Amour government’s lack of ideological tolerance was the main causal factor. However, it also happened because of the unavailability of an adequately unified planning mechanism – a situation which had allowed these informal settlements to flourish after all. The demolitions provided severe hardships to the majority of the affected home owners who then lacked shelter during the rainy season. The demolitions became a huge political issue thereafter, forcing donors to halt their support for the government’s other urban projects. Justifying its actions, the government and CCM leaders claimed that the houses, most of which were occupied by Pemba islanders, were illegally constructed and that CUF had politically instigated the settlement in the first place.

Nearly a year later, following the 1995 election, the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning was able to convince and involve the affected people in a small-scale homemade collaborative initiative which was supported (after much moral suasion from COLE and the Department) by an eventually sympathetic regional commissioner of the Urban/West region who had presided over the demolitions. The affected people were provided with new lots of land in
the newly surveyed Kijitoupele area to resettle and relieve them from some of the demolition costs. But this attempt also generated its own cost to COLE: its abolition following the 2000 election.

The abolition of COLE in the January 2001 government reshuffle was a huge blow to the land sector (COLE had combined three departments: Environment, Lands, and Planning & Surveys). This abolition was ultimately legitimized, after the fact, by Act 15 of 2003. COLE was the responsible institution which helped to build the dialogue between the people affected by these demolitions and their local authorities. The institution had also helped to legally protect the rights of the poor property owners against the wealthy land speculators. The reshuffle of the three stand-alone COLE departments led to the environment department’s reallocation to the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands and Planning & Surveys remained with the Ministry of Water, Lands, and Housing. Much of the reshuffle of the departments played directly into the hands of then new presidency. The brother in-law of the president, Mansur Yusuf Himid, became the minister of lands. The reshuffle shattered the earlier donor dreams of ultimately integrating those functionally related tasks in COLE. COLE was once seen as a people-centered authority that was intended for remodeling into a powerful and responsible ministry for lands and environment (Singer 1994). The then incumbent regional commissioner and those senior collaborators from COLE in the Kijitoupele relocation/compensation planning from the 1995 demolitions all lost their positions in the same reshuffle. In a politically motivated move, the responsibilities for issuance of land titles and lease holdings were revoked from the director of lands and vested directly under the responsible minister, brother-in-law to the prime mover of hapa pangu.

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This sentiment appears regularly in Myers’ transcripts from his 2007 fieldwork in peripheral West District informal settlements.
The Kijitoupele project had taken place with an inclusive subdivision planning technique to achieve resettlement; it gave a well-planned mini-neighborhood to most of the affected urban dwellers without much involvement by the donors (Myers and Muhajir 1997). Since then a primary school has been built within the resettled area and a number of the privately owned health clinics, local stores, and other low key services are found nearby. Some individuals have extended the available public water pipes and power lines to their houses with the construction of other properties and provision of facilities that are incrementally taking place (Ibid).

This is how urban planning survived, turbulently and with professional casualties along the way, in the transitional socialist age of political transformation and neoliberal land reform in Zanzibar. The underlying fact of political intolerance still prevails. As reported by one of Tanzania's Swahili daily newspapers, more recent demolitions occurred in 2009 in a similar informal situation and a similarly politicized fashion, against opposition party supporters living in the neighborhoods located at the outermost, eastern corner of the city’s airport at Tomondo. This demolition program lasted for four days (February 22-26) and was carried out under the supervision of the then advisor to the President on Environmental Affairs, Abdalla Rashid Abdalla - who had presided over and directed the 1995 demolitions while serving as the Urban/West Regional Commissioner. A similar number of houses were affected in this latest demolition exercise in this area on the south-eastern side of the city, which is again mostly inhabited by the Pembans. In a city where more than 80% of the population lives informally, in more than 90,000 housing units of this nature, this sort of calculated politicized demolition is a big loss. The following is my translation from the KiSwahili of a comment from one of the angriest respondents affected by this latest demolition exercise. The response by an informant who identified himself as a CCM supporter has a lot of resonance with Zanzibar’s revolutionary
past.

“The oppressive demolition of people's houses done here in Zanzibar is just an attempt by SMZ (KiSwahili acronym for Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar) to generate confusion (or beating about the bush). Whatever begins has also an end. We once witnessed this during Salmin’s regime [Amour] and now… Amani [Karume] is doing the same thing. Was [the importance of] urban planning not seen then by the political elite for all that time until after they have been bribed by their Arab relatives and in-laws, toward the suppression of the poor majority? Was our revolutionary act correct? We made the revolution by machetes and now money is being used to oust us. Wither Chama cha Mapinduzi [the Party of Revolution] - Revolution for Ever!” (Amani Mmalawi, in *Tanzania Daima*, [Tanzanian daily newspaper], # 12408, February 24, 2009).

This angry remark hints at notorious connections with the socialist past that many Zanzibaris do not want to go back to. Despite the fact that these demolitions attempt to eliminate informality, informal activity remains the most influential way within Zanzibari housing culture. The authorities’ actions brought some mixed messages to the powerful donor community that the existing polity is still living in its oppressive socialist past. They also affect the integrity and competence of urban planning practices in the islands.

One of the government officers disclosed that the Tomondo neighborhood was demolished to demonstrate the enforcement of land and planning laws. The officer too asserted that “the government cannot leave the people to build for free….; it was forced to intervene to stop the ongoing informality, which is environmentally harmful and continuously damaging to the fragile farm environment found in the city’s periphery illegally developed without any government benefit” (Hassan Mussa Takrima, West District Commissioner, Daily News, Tanzania, Feb 24 2009). He reiterated that this informality was taking place against the municipal laws, land, and urban planning provisions for individual farm owners who were entitled to compensation (Ibid).

Interestingly, all this was reported by the government’s newspaper under the article entitled 'Town Planning in Zanzibar: Since When?’ This gives recent evidence of how political
and professional connections are indirectly implicated in spearheading unfounded land acquisition claims in the shadow of planning operations. Recalling the previously outlined colonial role of planning that caused a huge bias against informal practices, the more recent demolition could be seen as a repeat of history. Whereas contemporary informal development is left out of the formal planning process, the colonial regime also denied most residents title deeds or ownership rights to their habitation. As history tells, disrespect for community concerns created the political and social atmosphere for the revolution in Zanzibar, whereby those who found themselves oppressed (for example, in their struggle against slavery), denied or cheated (in the provision of social services, especially in Ng’ambo), opted for revolt (Myers, 1993). It may not be a similar type of revolution like the one experienced in 1964, but the continuation of illegal activities, regardless of the government efforts to stop them, could also be seen as part of the people’s resistance.

Whatever way one chooses to argue in Zanzibar’s planning impasse, I feel we may all share one common sense approach, wherein talking and listening to appreciate each other’s points of view could be a common harmonizing factor. For example, none of those parties involved in the kind of political and administrative showdown from those two chosen demolition exercises appreciated or understood the mutuality of each other's interests. Because of their unwillingness to inform or talk to each other, the informal developers and government actors hold to vehemently negative opinions of each other. The government is blinded by the prevailing political divide. The planning office becomes incapable of speaking out in favor of a self-standing, socially unifying, and confident position toward informality in this fractured housing environment. Marita Sturken (2007: 4) recently wrote that “[f]reedom is never free.” Informality should not be left to build itself up front for free (which is never free anyway) without formal
supportive guidelines, but informal developers should not be humiliated through demolitions. In these two cases of house demolitions, they were rejected by the very formal institutions that encouraged the informality to flourish anyway and they also became “divisions precisely when they [were] politicized,” to paraphrase Shivji (2008) from the beginning of this chapter.

This Shivji quote is exactly what is going on in the informal housing situation in Zanzibar. This is because the government allowed what was once regarded as a minor culturally-influenced problem in Ng’ambo to become an elephant-sized planning problem because they were blinded with inherited colonial rules. On one side, when the government tried to control development through the massive urban renewal programs of the 1970s and their subsequent planning schemes that followed thereafter, the people’s eyes were awakened to nepotism and other institutional mismanagement in the government. In retrospect, the elephant grew even bigger. On the other side, the government has let the situation exist for almost 50 years since the 1964 revolution. When urban renewal schemes were being implemented in the inner city areas, peri-urban planning was thwarted by the out of control informal housing sector. This encouraged urban-rural migration to occur which caught the government unable to enforce its own formal processes through the revised planning policies which favored rural development.

In principle, formal and informal housing sectors coexisted, divided by the prevailing planning provisions. Both are complex systems which form part of elaborate broken networks that produce haphazard results. Due to the insufficiency of the formal processes, informality has overrun the public shelter demands for the vast majority of citizens. Borrowing from Sturken (2007: 4) again, if each system could be seen as part of kitsch, something that appeals to popular support, then the two systems might be enabled to harmonize their complex inter- as well as intra-relationships. This could be achieved by referring to pieces of a success story from each
system to exemplify the most acceptable historical logic from each system to justify their common existence.

However, despite recent hopefulness from political reconciliation, which is still surging in the minds of most Zanzibaris, I am still afraid, to use Sadalla’s (2010) words, that “the light at the end of a dark tunnel” will remain elusive in terms of improving urban planning unless the two systems are equally appreciated. Therefore, both systems need to be less ambitious, to be able to accept something that appeals to popular support quickly and satisfactorily. The housing demolition schemes I have highlighted, which occurred for nothing other than political gain, are both painful and broadly unrewarding. They cripple community support, especially when they become repetitive, happening during every election season. Like these two demolition exercises, the recent power blackout for nearly three months (from late December 2009 to March 201027, did very little to encourage community trust/confidence for improved governance, urban planning activities included. The supply of electricity has been fluctuating over many years and may remain unreliable temporarily even after the most recent repairs to the undersea cable, unless more work is done to evaluate the historic reasons for service provision’s unevenness and inadequacy. Zanzibar, even more than Tanzania mainland, has a highly socialist electricity sector – all power is still supplied through the government parastatal – and, in electricity as in water and lands (all three sectors are under the same government ministry, after all) there is a near total disregard of any wider social networking base where the affected community is involved in governance processes (Ghanadan 2009; Myers 2011). It is ironic that the government, whose hostile and careless attitude let the informality get out of control (in electricity as in lands),

27 Zanzibar endured electricity blackouts for nearly a month in 2009 and then three other consecutive and bitter months in 2010; the blackouts badly affected the operation of businesses and various other institutions (Mwinyi Sadalla, Sunday Guardian, February 28, 2010).
should have been the accountable party under the Land Tenure Act of 1992. That law gave the informal developments a grace period of 12 years to qualify for legalized tenurial rights.

5.6 The Present Planning Role and Housing Reality: Reform Status and Scenarios

The professional and practical significance of urban planning in Zanzibar is at its all-time low and its future remains uncertain. For example, it ranked at the bottom of the list of activities and components supported in the current Finnish-funded land and environmental sustainability project (SMOLE) budget. This is quite different from 1989, when planning became the catalyst for the creation of the then Commission for Lands and Environment (COLE). For example, the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning no longer actively works in conjunction with the two look-alike departments responsible for lands (Department of Lands and Registration and Department of Land Administration: even their officials could not explain, in 2006 or 2008 interviews, what distinguishes these two units in practice) and its other government affiliate units (such as the Department of Environment or the Municipal Council). It is so disjointed as to not give a sufficient response to any public needs in the wider modern planning context. As detailed in the chapter that follows, the department was given just “an assistance role” in the “implementation of the neoliberal land and environmental management agenda of the Zanzibar Integrated Lands and Environmental (ZILEM) project funded by FINNIDA” (Singer, 1994). For instance, the then COLE had a budget in the early 1990s in which more than three-fourths of its donor aid went to its Department of Environment. It was also the same case with the Stone Town Conservation and Development Authority (STCDA), instituted to oversee the conservation interest of that part of the city, as Stone Town was proclaimed a UN world heritages site. It is
hard to fathom anything that has happened in Zanzibar in the last two decades without recognizing the bitterness that party politics has engendered, and hence it is equally hard to imagine the airy rhetoric of outsider-imposed collaborative planning ever overcoming this situation.

With the exception of the UN and some private agencies, donors froze aid in late 1995 to protest the election outcome. The freeze lasted from that first election until the middle of 2002 for many donors. The freeze occurred just as donors were pouring money into Dar es Salaam’s collaborative planning measures, for instance (Halla 1994 and 1998). Although donors slowly trickled back to the scene in 2002 and 2003 (to support SMOLE, for example) the 2005 elections again left in doubt the willingness of donors to sponsor decentralized partnership planning if a government that many Western powers regard rather warily remained involved. Table 5.3 below summarizes key events and some incidents associated with land reform activities in Zanzibar since 2000.

The abolishment of what had been seen as a well-coordinated land and environmental management entity also frustrated the integrity of urban development efforts. The initially promising Zanzibar Sustainable Program (ZSP) introduced in 1998 under UNDP/UN-Habitat support failed to resist administrative pressures experienced within the Zanzibar's Municipal Council, and it was terminated by the end of 2005. ZSP was tied to the United Nations Sustainable Cities Project (SCP) wherein solid waste management has been its major priority issue (Myers 2005). The other key SCP priority areas were governance reform in other service delivery sectors and the enablement of local authorities and civil societies “to cope with the plans and policies of neoliberalism, sustainable development, and good governance in a time fractured by the politics of cultural difference” (Myers 2005: 17). One case of the reformed governance
dynamics at work in service delivery in the city that in some senses can be counted as a “success” is the SEMUSO Water Project. SEMUSO is a shortened Swahilized reference to the greater Sebleni, Muungano, and Sogeа informal settlement.

Table 5.3: Key Events Associated with Land Management Reform Activities in Zanzibar (2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recorded provisions</th>
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| 2000 | ● Zanzibar Vision 2020 framed; Land sector less discussed  
      | ● Election year (President Amani Karume elected) |
| 2001 | ● Land Commission abolished  
      | ● Institutionally-enabled 40%/60% shared subdivision planning silently terminated  
      | ● Follow-up of Finnish mission for revival of the SMOLE reform project phase  
      | ● SMOLE reform project preparatory phase begins |
| 2002 | ● Government's banned 40%/60% shared subdivisions silently distributed  
      | ● Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Paper approved  
      | ● SMOLE Project Outline Completed; Mapping Project consolidated  
      | ● Assessment Report for Local Government Reform Strategy released |
      | ● Subdivision schemes at Tunguu continues; Elite rush for Chukwani subdivided lands  
      | ● SMOLE reform project phase officially takes off |
      | ● Vested allocation of land authority to the minister instead of director responsible for land  
      | ● SMOLE Strategic Plan (2005-2009) approved  
      | ● Report of SMOLE reform project legal advisor revealed |
| 2005 | ● Institutional and Human Resource Development Report completed  
      | ● Election year (Second President Karume's phase begins) |
| 2006 | ● Land Tribunal Inaugurated and began to listen to various land disputes  
      | ● Land Registrar's Office established to manage a pilot fiscal land cadastre for Stone Town  
      | ● Land use control regulations for rural subdivisions completed  
      | ● Land Use Planning Advisory Mission postponed |
| 2007 | ● Amendment of Transferred Land Act 8/1994 accented  
      | ● Land survey regulations completed |
| 2008 | ● BEST Program - Zanzibar: Land Sector Component proposed  
      | ● MKURABITA Program for land policy support negotiated |
| 2009 | ● SMOLE Reform Project five years (2010-1005) phase officially extended/approved  
      | ● Assigned new SMOLE's Chief Technical Advisor (CTA)  
      | ● Assigned new Local Coordinator for SMOLE project |
| 2010 | ● Election round (President Ali Muhammed Shein elected)  
      | ● Government of National Unity introduced; No major institutional changes observed |

Source: Own Construct, Based on collected reports, (2008-2010)
In 2000, the community-based organization known as *Umoja wa Mradi wa Maji na Maendeleo* (UMMM, or Cooperative Project for Water and Development) gained funding from the UN Development Program, the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government, and various government elites (Tanzania’s then-President Mkapa, Zanzibar’s Presidents Amour and Amani Karume, and Zanzibar’s former Deputy Chief Minister (1995-2000) Omar Ramadhani Mapuri all contributed) toward a water supply project that would rid the rapidly sprawling area of two decades of residential water shortages within those inner Swahili city settlements in Ng’ambo.

SEMUSO’s UMMM was formed as a community-based organization (CBO) in 1997 with three aims: increased clean water supply, drainage/waste-water management, and enhanced educational infrastructure. The first of these was always the group’s first priority. In a cruel irony, *Sebleni* [Living Room], *Muungano* [Union], and *Sogea* [Cram In] are all low-lying, frequently flooded and densely built informally-guided settlements where more than half of the residents in the late 1990s lacked access to a potable public water supply. Over the five and a half year life of the project, SEMUSO gained two boreholes with four pumps, supply lines and standpipes, as well as an overhead water storage tank, more than doubling the percentage of the population with access to clean water. The community group pooled its resources and contributed a bit more than a million Tanzania shillings (about US$ 1000) to the effort, and its members performed much of the heavy construction and excavation work necessary to the water program alongside the government's water authority. The Zanzibari government contributed a bit more than 18 million shillings and the expertise of its Water and Construction Departments in the Ministry of Water, Construction, Energy, Lands and Environment (as we’ve seen, the Environment Department was severed from that ministry in 2001), with UNDP supplying slightly more than half of the money for the project. UMMM’s file for the project documents the successes that the CBO had in
persistently pushing the people in power to keep the project in mind (SEMUSO 1997-2006). In the end, for less than $35,000, SEMUSO’s 17,000 or so residents gained delivery of a crucial urban service in a participatory scheme that really had very little that was neoliberal about it whilst deploying a participatory, populist framework.

Yet this sort of characterization of the SEMUSO Water Project can be misleading. How did a swampy informally originated settlement’s CBO garner the attention of Zanzibar and Tanzania’s elites and the resources of the UN? The short answer is three letters long: CCM. Tanzania’s ruling party counts SEMUSO as one of its surest urban strongholds, with most of the residents being either solid CCM mainlander or southern Ungujans (rural Unguja South Region recorded CCM’s highest percentages of the votes by far among Zanzibar’s five Tanzanian Regions in the 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 elections, and SEMUSO’s CCM majority was one of the very few urban constituencies at all comparable to the south). Moreover, UMMM’s Secretary just happened to be a member of the family of the powerful Urban District Commissioner who was the party’s Deputy Secretary for Zanzibar during former President Amour's time and involved in the squatter house demolition exercise at Tomondo in Karume Jr.’s phase. The deep involvement of the then Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Water, etc., (who became its full-fledged Minister) Mansur Yussuf Himid, adds to this picture still further. As stated earlier, he is the brother-in-law of President Karume Jr. who has been moved to a peripheral ministry of agriculture in the new government phase led by the CCM pick, Ali Muhammed Shein. Shein was precisely moved to the Zanzibar presidency to oversee the implementation of GNU from his former Tanzanian vice presidential role and to calm down the opposition led by Hamad who is a fellow Pemban. Retrospectively, the former Principal Secretary to Himid in the Ministry of Land (a former Director-General of the STCDA) is one of the active founding members of SEMUSO.
One need not discredit everything about the SEMUSO Water Project as a result. Twenty-first century Zanzibar functions a bit like the late Roman Republic, such that bearing each other up plays a major role. For example, if you are an ally or a family member of the consul or the governor of the provinces (or in this case, the government or the President), no one is shocked if you enrich yourself. And plenty of poor people, and women-headed households, gained in their capabilities as a result of this water project. The problem is in the extreme unevenness of governance and collaborative outcomes across the map of the city.

As the work of sociologist Brian Dill\textsuperscript{28} (2009) has shown for Dar es Salaam, it is increasingly common in urban Tanzania for city wards to have CBOs that focus on community infrastructure. These CBOs are seldom as successful as that of UMMM, when they do not have such high-level and high-power connections. Dill (2009: 3) calls CBOs a “poor fit” with “the norms that have long governed the relationship between the state and society” in Tanzania in terms of how and when (and which) people participate, and a mismatch with the expectations of international donors for CBOs, namely, “the production of public goods that will ultimately benefit a physically delimited community beyond the membership of the association.”

This above discussion has shown some mixed feelings about the unorthodox demands of political realities in the urban Swahili community of Zanzibar. But this is not all. The October 1995 elections did not end up with just rampant voting irregularities; more things were experienced in the planning arena that worsened its weakened position towards the argumentative turn. The next chapter will, on the one hand, continue to present both the

\textsuperscript{28} In \textit{Sowing the Seeds of Support: Recognizing Grassroots Organizations in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania}, Brian Dill (2009) specifically argues that “the recognition of certain types of organizations has served to legitimize both the rule of the colonial and neoliberal state and the assumptions and ideology underpinning each. In other words, local organizations play a key role in bolstering the state’s capacity to govern.” Dill (2009) also argues that by recognizing the authority of specific types of organizations, governments as well as members of the transnational development apparatus, are in effect, seeking to bolster their own authority.
international and institutional insights over what constricted the reformed planning performance and COLE’s abolition following the 2000 general election. This will help to connect the ongoing discussion on the first reform generation of the 1980s and 1990s with the planning processes of the last decade. On the other hand, the two chapters that follow that one will show examples where planning principles were compromised by the community during this period of reduced planning roles in case studies of the impact of communicative action planning.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter was devoted to talking about the broader political and historical contexts for planning in Zanzibar. Overall, the discussion has shown that politics rather than policy on development issues has dominated neoliberalism in most planning undertakings in Zanzibar. However, scores of planning manipulations and other reform weaknesses were demonstrated through the experiences of political wrangling and arrogance (like in the demolition exercises and the case of the recent electricity blackout). Political indifference to an improved housing sector has been an evident norm and regrettable reality for the recipient communities over many decades. Lack of tolerance in the socialist ideological era and its institutional decision making system has been perhaps the main causal factor to most of the historical limitations of planning. The 1995 demolition exercise, for example, generated much donor and local attention and became a real political issue thereafter although it was originally instigated to punish the opposition CUF party supporters. These demolitions provided severe hardships to the poor majority, who witnessed their lifetime dreams to own a place to shelter their families being eroded without solid planning reasons.
The chapter also presented the outright hostility against informality and the improper governance of the land sector that have usually been politically directed by the central authorities. In the case of the electricity blackout, deadlines after deadlines were cited by the responsible authorities including the Zanzibar’s Minister for Water, Energy and Land, that the resumption of a normal power supply would return, but instead the problem persisted for slightly over three months. The minister’s optimism had been anchored on the problem being fixed by a team of South African experts. The undersea cable to Unguja from continental Tanzania was installed in 1982 during Jumbe's time and projected to last for not more than 30 years. Loss in revenue, hiking prices, and shortage of water associated with other critical social problems connected to and occasioned by the absence of power are some of the results of this bad governance example.

In Chapter 6, I introduce the policy context for the sustainable land reform framework in Zanzibar in the last 20 years. This is followed by my three successive case studies that present insights on how the reform approach in land management, collaborative planning, and housing development was experienced in Zanzibar over the last two decades, both within the contemporary informal settlement in Ng’ambo's peripheral zone and in Stone Town. In each outlined case – Welezo-Darajabovu, Chukwani, and Stone Town - I will examine a different angle of approach to reforming planning toward more inclusive, participatory, grassroots, deliberative, or argumentative processes.
Chapter 6


[In the face of conflict] “one does not turn inwards, one does not retreat; one moves sideways, one moves forward” (Michael Watts, 2003: 22).

“What matters is the machinery of government because it is how the wheel turns” (Joseph Mihangwa, “The African” [Tanzanian weekly newspaper]; Wednesday, October 25, 2006).

6.1 Introduction

Having discussed the historical origin of spatial planning and its relations with political reforms in the previous chapter, this chapter is aimed at documenting the newest land reform practices in Zanzibar. I will discuss difficulties with rigidity in the struggle for urban planning influences in Zanzibar within the integrated and sustainable forms of neoliberal land reform implemented in the islands during the years of the structural adjustment programs, from the late-1980s to date. While the last chapter has shown that political factors overshadowed the entire structure of the sustainable land management29 practices and urban planning reforms, especially since the latest push for the democratization process, the emphasis of this chapter is to show how the post-revolutionary land policy reforms and legislation have performed over the last 20 years. It is also important to note that many of the laws that existed in the revolutionary times regarding land administration are no longer valid. Post-revolutionary reform processes have happened

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29 The term land management is defined here to combine urban management and land use planning with tenurial authority since “planning is always a combination of the implementation of laws and regulations controlling the uses of land and dealing with ownership” (Scholz 2008: 71). In order to understand the current land management system on Zanzibar and the increasingly informal urbanization, there is a need to analyze the legal framework of planning and land administration and to go back into history to analyze different policy and conceptual influences that have been exposed to Zanzibar’s most notable land and housing development and cultural backgrounds on African, Arab, and European influences which had an impact on the structure of the current legalized land reform system (See also Krain 1998: 31).
rather to politically direct the institutions. Therefore, we will see what has happened in recent times when the powers of the liberalized economic policies of the mid-1980s have competed to provide bad influences.

This chapter displays how (and to what extent) the execution of this policy reform has impacted professional and technological advancement for the land institutions and the traditional management of native housing practices in the city. The overall goal for this chapter is to contribute to the contemporary debate discussing how urban sustainability planning works (or does not work) in the age of neoliberal land reform in tropical Africa. I answer a basic set of questions, investigating what the dimensions, nature, tools, and contexts are for sustainable land management practices within formal policy processes and what purpose the existing reforms served with regards to the informal provision of urban lands for housing development. Why and how did the reforms emerge? Who are the key actors and or beneficiaries? What sustainable role exists among major players? The reason for doing this is to gather basic facts that support the characterization of my arguments for my hypotheses.

6.2 The Political Framework of Land Reform in Zanzibar: International and Historical Insights

Chachage (2000: 62) informs us that Zanzibar has been a “recipient of foreign assistance since the revolution in 1964. Initially, most of the flow of aid in Zanzibar came from the [World's] socialist countries.” On his analysis of the political environment of aid and economic aspects of development of the forestry and ZILEM projects in Zanzibar, Chachage (2000: 62) continues that “[i]t was from the late 1970s onwards that Western countries became increasingly
involved in the provision of aid to Zanzibar.” During the early period, aid was allocated to countries on the basis of the broad endorsement of their political inclination rather than on the basis of their detailed policy frameworks to develop their economies. In this broad explanation Chachage also continues that:

“The situation in Zanzibar was related to the manner in which the revolution was undertaken and the international politics around it, given the dominance of the Cold War politics in those times. With its union with Tanganyika to form Tanzania on the 26th April 1964, Zanzibari foreign affairs were merged under union matters, which greatly affected the islands' foreign relations and patterns of trade. Therefore, it is imperative to outline some of these key political events related to the 1964 revolution if one is to make sense of the nature of aid flow in Zanzibar, before dealing with the aspects of aid in general, and Finnish aid in particular” (Chachage, 2000: 62).

In addition to what has been said in chapter 5, this situation spearheaded the land and environmental sustainability and collaborative planning in Zanzibar. It was during the second half of President Jumbe’s term (1972-1984) that most of the Western donors began to seriously consider the flow of their development assistance to Zanzibar. They saw his change of political attitude to favor for dialogic or at least quasi-democratic governance. This coincided with the timely introduction of the House of Representatives (HoR) that manifested the initial “donor trust for the primary institutions of governance” (Amponsah, 2007: 107) in Zanzibar which was absent in the early revolutionary years. Indeed, this was the most crucial moment of the problem of institutional uncertainty that surrounded the islands during most of Karume Sr.'s seven revolutionary years. The 1970s was the time that Zanzibar also began to witness a deep crisis economically which, according to Chachage (2000: 85), “manifested itself in shortages of essential commodities including food and the shrinking of foreign exchange reserves.” It was in the 1970s that the ruling party – CCM - was founded (1977) and Tanzania's political “relations with the US began to improve tremendously” (Ibid: 83). This was largely a case of the former
seeking help and sympathy from the latter, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In the late 1970s, in particular, “the IMF was the largest provider of aid to the United Republic of Tanzania, with an annual loan of US$ 143 million over the period of 1976-1979, followed by the [European Economic Commission-] EEC) (Ibid). This had a lot of implications as far as Zanzibar was concerned.

As Bakari (2000:133) rightly observed, “some deliberate measures were taken to ameliorate regional disparity where service accessibility was equally shared among urban and rural communities in both Unguja and Pemba islands.” For example the remote island of Tumbatu in the northwest corner of Unguja island, which does not have its own ground water source, was supplied with piped water during Jumbe’s time, in addition to other development schemes initiated across the islands. By this time, the US had become a major potential contributor to the island's development - a total reversal of the revolution when the Soviet Bloc countries and China were the main foreign aid donors (Ibid). USAID began to invest into two irrigation projects in 1978 costing more than US$ 6.4 million, helped with the dairy industry, and provided experts to assist in expanding rice production as part of its bilateral support though UNDP and FAO (Ibid). The European Union and the Scandinavian countries in particular started to direct their aid to Tanzania and Zanzibar at about the same time, led by the Finns in forestry development, Norwegians in electricity supply, and Swedes and Danes in education and health, respectively.

By this time, “the Western donor assistance had become more significant in Tanzania's development affairs than ever before,” Chachage (2000: 83) reveals, as the economic hardships provided an avenue for such external engagement, including that of CCM’s formation. On the other side, the general agitation, however, tended towards pushing for the breakup of the union, a
sentiment which still stands between the two dominating political parties (CCM and CUF). As regards to the land sector, Zanzibar islands were not left out of the pool as they also needed some push to uplift their regulatory position and re-engage with the West both administratively and developmentally. The direct evidence of their Western support to the land sector is evidenced by the 1978 Zanzibar mapping project spearheaded by the British Directorate of Overseas Surveys and the development of the UNDP supported land and housing policy attempts in 1979 and 1980, respectively.

After 1981, aid allocations began to consider detailed economic development policy frameworks taking the form of what has come to be referred to as structural adjustment policy reform programs which were extended to poverty reduction strategies in recent years. Aid was expected to induce or stimulate development policy reforms as designed and introduced both bilaterally and multilaterally to recipient countries by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), notably, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This coincided with the improvement of other policy reforms such as those extended for Zanzibar in the form of land-use planning, land administration, and environmental management, which benefited from bilateral support agreements mainly from the European countries, and most notably the Finns.

Over time, as has been discussed in chapter 5, Zanzibari foreign relations and the type of aid assistance has gone through various phases due to political maneuvering. The union divide seems to control its domestic anger. Much energy is expended in mainland and international circles criticizing and manipulating the political issues surrounding Zanzibar's violent elections, but with little conviction. For example, after the 2005 election, the US initially condemned the violence and intimidation that followed the Zanzibar election and even boycotted the President's swearing in ceremony. However, a few days later, soon after this boycott, the story completely
changed. It was the US State Department's welcoming the result as “reflecting the will of the people” that led to the election’s broader acceptance, with the US justifying its stance based on the “youthfulness of Tanzania’s democracy” and, of course, its stance in the war on terror (Campbell, 2005). Yet the key issue in Zanzibar is not about the state of democracy or the war on terror, but more about peoples' own development; it is about fighting against the poverty which overwhelms most local residents.

Hence, looking back at the discussion of aid in Zanzibar over the last 30 or so years, the point to be emphasized is that there have been a lot of mixed reactions with regards to conventional aid delivery in the islands. The resultant outcome in land management and housing delivery has not been beneficial so far to local communities. The next section will show aid in land policy development, wherein donor assistance has not had the desired development or poverty reduction impacts. First, I evaluate the former Finnish International Development Assistance (FINNIDA) and now Finland Ministry for Foreign Affairs land reform projects that I observed during my urban planning and surveying professional career in Zanzibar.

6.3 Finnish Development Aid in the Context of Zanzibar’s Land Reforms:

Conceptual Framework and Model Approaches

“Cooperation between Finland and Zanzibar in the fields of land use planning, [...] land administration,” and environmental management was consolidated following the approval of “an Act [of Law] to establish the Commission for Lands and Environment [COLE] in 1989” (Chachage, 2000: 135). The introduction of this Commission was framed under three equally-
ranked departments: (lands, survey and planning, and environment) in order to encourage the government commitment to the commencement of the reform projects under its conviction. This Commission, including its respective departments, had their sub-offices on Pemba. While the Department of Lands and Registration had about 90 employees by 2008 (about 30 of them stationed in the Pemba offices), the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning had 194 staff members, 64 of them in Pemba. The Town Planning Office of the planning department had about 19 staff members, seven of them being responsible for rural land use planning activities. In total, COLE had about 300 employees by its endpoint in early 2001 (Annual Report, Department of Surveys and Urban Planning, Zanzibar, January, 2001; BEST Program, Zanzibar: Land Sector Component Project Design, May 2008).

