

**CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS: THE
IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY AND MILITARY EXPERIENCE GAP ON
DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1952-2000**

BY

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Byeonggu Lee

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Chairperson

Committee members

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The Dissertation Committee for Byeonggu Lee certifies
that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

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DEDICATION

To my parents, mother-in-law, wife, and lovely sons

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The journey to completing this dissertation has been full of happiness, frustration, and enlightenment. It reminds me of an old Korean saying: people who have an experience of being lost can realize something insightful that would not have been possible if one had followed a stable path. At times I found myself lost in working on this project and unexpectedly this allowed me to gain many lessons that can be utilized in the years or decades to come. Without help from good Samaritans, however, I would have been still lost. I would like to thank those who helped me get through this long and arduous process.

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ABSTRACT

Civil-Military Gap and Military Effectiveness: The Impact of Ideology and Military Experience on Defense Spending in the United States, 1952-2000

by

Byeonggu Lee

Previous studies of civil-military gap have argued that the difference in values, perspectives, and opinions between civilians and the military matters because it determines military effectiveness, but empirical analyses of the relationship have been rare in civil-military relations scholarship. This study also found that the existing studies on this topic have theoretical and methodological weaknesses, and this makes it difficult to draw a meaningful conclusion about the implications of civil-military gap for military effectiveness.

This dissertation attempted to fill this void by examining the impact of ideology and military experience gap on defense spending, an element of military effectiveness. This study employed two measurements for the dependent variable, defense spending: defense outlays and defense budget authority. Specifically, this study tested if the ideological gap between the United States Congress and the military has any causal impact of defense spending level. It also examined whether the level of military experience in United States Congress and Cabinet influences defense spending. This study covers the period between 1952 and 2000. Multivariate Ordinary Least Squares analyses were employed to estimate the coefficients. Control

variables such as external threat and partisan control of the presidency were included in the analyses.

This study presents four major findings. First, the ideology and military experience gap did not have any independent effect on two measures of defense spending. Second, to the extent that ideology and military experience gap exhibit a meaningful impact on defense spending, the results show they have interaction effects. Specifically, I found that the ideology gap has a positive interaction effect with Republican administrations. This effect was confined to defense budget authority. As for the military experience gap, this study found that it has an interaction effect with external threats. This effect was shown in two measures of defense spending.

Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, the results indicate that Democratic administrations spend more on national defense than Republican administrations. This pattern was clear for defense budget authority. The same difference was also observable for defense outlays when I excluded the Reagan years from the analyses. Finally, external threats are demonstrated to be an important and consistent factor that has a positive relationship with both measures of defense spending.

In closing, this study calls for scholarly efforts to reevaluate our understanding of the implications of the civil-military gap.

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I. Introduction

1. Controversies in the 1990s

Many events in the late 1980s and early 1990s appeared to usher in a new era in human history. The U.S. Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, imploded from inside. Many international relations theorists who had expected a relatively stable international system with a bipolar structure found themselves baffled because of this unexpected development.¹ The end of the ideological conflicts, which lasted for over four decades, led Francis Fukuyama to announce “the end of history.”² The unprecedented sweeping military victory in the Gulf War of 1991 seemed to reaffirm the beginning of what President George H. Bush called a “new world order,” which would be characterized by peace, prosperity, and cooperation under the leadership of the U.S. as the sole super power in the world. In an address before a joint session of the Congress in the aftermath of the Gulf War, President Bush described:

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and cold war. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong. . . ." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a

¹ JL Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992); RN Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization* 48, no. 02 (1994); WC Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994).

² F Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest* 16(1989).

home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test.³

What many did not foresee was a new set of controversies in American civil-military relations throughout the 1990s. The controversies extended from foreign policy decisions to sexual scandals and domestic policies. The magnitude of the controversies was so unprecedented that many scholars and observers gave them the egregious name of a “crisis” in U.S. civil-military relations. It seemed that the end of the Cold War opened Pandora’s Box, unleashing a variety of tensions between civilians and the military.

In foreign policy decision making, especially regarding use of force, many argued that the military wielded an undue influence, challenging civilian authority to determine when and how to use military force. The most obtrusive instance was the role that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell played in the decision making process over military operations in Bosnia. In interviews with media and in a few op-eds, Powell expressed his concerns over the limited use of force by saying “As soon as they tell me it’s limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me it’s ‘surgical,’ I head for the bushes.”⁴ Many scholars criticized his behavior saying it breached the norm of military professionalism that instills military officers with a sense of limited competence only in military affairs. For example, Weigley argued that Powell’s

³ George H. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict," (March 6, 1991). The transcript of the presidential address can be assessed at http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=0391

⁴ C Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, 8 October 1992.

open disagreement with the civilian leadership about military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina went against the principle of civilian supremacy⁵, which says that “civilians have a right to be wrong.”⁶

Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn maintained that the military had become very partisan and closely affiliated with the Republican Party.⁷ They argued that the military’s public opposition to the Clinton administration’s limited use of military force in Bosnia and Haiti was motivated by partisan considerations. Bacevich and Kohn further argued that strong Republican partisanship in the military would only undermine military professionalism and effectiveness, placing the institution in the middle of partisan politics, which required it to take sides.

A similar concern was raised in defense policy issues, especially the ones related to defense strategy and force structure in the post-Cold War era. Observers viewed Colin Powell’s initiative in formulating and pushing the base force concept—which was a plan for reducing the size of the U.S. military by about 25 percent—as beyond what the military was expected to do: He usurped civilian authority.⁸ They also argued that General Powell took a preemptive step to direct the debate over the adequate level and structure of military force in the post-Cold War

⁵ RF Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *The Journal of Military History* (1993).

⁶ PD Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 216.

⁷ Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans - Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force," *The New Republic* 23, no. 8 (1997).

⁸ RH Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* 35(Spring 1994).

period.⁹ Powell's initiative set the terms of the debates over the force structure, narrowing civilian leaders' options. The resulting force reduction was substantial, but "it outran the resources that either Bush or Clinton were willing to provide."¹⁰ Others suggested the U.S. squandered a valuable opportunity to fundamentally restructure its forces by letting the military set framework that included the details of force reduction.¹¹

Disputes over military personnel policy were also seen as indications of bad civil-military relations. Some lamented that the military opposition to homosexuals in the military and an expanded role for women was based on the unwarranted idea that liberal civilians were trying to demilitarize the institution. A careful examination of the impact of the policy on military effectiveness was evidently secondary to political considerations.¹² From this perspective, the military was not only failing to reform itself, but it was also opposing legitimate civilian intervention. The military was unable to keep pace with a changing society. Others observed that the military's isolation and lack of diverse representation originated from its position as the moral bastion in American society.¹³ The coordinated effort of the military

⁹ PD Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed forces and society* 23(1996).

¹⁰ EA Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics: The General's Zest for Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 6 (1995): 108.

¹¹ David Isenberg, "The Pentagon's Fraudulent Bottom-up Review," *Policy Analysis no. 206*(1994), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1065 (accessed May 12, 2010).

¹² Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the US Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1998); DM Britton and CL Williams, "'Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue': Military Policy and the Construction of Heterosexual Masculinity," *Journal of homosexuality* 30(1995).

¹³ Thomas Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society" in *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations* (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies 1996).

and Republican lawmakers in opposition to minority policies was also seen as indicative of growing conservatism and politicization of the military.

