

Public Messages, Private Support: Base Reaction to Presidential Rhetoric

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Abstract

President George W. Bush's attempt to reform Social Security in 2005 provides an opportunity to test the effects of presidential rhetoric on public support. I analyze survey data taken before and after President Bush's public campaign and I utilize a survey experiment conducted in May 2005 to measure the effects of his public campaign on support for his Social Security proposal. My analysis separates members of President Bush's core constituents from the general public. My findings show that, in general, support for the proposal declined after the public campaign, but that the public campaign successfully increased support for the Social Security proposal among President Bush's core constituents. I argue that modern presidents use the 'bully pulpit' to speak to their core supporters.

Introduction

Public support is a strategic asset for the president in pursuing his policy goals with Congress (Neustadt 1980). Conventional wisdom holds that some of our most effective presidents achieved their policy goals because they were adept in their appeals to the public for support. And indeed some evidence shows that a president has considerable ability to move public attention through a well-crafted public address (Cohen 1995a; Tulis 1987; Cohen 1995b). But more recently a number of studies suggest that the conventional wisdom is wrong and presidents are not very effective in their appeals to the public (Edwards 2003; Edwards 2007; Edwards 2009).

In part, we may have witnessed a decline in presidential influence over public attention and opinion that may be the result of developments in the modern era. For example, the proliferation of different media sources has made it increasingly difficult for the President to speak directly to the American public without the filter of the media. The major television networks are unlikely to broadcast live presidential addresses aside from messages regarding scandals, military actions, or the State of the Union address (Edwards 2003; Kernell 2007).

In addition, there are segments of the population that presidents are unable to reach. Partisan labels can have considerable influence on how information is processed, and political ideology and party identification are persistent and become more crystallized with age (Sears and Funk 1999; Rahn 1993). Fischle showed that people who already liked Bill Clinton maintained their high approval ratings of his presidency during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. “Prior attitudes toward Clinton very strongly influenced the tendency to perceive the scandal as nothing more than a conspiracy.” (Fischle 2000). Although the promise of moving public opinion through public addresses exists, the public is more difficult to reach, less likely to tune in, and very unlikely to be moved by a president from a different party.

But if some partisans tune out a president who does not share their party label, then it is possible that presidential appeals to the public can still have an influence on those who belong to the president’s party, and perhaps even some independents. In fact, while analysis of national polls may show little or no change following presidential appeals, population sub-groups, such as partisans, may simply be shifting in opposite directions but these changes are masked at the aggregate level.

Because the conflicting arguments in the literature do not clearly settle the question of presidential influence, my project explores the impact of George W. Bush’s public campaign to reform Social Security on public opinion among his core constituents. I argue that although it is unlikely these public appeals increased support for his proposal among the general population, Bush may have only been trying to influence support amongst his partisan base, and that is where our attention should be focused.

I begin with an overview of the literature on presidential rhetorical power and the use of issue framing to increase the salience of issues. I then describe the 2005 public campaign by George W. Bush to generate support for his plan to reform Social Security. My discussion suggests that George W. Bush thought he had a mandate after the 2004 presidential election to reform Social Security and his public campaign was an integral part of his effort to garner support among his base constituents for his plan and properly frame the issue for his core constituents. Based on the theoretical overview I examine individual-level partisan support for Bush's proposal to reform Social Security. I employ data from two national surveys; one conducted before Bush began his public campaign and the other shortly after he began his public campaign. In addition, I examine data from a survey that was conducted at the end of the public campaign because it contains an experimental treatment of individual-level responses. My analysis suggests that general support for president Bush's proposal declined after his public campaign, while support for his proposal increased among his core constituents. I argue that models of presidential rhetorical powers that focus exclusively on general public opinion are too constrained. I explore the implications of my findings and offer suggestions for future research.

Theoretical Overview

The literature on presidential rhetorical power¹ is mixed. Some argue (Edwards 2003; Edwards 2007; Kernell 2007; Collier and Sullivan 1995) that presidents do not have the ability to move public opinion through public addresses, others argue that the president can, under certain conditions, move public opinion and change the public's

¹ "Rhetorical powers," "going public", "public appeals", and the "Bully Pulpit" all refer to the same phenomenon of a president using a public address in an attempt to sway public opinion. For convenience, I will use the term "rhetorical powers" in this paper, unless quoting an author that uses a different term.

policy preferences by effectively appealing to the public (Cohen 1995a; Druckman and Holmes 2004)

Continuing the work of Neustadt, many scholars focus on the president's ability to use presidential rhetorical powers to influence Congress and bring about his desired policy outcomes. This research also has mixed results with some arguing that high presidential approval ratings lead to congressional passage of the presidential agenda (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Ostrom Jr and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985) and others arguing for a more nuanced view of presidential rhetorical powers that includes the dynamics of Congress and issue salience (Lockerbie et al. 1998; Borrelli and Simmons 1993; Canes-Wrone 2006). Edwards even contends that presidential rhetorical powers should no longer be considered an element of presidential leadership, since presidents lack the ability to persuade the public (Edwards 2009)

Taking an issue public is a risky proposition for any president. Once an issue becomes publicized, defeat is also publicized (Kernell 1997). 'Staying private,' or limiting the scope of conflict, may be the best option, depending on the goal a president seeks to achieve (Covington 1987). Canes-Wrone (2006) uses a spatial model to develop a "Public Appeals Theory" of when and why a president uses appeals to the public. She argues that under certain conditions a president can use his rhetorical skills to affect policy outcomes in Congress. A president's success from appealing to the public depends on strategically choosing initiatives that are complex and salient (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2008). She also argues that if the president cannot alter existing opinion he has the incentive to publicize already popular initiatives in order to bolster public presidential approval. Finally, she argues, a president should avoid publicizing unpopular

initiatives if citizens perceive that his policy goals differ from their own (Canes-Wrone 2006).

Jacobson has tracked the changes in partisanship among members of Congress and the electorate. He shows that the ideological distance on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale of the electoral constituencies of the two parties have more than doubled from 1972-2000. He also shows that Congressional districts have become much more ideologically homogeneous. As congressional districts have become more ideologically homogeneous, Congress has become more polarized. More to the point, Jacobson finds, "...a discernable secular trend toward lower presidential approval by opposition party identifiers." from 1952-2000 (Jacobson 2006). Consistent with the evidence from the introduction (Kernell 2007), greater polarization among the electorate leads to less responsiveness from the electorate to a presidential appeal. As the people become more ideologically heterogeneous, a president's ability to persuade them will diminish.