The approval of COLE's Act #3 of 1989 set the stage for the Finnish reform project to assist Zanzibar in land and environmental management sectors for the years 1990-1995. The Zanzibar Integrated Land and Environmental Management (ZILEM) project was born in December 1990. This initial five year land reform project initiative was approved “with a total budget of Finn marks (FIM) 20.5 million [equivalent to same amount of US$]. The Finnish contribution during 1991-1994 was FIM 16.2 million, of which FIM 8.2 million was subject to the approval of the Land Tenure Act” (LTA) which came into force in August 1992 (Chachage, 2000: 135).

The ZILEM project emanated from the forestry development project introduced earlier in the mid-1970s under Finnish support to improve Zanzibar’s agricultural sector. Phase one of this land reform project was popularly marked by four basic components: participatory land

30 The organizational framework for the two departments of lands and survey & urban planning in COLE is set out in Haji et al (2006) (Please also refer to “Umiliki na Matumizi ya Ardhi Zanzibar: Special Committee Report for Establishment of Lands Commission”, December 1988; and BEST Program, Zanzibar: Land Sector Component
administration, institutional capacity building, integrated land use planning, and sustainable environmental management. When COLE was established it had less than 10 trained and skilled professionals in all land, planning, surveys, and environmental sectors with over 200 field assistants in both Unguja and Pemba islands. Four years later, this situation was different. Qualified professionals (including ten trained planners, eight architects, seven land surveyors, six land economists/managers, five building economics or quantity surveyors, and four civil engineers) returned from various mainland Tanzanian higher learning institutions to spearhead land and housing institutional development processes. This meant a huge contribution of newly trained staff through the capacity building component in COLE’s Finnish aid. The number of trained staff in the fields of lands and environment jumped to over 40 and the overall number of field and office assistants increased to 300 (196 in Unguja and 104 in Pemba). Yet the ZILEM project phase was implemented in typical project fashion, in that the whole process was initiated outside the realm of the existing institutional structure and needs of Zanzibar.

The late Timo Laisi (an urban planner) and his successor, Veikko Korhonen (a land surveyor), were the first and second Chief Technical Advisors (CTAs); both were from Finland. They were assisted by a local project counterpart, Haji Adam Haji (an engineer trained in socialist Eastern Europe, and the immediate former surveys and planning director31). Some senior departmental staff members were also engaged for specific tasks and 'workshop' responsibilities. Both CTAs were routinely answerable back home to the donors – the FINNIDA leadership, which was also controlling the financial expenditures of the project. It was more or less a parallel organization with its own management structure affiliation similar to COLE's organization under its own less-powerful (quasi-) project management team (or PMT in short).
This PMT had some sectoral representation from institutions such as agriculture, local government, and finance and economic affairs which was separately headquartered within the building that housed COLE and its respective departments in the then ministry of water construction, energy, lands, and environment.

The uplifted land management status in COLE helped to build up an internal technical capacity in the ministry, which at that time was not included as part of the capacity building of the reform project components. The construction of a new office block in Pemba in the first project phase was meant to harmonize the project implementation formalities between the Unguja and Pemba beneficiaries. In this phase, however, most of the activities were directed to the enactment and revision of new policy documents, land use plans, and associated land legislation by the ministry of land, housing, and environment, respectively. The documents include the Environmental Policy Program (1992), Tourism Zoning Plan (1993), Settlement Structure Plan (1993) and associated National Land Use Plan (1995).

Other legislation approved by the House of Representatives (HoR) alongside these policy documents included the Land Survey Act (1990), the Land Adjudication Act (1990), the Registered Land Act (1991), the Land Tenure Act (1992), Environmental Management for Sustainable Development Act (1996), the Land Transfer Act (1994), and the Land Tribunal Act (1994) which had many overlaps in between them. Most significantly, as Myers (2008: 18) said, these “did not remove the state ownership of land declared since the revolution in 1964,” contrary to what is promoted under the neoliberal agenda. Little amendments were, however, made to the Confiscation of Immovable Properties Decree (1964) and the Land Distribution Degree (1966) which laid legal footprints in the distribution of the nationalized land to the

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31 This director was replaced in February 23, 2011 following the ministerial reshuffle of the new presidential phase.
landless revolutionaries in the form of three acre allotments for agricultural uses and small lots of land for urban housing. On paper, the overall effect of the legislative reform, Myers observed, was an “incursion of neo-liberal ideas of individual property and security of land into a socialist system” (Ibid: 18). Under 1992's Land Tenure Act, domestic foreign private investments and commercial interests, for example, became entitled to lands on a leasehold status but not on actual freehold ownership basis (Ibid).

Indeed, with regards to urban housing development issues, the persistence of informal practices evidences the insignificance of the new legal instruments. Urban and housing development activities of the decayed Town and Country Planning Degree of 1955 were not included as part of the first listed land legislative reform priorities. This was partly because of the complicated nature of the existing planning problems but also due to the project’s failure to link its land reform activities with other planning requirements to assess or evaluate the existence of such problems and their statues. It was claimed that this exclusion was purposely made so that the said piece of legislation still retained some of the potential colonial provisions acceptable within the neo-liberal reform agenda. Instead, the integrated land use planning unit was created as a part of the project to look after the overall land use affairs outside legalized planning responsibilities within COLE. This created significant rivalry with the veteran town planning office (TPO) instituted as part of the 1955 planning decree and also part of the COLE structure in 1989.

Moreover, municipality-based town planning practice was almost dead, because the municipality was (and still is) dominated by the centralized planning powers. The struggling development control unit of the Zanzibar Municipal Council (ZMC) was elevated into a full town planning department in 2004, but without having been given a clear administrative mandate
or technical tools to sustain its duties above its traditional building superintendency role. The localized municipal planning activities had been inactive following the 1969 abolition of Zanzibar's municipality by the revolutionary government. Indeed, local-based town planning practices were also killed along the municipal abolition process. The Jumbe regime reinstated a Municipal Council in 1982, but this was followed in 1987 by the repeal of the Towns and Township Decrees, Cap 79 and Cap 80 of the Laws of Zanzibar, respectively. Following recommendations by the UNDP-sponsored local government reform initiative for Zanzibar, the development control and building superintendent units of the Zanzibar municipality were elevated as part of its newly formed Town Planning Department in 2004 but with limited planning duties whose scope was outside the centralized urban and regional planning responsibilities of the former COLE and the present Town Planning Office (TPO) of the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning (DoSUP).

There was insignificant advisory involvement in the functional reform arrangement of the Zanzibar municipality, with its limited local planning role, throughout the ZILEM project. Within ZILEM project, staff training both within and outside the country, tools and equipment were available to only facilitate reform components and 'task force' activities. The equipment

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32 Local government reform in Zanzibar was intended to bring about a changed institutional and legal relationship between the central and local government, as well as a change in the relationship between civil society, the public, and government (Local Government Issues in Zanzibar – Prospects and Reform, UNDP/UNCDF, Dar es Salaam, 2002). The current administrative set-up in Zanzibar has both elements of devolution (structured under one municipal council, three township councils in Pemba, and nine district councils) and deconcentration of the central government personnel and functionaries at regional, districts, and sub-district levels, all involved in day-to-day activities performed according to sector ministry plans (Local Government Strategy for Zanzibar, UNDP/UNCDF, 2002).

33 The current local government authorities are established by law under Acts Number 3 and 4 of 1998 following the review of the Municipal and Local Governments Act Number 3 and 4 of 1995. With the established wards led by councilors (one elected under each ward of the municipality) the two new Acts also created the lowest administrative locality known as Shehia whose area of jurisdiction is governed under the central authority. Its leader is known as Sheha. What needs to be noted here is that Shehias not only prove the exact opposite from strengthened grassroots institutions of local governance (since they are under the central government) but also that in practice their creation led to major dysfunction in the real administration of policy reforms in land
supplied was in the form of office stationary, computers, and field equipment, such as GPS units, theodolites, and associated tools or devices for project purposes. Except for minor subdivision planning support purposes, the lack of Town Planning Office (TPO) support seems to have been repeated in later reform project phases. This continues to tear at the intricacies of this reform project for wider issues of planning, such as relations with municipal government and the local communities.

Most other urban planning and housing development problems such as rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, the informality of city growth and disorganized infrastructure provision still persisted, despite handsome budget support to ZILEM for training, equipment purchases for identified pilot areas, technical consultancies, and related activities (Myers and Muhajir 1997). Following the 1995 election standoff, ZILEM ceased to operate. Even though the national land use plan was approved before the election standoff and subsequent donor freeze, the project suffered from many unexpected events, which led to the cancellation of all advisory missions that used to be associated with this project. The project's CTA and his locally-based Finnish counterparts had to return back home without leaving behind a single penny or any personnel for the project to continue. The supportive local staff rejoined their departments in each respective institution. The ZILEM project’s investments, which had totaled more than 13.72 million Euro\(^{34}\) overall, had enabled the purchase of a lot of equipment, including over one hundred desktop and laptop computers in just over five years (Mirza and Muhajir, 1999). By 2000, seven of ZILEM’s laptops, and none of its desktop units, were still in use. Still, thirteen senior staff members were sent overseas for graduate training, and many other

\(^{34}\) Please see Table 6 in ‘Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE), Strategic Plan 2005-2009; August, 2004: 26) for comparative budget summary of the succeeding project phase.
junior staff members received both local and in-service training within the country.

By 2001, the COLE had been demolished and most of the senior staff recruits fired or frustrated at the decimation of support for the reform agenda. It is very hard to believe that the Finnish government was consulted for undertaking what must have been an offensive move, disintegrating so much of the land, planning, and environmental management infrastructure ZILEM had attempted to establish. If COLE was the pride of all believers in the integrated development approach and in environmental sustainability modeling, then the Finns and other donors had supported a provision that lasted for only 10 years and witnessed the departure of many of its professional trainees. In a move that proved unsurprising to many of the cynical political and professional COLE affiliates in the post-COLE abolition era, departmental activities and institutional affiliations were immediately squeezed back directly under the centralized ministerial structure, directly opposed to the semi-autonomous and collaborative think-tank approach of the COLE years (Myers 1996).

But what followed thereafter? How does the newest reform package for land management (SMOLE) address socially-based initiatives and inclusive housing land development? How did the reform project framework operate? How was it managed? To what extent do the existing legal/policy frameworks, processes, and procedures provide opportunities for effective collaborative (participatory and community-based) land management practices? Does the new sustainable reform project operate differently based on its leadership and interface with communities? How do people currently get involved in the formal land management and settlement development processes? What prospects exist and challenges are encountered in the current reform implementation process? Is this reform of land and housing development in Zanzibar the best approach, or is it just there serving the government's own interests? What
could then be considered as a means to improve the present social and legal land management
governance framework’s local acceptability? The following section summarizes those key
questions in the post-ZILEM era.

6.4 Implications of the Newest Land and Housing Management Framework in
Zanzibar

Changes of political leadership and institutional governance were fully expected in
Zanzibar following the 2000 elections, due to the pre-election rivalry within CCM between the
Union-backed candidate, Amani Karume, and the Chief Minister under Amour, Muhammed G.
Bilal, strongly favored by most Zanzibari CCM supporters. Not long after Karume took power,
Finnish support to land and environmental management was reinstated. The reinstatement came
in mid-2001, in the form of an 18-month Preparatory Phase with the objective to let the
incumbent President grasp his authority and “to [re]prepare a strategic framework for the
management of land and environmental issues in Zanzibar” (SMOLE Strategic Plan 2005-2009,
August 2004). Soon, the World Bank injected US$ 75 million into Tanzania for the Marine and
Coastal Environment Management Project (MACEMP)\textsuperscript{35}; Zanzibar got a third (TZS 25 million)
of this amount for the initial six-year project period (Shinn, 2010). MACEMP received much
publicity and political attention in Zanzibar, alongside the TASAF or the Tanzania Social Action
Fund project respectively coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and

\textsuperscript{35} Renamed from the Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Project (SCLP). As noted by its Concept Paper (2003), the
project was tied to the “Strategic Partnership for a Sustainable Fisheries Management of Sub-Saharan Africa”
which includes TASAF (the Tanzania Social Action Fund) and PADEP (the Participatory Agricultural
Development and Empowerment Project) as contributions to coastal zone community development, with
contributions from the United Republic of Tanzania and SMZ (Global Environmental Facility Concept Note,
2003).
Environment and the Chief Minister's Office. Other popular projects included the Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) Program which conducts analyses of alternative dispute resolutions in Tanzania, and MKURABITA (discussed previously). This is just to mention but a few of the projects which competed or overlapped with other on-going projects, causing uneasiness to some bilateral donor partnerships in Zanzibar.

Negotiations for the reintroduction of land reform were initiated with an interim support arrangement completed in 2003 under the new political administration, which foresaw centralizing land issues at the ministerial level. After 2003, the rhetorical focus of reforms centered on poverty reduction and the improvement of the fiscal health of the islands; taxes on commercial leaseholdings and other businesses were reintroduced, alongside what appeared to be open encouragement for informal land brokering among senior staff ranks within the land offices and other politically-influenced SMZ units. It was believed by both the Amour and Karume regimes that in order to sustain land reform, it must adopt poverty reduction and economic restructuring programs that would encourage investment through the private ownership of land. Promoted under the Zanzibar Vision 2020, this long-term plan was crafted “as a means for poverty alleviation, a scourge that has affected several developing countries the world over” (Forward by Salmin Amour, Zanzibar Vision 2020, January 2000: v). Consequently, this Vision strategy was consulted, in President Amour's words, in order “to pave an unquestionable path for progress instead of retrogression, [community] understanding in place of misunderstanding, and

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36 This centralizing tendency in Zanzibar is not a new thing. It has been strong since 1964 in post-revolutionary Zanzibar, but even has a precedent in the 1940s, when the British created the Central Development Authority under Chief Secretary Eric Dutton (Myers 2003). It has been argued that in the period following the revolution (between the 1960s and 1970s), aid was allocated according to broad populist agreement based on socialist development philosophy (Myers, 2005). In the 1980s and 1990s concerns about participatory policy reform in development cooperation emerged and became dominant, rhetorically at least. In this respect, aid was allocated according to the detailed prescriptions of structural adjustment policy reforms with slight community involvement but without lifting the overall government responsibility.
collaboration in our quest to build a strong nation for this and the future generations” (Ibid). Tourism development and taxation related projects such as the recently introduced housing adjudication scheme for Stone Town were seen to be the best ways to help Zanzibar flourish.

Within the same time period, the initial welcoming attitude of the new Karume regime renewed donor support and influence for a fresh land reform project whose version used modified principles and management practices from what had previously been deployed. This version was named the *Sustainable Management of Lands and Environment (SMOLE)*, introduced in 2003. This new project phase was banking on what was described by the SMOLE Strategic Plan 2005-2009, (2004: 1) as “somewhat positive overall legacy” left behind by ZILEM, hence safeguarding support for the Zanzibar government’s land and environmental management institutions - modified with a slight twist to support the poverty reduction strategy paper. Right away, however, the project was forced to borrow much of its integrated land administration, land use planning, and environmental management components and personnel. Additionally, forestry and social awareness programs that were not considered part of ZILEM were also included alongside broader sectoral involvement, so as to comply with the poverty reduction strategy guidelines on sustained governance and to account for the donor's future departure (Ibid). A year later in 2004, the morale of the local staff members of the former COLE supporting SMOLE project activities began to drop.

Some comments were given on the overlap of the SMOLE and MACEMP projects which saw some diversion of staff time and efforts to MACEMP (SMOLE Supervisory/Steering Committee Meeting, January 23, 2004). The SMOLE project team leadership blamed this on the poor performance of government in releasing the local contributions to SMOLE. SMZ’s share was supposed to be 15% of the total project funding; some 67% of local funding (Tanzanian
Shillings 54.14 million, equivalent to about US$ 50,000) was released by the end of 2006 out of the budgeted 80 million (about US$ 75,000).

Most importantly, via the long-term SMOLE Strategic Planning approach (2005-2015), the responsible implementing authorities were required to devise the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) for reform support functions as preferred by the donor community. Initiated by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) in 2003, the LFA is an instrument for the objective-oriented planning of projects. The method is also used for analysis, assessment, follow-up and evaluation of projects. What the method is used for depends on the role of its users and their needs. Both Sida and the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, like many European Union donor agencies, use and encourage their development cooperation partners to use the LFA method, as an instrument to improve the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their development intervention. The approach was adopted by the Finns, on paper, in SMOLE in 2003 “as the systematic application of the method, with good judgment and sound common sense, [which] can help to improve the quality, and hence the relevance, feasibility, and sustainability of development cooperation” (Örtengren, 2003; SMOLE, 2004).

This newly designed guiding LFA for the first SMOLE project phase had three key principles: 1) timely resource allocations for its implementation within the annual work plan; 2)

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37 According to Kari Örtengren in the Sida Project Design Unit report (2003), LFA is based on the idea that the user, the project owner, assumes the main responsibility for the planning process. However, [local] assistance with planning may be needed and useful. LFA has the aim of improving the quality of project operations and can only achieve this if the user has a good grasp of the method and uses it throughout the entire project cycle. Therefore, it is useful to start cooperation by integrating information on LFA in the dialogue between the parties concerned. This report also emphasized that most steps in the LFA method are often used during participatory workshops. An ideal situation when planning a project via this approach would require clear distinctions in the role of the owner of the project (the cooperation partner) and the development partners (e.g. donors and consultants) (Örtengren 2003).

38 With SMOLE, the donors assumed the main responsibility for the planning, implementation and follow-up of the project. Hence true local ownership did not exist. The owner of the project was not really the local organization (the cooperation partner). Promoting local/recipient “ownership” of projects and programs was not recognized as a key issue in the strategy for SMOLE.
basing the project on the overall strategic work plan 2005-2009 described within the inception report formulated according to requirements of the European Union; and 3) establishing a supervisory board named the Project Management Team (PMT) and the Project Steering Committee (PSC) to be responsible for the review of the draft annual work plans.

The work plan approved in 2003 facilitated the recruitment of some 24 foreign-based technical advisory (TA) missions for this project. With their local counterparts attached to show them the way, two among the short term advisors were from mainland Tanzania. Among the foreign-based advisors to the SMOLE project, the longest advisory service was granted for mapping, legislative review, and the Zanzibar Land Information System (ZALIS) activities, from early 2005 through 2009. For each advisor, a detailed term of reference was prepared by the so called departmental focal point (DFP) persons, with CTA supervision. These were then reviewed by PMT then submitted to the CTA's home office (the Helsinki-based international environmental engineering firm, Poyry Environment Oy, which won the Finland Ministry for Foreign Affairs bid to run SMOLE, in association with the Swedish environmental engineering firm, Scanagri). Poyry was responsible for the selection of the candidate that could fit the consultancy engagements. According to the SMOLE Work Plan and Budget Report (2007), the final recruitment of the consultant was supposed to commence after agreement on the approval of the candidate recommend by the PMT under the consultant advice by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only one advisor was dispatched for land use planning purposes; his contract only survived two short (2-week) missions, without renewal, as clearly had been expected (Annex # 9 page 15, in the Supervisory/Steering Committee Meeting # 6, January 23, 2007; a summary of the Work Plan and Budget Report for SMOLE (2006) is also available in the same document).

However, this SMOLE Strategic Framework was presented differently in the form of
what was referred to as inside 'interlocking mastery attitudes' (that means to connect the activities within the project itself) and components' log-frames for intermediate years “without adjusting for the much reduced time frame” or the dynamic community needs from 2005 to 2009, according to the aforementioned report. Upon the implementation of this approach, the government found it difficult in using this noted 'interlocking mastery strategy' and components' log-frames, until its revision in 2006 which forced adjustments and rewording of some reform components.

An indicated summary of the LFA model displaying the objective and assumptions for each project activity is annexed in the SMOLE project document (pages 3-23) with summaries of its principles, approaches, and how they will be implemented. In this cooperation partnership, the LTA framework lists down different roles, the project planning procedures, and component arrangements to be used in the practical application processes supposedly assumed during dialogue between the project counterparts, and during meetings with different stakeholders. The framework is also indicated in the final SMOLE Strategic Framework approved by the project implementation authority, borrowed from the 2007 report.

6.4.1 Shifting SMOLE Priority Impact

SMOLE included development of digital geographical information systems (GIS) and other mapping activities. These mapping activities included stereoscope operations, CAD operations, aerial photogrammetry, GIS data creation, and purchase of support, software, equipment or tools needed. Over time, mapping became the number one SMOLE project priority, assigned a separate budget by 2006 of 2.18 million Euro. This is almost half of the total SMOLE project budget of 4.5 million Euro by early 2007 (Minutes of the Supervisory/Steering
Committee Meeting, held in Pemba, January 23, 2007). The promotion of this activity into a full-fledged component contributed to the extent of lowering morale of some local partners outside of the mapping sector. As part of damage control, the mapping component led by FINNMAP International Ltd was supposed to be “later integrated into all other SMOLE activities”, according to Annex 5 of the Short term Advisor’s Status Report (2006). Considering the overlapping of activities, it was on the agenda of the 2007 project's steering committee meetings to discuss how the structured framework of the reform project’s activities might be in closer harmony with other identified projects.

By the time this was being negotiated, there were other local opinions with regards to financial expenditures involved to support this imported project. Muhammed Haji (in a group interview with senior departmental staff in land offices during my summer 2008 fieldwork), for example, argued: “Look, we have become an aid-reliant partner in everything until we are afraid to speak our own mind on the development cooperation above,” pointing to the top floor of his office building where the SMOLE offices were situated. But “we should not be an aid to defeated villains like this”, he emphasized. “Here is the story. We did not sit to discuss this project. It was signed in Helsinki, Finland with only two officials invited, from the high offices – our director and the advisor to the minister. We ended up accepting the project expecting that it would better perform its priorities both technically and administratively, like its sister, ZILEM.” This project is playing what Said Hassan called “‘collaborative tactics' whereby 15% as the local contribution [about EUR 675,000 of the EUR 4.5 million annual budget] does not relate with our condition economically” (Interview with Said Hassan, IPU, July 9, 2008). “Our economy is not stable; that is why the government takes time to repay back its contribution”, added Hamza Rijal in the same (2008) gathering.
The arrangement of the PMT wants the local counterparts to get their incentives through the government's local contribution, which takes more than three months and is above the stated figures from the project estimates. Therefore SMOLE provides only a daily subsistence allowance (DSA) of not more than TZS 2,000 (equivalent to a dollar and half) for these planners’ participation in workshops. No one could be expected to stay in this project on this arrangement, which also does not provide training support to its staff members or provide other necessary incentives. Because of this limited local contribution and an arrangement that generated a lack of staff motivation, most professional counterpart staff members decided to join other projects with better incentives by 2004, including both short and long term training arrangements.

There is another scenario that led to lowered staff morale, according to my focus group conversations and interviews with local staff members. “It is about a lack of good will and clear local ownership of this reform project”, said Said Sofo (2008), then Chief Land Officer. “Our partner does not realize that our departments provide venues to host these project activities, beyond what we can afford”, Muhammed Haji (2008) continued. This interviewee is heading the Integrated Planning Unit (IPU) of the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning (DoSUP), once a major component host and aid recipient for the implementation of land use and related settlement structure and tourism zoning plans during the ZILEM project time and now co-hosting the Land Assessment Component of MACEMP. IPU staff felt strongly that they needed “leeway on other cost arrangements including especially when IPU is obligated to pay for the out of office/elite neutral venues for the meetings, seating, and staff allowance which should come from the local components”, as Said Ufuzo (2008) added in the same focus group.

Another observation from this staff discussion came from Salum Simba, Director of Land: “We once suggested in vain to the CTA to review this local arrangement which cost more
money from local contributions.” Simba emphasized how irritating the local contribution demands were, especially when the actual Finnish disbursements were usually slightly below the budgeted amount between 2005 and 2007. The total funds used in the whole project were EUR 790,371 of the revised half a year budget amounting to EUR 1,172,800 for different components in relation to the whole year budget (Annex # 4: Annual Report 2006 of Supervisory/Steering Committee meeting Number 6, January 23, 2007). The reason given was the “rather low utilization of budgeted funds in institutional development (40.8%),” according to this report. Thus if we count on this, “it is better getting paid by the project in cash for a day seminar than wasting more money from the local contribution for covering costly and unnecessary meals, venue rental, and other costs,” Simba continued - “since this will both save money and improve motivation”, interrupted Sofo, as our meeting was getting to an end.

To break down some expenditure scenarios of the local contribution, let us refer to simple arithmetic calculation. Suppose you are required to organize a 20-person seminar for a day at the Bwawani Hotel39 or at any other equivalent hotel in the city of Zanzibar, a typical SMOLE expectation for any required consultancy workshop. As revealed by Rijal (2008), you would need to pay for not less than TZS 300,000, which includes TZS 160,000 (TZS 8,000 for each participant's meal, TZS 200,000 (TZS 10,000 for their pocket allowance each) added to TZS 24,000 cost of the hall hire. Other affiliated cost that cover transport, equipment, and other services were not included. This will equal TZS 384,000 a day, all beyond the capacity of the local contribution budget. It is a common monthly practice by SMOLE to host such meetings, mostly in hotels like Bwawani for their privacy and comfort reasons, especially in between the arrival of any components' short-term advisors, for discussion of annual budget designs or their

39 This is a modest government-owned hotel in Zanzibar city standing at the northeastern corner of Stone Town; it
reviews. The assumption is that, according to SMOLE’s budgeted outline (Annual Report 2006: Annex 4), the cost for each seminar should not exceed TZS 284,000 as the local contribution which includes covering expenses for locally organized seminars and related workshops. This estimated breakdown for just this one day element tends to send local expenditure higher than budgeted. However, as usual SMOLE-organized seminars take more than 40 people (some from Pemba) for a single gathering with ongoing workshop or seminar activities of other components sometimes left uninterrupted in either their Unguja or Pemba offices.

In the 2006-2007 financial year, the SMOLE project CTA invited two facilitators from mainland Tanzania for two three-day seminars held in Pemba and Unguja. With each facilitator given TZS 60,000 for each day's seating, this amounts to TZS360,000 from the local contribution account. With their return tickets amounting to TZS 105,000 each, this added TZS 210,000 in extra cost to the local contribution account. The Pemba seminar was for two days with a cost of TZS 30,000 per day for rental of a conference hall. When considering the meeting being held in Pemba, including the participants’ per diem allowances, this demands even higher local travel and allowance costs for the participants, which quadrupled the amount of seating allowances when considering the cost of hall fees in Pemba, located some 30 nautical miles from Unguja island. Then there were the return travel costs from Pemba island at the expense of the local contribution. Including the necessary supplementary staff cost required, I estimate that the two day seminar in Pemba cost a third more from what the Zanzibari government-owned hotel would have cost. Overall, with other costs involved, SMOLE’s organized seminars ran over 50% of the total local contribution budget.

SMOLE’s activities were, in fact, dominated by workshops and seminars, consuming is among the most ideal hotels for hosting government organized meetings or visiting executives.
more than half of the funds allotted for local contributions. There were also project management team members’ costs, four times above the normal staff members’ average costs. The team had four members and each were paid TZS 110,000 in membership allowance for this Pemba workshop which totals to TZS 440,000 per month. Then there are four focal point persons of the project who got TZS 90,000 for each meeting quarterly organized by SMOLE for the 2006-2007 financial year. This equals TZS 360,000, followed by their seven supporting staff members which were each given per diem allowance of TZS 40,000 (amounting to TZS 280,000 for the support staff) which equals TZS 1,080,000 for them all.

What can be surmised here immediately is that the project became a huge burden to the government finance and planning offices as hosts, with most of the local contribution spent on workshops supposedly designed to lower staff complaints and boost their morale for better project performance. When local contribution funds were not available it frustrated the project even further. The SMOLE project also used departmental premises, while being charged some TZS 50,000 per day to pay for power supply costs; when the costs amounted to a TZS two million bill during the 2009 three month-long power blackout, it resulted in a big tug of war on how to supply electricity to the lands office building, including the project offices, without sufficient local funding to buy fuel for the stand-by generator.

Although mundane, writing about all of these recurrent costs helps us to comprehend the basic shortcomings of this sustainable project. There are other issues on capacity building, infrastructure support training, and other downloaded costs due to misplaced reform priorities. For example, in 2006 the SMOLE project was forced to engage someone from mainland Tanzania for a two-year TZS 48 million contract to maintain its office computers and other electronic devices in both Unguja and Pemba. One may argue that, with this amount of funding
in hand, and based on experiences during ZILEM, SMOLE would have alternatively tried to send at least two people for their undergraduate courses and one person for post-graduate studies in, say, India or mainland Tanzania to provide the project with an even more long-term human resource investment. Regardless of whether they return or not, they would still remain committed as part of the Zanzibari community wherever they would be, if SMOLE’s donors were worried about such an outcome.

Within the LFA defined above, the demand for training needs assessment surveys would have been necessary done collectively with the host project partner. However, the reality of the project implementation was that it became structurally too rigid and one-sided, not sticking to the LFA’s propositions. This looks like a repeat of the self-centered master plan approach. For example, at the end of 2007, following short-term environmental management advice, as disclosed by Hamza Rijal (the environmental coordinator of the project, in a 2008 interview), a premature decision was taken to send someone to Swaziland in southern Africa for an environmental impact assessment course, which cost the project over US$ 7,500 (close to TZS 10 million) for just a six-week course. Rijal compared this cost with the three staff members from the Departments of Environment and Surveys and Urban Planning who were sent by their departments under MACEMP to Ardhi and Dodoma Universities for only about TZS 4.2 million for their graduate diploma and degree courses. Two other staff members were also sent to Indian colleges for their ordinary diplomas for just TZS 3.0 million each. If one would have sent others for their advanced graduate courses at the Master’s degree level it would have required only an additional couple of million shillings, according to this officer.

By the end of our discussion on July 12, 2008, the interviewed staff team of different ranks was not hopeful even for the recently signed phase in December 2009 which would carry
the strategic implementation process of the reform project to the end of 2015, unless there would be an even deeper negotiation between the two collaborative partners and their supportive stakeholders at all project implementation levels.

6.5 The ZILEM/SMOLE Project Policy Context with Regards to Housing Delivery

With regards to housing delivery within the reform processes, it has been observed that the project “generally displayed a lax attitude concerning both the informal urbanization [and formal development] processes” (Scholz, 2008: 83). As a consequence, informal housing development continues to form the largest component in the ongoing uncontrolled urbanization process. An assessment activity on informal settlements suggested as part of the project's poverty reduction strategic initiative has been postponed in all the revised yearly budgets of the SMOLE project since the execution of its initial strategic plan in 2003 (Ibid).

An interesting argument by the project was raised to the PSC during the presentation of the annual report (January-December 2006) to defend this activity’s exclusion from normal project deliberations. According to this report, “the activity could not be started due to resource allocation problems” (Minutes of the Supervisory/Steering Committee Meetings No. 6, 2007: 16). Surprisingly, there was funding remaining (EUR 383,402 - equivalent to 32.60%) in the actual annual budget expenditure reported at the same meeting. The report showed that TZS 53.98 million of the local contributions budget had been spent, for 67% of the approved budget of TZS 80.00 million. However, assessments of physical planning problems, especially in the informal settlement areas, kept on appearing in most SMOLE project briefings, without any actions on them throughout the initial planning advisor's contract, through the time of his ouster.
Furthermore, within other land development practices, the project was only jumping to assist, rather than initiating, any department-generated local land subdivision - and most of these were in rural lands, through IPU initiatives. On guiding informal processes, again there was consistent hesitation by the project institutions to apply their guiding collaborative principles to improve these areas - basically (the project leaders claimed) “because of the complicated nature of the problems,” leaving responsibility to the TPO and the municipality (Supervisory/Steering Committee Meeting Number 6, 2007). In due course, the arrival of broader land reform initiatives has not changed much of the urban planning landscape and/or housing development pattern of Zanzibar city in the last 20 years. The structure of the old Ng'ambo areas has remained as it was since the 1970s socialist interventions as the periphery was left to develop organically in its own disorganized informal orientation, well beyond the neighborhood zones structured from the 1982 master plan towards prime agricultural lands. Although this scenario is not well reflected within ZILEM or SMOLE project reports, much of its evidence is reflected when looking at the aerial photographs of the last 30 years, as displayed in Scholz (2008: 38).

