The Political Economy of the Film Industry in Tanzania: From Socialism to an Open Market Economy, 1961–2010

By

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Abstract

This study examines the film industry in Tanzania from the 1960s to 2010 and assesses how government policies, legislation, and cultural institutions have impacted filmmaking in Tanzania. By employing a critical political economy theoretical framework, the study explores succeeding administrations, from President Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1961–1985) to President Mrisho Jakaya Kikwete (2005–present), and reveals cultural mechanisms governments use in controlling the film industry. Through the use of archival information, interviews, and participant observation, the study reveals that despite the social, cultural, economic, political, and ideological shifts that Tanzania has experienced in moving from socialism to capitalism, each administration, using different mechanisms, has retained a strong hold on the film industry. These administrations in advancing their power and legitimacy established cultural institutions and film policies that saw to it that only government-sanctioned images and cultural values were projected to its citizenry. This study reveals that government institutions such as the Government Film Unit (GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), the Audio Visual Institute (AVI), the National Film Censorship Board (NFCB), the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976, the Cultural Policy, the Cultural Trust Fund, the Copyright Law of 1999, the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA), and the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) were established as mechanisms to control local cultural products as well as the intrusion of foreign cultural products. The policies, legislation, and cultural institutions gave the government the power to influence the opinion of its citizens by dictating what cultural images and identities were permissible.

By examining how policies, institutions, and legislation impacted the film industry, an understanding of how governments manipulate and control the cultural/film sector is critically highlighted and addressed in the hope that an alternative, more diversified perspective will emerge.
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Chapter One

Introduction

This study explores the film industry in Tanzania from the 1960s to 2010 and assesses how government policies, legislation, and cultural institutions have been used as mechanism of cultural control and thus shaped and impacted filmmaking in Tanzania. An examination of how different administrations, from President Julius Kambarage Nyerere in 1961 to President Mrisho Jakaya Kikwete in 2010, have perceived film production and thus the film industry as a challenge to the neo-liberal narrative of globalization that sees governments as obsolete is made and a critical political economy analytical framework is employed for examining the tools governments use and continue to use in establishing and sustaining their dominance and relevance in the cultural sector. This study examines the social, economic, political, and cultural transformation of Tanzania and discusses how those different paradigms interpenetrate and influence the Tanzanian film industry and further assesses to what extent and with what mechanisms the government controls the film industry.

The study reveals complex, antagonistic, and sometime contradictory relations existing between the government and its filmmaking citizens and how that relationship has ushered in alternative modes of film production and exhibition.

The Social, Economic, and Political Landscape of Tanzania

Like many of Africa’s developing nations, Tanzania attained its political independence in 1961, and like many of the newly formed Third World countries it struggled to form a unified nation. In the endeavor to construct this nation, the newly elected Tanganyika African National Unity (TANU) government under the leadership of President Nyerere established the Ministry of National Culture and Youth in 1962. In his inaugural speech to the parliament on December 10,
1962, the president laid out the mission of the ministry: “Culture is the essence and spirit of any nation. . . . Of the crimes of colonialism there is no worse than the attempt to make us believe we had no indigenous culture of our own. . . . So I have set up this new Ministry to help us regain our pride in our culture, I want to seek out the best of the traditions and customs of all our tribes and make them part of our national culture (Nyerere, 1962: 4).

In the endeavor to realize a national culture and identity, President Nyerere suppressed all political parties, civil societies, trade unions, and ethnic associations under the pretense that indulging in diverse and multiple organizations would “introduce elements of disunity and retard development” (Shivji, 2006: 37). To further and officially flush out dissidents in 1963, Nyerere announced that Tanganyika would become a one-party state (Coulson 1986: 137); in 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the United Republic of Tanzania; and in 1965 the TANU party declared itself the de facto party, officially making Tanzania a single-party state. In 1967, the government further cemented its authority by officially announcing a socialist manifesto entitled “Socialism and Self-Reliance,” otherwise known as Ujamaa in Kiswahili, which declared socialism as the state ideology and highlighted the steps the nation would take to implement its social, economic, and political development programs. With the socialist ideology thus established, the government became the sole guarantor of the citizen’s general well-being. The government thus had the power to construct and control the thinking pattern of its citizen. According to Jeffery Klaeh, a government gains its power through “ideological conditions that encourage people to believe in their legitimacy and acquiesce to their authority” (2010: 12). The power to narrate and block other narratives from emerging became the preoccupation of the TANU government, and this was cemented through the adoption of the socialism and self-reliance manifesto.
Ngumbele-Mwiru notes that the building of socialism can only be ensured when the peasants and workers, by the instruments of their government and cooperatives, control the major means of production and distribution (quoted in Cliffe, 1973: 53). In short, the Tanzanian state, to legitimize its power and interests, put its citizens and their means of survival under its control. This kind of thinking was also prevalent among other African states such as Zambia and Ghana. Claude Ake has noted that in a lot of the African countries an increasing range of economic activities was brought under the control of the state, notably by nationalization, “to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power” (1983: 37). Applying socialist ideology, the Tanzanian government nationalized and controlled all major means of production, including film production. But this was challenged in the social-cultural, economic, and political crisis of the 1980s and 1990s by intellectuals, political parties, and the general public. The introduction to Third World states of the structural adjustment program, trade liberalization, free market economy, and multiparty democracy, and the intensification of global connectivity brought unforeseen changes, forcing the government to transfer control of major means of production from its hands to the private. This neo-liberal trend in economic policies pointed away from welfare state economies and toward free trade policies, the privatization of state enterprises, and the commercialization of all spheres of life, including the arts (Falicov, 1999: 15). The change of hands from the government to the private, from socialism to capitalism, brought about an emergence of the commercial video film and diasporic filmmaking, as well as multiplexes and the demise of cinema halls. The emergence of video filmmaking and diasporic cinema in Tanzania solicits a scrutiny of the global interconnectivity that fosters resistance, negotiation, interpretation, and invasion of new modes of expressions and practices.
In 1997 the Tanzanian Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Revolutionary Party) government, under the leadership of President Benjamin Mkapa, for the first time in thirty-four years of independence established a national cultural policy document (Cultural Policy Document, 1997). Less than a year later, the government established the Cultural Trust Fund, an organization that grants financial assistance to artists who aim to promote Tanzanian culture. The same year, on the island of Zanzibar, the government established the Zanzibar Film Festival (ZIFF) to showcase and promote Tanzania’s cultural heritage. In 1999, the Copyright Law Act and the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) were inaugurated and administered under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing for the purpose of promoting, protecting, collecting, and distributing royalties to artists (Copyright Act, 1999: 731). All through the first decade of the 2000s the government held meetings, conferences, and workshops to discuss the need to review or strengthen the Film Act Policy of 1976 and the cultural policy (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009).

The transformation above reveals that the government sought to reinvent itself in the way it perceived culture and cultural activities such as film. But it also raises questions such as what prompted these kinds of investment in the cultural and film industries, especially after more than thirty-four years of self-rule? Why has the government found it imperative to establish a cultural policy and cultural institutions? What impact do these organizations and policies have on cultural industry such as film? Through a critical political economy framework, this study explores to what extent the established policies or lack there of influenced the types of films made in a particular administrative era and how economic and politics interplayed in the shaping of film legislation, how the adoption of socialism and self-reliance and the subsequent reforms impacted the film industry during the Nyerere administration, and how the implementation of the neo-liberal policies with their structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the political-economic shift
from socialism to postsocialism changed the way the government perceived and approached the film industry during the Mwinyi, Mkapa, and Kikwete administrations.

**Methods and Literature Review**

In a country like Tanzania where government control has and continues to have influence on all modes of cultural production, including films, a theoretical approach that interrogates this power relation is needed in order to unveil mechanisms governments use in solidifying their control. This study probes the institutional forces such as the ideological shift from socialism to an open market economy and how the emerging of cultural institutions have contributed to the commercialization of film and thus the development of the video film industry, and how different government administrations have controlled, negotiated, and created policies, institutions, and legislation and how this has impacted the kinds of film produced.

The social, economic, technological, and political changes that emerged globally in the 1980s have called for the reevaluation of the way states function in today’s world. The permeability of nation states and the rise, acceleration, and expansion of market economies has caused some scholars to predict, prematurely, that the nation state is obsolete. This has been an exaggeration, for as Robert Gilpin notes “the nation state [still] plays the central role in guiding economic development and has to lead rather than follow the market” (2001: 319). This is true of the Tanzanian government. Although it has embraced neo-liberal economic and political policies that call for less government intervention in modes of production, the Tanzanian government continues to control and intervene in economic, social, and cultural affairs. Gilpin argues that national governments still make the primary decisions regarding economic matters, they continue to set the rules within which other actors function, and they use their considerable power to influence economic outcomes (18). Although external actors (Hollywood, corporate international
agencies, and governments) exert strong pressure, the state remains an important agent in shaping the structure of media markets. As Jeffery Klaeh notes, governments “have the authority to regulate-coerce the media to carry or not, certain kinds of program content, to license or not, and generally to ensure certain public policies are realized and protected” (2010: 18).

Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord explore the role of the state in communication and cultural policymaking in a globalized world. They note that the growing prominence of international agreements has not eclipsed the most tangible power available to states: lawmaking (2001: X). States hold the power to pass legislation that affects domestic media industries; they create rules and regulate national media, and therefore effectively construct the environment within which national media operate. This means then that, especially in Tanzania the media has become the ideological branch of the government, manufacturing and controlling what Klaeh calls public’s “thinkable thoughts” in a way that serves the state’s interest.

Therefore, a critical political economy approach that puts the state at the center will illustrate the mechanisms the government utilizes in its continuing endeavor to control and influence an aspect of production such as film and how such attempts can promote or hinder the film industry. James Caporaso and David Levine (1992), and Robert Gilpin (2002) define a state centric approach to political economy as the ability of the state to define and pursue an agenda not defined solely by private societal interest. Gilpin favors this state centric approach because, as he says, “The nation state remains the dominant actor in both domestic and international economic affairs” and thus states continue to use their power to implement policies that channel economic forces in ways favorable to the national interest and the interest of the citizenry (21). And I would argue to their own interest too.
In the current global system, where powerful governments and international corporations and agencies put pressure on weaker nations, I argue that this pressure is filtered through the prism of national political, economic, and cultural institutions. In a country like Tanzania, with a history of government control, a critical political economy is fundamental in scrutinizing the state and its institutional apparatus. As Yuri Popov notes political economy studies do not ignore the nature of political power, the class content of the state, the influence of state policy on the economy, and the mutual influence of various socio-economic systems existing in the modern world (1984: 49).

In this study, this state-centered approach is explored in order to demonstrate the mechanism the state employs and how that hinders or promotes the film industry. The study argues that although the state has succumbed to the neo-liberal policies of open market and global capitalism, a socialist authoritarian mentality and its policies continue to inform economic, political, and cultural decisions and legislation, especially when it is in the interest of and serves the state.

Overview and Debates on Critical Political Economy in Communication (Media)

Critical political economy of communication—or media, as it is sometimes referred to—unlike neoclassical economics is holistic, historical, and goes beyond issues of efficiency to engage with moral questions of justice, equity, and public good (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 33). According to Hesmondhalgh, a critical political economy approach to communication developed in the late 1960s among academic sociologists and political scientists concerned by the increasing role of private business in cultural production (33). Other scholars (Mosco, 1996; Babe, 2009; Guback, 1969; and Wasko, 2005) credit the development of the approach to Adorno and Horkheimer from the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Horkheimer investigated the
consequence of mass producing culture for profit through their idea of the culture industry. Most of their works addressed mass media and their effect in society. Mosco asserts critical political economy emerged in connecting mass marketing to wider economic and social processes and critiquing them from a range of humanistic values (176). Richard Babe (2009) in his examination of the genealogy of political economy and cultural studies credits Theodore Adorno as the founder of the political economy study of media as well as the critical cultural studies.

In scholarly debates about the political economy of communication, there has been a tendency to divide its development into three geographical settings: North America, Europe, and the Third World.

**North America: Media Ownership Concentration**

Vincent Mosco in his comprehensive study *The Political Economy of Communication*, Richard Babe in *Cultural Studies and Political Economy*, and to some extent Hesmondhalgh in his book *Cultural Industries* have conducted detailed analyses of the development of the political economy of communication. Mosco, Hesmondhalgh, and Babe note three individuals, Dallas Smythe, Herbert Schiller, and Harold Adams Innis, as the discipline’s most influential figures in North America. Their work centered on how the communication industry has become part of the corporate order and is thus exploitative and unjust. The major objective of these scholars is to interrogate the relationship between the center of political power and the center of media power. In doing so, they hope to advance public interest and to create an alternative, democratic communication industry. Other scholars (Chomsky, McChesney, Mosco, Babe, and Schiller) have emphasized the relationship between government and corporate powers. McChesney, Herman, and Chomsky in their analysis of U.S. media have come to conclude that the U.S. mass media, through its five filters—ownership, advertising, government information, flack, and
anticommunism—actively frame issues and promote news stories that serve the needs and 

Thus critical political economy in North America concerns itself with ownership 
concentration, how media are structured and controlled, and how they operate. In this perspective 
North American scholars’ major concern has been with the capitalist economic system and how 
it has nourished inequalities of power, thus creating oppression, manipulation, and control 
through media. Although it is true that the capitalist system nourishes inequality of power, I 
argue and this study shows that this inequality and control prevails even under a socialist 
economic system. Therefore, critical political economy of communication must concern itself 
with the ownership, whether it be in the hands of the private or state sector, and control of media 
industries.

**Europe: Integration and Resistance to Institutional Authorities**

In Europe, the political economy approach to research has been associated with scholars 
such as Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, James Halloran, Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, 
Kaarle Nordenstreng, Armand Mattelart, Nicholas Grahams, Bernard Miege, Marie Gillespie, 
and Cees Hamelink. Unlike their North American counterparts, most European scholars eschew 
identification with a political economy approach, preferring to situate themselves in cultural 
Studies, critical sociology, or social psychology. Mosco notes, “What appears to be an 
institutionalized program of research is actively a collection of individuals . . . whose setting is 
more congenial to critical social research, but not one that gave particular attention to political 
economy” (1996: 99). Scholars such as Cees Hamelink, Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Armand 
Mattelart have occupied themselves with issues of the presence of foreign media and its threat to 
developing nations’ cultural autonomy. These scholars have played leading roles in the
development of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in the 1970s and 1980s, a policy initiated by the Non-Aligned Movement that was concerned with the unequal cultural trading relations between Western capitalist countries and the Third World. Hamelink asserts that foreign cultural flows bring about cultural synchronization whereby local characteristics and cultures are threatened. He explores and analyzes how the cultural autonomy of Third World countries is threatened and what initiatives have been taken to resist synchronization. He calls for dissociation with the West and a move toward more regional cooperation. European scholars are primarily interested in documenting the integration of and resistance to communication institutions and authorities.

The Third World: Dependency and Cultural Imperialism

The Third World critical political economy approach, which is the central concern of this study and which has not received extensive coverage in Western academy, emerged out of the social, political, and economic struggle during and after the liberation period of the 1960s and 1970s. Third World political economy research centers on presenting a framework for understanding the social, political, and economic realities and their connection to the global political economy environment. Dependency theory, propounded by Third World scholars, is born out of these realities. This theory emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a critique of the West’s modernization theory and as a remedy to Third World social and economic problems. Mosco notes that in order to win and secure the Third World within capitalism modernization theory, the “West mounted an unprecedented global military, economic and ideological campaign” (121). For this they used the mass media, which became a tool in the campaign to change the people’s social structure and the introduction of a market economy. The dependency theory advocated by Third World scholars critiqued modernization by showing how little it did
to improve socio-economic conditions and how it worked to benefit the West and its corporate 
machineries. Cultural industries scholars in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Schiller, Mattelart, 
Janus, Boafo, Rugumamu, Munyae) have shown how Western media companies have profited at 
the expense of local programs and how this has impacted domestic media production. They have 
critiqued the Western media’s structure and practices, have called for the need to develop 
popular forms of local media, and more importantly have called for an intervention in media 
policy, creating policies that center on the interests of the public.

**Cultural Imperialism Debate and the Third World**

Herbert Schiller termed the domination of Western media products in developing nations 
cultural imperialism. Schiller formally defined cultural imperialism as the sum of the process by 
which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is 
attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes even bribed into shaping social institutions to 
correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system 
(1976: 9). As this definition makes clear, the motivation of cultural domination is not only profit 
making, but more importantly to persuade and influence people’s hearts and minds. Some 
scholars have called this form of domination, especially American cultural domination, “soft 
power.” According to Matthew Frazer soft power is based on value and how it seduces and 
persuades. He explores how soft power has accelerated the expansion of the American empire 
and argues that “America’s global domination has been achieved largely through non-military 
means—in short, through the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. . . . American 
soft power (movies, pop music, television, fast food) spreads, validates, and reinforces common 
norms, values, beliefs, and life styles” (Quoted in Bernd Hamm, 2005: 6).
Cultural imperialism as a theory focuses on the cultural imbalances between the Western world and the Third World. Emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, the theory critiques the impact and imposition of Western cultural products and their homogenizing effects. Advocates of the theory claim that the spread of cultural products from the West to the Third World is largely one-way and thus destroys Third World cultures. With the emergence of new technological developments in the late 1980s and 1990s, the acceleration and expansion of cultural flows, and the interdependency and permeability of nation states, criticism of cultural imperialism arose. Culturally oriented globalization theorists challenged the culture imperialism thesis, arguing that the West and non-West paradigm is more complex than cultural imperialism theorists envisioned and that cultural flows induce neither homogenization nor synchronization. Cultural imperialism theorists have been blindsided by the complexity that takes place within the negotiation of, resistance to, and transformation of the global to the local. Their view suggests that Third World nations cannot resist Western cultural products but simply succumb to them. Edward Said notes that because of Empire, “all cultures are involved in one another, none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic” (1994: xxv). John Tomlinson critiques the theory, noting that global culture as it is now can no longer be said to emanate from the West and be imposed upon the non-West. What actually takes place is not cultural imperialism but rather a process of cultural loss, and instead of cultural synchronization, a hybrid culture emerges, one that takes foreign cultural flows and localizes them. Tomlinson’s concepts of cultural loss and hybridity do not presuppose the existence or use of a coercive power relation to describe the process of cultural change; thus they neglect the questions of power and inequality. Annabelle Sreberny notes that the cultural imperialism model has helped in recognizing the global dynamics and relationships taking place and the links between foreign
policy interests, capitalist expansion, and media infrastructure, but “fails to recognize the
historical cultural contact of nations and through its hypodermic needle assumption fails to see
that audiences are not passive or cultural dupes, they bring their own meaning to the text” (2000:
216). Sreberny advocates a need to adopt a different perspective that recognizes the dynamic
tension between the global and the local and the shifting terrains that they encompass. She
borrows Trinh T. Minh-ha’s notion of the global in the local and the local in the global to explore
the contradictions and tension between the two poles.

The same social, economic, technological, and political conditions that gave birth to the
critique of cultural imperialism have also brought about a reemergence of the cultural
imperialism theory. The intensification and spread of neo-liberal policies, the influence of
American export cultural industries, and the shifting nature of global politics have brought about
a renewed interest in the theory of cultural imperialism (Hamm and Smadych, 2005). Pierre
Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant argue that cultural imperialism “rests on the power to universalize
particularisms linked to a singular historical tradition by causing them to be misrecognized as
such” (1999: 41). Bourdieu and Wacquant explore how American cultural values have been de-
historicized and imposed upon the whole world under the notion of globalization, which
submerges imperialism and cultural ecumenism’s effect and makes transnational relationships of
power appear as a neutral necessity. The renewed cultural imperialism thesis concerns itself with
how global economics and politics affect culture. Cultural imperialism, as Bernd Hamm notes, is
a byproduct—sometimes intended, sometimes unintended, but always inevitable—of political
and economic imperialism (2005: 24). This study, therefore, explores how neo-liberal policies of
open market, privatization, and liberalization impact domestic cultures in a globalized world.
One of the major critiques leveled by cultural globalization scholars against Third World political economy scholars, with their dependency and cultural imperialism theses, is their concentration on how external factors impact the social, cultural, and economic development of Third World nations. Third World media political economy scholars are critiqued for paying less attention to how internal factors and contradictions impact local development. This study intends to bridge this gap by making an internal analysis of how local—in this case governmental—policies and institutions play a substantial role in the development and production of cultural products such as film and how, in combating external cultural domination, Third World governments such as Tanzania’s create, adopt, negotiate, and put forward mechanisms that impact national cultural products.

**Political Economy and Film**

Numerous scholars (Guback, 1969; Wasko, 2005; Pendakur, 1990) have analyzed films as commodities produced and distributed within a capitalist industrial structure. Thomas Guback has analyzed the relationship between the American and European film industries and how American film companies and films (Hollywood) have entered the European market and changed the structure and policies of both American and European film production, content, and marketing. He documents how the U.S. domination of European film industries intensified in 1945 with assistance from the U.S. government. Janet Wasko has written numerous articles and book chapters that examine the changing relationship between the film industry and the financial institutions that provide the capital. She has given an overview of political economy and how it has been applied in film; she acknowledges that the approach has not received much recognition within cinema studies, but points out that with the increased attention to Hollywood as a business, the political economy of film becomes important in assessing the political and
ideological implications of these economic arrangements. Wasko notes film must be placed within an entire social, economic, and political context and critiqued in terms of the contribution to maintaining and reproducing structure of power (11). The political economy of film must critique the uneven distribution of power, the role of the state, and alternatives to commercial film. To echo Mosco, Wasko advocates that the political economy of film must “involve not only a description of the industry but also a theoretical understanding of these developments, situating them within a wider capitalist totality encompassing class and other social relations offering a sustained critique from a moral evaluative position” (11). Wasko and other critical political economists believe that the political economy of film must challenge the industry rather than accept the status quo, it must investigate how Hollywood came to dominate the international film market, what mechanisms are in place to see that Hollywood remains on top, how the state becomes involved, and what impact this has on film industries in other countries.

Manjunath Pendakur in his study of the Canadian film industry examines how the American (Hollywood) film industry has dominated and controlled Canada’s distribution and exhibition circuit. “Whereas 97% of theater screen time in Canada is filled by imported films, most of which are marketed by U.S. based media transnational corporations . . . most films produced by Canadians languish in cans” (29). The reason for this situation, Pendakur states, is the competing forces in the industry among Canadian workers, Canadian capitalists, and the American majors. He investigates these forces by assessing the structure and policies of the Canadian feature film industry so as to understand why Canada has been unable to develop its own indigenous film industry.

The above studies have examined the film industry, especially Hollywood, as a capitalist industrial structure and the role of the (U.S.) government in the expansion of Hollywood films
across the world. Although Tamara Falicov (2007) and Mathias Diawara (1993) have dealt with how Hollywood (Western) films and governments have influenced film production, distribution, and exhibition in Latin America and Africa respectively, they have paid closer attention to how internal factors influence, to a great extent, the kinds of film and national identity produced. Falicov in her study of the Argentine film industry assesses how different administrations from the 1940s to 2006 have conceptualized culture and cultural policy and how that has shaped national culture/identity in film.

Falicov outlines two typologies of how Argentine people have tended to perceive national identity and how that has affected the kind of films produced. The first is the European influence, whereby films are made for elite audiences at home and abroad; and then there is a local perspective, where film reflects the social reality of the Argentinean people and culture. Falicov’s study thus looks at the impact of the state cultural policy toward cinema as well as the impact of economic policy, politics, and cultural mores in shaping Argentine film legislation.

Manthia Diawara in his study of African cinema traces the development of film in Africa; how Western governments and their social, economic, and political policies have affected the kinds of films produced, distributed, and exhibited in Africa; and how African governments have responded to such a phenomenon. For example, he demonstrates how the French government in its “effort” to help its former African colonies with film production was actually helping France and French filmmakers. He elaborates on how the French government in establishing the Conrtium Audiovisual International (CAI) in Paris to help with the finance and production of African films, in reality was imposing a certain point of view of African and by extension helping French filmmakers and the French film industry by contractually insisting on hiring French film crew members and conducting postproduction in Paris. Femi Shaka, an African film
scholar, verifies this: “It is naïve to expect that the former colonial powers in Africa would help to develop the film industry in Africa, when the reality rather suggests that they need the African market” (2004: 75). Diawara also shows how African governments were reluctant to support the film industry and even nationalized some parts of it.

Falicov’s and Diawara’s studies demonstrate the difficulties developing nations encountered in their effort to develop viable domestic film/cultural industries. They show how external and internal political and economic forces influenced the type of films produced. Although this present study acknowledges the pressures and strength of external forces upon domestic film production, it is also aware that these pressures and forces are filtered through the prism of domestic politics and economics. This study, therefore, examines these domestic dynamics by assessing how social, economic, and political realities; government institutions; and cultural and film policies have impacted filmmaking in Tanzania.

This study also recognizes the scarcity of scholarship on individual national film industries, let alone on how each country’s policies and institutions impact its film industry. African scholars, like their counterparts in the West, have investigated African cinema as a pure, homogenous entity and have defended this by noting that the nations of Africa, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa, “share a unified structure of belief-system and world-outlook whose form is discernible in black Africa’s social practice” (Shaka, 2004: 36). This form of justification, that sees African cinema as a homogeneous entity, denies and erases the diversity of African nations and their film industry. This study departs from this view and evaluates the Tanzanian film industry and examines to what extend the government and its policies and legislation influence that industry.
Historical Background to Film and Film Policy in Tanzania

Film policy in colonial Tanzania (Tanganyika)

The history of Tanzanian film exhibition can be traced back to the 1920s, when the first commercial cinema hall was established by Hassanali Adamali Jariwalla, a Tanzanian of Indian descent (Brennan, 2005). Film production originated in the 1930s when the British colonial government set up the first film production unit in sub-Saharan Africa at Vigiri village in the northern part of Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania), under the leadership of colonels Notcutt and Latham (1937). In their book *The African and the Cinema*, Notcutt and Latham document the experiment and their experience in establishing and operating the 1935 Bantu Experimental Cinema Experience (BECE). The book methodically elaborates how the films were produced and processed in Vigiri village using 16-mm film equipment; the kinds of themes tackled, ranging from how to save and store money in *The Post Office Savings Banks* (1935), the need to pay taxes in *The Tax* (1935), and the use of modern medicine in *The Chief* (1936); and how films were distributed and exhibited in the British African colonial empire of present-day Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, present-day Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The experiment was conducted from 1935 to 1937, and during that time more than thirty-five short documentaries and feature films were produced and exhibited to introduce and persuade Africans to adopt British social, economic, and cultural values. Ironically, although the films were produced specifically for an African audience, during exhibition, Africans were relegated to the back of the viewing venue. The films Notcutt and Latham produced clearly facilitated the advancement of the British political and economic imperatives and the creation and continuation of a segregated film audience. Films were used by the British Empire as part of the relationship between culture and empire; they were important in the “formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences”
(Said, 1994: XII). The racist and segregative seating arrangement reflected the British Empire’s film policy. The colonial film experience was further supported by the type of film policy that the British Empire advocated. The British Empire advocated a film policy that excluded Africans from the production as well as from commercial film viewing.

Cultural studies scholar Andrew Ivaska (2003) and African studies historian James Brennan (2005) have both assessed the issue of colonial film and film policy in Tanzania. Ivaska explores the politics surrounding the debates over culture in colonial and early postcolonial Tanzania (1922–1970). He examines how state power and popular culture, including film, influenced the daily life of people in the capital city of Dar es Salaam. In his analysis of colonial films and film policy Ivaska notes how cultural apparatus such as a film policy were used as intervention tools by both the colonial and postcolonial states. Ivaska goes on to elaborate how cinema and censorship were utilized from the 1930s up to the early 1970s. He does not, however, question the underlying reason for censorship or the type of films that were produced and exhibited for Africans. The fact that films were used to facilitate colonial, social, economic, and political expansion is nowhere alluded to in the study. By omitting this important information, Ivaska seems to whitewash the atrocities of colonialism and its cultural effect upon the people of Tanzania. To study the intersection between colonial policy and the African film experience without critiquing the moral injustice of the system legitimizes colonial rationality and encourages the perpetuation of a colonial discourse. By employing a critical political economy approach to the film industry and its policy, a more holistic and moral interrogation of the colonial system and its film policy would have brought to the fore the colonial power relation and its subsequent outcome.
On the other hand, Brennan, an African studies scholar specializing in Tanzanian history, interrogates the injustice by examining the political and institutional struggle over cinema in colonial and postcolonial Tanzania. Through an in-depth study of the colonial film policy and administration, TANU, and archival reports of the National Film Censorship Board, Brennan reveals how Africans were excluded from viewership of commercial films and from being members of the film censorship board committee, and how through their struggle for social, cultural, economic, and political autonomy Africans were able to change the film policy by insisting and getting the first African Tanzanian, H.M.T Kayamba, to become a member of the film censorship board (2005: 495). Brennan’s study, however, does not investigate to what extent those changes in any way influenced the type of films exhibited in Tanzania. Did the inclusion of an African member on the board change the fundamental objective of the policy?

This study shows how the inclusion of Africans on the film censorship board from the 1960s to 2010 did not fundamentally change or transform the policy. The policy basically remained as it has always been, a controlling organ of the state, whether a colonial or postcolonial one. The study reveals that the state’s need to control film or any visual representations stems from its desire to control the socio-economic, political, and cultural formation of the society and thus safely keep itself in power.

**Media and film policy in independent Tanzania**

It was not until Tanzania attained its political independence in 1961 that Tanzanians, through their government, were able to fully control the production, distribution, and exhibition of films. But this control was not democratic; it was the newly formed government that controlled film production. John Mpongonliana (1982), a government filmmaker; Mark Leveri (1984), a managing director of the Tanzanian Film Company; Kaarle Nordenstreng (1986), a
cultural and political economist; Mike Ssali (1988); and Seithy Chachaghe (1997), a sociologist, have all documented the Tanzanian film/communication industry in the hands of the government. Mponguliana (1982) traces the development of the Tanzanian film industry from 1961 to 1982 by examining such government film institutions as the Government Film Unit (GFU), established in 1963; the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), established in 1968; and the Audio Visual Institute (AVI), established in 1974. He describes how those institutions produced, distributed, and exhibited films and acknowledges how the government propagated its socialist ideology and policies through its film institutions. Mponguliana does not, however, critically question the power relation of the state and its citizens. Why did the government insist on controlling the film industry and to whose benefit? His lack of critical assessment can be attributed to his ideological training and involvement with the government. As a government-trained filmmaker working within the system at the Audio Visual Institute and compelled to prize and not criticize the party and its government, Mponguliana’s assessment explicitly reveals the government’s power and control over its filmmakers. Mark Leveri, on the other hand, critically analyzes the AVI, an institute assigned to produce and distribute documentary and newsreel films for the government. As a government employee with an economic background, Leveri assesses the allocation of resources to the institute and asks to what extent the government was interested in developing a viable film industry in Tanzania. He acknowledges that Tanzanian political leaders have looked at cinema as a potential propaganda tool and as a catalyzing force for the realization of national culture and social development (1984: 21), but in terms of its resource allocation and political economic benefit, Leveri concludes that the government did not care about the development of the film industry: “Little investment was put forward and what money the government made from film exhibitors, through taxes, was never reinvested back into
the domestic film industry” (105). Oliver Barlet, an African film scholar, notes why many African governments put little investment in film and at the same time tried to control it: “African leaders are apprehensive about supporting the motion picture industry because they are afraid that cinema would be used by filmmakers to manipulate political situations” (1996: 59).

The state’s full control of production and distribution of films in Tanzania was no accident. The Tanzanian government made a deliberate effort to keep a firm hand on film production and distribution, lest it fall in the wrong hands. It never saw or envisioned film as a profitable industry, but rather as an ideological propagandistic tool that was there to serve the state.

Leveri’s study highlights how the government allocated funding and how that shaped and impacted the film industry. What he does not delve into is a systematic analysis of the structure and mechanisms governments put in place in an effort to control film production. As a government employee working within the socialist structure, Leveri accepts governmental control of the film industry as natural. He fails to realize that he, like other filmmakers working with and within the government structure, was himself a tool and mechanism by which the government controlled the production and distribution of film: Filmmakers functioned as agents of control.

In his informative article “Tanzania and the New Information Order: A Case of African’s Second Struggle,” Kaarle Nordenstreng assesses the role of information (media) in Tanzania from the 1960s to the early 1980s and notes how through nationalization and control of the communication media, the mass media were forced to broadcast socialist ideals. He shows how, during conferences and meetings, the ruling party and government categorically stated that the purpose of the media was to support the socialist ideology of Tanzania as defined in the Arusha Declaration (179). Film and cultural media were singled out as important vehicles for promoting
a political consciousness and mobilizing the masses for development. Nordenstreng also notes how through numerous meetings the government called for the banning of books and films that conflicted with the *Ujamaa* party policies, and how in the mid-1980s the government considered the idea of establishing and ensuring the implementation of a national media policy. Nordenstreng clearly elaborates how through charters, memorandums, and meetings the government expressed the viability and potential danger the media might cause.

Although the government started early on to think of establishing a media/cultural national policy, it was not until the late 1990s that a national cultural policy was put into place. What prolonged the establishment of such a policy and how did this impact cultural and media development? Sociologist Seithy Chachaghe takes a historical look at the media industry, specifically Tanzania’s print media, and shows how the press expanded despite the existence of draconian laws against it. Although the press expanded quickly, Chachaghe acknowledges that print media did not enjoy much freedom even with the opening of the democratic space. The government, rather than allowing a free flow of information, made attempts to curb it (1997:186). Studies by Nordenstreng (1986) and Chachaghe (1997) have shown how the Tanzanian government continues to consolidate and strengthen its media power regardless of socio-economic and political transformations.

Kanganga Mwangaza’s study (2006), on the other hand, moves away from the broader examination of the media to specifically looking at the film industry when Tanzania decided to reinvent itself as a capitalist multiparty democratic state. Mwangaza traces the emergence of the video filmmaking phenomenon and sheds some light on filmmakers and the production process of these video films. Her study reveals a seismic shift from a pedagogical/propagandistic filmmaking phenomenon to commercial filmmaking, from the public to the private sector. The
major preoccupation of the local commercial filmmakers and businesspeople who have ventured into the industry is commercial interest and not so much the creation of “quality” cinema (2006). The film industry has transformed from being a propaganda instrument for the reinforcement of state ideologies, into an economic activity. Culture is now separated from ideology and is turned into capital. Why was there such a sea change? What Mwangaza’s and four other dissertation on film in Tanzania, fails to assess is how and why the shift occurred, and more importantly, how the government handled this transformation. In his book *Let the People Speak*, Shivji speculates as to why the Tanzanian government may have changed its perspective: “They are those who see that change is coming. It is inevitable and irresistible. They would not therefore oppose change. They would like to co-opt it, . . . manipulate ‘change’ in the interest of the status quo, they would like the boat to move but move under their directional supervision and if possible even make a gain from the change by curving out a new niche for themselves in the change system” (2006: 62).

Shivji’s analysis sheds some light on why the influx of foreign cultural products via the free market economy can safeguard government power and ensure that it remains in power. The government created the Cultural Trust Fund, the National Film Censorship Board, and the cultural policy to supervise the kinds of local and foreign cultural products that were permissible for viewing by the Tanzanian public. This study thus interrogates how the government co-opts, manipulates, and supervises the film industry in Tanzania.

By interviewing government cultural officials, executive secretaries, and directors of cultural institutions such as the National Film Censorship Board, the National Arts Council, the Cultural Trust Fund, the Zanzibar International Film Festival, and the Copyright Society of Tanzania, some who have been in government positions since the early 1960s and 70s, an
understanding has been gained of how policies influence decision making regarding cultural products and how the government through its institutional mechanisms controls film production. Some of these individuals were also primary historical document in of themselves. They were invested in representing history in a certain way, they had a vested interest in the politics that was going on and supported the regimes they worked for and believed that the government should control the cultural sector. Thus they too need to be subject to some kind of scrutiny.

This study has utilized archival documents, interviews, as well as observing the day-to-day activities of two film production crews. Interview as a research method has been extensively employed. This was necessitated by the dismal state of film documentation. Because of the liquidation of the Tanzanian Film Company and the merger of the Audio Visual Institute with the Tanzania Broadcast Company, most of the films and files have been destroyed or neglected and left to ruin. I was given a tour of the National television station and shown where most of the ruin films of the 1960s, 70s and 80s were dumped with very little regards to the value of those films. The lack of tangible films and important documents made interview as a method of research very important in this study. Filmmakers who worked during the colonial and postcolonial period provided in-depth narratives of the working of the film industry that could not be found in any of the archival documents. Although the video film industry has captured the imagination of the public, very little documentation, academic or otherwise, can be found on the phenomenon. Interviews with video filmmakers, producers, and distributors filled the gap and provided a picture of the challenges and complexities that filmmakers face and overcome.