2. Statement of the Problem: Gap Thesis and Its Weaknesses

In an effort to explain the tensions between civilians and the military in the 1990s, various theoretical approaches have been proposed.¹⁴ One of these approaches is the so-called culture gap thesis, often known simply as gap thesis. The main idea of this approach is that an increasing or decreasing gap between civilians and the military—in terms of values, attitudes, and opinions—explains changes in the civil-military relations. According to this perspective, when the gap between civilians and the military increases, it has a negative influence on civil-military relations due to the decreasing level of mutual understanding and respect for each

¹⁴ Other approaches include structuralist and institutionalist approaches. First, Desch presents a structuralist theory in which basically two independent variables, external and internal threat, explain the level of civilian control of the military. According to this theory, it is when external threat is high and internal threat is low that civilian control is strongly established because the military maintains an externally oriented military doctrine. He argues this explains what happened during the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War and the resulting ease of external threat made this equilibrium broken, making civilian control somewhat problematic. He recommends that the adoption of externally oriented military doctrine would reestablish civilian control of the military. See Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (1998); ———, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). The second approach is an agency theory based on an institutionalist framework. In Feaver's agency theory, two main independent variables, monitoring and punishment mechanisms, that determine working or shirking of the military. According to this theory, during the post-Cold War era, while civilians' ability to monitor the military's behavior remained high due to the low monitoring costs, the expectation that the military would be punished when they shirk decreased, giving the military an incentive to shirk. Feaver sees the civil-military tensions during the 1990s as caused by military shirking, indicating weakening in civilian control. See P Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Pr, 2005); Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control."

other.¹⁵ For proponents of the gap thesis, therefore, the controversies in the 1990s were understood as symptoms that indicted a growing.

Scholarly interests in the nature and extent of the gap have covered a wide range of issues including political affiliation, and social, foreign and defense policies.¹⁶ Particularly relevant to this study are the following two aspects of gap thesis findings. First, researchers found that conservatism is quite strong in the military. Holsti found, based on one of the most comprehensive survey studies in civil-military relations literature, that about 66 percent of mid-level military leaders identified themselves as conservatives whereas less than 5 percent of military respondents claimed to be liberals. In comparison, among civilian leaders, conservatives and liberals were almost evenly divided.¹⁷ A similar pattern of the military's strong self-identification with conservatism was found among the military

¹⁵ PD Feaver and RH Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding," *The National Interest* 61(Fall 2000).

¹⁶ JA Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001). Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans - Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force." Jason Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Peter M. Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009).

¹⁷ Ole R. Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).

brass¹⁸ and military academy and ROTC cadets¹⁹, whereas the same tendency was not found among enlisted soldiers²⁰.

Holsti's other study, in which surveys were conducted for military and civilian leaders every four years from 1976 to 1996, found that the percentage of conservatives in the military has increased.²¹ While 61 percent of military leaders identified themselves as conservatives in 1976, that number grew by 12 percent by 1996, when 73 percent self-identified as conservative. The decrease of liberals in the military was quite dramatic. During the same research period liberals among military officers dropped from 16 to 3 percent. Although the percent of liberal civilian leaders decreased during the period, the drop was not as dramatic as among military leaders.²² In 1996, civilian leaders were divided evenly between liberals and conservatives at 36 percent.

Overall, the above-mentioned studies confirm the results of previous studies: the military's ideological leaning toward conservatism. Huntington—the dean of scholars of American civil-military relations—argued that the military is inherently

¹⁸ Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99."

¹⁹ VC Franke, "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West Point Cadets and College Students," *Journal of political and military sociology* 29, no. 1 (2001); David E. Rohall, Morten G. Ender, and Michael D. Matthews, "The Effects of Military Affiliation, Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 1 (2006).

²⁰ David R Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically Mainstreamed," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and Richard H Kohn (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2001).

²¹ Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998).

²² Liberals among civilian leaders declined from 42 to 36 percent during the research period whereas conservatives went up from 30 to 36 percent. *Ibid.*: 13.

conservative due to the functions it performs.²³ The difference between proponents of gap thesis and Huntington, however, is that whereas the latter saw military's conservatism as a necessity for military effectiveness, the former viewed it as, at least partly, responsible for the tensions between the military and civilians stated earlier. While Huntington argued that conservatism nature of the military needs to be preserved, scholars worrying about the ideological gap maintained that measures to reduce the gap are needed.

Another important finding in the recent gap literature is the decline of military veterans in the U.S. political institutions. Scholars found that the number of military veterans has significantly diminished since 1970s, the time period when the military changed the personnel acquisition policy from the draft to the All-Voluntary Force structure.²⁴ While about 74 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives were military veterans in 1969, the equivalent figure in 1999 was 34.8 percent. A similar dramatic decline of military veterans was also observed in the U.S. Senate.²⁵

Given the so-called "veteran effects"²⁶, the decreasing number of military veterans in political institutions was seen as a warning sign. Scholars found that military veterans tend to be closer than non-veterans to active duty military personnel in terms of political and social preferences due to the socialization effect

²³ SP Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957:2002).

²⁴ John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15, no. 2 (2001).

²⁵ William T Bianco and Jamie Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. Peter D Feaver and Richard H Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).

²⁶ JM Teigen, "Enduring Effects of the Uniform: Previous Military Experience and Voting Turnout," *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (2006).

that military service leaves. In this sense, Burk called veterans “cultural bearers” and considered them as a bridge between the military and society.²⁷ Thus, the decline of military veterans was seen as meaning that the military had been losing its ties with the society. Proponents of the gap thesis argued that the controversies in the 1990s were some of the symptoms of this estrangement of the military from society. The less military veterans in different segments of society, including political institutions, the less societal understanding of military life, culture, and needs. Under this condition, the preferences of the military and society would diverge, and tensions between the two would increase. To the proponents of gap thesis, serious efforts to “bridge or at least narrow the chasm” seemed essential.²⁸

Not only did proponents of gap thesis attempt to explain tensions in the 1990s as a result of growing civil-military gap, they also tried to examine how a gap influences military effectiveness. The basic argument about the influence of the civil-military gap on military effectiveness was well expressed by Feaver, Kohn, and Cohn. Raising concerns over the controversies in the 1990s, they speculated that “a gap in values or attitudes between people in uniform and civilian society may have become so wide that it threatens the effectiveness of the armed forces and civil-military cooperation.”²⁹ Using more general terms, the above assertion can be expressed as meaning that the size of the civil-military gap has an inverse

²⁷ J Burk, "Military Culture," *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict* 2(1999).

²⁸ Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96," 8.

²⁹ P Feaver, Richard H Kohn, and Lindsay Cohn, "The Gap between Military and Civilian in the United States in Perspective," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 1.

relationship with military effectiveness. When the size of the gap is small, civilians and the military are expected to share a common understanding of what needs to be done to enhance military effectiveness. When the magnitude of the gap is substantial, “the military and civilians hold sharply divergent opinions on what hurts military effectiveness and therefore, by implication, endorse sharply different policies for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.”³⁰

This points to the main analytical focus of this study. I argue that supporters of gap thesis have not been successful in theorizing and assessing the relationship between civil-military gap and military effectiveness. So far, only a handful of studies have been devoted to studying the implications of civil-military gap for military effectiveness, and those studies suffer from various problems such as ambiguous causal mechanism and omission of relevant variables. Due to these weaknesses, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions on whether or how civil-military gap affects military effectiveness.

A closer look at the analyses dealing with the relationship between civil-military gap and military effectiveness easily reveals weaknesses in theory and methodology. Fordham examined whether the decline of military veterans had an impact on defense spending in the United States.³¹ Fordham’s study, however, lacks a causal mechanism that connects military veterans and military spending. He began

³⁰ P Gronke and PD Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes About Civil-Military Relations," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 151.