There have been some efforts in rural subdivision planning proudly portrayed and hinted as the SMOLE project's own initiative but placed silently in books without local acknowledgment. The 2007 land management component's work plan, to which land use planning belongs (certainly not housing improvement or urban development planning activities per se), facilitated development of land-based income generating activities in the elite Stone Town instead, allegedly in order to directly contribute to the poverty reduction strategy paper. The component aimed at improved security of tenure and sustainable use of land as proposed in the SMOLE project document for 2005-2009, in which a review of the Town and Country
Planning Decree, Cap 85/1955 for strengthened land/development control and improved working conditions in planning was suspended even in the proposition of a short term international land-use planning advisory mission report in May-June, 2006. But later in 2006, the step-by-step approach to budgeted recommendations by this advisor was replaced by the CTA’s proposal “to enhance revenue collection through fiscal land registry [favorably encouraged by the then lands minister] and digital [small-scale] line mapping” or GIS infrastructure buildup on ortho-photographs for sale to tourists and other elite buyers (Nieminen, 2008).

Equipment procurement was also encouraged by the mapping/GIS advisor from FINNMAP International Ltd., biased with a separate budget for the mapping section of the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning (DoSUP) in Zanzibar, influenced by that department’s director, who seems to have been regularly consulted in most land and surveying related SMOLE’s project activities without much input. Stone Town was selected for piloting the fiscal cadastre project, leaving earlier adjudication schemes at Jumbi-Tunguu and Kwale-Gombani in peri-urban zones adjacent to Unguja and Pemba’s major towns uncompleted. Key executed components of the fiscal land cadastre project include the appointment of the land registrar and an adjudication officer, identification of an adjudication area, staff recruitment, house re-registration, equipment procurement, and taxation. Computers, accessories, survey equipment, furniture, vehicles, and motorcycles were bought for the project. A complete list of procured items is outlined in the identified annual project report, 2006. Training on the use of global positioning system (GPS) equipment continued over all those years without obstruction.

The SMOLE work plan for 2006 was reported to have been too ambitious by the project Supervisory/Steering committee, although it was also biased toward arm-chair mapmaking activities, short-term advising, and equipment purchase. A little space for additional practical
activities in planning and its related fields were considered necessary. Nevertheless, following some influential internal complaints focusing on rural land use and tourism zoning activities through the Integrated Planning Unit (IPU) of the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning (DoSUP), “the survey and demarcation of plots in Nungwi [a tourism area at Unguja’s northern tip] was conducted with 230 plots demarcated” (SMOLE Four Monthly Report, 2007).

Similarly, support for neighborhood planning was ultimately availed through stiff pressure also from the IPU, which facilitated (through personally friendly terms with the lands and survey directors) a reconnaissance for 2,350 residential plots at Tunguu village, some ten miles from the city. Tunguu had been set aside for establishment of a satellite new town. The pace of plot survey estimated here compares unfavorably with the 5,800 and 4,300 peri-urban plots delivered during the 20-year implementation of the 1982 Zanzibar Master Plan and the ZILEM project, respectively, in various urban areas (Zanzibar File: UMM/MUN/N.10/24). Tunguu and the adjacent Jumbi village were formally earmarked for extension of ZILEM’s adjudication pilot project in the peri-urban area. By 2006, it was somehow officially claimed (or, rather, exaggerated) that the 1982 Zanzibar Master Plan “was implemented by 60%” (Haji et al 2006: 7). However, it is also true to say that “the planned development attracts new informality” (Scholz, 2008: 14). Scholz suggests only a 14% implementation result for the master plan’s development areas as opposed to the 27% projected by Haji et al (2006) for planned city's residential neighborhood units (NU). The estimate by Scholz (2008) is easily verified by cursory examination of SMOLE’s 2006 orthophotos in planned neighborhood areas such as Mwanakwerekwe (NU 22), Mombasa (NU 23), Mpendae (NU 18), Mazizini (NU 34),

40 Haji Adam Haji was the director (2001-11) of the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning and a land surveyor who influenced the promotion of the mapping component from the SMOLE project under FINNMAP International Ltd advisory services in Zanzibar. His co-authored paper (with Rashid Azzan and Said Ufuzo) was
Chukwani (NU 40), Mtoni (NU 50) and at Bububu/Kidichi outside the city area. The layout of the Chinese master plan is displayed back in Figure 5.2. Today, as projected from the Tanzanian Population Census (2002), about 420,000 inhabitants are distributed in about 90,000 households across the municipality and its immediate West District extension.

The total Finnish contribution for the land management component, with planning included, was EUR 618,000 (of which nearly half went for administrative purposes), distributed in the form of the following major budgeted items: administration (EUR 229,000), survey instruments (EUR 175,000), demarcation of plots in tourist zones (EUR 69,000), capacity building (64,000), and office furniture (EUR 21,000) (Minutes of the Steering Committee Number 6/2007). Those committed expenses rarely cover activities related to urban and housing development or improvement, let alone participatory sustainable planning.

The buildup and management of map information continued through the preparation of indexed sheets and the re-organization of manual records. As reported in the above-noted monthly report, a study on land and property taxation was begun in 2006 with the appointment of the land registrar and his adjudication officer for Stone Town. This meant that the reform project waned towards the end of the 2005-2009 phase, with mapping and fiscal land cadastre projects dominating the land reform program, supposedly under the banner of revenue generation to support the global agenda for poverty reduction in Zanzibar.

Conceptually though, since the localized ZILEM/SMOLE reform approach was built on the sustainability principles of integration, participation, and collaboration, as theorized by John Forester (1984) and Patsy Healey (1993), among others, then it ought to have had meaningful communicative considerations inspired by Harbermasian discourse. It became, instead, not only

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presented at the XXIII FIG Congress, Munich, Germany, October 8-13, 2006.
chaotic, disrespectful, and disappointing at the local levels, but also contradicted the localized collaborative planning techniques in favor of the imported LFA. Even at the project activities level involving mapping, GIS construction, and fiscal land cadastre activities, it was the donors themselves, through their CTA\(^\text{41}\) who seemed to have bowed to ministerial domination/pressure and his own bias to influence intermediate changes in the project decision making processes which determined the final validity of the chosen activities for land subdivision, planning, and housing development. SMOLE gave no options against informality, which continued to mushroom at the local community level.

These outlined project complications and shortfalls influenced the separation of most other departmental-based land management, survey, and urban planning activities, so that any reform-oriented action planning would have to be carried out in isolation from the SMOLE project activities through day-to-day social engineering field actions involving the concerned parties, technical providers, and land clients to achieve simplified accessibility to land and housing/development control. Whatever the result of these actions, the remaining chapters provide some communicative and collaborative techniques employed over these planning experiments which arguably outline some guidance over how to interpret what Nnkya (2007: 279) calls “socio-cultural grids of communicative actions” and collaborative planning ideals for the land reform agenda.

6.6 Discussion and Conclusion

From the discussion above, it is clear that Zanzibar donor relations and the type of aid

\(^{41}\) By the end of 2009, this CTA was replaced following the signing of the new SMOLE project agreement for 2009-15.
assistance gained have both experienced a number of unwelcome challenges. Most significantly, deviations from land reform projects due to overlap with other institutional priorities have been evident in the most recent phase of reform, especially. Lower morale has been reported due to a shortage of local contribution funding and other incentives that were seen as essential parts to stabilize or sustain the latest reform agenda. However, the shortcomings of the project have been greater than this when we consider the international and scholarly concerns on the sustainable performance of the donor-funded projects and their institutions, and internal dynamics within the island itself (Myers 2008).

It also may be clearly seen that the donor agency was very slow in recognizing overlap with other planned development projects, maybe because it did not want to be seen as competing against the multilateral community supporting those projects, especially the World Bank. This is evidenced by the fact that, at the sixth SMOLE steering committee meetings, the project management team was asked to discuss with the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Environment the idea of hosting MACEMP within SMOLE (Minutes of the Supervisory/Steering Committee Meeting, # 6/2007). As agreed at the same meeting, “[t]here is no need to compete against the World Bank” (Ibid: 5). Instead, SMOLE leaders opted to “give them [MACEMP] all they feel are in their domain, [as there was] enough to do with all other challenges for SMOLE.” Also in my field work in the summer 2008, I learned about five senior SMOLE project members of staff from the departments of land, survey/planning, and environment who chose to undertake post-graduate studies at Ardhi University in Dar es Salaam under the MACEMP funding package. However, they also seem not to be worried about the way they are now perceived negatively upon their return, as the SMOLE project may not be willing to
offer them their further support.42

One would now begin to wonder why then Zanzibar still continues relying on this donor supported land reform practice that has garnered and engendered such significant local disrespect. There are very serious reasons to answer such a sticky question: a donor's sympathy is needed to consolidate internal politics in this young democratic transition going on in the country. One would also think that the above quoted Joseph Mihangwa (2006, in my lead quotation for this chapter) had the future of this part of the world in mind, because of the way the machinery of the government was clearly seen to make the wheel turn. For the case of the donors, who tend to avoid local conflicts, they mostly monitor their own expenditures, the election results, and the mismanagement of the funding they provide, above the local or institutional interests per se. Their funding goes with a specific task and is not really allocated for the survival of the restructured institutions or the project activities they helped to create.

Remembering Michael Watts’ (2003) contention, also in the header for this chapter (“one does not turn inwards, one does not retreat; one moves sideways, one moves forward”): this is evidenced by some of the disappointed young staff members like those seen recently joining Ardhi University, who have decided to 'move forward' leaving behind some of their frustrations to the few fellow colleagues who are 'moving sideways', opting to still believe in the mostly illegal land brokering against the will of the adopted reform’s ambitions. Alongside of this, we see Hilal Sued's (Sunday Observer, Tanzania, 2006) contention that “one has to read their statements between the lines to understand that they [donors] are anything but happy with the ongoing situation in Zanzibar whenever elections are held.” That is precisely where the whole contradiction abounds that causes much trauma and the state of uncertainty on these sustainable

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42 One of these newest Ardhi graduates was named a Director of Environment in the latest departmental reshuffle in
projects. The SMOLE project is expected to come to an end by 2015 following the signing for its continuation in December 2009. The arrogance of the fifth phase (Amour) government regarding the donors’ withdrawal was only put on hold throughout the sixth (Karume Jr.’s) presidential phase.

The continuity of this attitude towards the project in the new seventh phase (under President Ali Shein) may provide a big relief for the corrupt and lavish behavior of the Karume regime in property ownership and land management systems in Zanzibar. As regards support for housing development issues, the project has shown little concern or support for increasing land accessibility for residential development; the rate of land delivery under SMOLE was only about a third of the rate of land delivered under the 1982 Master Plan and the ZILEM project. Due to the ambitiousness of the 2006-2007 project work plan, except for the project's late engagement over the review of tourism zoning plan, none of the activities that the land use planning advisory mission had recommended in 2006 were put in practice (Please see Tapia Toropainen's Report, Annex 5_ Short Term Land Use Advisor's Status Report, SMOLE, January 23, 2007). These recommendations included the complete renewal of Zanzibar's land use planning, improvement of urban informality and development control, staff training, building up the use of GIS for planning activities, and equipment procurement.

Even the continuation of the land use advisory services was also put on hold after 2006, including the review of the Town and Country Planning Decree (Cap 85/1955). A new TCPD has been in draft stage since the ZILEM project time, but it was said to have been overtaken by other priorities - most in favor of digital mapping and fiscal land cadastre, in the name of government poverty reduction initiatives. One has to wonder whose poverty is being reduced via a fiscal

January 25, 2011.
cadaster of Stone Town, since its principal impact financially would be an increase in government revenue – none of which is yet in evidence as having accrued to the more effective functioning of the lands or planning departments. Whether it will be sufficient to eliminate these management shortfalls and messy land management framework through the LFA and its procedures depends on how the approach is going to recognize its sustainable and collaborative planning barriers to not being able to develop dialogue with local community interests outside the structured limitations of the host institutions. I will explore this argument further in chapter 7 in the first applied case study option alongside my personal experiences and my fieldwork observations from summer 2008.
Chapter 7: Case Study 1
Formal vs. Informal Housing Development: Peri-urban Insights on Policies, and Land Reform Contradictions in Zanzibar

“Yet, even in the darkest time, there are people who are making a difference, creating an oasis of hope, they do it by combining a knack for public relations with a visionary reasoning and the audacity to break out of old paradigms and try new things; *they don't respect the law, but it doesn't stop them either* (Hallsmith, 2003: 1, italics mine).

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the research results of the first case study aimed in answering my first hypothesis on informality and the struggle for land accessibility in Zanzibar’s peripheral urban settlements. It includes the analysis of the data set collected in 2007 under the leadership of Professor Myers in 62 interviews in two peri-urban neighborhoods as a part of the NSF research project. The 2007 data set was also boosted by my own follow-up fieldwork survey conducted a year later in summer 2008, meshed with various other data as indicated in my methods chapter. All protocol for Human Subjects was followed and informed consent given for all material in all interviews, even where anonymity was requested. At the outset, I give a short description of the case study area and both its formal and informal housing characteristics as observed when conducting my survey. I also explain the methodology used in my data gathering within this case study context. The end result links back to analysis of my first hypothesis. This first hypothesis assumes that because of continued central state domination influenced by the lack of social dialogue within sustainable land management and urban planning reform practices in Zanzibar, the applied sustainability strategy has not been able to match or break the practical, socially-inspired traditional patterns of the people's land and housing development.

This chapter analyzes a bunch of differing approaches the people of Welezo-Darajbovu
use in their attempts to access land for housing without any donor assistance for planning in this rapidly urbanized outer city area through violation of individual farmlands. The next section profiles the first case study.

7.2 Welezo-Darajabovu Profile: Identification, Analysis, and Fieldwork Results

Divided into two disproportionate parts, the Welezo-Darajabovu settlements manifest a situation whereby the urban poor obtain their housing lands through unofficial (informal) means in Darajabovu and through mixed formal and informal housing forces in Welezo. While the former is purely tradition-driven, the latter includes some authorized lands (plots that were legally obtained and developed), a case of gross violation of family waqf land, and plots developed through the political gamesmanship of the ruling regime’s interventions in the allotment process. This Welezo-Darajabovu neighborhood includes the roadside settlement crescent combined with the sloppy valley settlements below the western side of the Masingini ridge in the central outer edge of the city (Figure 7.1).

Visiting this housing area in the outskirts of Zanzibar, you obviously get many impressions about both formal and informal settlement conditions in the city. On the one hand, at Darajabovu, there is a sense of a densely settled housing concentration of informal semi-rural picturesque huts and smaller homes; overall one is struck by the structurally disjointed landscape and disorganized environment and overwhelmed by the poverty and the absence of urban planning control. On the other side of this crescent, in Welezo, just off the Amani-Mtoni road northwards from that road’s intersection with the Chwaka road heading out of town, we find a neighborhood that is of mixed (formal and informal) structure. While the Welezo part of the case
study combines poor and middle class, most of Darajabovu is very poor, a community characterized by chronic shortages of sanitation facilities or clean water supply, and dominated by overcrowded, partly constructed, temporary-roofed housing.

Figure 7.1: Map of Zanzibar Showing Location of Welezo Shehia

Source: Courtesy of Garth Myers (2010a)

The West District population in some selected Shehis is displayed in Table 7.1 below. As categorized in this Table, Welezo-Darajabovu is considered a mixed type of settlement, meaning
it combines both formal and informal characteristics. This means it is a good case for examining both types of the peri-urban settlements, and it was an area most developed contrary to the 1982 master plan provisions having been converted from its original proposal as a city's subcenter to the mixture of housing environment which is one of the worst in town at some corners of this area.

Table 7.1: Selected West District Shehia's Population by Sex, Households (Numbers and Sizes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Type by Locality</th>
<th>Population (Numbers)</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shehia</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/Samaki</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>9,967</td>
<td>19,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukwani</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>4,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwerekwe</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>10,317</td>
<td>11,177</td>
<td>21,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtoni</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>9,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mto Pepo</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>5,371</td>
<td>5,329</td>
<td>10,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magogoni</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>6,424</td>
<td>6,746</td>
<td>13,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Kidatu</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>3,546</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>7,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kijitoupele</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>5,552</td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>11,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomondo</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>6,764</td>
<td>7,237</td>
<td>14,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welezo</td>
<td>Urban/Mixed</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>6,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Total</td>
<td>29 Shehia</td>
<td>91,429</td>
<td>93,281</td>
<td>184,710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The case study area lies along the outer Mtoni-Airport ring road on the West District side of Urban/West Region, some four miles from the city center (Figure 7.2). It is situated close to the water works station for the city on the hilltop above the settlement, a military camp housing the air wings, and an abandoned small scale industrial complex. The southern edge of the case study area lies along the central road that goes to the central countryside regions of Zanzibar.
island. On the west side of the settlement are Kilimahewa, Chumbuni, and, to the south, Amani and Mwanakwerekwe neighborhoods of Urban District, separated from West District by the outer ring road. There are two gas stations, a playground, a bar, two mosques, and many more local stores made out of ship containers along both roads within the western valley side formed by the Masingini hills, the humble escarpment of Zanzibar, the highest of which does not exceed 450 feet above sea level.

Figure 7.2: Welezo Shehia, West District, Zanzibar

As you walk up to the highest point of the settlement you pass over some modern buildings that are easily distinguishable from the dominant Swahili houses, the result of a recent subdivision planning intervention in the area. These new buildings are located close to the
Welezo Hospital, which used to house an abandoned leprosy clinic in the colonial era and is now a nursing home privately managed by one of the Christian communities in town.

Based on the population of 62 residents sampled and tabulated in Myers’ (2008: 271) research on peri-urban Zanzibar (which also involved the adjacent Makufuli, Uholanzi and Mwera areas of the upper Masingini hills), this whole Welezo-Darajabovu constituency is dominated by people of broadly African origin which came from as far as Mozambique. With their numbers bracketed, this population’s origins range from Pemba (15), South Unguja (12), Mwera (12), Urban District (9), North Unguja (7) Mainland Tanzania (4), Mozambique (2), and Other West District Shehia (1). Here at Welezo you get a sense of a resilient community of urban dwellers, interestingly enough full of confidence and pessimism in equal combination. Its residents and home owners have been able, with respect to their mixed population origin and land purchase experiences, to withstand eviction threats from the previous land owners and inhabit a reasonably safer and better form of settlement to shelter their families. Regardless of this area being fairly organized with modest housing conditions, there is also a feeling of hopelessness with some settlers who are unsure of their land ownership status. Most houses on this area are located within land previously considered waqf[^44] land, claimed in vain by its trustees, who lost their property while it was occupied without their consent or their claims went unheard by the responsible authorities, over a period of many years. The narrative of this waqf land trusteeship dominates most of my discussion of the Welezo case study.

However, before we go that far into analysis of this settlement, I want to clarify about my

[^43]: Mwera area is the outermost settlement of the adjoining constituency, excluded for various reasons from my Welezo-Darajabovu case study.
[^44]: Waqf is a charitable endowment: a gift of land or property [...], intended for religious, educational, or charitable use. It, [therefore], concerns withholding one's property to eternally spend its revenue on fulfilling certain needs depending on the choice conditions made by the 'waqef' or the person who owns the property (see: http://www.awqafshj.com/php/summaryWaqf.php).
usage of the term 'mixed' in the description of formal and informal characteristics of peri-urban and urban Zanzibar. These terms, formal, informal and mixed, are used throughout this dissertation to replace the terms 'planned', 'unplanned', and 'semi-planned' - the words used in the Environmental Profile of Zanzibar Municipality (1998). The term 'mixed' is linked to the 'semi-planned' settlements “which came into being with a guided planning approach during the 1980s” (Scholz, 2008: 69) as originally adopted from the rather decayed settlement planning schemes of the 1940s in the inner areas of the city. The fact that a few decades after Welezo began to experience its initial planning intervention following on the heels of its informal origins, testifies to its status as holding both formal and informal character, as opposed to the adjacent Darajabovu settlement, which is completely informal in nature.


The origin of the Welezo-Darajabovu neighborhood is associated with a rush for informal housing development in the 1980s. It was especially so for the informal dwellers, who witnessed the slow speed of the official land allocation process that showed heavy favoritism to elites after the completion of the 1982 master plan. The first informal overspill involved people who did not benefit from the formally subdivided and allocated lands at nearby Amani/Magogoni, and Mwanakwerekwe neighborhoods, NU 20 and NU 21 on the 1982 master plan, and it occurred due to the slow implementation process of that master plan. Additionally, the construction of the ring road in the 1980s (even if the northern portion remained a gravel track until the early 2000s) helped to open up the area to the central node of the city’s outskirts as migrants to the city were
moving close to the public and economic infrastructural services such as the Amani Industrial Park and the national soccer stadium that are close by. The arrival of the outer city ring road in the 1980s also provided some conveniences to build along the way for their transportation and petty trading activities. The Jumbe regime had, in 1982, also authorized and codified a set of public transport (daladala) routes that were city-specific. The initial list of routes connected downtown Zanzibar to the peri-urban edge of Urban District (essentially ending at or near the ring road) with termini from north to south at Bububu (by the new letter code, route B), Amani (route A), Magomeni (route M), Jang’ombe (route J) and the Zanzibar Airport (route U, for Uwanja wa Ndege, airport in Swahili). While the new daladala routes benefited the working class, the ring road, and other road improvements throughout the city were helpful while the upper class community was moving close to Zanzibar’s airport on the planned southern end of the city, in newly acquired foreign automobiles.

Back in 1992, just three years after the formation of the Commission for Lands and Environment (COLE), this institution was faced with a serious property distribution inquiry to test its authorized role in land administration. The concept of post-revolutionary ownership of land was hereby challenged by one Haji Tayib Haji Abdalla (File # UMM/MUN/U.50/01/362) who claimed that his family land at Welezo (Figure 7.3) was violated by the government issuance of a three-acre plot$^{45}$ (TAP) to one Said Washoto, first Regional Commissioner of the Urban/West Region in the 1964 revolutionary government, apparently invalidating the Haji T. H. Abdalla family’s waqf property holding. This land, which originally measured some 31 acres,

\[45\] This is a type of confiscated agricultural or plantation land which was mostly granted to the Zanzibar revolutionaries and some landless families soon after the nationalization of land policy that followed the 1964 revolution, a process which was reconfirmed by the Land Distribution Decree 5/1966. As the result of this revolution, all land in Zanzibar belongs to the state but the right to use land was granted to individuals (See also Scholz, 2008: 73). “The land issue was one of the most crucial factors in the revolution” and one of the major reasons for it (Torhonen, 1998: 50).
was granted under Chief Justice G. H. Pickering's seal of the High Court of Zanzibar, as part of the *waqf*-holders’ father's will “to administer this trust for the deceased Hemon Haji Ahmed Haji Talib Ilma” (The High Court of Zanzibar, Cause No. 104 of 1928, January 22, 1929).

The will of this *waqf* trusteeship was granted to both Haji Abdalla Haji Tayib and Haji Osman Haji Abdalla; the former was a key informant during my 2008 fieldwork for this case, and I had met him several other times in the past. “We submitted our case to the lands commission believing that we had a case to prove against the big shot, Said Washoto, who began to squat on our land and caused others to do the same thereafter,” he began.

According to Shao (1992: 15), “in the pre-colonial past, if any stranger wanted to take up land for cultivation, even *waqf* land, he would have asked permission from the communally entrusted guardian and allied clientèle of the concerned indigenous land.” With the advent of formal colonialism (under the joint British and Omani Arab administration), lands were
considered to be controlled privately, whether under communal, British, common, or waqf/Islamic laws (since the British-Omani regime never created a proper land registry, in practice multiple claims to the same property under different legal rights were common, further complicating future land politics). Just after the 1964 revolution, all lands were nationalized - with the crucial exception of waqf lands, where religious institutions or family holders were given some possession and use rights (Ibid).

The involuntary allocation of the peripheral farmland at Welezo from a family waqf to the TAP allotment process, to the benefit of the powerful revolutionary elite, the late Said Washoto, had a major role in other peoples' movement into this area. Many occupied the adjacent lands for free, or after a minimal fee to an ASP branch official, for their housing purposes. Both the family waqf trustee, Haji Abdalla Haji Tayib (2008), and an anonymous source at the area cited in interviews with me the significance of Washoto’s seizure of the land. The example of “the late Said Washoto's occupation of his land at Welezo … caused most of the informality in this area,” the anonymous source said. “Washoto was then a very powerful urban/west regional commissioner who forcefully occupied someone's lands in the period of nationalization during the first government phase to establish his habitation on that farm,” said this interviewee.

However, Washoto was granted this land by the government on a TAP basis, meaning an avenue existed by which one could reach a conclusion that his occupation of the land was legal.

There were some other reasons not disclosed by my waqf-holder informant, Haji Tayib. Bibi Riziki Shomari, Chairperson of the Welezo CCM Branch, for example, recalled that “many of those who obtained their lands for housing in this area, myself included, were given land by our ruling party which was then responsible to allocate land, during Jumbe's presidency” (Interview Bibi Shomari, July 1, 2008). However, it is true, she continued, that the “Honorable
[she gave him this honorific, a sign of respect given to revolutionary elites by their followers]

Washoto’s conversion of his grant from TAP to residential development provided a major influence for others to settle through the ruling party allocation initiatives around his land” (Ibid). Following this move, people began to also slowly dispose of their TAP lands for housing purposes adjacent to his demarcated elite TAP boundaries, within and beyond the former Haji Tayib *waqf* land. Responding to his family request, Washoto's land was then officially subdivided by the land authority in the late 1980s to produce about 58 plots, which were sold to other people for their residential and commercial development. A portion of subdivided land at Welezo is shown in Figure 7.4 below. The large plot in the middle belongs to Washoto's family.

Later, in the early 1990s, the rest of the allegedly abandoned patchy *waqf* land was used as a playground, before it, too, was officially subdivided and granted to other applicants. In Zanzibar, beneficiaries of official (formal) land subdivision belong to top classes or official elites (such as government workers, business people, and influential ruling party members) who are offered their lands usually as favors. This also happened in this area, with the result that about 40% of the available 204 housing units within the Welezo area result from the planned subdivisions owned or sold mostly by the top class in the community.
This encouraged other residents to look for an informal land purchase alternative over the entire area, which encouraged the growth of informality across the larger settlement community. The settlement continued to expand on a northeast-ward axis from the Amani road intersection until it connected with the present Darajabovu side of the case study area. The relatively young Makame Haji (aged 37) who started building his house with his late brother in 1993 concurs with this viewpoint by saying “the whole southern side of this Welezo area is a planned intervention
by the government to stop the continuity of our informal ways of housing development and to concur with the [1982] master plan provisions for this area, which benefited only a few” although it was initially earmarked by this master plan as one of the city's sub-centers (Interview with Makame Haji, July 2008).

Those who belonged to the lower class in the community had to resort to informal land purchase arrangements which were based on cheaper, friendlier, and less restrictive transactions, either through the area's councilor, local party chair, or neighborhood Sheha. “The Government 1982 master plan arrangement was faced with drastic community reaction against its unwelcome bureaucratic delays in land subdivision processing and favoritism,” Makame Haji asserted. “I am afraid the official surveyed plots are not done for us; and their allocation processes are both exhaustive, expansive, and expensive if I base this on what is affordable at my income level.” However, even in this informal part of the building, a single mother I interviewed boasted of having “my own temporary-roofed place in town to live in with my family” (Interview, Asha Faki, 2008). “The front/secondary part of my house could be incrementally completed by my family offspring based upon what they can afford,” Makame Haji concluded.

7.4 Accessibility to Land and Housing Development Process

There are at least four stages associated with the official obtainment of land for housing development in Zanzibar. These are as follows: planning, valuation, land surveying, and allocation. These stages are broken up into an unbelievable list of 148 procedures, as categorized by Makame Pandu (2008)\textsuperscript{46}. Out of those steeply stepped procedures, six fall under evaluation

and compensation activities, 18 under the planning processing activities, 28 under surveying and demarcation purposes, 43 under land application, allocation, and registration processes, and the remaining 53 fulfill the development control (engineering and medical) conditions and other building supervisory responsibilities. While the first and last stages are hereby detailed to back up the narratives of this chapter, some of the steps under each stage are shortlisted here as tabulated in Table 7.2 below.

At the planning stage, the law recognizes that the Planning Authority must identify the planning area and prepare the planning scheme. However, over the last 20 years, the Department of Surveys and Urban Planning in collaboration with the Department of Lands and Registration, all under the ministry of lands has usurped this responsibility, with the Town Planning Office (TPO) holding up the leading role on behalf of the two departments at planning stages and the Lands Department at land allocation levels. Subdivision schemes for Mwanakwerekwe done in (1988), Mbweni (1988), Mombasa (1989), Kijitoupele (1995), Tunguu (1999-2003), and Kidichi (1997) were all prepared and processed by these two departments for allocation by the minister.

Among the required processes, the delay of plan preparation and approval is a normal case due to limited staff commitments, shortage of equipment, and multiple engagement for other matters. “We have evidence of people waiting for more than 20 years,” noted Makame Pandu, (2008), a lawyer for the Department of Lands and Registration, Zanzibar (This local land lawyer is on leave of absence in working for the MKURABITA project in Dar es Salaam.)
### Table 7.2: Zanzibar's Land Allocation Procedures and Associate Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: Planning</th>
<th>2: Valuation</th>
<th>3: Survey/Demarcation</th>
<th>4: Titling/Occupancy Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Time line: 1-2 years)</td>
<td>(6 months)</td>
<td>(6-12 months)</td>
<td>(6-12 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identify/Declare Planning Area(s)</td>
<td>- Assign and Identify</td>
<td>- Identification of subdivision area</td>
<td>- Collect/Record Individual Applications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning and reporting</td>
<td>- Compensation scheduling</td>
<td>- Assign and Visit</td>
<td>- Offer Application forms (TZS10,000 each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consult Plan</td>
<td>- Reporting</td>
<td>- Demarcation</td>
<td>- Fill form by Applicant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Plan Director</td>
<td>- Authentication</td>
<td>- Mapping Cadastre</td>
<td>- Sheha's Confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Plan Committee (include: Sheha, DC, RC, etc)</td>
<td>4. Director</td>
<td>5. Minister</td>
<td>- Return/Compilation of Applications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Modify Plan</td>
<td>- Confirm/Dispose in cash or kind</td>
<td>- Submit for Allotment</td>
<td>- Submission to land Allocation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public Display</td>
<td>- Recording</td>
<td>- Chief Surveyor</td>
<td>- Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Final Approval</td>
<td>- Acquisition</td>
<td>- Director</td>
<td>- Land Directory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Minister</td>
<td>- Proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Publication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Committee submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Minister's Approval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 According to Section 7 of the Town and Country Planning Decree, Cap 85/1955, the detailed/subdivision plan is undertaken based on the proposition of the general planning scheme for the city which is in the form of the master plan for the city, structure or land use plan for other areas or sectors. Examples include the Zanzibar Master Plan, 1982, abandoned Settlement Structure Plan, 1993, National Land Use Plan, 1995, and Tourism Zoning Plan, 1995. Therefore in theory it is not possible to prepare detailed subdivision plans in the absence of the planning scheme. However, in practice this has happened in many areas, such as Mwera (1994), Kijichi (1997), and Tunguu (1999).