It is hoped that this study will provide some understanding on the influence of government policy on the Tanzanian film industry and therefore point to what ought to be done in creating a democratic, multiple-identity film industry and aesthetic. By shedding light on a
marginal discipline such as African cinema, and Tanzanian cinema specifically, the study seeks to expand the film studies discipline to see African cinema not as a homogeneous entity but as cinema of individual countries, each with its own distinct film industry.

Organization

What follows is a brief outline of this study.

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter One offers a historical account and a theoretical framework of the study, in an attempt to reconfigure the relationship between the government and its mechanism of control. The chapter lays out a critical perspective of Tanzania and its film industry.

Chapter Two: The New Nation: Consolidation, Nation Building, and Film

This chapter investigates the Nyerere administration (1961–1985), exploring the administration’s vision of Tanzania and how that vision is articulated in its film policy. The chapter explores the social, economic, and political path that Tanzania chose to follow and evaluates how that impacted filmmaking and consumption. It explores how the Nyerere administration structured the film industry, the kind of cultural policy and film policy it advocated, and for what purpose and for whose benefit. The chapter shows how through the government’s advocacy of socialism; its ban of political parties and ethnic and civic associations; the installation of a one-party state; and the establishment of a the film censorship board, the administration solidified its ideological rule by controlling and constructing a national culture/identity that did not allow room for alternative diversified identities and how that assumption of national culture and film policy emerged out of the colonial state. Two films,
Fimbo ya Mnyonge (1974) and Yomba Yomba (1985), are explored to exemplify the government’s control of the film industry.

**Chapter Three: Rukhsa: Everything Goes? Transition to Neo-Liberal Policy and Film**

This chapter investigates President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s administration (1985–1995) and how its adoption of the structural adjustment program (SAP) and the neo-liberal policies of trade liberalization and privatization in the mid-1980s and early 1990s affected filmmaking in Tanzania, focusing on how through the policies of liberalization and privatization, which called for less government intervention in the economy, the state slashed or reduced funding to the film industry, and how this influenced the emergence of co-productions and non-governmental organization backing for films as ideal methods of remedying the industry. A critical examination of the economic and political policies that transformed Tanzania from a socialist nation state to a postsocialist state is conducted to reveal its impact on the film industry and how the introduction of multiparty democracy and the emergence of non-governmental organizations slowly started to question government authority. An analysis of the films Harusi ya Mariamu (The Marriage of Mariam, 1985), by Ron Mulvihill and Nangayoma Ngope, and Mama Tumaini (Women of Hope, 1987), by Martin Mhando, reveals the film industry’s changing milieu.

**Chapter Four: Uwazi na Ukweli? (Transparency and Truth): Accelerated Neo-liberalism and the Emergence of Diasporic and Video Films**

This chapter focuses on President Benjamin Mkapa’s administration (1995–2005) and its vigorous implementation of neo-liberal policies and how the government tried to slow down the process by establishing institutions and policies that continued to put the government at the center as the gatekeeper of national culture, value, and identity. The chapter evaluates the creation of institutions and policies such as the Cultural Trust Fund, the Tanzanian Art Council,
the National Film Censorship Board, the Zanzibar Film Festival, the Copyright Law, the Film Act, and the cultural policy to reveal how these institutions worked to control and promote a state-sanctioned national culture. Through an in-depth analysis of the censorship board and its objectives and duties, it is revealed how, in this era of cultural flows and influences, the state apparatus continues to control the perception of what is a Tanzanian identity/culture and how this perception is challenged by contemporary video filmmakers. The chapter explores the emergence of video films and diasporic films and their production, finance, and circulation, and how these films and their filmmakers are opposed to state-sanctioned identity. Interviews with government officials and video filmmakers are used to extrapolate the antagonistic relationship existing between the government and filmmakers. Martin Mhando’s film *Maangamizi: The Ancient One* (2001) and George Otieno’s *Dilema* (2004) are evaluated to reveal this contested view of national identity. An in-depth analysis of governmental cultural and film policy is conducted to discover its impact on the film industry.

**Chapter Five: Firming Up Neo-liberalism: Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya and the Transregional/Transnational Video Film Industry**

This chapter focuses on the present status of filmmaking in Tanzania and how the fourth-phase administration of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (2005–present) and his reforms have impacted the structure, production, marketing, and circulation of video films. The chapter assesses how film subtitling has created a diasporic viewership that has expanded to include not only neighboring African countries but also diasporic communities living in Australia, Britain, and the United States. This chapter explores the expansion of video films from national to regional and transnational and how filmmakers have utilized, interpreted, and explored cultural and film policies and have created a regional and transnational video film industry.
Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes major findings of the study, situates it within a larger political economy debate, and points to further areas of research.
Chapter Two

The New Nation: Consolidation, Nation Building and Film

Julius Nyerere’s administration and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party came to power on December 9, 1961, as Tanganyika gained its independence from British colonial rule. The handing-over ceremony and celebration was captured in a film, *Tanganyika Triumphant* (1962), by Bernard W. Kunicki. The film shows the arrival of Prince Philip and his British dignitaries at the airport, and the subsequent arrival of Julius Nyerere in a motorcade at the National Stadium, where crowds cheered as he waved. The whole atmosphere was filled with people dancing traditional dances and ululating as the British flag was lowered and the Tanganyikan flag was raised. As a symbol of national pride, this film is shown on television every year to commemorate the day Tanganyika became a new, independent nation. Just as it was used in the establishment of the new nation, film played a large role in the nation-building process that was to follow. How does a nation come to be imagined? Who does the imagining?

Charismatic, intelligent, and shrewd, Julius Kambarage Nyerere dominated and defined what Tanganyika, soon to merge with Zanzibar to form the nation of Tanzania, was and how it was to be imagined. In describing the economic and political development of Tanzania from the 1960s to the 1980s Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul note that “most of the development charted have [has] been the evolution of President Nyerere’s own thinking” (1972: 3). Nyerere’s social policies of unification, such as the language policy that formulated Kiswahili as the national language and the sole political lingua franca; weakening of ethnic social bonds by banning ethnic associations; and the promotion of social communal services such as education, health, and water, earned him accolades, and he consequently became for Western countries the poster child.
for African development. Tanzania under Nyerere had the highest rate of literacy in Africa, and his rural economic development plan earned more development funds than any other country in Africa (Askew, 2002). Even with these achievements, scholars view the Nyerere administration as less than democratic. Kiondo refers to it as a “statist regime” that centralized government control of social, economic, and political activities while diminishing venues of people’s participation (1995: 72). Mkandala refers to the administration as “domination through the ideology of Ujamaa and self-reliance,” thus assuring organizational hegemony (1995: 53). Issa Shivji and Ngoyoro have both referred to the regime style of ruling as “ideological hegemony” and “soft authoritarian” (Shivji, 1991: 67; Ngoyoro, 2006:10). How did the Nyerere administration create this statist, dominating, hegemonic, and authoritarian power structure in order to establish a new nation with a very successful social safety net? According to Mkandala, the power structure has been heavily influenced by concerns of statecraft, including the monopoly and defense of the state (1997: 36).

In 1961 the biggest task that faced the new government was nation building. What kind of a nation was Tanzania to become? What social, economic, political, and cultural path was it to take? How was the government to construct, invent, and re-invent a nation out of 120 ethnic groups? In building this new nation, the Nyerere administration in its first years embarked on legitimizing and solidifying its political power in the eyes of the public. One of the major steps in solidifying this power occurred in 1965 when the TANU administration revised the country’s constitution to convert from a multiparty system into a one-party state.

As early as 1962, Nyerere had envisioned turning the country into a socialist nation. Nyerere stated, “TANU has pledged itself to make socialism the basis of its policy in every field. The people of Tanganyika have given us their mandate to carry out that policy by electing a
TANU government to lead them” (1968: 9). Nyerere claimed that the mandate came from the people. On February 5, 1967, the Arusha Declaration, otherwise known as *Ujamaa*, or socialism and self-reliance, was endorsed by the TANU party, and socialism officially became the state ideology. *Ujamaa* was opposed to capitalism and ensured economic, cultural, and political development that was more communally centered. Nyerere envisioned *Ujamaa* as part of his focus on a nation as communal, not limited by family unit or tribe. In his book *Essay on Socialism*, Nyerere argues that “*Ujamaa* . . . draws on traditional heritage, and recognizes the society as an extension of the basic family unit, but it can no longer continue the idea of the social family with the limits of the tribes” (1968: 12). *Ujamaa*, just as African socialism in other countries, was based on the re-invention of an idealized African past, and its primary vehicle was communal living and the nationalization of major industries.

Through the instruments of cohesion, installation of a single-party system, and the ideology of *Ujamaa*, the Nyerere administration was able to eliminate all political and ethnic opposition. These constitutional changes gave TANU the authority to govern all social, political, economic, and cultural matters. Through its National Executive Committee (NEC) and the president’s executive power, TANU became the decisive organ in setting policies and running the country. Parliament was no longer viable as a law-making institution. The president and the TANU party had the sole decision-making power, setting policies, which the parliament then implemented. It was forcefully argued through the one-party ideology that since the party represented the people and the government was made up by the party, the government was the people. As Mkandala states, “The sole political party had overall control of the state, the government and every other public organization was part of or answerable to the party. . . . Centralized hierarchical control by the party-state of civil society was almost total” (1995: 56.).
Not only were political activities but also all economic activities of public institutions under the control of the party, including filmmaking.

The administration created policies that expanded the government’s control of economic activities. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 both defined the economic policy of the state and called for the nationalization of all major means of production. In order to ensure economic justice, the declaration argued, the state must have effective control over the principal means of production (Nyerere, 1967). The government then proceeded to nationalize and control all banks, insurance companies, cigarette companies, sisal plantations, processing industries, and—of interest to this study—the film industry. This centralization of the economy created and increased the state’s control over the Tanzanian people’s participation, expression, and depiction.

To consolidate Nyerere’s ideology of nation building through socialism, only one voice and one point of view were permitted and heard. Issa Shivji, a professor of law, notes that nation building called for national unity, which in practice was referred to as “national unanimity” (2006: 66). Nyerere argued that it was necessary that there be no differences in the period of nation building because differences delayed progress. But what this meant in actual fact was that this was a period of strengthening and legitimizing the party. The TANU party, with its charismatic leader Nyerere, guided the government in its plans for political, economic, and cultural actions. The era of domination of the party over the state, state hegemony over society, and concentration of executive power in the party leadership and the president became known as party supremacy (chama kushika hatamu), during which challenges to the legitimacy of the state were not permitted. Despite hegemony over society, or because of it, a considerable degree of popular acceptance and support was shown by the Tanzanian people. The people, majority of whom worked and lived in the rural areas were recipients of social services such as hospitals,
schools and water, and thus gave the president and his administration popular support. Nyerere became an iconic figure and the father of the Tanzanian nation because of his vision and deeds. However, within this political, economic, and cultural background, the administration set out to create a nation in its own image. The administration inscribed its own personal stories in the guise of national stories and through various other means enforced conformity of thought upon the people. Members of the ruling party, led by the president, allocated themselves the power to define the national character and in the process legitimized their power over their citizenry.

In defining national character, the ruling party used the film industry to encode and transmit nationalist ideologies. Cinema became a propaganda tool for the newly formed government of Tanzania. Used by the colonial regime to persuade Tanzanians to adapt to Western values and lifestyles, films were again used to persuade the people to adapt to the party’s perception of a national culture. What was not being depicted, though, was that this culture was not to be of the people but rather of the ruling party, TANU. Official cultural interventions were therefore closely linked to the state ideology and policies.

**The Question of National Culture and Cultural Policy**

In order to create a unified nation out of the 120 ethnic groups residing in Tanzania, the administration saw culture as one of the major social formations that countries like Tanzania could rally behind and use as a unifying device. On December 10, 1962, President Nyerere inaugurated the Ministry of Culture and Youth and emphasized the importance of culture as a unifying agent, stating, “A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people without the spirit which makes them a nation” (1981: 3). To create this nation President Nyerere laid out the major objective of the new ministry, “to help us regain our pride in our culture” and thereby to “seek and collect the best of the traditions and customs and make them
part of our national culture.” The ministry, through its cultural officers, was mandated to travel all over the country and choose what the officers perceived as the best traditions and thereafter to create mechanisms for imparting and making those chosen traditions part of a national culture. As the party document on culture proclaims, “The Party has a specific position in culture, it gives suggestions and directives of culture. The goals of the Ministry are to reconstruct, preserve and promote nationally sanctioned traditions of Tanzania which reflects the politics of the country” (Cultural revolution document, 1981). Thus, cultural traditions that fit the socialist or collective ideology were valorized. Traditions that did not fit the constructed vision of Tanzania were vilified and even banned. For example, in 1967 a campaign to impose sanctions on Masai traditional tribal wear was carried out, and those who did not comply with the order to modernize their dress to shirts and pants were harassed and humiliated (Ivaska, 2003). Raymond Williams reminds us that “tradition . . . is not just a tradition but a selective tradition; an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification” (2009: 115). Rose Sayore, a filmmaker and government cultural employee, captures the challenges and contradictions the administration faced:

After independence the first thing that Nyerere did that was really pronounced and cemented us as a nation was the establishment of the ministry responsible for culture. . . . Nyerere as a single person couldn’t have done it by himself; he needed people who were ready to internalize the concept. But the people Nyerere was dealing with are the people who had washed out their culture, looked at it as something foreign, as something dirty. These are the people who all of their lives had learned to emulate foreign culture, and now they were in strategic positions in
the government, they were supposed to implement these policies: how could they?

(Interview, 2009)

This construction of a national culture was thus to be carried out by bureaucrats and party members who, as Rose Sayore has noted, had lost their traditions. Culture was not only to be chosen and imposed from above, but it was constructed by people who were far removed from it. This form of top-down directive created a national culture in which only the ruling class’s view of culture was promoted. The party created a hierarchal, formal structure in which order flowed downward and obedience upward (Mkandala, 1995). In this regard a national culture, manifested through different cultural forms, showed a tendency toward pleasing, praising, and legitimizing the ruling party, never criticizing or analyzing societal issues. Penina Mlama, a cultural anthropologist, concludes that culture in Tanzania was never integrated into the socialist construction that the government propagated, but in fact there was a lack of effort in directing culture toward a socialist development (1984: 12). She opines that in 1962 the government of President Nyerere was very clear in terms of what the role of culture was, but the government cultural policy did not go beyond that proclamation: “When it came to actually coming up with the cultural policy to move up that feeling into a very concrete step, the government lost it” (Interview, July 2009). Mlama bases her claims on the fact that no unified cultural policy was created. Cultural undertakings have been based on statements and speeches made sporadically by politicians and which were mistakenly taken for official cultural policy. Although Nyerere had said the Ministry of National Culture and Youth was to be his administration’s most important ministry, the migration of the ministry from one ministry to another and its shift from a full-fledged ministry to a directorate showed the lack of seriousness and determination of the administration to truly build a national culture, let alone a “people’s” socialist culture.
Cinema and the Government

In cementing its domination and control of national culture, the administration employed cinema as a propaganda tool. At independence, Tanzania inherited two types of film industries: a government instructional cinema and a private commercial-film industry. The newly formed government asserted control over both forms of the industry. It did this by establishing institutions such as the Government Film Unit (GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), and the Audio Visual Institute; amended and utilized the Cinematographic Ordinance (film policy) of 1932 and the National Film Censorship Board (NFCB); trained filmmakers; and regulated the importation and distribution of private commercial film as a means to control and construct a sanctioned vision of Tanzania. The following will detail each film organization under the Nyerere administration.

The Government Film Unit and Its Newsreels

In 1961 the Government Film Unit was established under the Ministry of Community Development as an information wing responsible for producing newsreel and government information films, and in some cases documentaries. The main preoccupation of the GFU was to document all events and travels of President Nyerere and the implementation of his party’s policies. Whenever the president made a visit to a foreign country, a region, or a village, the unit was called in to document the event. The GFU became part of the president’s entourage. Rose Sayore notes that “most of the time newsreels were about the president and his events, so when he would go to England, Yugoslavia, or Zimbabwe we would tag along.” (Interview, 2009). The objective was to show what the government, and especially the president, were doing. The
newsreels and documentaries produced were politically oriented and semi-propagandistic. The newsreels were ten-to-fifteen minute films that dealt with the political arena.

Dickson Saileni, a cinematographer who worked at the GFU, remembers, “When foreign officials visited the country, we would cover the whole trip and all their activities while in Tanzania, but we also covered almost all the important speeches that were made by the then-president Nyerere. The objective of the GFU and the TANU party was to make the president and the administration’s policies known to the public” (Interview, 2009). Two considerations drove the choice of newsreels over documentaries or feature films. First, the government’s agenda was to make itself visible to the public through its activities. The newsreel was a viable tool for capturing the immediacy of the event. Second, the length of a newsreel made it possible to produce it in a very short period; it took on an average one month to produce one. Siril Kaunga, one of the first filmmakers of the film unit, notes that since they did not fulfill the definition of news, instead of calling the films newsreels, they were called a “cinema magazine,” because “if you wanted news, it must be shot and shown on the same day or the day after, but this was impossible within the unit” (Interview, 2009). Another difficulty pointed out by John Mponguliana, another GFU filmmaker, was “the shortage of film experts; as documentaries entailed a lot of processes and steps, thus newsreel was ideal for that moment. We tried to make documentaries, but it was hard” (Interview, 2009).

The difficulty of making documentaries was due not only to a shortage of film experts, but most importantly it was precipitated by the lack of film-developing facilities in Tanzania at the time. This meant that all of the films made by the film unit had to be sent to Europe. Dickson Saileni recalls that they had to shoot the film in Tanzania and then send it to England, Yugoslavia, Romania, or Sweden, where the rushes would be produced, to be edited in Tanzania.
and then sent back for optical printing (Interview, 2009). Although this was a costly endeavor, the government knew the importance of film in helping persuade people to adapt to the new government policies.

**Exhibition of GFU’s Films**

In order for government films to reach the intended audience, two distributing and exhibition channels were employed by the government: mobile cinema vans and cinema halls. The use of mobile cinema vans in Tanzania can be traced back to the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment (BEKE) in the 1930s and the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) in the 1950s, which the colonial British government used to distribute instructional films to its East Africa Empire. In 1964, the Tanzanian government, with assistance from the Canadian government, acquired twenty-one Land Rover vehicles, one for each region, to be used as mobile cinema vans for the distribution and exhibition of government films in the rural areas of Tanzania. Eighty percent of the population lived in rural areas and were farmers, and the Nyerere administration had declared agriculture to be the backbone of Tanzanian economy and thus targeted this audience. This was in line with the *Ujamaa* policy, which emphasized rural development. Films such as *Habari ya Tanzania* (*Tanzanian News*, 1964), *Road Ahead* (1962), *Land of Promise* (1963), *Kilimo Bora Cha Mahindi* (*Modern Method of Farming*, 1968), and *Panda Pamba: Mkoa Wa Mashariki* (*Grow Cotton: Eastern Region*, 1968) were shown to the rural population to show them what the government was doing “on their behalf,” in hopes of persuading them to adhere to the government’s agricultural policy calling for the production of more cash crops. The films *Kilimo Bora Cha Mahindi* and *Panda Pamba: Mkoa Wa Mashariki* both illustrate better ways of cultivating corn and cotton.
Most of the government films were shown at about 7:00 p.m. This was a convenient time for many of the village people because the daylight hours were dedicated to working on their farms or tending to household chores and husbandry. After a film screening, a government official or a party leader would be present to introduce and reinforce government agendas. For example, if film dealt with farming, an agricultural expert, who was also a party member, would be there to elaborate on and emphasize the importance of applying the right methods of farming so as to have an increase in agricultural output. As Horace Campbell sums it up, “Regional visits by party leaders became part of the political culture as the state consciously used radio [film] and language as a tool of legitimacy” (1991: 129). Moreover, government hierarchical structure predominated; Mkandala observes that “orders flowed downward and obedience upward” (131).

Another venue where government films were screened was in private cinema halls. After an optical print was brought back from abroad, copies were sent to different cinema halls in the country for viewing. Before the main feature film was shown, the national anthem was played and then a government newsreel was screened. The exhibitors were obligated to show government films. Although no official law existed that made it compulsory to screen a government film, Martin Mhando bluntly states, “Where would they get any films? Distribution in Tanzania was in the hands of the government. . . . Otherwise, they would not get films” (Interview, 2009). John Mponguliana, a government filmmaker, calls this a “silent policy” between the exhibitors and the government. By controlling distribution, the government was able to supervise the type of films Tanzanians were exposed to, thus insuring its agendas and policies reached the people. The production, distribution, and exhibition of newsreels helped the government spread its agendas in the hope of persuading the people to abide by government policies.
Filmmakers and the Government

Another way of controlling the image and identity of Tanzania and its developmental path was through filmmaking and, by extension, through the filmmakers themselves. Filmmakers were perceived as civil servants; they were called information officers and had to be members of the TANU party, later renamed the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or CCM (Revolutionary Party). Without membership there was no employment. This firm control of filmmakers is unique to Tanzania in two ways. Although it is known that other governments in African, Latin American, Eastern Europe, Russia, and China employed cinema and used it to further their socio-political agendas, in Tanzania the hold was firmer. Tanzanian filmmakers were not allowed room for self-expression, criticism, or work outside the state. A slogan such as “Inside the revolution everything, outside the revolution nothing,” proclaimed by Fidel Castro in his famous 1961 “Words to the Intellectuals” speech (National Cultural Council 1961:32), allowed constructive criticism of the state in cinema as long as it furthered the revolution. In Tanzania, the opposite was true; no criticism, constructive or otherwise, was allowed; the filmmaker had to toe the party line.

This kind of control of the filmmakers by the state created what Eberhard Chambulikazi, a former production manager of the Tanzania Film Company, calls a “positive image of the government for public consumption” (1995: 5). Roseleem Smythe, an anthropologist, notes that what is missing in Tanzania are “films which are strong essays in social criticism” (1989: 395). In other countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Cameroon, filmmakers played the role of outsider and presented films with social criticism. This is not to say that those countries did not practice censorship or control over the film industry, but at least in those countries some filmmakers, such as Sembene Ousmane (Senegal), Souleymane Cisse (Mali), and Jean Marie Teno
(Cameroon), were independent of the state and created films that questioned, critiqued, and challenged the state. These filmmakers were free to choose their own subject matter for their films. In Tanzania this was not the case, as no independent filmmaker existed outside the state. In countries like Ghana and Nigeria, where nationalization of the film industry was carried out, independent filmmakers still existed and were allowed to use state-owned production facilities. In Tanzania (as in other African states), the government feared filmmakers. If left alone, the government thought, filmmakers would use film to manipulate the political scene. Oliver Barlet notes, “African leaders are apprehensive about supporting the motion picture industry because they are afraid that cinema would be used by filmmakers to manipulate political situations” (1996:59). Hence, to safeguard their interests the Nyerere administration controlled filmmakers.

Ideological education was another way filmmakers were molded into conformity with the party line. The introduction and indoctrination of Ujamaa sustained the structure of domination and legitimized the party’s rule. This was accomplished in two ways: training filmmakers abroad in socialist countries, and training them at home with a heavy dose of political and party propaganda. Because at the time of independence the country had no film training institutes, filmmakers initially were sent abroad for training. Siril Kaunga, one of the first filmmakers of the GFU, was trained in England for one year (1960–1961) and later received training in India for three years (1967–1969), where he studied basic techniques of filmmaking and then specialized in directing and screenwriting. Saileni Dickson, another addition to the GFU, trained as a cinematographer at the state university of cinema in Moscow for six years (1965–1971). John Mponguliana, after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam with a theater arts degree, joined the GFU and was an apprentice to Sirl Kaunga and Dickson Saileni. He later went to Yugoslavia, England, and Sweden to study filmmaking. Rose Sayore, the only female at the
GFU, also joined the GFU after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam with a theater arts degree, and later went to Canada for four years to pursue a Master of Fine Arts degree in filmmaking, specializing in negative cutting. As can be extrapolated, most of the training came from socialist nations, or socialist-friendly nations. This was no accident, as the government in its creation of a socialist state ensured that filmmakers, along with attaining filmic knowledge from these states, would be inculcated with socialist ideological knowledge. These filmmakers were the socialist pioneers and established what and how a Tanzanian filmmaker was—in essence, a propagator of government policies and ideology.

Although in full control of film production in Tanzania, the Nyerere administration did not have control over the importation, distribution, and exhibition of commercial foreign films. This industry was in the hands of local private business individuals. This lack of control of the private commercial sector troubled the government, and it thus sought means to supervise, if not control, the commercial film industry. The government accomplished this through the strengthening of the existing colonial film policy, the Cinematographic Ordinance, which was implemented through the National Film Censorship Board and through the establishment of the Tanzania Film Company.

**The Cinematographic Ordinance and the National Film Censorship Board**

Many national cinema industries have protected their film industry through establishment of a restrictive or a supportive film policy. A restrictive film policy is design to protect the local film industry from foreign film domination. This is implemented through quotas and tariffs. A supportive film policy provides state support to filmmakers or the film industry by providing bank loans, grants, and training (Moran, 1996). Film policies throughout the world have been devised to provide protective as well as supportive mechanisms for individual nations’ film
industries. In countries like France, a film policy has been created to safeguard domestic production by controlling the importation of films, especially Hollywood films. China only allows twenty foreign films a year to be screened there (Wang, 2003). Most of the world’s film policies have been established protective measures against foreign films, and mostly American Hollywood films. At the same time, Hollywood films have functioned as the standard other national cinemas imitate, adopt, or revolt against.

Latin America has geared its film policies toward protecting and promoting the local market by mandating screen quotas of national cinema. Exhibitors are forced to screen short national films in each program of foreign film. Although the quotas and tariffs have not guaranteed audiences, since most audiences are conditioned by Hollywood, and exhibitors do not want to risk their business on untested film aesthetics, Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba have continued to use protective as well as supportive measures in the promotion of their local film industry. Randal Johnson notes, “Latin American cinema is in many ways dependent on or shaped by the state and its policies” (1996: 134).

The film policy in Tanzania, to the contrary, is rooted in the colonial Cinematographic Ordinance of 1922, whose aim was not only to restrict which films could be shown, but also which groups of people could view and make films. Through the Cinematographic Ordinance, the colonial government set out to regulate who was allowed and not allowed to make or even see films. The film policy instituted the distinction between native and non-native populace and stipulated that natives were excluded from film viewership. In terms of film production, the colonial governor of Tanzania was invested with the authority to grant or deny a film permit to an applicant. The policy states, “No person shall direct, or take part, or assist in a making of the film for a cinematograph picture . . . unless a cinematographic permit in respect of the making of
such film shall have been first granted by the governor” (Cinematographic Ordinance, 1935).

And if a governor did grant a permit, an officer authorized by the governor was to be present at
the making of the picture and had the right to stop the production of the picture if in his opinion
he found it “objectionable.”

The Nyerere administration inherited this policy and modified it in its endeavor to control
film production. After independence, political authority was transferred from the colonial
governor to the minister of national culture and youth, James Naghwanda. Naghwanda had the
sole power of granting or denying an applicant permission to shoot or exhibit a film. If a
filmmaker or exhibitor was unsatisfied with the ruling of the minister, they could appeal, not in
court, but back to the minister. Unlike in other countries such as India or Singapore, where a
filmmaker can take the matter to court, in Tanzania, this was not and continues not to be the
case; the ruling of the minister, most of the time if not always, is final. For example, the minister,
in his budget speech to the parliament in 1976, noted that in terms of Tanzanian film exhibition,
533 out of 555 films were allowed to be shown, while 22 films were denied exhibition. Out of
the 22 denied, 7 had appealed and were again denied (Ministry of Culture budget document,
1976). Out of the 533 films screened in Tanzania, 390 were U.S., 121 were Indian, and 22 were
from Arab nations. Since film production in Tanzania was in the hands of the government, and
the government mostly made newsreels and documentaries, most, if not all, of the films
exhibited in cinema halls were imported, with the majority being U.S. feature films.

In 1976, in the same parliament meeting, the minister presented a Kiswahili version of
the colonial Cinematographic Ordinance called the Film and Stage Play Act No. 4. The new law
was no different, with the exception of language, from the colonial law. It still called for
government control of the film industry, but this time it was reinforced by using the language
that most of the people of Tanzania could understand, Kiswahili. The law was passed on March 1976 and the same year was distributed to all cultural officers in the country. This was a vital move by the Nyerere government. As the country was struggling with its implementation of socialist development plans, especially the 1975 “villagilization” project, foreign films—particularly those promoting individualism and capitalism—were seen as inimical to the state, distractions that kept the Tanzanian people from fully embracing socialism and participating in building it. To combat this, the government was vigilant in making sure no foreign film went unsupervised.

The new film law covered theater licenses, film permits, and exhibition permits. Films that were exempted from acquiring a permit were those either made by amateurs or intended for a private viewing by family and friends, and films produced by the government itself. One could not exhibit a film or advertise materials such as posters without the government’s approval. The government had the right to grant, revoke, or ban production and exhibition of a film, and it did. Films that promoted individualism and those that portrayed “our socialist” friends in a bad light were the main targets.

One other aspect of the film law that was implemented aggressively by the government was the National Film Censorship Board. This board received its power and legitimacy from the Cinematographic Ordinance of 1935, which states, “For the granting of film permits it shall be lawful for the Governor to appoint a Censorship Board consisting of a chairman and such numbers as the Governor may deem expedient,” as well as the 1958 version, which states, “The Governor shall appoint a Territorial censor” and the Film Policy of 1976, which states, “The minister shall appoint a National Film Censorship Board and shall announce the appointees in the government newspaper.” The task of the board has always been to review all applications for
film permits, to view and censor films for exhibition, and to grant or deny theater licenses. The censor board’s major preoccupation was ensuring that film produced or exhibited in Tanzania adhered to the socialist ideals that the government wished to inculcate in the populace. To be in compliance, a film or exhibition permit applicant had to supply, together with the application and fourteen days prior to the shooting date, a synopsis of the film. Once a permit was granted and a film made, the applicant was required to submit the final film for inspection.

Not only were these films subject to final inspection, but also during shooting a filmmaker from the Audio Visual Institute or the Tanzania Film Company would accompany the film crew. This double control ensured that films made in Tanzania by foreign individuals did not distort matters or portray Tanzania in a negative light. The government controlled not only what images Tanzanians were allowed to see, thus presenting a construction of their national identity, but also what images of Tanzania foreigners were allowed to present. Dick Kaombwe, an Audio Visual Institute filmmaker, remembers that on countless occasions he accompanied foreign film crews to make sure Tanzanian culture and values were not misrepresented (Interview, 2009).

The Tanzanian National Film Censorship Board, with the power invested in it by the minister, had the power to permit, revoke, and or ban any film that was exhibited or produced in Tanzania. The composition of the board included TANU party members, government officials, and sometimes the wives of political leaders. This composition clearly reflected that only government-sanctioned socialist values were promoted, and retribution rendered to those who did not conform. The film policy and the censorship board promoted a particular social order through their selective cultural, political, and economic interests. Eberhard Chamblikazi, a former production manager of the Tanzania Film Company, states that censorship in Tanzania is
tied to values the ruling party upholds, and therefore, the board has never acted in the basic interests of the people, but rather has been a tool of domination by the government (1995: 17).

The appointment of the National Film Censorship Board by the minister was politically and ideologically motivated. For example, Rashid Kawawa, a TANU member, former trade union chair, and former prime minister, was appointed as the first chairperson of the NFCB. Ironically, Mr. Kawawa, in the 1950s, was an actor and had appeared in the colonial government film *Mhogo Mchungu* (Bitter Cassava, 1951). *Mhogo Mchungu* is a comic film about Juma, a plantation worker who after receiving his salary decides to venture for the first time into the city. He boards a truck, which takes him into town, where he is swindled out of his money and is beaten up by a man whose wife Juma has been admiring. In the end Juma returns to his village, swearing never to set foot in town again. The film’s underlying message was to persuade the youth to remain in the rural area and work in the field of agriculture. It is said the film was later destroyed by the government because it depicted a government official in a disrespectful manner. Government films were supposed to educate, not entertain, and even more to the point, they were supposed to show government officials in a positive light. Kawawa and his successors worked to control and curb the importation of foreign films by taking measures to make sure that those films did not distract from Tanzanian social values and experiences. The January 13, 1962, issue of the party newspaper, *Uhuru* (Freedom), wrote that “foreign films destroyed African culture and history by teaching the youth to become thieves,” and the editor called for Tanzania to establish its own local film production system.

Foreign films were perceived by the government as detractors to the process of socialist nation building. Foreign films, especially American ones, were seen as the antithesis to the socialist ideas that the government was trying to foment in the country. To curb the infiltration of
American (perceived as capitalist), individualistic (as opposed to socialistic) values, the censorship board critically reviewed all films and censored all “subversive” materials. It was hailed that Tanzania was a socialist state, and the censorship board thus had to make sure that the films brought to Tanzania did not distort the true values of socialism. Another argument that was brought forth by some of the members of the board for its stringent assessment of foreign films was that Tanzania was a non-aligned country; thus in this period of cold war Tanzania did not want to be used as a political playground for the superpowers. Rashid Masimbi, once a member of the censor board, notes, “You know these films are sometimes produced deliberately to disgrace one nation and their way of life and promote another; thus we say no to that” (Interview, 2009). A TANU guideline document states that Tanzania is a “non-aligned nation and is ready to co-operate in a friendly manner with any country that wishes us well, be it from the East or West” (TANU Guideline, 1971). But in an analysis of how censorship was conducted, it is found that only American films were censored in this manner. For example, the James Bond film *From Russia with Love* (1963) was censored and the title changed to *From 007 with Love* so as “not to offend our friends.” Likewise, other films that degraded another nation were banned from being shown in the country. It is clear that although Tanzania was strategically a non-aligned nation, it knew who its friends and enemies were. Its friends were those nations that leaned or were sympathetic to socialist ideals, such as Russia, China, the Scandinavian countries, India, and Canada. No reasons for censoring films beyond their unsuitability for the national interest were given. In 1969 TANU’s national executive committee declared that the “roguish” effects of international cinema were ruining African culture and that the remedy to this was to produce local films that would entertain and educate the people on the policy of local culture (Stumer, 1998).
Production of local entertainment feature films was to occur in 1973, but before that was to happen, the National Development Corporation (NDC) demanded, in late 1967, that distributors of foreign films in Tanzania contribute 10 percent of their revenues towards the promotion of domestic production. Distributors refused to adhere to this demand, and the NDC responded by announcing the creation of a national film distribution company that was to take over distribution of all commercial films in the country (Leveri, 1983). 20th Century Fox, the major distributor of American films in East Africa, responded by withdrawing their supplies from Tanzania. In 1968 the Tanzania Film Company was created as a subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, for the importation and distribution of foreign films.

The nationalization of the importation and distribution circuits proved challenging for the government. Not only did it require a lot of financial resources to operate, but more importantly, the importation and distribution companies did not relent. The United States, Anglo-American, and Pan-African film distributors with their subsidiaries abroad networked together and blocked the government from acquiring films abroad. After a period a compromise was reached in 1975; Tanzania Film Company was made the sole distributor of foreign films in Tanzania, but without a monopoly over their importation (Smythe, 393). The Motion Picture Association of America Export (MPAAE), finding the compromise unprofitable, stopped importing films to Tanzania. The MPAAE opposed the idea of governmental control over the distribution of films. Because payment of foreign currency was also controlled by the government, their money would have been held back in the bank for whatever duration the government wished. Clearly, as Mhando notes, there were “political elements about it” (Interview, 2009). The relationship between the MPAAE and the Tanzanian government is reflective of a larger political and ideological relationship that existed between Tanzania and the United States.
Tanzania was an aspiring socialist state, and its government was in the process of waging an offensive against any capitalist tendency that existed. Any film distribution and exhibition comprised of American films and distributors seemed the best target. In his 1974 budget speech to the parliament, the minister of culture and youth S. Chiwanga noted that, out of 708 films exhibited in Tanzania, 489 were American, 201 were Indian, and 18 were from Arab countries. In 1975 the MPAAE did not conduct direct business with Tanzania, but as Mhando notes, as a consequence, B class films were sent over through other importers. Local private film exhibition thus remained separate and distanced from the cultural nationalist project. The goal of the government to control cinematic exhibition and distribution encompassed the creation of a local film production industry that would serve its needs.