³¹ Benjamin O. Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 2001).

with an idea that given the findings that military veterans are more supportive of defense spending increase than non-veterans, the decline of veterans would be associated with a significant drop or fluctuations of the level of defense spending. This is a plausible hypothesis. But, Fordham is not clear about causal mechanisms. Does the decrease of military veterans in the general public matter? Alternatively, can the decreasing number of military veterans in Congress or defense-related committees explain variations of defense spending? Nowhere in his study can I find serious efforts to specify causal mechanisms.

In addition, Fordham did not control for other potential factors that are known to influence defense spending. There is extensive literature on determinants of defense spending. The factors range from external threat, macro-economic considerations, and political as well as ideological factors.³² With ambiguous causal mechanisms and omitted variables, Fordham's study does not shed much light on the relationship between civil-military gap and defense spending.

The same problems are also found in other studies. Szayna et al. examined the relationship between civil-military opinion gaps and military effectiveness.³³ They clearly recognized the theoretical connection between attitudes, political processes, and military effectiveness:

³² AR Chowdhury, "A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 1 (1991); Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003); CW Ostrom Jr and RF Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 3 (1986); Tsai-Tsu Su, Mark S. Kamlet, and David C. Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective," *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 1 (1993).

³³ T Szayna et al., *The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007).

Military effectiveness is defined in terms of the military's ability to carry out its missions. That ability is a product of the processes that determine the military's critical aspects, such as its size, force structure, armament, manning, and training. While the behavior or attitudes of military personnel and civilians may differ in a variety of ways, our primary interest in this study is in those differences that may affect military effectiveness. The challenge, then, is to identify such attitudes and determine how they might affect policy. Thus, the interplay of attitudes and process—i.e., how differences in attitudes affect the processes that determine military effectiveness—is our focal point.³⁴

The study is laudable for the awareness of what constitutes military effectiveness (e.g. threat assessment and military budget), what specific procedures influence each constituting element of military effectiveness, and how civil-military gap is to influence the procedures and the outcomes.

The methodology they employed, however, makes it difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions. First, even though Szayna et al. made a detailed analysis of the elements of military effectiveness, they did not specify the causal mechanism that links civil-military opinion gap and military effectiveness. They did mention that “with regard to military effectiveness, the direct and most important consequences of a civil-military gap arise in conditions when major differences exist between military and civilian elites.”³⁵ Yet, it is unclear who the military and civilian elites are. Without specifying causal mechanisms, the results of Szayna et al. become less meaningful.

Second, the study by Szayna et al. does not employ any dependent variables that have a direct bearing on actual military effectiveness. The dependent variables they employed are *opinions* on various elements of military effectiveness. The main

³⁴ Ibid., 13.

³⁵ Ibid., 151.

analytical interest is whether civilians and military personnel differ in terms of the priorities they assign to national defense. When there is little civil-military opinion gap in the priorities, they conclude that there is little concern over the gap. This also means that when the opinion gap is substantial, it may harm military effectiveness. Is this really the case? There is a possibility that the size of the civil-military opinion gap may not have any relationship with actual military effectiveness. Szayna et al. did not address this possibility and drew erroneous conclusions about the implications of civil-military opinion gap. In other words, the theoretical linkage between civil-military opinion gap and *actual* military effectiveness is never tested in their study. Therefore, their study still leaves readers confused whether the opinion gap really matters in explaining the level of military effectiveness. The same set of problems is also found in a study by Miller and Williams.³⁶

A notable exception is the study by Gelpi and Feaver.³⁷ They applied the methodological rigor for establishing the causality between the civil-military gap and use of force. The main theoretical concern is the way the level of military experience, as measured by the percentage of military veterans in the U.S. House and Cabinet, influences foreign policy decisions concerning use of military force. In so doing, the analysis makes the causal mechanism clear: the impact of military experience is to be exerted through the political institutions. They found that the

³⁶ Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, "Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness?," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).

³⁷ P Feaver and C Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). Also see C Gelpi and PD Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4 (2002).

more military veterans in the House and Cabinet, the more likely it is that the contents of decisions related to use of force reflect the preference of the military. Not only did they examine the influence of military experience on actual policy outcomes, but also they enhanced the validity of the results by controlling for other possible explanations of use of force.

The lack of systematic evidence demonstrating negative implications of civil-military gap is at the center of debates between proponents and critics of gap thesis. Critics are often called the “so what” school.³⁸ They tend to agree with the existence of civil-military gap, but the two schools sharply differ in the implications of the gap. The central claim of critics is that the existence of the civil-military gap does not necessarily mean it has an adverse effect on decision making processes and public policy. Pointing out there is little evidence that the growth of Republican Party affiliation in the military has led to political activism, Collins argued that “If we cannot correlate or otherwise connect the growth in the number of officers as moderately conservative or Republican with significant political activity or fractious differences on policy issues, we will have to redefine our terms or move the analysis of the ‘gap’ to another plane.”³⁹ At the more fundamental level, Collins further emphasized that a key focus of civil-military gap thesis should be an examination of

³⁸ SC Sarkesian, "The US Military Must Find Its Voice," *Orbis* 42, no. 3 (1998); RM Cassidy, "The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review* May-June(2005); JJ Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," *Washington Quarterly* 21(1998); J Hillen, "Must US Military Culture Reform?," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (1999).

³⁹ JJ Collins and OR Holsti, "Civil-Military Relations: How Wide Is the Gap?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999).

“whether any fact or trend ... has ever had or will ever have a significant impact on public policy.”⁴⁰

A similar concern for the current status of gap thesis was also raised by other critics. Hooker maintained that “[T]his tendency to draw broad conclusions from a specific case is prevalent in the field but highly questionable as a matter of scholarship.”⁴¹ In a similar vein, Snider argued against the contention that any gap between civilians and the military is problematic, and stressed that “[A] truly informed debate is called for—one concerned with effective policymaking and focused on ... military capabilities and effectiveness. The purposes of the military and its ability to fulfill those purposes should drive the debate.”⁴²

Critics of the gap thesis, however, are not immune from criticisms. Even though they have been successful in pointing out weaknesses of gap thesis, critics have not made serious efforts to prove or disprove the theoretical connection between the civil-military gap and policy outcomes. In this regard, Holsti is critical of the way opponents of the gap thesis present their arguments:

These incidents do not satisfy the criterion suggested by Colonel Collins because they cannot demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt a significant correlation between partisan preferences and behavior and they are not equally severe violations of professional norms. They do suggest, however, that those in the ‘so what’ school may not be wholly correct when they

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ RD Hooker Jr, "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (2003): 9.

⁴² DM Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (1999): 25. A similar argument is made by Hillen. See J Hillen, "The Gap between American Society and Its Military: Keep It, Defend It, Manage It," *Journal of National Security Law* 4(2000).

dismiss as irrelevant any evidence of partisanship within the armed forces by depicting an impermeable firewall between beliefs and actions.⁴³

Indeed, as much as the proponents of the gap thesis are vulnerable to criticism over the lack of systematic evidence concerning the relationship between civil-military gap and policy outcomes, critics are also susceptible to the same kind of criticism.

In sum, scholars in the subfield of civil-military relations have made strides in uncovering the nature and extent of civil-military gap. It is safe to argue, however, that the current status of the gap thesis is in a state of collective ignorance over the implications of civil-military gap for military effectiveness and other public policy. This scholarly void needs to be filled.

3. Research Questions

To this point, I have reviewed studies in the gap literature and identified an area of scholarly debate. The main source of the debate is the lack of systematic evidence that civil-military gap has an influence on military effectiveness and public policy. As analyzed earlier, existing studies dealing with this relationship do not help us resolve this debate due to the theoretical and methodological weaknesses. Therefore, we still do not know the extent of the influence of civil-military gap.