48 Chaired by the respective District Commissioner.


50 Selection for a residential land application is legally supposed to respect criteria such as capacity to build, first time grantee status, or if an applicant is a Zanzibari. A compiled list is sent back to the lands department for recording before it is finally sent to the minister for allocation as per LTA (Amendment No. 15/2003). At the Tunguu subdivision area, which produced about 890 plots in its first subdivision scheme phase, for example, only 570 applications were selected for allocation from volumes of the list waiting for the next phase, leaving aside the other 320 plots, to be under ministerial decision control. During my 2008 field work, I met a displaced landowner of the surveyed area and resident of Tunguu, complaining about being not included among the beneficiaries – he was merely given a ministerial promise to be included in the next phase. He was highly disappointed to see some names included in the list with less allotment qualifications, such as his sheha, his chair of the ruling party, and their deputies (Interview Kombo Mganga, June 12, 2008).
- Development Control with Council, Lands, etc
- Confirm names by sold forms
- Display approved names to the public
- Make Payment (TZS100,000-180,000)
- Prepare titles
  - Lands director
- Signing titles
  - Lands Minister
- Registration
  - Land Registrar\(^{51}\)
- Prepare architectural drawings and apply for building permission processes through UDCA of ZMC\(^{52}\) (requires more steps back and forth)

Source: Author, from Fieldwork in Zanzibar, 2008). Note: Other land titling steps necessary to be taken include submission of the list of proposed allocatees by the Director of Lands through the allocation committee to the minister responsible for lands, a process which is easily bypassed to the top authorities' manipulation.

Consequently, little respect is given to those planning schemes. For example, with respect to the high population density of Zanzibar (330 square meters per person by the time the 1982 master plan was getting prepared), the recommended plot size for each high density neighborhood was between 110 and 320 square meters. This was responsive to the used standards by the older planning schemes for a single high density residential plot; they were then modified to between 360 and 400 meters squared for the same types of neighborhoods, paving the way for elite gated housing conditions and associated control violations now being

\(^{51}\) Appointed in 2006. Currently, there is no specific procedure for registration of provisional rights of occupancy. However, the statutory declaration must be registered to acquire legal status. With sheha confirmation, property registration may cost to about TZS20,000 which is skipped by most developers.

\(^{52}\) The Urban Development Control Authority, formerly Joint Building Authority of the Zanzibar Municipality is responsible for approval and control of development or building inspection and issuance of building permits across the city. This body is ill-equipped and lacks legal recognition. The average processing fee for the filed
experienced in most planned residential suburbs.

But in Makame Haji's narrative for Darajabovu, no such formal allocation, and virtually none of the 148 steps were followed. He adds: “for my case, I was assisted by my late brother Haji wa Haji to build this house.... “We are from the rural Tumbatu community in origin and escaped from the village's poverty-stricken environment and restrictive government conditions to purchase our plot within a week from the previous land owner, who was my brother's friend, for just TZS 50,000.... And, we paid on installment in the presence of a sheha who respectfully requested some TSZ 5,000 as our land fee” (Interview Makame Haji, 2008). As to an official plot allocation, none of the steps would have been possible. The amount for covering the land deed, architectural, and other engineering approval costs would have been not less than TZS 300,000 at that time, placed on top of the construction costs, which are hardly affordable by low income earners.

This interviewee used to get a collective salary of not more than TZS 25,000 per month, whereby the construction cost would have been so huge for even these two brothers when teamed up to purchase their property. His deceased brother was a poorly self-employed informal sector goods seller. Makame Haji is an office assistant at Mazsons Hotel in Stone Town, which is his second job since he moved to the city from his Tumbatu village. The building work was also done on a brotherly/communal basis - their house builders also came from the same village, for cost reduction purposes. This informal building development approach is tied up with cultural rules and norms in rural Swahili traditions that evade the tensions of legislative planning and housing provision. Figure 7.5 summarizes this informal land transaction process in Zanzibar.
The process, which is still traditional, mostly includes a lot of family support, bargaining with the landowner or middle person involved, buying land in installments, reporting to the sheha, and developing an understanding with neighbors at the initial construction stages, among its other basic procedures. It creates a friendly building environment among dwellers and makes an informal area a place for refuge escaping from the building hardships in the city running away from waiting tensions of formal housing processes. Indeed, this Welezo-Darajabovu settlement's development outline shows a departure from a 'divide and rule' kind of formal housing method caused by planning provisions that backfired in this area (Shao 1992). Objectively, they experienced informal housing practices but developed without the adequate provision of essential sanitary services; the haphazard environment, seen at least from the Darajabovu side of
the case study area, might, however, be improved with greater consideration to the initiative shown in seizing those housing opportunities (Ibid). Its uncertain outcome and vast sprawl now overshadow the *waqf* land purchase arrangement from the Welezo experience. Those contradictions and the potential opportunities for alternative planning in the Darajabovu subsection of this case study are detailed later in Section 7.7 preceded by the outline of the existing settlement development and land ownership pattern on the Welezo side in the two sections that follow.

### 7.5 Effects of the Existing Settlement Development Pattern and Land Ownership System

From this foregoing discussion, Welezo looks less traditionally/informally developed than Darajabovu, but it certainly was not developed in a conflict-free or fluid formal manner. To reinforce this view, Table 7.3 gives a picture of how long it took and how bureaucratic it became for Bwana Haji Tayib in his quarter of a century (from 1992-2008) of correspondence with government institutions requesting the return of their *waqf* property or payment of their compensation. Based on this summarized Table, some 73 separate dispatches were recorded beginning from March 30, 1992 to COLE and other superior offices in the top government ministries to reclaim this vested *waqf* property. These claims were made to the offices that rank from the President of Zanzibar through to the Chief Minister down to the regional, district, municipal and land offices at COLE.
Table 7.3: Complaints Over Welezo Waqf 92/23 Violation: Various Correspondences, 1992-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/#</th>
<th>Types of Dispatches</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>State House</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Letters were dispatched to responsible offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lands Commission (COLE)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Addressed to different COLE authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ministry of Lands etc</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Addressed to the Principal Secretary &amp; then to the Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CCM (Head and Sub-Offices)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Addressed to the Party Secretary offices at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anticipated for action against land authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chief Minister's Office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Then responsible for COLE's affairs (1989-1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zanzibar Municipal Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Two addressed to the Lord Mayor; 1 to Director of ZMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Urban/West Region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Addressed to U/W Regional Commissioner's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Addressed to other anonymous correspondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own Construct, based on Haji Abdalla Haji Tayib and COLE's file collections, Fieldwork, 2008

The ultimate outcome of all these letters was the continuous influx of residents for this Welezo land who came from outside the area. This is confirmed by Myers’ (2008) research results, whereby among “fully 20 of the 25 people [he] interviewed in Welezo had moved to the Welezo Shehia from the Zanzibar urban district, and none were born in Welezo” (Myers, 2008: 264-288). It is also evident that the majority of those who owned more than 60% of the informal houses around Bwana Haji Tayib's waqf farmland at Welezo were beneficiaries of this trustee's hopelessness. From the analysis of those letters based on Haji Tayib's own collection, it is also obvious that the growth pattern of this case study settlement was pretty well done, planning-wise - with a corresponding loss of hope for Haji Tayib – since the combination of support of the local ruling party offices and community pressure for service provisions resulted in a reasonably well serviced neighborhood, certainly in comparison with Darajabovu next door.

As shown below, some of the transactions in the issuance of this land for housing and
other services had the *waqf* trustees’ consent. Yet over the years, some of these forcefully occupied lands remain disputed, with a lot of claims by the former owners for the plots’ return into their possession. These owners still believe they have the rightful ownership and possession of these lands. I discuss an example of one of those claimants below. In some ways this is an ideal case where the argument for good governance during the last 20 years of planning periods could be outlined.

Because of the CCM party's supremacy in the 1980s, it was able to orchestrate development of the Welezo area as opposed to the planned intervention of the early 1990s COLE era, when multi-party politics had begun to boil up. In his own words to the Anti-Corruption Commission of the President's Office, Haji Tayib confessed to having allowed the establishment of a playground and other developments upon their *waqf* land. In his November 5, 1989 letter to this Commission, Haji Tayib confirmed the receipt of TZS 32,000 to compensate for the loss of some mango and other fruit trees in the establishment of the playground. This transaction was coordinated by the District CCM Office in the city for the nearby Kilimahewa Sports Club. This compensation arrangement was claimed for the following items: 24 Palm tree costing TZS 600 each (TZS 14,400, large mango tree for TZS 15,000; small one for TZS 900, java plum tree for TZS 1,000, and a pple tree for TZS 1,000. (Please see Files: CCM/WM/B.10/3/138/21 of November 5, 1986 and IKL/TS/MM(E)-94/V ol. II/73).

### 7.6 Potentiality for Negotiated Land Subdivision Arrangement

Although state institutions had been trying in every letter to suggest attention go to this *waqf* land tenure saga, alternative subdivisions of land were pegged by the developers for various
residential and commercial uses, in the 1990s and throughout the last decade. Although we see the transference of this family waqf land in a transaction that was done privately (out of the public eye) by the revolutionary elite actor(s), its transference originated from the legally granted TAP allotment under the official legal decree. Following the 1964 revolution which oversaw the vesting of land under government ownership in 1965, large Zanzibari (Arab and Indian) plantation lands were abandoned by owners who took refuge in other countries. Their plantation lands were confiscated and the state became the owner. For the case of the Welezo waqf land, owned by an Indian family that moved to Dar es Salaam after the revolution, the local trustee agent, Ibrahim Haji Tayib Lakhani, could not handle regular supervisory work for this farmland, until it was 'invaded' by the elite settler who claimed to have the right to its granted through his three-acre property allocation. Earmarked for an urban development proposal by the 1982 master plan, the whole area was later converted for full blown residential and commercial uses to the present land use conditions.

In 1966, as noted earlier, Land Distribution Decree #5/1966 granted the confiscated plantation lands as TAPs\(^{53}\) to the revolutionaries and landless families, the distribution process for which was handled by local party branches (Torhonen, 1998: 51) to speed up allocation process. It is also widely acknowledged, as in Torhonen's (1998) analysis, that the distribution was not very transparent and was corrupt from the beginning, as party supporters and revolutionary elite members received highly favorable treatment. There were “very few restrictions on these TAP lands” (Scholz, 2008: 74), which were subsequently not considered as a

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\(^{53}\) Scholz (2008: 73) notes that the main period of TAP distribution was from 1965 to 1974, two years after the assassination of President Karume Sr. (see also Shao, 1992: 51). Clear figures of the amount of distributed TAP lands do not exist. The total number, however, ranges from 22,251 (Shao, 1992) to 23,175 (Clayton 1981: 138) to 24,825 (UMM/MUN/R.40//1; Interview with Duchi Haji, former TAP Officer In-charge and Adjudicator, Zanzibar, July 3, 2008). According to calculations made by Torhonen (1988: 58), the percentage of TAPs on Zanzibar is 12% of the total land area of the island.
priority by the majority of the holders, who were mostly urban dwellers, and were not easily controllable by the government. Myers (1993) noted the case, for example, of one of his elderly neighbors who biked from Kikwajuni in the inner Ng’ambo area out to Mwera (5 miles) each day to collect coconuts from his three-acre allotment; that was the extent of his land management activities. However, as Krain (1998: 41) observes, whoever was granted TAP within abandoned redistributed land was believed to have the rights over such land and its affixed title, even if all they did with it was casual coconut harvesting. Some trustees of waqf lands, exemplified by the cited case at Welezo, also lost control but not necessarily ownership status under the waqf family legal provisions. In reality, though, because of this regulatory confusion about land, people did not distinguish between a granted TAP and the land granted under any other tenurial right condition.

Therefore, even when the land reform programs (ZILEM-then-SMOLE) arrived, enforcement of their laws and procedures was not as serious as some would have expected. Another important observation to bear in mind is that it inherited the allocation of planned land taking place only among the elite group in the urban community, which strongly suggested that the poor would not be able to house themselves in the city or its suburbs without violation of land rights through the informal process, as the earlier, revolutionary reforms had been shown to favor those who were economically, institutionally, and politically powerful or influential enough to either buy the land or be positioned so as to gain from its being allocated within officially subdivided lands. This reinforces the hypothetical argument in terms of the negotiated (informal) approach to land accessibility detailed in the Darajabovu side of this case study - evidenced by my interviewee, Makame Haji and his land-seeking at Darajabovu for informal housing development that superseded the trials of the 1982 master plan or proposals to control the poorly
regulated land conflict at Welezo.

The strategy for controlling land through implementation of the master plan was tried at various moments during the colonial British administration, but this legacy won little respect from the elites after they toppled the regime in the 1964 revolution (Myers 2008). The consequential outcome was that many ordinary housing developers kept on in their neglect of legal provisions through until the present, despite all of the legal land reform efforts. The performance of the Land Tenure Act of 1992 and its associated legislative provisions bear this out. Since the activation of these Act provisions, regardless of the Transferred Land Act of 1994's restrictions, allotted lands have been illegally changing hands by different methods, as Scholz (2008: 78) observed. First, there was the attachment to *shamba* (or farm) land by the owner whereby their perception is that they are the landowners. Second, the instability in existing land administration institutions and processes frustrates these “owners” in their own subdivision and allocation procedures. In other words, procedures for land application have been consistently bureaucratic, but under unstable management structures with changing responsibilities for land management swayed by different authorities from 1964 to the present - COLE’s abolition in 2001 is the latest example. Indeed, there is no other alternative other than the informal sector because, as Scholz (2008: 80) noted, “the formal process of allocation takes too much time or fails.”

Third, informal squatting is also a traditional way of housing within Swahili communities, adjusted in the case of contemporary Zanzibar in that the squatter-developers have bought their lands directly from the TAP owners or indirectly through middlemen and other actors (see also Scholz, 2008: 80). For the case of Darajabovu that is briefly profiled next, it was mostly due to private connections through the *sheha* who stood by these land dealings. Actors involved in the informal development process, which are also listed in Scholz (2008: 80), include some of the
following:

- traditional shamba land owners or TAP holders who privately subdivide and sell their lands to a land-seeking settler;
- connections between the landlords, middle persons, and land seekers willing to sell/buy land to newcomers;
- land-seekers or settlers who approach the owners or as clients of land holders or their middlemen;
- through sheha who confirm the transactions; or
- through survey officers or other technicians inside the government who help with legal and technical connections in servicing those lands on owners own account, as happened in many land subdivisions in the 1990s.

(This set of procedures will be consulted to visualize the comparative similarities of the allocation process utilized in the next subdivision case at Chukwani in the following chapter.)

7.7 The Origin, Growth and Characteristics of Darajabovu Settlement

Darajabovu is a settlement that had arisen in the 1980s at the very earliest stages of the 1982 master plan’s implementation. The master plan essentially split the city's growth pattern into areas associated with formal planning, for the rich, and areas connected to informal development for the poor urban majority. Darajabovu is a purely informal settlement located on a stretch of land initially earmarked by the 1982 master plan for the sub-center satellite area of city services stretching nearly a kilometer square of land adjoining northwards from the road.
intersection that includes the Welezo neighborhood (Figure 7.6). This segment of the case study is a typical overgrown and haphazard *Kiambo* (Swahili for settlement) at the opposite side of the road from Urban District’s Kilimahewa area. Darajabovu (Broken Bridge in Swahili) is known for being prone to malaria and cholera epidemics.

Some 12,000 people lived within this area during the time of the 2002 census. A plurality (11) of the 30 residents interviewed in this area were of Pemba island origin, with 8 from northern Unguja island, 3 from the mainland, 3 coming from the Urban District, 2 from the Central District, and 1 each from West District, Kenya and Mozambique, respectively (Own Fieldwork, 2008). It is shown in both of the NSF-funded surveys taken for two consecutive years (Myers in 2007 (discussed in Myers 2008 and Myers 2010) and my own 2008 fieldwork) that people of the Pemban origin led the list of the peri-urban dwellers in this constituency.

All these people taken together form a combination typical of the fluid native Swahili community of Zanzibar. Their houses are mostly built with cement block walls and corrugated iron sheets for roofs, modified from the traditional Swahili wattle-and-daub houses with thatched roofs. Located also on the western side of the Masingini ridge continuing northwards from Welezo, Myers (2010a: 15) describes this area to be comprised of the “rather more sloped” side of that ridge “cut up continually by highly eroded intermittent stream channels... giving way to poorly drained swampy grounds.” It is a neighborhood that has, in some ways, followed patterns created over many centuries in densifying informal settlements in Zanzibar.
In housing terms, the area is dominated by unfinished traditional Swahili houses; on the front sides of the few that are closer to being finished one finds a low, raised cement platform called a *baraza* used by neighbors (mostly males) to dialogue, chat or gossip over daily occurrences in the islands, or for relaxation during spare time. (This tradition has been somewhat replaced by *maskani* (small covered gathering platforms) that dominate roadsides in most of the areas of the city. These roadside shaded platforms have been favored in the half-built and semi-planned housing environment that is coterminous with the emergence of partisan politics in Zanzibar since the early 1990s.) The house construction process in this area may consume more than a decade to complete, but the half-finished houses that dominate the area are usually adapted and modified to facilitate at least two rooms to accommodate the family and other visitors while waiting for other rooms to be extended up front as the family's income allows.
Really, this is a process that may take the whole lifetime of the original owner.

While each of the outer city settlements might be said to form a small kiambo village community, a typical kiambo settlement is established in Swahili village origins, originally constructed with respect to the maintenance of its rural (often coastal) environment (Shao, 1992). There are traditions or customs of the kiambo not found in the peri-urban zone, such as the establishment of four quarters and assignment of male and female leaders for each quarter (mtaa in Swahili) (Ibid). But in other ways, one can sense some parallels. These outer city kiambo-like settlements are usually concentric in nature, and they are developed with people's houses facing each other or in a chosen direction depending on the shape and size of the purchased land, albeit without following any form of town planning requirements or any of its conventional standardized layout principles. In this growth pattern the typical kiambo is decorated with narrow winding alleys (in Swahili, vichochoro) that average a meter and half separating the houses, with some incidental open spaces developed around the settlement by its unfinished buildings or plots. The unfinished parts of the houses are mostly used for gardening (or livestock-raising) with the incidental open spaces sometimes serving as neighborhood meeting-places, as local shopping grounds, and as sites for other cultural events. They also provide safe playgrounds for the children.

Ill-controlled environments like this have encroached on most of the city's residential areas, in an era of poor planning enforcement and poorly controlled service provision in the city. The peri-urban area was also preferred by the majority of its dwellers because of its 'simple-to build' environment which is easier than processes in the planned areas, which are time consuming and expensive to achieve for most of the low income dwellers of Darajabovu. Myers (2008) has explained these people belong to the lowest income group of the city's population,
living on less than a dollar per day.

While walking into the neighborhood from Welezo to meet my first interviewee for this area, I found a rather dusty playground lying close by the mosque structure that divides Welezo from Darajabovu. These two facilities (the mosque and playground) were developed from Haji Tayib's family’s negotiations with CCM on behalf of the Kilimahewa sports club and the growing community’s needs. These types of planning features that are rarely found in the recent land reform processes, where most decisions are made at institutional levels that rarely incorporate ordinary people's opinions, and where open spaces are being illegally violated or occupied throughout the planned city areas. Interviewee Makame Haji's house lies nearby at the intersection of the two neighborhoods, with unfinished block walls, poorly shuttered and steel window frames, and temporary roofing with corrugated iron sheets. At the back of his half built house, I came across strange poorly-drawn graffiti that displays the existing housing characteristics for this area, in my interpretation, in paint.

Shown in Plate 7.1 below, this graffiti combines three important elements: a swastika painted with a danger sign and the descriptive Swahili words *kimpango wako* (literally 'by your own plan') on a bare cement block wall. This paint was also drawn adjacent to an unfinished window frame covered by wooden boxes and steel bars running horizontally into the frame structure. The perimeter over the swastika sign made me wonder what is wrong in the area. It also reminded me of the poison sign that one sees on a rat poison can; the word danger is written underneath the window and goes with the sign. This graffiti symbolizes a very common opinion, as displayed by the painter, of how native settlers translate their unplanned housing environments – these are dangerous areas where one makes the plan up, for life and the house, out of the conditions available.
Plate 7.1: Settlers’ translation of their settlement conditions at Darajabovu

When linked with the phrase “by your own plan” painted over the top of the danger sign, it reveals an even more interesting picture about this unfinished house and the overall haphazard nature of the surrounding areas. The wall is not plastered and the window is not finished, with a poor-looking wooden frame, and there is no glass or wooden shutters to cover the window. It also shows poverty here, with the boards that cover the window from the inside; even if the owner could afford those boards, s/he has to wait for many years to do the shutters due to lack of money (windows and doors are by far the most expensive materials per unit cost in self-help housing in Zanzibar). At least the iron bars suggests protection from the outside interference in the house – these are a common design/style of Swahili house window frames, but also a cautionary sign of the petty crime common in Darajabovu.

Perhaps, the tiny swastika drawn between the iron bars on the inside boards would just mean a decoration in this setting, without any hidden meaning, just looking like another form of graffiti – indeed, its Indian origins probably mean the swastika is not deployed in this Swahili

Source: Author, on Fieldwork in Zanzibar, July, 2008
house to symbolize affection for German Nazism. But overall, this whole picture is not of an inviting place, because of its unfinished nature of the structure and the signs connected to it. Environmentally, the picture also recognizes that no matter how dangerous these settlements may be, these are the types of shelters people can afford in the absence of planning interventions. On the planning side, the responsible institutions both in the municipal and the central governments always repeatedly claim that they are limited in planning manpower and other equipment shortages to be able to look after those housing areas.

Opposite Makame Haji's residence, the picture was somehow more inviting. There was a small vegetable garden on one side of the front door separating my interviewee's house from that of his closest neighbor. This opposite house is well constructed with reasonable utility services, such as power and water supplies and an independent drain or sanitary waste pit outside the house. A decent TV antenna points to the air, and other utility features are attached, with a nice looking carved front-door standing in between the two *baraza* – a much nicer façade when compared to most of the other houses that surround it. I was told the decent house belonged to a Pemban businessman who could not get a planned plot elsewhere in the city.

I have been back and forth for many years in this area visiting relatives and friends from when I was an urban planner in Zanzibar. Reconnecting with this community was part of the reason for my fieldwork there, in order to investigate what folks do in their housing development and construction processes. I came to realize that people who live within informal housing areas also have in common many things with formal processes that they refer back and forth to whenever opportunities appear. When respected by the authorities, others prefer to improve their own plans according to their needs and economic status, regardless of their location. Whether those areas are planned in conventional ways or not is another thing, but the most important
thing for them is to be connected, utility-wise.

### 7.8 Liberalized industrialization and land reform in the case study area

The headquarters of the ineffective Economic Processing Zone (EPZ) Authority is just around the corner from the Welezo neighborhood at the Amani Industrial Park complex. This is an area that was essentially established to diversify Zanzibar's ailing agriculture-based economy during the first liberalization initiatives in the 1980s. By early 1992, on the advice of a visiting development delegation from Mauritius, the Zanzibari Government, then led by President Salmin Amour, decided to convert the park to an EPZ area that could provide significant employment opportunities to low-income residents. This initiative was intended to provide a clear copy of the Mauritius industrial development concept, under the influence of the World Bank's guided development initiatives for the Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) countries. Zanzibar was included here as one part of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT). The government was quick to convert the empty shells within the Amani Industrial Park (AIP) for an EPZ facility. The Pemba component of the EPZ program never took off – probably resulting in another influence on the massive amount of Pemban migration to Zanzibar city.

As in other countries where the EPZ concept was established, as part of the World Bank development loan initiatives, the government is obligated for paying back the loans on all free zone authorities that usually take years to repay. Still, the AIP was a well-planned park, with the necessary infrastructure, built in the 1980s under Indian expertise. It was originally built to house government-owned small-scale industries during President Aboud Jumbe's time in the early 1980s. There are 12 factory sites within AIP which were originally used to produce clothing,
electrical and electronic products, soaps and other detergents, perfume and liqueur products, motor spare parts, kitchen utensils, and processing of many other agricultural and dairy products available from Zanzibar. Manufacturing of most of these items is history now in Zanzibar.

Presently, Zanzibar is importing almost everything, and the factory stalls have remained empty for nearly a decade, since Salmin Amour's replacement by Karume, Jr., who depended on the growing tourism industry and its 4.5% share for development projects by the donors from the union treasury. Except for the non-agricultural products, the products were processed based on 100% foreign made materials with only their assemblage in Zanzibar. “I don't know how much they were getting done, but it was a good amount,” said Juma Shaame, a former employee of the cable processing factory. “But when I was first employed, I heard that we were going to get paid directly from the factory owners but the government refused, saying we must be paid through the Zanzibar treasury and in local currency to avoid differences in their salary scales with other workers in the islands because of the needed foreign currency in the country. The good news is we got employed for being able to operate their factories. But the factories were shut down 10 years ago. The investors could not continue with their investments because of the high taxes charged on their products,” he concluded. The investors ran into interference from the political rumbling between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar on who holds the right to manage EPZ areas, on the premise that external trade was part of the Union's foreign affairs, although economic development is not.

Theoretically, liberalized investment in EPZ complexes are a good initiative for the benefit of the local population. However, it proved very challenging in the case of Zanzibar, which would need to become a sovereign independent entity within Tanzania’s geopolitical arrangement to reduce such a challenge. It was also hooked into the taxation scheme within the
URT. Following many hiccups of the tariff and taxation arrangements those factories became unreliable for the Zanzibari economy and contributed to the strained relationships that were felt between Zanzibar and the (Union) Tanzanian governments during that time.

This frustrated the Zanzibari leadership throughout Salmin's presidency which became one of the most disturbing cases of the so called union annoyances. The EPZ became unreliable and was not under local control. The EPZ also was not reliable for actually paying things like income tax or certain duty taxes or anything like that. Unlike the original concept of the free zones, which were intended to provide opportunities to investors without being under the stifling control of laws of the taxation systems of Tanzania and Zanzibar, Zanzibar’s EPZ ended up being governed much more politically than economically by the country's union agents. The EPZ became a showdown of political strengths between the two union parts, which was a hard pill for the investors and their inviting Zanzibari government to swallow.

In the heyday of the EPZ’s operation, “you would be given about 400 pieces to sew in case of clothes. You will be required to complete them in order to get your total pay for that day”, recalled Mariam Juma (2008). “There were endless pressures for us workers all times.... You will be needed to pay attention without talking to anybody until lunch time. If you are to go to mosque during lunch hours or to the bathroom they watch you miserably. There was displeasure in almost everything. It was like the return of colonization or slavery. We used to get very tired, and then if you complain, they bring the people from the mainland who got paid even less than us.” Most important of all, we were not supposed to make excuses; we were supposed to work five days a week. “They will only expect you to become the fastest sewer among your fellow workers, she continued in my long conversation with her.

However, “their pay was reasonable if compared with the government salaries for
ordinary working folks like us. By the month end you get some TZS30,000 which was valued at about US$30. By the time they deduct your taxes and other charges you end up with about $25 which was not bad at all at that time. And that is how I got to this place”, she recalled, referring to her half-built house at Darajabovu. “There were hardly 10 houses when we moved to this place, except that Washoto house,” she said, pointing to the two-story building owned by the former revolutionary which had existed since the early 1970s up the ridge slope in Welezo.

Washoto’s presence here and the introduction of this industrial park during the 1990s, together with the new ring road and the stadium nearby, are major catalysts of the development of these neighborhoods along the entire crescent just west of the municipal boundary and its ring road.

Right now the widowed interviewee above is jobless. On the other side of the story, Karim Islam, another Darajabovu interviewee, had this to add. “I work at Tembo Hotel in the city” but most of the young people in the neighborhood do not have anywhere to go because “the available jobs in tourism are mostly sold out to either people from the mainland Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya.” Karim, who used to drive one of the factory buses at the EPZ park, noted that the neighborhoods will soon include other people from all around the great lakes region including Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) due to the approval of a common customs union within the East African states. “Since I do not have reliable employment,” said Ali Zungu (one of our local guides and friends from the nearby Mwera settlement) “when I wake up I quickly rush to the dock for the day's work or to the fishing wharf to pick a boat for cleaning from the returning fishing boat convoys, a chance which is seasonal and not reliable. There is no system of an independent workers union here like in the West,” he joked (Interview, Ali Hassan Zungu, June 5, 2008). Many Zanzibaris argue that employment opportunities are politically connected. “You do not have even a chance to protest,” said Zungu.
Another interviewee added, “like a colony, Zanzibar is in Tanzania which is as politically controlled for affiliates of the ruling party, CCM. It does not operate like an equal union partner as it used to be in the past. You can't protest easily here without a special police permit which is available only for a fortune ... At the end of the day everything falls in the elites' hands” (Anonymous Interviewee, 2008). This interviewee was referring to the nearby empty EPZ shells which “are rumored to have been taken by ZAYEDEZA” as part of the continuation of Karume's well known *hapa pangu* property grabbing strategy discussed earlier (Ibid).

It was a very interesting story from this former employee of the EPZ in Zanzibar who was now jobless. He was one of my interviewees and a hut owner living near the park at Darajabovu. Although it is beyond the scope of this project to continue with other political narratives from my other even angrier interviewees, it somehow unveils a bit of the failed opportunities that were instituted in Zanzibar as part of the broad neo-liberalism model that was employed to improve socio-economic conditions and political society during the last 20 years. It also unveils some linkages between the emergence of the informal settlements, such as this one, to the development of nearby infrastructure, both physical, economic, and social.

At present, there are up to 15,000 young people working in hotels, of whom only about a quarter are Zanzibaris (Interview, Ali K. Mirza, Tourism Commission, Zanzibar). Obviously when you talk to these authorities they will try to be more polite in accepting that the tourism industry is dominated by mainland workers and people from Kenya. There is a reason for this fact. Most of the local young people, especially young women, do not find it attractive to work in

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54 Founded by the immediate former first lady of Zanzibar, Shadya Karume, ZAYEDESA stands for Zanzibar Youth, Education, Environment and Development Support Association, [www.zayedesa.org](http://www.zayedesa.org). Emulating the first ladies' NGO activities under the former Tanzanian Ben Mkapa and Zanzibari Salmin Amour's presidencies, ZAYEDESA has been holding a number of properties independently or in partnership with some international organizations to support the family's leadership and economic interests (Please see: [http://mamashadyakarume.blogspot.com/2010/02/mama-shadya-amanikarume.html](http://mamashadyakarume.blogspot.com/2010/02/mama-shadya-amanikarume.html)).
hotels, especially in beach hotels, due to their religious and cultural restrictions. When talking to hotel employers, they agree openly that Kenyans are by far much more skilled for work in hotels than the rest. “Obviously we are trying to provide employment to everyone possible, but we are also attracted to Kenyan people based on their experience in this industry,” said one anonymous hotel manager (Blue Bay Hotel, Zanzibar, 2008). Italian hotel operator, Mario de Biasi claimed that most of the Italian hotel employers originated from Kenya and were thus used to the Kenyan employees’ attitudes and behaviors. “You know these hoteliers are very aggressive and are here to make profit just like any other investor.... And they work in a shareholding engagement so they are prepared to move anywhere that they would agree with their partners,” Ali Mirza of the Commission for Tourism emphasized. But they “certainly are not going back to a messy place like it is in Kenya right now where this industry is also becoming a bit saturated,” concluded de Biasi.

Neoliberal trade and industrialization agreements and the tourism emphasis have provoked mixed reactions and outcomes. Neoliberalism performed badly in the case of the closed EPZ, but wonderfully in tourism. But in the latter case it will take time to experience the full effects, since it is still a relatively new industry. It has clearly had a negative impact in the housing sector, further impoverishing those at the city’s edge. “I have been in Mazsons for nearly 15 years since its inauguration in 1995,” said Makame Haji. “But this is my second job having started with Mawlems Construction Company at the airport a long while before that.... See, although I am a full time employee, I am not doing enough to complete my house because of other family needs.” Bihindi Mfamao, in my July 2008 interview with her, said “as you see here, we use our half of the plot for circulation space, gardening, and for a children's playground further out.” These Darajabovu residents live where they live in direct relationship to Zanzibar’s
neoliberal turn, both because they cannot afford to live elsewhere and because, in some cases, it was convenient to new work opportunities. Their neighborhood’s everyday life is both impoverished by the neoliberal order and existing in its own, kiambo-like separation from the planned or semi-planned city.

7.9 Analytical Reflections

This story of a quarter of a century in time in this case study shows clear and robust urban planning, land management, and subdivision processes encountered a number of conflicting political and economic challenges to achieve both respectable and haphazard housing development in these two city areas. The purpose of this chapter was to identify the strengths and the weaknesses in the first case study area’s experience with planning. The discussion has outlined how inaccessible formal land has interacted with informal traditions in informal housing in the peri-urban environment, where legal instruments clash with commonsense, though technically illegal, land purchasing arrangements. The Welezo-Darajabovu experiences show the consequences of the rush for housing lands in Zanzibar city’s periphery after economic liberalization began in the mid-1980s.