In her study on the use of presidential polls, Diane Heith used archived documents from the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations to examine how presidents use internal polls. She finds that each of these presidents used internal polls after elections in order to identify their constituents and their preferences. For example, after Nixon coined the phrase "Silent Majority," his pollsters went to great lengths to identify them, not by party or group affiliation, but by their attitudes contrary to those of the students protesting against the Vietnam War. The second major purpose of presidential polls is to allow the president to test phrases before major speeches to see how his target audience will respond. In short, "Polls allow presidents to bridge the gap of understanding

between elites and masses and to create rhetoric that appeals to a supportive audience for proposed policies.” Internal polls are used by presidents to identify their constituents, identify their constituent preferences, and shape the message their constituents hear to maintain or increase their support (Heith 2000). Jacobs and Shapiro concur. They argue that presidents carefully track public opinion in order to identify the words, arguments and symbols that are most likely to win public support for their desired policies. Their analysis of the use of internal polling from Kennedy to Reagan led them to conclude that the White House is better positioned than in the past to manipulate public opinion, and that presidents use internal polls to design the presentation of already decided policies (Shapiro and Jacobs 2002).

Modern presidents make public appeals more frequently than early presidents, but the evidence suggests presidents have very limited capacity to move general public opinion (Edwards 2003). This paradox can be explained with a more precise understanding of the purpose behind presidential appeals to the public. The current literature emphasizes the presidents’ ability to move general public opinion, in this thesis, I argue for a different interpretation of presidential rhetorical powers. I argue that when presidents appeal to the public, they are not really trying to appeal to the general population; they are appealing to their core constituents—the party base and those who were strong and early supporters of the president.

The enormous increase in spending on presidential polling adds to the credence of my hypothesis. Presidents spend more money on internal polls, because the polls are working as expected. Presidents today are likely to use their internal polls for the same

purposes that presidents in the past used internal polls; to build their constituent base and to help them shape their message.

Framing and Priming Effects

Framing is a psychological tool that presidents use to shape public opinion among their core constituents. Framing is different from persuasion. There are two types of framing effects, equivalency (valence) framing and issue framing effects. Equivalency framing occurs when the same information is presented in a more positive or more negative way in order to change the way a person thinks about that information. Equivalency frames can override individual preferences and cause people to respond to the loudest or last frame (Druckman 2004).² Chong and Druckman argue that issue frames and priming describe the same process and the two terms can be used interchangeably (Chong and Druckman 2007).

Meanwhile, "...priming occurs when media attention to an issue causes people to place special weight on it when constructing evaluations of overall presidential job performance." When a mass communication places greater emphasis on an issue, that issue will receive greater weight and attention from the public (Miller and Krosnick 2000). The media's greatest impact is not in changing people's minds, but in influencing the importance voters place on issues (Kelleher and Wolak 2006; Zaller 1992).

Issue framing is a tool used by elites to alter the weight and importance of considerations. Political elites frame issues in a particular way not only to simplify issues for the public, but to circumscribe the considerations they take seriously (Nelson and

² Equivalency frames are not an effective tool for presidential rhetoric, I mention them here to keep my concept of issue framing clear.

Kinder 1996). “He who determines what politics is about runs the country”

(Schattschneider 1960). When elites hold up a clear picture of what is to be done, the public tends to see things from that point of view.

Ambivalence in the electorate does not come from ignorance, but from the inability to commit unequivocally to a single policy position. Frames provide the direction for resolving this uncertainty in opinion by giving guidance about the relevance of these clashing considerations (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Issue content also seems to matter. Familiar and understandable issues are more likely to be primed than complex and difficult issues. An issue is advantageous for a candidate to prime when the public gives high evaluations to the candidate’s handling of the issue, when the public supports the candidate’s position on the issue, or when the public ranks the issue as politically important. The president can also emphasize bold and aggressive foreign policy initiatives to prime his image as an effective leader (Druckman et al. 2008). Iyengar offers two important caveats relevant to the thesis of this paper. First, people are less susceptible to framing influences when the issue is *highly* familiar and second, *preexisting beliefs* moderate framing effects (Iyengar 1991).

Implications for Presidential Influence

This discussion provides a theoretical foundation for some hypotheses about a president’s use of his rhetorical powers to solidify support among his core constituents. If a president were to detect from an internal poll that certain members of his core constituency were ambivalent toward a particular issue, the president could use a

presidential address, or a series of presidential addresses to frame the issue in a way that increased support among his base for a particular policy issue. The issue would have to be a familiar and uncomplicated issue that his base constituents believe the president is capable of handling, or it would have to be a bold foreign policy initiative.

This is precisely what happened during President Bush's 2005 campaign for Social Security reform. By the end of 2004, the public was growing tired of the war in Iraq, and support for the war was beginning to fade. Though the president might have chosen to focus his attention on foreign policy initiatives, as many previous presidents have, Bush had campaigned on his domestic policy agenda and thought he had a mandate to reform Social Security (Alberts 2005). A *CNN/USA Today/Gallup* poll conducted Dec. 12-14, 2004 showed that a majority of US adults disapproved of the decision to go to war in Iraq (Report 2009a). At approximately the same time, a *Fox News* poll conducted Dec. 14-15, 2009 showed that 60% of US adults thought that people should have the choice to invest their Social Security contributions. In addition, 74% of those surveyed by *ABC News/Washington Post* between Dec. 16-19, 2004 thought that the Social Security program was either "in crisis" or had "major problems" (Report 2009b). For a president that has just won an election, and is looking for an area in which to solidify his base and implement a policy agenda that will leave a lasting legacy, Social Security seemed to be the perfect issue. It was a salient, simply understood issue and the public's support of Bush in the previous election seemed to confirm that they trusted him on this issue. Thus, President Bush used frequent, public appeals to frame the issues in the Social Security debate in a way that would increase support for his policy proposal among his core constituency.

The 2005 Campaign to Reform Social Security

In his book, *Governing by Campaigning*, Edwards (2007) documents the attempt by President Bush in 2005 to move public opinion on Social Security Reform. According to Edwards, President Bush began his second term with less public support than other recently elected incumbents, without a clear mandate, and saw a dramatic decrease in his approval ratings drop as he tried to advance his domestic agenda. Congruent with the dominant view on presidential rhetoric, Edwards argues that Bush failed because he misread the public agenda and did not have high enough approval ratings to move public opinion. The strongest empirical evidence to support Edwards claim is a poll conducted by Pew Research Group in May 2005. They found, that by a 53% to 36% margin, Americans generally favored the idea of privatized social security accounts, but when the same idea is preceded by the phrase "George W. Bush has proposed..." the public was divided (45% in favor, 43% opposed) (Pew 2005). George W. Bush began his public campaign to change Social Security in January of 2005, this poll taken four months later is evidence that public support for the president's plan decreased when it was associated with him. By the end of his second term, Bush seems to agree with Edwards' assessment. In his final press briefing at the White House, when asked about mistakes he made as President, George W. Bush replied:

"I believe that running the Social Security idea right after the '04 elections was a mistake. I should have argued for immigration reform. And the reason why is, is that -- you know, one of the lessons I learned as governor of Texas, by the way, is legislative branches tend to be risk-adverse. In other words, sometimes legislatures have the tendency to ask, why should I take on a hard task when a crisis is not imminent? And the crisis was not imminent for Social Security as far as many members of Congress was concerned" (Bush 2009).

