Terrorist Safe Havens: Towards an Understanding of What They Accomplish for Terrorist Organizations

By

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Ari Jean-Baptiste

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Terrorist Safe Havens: Towards an Understanding of What They Accomplish for
Terrorist Organizations

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Abstract

How do safe havens help facilitate a militant terrorist organization’s activities and operations? This study expects to find that safe havens do matter, that they provide safety, training, rest, etc. The researcher presumes that without safe havens, many of the operations that these organizations conduct would be more difficult, if not next to impossible. This is contrary to the idea that a physical haven is unnecessary. At the nexus of this line of thought is that in a globalized environment, access to the internet or other technologies that negate the need for physical presence, could be utilized from any location worldwide, serving as a safe house to conduct their operations. The hypothesis of this research is that the presence of safe havens will continue to be a factor, as their existence and significance persist, facilitating dissidents’ ability to conduct operations, and continues to be a salient policy issue for states in their continued efforts to eradicate their presence. The foundation for the theoretical analysis of safe havens is based upon Lichbach’s solution groups of the Rebel’s Dilemma.
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**Introduction**

In the mid-eighties, Ronald Reagan recognized a phenomenon in the growing threat of international terrorism, and stated:

> there can be no place on earth where it is safe for these monsters to rest, to train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally, if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary—anywhere (Reagan 1985).

The term sanctuary has been used interchangeably with safe haven by both academia and government agencies in a wide range of publications. Brynen defined “sanctuary” as a secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure needed to support its activities (Brynen 1990). The Department of Defense’s description of sanctuary is a bit more distinct. It is characterized as a nation or area near or contiguous to the combat area that, by tacit agreement between the warring powers, is exempt from attack and therefore serves as a refuge for staging, logistic, or other activities of the combatant powers (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009). The U.S. Department of State made note of this distinction in its reports stating that “sanctuary” is commonly associated with places of worship¹, such as mosques, churches, or temples, and in an effort to eliminate confusion and provide clarity, uses the term safe haven to describe terrorist enclaves. Henceforth, “safe haven” in lieu of sanctuary will be utilized to reflect the above definition.

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¹ The Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions all reflect its connotations with religion.
Background

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001 did not occur in a vacuum. From evidence obtained by military, intelligence, and law enforcement, the organization, planning, and financing of this terrorist operation reflected a sophisticated and well-connected network. It was determined that the attacks were masterminded by al Qa’ida (AQ) from Afghanistan, where the Taliban had obtained power in 1996, after a protracted civil war between various Afghan warlords. In retaliation, Taliban-led Afghanistan became a military target under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom in order to eliminate Osama bin Laden and al Qa’ida, and deny them the sanctuary, a secured or protected a base of operations, they were granted by their Afghan hosts led by the Mullah Omar. The establishment of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for Al Qa’ida was already confirmed, as its training camps had been subject to missile strikes by the previous administration—the operation destroyed the camp, but failed to eliminate bin Laden, its primary target. Though bin Laden, Al Qa’ida, and the Taliban were headquartered in Afghanistan, the creation and proliferation of salafi jihadist networks originated in neighboring Pakistan, where Islamic militants are deeply rooted.

Pakistan has an extensive history with the Afghan mujahedeen (freedom fighters) that would evolve into the global salafi jihadi movement. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made allies of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the duration of the war. An agreement was established wherein the CIA would provide the ISI with monetary resources, all of which would be handled by the ISI to train and arm the Afghan mujahedeen. Also involved in these transactions, were the Saudi General
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Intelligence Department (GID), which matched US funding (Gregory 2007). Neither the CIA nor the GID had clear oversight of how the money for these transactions was being spent—indications are that the Pakistanis had ulterior motives. Depending on which account one adheres to, the ISI used some of the funds (estimates of anywhere from $3.5-8 billion from the US alone) to supply the mujahedeen, along with Pakistan, of which the ISI still had access to three million AK-47’s (Stern 2000). Under the direction of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization project, a number of madarris (Islamic institutions of learning) taught a militant brand of Islam that preached jihad, turning the Taliban, students in Pashto, (Afghan refugees, and Pakistani Pashtuns) into mujahedeen. 2 A series of support bases were established along the Afghan-Pakistani border, ranging from Karachi, Baluchistan, and up to North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) (Khokhar 2007). Some contend that Zia and the ISI, in addition to the CIA, transformed what had been a nationalist struggle into a pan-Islamic jihad, encouraging Muslims the world over to become involved (Weaver 2002). Saudi Wahhabi missionaries (led by the so

2 Islamization was designed as a counter to a growing Pashtun nationalism. Gen Zia wanted to prevent another Bangladesh from occurring. Afghanistan supported the idea of Pashtunistan for Pashtuns, for the government of Afghanistan has never accepted the Durand Line as a legitimate border with Pakistan. It is interesting to note that for the most part, Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line do not recognize the boundary, freely travel back and forth as many have family on the opposite side, and consider themselves to be one nation (Johnson and Mason 2008). Many of the Taliban came from the madarris run by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) that taught a radical interpretation of Islam along the same ideological lines as conservative Wahhabists used to justify tribal customs and inclinations.
called Afghan Arabs, along with other foreign Muslims) provided monetary assistance as well as their own radical interpretation of Islam, further fueling the fire of extremism.  

The conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet war did not put an end to the jihadi networks already established. The defeat and complete withdrawal of the Soviet Army by February of 1989 only marked the beginning of what the world would come to know as the global salafi jihadi movement. In anticipation of the departure of the Soviet and the uncertainty of what lay in the aftermath, many of the key leaders of the Arab Afghans jockeyed for position to be able to direct the future of the jihadi movement the one common thread that would permanently connect and strengthen the bond of the mujahedeen (Cohen 2003). For the Pakistanis, the ISI trained separatist militants of Jammu and Kashmir, in conjunction with Afghan mujahedeen and foreign fighters created new salafi jihadi organizations, that included: Lashkar-e-Taiba (1990), Harakat ul-Ansar (1993), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (1994) as a preference means to maintain control of the militant insurgents (Gregory 2007). Wahhabism continued to shape and mold the salafi jihadists, as they maintained their presence in Pakistan, teaching and influencing the Deobandi sect of the tribal areas and provided financial backing (Allen 2006). As civil war raged on in Afghanistan, the Taliban, who were mobilized under the same madrassa system as Wahhabists, Afghan Arabs, other foreign fighters and elements of the ISI, gathered and trained along the tribal regions.

Many Afghan Arabs and other foreign fighters that participated in the Afghan-Soviet War either returned to their homelands, to engage in jihad against an established system from within, or conducted jihad in other hotspots such Bosnia, Chechnya, or Algeria, in order to

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3 Wahhabism, followers of Abdul Wahhab, has roots in Saudi Arabia. The intent of the movement was to eradicate from Islamic societies practices that were foreign to the religion and restore a rightly-guided caliphate based on Muhammadan principles.
establish Muslim ummahs (community or nation). Salafi jihadists would continue to spread their message and set up clandestine operations through social networks. In 1988, bin Laden, along with key figures of the mujahedeen, organized al Qa’ida (the base) as an umbrella organization designed to be the vanguard of the global jihadi network. al Qa’ida’s strategy would be launched in two phases. In the first phase, jihad would be utilized to liberate the Islamic world of the West’s presence in Muslim territory and establish a Caliphate. During the second phase, the established Caliphate would direct jihad against the West. This organization had direct links with major attacks against the U.S., the first attack of the World Trade Center (February 1993), the bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi Kenya (August 1998), and the suicide attack on the USS Cole while harbored at the port of Aden, Yemen (October 2000). Originally founded in Pakistan, al Qa’ida would set up operations in Sudan, until it was forced to leave, eventually relocating to Afghanistan, where they found a suitable host in the Taliban.

Following the tragic events of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed attempts of the flight 93 hijackers, the 9/11 Commission was established in late 2002, in order to determine the causes that allowed such a violent act to occur on American soil, identify lessons learned, and make recommendations to safeguard the United States from future attacks. Of the many findings, the Commission concluded that because of the complex nature of large-scale attacks such as 9/11, Bali (2003) and Madrid (2004), these operations would require the following criteria: time, space, and ability; command structure; the opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives; a secure logistics network to facilitate operations; access to appropriate weaponry; and reliable communications (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). The U.S. Department of State
incorporated the elimination of safe havens as a main concern when it outlined the issue of terrorist safe havens in its congressionally mandated report in 2005. The 7120 report released by the U.S. Department of State defined safe havens as:

ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both ("Country Reports on Terrorism" 2006).

The Commission continued that in order to find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). The region surrounding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, given its recent history, fits many of the safe haven criteria as established by the US State Department. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Abdullah Azzam set-up Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahideen (the Services Offices for Arab Jihadists) –the precursor to al Qa’ida—in Peshawar, a safe house organization for foreign jihadists (Williams 2008). Although al Qa’ida does not appear to have a dedicated recruiting infrastructure in Pakistan, the group’s informal connections with other militant groups and Pakistani state organizations and logistical networks through Pakistan provide it with proxy assistance and support for their operations.

It should also be noted that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Numerous countries (the United Kingdom and the IRA, Israel and Hezbollah/PLO, and Spain and ETA, to name a few) have a rich history and experience with combating terrorist acts committed against the state. What is unique, though, is the manner in which terrorism is addressed. The focus of policy and institutional efforts designed to counter terrorism shifted from a mostly internal matter handled by domestic law enforcement, to that of an issue on the national security level, wherein nation-states utilized military power, economic sanctions, legislation, government institutions, and
diplomacy to ensure the state’s survival. The same can be said for safe havens. Prior to 9/11, terrorist groups still had a requirement for safe havens. Some of the differences between single nation-focused terror groups (IRA, Hezbollah, or ETA) and the globally-focused jihadist of al Qa’ida are the scale in which resources are required, as targeted states vary.

The focus of this work is not to redefine our understanding of the concept of terrorism. Usage of the term terrorist is not intended to make a subjective statement. In describing dissidents that utilize political violence against civilians or infrastructure that represent the state in order to influence political change through the utilization of terror, the term terrorist is used to refer to militant organizations that exploit this tactic. Throughout this essay, the expressions “militants”, “terrorist”, “terror group”, and “politically-violent dissidents” will be used interchangeably.

Elements of Political Violence as it Applies to Terror

Guerilla warfare, though different from terrorist activities in methodology and targeting—terrorism targets civilian populations and infrastructure, whereas guerrillas target governmental military and security forces—provides some insight of how they overcome geographical limitations due to the fact that both are essential illegal operations in the eyes of the state. The nature of clandestine activities necessitates challenges exclusive to such organizations. While guerrillas generally engage their enemies through direct contact and hit and run techniques, terrorists generally avoid direct contact with state authorities, but still need to retreat once the public display of violence has been committed. The exception to this is the suicide bomber, whose intent is to die along with the victims.
In guerrilla warfare, the guerrilla is at a tactical disadvantage against their enemy, mainly due to a lack of resources. Unconventional tactics are thus employed in order to overcome the shortcomings of resources. Whereas conventional forces need a rear area, guerrilla warfare makes due without, a hallmark of unconventional tactics. Terrorist groups, too, experience similar disadvantages guerrillas face when confronted against well-funded states. But as Mao Tse-tung reflected,

this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. [Contrary to this], a guerilla base, an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development, [is an essential tool in the guerrilla’s campaign] (Tse-tung 1989).

Safe havens are also important to terrorist groups wherever they can find them, because of the need for down time. In simple terms, it is necessary to have a place where they can plot and plan, and be reasonably secure from the possibility of being overrun or killed by the enemy.