This case study was meant to outline resident's opinions from the formal and informal dwellers point of view. Welezo displays a mixed origin from a negotiated planning approach but with many economic challenges due to neoliberalism, from the failings of the EPZ to the elite bias of land allocation and property grabbing strategy. There are so many challenges, including the system's irresponsible land rights control (as exemplified by the case of the waqf land conflict) and its intolerance of other subdivision processes, some of which the system responds
to with violence. For example, the government intervened violently to stop informal land parceling and subdivision in a small valley area just north of Welezo’s main settlement called Baghdad (from the violent capital of Iraq during the recent war there), because of the reaction from the nearby military base, which had not been involved during the subdivision process of this area. The military claimed the Baghdad valley belonged in their buffer zone, a claim for which no cartographic record exists but the government lands institutions felt they could not contradict. Welezo also gives an example of the original owners who lost their lands regardless of legal protections for their waqf property following the nationalization of land of the 1960s which led to an official land re-allocation to one of the elite revolutionaries. Because of that land conflict, the area became quite an interesting place for other developers to try their fortunes through the ruling party. The party was another arm of the state that, however informally, usurped planning authority to allocate land within its constituencies.

There are also other reasons for choosing this area. The home developers I interviewed showed me that they cannot differentiate between the official and unofficial (formal and informal) alloted areas since the facilities available at Welezo or Darajabovu look almost the same (albeit with the homes of wealthy elites standing out a bit), regardless of the bureaucratic frustrations and conditions over their standardized planning experience over the planning, allocation, and approval stages. The best option for them was to purchase their lands or apply for housing land from the TAP land owners due to the flexibility and the shortage of time experienced in processing their transactions. They complained against elite favoritism, blaming land authorities for having no concern about the poor majority like themselves, especially when they do not belong to the same ruling party or are not rich enough to bribe people in the system.

Like Makame Haji, one of my lead informants for this case study, people in Welezo-
Darajabovu remained opinionated against the official processes, claiming that to be granted a planned land parcel, an applicant cannot be poor, because s/he would be made to wait longer until their applications have been processed and approved, a process which can take more than five years of waiting until the final approval is made. Before then “they [the elite] have their own alternatives for sheltering themselves in town or they are provided with alternative houses in the government-owned apartments at Michenzani, Kilimani, Kikwajuni or even in Stone Town.... They are people without shelter problems, who are just looking for new-found lands for sale” (Interview Ngwali Makame, 2008). His grievances continued: “it is different with most of us here who originated either from Pemba or the Unguja countryside and especially who are less influential both politically and economically.”

Unfortunately, this view stacks up against the official viewpoint that “informal settlers are land invaders who do not want to obey the declared municipal land administration and planning rules” (Interview Haji Adam, Surveys and Planning Director, June, 2008). This opinion by this government official also contributes to encourage the creation of underground land subdivision movements by land seekers who look for their housing lands through farm owners or middlemen without official consultation, and at the same time fearing the government’s potential rights to intervene. This hidden movement’s movers and shakers help inform each other while consolidating their informal processes, without wasting time or resources by waiting for so long to satisfy unforeseen government promises.

In this fieldwork, I was also able to learn about the effects of the Swahili culture on housing by the poor urban dwellers when the area was opened up for housing to the newcomers and diverse groups on both sides of the Swahili culture from the mainland to the isles, from urban to the rural peoples’ perspective. In the decades since the revolution, the government of
Zanzibar has attempted to keep history and the peoples’ multi-cultural origin from becoming social issues, with their main focus placed on their political ideology (party-led socialism) rather than on the ordinary peoples' interests per se. Even though the main unifying language is KiSwahili, and its associated amalgamated cultures manifested in the different-yet-of-a-piece look of the housing forms throughout the Ng’ambo region of the city, this has not been used by the authorities as a unifier. Instead, political ideology has become a divider. So have the land purchasing and parceling processes also, sometimes, largely echoing the 'hidden fact' of ideological rift in Zanzibar.

While KiSwahili is taught as a major language in schools, civic education has replaced politics (siasa) since the start of the multi-party democratic era (1992), but civic education ends up being a means for retaining the power of the reigning political ideology in all walks of life, including in servicing for land and housing issues. This has affected how services are provided in the communities with the emergence of the CCM as the ruling party influencing what the government should do in its decision making processes, including those concerning land sectors. Party branches and/or Maskani are in every neighborhood of the city funded through individual local patrons who influence most of the governmental decisions in their areas. Politics as a ‘civic’ subject was re-introduced to schools’ curricula to display and protect the interests of the islands’ revolutionary socialist spirit in this multi-party phase and to protect the controlled ideological preference of the ruling party, even if it was received with some objectionable multiple-choice responses, if you will, from the informal sector. These types of political cadres influence the government’s decision making for their areas, especially in land cases - about who deserves the right to a specific area in official allotments, for instance. The opposition and other

55 The term, cadre, is commonly used in Zanzibar (in Swahili, kada) to describe a passionate rank-and-file member
people who are below the political rank of cadre end up looking for land or services in their own informal ways, which may be faster and cheaper, and therefore in turn become attractive to even those close to the elite ranks. These local strategies employed to access land informally were working adequately for a fair number of people until some sporadic new government interventions have come in to regulate or eradicate them. I will look at one of such these experiences in the next chapter.

The other point which I want to emphasize here is about the rural cultural landscape in the case study areas. Most of this place is occupied by people born in the countryside; only two of the 30 respondents I interviewed came originally from the urban district (though some of the others did move to Welezo-Darajabovu directly from the urban district, this was after many years in rural settings). When these people are able to purchase their lands in the periphery, they often maintain in close touch with their places of origin, either by going there or by receiving their family members to live with them. So the areas often keep some elements of a rural landscape intact – gardens, livestock pens, fruit trees, and, sometimes, a sort of compound-housing whereby relatives or village-mates relocate as neighbors in a contiguous set of houses. This may last for a relatively long time, until it encounters something of a gentrification process, upon the elite’s discovery of a place’s potentiality. Such a discovery is unlikely in the low-lying, swampy parts of Darajabovu that are nicknamed Uholanzi (Holland) because of their flood potential (Myers 2010a).

A noticeable contribution these people of rural origins bring about lies in how they deal with each other in neighborliness; this is quite unlike the social behavior of similar people when they end up in the gated, planned communities or government apartment complexes. They leave
their political differences aside, so that these do not affect what they hold in common in their shared housing environment. Most importantly, they learn how to mobilize their shared energies for the case of mosque buildings and playgrounds, and to tolerate each other in the case of any observed serious irregularity. In the occurrence of some misunderstandings, they normally refer matters to the government representative of the area, the sheha in particular, but also through the elder statesmen or women in the neighborhood, who may be imams at the mosque, teachers, retirees, or simply respected senior citizens. Myers (2010a) gives two relevant examples of interviewees from 2007 in the area that illustrate the point in the extreme: a retired revolutionary who consistently protects the interests and tends to the urban service needs of a CUF neighbor because of his longstanding friendship with the father of the woman in that CUF household; and the retired CCM stalwart secret policeman who carefully tends the graves of the Omani landowners whose shamba became his TAP, sharing a warm friendship with their relatives when they visit from Stone Town or abroad. These social relations persist as if the people are still in the countryside with the same housing and community culture.

Once a developer wants to set out his structure, s/he will inform the neighbors. In horrific ways some isolated instances can occur that signify some challenges experienced for those living in these areas. There are more concerns with the densely populated nature of this poorly accessible disorganized settlement in case of fire accidents or any other unforeseen emergency. It is a typical example of Zanzibar's worst-served informal areas which are mostly half-built and poorly looked after, especially by the municipal council authorities or the government, since they are seemingly beyond the reach of the official recognition for service provision. They do their own electricity connections, for example, by approaching the electric authority through ways far outside the normal official channels, or sometimes through their local ruling party cadres. Some
rich people use their money to corrupt those authorities while extending their facilities to their immediate neighbors. Interestingly, where the informal area is much larger like in Darajabovu, it becomes easier for the party and its government to expand services to the area in return for political favor. Unfortunately, the haphazard, semi-*kiambo*, rural-influenced style of layout has one very crucial flaw: it seldom leaves any significant rights-of-way for roads. What few one-lane dirt tracks do exist in Darajabovu, for example, have steadily become disconnected dead-ends with house extensions and irregular plot allocations (Myers 2010a). Walking through narrow alleys can be a charming and unifying experience in a rural *kiambo*, but it is a major problem in increasingly densifying peri-urban settlements of 12,000 people expecting urban-level services.

There are a few government officers who work to spread the positive side of this informal housing development approach, as a base for improving local planning practices with the engagement of the peoples. They think by so doing they may create better understanding with the people involved regardless of the other challenges involved, such as road construction. These are mainly officers who were involved in the facilitation of the defunct COLE and in the management of urban-related poverty-reduction and solid waste disposal strategies from various corners of the society. They are joined by some ordinary residents and even some property owners who believe in the promotion of planning as a form of debate in the city that needs to be facilitated. Several areas of the city have begun to show some footprints of this kind of locally-rooted planning option, politically-incorporated in some areas, and extended with some government negotiated strategies at a mature and somewhat larger-scale level.

Omar Ramadhan (nicknamed Mapuri) was among those government’s technicians who were involved in this type of low key dialogic subdivision planning experiment. I utilize his
know-how and those of other like-minded technicians as part of my next case study analysis on Chukwani's land subdivision sharing alternative. From the mid-1990s, this technician also began an organized subdivision with some peri-urban village people, and without even informing his seniors. He was simply going to the field and telling people about his ideas and concerns and reported what he had underway to his boss long afterward. Mapuri began by assisting owners to subdivide their lands to improve their land values. His plan then continued to grow as an ad-hoc activity; it turned out to be well respected locally, even by his fellow surveyors who were in on the secret. It was like "making a difference [by creating a] visionary reasoning in try[ing] new things" as Hallsmith (2003: 1) contended on top of this chapter. He nearly lost his job, though, through this illegal practice. This initiative had much influence later in the mid-1990s, after similar experiments within some outer city places when some nearby landowners were able to pool themselves together to help surveyors easily subdivide their lands upon receiving unofficial government advice and resource sharing techniques.

The process tied together landowners' requirements with middlemen/local agents’ involvement and ad-hoc technical advice and consultation from lower-ranking officials. The local landholders and agents in return learned some much easier and quicker techniques on how to engage the authorities in their local quasi-planning cultures. In the process they began to inculcate official land entitlement and recognition. For reasons well clarified in the following chapter, the exercise was temporarily phased out in most of the last decade but it came back as the regime began to understand its logic. Until recently, however, this 'hidden' alternative has been one-sided technically, dominated by the same time-wasting survey and mapping techniques of formal planning but without serious trained planning involvement. Control of those ad-hoc activities was also weakened by their lack of collective governance and municipal involvement.
That said, it was a step forward for intellectual evaluation.

7.10 Conclusion

Zanzibar is definitely entering a new era in the potential for dialogic planning. This is an era where even a truly humble-looking local subdivision practice could perhaps be shown as a potential initiative by some African cities that experience similar planning difficulties in accessing land/housing for the people based on the old-fashioned planning approaches. Mapuri's 'hidden contribution' may provide a unique base to outline a methodology behind a collaborative land subdivision that celebrates multiple cultural considerations and stakeholder involvement at all levels. Landowners want to profit from their land transactions as they help to speed up accessibility to land for the Zanzibari community in need of planned or guided land for housing in the city. But it is yet to achieve official recognition.

Additionally, what can perhaps best be appreciated from this chapter is that in the absence of efficient planning and formal land management activities, people rushed for their own alternatives. Instead of doing things on their own informal processes and not following the government way of doing things, they sometimes moved to an ad-hoc quasi-planning that balanced technical advice to improve their own local subdivision schemes. This could be a big jump as far as sustainability and collaborative planning rhetoric is concerned. Without such alternative consideration the still purely state controlled and socially neglectful new system risks repeating the limitations of previously instituted strategies during the years before the reforms.

Moreover, as shown from this example, however humble the Mapuri initiatives have been, this could have been a step forward to make a difference. It advocates people's rejection of
the government becoming a big elephant stepping on people's feet. However, instead of letting
the government becoming a 'bull in a China closet,' or letting housing informally overrule the
government's destroyed land management system, people had their own vision of what they had
to do. What essentially remains, in my opinion, is to promote this dialogue. This is because of the
people's realization that even within the poverty stricken living environment that they are still
locked within, with informal processes that can mean taking huge risks to inhabit poorly
controlled housing areas, they still are of the opinion that the government should stop taking their
lands or tearing down their properties or condemning their lands and houses and should instead
give them the support and infrastructure they deserve.

Most interestingly, if only 14% of people get land through the formal processes, then the
remaining options for the majority are to resort to their informal means, even though their
methods are not appreciated by the authorities. An encouraging step is that at least some people
have changed their opinion and attitude in favor of their own strategy to access and develop land
through guided technical alternatives, where nobody could be thrown out because of only modest
and informal government involvement. We need to see to what extent these exercises are able to
cope with other environmental sustainability and urban governance concerns that can deservedly
contribute to the ongoing dialogic debate about the unified planning process for Africa.
Chapter 8: Case Study 2
Collaborative Planning at Chukwani: Peri-Urban Land Policy Localization in Zanzibar

“Achievement in spatial order is a result of efforts made by the grassroots actors in collaboration with the local formal institutions.... “In addition, it is an outcome of simple approaches and tools....” (Lupala, 2002: 258 and 268; italics mine).

“We grieved, we complained, we finally realized that how much you are determined to do you just stick to or do it! However much less you earn, you still go for it! This land transaction practice was our last resort. Whether you will call it an informal activity, god forbid, for us it is not; because we do not see it that way....” (Interview Mzee Mwinyi Ramadhani, Chukwani Community Leader, Zanzibar, 2008).

8.1 Introduction

The role of this chapter is to reveal a local collaborative land subdivision planning case that attempted to remove the government's domination of land management and its ignorance of the informal land subdivision process in peri-urban Zanzibar, and how it was implemented at Chukwani. We will see how the government eventually became responsive in supporting the sharing approach, as it improved its access to the people in a more consultative way of doing things, and how it was convinced to accept peoples' contributions in the introduction of this alternative model. In answering how the planning process operated in this advantageous peri-urban settlement, I also outline the prospects that exist for this approach and what challenges are still being encountered with respect to the present land reform processes since they were put in practice in the early 1990s.

The chapter begins by profiling the Chukwani case study area. This is followed by analysis of its land uses and how the collaborative subdivision planning process took place in this village. The concluding reflections show how the idea of collaboration was briefly
actualized, even as it was infected by the tolerant state’s political intervention within the local community environment - from the historical revolutionary background that this village is coming from into the new wave of democratization, with the state’s socialist tendencies still intact. This is evidenced by the connection between a new parliamentary building, colleges and high school compounds, and other elite properties that violate the earmarked post-subdivision planning or land use activities within this village.

8.2 Chukwani Case Study Profile

Chukwani is a peri-urban village located five miles from the city center on the Southwestern edge of Zanzibar city (Figure 8.1). It is partly earmarked by the 1982 master plan as NU # 38, 39, and 40 housing Mbweni, Kigaeni, and Buyu settlements combined. These were collectively inhabited by just above 4,100 people according to Tanzania’s 2002 Population Census. Chukwani is considered a mixed type of settlement on the census, meaning it combines both urban and rural characteristics. This means it is a good case for examining peri-urban subdivision planning, and it was home to an experimental scheme for such subdivisions during the first (ZILEM) reform project phase of the 1990s.

From Stone Town (the city center) on the way to Chukwani, the village can be reached via the airport road once one turns off onto Chukwani road at the Mazizini police station. The village is reachable by local buses and daladala that go through the oldest and most elite suburban residential parts of the city at Mazizini and Mbweni, where one gets a feel of how well the rich people live in the city suburbs before arriving at Chukwani village itself, in the southwestern-most residential and institutional compounds of the city's outskirts.
Historically, like many Zanzibari families, the origin of Chukwani residents is seldom discussed. To most other residents, the village people's origin is assumed to be with the southern Unguja culture hearth\(^56\) of Zanzibari Swahili peoples, on the southwestern corner of Unguja island, and with migration from coastal mainland Tanzania. However, W. H. Ingrams (1931) found some interesting reference points for greater significance for Chukwani at an earlier time.

\(^{56}\) Most historians and anthropologists consider Zanzibari Swahili culture to have had three early hearths, in southwestern Unguja, on Tumbatu island in the north of Unguja, and in central Pemba island; while this seems to be accurate, the British erroneously extrapolated from this the notion that Zanzibar’s Swahili peoples consisted...
In 1927, “some fossils [were] found in blasting operations at Chukwani, six miles south of Zanzibar Town, and …they had the appearance of being a typical Pleistocene stone breccia, the remnants of the meals of Stone Age men from the bottom of a collapsed cave” (Ingrams, 1931: 7). Regardless of how long ago Chukwani may have been inhabited, though, the current village area arguably has more recent beginnings. The extant stands of coconut plantations in this part of the island encouraged human settlements to flourish there during the Omani Sultanate, especially after the turn of the 19th century. Chukwani village, however, remained small and only marginally connected to the growth of Zanzibar town during the British colonial era. Even during the early years after the revolution, Chukwani – unlike what we have seen in Welezo-Darajabovu – was still somewhat isolated from the processes of dramatic transformation, such as the proliferation of TAPs (since there were virtually no Omani or Indian plantations to nationalize or confiscate in the area to start with).

The village was designated by the 1982 Zanzibar master plan for medium and low density residential suburbs alongside the development of academic institutions, namely the already-existing Karume Technical College, a new College of Education, College of Health Sciences, and two other private high schools (which have been built more recently). The area is now perceived as possessing the city’s most expensive land, much of it subdivided in the 1990s. Some parcels of lands were priced at the time of my 2008 fieldwork from around US$60,000 to 80,000 per acre (or accurately a 1,000 square meter) plot. Most of the newcomers were from the elite group of Zanzibar society, with transnational exiles or expatriate hoteliers often occupying the houses; one has to be among this group to be able to purchase land in the village’s prime coastal areas.

of three distinct “tribes.”
Because of the escalation of land prices, some parts of Chukwani (here including all of Mbweni and some patchy lands alongside the western village coast, since these are part of Chukwani shehia) are regarded by most other Zanzibar city residents as “not entitled for people like us from Ng’ambo or the countryside” (Interview Ali Ussi, 2008), but instead an extension of the adjoining colonial-era Mazizini and Migombani suburbs inhabited by Zanzibari government, diplomatic, and business elites. Ali Usi was once given a parcel of land in 1996 in this area, which he sold for only about TZS 3.5 million, only to realize in disbelief that his half an acre of land was resold for more than TZS 15 million a year later. The ‘private’ residence of the former president Karume's family lies close by on the Mbweni side of the Shehia alongside a beach-front hotel resort and the lands of the government’s security service. Not surprisingly, given the elite locale, Chukwani residents were among the first to benefit from guided, alternative development planning in the form of a negotiated subdivision experiment introduced with some technical involvement of land institutions that helped to provide “an option for the combination of formal and [traditional village-based] informal sub-urban development and its actors” (Scholz, 2008: 147). The experimental subdivision process also had its limitations, though, which are also displayed below.

The residents of this village make a great distinction between their village and other peri-urban villages, for being close to the revolutionary politics of Zanzibar. During the Sultanate era, the village leadership was involved in the formation of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) that preceded CCM. The political riots locally known as The War of Cattle (Kiswahili: Vita vya Ng’ombe) occurred before the 'time of politics' as described by Myers’s (1993) during the British protectorate era in the 1950s. In this Vita vya Ng’ombe, a serious riot broke out as a result of the opposition of the cattle owners of the nearby Kiembesamaki village to compulsory inoculation
against anthrax. Twenty cattle owners were prosecuted and 19 sentenced to terms of imprisonment (Mwakanjuki 2009, http://kibunango.blogspot.com). A crowd of sympathizers, from the surrounding villages and beyond hurried to the prison asking for the release of the jailed convicts and a serious riot then took place outside the prison after they left the court (Ibid). This was among the most serious incidents that enhanced Africans opposition to the Sultanate regime, which then influenced the first election that was held in Zanzibar six years later in 1957, in which ASP won five out of six seats (Lofchie, 1965; Mapuri, 1996). The elections were bitterly contested by both political parties and racial and religious organizations but in the end, they really escalated the conflict between ASP and its rival ZNP (Zanzibar National Party) for Zanzibar's political domination that culminated in the 1964 revolution.

Thereafter, during the post-revolutionary times in the early 1980s, some 12 semi-detached bungalows were built in the village from President Jumbe's rural housing scheme to commemorate this village’s contribution to the revolution, as also happened in other villages that were siding with ASP. It was not surprising, given the evident support the revolutionary regime had here, to witness some 30% of the village’s land that had been previously used as part of the government ranch land dedicated for mixed residential and other spatial institutional development purposes during the completion of the 1982 master plan. Most of this land was designated for low, medium, and high density developments in Mbweni, Kiembe Samaki, and the Chukwani village areas, respectively. This would have replaced most village farmlands with planned developments, leaving only a small segment of land under native control. This part of the village land conveyed a similar collective response to impoverishment characterizing most peripheral lands housing the poor. Following a short term economic boom in the 1990s, which increased the shortage of planned residential land, it was also in this village land where many
destitute villagers were bought off by local officials and their fellow businessmen in the scramble for land and in land speculation.

Chukwani village is near the most protected government lands in Zanzibar – the “royal” Karume family land, the airport and a major military installation virtually surround it. It is, perhaps, as the consequence of its history of political tolerance toward and from the ruling elites, and the economic fortunes that were associated with that history, that some of the village land was released for further airport development and the construction of those new educational institutions (Karume (formally Mbweni) Technical College had been built by the US in the times before the revolution).

Natives in this Shehia categorize their village into two parts, 'A' and 'B', whereby area 'A' stands for their traditional village land area and 'B' for the land originally placed under the government's ranch land before the revolution – the land which was earmarked as land for educational institutional uses by the 1982 master plan. My study is based on native village areas located within neighborhood numbers 39 and 40 and its adjoining residential and agricultural environments. The reasons for choosing this area are historical - it was not accidental to choose this village for the experimental planning exercise. Although the area is located within the 1982 master plan area of mixed peri-urban housing characteristics, it is legally rural land, falling outside the municipality’s legal boundary. This situation was seen as beneficial for testing the exercise, in a loosely controlled setting. Since Chukwani was within the Town Planning Area of

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57 Shehia is KiSwahili for the lowest authorized administrative entity at the village or local community level in Zanzibar. Established under the Local Government and Regional Administration Act No. 3/1995, this entity is headed by Sheha or a local leader of any governing structure of the Zanzibar community (called Shehia) at the lowest local level. Unlike local government councilors, Sheha is not elected through the ballot box but appointed by the Regional Commissioner and is given all executive powers as the presidential representative of the area. She is technically below the councilor who is a political representative but practically they have been two parallel and conflicting structures of governance despite the fact that they serve the same constituency. The councilor of the Chukwani Shehia was an absentee at all our meetings with the Sheha.
the 1982 master plan, the TCPD, Cap. 85/1955 was applicable, with the assistance of the Towns and Township Decrees, Cap 79 and Cap 80 of 1929 – both of which had been repealed by the Zanzibar Municipality Act # 5/1995. The old laws, weakly enforced, created a better environment for people's violation of rules for obtaining land for housing, knowing that it was hard to control them.

6.3 Village Land Use Characteristics

Chukwani was the pilot area for the first large-scale subdivision scheme based on a 40%/60% sharing formula. The housing development process in it is still ongoing, with incidental fruit, yam, grain, and vegetable fields still dominating its peri-urban landscape covered by coconut palms and mango trees. Not many urban facilities would be typically expected to be available as yet in neighborhoods like Chukwani. However, because of the original inhabitants’ proximity (ideologically and physically) to the political establishment, the area is well ahead of the normal city average in Zanzibar. It contains its own nursery and primary schools and it is well supplied with piped water, a government’s technical college, nursing college, two private tourist resorts, and a college of education in the vicinity. The area also houses the newly built parliament of Zanzibar within earmarked land for the Karume Technical College expansion. Overall, it is a well facilitated area, except for road and sanitary infrastructure, which is as poorly developed as the rest of Zanzibar city. Drainage systems are always done individually within people's houses through a private septic tank and soak-away system for the elite houses and improved pit latrines for the majority of the low income residents.

Before I came back to Zanzibar in the summer of 2008 for my fieldwork, I had made a
visit to this area three years earlier and walked around its neighborhood first to remind myself of the neighborhood pattern. The village retained a little of its rural stone-bush\textsuperscript{58} environment and beauty, but this had been steadily replaced by uncontrolled urbanization processes. The village community was still physically divided into two parts, 'A' and 'B', meaning part 'A' was the original village side and part 'B' meaning the low density elite residential side of the village close to the sea front alongside the above mentioned academic institutions. When moving within the original part of the village with my former workmate, Talib Shaaban, in 2008, we were able to see new housing traditions clashing with the oldest village housing pattern. The latter was still evident in traditional Swahili stone wall structures connected to one another by foot paths that led eventually to the main planned streets, providing a good indicator of how these old areas are being transformed with the arrival of the guided planning scheme for their area. You see the original villagers doing the marvelous and creative things they can do with their domesticated livestock, incidental and haphazard utility supply, and kitchen gardens, all being squeezed, or replaced, by the relatively larger planned houses built by the newcomers.

The village center is just a mile from Zanzibar airport. This is the first place where peoples' traditions collided with a collaborative land management and planning exercise in the first phase of Finnish land reform. During the ZILEM project, a number of peri-urban village land holders objected to the implementation of land adjudication and subdivision schemes in their areas, claiming that their village lands fell under communal family ownership and that it was unfair to parcel them without consultation as their lands were reserved for family inheritance. They also thought that the land authority had deliberately collaborated with

\footnote{Almost all of the flat southern half of Unguja island is classified by local physical geographers as \textit{uwanda} land, best translated as stone-bush: its soils are incredibly thin, barely covering the coral stone bedrock, and if left unsettled or uncultivated, the native vegetation is a bush thicket (Myers 2002).}
expatriate donors to terminate their traditional housing practices and property ownership within their areas.

Realizing that the government land authority was still determined to continue parceling their land within the areas, Chukwani leaders used their influence with local political authorities, which changed the whole project focus into the dialogic mode of planning process. “It became impossible to go forward with a prepared, institutionally recognized scheme layout, but instead we had to work through a new mode of negotiations with lot owners,” revealed Shaaban (2008) in our conversation. This helped to recreate community confidence and trust for the whole exercise and also helped to remove the hurdle that had been experienced by the authorities before the agreement was reached. This led to an erosion of the domineering role of the land authorities as a consequence. The other peri-urban villages where some form of a negotiated collaborative sub-division subsequently went forward included Mbuyu Mnene, Bububu-Kijichi, Kisauni, Mwera, Mtoni-Kidatu, Fuoni, and Uzi-Mwanakwerekwe, but the full-blown process began in Chukwani.

The reasoning behind this collaborative subdivision started with the blistering experience planners had had in peri-urban areas in the new time of politics. Emerging from Mapuri's small scale experiments mentioned in Chapter 7, it originated as an alternative to an earlier foiled survey attempt by “Ardhi House consultants from mainland [Tanzania's Ministry of Lands and Urban Development] ... [who] were engaged to subdivide the area in implementing the 1982 Chinese master plan in southwestern city neighborhoods” (Shaaban, 2008). The Ardhi House consultancy failed because the surveyors were seen camping for their work, based on the technically time consuming and old-fashioned survey approaches, without having informed the concerned village people. By 1994, the humble-looking consultative subdivision strategy behind
collaborative means was employed instead, to replace this initial attempt. The main goal of the new exercise was aimed at reducing peoples' anger.

The participatory procedures for implementing the 40%/60% sharing subdivision strategy in Zanzibar, in a way, came in with reference to the environmental planning and management (EPM) approach adopted by Tanzanian colleagues in the mainland’s urban planning systems through the experimental UN-funded Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP) of the early 1990s. This is due to the fact that nearly all of the Zanzibari local planning, surveying, and land management practitioners are trained on the Tanzanian mainland. With this professional training background, this approach was introduced at Chukwani based on the philosophy that “plan-making” should not only be strategic and participatory but should also “be closely related to the question of compensation, because it touches upon interests of those with rights in the land affected by the plan [for influencing and maintaining] the relationship with those holding land rights over the land in question” (Nnkya, 2007: 145). It was the government which was required, though, according to the rightful Acquisition of Land Decree of 1929, to pay compensation and presumably recover the cost from the would-be new developers or plot allottees. This was a heavy burden for the government to bear, which led to the costs being shared in terms of the produced land parcels while the collected land title fees from the new allotments constituted the government’s revenue in its own funding scheme within COLE.

Landowners wanted to profit from their land transactions as they helped the authorities to speed up land accessibility to other applicants based on the new laws and the government's

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59 The author of this book (Tumsifu Jonas Nnkya) is a Tanzanian planner and professor at Ardhi University in Dar es Salaam, who was heavily involved in training local (including Zanzibari) planners and in the establishment of the sustainable cities programs in Tanzania. He was also engaged in the evaluation of the short-lived Zanzibar Sustainable Project (1998-2005) and the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project, as is expressed in the UN’s report, Sustainable Cities Program in Tanzania, 1992-2003: From a City Demonstration Project to a National Program for Environmentally Sustainable Urban Development, from 2004.
procedures. The village was inhabited by about 500 people in 1988 before it was hit by the intensive unguided urbanization pressures of the 1990s. The village had increased ten-fold from its original 1988 population by the time of the 2002 census, with about 822 households. This expansion can be explained by considering the number of the new incoming settlers who have moved to the area since the village land was parceled under this new consultative model approach.

Physically, the morphology of this village, originated from the coral bushland and settlement development environment, has begun to change dramatically since then. It is now divided into two different settlement land use patterns: the initial traditional housing and the planned institutional and residential subdivisions - which still manage to contradict the original master plan proposals for the area. My work here is about analyzing people's social contributions to planning within the nucleus native informal settlement area at Chukwani which is now being formally organized based on the newly introduced negotiated planning approach. This shehia is bounded by the Zanzibar airport on the east, Kiembesamaki settlement in the north and by the sea coast and some private residences facing the Zanzibar channel in the west. The Chukwani military camp, which replaced the Sultan’s palace associated with the reign of Ali Hamoud (1902-1911), is located on the outermost southwestern corner of this village. This camp is not included as a part of this village land use analysis. However, its advantageous location helped the village to benefit in service provision after the 1964 revolution.

Karume Technical College was built in this shehia in the early 1960s, followed by the

60 What can be noted here, however, is that, considering the historically socialist background of the islands after the revolution and the political sensitivity of Zanzibar’s union with Tanganyika, Zanzibar, for a city of its modest size, has an extraordinary number of military and security barracks in comparison to comparable secondary cities in Africa (eight in total, with each measuring from one to three square kilometers). They take up more than a third of Zanzibar's city land and are located every three or so kilometers across the entire city.
College of Health Sciences and the College of Education in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, respectively. The construction of the building housing the headquarters of the Zanzibar's House of Representatives on Karume Technical College land was completed in July 2010. However, the village land was not all parceled. Some of its lands close to the original homesteads were left open until recently. Presently, the greater part of the Chukwani Shehia is a combination of small and scattered native homesteads intermingled with subdivided lands in four separate mitaa: Mbweni, Chukwani, Buyu, and Kigaeni. Its diverse character is due to the fact that the stunning urbanization of the outer edge has associations with both the great benefits and vast “difficulties in living conditions experienced there” (Myers, 2009: 94; see also Scholz 2008). Some of the setting resembles the traditional countryside environment, built without basic municipal utilities and improved road infrastructure. This makes some of the Chukwani homesteads much more remote than their proximity to the city would suggest, and extremely poor, inhabited mostly by the people from mainland Tanzanian's northwestern region engaged in stone quarrying for the new construction industry. It has a severe incidence of crime, insecurity and ill-health. In 2007, one of the foreign hoteliers was found killed in one of the nearby beach resorts.