In order to address this research gap in the literature of gap thesis, this dissertation focuses on two aspects of civil-military gap: ideology and military experience gap. What is the impact of ideology and military experience gap on

⁴³ OR Holsti, "Politicization of the United States Military-Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot," *International Journal* 57, no. Winter (2001-2002).

defense spending? As will be shown in the following chapter, the military has a strong preference for a higher level of defense spending due to its inherent conservative ideology and functions it performs. Accepting the logic of proponents of gap thesis, this study hypothesizes that the magnitude of these civil-military gaps has a negative relationship with defense spending. When the size of the gap is small, it is expected that civilians and the military have a shared understanding about the measures to improve military effectiveness. Under this condition, it is anticipated that civilians are likely to agree with military preference for defense spending. This study expects that this will lead to increase in defense spending. When the magnitude of the gap is large, decreases in defense spending will follow.

This study limits the scope of analysis to the United States and covers the period between 1952 and 2000. In doing so, this dissertation theorizes that ideological and military experience gap in *political institutions* matters in explaining the level of military spending. Political institutions such as Congress and Cabinet possess the authority to allocate resources to national defense. If the civil-military gap exerts any causal impact on defense spending, the most direct influence will be through political institutions. By taking a set of control variables into consideration, this study addresses some of the weaknesses of existing studies dealing with civil-military gap and military effectiveness.

In examining the role that the ideology gap plays, this study treats the conservative ideology of the military as an analytical constant for the following two reasons. First, it is difficult to obtain data that measure the ideology of the military

over an extended period. The most desirable research strategy is to measure the ideological gap between political institutions and the military over time, and test if this gap has actually influenced increase or decrease of defense spending with other possible factors controlled. Although scholarly interests in the conservative nature of the military have lasted over decades⁴⁴, it is not until recently that analysts have begun to conduct extensive surveys to tap into this ideological gap between civilians and the military.⁴⁵ Therefore, the scarcity of data imposes a constraint on direct measurement of military's ideology.

Second, studies have demonstrated that the officer corps is predominantly conservative, and this tendency has been more or less stable. Even though Huntington's notion of the officer corps as an ideologically monolithic entity has been challenged⁴⁶, studies repeatedly confirmed the strong conservative nature of the officer corps.⁴⁷ A recent dissertation found that while wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused a meaningful change in party affiliation among military officers, they

⁴⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*, Free Press Paperback (New York: The Free Press, 1971); Jerald D. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study in Military Ideology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

⁴⁵ P Feaver and RH Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 2001); Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations*; JM Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2005); Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq".

⁴⁶ For example, Dempsey found that female and Hispanic officers are much less likely to identify themselves as conservatives than white officers. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations*. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

⁴⁷ Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics"; Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society "; Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99."; Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96."; ———, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."

have not brought about a concomitant adjustment in ideology, proving stability of ideology in the officer corps.⁴⁸ Considering the limitation in data collection and the stability of ideology in the military, this study takes the ideology of the military as an analytical constant and measures the changes of ideology in political institutions as a proxy of ideological gap between civilians and the military. According to this strategy, when conservatism in political institutions becomes stronger, it indicates that the ideological gap between civilians and the military decreases. When liberalism intensifies, the gap increases.

As for the military experience gap, this dissertation follows Gelpi and Feaver's conceptualization.⁴⁹ The level of military experience, which is measured as the percentage of military veterans in political institutions, is treated as a proxy measurement of military experience gap. A high percentage of military veterans in political institutions means a small military experience gap. Under this situation, political institutions are expected to have enhanced understanding of military needs. On the contrary, when there are a small number of military veterans, the military experience gap becomes large.


Employing this approach, this study measures a relative—rather than absolute—gap between civilians and the military. Figure 1 graphically expresses conceptualization of ideology and military experience gap. The point B in the figure describes a situation where conservatism is strong and there are a large number of

⁴⁸ Heidi A. Urban, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2010).

⁴⁹ Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force."

military veterans in political institutions. Under this condition, the civil-military gap (1) is small. The point A illustrates the opposite situation, showing that the civil-military gap (2) is substantial.

Figure 1. Conceptualization of Civil-Military Gap



This study treats defense spending as a constituting element of military effectiveness. According to Millet, Murray, and Watman, military effectiveness has four hierarchical dimensions: political, strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness.⁵⁰ In this framework, the volume and nature of defense spending is an

⁵⁰ AR Millett, W Murray, and Kenneth N Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in *Military Effectiveness*, ed. AR Millett and W Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988). For a short version of their argument, see AR Millett, W Murray, and KH Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986). In civil-military relations literature, the following studies focus on strategic effectiveness. Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 19, no. 2 (1996). Risa A Brooks, *The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, California: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008). ———, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars," in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, ed. Risa A Brooks and Elizabeth A Stanley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007). BR Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Cornell Univ Pr, 1984). Richard K Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). For studies analyzing operational effectiveness, see DD Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (1993); Deborah D. Avant, "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Contemporary United States and United Kingdom," in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, ed. Risa A Brooks and Elizabeth A Stanley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007); Stephen P Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ Pr, 1994); Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988). Lastly, the

element of the political dimension where common understanding between civilian and military elites is essential to ensure that the military is given a regular share of national resources. This study expects that the size of ideology and military experience gap influences the level of common understanding. Given the competitive nature of resource allocation among government agencies, when there is little common ground between civilian and military elites, the military would have a hard time to obtain sufficient military spending. This study concentrates on one element of military effectiveness, and by only examining that particular aspect, it has a limited, but focused analytical purpose.

This study contributes to the existing scholarship of gap thesis literature by establishing and testing institutional theories of the impacts of civil-military gap on defense spending. By doing so, it sheds light on the question of whether the civil-military gap really matters in explaining military effectiveness.

4. Chapter Plan

This study consists of the following five chapters. In the second chapter, I review literature on ideology and military veterans. As for ideology, I focus on analyzing Huntington's theory of what role ideology plays in determining the level of defense spending. With regard to military veterans, I trace the origin of the preference of military veterans on defense spending. The main focus of this chapter is on deducing testable hypotheses about the impact of ideology and military

following study deals with tactical effectiveness. Miller and Williams, "Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness?."

experience gap on defense spending. In chapter 3, I operationalize and measure independent and dependent variables. A set of control variables are also considered. In chapter 4, I show the results of multivariate regression analyses. Interaction effects related to the variables of ideology and military experience are also examined. In the concluding chapter, I discuss major findings and their implications.

II. Literature Review

Why does the civil-military gap matter? The logic behind the scholarly interest in the civil-military gap is the expectation that the extent of the difference in values, ideology, opinions, and perspectives between civilians and the military explains the parameters and outcomes of civil-military relations. When the civil-military gap concerning a certain policy is small, it is conceptualized as meaning that there is a general consensus and common understanding between civilians and the military. Under this condition, it is expected that civil-military relations is characterized by harmony, and the preferences of the military are accepted by civilians without major impediments. In contrast, with a substantial civil-military gap, the gap thesis predicts that there exists a lack of consensus and mutual understanding between the two groups. Under this situation, it is anticipated that the relationship between civilians and the military will be marked by tensions, and military preferences will not be readily accepted by civilians in public policies.

Applying the logic stated above to the issue of military spending, we can expect that military preference on military spending will take precedence when the value and preference gap between civilians and the military is small. On the contrary, it is expected the opposite is true when the preference gap is considerable. Civilians, who have priorities different from that of the military, are likely to give less attention to military needs and impose their own preference on defense spending.