The Government and Local Film Production

The Tanzania Film Company served as the sole distributor of films in Tanzania; importers had to take their films to the TFC, and the TFC would plan for their censorship and their distribution. For this, the TFC received 40 percent of the gate collection (Mhando, interview, 2009). In its Five-Year Plan (1969–1974) document, the Nyerere government seemed to want not only to control the distribution channels of the film industry but also to establish a “processing plant” that would enable the government to produce, develop, and process the films locally (Leveri, 1983). To fulfill this, the Tanzanian government wrote a letter to UNESCO requesting assistance. UNESCO agreed to support Tanzania, and to do so requested the assistance of the Danish government and in 1969 assigned Mr. A. W. Acland to do a feasibility study and assess the viability of such an undertaking. In his report submitted in early 1970, Acland, recommended that an institute be established to take the following measures: (1) make films that would motivate communities by influencing attitudes, (2) produce films on “how to do
it,” and (3) supply state-run schools, universities, and vocational training centers with 16-mm and 8-mm educational films and visual aids produced by Tanzanian filmmakers. In 1970 a Danish-Tanzanian agreement was signed and construction of a film processing laboratory was begun. The lab was to be called the Audio Visual Institute (AVI). The institute was to produce documentaries and educational films for national development. In 1971 the Danish government helped the Tanzania Film Company to establish a production wing of the company. The production wing was to carry out the production of local commercial films. In 1973, a Danish film expert who had also trained TFC employees in the art of filmmaking assisted the TFC in producing feature films.

The assistance of foreign governments in Tanzania—the Danish government in this instance—was prevalent during this time period. Social democratic countries such as Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and Canada, and communist countries such China, Cuba, and Russia embraced Nyerere’s vision and philosophy of African socialism or *Ujamaa* and eagerly supported them as a possible noncapitalist path in Africa. Tanzania became a poster child for development and became the most-funded country in Africa (Askew, 2002). These foreign countries and their organizations were impressed with the social direction that the Nyerere government was taking in regards to its development process.

Foreign involvement was consciously noninterventionist in philosophy. There was a declared ambition to avoid interference in domestic political issues. The countries were there to assist Tanzania reach its development goals. One of the development plans that the Nyerere administration had had since it came to power was the creation of “*Ujamaa* villages.” *Ujamaa* villages involved encouraging people to relocate and form organized communal villages where it would be easier for the government to provide such social services as education, health, good
roads, and water. Nyerere, in his writings on *Ujamaa* and communal villages, as early as 1962 had pointed out that the creation of *Ujamaa* villages would help the government in bringing social services to the people. This process of creating *Ujamaa* villages was called for by the Villagization Act. It involved the replacement of the traditional rural settlements with larger and more viable villages. In 1974, 60 percent of the rural population was relocated (Askew, 2002).

To accompany the villagization process, the government with the assistance of the Danish government and filmmakers produced Tanzania’s first feature film, *Fimbo ya Mnyonge* (*A Poor Man’s Salvation*, 1973). It had been argued on numerous occasions by politicians and government officials that Tanzania, to rid itself of foreign film influence, should produce its own local commercial films. The production of *Fimbo Ya Mnyonge* was hailed as a step in that direction. In 1974, the minister of culture reiterated in his speech to the parliament that foreign films distorted Tanzanian culture and values, and that producing national films would make it easy to educate the society politically, economically, and culturally (Budget speech, 1974). He hailed the TFC for adhering to “the cries of the nation” by producing *Fimbo ya Mnyonge*.

*Fimbo ya Mnyonge* is about a man named Yomba Yomba, a farmer who, after a poor harvest, leaves his wife behind and goes to the city to seek employment. While in the city, Yomba Yomba embarks on petty businesses selling foods and utensils, only to find himself robbed, tricked, and almost jailed. As he is about to give up in desperation and return home, he visits a TANU party office where he is informed of the communal villages and the benefits of living and working there. The film ends as Yomba Yomba decides to return home to spread the good news about communal living.

The film is a reminiscent of the colonial films *Mhogo Mchungu* and *Charo Amerudi* (*The Return of Charles*, 1951), which depict the same rural-to-urban migration phenomenon. The only
difference here is that instead of returning to an agricultural plantation, Yomba Yomba returns to create an *Ujamaa* village. Smythe notes, “Films that have been produced in independent Tanzania shows that the inherited British tradition of cinema with social purpose is still strong” (1989: 395). *Fimbo ya Mnyonge* is an excellent example of how political agendas are manifested in films.

The Nyerere administration considered agriculture to be the backbone of the Tanzanian economy, and through the creation of *Ujamaa* villages it hoped to increase agricultural output and thus raise the standard of living of the rural population. The government hoped that Tanzanian cinema would assist in spreading the word about the benefits of living in these villages. *Fimbo ya Mnyonge*, just like other government films, only praised government initiatives; it did not question or critically look at the validity of moving people from their fertile ancestral land to sometimes barren, dry land. The film made it seem like communal living would eradicate poverty and bring about social and economic development. On the contrary, *Ujamaa* as a program of communal villagization was by all accounts a failure. Individuals were forcefully removed by the military from their homes and herded like animals onto trucks to relocate. Although the president had on numerous occasions and in many of his speeches reiterated that viable socialist communities were only to be established with willing members and that the task of leadership and government was not implemented by force but through explanation, encouragement, and participation, the government turned to force in the implementation of the villagization policy.

*Fimbo ya Mnyonge* may have been seen by people, but this did not transform them into willing members of *Ujamaa* villages. Kelly Askew calls this policy “an abysmal failure” (2002: 47). The relocation of 60 percent of the rural population not only crippled the Tanzanian
economy but also earned Tanzania the title of the “second-poorest nation in the world” by the World Bank.

It was to take the TFC more than ten years before another feature film was produced. Surprisingly, though, the film that was produced was a sequel to Fimbo ya Mnyonge simply called Yomba Yomba. From the above scenario it is evident that the TFC was not able to curb Tanzania’s dependence on foreign films. To keep itself afloat, TFC made documentaries for national or international organizations that sought its services.

The Audio Visual Institute: Documentaries and Educational Films

As pointed out earlier, to curb its foreign currency expenditure, the government had enlisted the help of the Danish government to establish a government institute to develop films locally. The Audio Visual Institute was officially established in 1974, and a parliament act of 1974 states the objectives of AVI as to provide facilities for training in all aspects of film production, including film laboratory processes; to provide for the government facilities for the establishment and maintenance of a national film library; to construct and maintain workshops and associated facilities; to undertake the repair, maintenance, and servicing of film projectors and other visual aid equipment; and finally, to produce educational films and other audio visual aids for national development.

The Audio Visual Institute produced documentaries and educational films and distributed them throughout the country on a noncommercial basis. The creation of the AVI was a step towards a viable government film industry. Not only was AVI to produce films that the Government Film Unit did not, it was to process them locally. Films were no longer to be sent abroad for development; now everything was to be produced in Tanzania. “The shooting, developing, and editing was all done here” (Kaumbwa, Interview, 2009). The institute had six
separate departments: camera, sound, editing, directing, script writing, and technician. With the support from Denmark the institute acquired Westrex sound machines, a Steenbeck editing bay, Bauer projectors, Arriflex cameras, Nagra tape recorders, and a Bell and Howell processor. The institute was able to produce 16-mm black-and-white films, which were later blown up to 35 mm for cinema halls. The only facility the institute was missing was an optical printer. Films thus were still sent abroad for optical printing.

The Government Film Unit, which had specialized in making newsreels, was to merge with the Audio Visual Institute. The merger was not a cordial one, for as Saileni Dickson remembers: “The Danish put greater emphasis on films for social development; they did not like newsreels. They wanted to start the institute with their own film people, who they were to train. They did not want to associate with the GFU in any form. They wanted to do things their way...but unfortunately when they came, they found us, and we were very qualified and in fact we were more educated than them by far. . . . That did not make them happy at all” (Interview, 2009).

This tug of war was soon to be settled by the government: GFU and its film experts were transferred to AVI. The Audio Visual Institute was first and foremost a government entity; thus it was guided by government policies, agenda, and ideology. Kaumbwa recalls that “back then, even a writer knew his responsibility . . . because we were propaganda machinery of the government” (Interview, 2009). As an ideological propaganda machine, AVI and other information sectors tied to the government made sure that their documentaries and educational films persuaded the people to support government undertakings. In 1979, amidst the Tanzania-Uganda war, AVI produced a documentary, *Vita Vya Kagera (The Kagera War)*, which showed how the Tanzanian military toppled “the evil” Idi Amin, the president of Uganda. Militarily, the
Nyerere government ousted Idi Amin and installed in his place Yusufu Lule. Cinematically, the documentary, shot in color, showed the horror of war but more importantly the strength and power of the Tanzanian army and, by extension, the government. Although AVI was only able to develop films in black and white, the film was shot in color “for people to actually feel the war. . . There was no other way of making the documentary” (Kaumbwa, interview, 2009). The decision to shoot the film in color had, therefore, an ideological as well as an aesthetic basis.

The war with Uganda together with the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s brought about financial deficits as well as disgruntled feelings among the people. The government failed to provide basic social services to its people, and at the same time corruption and misuse of resources within the government ran rampant. The Tanzanian crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s was not only an economic crisis, but a political one as well. This occurred due to the increasing inability of the state to provide avenues for effective popular participation and its failure to stimulate production or maintain capital accumulation. Many promises made to the people went unfulfilled; squandering of public services continued, and avenues for people’s expression and participation remained blocked. This stimulated political apathy and resignation on the part of the people (Kiondo, 1995). The legitimacy of the government was at stake. The socialist political and economic path was no longer as clear as the government had envisioned.

Instead of critically evaluating its policies and assessing what had gone wrong, the government went on a campaign to bring socialism back. Film again was employed as a tool to strengthen the party and socialism. In 1985, the Tanzania Film Company was quickly contracted by the prime minister’s office to try to salvage socialism by making a sequel to *Fimbo ya Mnyonge*. Martin Mhando had just come back from a three-year stint studying film in Romania and was given the task of writing and directing the film. The script was written by Martin
Mhando; Godwin Kaduma, the production manager of TFC, and Ahmed Mushibu, from the prime minister’s office. It is reasonable to suggest that, although TFC was a government parastatal, and thus already inclined to implement the government’s views, the appointment of Mushibu was nothing short of a strategic move by the government. Mushibu was assigned to oversee the project. However, the director thought differently: “I could not accept making a film that said socialism was successful, because we could see a lot of pot holes in it” (Mhando, interview, 2009). The director’s personal ideological stance regarding socialism generated a heated debate among the three writers, and especially with Mushibu. The resulting compromise was a script and a film that depicted how socialism could be or ought to be. The film was more of a fantasy than a reality, Mhando notes.

The film was named *Yomba Yomba* after its main character, and it began where *Fimbo ya Mnyonge* left off, with the protagonist trying to return home with news of *Ujamaa* villages. *Yomba Yomba* deals with that journey back home. On his return home Yomba Yomba passes through different types of villages, each of which symbolizes a different stage of socialism. The first village he comes into contact with is in total shambles and is dependent entirely on one leader, the chair of the village, who makes all the decisions. In a pivotal scene, the chair has convened a meeting, and only a few people have shown up. Yomba Yomba, questions the chair:

**Yomba Yomba.** How long have you been the chair of the village?

**Village Chair.** Almost twenty-five years

**Yomba Yomba.** Why is it that you have been the chair of the village for so many years?

**Village Chair.** There is no other person who can fill this post.

The response of the chair puzzles Yomba Yomba, but he moves on with his journey.
The second village Yomba Yomba visits has energetic young people who are underutilized; they are not given chances by the old guards in the village. In the third village, women are seen working in leadership positions and are contributing to the development of the village. Mhando states, “Our argument in this village is that there is a need to change the whole social structure, the social environment.” The fourth village is portrayed as a successful village, showing and arguing for a mixed economy, a socialist as well as a private economy. The last village that Yomba Yomba visits is considered a “fantasy village” by the director: here new technology is employed successfully, leadership is in the hands of women, and everybody participates equally and harmoniously. According to Mhando, “This is an area where we hope to go.”

But this hope was a fantasy, for Tanzania, after twenty-five years of employing socialism, was still in the first and second village stage of socialism. Leadership, as in the first village, had remained, since independence, in the hand of one party; one president; and one social, political, and economic ideology. People were underutilized and marginalized, and alternative expressions were blocked. The film in its subtle way critiques the government and its policies. Yomba Yomba did not discard socialism as a worthwhile ideology, but argued rather that there were challenges to be overcome if it was to succeed. Socialism in Tanzania needed to involve young people, women, technology, and democracy. This view of the film did not sit well with the top government officials. The minister of culture, Gertrude Mongela, asked to view the film before it was screened to the public. With some hesitation, she permitted the film’s exhibition. Unfortunately Yomba Yomba was never shown to the public, nor has it ever been shown. There has been some speculation that maybe the president saw the film and did not appreciate the resemblances in or the allegory of the film, for in a sense the film was critical of him and his
administration. The government official statement was that the film was no longer relevant (Mhando, interview, 2009). This is the same government that not less than six months prior had eagerly requested TFC to produce the film. What had changed in six months?

The political and economic changes that were taking place in the 1970s and mid-80s in Tanzania influenced what was being produced and consumed culturally. No longer were individuals satisfied with the government’s views and policies; individuals wanted to participate, wanted their voice and cries heard. The debate that transpired in the production of the film and in the film itself not only showed that the days of passively accepting government views were coming to an end, but it also elaborated that within the system itself, individuals were starting to question and ask for alternative answers. Although Mponguliana asserts, “One had to be very careful on how to criticize the government, because that is where your bread came from” (Interview, 2009), Mhando demonstrated that sometimes bread is just not enough, especially when the bread provider and the bread itself are stale. The Swahili proverb *Ukimuweka kwenyekona hate bubu hutoa sauti* (If forced into a corner, even a mute person will make a sound) highlights the conditions that Tanzanians found themselves in: they had been put into a tight corner, and thus to fight back they questioned and challenged the government. Filmmakers like Martin Mhando could no longer just toe the party line; they questioned it and suggested the way forward.

When the character Yomba Yomba asked the chairperson of the first village why he had held that position for such a long time, twenty-five years to be exact, the reply was that there was no one else to give it to. This must have hit a nerve within the party, because it had also been twenty-five years that President Nyerere had been in power, and it seemed his rationalization as to why he was still in power reflected the chairperson’s response. This state of affairs did not
continue for long, for in 1985, the same year that the film was made and was supposed to have come out, President Nyerere voluntarily resigned from his post as the president of the United Republic of Tanzania. Did he see the film? Did he see the writing on the wall? What was to come of Tanzania?
Chapter Three

Rukhsa: Everything Goes? Transition to Neo-Liberal Policy and Film

In 1985 Ali Hassan Mwinyi came to power as the new president of Tanzania. Shortly after, in September 1986, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was signed, signifying a major shift in Tanzania’s socio-economic and political worldview. The socialist ideology, which only a few months earlier was being revitalized through various government agencies such as the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) and its film *Yomba Yomba*, was now becoming an image of the past, and subsequently neo-liberal policies introduced through the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) became the awakening present and future of Tanzania. Mwinyi’s era is best represented by the word *Rukhsa*, uttered by the new president, who himself became known as *Mzee Rukhsa* (Mr. Permission). *Rukhsa*, similar to the Russian *Perestroika*, meant openness—opening the economic door to private individuals and companies, local and foreign. *Rukhsa*, with its embrace of IMF and World Bank policies, also transformed Tanzania from a one-party socialist state into a multiparty democratic state. What did this transformative word mean for the film industry, and how did this affect the way the government administered the film industry?

For Tanzania, the IMF and World Bank SAPs entailed the devaluation of the Tanzania shilling, trade liberalization, elimination of government subsidies, reduction of state investment in the economy, encouragement of the private sector, privatization of government enterprises, civil service reform, and eventually the dismantling of the single-party state and the introduction of multiparty democracy (Mongella and Kiondo, 2006). This fundamental change meant that now the market, not the government, would determine how resources would be distributed in
society. Thus SAPs led the government to limit its role in controlling the economy and providing social services.

**Rukhsa, a Savior for the Film Industry?**

The devaluation of the shilling meant that film equipment, film stock, printing, and importing became an expensive undertaking for both the government and private companies. Between 1986 and 1990, the Tanzanian shilling was devalued from 7 shillings to the dollar to 193 to the dollar, and by March 1991 it had reached 201 to the dollar (Kiondo, 1998: 83). To ease its burden on foreign currency expenditure, the government expanded its “own fund” scheme, introduced in late 1984, to allow importers to import products without requesting foreign exchange from the central bank of Tanzania. This meant that individuals who had foreign currency funds outside the country could freely (without questions being asked about how foreign exchange had been obtained) use their money to import goods, including film (Wangwe, 2006: 31). This was a significant socio-economic and political shift that categorized President Mwinyi’s administration. This major shift meant that the private sector, which had been marginalized during the Nyerere era, became the savior of the economy in the Mwinyi administration. But did it save the film industry? Did the government loosen its control of the industry?

The promotion of the private sector in terms of film caused the government to relax its hold on the film industry by allowing private individuals and companies to import and distribute films. Companies such as Pan-African film distributors, United Film distributors, and Anglo-American film distributors were no longer required to distribute their films via the TFC; they could import and distribute films to exhibitors independently. This eased the bureaucratic red tape that film importers and distributors had previously had to endure from the TFC. Although
this was a major step in the reduction of the government’s hold on the film industry, censorship, a major apparatus of the government, remained in its control. The government continued to monitor and survey the kinds of foreign images and content that Tanzanians were seeing. Some, such as Ng’wanakilala, the managing director of the Media Publishing House, have argued that an increase of foreign films in Tanzania had a negative influence on Tanzanian viewers, and questioned whether the country should continue to depend on imports in this sector of the cultural industry (1981: 26). Although no research has ever been carried out to substantiate such a claim, and—more significantly—the government was not able to produce a sufficient number of feature films of its own to compete with the influx of foreign films, a close monitoring and control of foreign films was advocated. Foreign films were perceived to have an ideological and cultural effect that came into direct conflict with Tanzanian values.

Andrew Higson reminds us that “the state intervenes only when there is a felt fear of the potential power of foreign cinema and particularly when the products and therefore the ideologies and values of a foreign cinema are widely circulated within a nation-state, and assume to have a detrimental effect on that nation’s state economy” (2002: 61). The Mwinyi administration saw cinema as an important instrument in the promotion of desirable “national values.” Since the government was economically challenged and could not produce a sufficient number of films, it relied on the mechanism of resistance to and control of other cinemas. As Croft notes, “Governments support films they deem worthy, and withhold support from unworthy ones, as part of an international politics of culture” (2002: 8). Films can reflect and keep in circulation values and behaviors associated with a particular nation.

The Mwinyi regime’s fear of foreign film was not in terms of its effect on the nation’s economy—one could say it was actually profiting through taxation—but in terms of its effects on
cultural values. The fear was not so much how foreign values were destroying the cultural mores of the Tanzanian people, as how foreign values did not help, and in fact obscured, hindered, and slowed down the construction of a national culture. Therefore, to speed up the invention and construction of a national identity, the Mwinyi regime, just as the Nyerere regime before it, systematically worked to retard, monitor, and control the content of foreign films as it attempted to develop a national identity.

The idea that something is going to come from outside and destroy something “organic,” the cry of many cultural imperialism scholars and governments, has been refuted by pointing to the fact that there has never been something organic to any given place. John Akomfrah, an African filmmaker, comments that there has always been a mixture of cultures (289). Tomlison calls this form of cultural mixing “cultural loss,” while Homi Bhabha refers to it as a state of “in-between-ness.” National identity or national culture is by no means a fixed phenomenon; it is constantly shifting, constantly in the process of becoming. The Mwinyi regime in its endeavor to form a coherent and unitary identity promoted national values that supported the regime’s political ideology. Cultural construction was not to be left in the hands of foreign cultures, whose values were perceived as individualistic and capitalist at best. Although major socio-economic and political transformations that threatened to precipitate less government interference were taking place, the administration found ways to circumvent this. Through the National Film Censorship Board, the government ensured a continued stronghold on foreign films.

The Foreign Film Scare

Antipathy toward foreign films reached a peak in the parliamentary budget session of 1987, when members of parliament called for the Minister of Social Development and Culture, Fatma Said Ali, to elaborate on what was being done about “the public exhibition of foreign
“videos” and what the censorship board was doing about this foreign cultural attack. To place this in context, while the Nyerere administration in 1974 had banned the importation of video cassette recorders (VCRs), in 1985, following revision of the import laws, the ban was lifted, resulting in an increased import of VCRs, televisions, and video home system (VHS) tapes. This process prompted the emergence of an informal film exhibition business and venue. This exhibition business was conducted by individuals who owned television sets and VHS tapes, and screened, for a small fee, films at home or in a temporary shack built by the owner. These films, because of their informal and clandestine screenings, evaded the hands of the censorship board. The emergence of this covert film sector threatened the existence and legitimacy of the state, prompting members of parliament to demand the application of the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976, which required business owners to obtain exhibition permits from the censorship board, to this new mode of exhibition.

The parliament’s call for the censorship board to take action demonstrates the macro-contradiction that faced the state in its endeavor to move forward in its democratization and adoption of a free market economy. On the one hand, the government had allowed for the importation of foreign technology and cultural products, but on the other it still held to the view that it had to control how and what was being fed culturally to the Tanzanian people. The government, in this case, reverted to the authoritative rule characteristic of the Nyerere regime and cracked down on the informal film business by enforcing the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976. Fatma Said Ali reassured the parliament that the Ministry of Social Development and Culture had distributed copies of the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976 to all districts in the country, and all cultural officers and district censorship boards had been informed that the videos that were being shown to the public fell within the film act law, and thus it was prohibited to
show videos in public without an exhibition permit from the censor board. The parliament applauded the minister and admonished the censorship board to be more vigilant in its effort to safeguard Tanzania’s national culture, lest it be destroyed by foreign values (Ministry of Social Development and Culture Budget speech, 1987). Although the government had accepted neo-liberal policies in the economic sector, it was not ready to accept them in the cultural sector. The control of the film industry through censorship was not, however, without question and debate, especially among the government’s own filmmakers.

**Filmmakers Challenging the State**

In 1983, Siril Kaunga and other filmmakers from the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) and the TFC founded an organization called the Tanzania Filmmakers Association (TAFILMA). The organization had three objectives: (1) to advise the government on matters of film and filmmaking, (2) to make its own independent films outside the government, and (3) to meet and exchange ideas among members (Kaunga, interview, 2009). In hopes of loosening governmental control of film through censorship, the association proposed to the government the idea of using filmmakers in censoring film. After all, “We were film experts and knew how films were made. . . . We felt it was best that we looked at the films and advise the government where changes could be made” (Siril Kaunga, interview, 2009). The idea fell on deaf ears and was flatly rejected by the government. It is apparent that the government and the filmmakers had conflicting agendas. Whereas filmmakers were interested in the preservation of the story line and film aesthetics, the government was more concerned with political and ideological legitimacy, especially during this fragile period of transition for the nation. The priority of the state was to guide and control the path and destination of the Tanzanian nation, especially as visible cultural cracks began to emerge. It viewed allowing one of its film controlling mechanisms, censorship, to be in the hands
of filmmakers as jeopardizing its power to rule, and thus threatening its legitimacy. The concern of the government at this juncture was not so much, as they have suggested, the cultural values of the Tanzanian people, as how the relinquishing of such a cultural institution could diminish its political and ideological capital.

Not only was the Tanzanian Filmmakers Association unable to persuade the government to employ the association’s expertise on matters of film censorship, producing films independent of the state also proved difficult. The association did not have the funds to make films, and those who were willing and able to fund, such as the international donor community, “wanted to make films of their nature” while “we wanted to make films that reflected us” (Siril Kaunga, interview, 2009). The struggles and negotiations that filmmakers had to endure in the process of making either films that propagated government ideologies or those that catered to international donors has prompted some scholars such as John Komfrahn to call African cinema an “impossible cinema.” (2006:277). John Komfrahn notes that there is not enough money to sustain an African cinema and that the continued reliance on the government has constituted a major problem (2006: 289). In order for an African cinema to flourish it would have to be independent of the state both financially and in terms of content. This is something the government was neither ready nor willing to grant. Although the government was financially withdrawing from the film industry, politically and ideologically it maintained control. In the midst of new technologies and the emergence of private media forms, was this control to last?

**The Fourth Wall: A Challenge to the State?**

**New technologies and the emergence of private media forms**

As previously mentioned, no private media forms existed prior to the adoption of the neo-liberal policies. The neo-liberal policies, besides calling for less government interference in the
economy, also called for a shift in the political landscape away from one-party rule and toward a multiparty democracy. This meant the government had to widen its political platform and allow people, organizations, and political parties to form and participate in the construction of a multiparty democratic country. For these changes to take place, President Mwinyi, on February 27, 1991, appointed a commission headed by the Minister of Justice, Judge Francis Nyalali, to review the possibility of Tanzania becoming a multiparty political system (Mwapachu, 2005). The report thus generated recommended that, while only a minority of respondents favored a multiparty system, a majority wished to see changes that, theoretically at least, could be easily facilitated through the introduction of multipartyism (Gibbon, 1995: 13).

In considering the transformation of Tanzania into a multiparty state, the Nyalali report had, among other things, recognized the need for independent print and electronic media and thus the need to amend media laws that hindered or impinged on people’s freedom and rights. The commission cited the Newspaper Act of 1976 and the Tanzania News Agency Act of 1976 as media laws that needed amendment (Nyalali’s report, 1991). However, the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976, which was just as oppressive as the other two laws, was not mentioned at all in the report. This could be attributed to either or both of two things: (1) the government feared the print media more than the film media and thus sought to maintain its control, and (2) because the government had controlled the film industry since its inception, the commission assumed this was to continue and thus an amendment was not necessary.

Prior to and following Tanzanian independence, the print media was controlled by private companies and individuals, and it was not until 1974 that it was nationalized and placed under government control. With the coming of a multiparty system and the implementation of a free market economy, private-print media companies, the government feared, were bound to
resurface. To continue its control of the print and broadcasting media the government thought to
embrace the changing conditions while retaining a strong hold on the industry by strengthening
the two media laws and giving itself the power to monitor and regulate the incoming independent
media. For example, the report recommended the strengthening of both laws by increasing the
staff and working facilities of each institution, giving the Tanzania News Agency the right to
distribute and disseminate news, and creating regulations that would monitor and control other
independent agencies (Sturmer, 1998: 172). The amendments to the two laws asserted
governmental control. Thus, overall the amendments in the two laws were to give more power to
the government to regulate, monitor, and control the emerging independent media forms.

Although the door had opened for private companies to import and distribute films in
Tanzania, both film importation and exhibition declined. Whereas in 1976, 550 films were
imported to Tanzania, in 1986 only 230 films were imported (five of which were banned); in
1987 this figure had plummeted to 154 (of which two were banned), and in 1988, the number
further declined to 100 (Ministry of Social Development budget speeches, 1986, 1987, 1988). By
1993, film imports and distribution remained steady at 100 films (Ministry of Education and
Culture budget speech, 1993). The decline of film imports and distribution has been attributed to
two factors: audience attendance and the emergence of new media forms.

The Withering Audience

Because of the rising cost of film imports, distributors, importers, and exhibitors were
forced to evaluate the future prospects of the film industry. Distributors, who sometimes also
doubled as importers, thought to raise ticket prices as a remedy to the falling business and a way
to recoup their investment. The ensuing decline in attendance dramatically affected the industry.
While in 1986 the cinema halls were frequented by 3 million viewers, by 1988 audience
attendance had plummeted to 1 million, causing a decrease in film importation and exhibition (Mpongualiana, 2001). The price increase seemed a necessary strategy for the industry’s survival, but to the distributors’ dismay in fact acted as a severe blow to the film industry. In trying to keep the film business afloat, distributors lost sight of who their major filmgoers were, and how this price increase affected them. The majority of filmgoers were working class people who had been financially impaired by the economic crisis. People who went to the movies were typically young working class people, for whom film served as entertainment, an escape from the drudgery of everyday life, and a connection to the outside world (Mhando, interview, 2009).

Martin Mhando notes that distributors were only concerned with their financial gain and had forgotten that “it is only the people with extra financial means who go to see a film”; in these trying times, when everything was a struggle, to increase the price of a ticket was to dig one’s own business grave (Interview, 2009). Not only was the economic environment killing film distribution and exhibition, by 1988 the establishment of private media forms put the last nail in the film exhibition business coffin. In 1992, Tanzania officially adopted a multiparty political system, and shortly after, in 1993, the Newspaper Act was officially amended and the Broadcasting Service Act was passed, opening the door for an influx of independent print and electronic media.

**Television Networks: The New Exhibition Venue**

Following the passage of the Broadcasting Service Act, three private television stations, Independent Television (ITV), Coastal Television Network (CTN), and Dar es Salaam Television (DTV) were established in 1994 (Sturmer, 1998). It must be noted that prior to 1994, Tanzania did not have a national television station. Thus the establishment of television stations in Tanzania was a new and exciting novelty for the Tanzanian people. In Zanzibar, Television ya
Zanzibar (Television Zanzibar) (TVZ) had existed since 1974 and was the first color television station in sub-Saharan Africa. Television Zanzibar did not transmit to mainland Tanzania, because at that time television sets and VCRs were banned. The ban was lifted and replaced with an import duty ordinance in 1985. With the introduction of television stations, not only were people able to watch movies on television, but more importantly, the movies viewed were free of charge. The economic crisis that had turned people away from cinema halls was now turning them toward television “halls.”

Not everyone could afford a television set, but the homes of the families that did buy sets became the new neighborhood television halls. Neighbors would gather at a house with a television set to watch local news programming and foreign films. In addition people stayed at home to watch televised “free” movies. Thus the new media forms, coupled with the increase in film ticket prices, caused people to stay away from traditional cinema halls and shift toward alternative media forms such as television. Some television stations had what were called “watching posts,” where people gathered to watch news and evening programs. The first to establish a watching post was Independent Television. ITV mounted a giant television screen high above the busy economic center of Mnazi Mmoja in the heart of Dar es Salaam. The huge screen was switched on at 7:00 p.m. and went off at midnight when the ITV station went off the air. Home television sets and watching posts became an alternative exhibition practice to moviegoing.

The mushrooming of television stations and the decline of attendance in cinema halls compelled film exhibitors to rethink their business venture. Film exhibitors were forced to sell their businesses or convert them into more profitable ventures. Within a short period of time a majority of theater halls, such as the Cameo Cinema, New Chox Cinema, Empire Cinema, and
Avalon Cinema, were converted into malls, churches, fast-food restaurants, and supermarkets. This transformation surprisingly did not alter the film policy of Tanzania. The film policy continued to forbid individuals from making or exhibiting films without the consent of the government. The government and its film policy were to encounter greater challenges ahead, facing such questions such as How was the government to monitor and censor foreign cultural products shown on television? For domestic television production, were the production companies required to obtain film permits from the censorship board? And more importantly, how was the government to keep control of the development of a national culture amidst the emergent and contending views and perspectives?

To deal with these threats to the state-sanctioned national culture, which still persisted in socialist ideals and values, the government considered reviving its agenda of establishing a national television station. A task force was set up in 1985 to evaluate the viability of setting up such an entity. The task force, chaired by F. C. Kasambala, the Director of Posts and Telecommunication, with Siril Kaunga, an AVI filmmaker, as one of the members, carried out the evaluation and in 1989 submitted a report that suggested the need of quickly establishing the television station. When an enquiry about the cost for establishing the station came back with an estimation of 2 billion U.S. dollars, it became obvious that such an endeavor was way beyond the government’s means (Stumer, 1998). Not giving up, in November 1989 the Minister of Broadcast and Information, Hassan Diria, appointed a television technical committee whose major task was to find ways to establish a television station at a much lower price. The committee, headed by Ambrose Ottaru, reported that a television station could be established by the year 2000 at a cost of only 22.6 million dollars (Stumer, 1998). The report recommended that the construction of the television station be carried out in phases.
In 1996 the national television station, Television ya Taifa (TVT) launched a test transmission signal limited to the capital city of Dar es Salaam, and the year 2000 saw the official national launch of Television ya Taifa. With the establishment of a national television station, the government not only created its own institution to combat and compete with the private media industry in the formation of a national culture but also through its legal framework, with such legislation as the Broadcasting Service Act, made sure it was still able to lead the cultural direction of Tanzania. But with an increase of new technologies finding their way into the hands of ordinary Tanzanians and the emergence of media production houses, the government had to constantly look over its shoulders and take wider and faster steps, a task that was proving to be increasingly difficult.

**Media Production Houses**

The emergence of television stations as alternative venues to cinema halls precipitated the establishment of media production houses. A television station relies heavily for its sustenance on the number of advertisements it is able to generate from different companies. To sell advertisement time, television stations were forced to create programs that attracted the interest of advertisers. Media production houses emerged to fill this gap, to produce home-grown programs for the many television stations as well as commercials for different companies. Thus production houses such as Reel to Real, Benchmark Production, and Prime Time Production were established in the early 1990s. One of the primary functions of these media production houses was to produce commercials for corporations, companies, and organizations for airing on televisions stations around the country. These production houses later moved from just making commercials to making music videos and later domestic videos, films, and programs for television stations as well as other organizations and individuals.
Other production houses such as Dance Theater Studio, later renamed Dar Talent Studio (DTS), established in 1989, and Abantu Vision, established in 1996, chose to deal only with filmmaking. DTS, founded by a former production manager of TFC, Eberhard Chamblikazi, and a former theater teacher at a government college of arts, Gonche Materego, made commercial and educational films, which they shopped around to television stations or sold to the public via book stores and public events such as festivals and conferences. Abantu Vision, founded by Beatrix Mugishagwe, specialized in educational films. In an interview with Mugishagwe, she elaborated her reason for that as being “we produce films for the society; we want to participate in the education of our society.”

At a glance, the media production houses did not seem to pose any threat to the government. For starters, the types of programs most of them produced were either just entertaining, such as music videos, or nonpolitical, such as advertisements and educational programs. But this was to change as the first multiparty election neared. Programs on most television stations started to reflect the changing condition of Tanzania and aired programs that put the government in the hot seat, so to speak. *Kiti Moto (Hot Seat)*, a program aired by DTV and produced by Pascal Mayala, put politicians, members of different political parties, and other prominent national figures on air and asked them tough questions pertaining to the social, economic, and political climate of the time. This kind of program, which at times would expose government misdeeds or show a politician’s weakness, was openly banned from airing. *Kiti Moto* was taken off the air, to resurface later on another, “government friendly” television station (ITV), but this time the show had no hard, bold questions. Politicians used the program as a platform to air their views. But the government and its friendly television station had failed to read the changing times. No longer would viewers passively accept the views of their leaders; the
viewers wanted to question their leaders and hold them accountable to the decisions and policies they made. Failing to understand this, the program lost its viewership and was taken off the air.

Although the above scenario presents the government as still in control and determined to go to any lengths to achieve its goals, even if it meant banning a program, media production houses had opened their doors to alternative media content and paved the way for an alternative film industry that was to be independent from the government—the video film industry phenomenon. At this juncture the government not only received contending views from its own filmmakers at AVI and TFC but also from independent media production houses.

To deal with the challenges posed by filmmakers and other cultural practitioners, a comprehensive analysis of the way government cultural institutions and agencies conducted their business was carried out. Although conditions imposed by IMF included government enterprise reform, which meant closing down state-run industries or selling them to private investors, the AVI and the TFC were spared. Out of almost 400 enterprises the government owned, the World Bank had asked the government to liquidate 60 of them (Kiondo, 2006: 46). The call for less government intervention in the economy by IMF meant that the government had to further scale down or liquidate all of its enterprises. Before the introduction of the IMF conditions, the government had more than 400 parastatals. These enterprises ranged from banks, insurance companies, and industrial plants to film institutions. Since signing the IMF agreement in 1986, the government by 1989 had sold 40 enterprises to private local and foreign investors and liquidated 10. For those institutions that it had not sold, financial and personnel cutbacks were the norm. The AVI and the TFC fell into this category.

The financial cutbacks at AVI and TFC were so severe that the only expenditure category the government was able to afford was employee salaries. Rose Sayore remembers this period
and notes that “the government did not have enough money to pay for productions, so there was a lot of wasting of time, we just sat around and became lazy” (Interview, 2009). This idleness at the workplace eventually became intolerable for some, who like Rose Sayore, decided to leave AVI. Among those who did not leave, some were forced into early retirement and others were laid off. Those lucky enough to evade retrenchment were forced to come up with alternative funding strategies for producing films. This meant soliciting funds and projects from international organizations such as UNICEF and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Dick Kaombwe, an AVI filmmaker, described during an interview how he and others would go to various international organizations to convince them of the need to use film in their developmental projects; since organizations such as SIDA, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) financed different government ministries, AVI employees were often able to persuade donors to add a film component to their projects. For example, Kaumbwa notes, “SIDA, which used to fund the Ministry of Education, also funded films. . . . So it was not the government as such that funded us but it was SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), DANIDA (Denmark), and NORAD (Norway), those were the great financiers” (Interview, 2009). Thus filmmaking at AVI was kept alive with the assistance of international organizations. Films funded by international organizations were not that different from those made by the government. This is because most of the donors and their developmental activities were in line with government policies for social development. This was different at TFC.