Most of Chukwani's traditional homesteads are not that prestigious. The economic condition of the native part of the village largely represents that of the Welezo settlement situation, with its mix of middle and low income setters with diverse income generation activities. While more than 40 percent of the native villagers are still engaged in farming activities, about 90 percent of the remaining portion of the newly arrived immigrants work in government related jobs, self-employed businesses or itinerant labor jobs in the city and the adjoining academic institutions. The village is poorly serviced, with a single paved road running across its village center to the nearby army barracks.
Administratively, Chukwani is one of the six localities lying within the Kiembesamaki constituency, for which the present minister for agriculture and former minister for lands and housing in the sixth phase government serves as the representative in the House of Representatives. With a representative as minister who is also an in-law to the previous sixth phase president (brother of Zanzibar’s then first-lady), the village is by no means positioned politically to interdict anything its representative would seek to do – its development fortunes rest largely on its relationship to him. They thus had no ability to stop his ill-advised subdivision interventions. Lately, though, this minister has become the second in the Karume extended family to have been taken to court for land issues, in his case for having forcefully occupied a part of Buyu's native inherited land for his own private hotel resort project (Mwinyi Sadalla, *Nipashe*, February 11, 2011).

The Urban/West region in which Kiembesamaki constituency is located experienced some steep growth in terms of its population since the 1960s, from only 95,047 in 1967 to 391,002 people in the 2002 census. However, the calculated figures of the village population based on the 2002 census represent a modest situation of 1.8 households per hectare, which forms around 19 persons per hectare. And, based on data for the village population compiled by the village *Sheha* in 2008, a rapid growth trend of close to 1,000 new households were observed for Chukwani.

The *Shehia* represents a multi-ethnic population structure built up from a native village background, with recent local immigrants (led by Nyamwezi and Sukuma people) from mainland Tanzania adding to the settlement's population composition. Its people work in both blue and white collar jobs, including in farming, office work, construction labor, domestic help, and tourism. Like the Kiembesamaki and Mwanakwerekwe sides of this constituency, Chukwani
Shehia has grown tremendously in less than 20 years. At the grassroots administrative level Chukwani is composed of eight grassroots members, two from each of the four village localities (Mbweni, Chukwani, Buyu, and Kigaeni). The village also has a huge CCM majority, part of providing CCM with the highest percentage of the votes by far among Kiembesamaki’s three major constituent localities (Mombasa, Kiembesamaki, Chukwani) in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 multi-party elections. A formidable part of this Kiembesamaki constituency houses most of the private elites' properties in the city including the current president and a number of other political and business elites who preceded him.

In terms of its social environment, urbanization which takes place in this area is due to its proximity to work places having connections with the academic, transportation, and military institutions nearby alongside peri-urban-oriented farming, and construction activities that absorb most of the workload. Within a similar research environment in one of Dar es Salaam's peri-urban settlements at Changanyikeni, located within the vicinity of an academic institutional landscape, like at Chukwani, Lupala (2002: 174) observed that “the land prices have attained the urban-value influence that land rent from urban agriculture can no longer compete with land rent from housing.” Unlike in the interior parts of Chukwani and Kigaeni towards Buyu and the airport, close to Buyu homestead, land management is largely a village responsibility with the exception of a few elite possessors who own large land parcels on the village beach side. Figure 8.2 below briefly shows the determinants of urbanization in most peri-urban areas including Chukwani.
8.4 The Case of Chukwani's Collaborative Subdivision Process

The exercise began as a small-scale subdivision scheme which covered only 36 plots within a parcel of land owned by the Sheha's family (according to Thalib Shaaban, interviewed in 2008). The inclusion of the village landowners into a village-organized meeting began before the design stage of its layout plan. It was begun by Mzee Mwinyi Ramadhani, the Sheha of the area, and by invitation of the Chief Surveyor of the planning and survey department into the village in 1994. “Yes, we had to get serious,” continued Shaaban in this interview.

Taking into consideration that the formal planning process was snubbed by the people in the earlier years of the 1990s when the consultant surveyors from Ardhi University were chased out of Chukwani village, “it gave us the picture that presiding planning practice was no longer suitable to guide residential housing development in the city and that concerned peri-urban
villagers and other landowners have become used to their informal ways influenced by the escalated land prices” (Shaaban 2008). Therefore, local planners were expected to guide development in different ways as a litmus test to the ongoing democratic, localized, and participatory land reform processes engaged in at institutional levels. Elsewhere in the city, where this exercise began for testing on much smaller-scaled initiatives, the idea was aimed at regulating the informal land transactions in the form of negotiating on a 40/60 percentage campaign in land owners/occupiers' favor and guiding the urbanization process in the peripheries. This involved providing assistance to village or farmland owners in changing their land uses from agricultural or institutional to residential earmarking on a case-by-case basis (Please refer to the case of Shamba ya Mzee Uddi – or Mzee Uddi's farmland - in Scholz, 2008).

8.4.1 How was the project initiated?

It emanated from the earlier small-scale cases. This practice was nicknamed, from the above chapter, as ‘Mapuri's informal land sharing approach'. Based on the same foundation, the initial objective for the government support for this pilot subdivision planning exercise at Chukwani was aimed at improving the shortage of land allocation people experienced from the government; the citizens applying for regulated land during the age of the neoliberal economic agenda in Zanzibar were frustrated. Referring to the amount of land respectively shared between the government and landowners, the initial condition by the government was that 40% of these lands initially parceled on ad-hoc official interventions would remain under government control for its own allotment and 60% would remain under the control of occupiers. Linked partly to the village’s history, close relationships and personal influences for some of the office staff involved with village leaders and their land occupiers, and their tolerance within the ruling party organs,
this exercise was seen as potentially acceptable by the villagers based on the ten-point subdivision agreements (partly adopted from the informal processes) as shown in Table 8.1 below. The ten bullet approach was acceptable “in order to allow the government to cover the planning and land survey costs incurred during this subdivision process” (Shaaban, 2008). Its locational advantages and the housing environmental conditions also helped, being close to the airport area and to the sea, and somewhat hidden from the Zanzibar city disorder in Ng’ambo. This approach was independently carried out under the supervision and willingness of the surveys and planning department with limited financial and technical assistance from the donors who were supervising the very influential first phase of the ongoing land reform program. It was seen as an inside job of the department which was not meant “to change the current land subdivision practice but rather”, as Scholz (2008: 148) put it, “a model to test.”

Some achievements recorded included a significant change of people's negative attitudes towards land and planning institutions, surveyed land on grid layout road network pattern, and an improved amount of serviced land allocation to people who applied for registered government land, regardless of its other disadvantages that benefited the rich more than the poor. A portion of the site plan for the area that was used by the land authority for lot allocation process for this area which clearly depicts the well arranged layout of the new subdivided area is shown in Figure 8.3 below. The site plan shows a minimum of a four and eight meter wide grid street pattern passable by cars.
Table 8.1: Collaborative Land Subdivision Agreements for Chukwani

- Meeting called, reconnaissance done with sheha's leadership/guidance. Applied an ad-hoc strategy based on quasi government's recognition of private land market/selling practices.

- Detailed land use assessment to identify ownership status for land negotiation and conformation.

- Prepared detailed base map for designed layout plan demarcating all individual parcels involved. Provided basic tool for land negotiation.

- Owners agreed to respect demarcated road access and other social and utility infrastructure proposed according to plan.

- Shared plot allocation based on 40/60 agreed in owner's favor with authorized enablement.

- Barred from official Transferred Land Act #8/1994 accented in the same period. It was then repealed in 2007 to reflect demand for community concession.

- People released their lands for pre-survey of their shamba or farmlands.

- Planning/survey/land authorities jointly prepared land ownership map overlay onto the layout plan to assess ownership status and reserved lands for service provision in accordance with official planning standards.

- Boundary specification for each land constraint such as cemetery, underground water work pipeline, etc

- By completion of this subdivision exercise, all surveyed lands would be officially allocated and registered.

The government was able to regulate this peri-urban village growth according to controlled urban development standards and infrastructure provisions. The layout plan prepared by the Town Planning Office for this subdivision exercise provides a clear shape of demarcated roads and the accessibility connected to each plot. It also demarcated some 30 percent of land in the center of the settlement layout for social services which would then be locally available in this village, including a primary school and a village playground. While in the process of stopping development based on this scheme proposal, some influential applicants were granted lands for the development of social services, such as the two private high schools located in the
area, but in most other respects, the experiment proceeded effectively.

Furthermore, as noted in the annual Government Budget Report of 1995-96, the applied pilot exercise for this area improved by about 60 percent the rate of land allocations, which jumped from about 219 to 368 in 1994 and 1995, respectively. By 2008, this number had climbed to about 583 plots for neighborhood number 40 at Chukwani (Files UMM/MUN/N10/23 and UMM/MUN/N.10/CK.40/201). The increased performance in land allocations also encouraged the government's land, surveys and planning departments to refer to its 1990s land allocation achievement in their request for revolving funding from the government to support their management activities, instead of relying only on donor funding whose allocation was project specific. By 2004 (ten years after the pilot for a full-fledged shared land subdivision project approach was executed), it had encouraged improvement of land fees and lease charges collection from TZS 436.3 million, to TZS 526.4 million and 668.7 million in the 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2006/07 financial years, respectively (Government White Paper Number 4B/2008) and also increased the amount of individual residential title fees received by the lands offices from TZS 50,000 to TZS 120,000 in the same development period.

Similarly, both the Land Tenure Act 12/1992 and the Transferred Land Act 8/994 were amended respectively in 2004 and 2007 to provide more leeway for the owners' own consent in land development processes. The informal land invasion for housing in the Chukwani area was also reduced, according to the above quoted white paper. Before then, an assessment survey done for four suburban peri-urban cases of Bububu, Kihinani, Mbuzini, and Chuini off the north Mkokotoni road, realized some 26 percent of land being informally occupied (Interview with Mkasi Is-hak, 2008). This land valuation technician also revealed that the government feared that the remaining 617 hectares of suburban land in these areas are now unsafe to absorb formalized
urban development, unlike the case on the Chukwani side of the city. Mkasi attributed the difference to the history of the negotiated collaborative subdivision.

8.4.2 How was the project practiced?

Regardless of those noted mixed records, this subsection shows some encouraging steps involved in community engagement with their counterpart technicians (planners, surveyors, and land administrators) at the local as well as the institutional levels for this exercise. I won’t repeat the applied planning, evaluation, surveying and land allocation stages as outlined in chapter 7. However, as shown in Figure 8.4 below, the inclusion of people at the initial planning stages improved the situation both in terms of time consumed as well as its efficiency in handling sensitive cases on land delivery in Zanzibar. Although some would have called for more in the community's favor, the agreed 40/60 percentage sharing formula helped to start the journey forward.

When I continued to walk around this village with three colleagues (Talib Shaaban, Said Sofo, and Abdalla Ali Abdalla) from survey, land, and planning offices during my fieldwork in 2008, we started seeing young villagers with their motor-bikes on the village road front and their elder parents at home looking after their grandchildren. Symbolizing how much their income has grown from the land selling exercise, their houses were also being modified with cement blocks although they are most of them yet to be plastered. The domesticated livestock rifling for their food in between native houses were surrounded by regularly arranged large fenced structures under construction owned by their beneficiaries who bought their lands from the villagers. These structures were gradually replacing their family gardens and other plantations.
It took us only about five minutes from the city bus stop to reach the village Sheha's residence by foot to begin our interviews in this study area. Here we found this settlement being easily transformed by the increased density of population in the area but without people's regrets. Why? “Because we wanted them to come and build their houses, as we also invited you guys (from the lands office), to help us bring development into our area on our own terms that we had suggested” said Chukwani's Sheha, Mzee Mwinyi Ramadhani (2008). His happiness showed in his big smile; he argued that the former leadership (under President Salmin Amour) in the lands department had been responsive to their cries for an active role in their lands’ subdivision. Actually, the deliberation to consult the land offices came by realizing the gradual speculation on
and usurpation of their land by elite people from the city had brought such insignificant gains for the local residents. “We were fully involved when the area was being surveyed”, this Sheha continued while asking for a helping hand from one of us to open his copy of the surveyed plan. “Yes, it is a fact we cannot deny,” said Mzee Ramadhani, pouring water on the side of the treated gravel road at his house, hanging out with his grandchildren and their friends.

While waiting for his full committee to join us we continued chatting with this aging Sheha with his kids (the last born, aged 23, we were told, tilling the garden in front of their house) and one would think people are so relaxed, so laid back, and so satisfied, taking into account the Sheha's initial remark on the area, and with the other invitees never in a hurry. “If there was not any formula for negotiation, no one would have been supportive”, intervened Talib Shaaban (2008), the former Chief Surveyor who had been heavily involved in the subdivision exercise for this area as the former COLE's Chief Surveyor. Shaaban had aimed for the quickest work schedule possible, and built a sense of mutual trust with the people when approaching the exercise. “We did not want to dictate terms, except in situations that were beyond our affordable means such as the division of the percentage shares – for that we had to consult our executive secretary (of the former COLE) for his final word”, Sofo (2008) said. The initial low-key experiments began with 30:70 percentage shares. Derived from cooperating with people, the approach was participatory in layout planning, plot provision, and mobilization for graveled neighborhood streets and service extension all in one package. The government benefited because people were willing to contribute more land at the 40/60 percentage basis.

What made the people become more corporative was “their honest incorporation into the planning process”, Abdulla (2008), commented. These are “people with a long history of rebellion in Zanzibar since the sultanate times. They are the most rebellious people in town that
once chased government's commissioned survey officers out of the area”, during subdivision activities of the Chinese master plan in their area. Abdalla was referring to the previous comment made earlier by his workmate, Talib Shaaban. “These are the people who once dismantled a survey team camp and took the staff back to the survey office without showing any shame for such an action believing they were right to protect their land. These are among the people who were once involved in the first serious riot in Zanzibar in 1956 raising their objections against construction of the cattle deep close to their village area.”

By then, the other invitees had arrived, with their responses about this area and the adopted planning strategy. “Every native from any place is a potential visitor to the other place,” Mbwana Saleh Mshamba said. He was emphasizing how they were ready to accept an influx of the new builders within a short period of time, showing in the Sheha’s file to have gone from 39 newcomers in 1991 to 367 in 2001 – more than 9 times the volume of annual village growth of a decade earlier. “We were here earlier than anyone as natives of this area, but we also realize that we are going to share this land with other people in this place of ours. Everybody understands that this is our land. It is not a 'three-acre' land [i.e. not TAP lands from the revolutionary era]. This is our village,” Bwana Mshamba concluded. “But we also know that those beautiful houses are taking over the bush that used to surround our fields,” the Sheha continued.

But is this development sustainable? I asked. “Of course we do not know how it is going to end!” Bi Amina Ali, one of the village members invited for this meeting, quickly jumped to answer my question. “But this was a better way than the way those surveyors that were earlier sent to survey our area wanted. They wanted to grab our land for nothing other than accumulating for themselves and with a very short government notice,” she concluded. My conversation with these villagers continued with more exciting remarks from the village sheha
himself. Look, “we grieved, we complained, we are now here much better listened to in sustaining our planning demands. We were treated just like any ordinary informal folk; we are not! We belong to a native village. Whether you will call it an informal activity, god forbid, for us it is not; because we do not see it that way. We finally realized that how much you are determined to do you just stick to or do it! However much less you earn, you still go for it! This land transaction practice was our last resort. And, proudly speaking, let me be frank with you these are what our revolutionary founders called ‘maendeleo ya wananchi’ (citizens development) which started with housing improvement more than anything else,” Mzee Sheha said, summarizing the discussion during the whole focus group meeting. “By now, at least I know who locates where and why. We did not want to be hawkish but we were determined to protect and benefit from our land for our family and children's future interests,” he concluded.

“We should also not forget that anybody seeking land for housing in our city is a native of another area,” my team-mate Sofo intervened. They are from somewhere, and therefore, “ every native would also want to find a better way of protecting their own habitation,” he said. “I myself am originally from Pemba, but I am an inhabitant of Mombasa and Magogoni, with a Pemban and a Zanzibari wife. This is a reality with respect to our religion”, he emphasized.

“I now know my neighbors as they now know my place and its significance about who I am in this Chukwani village,” Ahmada Ali, a local concrete block seller, proudly concluded. “Every native would like a rest calmly and happily like anybody else, and every native would like a tour of a better place. Don't you see planned places are better than unplanned ones?”, he asked. At this question, another invitee, Bwana Juma Is-haka joined in, to incite the conversation. “But we should also know that some property owners within most native lands in the world cannot go anywhere, they are too cautious to escape the realities of their lives, they are and are
left improperly and too ignorantly imagined in the place where they live unless they stand up for their own ownership rights. For us, we thought, [therefore], that we were right to defend but also benefit from our ownerships, and to speak up for our children while dialoging with the government to improve our place without letting it slip out of our control,” Bwana Is-haka concluded. “And, if we let the planning department continue with this dialogic way, they may reduce a lot of landowners’ tensions that they experience with subdivisions practices that violate their farmland holding rights in the city peripheries,” Bwana Is-hak concluded.

I had great interest in listening to this village committee's responses and those of the other invitees. “Harmony is what everybody wants to achieve in everything that someone wishes to perform.” Talib Shaaban,” whispered to me. “We did not end with the completion of our surveys. We had to reconfirm our survey work by physically translating the plan to the people on how we did it although we were also working with their villagers in our survey team during the demarcation processes,” he concluded. Some compromises were made before the concerned villagers were then invited to come to the lands office to present their pre-survey ownership status for submission of their names for the allotment of their land shares. This process followed normal informal land allocation procedures except for its inclusion of official subdivision and allocation processes, as shown above. This included people who qualified for issuance of titles and full-fledged registration of their surveyed lands according to all legal provisions. The government's titling time frame was also tremendously reduced. The land owners lost only about two to four (2-4) weeks instead of twelve or so months to wait for their land titles. “We were not declaring administrative boundaries, we were doing property earmarking that needed people's consent”, Talib Shaaban reminded the meeting. “So when the landowner sees you as a government land agent he won't chase you out,” I joked.
8.3 How was the project halted?

Regardless of its achievements, the 40/60 percentage subdivision planning approach was stopped by the government in 2001 with the following legal reasons. First, the government claimed that the idea was not compliant with the existing legal provisions. Second, it argued that the area selected was still a village community falling outside the designated urban development provisions (incorrectly so because it was part of the NUs 39-40 of the 1982 master plan). Third, they claimed that the subdivision scheme was a part of the hidden corruption which overwhelmed the entire land delivery process. However, by the time this stoppage was declared, said an anonymous official interviewee, “I knew someone was using this as an excuse to protect their lands purchased earlier on from being subdivided based on this scheme approach” (Anonymous at Land Office, Zanzibar, 2008). He was referring specifically to the Member of the House of Representatives for Kiembesamaki constituency, Minister Mansour Himidi who claimed their familyland by this village's seafront. Whatever may have been claimed by this official, “speculations like these are difficult to prove” as Scholz (2008: 148) put it. He summarizes his contention on the said subdivision exercise by saying that it “proved difficult to legalize a project which was not in line with the current legal system. It would have allowed land owners to sell their land for building purposes, forcing the government to accept private land ownership, which is against the constitution” (Scholz, 2008: 149).

The government’s (and Scholz’s) legal reasoning is framed incorrectly, because the village was not in the city in the first place but was a rural enclave. Similarly, denying people a voice to be heard was more unconstitutional to me than an allegedly unconstitutional-looking
legal statement. The government’s 2001 declaration impeded the new approach for planning collaboration which had proven to be acceptable by all concerned parties at the international, local, and institutional levels as a practice to improve and harmonize, rather than control or delegitimize, the informal existence rooted from indigenous settlement origins regardless of any limitations involved. The government wanted to not break the law; they were not prepared to let their misinterpretation of an outdated law stop their private accumulation initiatives. The villagers were also not willing to wait for too long to lose the prevailing land market potentiality being experienced in Zanzibar with the liberalized economic boom of the 1990s. They were afraid of losing their land to the government as a punishment from the previous owners’ protest against the imported surveyors whom they had forced to stop surveying.

Moreover, there were some mixed interests by both land owners and responsible authorities against the higher authorities that barred the devoted technicians from working together any further with the community for a close common cause. Based on Mzee Mwinyi Ramadhani’s (2008) contention, in my second lead-off quotation for this chapter, we have to acknowledge three basic lessons here. First, that the owners were highly frustrated with delayed and controlled planning tactics. They had their own plans from their own mind based on their own psychology which was not as simple to stop as one may wish to believe. It is possible to change people's mindset, but “because most of the official process is not that efficient or honest, people resort to their own knowledge base and affordable means” (Interview Sheha, MwinyiRamadhani, 2008). Secondly, the trust generated in the community had helped to create a sense of community readiness to support the experimental exercise. “This is true”, said Abdalla (2008) “because I saw the willingness of the people to cooperate with the authorities the moment we were there on the first place” (Interviewed Abdalla A. Abdalla, Senior Planning Officer, 2008).
The government was also able to recover its subdivision cost based on collected revenue through land titling and registration.

Scholz, (2008: 148), acknowledges these efforts were “complying with new approaches in the Western World [which follow the idea of] public-private-partnership, planning and cost recovery, and betterment sharing.” As he observes from his hometown German planning experience, “settlers would live in a well-planned areas and purchase registered plots. For the land owners, the advantage would be the legal opportunity to sell their lands [at a market price]” (Scholz, 2008: 148) and be able to get employed, as the building boom continues in Zanzibar. He also emphasized this consultative planning intervention as a 'win-win' situation in subdivision planning for Zanzibar. That is why “it is potentially accepted both for the compliance with expert advice enabled by locally available technical assistance and other potential local actors involved,” added Shaaban (2008). But why was this not observed at the more skeptical level of the higher authorities? Was that because the exercise was relatively new especially in terms of coping with a sensitive Zanzibari nationalized urban land management environment that was still suffering a socialist hangover within the present transitional democratic political environment?

I have a feeling that this may have been essentially one of the key reasons that stalled the survival of this subdivision planning process due to a created fear about adopting this optional strategy within a still-radicalized socialist institutional setup, an involuntary political transition, and slow movement in amending outdated provisions within the existing legal structure - yet in love with individualized central (presidential) domination. For example, since the initial abolition of the Zanzibar Municipal Authority in 1969, and even since its nominal reinstatement in the early 1980s, planning itself has remained controlled under central manipulation, without any documentation of information that abounds locally, informally. This brings me to a third
learned lesson about this exercise. There was a change of political leadership in October 2000, and the new regime came up with its own set of new priorities not reflective of priorities of the preceding presidency. This frustrated the villagers, who also observed this state of attitudinal mindset change and mistrust against their efforts at the higher level, regardless of the amount of assistance generated from the previous iteration of institutions. This creates some questions for any future attempts similar to this collaborative scheme – considering it ran aground even in such a politically-allied environment as Chukwani. My analysis shows that we have yet to arrive at an acceptable normalization of collaboration. We are still floating on the cutting edge over how to break the mistrust among actors. For the government side, much of the problem has been an attitudinal barrier that its officials dared not think about breaking when framing the sustainable and collaborative strategies employed under the ZILEM and SMOLE land reform projects in the first place.

8.5 Reflections on the Chukwani Subdivision Case

Whether it was considered as an achievement by some interviewed villagers or an aggressive step against the government's instituted land policy reforms, the 40/60 percentage sharing subdivision scheme at the Chukwani village case, and their fellow land seekers involved in similar schemes in different peri-urban city locales, encountered a very complicated authoritarian environment which led to its termination. The fact that this institutionally-enabled 40%/60% shared subdivision planning was terminated by the government in just five years after its humble beginning also took away most of the dreams people had about this type of planning expectation in Zanzibar. In 2001 the newly elected government phase took away the subdivision
planning out of the people's and the planners' hands and restricted community participation in the planning process without freely returning back those subdivisions and their plots to the people concerned. The outcome was that the subdivided lands of the revolutionary supporters (who were supposed to have had special privileges in this regard) were surprised with a number of institutional buildings, including the new parliamentary building which was placed in the middle of the subdivision areas.

Contrary to people's expectations of the subdivision area, they were expecting to be able to join the government in supporting this guided planning scheme to successfully provide it with all of the facilities required to be put in place which include adequate sanitation, paved roads, a domestic piped water supply and the improvement of the whole area to become an independent suburb or neighborhood like any of those colonial model neighborhood in town. Unfortunately, this was not achieved because only the land was subdivided and provided to the people and that for sure helped to reduce cries for legal accessibility to land. In otherwards, the government was partly able to clearly facilitate the promised land ownership to most of its esteemed followers. Most of the water supply is not connected to faucets, spigots, or flush toilets in the village people's homes. In fact, sanitary facilities still consist of septic tanks and soak pit systems which are not environmentally safe. The tanks or pits are not cleaned or emptied on a regular basis.

This situation does not fulfill the requirements for urban sustainability. Similar situation is available elsewhere in the city even within informal areas. Hence, planning is being seen here at the informal subdivision level rather than at a formal planning process it continues to be so since the practice was cut short and came to an end within five years of its existence. It essentially died prematurely in short to suggest for any significant success; which goes back to the original reason for all of the applied housing development projects implemented by the
socialist government of Zanzibar in the past, especially during the first and the second post-revolutionary phases – they were all characterized by a lack of continuity and the government preempting any progress made.

The Chukwani subdivision case was not an exception. It was clearly used as an open window of the government of Zanzibar to maintain its socialist grip on people's land in this neoliberal time without raising eyebrows to some of its concerned donors. The overarching objective of giving privileged elites land was not a success either. Yet, a remarkable example for local planning at Chukwani village became shattered because it was not allowed to evolve independently within the complicated authoritarian environment. Its stoppage also contributed to killing the government's land commission which was terminated in 2001, the same year that this shared subdivision scheme was terminated.

In conclusion, the promises of this subdivision practice were hijacked by the elites and other beneficiaries whose interests interfered with the dreams of the community; contrary to its original expectations or the provisions of the sustainability model of collaborative planning. In other words, the desires of the government took away the dreams of the people and left them, as many Welezo-Darajabovu dwellers, with little hope of having their own lands well planned or facilitated as necessary to sustain their individual communities.

Essentially, returning to Lupala's (2002) quote at the beginning of the chapter, there was “[not] much achievement in spatial order [here] in collaboration with the local formal institutions.” Instead, the government imposed a top down approach through its elite manipulation for their prime village lands rather than allowing the Chukwani residents to have a say in the planning and improvement of their subdivision. Therefore, not much effort was made to collaborate with the local residents and local formal institutions. The grieving of these people,
as reported by Mzee Mwinyi Ramadhani at the beginning of this chapter and their complaining continues to this day. Hope removed became hope deferred. Because there was no continuity, people opted to go back to their own informal subdivision means which clearly looks unstoppable. The elites land seekers took away the people's vision because they (elites) wanted to control the situation. In so doing, the Chukwani subdivision moved from the formal to the elites' controlled informal subdivision process (through land speculation and favoritism by the government's allocating authority) BUT do not tell that to the Chukwani subdivision residents because “... they did not see it that way.”

“Yes, the accessibility problem for this area has been reduced,” revealed Simai Shauri (2008) in my interview with him in front of his house, but those roads are still unpaved even now and never matched with the overall requirement of this community. The unpaved picturesque streets dominated by the overlay of the winding nature of the majority of the informal settlement's pathways still depicts our village environment since before this planning intervention became effective,” commented the above-mentioned interviewee. Most residents still complain of their state of the village environment, which looks rather like a common phenomenon throughout the peri-urban areas of the city. The initial good will by the elite beneficiaries ended with the obtainment of their massive housing lands and while the traditional village houses are still suffering from the lack of a decent housing environment, the tarmacked road which goes straight to the government minister's family house is clearly one among the most serious incidents which overshadows the villagers' original collaborative or dialogic-driven subdivision planning expectations.

Whether such a modest facility was accidentally developed or whether it was responsive to the original vision of this subdivision practice, its reflects a fairly narrow range of the local
opinion in its favor. But it also signifies a bad image for those devoted and politically-connected to those individually initiated and institutionally supported revolutionary contradictions. Like with the SEMUSO elite-influenced project outlined in Chapter 4 and at the subsequent Welezo waqf land intervention case in Chapter 7, Chukwani village is counted by the government of Zanzibar and by CCM as a sure urban stronghold, with most of the residents being either solid CCM supporters, addicted, and sensitive defenders of their native land ownership status, but their continuity as government supporters was snuffed out after the desired elites interests came to an end. The main road from the city to the Chukwani military camp and its diversion to the prominent government minister's family property is the only paved road available across the entire settlement.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter contained my analysis of the second case study, established to answer my second research hypothesis for this dissertation. In this hypothesis I argue that because of the continued central state domination in Zanzibar, influenced by insufficient social dialogue within sustainable land management and urban planning reform practices, the sustainable and collaborative strategy has not been able to match or break the practical, socially-inspired traditional patterns of the people's land and housing development engagements. The results from Chukwani have indicated that the village did not fully benefit from the improvement of people's accessibility to land through the shared land allocation process in the collaborative subdivision planning experiment. The unexpected termination of this collaborative strategy is one of the shortcomings of this collaborative effort at Chukwani, regardless of the village's revolutionary
and political history, which helped it tolerate what went on during the initial experimental times of the strategy. While the villagers were concerned about the availability of their lands to maximize their property prices, impressing their own ideas upon the land authorities including the initial engagement of their own surveyors, the elite authorities were also concerned about how to control the exercise to help them maximize their political grip over these revolutionary supporters.

But there were other observations connected to this Chukwani case study, following the decision to build the parliament building and other academic and elite institutions within the village. Building the House of Representatives at Karume College is comparable to building a Capitol on any academic campus. It is like locating the most important part of the government in the middle of college students, who might be easily radicalized by politicians, or could be used to incite violence. In light of the great political divide, despite the silence facilitated by the delicate government of national unity introduced after the recent Zanzibari elections, this may create more tensions in the future and divide among the elite politicians, or the college students, which may not be helpful to the future of this area and its village surroundings. It is also against the wishes of the democratized collaborative experiment advocating for local consensus.

This case study also demonstrates that the ineffectiveness of urban planning in Zanzibar is increasingly being threatened by political interference. Chukwani village engineered its version of collaborative subdivision strategy for land sharing through community grassroots dialogue but, again, with the emergence of those administrative and academic institutions within the village, which were not a part of its original agreement with the involved technicians, it shows the project might have been overtaken by political manipulation at the top level of government more interested in its own self-preservation rather than the village's subdivision
development at the local grassroots level. From this viewpoint, based on the conducted interviews, one might not hesitate to note the shift from the concepts and approaches originally thought of by the villagers to this guided subdivision plan that took place mostly in the elites favor, even before they were canceled in 2001.
Chapter 9: Case Study 3
Collaborative Planning and Housing Reforms in Stone Town of Zanzibar: Policies, Programs, and Reality

“Representing others is personal, it is political, and the conundrums of the negotiation are all around us. Yet, [...] we must see research relationships [or contingent initiatives] as ongoing, make efforts to consciously connect work and life, [alternative and reality], in order to make room for more open, honest, [or dialog-driven solutions], and think critically about reflexivity and reciprocity” (Garth Myers, 2009; italics mine).

9.1 Introduction

Institutionally-enabled planning interventions in Zanzibar lack continuity. Some local interventions have also followed the trend becoming contingently experimental, causing obstruction of peoples' beliefs, within a formidable lack of institutional appreciation. People are thus left to favor their own individual development paths instead. Zanzibar's Stone Town community is no exception when it comes to society's dejection about unsuccessful institutional interventions. The latest disappointments have been connected with the short-lived collaborative planning program that was initially used to rehabilitate the city's housing stock within the oldest Stone Town area through continuous residents' involvement and other collaborative and decentralized arrangements.