In this chapter, I lay out a theoretical framework for an assessment of the impact of the two kinds of civil-military gap, the ideological gap and the military experience gap, on defense spending. The key purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I identify what preferences variants of ideology and military experience generate. Second, based on this identification, I draw hypotheses about how varying degrees of ideology and military experience gap impact defense spending.

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first section, I draw on the literature to comprehend the role of ideology as the source of preference on defense spending. In doing so, Huntington's civil-military relations theory provides the main theoretical foundation; the empirical findings of other scholars that support or deny the validity of Huntington's arguments are also assessed. Based on the analysis, I deduce a hypothesis about the impact of the shift in ideology at the institutional level between liberalism and conservatism on the amount of defense spending.

In the second section, I draw together literatures on military socialization, self-selection, and military culture to show how military experience gives military veterans a set of preferences that are distinct from non-veterans. The review ultimately leads to a hypothesis about the relationship between the prevalence of military experience in political institutions and the level of military spending.

1. The Ideology Gap and Defense Spending

A discussion about the ideology gap and its implication on defense spending should begin with the definition of ideology. Scholars have defined ideology in many different ways.⁵¹ Converse defined ideology as belief systems that contain “ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.”⁵² While Converse’s definition emphasizes the coherence as an essential element of ideology, Zaller puts an emphasis on the function of ideology in his definition when he labels ideology as “a mechanism by which ordinary citizens make contact with specialists who are knowledgeable on conversational issues and share the citizens’ predispositions.”⁵³ Huntington’s definition accentuates the problem-solving function of ideology: “A set of values and attitudes oriented about the problems of the state.”⁵⁴ Employing the important elements from the definitions presented above, ideology in this study is defined as a coherent set of ideas and attitudes that help determine ways to solve social and political problems and communicate among individuals and institutions.

Why does political ideology matter in civil-military relations? The obvious answer to this question is that ideology matters because of its importance as a source

⁵¹ J Gerring, "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1997).

⁵² PE Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 207.

⁵³ J Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge Univ Pr, 1992), 327.

⁵⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 90. In his later work, Huntington defined an ideology with similar terms. He defined it as “a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group”. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," *The American Political Science Review* 51, no. 2 (1957): 454.

of political preference, attitudes, and policies.⁵⁵ Then, we need to ask the following questions: What preference do variants of ideology generate in terms of the level of military spending?

In civil-military relations literature, Huntington provides the most sophisticated theory that links political ideology and parameters of civil-military relations, including military spending. The influence of Huntington's theory has been so pervasive that Cohen asserted that Huntington "set the terms of debate about civil-military relations."⁵⁶ Even more than six decades after the publication of *The Soldier and the State*, many scholars still agree with the relevance of this book especially as they revisit Huntington for answers to impending problems in civil-military relations in this era of war on terrorism and counterinsurgency.⁵⁷ Indeed, Huntington's theory that explains civil-military relations as a function of the ideology gap between society and the military still resonates. Scholars argued that the individualistic liberal society is not tolerant of the conservative military, which enshrines masculinity and group-oriented mindsets. Accordingly, the controversies

⁵⁵ In public opinion literature, scholars have found many other sources of political predispositions and behaviors. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing demonstrated that genetic factors are important as a source of political attitudes. JR Alford, CL Funk, and JR Hibbing, "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 02 (2005). Kinder also noted such factors as personality, self-interest, group identification, values, and inferences from history are important in generating political orientations. DR Kinder, "Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion," *Political science: The state of the discipline* (1983).

⁵⁶ EA Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 2001), 433. Another research noted that "*The Soldier and the State* put the issue of civil-military relations on the map". Robert D. Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," *Atlantic Monthly*(December 2008).

⁵⁷ Suzanne C. Nielson and DM Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press,2009). J Garofano, "Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control," *Orbis* 52, no. 2 (2008).

over homosexuals and extended combat roles for women are indicative of the ideological tensions.⁵⁸ Scholars are also concerned with ideological strains in the context of the growing ideological polarization in the American political environment. They worry that the military's close affiliation with the Republican Party, based on the shared conservative ideology, may force the military to suffer budgetary and recruitment problems under Democratic control of the White House and Congress.⁵⁹

Given the importance of Huntington's theory in civil-military literature, it is no surprise that many scholars have assessed the validity of Huntington's theory in various ways. Several scholars have produced evidence that invalidate Huntington's analysis on such concepts as military professionalism and objective civilian control.⁶⁰ Huntington's theory regarding the relationship between civilians and the

⁵⁸ Hillen, "Must US Military Culture Reform?."

⁵⁹ Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."

⁶⁰ Finer criticizes Huntington's argument that military professionalism leads to voluntary subordination by demonstrating that the professionalized military may involve domestic politics to impose its influence because of the professional norms such as patriotism. See, S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). Welch shows that the level of military intervention to domestic politics is explained not only by internal factors of the military (e.g. the level of military professionalism), but also by environmental factors such as institutionalization of political systems. This provides a criticism on Huntington's theory that puts emphasis on military professionalism as the main factor explain the military's involvement in politics. CE Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). Abrahamsson also criticizes the relationship between military professionalism and political neutrality. B Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc, 1972). The study by Janowitz problematizes Huntington's argument of a clear division between politics and military matters such as military strategy. Janowitz argues that because of the development in technology, weapons systems (e.g. nuclear weapons), and societal changes, military autonomy is not tenable and can pose dangers for national defense. Based on the analysis, he suggests the notion of "constabulary" military, which is "continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory." Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*, 418. Other scholars have critiqued Huntington over whether the division of labor between civilians and the military can generates strategic successes.

military (ideological gap), and its connection with military spending, however, has not been not explicitly examined in civil-military relations literature. As will be discussed later, Feaver—who is one of the most influential critics of Huntington—did attempt to examine Huntington’s theory and concluded that “Huntington’s theory does not adequately capture American civil-military relations. Another theory is needed.”⁶¹ His assessment of Huntington’s theory, however, was not complete. This dissertation tries to fill this void.

In this section, I first analyze Huntington’s theory about the relationship between ideology and military spending. After that, I evaluate Feaver’s criticism of Huntington’s theory. Finally, this section ends with a hypothesis to be tested in the following chapters.

A. Huntington’s Theory of the Ideology Gap on Military Spending

Huntington’s key concern in *The Soldier and the State* was what he saw as the crisis of American civil-military relations in the wake of World War II. The crisis concerned the clash between two factors generating opposite preferences—functional and societal imperatives—on civil-military relations and its implication for national security. On the one hand, the functional imperative, originated by the enormity of external threats, required that the United States build an effective and sizable military establishment. On the other hand, the dominant liberalism in

This leads Cohn to argue for “unequal dialogues” characterized by active involvement and probe of civilians into military matters including strategy. EA Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Pr, 2002). For similar criticisms, see Mackubin T. Owens, "Civil-Military Relations and the U.S. Strategy Deficit," E-Notes(February 2010), <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201002.owens.civilmilitaryrelations.html>.

⁶¹ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 38.

America had been reluctant to possess a sizeable military, due to the inherent tensions with military conservatism. Although the military was at times provided with substantial amount of resources for defense against outside threats, as soon as threats lessened, America liberalism reduced the size of the military. Further, American liberalism attempted to civilize the military, causing the institution to lose its distinctive military mindset and to become an entity that reflected societal liberal values. This liberal approach to civil-military relations, which worked before the Cold War, would undermine the security of the United States during the Cold War era where the “rivalry between the United States and the Soviet states appeared a relatively permanent aspect of the international scene.”⁶² While the Cold War demanded a long term commitment to national defense, American liberalism, as the dominant societal ideological philosophy, was not meant to support a large military. This is the central concern that motivated Huntington.