As a company established to distribute and produce commercial films, TFC had a slightly different experience than that of AVI. Although TFC suffered financial cutbacks and also had to solicit external funding, the type of films produced and the kind of cooperation developed with
external investors was different. With weak funding, for their survival TFC filmmakers had to devise a mechanism that would keep them financially afloat. Co-production became the solution to the economic crisis for TFC filmmakers. The difference between AVI and TFC was not only that the films made at TFC were co-produced, but more importantly, the films made at this juncture did not foreground or overtly propagate government policies. When they did deal with government policies or issues, it was more in the form of a critique. Co-produced films did not praise the government, and government agendas were now to take a back seat to social matters in co-produced films such as *Harusi ya Mariamu (The Marriage of Mariamu)* (1985) and *Mama Tumaini (Women of Hope)* (1987). The challenge to the state thus came not only from outside, but from its own establishment, its own filmmakers. But John Mponguliana cautions, “You must use your intelligence in criticizing the hands that feed you” (Interview, 2010). Co-production thus allowed for an intelligent criticism to occur.

**The Emergence of Co-production**

After the collapse of socialism and the rise of global capitalism, film in Tanzania had a sporadic existence. Cinema halls closed down, and cutbacks to film institutions and retrenchment of filmmakers followed. One thing that saved the industry from total collapse was the co-production mode of operation. Co-production has been praised by some scholars as the savior of domestic film production and as a way of eliminating national differences and building global communities. Others have condemned it as cultural homogenization, whereby Western (U.S.) capitalist values are privileged over national culture, and in this process national issues are sacrificed to the creation of internationally appealing commercial films (Barbara Selznick, 2008; Toby Miller et al., 2005). These critics believe that co-production films lack substance and artistic value; terms like “Europudding” are used to describe them. These films signify a cultural
loss; they lack national specificity and therefore cannot provide a cultural national identity. The question of national identity will be explored further as we analyze the two co-production films *Harusi ya Mariamu* (1985) and *Mama Tumaini* (1987).

What is clear about film is that during Mwinyi’s regime, co-production was the last and only hope in an effort to save the national film industry. Co-production is defined as a process by which at least two companies in at least two different countries work together to create a media text, or any production/business arrangement among organizations based in different countries, in which creative, artistic, and financial contributions are roughly equal and each participating country or government recognizes the finished product as its national product (Toby Miller et al., 2005; Barbara Selznick, 2008). Were *Harusi ya Mariamu* and *Mama Tumaini* a national product of the countries involved in the production?

There are two types of international co-production: treaty co-production and non-treaty or co-venture co-production, and each has distinct features. Hoskins et al., Miller et al., and Selznick define co-production treaties as those for which countries have signed a bilateral international co-production agreement and therefore are eligible for investment and tax breaks from government funding agencies. Miller notes that co-production treaties create rules for collaborative projects to qualify for subsidies and fulfill quota restrictions (2005: 184). In non-treaty or co-venture co-production, international partners discover economic and cultural benefits in sharing resources, despite not meeting the criteria for treaty provisions. In these kinds of agreements, each partner usually holds equity and each has a voice in the project, but the level of creative input may vary (Hoskins et al., 205; Miller, 2005).

In Tanzania co-production has been conducted under the non-treaty or co-venture mode of production. No treaties have existed that enforced or provided subsidies or tax incentives to
filmmakers. For example, in the production of *Harusi ya Mariamu* as a co-venture, it was agreed that Ron Mulvihill, a co-director and an independent filmmaker from the U.S., was to provide film stock and finance post-production, while TFC was to provide camera and light equipment, a film crew, and actors (Ron Mulvihill, Interview, 2010). Although Ron Mulvihill initially wanted to make a documentary on alternative medicine, TFC, headed by Martin Mhando, wanted to make a dramatic short feature that explored the conflict between traditional and modern medicine. The final product combined Ron’s documentary aesthetics, using a real traditional healer (Simba Mbili) as the healer and scripting the story around a true story. As Mulvihill elaborates, “Nangayoma [the co-director] interviewed Simba Mbili to find out if there was a true story that would fit the elements of conflict between traditional and modern medicine. . . . So basically Simba Mbili told us about one of his patients, Mariamu, and in a way we scripted her story to become *Harusi ya Mariamu* and Simba Mbili agreed to play the healer” (Ron Mulvihill, Interview, 2010).

International co-production treaties are usually designed to pool resources so as to enhance the domestic film industry and combat Hollywood’s domination of screen culture (Miller, 2005: 177). Co-production brings knowledge that would allow for the development of a national film industry and thus a national culture. To qualify for subsidies and production incentives, co-productions are required to satisfy certain national conditions such as hiring local film personnel and setting the film in a national location. The irony of co-production is that although they must appeal to the national audience as an authentic national product, they must at the same time appeal to transnational audiences. This means that to succeed, as Selznick notes, “these productions must limit their national particularities and reflect global issues and concerns.” To this, Guback in his 1969 book *International Film Industry: Western Europe and*
America Since 1945 adds “while this [co-production] can yield products which are technically slick, the range of differences among them is reduced considerably—as among loaves of commercial white bread” (178). In this sense co-production calls into question and destabilizes national identity. Toby Miller points out that in co-production “socio-spatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated” (209).

Co-production in Tanzania brought to the fore the question of a national identity or a national cinema. In a country that is trading its socialist values and ideology for the untested values of open market and capitalism, how is it to reconstruct itself? How is it to merge the past and the present? What cultural losses are to take place, and what cultural gains, identities, and values must be invented and propagated?

Although co-production became a mode of production in Mwinyi’s era, it was sporadic and generated some controversies that pointed to the complexities of assigning national identities or nationality to co-production films. The primary reasons for co-production in most cases are the pooling of financial resources, accessing government subsidies and incentives, audience expansion, and gaining knowledge. Most importantly, the product is seen by each country as an authentic national product; each country gets to call the finished product its own. This was not so simple when it came to Harusi ya Mariamu. The nationality of Harusi ya Mariamu became a major discussion topic for filmmakers and critics alike.

The thirty-six-minute Harusi ya Mariamu attracted attention at the Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO) in Burkina Faso, when it premiered there in 1985. Harusi ya Mariamu, co-directed by Ron Mulvihill and Nangayoma Ng’o ge, was the only African-language short feature film presented and the first film from an Anglophone country to
win an award at FESPACO. But with—or in spite of—all that, its nationality was questioned and contested. Was the film a Tanzanian or an American film?

Harusi ya Mariamu centers on the art and science of healing through traditional medicine. Set in contemporary Tanzanian society, the film depicts its heroine Mariamu’s (Amandina Lihamba) fear of traditional doctors and their medicine. This fear stems from Mariamu’s childhood psychic trauma of finding her father, a famous traditional doctor, dead under a tree. She equates her father’s death with the practice of traditional medicine. Seriously ill, Mariamu refuses traditional medicine, opting for modern hospital and medicine, but as her condition worsens, Mariamu’s husband Senkondo (Godwin Kaduma) takes her to a traditional healer, where her cause of sickness is detected and as she recovers, she overcomes her fear. The film takes us through Mariamu’s physical, mental, and spiritual transformation and healing. Unlike colonial films that depicted traditional doctors and their medicine as ineffective and primitive, Harusi ya Mariamu shows the triumph of indigenous medicine over Western medicine, and thus tradition over modernity. Mhando notes, “We wanted to tell the conflict people go through in choosing between Western and traditional medicine” (Interview, 2009).

Since its screening, the film has been praised and has won a number of prizes in film festivals, including the best short feature film and the Organization of African Union (OAU) awards at the 1985 FESPACO. In Black African Cinema Francis Ukadike has praised the film for its excellent integration of the ritual scenes into the structure without diminishing the impact of the story line; the Marriage of Mariamu, he notes, succeeds where most African films fail, “African films are replete with ritual scenes, but one must admit that most of them are poorly conceived” (1994: 124). This kind of praise did not, however, prevent questions from being raised about the film’s nationality and legitimacy.
Although the film was shot on location in Tanzania, with Tanzanian actors, and was a Tanzanian/African story, narrated in Kiswahili (Tanzania’s national language), and co-directed by Nangayoma Ng’oge, a Tanzanian citizen, the nationality of the film became a topic of contention at the 1985 FESPACO. The debate about the film’s nationality and even more its eligibility to compete as a Tanzanian film was brought to the fore at the festival by Haile Gerima, an Ethiopian-American filmmaker, and Pearl Bowser, an African-American film distributor and member of the jury. Haile Gerima and Pearl Bowser objected to the submission of the film as a Tanzanian film, arguing that “the film was presented in the United States as only being directed by Ron Mulvihill” (Ukadike, 1994: 138; Ron Mulvihill, Interview, 2010). Ron Mulvihill refutes this allegation, pointing out that the credits in the film have never been changed; he and Nangayoma Ng’oge share equally the co-directing spot in the film. When does a film become or cease to be a national film?

**The National Cinema Question**

The above debate triggers the question of a national cinema, and begs the questions what is a national cinema, what consists of a national cinema, how is it constructed, and who assigns a nationality to a film? Does a director’s nationality determine a film’s nationality? What about co-production? Femi Shaka’s definition of African cinema gives us a hint of the complexity of assigning a nationality to a cinema. According to Shaka, for a film to qualify as African cinema and therefore national cinema, its primary audience must be Africans; the text must be inscribed in the broad range of African subjects, identities, and social experience; and finally, its director must be African by birth or naturalization. A film that explores indigenous language as a medium of expression, Shaka states, is beyond doubt African cinema. Therefore, for Shaka, *Harusi ya Mariamu* is African cinema and thus a national/Tanzania cinema. But *Harusi ya Mariamu* is also
a co-production, and this is where the notion of a national cinema becomes more complicated. As Andrew Higson notes, “The concept of national cinema is equally fluid, equally subject to ceaseless negotiations. It is clear that the concept is mobilized in different ways, by different commentators, for different reasons” (2002: 53). The concept of national cinema, Higson observes, is used “prescriptively rather than descriptively, citing what ought to be the national cinema, rather than describing the actual cinematic experience of the popular audiences.” (2002: 53).

The complexities of assigning a nationality to film have been argued by numerous scholars (Higson, 1995; Jarvies, 1998; Croft, 1995; Willemen, 1989, 2005). In most cases a national cinema has simply been defined as a cinema produced within a particular nation-state. The discourse about national cinema has been debated in a variety of ways. National cinema has been defined in economic terms, where such questions as who owns and controls the industrial infrastructures, the production, the distributors, and the exhibition circuits are articulated. It has also been defined in textual terms, with questions such as What is the film about? Does it share a common style or theme? How does the film project the national character? Is the film concerned with questions of nationhood? and What role does it play in constructing the sense or the image of a nation? (Higson 1995).

Consumption is another way by which the national cinema has been defined. The major question here has been which films are audiences watching? What percentage of these films are foreign films, how do audiences use these films, and what is their effect? Defining national cinema in terms of its consumption is problematic when it comes to African or Tanzanian audiences. The majority of the films viewed by Tanzanian audiences are American films and a few Indian films. The question then becomes are these films (American and Indian) to be
considered Tanzanian national films? This form of analysis, as with other forms, is inadequate for defining a national film, especially in this era, where border, technology, and artistic crossings are taking place. As Alan Williams warns us, we should be wary of concluding that there is such a thing as a “national cinema.”

Others have defined national cinema in relation to Hollywood. Croft comments that national cinema is usually defined against Hollywood. Most national cinema, he asserts, has to operate in terms of an agenda set by Hollywood. In Croft’s view, national cinemas compete with, imitate, differ from, critique, or simply ignore Hollywood. Cinemas that compete with Hollywood are European and Third World commercial cinemas that struggle against Hollywood in domestic markets. There is also a cinema that attempts to beat Hollywood at its own game. Such aspirations have emerged in Britain, Canada, and Australia. The cinemas that differ from Hollywood but do not compete with Hollywood are cinemas that target a distinct, specialist market sector art cinema. These cinemas aim to differentiate themselves textually from Hollywood, to assert explicitly an indigenous product, and to reach domestic and export markets through specialist distribution channels and exhibition venues usually called “art houses.”

There are those national cinemas that critique Hollywood, such as Third Cinema. Third Cinema opposed the United States and Europe with its anti-imperialist insistence on national liberation and in its insistence on the development of aesthetic models distinct from those of Hollywood and European art cinema. And there is national cinema that ignores Hollywood, such as that of India and Hong Kong; these cinemas have large domestic audiences and effective trade barriers and typically outsell Hollywood films. Lastly, there are national cinemas that work within a wholly state-controlled and often substantially state-subsidized industry.
For Paul Willemen the issue of national cinema is primarily a question of address, rather than a matter of the filmmaker’s citizenship or even of the production finances’ country of origin (2006: 36). Martin Mhando, the director of *Mama Tumaini*, an employee of the Tanzanian Film Company, and a partner in *Harusi ya Mariamu*, agrees with Willemen; he chooses to look at film, especially African film, not as a national product but as a regional product. “Films of African can only been seen in its identity factor and the identities we have are not national as to call Tanzanian cinema or Kenyan cinema. . . . For me it is more a cultural base, and the base is never national” (Interview, 2009). For Mhando it is best to speak of regional cinema, for, as he points out, “The culture of Zambia and the culture of Zimbabwe are very similar to the culture of Tanzania”; thus, the cultural base from which one expresses oneself is more important than the physical one of being in a specific location. For Mhando the space in which one creates is much more important than the space in which one lives. Therefore, in this changing social, economic, and technological environment where cultures cross borders and global financial exchange takes place, the logic of assigning nationality to a cinema becomes difficult, contested, and blurry.

The space created in *Mama Tumaini (Women of Hope)* (1986), a co-production film between Tanzania Film Company and the Norwegian Ministry for Development Cooperation, is a Tanzanian space, occupied by Tanzanians who are struggling to survive and foreign development experts whose attitudes are being questioned and evaluated. Directed by Martin Mhando and Sigve Endresen, *Mama Tumaini* is about women and their struggles for survival. The film centers on Mama Tumaini (Penina Mlama) and her women friends and their efforts to raise their socio-economic standard of living through the establishment of a co-operative union of potters.
The film starts by showing Mama Tumaini (called that because she has a child by the name of Tumaini, which means hope), a village pot maker, who is forced to move to the city and tend to her husband, who lives and works there and has fallen ill. While in the city Mama Tumaini, together with other women potters, forms a cooperative union and struggles to get it registered. Registration of the union is hampered by a corrupt officer who gives them the runaround until, with the help of Hawa, a city girl, and the police, the officer is apprehended and the union registered.

A subplot of the film is the friendship between Mama Tumaini and Elizabeth, a Norwegian woman who has come to Tanzania with her husband, a development expert at a cement factory. The husband, Jan, a drunkard and a racist, does not want Elizabeth to socialize with locals such as Mama Tumaini. Jan’s racist attitude offends Elizabeth and is the final factor in the breaking up of their marriage. Elizabeth leaves her husband and joins the cooperative of women potters.

The film not only criticizes development aid and its personnel, it also further criticizes government bureaucratic structures that hinder participation and development. This is revealed in the way the corrupt government registrar officer solicits money from the women before he will register their union, something that he is already being paid to do by the government. The film challenges how the government runs or conducts its business.

As a co-production, the film had other objectives. One of these was to bring an understanding of development work and aid to expatriates who come to work in Tanzania. In the transformative era of the 1980s and early 1990s, where socialism and capitalism crossed paths and the political ideology was unclear, the vision and mission of development aid and work also became unclear. Prior to the SAPs, the mission of development aid was clear, and most of the
expatriates coming to Tanzania knew exactly what was required of them, but recently most of them came to “just have fun and for their own benefit” (Mlama, Interview, 2009). The Norwegians were feeling that their own expatriates were losing a sense of what the mission of development aid was all about. Thus the film was made to be shown to Norwegian expatriates who were coming to Tanzania, those who were already in Tanzania, and those who had left. Its purpose was to remind them why they were in Tanzania and what was expected of them. Thus the film was a challenge to development aid and development aid relationships.

For the Tanzanian audience the film was designed to promote self-help and community-based projects and organizations and critically examine the obstacles such programs face (Mlama, Interview, 2009). The film was also created to promote and empower grassroots development and participation. With the government no longer able to sufficiently provide for its people, grassroots organizations emerged to fill the gap. These organizations mobilized resources for development independent of the state. *Mama Tumaini* gave credence to grassroots organizations as well as criticizing the government through the portrayal of the corrupt government office worker.

*Harusi ya Mariamu* and *Mama Tumaini* are milestones in Tanzanian film production. Just as the nation was going through political and economic transformations, so was the film industry. Through the advocacy of traditions and civil society, these films turned their backs on government agendas and became more people centered. These films empowered individuals to question and even challenge the status quo. Co-production films of the Mwinyi era were able to criticize and challenge the government. This was made possible by the emergence of alternative modes of participation and expression in social, economic, and political life—the emergence of a civil society.
The Emerging Third Sector: Non-Governmental Organizations

The civil society, an alternative venue for filmmakers

The introduction of neo-liberal policies with their social, economic, and political reforms in Tanzania promoted another sector where Tanzanian filmmakers were to find refuge: civil society organizations. Civil society organizations, also known as the third sector—the others being the state sector (power and politics) and the private sector (capital and economics)—allowed for more participation of people in governance through their collective powers. The rapid growth of civil society organization in Tanzania has been attributed by some scholars to the widespread and persistent poverty and the failure of the government to provide its citizens with basic social services and security (Mukandala, 2006; Ndumbalo, 2006; Mogella, 1996). Other scholars (Shivji, 2001; Nyangoro, 2006) have attributed the emergence of civil society to the entrenchment of external forces, thus decapitating the government’s capacity to perform its duty to the people. Shivji notes that the role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in helping Western “development” agencies to “get around” uncooperative national government sheds a good deal of light on the current disdain for the state and celebration of civil society that one finds in both theoretical and policy-oriented literature. Shivji concludes that the sudden rise of NGOs and their apparently prominent role in Africa is part of the neo-liberal organizational, and particularly ideological, offensive. Thus the anti-state stance of the so-called donor community was the real push behind the upsurge of NGO activity (Shivji, 2005: 19–22).

What both views agree upon is how these organizations have stimulated greater citizen involvement in socio-economic and political activities of the country. Thus NGOs became an alternative venue through which people’s expression and participation was emphasized and
valued, and this arena became a place where international financial institutions and other donors diverted their aid. Instead of the government, NGOs became the alternative aid recipients.

In Tanzania, the post-1992 period saw a rapid increase in the number of NGOs. Whereas between 1961 and the late 1980s only 18 NGOs were formed, by 1992, 200 NGOs were registered, and by 2000, 2,700 (Kiondo and Mogella, 2006; Mkandala, 2006). NGOs such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) emerged as alternative voices to that of the government and also became a refuge for many of the retrenched government filmmakers and newly aspiring filmmakers. The major objectives of these organizations were to bring about social justice and people’s participation. Ussu Mallya, the managing director of TGNP, states that “the adoption of the structural policies which reduced the power of the state to deliver sound economic services was one of the reasons TGNP emerged. We needed to organize and engage with different strategies that would enable the mobilization of individuals to move forward” (Mallya, Interview, 2009). Filmmaking became one of the strategic tools that TGNP and other NGOs used to mobilize and empower people.

NGOs like TGNP emerged in Tanzania, not as a celebration of the neo-liberal policies or against the state as many would assume. Many Tanzanian NGOs challenged the neo-liberal policies for reducing government’s role in the society as well as challenging the states to deliver services. In Tanzania, Ussu states, “we need a stronger state, but it is not a matter of supporting a corrupt state, we are challenging the state to transform” (Interview, 2009). In the process of challenging the state and empowering people to participate in their own social, economic, and political lives, NGOs used artistic expressions such as film/video to disseminate, produce, and articulate social realities. Thus NGOs became a place where filmmakers, either those still working for the government or independent filmmakers, found a platform to make films.
For example, production houses like DTS teamed up with TGNP to produce several video films: *Ukatili Wa Kijinsia, Pambazuka La Mashaka, Mapambano*, and *Lupi Mikokoni*. These films, which were shown at different events, such as gender festivals, seminars, and workshops, were made in the hope of raising people’s awareness of and empowering them to question and challenge social injustices. The films also challenged social realities, be they patriarchy at the household level, decision making at the district and national level, or corruption and lack of accountability at the governmental level. Although films of this nature could be placed in the same category as the government educational films made by AVI in the 1970s and 1980s, a major and important difference exists. NGO films are participatory in nature and aim for social empowerment through questioning and challenging, rather than the acceptance of the status quo.

As much as their legitimacy as the third sector may come into question, the role of NGOs in the sustenance of a film industry cannot be disputed. Through the NGOs’ use of video and film as tools for social participation and questioning of everyday realities, filmmakers found a space, a venue where they could navigate and support their economic as well as creative life.

Were NGOs to continue to be a venue for Tanzanian filmmakers? Was the influx of foreign cultural products to continue to dominate programming? What kind of a national identity was to emerge out of this? Just as the Nyerere regime before it, the Mwinyi administration in its last days struggled with the idea of how to sustain a national culture and how to go about defending a culture in the midst of an open-market economy. In describing his era and the implementation of neo-liberal policies and the effect of the SAPs, Mwinyi has been quoted as saying, “We had to open windows to let in fresh air, but in the process we could not totally keep out flies and mosquitoes” (Shivji, 2006). In 1995, before the Mwinyi administration came to an
end, it seemed, especially in regard to foreign cultural products, that the administration was toying with the idea of creating a mechanism that would keep the flies and mosquitoes out. In September 1995 the administration, through the Ministry of Education and Culture, held a meeting to brainstorm about the possibilities of establishing a “mosquito net“—a cultural policy document that would advocate the promotion and implementation of cultural values and identity in Tanzania.
Chapter Four

_Uwazi na Ukweli? (Transparency and Truth): Accelerated Neo-liberalism and the Emergence of Diasporic and Video Films_

The year 1995 for many Tanzanians was a historic watershed year. It was the year in which, for the first time since independence, Tanzanians participated in a multiparty election. The whole country was excited; Tanzanians were free to cast their ballots and express their views on which party and candidate was to take them out of their “less than a dollar a day” existence and toward a better future. I, too, participated in this historic moment. As a student at the University of Dar es Salaam I was eager to cast my first political vote. My determination to participate in the election was not only because I was excited to become involved in this new democratic political system, but because I thought I was going to help transform the country for the better. Thirteen political parties participated in the election, their candidates vying for parliamentary seats as well as for the presidency. Out of the thirteen political parties, only two presidential candidates, William Benjamin Mkapa, from the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) and Augustine Lyatonga Mrema from the opposition party National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi seemed to be true contenders for the presidency of Tanzania. In a couple of days, one of them would be announced as the president of Tanzania.

I cast my vote, along with 63 percent of my fellow Tanzanians, for William Benjamin Mkapa. Mkapa, a journalist and a seasoned politician, who had held various positions in the country—President Nyerere’s press secretary (1974), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1977–1980, 1984–1990), Minister of Information and Culture (1980–1982), Minister of Information and Broadcasting (1990–1992), and Minister of Science, Technology and Higher Education (1992–
1995) and outside the country as High Commissioner to Canada (1982–1983) and ambassador to the United States (1983–1984))—became the third president of the United Republic of Tanzania. Dubbed by his critics as Nyerere’s “errand boy” and viewed as a socialist, Mkapa was to prove them wrong.

The newly elected president formed his administration and quickly accelerated the neo-liberal policies initiated by his predecessor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The administration’s primary role, as Mkapa notes, was “to set the economy right, . . . creating the legislative policy framework which invites investment, production and trade by a private sector that will be vibrant and therefore bring about growth” (2001: 3). Mkapa further observed, “For almost three decades of our independence, we looked to the state to do most things. . . . Now when you are transitioning into a private sector-driven economy, . . . it will take a while for us to do for ourselves as individuals. That reaching out, that go-getting spirit is what we have to build quickly, because the process of globalization is not going to wait for us” (2001: 10). Mkapa informed his people that they had no choice but to embrace and follow neo-liberal policies, even if the result seemed grim at the time. Juma Mwapachu, a seasoned politician, commented, “Whilst the reform programme commenced in June 1986, it is from the financial year 1997/98 that Tanzania seriously began to take great leaps forward in pursuing bold and radical economic reforms” (2005: 39).

To initiate the globalization process, Mkapa aggressively pursued economic recovery programs, structural reforms, and the privatization of state-run institutions. In addition, in 2002, he liquidated the Tanzanian Film Company (TFC) and merged the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) with Television ya Taifa (TVT), the national television station. This acceleration of the economy through an embracement of globalization was seen as the only solution to the persistent poverty
of Tanzania, but the government also knew that globalization, if left unchecked, tended to benefit richer nations. Therefore, to curb the threat of globalization, the Mkapa administration adopted measures for safeguarding cultural products.

To accomplish this, Mkapa designed policies that not only took advantage of the new opportunities offered by the global economy but also strategized ways to minimize the risk of undesirable exposure to global currents. Although he embraced economic and political globalization, he took a more critical stance when it came to cultural globalization. While Mkapa understood that globalization was not going to wait for Tanzania, he nevertheless felt compelled to find ways to minimize unwanted foreign exposure, especially in the cultural sector—which included the film industry.

The Cultural Globalization Debate and Tanzania’s Position

The cultural globalization debate in Tanzania, as in other African countries, has been characterized by politicians and intellectuals as both an imposition and domination of Western cultural products upon local cultures. Some scholars view it as a new form of colonization, an exploitation of African social, economic, and cultural life. Severine Rugumamu notes, “Globalization is not some process out there, but is a social construct engineered and channeled by powerful economic, technological and political processes in the service of an increasingly transnational bourgeois class” (2005: 20).

The debates about cultural globalization are reminiscent of the cultural imperialism theory propounded by Schiller, 1976; Hamelink, 1983; Mattelert, 1983; Shivji, 2006; and others, who have noted that foreign cultural flows are unidirectional and bring about cultural homogenization whereby local cultures are exploited and threatened. For these scholars
globalization induces the obliteration of local cultural values, thereby moving the world toward cultural homogeneity. The influx of foreign cultural products such as fashion, television programs, films, and music have been cited as evidence of the erosion of Tanzanian culture and cultural values. According to Mrutu, 80 percent of the programs broadcast on television are Western, and mostly American.

     Opponents of the cultural globalization theory (Berker, Tomlinson) foresee problems in looking at cultural flows as solely emanating from the West and streaming into other cultures, producing a dominating effect. They refute this claim by demonstrating how African music and art have influenced Western artists, and how telenovelas from Latin America are exported to the United States and Europe. John Tomlison notes, “Global culture as it is now, can no longer be said to emanate from the West and imposed upon the non-West.” (1994: 54). What takes place, for Tomlison is not cultural imperialism but rather a process of cultural loss, and instead of cultural homogenization, a hybrid culture emerges, one that takes foreign cultural flows and localizes them. The forces of globalization, for these scholars, are unpredictable, disjointed, and multidirectional.

     These scholars claim that cultural crossing should not be seen as an imposition or domination; Chris Berker asks, “What sense can it be argued that the popularity of rap music in South Africa represents coercion?” (2002: 40). They also refute the notion of an authentically pure African culture. The notion of a stable culture is unsustainable, especially in this era of globalization (Mensah, 2008: 3). All cultures are involved with one another; none are single and pure. All are hybrid and heterogeneous, none monolithic (Said, 1991: 34). The notion of a pure African/Tanzanian culture disregards the long-standing cultural exchange between societies. Appandurai notes that globalization induces the dynamic movement of ethnic groups,
technology, media images, and ideological conflicts that are not neatly determined by one harmonious “master plan”; rather, the speed, scope, and impact of these cultural flows are complex, overlapping, fractured, and disconnected. (1990: 296.)

What is evident, though, concerning globalization is the inequality of power relations between the West and the non-West. As Doreen Massey notes, “Some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movements, others don’t” (1994: 149). Most Africans are unequal participants in contemporary globalization, not only because of present power inequalities, but also because of the material and epistemic violence brought by the Western imperialism of the past. It is important to recognize these imbalances, especially when discussing Africa’s involvement in the global economy.

The Mkapa administration, while embracing globalization, still viewed it as an unequal playing field and established means to prevent an imbalance. In order to curb the infiltration of foreign cultural products the government was forced to develop strategies and policies that took into consideration this globalized aspect of the economy and culture and attempted to slow down the invasion. In its cultural development plan document, the government noted the infiltration of foreign products, vehemently denouncing the phenomenon and promising to rid Tanzania of such influences. The document stated, “The current situation is a grave confusion. The youth are busy copying foreign culture, particularly Western and Arabic it is not clear what actually constitutes a Tanzanian way of life anymore. . . . Television, films, video shows [video films] often espouse cultural degeneracy” (Cultural Development Plan Document, 2001: 47). This analysis of the infiltration of foreign culture gave the Mkapa government an impetus to formulate policies that were designed, supposedly, to safeguard the identity and culture of the nation. But in actual fact, it was one of the mechanisms the government employed to make sure it remained
in power, especially in an era when a diversity of views and voices flourished, views that challenged and thus threatened the interests and stability of the state. As Andrew Filbert reminds us, “Nations frequently declare their cultural specificity in order to legitimize and materialize unity” (2005: 17). Without unity, the legitimacy of the government is threatened. Thus to reduce this risk, the administration established policies and institutions that would advance Tanzania toward becoming part of the global market, but would also safeguard Tanzania against the influence of unwanted foreign cultural values, thereby promoting and disseminating Tanzanian cultural products that would promote Tanzanian cultural values. All this was in an effort to counteract the dominance of foreign products and globalization and to give the government more leverage to continue to control the content of cultural products.

In order to accomplish this, the government established several policies and institutions: a cultural policy document that outlined the mission and objectives of Tanzanian culture, values, and customs; the Copyright Law, to safeguard and protect artistic works; the Cultural Trust Fund, a funding organization for individual artists and companies that promoted the advancement of Tanzanian cultural activities; and the Zanzibar Film Festival, a platform for showcasing Tanzanian cultural film heritage. The government also reviewed the Film and Stage Play Act of 1976 so as to give it more power and legitimacy in dealing with technological innovations. These policies and institutions were to play a leading role in the kind of films and filmmaking practices that were emerging in Tanzania.

**The Cultural Policy: Controlling National Culture?**

A cultural policy, according to Andrew Flibert, consists of the state’s effort to shape national identity and articulate a public philosophy embodying its most significant values (103).
It is a regulatory guide to action that is adopted by organizations and governments to achieve their cultural goals. In short, it is bureaucratic rather than creative (Miller and Yudice, 2005: 2). State cultural policy seeks to influence, and sometime to control, the prevailing definition of salient social identities. According to Miller, this cultural policy is frequently made “on the run” in response to unpredictable pressures (2). National cultural policies are, then, a privileged terrain of hegemony. They provide a means of reconciling cultural identities by holding up the nation as an essence that transcends particular interests (8). The Mkapa administration, through the Ministry of Education and Culture, formulated a cultural policy that presented a notion of how people would live, work, and pursue their goals. The cultural policy and the Copyright Law proposed ways to manage the people through suggested behavior. The cultural policy document became the basis for all cultural development operations in the country.

**Cultural policy as a controlling mechanism**

Although established in 1997, the historical trajectory of the cultural policy document can be traced back to the 1974 UNESCO-sponsored cultural policy document compiled by L. A. Mbuguni, director of arts and language in the Ministry of Education and Culture. The document, entitled “The Cultural Policy of Tanzania,” laid out the strategies and implementation of cultural activities by the Nyerere administration. The cultural policy document did not go much further than maintain shelf space in both the UNESCO archives and the Department of Arts and Language. The second attempt at establishing a cultural policy came in 1986 when Edwin Kaduma was the director of arts and language. But as Rashid Masimbi, a former commissioner of the Culture and Development Department at the Ministry of Education and Culture stated, “The need of a cultural policy was not enthusiastically taken up by some government officials. It is within those years that people were starting to say we should privatize culture; therefore, there
was no need for it to have or be in a specific ministry. The government should not involve itself in cultural affairs” (Interview, 2009). According to Robert Kayombo, the managing director of the national museum and the executive secretary of numerous cultural policy conferences held by the government, during Nyerere’s administration, the government knew exactly what culture was and how to administer it. This was because at that time there was one vision—the socialist vision, which had guidelines, and now, there are multiple voices and perspectives and no guidelines. This makes it difficult to implement any cultural activities (Kayombo, interview, 2009).

In reality, two points of view can be ascertained as to why the government thought it necessary and timely to have and put into law a cultural policy that spelled out the cultural direction of Tanzania. With the social, economic, and political transformation that swept the Third World and Eastern Europe in the mid-1980s and 1990s in the wake of the fall of communism, the Tanzanian government, like many other Third-World governments, witnessed cracks in the political as well as cultural arena and the emergence and spread of dissidence. These emerging voices threatened the stability of the people in power and questioned their legitimacy. To prevent the spread of an authorized belief system and images, stern measures had to be implemented; thus the cultural policy was seen as a viable solution in controlling the cultural behavior of the public.

The second, which relates to the first, is that most of the government officials debating the plight of culture are of the old guard, whose view of culture is stipulated in the notion of a “pure” culture and nostalgia for the “lost” culture of a long-forgotten past. These officials, who have held government posts ever since Tanzania attained its independence in 1961, are accustomed to giving orders, and for them, foreign culture not only disturbs and destroys an
authentic Tanzanian culture, but also slows and threatens their power in shaping the opinions and minds of the Tanzanian people.

Therefore, to combat this threat, and to cast out mosquitoes and flies, as the Mwinyi administration had intended to do, on February 14, 1995, under the chairmanship of John Ndagala, the commissioner for cultural development, a meeting was held in the town of Morogoro to establish a cultural policy. Stakeholders involved in the meeting were mostly government officials coming from different sectors and institutions. Recommendations from the meeting were compiled by Kayombo, and a second meeting was held in 1996 to cement the policy and make it ready for official adoption. Finally, in May 1997, the policy was established and passed by the parliament. The process of establishing the policy was, as Penina Mlama comments, not inclusive. “It was just a government process. . . . The ministry decided we need a cultural policy; they brought stakeholders, but they decided which stakeholders to bring in. . . . So I’m not sure if those who drew up the cultural policy were pushed by a particular movement or not” (Interview, 2009). As Toby Miller had noted earlier, cultural policies are usually made on the run and in response to unpredictable pressures. What pressure was the Tanzanian government facing, and what movement propelled the government to establish the policy?

Looking at the cultural development plan document established by the government, provides an idea of what the government was facing. The document states that the “economic liberation has brought into Tanzania the inevitable capitalistic spirit, attitude and practices of cutthroat competitions. [We] seek to address this problem by putting into place regulations and mechanisms which will curb and control the proliferations of cultural wayward tendencies and practices currently being displayed in the reckless commercial industry in Tanzania” (54). The cultural policy was therefore passed and became the basis for all cultural development in the
country, including film. The objective of the cultural policy was to lay out ways the government could achieve its cultural hold and at the same time become a participant in the global market. For the first time in the history of Tanzania, culture was stipulated as an economic activity rather than a political and an ideological tool (Cultural Policy Document, 2.1.7). For example, the cultural policy defined film as an industry rather than the propaganda instrument for the re-enforcement of state ideologies it had been in the Nyerere administration. At this juncture, culture parted ways with ideology and turned into a business enterprise. But this departure was closely monitored by the government.

Although the cultural policy had stipulated that individuals and various organizations were encouraged to invest in the cultural sector and use their talent to earn a living from their creative works, this was predicated on the individuals and organizations adhering to the objective of the cultural policy, which was predominantly to safeguard and promote Tanzanian customs, traditions, aesthetics, and ethics. Organizations and individuals were asked to be cognizant of Tanzania’s national values and culture. Radio and television stations were asked to observe national customs and traditions and to provide more airtime to Tanzanian arts (4.1.2). As much as the government gave freedom to individuals to earn a living from their works, it was clear who was to dictate what was appropriate. The policy stipulates, “The government shall continue to manage the cultural sector. The cultural sector shall continue to be part of the government structure” (Cultural Policy Document, 7.1.1). The government was the overseer, the gatekeeper, and the judge and jury of what was allowed to be produced and become part of Tanzanian culture. This policy was the same as the unwritten policy of the earlier administrations of Nyerere and Mwinyi. The cultural policy, as an instrument of hegemony, aimed to safeguard and supervise the kinds of local and foreign cultural product that were made and offered in Tanzania.
This hold became complex as technological innovations and economic obstacles and opportunities brought unforeseen shifts in the film industry.