The parallels between terrorism and guerrilla warfare are due to their unconventional nature and anonymity. Utilization of tactics is at the discretion of the dissident organization. Some selectively exploit one approach over another or may use a combination of tactics. The selection of one approach over the other is a reflection of the strength, resources, and capability of dissident organizations that resort to violence. If one were to position guerrilla warfare and terrorism as exclusive tactics on a hierarchical scale, guerrilla warfare would be above terrorism. Guerrilla warfare reflects an organization with a larger membership, access to more resources, and operates as conventional military units. Terrorist dissidents contain fewer numbers than guerrillas, and rely on clandestine means more so, and are organized as cells in order to overcome their lack in manpower. The key is that both types of dissident organizations resort to violence for the express purpose of overthrowing a regime in power.
T.E. Lawrence agreed on the critical need for a guerrilla base. He referred to it as a means of “sure retreat” into an area which the enemy cannot enter (Owens 2008). Lawrence also added another dimension to the criteria that “sure retreats” require a sympathetic population, that will not betray rebel movements to the enemy (Owens 2008). In this aspect, al Qa’ida and the Taliban have been successful in establishing safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Both the Provisional IRA and ETA were successful in establishing safe havens within their respective communities. A physical safe haven in conjunction with a social network (these associations date back to when the area was first established as a staging area for the Afghan mujahedeen) in FATA and NWFP would allow AQ and the Taliban with the resources it would need to be reconstituted, especially after being defeated and driven from Afghanistan. Similarly, Mao, in China, and Ho Chi Minh, in North Vietnam, had constructed safe havens based on their knowledge of the land and people. For the purposes of this analysis, the most striking failures of Che Guevara’s operations in Bolivia were that the guerrillas lacked a safe haven to recuperate and did not gain any kind of sympathetic support from the population.

The operational environment that militant organizations manage is a key determinant to assess an insurgency. While certain terrains permit greater maneuverability and others afford greater protection, the space insurgents occupy will also dictate the best suited strategy. Rough terrain encumbers the movement of better equipped fighting forces, whereas the same terrain offers guerrillas hiding places and permits greater ease of maneuvering. Urban areas, while they are endowed with numerous targets and offer concealment, they are also an area where state security forces are overwhelmingly concentrated, which makes it problematic for militants. But for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the urban area was used to its advantage, as
its members were able to blend in with the community. The same can be said of insurgents in urban areas in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The ability to be absorbed by a population is a strategic advantage for insurgents or any dissident, but only under conditions where a government is incapable of maintaining its authority over the area. Stronger governments can easily monitor the movement of people in areas where the state is the clearly established authority. Contested areas of conflict are also problematic, as the state’s sole authority is in question. The environment is a determinant feature that can bring success or failure to both security forces and the oppositional militant organizations they face.

**Insurgent Terror Groups**

The literature on safe havens as defined by Mao, Guevara, and Lawrence refer to insurgencies or guerrilla warfare. Not all terrorist groups are insurgents, but almost every insurgent group uses terrorism, although the exact percentage depends heavily on how the organization is coded (Byman 2008). The global jihad is characterized by the U.S. as transnational (non-state actors) terrorism in the sense that the targets of a terrorist episode are not the victims who are killed or maimed in the attack, but rather the governments, publics, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction—such as fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, or radicalization (Cronin 2002). In his Foreword to Al-Qa’ida’s *Doctrine for Insurgency*, Julian Lewis writes of the organization’s understanding of ideological battles, and states that “the inability to win militarily must be compensated for by the ability to defeat psychologically—to cause the mental collapse and capitulation of the enemy” (Al-Muqin 2009). When one considers the political and psychological ramifications the 9/11 attacks had on
global security, the intent and impact of terrorism becomes an effective tactic utilized by global jihadists. In many regards, the World Trade Center symbolized the financial capital of the Western world and its horrific destruction graphically conveyed the West's vulnerabilities. In comparison, more people have died in the First and Second World Wars, Vietnam, and Korea, yet the 2,973 casualties of 9/11 appear to have had a greater emotional impact on the American psyche. It can be understood that organizations that represent a global jihadi outlook conduct acts of terrorism, and are labeled as such, at least from a policy standpoint, the U.S. being no exception. As such, there exist drawbacks in identifying an organization on the basis of its tactic.

An alternative approach, which the former chief counter-terrorism strategist at the U.S. State Department David Kilcullen adopts, is to define and analyze the global jihadi networks in a manner unlike that of transnational terrorism. According to Kilcullen these networks constitute an insurgency, an organized movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo (established political order) within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda (Kilcullen 2009). This definition is adapted from the US military, which states that an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control ("FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency" 2006). An insurgency may also be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the former consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish a legitimacy for some aspect of the! present political system which it considers illegitimate (O'Neill 1978). The strategic goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate reflects a desire to overthrow the established governmental/societal order and replace it with one based on extreme interpretations of Islamic
principles, a theme that is central in the above definitions. Kilcullen continues that like other insurgents, al Qa’ida draws its potency from its demographic base (the world’s Sunni Muslim populations) and its ability to intimidate, co-opt, or mobilize that base for support (Kilcullen 2009). According to O’Neill,

insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence because terrorists seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term goals. The long-term goal is to change the political community, political system, authorities, or policies. The intermediate goal of terrorism is not so much the desire to deplete the government fiscal resources as it is to erode its psychological support by instilling fear into officials and their domestic and international supporters (O’Neill 1990).

Insurgent terrorism is further divided based upon an organization’s goals and the politics involved, which will allow one to better understand the movement, permitting one to discern the nature of the insurgency. Of the seven types of insurgencies in existence, the global jihadi networks generally fall under the banner of the traditionalist.

Traditionalist insurgents also seek to displace the political system, but the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones, rooted in ancestral ties and religion. The political structures they seek to establish are characterized by limited or guided participation in low autonomy, with political power in the hands of an autocratic leader supported by nobility, army, and clergy (O’Neill 1990).

Again, this is reflected by the global jihadi aim to establish an Islamic Caliphate. As O’Neill states, this category insurgents are engaged in a struggle to restore a system that existed in the distant past. In the case of global jihadists, the Islamic Caliphate that they seek is more mythological than the historical Islamic empires of the Moors, Arabs, or the Ottoman.

Within the traditionalist grouping, exists the reactionary-traditionalists, characterized as being zealots. Salafi jihadists typify this subtype, which is personified through their goal of establishing an idealized and distorted brand of the Islamic Caliphate. The ideology of global
Jihadists is considered to be a revolutionary public good, one that is desirable and beneficial only to a small group of elites, mainly those who are currently involved in the movement and prescribe to a draconian interpretation of Islam. Some examples of this strict interpretation occurred during the Taliban experiment in Afghanistan.

Women were banned from work and hidden from public view. The religious police decreed that "women going outside with fashionable, ornamental, tight, and charming clothes to show themselves will be cursed by Islamic sharia and should never expect to go to heaven. Music was banned, and so were television, kite flying, chess, and soccer. Adultery was punished by stoning, and drinking alcohol by whipping (Buruma and Margalit 2004).

As the guardians and embodiment of true Islam, these elites represent a repository of faith.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom Basque Country and Liberty) or ETA, which claims to represent the Basque, constitutes what is known as secessionist insurgents. They seek to withdraw the Basque Nation from the territories the ethnic group inhabit in Spain and France. The argument for the radical nationalism ETA espouses is based on the understanding that the Basque are culturally different, and historically, enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy from both French and Spanish monarchies. ETA has conducted attacks on the infrastructure and various targets that represent symbols of Spanish authority. At the root of the ETA movement was a revival of Basque cultural activities and the Basque language, which was initially taught clandestinely, but was later taught openly and used as a form of protest to counteract the presence of Spanish immigrants. Youths became radicalized and adopted ETA’s radical anti-imperialist resistance and mobilized against a despised state that many believed intended to destroy Basque society.

After ETA assassinated Meliton de Manzanas, the chief of the secret police of Guipuzcoa, the Spanish government responded with massive repression, constant road patrols,
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arrests, house searches, and the widespread use of torture (Heiberg 1989). The organization resorted to extortion as an economic means to finance their operations, and in this manner functioned much like the mafia. ETA would also conduct kidnappings, relentlessly attacked security forces, and individuals believed to be informants. Safe houses were maintained and concealed quarters were established in forests to store supplies and weaponry. Members of ETA have used the French Basque region as a cross-border safe haven when pursued by Spanish authorities. The French government tolerated the Spanish Basque’s use of the French Basque region, but offered ETA exile in other regions of France as a safety measure to keep Basque nationalist fervor in check.

Likewise, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) also represents a secessionist insurgency. The PIRA sought to remove Northern Ireland from British control and bring about a united Ireland by means of guerrilla warfare and armed conflict. The PIRA splintered from the IRA due to the original organization’s inability to protect the Catholic community from Protestant mobs that led to the destruction of Catholic homes. The ranks of the Provisionals were, mostly “urban working-class activists who perceived themselves, initially, as defenders of their communities against contemporary loyalists, partisan police and partisan British troops” (O’Leary 2007). Initially, the PIRA was mostly comprised of volunteers that were regularly employed, but donated their time and effort to the organization. These volunteer members of the PIRA operated from their homes and communities. Many members of the PIRA leadership, as well as rank-and-file members joined the PIRA because of prior memberships within their immediate or extended families (Moore 2007).

Though the PIRA was community-based and supported, it was also a clandestine organization that forbade the disclosure of organizational intelligence. The senior leadership of
the PIRA, a twelve-member group known as the Executive, did not meet during a 16-year period lasting from 1970-1986 due to the dangers associated with group assemblies (O'Leary 2007). Equipment and armament were secured in outlying counties of Northern Ireland or outer regions of Dublin in the same manner as modern-day insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan secure weapons cache in open fields or farming areas. Since the members of the PIRA were from Northern Ireland, it is safe to conclude that the planning and organization occurred within that region. The IRA did not champion and were not championed by Ireland—although the British regarded Ireland as the IRA’s safe haven (O'Leary 2007).

Since 2003, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism has given a tremendous amount of energy and resources to deny terrorists safe havens, albeit state-sponsored or non-state actors. In a Congressional Research Service report analyzing US policies targeting terrorist safe havens, Francis T. Miko, a Specialist in International Relations Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division summarized that,

The aim was to choke off the lifeblood of terrorist groups. In language very similar to that of the 9/11 Commission report, the strategy document spoke of denying access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit (Miko 2005).

In April 2008, the US Government Accountability Office found that since 2002, the US has failed to meet its National Security objective of eradicating terrorist safe havens.

Despite the importance of safe havens to insurgent movements, little analytical attention has been devoted to examining the relationship between the two. Neither has it been delineated how insurgent terrorist movements can and do respond to the dilemmas that without the existence of a safe haven, the chances of success are greatly reduced. Feldman described how the IRA utilized numerous “safe houses” (a place for receiving orders, weapons, disguises, stolen
vehicles, or for hiding), “runbacks” (a network of alleyways, double-entry buildings, street systems, and highways that permit the evasion of police/army patrols, check points, and antagonistic paramilitary units), and “wash houses” (a safe house used to get rid of weapons and disguises and for the transfer of stolen vehicles after an operation; also used for debriefing) as a network of safe havens (Feldman 1991). For the IRA, this network was initially community-based due to Irish neighborhoods being barricaded by the British government, but was eventually relocated in other ethnically diverse and nonaligned communities. Likewise, the PLO was also able to operate within Israeli-occupied territories—the refugee camps in many instances became safe havens. Government weakness or inability to combat the presence and activity of militant organizations has also been identified as a factor in the proliferation of safe havens. The presence of militant organizations has proven to be a disruptive force and diverts tremendous resources and energy for states that identify militant activities as an issue and a threat.