As presumptuous as it may seem to argue with Bush's ex-post evaluation of the situation, I argue that Bush believed he had a mandate from the public following the 2004 presidential election. In addition, Bush wanted to shift the public's focus away from the Iraq War and to establish a conservative legacy by reforming Social Security. The next sentence from Bush's statement above confirms that by 2009 he still thought that the 2004 presidential campaign was about Social Security; Bush continues:

“As an aside, one thing I proved is that you can actually campaign on the issue and get elected. In other words, I don't believe talking about Social Security is the third rail of American politics. I, matter of fact, think that in the future, not talking about how you intend to fix Social Security is going to be the third rail of American politics (Bush 2009).”

George W. Bush spent the 2004 presidential election campaigning on his domestic policy agenda. It is not astonishing, therefore, that he interpreted his victory in the election as a mandate to implement his domestic policy agenda. He had become the first president since his father to win the presidential election with an outright majority, his party gained seats in the House and Senate, and rightfully felt like he had earned some “political capital” (Lindberg 2004; Monitor 2004). When Bush said that he would “spend it,” he meant that he was going to implement the domestic agenda on which he had campaigned. His presidential strategy for implementing this policy involved a series of public addresses, rallies, and a State of the Union address. President Bush used internal polls to identify the language and symbols he should use to construct his message, and then used a series of public addresses to frame the issue for his base constituents. Potential change in opinion among George W. Bush's base before and after the public campaign provides the test for my hypotheses.

Hypotheses

The preceding discussion allows for the formulation of specific hypotheses. The dominant view concerning presidential rhetorical skill does not differentiate between support for the president among base constituents and support for the president among the general public, it should not be taken as a given that a president's base will support the president. Consistent with the dominant view, we should expect that as general support for a president declines support for the president among his base constituents should also decline.

Hypothesis 1) General support may decline, but support for Bush's plan will increase among his base after his public campaign to reform Social Security.

Hypothesis 1 is a test of the idea that President Bush was appealing to his base as opposed to the general public. Though a decline in general public support for President Bush's Social Security reform package has been documented, an increase in support for this proposal among his base shows that his appeals to the base were effective. It would confirm that presidential rhetorical powers have not diminished over time; they are simply most effective among the base constituents of a president.

Hypothesis 2) George W. Bush's base will be more likely to support a plan that includes his name as the author of the plan than a plan presented without his name.

This second hypothesis tests how effective the president uses issue framing to solidify support among the base. Individuals may not be aware of the specific details of President Bush's proposals, but they know that they trust him and they are supportive of the plan he proposed. This shows that the symbols, words, and ideas President Bush used in his

public appeals were effective in increasing support for his proposal among those to whom they were targeted.

Variable Conceptualization and Measurement

The test for my first hypothesis comes from a dataset that was created by pooling responses from two different surveys collected for the Pew Research Center by Princeton Survey Research International. The first survey was conducted from December 1 to December 16, 2004 using telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample of 2,000 adults living in the US. The second survey was conducted from February 16 to February 21, 2005 using telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample of 1,502 adults living in the US. Each survey asked a question with the same wording that measured the level of support for private social security accounts (see Appendix for full question wording). I created a pooled database that has the responses for this question (coded 1 if they support the proposal and 0 if they do not). The response to this question in the February survey is the dependent variable for my model that tests Hypothesis 1. The survey in December was conducted before George W. Bush began his public campaign for his social security proposal. During the period between these two surveys President Bush gave a State of the Union address, several televised addresses and conducted his “60 stops in 60 days” campaign to promote his social security proposal (Edwards and King 2007). The February, 2005 survey is an opportunity to test the effect President Bush’s public campaign for Social Security reform had on public opinion.

Independent Variables: Edwards (2007) has already documented the decline in general public opinion following this public campaign, but I test the effect this public campaign had on support among George W. Bush's core partisan constituents. The dependent variable is dichotomous, so I use a Logit model. I use the standard controls for age, income and education. Education is a 1 to 7 point scale with 1 representing those with no education or only grades 1-8, and 7 representing those that have completed any post-graduate training. The independent variable 'February Respondent' represents individuals who took part in the February 2005 survey. This is a dichotomous variable coded 0 for those who took the survey in December 2004 and 1 for participants in the February survey. Given the general trend of opinion, I expect those who were surveyed in February to be less likely to support the reform proposal.

'Heard Proposal' is also a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent heard about Bush's proposal and 0 if they had not. Respondents were also coded 1 if female and 0 if male. George W. Bush split the Hispanic and Asian vote, but eight out of ten African Americans supported Bush's opponent (McFadden et al. 2004). For this reason, race was coded 1 for African American respondents and 0 for everyone else; this magnifies the effect of race allowing for more stringent control.

Other variables are included that would capture support from George W. Bush's core constituents. In the 2004 presidential election, four out of five of those who attended church at least once a week voted for Bush (Langfitt 2004). The variable Church Attendance is a scale with 1 representing those that attend church once a week and 6 representing those that never attend church. Although George W. Bush received a lot of support from voters of all religious groups, white born-again Christian voters were

his strongest supporters (Goodstein et al. 2004). For this reason, I include a variable that is coded 1 for born-again Christians and zero for all other religious affiliations. Finally, I include variables designed to capture political ideology and party identification. The variable Democrat is coded 1 if a respondent is a Democrat and 0 for all other responses, Republican is coded the same with 1 representing Republicans. Ideology is a 1 to 7 point scale with 1 being very conservative and 7 being very liberal.

The results presented in Table 1 show some preliminary support for Hypothesis 1. Overall, those that heard about the Social Security proposal were less likely to support the Social Security proposal after the State of the Union address in February 2005. In addition, the more ideologically liberal, the more likely a respondent is to oppose the proposal after hearing the State of the Union address. The coefficient for those that approve of George W. Bush in the survey indicates that they were more likely to support his proposal.

Results and Discussion

Table 1: Support for Social Security Proposal after 2005 State of the Union

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Support Proposal</i>
February Respondent	-0.375** (0.101)
Heard Proposal	-0.282** (0.077)
Gender: Female	-0.055 (0.102)
Age	-0.035** (0.004)
Education	0.029 (0.036)
Race: African American	0.004 (0.164)
Religion: Born Again	0.110 (0.117)
Have Children: Yes	-0.083 (0.114)
Church Attendance	0.013 (0.035)
Income	0.054* (0.025)
Party ID: Republican	0.857** (0.143)
Party ID: Democrat	-0.231# (0.121)
Ideology: ^ liberal	-0.148* (0.061)
Approve of Bush: Yes	1.311** (0.126)

Note: Coefficients are logit coefficients. The appendix contains full question wording and coding. Standard errors are in parentheses.

**p<.01; *p, .05; #p<.10

A more efficient way to identify Bush's core supporters requires the use of interactive terms. Whenever a hypothesis is conditional in nature, it is best to use an interactive term (Brambor et al. 2006). Hypothesis 1 states that support for the Social Security proposal will increase among President Bush's core constituents in February 2005. Stated as a conditional hypothesis we can suggest that an increase in support for the Social Security Reform plan will be detected in the survey conducted after George W.