Although the cultural policy laid out parameters for cultural production and expression, it still called for private investors to invest in the cultural sector. To attract these private investors, the government created an attractive “package” environment for them. To accomplish this, the Mkapa administration rectified and amended the Copyright Law of 1966, established an institution to oversee copyright matters, and established the East-African Community Act of 2001.

**The Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999: An Infringement on Creativity?**

The establishment of the Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 and the establishment of the East-African Community Act of 2001 were predicated on the cultural policy’s call for more integration and exchange with outside countries and for the recognition of an individual’s right to earn a living from his or her creative works. But as Laikwan Pang and Lawrence Lessig have noted in their studies on copyright laws in China and the U.S., instead of promoting and protecting creativity, the copyright law actually suppresses and controls culture.

The first copyright law in Tanzania was established in 1924 by the British colonial authority, and in 1966 was amended by the Nyerere administration. The Copyright Law of 1966, which gave some rights to artists but did not have an organization to oversee the implementation of the law, was more or less identical to the colonial law. In 1967, when the government became a socialist state, the law became inefficient. Under socialism the government controlled all means of production; thus everything produced became the property of the government. Individual ownership was marginalized and criminalized at the expense of the collective, in this
case the collective being represented by the government. For example, since the government owned and controlled the film industry, films produced by filmmakers became the property of the government. But as the shift from socialism to an open-market capitalist economy took hold, so did the need to rectify and review the copyright law.

Rectification of the copyright law first began in 1986 when the minister of culture and development, Fatma Said Ali, assigned members of the Tanzanian Film Company, Radio Tanzania, and the National Arts Council to evaluate the Copyright Law of 1966 and provide suggestions and recommendations regarding the best way to change it. The selected committee members came up with a report that provided a draft of the new copyright law. In 1992, representatives of the World Intellectual Property Organization came to Tanzania and held a national workshop on copyright law. The government was able to move forward with the amendment, and in 1994 Dr. Philomon Sarungi, the minister of education and culture, informed the parliament in his budget speech that the formulation of the copyright law was completed and being prepared for endorsement. In 1995 the copyright law was still being finalized, and it was not until April 1999 that the new copyright law was introduced to the parliament. In June, President Mkapa signed it into law. But what must be kept in mind is that the copyright law is designed to regulate culture under the disguise of protecting individuals and cultural heritage (Laikwan Pang, 2005: 10).

It is conventionally believed that copyright exists to reward makers of creative materials and to encourage further creative material to be made for the benefit of the society. But rarely is copyright seen as a controlling agent of culture used by corporations and governments primarily to ensure their protection and stability. This is no more evident than in Tanzania, where the Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 is regulated by the government through the
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing and administered by the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) a government institution within the ministry.

Under the copyright law, COSOTA’s main functions are to protect the interests of artists, collect and distribute royalties, maintain registers of works and artists, fight piracy, print and distribute materials relating to copyrights, and finally advise the minister on all matters under the act. (Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999: 737). As an organization under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, it is fully controlled by the minister. The minister has the constitutional right to appoint board members to the society as well as to remove them. The minister also chooses the board’s chairperson. This form of control, which is purportedly designed to promote and protect creativity among artists, clearly reveals the government as the watchdog of culture.

The copyright law, among other things, is designed to protect the moral and economic interests of filmmakers by granting them relevant rights. The economic and moral rights of filmmakers, as stipulated in the law, shall be protected for fifty years from the date on which the work was first made available to the public. But in order for the work to be protected, filmmakers must register their work through the government agency, COSOTA. As the law stipulates, “A person shall not produce, distribute or import for distribution audio-visual recordings in Tanzania except under a license issued by the copyright society of Tanzania” (1999: 745). To make sure that all audio-visual materials have had a government approval, a label called HAKIgram shall be fixed to each audio-visual recording. Without the seal, a filmmaker’s work is considered a copyright infringement and can be seized. Mkinga, the executive secretary of COSOTA notes that “all production companies have to register, especially
now when we want to use stickers because we want to know how many companies there are” (Interview, 2009).

Once filmmakers register their work with COSOTA, the society carries out a review of the work and may accept or refuse the application. Filmmakers are forced to register with the society and fear that not registering with the society will have more negative consequences than they can handle. According to William Mtitu, a filmmaker, “To register with COSOTA is a must because that is a government organization. If you register with COSOTA, you put yourself closer to the government; without their approval you can never know what will happen to you” (Interview, 2009). Filmmakers fear that any contention with the government will result in their films being banned, and thus in producing their films, filmmakers must be aware of and in line with the government. Filmmakers, although they don’t trust COSOTA since it is an institution of the government, nevertheless have no choice but to comply; as filmmakers William Mtitu and George Otieno state, “Without a permit from COSOTA, we cannot enter into agreement or contract with international television channels such as African Magic Plus” (Interview, 2009).

There has never been a time in our history when more of our “culture” was as owned as it is now. And yet there has never been a time when the concentration of power to control the use of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now (Lessig, 2004: 12). Although Lessig frames this in terms of how corporations collude with the government to control culture in the United States, especially the Internet, this can be similarly applied to the Tanzanian government’s effort to control culture through the Copyright Law and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999. Lessig notes the irony here: to critique the culture around us one must first ask for permission. Permission is, of course, often granted, but rarely to properties expressing critical or independent views (2004: 10). Therefore, the government through policies and laws such as the
copyright law has the power to discourage critical thoughts, especially when those critical thoughts are leveled against the government. The law functions less and less to support creativity and more and more to protect the government against divergent views that may threaten its interests and legitimacy.

The cultural policy together with the copyright law were not sufficient to curb the spread of undesirable foreign and local cultural products through private media; the government in their cultural development plan stated, “The private sector [which the government had invited and enticed into the cultural sector] has brought some problems such as deterioration of ethical, aesthetical, and moral standards. If left uncontrolled, the private sector, profit-driven as it is, can destroy our culture” (2001:47) To curb this deficiency, the Mkapa administration established the Cultural Trust Fund and the Zanzibar Film Festival as ways to implement some aspects of the policy and its power.

**The Cultural Trust Fund and the Zanzibar International Film Festival**

The Tanzania Cultural Trust Fund, otherwise known as Mfuko (Basket) and the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) were established to protect and promote the cultural heritage of Tanzania. Whereas the Cultural Trust Fund is a government arts funding organization established in 1998 by the Tanzania and Swedish governments, the ZIFF is a film festival that showcases the rich cultural heritage of Tanzania as well as encouraging tourism, and was established in 1998 by the Zanzibar and Tanzanian government and Emerson Skeens, an American hotelier.

The Cultural Trust Fund was established solely to grant financial assistance to individual artists and to organizations that propose to advance and promote Tanzanian culture. Through
selective allocation of funds, the trust fund supports activities that strengthen the capabilities and competitiveness of Tanzanian artists and promotes and rewards merit and excellence with the purpose of enhancing the quality of cultural activities in Tanzania. The activities that the trust supports must be within the framework of the cultural policy. To deliver its service efficiently, the trust has six areas of constituency: (1) cultural heritage; (2) performing arts; (3) fine arts and crafts; (4) cultural industry; (5) language and literature; and (6) film, audiovisual, and multimedia production. Each constituency is headed by a committee or a focal point that oversees and reviews the applications and recommends those it finds suitable for funding. The Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC1), a government-run television station, oversees the film and audio-visual constituency. Fine arts and crafts is headed by the National Arts Council, cultural heritage by the Dar-es Salaam Museum, language and literature by the Tanzanian Writers Association, performing arts by the Bagamoyo College of Arts, and the cultural industry constituency is headed by Afrika Sana, a cloth-manufacturing company owned by Ndesumbuka Merinyo. All of the constituencies, with the exception of cultural industry, are headed by government-controlled institutions.

The recommendations for these constituencies are then “brought to the board, the board screens them and eventually the decision on who should be funded is communicated to the secretariat who provides the amount of funds that are available for that particular year” (Rose Sayore, executive secretary of the Cultural Trust Fund and chairperson of the National Film Censorship Board, 2009). These committees are supposed to represent the cultural stakeholders, who according to the Cultural Trust Fund are the federal government and all its cultural agencies and departments, the local government, non-governmental organizations, cultural training institutions, and private organizations that deal with the cultural sector.
Throughout its existence the trust has provided funding for individuals and organizations that have adhered to the government’s vision of Tanzanian culture. For example, one of the institutions that has received funding from the trust is the National Film Censorship Board. Funding was provided in 2004 to conduct a workshop entitled “Control of Cultural/Ethic Disintegration in Films and Stage Plays.” The workshop’s goal was to establish mechanisms and strategies to strengthen both the Film Act and the National Film Censorship Board. This is a clear example of efforts made to maintain the status quo and avoid seeking any new types of cultural production. The trust also funds documentary and archival filmmakers. Not a single filmmaker from the commercial video film industry has received funding from the trust.

The Zanzibar International Film Festival, founded by the Tanzanian government and spearheaded by Mark Leveri, the managing director of the Tanzanian Film Company; Hassan Mitawi, the director of Television Zanzibar; Emerson Skeens, an American businessman; and many others, was established to celebrate the rich cultural heritage of Tanzania, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean islands. The festival is known as the festival of the Dhow countries, because of the historic significance of the Dhow in linking the countries for trade. According to Martin Mhando, the current artistic director of the festival, the festival’s ultimate aim is “to promote culture as an asset, and use the festival of the Dhow countries as a vehicle to create a flourishing cultural industry in East-Africa” (2007: 45). Run by nine board members, most of them affiliated with the government, and supported by a staff headed by a chief executive director, the annual festival brings together a diverse range of films from Africa, the Middle East, and the rest of the world. Hassan Mitawi, a board member of ZIFF and a former director of Television Zanzibar, notes that ZIFF was a response to the decline of the film industry in the region and a mechanism to fight foreign cultural influx. According to
Mitawi, “In order for the Dhow countries to compete in the global economy, there was a need for
countries to consider and give priority to the dynamic growth of their cultures vis-à-vis the
Western culture” (2007: 43). ZIFF was in this way a form of resistance as well as, it was hoped,
a promoter of the local film industry. But unfortunately, throughout the years, most of the films
showcased at the festival have been art cinema and thus are privileged over the commercial films
that comprise the majority of the domestically produced films.

Since the festival’s inception, only one Tanzanian film has won an award (Maangamizi:
The Ancient One, 2001) and thus the festival has yet to contribute to the development of a local
film industry. No single Tanzanian video filmmaker can boast of being trained or inspired by the
film festival. Although the festival has conducted some film training workshops, they have not
managed to boost the local film industry. According to Imru Barak, a former director of ZIFF,
these short courses are “a disaster, and they only give people false hope about what they can do”
(Interview, 2009). The duration of these short courses usually ranges from two to ten days. It is
not clear if someone can actually acquire proper and sufficient knowledge of the film business in
such a short period. When it comes to the exhibition of Tanzanian commercial video films, ZIFF
has yet to play a distinct role. According to Mtitu, “ZIFF does not see the value of local
commercial films, and if any Tanzanian films are shown at the festival those films are usually
made by university people”(Interview, 2009). And these university films are usually message
films that have been funded by an NGO or an international organization. Thus ZIFF has
alienated Tanzanian video filmmakers and failed to promote the development of a domestic film
industry. What ZIFF has managed to do to some extent is to bring an awareness of film to the
Zanzibar audience, but these are not the Tanzanian or East African films Mhando had stipulated
as the aim of the festival.
The big question, though, is what is the value of creating an audience if the local film industry is not nourished and all the cinema halls are being demolished? At one time Zanzibar had five cinema halls and Tanzania mainland had thirty-six, but currently all the cinema halls have been converted into malls, business offices, and fast-food restaurants. In mainland Tanzania, two cinema multiplexes have opened that show Hollywood blockbuster films and Indian melodramas but have no space for local films. ZIFF, like other government film agencies, has done little to inspire local filmmakers and nothing to promote a local film industry.

What ZIFF has managed to do is to promote Zanzibar as a tourist destination spot, thereby increasing government tourist revenue, and thus the main beneficiary of the festival is the government. Situated just a fifteen-minute flight from the city of Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, historically known as the spice island because of its production and export of cloves, has become a major tourist attraction, thus toppling cloves as its major export and turning the island itself into its primary export item. With its white sandy beaches, historical buildings and sites, and the Zanzibar International Film Festival, Zanzibar attracts millions of visitors to the island. The festival through its more than ten years of existence has grown into an international festival that attracts and caters to foreign visitors, paying little attention to the needs of local filmmakers.

By establishing the Cultural Trust Fund, which gives prominence to individuals who promote Tanzanian culture, and ZIFF, which proposes to combat foreign influences and culture, the government continues to give itself the prominent role of safeguarding Tanzanian national culture. But to assume that the government will continue to effectively and efficiently control cultural products is to underestimate the role, strategies, and struggles that filmmakers and other artists undertake in their effort to challenge and question the status quo, especially in this globalized, technologically advanced and border-erasing world view.
The conflicting relationship between the Mkapa government and filmmakers has impacted the kind and types of films produced in Tanzania. This relationship has ushered in alternative filmmaking practices that take into consideration national, regional, and transnational cultures. Two modes of filmic production emerged out of this juncture: a diasporic transnational filmmaking practice and a national video film practice.

**Emergence of a Diasporic and Transnational Cinema in Tanzania**

In this era of global capital and cultural flow, circulation of people and images, and advancement of telecommunication technology, Tanzania has witnessed an intensification, acceleration, and interconnectivity of events that has brought about fundamental changes in the way Tanzania is defined and represented in film. Permeability of national borders, acceleration of global flow of capital, shifting geopolitical climate, and accessibility of technologies have called for a re-imagining of Tanzania and called into question old models that took the nation and national identities as something fixed and homogenous, and reevaluated them as concepts that must be questioned and contested.

The global linkage of people and institutions across nation-states has been loosely defined as transnationalism. Transnationalism as a conceptual framework has been advanced in coming to terms with the complexity of the global cinematic landscape. Transnational cinema has been made possible by the decline of national sovereignty as a regulatory force in cinema and the impossibility of assigning a fixed identity to much of today’s cinema (Ezra and Rowden, 2006). Transnational cinema has also been defined as a result of the globalization of the mechanism of film production, distribution, and consumption (Sheldon Lu, 1997). The increase in transnational migration and circulation of cultural commodities has propelled the development of transnational and diasporic film and filmmaking practices.
Film scholars define diasporic transnational cinema as a “cinema created by migrant filmmakers living in a transnational situation and profiting from the infrastructure of at least two nation states” (Desai 2004). It is a cinema that blurs boundaries and thus is not confined to the form of territorial nation-state and that which is interstitial, not only looking on the margins of society and media institutions but also inside them. The filmmakers “operate both within and astride the cracks of the system, benefiting from its contradictions, anomalies and heterogeneity” (Naficy, 2001: 47), making them simultaneously global and local. Its mode of production is considered by transnational film scholars as artisanal, performing multiple roles, and its mode of distribution and exhibition marginal and confined to alternative modes such as film festivals, university libraries, museums, and art cinema houses; digital technology and television have become new markets (Desai;2004). Thus the emergence of a diasporic filmmaking practice is attributed to the permeability of the nation-state and the increase of migration to the metropolis.

At the height of the political and economic shift of the late 1980s and 1990s, Martin Mhando, once an employee of the Tanzania Film Company, was among the few filmmakers who left the country and migrated to Australia. He left Tanzania during the period of the failure of nationalism and socialism. He, like many diasporic filmmakers, occupies a hybrid position, multiple identities generated by geographical displacements, which is reflected and elaborated in his 2001 film *Maangamizi: The Ancient One*. To paraphrase Mhando, “I’m a filmmaker, an African filmmaker, a diasporic speaker, and an academician.” Through these hybrid positions, diasporic transnational films depict a world of multiplicity, plurality, and multilingualism. More often than not the hybridization of these films is a process in which local cultural features are fused with foreign influences in order to appeal to a global market. Naficy notes that “accented (transnational) films in general derive their power not from purity and refusal but from impurity
and refusion” (6). This impurity and “refusion” stems from the filmmakers’ “in between” position, their identity in their homeland before their departure, versus their diasporic identity.

While working for the Tanzania Film Company prior to leaving Tanzania, Mhando was relegated to directing numerous documentaries and feature films that were confined to propagating the state ideology of socialism and self-reliance; with the emergence and adoption of the global capitalist economy and multiparty democracy in 1992, this view was no longer possible. Since the TFC was not longer needed to promote socialist ideals and lacked resources to remain operational, the Mkapa government prepared the company for liquidation. The making of *Maangamizi* was the last resort in trying to save the company, as co-director Ron Mulvihill remembers: “TFC was sort of in its last days—it needed something big or a feature film that could be used to prove that it was worth keeping it open” (Interview, 2010). *Maangamizi: The Ancient One* was not able to save TFC from liquidation, and the company was terminated in 2002.

**Maangamizi: The Ancient One and Transnationality**

This film, a co-production of Ron Mulvihill, Martin Mhando, and the Tanzanian Film Company, centers on three women: an African-American doctor, her Tanzanian patient, and the ancient and mysterious ancestor who brings them together. Realizing a longtime dream, Dr. Asira (Barbara O) journeys to Africa after securing an appointment with a national institute of psychiatric medicine in Tanzania. While at the psychiatric hospital she meets Samehe (Amandina Lihamba), a patient who has not spoken in more than twenty years. As Asira delves into Samehe’s past, images from her own past surface. The ensuing relationship, Mhando notes, “leads Asira to delve into her haunting Mississippi past and, furthermore, elevates both of them
to a higher understanding of themselves and the world” (2003: 11). It is a story of healing through love, compassion, and forgiveness. This film is described as one “that steps out to reclaim the spiritual connection that threads us together as a global community” (Maangamizi website).

The screenplay was written by an African–Native American woman, Queenae Taylor Mulvihill, the wife of Ron Mulvihill, and is based on the story of Hecate, the Greek goddess of magic, witchcraft, the night, moon, and ghosts. The story’s journey from Greek mythology to an African-American and African story captures diasporic/transnational cinema’s plurality, fluidity, and permeability. The transnationality of Maangamizi lies not only in the thematic origins of the story and its filmmaker, but also its international crew and ensemble cast, multilingualism, finance, and mode of exhibition. The crew included Australian makeup and costume designers, an African-American cinematographer; Amandina Lihamba (Tanzania), BarbaraO (U.S.) and Waigwa Wachira (Kenya) starred, with a supporting cast from Tanzania; and the film was shot on location in Tanzania. The international cast and crew “enabled the cross cultural experience to come through” (Mhando, 2003: 11), which reflected the cultural diplomacy policy that Tanzania embarked on following the end of socialism.

This policy promoted cultural exchange and understanding. One manifestation of cultural exchange in the film is its use of Kiswahili, Tanzania’s national language, and English. Transnational cinemas are often multilingual, both the films themselves and their production crews. Because of their bilingualism, transnational cinema more often requires dubbing or subtitling. Maangamizi has been subtitled in English and French. The international crew, the origins of the story, the multilingual aspect, and the multicultural nature of the film reflect an increasingly globalized world.
Although transnational cinema fights to reach a global audience, its distribution and exhibition is marginal. It typically finds an audience in ethnically noted film festivals, art houses, and university and colleges. The spectators for these films are not automatically there; they must be cultivated and nurtured. In nurturing its audience *Maangamizi* first premiered in Tanzania at the 1998 Zanzibar International Film Festival. At the time of the premiere, the film was still in post production in the U.S. To meet the submission deadline, co-director Ron Mulvihill says, “We felt that *Maangamizi* would not be able to compete at the festival, however since the festival was viewing both films and video on video format, we were encouraged to complete the film on video and submit it as a video entry” (*Maangamizi* website). At the festival the film won best feature, and Amandina Lihamba was awarded best actress. But as is noted by Maalista, with transnational cinema, “It is more likely that they will be screened only in film festivals specialized in certain geographical areas, such as Milan African Film Festival, Los Angeles Pan African Film Festival and New York African Film Festival” (2007: 83). This is precisely the case for *Maangamizi*; it was exhibited and won awards or official mentions at the Newark Black Film Festival, the San Francisco Black Film Festival, the Tokyo African Film Festival, the Pan African Film & Arts Festival in Los Angeles, and the African Diaspora International Film Festival in New York. Transnational films are more often than not “classified within either the national cinemas of their host countries or the established genres and styles” (Naficy, 2001: 19) and remain marginal in the new host country.

Another characteristic of transnational cinema that *Maangamizi* displays is its production time lag. It took six years to complete the film. Principal cinematography was shot in 1995, but the film was completed until 2001. The artisanal mode of production of transnational cinema contributes greatly to this time lag. In these types of films the director is often the director-
producer. Naficy states that “this independent and alternative mode of production is a characteristic of the accented (transnational) film practice and constitutes its accented (transnational) style” (2001: 37). This style or mode of production reflects the meager output of many transnational filmmakers. Since the completion of *Maangamizi*, Mhando has produced only one more film, *Liyarn Ngarn* (2007), a documentary on the history of Australian Aboriginal politicians. He continues to lecture on film and television at Murdoch University in Australia and works (2006–present) as the director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival in Tanzania.

The socio-economic and political conditions that fostered the migration of people and crossing of cultures has witnessed the transformation of an insular, introspective cinema into a hybrid, transnational cinema that looks to capture a transnational, global audience. *Maangamizi*, through its transnational status, has permeated and transcended boundaries, forming a diasporic filmmaking experience that never existed before in Tanzania, opening doors to filmmakers such as Josiah Kibira, who lives and makes films in the United States, to make diasporic/transnational films such as *Bongoland I* (2003), *Tusamehe (Forgive Us)*, (2006), and *Bongoland II* (2008).

**The Emergence of Video Films in Tanzania**

The emergence of video films in Tanzania and in Africa as a whole can not be adequately examined without an overview of the historical and theoretical discourse that it garners from politicians, intellectuals, and filmmakers. Video films, or films produced through the use of video or digital cameras as opposed to celluloid film, has an “entirely different social, political and historical character from that of African cinema” (Haynes, 2000: 4). It has received either negative or little recognition from political leaders, intellectuals, film critics, and some African filmmakers from the Pan-African movement era. Video film is a local, popular, privately funded,
and commercially based industry that has been criticized for its orientation toward commercialization and its apolitical stance compared to African cinema. This ideological difference between video films and African cinema has brought about conflicting views of what should constitute or represent a national cinema identity.

Video films have no manifestos like their African cinema counterparts, no masterpieces or renowned directors; they are commercially motivated and exist almost “entirely outside the pan African institutions and international circuits that have shaped most of African Cinema” (Haynes, 2000: 7). The apolitical and commercial stance of video films is in opposition to the Pan-African film movement and filmmakers of the 1960s and 1970s. African cinema was “shaped by the historical moment of decolonization and its twin ideologies of cultural nationalism and a more or less left-wing social revolution” (8). Therefore, African cinema was a militant and political cinema that intended to decolonize the African mind and propagate an African identity and national and cultural unity. It was a cinema that stood as an alternative to Hollywood. Taher Cheriaa spoke to African filmmakers during a Pan-African Federation of Film Makers (FEPACT) meeting: “Your cinema shall be a militant cinema, it shall be first and foremost a cultural action with social and political values, or it will be nothing. If it eventually can also become an economic action that will only be a by-product” (Haynes, 2000: 6).

This view of African cinema has been held by many African filmmakers, politicians, intellectuals, and critics. In a conference titled Nollywood Rising (“Nollywood” being a term given to Nigerian video films), held in Los Angeles in June 2005, a heated debate erupted between video filmmakers and intellectuals. Intellectuals criticized the videos for fetishizing wealth and violence, emphasizing glamour over substance, and using themes of witchcraft and ritual abuse, while the video filmmakers unapologetically proclaimed, “We give the people what
they care about” (Orji, 2007: 110). In general, critics argue that video films lack the ideological mission that could make them relevant to political and social transformation in Africa.

What is clear from the ongoing debate is that video films in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Africa as a whole have become the driving media, a popular art form that is both loved and accessible to its African viewers, unlike African cinema. “It has always been difficult for African cinema to address an African audience at all” (Larkin, 2007: 109) because of the monopolization of distribution and exhibition circuits by foreign investors. As Diawara observes when examining the development of video films in Africa, “the movement toward popular culture constitutes a step toward giving African cinema its own identity” (1993: 125). Paradoxically, African cinema has not managed to garner an audience in its own continent; it is a product for Western film-festival goers and Western television stations. The Tanzanian video film industry, like its Nigerian counterparts, is an industry that has no affiliation with any government enterprises or institutions and whose objective is to “give what the people care about” and make a profit.

The video film industry in Tanzania

The video film industry in Tanzania was born out of the intersection and convergence of the global and the local. Foreign film, especially American films, Indian films, and later Nigerian video films, dominated television scheduling in the mid-1990s and became the staple diet for most Tanzanian viewers. Nigerian video films took the lead in scheduling and popularity because of their cultural proximity to Tanzanian culture. Most viewers expressed identification with the environment, issues, traditions, and appearances of the characters. American and Indian films suffered from cultural discount, which “arises because viewers in importing markets generally find it difficult to identify with the ways of life, values, history, institution, myths and physical
environment depicted” (Colin, Hoskins, et al., 1997: 3). Tanzanian viewers saw in Nigerian video films similarities to their own ways of life and as a result these films became extremely popular on television. Nigerian video films offered the strongest and most accessible expression of contemporary Tanzania popular culture. They projected a contemporary worldview that Tanzanians could understand and connect with. Even though they were foreign, they were still viewed as “like us.” These films/videos utilize indigenous folklore, themes, and settings to explore socio-economic experiences such as polygamy, class, corruption, deception, wealth, power, and love. Tanzanian video film was born out of this global interconnectivity.

Tanzanian filmmakers, business individuals, and media production owners were not blind to the Nigerian film phenomenon that swept Tanzania, and quickly got on board by acquiring Nigerian VCDs and DVDs and retailing them for home consumption. Now viewers could not only watch Nigerian videos on television, but they could also purchase and play them at their own convenience. As the demand for Nigerian films increased, shrewd entrepreneurs and filmmakers—and just about anyone with a digital camera—jumped on the opportunity to produce videos to meet the demand. They made video films for television stations and then sold them to the public. Mwangaza notes that filmmakers “started by compiling popular soaps programmes that had been shown on local TV stations in VHS format for sale to the public . . . [and] later graduated into making commercial video films” (2006: 36). The liberalization of the economy that brought an influx of foreign cultural products and inexpensive digital technology, and the introduction of a cultural policy that encouraged individuals to invest in the cultural sector, became a landscape from which the video film industry emerged.

The first video film that popularized the industry and proved profitable was *Girlfriend* (2002), directed by George Otieno and produced by Eric Shogongo and Sultan Temba. The video
film was made for 3 million Tanzanian shillings (US$3,000), and at its premiere it grossed more than 50 million Tanzanian shillings (US$50,000) (Otieno, Interview, 2009). I was fortunate enough to be at the premiere held at a four-star hotel, the Tulip in Dar es Salaam. The film was well publicized and the turnout was massive. The price of a ticket ranged from 20,000s (US$20) for front row seats to 3,000s for standing room only. The film, about the struggles and rise to fame of a young musician, received accolades for opening a new chapter in the Tanzanian film industry. Though it also received some negative reviews because of its nontraditional views of a mother-daughter relationship, where a girl yells back at her mother, Girlfriend’s reception proved that the Tanzanian film industry was no longer under the purview of the government and, with the influx of inexpensive cameras and film equipment, no longer reserved for professional filmmakers.

George Otieno, Eric Shigongo, and Sultan Temba had very little prior experience with filmmaking. Otieno had some experience with photography while attending high school, while Shigongo and Temba both wrote stories for newspapers. The massive profit generated by Girlfriend gave other individuals incentive to join the industry. According to Otieno, “When people saw the success of Girlfriend, everybody thought they could do it. And when they did try to produce movies, each film was bought by film distributors, and everyone made a profit” (Interview, 2009). These films filled a void experienced by local people; they represented local environments and experiences while speaking in Kiswahili, the local language. Another video filmmaker, William Mtitu, made his first video film Sandra (2003) for 150,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$150) and sold it to the distributor for 12 million Tanzanian shillings (US$12,000). These kinds of profit margin propelled a wave of young people with little or no training in filmmaking to enter the film business, thereby dominating the industry. The film industry
became known as the “video film industry,” an amateur or nonprofessional film industry associated with poor-quality filmmaking.

The influx of unskilled labor into the film industry can be said to emanate not only from the cultural policy’s call for individuals to use their talent to earn a living, but also from President Mkapa’s call for *kujiajiri* (self-employment). In his acceleration of the neo-liberal economy, President Mkapa intensified government service reforms by firing many government employees. The Mkapa government from 1995 to 2003 had retrenched 536,478 individuals and was not looking to hire anytime soon. *Kujiajiri* became a slogan that the Mkapa regime used as a defense and an answer to the massive unemployment that faced Tanzania. Mkapa preached *kujiajiri* to the point that even criminals, when caught in the act, proclaimed they were merely implementing the president’s call for self-employment. The self-employment motif also manifested itself in the film industry, where the majority of individuals entering the business had no prior training in filmmaking. This phenomenon proved to be a bone of contention and brought about contested views of filmmaking between those who called themselves professional filmmakers and those who identified themselves as amateur commercial video filmmakers.

**The video film debate**

Whereas Imru Barak, a professional filmmaker and academician, says that “people are fooling themselves that we have a film industry, that we have something called Tanzanian cinema,” William Mtitu and George Otieno, both commercial video filmmakers, contend that “Tanzania is the second highest film producing country in Africa, after Nigeria. It produces 30 films a week, 100 films a month” (Interview, 2009). These contrasting views represent the cornerstone in the debate between professional filmmakers and amateur video filmmakers. What
is Tanzanian cinema and who defines it and its characteristics are just a few of the questions raised in this debate.

Professional filmmakers in Tanzanian can be categorized as individuals who have studied filmmaking, primarily abroad, and the majority of whom own their own production houses, with film projects being funded by NGOs and international organizations. Thus their films tend to be donor funded and could be called message films. Some of these filmmakers and their production houses are Imru Barak (Savannah Films), Beatrix Mugishagwe (Abantu Vision), Maria Sarungi (Compass Communications), and Carrie Matiku (African Image). While these filmmakers, according to Carrie Matiku, are busy looking for funding, video filmmakers are rapidly producing films. Although she appreciates and admires the energy of these video filmmakers, in her view the rapid output of video films marginalizes Tanzanian filmmaking and the quality of films. “There is a feeling among the international community that Tanzania is not capable of making quality films” (Interview, 2009). This marginalization blankets the few professional film production companies that exist in Tanzania who make quality films.

Not only do professional filmmakers lament their lack of visibility amongst the plethora of amateur filmmakers and video films, but they also challenge the themes and quality of these films. “These films are doing more damage than Hollywood films because a lot of them are culturally backward, reinforcing all the negative values. They may be African, but they are negative” (Barak, Interview, 2009). To discredit the video filmmakers, professional filmmakers have pointed out the lack of video films and awards in the international film festival circuits. “Although Tanzania makes about 100 films a month, this is nothing to boast about since none of them can win a prize at any international film festival” (Barak, Interview, 2009).
The argument that video films and filmmakers give people what they want or care about is refuted by professional filmmakers as nonsense. According to Pius Mota, the production manager of Abantu Vision, “The films are garbage. The people don’t have a choice; when you watch a Tanzanian video film, you cannot watch it for the second time” (Interview, 2009). But Tanzanians do have a choice; they can choose to buy and watch Nigerian films, watch the Latin American *telenovelas* shown on multiple television stations, or watch the multitude of American programs aired daily on all the television stations in Tanzania.

Video filmmakers unapologetically note that they are proud of what they are doing and, unlike professional filmmakers who wait for donor funding, are in the field and making films and money. Video filmmakers resent the fact that professional filmmakers and intellectuals have viciously attacked them for doing something that they themselves have not managed to do: satisfy the demand of the local Tanzanian audience. Mtitu states, “Professionals and intellectuals have a lot to contribute to our industry; the problem is their method of airing their views/perspectives. Professional filmmakers do not appreciate the fact that our films are loved by people. We may not have the best training, but we are improving” (Interview, 2009).

They may not have the best training, but their films have become the staple diet of a majority of the Tanzanian audience. This is what the video filmmakers care about most, not winning awards at international film festivals. The video film industry may be in the hands of amateur filmmakers, but unlike the political economy of professional filmmaking practice, it is an economically viable, sustainable, and entertaining medium, as the video film *Dilema* (2004), directed by George Otieno Tyson, illustrates.
The production of *Dilema*

The production, distribution, and exhibition of *Dilema* proves that Tanzanian video films are both a business and a popular art form that continues to influence the East-African market. Since the film’s critical reception, *Dilema*, George Otieno Tyson’s second film, has demonstrated that the video film industry can be profitable and that Tanzanian audiences are eager for stories that are closer to their social experiences.

*Dilema* was produced in response to the government’s call for cultural cooperation and diplomacy within East Africa and because of the director’s eagerness to expand the market for video films. The government cultural master plan states, “The East-African community has re-emerged out of the political goodwill of the leaders, . . . but sustainable cooperation will only be achieved if there is the cultural goodwill and cooperation amongst the citizenry” (2001: 86). The producers of *Dilema* heeded this call and, in its production, assembled a regional cast and crew. By recruiting a regional cast and crew, the director’s intention was to capture the East-African market. Otieno notes, “We were thinking of producing a film that was going to sale in East Africa, therefore involving actors from the three countries ensured the sale of the film as a local product in each of the perspective countries” (Interview 2009). The cast consisted of Ken Ambani, a famous Kenyan television actor; Khalfani Ahmadi, a Ugandan hip-hop musician; and Yvonne Otieno, Jenerali Ulimwengu, and Mudhihir Mudhihir, all famous Tanzanian television personalities and politicians. This assemblage gained favorable response from East-African audiences, thus generating a profit for the filmmaker.

The story of *Dilema* centers on Baraza (Ken Ambani) a young Kenyan man who is forced to leave his village and find work in Tanzania, in the hope of returning to his home village a rich
The film starts with an exterior long shot of an eerie village hut and quickly cuts to Baraza entering the hut. A pan of the camera shows the body of a woman sleeping on a bed. Baraza quietly looks around and slowly approaches the woman. While he is standing beside her, he starts to unbutton his pants, but before he pulls his pants down, a man enters and asks Baraza what he is trying to do with his mother. The man, who we subsequently learn is Baraza’s father, chases Baraza out of the hut and tells him not to return. The next shot is of Baraza running frantically at night and eventually reaching another hut, that of a medicine man or witch doctor. He falls onto the floor inside the hut. The medicine man, dressed in all red, tells Baraza that because of his attempted deed, he has angered the ancestors and needs to get out of the village. Through the use of montage, the film shows Baraza, with a friend, hitching rides and eventually reaching Tanzania. While in Tanzania he finds work as a house servant for Mr. Athmani, a respected university professor, but is fired as soon as Athmani finds out his teenage daughter has been impregnated by Baraza. The story follows Baraza as he navigates his way through different jobs and women and descends into drunkenness.

Kiswahili, which is spoken throughout East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, and parts of Mozambique and Malawi), is the film’s major language. Kiswahili thus provides a vehicle for cross-cultural flow, especially in regards to media products such as video films.

**Distribution and exhibition of Dilema in Tanzania**

The distribution and exhibition of video films in Tanzania and East Africa is quite different from that of feature films. For example, once a video film is complete, a premiere is organized at either a cultural center (such as the local Russian or French cultural center), a social
Dilema premiered at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam for an audience of 3,000 people. The guest of honor was a famous Nigerian video actor who was flown in just for the occasion. This collaboration between Tanzanian and Nigerian video filmmakers not only shows how influential Nigerian films are in Tanzania but also that a continental cooperation that Pan-African filmmakers of the 1960s and 1970s hoped to achieve, but could not, was being realized by the video filmmakers.

The distribution of video films in Tanzania is more or less controlled by the “Big Five,” five Tanzanian families of Indian descent. Before video films, the primary business of these families was selling music cassettes and owning and operating music stores all over Tanzania. As the video film industry mushroomed, the Big Five stores became the logical distribution channels for video films. The Big Five not only distributed video films, but also later financed them.

The financial logistics for distributing video films to a large extent benefited the distributor. There are three different contractual categories. In the first, the filmmaker completes a film independently and enters into contract for distribution only. The contract for this category gives 20 percent of the profit to the filmmaker and 80 percent to the distributor. In the second category, the filmmaker produces the film and sells it wholesale to the distributor. Here the filmmaker receives a lump sum of money and is not concerned whether the film makes a profit or not. Similarly, in the last category the distributor commissions a filmmaker. The filmmaker
takes money from the distributor and in return hands in a complete film. Because the video film industry is such a profitable business, distributors and financiers rarely interfere with film production.