This chapter, which forms the dissertation’s last case study, addresses the housing improvement part of collaborative processes in Zanzibar's Stone Town. I examine a professionally collaborative urban management program conducted in Zanzibar in the 1990s and 2000s through inclusive decision-making approaches in a housing rehabilitation program in Stone Town. This examination represents part of my analysis aimed at documenting and
evaluating ordinary people's experiences with land and housing reform policies adopted in Zanzibar in the last quarter-century. It concentrates on the role of the collaborative planning philosophy employed to guide the urban village61 program instituted in Zanzibar in the last decade as part of the poverty reduction policy directives implemented with the neo-liberal sustainability agenda. I look at how the execution of the policy reforms has (or has not) impacted the traditional management of housing rehabilitation practices in the city. The concept that I adopted in this chapter is drawn from Myers's (2009: 6) communicative and place based theoretical line that questions whether “‘fluidity', 'flexibility', and 'contingency' [could] find urban poor majorities [in] the city working well with donors to develop places they can live with.” The overall goal for this chapter is to contribute to the ongoing contemporary debates discussing how deliberative urban environmental sustainability planning works in African urban housing improvement programs, for the case of Stone Town.

I sought an initial assessment of how the rhetorical shifts in planning actually played out on the ground in Zanzibar city's housing rehabilitation and community-based management in Stone Town. This setting centered on the urban village project (UVP) initiative set into motion by external donors, the state itself, and ordinary residents, respectively. I developed these fairly detailed and somewhat technical vignettes to gauge the degree to which outcomes in the urban village case study manifest pro-poor policies that have improved access to quality housing, to non-hazardous residential buildings, or to urban services in the form of domestic supplies of

61 Zanzibar's Community-Based Housing Rehabilitation Program in Stone Town defined an 'Urban Village' as a large multi-family residential building inhabited by a generally poor and disadvantaged “quiet majority”, to borrow Knippel's (2003) words. The Urban Village Project is not just about repairing those buildings: “it is also about building durable administrative systems that will sustain buildings in the long-term, and about getting [the] quiet majority in the Stone Town, who are generally poor and disadvantaged, greater responsibility for managing their built environment”, through a “new type of [collaborative] partnership” between tenants, house owners, and the community-based conservation project”, including their tenancy arrangements, their environmental cleanliness and the maintenance of their buildings (Knippel 2003: 2; emphasis mine).
water, liquid and solid waste management, maintenance of tenancy funding, and occupancy contract reforms. Revised and updated from my 2003 study, *The Rapid User Study and Impact Assessment Report on House Number 1494, Kiponda Karavan-Serai* for Aga Khan Cultural Services, Zanzibar, this chapter's argument is that there is a mixed outcome, at best, in all the cases in which I conducted interviews.

This argument shows that the urban village project expected to improve tenancy housing management through the promotion of an integrated, sustainable, and participatory reform strategy for Zanzibar city, but it faced a number of challenges mainly due to four major factors: the unpredictability of neo-liberal housing development policy influence in the Stone Town planning setting; donor ignorance of hidden local agreements involved in accessing land for housing; the influence of state power within the locally fragmented decision-making system; and the absence of an adaptive, inclusive (hybrid) planning strategy that is continuously conscious of the overwhelming reality of the local political settings.

As observed earlier, Zanzibar, as a whole, has yet to truly embrace a democratized, collaborative, or transparent vision of planning practice, and donors often do less than it appears to encourage that embrace, with the consequence of only minor improvement in the planning outcomes for the urban poor (Chachage, 2000). As a consequence, while Zanzibar's collaborative and neo-liberal land and housing reform may remain alive as a conceptual remedy to justify global donor-state relations, it is an impractical and isolated model if not sustained within a people-centered deliberative strategy that can cope within the informally organized nature of Zanzibar's Swahili society (Myers, 2008).

I suggest, though, that possibilities still remain for genuinely working with the marginalized poor urban majority in such a way that environmental justice and pro-poor
progressive planning might expand in significant ways. Understanding this contemporary collaborative planning setting requires me to provide a broader historical and geographical context for Stone Town before the analysis of the local urban village project in Zanzibar is summarized. I begin, therefore, with a short introduction of this part of Zanzibar city and its planning history. From there, I will move to the case study analysis, before arriving at my conclusions.

9.2 Stone Town's (Planning) Profile

The structure of Stone Town (Figure 9.1) actually represents only a small core heritage area of Zanzibar city. It was subjected to a number of historical empires over the last five or so centuries, with the initial arrival of the Portuguese (1501), Omani Arabs (1690), and the British (1890). Stone Town was at first centered on the plantation and monsoon trade economies in ivory, spices, and slaves that made other activities flourish to the point of this urban area's present structural significance (Forss et al, 2005; Sheriff 1987). It has an area of 96 hectares which covers only about 6 percent of the total city area (not including West District). It is a town that has undergone population decline, with only about 12,955 people recorded in the 2002 Census as shown in Table 9.1 below. This is a drop of nearly 30% from its demographic peak of 18,300 people in the mid-1800s (Sheriff 1995).

As shown in this Table, Stone Town is divided into four districts (shehia) - Shangani, Mkunazini, Kiponda, and Malindi, which together comprise the unique commercial, administrative, cultural, and residential characteristics of its urban fabric. Comparatively, the population of Zanzibar’s Urban District (the official Municipality), as we’ve seen, has nearly
quadrupled since the revolution, from approximately 58,000 to 206,292 in the 2002 census. Again, to put this decline in perspective, please recall that the population of West District expanded from 53,000 in 1988 to 184,710 in 2002. By 2011, more than half of the 420,000 or so residents of the Urban-West Region, resided in the under-serviced and unplanned neighbourhoods in the West District that we’ve seen in the last two chapters, beyond the municipal boundary (Myers 1999, 2005 and 2008; ZSP 1998).

Figure 9.1: Zanzibar Stone Town Location Map and Structure

Table 9.1: Stone Town Localities/Shehia Population by Sex, Household (HH) Numbers and HH Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stone Town</th>
<th>Population (Number)</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangani</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkunazini</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiponda</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malindi</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Town Total</td>
<td>4 Shehia</td>
<td>6568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Historically, Stone Town is associated with the original coastal village built “on the leeward side of the tropical island of Unguja on the Shangani peninsula” (Sinclair, 2009: 73).

The pioneer of the earliest Zanzibar planning document describes Shangani peninsula as “a worn-down coral reef” (Lanchester, 1923: 11) that became the island’s main center of commerce and culture. It is formed by a tradition of urban morphology that has mixed and matched cultural references for more than two hundred years (Myers, 1999). Arab and Indian influences dominated the formation of Stone Town, in contrast with the African, colonial, and Eastern European socialist influences evident in Ng’ambo. In recognition of its cultural and architectural historical transformations that were influenced by its lucrative plantation, ivory, and slave trade economies of the past (Sheriff, 1987: 201-204) and because of a number of other experts commissioned over the last quarter-century, Stone Town became a World Heritage site in 2000 (LaNier, 1982; Seravo, 1996; Kamamba, 1999; and Myers, 2003).

Stone Town thus became a World Heritage site at the peak of neoliberal policy implementation in Zanzibar. In the past 20 years, Stone Town has been reborn and has become a
major international tourist destination. However, the great increase in tourism, Forss, et al (2005: 6) noticed, came with a mixed blessing: “It brought wealth and much needed income, [but] it also brought rapidly rising real estate, [increased commodity prices], commercial exploitation of culturally valuable buildings, crime, and drug abuse.” This encouraged gentrification – and an intense commercialization process of the town that moved some of the population to the city peripheries – which changed the face of the Town with new hotels, shopping outlets, internet cafés, restaurants, and night clubs replacing what once were residential buildings. In due course, ironically inspired by the tourism boom of the 1990s and the 2000s, poverty persists in Stone Town. Its social dynamics orchestrate many female headed households that are visibly residing within poorly serviced dilapidated apartment buildings in the inner areas of Stone Town.

Stone Town houses were commonly built as residences by the wealthy trading families of Arab, Indian, and Goan origin (Forss et al. 2005: 6) who lost their lives or left the country after the 1964 revolution. The new settlers were ordinary immigrants, mostly from Ng'ambo, Pemba, and other rural areas and mainland Tanzania, who were encouraged by revolutionary sympathizers to move into the abandoned buildings. A large portion of the Town continued to crumble over the 1970s and 1980s due to overcrowding and the lack of adequate service maintenance strategies. Most of the Stone Town buildings are made of clay soils and lime moulded together with sticks, mangrove poles, and coral stones. Following revolutionary neglect to this Town, building technologies were poorly extended to the new dwellers to maintain their residences. By the early 1990s, Zanzibar's Stone Town was described to have been “at the dawn of its major transformation” (Balcioglu, 1994). However, the pace of Stone Town building decay accelerated and several buildings fell apart. A survey in the beginning of the 1990s found that there were around ten houses collapsing (about 0.6 percent) every year, with some fatal incidents.
recorded. This was a huge loss, as the total number of houses in this area is only about 1,709 buildings. Its positive consequence was the establishment of the community-based collaborative housing rehabilitation program that I focus on here.

9.3 Community-based Rehabilitation Program of Stone Town: Reforming Planning

Toward a More Dialogic Angle

Referring back to LaNier's (1982) UNCHS proposal, the 1982 Chinese Master Plan had very minor impacts on the Stone Town, with its development emphasis mostly on peripheral residential development. Instead, the Stone Town Conservation and Development Authority (STCDA) was established by the STCDA Act (Number 3) of 1994, to implement the strategic development of this historic city enclave. STCDA’s work included the preparation of its own conservation master plan sponsored by the Aga Khan62 Trust For Culture (AKTC) to oversee its strategic development and conservation activities. Some of these urban conservation practices took place in apartment houses occupied by the poor majority in Stone Town to improve their building and service conditions, including improvement of their tenancy and employment conditions. There were responses from a number of consultancies. One of the Aga Khan's experts came up with the following observation:

“Never in modern history was the island [Unguja] confronted with such rapid processes of change, not only as far as values are concerned, but also by the reflection of these changes on the physical environment. These processes, if not checked, could rapidly and inexorably lead to the loss of the intrinsic character and quality of the historic city covered by an artificial mantle of a hybrid style often presented as the unavoidable side effect of economic development. Zanzibar should not fall into this trap and instead

62 Leader of Ismaili Muslim Community, based in Monaco. He owns a number of properties worldwide, Zanzibar Serena Hotel in Stone Town included, and he has been assisting in a number of architectural conservation projects, and other programs associated with cultural renewal in the built environment. For example, his Trust for Culture bestows the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, established since 1977.
should face the challenge of transforming the conservation of its cultural heritage into a vehicle of its economic development (Balcioglu, 1994: 1)

By 1996, a Stone Town Conservation Plan was prepared under Francesco Seravo's consultancy to guide and regulate the implementation of planning by the the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC). Founded in 1988, AKTC’s activities seek to reflect and respond to the aspirations of Muslim communities throughout the world. Its different programs share the conviction that cultural renewal takes place when traditions, solidly grasped, are “suffused with the creative, confident expression of modern ideas and techniques” (Balcioglu, 1994: 1). The Trust has a recent initiative called the Historic City Support Program (HCSP). Its “project brief goes beyond technical restoration” (Balcioglu, 1994: 2) to address the question of urban conservation through broad processes of collaborative community development and housing revitalization. By 2000, the HCSP was supporting the revitalization of the 'urban villages' in Zanzibar through the Community-based Rehabilitation Program (CBRP). This program was supported by the Swedish International Development Agency, or Sida, which showed interest in Stone Town conservation issues and decided to finance project activities developed by the AKTC, in association with the Ford Foundation.

The rehabilitation began as part of the Seravo plan’s implementation. Some eight houses were rehabilitated, which helped to improve the lives of their 500 dwellers (an equivalent of 12 families per building). The Ford Foundation withdrew from the project just after the 2000 election season, but Sida continued to fund the project until it was closed in 2005. As noted earlier in the dissertation, the political strife of the past two decades resulted in the collapse of a number of other land and housing related projects. Most donors froze aid from late 1995 to early 2002 to protest the election outcomes. Donors like Sida continued to work on projects like that of
the CBRP, either by using funds already allocated or by channeling money through international NGOs like AKTC, to avoid rewarding the revolutionary government for the election outcomes.

In the following section, I display the results of my 2003 fieldwork in Stone Town with some information based on documents made available since my engagement with this project. I was also able to talk to the people involved in the project in my 2008 fieldwork. I examine a different angle of approach to reforming planning toward a more dialogic (inclusive, participatory, grassroots, deliberative, or argumentative) process, in a different part of the city from the previous chapters.

This Stone Town case study was a rather donor-driven community-based rehabilitation program. However, I also examine contributions made by the tenants into this project. One fact which emerges is that, although funded by the donors, it appears that the rehabilitation project also had origins with a highly debated Baraza (Swahili name for dialogic forum) television series which had shown the problems of large houses in Stone Town and their poor inhabitants. The Baraza television series (known in Kiswahili as Baraza la Mji Mkongwe) also brought about recommendations on how to solve these problems through a new type of participatory partnership between tenants, home owners, and the donors within the community-based conservation program. This helps to provide a thorough grassroots example of planning, from housing that was crumbling and lacked the necessary utilities and government support even within an elite area of the city, through the arrival of the donors, to a positive self-help improvement and conservation outcome.
9.4 The Urban Village Project in Kiponda

The idea of rehabilitating Stone Town is hardly a new one that came with the neo-liberal vision of collaborative planning. Unlike earlier approaches to rehabilitation under colonialism or socialism, though, the common theme of the new planning rhetoric is that of safeguarding both the community and conservation interests in a supportive package in addition to the government's poverty reduction strategy. Enablement, conservation, poverty reduction, and safeguarding communities all were fundamental principles of the CBR Project. Here, I examine the performance of this project on house number 1491 in the Stone Town neighborhood of Kiponda, to assess its broader collaborative impacts and effects on the community concerned. Other houses rehabilitated within this urban village project are shown both in Figure 9.2 and Table 9.2 below.

Before this project was introduced in this Kiponda building in 2000, there had been only limited organized or donor-funded efforts to improve the condition of residential houses in the Stone Town. Most efforts by individual landlords were doomed by a lack of financial capital. The result is that neither tenants nor landlords, including the government authorities, were investing in the rebuilt environment.

In the case of privately owned houses, there was little interest in investing in building restoration and a limited sense of property ownership by resident communities of the Stone Town. Even among the well-to-do family owners, a majority of individual families diverted whatever financial reserves at their command into building their own properties in the urban peripheries rather than in restoration of their collective family properties in the Stone Town. This trend led to the widespread decay of Stone Town buildings and the urban form. Even after the
restructuring process of establishing a planning and management system for Stone Town was complete, replete with the preparation and administration of the 1996 Stone Town Master Plan, far more emphasis went to the improvement of infrastructure than to individual building repairs. This was perhaps most strikingly detrimental to the poor.

Figure 9.2: Map of Zanzibar's Stone Town Showing Houses Involved in Urban Village Project:

Source: Silvia Carboneti and Makame Muhajir, CBR Program, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 2005
Table 9.2: Urban Village Project Implementation: Houses, Owners, and Donors Involved, 2000 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/#</th>
<th>House Involved</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>House 1491, Kiponda Karavan Serai</td>
<td>Waqf</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Halfway House, # 290, Shangani</td>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>House 1267, Darajani, Kiponda</td>
<td>Waqf</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>House 456, Kajificheni, Mkunazini</td>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>House 2052/55, Mkunazini</td>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>House 836, Malindi</td>
<td>Wakf</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>House 1783/84, Vuga, Mkunazini</td>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>House 2050, Kajificheni, Mkunazini</td>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Silvia Carboneti and Makame Muhajir, CBR Program, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 2005

Quite apart from Stone Town’s importance for Zanzibar’s tourism, commercial, and administrative activities, it is also home to a large number of the urban poor, mainly living as tenants within publicly owned and densely occupied multi-family dwellings, e.g. the “urban villages.” House number 1491 is one of these, located along Kiponda Street in the central area of Stone Town (Figure 9.2). Popularly known as *Kiponda Karavanserai*, it was chosen for the first phase of the CBR Project in 2000 due to its characteristics and architectural values. Sida paid for building rehabilitation costs and the AKTC for project management/staff support costs. It was established to foster a gradual restoration approach for Stone Town that would work through partnerships with concerned communities.

The principal object of this approach to conservation was to encourage community participation in the improvement of housing conditions in Stone Town in order to build a sustainable partnership between tenants and owners through improved dialogue. The CBRP was officially introduced in 1998, to cover the following three principal components: a Conservation Center, Outreach Projects, and a Halfway House. The former led to establishment of an
independent non-governmental board to make follow-ups on conservation and heritage initiatives in Stone Town, while the latter two components are where the applied dimensions of the CBRP developed from. The outreach project’s implementation, which was later renamed the 'urban village' program, was carried out together with the halfway house component (intended to accommodate temporary stays by tenants from selected buildings undergoing repairs). However, the establishment of the Stone Town Conservation Center (STCC) was given a top priority, as a self-sustaining (quasi-governmental) management “resource for information coordination, technical, and social follow up aspects of conservation.” It was supported by the “establishment of a non-governmental organization to be an independent group of stakeholders devoted to further development and conservation of Stone Town.” The Zanzibar Stone Town Heritage Society (ZSTHS) was formed in July 2002 to operate the Zanzibar Stone Town Tenancy Project within STCC (Yahya, 2002). This was also seen as necessary in the “establishment of a tenant support project to provide legal and other housing occupancy advice to tenants in Stone Town buildings” through tenancy associations or residents' committees for each individually rehabilitated building.

The establishment of a technical support group for capacity development in building technology and conservation of the sea front façade of Stone Town was also included as part of the conservation center activities as well as the establishment of a media resource center to develop short and long film productions for TV and other public performances to promote awareness of the cultural heritage and social organization created to sustain it. The development of an outreach project helped to organize tenants committees within poorly occupied government and waqf-owned buildings and the establishment of extant halfway houses to support the project implementation process. Prior to AKTC/Sida’s engagement, and before Stone Town was declared
a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2000, the implementation of Zanzibar’s Stone Town residential conservation efforts had relied only on the very limited government budget sources.

The House in question here, *Kiponda Karavanserai*, is a *Waqf* building wholly administered by the *Waqf* and Trust Commission (WTC), meaning it is property dedicated to God by its deceased former owners under Islamic law and entrusted to a government-run commission under Zanzibari law (*Waqf* Property Decree, Cap 103, 1961; *Waqf* Property Decree (Amendment) Act Number 12/1965). It has two floors, with 24 rooms equally distributed between the ground and top floor. There are about 70 residents living in the house from 19 families (13 out of them being single women-headed families). This is equivalent to about 3.68 people per room. The original building use was to house widows, as a charity administered by Zanzibar’s Ismaili (Aga Khan) Community from 1905 on. It was chosen for restoration because it was a very significant public housing structure in danger of collapse.

A tripartite agreement to carry out renovation works in this house was reached in the form of a memorandum of understanding between the residents of the building and WTC on one side and between WTC and Aga Khan Cultural Services – Zanzibar (AKCS-Z) on the other. The project was funded out of a grant amounting to US$55,000 made by AKCS-Z. Tenants were obligated to establish the Maintenance Fund jointly with the AKCS-Z under WTC supervision, and contributions from their own resources were needed to add to the amount granted. The WTC agreed to contribute 50% of rents collected from the tenants to the Maintenance Fund. Tenants were supposed to vacate their homes during the repair process and return to the rooms they had previously occupied upon completion of the repair works. Other significant agreements connected to this project included tenancy reform, in which ten-year leases were granted free from rent revision, payment of arrears, and the formation of a residents’ committee.
The implementation conditions of this project were not completely honored, but it was judged by some Zanzibari architects/planners as a success. The repair work provides an excellent example for most of the tenancy challenges encountered within publicly owned properties of Stone Town. This is mainly because of the observed quality of repairs at the house and the level of community participation employed during the project's execution. As a consequence, the beneficiaries, predominantly single women and children, now have better shelter and basic facilities such as water and sanitation. Indeed, residents are now more aware of their basic rights through publicity initiatives and the establishment of their own tenancy conditions.

9.5 The Survey Results

A survey conducted at the house (summarized on Table 9.3) among a selected sample of residents revealed a number of critical issues. In my analysis here, broad aspects of interview responses are grouped to describe the status of the project, its performance and the available opportunities based on the following six aspects of the interviews and the questions asked: awareness of the rehabilitation program and publicity campaigns; quality of outputs, risks and socio-economic potentials; political support and legitimacy; project organization and institutional linkages; participants’ gender, security and family interests; and opportunities for environmental hygiene.

The donors felt that the public education and awareness program through television programming left a strong impact and “contributed to making community participation in this project much more effective” (Sten Rylander, then Swedish Ambassador to Tanzania, 2001). When asked to assess the project in terms of publicity, all respondents agreed that it was a good
thing to be introduced especially in the beginning of the process. For example, the building and its tenants played a starring role in that *Baraza* TV series. The show helped to expose tenancy problems experienced within the building and in Stone Town in general. Some tenants felt the television show was “a great thing in the beginning but” they resented being “overexposed unnecessarily.” Many were irked at seeing themselves “always on television, for free.” The contract to air public education programs was signed using facilities of Television Zanzibar and specific staff members' contracts. But to the surprise of the residents, they have been shown throughout (and probably outside) Tanzania using other television channels, without any consultation made with them or their consent.

Everyone interviewed commended the donors’ contribution to this project, considering the bad conditions that had existed before. A lot of celebrations were held at the completion of the donors’ segment of the project, suggesting the happiness of the people and satisfaction to what was done for them in this building. There is a slight edge to that happiness for many residents. “We always remember the donor efforts, but you need to avoid the problems that we experienced here to make this project successfully replicable in other buildings,” as one resident put it.

Tenants generally suggested some satisfaction with the work. “This project is good, at least as a start. We used to live in such a pathetic situation that we do not have to complain [now],” as one put it. Yet they also highlight insufficiencies caused by contracted craftspeople in some project activities. For example, workmanship involved in “sanitary connections and the toilets was not cheap, but poor, because the whole house is now smelling and the septic tank gets full within the shortest period of time compared to the situation before repairs,” concluded another resident. The spirit of motivation for tenants in the form of temporary employment and
involvement through negotiations was the most frequently mentioned benefit gained in this project. It helped residents to solve some of their family problems, according to one woman. “You know, I come from the Government service, almost working voluntarily there, without receiving adequate encouragement. Due to the nature of our work, we are also most of the time relaxed, without adequate professional and supervisory responsibilities, especially during finishing and with respect to overall workmanship in restoration-related projects. Not that the government does not like to motivate its workers, but this is due to the shortage of capital and or inadequate resource availability. Here, in this house, the situation was a bit different. Adequate resources were available for the work at hand.”

This adequacy of support lasted as long as donor funding. However, it was a razor-thin margin of support, lacking local political will to sustain it. Political support is the most important prerequisite in the quest for sustainable project activities. Government commitment to project development, comprehension of the issues at stake, coordination and cross-sectoral linkages for effective allocation and distribution of resources to stakeholders concerned, all determine the success of any project exercise. This support to community-based management projects (like this one) also legitimizes such efforts and makes it easier for others to adopt the approach (Veit, et al, 1995). Every effort must be made to ensure support at the highest (and lowest) project levels, not only for the design and implementation exercises but also for the whole project management process (Dorm-Adzobu, 1995). This seems not to have been the case for this project.

To assess the impact of the project in this category, respondents were asked to rank their relationship and contracts with other project partners during and after project completion. The general response to this question indicates a poor relationship between tenants at this house and the responsible authorities of the Government, especially the Waqf Commission and the STCDA.
As one put it, “everybody here [in the house] played his/her own part. But some played a bigger role, especially the project consultant and the donors.” There was good cooperation between the tenants themselves, apart from few undisclosed sporadic incidents experienced during the renovation process itself. When the question moved to analysis of state involvement, many tenants were reluctant to express their views, and those who did had fairly bitter things to say.

Even government authorities would admit to this bitterness toward a project which, in their view, had “very limited institutional involvement and lacked transparency.” At both the Stone Town and central government levels, officials believe that the “decision-making had a lot of criteria selection bias in favor of the local based Aga Khan Cultural Services (AKCS) and the foreign consultant.” That consultant left the project immediately after the completion of the Kiponda house restoration project. More often than not, the Waqf Commission has provided insufficient attention to tenancy and maintenance problems in this house. This also suggests the existence of a very complex relationship between the other potential state-based institutional partners. As a result, a workable strategy using all of the available means has yet to be developed that would bring the parties together at the institutional, donor, and local levels for further effective project extension and replication. Initially, during the formulation of the project, the leadership of the housing department of the Waqf Commission promised in all meetings to provide their maximum support for the project and its related agreements. They did not do so. Clearly, the working relationship amongst government stakeholders in this project left a lot to be desired. As the other authorities did not feel fully involved in the management of this project, their full assistance was rarely obtained when needed. Table 9.3 below summary these residents’ responses.
Table 9.3: Stone Town Survey Results on Kiponda Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/#</th>
<th>Questions Asked</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Awareness and Publicity</td>
<td>Strongly felt through <em>Baraza</em> TV series; but community felt over-exposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Quality of Output</td>
<td>Donors highly commended but they dominated; behind the scene slight over-expenditure felt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Risk and Socio-economic Potential</td>
<td>Temporary employment improved motivation and spirit; involvement through negotiations limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Political Support and Legitimacy</td>
<td>Adequate as long as donor funding lasted; community role and relationships short-term; government role limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Project Organization and Institutional Linkages</td>
<td>Government claimed project lacked transparency; biased in AKTC &amp; Co favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Participatory and Gender Security</td>
<td>Tenancy contracts supported single and widowed women; women dominated tenants committee and controlled maintenance funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Opportunities for Environmental Hygiene</td>
<td>Most acceptable approach to deal with housing rehabilitation and tenancy improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Involvement, Continuity, and Sustainability</td>
<td>Not assured; Donors’ withdrawal frightened ill-consulted STCDA, ZSTHS; and project’s replication doubtful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, Fieldwork, 2008

The project’s gender dynamics may be among its most successful elements. As single mothers rather than married women mainly occupy the house, they are the major beneficiaries from the project’s success. Women participated in providing their labor for cash that was used partly to repay their rent arrears. The rent per room was between 1,500 and 2000 Tanzanian shillings before repairs, which had been difficult to set aside funding for, considering other uses and needs. The tenant’s committee was also women dominated. Most of them were involved in the tenants’ meetings and actively contributed ideas in the formulation of their committee and for the maintenance fund, as outlined in their regular TV shows. The special character of the building, which makes this project fascinating, is that after nearly forty years of administration under the WTC, the composition of residents actually seems to match the original owner’s idea.
at the time of construction in the early 20th century: to support single and widowed women.

Figure 9.3 below outlines the level of community and institutional satisfaction of the interviewed residents at Kiponda.

The survey results have also shown that tenants were impressed by the donors’ trust and honesty, which played a large part in convincing them to cooperate. Most of them felt relaxed following the completion of the building renovation. They were free from debt, as they were able to pay their rent regularly. On the basis of these points, the project remains a relevant approach to dealing with complex community-based housing rehabilitation issues and occupancy improvement activities of Stone Town. However, this project’s effectiveness was limited by its failure to take on board the key concerns of all stakeholders. For example, it could be true, perhaps, to argue that “[the] people are empowered and given [a] voice” (Forss, et al, 2005: 31) through this project, hoping to “contribute to democratic changes in society” (Ibid), as the idea was associated with neo-liberal policies imposed over the last 20 years. In due course, it helped in the tenants’ committee formulation process whereby the housing committee was active when the residents were moving to halfway houses, during contract formulation, and when they returned back to those refurbished houses.
Beyond that stage, the role and focus of the established committees, including that of the umbrella ZSTHS, became unbelievably disappointing - and soon after the donor's departure. Not long after this, we witnessed the collapse of the respective housing committees once tenants returned back to their houses. The once visibly organized resident committees shirked their responsibilities, instead calling for project support for their normal house cleanliness, payment of rent, and intermediate house repairs. This social deterioration occurred alongside the deterioration of the respective building conditions, which happened even faster than anticipated, within a limited, seven-year project duration. While the halfway house and house number 1783/84 were converted to government departments, the rehabilitation of the popular Forodhani seafront park was just completed in 2009. The Forodhani park portion of the AKTC’s CBRP was unexpectedly put on hold by the government in 2003, which was the same year that the rumored
privatization of the adjacent orphan homes associated with the *hapa pangu* nepotism phenomena by the ruling elite began a wave of popular accusations against the Zanzibar government.63

### 9.6 Reflections on Stone Town's Urban Village Project

Comparatively speaking, unlike the other locally adopted participatory subdivision projects in Zanzibar city whereby some sympathy within the state apparatus was easily noted in “formalizing the informal land market already in existence in northern and central peri-urban settings” (Myers and Muhajir, 1997: 379) and in the Chukwani case, the implementation of the UVP and CBRP in Stone Town was hampered by its donor-controlled approach, which crippled the local innovations put into the housing improvement project. For example, in the peri-urban areas, local innovations were possible outside the donors’ purview, as in the improvement of neighborhood units number 23 and 24 at Uzi, Mwanakwerekwe through public-private community relationships, and this “led to the semblance balance of competing land uses [and to] speed up the land delivery process in Zanzibar” (Ibid). This was the case, albeit with “land price escalation at the expenses of the poor” (Alder and Materu, 1992), as the former COLE worked with hundreds of unlawful squatters in those neighborhoods (from the 1982 master plan) “to provide a form of title to those who had purchased user rights for their house-plots, charging the squatters a nominal fee for the title and for a formal survey of their properties” (Myers and Muhajir, 1997: 379). This informal subdivision story relates to the Stone Town UVP case because they are both frameworks that aim at holistically unifying formal and informal land and

63 The Karume family gained control of the orphanage and converted it into a posh tourist-oriented restaurant; while their later donation to the construction of a new orphanage in the urban periphery through their family-owned ZAYEDEZA restored some of their reputation, it was hard for the AKTC’s personnel to witness the privatization of an orphanage on the seafront in the very midst of its heritage and conservation efforts.
housing management activities in Zanzibar city in differing strategic ways.

But for the case of UVP, its sustainability was even more questionable (Forss, et al, 2005). It is questionable more because of the inhabitants’ lack of any sense of property ownership which endangered their commitment to their project’s replication. Indications are that the prevailing community customs were misinterpreted and the realities of the sustainable approach were largely misunderstood. The rightly called sustainability gospel (in Myers 2003) is openly seen in the CBR project document, with added bullet points, continuously being edited on overcrowded flow charts by the respective donor/project managers (Sida and the Aga Khan Trust in this case), but without full incorporation of local realities. It was unable to predict and understand the dynamics of the local housing management complex or cultural diversity within the young theatre of African democratic politics, overwhelming in informal communities in Zanzibar (Ibid). I, therefore, confirm that the scope of the projects put in place to achieve land and environmental sustainability in Zanzibar is still narrow, less equipped to cope with unpredictable local events, unless it is unified to include those resourceful values from people's own initiatives into the formal system. Additionally, the type of planning system that exists in Zanzibar is difficult to push into progress unless the ongoing individual attempts collectively realize the fact that they cannot compete against, but must be part of dialogue in between, each other's interests to build up housing communities in a manner that they all want.

Indeed, in this respect, the integration of the collaborative planning approach in the still skeptical central and local government units failed, and units were still finding it difficult to be more effective and efficient or to divide responsibilities among themselves, on the one side. And the community's individuals, from the other side, also faced difficulties in being cooperative or responsive to restrictive development control conditions applied in the project, with many
matters still regarded as the government's responsibility by most citizens. The authorities find it difficult to be judicious in the allocation and utilization of their limited resources and to develop a consensus building vision and its supportive structure, working together with citizens through responsible and legitimate social institutions. At the center of the cases in the two previous chapters, I could not see organised efforts by government institutions from the beginning to look for any positive modalities within the informality practiced by residents.

By contrast, with the UVP, there was a slight change in the implementation approach which invited a parallel intervention involving negotiation and communication with ordinary people, and its short-lived official recognition and associated donor support commitment helped to reaffirm project continuity at the initial implementation phase. It utilized what Gregory (1994) would term interactive schemes or Pieterse (2005) or Myers (2009) would see a relational model of urban politics moving towards the possibility of 'other thinking,' to borrow from Harrison (2006). This Stone Town experience seemed to drive most of the house tenants to support the UVP, but planners seldom took this into account or took it up into the operative planning framework. This suggests that the scope of the reform projects put in place to achieve Zanzibar's peripheral lands and Stone Town's housing improvement are both still narrow and poorly equipped to cope with unpredictable local politics and development dynamics.