Bush's State of the Union address if the person expressing support is a member of George W. Bush's base (Republicans and those who approve of Bush), but this will not happen if the person is not a member of President Bush's base. To measure support for members of President Bush's base, I created three dichotomous interactive variables. The first interactive variable combines those who approve of George W. Bush with taking part in the February 2005 survey (coded 1=took survey in February, 0=took December survey). This allows me to capture the difference in support for the proposal among those that approved of the president. The second interactive variable combines Republicans with those that heard about the Social Security proposal. The third interactive variable combines those that approve of Bush with those that heard the Social Security proposal. These final two interactive variables allow me to see the base separate from the general public.

The results for my three interactive models are combined with the results from my preliminary analysis of Hypothesis 1 in Table 3 below. Model 1 shows the results from Table 1. Model 2 is the model with my first interactive term, Model 3 is the model that includes my second interactive variable, and Model 4 is the model that includes my third interactive term.

Table 2: Support for the Social Security Proposal in February 2005

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Took Survey in Feb. 2005	-0.375 (0.000)	-0.543 (0.000)	-0.387 (0.000)	-0.383 (0.000)
Heard about Proposal	-0.282 (0.000)	-0.279 (0.000)	-0.507 (0.000)	-0.817 (0.000)
Interactive: Bush Approval and Took Feb. 2005 Survey		0.382 (0.057)		
Interactive: Republican and Q31 Heard about Proposal			0.959 (0.000)	
Interactive: Approve of Bush and Q31 Heard about Proposal				1.259 (0.000)

Note: Full results from all models available in Appendix. P-values are in parentheses below the estimate for the coefficient from the model.

The results from maximum likelihood estimation reported in Table 2 confirm Hypothesis

1. Though the interactive term in model 2 is not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, it is in the expected direction. Table 2 shows that respondents that heard about George W. Bush's Social Security proposal were likely to oppose the proposal in February, 2005 following his public campaign. Those that were a part of George W. Bush's core constituency, however, were statistically more likely to favor the proposal after the public campaign. This shows that if George W. Bush was targeting his core constituents in his State of the Union address, he was successful.

Secondary Analysis

The data used to test my second hypothesis comes from data collected by The Pew Research Center. Princeton Survey Research Associates conducted a telephone survey among a nationwide sample of 1,502 adults age 18 or older from May 11-15,

2005. One of the questions asked half of the respondents if they favored a particular proposal for reforming Social Security with no mention of President Bush's name. The rest of the respondents were asked the same question with the proposal being attributed to President Bush by name. Since my dependent variable is dichotomous (1=Question w/Bush, 0=Question w/no Bush), a maximum likelihood Logit model is the most appropriate test. Table 3 below shows the results from the basic Logit model. I coded the variables the same as I coded them for my previous model. I also included a dichotomous variable for those that received the treatment. Those that heard the question with the proposal being attributed to George W. Bush were coded 1 and those that heard the proposal attributed to no one were coded 0. The model also includes a variable to account for the effects of having a retirement plan other than Social Security. This was coded 1 if the respondent had no retirement plan, 2 if they had a retirement plan, but it was not invested in the stock market, and 3 for those that had a retirement plan invested in the stock market.

Table 3: Support for Social Security Proposal When Attributed to Bush

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Support Proposal</i>
Attributed to Bush: Yes	-0.324* (0.140)
Heard Proposal	0.109 (0.110)
Gender: Female	-0.175 (0.142)
Age	0.002 (0.004)
Education	0.051 (0.051)
Race: African American	-0.371 (0.249)
Religion: Born Again	0.325* (0.166)
Have Children: Yes	0.073 (0.165)
Church Attendance	-0.103* (0.052)
Income	-0.115** (0.039)
Party ID: Republican	0.122 (0.195)
Party ID: Democrat	-0.293 (0.183)
Ideology: Scale	0.022 (0.089)
Approve of Bush: Yes	0.176 (0.186)
Ideology: Conservative	0.809 (0.527)
Have a Retirement Plan Other than Social Security	0.002 (0.090)

Note: Coefficients are logit coefficients. The appendix contains full question wording and coding. Standard errors are in parentheses.

**p<.01; *p,.05; #p<.10

Table 3 confirms the results often cited in the literature as evidence that George W. Bush was unsuccessful in his public campaign to reform Social Security (Edwards 2007; Kernell 2007), overall those that heard the proposal attributed to George W. Bush were less likely to support the proposal than those that heard the proposal without the president's name. Interestingly, regular church attendance was negatively associated

with support for the plan as was income. These two groups were generally strong supporters of George W. Bush. President Bush's strongest supporters, born-again Christians, were more likely to support the proposal. These results show mixed support for Hypothesis 2.

A more efficient way to identify Bush's core supporters requires the use of interactive terms. Whenever a hypothesis is conditional in nature, it is best to use an interactive term (Brambor et al. 2006). Hypothesis 2 states that support for the plan will be greater among Bush's base; stated as a conditional hypothesis: if a member of President Bush's core constituency hears the Social Security proposal attributed to the president, they will be more likely to favor the proposal. Those that are not members of George W. Bush's core constituency will behave the same as the general public and will be less likely to support the proposal when it is attributed to the president. I created four dichotomous interactive terms.

Model 1 in Table 4 contains all of the same independent variables from Table 3, but it also contains an interactive term that combines those that approve of Bush in the survey (coded 1 approve, zero do not approve) with those that received the treatment (proposal attributed to Bush). This independent variable captures George W. Bush's base by looking at those, regardless of party affiliation, who support the president. The crudest definition of a president's base is those who support the president; this independent variable captures those individuals. Model 2 in Table 4 contains all of the independent variables from Table 3, but it also includes interactive terms that multiply Republican (coded 1 for Republican, 0 for all other party affiliations) with receiving the treatment (proposal attributed to Bush). This term measures Republican support against

all others, including Independents. Model 3 in Table 4 contains all of the independent variables from Table 3, but it includes a different interactive term, which multiplies Democrat (coded 1 for Democrats, and 0 for all other party affiliations) with receiving the treatment. Like the Republican interactive term, this one compares those of the opposition party with all other respondents, regardless of party affiliation. The idea of party polarization is implicit in my hypotheses. This term will allow me to see if the “opposite” of the President’s base behaves in a manner consistent with my hypotheses, in the opposite direction.

The final model, model 4, contains all of the independent variables from Table 3 with a different interactive term, which multiplies ideology (measured on a scale with 1 representing very conservative, and 5 representing very liberal) with receiving the treatment. This term will capture those that may be members of the president’s base that do not affiliate with a party, but share the president’s conservative ideology. Since the most conservative individuals are given the lowest score and President Bush was conservative, I expect the sign on the coefficient to be negative. A positive coefficient would suggest that individuals that are more liberal are more likely to support a policy when Bush’s name is included as the proponent. I expect the opposite to be true. The independent variable for this model is also dichotomous. Of those who received the treatment (Social Security proposal attributed to George W. Bush), do they approve or disapprove of the plan (coded 1 = approve, 0=disapprove). Table 4 below shows the results of these models.