*Dilema* was not financed by the Big Five, but it was distributed by one of them, GMC Wasanni Promoters. *Dilema* was privately financed by the director himself; business investors such as hotels, bus companies, Coca-Cola, and a local boutique and hair salon; and private individuals. The film made its return and a profit during its premiere. It was produced for 75 million shillings (US$75,000) and grossed at the premiere 150 million shillings (US$150,000). This proves the profitability of the video film industry. The exhibition of a video film occurs basically at a single premiere in a public space and then goes straight to video stores for home consumption.

With the liquidation of the Tanzania Film Company, cinema was no longer only in the hands of the government or foreign distributors. Tanzania filmmakers and business individuals have taken advantage of the open market economy to create a diasporic cinema and a popular video film industry that speaks to audiences at home and abroad, creating a fluid geographical and cultural boundary that allows for borrowing, appropriating, and adopting of foreign cultures. The shift has not only facilitated regional and global integration but has laid the groundwork for the formation of an indigenous popular art form, the video film.

The drumbeat of Tanzanian cinema since the early 2000s had heralded cinema’s economic value. The arrival of video films had since taken Tanzanian cinema to its commercial roots, undermining the pedagogical values of cinema promoted by the state. It had transformed Tanzanian cinema from a subsidized film industry into a popular, commercial film culture. This popular film culture was about to receive a response from the government.
The government’s response to the diasporic video film phenomenon: Review of the Film Act and the National Film Censorship Board

Viewing the proliferation and success of the video film movement as a threat to Tanzanian mores and culture, the Mkapa administration responded by strengthening control of the Film Act and its film censorship board.

In its cultural development plan document the government recognized the influx of foreign films and an increase of local film production following market liberalization and the expanding private sector, and thought to restructure the Film Act and the film censorship board so that “films presented to the public are in line with national values and aspirations” (2001: 11). To redress this situation the government, beginning in 2004, thought to review the structure and function of the censor board and the Film Act. This was seen as a potentially successful strategic move despite the existence of a market-oriented economy. To accomplish this, the government held numerous workshops and conferences.

In 2004 and 2005, the government held numerous workshops on film during which it stressed the necessity of constructing and establishing procedures for how filmmaking should be organized and run. As Mwantunu Malale, the executive secretary of the Ministry of Education and Culture, states, “No country on the planet does not have policies or legislations that administer the production, distribution and exhibition of film. Although film can bring about knowledge and entertainment, in Tanzania, it has significantly contributed to the disintegration of norms and values to the point that the Tanzanian public has complained to the government to take appropriate measures to curb the situation” (2004: 2). Using the public welfare as its shield, the government strove to ensure that no films that imitated values or culture alien to its people
were allowed for exhibition. As Rose Sayore, the executive of the Cultural Trust Fund and the current chair of the National Film Censorship Board claimed in discussing video films, “There is much of this other culture that has overtaken our culture. . . . When I look at these films coming from Tanzania, there is very little that shows that this is Tanzania” (Interview, 2009).

The call to ensure that the public is protected from “alien culture” has been to strengthen all institutions that deal with the control of film; as Malale states, “Film is an important tool for the protection and promotion of national culture, but it is also a weapon of destruction if they are not controlled and instructed” (2004: 24). Both workshops conducted by the government called for a review of the Film Act and the National Film Censorship Board. In its review of the Film Act, the participants recommended the name of the censorship board be changed from the National Film Censorship Board to the National Safeguard Board. It was recommended that personnel from the board receive training on the importance of cultural control. Recognizing social, economic, political, and cultural changes, the participants also recommended that the changes to the Film Act and the board should be in accordance with the realities of globalization. In both of their conferences, the government nowhere touched upon the issue of promotion, such as how to promote the film industry, or how to nourish individual talents. Great effort has been spent on controlling the film industry by imposing laws that reduce and control the creativity of artists and their productions.

In this technologically savvy world where production, distribution, and exhibition of films are constantly shifting, and border crossing and cultural borrowing are the norm, the Mkapa government, like its predecessor, sought to create speed bumps that would slow the process and thus keep them in control of cultural affairs and public consumption. This form of public control gives the government reassurance as to its existence and legitimacy. The cultural
policy, the Copyright Law, the East-African community, the Cultural Trust Fund, the Zanzibar International Film Festival, and revision of the Film Act and National Film Censorship Board were ways the government sought to curb and control the representations of a national culture. But despite all this apparatus, a popular film culture that strayed from government ideological agendas emerged. The commercially driven video filmmaking practices conquered the public, not only in Tanzania and Africa, but as far away as the United States, London, and Australia. The next chapter demonstrates the production, distribution, and circulation practices of the Tanzanian video film industry and how it has expanded from a national phenomenon to a transnational product, and how the newly elected Kikwete administration has dealt with it.
Chapter Five

Firming Up Neo-liberalism: *Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya*, and the Transregional/Transnational Video Film Industry

In late 2005 President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete came to power with the slogan *Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya*, (With new strength, new velocity, new vigor), a new Tanzania is possible.” This motto captured the spirit of young people who, during the Mkapa administration, had felt marginalized, and gave unprecedented support to Kikwete, who won the presidency with a historic 82.3 percent of the vote. Kikwete promised to create employment opportunities for the millions of young people who were either fired or could not find work during Mkapa’s regime. The challenge for Kikwete was to translate “new strength, new velocity, new vigor” into a policy framework for his regime.

By the time President Kikwete took office the cultural sector, especially the film industry, had already shown signs of becoming a strong economic contender that, if promoted right, had the potential of creating revenue for the government. The new administration determined to capitalize on culture as an economic activity by reviewing and changing the cultural policy, established during the Mkapa administration, and the Film and Stage Play Act, established during the Nyerere’s regime, to reflect the expansion and flow of cultural activities in Tanzania. The government was forced to recognize film as a burgeoning, independent industry that was popular and had the potential of becoming economically viable and influential.

According to Rashid Masimbi and Hermus Mwasoko, former and present commissioners of culture, the review of the cultural policy was due to the political, economic, and social changes that had developed since its establishment in 1997. Masimbi notes, “The intensification of globalization has forced the government to have a different view, an improved world view”
One of the improved views was to look at the cultural sector as an economic activity rather than just recognizing culture for its own sake. Therefore, in numerous meetings held by the Ministry of Education and Culture and later by the Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports, the primary objective was to see the economic aspect of culture, and in terms of film, recognize it as a legitimate and important art form. To this end, articles 4.0 and 4.1 of the draft of the new cultural policy defined film and categorized it as one of the four major art forms, the others being arts and crafts, performing arts, and literature and languages.

A significant change in the cultural policy, apart from the inclusion of film as a viable art, is the language and terms used to describe Tanzania and its colonial past. In the 1997 cultural policy, British people or Westerners in general were referred to as colonialists who imposed their social, economic, political, and cultural life on Tanzanians and made Tanzanians believe that they had no culture of their own. In the current draft, the word colonialist has been substituted by wageni (guests), and colonialism with utawala (administration). This change in perception is a major shift in the way the Kikwete administration was to enter a dialogue with Western as well as other countries; they were not our enemies but rather our guests and partners. But although the new strength, velocity, and vigor was seemingly taking hold in Tanzania, the review of the Film Act proved otherwise. Instead of relaxing restrictions and meeting the demands of a new democratic country, the new Film Act called for more centralized control, not only of the video film industry, but also of programs aired on all television stations. The Film Act seemed to regress to the stringent hold on the film industry of the 1960s and 70s.

Although within the new cultural policy the government had recognized film as an important art form, the Film Act was to receive only a cosmetic change. Two obvious changes contemplated by the government were the name of the act itself and that of the National Film
Censorship Board. During Mkapa’s administration a name change had also been considered, and it was suggested that the the National Film Censorship Board be renamed the National Film Safeguard Board. The Mkapa administration felt the major task of the law and the board was to protect and safeguard Tanzanian national culture and values. The name was never officially changed, and subsequently the Kikwete administration considered renaming the Film Act either the Tanzanian Film Authority Act or the Film Classification Act and Board. According to Herbert Makoye, a professor of cultural studies and a participant in the review meetings, “People don’t like the name censor board, because censorship is very negative and people hate it” (Interview, 2009). Renaming the Film Act was simply placing old wine in a new bottle.

Other reasons for the name change were due to current realities, in which new technologies for production, distribution, and exhibition had brought on new sets of challenges for the film board. Previously the board was able to monitor films by inspecting them before they were shown to the public in cinema halls, and once in a while, a board member paid an unprompted visit to cinema halls to check up on the films and how they were exhibited. But with the rise of new technologies such as satellites and the Internet, which allowed people to download films, and with the disappearance of cinema halls, this kind of monitoring and control was no longer possible. New forms of exhibition had developed, leaving censor board members to ask themselves what, how, and where do we censor? The compromise was to rename the film censor board the film classification board. According to Makoye the function of the censor board was “to classify, saying this film in this particular context should be A or X” (Interview, 2009). This name change was only a smoke screen, however, for the content of the new law and most of the functions of the film classification board either remained the same, expanded, or became more stringent.
The draft for the new Film Act of 2009 empowered the film board to monitor the production, distribution and exhibition of film. The board was to inspect and monitor all video films made in and out of the country. The board was also empowered to inspect all films shown on all television stations in the country, private or otherwise. In addition the board was given the mandate of registering all film distributors and producers in the country. Not only were distributors and producers required to register their companies and works with the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA), another government agency, they were also forced to register with the film board. Anyone violating the law was fined no less than 20 million shillings (20 thousand dollars) and/or received a five-year prison sentence. This new law, unlike the old one, did not allow for appeals. Once a film was denied a permit or was banned, a filmmaker could not appeal to the minister or take the matter to court. The board’s verdict was final. Not only does this deny a filmmaker justice, but more importantly to the government, it reinforces conformity to the status quo and self-censorship.

The irony of the new law is the amount of responsibility that is invested in the film board. The tasks given to the film board exceed the material and human resources available to meet the challenges they present. The board, appointed by the minister, is comprised of six voluntary members and a staff of three office employees. In the budget speech of 2005–2006, the minister of education and culture informed parliament that the film board was to classify 2,000 films and 5,000 DVDs and inspect 1,000 television programs. In addition, the board was also to carry out a training workshop for twenty-one district cultural officers on the use of new technologies in safeguarding Tanzanian national culture and values. The allocated budget for all of these activities was 20,362,100 shillings, less than 1 percent of the ministry’s total budget (Budget speech of 2005/2006, the Minister of Education and Culture). Not only was the budget
insufficient, but to expect the six board members to inspect 8,000 films and videos was an unrealistic expectation, especially when the board only met twice a week (Tuesday and Thursday) for one hour.

In actuality the board meets infrequently, sometimes not meeting for a month or more. While I was in Tanzania from late May to mid-August 2009 conducting my research, the board did not meet even once. This scenario proves that the government was not eager to support the film industry as it had proposed to do. Its main objective was to curtail the development of a viable film industry. Penina Mlama, a cultural anthropologist, comments on this when she says, “Political leaders think they are better off if they don’t develop the film industry, because if they really develop it so that people themselves have got power to make films to use it to really express their views, it will get out of hand. . . . I don’t think they would put money into the development of a film which is not controlled” (Interview, 2009).

Not only does the film board lack resources to carry out its activities, but more importantly, how and where were they to receive those 8,000 films? As much as the video film industry was booming in 2005, it was not producing 2,000 video films a year. Currently it still does not produce that amount. How did the film board arrive at that figure? Even if it was capable of producing that amount in the year 2005, filmmakers were not taking their films to the film board; in fact, they did not know of its existence. As for the 1,000 television programs, no law or policy existed at the time that gave the film board the authority to inspect the content of films shown on television stations. The only institute with that kind of authority was the Tanzanian Content Regulatory Authority (TCRA), which monitored the content of aired programs on television and handled complaints from viewers. The television owners had no obligation to send their films to the film board, nor have they done so. The figure concocted by
the film board shows how the government is not serious about the development of the film industry and how it will go to any length to mislead its people.

The budget speech of 2007–2008 was more realistic regarding the actual capacity of the film board. The minister of information, culture and sports, George Mkuchika, noted to the parliament that the board had inspected seventeen films, classified fifty-nine DVDs, and read six synopses and eight scripts. Additionally, it had printed and distributed across the country 2,000 pamphlets entitled Ijue Film Bodi Yako (Know Your Film Board) in order to demonstrate transparency and to inform the public of its existence. The budget for the year was 15,554,500 shillings. In the budget speech of 2008–2009 no activities of the film board were listed, but it received a budget of 1,440,000 shillings.

The location of the censor board office can be viewed as an allegory for how filmmakers perceive the board and the government in general. The office is located in the midst of a busy crowded street in the center of the city of Dar es Salaam. When I made my first research visit to the office, it took me awhile to locate it. After a close scrutiny of nearby buildings on Morogoro Road and Azikiwe Street, I came across a dark hall that had on its wall numerous gold- and silver-plated signs of companies that had offices in the building. Amongst these was a sign printed on white paper, with the words National Film Censorship, 3rd floor. As I ascended the narrow, dark stairs to the third floor, a feeling of fear and anxiety overwhelmed me; I felt like somebody was constantly near me. When I eventually got to the office, I was greeted by a guard uniformed like a policeman; I was asked to sign a visitor’s book and was ushered in for my research interview. The office consisted of four small rooms, one for the executive secretary, two for the assistants, and one for the receptionist/secretary. There was only one television set and a DVD player, which were used to inspect all video films brought in by filmmakers.
The poor location of the office and meager allocation of resources for board and film activities by the government demonstrates the contradictory nature of a government that purports to support the film industry by recognizing it as both an art form and an economic activity and at the same time creates obstacles and makes it difficult for filmmakers to survive and express themselves. This form of ambivalence forces filmmakers to either conform to or bypass the film laws, and renders the board useless. This antagonistic relationship between filmmakers and the government has impacted the way video films are produced and distributed.

**Distribution Deals**

There are two ways in which arrangements are made for distribution of video films in Tanzania. In one of the first distribution agreement methods used, an independent filmmaker or producer made a film and took the film package to the major distributing companies and sold it to them. This was the most prevalent form of distribution agreement when the video film industry was emerging in the early 2000s. Whereas deals with Hollywood majors entail a long, complicated contract that includes assignment of rights for all potential markets, etc., in Tanzania that is not the case. According to Mrisho Mpoto, a video filmmaker and poet, “Our contracts are simple.” In other words, no lawyers are involved, and the filmmaker sells their rights to the distribution company. As films started to sell at a faster rate, distributors eagerly to bought all the films that were brought to them and subsequently made profits from them. For example, William Mtitu sold his first film, Miss Bongo (2003), for 6 million shillings and his second film, Sandra (2006), for 12 million shillings. According to Mtitu, they “made it for 145 thousand shillings, and sold it for 12 million shillings” (Interview, 2009). The 145 thousand shillings only covered the cinematographer, however; the payments for actors and other crew members were deferred.
until the film was sold. Although Mtitu made a profit out of the films, he no longer owned them. The films became the sole properties of the distributing company.

The distributing companies owned a film outright after buying it. This form of agreement is called “trading the master” by video filmmakers—that is, handing over the master copy of the film to the distributor. As Mtitu notes, “I have sold the film, and it’s his for the rest of his life; I have no right to Sandra nor Miss Bongo” (Interview, 2009).

The second type of agreement entered between filmmakers and distributors is called “stamping” or—as it is called by Hollywood majors—“negative pickup.” This kind of deal is usually made before the film is completed. The distributor often provides an advance to the filmmaker and in the end the revenue of the film will be shared by both filmmaker and distributor. Both agree on the number of copies to be replicated, the distributor duplicates the video film and hands the copies to the filmmaker to put his or her seal or signature on each copy of the film before it is distributed. The purpose of the seal or signature is to show the authenticity and originality of the copy and also to protect and ensure the filmmaker and consumers against fraud or pirated copies of the film. Once the copies are sold, another agreement can be made between the two parties. Since the distributor manufactures copies of the film and thus takes more risks than the filmmaker, he or she receives a larger share of the revenue, usually on the scale of 70/30 percent. This form of agreement did not last long, as filmmakers became suspicious of distributors, fearing that distributors were dishonest with revenue collection. This is because filmmakers had no way of tracking the sale and thus had to be content with what the distributors told them. This did not settle well with filmmakers, who often accused distributors of fraud. They felt distributors were illegally making and distributing copies and selling those instead of the sealed and agreed-upon copies.
To prove this, filmmakers traveled to video stores in different cities and towns and found numerous pirated copies of their films on the shelves and none of the original ones. Distributors, upon confrontation, attributed the situation to piracy, which they vehemently denied participating in. To come to an agreement, distributors and filmmakers settled by returning to the former type of agreement, paying the filmmaker a set sum in exchange for full rights. Ignacio Kambarage, the marketing manager of KAPICO distribution company, states, “If you bring us your master copy, and we agree on the price, we would pay your price in installments” (Interview, 2009). For filmmakers who entered into distribution deals with KAPICO, for example, a contract might be signed that specified that the filmmaker would be paid twenty-one days after the release of the film. This form of agreement has been adopted by almost all distribution companies in Tanzania. This has somehow eased the business relationship between the two parties, but it has not fully erased the suspicions once leveled.

The mistrust between filmmakers and distributors extended particularly to distributing companies owned by Tanzanians of Indian heritage. Distributors of Indian descent were the first business individuals to venture into the video film business in the late 1990s, and this was because they were already in the business of distributing local and international music throughout the country. As filmmaking became a prominent fixture in Tanzania, distributing outlets that catered to the recording industry welcomed film and diversified their distribution outlets to include video films. The relationship that these distributors had with local musicians was marred with suspicion and mistrust. Musicians constantly complained of being cheated out of money and of not getting their royalties. This form of a distributor-artist relationship continued with video filmmakers, who also complained of being cheated and put forth allegations of exploitation and fraud; embezzlement became the cry for most filmmakers who
worked with these distributors. One of the major claims of exploitations leveled against Indian distributors was price fixing. Because of the close familial relationships among some distributors (such as MAMU distributors and Wananchi Production), price fixing became the order of business. For example, if a filmmaker took his or her film to MAMU, MAMU would offer to buy the film for 2 million shillings. If the filmmaker declined this offer and shopped the film around to another distributor who also happened to be of Indian descent, a phone call would already have been made by MAMU to all other distributors informing them of the price deal. Therefore, upon reaching another distributor, according to Irene Sanga, a video filmmaker, “The filmmaker would be given a lower price than that of MAMU, forcing the filmmaker to return to MAMU, and at this time MAMU would lower the price even further” (Interview, 2009). The filmmaker, having no other way of distributing his film, was forced to accept MAMU’s offer. With this type of cutthroat business deals, Indian distributors were castigated constantly in numerous newspapers articles, and consequently garnished negative public opinion and, on occasion, a glance from the government.

This oligopolistic business condition was erased only when other businesspeople not affiliated with Indian distributors made an entry into the distribution market. The establishment of Mtitu Game Quality Production and KAPICO brought on the demise of price fixing. But it did not reduce the mistrust filmmakers had with distributors. Although currently all distributors are looked upon suspiciously by filmmakers, Indian distributors, because of their history, are held in the greatest suspicion. When I was interviewing distributors, it was only the Indian distribution companies that I had difficulty tracking down. Out of the three major distribution companies owned by Tanzanians of Indian descent, only one agreed to be interviewed, and they dictated the kinds of questions I was allowed to ask. For example, questions that dealt with the perceived
contentious relationship between Indian distributors and filmmakers were off-limits. Distribution companies owned by Tanzanians of African descent were more willing and open to the questions posed. Was it because I was not of Indian descent that Indian distributors were unwilling to speak to me? When I raised this concern to some of the filmmakers, one of the filmmakers, Mrisho Mpoto, said no. “It’s because you approached them too officially, and so they probably thought you were from the government or COSOTA” (Interview, 2009). The antagonistic relationships among filmmakers and Indian distributors—and indeed all distributors—and the government continue to exist between filmmakers and distributors and thus it motivates the way the film industry is operated.

To combat this antagonism, most filmmakers have returned to the original form of agreement, selling their rights to the distributors for a lump sum of money. This way filmmakers do not have to worry about how many copies the distributors has sold or pirated. But currently this form of agreement has come under scrutiny by COSOTA. This scrutiny was prompted by complaints the society received both from filmmakers and distributors, especially in regards to the airing of video films on the international television channel African Magic Plus. Owned by Electronic Media Network of South Africa, Magic Plus is an English-speaking pay cable channel that broadcasts African films. The channel accepts films from filmmakers and distributors, and if the films meet their criteria, they are aired and seen by people all over Africa. Filmmakers and distributors not only receive financial benefits but also international exposure and recognition. The problem that COSOTA encounters more often than not is that filmmakers have sent their films to Magic Plus, only to realize later they no longer possessed the rights to the film. The filmmakers did not understand the parameters of the distribution deal they signed with the distributor. In such cases, COSOTA has acted as the go-between. Yustus Mkinga, the executive
secretary of COSOTA, states, “We tell filmmakers they must specify the distribution markets and territories. We are trying to encourage them, but it is still happening” (Interview 2009). The distribution deals that are made between filmmakers and distributors are not supervised by lawyers as one would expect, but instead the filmmaker simply signs a contract formulated by the distributor. Video filmmaker Mrisho Mpoto, in referring to these contracts, says, “They don’t require a lawyer; it’s between the distributor and a filmmaker” (Interview 2009).

Filmmakers like Mtitu have decided to sign agreements that have an expiration date. In his latest film Kamando Yosso (2010), Mtitu entered a deal with Steps Entertainment to distribute his film for only two years. After the two years the distribution rights will revert to Mtitu, who can then decide on the next course. Mtitu hopes that within that time he will have expanded his film company, Five Effects, to include a distribution division. This will allow Mtitu to have full control of production and distribution of his films.

As much as filmmakers and distributors are intent on formulating ways to sustain themselves in the cutthroat business of film, government institutions such as the National Film Censorship Board and COSOTA have not had the same kinds of enthusiasm for the industry.

COSOTA, the National Film Censorship Board, and the Film Industry

Although filmmakers and distributors have had a contentious relationship that has been guided by mistrust, they both agree in their view of government institutions and policies such as COSOTA and the National Film Censorship Board. Theoretically, filmmakers and distributors take the films to the censorship board and COSOTA for inspection and registration, but in practice this does not often happen. Makaraghe Mkinda, during her one-year employment as a film inspector at the film censor board, commented, “Since I have been here, only two DVDs have been brought here” (Interview, 2009). Filmmakers and distributors are often reluctant to
take their films to the censor board. Some distributors have accused the institution of corruption. Even if one took a film for inspection, Ignatus Kambarage claims, “They will tell you, ‘You see this pile here? All of them are waiting to be inspected,’ and they would finish by saying, ‘Mkono mtupu haulambwi [an empty hand cannot do the job],’ and you would know exactly what they mean by that” (Interview 2009). So if a filmmaker or a distributor wanted his or her film inspected quickly, he or she must put something in the hand of the inspector, or else nothing would be done. The end result is that filmmakers and distributors don’t take their films to the film censorship board. The board, to them, is there to serve the state, not the film industry. As there is no enforcement of the law or a penalty if they do not, there is no incentive to do so.

COSOTA, on the other hand, although a government institution just like the censor board, is viewed more favorably by both filmmakers and distributors. They view COSOTA as a partner who has created a rapport with its clients. COSOTA has captured the interest of filmmakers and distributors because of the aggressive campaign it has waged against pirates by seizing and destroying pirated video films and collecting and distributing royalties to filmmakers. In describing and contrasting the work of the censor board and COSOTA, Mrisho Mpoto comments, “The censor board has not managed to tell filmmakers who they are and what they do. We know the board is there, but it is more governmental, it is not for us, whereas COSOTA is for the people, it has come to and for us” (Interview, 2009). These different views of government institutions are echoed by Irene Sanga, who puts this question to a censor board employee: “The film censor board has been in existence longer than COSOTA, so why are artists aware of COSOTA? Even if it does not work properly or efficiently, artists are still aware of its existence, but artists are not aware of the censor board” (Interview, 2009). The censorship board is viewed as a government agency that is there to monitor and control filmmakers’ artistic
creativity and expression, whereas COSOTA, according to filmmakers and distributors, has showed support to the film industry not only by cracking down on piracy, the film industry’s major nemesis, but also in its effort to support the development of the video film industry by training law enforcement officials on issues of copyright law and infringement, thereby allowing video films to flourish.

The Process of Producing Video Films

In his 2008 presentation of the trends in filmmaking in Tanzania, Frowin Nyoni identified two emerging trends: artistic and commercial filmmaking. For Nyoni, artistic filmmakers are those who adhere to the professional principles of filmmaking and ensure that the production has adequate crew, equipment, and time. Most of the films in this category, according to Nyoni, are under sponsorship, and producers spend millions of shillings to produce them. Commercial filmmakers produce films that adhere to market demands rather than the professional principles of filmmaking. Films of this type are low budget and poor quality, and payment is always deferred until the movie is sold. Mwangaza Kang’anga in her study “New Trend in Tanzanian Film Making” categorizes films in terms of “the best” and “the moderate.” She says the best filmmakers are those who are able to carry out at a professional level the three phases of production (preproduction, production, and postproduction), are able to demonstrate both artistic and commercial attributes, and have a large production crew. The moderate filmmakers are those who “lacked artistic ingenuity [and] are often driven by opportunistic consideration, such as making a profit” (2006: 45). Production crews in this category comprise “only a few individuals with some assuming double or multiple roles” (46). The major difference between these two types of filmmakers is their filmmaking practices and aesthetics.
The editor of the Sunday Citizen newspaper of July 12, 2009, summarize this attitude succinctly: “The filmmaking revolution has finally reached Tanzania, but as is typical of the country’s other sector of the economy, imposters have swamped the industry. Professionals are complaining that films produced in a hurry are ruining the industry.” Another newspaper, the Sunday Daily noted that “filmmaking in the country, has been invaded by a legion of get-rich quickly producers, who often lack professional know-how and thus prey on the easier themes of love and crime for a not-too-critical audience” (Salome Gregory, July 19, 2009). The imposters and the get-rich-quick producers that the newspapers have called out are the video filmmakers.

Whereas professional filmmaking has been cited by both the critics Nyoni and Mwangaza Kang’anga as a film practice that follows the three phases of filmmaking and therefore results in quality films that adhere to the aesthetics and techniques of filmmaking, video filmmakers have been perceived as filmmakers who use techniques and aesthetics that do not follow the three stages of filmmaking and as a consequence yield poor quality films that are geared toward profit maximization only. While it is true that video films’ major preoccupation is financial gain, what is left out in these arguments is that the film industry is a business, be it in the hands of video filmmakers or professional filmmakers, and it exists to make a profit. It is both a commerce and an art.

The biggest misconception is that the video film industry does not have a coherent structure and does not adhere to the three stages of filmmaking. This cannot be further from the truth; the video film industry has a coherent structure that has clear preproduction, production, and postproduction phases.

In Tanzania, distribution companies are the major producers of films, and dominate the video film industry. They are in control and often set the terms of deals. There is a contingent of
independent video filmmakers who look upon the major distribution companies to distribute their films if they hope to sell them in video stores. These distribution companies or studios, like Hollywood majors, are the main producers as well as distributing giants of the video filmmaking business. These five companies are GMC Wasanii Promoters, Mwananchi Production, Mtitu Game Quality Production, KAPICO, and Steps Entertainment. They own their own film equipment, which they provide to filmmakers for use. The method employed by these distribution companies is used here to illustrate the process of producing video films in Tanzania.

Development and preproduction: Acquisition of ideas/stories, actors, and locations

This initial part of the process, which often takes anywhere from one week to a month, involves the seeking and buying of interesting stories and ideas from filmmakers, budgeting, casting lead actors, and location scouting. A typical scenario goes like this: A filmmaker approaches a distributing company and pitches his or her idea or story. The distribution company spends anywhere from a week to a month reviewing the script or story. If the idea is liked by the distributing company, it is bought from the filmmaker. As Solank Diresh, the general manager of Steps Entertainment, notes, “You come with an idea, we sit with you and see how the story goes; if we find it ok, we tell you our purchasing price” (Interview 2009). At this point the distributing company may hire its own director and continue with the process of producing the film or else hire the writer, who then becomes the film director. According to the marketing manager of KAPICO, at this juncture, “I will pay him the money for the script and the money for directing” (Interview 2009). At this stage the director takes charge and works closely with the distributor to cast the film, making every effort to lure a major actor to the project. A deal with a major actor is important for distributors, because consumers often request a film by the actor’s name. As Mrisho Mpote says, “You have people who go to stores and ask for a Kanumba or Ray film and
[therefore], you make a film according to the producer/distributor’s request because they know what is in the market” (Interview, 2009). According to Ignatus Kambarage, the managing director of KAPICO, “The basis of a great film is the story, the location, and actors. A film must have a recognizable actor, interesting scenery, and a great story. If a film has those elements and it is marketed well, the film will make a profit” (Interview, 2009). While I was interviewing Diresh Solank at Steps Entertainment, no less than five filmmakers and actors came by looking for work or with ideas or stories they wanted to pitch to Diresh. One famous video film actor, Raymond, dropped by to pick up a copy of a film just released by the company that he had starred in.

Once the story or script has been accepted, casting completed, budgets finalized, and locations scouted, the project is given a green light, and the second phase of production begins. Most distributors don’t go on location to supervise the process; they allocate the funds to the director or filmmaker and wait for the final product. Solank Diresh states, “They produce it for us, and finally it becomes our property” (Interview, 2009). Of course there is always the issue of adhering to the budget and problems that may lead to going over budget. The distributing company KAPICO has diverted from the practice of giving funds to filmmakers and now buys films that are already made. Other distribution companies have followed suit, and either buying completed films or make their own. As video filmmaker Mrisho Mpoto describes the process, “You go and make a film at your cost. The distributor tells you he will pay you this amount, so when you are making the film you know the exact amount you will receive” (Interview 2009). The amount of money filmmakers receive for their work can range anywhere from 3 million shillings to 14 million shillings. According to KAPICO marketing manager Kambarage, the location, story, and casting determine the price of a film. “If you bring your film to me I will take
about ten days to inspect it. I look at the location and the artist involved, so depending on the work the price ranges from 3 to 14 million shillings” (Interview, 2009).

Production: Rehearsal and principal photography

The production of a video film takes anywhere from one to four weeks. This phase of the filmmaking process consists of a rehearsal period and principal photography. An extensive rehearsal period is allocated to the production of a video film. This is not only to hone the acting, but more importantly, it makes sure the film is completed in a timely manner. The video film industry relies heavily on how quickly a film commodity reaches the market. The faster it is produced the less costly it is and the more profitable it becomes. To achieve profitability at a minimum investment filmmakers have come up with an arrangement that calls for the director, actors, and crew to live together in a rented apartment or house for the duration of the rehearsal and principal photography. This form of living arrangement is aimed toward, among other things, combating lateness and any distractions that may have presented themselves if actors and crew stayed at home. By confining actors and crew to a single space, the apartment or house, societal problems such as traffic and family issues are avoided, allowing the film to remain on schedule and on budget. The Ramada Inn (a hotel located in the commercial part of Dar es Salaam and a convenient distance from headquarters of most of the distribution companies) is one of the most famous hotels used by filmmakers. Other hotels outside the commercial center are also used. The Atriums hotel has become a popular rehearsal venue. I had an opportunity to visit a rehearsal there of a film entitled Tears on Valentine’s Day, directed by Hammie Rajab and produced by Erick Shigongo through his newly established distribution company, Tollywood. Ten actors were present together with the director, assistant director, and a script supervisor. The assistant director was in charge of the rehearsal, making sure actors memorized their lines and
spoke accordingly; director Hammie Rajab conducted a meeting with a couple of people on a far away table; and Issa Hamis, the script supervisor, kept actors within the parameters of the script, although improvisation was allowed. “We don’t follow the script word to word, we improvise a lot.” Hammie Rajab, who has directed numerous video films and is considered one of the leading video film directors in Tanzania, stressed to me the importance of rehearsals in making films that are well acted and of high quality. To reach that standard, according to Rajab, investment in the rehearsal period must be made. The rehearsal period of a video film can last anywhere from one to two weeks. Kambarage notes, “It takes two weeks. . . . In the beginning it was three weeks, but now people don’t train actors, they take actors who already know the craft” (Interview, 2009).

After an intense two weeks of rehearsal a film is shot in one or two weeks. Since Tanzania has no film studios, all of the shooting is done on location. Just as in Hollywood, Bollywood, and Nollywood, the film is shot out of sequence. This is done predominantly to reduce rental cost. The major filming equipment used by filmmakers consists of a digital camera, a boom microphone, a monitor, and—on rare occasions—a lighting kit. Once shooting is complete the postproduction phase consisting of editing, marketing, distribution, and exhibition commences.

**Postproduction: Editing, distribution, and marketing**

**Editing**

Editing usually begins during principal photography and continues after shooting is finished. During editing, dialog, music, and sound effects are mixed and subtitles are added to the film. The editing of a video film can either be done at the distribution company studio, since they own film equipment, or completed elsewhere, depending on the agreement. As a general
rule the editor, together with the director/filmmaker, edits and mixes the visual, audio, and sound effects of the film. The major preoccupation of the editor and director at this stage is to make sure the film is audible and comprehensible to the public. Scoring of music is minimal, if incorporated at all. Typical music protocol in the video industry is the plagiarism of Western music. Distributors such as Mtitu Game Quality have stopped using Western music and have opted to use one continuous and monotonous tone of music throughout the film. This has not increased the quality of film, but at least the company cannot be accused of music piracy. The editing of a video film can take anywhere from one to two weeks depending on the length and complexity of the film. Upon completion of the editing process, the filmmaker takes the film to the distribution company and awaits remuneration for the service rendered. Theoretically it is at this juncture that the film is taken to the National Film Censor Board for a permit and to COSOTA for copyright registration. Most of the distributors interviewed noted it was the filmmaker’s responsibility to take the film to the film censor board before they surrendered it to the distributors, and since the distributors owned the film, it was their responsibility to take it to COSOTA.

**Distribution**

Distribution is the backbone of the video film industry. The film industry exists and flourishes because of distribution. Distributors have tremendous power, handling the distribution of a film in all outlets and determining when the video film is to be released. Therefore, they have full control of a film and the film industry. Although Pius Mota in 2009 called the video distribution system in Tanzania “crude,” it is this same crude system that has propelled Tanzania to its position as the leading film-producing country in East Africa, second only to Nigeria in the whole of Africa.
Numerous film distribution companies have come and gone since the emergence of the video film industry. In the late and early 2000s the distribution industry was dominated by six distribution companies, but by the mid-2000s, this number was reduced to five: GMC Wasanii Promoters, Wananchi Video Production, Mtitu Game Quality Production, KAPICO, and Steps Entertainment. These distribution companies are in charge of manufacturing, storing, and shipping video films through their retail outlets in Tanzania. The majors are also producers and manufacturers of video films and have distributing outlets throughout major cities and towns in the country. For example, KAPICO has at least one agent in each of the twenty-five regions in Tanzania; in some cities KAPICO has two or more agents: Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital, has more than ten agents, Mbeya three and Dodoma two. Steps Entertainment, a newcomer to the distribution business, has outlets in 70 percent of the country and by the end of 2009 “will be in every region” (Solank Diresh, interview, 2009). Mtitu Game Quality Production, GMC Wasanii Promoters, and Wananchi Production each have agents in all of the regions in Tanzania.

Other upcoming distribution companies such as Tollywood, Five Effects, and Tuesday Ltd as of 2010 were setting up distribution divisions in their companies and were only able, at the moment, to distribute films in Dar es Salaam. These minor distribution companies have developed informal channels such as newspaper stands, market areas, music stores, and street peddlers. In addition, there are independent filmmakers who devise their own means of distribution. Mrisho Mpoto comments, “Now most of the filmmakers distribute their own films as they know where to produce posters, they make television ads, and regional distributors call and request for orders” (Interview, 2009). And it’s mostly through these informal means, Mwangaza Kang’anga notes, “that video film reaches out to the market” (2006: 37). But if
independent and minor distribution companies want their films to ultimately appear in video stores around the country, they still depend upon distribution deals with the majors. Major distributors have the power to decide how, where, and when a film is to be distributed and promoted.