**Spatial Coexistence of the State and Terror Organizations**

There are numerous accounts of how militant organizations adapted to state actions aimed at cracking down and limiting terrorist activities. Militant organizations cannot openly mobilize and recruit due to opposition from the state. In order to overcome such an insurmountable obstacle, militant organizations devise methods to clandestinely mobilize. In order to counter the constant harassment and pursuit by the British authorities, the PIRA’s organization was structured to function as independent cells, or Active Service Units (ASU), that could continue to execute planned activities in the event a cell was compromised (Hardin 1995). The PIRA took an additional security measure to prevent infiltration and the monitoring of the
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groups movements, by excluding PIRA members who had been imprisoned from the ASU’s. Likewise, Mao Tse-tung stressed the importance of the establishment of guerrilla bases, which in some cases were used as secure sites for purposes of retreat. Mao asserted that rugged terrain was preferable to the desert or even flatlands (Tse-tung 1989). Gurr noted that rugged isolated terrain would provide better protection, allow guerrilla forces to accrue resources, and to reorganize to fight another day (Gurr 1970). Therefore, remoteness and ruggedness criteria are the most suited of geographical features in establishing safe havens for transnational militant organizations such as the global salafi jihadi networks. The geography aspect of transnational terrorist safe havens has been a fundamental feature that has influenced the current discourse on the subject—this trend persists.

Whereas “traditional” terrorist organizations espoused more “local” grievances, resources are mostly obtained from within the state or contested area. Transnational militant organizations represent a more diverse set of dissidents, and their grievances and goals are more globally oriented, requiring resources and assets from different locations. State-sponsored militant organizations enjoy the comfort and support from the host nation, which provides a de facto safe haven, and do not have the burden of expending additional resources in establishing, protecting, and maintaining a base of operation. Failed states, i.e. tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions, an enduring character of the violence from conflict, present suitable territory for militant organizations to occupy (Rotberg 2003). Takyeh and Gvosdev established four reasons that failed states are viable options for transnational militant organizations: 1) the acquisition of territory on a larger scale than a collective of scattered safe houses; 2) weak or nonexistent law enforcement capabilities allowing for freedom of maneuver; 3) supply of manpower with the capability to mobilize resources; and 4) outward appearance of
soverignty, which reduces the chances of outside interference (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). Within these failed states, transnational terrorist organizations can establish base camps in remote locations where they can operate with little interference. But with the establishment of a safe haven within a failed state, also comes the issue of the associated cost for the state and regime. This is an issue that must be overcome by the militant organization if the safe haven is to remain operational.

State weakness is characterized by the existence of a temporary or situational fragility caused by internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks (Rotberg 2003). Weak states are limited in their capacity to project power, as manifested in an inability to regulate traffic across its borders. A key function of states in the Weberian sense is to secure and protect its borders, offering citizens a degree of safety. Porous borders grant capable violence-oriented dissident units greater efficacy during insurgencies, and increase their chances of success. NATO forces have reported of an enemy that attacks its forces in Afghanistan, only to retreat to its haven in Pakistan. To this end, Pakistan has been unable to rid the country of the Taliban and other militant organizations. These organizations have thrived in harassing and attacking NATO and Afghan forces from without, and Pakistani security forces from within, while creating insecure conditions for civilians with indiscriminate targeting.

An alternative explanation to factors that create favorable conditions for transnational terrorist organizations to establishing safe havens is the concept of quasi-states. The term is used to describe conditions in post-colonial states where positions within state institutions are occupied and used to the benefit of the individuals in power. In this sense, citizens receive little in terms of public goods and services associated with independent functional states, which are siphoned to the elites. This condition creates governments that are often deficient in the political
will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights or to provide socio-economic welfare (Jackson 1990). Externally, these states have all the appearances of sovereign states, and are recognized as such. In countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Zaire, there exist regions that have escaped from national control, and where either regional warlords or internal anarchy reign (Jackson 1987). These areas where the central government lacks authority form the basis for ideas such as “lawless” or “ungoverned” regions. This is the same language that is utilized in the 9/11 Report. Such regions permit non-state actors to operate without interference from the state.

Quasi-states form the basis of “black holes” and “Black Spots”. Black Spots constitute areas that are neither recognized by the international community, nor under true governmental control of the host states; they remain in the grey area between formal international recognition and semi-formal central control (Stanislawski 2006). A black hole is an area in which terrorist groups can undertake activities in support of terrorism without government knowledge or despite activities of the central government to undermine them (Korteweg 2008). A fundamental aspect of both definitions is the presence of an area that is ungoverned or out of reach of a central state’s authority, creating conditions conducive to illegitimate militant activities. Militant organizations exploit a state’s inability to regulate illegal activities within its borders and utilize this weakness to their advantage. Within these environments, militant organizations prosper because of an absence of external authority to prevent them from expanding. These permissive environments create safe havens, allowing militants to operate and sustain their activities.

Because militant organizations are permitted to freely operate in these environments, they become problematic to the state for several reasons. Under conditions where militant organizations lack a safe haven, considerable amount of resources are expanded towards
remaining invisible to state authorities. But, when a safe haven is available, those resources can be used towards other areas in support of the organization. Terrorist movement and activities that are allowed to expand and gain strength become more costly for a state. Under such conditions, the presence of a safe haven places a state in a disadvantaged position. The state functions from the standpoint of being in a deficit, because it has a tremendous amount of ground to make up. If expenses for counteracting militants are determined to be too much, states may become complacent or opt to “turn a blind eye” (Stanislawski 2006). Pakistan’s, notably the ISI, history of encouraging, nurturing, and partnering with militant organizations is a case in point. Even when it was determined that militant organizations were becoming detrimental to Pakistan, its neighbors, and allies, the relationship with extremists endured. The government reluctantly came around, and even when the state took action to address the growing problem of indiscriminate extremist violence, it was militarily and politically ill-prepared.

The Role of the State and Terrorists in Creation of Safe Havens

States offer varying degrees of support to militant organizations ranging from full-fledged support to conditions of tolerance. Most apparent and salient of state support is that of a safe haven. A study of the types of state support to militant terrorist organizations suggests that both “training and organization” and “money and logistics” correlates strongly with the presence of safe havens (Byman et al. 2001). Though the number of states that continue to support militant organizations has decreased since the end of the Cold War, it is a phenomenon that still persists.
One type of state support offered to militant organizations is passive support. Passive support is when a regime *knowingly allows* a terrorist group to raise money, enjoy a safe haven, recruit or otherwise flourish without interference, but does not directly aid the group itself (Byman 2005). Such conditions are known to have existed with the U.S. and the IRA, Saudi Arabia and Islamic radical groups, as well as Pakistan and homegrown and foreign Islamic radicals. In Saudi Arabia, the kingdom itself has donated an estimated $70 billion to broaden the reach of Wahhabism by building mosques and schools, and providing other types of aid (Byman 2005). Some of the recipients of these charities were well intentioned, while the remainder of the financial support went towards funding global jihadi networks. When states knowingly look the other way, it permits militant organizations to function and flourish, and if left unchecked, can lead to full state sponsorship.

State sponsorship encompasses more than what passive support entails. Direct state sponsorship is more vital when a militant organization faces an overwhelming force and lacks the means to effectively mobilize and survive on its own. To varying degrees, state sponsorship comes in the form of money, safe havens, weapons, supplies, logistics, training, and mobilization to name a few. This list is not exhaustive, nor is it all inclusive, because, some states assist more in some ways, and less in others. The rationale behind state sponsorship is primarily geopolitical rather than one of ideology, ethnic affinity, or religious sentiment (Byman et al. 2001). States utilize militant organizations more as proxies to influence geopolitical events that sometimes result in regime change, deterioration of a rival, or even retribution. The one advantage to state sponsorship is that it is a less costly option for states to implement policy through a third party than direct involvement where expenses or consequences of failure are dire, and affords states a degree of distance.
Rationale for Safe Havens

The creation and maintenance of safe havens requires support from a community. This support could come in the form of cultural/religious/ideological beliefs. It is crucial that the dissident group believes in their cause, and is willing to bear the cost—in some cases the cost is more for others, depending on the political landscape and degree of autonomy. For leaders, it is critical that they convince followers that their cause is just and that they will win. Patience is a key component to a successful dissident movement; the goals sought can be likened to a marathon rather than a sprint.

All dissident organizations require space to operate. Those that utilize legal methods of protest that are deemed to be legal or less threatening to the ruling regime are afforded the necessary space to operate. While those that utilize violence, terror, or other unauthorized means of protest that threaten to topple or challenge a regime are vehemently denied all means to mobilize and operate. Militant organizations have the added challenge of overcoming this obstacle; they are faced with a tremendous amount of resistance every step of the way. Regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, have little tolerance for organizations that defy their authority or legitimacy. The establishment of safe havens greatly increases the chance of success—a safe haven can be said to be a combat multiplier, it strengthens militants’ capabilities to conduct deadly attacks.

What bridges the gap between the above concepts on the existence of safe havens is Leon Trotsky’s idea of dual sovereignty. Trotsky refers to,

\textit{a multiple sovereignty} as the identifying feature of revolutionary situations. A revolutionary situation begins when a government previously under the control of
a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities (Tilly 1978).

Though his writings are a reflection of the Bolshevik Revolution where coalitions of groups were created to form the opposition to the Tsarist government, it adequately reflects the nature of safe havens as applicable to terror groups. Regardless if one refers to international or domestic terrorism, the case still applies. In this light, a terrorist safe haven functions in the same manner as a sovereign state, wherein terrorist organizations exercise a degree of influence of a given part of the state where there support is greatest, but with the intended purpose of usurping the existing regime. Under revolutionary situations, Trotsky describes this as “the presence of a bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus” (Tilly 1978). In the eyes of international law, though, no legal sovereignty is established under such conditions. Within the confines of a safe haven, a different set of rules apply, as all activities are geared toward supporting the terror group in question. On the surface, though the inhabitants of the said region belong to the larger population of the state, there allegiances are given to the militant movement.

Mark Lichbach has tackled the issues that dissidents (individuals whose objectives are to change government institutions, policies, and/or personnel)4 face in their attempts to overcome the Rebel’s Dilemma, how to mobilize people so that a rebellion takes place given that there high costs associated and the benefit is vague (Lichbach 1998). In other words, the Rebel’s Dilemma is “the problem of nonparticipation in protest and rebellion”; or how to overcome the problem of a rational individual will participate in protest and rebellion (Lichbach 1994). He proposes four

4 No distinction is made between protesters, rioters, or even terrorists.
solution groups (Market, Community, Contract, and Hierarchy) that dissidents utilize to address the issue of collective action (CA). Lichbach stresses that “collective endeavors involve public good (PG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) elements” (Lichbach 1994)—as noted above, the PG that terrorists espouse is often times too radical for larger populations. Lichbach also notes that in order for any kind of mobilization to occur, dissidents must employ one of the solutions in conjunction with another, because, attempts to utilize a solution individually will be incomplete. The task the dissident is faced with is which solution works best for the given situation. The focus of Lichbach’s solution groups will be those applicable to terror groups as they relate to safe havens.

**Market Solutions**

Market solutions are the foundation of the solutions of the rebel’s dilemma. Market approaches encompass several elements: “unplanned and spontaneous order”; “invisible hand’ that leads rebels to the voluntary provision of the PG they seek”; and “uncoordinated exchanges . . . as the basis for cooperation” (Lichbach 1998). These elements of Market solutions can be said to be “uncoordinated exchange relations among individual which serves as the basis for cooperation in the political market” (Lichbach 1994). The utilization of Market solutions enables terror groups to increase the probability of winning, increasing resources, and improve the productivity of tactics.

Terror groups are aware that they do not have access to the same resources as states. Dissidents attack targets that are perceived to be vulnerable (soft targets), taking action only when they think they can win (Lichbach 1998). Terrorists have the capability to wait and
effectively plan attacks, and are in a position of dictating the time and place an attack will occur, as they have complete information.

A safe haven or network allows terror groups to increase resources. This means that terror groups are able to accumulate vital equipment, manpower, and supplies, and deploy them to conduct terror campaigns without the knowledge of a regime. Organizations with greater resources are able to sustain greater levels of terror campaigns (Lichbach 1998).