Huntington argued that the tension generated by the coexistence of heightened external threat and liberalism could only be solved by a significant change in one of the two imperatives: “The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism.”⁶³ Because Huntington saw the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as a more or less constant feature of international politics, he was left with only one option: shift American ideology from liberalism to conservatism. By

⁶² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 456.

⁶³ Ibid.

departing from liberalism—which he considered “the gravest domestic threat to American military security”⁶⁴ in the Cold War era—and embracing conservatism, Huntington anticipated the United States would create “a new, more sympathetically conservative environment for military institutions.”⁶⁵ Most importantly, under this condition, in Huntington’s reasoning, the ideological affinity between the conservative society and the military would allow the military establishment to receive sufficient resources and develop into an apolitical and effective organization.

Summarizing the nature and solution of what Huntington saw as the crisis in America and American civil-military relations, this study identifies two determinants of military spending in Huntington’s theory: external threats and societal ideology.⁶⁶ As we will see shortly, the impact of external threats on defense spending is rather straightforward: The level of military resources is a function of the level of external threat. What is more important for this study is the role that societal ideology plays on military capabilities when the effect of outside threats is controlled for. According to Huntington’s analysis, when liberalism was the dominant societal ideology, the United States tended to minimize the scale of military force. This is the concern that Huntington posed. Thus, Huntington argued that shift in societal

⁶⁴ Ibid., 457.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Huntington emphasizes the importance of these two variables for their influence on civil-military relations. He argued “[T]he military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. This interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations. The degree to which they conflict depends upon the intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of society.” Ibid., 2.

ideology from liberalism to conservatism would ensure sufficient military capability to ensure national security in the post-World War II era.

Huntington's first independent variable is functional imperative or "the threats to the society's security."⁶⁷ The logic is simple. The intensity of external threats determines the level of military preparedness a society needs to cope with the threats. In the presence of compelling external threats, society would empower the military by allotting resources for military preparedness in terms of personnel and military budget. The scale of the military could drastically increase as America saw during the first and second World Wars. Importantly, Huntington observed that American society would reduce the size of the military after the major threats receded. This pattern was largely consistent with the expectation about the impact of external threat on the variation of military capability, including the military budget. Table 1 shows the changes in military expenditure and personnel in the first half of the 20th century.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Table 1. U.S. Military Capability (1901-1957)

Year	1901	1919	1923	1936	1945	1948	1957
Military expenditure (million dollars)	36	11,218	678	932	90,000	10,961	44,548
Military personnel (thousands)	112	2,897	247	291	12,123	1,446	2,796

Source: National Material Capabilities (v.3.02) in the Correlates of War dataset (2005). The military expenditure figures are calculated in current year U.S. dollars.

As Table 1 indicates, until the aftermath of World War II, there was a pattern in allocation of resources for national defense. During the two World Wars, the military was given a substantial amount of resources. But, when the threats were gone, the United States substantially reduced the level of military preparedness. In 1957, when Huntington published his book, the level of military expenditure and personnel was not as high as it was during the two World Wars, but it still remained substantial. This unusual level of military spending, even after a major war ended, reflected the reality that the U.S. was facing during the Cold War. On the one hand, U.S. interests now stretched to a global level. On the other hand, potential threats from the Soviet Union were seen as enormous concerns to the security of the United States and its allies.

Huntington's second variable is societal ideology, which is part of what he termed a societal imperative. The other constituting part of societal imperative is the Constitution characterized by separation of power. Wary of the danger of concentrated political power and unified control over the military, the Founding

Fathers came to an agreement to enact a conservative Constitution. Under the Constitution, Congress and the president possess different authorities and responsibilities over the military. For instance, the Constitution grants Congress the authority “to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy,” whereas the president assumes the role of Commander in Chief.⁶⁸ As Huntington acknowledged, the Constitution makes civilian control difficult because it encourages the military to seek various venues for access to the policy making process.⁶⁹ Importantly, the Constitution is an analytical constant in Huntington’s theory.⁷⁰ Thus, societal ideology bears much of the explanatory responsibility on the variations of military spending along with a functional imperative derived from external threats.

Again, Huntington defines political ideology as “a set of values and attitudes oriented about the problems of the state.”⁷¹ Among the four types of ideological variants—liberalism, conservatism, Fascism, and Marxism—Huntington argued

⁶⁸ Ibid., 427.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 163-70. Also see pages 177-178, 400-403, and 427. Studies by subsequent scholars confirm the nature and consequence of the U.S. political system that divides the responsibility over the military into the hands of Congress and presidents. For example, Avant argues that this divided control over the military was the cause of the bias and rigidity in military strategy and doctrine during the Vietnam War, which led to a military failure. In the author’s analysis, Congress and the president before and during the Vietnam War could not have a shared understanding and view toward the nature of the war that the U.S. army was conducting. As a consequence, the U.S. army continued to apply a conventional military doctrine that was designed for regular warfare, to the guerilla warfare. DD Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (1993): 409-30. Also see ———, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ Pr, 1994); Deborah D. Avant, “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Comtemporary United States and United Kingdom,” in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, ed. Risa A Brooks and Elizabeth A Stanley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁷⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, ch. 7.

⁷¹ Ibid., 90. In his later work, Huntington defined an ideology with similar terms. He defined it as “a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group”. See ———, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” 454.

liberalism had been the dominant political thought in the United States, so much so that he called it “ideological constant.”⁷² Huntington saw American liberalism as holding a few characteristics such as individualism, commercialism, and, hostility to the military and its values.

First, Huntington noted that liberal political ideology emphasizes individualism, which he regarded as the “heart of the liberalism.”⁷³ Liberalism is based on the ideal that “success in any enterprise depends upon the maximum release of individual energies.”⁷⁴ It rejects organizational constraints on individual rights such as freedom of speech, and believes that conflicts in interests among states could be resolved through education and the establishment of appropriate social and political institutions. Last but not least, Huntington noted that liberalism fosters progress and is inherently optimistic.

Second, Huntington saw that liberalism upholds commercialism. The ideology supports progress through economic growth.⁷⁵ National resources should be used to advocate and promote economic development. Thus, preparation for war is wasteful and to be avoided: “War itself was actively destructive of economic wealth.”⁷⁶

Last, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington noted that liberalism is hostile to military institutions. Liberal values and perspectives are starkly different

⁷² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 143.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 267-68.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 222.

from what Huntington termed military conservatism, which will be discussed shortly. For liberals, the military equates to a group of people who try to justify the rationale for their existence, a tendency which puts society into danger: the military is “a warmonger” or “a sinister drag upon the conduct of war.”⁷⁷ In addition, maintaining a standing army is considered undermining individual freedom and increasing the danger of dictatorship by facilitating concentration of power.

Huntington maintained that these characteristics of liberal ideology are very different from the ideology that the military defends, the so-called military ethic or conservatism realism. This ideology derives from the function that the military performs—“the management of violence.”⁷⁸ The military ideology “consists of the values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function.”⁷⁹

According to Huntington, the military conservative realism has several distinct features. First, it is characterized by pessimism. Human beings are selfish, as are states, and this makes the military constantly alert to external threats. The existence of military force itself indicates the constant possibility that conflicting interests would not be resolved in a peaceful way: “The man of the military ethic is essentially the man of Hobbes.”⁸⁰ The military man is skeptical of maintaining peace through economic and legal measures. He stresses that military force is the

⁷⁷ Ibid., 153.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 61.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 63.

last resort that states can rely on. Thus, he demands “the enlarging and strengthening of the military forces available to protect the security of the state” and “a larger share of the national budget.”⁸¹

Secondly, the military conservative realism prefers groups over individuals. In other words, it opposes individualism, one of the key attributes of liberalism. Military activities occur at the group level: “Success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group.”⁸² Individuals sacrifice themselves when they are required to do so for the accomplishment of group missions. The wisdom of individuals gives way to the experience of the group. Initiatives of individuals are limited and are only allowed under constraints. As some scholars have found, this tendency is what makes it difficult for the military to innovate.⁸³

In sum, Huntington concluded that based on his theory of the ideological tensions between liberalism and military conservatism, the military would have difficulties ensuring resources for national defense under strong societal liberalism.