Finding reliable agents and outlets is an involved activity that is conducted by major distributors by surveying and visiting each region in the country and scrutinizing each individual who wants to become an agent. All of the majors, with the exception of GMC and Wananchi production (who already had distribution agents prior to the emergence of the video film industry), had to first visit and conduct visibility studies of each region. They had to survey and convince music shop owners to venture into the film business and become agents or retailers of video films. “I have been all over Tanzania for twenty-one days. We have been to each shop and we follow up with calling and calling. It is a very difficult job” (Diresh Solank, interview, 2009). Another method distributors have used to entice individuals to become their agents is to get the film commodity out there and have shop owners call distributors and request to become retailers of the product. Kambarage notes, “When we make a film, we put our telephone number in all of our films, so when we advertise the film on TV, our prospective agents take the number and call us. They tell us where their store is located, we find someone that we know in that region to go and evaluate the store. If it is legitimate, we make them our agent, and we send them the package” (Interview, 2009).

The packages are usually sent via bus or truck, Kambarage continues. “If we intend to release a film tomorrow, then today we send the film via bus or truck to the regions, so that tomorrow at 8:00 a.m., when we are distributing films to our agents/retailers here in Dar es
Salaam, the same is happening in other regions” (Interview, 2009). Once agents are established, they then sell the films to local video shop owners and/or to individual consumers.

Through the five majors and minor distribution companies and other alternative means of distribution, Tanzanians of all classes are able to consume video films as their principal leisure activity. Although the majors are able to control what Tanzanians see and hear, the continuation of the control and popularity of video films is fueled by the kinds of marketing strategies undertaken by distributors.

**Marketing: Advertising, promotion and publicity**

Marketing and distribution are an important process in the commercialization of the video film industry. How a product is marketed and distributed will result in a profit or loss for the producer. Marketing is a key means for the industry to establish product recognition and differentiation by highlighting a film’s marketable elements prior to release. Marketing thus not only responds to consumer demand, but also attempts to both anticipate and create demand. The function of marketing is therefore to establish the film as a recognizable brand with strong audience appeal. Kambarage states, “Marketing is very important. If marketing is done well, you will be surprised that within seven days you have recouped all of your investment” (Interview, 2009). Marketing strategies are therefore formulated during preproduction and are constantly revised depending on the product marketed.

The marketing of video films is divided into two categories: promotion and publicity. The main focus of marketing is to create a recognizable brand; thus, at the onset of production arrangements are made to meet this objective. In the video film industry, the marketing or promotion of a video film entails an elaborate marketing scheme that consists of creating colorful posters, television ads, tabloid news (gossips), banners, film trailers, newspapers, and interviews.
The most visible and utilized promotional materials are film trailers and posters. It used to be that if a producer/distributor had money, the film usually had a premiere before it was released for sale in video stores. Because there are no video film cinema halls, a premiere usually took place at a cultural center, a five-star hotel, or a bar depending on the budget and was one of the primary promotional tools of a film.

Recently this form of promotion has no longer been feasible. Not only has it become too expensive, but the way premieres were organized and structured, they did not reach the intended audience: avid buyers of video films. Most of the people who attended the premieres went for the purpose of listening and dancing to the local music band that usually preceded the event. In order to organize a premiere, a filmmaker/distributor had to rent a venue and hire local musicians to play and entertain the audience. Venue rents ranged anywhere from 200 thousand to 1 million shillings. For the band, the distributor/filmmaker would pay anywhere from 1.5 million to 5 million shillings.

The primary purpose of the band was to attract people to the event, with the hope that they would buy the film there or later at designated outlets. But as filmmakers and distributors soon found out, the premiere often attracted the wrong crowd—music lovers—not video film buyers. According to video filmmaker Irene Sanga, “If you say you will only screen the film without the band, the only people that will come to the premiere are filmmakers and other artists” (Interview, 2009). The working-class Tanzanians, who are the major viewers of video films, cannot afford to attend a premiere. Thus due to its prohibitive cost and therefore the inability to reach the targeted audience, the premiere has been shelved as a promotional device in favor of television ads and posters.
The most important element of a marketing campaign is the creation of posters and a film trailer. The aim of posters and trailers is to condense the film’s highlights and showcase its elements, creating a narrative image of the film in the minds of audiences (Philip Drake, 2008). Once a trailer is made it is used in two ways: as a promotional spot on television and a trailer on upcoming DVDs. According to Diresh Solank, “We look at the screenplay. Once we know where the climax is, where the suspense is happening, we design, and while on location we ask the director to take still pictures and bring them to us . . . and before a final cut of a film is made, to make us a one- or two-minute trailer. We then put the trailer in a movie which we are about to release” (Interview, 2009).

The still photos are used to create posters and fliers that are to be distributed in all regions of Tanzania. Kambarage confirms, “When we send video films to our agents in the regions, we also send them posters of other films that are to come” (Interview, 2009). Posters are usually mounted all over the city in places such as bus stands, restaurants, bars, electricity poles, and cultural centers. But as the film release date nears, Irene Sanga notes, “posters and fliers are again distributed in different places, banners are mounted in busy street crossings, and fliers are handed out to pedestrians and drivers as they pass by” (Interview, 2009). Young boys are recruited, and they strategically stand on busy street corners, at major bus stops, and near market stands and hand out posters and fliers. The posters are usually very colorful and feature the faces of the major actors in the films. On the poster the name of the video film, the distribution company, and the date of the film’s release are spelled out (see Appendix C).

The largest part of the marketing budget is spent on purchasing television spots. The TV spots are chosen strategically; “We look at programs that are viewed by a majority of the people, and we buy advert time” (Kambarage, Interview, 2009). The expense of advertising on television
ranges from 500 to 700 thousand shillings a minute. Television ads are extremely important, not only because the trailer helps to create an audience for the film, but also because it is at this juncture that would-be agents come forth. “If we advertise twice or three times, phones start to ring, asking for the film. . . . So through people calling, we sometimes are forced to release the film earlier” (Kambarage). And according to Kambarage, if marketing is massive and well done, within a week one can see a return on the investment.

Since buying an advertising spot on television is very expensive, some distributors like KAPICO and Wananchi Production have ventured into buying one to two hours of air time. Within those hours, they show their old films as well as show previews of their new films. This form of marketing is lucrative to distributors, Kambarage notes. “If sponsorship is found, they screen their advert; we divide the proceeds between the television stations and us” (Interview, 2009).

Another form of marketing used by distributors is publicity, media coverage for which no payment is made. This consists of interviews, newspaper articles, tabloid magazines, and blogs. These forms of publicity benefit both the distributors and the media, and are a reliable means of increasing an audience (Philip Drake, 2008). Newspapers and especially tabloid magazines with stories of video film stars are always of interest to the public and have been used by filmmakers, producers, and distributors to create a fan base. Personal stories, tragedies, or scandals of actors are printed and can be found in tabloid magazines such as Kasheshe (Turmoil), Uwazi (Transparency) and Ijumaa (Friday). Interviews with actors and a synopsis of the film they are promoting can be found in the entertainment section of most of the Sunday newspapers. These interviews are used by filmmakers and distributors as a springboard for Monday’s video film releases. Websites and personal blogs of actors have become the latest form of advertising
filmmakers and distributors use to sell their films to the public. Mtitu Game Quality has gone further than other distributors in the country by establishing a viable website where the distributor sells backlist films as well as promotes and sells the most recent films.

Proper marketing strategies for video films ensure that the product reaches the widest possible demographic and thus makes a hefty return on the investment. But this is not always the case; piracy has become a thorn in the side of the video film industry. George Otieno laments that “piracy is a pregnant problem in the video industry” (Interview, 2009).

**Piracy: A Challenge for the Video Film Industry**

“Despite the existence of copyright legislation, Tanzania is the leading country in copyright infringement in the Southern and Eastern African region. The Tanzanian market apart from being flooded with fake (pirated) carriers is the main source of the same in Eastern and Southern Africa.” states executive secretary of COSOTA Yustus Mkinga (2008:3).

“In today’s global economy with its easy and wide spread access to computers, copies and scanners, there is no product line that escapes the reach of pirates. The profits are huge, the cost of entry is minimal and the risks are relatively low,” observe Treverto et al. (2009:3).

Most of the studies conducted on film piracy (see Wong, 2003; Pang, 2006; Sefrave, 2003; Treverto et. al., 2009; Mertha, 2005) tend to examine how Hollywood is economically affected by piracy. They also elaborate on how the Motion Picture Association of America and the U.S. government have vowed to fight piracy by influencing how copyright laws are implemented and reinforced in countries that are perceived to be centers of piracy. Recently China has been attacked for copyright infringement, followed by Eastern Europe, Japan, and Italy. Little to no attention has been paid to how local film industries have been hampered by local piracy, let alone how those local industries combat piracy.
Film piracy, the unauthorized manufacturing and selling of film for profit without the consent of the copyright holder, can range from a complex organization of mass-produced video films with wide distribution networks to a video store owner who buys a legal video film and then burns copies for his video rental shop. Piracy can be set up in a single room or apartment and be up and running within a matter of hours. Video piracy in Tanzania is a booming industry that, according to Kambarage and George Otieno, makes its purveyors more money than the filmmakers, producers, or distributors of video films. Tanzania is unlike Australia or Japan, where piracy has been attributed to the delay of the theatrical and DVD release dates of films, or China, with its tight control of the number of foreign films allowed for screening each year.

In Tanzania most of the films pirated are not Hollywood films, but of Tanzanian origin. Tanzanian filmmakers and distributors are hurt by local piracy predominantly because of the early release dates of pirated films. A bootleg copy of a video film appears hours after a film is first released. As Mrisho Mpoto comments, “You receive your film today in the morning and by the afternoon, you will find 200 pirated copies of your film piled up at the market or bus stand selling like peanuts and for peanuts” (Interview, 2009). According to George Otieno, the people involved in the piracy business are “people who have a big investment, who cannot be arrested, have got an army behind them, and are ready to risk their lives for piracy” (Interview, 2009). To get their business running, pirates have somehow developed a partnership relationship with law enforcement officers and thus are shielded and protected by them. In their study of film piracy, organized crime, and terrorism, Gregory F. Treverto et. al. call this kind of a relationship “protected spaces,” whereby governments are either too complacent or too corrupt to take serious action against piracy (98). If law enforcement officials are not corrupt or in compliance, then they are usually ignorant of copyright law and policies.
The enormous demand for pirated films is abetted by lack of enforcement of copyright laws. Filmmakers and distributors are critical of the government’s handling of piracy. KAPICO’s Kambarage has gone as far as to write a letter to the Ministry of Culture and complain about the impact of piracy on the industry and on the government and even suggest a course the government should take to remedy the problem. Filmmakers and distributors have suggested that a copyright law and infringement course be established and taught in all of the police academies in the country. According to Kambarage, police officers do not see film piracy as a criminal offence. “I have caught more than 300 copies of pirated copies. When I take them to the police, there is a problem, as the police do not know about film piracy, they don’t understand the value of a film, and they tell us, ‘Why don’t you negotiate with pirates?’” (Interview 2009). Kambarage remembers two occasions when he was able to catch pirates and involved the police, but nothing happened to the perpetrators. On one occasion, Kambarage raided an apartment that had fifteen computers and bootleg copies of video films from different distribution companies, but the police were not willing to make an arrest, nor were the computers confiscated. The police officer contacted suggested that the distributor and pirates strike a deal among themselves. On the second occasion the culprit was taken to the police station, only to be freed because one of the police officers was going out with the culprit’s sister. “It is very hard to convict a pirate,” William Mtitu laments. “There is no strong legislation in place that can be used to arrest pirates. He only pays a small penalty and goes free” (Interview, 2009).

Inadequate legislation and lack of resources, coupled with government complacency, has forced some distributors, like KAPICO, to in fact make deals with pirates. When Kambarage catches them, “I tell them to pay me the money or I will take them to COSOTA and destroy all of the bootleg copies. We also try to turn them into our agents” (Interview 2009). Filmmakers
and distributors have called for an increase of government awareness of the seriousness of piracy and adoption and enforcement of appropriate national legislation against piracy and are fighting to make piracy a criminal offense. But lack of political will or strong legislation has made piracy a thriving business that has expanded into erstwhile legitimate businesses such as television stations and video store rentals.

**Television stations and video store rentals as forms of piracy**

Broadcast piracy is a form of piracy that a number of Tanzanian television stations have practiced and continue to practice. This form of piracy involves the broadcasting of a bootleg copy of a film or the showing of a legitimate film or television program without permission from the copyright holder (Segrave, 2003). Private television stations are major infringers of the copyright law. Television stations in Tanzania don’t commission works or buy programs from independent Tanzanian producers as mandated by the Broadcast Service Act of 2003; likewise, they do not pay for some of the local and international programs aired on their stations. The popularity of Nigerian films originated in Tanzania because television stations, especially ITV, did not seek permission or pay the copyright holder for airing those films. Nigerian filmmakers, producers, and distributors did not receive payment for the aired films. The airing of unauthorized films included both Nigerian films and Tanzanian video films. According to Kambarage, when filmmakers confronted television owners, they were met with “we are promoting you and your film.” Filmmakers thus are reluctant to pursue the matter further; as one of them noted, “At least they are showing our films without us paying for the air time, and maybe after seeing the film, audiences may want to buy it” (Hamis, Interview, 2009). As filmmakers and distributors continue to fight with television stations over infringement, the
video rental libraries, as they are called, have emerged and have taken over the film exhibition industry.

**Video libraries as a form of piracy**

Video libraries emerged in Tanzania in the mid-1990s when cinema halls were shutting down and importation of foreign films allowed. The video libraries filled the void left by the closing cinema halls. Most of the video libraries were membership only and their film inventory contained exclusively Western, and mostly Hollywood, films. This was prior to the popularity of Nigerian films or the emergence of the video film industry. To become a member of a video library, one had to pay a nonrefundable fee of 30,000 shillings ($30); one could then enjoy an array of European and Hollywood films for 5,000 shillings ($5) a night. With the popularity of Nigerian films in the late 90s and the coming of Tanzanian video films in the 2000s, these video libraries went bankrupt and in their place, the current video rental stores, also called video libraries, emerged.

The collapse of the former video stores can be attributed to its exclusively middle-class, English-speaking clientele. Those video rental shops were frequented by middle-class people who were attuned to Western culture and film and who owned television and VCR sets, which were too expensive for working-class people. With the emergence of television stations in the mid-1990s, followed by the popularity of Nigerian films and the spread of inexpensive technologies for television sets and digital camera DVD players, and the eventual rise of the video film industry, Tanzanians of all classes bought and consumed local video films, thus forcing Western-oriented video rental libraries to go under.

There are over 700 video libraries in Dar es Salaam alone; these video libraries have become major exhibitors of Tanzanian video films and can become influential partners in the
development and growth of the industry. But this relationship has yet to develop between video rental houses, filmmakers, and distributors. Prior to 2004, the majority of the video rental houses stocked Nigerian films. Many of those films were bootleg copies. When the Tanzanian video industry emerged it became a conduit for bringing the local viewing experience to the people. Now there was a direct link from the distributor’s designated agent or outlet to the video library owner who bought the film to the consumer who rented it. Steps Entertainment managing director Diresh Solank recognizes the importance of video libraries: “People depend on video libraries to watch movies, and this directly affects the film business” (Interview, 2009). It affects the business because it costs anywhere from 4,000 to 2,500 shillings to buy a video film, but it only costs 1,000 shillings to rent it for a day. The fact that distributors were not getting any royalties or money from the video libraries created animosity between distributors and video library owners.

The antagonistic relationship between distributors and video libraries is not in the pricing of a rented film but more in how the libraries operate. Video libraries pirate video films and rent them to consumers. Video libraries usually buy one copy of a film at the original price and then burn extra copies for their rental stock. This form of operation, filmmakers and distributors note, stifles revenue from them. During one of my visits to a video library, I observed a girl coming in and asking for a “Kanumba” (the name of an actor) film that had just been released. The storekeeper told the girl to come back in an hour, when a burned copy of the film would be ready for her. The storekeeper informed me that all the copies he had previously burned were rented out. When I pointed out the illegality of his action, he asserted it was not illegal because he had bought one original copy, and even if it was, who was going to catch him? During the thirty
minutes that I spent at the store, I witnessed eight individuals coming and renting Tanzanian video films.

Tanzanian filmmakers and distributors acknowledge the importance of video libraries and thus have not come out and aggressively condemned the business. They have expressed the need for video libraries to join hands with distributors and become their agents or partners. “We don’t want them to close down. Let them be our agent: we supply them with our films, we charge them, but not the price we are selling to individual consumers” (Diresh, interview, 2009). Other distributors have suggested charging video libraries a higher price than that charged to an individual or that video libraries be required to buy at least five original copies of films.

Communication between video libraries and distributors has not been fruitful, since each video library is individually owned and operated and there is no association of video libraries that distributors can negotiate with. But distributors have thought about and suggested other ways of changing the business structure of video libraries.

Filmmakers and distributors have turned to legislative efforts to regulate the structure. Some have sought to push legislation that would require the installation of antipiracy devices in films. Others have asked the government to enact and enforce a law that prohibits video libraries from renting a film until a three-month period has passed since the film’s release date. All have suggested that the government, through COSOTA, provide a sticker certifying proof originality for each copy sold. This suggestion has been taken up by COSOTA; executive secretary Mkinga states, “The government is in the process of preparing a security device for differentiating between original and pirated works, but the implementation is not yet in place.” Until that happens COSOTA is preparing to have a Hakigram sticker that shall be affixed to each film. The copyright law stipulates, “The Hakigram shall be delivered exclusively by the society
[COSOTA] after verification that the audio-visual recordings have been produced in the United Republic of Tanzania . . . without infringing any copyright granted by the Act” (Act, 1999: 745). This, hopefully, will reduce the number of pirated copies on the market. But in the meantime filmmakers and distributors have devised ways of reducing piracy.

**Price reduction as a means of controlling piracy**

One of the major reasons consumers are attracted to pirated films is their pricing. Whereas an original copy of a film may cost 4,000 or 5,000 shillings, a bootleg copy is sold at anywhere from 1,700 to 2,000 shillings. Most viewers of video films are working-class individuals who cannot afford the 4,000 or 5,000 shilling price tag. When the video film industry was emerging in the early 2000s, one film copy of a VCD sold for 5,000 shillings and a film copy of a DVD was 8,000–10,000 shillings. As technology advanced and expanded and became inexpensive, the price of VCDs and DVDs came down, which precipitated a reduction in price for films in VCD and DVD format. VCD films sold for 3,000 shillings, and DVD films for 5,000. Although the prices were expediently reduced, they were still out of reach for the majority of film viewers. Since filmmakers and distributors did not meet customers’ financial capacity, piracy filled the gap and sold films at a price that the majority of working-class Tanzanians could afford—1,500 for a VCD and 2,000–2,500 for a DVD.

Filmmakers and distributors were blindsided by this move and, not wanting to reduce returns on their investment, were reluctant to reduce the price and thus opted to crack down on pirates. But as cracking down proved difficult, some distributors, like Steps Entertainment, were forced to reduce their prices to compete with pirates. As Diresh notes, “Slowly we started to increase our sale by reducing the price to reach the price of piracy. It was a challenge in the market, and we were criticized by many. People were thinking that reducing the price wouldn’t
help, but it did” (Interview, 2009). Not all distributors jumped onto the price-reduction bandwagon; GMC and Wananchi held back for a while, hoping the process would backfire and perhaps even drive the other distribution companies out of business. That did not prove to be the case, however, and other distribution companies such as Mtitu Game and KAPICO followed in the footsteps of Steps Entertainment and reduced the prices of their video films. Kambarage of KAPICO notes, “We used to sell a copy of a DVD film for 4,500–5,000; now we sell it for 2,000 and our agent sells it for 2,500. It has reduced piracy, but not eliminated it” (Interview, 2009). Because of price reductions, the majority of working-class people were able to afford to pay for an original DVD film copy. This resulted in an increase of sales for Steps Entertainment video films by 100 percent. “We wanted to win the people at a cheaper price at a minimum profitability” (Diresh, interview, 2009)). GMC and Wananchi took notice of this development, and they too reduced the price of their video films. Although this move has not completely eradicated the piracy of video films, it has slowed the process.

Besides the reduction in DVD and VCD film prices, distributors are also aggressively pursuing other ideas for obtaining viewers and reducing piracy. Steps Entertainment and KAPICO are both exploring the use of lottery tickets to lure viewers into buying original works. Steps, in collaboration with a radio station, Clouds FM, teamed up to promote the buying of original copies by giving out motorcycles to the buyers of Steps video films with winning numbers found inside the cover. KAPICO as well as Steps have also formulated a service that delivers video films straight to their customers’ homes. Mtitu Game has beaten other distribution companies in the game by establishing a website that showcases all of the distributor’s film repertoire and sells them on-line. While all of these efforts may help solve some of the piracy
problem, it is likely that this will continue to be a significant problem for distributors and filmmakers.

Despite the lack of supportive policies to promote the film industry, distributors and filmmakers have come up with innovative ways to persuade consumers to buy from them and therefore reduce piracy. “Let nobody lie to you, the film industry is a money-making industry,” Kambarage proclaims (Interview, 2009). To continue to make more money, distributors and filmmakers have crossed borders and are reaching as far away as the United States, Australia, London, and Nigeria and as near as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Republic of Congo, in order to market their films.

**International Video Film Distribution**

While visiting Tanzania in 2007, I noticed a new phenomenon in the video film industry: subtitling. Most of the films in the market had English-language subtitles. Upon enquiring I was informed that filmmakers were responding to criticism leveled against them for using English titles in Swahili films, something regularly done. Visiting a video library or a video store in Tanzania, one is bound to see titles such as Girlfriend (2002), Family Tears, parts one and two (2008), From China with Love (2008), and Yellow Banana (2008) on the shelves. While English titles are a direct influence of Nigerian films, the way it is applied in Tanzania is quite different. In Tanzania it is more of a promotional device, used to draw in the interest of consumers. “Filmmakers and distributors think English titles sell more movies than a Swahili title, and therefore they keep coming up with English titles” (Irene Sanga, Interview). Therefore, responding to the critique leveled against them, instead of parting ways with English titles, and thus losing customers, filmmakers decided to complement their films by adding English subtitles. This, they hoped, would silence critics and at the same time allow them to continue
with the English title tradition. As other transformations and innovations such as border crossing and the emergence of cable television and film festivals took form, the subtitling of video films took on a different meaning.

**Video films crossing borders of Africa**

As Tanzania is the leading filmmaking country in East Africa and second to Nigeria in Africa as a whole, border crossing became essential and one of the defining reasons for subtitling video films. Tanzanian video films have found markets in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Malawi, the Republic of Congo, and all the way up to Nigeria. “That is why we have thought it was important that we put subtitles” (George Otieno, interview, 2009). For countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and parts of Congo subtitles might not be as important because of the spread and use of Swahili in those countries, but if Tanzanian video films were to reach countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, and other African countries, subtitling became imperative.

To maintain dominance in East Africa and expand to other African countries, producers of Tanzanian video films not only used subtitling, but also employed and incorporated border-crossing themes, actors, and locations. Filmmakers and distributors in Tanzania have collaborated with actors from Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and as far away as China and Singapore in such films as Dilema (2004), My Cross Sin (2007), The Twins (2007), From Dar to Lagos (2008), and From China with Love (2008). Foreign locations have also played a big part in expanding the market for these films. For example, Mtitu Game has extensively used Nigeria, especially Lagos, as a prominent location site for his films. In his film From Dar to Lagos (2008), a title that encapsulates a journey, Mtitu Game, who doubled as director and distributor of the film, not only brought in actors from Nigeria, but also shot the film in Nigeria and
Tanzania. The film tells the story of a man on his deathbed whose last wish is to see and rekindle his relationship with a long-lost son before he dies. He sends his trusted servant to Lagos, Nigeria, where the son and his mother had moved, to look for him and bring him back to Tanzania. The film was favorably received by Tanzanians, prompting more border crossing and subtitling of films.

The prominence and expansion of Tanzanian video films via subtitles has propelled distribution companies such as KAPICO, Steps Entertainment, and Mtitu Game Quality Production to consider opening retail outlets outside the Tanzanian border. Steps Entertainment has already established an agent in Kenya and is considering expanding to Uganda; KAPICO has an outlet in Kenya; and Mtitu Game has agents in Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria. For countries that Tanzanian distributors don’t have agents or outlets for, individuals from those countries often come to Tanzania to purchase video films for sale in their home countries. For those individuals, Mkwepu Street, a busy street in the center of Dar es Salaam and a short distance from most of the distribution companies’ headquarters, is their destination. It is the transport center of video films. On this street individuals from the Republic of Congo, Malawi, Rwanda, and Mozambique can be seen conducting business transactions and conversing in French and broken Swahili as they load their video film packages onto buses and trucks. Mkwepu Street is a gateway to Africa for most of the subtitled video films in Tanzania.

**Video films and the diasporic community in the West**

Much scholarly literature exists on the topic of diasporic communities (Naficy, 2001; Mishra, 2002; Desai, 2004: Kaur and Sinha, 2005; Thussu, 2008), but little has been written on the African diasporic community in the West. The emergence of film titles such as A Trip to America (2009) and From China with Love (2008) is an indication that the Tanzanian video film
market is expanding beyond Africa and entering diasporic communities in the West. Diresh Solank states, “There are a lot of Tanzanians living in the U.S., London and Australia; we are starting to tackle that market” (Interview, 2009). The market was recognized once distributors noticed an increase in customers buying films for their relatives abroad. Recognizing the diasporic community as a target market, distributors and filmmakers have intensified the subtitling of Tanzanian films in the hope of marketing not only to Tanzanians living abroad, but also to Africans and other individuals interested in learning the Kiswahili language and culture. According to Kambarage, “A lot of Africans like to watch Tanzanian films or would like to learn Swahili. . . . You give them subtitles, and they may be able to learn Swahili a little” (Interview, 2009).

The video films have crossed borders and captured viewing audiences not only of Tanzanians living abroad, but also of Africans living in and outside of Africa. The video films represent for the diasporic community a window to home; as Diresh comments, “Video films allow the diasporic community to see itself, to see its people; they are a link that holds the home and away together” (Interview, 2009). Subtitling of video films has provided the diasporic community with an opportunity to go home without actually going home. This has prompted distribution companies in Tanzania to consider the diasporic community as a distribution territory to be fully explored.

Subtitling for Television Stations and Film Festivals

The emergence of the South-African based cable network African Magic Plus and the localization of film festivals further fueled the demand for subtitled films. African Magic Plus established itself in Tanzania in 2007 and became a major exhibitor of Tanzanian video films. The prerequisite for airing a video film on the Magic Plus channel is that the film must be in the
English language or subtitled in English. Because Magic Plus is an international channel viewed by audiences across Africa and beyond, independent filmmakers have found the channel to be both a financial and a professional, resource.

Airing on Magic Plus has become a seal of approval for many of the video filmmakers. This is because there is a sense that once a filmmaker’s work is accepted and aired by Magic Plus, his or her status is elevated and acquires the “I have made it” status. Financially Magic Plus has become a first-rate investor that independent video filmmakers run to. Magic Plus has become a savior to independent filmmakers who do not have a reliable distribution outlet. Not only are the films screened at Magic Plus seen internationally, but the financial rewards are better than those obtained selling the film to local distributors. Magic Plus pays more than the local distribution companies, and its eighteen-month agreement deals are more desirable than the for-life stipulation that other distribution companies ask for. With these advantages, independent filmmakers favor subtitling their films for the purpose of showcasing them on Magic Plus. The station has become a promotional and financial platform for independent filmmakers and their films.

Wanting to attain, if nothing else, international exposure, filmmakers who have contractual deals with local distribution companies or have sold their films to them are negotiating with their distribution companies to also take their films to Magic Plus. Although the majority of the distribution companies have not considered Magic Plus a major market, the push they get from their filmmakers has encouraged them to reconsider and eventually take their films there. Diresh notes, “We are forced by our filmmakers to take the films to Magic Plus, because for filmmakers that is a venue where one can claim their status” (Interview, 2009). Therefore, to
satisfy filmmakers, distributors like Steps Entertainment have subtitled some of their old films and taken them to Magic Plus for broadcast.

Film festivals in Dar es Salaam have also become consumers of Tanzanian video films, as evidenced by the number of video films that have been showcased in local film festivals such as the European Film Festival, the Korean Film Festival, and the Zanzibar Film Festival. These festivals have opened up their repertoire to include films by both professional Tanzanian filmmakers and the amateur filmmakers who comprise the majority of the video filmmakers. Like Magic Plus, subtitling became a major requirement of festival organizers. Since festivals are frequented by a diverse group of people coming from different parts of the world, the subtitling of films has become a common denominator that brings the audience together for a viewing experience. In 2008, the European Film Festival, organized by the French Cultural Center, had for the first time a special screening of Tanzanian video films. From October 10 to 30, one Tanzanian film a day was screened for the general public. “Professional” art house films such as Beatrix Mugishage’s Unsung Heroes (2008), Imru Baraka’s African Tales (2008), and Omar Chande’s Fimbo ya Baba (2008) were screened side by side with commercial video films such as Khalfan Ahmad’s Copy (2007), Irene Sanga’s Kolelo (2007), and Mrisho Mpoto’s Twenty Million (2008). For the first time in Tanzania commercial video films were presented on a par with art house films at the festival, thus blurring the high and low culture divide that has been so prevalent.

The Future of the Film Industry in Tanzania

The European Film Festival also conducted a screenwriter’s workshop and a roundtable discussion on the future of the film industry in Tanzania. Film producers, distributors, filmmakers, academicians, and government representatives attended and discussed the
challenges and prospects of the film industry and resolutely called for the need to support the growing industry by creating supportive policies and training institutions.

Inadequate policies and training institutions have compelled filmmakers and distributors to find ways to adapt, resist, and develop, despite the lack of sufficient support from the Kikwete government. The Kikwete administration, through its policies and institutions, continues to seek control of the production, distribution, and content of video films. But with technological innovations, the spread of the market economy, and the loss of an ideological vision of the government, this endeavor has been difficult to fulfill.

To control and monitor the artistic expression of filmmakers and distributors, the government had mandated the registration of all art works and companies with government institutions such as COSOTA, BASATA (Baraza la Sanaa Tanzania) (National Arts Council), and the National Film Censorship Board. This, though, has not deterred filmmakers and distributors; they have found ways of negotiating with and even bypassing government agencies and policies. Some filmmakers have dared to respond to the government by openly refusing to take their works to the film censor board, and some have questioned the legitimacy of such institutions. Filmmakers, in defiance of the government, have continued to make and distribute films, and in doing so, they have disregarded the laws and penalties the government and its institutions have mandated. This form of defiance has awakened the Kikwete administration and has forced it to reevaluate its stance on the film industry, and especially the young people who are the driving force behind it.

In August 2009, the Kikwete administration, via the minister of finance, Mustafa Mkalo, announced to the parliament that a duty tax on all film equipment had been removed “so as to promote the film industry for the purpose of encouraging employment of young people” (Budget
Many of the filmmakers and distributors received the news with some skepticism. “Our problem is not equipment, it is a comprehensive policy to educate and support the film industry. . . . The industry needs investment in education and most of all investment in ideas” (Imruh, Interview, 2009). Not to seem disrespectful, filmmakers welcomed the gesture of the government but knew exactly why the gesture had come at that opportune moment. Presidential and parliamentary elections were around the corner. 2010 was an election year, and this was a calculated move on the part of the government. In 2005, the Kikwete administration had come to power largely due to the support and votes of young people, and in 2010 they were needed even more.

It was clear that if Kikwete wanted to be re-elected, his base, the young people, had to be galvanized, lest they fall to the opposition. To get filmmakers’ support Kikwete did not stop at tax breaks. In his farewell speech to the parliament on July 16, 2010, President Kikwete noted, “Right now we have paid an expert from the University of Dar es Salaam to help develop a reliable and proper distribution network for filmmakers and musicians so that they may receive proper payment for their sweat.” The removal of taxation on film equipment and a promise of a better distribution circuit was a way to lure young people to remain loyal to the Kikwete administration and show their gratitude by re-electing him and his administration to a second term.

To further its hold on filmmakers and artists in general, in July 2010, the Kikwete administration, through the Tanzanian National Arts Council, established a video filmmaker’s association whose aim was to safeguard the interests of filmmakers. It is a government based and mandated association that, on the surface, seemed to be in the interests of filmmakers, but in reality was there to service and strengthen the government. But if filmmakers were not to comply
with or be fooled by this smoke screen, Kikwete made it clear what he was capable of doing. In his closing remarks to his party’s National Executive Committee meeting, Kikwete uttered, “It is said that the country disregards human rights and that the media is not free. . . . There were certain individuals who started to question, ask them where there are now? We quietly dealt with them. I will do the same to anybody who will be a ‘trouble maker’ in the country. Presidents’ powers are enormous; if I say this is no, it is no, even if you come with people from the human right watch, I will kick you out. You will get nothing and they can’t force me to change anything” (2010).

This shows that the Kikwete administration, just like administrations prior, continues to want to control the media industry; it continues to flex its muscles as a sign of power. And it continues to try to tame the industry to its own advantage. Time will tell if Kikwete will be forced to demonstrate his power in silencing people, or the media, especially the video film industry, will continue to flourish despite his threats.
Conclusion

Nancy Morris and Silvio Waishord have explored the role of the state in communication and argue that the most tangible power available to states is law and policy making (2001: 10). Robert Gilpin, likewise, argues that it is the state that sets the rules within which other actors function and the state that uses its considerable power to influence outcomes (2001: 18). Thus, the state is an important agent in shaping the structure of media markets. In this study, I have examined this power and analyzed how state cultural and legislative policies—or the lack thereof—have influenced the type of films produced in a particular administrative era in Tanzania. This study has also examined to what extent the film industry remains under government control through legislative mechanisms. I have explained how the economy and politics have interplayed in the shaping of film legislation. Critical political economic theory that calls for questioning the role of the state in reproducing the structure of power in the film industry has been employed.


Through an in-depth analysis of government archival reports; interviews with government cultural officials, government filmmakers, independent filmmakers, film producers,
distributors; and first-hand observation, this study reveals a strong government’s hold on the film industry in Tanzania. In advancing their power and legitimacy, different administrations have established cultural and film policies and legislation as mechanisms for monitoring and controlling Tanzania’s cultural industry. They have co-opted, manipulated, negotiated, and invented policies and institutions that have protected their interests.

In my analysis of the Nyerere administration I discuss how the *Ujamaa* and self-reliance policy advocated, centralized, and controlled all major means of production, including the film industry, and how this informed the kinds of films that were produced and distributed in the country. The major question in this chapter was why and how did the government invest in the cultural sector. In an attempt to build a unified nation out of the 120 ethnic groups, the Nyerere presidency was called the “nation building phase,” during which the government banned all political and social organizations and citizens became subservient to the state and its ruling party. This was arguably done because indulging in diverse and multiple organizations would introduce elements of disunity and retard development. In this regard the government gave itself the power to define national social, cultural and political characteristic of Tanzania.

Through the ideology of socialism and self-reliance, also known as *Ujamaa*, the government created policies and cultural institutions that solidified and spearheaded government cultural agendas. This was done through several means; by establishing the Ministry of Culture and Youth in 1962 whose main objective was to seek and collect the best traditions and make them part of the national culture. The goal of the ministry was to reconstruct, preserve and promote nationally sanctioned traditions which reflected the politics of the country. In this regards the government sanctioned national culture showed a tendency toward pleasing and praising the government.
In terms of the film industry, the government established the Government Film Unit (GFU), to produce government newsreel, the Audio Visual Institute (AVI) to produce documentaries and educational films and the Tanzania Film Company (TFC) a distribution and commercial film company, in order to promote and construct cultural values and traditions that adhered to the government version and vision of a socialist Tanzania. With the use of newsreel, documentaries, and educational films, the government was able to construct and control of what cultural image/identity was permissible to the Tanzanian public.

To also control the commercial film industry, which was in the hands of private individuals, the government established the Tanzania Film Company and made it the sole distributing company of foreign films. All importers and exhibitors of foreign films were forced to take their films to TFC for distribution and censorship. The Nyerere administration used and solidified the colonial Cinematographic Ordinance of 1932 and strengthen the National Film Censorship Board. All the oppressive and authoritarian tendencies of the cinematographic ordinance were left intact; filmmakers still could not make films without the consent of the government. The new administration further controlled and limited the artistic expression of filmmakers by turning them into workers of the state.

To legitimize and strengthen their version of a national identity/culture in film, the National Film Censorship board comprised of government officials and TANU party members. These members had the power to permit, revoke, and or ban any film that was exhibited or produced in Tanzania. Institutions established by the government, the Government Film Unit (GFU), the Tanzania Film Company (TFC), the Audio Visual Institute (AVI), the Ministry of Culture and Youth, and the National Film Censorship Board facilitated government control of what cultural image/identity was permissible.
The Nyerere regime, through these institutions, was able to control what was perceived as the social, cultural, economic, and political path of Tanzania. Through its nationalization of the economy and control of the film industry the government was able to project an identity of Tanzania that adhered to its own interests. The Nyerere administration through its policies and cultural institutions saw to it that only government-sanctioned national culture and identities were accessible to the public.