The improving the productivity of tactics materializes in a safe haven by amassing individual areas of expertise. Those individuals with particular knowledge share that information with their comrades. That sharing culminates in the creation of training manuals (IRA’s Green Book and Al-Qa’ida’s doctrine for insurgency) that allow for an easier process in producing collective violence. Also, through trial and error, dissidents are able to disseminate information on effective tactics and eliminate less efficacious ones, i.e., IED making 101.

**Community**

“Community approaches assume that communal institutions exist, and that they are so effective as to render social planning unnecessary” (Lichbach 1998). Central to Community approaches is the formation or existence of a common belief system. This allows for dissidents to become like-minded in ideology, approach, and execution. Social networks are formed on the basis of community approaches, and provide for much needed support in strengthening and promoting group cohesion. A common belief system also serves the purpose of indoctrinating new recruits, reinforcing the belief system and values of existing members, and obviates the need for monetary benefits.
Contract

Contract approaches assume individuals who collectively plan their society . . . in an attempt to alter the parameters of the canonical PG-PD game by creating a set of institutions that facilitate their interests (Lichbach 1998). This solution forms the basis for self-government/autonomy, and is fundamental in the creation of safe havens. Self-government of Contract solutions are in agreement with Trotsky’s concept of dual-sovereignty, as mentioned above. Under such circumstances, dissidents form strong formal/informal ties with their communities. Safe havens, therefore,

facilitate several other solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma. First, autonomous dissidents can create a base of operations to train, arm, and eventually attacked the regime. This facilitates the Increase Resources solution to the Rebel’s Dilemma. Second, as dissidents’ autonomy increases, the regimes information becomes more costly, unreliable, and untimely, and locating dissidents becomes more difficult. Autonomous dissidents can therefore easily take refuge from the state's repressive apparatus. This facilitates the Lower Costs solutions to the rebel’s dilemma. Third, [safe havens] provide food, refuge, weapons manufacturing sites, training facilities, and a magnet for recruits. This allows dissidents increase their resources, facilitating the increase resources solution. Finally, autonomous dissidents can seek foreign support, by taking refuge in neighboring countries. This facilitates the Locate Principles or Patrons solution to the Rebel's Dilemma (Lichbach 1998).

These factors make safe havens an attractive solution, as it provides dissidents with numerous capabilities and protection.

Hierarchy

The fourth solution to the Rebel’s Dilemma of interest in analysis of safe havens is Hierarchy. “Hierarchy approaches assume the existence of institutions that are created to manage society, and feature planned and contingent order in a deliberate attempt to solve the dissident CA problem” (Lichbach 1998). Hierarchy solutions facilitate the following: Locate
the Principals or Patrons; Become Decentralized—Create a Federal Structure; and Become Effective—Shape an Efficacious Group.

The utilization of Hierarchy solutions allows terror groups to locate principals or patrons. “Outsiders often have the necessary resources and can make the difference between success and failure” (Lichbach 1998). State sponsorship, along with key financial backers, and a pension program for a martyr’s family are forms of this aspect of Hierarchy solutions—these assist in reducing costs to an organization. Patrons can also assist in facilitating other solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma such as ‘improving the productivity of tactics’ and ‘increasing the probability of winning’. The reason patrons provide support to dissident organizations can be as varied as that of a common enemy, their use as a proxy, or the belief that the movement could succeed. One obstacle patrons must face though is that sometimes it can be difficult for the dissident organization to be controlled and manipulated as desired.

Hierarchy solutions also allow dissident organizations to reorganize. Terror groups are constantly confronted with the threat of infiltration by the state in order to undermine operations. One method to overcome this difficulty is to become decentralized. This can be accomplished by establishing a cellular structure for the organization’s personnel, which ensures continuity in the event of infiltration, because only a portion of their operations are exposed.

Dissident organizations can also select to become effective. “Dissident entrepreneurs seek to shape the PG”—Islamic Caliphate, independence from larger groups, or unification with a self-identified ethnic state—“sought by their group, such that the Rebel’s Dilemma is minimized and an efficacious (i.e., winning) coalition results” (Lichbach 1998). This can be accomplished with a variety of method: broadening the extent of grievance; changing the framing of the grievance; pledging to deliver a PG that is difficult to come to fruition; and
attempting to represent all possible aspects of the aggrieved community. In formulating these strategies, dissidents aim to shape and mold their movement in the direction assessed to be the most effective to accomplish their goals.

Methods

Logic dictates that organizations, mobilized individuals or institutions require physical space to operate and serve its intended purposes. This requirement also extends to terrorists. But how does the presence of an operational space (safe haven) impact a terrorist movement? Does it matter where a safe haven is established? The research question that guides this thesis is: How do safe havens facilitate militant-terrorist organizations activities and operations? I expect to find that the lack of safe havens would make it next to impossible to conduct terrorist activities.

Due to the nature of operational sensitivity of intelligence and military activities, the exact nature, composition, or any relevant data on safe havens is not disclosed for public consumption. There exist no how-to guides on building, maintaining, recognizing, or understanding what goes on in safe havens. Whatever information that is available is often vague and only offers a glimpse of the phenomenon. Similarly, information concerning the Mafia was almost nonexistent, until informants began to disclose information concerning their clandestine activities and structure. Those involved in clandestine terror groups are not available to disclose the inner workings of terrorist activities. All participants of insurgencies and terrorism know and recognize that a safe haven is crucial to operational success. Other than the realization that safe havens exist, there is no concise method to measure how safe havens
facilitate militant activities. Researchers are left to piece seemingly unrelated areas together to create a composite understanding of the phenomenon.

In many states, open mobilization of people in protest is not outlawed, but mobilizing to subvert the standing regime is a problem for the ruling elites. Militants utilize unconventional methods of violence to indiscriminately attack symbols of a regime in hopes of wearing down the government’s will to resist opposition and gain legitimacy (O’Neill 1990). Efficacy of safe havens for individual militant organizations could be determined by analyzing how well militant organizations accomplish their goals. Militant organizations do not issue reports of successes or failures, and even when one claims responsibility for an attack, the actual damage is sometimes inflated. They cannot be relied upon to produce accurate reports.

I propose to conduct analysis of what I have identified to be areas of interest that reflect activities of both terrorists and counter-terrorists. These areas serve as a function of the presence and establishment of safe havens: number of attacks; complexity of attacks; government responses; and persistence of attacks. Individually, none of these indicators would constitute safe haven efficacy. Neither are any of the indicators equivalents in impact and significance. There exists no precedence for analysis of terrorist safe havens on the factors that this study suggests. A synthesis of these markers should allow us to gauge how safe havens help facilitate militant operations. In order to conduct campaigns of terror, an organization would require finances, skilled fighters and replacements, and safe havens. It must be understood that it is within a safe haven that the manpower and financing are consolidated and allocated; making safe havens the centerpiece of their resources. These are basic resources, without which it is next to impossible for terror groups to conduct terrorist campaigns on any level. The resources of the group may then be interpreted as a proxy for the level of damage it is able to inflict on the
incumbent government, where damage may be both tangible (e.g., destruction of infrastructure, et c.) and intangible (e.g., the welfare loss to government constituents as a result of terrorist actions that arbitrarily hit the civilian population) (Overgaard 1994). For the most part, terror groups do not succeed in accomplishing their goals, but those that do have had narrow and specific goals (Laqueur 1987). If terror groups are to disrupt or wear down a regime, the efficacy of a terror campaign must be manifested within the affected society. Crucial to this analysis is the definition of terrorism, specifically its intent. Laqueur refers to:

> the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics (Laqueur 1987).

The ripple effects of terror campaigns are absorbed by a society’s institutions, and become apparent when one observes how they function, change and/or are negatively affect by the campaign. The definition of success is based on two criteria that refer to the intentions of insurgent terrorist organization: 1) terrorist operation occurred; and 2) the observed affect of the operation: damaged infrastructure, casualties and other effects. What we are measuring then, is the ability of terror groups to successfully modify behavior or politics, though on face value, it appears to be intangible.

A comparative analysis will be conducted of ETA, the IRA, and militant Islamists of the FATA and NWFP of Pakistan. The first indicator to be measured is the **number of attacks**. This will indicate how active militants are. Data will be obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to analyze the ETA, IRA and al Qa’ida cases. The GTD was chosen due to ease of accessibility and flexibility in configuration. An assumption is made that the amount of attacks terror groups commit is an indicator of the strength of its resources. If an organization
lacked crucial resources, then the level of activity would decrease. Thus, the number of attacks is one area which can be analyzed in order to gauge the amount of resources a terrorist organization has at its disposal.

The **more complex an attack**, the more resources the organization has at its disposal, as simple hit and run attacks are a sign of lack of resources and capability (Overgaard 1994). A small number of attacks committed by terrorist organizations have been large-scale attacks, such as 9/11. In accordance to the extent of attacks reflecting the resources available to terrorist organizations, these large-scale attacks would have placed a greater demand and cost on these organizations, requiring them to establish the necessary provisions to make these operations feasible. Terrorist groups utilize cell structures that operate with relatively few members—cell structures are not effective with large numbers of members. The events surrounding 9/11 required the coordination of several cells—each cell had the responsibility for specific aspects of the operation. Without the coordination and cooperation, of the various cells, these well executed attacks would not have succeeded in gaining national, as well as international, notoriety as many the world over, watched in horror at the level of destruction a small group was able to inflict.

**Government responses** are the actions that regimes make when faced with challenging situations. Departments, institutions, or government positions are formed are formed in response to a crisis. In the US, following 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was created to address the security problems that transnational terrorism posed. Military forces, law enforcement, border patrol, and intelligence assets are also mobilized to respond to emerging threats. Governments seek to minimize the effects of terrorist attacks by choosing and most favorable strategy (conciliatory or retaliatory) based upon its assessment of the resource
capability of the terrorist organization (Overgaard 1994). In such a scenario, the State is always at a disadvantage, because it does not have full information of the capabilities and resources of the terrorist organization. The area of interest noted above, scale of attack, is a good indicator of the resources and capabilities of a terrorist organizations. A more formidable opponent would make it more likely that concessions are granted. Responsible governments address the concerns and safety of its citizens by mandating changes in government, instituting policy designed to protect and meet the needs of its citizens, and lastly seeks to maintain the “political status quo”.

The ETA and PIRA case studies of state responses are based upon Jelissen’s categorization. Jelissen identifies three levels of state responses: conciliation, repression, and symbolic reassurances. Explanation of Jelissen’s data and categorization of state responses goes here. Conciliatory strategies are defined as being accommodative or appeasing in nature (Jellissen 2007). They can range from low, medium to high\(^5\). Repression represents a state’s ability to intimidate or threaten the opposition. Finally symbolic reassurances can be interpreted as the state’s “attempt to ‘reassure their populations that security challenges are being addressed’” (Jellissen 2007). Conciliatory and symbolic reassurance responses are interpreted more so as the State acquiescing to terror groups, and reflect the seriousness the State perceives the terrorist threat. The theory is based on the hypothesis that the state has to respond, otherwise their non-response strategy would be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the opposition, possibly resulting in further escalation and/or interpreted as an inability of the government to adequately provide for its citizens.

\(^5\) For more detailed account refer to Jellissen, Susan M. 2007. Civil Conflict in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Spain, Italy, and Britain, 1968--2001, Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign.
Persistence of attacks is an indicator of both the longevity and capability of terror organizations to remain relevant in spite of being hunted by the state. That an organization is able to continue to exist means that it has maintained support from its representative community. External support comes in the form of monetary support received from a diasporic community or other associated group. Mobilization of the represented community reflects how successful an organization is at obtaining and retaining members. Unlike open and legal organizations, terrorist groups face an additional obstacle of turnover of personnel due to the need to acquire new members caused by attrition associated with death or imprisonment. If they are to continue with campaigns of terror, terrorists must have the physical numbers required to fulfill the roles of the organization. A cessation or decline of terror-driven activities indicates a reduction in capability of a terror organization, a loss of resources, or inability to employ its assets. The following sections examine each of the areas of interest in regards to three terrorist groups ETA, IRA, and anti-Western extremist Islamic groups.

Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)

Basque Homeland and Liberty was founded on the basis of committing armed struggle against Spain. In 1961, an ETA operation to derail a train transporting supporters of Spain’s dictator Francisco Franco met with failure, as the organization failed to derail a single car. The Franco regime responded with swift and brutal repression, more than one hundred ETA members were arrested, tortured and, and sentenced to jail for fifteen years or more, while a group of nearly equal size was forced into exile in France (Irving 1999). During its first decade of existence, ETA would undergo a series of transformations, as members debated on ideology,
splinter groups formed, and members of the old guard were replaced with more militant figures. ETA reorganized itself to be able to conduct armed conflicts and designated individuals that would be paid to carry out its mission full-time. The organization adopted a theory of action-repression-action, which supported the idea that ETA could create objective conditions for spontaneous revolution by provoking Spanish security forces to overreact in response to its actions by aggravating already high levels of Basque resentment to Spanish rule (Irving 1999). ETA’s first successful act of terror occurred in 1968, almost ten years after it was founded in 1959. Again, the Franco regime responded with harsh repression, crippling the organization, and leaving them with few leaders in a position to mobilize inside Spain.

Figure 1, Focus of ETA’s Attacks

![Segment of Society Attacked by ETA](image)

Source: (Spanish Ministry of Interior 2010)

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6 A majority of ETA’s attacks are concentrated on security forces (Figure 1).
The repression that ETA faced from 1968 to 1972 was enough to almost extinguish the organization, but it was resuscitated in parts due to several events. The military court-martial of those accused of the Manzanas assassination (Burgos Sixteen) brought forth a considerable amount of protest that often resulted in violent conflict with security forces. During the trial, ETA members kidnapped a German consul, Eugen Biehl in hopes of leveraging the Franco regime to lessen the sentences of the Burgos Sixteen and gain sympathy from the international community through the media (Irving 1999). Though the German consul was released prior to the sentencing, all but one of the Burgos Sixteen was found guilty, with six receiving the death penalty. Those that received the death penalty were later commuted to thirty years in prison.

The second group of events surrounded the defection of many youth from the conservative Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) who became disillusioned with the organization’s inability to actively engage in the nationalist resistance movement. This defection provided ETA with one key resource it lacked, new members capable of action. ETA would also experience another break-up of the organization resulting in the separation of the political wing and military wing (Clark 1984). Free from the political wing’s criticisms of ETA’s armed attacks, the organization was thus poised to commence their campaign of terror.

In their efforts to establish an independent Basque state, ETA utilized a number of terror methods. Figure 2 is chronicles ETA’s victims since the founding of the organization to the present. For example, the number of targeted killings remained relatively low during the “action-repression-action” era. The average number of killings from 1968-1972 was below one killing per year. The average number of kidnappings was also below one annually. An increase in killings was observed in 1973, totaling 6, more than the five-year period before it. That same year marked the beginning of a transitional period and the convergence of a variety of factors in
Spanish politics. Francisco Franco relinquished his functions as prime minister, naming Admiral Carrero Blanco to replace him. Spain witnessed an audacious attack by ETA that resulted in the assassination of Blanco (the significance of the assassination will be discussed later in detail).

As mentioned above, ETA’s ranks increased, accounts estimated membership to be 500 due to its merger with EGI (Basque Youth Force), the youth wing of the PNV (Clark 1984). ETA also conducted its first armed action against a Basque by kidnapping and holding Lorenzo Zabala, a prominent businessman, for ransom. Furthermore, Franco’s illness in 1974, and subsequent death in 1975, resulted in a fragmentation of Spanish politics, leaving a vacuum in Spain’s central authority. These major events would embolden ETA to step up the frequency and intensity of its assaults on Spain.

Source: (Spanish Ministry of Interior 2010)
Of the seven Basque Provinces, ETA membership is concentrated in Guipuzcoa province. The Blanco assassination occurred in Madrid, a distance well over 400 km from the Basque region. A majority of ETA’s protest activities were of close proximity to the region where their strength and resources were more abundant (Figure 3). An ETA agent in Madrid informed the organization of a weakness in Blanco’s security detail when he attended mass, prompting the deployment of ETA commandos to gather intelligence and conduct preliminary planning to assassinate the prime minister (Clark 1990). The operation was planned and executed within a year’s timeframe. In November of 1973, ETA rented the basement of an apartment building at 104 Claudio Coello street in order to construct a tunnel that reached out to the street, in a general area beneath where Blanco’s vehicle was parked, and emplaced with 100 kg of explosives (Shepard 2002). The explosives were part of 3,000 kg of explosives stolen from the Hernani arsenal some seven months earlier (Clark 1990). Planning for the assassination, originally designed as a kidnapping, evolved, as additional ETA commandos were incorporated, needed resources acquired, and smaller attacks conceived in order to mask ETA’s assassination intentions. The exploded vehicle was hurled over a 5-story building, landing on an inner courtyard of the adjoining building. The message sent by the assassination was that ETA could also kill-high ranking members of the Spanish government, and that the organization could prevent the continuation Franco’s.
The Franco regime utilized various tools of repression in response to ETA activities. When Spain transitioned to a democracy in 1978, the interim government, headed by King Juan Carlos abolished Franco’s “Law on the Prevention of Terrorism” along with the courts designed to bring terrorists to trial. Concessions were made towards imprisoned Basques, granting them amnesty, but fell short of releasing all of the prisoners (Von Tangen Page 1998). The amnesty granted towards Basque political prisoners was a partial victory for ETA, as this issue had been one of the five basic points outlined in the so-called “KAS alternatives” the organization outlined as a prerequisite in the discussion of any kind of cease-fire with the Spanish government. These conciliatory actions are consistent along the lines of improving the possibilities of winning, as outlined by Lichbach. Amnesties are identified to be low-conciliatory State policy that terror groups utilize to assuage terrorist claimed constituency—it must be noted that the generally the
cost accrued by the State is minimal (Jellissen 2007). Although Spain’s government was
democratic, ETA claimed that it was as equally repressive and illegitimate as that of the Franco
regime. It is during Spain’s transition into democracy, that ETA’s attacks increased. In the last
years of the Franco regime, 1974 to 1977, casualties from ETA’s attacks averaged 15.5 annually.
But in 1978, the number of victims increased to 66, which can be attributed to changes in policy
as the repression tactics utilized by the Franco regime were no longer enforced. But the state
would respond to ETA’s violence, again, with severe repression similar to the Franco regime.

ETA’s intent was to mobilize the Basque by exposing the repressive nature of the
Spanish State evidenced by state responses and actions toward the organization, and coercing the
State to implement policy favorable for ETA. State responses fall into three categories:
repressive, conciliatory, and symbolic reassurances. Those State responses of interest to this
study are conciliatory (accommodative or “appeasement”) and/or symbolic reassurances
(rhetoric by a state actor) that ETA would regard favorably moving towards in the direction of
obtaining the organization’s goals (Jellissen 2007). The graph in Figure 4 is a comparison of
state responses between the Franco Regime and the Democratic regime that came into power
after the death of Franco. The medium to higher levels of repressive responses were
disproportionately utilized by the Franco regime in comparison to the Democratic regime,
approx 48% vs. 24% and 25% vs. 3.27%, respectively. Authoritarian regimes generally have
fewer instances of dissident activities due to heavy handed tactics employed to suppress
uprisings and contestations of power, and Franco’s Spain falls in line along with this convention.
Due to high levels of repression the opportunity to mobilize is greatly reduce. Democratic
regimes, in contrast, conventionally do not utilize those same tactics as authoritarian regimes.
We can observe this to be the case in the comparative analysis of state responses between the
two regimes. When one refers to the timeline of the number of ETA killings, it begins to
dramatically spike under the Democratic regime. Under the Democratic regime, one did observe
the elimination of many of Franco’s policies, which effectively removed the previous barriers to
mobilization ETA encountered, enabling the organization to more actively engage in terror
campaigns designed to coerce the State to capitulate to ETA demands. Jelissen indicates that
increases in violence against Spain proper can generate concessions, but the accommodative
stance is more so when left-leaning governments are in power (Jellissen 2007).

There are two significant conciliatory state responses that deserve mention. The first is
the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, ratified in 1978 in a referendum; as a result, the
Basque Country has its own parliament, police, fiscal resources, education in the Basque
language, health system and a public channel. The second event is the withdrawal of the Guardia
Civil, the Spanish military police, from the Basque Country. One would conclude that reforms
and securing the degree of autonomy granted by the Statute would promote a reduction of ETA’s
political violence causing the organization to abandon its terror campaigns, as the PNV assumed,
but ETA persisted, and continues to demand complete independence.
The Spanish government responded to ETA’s stepped-up activities with tough anti-terrorist legislation that increased the cost of terrorist activities. Approved in July 1978, Law 21/1978 was a comprehensive package that provided the police with the ability to arrest and detain suspected terrorists, holding them in custody up to 72 hours without charges, upon notification to the courts. Judges had the authority to halt the detention, but in practice, this check was almost never applied. Police were also granted the right to intercept mail and telephone messages received by suspected terrorists. Amnesty and pardons were ruled out for any crime dealt with in the law; the courts were not allowed to release prisoners on by before the trial (Clark 1990).

Law 56/1978, December 4, 1978 approved the detention of persons for up to 10 days with the permission of the court, as well as holding suspects incommunicado for the duration of their
detention (Clark 1990). The number of etarras incarcerated from 1978 rose from fewer than 10 to roughly 500 in 1998, an increase of 1000%. A quick reference of the ETA killing timeline, indicates a gradual decrease from the peak of 92 killings in 1980 to a low of 21, a figure not seen since prior to the start of the decade. It is possible that due to ETA’s inability to recover from the number of ETA personnel incarcerated, the organization was unable to recover from such a shortage of manpower to sustain the level of activity observed from 1978 to 1981—a reduction in resources and capability. This would explain the drop in 1981, which is comparable in size only to the drop which occurred in 1992 immediately after the capture of ETA’s leadership at Bidart, France (Sánchez-Cuenca 2009). In this passage, the data and analysis indicate that depending on the type of government response, it can have both a positive and negative effect on terror groups’ ability to operate. It appears that there exists some correlation with state responses and ETA attacks, but without further analysis, it is difficult to determine the exact nature of this phenomenon.

**Provisional Irish Republican Army**

Following the August 1969 riots that left hundreds injured and thousands of Catholic families homeless, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or Provos) emerged from the IRA as a more militant and aggressive organization geared toward armed conflict. Their goal was to drive the British from Ireland using a more offensive strategy of direct conflict with security forces intended to cause as much damage as possible, forcing the British to relinquish its hold on Northern Ireland. Following the Aug ’69 riots, the PIRA experienced an increase in membership and support as many joined the organization’s ranks as defenders of their
communities. Under the leadership of Gerry Adams,

the PIRA realized that the great weakness of the British was their lack of hard
evidence on the burgeoning IRA. The no-go areas in Belfast limited the ability to
mount searches, screenings, and various other surveillance and information-
gathering exercises while the IRA itself changed radically, expanding way beyond
the small, well-known family networks of the 1940’s and 1950’s to include
people who had no republican background and were unknown to the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) counter-intelligence wing (Moloney 2002).