⁸¹ Ibid., 67. Bacevich’s notion of military professionalism also shows the uniqueness of the military ethic: “Traditional military professionalism—rooted in the ideal of the warrior as the embodiment of soldierly virtue—has also become an anachronism. It celebrates the group rather than the individual. It cherishes virtues such as self-sacrifice, self-denial, and physical courage that are increasingly alien to the larger culture. It clings to a warrior spirit that is deeply and perhaps irreducibly masculine. In short, orthodox notions of what is meant to be a soldier clash head-on with the imperatives of political correctness.” AJ Bacevich and RH Kohn, “Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force?,” *The New Republic* 217, no. 23 (1997): 16.

⁸² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 63.

⁸³ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*; ———, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation.”; HM Sapolsky, “On the Theory of Military Innovation,” *Breakthroughs* 9, no. 1 (2000); Donna Winslow, “Military Organization and Culture from Three Perspectives: The Case of Army,” in *Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview*, ed. G Caforio (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007); Bryon E Greenwald, “Understanding Change: An Intellectual and Practical Study of Military Innovation” (Ohio State University, 2003).

Given the seemingly irreconcilable ideology gap between liberalism and military conservatism, it would be difficult for the military to persuade liberal-minded society to allocate enough resources for national defense. The liberal society would view the military with suspicion and try to keep the military small, which would undermine national security.

Based on this theory, as long as the external threat variable remained high, the only logical prescription for national security was for the American society to embrace conservatism. Huntington believed that conservatism was sympathetic and compatible with military conservative realism, sharing fundamental assumptions with military ideology: “In its theories of man, society, and history, its recognition of the role of power in human relations, its acceptance of existing institutions, its limited goals, and its distrust of grand designs, conservatism ... is at one with the military ethic.”⁸⁴ Under conservatism, considering its ideological proximity to the military conservative realism, it was expected that the U.S. military would be able to maintain a substantial enough size to deter external threats.

B. An Unsolved Question about the Relationship between Ideology and Military Spending

This dissertation has so far followed the causal mechanism of Huntington’s theory that connects societal ideology, the ideology gap between society and the military, and its impact on military spending. This causal linkage was never tested

⁸⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 93.

in Huntington's book. What he pursued in *The Soldier and the State*, was an historic analysis of how the two independent variables, functional and societal imperatives, influenced the nature and features of civil-military relations until 1957. Based on his observation, he prescribed a solution to what he saw as the crisis in the United States by arguing for an ideological change of the society from liberal to conservatism.

In a subsequent study in 1977, Huntington made a comment on the changes in ideology since 1957. He argued that an ideological shift actually occurred: "[T]he argument advanced in the *The Soldier and the State* in 1957 was that, given the existing international situation, 'the requisite for military security' was a shift from liberalism to a 'sympathetic conservative' attitude toward the needs of military professionalism. To a surprising extent, that shift occurred."⁸⁵ He further argued that the ideological shift toward conservatism was beginning to reverse when he wrote that "in some measure, also, it has not been reversed. ... The dilemma that was partially resolved in the 1950s has returned."⁸⁶

Huntington's analysis of an ideological shift and its influence on military spending, however, was not complete, inviting a harsh criticism from Feaver.⁸⁷ I argue that neither Huntington nor Feaver put the relationship between ideology and military spending into a rigorous empirical analysis, leaving readers to still wonder

⁸⁵ S Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in *Civil-Military Relations* ed. Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel Huntington (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1977).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.


⁸⁷ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, ch. 2. Feaver presented the original criticism of Huntington's theory in his previous article published in 1996. See, ———, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control."

about the validity of Huntington's theory. There are two problems with their arguments.


First, the dependent variables that Huntington and Feaver used in their analyses are not measured appropriately. A large gap between the values of the indicators for the dependent variable and the actual numbers in military spending questions the strength of their arguments. In Huntington's 1977 study, the dependent variable—military spending—has a big margin of error. Huntington argued that a shift in ideology toward conservatism occurred. One indicator of this ideological change is changes in public opinion: “[F]rom the late 1940s until the mid-1960s, opinion surveys showed the mass public overwhelmingly opposed to reductions in U.S. military forces and budgets and a significant portion of the public in favor of increases in military strength.”⁸⁸ If public opinion on the level of military spending is a reliable indicator of an ideological shift, then there should be a connection to military spending: Military spending should remain high or it should have a stable pattern during the period.

The real changes in defense spending are seen in Figure 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the level of defense burden, which measures the ratio of military expenditure to GDP. Figure 2 indicates the changes in military expenditure. These are some of the most widely used indicators of military spending.

⁸⁸ Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s."



Source: *Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2006* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2005), Table 3.1—Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2010.



Source: *Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2006* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2005), Table 6.1—Composition of Outlays: 1940–2015.
 Note: The defense outlay figures are calculated in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

From the figures, it is difficult to find any stable trend between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s. After the Korean War ended in 1953, the defense burden substantially declined. Military expenditure from the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s were relatively stable until the United States became actively engaged in the Vietnam War. Huntington seems to be correct, however, in that the defense burden and military expenditure were declining around 1977. This does not mean that Huntington's theory was proven. Huntington should provide that an ideological shift between conservatism and liberalism has an independent impact on defense spending, when external threats are controlled. Indeed, Huntington acknowledged the importance of external threat in explaining increases or decreases in defense spending when he argued that "In the absence of a major international crisis, a return to anything resembling the cold war pattern of civil-military relations seems very unlikely."⁸⁹ Nowhere in Huntington's analysis is there a conscious effort to separate the impact of external threat from that of ideology.

In his criticism, Feaver made a significant mistake in terms of analyzing the dependent variable, military spending. Feaver wrongly understood public support for defense spending, instead of actual figures of military spending, as the dependent variable of Huntington's 1977 article. This mistake comes as much from the lack of a serious discussion of military spending in Huntington's article as from Feaver's own misunderstanding. Feaver maintained that "[O]f greater concern, his evidence consisted largely of output measures, but his theory was a claim about input

⁸⁹ Ibid., 16.

measures; the output was support for building sufficient armed forces, the input was the sway of liberalism in society.”⁹⁰ This interpretation of Huntington’s theory is wrong, as Huntington had considered public support for military spending as one of many indicators of ideology. The problem with Huntington was that he discussed many input measures—which contain contradicting values as Feaver shows—without discussing the output measure, military spending, in detail.

With this mistake, Feaver spent much of the analysis discussing the relationship between “support for the military as an institution” and “support for a large military establishment or support for a still larger military establishment in the form of defense budget increases.”⁹¹ The analysis led Feaver to conclude Huntington’s theory is flawed because of the mismatch between the two variables. The reasoning for analyzing the two variables comes from Feaver’s criticism that “Huntington must measure a change in ideology independent of the military buildup.”⁹² Even when we accept that the former—public support for the military as an institution—rightly captures the ideological change, a question still remains. Is the latter variable adequate for the military buildup? As the studies by Hartley and Russett⁹³, Wlezien⁹⁴, and Bartels⁹⁵ indicate, public opinion is an important determinant of defense spending. This does not necessarily mean, however, that

⁹⁰ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 23.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ T Hartley and B Russett, "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?," *American Political Science Review* (1992).