Table 4: Support for the Social Security Proposal When Attributed to Bush:

<i>IV</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Proposal Attributed to Bush	-0.989 (0.000)	-0.914 (0.000)	0.159 (0.361)	1.771 (0.000)
Approve of Bush * Attributed to Bush	1.306 (0.000)			
Republican * Attributed to Bush		1.695 (0.000)		
Democrat * Attributed to Bush			-1.411 (0.000)	
Conservative- Liberal * Attributed to Bush				-0.770 (0.000)

Note: Full results available in Appendix. Table reports coefficients with p-values in parentheses.

In the experimental condition where one group of respondents heard the question about Social Security reform attributed to Bush and the other group heard the same question attributed to no one, these interactive terms are statistically significant. As Table 4 illustrates, being a member of the George W. Bush's core constituency predicts stronger support for the president's proposals. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. From Table 4 it is clear that those who identified themselves as Republicans and those that said that they approved of President Bush responded differently to the treatment than the rest of the respondents. In general, a respondent that heard about the Social Security plan attributed to George W. Bush was statistically less likely to support the plan than those that heard about the plan with no attribution to George W. Bush. The negative sign on the coefficient from Table 3 confirms this.

The interactive terms in models 1 and 2 from Table 4 identify respondents that are members of George W. Bush's core constituency. These respondents were statistically more likely to support the Social Security plan when it was attributed to George W. Bush than those who heard it with no attribution. In addition, the negative signs on the coefficients for the interactive terms from models 3 and 4 in Table 4 confirm that those who are liberal and those who identified themselves as Democrats were statistically less likely to support the proposal when it was attributed to George W. Bush. Showing that these interactive terms are statistically significant is an important beginning to the analysis, but it alone does not describe the relationship between the variables. The next portion of my analysis will use post-estimation techniques to estimate the differences of the effects of the interactive terms.

Using the Zelig package in R it is possible to simulate predicted probabilities for each independent variable in my models (Kosuke Imai 2009). Though it is impossible to hold all things constant in the equations used to derive the coefficient estimates for models 1:4 reported in Table 2, and models 1:4 reported in Table 4, it is possible to simulate the predicted probabilities with margin of error estimates (Kosuke Imai 2008). I used the mean value for each independent variable in my model and changed the value for the independent variables reported in Tables 5 and 6. For example, the predicted level of support for someone identified as "very conservative" from model 3 of Table 4 was derived by placing values for all independent variables at their mean and placing the value for the interactive variable "cons_lib * treatment" at 1, to represent those that were "very conservative". I ran the simulation 100,000 times and the software generated predicted levels of support for George W. Bush's Social Security proposal and a margin

of error. The same method was used to calculate the predicted level of support for each independent variable listed in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5: Predicted Levels of Support for Plan after State of the Union Address

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Probability of Supporting Proposal in Feb. 2005</i>	<i>Margin of Error</i>
Approve of Bush	0.79	0.02
<u>Interactive</u> : Approve of Bush and Surveyed After State of the Union	0.70	0.03
<u>Interactive</u> : Republican and Heard Proposal	0.76	0.03
<u>Interactive</u> : Approve of Bush and Heard Proposal	0.75	0.03
Moderate	0.57	0.02

Table 6: Predicted Levels of Support for Social Security Plan

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Probability of Supporting</i>	<i>Margin of Error</i>
“Very Conservative” * Attributed to Bush	0.66	0.02
Approve of Bush * Attributed to Bush	0.78	0.04
Republican * Attributed to Bush	0.85	0.03
“Very Liberal” * Attributed to Bush	0.09	0.05
Democrat * Attributed to Bush	0.31	0.05

Tables 5 and 6 present the results of my simulations. In table 5, the probability that an individual who approved of Bush would also support his plan to reform Social Security in February 2005 is 0.79 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02. Likewise, the probability that someone who identified herself as ideologically moderate would

support President Bush's proposal to reform Social Security in February 2005 was 0.57 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02. In table 6, the probability that someone who identified herself as very conservative and received the treatment would support President Bush's proposal was 0.66 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02. Conversely, the probability that an individual that identified herself as very liberal and received the treatment would support President Bush's proposal was 0.09 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.05.

Conclusion

The dominant view on presidential rhetorical powers has shifted. Neustadt showed how Truman was able to pressure Congress to pass the expensive Marshall Plan, despite his abysmal approval ratings, in part because of his appeals to the public (Neustadt 1980). Cohen (1995) argues that U.S. presidents, regardless of popularity are able to sway public opinion through the State of the Union. Meanwhile, Edwards (2003; 2007; 2009) has shown that, since Reagan at least, U.S. presidents public addresses fail to move public opinion. I argue that the shifting paradigm fails to recognize an important element of presidential rhetorical powers. Though George W. Bush's public campaign to reform Social Security was seen as a failure by himself and others, it demonstrates one realm in which U.S. presidents can exercise rhetorical powers. This paper clearly demonstrates that George W. Bush effectively framed the issue of Social Security to solidify support for his plan among his core constituents. It is likely that President Bush had hoped for more of a shift in general public opinion, but his failure to move general public opinion should not be equated with complete failure.

My results show that the longer President Bush campaigned to reform Social Security, the more the general public disliked his plan. By May of 2005, just mentioning George W. Bush as the author of a plan to privatize Social Security caused support to drop by 11% (Pew 2005).

But my results also demonstrate that George W. Bush's public campaign to reform Social Security was very effective among his base. In May 2005, a conservative person was 21% more likely to support a plan that included Bush's name than the rest of the population. Those who approved of George W. Bush's performance as president were 33% more likely to approve of a plan that included his name and Republicans were 40% more likely to approve of a plan that included his name. Conversely, Democrats were 14% more likely to oppose a plan that mentioned President Bush's name and those who described themselves as "very liberal" were 36% less likely to support the plan when it was attributed to George W. Bush. This demonstrates that general public opinion headed in one direction, and the opinion of Bush's core constituents went strongly in the opposite direction. This finding not only confirms my hypotheses that George W. Bush was effective at framing the Social Security issue for his core constituents to increase support for his proposal among them. It also suggests that the dominant view of presidential rhetorical powers is insufficient.

This thesis can be seen as the beginning of a more specific approach to the study of presidential rhetorical powers. Instead of concluding that the powers do not exist because presidents fail to move overall public opinion (Edwards 2009), I suggest that it is beneficial to look for the contingent and specific benefits presidents receive from appeals to the public. As Edwards (2007) has documented, modern U.S. presidents appeal to the

public with greater frequency than early U.S. presidents. The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that aggregate opinion may be deceptive. Modern technology and internal polls give U.S. presidents opportunities to frame public addresses to their core constituents. Presidential rhetorical powers should be measured by the effect of public appeals on the opinion of the president's core constituents and not by the effect on general public opinion or the opinions of members of Congress.