Ed Moloney further documents that PIRA’s bombing campaign played a leading role in forcing
the British to act prematurely and hastily. He indicates that the PIRA officially began the
bombing campaign in April 1971 with 37 incidents, and peaked at 91 bombings operations in
July of 1971 targeting military, police, government, and commercial premises (Moloney 2002).
The actual number of explosions from those operations in 1971 is 45, a success rate of 50%
(Global Terrorism Database 2010). As a frame of reference, the number of fatalities in 1972
reached 235, yet, the British did not withdraw, so the PIRA continues their attacks. That the
organization was able to inflict such levels of damage indicates that they had both resources and
means.

PIRA also enjoyed material support from the Irish Diaspora in the US, from which they
were able to procure guns (2500) and ammunition (1 million rounds) totaling over $1 million
from 1969-1981; through their complex network, PIRA was able to hide and secure the
armaments upon arrival in Ireland (Moloney 2002). The organization also managed to secure
additional logistical assistance from a short-lived relationship with Libya in the late 1970’s.
Through this relationship, members of PIRA were able to procure modern weapons (AK-47’s,
missiles, and machine guns to name a few) that would normally not be available to them. Both
of these relationships reflect how PIRA’s safe haven network facilitated the *Locate Principles or Patron* solution to the Rebel’s Dilemma.

**Figure 5. IRA Incidents (1970-2007)**

![Graph showing IRA Incidents (1970-2007)](image)

Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2010

A key component of the PIRA’s strategy to force the British out of Ireland was their efforts to damage financial interests of the UK. Historical accounts of the impacts of the PIRA’s attack on British business interests will serve as the basis for analysis and provide an idea of the economic cost of PIRA’s terrorist attacks. Of the 2,669 IRA incidents chronicled by the Global Terrorism Database (2010) from 1970-2007, 539 of them were directed towards businesses, which accounts for approximately 20% of their attacks. The only other targets that surpassed or equaled this figure are the military (802) and police (539), which reflects an earlier strategy to inflict the most damage on British security forces designed to force a British withdraw from Northern Ireland (Sánchez-Cuenca 2007). One positive economic impact of PIRA terrorist
activities that can be accounted for is the disaster recovery industry in Britain. In 1993, the industry was worth £150 million and experienced an economic growth of 25-30% a year (Brown 1993). Rogers, citing An Phoblacht—Republican News, the Sinn Fein newspaper, indicates that a bomb threat on 21 April 1997 disrupted rail, underground, and air traffic around London cost at least £30 million in losses (Rogers 2000). Though businesses in the disaster recovery industry generated revenue, it came at the expense of other business interests. This is described as opportunity costs, “when people and resources are transferred to address the terrorism threat from other activities they were or might be doing” (Treverton et al. 2008). Most notable of the PIRA’s attacks on financial targets is the 1992 bombing of the Baltic Exchange in London that caused £800 million worth of damage (De Baróid 2000). Indirectly, the cost of maintaining large security forces over the years in Northern Ireland, though not discussed here, should be reflected as a tremendous economic burden that the British government had to shoulder. In all, terrorist activities make the targeted area a difficult place for businesses to operate, and create additional costs that businesses incur.

Based on the level of incidents and death, PIRA was able to maintain a persistent presence as a threat to the UK. From the time PIRA began its terror campaigns in 1971 through 1993, IRA death tolls were never below that year’s total of 36 (Cain Web Services 2010). The death toll decreased significantly in 1994 and subsequent years, though this can be attributed to the ceasefire announced in August 1994. In 1974-1975, PIRA’s Army Council accepted a ceasefire, a strategy that Gerry Adams denounced as eroding the IRA’s fighting ability and allowed the British the opportunity to regroup and devise changes in security policy in the handling of the IRA (Moloney 2002). In spite of the perceived erosion in fighting ability, the
organization was able to bounce back and continue its terror campaign—the level of terror incidents increased and peaked at just over 200 in 1979.

The British response to dealing with the PIRA terror campaign varied. With the PIRA’s goal of driving out the British from Northern Ireland, they inflicted substantial casualties upon security forces. Jelissen’s data, Figure 6, indicates that repressive responses were almost on par with symbolic reassurances. Repressive acts as the deployment of military personnel into Northern Ireland and indiscriminate arrests of suspected IRA members substantiated or not, served to the benefit of the PIRA, as they positioned themselves as the defenders of the community. In fact, in protest studies, empirical evidence shows that dissidents become more mobilized in the aftermath of harsh repression, as was the case in Northern Ireland, but sustained over a longer period of time (Francisco 2004). This would account for the continued support the IRA maintained in its respective community. British responses leaning more towards conciliation are represented via the many cease fires. At the onset, the cease fire in 1972, appeared to be promising on the assumption that the British would capitulate to the PIRA’s demands of withdrawing under pressure from the relentless terror incidents. The talks broke down as the British were not serious about relinquishing Northern Ireland, but used the opportunity to regroup. The expectations that the British would withdraw were even higher during the cease fires of 1974 and 1975, as a power-sharing deal had been put together.
al Qa’ida

The basis of al Qa’ida’s safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal region is dissimilar from both ETA’s and PIRA’s. ETA and PIRA served as a foundation to further our understanding of how to measure the efficacy of terrorist safe havens based upon the areas of interest outlined above; ETA and the PIRA were selected due to their longstanding history.

For al Qa’ida, their safe haven is established on the basis of political history, Pashtun culture, and shared religion (Islam). The tribal belt is administered through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a vestige of British colonial rule originally designed to counter Pashtun
opposition to British rule, by a political agent that represents the President of Pakistan. Though
the tribal region is a territory of Pakistan, laws drawn up by the Parliament do not apply to the
region, unless the Pakistani president grants such an order, per Article 247 of the Pakistani
constitution. The political agent “combines legislative, law enforcement, and economic management
functions, collects and disburses revenue, and oversees all development schemes and public
service departments” (Rubin and Siddique 2006). While the tribal region is afforded representation
in the National Assembly and Senate,

the tribes regulate their own affairs in accordance with customary rules and
unwritten codes, characterized by collective responsibility for the actions of
individual tribe members and territorial responsibility for the area under their
control. The government functions through [hand-picked] local-level tribal
intermediaries, the maliks (government-sanctioned representatives of the tribes)
and lungi holders (representatives of sub-tribes or clans), who are influential
members of their respective clan or tribe (Pakistan 2006).

When Pakistan gained its independence from Britain in 1947, Jinnah granted the tribal region a
semi-autonomous status as a tribute for their role and loyalty, referencing a desire of
noninterference with the area’s internal freedom (Usman 2005). For example, Pakistani security
forces did not operate in the region, the role of security was provided internally by the Pakistan
Army-commanded Frontier Corps (FC)—historically, the FC, like the rest of the tribal areas has
been underfunded, underequipped\(^7\). Based upon this set up, the presence of the national
government of Pakistan was kept to a minimum.

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\(^7\) The Pakistan Army Officers that led FC were non-Pashtun in charge of local Pashtun troops. The
dynamics of combining non-familiar groups (socially, culturally, and linguistically) has the potential for increased
tension. These units are geared toward general policing and are ill-suited for anti-terrorism campaigns (Ashraf
2008).
FCR recognizes the concept of collective responsibility (the territorial and soil responsibility), which is embedded in the tribal laws (Pashtunwali). Mirza, citing S. Iftikhar, describes the key components of the Pashtunwali Code which encompass:

- **milmastia**, which means showing hospitality and protection to every guest;
- **nanawati**, the law of asylum, according to which asylum must be given even to bitter enemies if they come as supplicants; **badal** (revenge) which imposes the responsibility of wiping out an insult with an insult; and **paighor** (taunt) in which, a person is pushed to a limit by taunting and calling him coward that he takes the revenge (Hussain 2000).

Since the lineage of al Qa’ida and the Taliban (location, ideology, and social networks) can be traced back to the Afghan mujahidin, it was not a far stretch for the two organizations to relocate into the region following the US invasion of Afghanistan. Through President Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of the tribal areas of the late 1970’s, mullahs of conservative madrassas supplanted tribal elders, khans, and maliks as leaders of their respective communities, and gained greater political authority in the process. The convergence of General Zia’s Islamization of the tribal areas and proliferation of fundamentalist madarris with the Afghan mujahidins would lay the foundations of a productive symbiotic relationship. In 2003 when al Qa’ida and its allies, the Taliban, returned to Pakistan’s tribal areas, the region still lacked a strong central authority and suffered neglect from the central government. A void existed that members of the Taliban

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8 Members of the Taliban movement that took control of Afghanistan are predominantly Pashtun, and collectively originated from radical Deobandi madarris. The Pashtuns, territorially, make-up half of Afghanistan and almost all of FATA and the NWFP (Figure 4), and generally, do not distinguish one another as being Afghan and Pakistani (Rashid 2000). As the Taliban are ethnically Pashtun, they are intimately knowledgeable of Pashtunwali.
Figure 4, Map of Pakistan

Source: (Pakistan 2002)
responsibility from their traditional source to more extremist Islamists who view the Pakistani government as infidels for its affiliation with Western governments. Kilcullen, though, maintains that a jihadist presence originally “infected” the tribal areas at the onset of the Soviet-Afghan war, and continued to proliferate over the years (Kilcullen 2009). In instances where the Taliban were not able to secure a direct connection to key leadership positions, they still have managed to gain influence through pro-Taliban/AQ organizations in the other agencies.

Figure 5, Map of Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan

Source: (Major Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan and Pakistan)
Upon obtaining *nanawati*, AQ et al secured shelter amongst the people of the tribal areas. By means of the religious connection described above, AQ et al were situated in a position of power within the Pakistani tribal area. In accordance to Pashtunwali, adult males may not fight under the leadership of another clan, but the exception to this is a holy war (jihad) led by a mullah (Johnson and Mason 2008). Accounts of Talibanization⁹ emerged from the tribal areas after AQ et al’s arrival: the challenging of government authority; the killing of 200 tribal elders who resisted Taliban domination; and the targeting of video stores, girls’ schools, and institutions perceived to be immoral (Johnson and Mason 2008; Gall et al. 2006). Figure 6 reflects the extent of the Taliban’s penetration of NWFP and FATA since their arrival. AQ et al’s re-emergence in the tribal areas completes the process of being further entrenched into tribal society that began during Afghan-Soviet war by continuing the practices of “inter-marriage with local tribes, co-opting of local leaders, purchase and operation of businesses, charity activities, sponsorship or partnership with madaris, and settling of local disputes” (Kilcullen 2009), thereby securing a more permanent *nanawati* and becoming a part of the community (Figure 6).

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⁹ The term refers to the increase in influence of extremists in daily Pakistani life that mimics the type of public implementation of sharia (Islamic law) that was seen in Afghanistan after the rise of the Taliban in the 1990’s (Johnson and Mason 2008).
Numerically, the number of terrorist incidents actually credited to al Qa’ida, is not as sizeable as that of ETA or PIRA. The largest number of terrorist incidents (28) attributed to the organization occurred in 2003 (Figure 7). Yet, the organization is responsible for the largest number of casualties resulting from the coordinated terrorist attack of the hijacked airline planes that crashed into the WTC and the Pentagon, and the failed attempt of Flight 93. The more high profile attacks (9/11, the US embassy bombings, and bombing of the USS Cole) of the
organization demonstrated how vulnerable government, military and civilian targets were to terrorist attacks, forcing countries the world over to rethink and overhaul security procedures.