During the period economists refer to as “Africa’s lost decade,” the Mwinyi administration (1985–1995) saw the rise of an economic and social crisis and the introduction and implementation of International Monetary Fund and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programs (SAPs) as remedies to the country’s economic difficulties. The implementation of the SAPs signified a major shift in Tanzania socio-economic and political worldview. SAPs brought on the adoption of neo-liberal policies that transformed Tanzania from a socialist-oriented nation into a postsocialist nation in which a global capitalist system became the norm. Neo-liberal policies called for the devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling, trade liberalization, elimination of government subsidies, reduction of the state investment in the economy, encouragement of private sector and eventually the dismantling of the single party state and the introduction of multiparty democracy. This transformation consequently had a tremendous effect on the film industry.

The government relaxed its hold on the film industry by allowing individuals and companies to import and distribute films without needing to take them to TFC. Censorship though continued to be the purview of the government, they continued to monitor and survey the kinds of foreign images and content Tanzanians were seeing. Foreign films were seen as
hindrance to and slowed down the construction of a national culture, thus in need of a watchful eye.

The control of film through censorship was not, however, without questions and debate. Government filmmakers questioned the validity of non film expert in censoring film. They suggested, and were denied, that they as filmmakers should be given the task of censoring the films. Although the government was financially withdrawing from the film industry, but through censorship, it maintained control. The financial cutbacks to the film industry brought on by the introduction of neo-liberal policies, saw the emergence of co-production as a mode of filmic production. Government filmmakers, especially those from the Tanzania Film Company, co-produced films with international partners and filmmakers. This kind of filmmaking changed the content of Tanzanian film. The films produced no longer overtly supported government agendas. In fact, filmed co-productions were covertly critical of the government and thus allowed for an intelligent criticism of the state to occur. Government agendas were to take a back seat to social matters such as in Harusi ya Mariamu (1985) and Mama Tumaini (1987). The tackling of social matters was made possible because of the emergence of alternative mode of participation and expression in social, economic and political life-the emergence of civil society organizations. NGOs in the Mwinyi era used films to stimulate greater citizen involvement in socio-cultural activities of the country. Filmmaking those still working for the government or independent made NGOs their refuge and a platform for making films.

The Mkapa administration (1995-2005) quickly accelerated the neo-liberal policies initiated by Mwinyi. Mkapa created legislative policy framework which invited investment from the private sector. To initiate the globalization process of open market economy, Mkapa aggressively pursued economic recovery programs, structural reforms, and the privatization of
state-run institutions but also established cultural policies and institutions that minimized the spread of global cultural currents. Major questions in this chapter has been why did the government found it imperative to establish a cultural policy document and cultural institutions and what impact did these organizations and policies have on cultural industry such as film?

As technology became available and inexpensive, and the liberalization of trade and the open market economy became the driving force of economic development in Tanzania, private investment in media outlets started to emerge. Local individuals established media houses such as television stations, newsmagazines, and independent film production houses. The mushrooming of privately owned companies revolutionized film production, distribution, and exhibition in the country. Local entrepreneurs ventured into the filmmaking business, and the government was no longer in charge of film production and no longer the sole producer and exhibitor of films.

This lack of control in the film industry and the emergence of diverse views and voices that challenged the monolithic view of a national identity, threatened the interest and stability of the state. To prevent the spread of an authorized belief system and images, the government designed and established policies and institutions that were supposedly to safeguard the identity and culture of the nation. But in actual fact, it was one of the mechanism the government employed in an attempt to control the cultural behavior of the public, giving itself more leverage to continue to control the content of foreign and local cultural products. In order to accomplish this, the government set out proscriptive mechanisms that dealt with this control. To combat the infiltration of foreign and local cultural products the government worked vigorously to create institutions such as the Cultural Trust Fund (1998), a funding organization for individual artists and companies that promote the advancement of Tanzanian cultural activities, and the Zanzibar
International Film Festival (ZIFF) (1998), a platform to showcase Tanzanian cultural film heritage and legislation such as the Cultural Policy (1997) that outlined the mission and objectives of Tanzanian culture, value and customs, and the Copyright Law Act (1999) that sought to safeguard and protect artistic works. All these institutions and policies, regulated by the government, were mechanisms for controlling the influx of foreign as well as local cultural products.

The Cultural policy document established in 1997 became the basis for all cultural development in the country. The objective of the cultural policy was to lay out ways the government could achieve its cultural construction and at the same time become a participant in the global market. Through the cultural policy the government continued to define the cultural path that Tanzania was to take. The Copyright law established in 1999 was said to protect the works of artists but in actual fact it is designed to regulate culture under the disguise of protecting individuals and cultural heritage. The copyright law is regulated by the government through the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing and administered by the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) a government institution within the ministry.

The Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) established in 1998 as a promoter of Tanzanian film heritage has yet to contribute to the development of a local film industry. No single video filmmaker can boast of being trained or inspired by the film festival. What ZIFF has managed to do is to promote Zanzibar as a tourist destination spot, thereby increasing government tourist revenue and thus making the government the main beneficiary of the festival.

With all the restrictive policies and institutions created by the government, filmmakers and other artists have devised alternative strategies in their effort to challenge and question the status quo, especially in this globalized, technologically advanced and border-erasing world
Two mode of filmic production emerged out of this juncture: a diasporic transnational filmmaking practice and a national video film practice. The emergence of diasporic filmmaking practice is attributed to the permeability of the nation-state and the increase of migration to the metropolis. Filmmakers like Martin Mhando and Josiah Kibira have moved from Tanzania and settled in Australia and the United State in an effort to make films that speak to a wider transnational audience.

The video film industry born out of the intersection and convergence of the global and the local is commercially motivated and has become the driving media, a popular art form that is both loved and accessible to its Tanzanian viewers. It has greatly been influence by Nigerian video films that dominated television scheduling in the mid and late 1990s and popularity of the video films has brought some contesting views between what are called professional filmmakers and amateur video filmmakers. Professional filmmakers are categorized as individuals who have studied filmmaking, primarily abroad with film projects funded by NGOs and international organizations, while video filmmakers are self trained and make commercial video films.

Professional filmmakers have lamented about the quality of the video films made by video filmmakers, criticizing them for their themes as well as their technical qualities. Video filmmakers in retaliation have responded by pointing out the popularity of their films and the financial independence they have as opposed to the donor funding that most of the professional filmmakers fight for. Currently the video film industry is economically viable, sustainable and entertaining and has become the staple diet for most Tanzanian viewers. The proliferation and success of the video film movement has been viewed by the government as a threat to Tanzanian mores and culture, thus the government has responded by strengthening control of the Film Act.
and its film censorship board, requiring all filmmakers to register with the film censorship board and the Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA).

By the time the Kikwete administration (2005–present) took office, the film industry had already shown signs of becoming a strong economic contender. But instead of relaxing the restrictions on film production, and meeting the demands of a new democratic country, the government through the new Film Act called for more centralized control, not only of the video film industry but also of programs aired on all television stations. The government seemed to regress to the stringent hold on the film industry of the 1960s and 70s. In this new Film Act the film censor board is empowered to monitor the production, distribution and exhibition of all video films and films screened on all television station in the country. Filmmakers and distributors are forced to register with the Copyright Society of Tanzania and the National Film Censorship Board. This way the administration controlled and monitored the kinds of cultural product that are being created by local producers of film.

Although the Kikwete government created more restrictive film policies, filmmakers and distributors found ways to bypass both the policies and the institutions they engendered. While filmmakers and distributors did register their works with the copyright society, they refused to take their films to the National Film Censorship Board for inspection and continued to make films that were consumed by not only Tanzanians but also by diasporic communities in the West.

This was made possible by five distribution companies; GMC Wasanii Promoters, Mwananchi Production, Mtitu Game Quality Production, KAPICO and Steps Entertainment who control the production and distribution of video films in Tanzania. These five distributing giants produce, via commissioning and or outright purchase of video films from filmmakers and distribute the films through their outlets and agents throughout the country. In marketing their
films, colorful posters, television ads, banners, film trailers and interviews are made, to generate recognition before a film is released into the market.

Because the video film industry is a profitable venture, piracy has become the number one nemesis of the video film industry. Piracy, conducted by dubious individuals, television stations and video rentals has been the thorn of many filmmakers and distribution companies. To combat piracy, filmmakers and distributors have reduced the price of their video films from 5,000 ($5) to 2,000 ($2) shillings to meet the piracy price. This has greatly reduced piracy but it has not eradicated it. To find other sources of revenue, distributors and filmmakers have expanded their business to countries as far as the United State and Nigeria and as near as Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. This has been achieved by adding English subtitles to the video films and creating border crossing themes such as in *From China with Love* and *From Dar to Lagos*.

While government continue to want to control the production of films in Tanzania, filmmakers have also been working hard to bypass the government by formulating alternative strategies and tools in getting their films to the public. Government insistence on continued control of the film industry reinforces the authoritative and undemocratic nature of the state and therefore an urgent need to critique and investigate the film industry rather than to accept the status quo. The need to examine the ownership concentration and control of media is critical in the hope of highlighting the uneven distribution of power and the role of the state and in the end, hoping to create a democratic alternative form of film production, distribution, and exhibition.

Scholars from North America and Europe (Schiller, Chomsky, McChesney, Mosco, Wasko) have concerned themselves predominantly with how Hollywood and Western media programs have come to dominate the international film market and how the state becomes involved and thus affects the development of a national cinema in other countries, especially in
developing nations. Ultimately, this phenomenon is indicative of how the capitalist development system has nourished inequalities of power. While Hollywood does have an impact on domestic film industries around the world, not all domestic film industries are affected by Hollywood. The film industry in Tanzania and countries such as Uganda and Ghana are affected by policies and legislation that have been put in place by their own governments.

This study reveals how different administrations have controlled the cultural/film sector, despite the social political and economic shift that has taken place in Tanzania. Each government has exercised its power to control the film industry differently but with the same force and determination. Although critical political economy of film has centered on how Hollywood has affected and marginalized other cinemas, it is important to pay attention to the internal dynamics of a local film industry. Hollywood has been at the forefront of investigation by North American scholars, ignoring the fact that there are countries whose cinema experience is not confined to Hollywood and for whom Hollywood is not the dominant film experience. This study hopes to expand the political economy discussion of African film by interrogating the inner working of domestic film production and the impact of government policies and legislation on the industry.

While it is true that the capitalist mode of operation creates and nourishes inequalities, this approach of analysis unintentionally suggests that other economic structures and ideologies do not create or have fewer inequalities, which is not the case. This study has revealed that during the Nyerere administration, characterized by its adoption of the Ujamaa (socialism and self-reliance) policy, a full attack on and control of the media was experienced. Individual expression was marginalized and banned at the expense of state-sanctioned identities. Therefore, in studying the structure of media ownership and control, the ideological or economic makeup of a country must come into consideration only when evaluating who owns and controls it and not
how power is maintained and reproduced. While in capitalist nations, government-backed
corporations may control and have power over the media, in postsocialist states such as China,
Vietnam, and Cuba, governments still own and control the media. Thus, inequality has no
ideology.

Third World political economy scholars have, like their North American counterparts,
examined how the presence of foreign films and foreign media companies has affected the
development of local programs and the domestic film industry. They have acknowledged the
negative effect of Western media upon domestic film production and have advocated for a media
policy that centers on the interests of the public and the need to develop and promote popular
forms of local media. What has not been brought to the debate is the interests of those in power.
Are those in power interested in creating a people-centered media policy or promoting a popular
form of local media? There is a fundamental reason why certain policies are created; they serve
the interests of their creators. The need to interrogate the workings of and establishment of
policies and institutions of power needs to be the agenda of critical political economy. As Mosco
and Wasko remind us, “The political economy of film must challenge the industry and offer a
sustained critique from a moral evaluative position” (2005: 11).

The analysis carried out by European and Third World scholars (Mattelart, Murdock,
Gillespie, Miege, Hamelink, Boafo, Rugumamu) that evaluates how foreign media threaten the
cultural development of developing nations sheds light on the influence of foreign cultural
products upon local and even pinpoints what ought to be done, but rarely does it examine local
dynamics and their influence on local cultural production. It either assumes that local dynamics
are subsumed and overpowered by foreign culture and therefore are passive and receptive to
foreign goods such as film. These states, as this study reveals, take a strong stance when it comes
to “defending” their cultural identity or values. All administrations, from Nyerere to Kikwete, have fought to control the film industry by demonizing foreign films and restricting their entry to the country and by creating policies and institutions that saw to it that only government-approved films were produced and exhibited to the public.

Despite stringent and concentrated control of the media industry by the government, the video film industry emerged. Filmmakers have bypassed and circumvented policies and institutions that were created to monitor and control them, and have produced popular films for the public, who consume them as fast as they hit the market. Popular forms of local media have been developed despite government control. By analyzing the workings and influence of government policies and institutions upon the film industry, a resistance to the application of the policies can be strategized and a truly people-centered local film production can flourish. This study has critiqued and interrogated the structure of power of the media industry, and has pointed out the prospects and challenges faced by filmmakers. By doing so, it is hoped a restructuring of the system will occur whereby people-centered views and aesthetics will replace those that are instituted by the government.

**Future Research**

Although the video film industry has put Tanzania on the world map as the second leading filmmaking country in Africa, very little documentation on the history or emergence of film in Tanzania is available. The history of film distribution and exhibition in Tanzania, especially prior to 1961, is nonexistent. Thus the need to study how film originated in Tanzania prior to independence and who controlled it will help to connect the past to the present and see if there are some comparisons. For example, the first cinema hall was established in Tanzania in 1906 and was run by a Tanzanian of Indian descent. In subsequent years commercial film
distribution and exhibition was the purview of Tanzanians of Indian descent. Was there a connection between the former Indian distributors and the present Indian video film distributors? Thus the study would be from 1906 to the present and specifically examine the hold on the industry by Tanzanians of Indian descent. How did it come to be a domain of the Tanzanian Indian, where did they get their films, who was their audience, and what social and political maneuvering took place with the colonial administration? A social-historical perspective of Tanzanian Indians and film distribution and exhibition in Tanzania will help understanding the origin of film in Tanzania and shed some light on its future standing. Another pertinent study is the reception of video film. What factors influence the popularity of these video films? Is it the themes, genre, or star power? Who are the primary consumers?

There has always been a contentious relationship between independent film producers, video filmmakers, and television stations. Independent producers have blamed television stations for the slow development of quality films, while video filmmakers have accused television stations of their ties to video film piracy. Regardless of these claims television still plays an important role in the promotion of video films and it is thus important to understand the workings of television stations and how they relate to the promotion and development of the film industry.

This study has revealed the impact of government policies and legislation on the film industry in Tanzania and how with the power to legislate and formulate policy, the governments of different administrative eras have continuously, with different mechanisms, controlled the cultural/film sector of Tanzania. But despite the tight control, as chapter four and five have illustrated, popular resistance emerged and bypassed the mechanisms put forth and created local films that spoke to the people and questioned government-sanctioned cultural identities and
values. It is hoped governments would see this resistance as a sign of change, a sign that restrictive film rules and policies no longer apply and will not be accepted in the new globalized Tanzania.
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Appendix A

Interview Subjects

The following is a list of individuals interviewed. I have categorized them into seven groupings, although many of them intersect and fit into more than one.

A. Government Cultural Officials

Prof. Hermus Mwasoko:
- Commissioner of Culture, Language and Development at the Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports
- Professor of Kiswahili at the University of Dar es Salaam

Rashid Masimbi:
- Executive secretary of the Tanzanian Theatre Center (tzTc)
- Former Commissioner of Culture, Language, and Development at the Ministry of Education and Culture
- Principal of the Bagamoyo College of Arts
- Board member of the National Film Censorship

Dr. John Ndagala:
- Commissioner of the Cultural Desk at UNESCO
- Former Commissioner of Culture, Language and Development at the Ministry of Education and Culture
- Designer of the Cultural Policy document

Gonche Materego:
- Executive Secretary of the National Arts Council
- The founder and CEO of Dar Talent Studio (DTS), a media production house

Robert Kayombo:
- Executive Director of the National Museum/cultural house
Rose Sayore:
- Executive Secretary of the Cultural Trust Fund
- Chairperson of the National Film Censorship Board
- Former employee of National Arts Council
- The Government Film Unit (GFU)
- The Audio Visual Institute (AVI)

Philemon Mwansanga:
- Program Officer of the Cultural Trust Fund

Egnacious Mkinga:
- Executive Secretary of the COSOTA

Lilian Beleko:
- Executive Secretary of the National Film Censorship Board

Makaraghe Shekaraghe Nkinda:
- Film inspector at the National Film Censorship Board

Peter Msuya:
- Film inspector at the National Film Censorship Board

B. **Government Filmmakers**

Siril Kaunga:
- Retired government filmmaker employed by:
  - The Government Film Unit (GFU)
  - The Audio Visual Institute (AVI)
  - The National Television (TVT)

Saileni Dickson:
- Retired government filmmaker employed by:
  - The Government Film Unit (GFU)
  - The Audio Visual Institute (AVI)
  - The National Television (TVT)
John Mponguliana:
- Retired government filmmaker employed by:
  - The government Film Unit (GFU)
  - The Audio Visual Institute (AVI)
Dick Kaombwe:
- Production supervisor at Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC)
- Former employee of the Audio Visual Institute (AVI)

C. Independent Filmmakers

Martin Mhando:
- Artistic director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) (2006-present)
- Film professor at the Murdoch University in Australia
- An independent filmmaker
- Former government filmmaker at the Tanzania Film Company (TFC)
- Director of *Yomba Yomba* (1985)
- Co-director of *Maangamizi: the Ancient One* (2001)

Ron Mulhivill:
- An independent filmmaker
- Co-director of *Harusi Ya Mariamu* (1986)
- Co-director of *Maangamizi: the Ancient One* (2001)

Imruh Bakar:
- CEO of Savannah Films production
- A film producer
- Former artistic director of the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) (2001-2006)

Beatrix Mugishagwe:
- CEO of Abantu Vision production
- Film director and producer
Pius Mota:
  • Production manager of Abantu vision production

Maria Sarungi:
  • CEO of Compact media production
  • Film director and producer

Carrie Matiku:
  • CEO of Afrikan Image production
  • Film director and producer

D. Video Filmmakers

William Mtitu:
  • Video filmmaker
  • CEO of Five Effects video production company

George Otieno Tyson:
  • Video filmmaker

Hemmie Rajab:
  • Video filmmaker

M-isho Mpoto:
  • Poet
  • Actor
  • Video filmmaker

Irene Sanga:
  • Poet
  • Actor
  • Video filmmaker

Issa Musa Hamisi:
  • Video filmmaker
E. **Film Distributors**

Solank Delish:
- Managing Director of, One Step Ahead Entertainment

Ignatus Kambarage:
- Marketing Manager of KAPICO Distribution and Production

F. **Academicians**

Prof. Penina Mlama:
- The Executive Director of the Campaign for Female education (Camfed)
- Playwright
- Actor
- Cultural activists
- Former Executive Director of Forum for African Women Educationalist (FAWE)
- Former Chief Academic Officer at the University of Dar es Salaam
- Former theatre professor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar es Salaam

Dr. Augustine Hatar:
- Professor of mass communication at the Mass Media and Journalism School
- Independent filmmaker
- Former professor of Television and Radio at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar es Salaam

Dr. Herbert Makoye:
- Head of the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar es Salaam
- Board member of National Arts Council
- Former member of the broadcasting services content committee

Prof. Elias Jengo:
- Art professor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar es Salaam
- Former member of the National Film Censorship Board
Edwin Semzaba:
- Professor of theatre at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar Es Salaam
- Playwright

S. Belleghe:
- Cinematographer
- Studio Instructor at the Department of Fine and Performing Arts at the University of Dar Es Salaam
- Former employee of the Tanzania Film Company (TFC)

G. Non-Governmental Organization

Ussu Mallya:
- Executive Secretary of Tanzanian Gender Networking Program (TGNP)
Appendix B

CULTURAL POLICY
(POLICY STATEMENT)

INTRODUCTION

The Cultural Policy (Sera ya Utamaduni) was inaugurated on the 23rd of August, 1997 in Dodoma. The policy document is in Kiswahili, the national language, to make it accessible to most Tanzanians. However, it is realized that the implementation of the Policy stands to gain from the participation and support of many different parties who may not understand Kiswahili.

In order to link-up with such parties we are publishing translations of the policy statements contained in the Kiswahili publication of the Cultural Policy titled Sera ya Utamaduni.

Ministry of Education and Culture

September, 1997
THE CULTURAL POLICY

POLICY STATEMENTS

1. LANGUAGE

1.1 The National Language

1.1.1 Kiswahili shall be pronounced the National Language and this
pronouncement shall be incorporated in the Constitution of the United
Republic of Tanzania.

1.1.2 There shall be incentives to encourage individuals and organization to
publish and disseminate Kiswahili publications.

1.1.3 The National Kiswahili Council shall be responsible for research into, and
the promotion of Kiswahili.

1.1.4 The National Kiswahili Council and other institutions responsible for the
promotion of Kiswahili shall be strengthened and adequately resourced in
order to enable them to discharge their functions.

1.1.5 Vernacular languages shall continue to be used as resource for the
development of Kiswahili.

1.2 Vernacular Languages

1.2.1 Our people shall continue to use and be proud of their vernacular
languages.

1.2.2 Communities, private and public organization shall be encouraged to
research, write, preserve and translate vernacular languages into other
languages.

1.2.3 The writing of vernacular language dictionaries and grammar books shall
be encouraged.

1.2.4 Public and private organizations shall be encouraged to publish and
disseminate vernacular language materials.

1.3 Foreign Languages

1.3.1 English shall be a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and
secondary education levels and shall be encouraged in higher education. In
addition the teaching of English shall be strengthened.

1.3.2 The teaching of other foreign languages such as French, Portuguese and
Russian shall be encouraged.
1.4 The Medium of Instruction

1.4.1 A special programme to enable the use of Kiswahili as a medium of instruction in education and training at all levels shall be designed and implemented.

1.4.2 Kiswahili shall be a compulsory subject in pre-primary, primary and secondary education and shall be encouraged in higher education. In addition the teaching of Kiswahili shall be strengthened.

2. ARTS AND CRAFTS

2.1.1 The National Arts Council shall collaborate with and promote artists and the arts. Furthermore it shall collect and disseminate information about prices and markets of the products of cultural industries to individual artists and organization. Moreover the Council shall encourage artists to participate in different festival and exhibitions.

2.1.2 Pre-primary, primary, secondary education and teacher’s college curricula shall include art subjects, e.g. Music, fine arts, handicraft and theater arts. Furthermore these subjects shall be examinable in continuous assessment and final examinations of these levels of education.

2.1.3 Artists shall be encouraged to form associations for the purpose of promoting and safeguarding their interests.

2.1.4 Government shall establish a mechanism for identifying and honoring renown national artists.

2.1.5 Artists shall be required to advocate the need for protecting the environment

2.1.6 Artists shall be required to mobilize the public to preserve and safeguard the environment.

2.1.7 Cultural industries shall be identified and encouraged to contribute towards national economic development.

2.1.8 Institutions responsible for the marking of Tanzanian products shall be encouraged to recognize and advertise Tanzanian artists and music products

2.1.9 Government shall insure that a national ultra modern art gallery is constructed. The public shall be sensitized to set aside places for exhibitions.

2.1.10 Government shall continue to set aside and protect places earmarked for handicraft, art exhibitions and music performances both in rural and urban areas.

2.1.11 There shall be incentives to individuals and various organizations to establish and manage exhibition halls.
3. CULTURAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT

3.1 Civic Responsibilities

3.1.1 The protection and promotion of our cultural heritage is a civic responsibility and shall be supervised by Government.

3.1.2 Members of the public, plus private and public organizations shall be sensitized to cultural heritage. The close links between culture, natural resources, the environment and development programmes shall be emphasized.

3.1.3 Cultural heritage sites shall be used as educational resources and tourist attractions.

3.1.4 In providing education and training all curricula shall emphasize the use of cultural heritage sites, museums, archives, libraries, natural physical formations and vegetation.

3.1.5 Mechanism shall be established to enable the nation to identify, own and preserve national treasures e.g. art objects, natural resources, minerals, as well as archaeological, paleontological and botanical remains.

3.1.6 Cultural heritage sites shall be identified delineated and developed including the establishment of site museums.

3.1.7 Government shall ensure that private and public offices recognize the value of records and archival material in their possession and preserve them as our nation’s history and culture bearers.

3.1.8 Records management shall be taught to all administrators, new employees and in all office Management Training institutions.

3.1.9 All leaders at place of work shall be responsible for the management of records created in the day to day discharge of their responsibilities.

3.1.10 Government shall encourage regions, districts, villages, private and public institutions to establish and manage museums, libraries and archival centers.

3.1.11 All man-made objects shall become national monuments on attaining the age of one hundred years.

3.2 Cultural Resource Assessment

3.2.1 All land development shall be preceded by Cultural Resource Impact Studies. The cost for undertaking these studies shall be incorporated in the budgets of the respective development projects.
3.3 **Aquatic Cultural Resources**

3.3.1 Underwater Cultural resources such as shipwrecks shall be identified, documented and legally protected.

3.4 **Regional and District Books**

3.4.1 The practice of Administrative officers writing and keeping Regional and District Books for the purpose of portraying the characteristics of the communities of the respective regions and districts shall be revived.

3.5 **Cultural and Environmental Conservation**

3.5.1 Traditional knowledge, skills and technology which are environmentally friendly shall be identified and their use encouraged.

3.5.2 Research on traditions and customs which are supportive of environmental conservation shall be encouraged with a view to identifying and popularizing their use.

3.5.3 Research of traditions and customs which lead to environmental destruction shall be encouraged with a view of identifying and discarding them.

3.5.4 Various art forms, shall be used to encourage the use of existing environmentally friendly traditions and customs and in disseminating the research results.

4. **RECREATION**

4.1.1 The press i.e., radio, television and newspapers shall encourage the observance of our values, traditions, customs and culture.

4.1.2 Radio and television programmes and times when such programmes are aired shall take cognizance of national values, customs and traditions. In addition, such stations shall be encouraged to give more air-time to Tanzanian music and arts.

4.1.3 Open spaces and recreation grounds for children and elderly persons shall be set aside and protected.

4.1.4 Individuals, the public and various organizations shall be encouraged to establish and manage recreation facilities.

4.1.5 There shall be incentives to local producers of recreation equipment and materials so that such equipment becomes easily available and at affordable costs.

4.1.6 Government shall ensure that available recreational activities do not distort our national values and ethics.
4.1.7 It shall be ensured that research into traditional recreational activities is undertaken and the findings disseminated in order to facilitate the teaching of these activities.

4.1.8 Sportsmen and sportswomen as well as artists shall be sensitized to know their rights and obligations.

4.1.9 Community Centers all over the country shall be used for community development and recreational activities. Where such centers do not exist, their establishment shall be encouraged.

4.1.10 Employers, including Government institutions and individuals, shall recognize the importance and relevance of recreation at workplaces in improving productivity and fostering the health of their employees.

4.1.11 Non-Competitive sports and non-competitive artistic activities shall be encouraged and promoted so that they become important aspects of recreation.

4.1.12 The public shall be sensitized to realize that sports are important in building a healthy body and mind, and fostering discipline, cooperation and international relations.

4.1.13 Land-use and settlement planning shall take into consideration the need to set aside and maintain recreational areas.

4.1.14 There shall be incentives to individuals and organizations to establish factories for local production of various recreational equipment and materials.

5. CULTURE AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

5.1.1 Every citizen must recognize that participation in one’s culture is a basic right.

5.1.2 Special programmes shall be established to enable women to participate fully in cultural activities.

5.1.3 The public shall be sensitized to participate fully in various cultural activities including recreation and sports.

5.1.4 It shall be ensured that all cultural institutions conduct their affairs in a democratic and transparent way, and according to the laws, with a view to encouraging wider community participation.

5.1.5 The public shall be mobilized to form associations for the different aspects of culture.

5.1.6 Sports-for-all programmes and festivals shall be encouraged and promoted.

5.1.7 The public, private and public companies and corporations shall be required to join hands in making sure that there are places, equipment, materials and conducive environment to allow the public full participation in cultural activities.

5.1.8 Special mechanism and programmes shall be established to enable elderly persons and the disabled to participate fully in various cultural activities.
The public shall remain free to earn a living from cultural activities in accordance with the law.

6. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 Bringing up Children

6.1.1 The family shall be respected as a basic and important institution in our social organization and shall be the basic for fostering ethics, education, training and culture.

6.1.2 The role of religious institutions in fostering value, education, training and culture shall be recognized.

6.1.3 Good customs and traditions shall be identified, enhanced and utilized in molding a peaceful, respectable and harmonious nation.

6.1.4 All programmes relating to child care, education and training shall recognize the important role played by women in the promotion of better upbringing of children as well as inculcating culture.

6.1.5 Research on child upbringing, customs, traditions and the environment shall be encouraged and the results of such research shall be used in the betterment of education and training.

6.1.6 A system of documenting, preserving and publishing cultural statistics and information shall be established.

6.1.7 Parents and the society at large shall be encouraged to respect values and good traditions and customs of child upbringing.

6.1.8 Government and the people shall ensure that the rights of the child are not violated.

6.1.9 Government shall ensure that children of school-going age go to school and that school curricula incorporate Tanzanian values including respect for human dignity, gender equity, care for property as well as respect for good traditions and customs.

6.1.10 Educational and training institutions shall recognize and utilize good customs and traditions in preparing your for responsible parenthood.

6.1.11 Religious institutions shall be part and parcel of child upbringing so as to emphasize moral values, respect for work, human dignity and the spirit of tolerance.

6.1.12 Mechanisms shall be put in place to enable street children to obtain better upbringing, education and skills for respectable living.

6.1.13 The public shall be sensitized to realize that patriotism, respect for work, cleanliness, and the protection of the environment and natural resources are part and parcel of our culture.
6.2 **Education and Training**

6.2.1 Government shall encourage the establishment of educational and training institutions for the teaching of different cultural professions.

6.2.2 Traditional technology and apprenticeship shall be recognized and promoted to become part of vocational education and training.

6.2.3 Government shall encourage the teaching of museology, archaeology, archival and library studies in institutions of higher education and training.

6.2.4 Government shall strengthen colleges of arts, sports, library and archival studies, and shall establish a college for architectural conservation.

6.2.5 Curricula for primary, secondary and teacher education shall incorporate the teaching of art subject such as music, fine art, sculpture and the performing arts. Furthermore, these subjects shall be examinable in the final examinations of these levels of education.

6.2.6 All forms of education shall recognize and encourage the use of museums, sites, monuments, libraries and archives as teaching and training resources.

6.2.7 Reading, writing, and counting skills shall be recognized as being part of our culture and shall be promoted.

6.2.8 Individuals as well as various organizations shall be allowed to establish, own and manage institutions for education and training in the fields of culture. Rules and regulations governing the establishment and running of these institutions shall be instituted.

6.2.9 Functionaries of the Cultural Sector shall be required to pursue further education and training in their respective specialization in order to enhance productivity and efficiency.

6.2.10 The public shall be sensitize to set own goals in life, accept competition, adopt modern technology in production, assess productivity, and keep records of daily activities.

7. **THE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES**

7. **Management**

7.1.1 The Cultural sector shall continue to be part of the Government Structure.

7.1.2 Government shall have a Cultural Policy and shall supervise its implementation. In addition, Government shall review all culture related legislation.

7.1.3 Institutions responsible for culture shall be strengthened by providing them with adequate facilities as well as appropriately qualified personnel.
7.1.4 There shall be officers responsible for the Cultural Sector at regional and district levels. These officers shall be assisted by specialists in the fields of Sports, Arts, Languages, Archives and Antiquities.

7.1.5 Principal cultural managers at national, regional and district levels shall have a University degree, professional competence in any field related to culture, training in management and administration, and working experience.

7.1.6 Principal cultural managers at national, regional and district levels shall be responsible for coordinating and supervising the implementation of the Cultural Policy and other activities related to culture in their areas of jurisdiction.

7.1.7 Heads of colleges and institutions providing education and training in the fields of culture shall be required to have at least a Masters degree in one of the disciplines related to culture.

7.1.8 Principal cultural managers at national, regional, district and heads of education and training institutions shall get training in management and administration in order to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently.

7.1.9 The Ministry responsible for Culture shall establish a system of registration and regulation of training in those skills which may be misused to threaten people’s lives and property such as wrestling, magic/Kung Fu, boxing and other martial arts.

7.1.10 Government shall establish a mechanism for the registration of cultural education and training institutions and professionals in the different cultural fields with a view to avoiding a decline in professional standards as well as ensuring that the rules and regulations are not breached.

7.1.11 The National Museums of Tanzania, the National Arts Council of Tanzania, the National Sports Council, the National Kiswahili Council of Tanzania and the Film Censorship Board shall provide advice on the establishment and management of similar institutions at regional, district and village levels.

7.1.12 Existing national laws shall be translated and published in Kiswahili so as to enable the majority of the people to read and understand them.

7.1.13 Stiffer penalties shall be imposed on all those found guilty of violating laws and regulations protecting our national values and ethics.

7.2 National Values and Identity

7.2.3 Symbols of national identity such as Mount Kilimanjaro, the Giraffe, the National Flag, the National Anthem, the Uhuru Torch, the Coast of Arms, etc…shall be given legal recognition so that the people can understand, respect and protect them in a fitting manner.
7.2.4 The basic principles of the Constitution shall be taught to all students at primary and secondary school levels along with civic responsibilities.

7.2.5 The National Anthem shall be taught to all pupils starting from pre-primary school level.

7.2.6 The National Anthem shall be sung daily in pre-primary, primary, and secondary schools before classes start.

7.2.7 All people shall be required to stand up and sing the National Anthem before the commencement of national and international arts and sports events.

7.2.8 Hoisting of tattered or faded National Flag shall be prohibited. Government shall institute regulations and make them public as to when and where the national flag may be hoisted or used.

7.2.9 The Uhuru Torch shall continue to be raced throughout the country and Government shall ensure that it is respected.

7.2.10 There shall be public participation in the selection of area, district, regional, and national names and symbols. Physical features and indigenous flora and fauna shall be considered when designing or selecting new symbols. The existing symbols shall be publicized to enable the public to know them and give them due respect.

7.2.11 Special songs shall be composed and taught to pupils and the public in general so that they become part of national identity.

7.2.12 There shall be designed special costumes that shall become part of our national identity.

7.3 Copyright

7.3.3 Government shall establish an institution to oversee copyright matters.

7.3.4 Tanzania shall ratify and join copyright conventions and organizations, respectively, such as the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention.

7.3.5 The operationalization and review of existing Copyright-related laws shall be expedited in order to update them and accommodate changes in technology.

7.4 Culture and Social Development

7.4.1 The people shall be mobilized to realize their prime obligations to protect and conserve cultural heritage and the environment in their respective towns, villages and localities.
7.4.2 The people shall be sensitized to identify and honour people with special
talents in the various fields of culture.

7.4.3 People with special talents in various fields of culture shall be encouraged
to recognize themselves as such, become self-confident, use their talents to
earn a living and improve their standard of life as well as educate the
public and enhance national values.

7.4.4 People with special skills which may endanger public safety and property
shall be identified and be required to abide by rules and regulations in
order to prevent the misuse of their skills.

7.4.5 People with special skills and talents shall be encouraged to pass on their
skills to others.

7.4.6 The Education and Culture Committees of the Local Governments shall be
mobilized to co-ordinate and enhance cultural activities by, say,
delineation and protection of areas set aside for recreation, sports, cultural
heritage and the establishment and management of museums and
community centers.

7.5 Financing Cultural Activities

7.5.1 Government shall mobilize and involve individuals, various organizations,
and the public at large to contribute towards the financing of cultural
activities.

7.5.2 Various cultural groups, clubs and councils shall be encouraged to become
self financing and self-reliant.

7.5.3 Institutes and colleges providing education and training in cultural fields
shall charge fees. These fees shall be used to meet the operational costs of
the prospective institutions and colleges.

7.5.4 Cultural institutions shall charge fees for services rendered. These funds
shall be used to promote specific areas of competence.

7.5.5 Government shall institute entertainment tax to be used in financing
cultural development.

7.5.6 Cultural education and training institutions shall be encouraged to have
income-generating activities.

7.5.7 Services and goods that shall be rendered and produced by cultural
institutions shall be sold at market prices.

7.5.8 Individual and various organizations shall be encouraged to invest in the
cultural sector.
Appendix C

Video Film Rental and Posters
DVD Covers of Video Films

Poster of Video Films
Poster of Video Films

The Making of a Video Film
The Making of a Video Film