In addition, this research fills in some of the gaps of previous research on framing effects. Druckman and Holmes (2004) argue that President Bush effectively framed issues in his 2002 State of the Union address and moved general public opinion. Iyengar (1991) argues that preexisting beliefs moderate framing effects. My findings point to some of the limitations of framing effects. Members of George W. Bush's core constituents were 20% more likely to approve of the Bush proposal after the February 2005 State of the Union address than were moderates. As Table 1 indicates, those that approved of George W. Bush before his State of the Union address were more likely to approve of his plan after the State of the Union address, while everyone else was more likely to disapprove of his plan after the State of the Union address. These results refute the findings of Cohen (1995) that presidential popularity and issue selection do not limit the effectiveness of presidential rhetoric in public addresses. In addition, my results indicate that the findings of Druckman and Holmes (2004) are more likely the result of an exceptional post-September 11, 2001 public mood than a general substantive effect.

My analyses suggest that preexisting beliefs are important moderators of framing effects. In general, what a person thinks about the messenger influences the frames through which the things said by that individual are received. In short, even U.S.

presidents are limited in their ability to frame issues for the general public. Future studies of presidential framing should recognize this empirical evidence. If the U.S. electorate is becoming more polarized as has been suggested (Jacobson 2006; Abramowitz 2010), U.S. presidents should not be expected to frame issues for the general public.

This thesis also provides some empirical support to Heith's (2000) work on presidential polling. My results indicate that U.S. presidents do indeed conduct internal polls to "identify their constituents, identify their constituent preferences, and shape the message their constituents hear to increase presidential support among the base." It appears that presidents make public appeals because these appeals allow them to accomplish their goals of framing the issues and increasing support for their proposals among their core constituents.

Although much research has focused on presidential rhetorical powers as they relate to legislative outcomes. Future research in the legislative outcome focus of presidential rhetorical powers could examine the way that moving public opinion among the base would influence legislation. However, my findings indicate that a new direction is needed for studies of presidential rhetorical powers. Since U.S. presidents are unlikely to be able to move overall public opinion in the future, further research could attempt to explore the conditions under which a president would fail to move public opinion among his base supporters. Though much research on issue framing and its effects has been conducted, it would be instructive to identify more specifically the limits of presidential rhetorical powers.

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Appendix A
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
DECEMBER 2004 POLITICAL TYPOLOGY SURVEY
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Poll 1 was a telephone survey conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International among a nationwide sample of 2,000 adults, 18 years of age or older, during the period Dec. 1-16, 2004.

On another subject...

Q.31 How much, if anything, have you heard about a proposal which would allow younger workers to invest a portion of their Social Security taxes in private retirement accounts, which might include stocks or mutual funds — a lot, a little or nothing at all? *{9-04 RVs modified}*

- 1 A lot
- 2 A little
- 3 Nothing at all
- 9 Don't know/Refused

Q.32 Generally, do you favor or oppose this proposal? *{9-04 RVs; 9-00 RVs}*

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose
- 9 Don't know/Refused

Appendix B

Stata Output for Logit Model Described in Table 1

Output for Dec 04 (time 1) and Feb 05 (time 2) Analysis: Basic model

```
. logit q32sspro_favor feb_survey q31heardss female age2 education black
children bor
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -1588.0899
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -1261.0065
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -1247.1331
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -1246.8958
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -1246.8957
```

```
Logistic regression                                Number of obs   =       2358
                                                    LR chi2(14)     =       682.39
                                                    Prob > chi2     =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -1246.8957                       Pseudo R2      =       0.2148
```

q32sspro_f~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
feb_survey	-.3753714	.101803	-3.69	0.000	-.5749016 - .1758413
q31heardss	-.2824517	.0765001	-3.69	0.000	-.4323892 - .1325143
female	-.0551789	.1017803	-0.54	0.588	-.2546647 .1443068
age2	-.0352189	.0035355	-9.96	0.000	-.0421484 - .0282893
education	.0290637	.0355219	0.82	0.413	-.0405578 .0986853
black	.0042708	.1642498	0.03	0.979	-.3176529 .3261946
children	-.0829155	.113777	-0.73	0.466	-.3059143 .1400833
bornagain	.110289	.1174607	0.94	0.348	-.1199298 .3405077
churchattend	.0129344	.0352284	0.37	0.713	-.0561119 .0819808
income2	.053922	.0253397	2.13	0.033	.004257 .103587
republican	.85745	.1430723	5.99	0.000	.5770335 1.137867
democrat	-.2314408	.1207608	-1.92	0.055	-.4681276 .0052459
cons_lib	-.1477644	.0606377	-2.44	0.015	-.266612 - .0289167
bushfavor	1.311498	.1262931	10.38	0.000	1.063968 1.559028
_cons	2.065904	.3504558	5.89	0.000	1.379023 2.752785

Appendix C

Stata Output for Models Described in Table 2

Table 2, Model 2:

Interaction Bush approval and Feb Survey

```
. logit q32sspro_favor feb_survey q3lheardss female age2 education black
children bor
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor
bush_survey
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -1588.0899
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -1258.6864
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -1245.3053
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -1245.0802
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -1245.0801
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358
                                                    LR chi2(15)    =       686.02
                                                    Prob > chi2    =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -1245.0801                       Pseudo R2      =       0.2160
```

q32sspro_f~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
feb_survey	-.5431092	.1351216	-4.02	0.000	-.8079428	-.2782757
q3lheardss	-.2797742	.0764588	-3.66	0.000	-.4296308	-.1299177
female	-.0504188	.1019666	-0.49	0.621	-.2502697	.1494321
age2	-.0351136	.0035398	-9.92	0.000	-.0420516	-.0281757
education	.0279463	.0355623	0.79	0.432	-.0417545	.0976471
black	.00489	.1646276	0.03	0.976	-.3177743	.3275542
children	-.0809254	.1139822	-0.71	0.478	-.3043264	.1424756
bornagain	.1071434	.1175664	0.91	0.362	-.1232825	.3375694
churchattend	.0139486	.0352832	0.40	0.693	-.0552051	.0831024
income2	.0529232	.0253877	2.08	0.037	.0031643	.1026821
republican	.8466424	.1429532	5.92	0.000	.5664593	1.126826
democrat	-.2409765	.1210906	-1.99	0.047	-.4783097	-.0036434
cons_lib	-.1510307	.0607222	-2.49	0.013	-.270044	-.0320174
bushfavor	1.145589	.1526297	7.51	0.000	.8464401	1.444737
bush_survey	.3823219	.2010251	1.90	0.057	-.0116799	.7763238
_cons	2.147592	.3541	6.06	0.000	1.453569	2.841616

Table 2, Model 3:

Interactions republican and heard about proposal

```
. logit q32sspro_favor feb_survey q3lheardss female age2 education black
children bor
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor
rep_q3lheard
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -1588.0899
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -1241.5796
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -1228.2823
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -1228.0654
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -1228.0653
```

```
Logistic regression                                Number of obs   =      2358
                                                    LR chi2(15)    =      720.05
                                                    Prob > chi2    =      0.0000
Log likelihood = -1228.0653                        Pseudo R2      =      0.2267
```

q32sspro_f~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
feb_survey	-.3871708	.1031701	-3.75	0.000	-.5893804 -.1849611
q3lheardss	-.5073101	.0859162	-5.90	0.000	-.6757029 -.3389174
female	-.05176	.1029403	-0.50	0.615	-.2535192 .1499992
age2	-.0355585	.0035571	-10.00	0.000	-.0425303 -.0285868
education	.0252949	.0358458	0.71	0.480	-.0449616 .0955515
black	-.0398772	.1658871	-0.24	0.810	-.36501 .2852556
children	-.0743826	.1143059	-0.65	0.515	-.298418 .1496528
bornagain	.1113457	.1185594	0.94	0.348	-.1210266 .3437179
churchattend	.0222019	.0357416	0.62	0.534	-.0478503 .0922541
income2	.056023	.0255591	2.19	0.028	.005928 .106118
republican	-1.324577	.368864	-3.59	0.000	-2.047537 -.6016165
democrat	-.2603239	.122775	-2.12	0.034	-.5009586 -.0196893
cons_lib	-.1228212	.0611569	-2.01	0.045	-.2426865 -.0029559
bushfavor	1.311728	.1276038	10.28	0.000	1.061629 1.561827
rep_q3lheard	.9589576	.154585	6.20	0.000	.6559766 1.261939
_cons	2.478293	.361784	6.85	0.000	1.769209 3.187377

Table 2, Model 4:

Interactions Bush approval and heard about proposal

```
. logit q32sspro_favor feb_survey q3lheardss female age2 education black  
children bor  
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor  
bushapp_q3lheard
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -1588.0899  
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -1219.4099  
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -1205.1597  
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -1204.9095  
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -1204.9094
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358  
                                                  LR chi2(15)    =       766.36  
                                                  Prob > chi2    =       0.0000  
Log likelihood = -1204.9094                     Pseudo R2      =       0.2413
```

q32sspro_f~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
feb_survey	-.3830664	.1047808	-3.66	0.000	-.5884331 -.1776998
q3lheardss	-.8170104	.1000233	-8.17	0.000	-1.013052 -.6209684
female	-.0438931	.1043011	-0.42	0.674	-.2483195 .1605333
age2	-.0363787	.0036026	-10.10	0.000	-.0434397 -.0293177
education	.0173001	.0362652	0.48	0.633	-.0537784 .0883786
black	-.1433728	.1695345	-0.85	0.398	-.4756543 .1889087
children	-.0891931	.1155007	-0.77	0.440	-.3155702 .137184
bornagain	.1110711	.1199255	0.93	0.354	-.1239785 .3461208
churchattend	.0300148	.0363192	0.83	0.409	-.0411696 .1011992
income2	.0571594	.0258875	2.21	0.027	.0064208 .107898
republican	.7496723	.1438419	5.21	0.000	.4677474 1.031597
democrat	-.2449406	.1240755	-1.97	0.048	-.4881242 -.001757
cons_lib	-.080107	.0621741	-1.29	0.198	-.2019661 .041752
bushfavor	-1.342069	.3139527	-4.27	0.000	-1.957405 -.7267335
bushapp_q3~d	1.259064	.1390435	9.06	0.000	.9865433 1.531584
_cons	3.049601	.3805399	8.01	0.000	2.303756 3.795445

Appendix D

**PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
MAY 2005 NEWS INTEREST INDEX
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE**

The poll I call May, 2005 was based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International among a nationwide sample of 1,502 adults, 18 years of age or older, from May 11-15, 2005.

ASK FORM 1 [N=758]:

Q.24F1 One proposal for dealing with Social Security's financial situation is to keep the system as it is now for lower income retirees, but limit the growth of future benefits for wealthy and middle income retirees. Would you favor or oppose this proposal?

ASK FORM 2 [N=744]:

Q.24F2 George W. Bush has proposed dealing with Social Security's financial situation by keeping the system as it is now for lower income retirees, but limiting the growth of future benefits for wealthy and middle income retirees. Would you favor or oppose this proposal?

Q.39 Do you have a retirement plan besides Social Security? [IF YES: Is any of your retirement money in the stock market through stocks, mutual funds or a 401k plan?] {early 10-02}

- 1 Yes, retirement plan in the stock market
- 2 Yes, but not in stock market
- 3 No, no retirement plan
- 9 Don't know/Refused

Appendix E

Stata Output for Model in Table 3

```
logit q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q2lheardss q39yesretireplan
educat
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat
cons_lib
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -602.24736
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -583.61449
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -583.56739
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -583.56739
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =           887
                                                    LR chi2(15)     =           37.36
                                                    Prob > chi2     =           0.0011
Log likelihood = -583.56739                       Pseudo R2      =           0.0310
```

-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
q24sspropf~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	-----
form2	-.3241366	.1403787	-2.31	0.021	-.5992738	-.0489993
female	-.1745575	.1424749	-1.23	0.221	-.4538032	.1046883
age2	.0017529	.0047943	0.37	0.715	-.0076438	.0111496
bushapprove	.1760973	.185998	0.95	0.344	-.1884522	.5406468
q2lheardss	.1088005	.1102482	0.99	0.324	-.1072821	.324883
q39yesreti~n	.0017344	.0902732	0.02	0.985	-.1751978	.1786667
education	.0508366	.0510954	0.99	0.320	-.0493085	.1509817
black	-.37142	.2494836	-1.49	0.137	-.8603988	.1175589
childrenyes	.0725398	.1652916	0.44	0.661	-.2514257	.3965053
bornagain	.3248742	.1657489	1.96	0.050	.0000123	.6497361
churchattend	-.1026108	.051981	-1.97	0.048	-.2044918	-.0007298
income2	-.114983	.0388518	-2.96	0.003	-.1911311	-.0388349
republican	.1219066	.1946856	0.63	0.531	-.2596701	.5034834
democrat	-.2930556	.1833493	-1.60	0.110	-.6524136	.0663023
cons_lib	.022292	.0889522	0.25	0.802	-.1520512	.1966352
_cons	.8091066	.5270826	1.54	0.125	-.2239564	1.84217

Appendix F

Stata Output for Models in Table 4:

Model 1

```
. logit q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss
q39yesretireplan educat
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat
cons_lib bushapprove_form2
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -602.24736
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -572.93982
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -572.83589
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -572.83587
```