Figure 7, al Qa’ida Incidents

Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2010

Pakistani militants have clearly benefited from AQ’s presence and establishment of a safe haven in the tribal areas. AQ brings with it years of operational experience and expertise from the Afghan mujahidin, Bosnia, Chechnya, and global terror campaigns in the West. The presence of al Qa’ida-run training facilities enabled Islamic Pakistani militants to function militarily at a more efficient capacity, as evidenced by the amount of resistance the Pakistani military experience during forays into the tribal areas. A safe haven in the tribal areas facilitated the existence of IED-making factories that double as training centers and labs where recruits experiment with explosives technology (Jones 2007). Jihadists from other theaters of operations have made their presence felt in Pakistan by successfully incorporating tactics used in other regions. Intelligence officials concluded that Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the 2008
Mumbai attacks, but also noted that due to the level of sophistication—targeting of infrastructure, usage of weaponry, and methods of communication to hostages—the militants received some sort of external assistance (Perlez and Masood 2009). According to Bruce Reidel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Qaeda are allies in the global Islamic jihad. They share the same target list, and their operatives often work and hide together” (Perlez and Masood 2009). The militants were composed of five two-man teams originating from Karachi, Pakistan, that coordinated primary and secondary strikes and bombings on ten targets that killed 174 and injured over 311 (Acharya et al. 2008). This attack served as a wake-up call for India identifying vulnerabilities in a similar manner as 9/11 for the US. Utilization of suicide bombers was almost non-existent in Pakistani-Afghan prior to 2002. “Despite Afghanistan's turbulent history and its recent three-decade long conflict, the first recorded suicide attack in Afghanistan did not occur until Sept. 9, 2001 – just two days before the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes in the United States”, where two AQ members posing as members of the media assassinated Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (Karzai and Jones 2006). The expansion in use of this tactic can be attributed to several factors, as suicide attacks have shown to garner greater media publicity, have a significant psychological impact, produce an increase in rate of casualty, and requires less resources. The psychological impact suicide attacks and mass casualties cause contribute to a sense of helplessness and insecurity among a population, raising concerns as to a government's ability to protect the general populace.

The US, taking the lead on the so-called War on Terror, implemented numerous measures and established previously non-existing institutions since the recognition of the threat posed by transnational terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security became operational on 23 January 2003, sixteen months after the events of 9/11. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security outlined three objectives: 1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (Borja 2008). On 20 September 2001, President Bush articulated the initial objectives of the invasion of Afghanistan to be the destruction of terrorist training camps, the capture of al Qa’ida leaders, and the termination of terrorist activities in Afghanistan (President Bush Announces Military Strikes in Afghanistan 2001). The unintended consequence of the Taliban and al Qa’ida’s retreat into Pakistan allowed for the tribal regions to become a safe haven.

Amidst what President Musharraf alleges as political pressure from the US, he pledged Pakistan’s allegiance to assisting the United States in the pursuit of al Qa’ida following the 9/11 attacks, effectively making Pakistan the frontline of the War on Terror.

With financial backing and behind-the-scenes political maneuvering, the Musharraf regime outlawed militant organizations and aggressively pursued al Qa’ida. Most notably, the high-profile member of AQ, Zayn al-Abidn Muhammed Hasayn Abu Zubaydah (allegedly responsible for training camps and chief of operations for al Qa’ida), Ramzi Binalshibh (financially supported AQ), and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (AQ #3 at the time of capture and responsible for planning 9/11), were all captured in Pakistan. In 2002, the World Bank estimated that 10,000 militant madaris were operational in Pakistan, and assessed that some 10-20% of them also provided military training to jihadi recruits (Fair 2004). Efforts to manage funding sources and account for the madaris activities—two-thirds of which are Deobandi—

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10 Many of the Taliban have attended Deobandi madaris. Deobandism stemmed from an effort by Muslims in the British Raj to defend their faith under foreign infidel rule. “Deobandi madarris are often run by religious teachers with little knowledge of or appreciation for classical Islam and whose chief task was promoting a militant jihadist vision and culture” (Esposito 2002).
resulted in a policy the Musharraf regime instituted requiring Islamic religious institutions to be registered with the government (Vaughn 2004). The Pakistani government’s efforts to reform the madaris, was met with resistance from the seminaries.

Pakistan’s crackdown and pursuit of militant Islamic organizations outlined in Musharraf’s address on 12 January 2002 can be considered a radical reversal of Zia al-Huq’s Islamization policy when one takes into account Pakistan’s history with the mujahidin in Afghanistan and the Kashmiri militants used as proxies against India. Starting in 2002, the Pakistani military began the first of many large-scale operations with the deployment of 70,000 troops to secure the Pakistani-Afghan border. The military aggressively pursued militants under the aegis of the Global War on Terror in a conventional manner of massing large forces against suspected al Qa’ida hideouts with highly publicized operations into the Waziristan agencies that yielded little high-value targets. Displaced residents fleeing the conflict zone between the military and militants caused civilians to be disaffected with the military, lending support to the militants instead. Failure of the Pakistani military to bring the tribal region under control and eliminate the extremists that operated in the tribal areas, along with a loss of political capital due to Musharraf’s stance against militants, and repeated assassination attempts forced the Musharraf regime to formulate the peace agreements with militants in Waziristan in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Of these three peace agreements, the government gave up the most under the 2006 accord (Miranshah):

the Pakistani Army released all prisoners it had taken in the previous fighting in the area, returned all weapons seized, and paid reparations for all damages caused by the Pakistani Army. In addition, the army agreed to cease its patrols and to dismantle all of its temporary checkpoints within the FATA, as well as to withdraw all of its troops to large established garrisons in a few significant towns and along important crossroads (Johnson and Mason 2008).
Though the peace agreements were said to prevent further conflict and fracturing of the army, the criticism was that the government capitulated to the jihadists further diminishing its legitimacy.

The Musharraf regime also sought other means to counter the rise of the growing militancy in Pakistan. Military operations failed to provide the populace of the tribal areas with any degree of security from the Talibanization movement. Though the military pressured tribal elders to resist demands from AQ and Taliban-inspired extremists to cede their authority and provide support to these organizations, it lacked credibility and could not effectively deter the tribes from providing a safe haven to extremists, a tactic the Imperial British used successfully when the region was a colony (Kilcullen 2009). The military did conduct operations wherein tribesmen suspected of providing safe haven to extremists were bulldozed. In addition, monetary compensation was utilized as a method to assist tribal groups to repay the “loans” al Qa’ida provided (Tohid 2005). These responses by the Pakistani government were all in violation of the principles and conventions set forth by Pashtunwali, the concept of collective responsibility, and the FCR. In all, the Pakistani employed a variety of tactics to combat the growth of the Talibanization movement to no avail.

While Figure 7 indicates that overall, the number of incidents credited towards al Qa’ida has significantly tapered since 2003, the organization continues to be a credible threat. Since AQ and the Taliban’s arrival in the tribal areas, there has been an increase of radicalization in the region. AQ’s ties with militant Pakistani organizations following their relocation to Pakistan were initially described as being informal and thought to be insignificant (Fair 2004). Prior to 9/11 and AQ establishing a safe haven in Pakistan, the jihadist movement represented a regional strategy designed to combat India in the Kashmir. After these events, militant Islamist organizations in Pakistan turned against the government. This shift in ideology can be attributed
to the convergence of the presence and influence of AQ and the Taliban in conjunction with Musharraf’s reversal of Pakistan’s Islamization policy. Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda conducted a terror campaign that could be directly credited to the organization. Post 9/11, AQ operated in a diminished capacity with fewer resources.

Through cooperative endeavors, the organization has remained relevant, as the number of terrorist attacks from organizations with ties with it or the Taliban increased. The key AQ members mentioned above who were taken into custody in Pakistan were all found to have some association with Pakistani organizations: Zubaydah, found in Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) safe house ("Country Reports on Terrorism 2005" 2006); and Sheikh Mohammed in a home of an alleged Jamaati-Islami, Islamist political party, member (Pakistan Asked to Explain Islamic Party Link to Al Qaeda Suspects 2003). Al Qaeda did not have dedicated recruiting assets in Pakistan, but was able to use its informal networks and endow the organization with proxy assistance and support for its operations (Fair 2004). Evidence of further collaboration surfaced during a raid conducted by Pakistani intelligence that resulted in the capture of Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan—alleged to have purchased the vehicle used in the US Embassy bombing in Tanzania—and dismantled AQ cells operating in Karachi under the protection of Pakistani militants (Rohde 2002). There are also reports of extremist penetration and collusion with mid-level Pakistani military officers (Rashid 2003). On some level of analysis, these events characterize conditions in which Pakistani militants (LeT, Pakistani Taliban, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Lashkar-e-Jabbar, among others) perform the function of facilitators of AQ operations, and are not recognized as being members of the organization. In the absence of a devoted recruitment infrastructure, analysis indicates AQ is able to circumnavigate this obstacle by using informal networks to continue terror campaigns to achieve its objective.
Pakistani militants strengthened their position as a credible threat to the State when they became firmly ensconced, effectively instituting safe havens in the tribal areas. Led by Taliban trained commanders, Pakistani militants were able to take physical control of Waziristan, set up operations to recruit personnel, levy the populace and accept monetary contributions, conscript males for *lashkars* (military force), and patrol the streets to enforce Talibanization (Khan 2005). Pakistani militants struck numerous targets within Pakistan creating a condition of general insecurity. The Shakai Peace Agreement of April 2004, negotiated by Nek Muhammad Wazir did not result in any lasting reduction in violence, but altered local power structures, empowering militants, who were seen as negotiating with the government from a position of strength (Kilcullen 2009). The same can be said of the peace agreements of February 2005 and September 2006, again the militants negotiated from a position of strength, while the Pakistani army negotiated from a position of weakness. Militants were further emboldened as tribal elders were continually marginalized. One key condition that AQ and the Pakistani militants never adhered to was the registration and guarantee that all foreign jihadists living in the tribal areas would not take up arms against the State. All three of the peace agreements would be broken by the extremists as they once again took up arms attacking targets various targets within the country.

**Discussion**

When dissidents are confronted with the Rebel’s Dilemma, “the challenges are to determine where and when particular solutions are effective” (Lichbach 1994). Organizations such as PIRA and al Qa’ida devised rulebooks that serve as guidelines on the micro level, “The Green Book” and the so-called “al Qa’ida Training Manual”, respectively, but they don’t directly
serve as a how-to-guide for all conditions terrorists may encounter. It is through the struggle that political violence-oriented dissidents learn and adapt tactics, techniques and procedures as they exploit the different approaches.

Thus far, the areas of interest have been explored as a function of the presence of terrorist safe havens in regards to ETA, PIRA, and al Qa’ida. Next, the areas of interest will be analyzed using Lichbach’s solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma and discuss their significance.

**Contract**

The establishment of a safe haven is a solution that corresponds with Contract approaches. Safe havens afford terrorists with the opportunity to self-govern, in other words, the ability to “forge procedures to design modify, adjudicate, monitor, and enforce rules” (Lichbach 1994). These acts have been observed in all three cases. In regards to their respective communities, all of these organizations collected taxes (“revolutionary tax”) in the form of extortion. In the tribal areas, AQ and the Taliban instituted the Sharia as a legal code supplanting the established FCR and Pashtunwali. Through the practice of Talibanization, AQ and the Taliban enforced strict interpretation of Islam as a means of controlling the population. For example, males grew long beards and women adorned the burqa, foregoing traditional cultural garments. Failure to follow these strict guidelines was dealt severely with punishment or death, effectively coercing the general populace. The secretive nature of clandestine organizations necessitates that members conform to the rules of the organization, or code of conduct.