The UVP’s performance indicates a number of other areas that might have been improved, in terms of relevance and efficiency, monitoring and sustainability. Because the project design emphasized parallel on-going tenants’ activities, such as managing their own committee, and building consensus around complex stakeholder involvement, long-term impacts might reveal many unforeseen issues. Indeed the general expectation is that major impacts may only appear after another five-year electoral season. In terms of project sustainability, success
would depend on the project’s ability and flexibility to adequately sensitize the concerned stakeholders so as to increase their awareness of one another and ultimately strengthen project ownership among respective groups. It would also be improved by the ability to drive the process of prevention and maintenance forward through the committee’s own initiatives. This will in turn depend on the availability of motivation, capacity building, follow-up and moral support to such a committee in other buildings as this project might have unfolded. It would also depend on the success with which the project would be harmonized and institutionally mainstreamed within the activities of the donors.

The sustainability of this project would not have been assured, based on my recent survey, even with continued donor funding. The original design of the project was only marginally respected. When the financial assistance to this project drew to an end, project implementation quickly lost momentum when no adequate and continuous strategy was employed to enable other partners to successfully take it over. Yet, there is a need to consolidate the gains made already within locally based institutions as well as influencing the project to be administered locally. Similarly, as the Stone Town is a world heritage site, government commitment to the project could have been demonstrated in concrete terms, primarily through modest budgetary support for follow-up activities and local resource mobilization to sustain the project performance. However, external funding was also needed to finance capacity building and to support demonstration activities.

In this chapter, I have been looking at one relatively small apartment building, and one small-scale attempt to create a decentralized, participatory means for redeveloping it. The efforts at this house, regardless of its noted shortcomings, produced moderately successful results, but the replicability of these results is quite suspect. Such an overwhelming constellation of forces –
financial commitments by increasingly reluctant foreign donors, political commitments by a reluctant state, and a huge commitment of time, talent, trust, patience, and labor by local people – seems increasingly impossible, particularly in the Stone Town “urban villages” that needed these kinds of projects the most. The opposition CUF dominated Stone Town in both the 1995, 2005 and 2010 elections – and it only failed to do so in 2000 because it boycotted the polls there. However, in this UVP they got all tenants involved, regardless of their political affiliation, paid significant support to its implementation, extended employment due to the opportunities to all jobless residents, and unified the tenants. The depth of bitterness many Stone Town residents feel for the state was rarely expressed openly, but it is virtually palpable in the narrow alleys of this historic quarter even with the recently approved political reconciliation. Otherwise, even good relations between genuinely committed progressive expatriate planners and poor urban village tenants will face a daunting future if a state that has poor relations with both remains uncommitted in between.

9.7 Conclusion

Since 1985, Zanzibar has experienced tremendous change, in a very short space of time, at a high level of intensity. Neoliberal policies have pried open an economy once more strongly state-controlled than that of the Tanzanian mainland and left the city’s poor majority vulnerable to high inflation, unemployment, and reduced service provision. Sustainable development and good governance policy rubrics fell short of their ideals, while other political flames have burned vehemently. Despite this difficult and turbulent context, new approaches to urban planning have come to the fore. Often these are attempts to decentralize and democratize decision-making
processes. I have shown, in this case study, that these efforts have had some measure of success, but ultimately the success is circumscribed by the broader context of Zanzibar over the last two decades.

There is an evident authoritarian hangover from which the Zanzibar islands still suffer. The kinds of participatory, collaborative, or argumentative planning I have examined here require a wide and deep political horizon to sustain. At first glance, Zanzibar’s experience with these new planning frameworks might seem exceptional. In Tanzania, only Dar es Salaam and possibly Moshi have experienced socio-political tensions of a comparable magnitude. However, even Dar, feted as Africa's 'best practice' collaborative and participatory city (Nnkya, 2007), still remains the eighth dirtiest city in the world, according to the recent (2010) evaluation by the international rating company Partnership Consulting of New York.

One look around the map of African cities suggests that Zanzibar may be close to a typical setting. Urban socio-cultural strife, political uncertainty, and animosity ignited by neo-liberal policies or democratic transitions are characteristic of the era of implementation for these new forms of collaborative, participatory, or decentralized planning in about a third of the major cities on the continent. My example of urban development policy reforms in the form of Stone Town's rehabilitation, offers suggestions of pragmatic and inclusive ways of working around the severe problems of state-society relations in African cities - until one looks a little more closely. If Zanzibar’s case is indeed not uniquely exceptional, then the new collaborative planning model, as actually practiced, may end up doing little to solve urban governance and planning problems.
Chapter 10: Conclusions
Is Dialogic Planning Feasible for Zanzibar?

*Haba na Haba Hujaza Kibaba* (Little by Little Fills the Measure); KiSwahili Proverb

10.1 Introduction

My initial respect for the applied side of sustainability planning was enormous. My position has wavered a little following a multi-dimensional literature review (on both sustainability planning and related theories of collaborative planning and communicative action) and my analysis of this model in practice in Zanzibar for this dissertation. The review of literature was helpful in suggesting many ways that the conceptual background could be utilized for my analysis. It was also useful for outlining the potential strengths and limitations conceptually for a dialogic and unified planning approach in urban sustainability for Zanzibar. As revealed in Chapter 3, most models have looked towards the improvement of the earlier models or looked at their weaknesses for guiding formalized land and settlement development processes via government and urban management institutions. The review of literature uncovered the foundational sources of sustainability theory from the 1960s but then specifically built up from the advocacy for urban planning, environmental, and land management (or human settlement development) by the *WCED (1987)* report through the UN’s Local Agenda 21 program.

Habermas's (1984) communicative action theory, especially via its critical elaboration by other scholars and planners, formed an important component of my literature review. Scholars such as Fischer and Forester (1993), Gregory (1994), Healey (1997; 2006), Freeman and

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64 Available at: [http://mwanasimba.online.fr/E_methali_01.htm](http://mwanasimba.online.fr/E_methali_01.htm), July 29, 2010
Thompson-Fawcett (2003), Nnkya (2007), Myers (2008), Forester (2009), and Ahmed (2010) have developed interesting contentions relevant for applied dimensions of sustainability and communicative action theories. I approached their takes on collaborative and argumentative action theories to seek ways to improve sustainable urban planning, land, and housing management practices for the environments of developing-world cities. I referred to Hernando de Soto (2000) on the formalization of informality through the capitalistic strategy for eliminating ‘dead capital’ and improving property ownership status of the informal cities of the developing countries such as those in Africa.

In Chapter 4, I used the work of Steve Robins (2006) and Ambreena Manji (2006) to challenge de Soto's apparent promotion of what they called, respectively, the '(re)informalization' of cities and the expansion of the 'mystery of poverty'. Therefore, what is being experienced now with regard to sustainability, land management, and planning for urban housing development in Africa is the opposite of what was initially intended. The democratization, liberalization, and privatization strategies introduced to guide urban sustainability in transitional situations such as in Tanzania, created disjointed elements of sustainability, but beyond the reach of the societies or responsible authorities to manage or harness. Because “planning is the organization of hope” that works practically in the face of power and value differences (Forester, 2009: 6), and because “it is faith (in KiSwahili: imani) and customs (desturi) that dominate the local ways, [...] in the absence of... equitable distribution of power” (Myers, 1993: 487) I contend that a more dialogic approach to sustainability is a necessary component for organizing ‘hope’, by facilitating conversation and promoting a debate to cope with value differences.

This concluding chapter is divided into five sections, with three aims. First, I aim to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the research in the following section 10.2. In that
section, my emphasis is to assess my research hypotheses that the imposed neoliberal policies faced a lack of political will and insufficient good urban governance. Neoliberalism set the wheels rolling for Africa's new democratization wave that created avenues for collaborative and communicative action planning in some cities as one of its significant strengths. However, those collaborative partnership strategies used in the implementation of the sustainability model in Zanzibar were not able to cope with local realities in the absence of the donors. They were also unpredictable and lacked continuity, and were not able to match or break the traditional and institutional land management housing development/improvement practices ongoing in the cities.

Housing (re)informalization and other development conflicts or differences on land and urban planning questions emerged and were not avoidable, and there was no continuity even in those mutually agreed positions in planning design and implementation, as shown in my three Zanzibar case studies. I suggest that the insufficient will of the political system associated with the paralyzed urban governance environment throughout the planning history of Zanzibar struggled to support the latest sustainability planning, housing, and land management procedures in any representative form.

My reflections from the three case study chapters comprise section 10.3. These reflections are based on how the case studies play out in light of the literature review, conceptual review, the historical, political, and policy/legal contexts of the land, housing and urban development framework of Zanzibar, and fieldwork itself. Section 10.4 sums up my overall observations, which include lessons learned and issues, implications, and challenges encountered in applying planning collaboration for Zanzibar.
10.2 Observed Strengths and Weaknesses of Sustainability Planning

Housing conservation, infrastructure development, and subdivision planning are the most significant urban planning engagements in Zanzibar. The guidance of these three activities emerged from five major fragmented planning schemes: the Lanchester plan prepared in 1923, the post-war Ten-Year Development Plan of 1945-54 that was dominated by urban redevelopment schemes, and the 1958 Kendall plan, all imposed by the British; the 1968 East German plan; and the 1982 Chinese master plan (Muhajir 1991, 1993). Each respective planning scheme, whether we consider the 1940s utility housing program, the 1960s urban renewal schemes, and or the model neighborhood development of the 1920s, 1950s or 1980s, belongs to one of the three different planning lineages I’ve outlined in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 also presented the outright hostility against the informality that had occurred due to improper governance of the land sector from the colonial era onward, but most importantly via the political manipulation of central authorities since the emergence of the new democratic phase of politics in the 1990s. This recent phase of manipulation hampered the performance of urban planning to the lowest enforcement level possible, disabled by the political interventions in almost every land sector. When the Finns first came in to support the introduction of sustainability planning (the ZILEM time), they stopped because of the post-1995 election political standoff. Their support later resumed with the on-going SMOLE project, but subject to even more obvious political manipulation.

Over the two and a half decades of unreliable donor assistance, institutional land management, urban planning, and housing development tradition, both formal and informal processes continued side-by-side unabated in and around the municipality. Chapter 6 conveyed
how (and to what extent) the execution of neoliberal land policy reform was undertaken and how this impacted the professional and technological advancements of land management institutions, urban planning offices, and traditional management of native housing practices in the city. To eliminate urban planning shortfalls and the messy land management framework, the reform projects employed a strategy they called the logical framework approach (LFA). Its procedures were not able to reach the local communities and dialogue with them outside the host institutional limitations.

On study leave during the formulation of the initial ZILEM project proposal, I was on the ground and able to provide coherent thoughts as planning director, from amidst the time when the program was being implemented, through its abandonment in the donor ‘freeze’ of the late 1990s, until after the COLE’s abolition in 2001. I then played a major role in the management of the collaborative donor-funded community-based conservation project of Stone Town in the early 2000s, while observing the return of the Finns in the SMOLE program, based just down the road from my office in the Stone Town Conservation Center. My in-depth understanding, analysis of archives and documents, and the insights gained through interviews in the field about the strategies adopted provide a clear sense of the strengths of these sustainability and collaborative projects in Zanzibar. In the course of my professional life, I witnessed that donor-funded projects were able to educate local professionals, and that the presence of these newly trained professionals also enabled the government to work more smoothly with donors. However, the trained native professionals were not allowed to deploy their skills, because they were limited by government politics. Alongside the introduction of the land adjudication or fiscal land cadaster project within the Stone Town of Zanzibar, these donors’ special emphasis went more into supporting the umbrella legislative review and mapping projects.
Chapter 6 conveyed most of the discussion about how the sustainability projects were crippled in Zanzibar's land sector due to heavily fought political divisions for the last two decades, until the coalition government was formed following the 2010 election. These projects initially brought great hope for post-revolutionary planning and land management practices in Zanzibar, before the hope faded away. By 1995 much of the housing areas around the city had become poorly developed, expanding beyond the Masingini hills on the eastern edge of the city in West District. The donors were not able to improve city housing conditions, claiming that it was too politically complicated for them to get involved in, which was equally so for the whole of the islands in the rural areas that they were contradictorily willing to help. Urban planning failed to work, with this donor bias toward innocuous legislative changes, technical mapping projects, and assistance to tourism investment areas. This was one of the major weaknesses of the whole project: jumping for easier, implementable issues rather than taking on complicated but necessary social development.

The result of this was that the informal system, which was kept outside the structure of the government's project activities, overwhelmed the formal system. Because of the government's socialist ethos, and, knowing that the donor was not much concerned with urban development per se, there was little or no institutional willingness or ability to talk to the community to stop informality. This was so despite the donor funds that created a huge number of trained professionals, including office and field assistants who were ironically left largely out of the process of genuinely reforming the government's land responsibilities. The government was also not able to enforce planning through decent institutional and legal means, because it was trapped in the middle between enforcing planning in new areas of town or getting its plans updated. The politics that prevailed automatically leaned in the government elite's political
direction.

In Stone Town, people were able to invest their moral support to the project I discussed there, but the government messed up with the donors, and houses are going to fall again now – some of the very same rehabilitated structures - due to the donor's departure. As I personally witnessed with the improvement of tenancy contracts in Stone Town throughout the five years of that project, the allocation of subdivided lands which end up in the elite hands in this neoliberal policy age was done around the election times to help political lobbying. In this regard, termination of the projects and associated lack of planning enforcement did not worry the legislators, and in consequence people did not get their land controlled or housing improved.

There is also another observation to make in favor of a more dialogic approach. The majority of people in urban and peri-urban Zanzibar are unable to read or interpret the plans and their related legislative provisions or standards because they are very technically written and are in English. And, even when they are written in KiSwahili, most people are still weak readers, and most of the design standards are highly technical. They need to be told what is in the government's plans and why they should make contributions, but how is that to be done without authoritarian or draconian measures? The bottom line is, through home-grown political tolerance, the government should gain control of the existing disconnect, to enable community engagement; community empowerment is most vital to planning enforcement in people's informal or semi-informal housing areas.

Unfortunately, the still-existing socialist mentality does not allow the full-fledged empowerment of ordinary people in planning. Yet the maturity of the ongoing democratization process may further improve the process. Again, in Stone Town the project depended upon a bargain with residents through an alternating system of weekly volunteering and paid labor. The
residents also provided other contributions, such as running their own tenancy committees or administering their own maintenance account for the project. The Chukwani residents got their shares of subdivided lands within a limited time, by volunteering and supporting the survey technicians, and through their own individual (mostly financial) contributions for plot demarcations, before that collaborative scheme was overridden by the elite beneficiaries.

In other words, for people to participate willingly in any collaborative sustainable planning action, they want to get authentic and tangible results out of their contributions and as quickly as possible - by, for example, issuance of recognized titles for the case of Chukwani, recognition of their informal development rights for the case of Welezo-Darajabovu, and the improved tenancy contracts and housing conditions for the case of the Stone Town project. People openly voiced their demands and claims in Stone Town and at Chukwani, before their voices were cut short by the government authorities. The government authorities did not even allow this limited expression of popular voices to emerge in the case of Welezo-Darajabovu, claiming that this was the most opposition-dominated zone among the informal city areas. Until the government changes this attitude to let all of the people enjoy equal housing development opportunities and access to the public expression of their views on planning processes, informality will continue winning over the formal process, since the former is cheaper and quicker to build than the latter and helps the people to evade oppressive state tactics.

In this case, if the government and the donors supporting it want planning to succeed, they need not remain one-sided, or to let everything be controlled by anxious and political agents merely because they lack essential planning expertise for any proper enforcement. Political agents take the power, instead of delegating to responsible institutions that are meant to serve the people that they were employed to help in residential development planning. Politics is running
the affairs of the government’s planning authorities. If the government is not ready to appreciate how to actually make the affairs of urban planning work toward democratized, decentralized, sustainable and participatory planning, then it is easy to cut such planning down. Technically, the government is left without any legal instrument to use for planning enforcement or control of informality, since the now-outdated 1982 master plan failed to guide the city's development activities, even in the presence of the current donors. Now because of political intervention and non-enforcement of planning guidelines, the city is more than 80% out of control. The other 20% is a combination of military camps and some planned neighborhoods, occupied largely by elites or allies of the state.

We end up with a handful (or a few pieces) of experimental exercises which, in their totality, do not qualify as any real success in implementing the argumentative/collaborative discourse of planning by following the prevailing principles. Yes, the ZILEM and SMOLE projects’ input helped to build up the government’s planning capacity, by reviewing old and introducing new legislation related to land and by equipping staff members with education and skills for handling local planning issues. However, all efforts were essentially stymied by the government's politics, either because the party chiefs wouldn’t allow them or because the donors wouldn’t finance them. The informal has overridden the formal; neither an urban development framework nor umbrella planning legislation has been developed to guide urban planning activities in Zanzibar. How do we expect planners to do the impossible, like planning enforcement or any other related work, without having the existing opportunities improved or institutional instruments unified, or without a renegotiation of the relationship between the state elites and the ordinary people? This takes us to my personal reflections, as expressed in section 10.3 below.
10.3 Reflections from Each Local Case Study Area

While Chapter 2 identified my methods, including my reflections on personal experience, secondary literature, and primary documents, archival material, fieldwork observations, and interviews, I discuss key elements of political, institutional, and ecological planning features further in this section based on my case study evaluations. When evaluating the Welezo-Darajabovu informal housing, the negotiated subdivision planning at Chukwani, and in Stone Town's tenancy improvement scheme as guided by a Grounded Theory approach (mixing fieldwork, interviews, and ethnographic survey), I showed that they all had unresolved planning problems despite readily recognized community support for improved planning practices.

The thread that runs through the three case studies is the sense of the disorganized property ownership system that persists in the damaged and incomplete dialogic planning process. The informal sector areas with no clear title to land with little or no government involvement are portrayed in the Welezo-Darajabovu case study. I showed in that case that land and municipal institutions and politicians were not transparently part of the informal housing process. However, the political agents were indirectly dealing with the informal land purchase arrangements through the sheha, as the local political agent, and the middlemen working for landowners in violating the revolutionary government's three-acre plot system.

A formalized informal guided process at Chukwani had ordinary villagers receiving recognized title to lands but they also intimately witnessed most of their precious native lands being sold out to the local Zanzibari tycoons or taken over for the construction of a parliamentary building, two private high schools and three educational colleges, among other higher-level services largely not meant for them. This political situation preempted the government’s lower-level experimental intervention, and the ruling revolutionaries were complicit in what went on in
this sub-urban village.

Within the Stone Town case, involving housing rehabilitation through dialogue between the public building tenants, external donors, and the government, ad-hoc (semi-governmental) arrangements were made to represent the donors and the host government for the Urban Village Project. But this nicely initiated collaborative project was cut short due to the violation of the original agreement, following the donors’ departure. In the community-based rehabilitation program, the tenants concerned enjoyed an extension of their tenancy contracts to 10 years, participated in the remodeling of the tenement buildings, and were paid for their labor through their tenant committees and house improvement funding schemes, so that they had a stake in building for the future. This also helped them avoid fake ownership contracts to their buildings, since the buildings belonged to and were registered with the *waqf* commission and the government. Figure 10.1 shows the thread of these case studies.

Figure 10.1: Thread of the Case Studies

Source: Author, 2011
My research has shown the limited successes in the implementation of the sustainability reform agenda for Zanzibar, because the government overrode everything that happened that could have resulted in urban sustainability planning. Even the short-lived collaborative projects at Chukwani and Stone Town that aimed to change the planning status quo were shut down prematurely by the government. And for the professionals in planning and land management offices, their powers were politically limited, they lost confidence in their ability to implement any experiments, and they were overwhelmed by fears about how their political inclinations might be read into their actions by their superiors. Lack of funds added to these major reasons for the phasing out of collaborative initiatives with property owners. The power of planning was for a long time delegated to other partisan influences, like CCM branches and other affiliates through sheha who essentially control the ongoing informal subdivision and housing development processes, to the extent that anyone does.

Only in those areas where politicians were sympathetic to the role of middle agents were achievements possible. In other areas, the government intervened through house demolition, condemnation of settlements, pushing the residents away from their original settlements, suing them for land violations, ignoring their claims to native titles, or institutional inaction - whichever suited political requirements.

This created a situation whereby new urban dwellers, and many established urbanites, had to look for extra possibilities that were contrary to planning intervention, based in an 'extra-legal' system in which government lawyers were inactive. Chapter 7 showed that nothing was done to stop their new construction elsewhere. The government was not able to control informality through house demolitions. Experimental alternative planning practices from within
government offices were ill-equipped and poorly recognized by the government; the top elites of government were always against these alternative plans. They did not want anybody to go against the leadership’s personal desires or political inclinations. Urban sustainability planning was face to face with the reality of the involuntary character of the imposition of democratization.

Chapter 8 about Chukwani displays political interference that abounds through the failure to sustain any long term support for community alternatives. From the historical background of this village and its political connection to new migrants, we might have expected this sub-urban area’s adoption of ideas of collaboration and sustainability. The implementation of the land subdivision sharing approach in this village revealed something else entirely, eventually. From the revolution to the second wave of democratization with its continuing socialist tendencies, the approach had proferred a land use solution which was easily applicable for both the elite peri-urban migrants and the Chukwani residents themselves. However, now the Zanzibari elites surround these people (ancestors of the original revolutionaries), and instead of liberating them, they have caused the villagers to become diametrically opposed to the original aims of the revolution they themselves had supported.

The short-lived collaborative tenancy project in Stone Town (Chapter 9) was discontinued following the donor departure; donors were angered by the government's revocation of its agreed memorandum and its taking over of the restored buildings and their office activities. It was also claimed that the donors were purposely helping in the rehabilitation of Stone Town because the town was an opposition-dominated enclave in elections. Therefore, the divided opinion between the government and other actors within the project made the situation even worse.
The existing dualistic system also made the collaborative approach flawed because of how the original agreement was violated. The original intention of this project was to restore the Stone Town houses and improve their tenancy arrangements, but it also included improvement of the Stone Town's physical environment via an incremental (gradual) guided approach. However, it ended up in money-grabbing gamesmanship activities by the government, which wanted to possess the monthly rent from the purposely formed quasi-governmental Stone Town Conservation Center. As originally agreed, this money was part of the tenants’ contributions to sustain the maintenance funding of the project in the long run after the donor's departure.

If the government had intended this project continuation, it would have not made such baseless claims or demanded to possess the established tenancy funds that were supposed to be used to restore the buildings, without the consent of other project stakeholders. It should have instead improved its support to the project management team implementing the project, because it had the means to do so, and it would have helped the project to sustain itself. But what actually happened was the death of the project, which meant that its activities became a very heavy load and responsibility for the tenants committees and their now ill-concerned heritage society (which lost interest with the donors’ departure). The government frustrated the donors, and they eventually suspended their funding allocation for the project.

During its heyday all related decisions were respectful to multiple opinions and respected all levels of government regulations with reference to the STCDA Act and conservation guidelines. Donors were not alone in the management of this project. Other stakeholders including the government authorities, respective buildings' tenants committees, and the umbrella conservation society were all involved at all city, council, and building code levels. The restoration guidelines were also respectful to the approved conservation standards.
To be well executed, the project's actors had to respect the agreed memorandum/project guidelines and include all levels of government authorities, non-governmental target groups, and donors, with each respecting each other's roles. Essentially, the government and its responsible political agencies literally interfered with virtually all planning efforts of the planners, conservators, land practitioners, and any other people or organization involved in the sustainability planning in Zanzibar city. Because of political sentiments and related interference all good deeds that were done and aimed at sustainability were negated by the government, and this forced the donors to leave and led to the common people suffering the most. From this point of view, sustainable/collaborative planning did not become a viable solution to planning problems on Zanzibar.

7.4 Lessons Learned (Issues, Implications, and Challenges)

I have formulated this concluding chapter to ask whether a unified planning system is possible for Zanzibar. This discussion tries to digest how such a rhetorical question may be answered, linking back to my research hypotheses. The KiSwahili proverb cited on top of this chapter suggests my advocacy for a step-by-step way into the dialogic mode of planning analysis. The belief here is that examining efforts towards social dialogue-driven planning, through a wider lens of native settlements development processes, would allow us more understanding of how planning works in this age of land reform in Zanzibar.

Insights from Welezo-Darajabovu and its informal adjudication, the Chukwani land sharing exercise, and the Stone Town tenancy improvement project in Zanzibar have offered the following lessons for some new communicative/discursive ways to think about a unified approach that might involve a wide range of doers, eliminate skepticism, and construct trust
among concerned groups. First, the government has to empower its employees and honor them, instead abandoning them, in their role of guiding informality, without disregarding the whole planning practice in Zanzibar. The government needs to also recognize informality as the dominant planning process happening across the entire Urban/West region. Without truly revolutionary thinking toward hybrid governance in planning, people will keep on building their houses as they wish and going against the government rules. Instead of the “order without framework” that Myers (1993) saw in the Ng’ambo of the colonial era, much of the peri-urban fringe looks more like disorder without framework: the system is not working. Instead of exercising house demolitions, the government should leave itself with what it can handle both politically and institutionally. Not much can be done to stop informality if the people are not part of the planning process or if their cries are not met.

In Stone Town the government has to provide those properties with clear ownership roles or recognize the tenants as their new owners in order to have this community feel their sense of property ownership. This could be done by giving the residents their certificate of ownership or some kind of title, as the donors’ project used to facilitate. The bottom line is to set the record clear in registered deeds, instead of letting residents be stuck in rotting tenements, without dialogue with them, leaving everybody out of the cold.

Politically, the local sheha and the ruling party people will keep on behaving like neighborhood mayors - provided they keep on existing politically. These will essentially remain the controllers or destroyers of their areas, depending on what their fellow party people want them to do. Because they are part of the government’s power structure, it is next to impossible to do anything against them. Therefore, they have to be accommodated formally into the planning process by also building dialogue with them, and between them and ordinary residents. In so
doing, if they are willing to help out, then they can be used as sort of local eyes of the state, to help the government find out who owns what in terms of the identification of property ownership status of the areas to avoid planning/management conflict, and also to become the local public relations officers to help disseminate planning information and agenda items that could be promoted to all planning levels for the local, technical, municipal, or governmental decision making levels and inform responsible politicians through their political structure.

In this structure, involving the property owners becomes the key activity, because they are the ones to surrender their lands for planning purposes and they are the ones who need to be assured they will not lose their material assets. In this process, the system should be able to exercise checks and balances easily because of openness, by informing the local people without let them abuse the given role. With their expertise planners should remain the key advisors in this process for the government and the people concerned at the top and below the structure, and they should be empowered by the government to do what they are supposed to do to foster social dialogue throughout the process. They should also be allowed to exercise their routine professional role by going to the field to update their information and to inspect or survey for the people. Donors should be encouraged to spend more time in the field to grasp the cries of the people, rather than to rely on their own empirical assessments which sometimes appear outdated and not helpful to the targeted communities. They should also be allowed to spend the funds they have, and to issue guidance to locals on how their funds should be spent.

The people concerned (including the informal developers) in this ad-hoc situation should be offered clear titles to their lands and houses, which they then can sell or transfer to another person, or give to members of their families within existing legal provisions. If one does not have land title, the price of the property is usually lower than it is with official documents. So by
adjudicating their property, as is now going on in Stone Town, and giving them official titles, informal owners are helped to maximize their property values. They might then give their moral support to planning, through voluntary participation, if they benefit from the planning. Without encouragement for their involvement and benefit, they will remain in the informal sector, and continue letting things get further out of control.

So is a dialogic planning approach feasible for Zanzibar in land management and urban planning? I think the answer may still vary, whether you are a plan designer or a plan implementer or if you are an authority or a community, an occupier or a land developer. But professionally it is a valid question. One obvious observation about this question throughout my case study analysis was that not everything was bad news. There were discernible changes in Zanzibar's land subdivision policy with the introduction of the popular land sharing practice in the form of the 40/60 percentage negotiation basis of 1996. For example, it helped to reduce disputes among land owners and the authorities. Before this practice was phased out by the government prematurely, and as outlined in Chapter 8, it helped to increase land access and the percentage of land delivery by a third for common applicants to the responsible institution. This little achievement, however limited it was (and if it had been allowed to germinate), suggests an approach that helps to build gradual consensus among all parties concerned in land management affairs even within a turbulent political environment like Zanzibar.

However, my interview results, especially in the Stone Town survey, correctly stressed that it is too early to definitely tell about the success of sustainability strategies, pointing to the grand challenge of acceptance by the authority concerned, especially as a strategic priority of the responsible ministry. None of the consulted projects (in ZILEM, SMOLE, and Stone Town's UVP) has ever had an interest in dealing directly with land subdivision planning - the most
fundamental land issue for the people in the community. Some local technicians thought that
doing so might help win the battle against informality gradually; they argued that there was no
choice other than embarking on such kinds of schemes to help organize people's lands even in
small-scale affordable projects.

The retired professor Volker Kreibich of the University of Dortmund in Germany once
described this approach as “a fair intended exercise for the time being until firm action will be
taken by the government” in favor of unifying urban planning practice in the country. Rather
than just surrendering, or remaining with a polarized framework within the SMOLE project,
“you will get criticism no matter what to this well-intended option of yours”, concluded
Professor Kreibich. Despite this criticism the technicians’ small-scale, low-key, dialogue-based
sub-division approach might be the beginning towards special measures to control misuse of land
informally within peri-urban areas of Zanzibar. It might help provide staff members of the land
institutions a chance to share their home-grown strategic orientations and objectives.

In the reform era, there has been a lot of time wasted without debating what the best
option is for acknowledging the existence of traditional housing informality in Zanzibar or how
to guide its development processes. While the ZILEM project looked as if it was a little bit
conscious about local positions and analyses of what might be sustainable means for planning,
the SMOLE project strives to expose its resources to the deep demands of central authority and
the business elite community, through its mapping in tourist areas and its adjudication project for
the Stone Town – and neither program is even remotely participatory, decentralized, or
transparent in the ways its Finnish management - at least rhetorically - would have liked, in the
discourse these two projects emulated from the outset.
What was brought to the surface in the COLE era ZILEM project was the need to continue dialogue on how to keep the society less divided among the two major housing traditions – formal and informal – where each blamed the other for its roles in incoherent environmental damage. There were some notable acknowledgments pointing to the fact that the formal housing development process was only working in favor of the elite few politicians and the richest group in the community, thereby making the informal housing areas the only ones available to poor urban dwellers. This left the people to exercise their own form of governance within these areas, including looking for the ways of bearing costs to service their areas on their own shoulders - unlike in the formal housing areas, where the government was expected to provide such services. However, both systems, the formal and the informal, operated in such a way that the whole city has been left to suffer for decades.

10.5 Areas for Further Research

This dissertation cannot claim to have completed the analysis surrounding the limitations of sustainability and collaborative planning discourses. Chief among the limitations, I’ve argued that in Zanzibar this planning approach was centrally controlled and was not responsibly built on dialogue. A number of contributing factors still remain uncovered in relation to the implementation of the urban sustainability model and its related collaborative planning rhetoric. Those concerns need further intimate investigation.

The case study findings, however, have helped to understand the disjointed element of sustainability based on theoretical, empirical, professional, and local analyses, which can itself

65 Wolfgang Scholz, (2005); Fieldwork Presentation; Conversation with Professor Volker Kreibich, Zanzibar
be a step forward for further research. This is because effective urban planning or urban
geography research has to reflect all other socio-economic, environmental, and cultural factors at
all levels for understanding social processes. “One needs in-depth knowledge,” in the words of
Kunfaa (1996: 275), to understand how planning works in the wider perspective of land and
housing reform environments. Until such analysis is achieved and other factors identified, urban
sustainability will continue to be understudied and contradictory.

Geographically, though, the end of this research has helped to introduce an adequate
place and space for dialogic planning in Zanzibar. For the Swahili culture, the place for social
dialogue is the baraza (platform) used by Zanzibaris to discuss their community affairs. This was
manifested in the Baraza TV show which initiated the Urban Village Project in Stone Town. But
also with Mapuri's shared subdivision idea, it was done on the baraza; and even when he thought
about piloting the concept, they agreed on the baraza. I would say when people discuss things
they traditionally do it based on the baraza. Baraza is not only a social place, but it is also a
physical space. People talk about the baraza and the space and the place it works is the baraza.
So the future of dialogic planning rests upon the baraza.
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