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	887
	LR chi2(16)	=	58.82
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -572.83587	Pseudo R2	=	0.0488

q24sspropf~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
form2	-.9893895	.2040294	-4.85	0.000	-1.38928	-.5894993
female	-.2140833	.1444935	-1.48	0.138	-.4972853	.0691188
age2	.0018813	.0048401	0.39	0.698	-.0076051	.0113678
bushapprove	-.4619787	.2330427	-1.98	0.047	-.918734	-.0052234
q21heardss	.1245311	.111643	1.12	0.265	-.0942852	.3433474
q39yesreti~n	-.0102031	.0913762	-0.11	0.911	-.1892972	.1688909
education	.0422799	.0519973	0.81	0.416	-.059633	.1441928
black	-.3683949	.2553011	-1.44	0.149	-.8687758	.131986
childrenyes	.0920957	.1673362	0.55	0.582	-.2358773	.4200687
bornagain	.30006	.1677528	1.79	0.074	-.0287295	.6288494
churchattend	-.1036107	.0526064	-1.97	0.049	-.2067174	-.000504
income2	-.1161361	.0394027	-2.95	0.003	-.1933639	-.0389083
republican	.127368	.1960184	0.65	0.516	-.2568209	.511557
democrat	-.2567396	.1866173	-1.38	0.169	-.6225028	.1090236
cons_lib	.026291	.0900794	0.29	0.770	-.1502614	.2028434
bushapprov~2	1.305711	.2837676	4.60	0.000	.7495371	1.861886
_cons	1.158552	.5404579	2.14	0.032	.0992741	2.21783

Table 4, Model 2:

```
. logit q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q2lheardss
q39yesretireplan educat
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat
cons_lib rep
> ublican_form2
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -602.24736
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -567.34901
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -567.16432
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -567.16426
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       887
                                                    LR chi2(16)    =       70.17
                                                    Prob > chi2    =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -567.16426                       Pseudo R2      =       0.0583
```

q24sspropf~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
form2	-.9141789	.1770143	-5.16	0.000	-1.26112	-.5672373
female	-.1988371	.1453165	-1.37	0.171	-.4836522	.085978
age2	.0017286	.0048761	0.35	0.723	-.0078284	.0112856
bushapprove	.1837549	.1891687	0.97	0.331	-.1870088	.5545187
q2lheardss	.1266806	.1125619	1.13	0.260	-.0939367	.3472979
q39yesreti~n	-.0239692	.0921674	-0.26	0.795	-.204614	.1566756
education	.0549111	.0524192	1.05	0.295	-.0478286	.1576509
black	-.340723	.2541754	-1.34	0.180	-.8388976	.1574516
childrenyes	.0644564	.1684769	0.38	0.702	-.2657522	.394665
bornagain	.2907397	.1688882	1.72	0.085	-.0402751	.6217544
churchattend	-.0903836	.0529612	-1.71	0.088	-.1941855	.0134184
income2	-.1166765	.0395808	-2.95	0.003	-.1942534	-.0390996
republican	-.7372982	.2462804	-2.99	0.003	-1.219999	-.2545975
democrat	-.3092935	.1872597	-1.65	0.099	-.6763156	.0577287
cons_lib	.0199456	.0906488	0.22	0.826	-.1577228	.197614
republican~2	1.694815	.2994537	5.66	0.000	1.107896	2.281733
_cons	1.104322	.5390299	2.05	0.040	.0478427	2.160801

Table 4, Model 3:

```
. logit q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q2lheardss
q39yesretireplan educat
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat
cons_lib de
> mocrat_form2
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -602.24736
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -572.49568
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -572.41576
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -572.41575
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =      887
                                                    LR chi2(16)    =      59.66
                                                    Prob > chi2    =      0.0000
Log likelihood = -572.41575                       Pseudo R2      =      0.0495
```

q24sspropf~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
form2	.1589108	.1738547	0.91	0.361	-.1818381	.4996597
female	-.2142633	.1446611	-1.48	0.139	-.4977939	.0692673
age2	.0028149	.0048628	0.58	0.563	-.0067159	.0123458
bushapprove	.1365018	.1884807	0.72	0.469	-.2329135	.5059171
q2lheardss	.1089672	.1120309	0.97	0.331	-.1106093	.3285438
q39yesreti~n	.0175806	.0915137	0.19	0.848	-.1617831	.1969442
education	.0397429	.0519945	0.76	0.445	-.0621645	.1416503
black	-.3415972	.2566511	-1.33	0.183	-.8446241	.1614297
childrenyes	.1128469	.1676921	0.67	0.501	-.2158236	.4415173
bornagain	.2613401	.168086	1.55	0.120	-.0681024	.5907826
churchattend	-.102794	.052488	-1.96	0.050	-.2056687	.0000806
income2	-.1179983	.0394029	-2.99	0.003	-.1952266	-.0407699
republican	.1385241	.1948142	0.71	0.477	-.2433047	.5203528
democrat	.3989422	.2384339	1.67	0.094	-.0683797	.8662641
cons_lib	.0217049	.0904141	0.24	0.810	-.1555036	.1989133
democrat_f~2	-1.410737	.3025172	-4.66	0.000	-2.003659	-.8178137
_cons	.5967902	.5344453	1.12	0.264	-.4507034	1.644284

Table 4, Model 4:

```
. logit q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss
q39yesretireplan educat
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat
cons_lib co
> ns_lib_form2
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -602.24736
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -572.20229
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -572.03796
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -572.03791
```

```
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =           887
                                                    LR chi2(16)    =           60.42
                                                    Prob > chi2    =           0.0000
Log likelihood = -572.03791                       Pseudo R2      =           0.0502
```

q24sspropf~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
form2	1.777063	.4668001	3.81	0.000	.8621513 2.691974
female	-.1916656	.1444252	-1.33	0.184	-.4747338 .0914027
age2	.002606	.0048763	0.53	0.593	-.0069514 .0121634
bushapprove	.1761764	.1879605	0.94	0.349	-.1922194 .5445721
q21heardss	.1142398	.1119331	1.02	0.307	-.105145 .3336246
q39yesreti~n	-.0110925	.0915669	-0.12	0.904	-.1905602 .1683753
education	.0439005	.0520315	0.84	0.399	-.0580793 .1458803
black	-.3223541	.2527222	-1.28	0.202	-.8176805 .1729722
childrenyes	.131117	.1680447	0.78	0.435	-.1982445 .4604786
bornagain	.29892	.1674999	1.78	0.074	-.0293737 .6272137
churchattend	-.1041358	.0526444	-1.98	0.048	-.207317 -.0009546
income2	-.1147794	.0394462	-2.91	0.004	-.1920925 -.0374663
republican	.1352876	.1961573	0.69	0.490	-.2491736 .5197488
democrat	-.295861	.1865024	-1.59	0.113	-.661399 .0696769
cons_lib	.4173274	.1253208	3.33	0.001	.1717031 .6629517
cons_lib_f~2	-.7690331	.1638322	-4.69	0.000	-1.090138 - .4479279
_cons	-.2666842	.575817	-0.46	0.643	-1.395265 .8618964