In this essay, it has already been noted that through Contract approaches, safe havens facilitate other solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma. Safe havens are where terror organizations
plan, mobilize, recuperate, and replenish supplies. As long as terror groups have a safe haven and are able to secure resources, they can continue to terrorize a population. ETA obtained weapons from the international market, but supplemented this source with arms from armories located throughout Spain, and etarras were never said to be in short supply (Clark 1984). Because the organization was well-armed, it could always conduct attacks against the state. PIRA utilized their knowledge of the surrounding communities of Northern Ireland to conceal weapons until they were needed. When al Qa’ida fled from Afghanistan, the organization lost its primary and secure safe haven, thereby reducing its capability to procure resources. As an organization on the run, it no longer had the same capabilities as when it maintained its Afghanistan safe haven, and did not have the same far reaching capabilities as was observed with the US embassy bombings in Kenya. Yet, the organization adapted to the tribal areas, collaborated with existing extremist organizations in Pakistan, and used them as a proxy. Though AQ did not have direct access to resources, it was able to tap into organizations with similar agendas by advising and directing operations. Pakistan experienced an increase in terrorist-based violence since AQ and the Taliban established a safe haven in the tribal areas (Figure 7). The same can be said of Afghanistan, cross-border attacks have been an on-going issue for the US-led NATO security forces, but it is difficult to differentiate attacks associated with combat versus terrorism as many of the militant Islamic organizations (Taliban, Haqqani network, & TTP, to name a few) are involved in both. Also, because they are able to tax the general populace, Islamic extremists in the tribal areas have a reliable source of income used to procure needed equipment and supplies (the distribution of heroin and other illegal activities are also reported to be used to generate revenue). The tribal areas are also a valuable source of manpower, though al Qa’ida does not actively recruit in the region, the organizations they’re
affiliated with have the capacity to do so. Thus, the greater the resources, the greater the capacity for terror groups to prolong terror campaigns.

Figure 7, Terrorist Incidents, Pakistan

Safe havens provide an organization with the opportunity to the lower costs associated with high-risk endeavors. After committing an act of terror, terrorists retreat to the security of their safe haven and live to fight another day. ETA’s network of safe houses consisted of sympathizers that could be counted on to provide shelter and nourishment, and permitted etarra

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to evade security forces and prevent capture. In many instances, the individual providing shelter was not an active member and did not have any knowledge of the ETA member, yet, still took the risk and provided the service (Clark 1984). PIRA’s network established pre-positioned vehicles for transportation, clean articles of clothing in exchange of the ones worn during an attack, and facilities to de-sanitize PIRA members to disassociate an individual from an act of terror and escape prosecution from security forces. Often times, security forces do not know the exact location of militants and spend a tremendous amount of resources to track down suspected terrorists. When a state’s information on the whereabouts and activities of politically violent
dissidents is inaccurate and unreliable, attempts to contain militancy can lead to repressive tactics. Indiscriminate repression (targeting of constituents, sympathizers, and militants) by a regime often antagonizes sympathizers and intensifies moral outrage from activists (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004). Costs can further be reduced when militants have the capacity to blend in with the population, making it more difficult for security forces to target and identify militants.

Safe havens also facilitate locating principles or patrons, a Hierarchy solution. In the case of PIRA, the organization received a steady flow of funding from donations made by the Irish Diaspora in America and American sympathizers. The American connection extended to George Harrison, a Mafia-associated arms dealer that proved to be a reliable source of weapons from 1969 to 1981 (Moloney 2002). Between 1985-1987, Libya and PIRA shared a common enemy in Britain, thus the former extended support to the organization by providing it with sophisticated weapons (AK-47’s and ammunition, grenades, rocket propelled grenades, machine guns, and surface-to-air missiles) normally not accessible (Moloney 2002). ETA could not function solely on its full-time members and relied heavily on sympathizers for support. Indirectly, France’s policy of non-extradition afforded ETA with a de facto safe haven and training facilities until the French changed its policy and began to extradite ETA members to the Spanish authorities. Originally, al Qa’ida first obtained a safe haven and protection from the Sudan, then the Taliban in Afghanistan, and currently, the tribal areas of Pakistan. Without the patronage of Hassan al Turabi, the Taliban, and the Pashtun hosts, AQ would not pose as great a risk as it does. Except for the safe haven in tribal areas, AQ demonstrated that it could generate devastating attacks with mass casualties. Even when acting in collaboration with Islamic extremists, the salafi jihadist movement is still capable of large-scale destruction (al Qa’ida-
linked L-e-T attacks in Mumbai 2008). Such arrangements serve to benefit all corresponding parties.

**Market**

“Contract requires Market because beneficial mutual exchange permits parties to arrive at the terms of a contract” (Lichbach 1998).

Terror groups have complete information, and know exactly when they plan to strike. In an effort to reduce innocent civilian casualties, PIRA would warn the authorities prior to when a bomb was set to explode. Though US intelligence monitored terrorist activities, the agencies were never able to determine the nature of the attacks al Qa’ida was planning. Deliberate planning and execution ensures that clandestine organizations make the most use of their limited resources.

“Generally, adaptation works to the advantage of dissidents” (Lichbach 1998). This holds to be accurate on several grounds:

First, adaptable groups use a variety of tactics. Second, adaptable groups mix inputs to produce outputs more efficiently. Third, adaptable groups quickly adopt innovations that have been used successfully elsewhere. Finally, adaptable groups are less predictable (Lichbach 1998).

The most utilized method of communicating the message of violence is by means of bombings. PIRA effectively used car bombs with explosives made from locally sourced materials. al Qa’ida’s associates utilize, the improvised explosive device (IED) and the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) against security forces to devastating ends. Suicide bombings are widely used in Palestine and Israel, but were never used in Pakistan prior to 2002 (Figure 8). Suicide bombing, a form of martyrdom, is an effective tool for al Qa’ida, as it requires little resources,
allows the bomber to get close to its intended target, causes significant damage, and generates publicity for the organization. This technique has been successfully integrated into the Pakistani theater of operation. ETA realizing that popular uprising against the Spanish regime would not come about changed its tactics to a war of attrition (Sánchez-Cuenca 2007). PIRA adapted the Long War concept (war of attrition) when it concluded that it could not militarily defeat the British (Moloney 2002). AQ successfully adapted to its new environment in the tribal areas, and continues to pose a lethal threat, because it is not known exactly what the organization is capable of or what it is planning. Adaptability appears to be one of the hallmarks of longevity for terror groups. Greater flexibility allows them to change within their given environments and continue to be danger to regimes and its people.

Figure 8. Suicide Bombings in Pakistan

![Suicide Bombings in Pakistan](image-url)

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan)
Community

“Market requires Community because common values create the trust needed to conduct market transactions” (Lichbach 1994).

Safe havens were initially established with the support of the community each of the terror groups claimed to represent. Terror groups exploited their social networks as a foundation for their safe havens. Through Community approaches al Qa’ida benefitted from the radical Muslim community. The overarching goal of salafi jihadists is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and a return to Islam as that practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, but prior to doing so, all infidels must be removed from Muslim land. ETA sought Basque independence from Spain, thus uniting like-minded individuals in the cause for independence; PIRA sought a reunified Ireland free from British rule, uniting its members in the same manner as ETA. Given that al Qa’ida’s movement is religiously based, the madrassa, an established and vital institution within the faith, was the institution of choice for the indoctrination and maintenance of the jihadi belief system. The madrassa network was encouraged to proliferate within Pakistan, but when the central government concluded that the radical madarris were a breeding ground for Islamic extremists, it attempted to indiscriminately repress the madarris, creating negative backlash towards the government from supporters, sympathizers, and ordinary citizens due to ill timing (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004). PIRA support was strengthened on the grounds that the organization represented itself as the defenders of the Irish community in Northern Ireland. ETA enjoyed support from the Basque region, and though members actively participated in the organization’s activities, they still managed to live a normal life, as this pattern was expected (Clark 1984). Young males also spent a considerable amount of time bonding through ritual cultural events that buttressed their commitment to the organization. A common belief system
also serves the purpose of solidifying group cohesion, increase dependence on the organization and members, and decrease the likelihood of defections.

**Hierarchy**

“Community requires Hierarchy because common values must be authoritatively enforced and passed on to future generations” (Lichbach 1998).

To a certain degree, all three of the organizations solved the issue of infiltration. PIRA’s organizational structure was based on the British army’s and associated with distinct geographic locations, making it easier for security forces to identify the unit accountable for an attack. Following the arrest of PIRA Chief of Staff Seamus Twomey in 1977, Gerry Adams reorganized the PIRA from an army organizational structure to specialized operational units of four with freedom to maneuver not restricted by geography (Moloney 2002). ETA was structured as a cellular organization as well, consisting of 3-5 man teams that conducted operations within the same area they lived. al Qa’ida uses sleeper cells that remain inactive for extended periods, as cell members live regular lives until activated. Decentralization is an effective solution because it addresses the issue of operational security when one team member is compromised, it does not affect the entire operation because of compartmentalization of knowledge and task.

The goals of ETA, PIRA, and al Qa’ida are nearly impossible to accomplish. Full independence, reunification, and establishing a new state from existing states run counter to the survival and sustainability of ruling regimes, as these acts threaten their authority and legitimacy. Yet, these organizations find a way to appeal to the stated goals of the community they claim to represent with a promise of a better tomorrow. ETA, PIRA, and AQ’s objectives reflect a
strategy that “promises a public good that cannot be delivered” (Lichbach 1998). What they are seeking is so radical that it cannot come to fruition with any immediacy.

**Conclusion**

The concept of a base of operations is widely known, and its importance recognized in the study of guerrilla warfare. Though both guerrilla warfare and terrorism are both tactics and forms of political violence, the same understanding and recognition is not as extensively extended to terrorism. The attempts to draw the parallels between the guerrilla warfare and terrorism stems from the fact that both are prohibited forms of political violence used to obtain political power and change the political status quo. When it comes to terrorism, the concept of a safe haven is regarded to be an issue of great concern for contemporary governments. States conclude that the existence of terrorist safe havens is a threat to a respective country’s national security. However, there are general studies of the concept (*Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens* 2007), studies on conditions conducive to the creation of safe havens (Korteweg and Ehrhardt 2005), and an acknowledgement that certain areas of the world have become safe havens for transnational terrorists (Rabasa et al. 2007; Stanislawski 2006). The general conclusion is that terrorist safe havens are an issue of enormous concern. But, overall, what do they do for the terrorist?

The central question of this paper is: How do safe havens help facilitate militant-terrorist organizations’ activities and operations? Lichbach’s theoretical framework allows for an explanation of what safe havens accomplish for terrorist organizations. Lichbach’s work presents a myriad of solutions of how dissents overcome the difficulties they face when
attempting to engage in collective action. This study has brought forth the notion of the areas of interest as a function of outputs related to terrorism to expand the analysis of safe havens. These outputs represent the presence of resources, because without resources, there would be no terror campaigns, therefore no outputs. Safe havens represent the nexus where the resources are received, accounted for, processed, and redirected. Safe havens also allow for the establishment and strengthening of a legitimized community where politically violent dissidents become socialized and further commit to a terror groups cause. Through Lichbach’s framework, we can see how safe havens facilitate other solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma, making it easier for collective action to occur.

That terrorists are involved in illegal activities makes participation more costly. The presence of safe havens reduce costs individuals bear when engaged in collective violence, as well as offering protection from repression, and providing access to other means to continue collective dissent. Though states have the capability to identify the organization responsible for a terrorist attack, rarely can the individual directly responsible be identified, unless the individual is captured by security forces.

State national security policies are correct when they make the assertion that terrorist safe havens are a threat to a government and its people. Yet, it is possible that if knowledge can be gained on how terrorist adapt and incorporate solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma presented by Lichbach, it is probable that this process could be interrupted, rather than merely seeking to eradicate safe havens as many governmental policies declare. A clearer understanding of the process would make indicators of terrorist activity more discernible. Analysis through Lichbach’s solution groups permits us to shift our focus of the units of analysis from the macro level to the micro level. This move means that researchers would no longer be diagnosing the
issue as a whole, but would be able to analyze each phenomenon individually. Before the researcher can arrive at this juncture the scope and nature of this study would have to be expanded.

In order to gain a greater understanding of what safe havens accomplish for terrorist organizations, future studies would have to expand to include a wider breadth of organizations than the ones listed here—this would make the study more robust. The question of how terror groups overcame their obstacles to the Rebel’s Dilemma can also be addressed in future studies. Solving the query of how terror groups prevail over these obstacles will lead to better clarity when navigating the complex maze of terrorist organizations.
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