⁹⁴ C Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending," *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 4 (1995).

⁹⁵ LM Bartels, "The American Public's Defense Spending Preferences in the Post-Cold War Era," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (1994).

public support for military spending can be a useful indicator of ideology. Thus, the answer to the question above is no, which shows Feaver's analysis and criticism of Huntington's theory did not live up to expectations.

Feaver also examined military spending, but his treatment of this variable was flawed. Feaver started by revisiting Huntington's main fear about the Cold War civil-military relations: "Huntington's real concern was whether a liberal society would support *enough* defense spending to prevail in the Cold War. Clearly, in retrospect, it did."⁹⁶ It is, however, not clear what he meant by 'enough' defense spending. According to his argument, there are only two values in the variable of defense spending: enough or not enough military spending. This treatment is too simplistic in terms of measurement, which is quite different from reality. As Figure 2 and 3 suggest, defense spending during the Cold War varied substantially. Without mentioning this, Feaver reasoned that because the United States supported 'enough' military spending, this should be preceded by a shift in ideology from liberalism to conservatism. Although Feaver discussed evidence that liberalism with regard to individualism, antistatism, and tolerance was quite strong during most of the Cold War era⁹⁷—which suggests that Huntington's theory is not empirically tenable—his flawed reasoning makes it difficult for him to make a decisive conclusion.

The second problem is that Huntington and Feaver employ many indicators of the independent variable—ideology—that do not covary with each other. In part,

⁹⁶ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 26.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

this is inevitable given the complexity of defining and measuring ideology.⁹⁸ What makes things more complicated for Huntington is the scope of his study. The fact that he attempted to explain the role that ideology (and ideological shift) plays on civil-military relations unavoidably broadens the definition of ideology, resulting in adoption of many indicators. Related to this are various units of analysis at different analytical levels. In his 1977 article, Huntington presented at least three indicators of ideology: Antimilitarism, support for the military forces, and support for defense spending increases. The unit of analysis includes legislators, the intellectual community, the attentive public, and the mass public. Notwithstanding the fuzziness in measuring some variables, this complexity makes Huntington's analysis susceptible to criticism.

Feaver's analysis of Huntington clearly shows the problem. Employing a study by Segal and Blair⁹⁹, Feaver pointed out that whereas support for and confidence in the military as an institution remained high from the 1960s until the mid-1970s, public support for increases in defense spending dropped from over 80 percent during the 1950s and 60s to less than 50 percent in 1969. This shows that at least one of the two variables is not a reliable indicator of ideology. The results of King and Karabell's study further questioned whether confidence in the military is a good indicator of ideology.¹⁰⁰ Examining the changes in public confidence in the

⁹⁸ K Knight, "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 04 (2006).

⁹⁹ DR Segal and JD Blair, "Public Confidence in the US Military," *Armed Forces & Society* 3, no. 1 (1976).

¹⁰⁰ DC King and Z Karabell, *The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the US Military since Vietnam* (Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 2003), ch.1.

military, they found that although ideology is an influential factor, other variables such as religiosity, the amount of time respondents spent watching TV, marriage status, and gender are also strong indicators of confidence in the military. The results also showed that ideological extremists, strong conservatives and liberals alike, were less likely to be confident in the military. This suggests that adopting confidence in the military as an indicator of ideology is questionable.

In sum, Huntington's own assessment of his theory and Feaver's criticism of Huntington did not systematically examine the influence of ideology, and the ideology gap between civilians and the military on military spending. They employed crude bivariate analyses between various indicators of ideology and the dependent variable—military spending—which they wrongly measured. Equally important, they failed to control for other alternative explanations of military spending including external threat. This void should be filled with a carefully designed empirical study.

C. Research Hypothesis

The theoretical link between ideology and opinion on defense spending and related policy issues at the individual level has been well established.¹⁰¹

Huntington's main concern, however, is the role of societal ideology on defense spending. As I demonstrated, neither Huntington nor his critics examined this relationship in a systematic way. This study attempts to test that empirical question.

¹⁰¹ Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy," 331. Bartels, "The American Public's Defense Spending Preferences in the Post-Cold War Era."

Testing Huntington's theory requires several choices. First, one needs to decide the unit of analysis. As reviewed earlier, Huntington and Feaver attempted to look at the manifestations of ideological changes at various analytical levels. An advisable way is to base this decision on Huntington's theory. Which unit of analysis did Huntington think more important? Second, a related question is to decide how to operationalize the independent variable, ideology. This is important because ideology can be defined and measured in many different ways. As I showed earlier, the analyses by Huntington and Feaver display the complexity of this issue.

With regard to the unit of analysis, I choose to focus on Congress.

Huntington conceptualizes the state as an element of the society in his book of 1957. According to his theory, political institutions are the primary mechanisms through which the influence of ideology on civil-military relations is exerted:

The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state: Here the conflict between functional and societal pressures comes to a head. The officer corps is the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society. The state is the active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including military security. The social and economic relations between the military and the rest of society normally reflect the political relations between the officer corps and the state.

In his 1977 article, Huntington reemphasized that the political leadership should be the most important locus of analyses: "[T]he central problem of civil-military relations thus becomes the relationship between military professionals and

the political leadership.”¹⁰² The selection of Congress as the analytical focus of this dissertation is further justified by studies analyzing and demonstrating the importance of Congress in politics of defense resource allocation.¹⁰³ It is also important to note that political institutions such as Congress have played a pivotal role in shaping the political environment in which average citizens understand and communicate in ideological terms. As Jackman and Sniderman state, “it is not possible to give an account of how people solve problems without considering the role of political institutions in organizing the choice space.”¹⁰⁴

The analytical focus on Congress as an institution differs from previous research emphasizing the role that ideology plays at the individual level. Indeed, the importance of ideology as a source of policy preferences on defense and security issues has been recognized as conventional wisdom. A particularly productive area of research concerns the impact of ideology in shaping policy preferences on congressional voting. Scholars have found that the more conservative the legislators are, the more likely they vote to support defense and security programs. The causal connection between ideology and roll-call votes have been found in the votes on strategic defense initiative¹⁰⁵, strategic weapons systems¹⁰⁶, decisions on foreign

¹⁰² Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 6.

¹⁰³ A Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970," *The American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972).

¹⁰⁴ Simon Jackman and Paul Sniderman, "The Institutional Organization of Choice Space," (Manuscript, 1999). The citation was quoted by RA Brody and JL Lawless, "Political Ideology in the United States: Conservatism and Liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s," in *Conservative Parties and Right-Wing Politics in North America: Reaping the Benefits of an Ideological Victory?*, ed. Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Roland Sturm, and Dagmar Eberle (VS Verlag, 2003), 55.

¹⁰⁵ JM Lindsay, "Testing the Parochial Hypothesis: Congress and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *The Journal of Politics* 53, no. 3 (1991).

intervention¹⁰⁷, defense budgeting¹⁰⁸, and the more general foreign policy decisions¹⁰⁹. In the light of these findings at the individual level, the results of this dissertation will shed light on the causal influence of ideology at the institutional level.

In terms of the operationalization of the concept, ideology, I identify two alternatives. First, one can narrowly define the concept and focus on specific elements of ideology. As Feaver did in his critique, individualism or antimilitarism can be some of the possible measurements for ideology. Second, one can broadly define ideology and measure accordingly. Measurement of ideology based on overall roll-call votes—a conceptualization of ideology in explicitly spatial terms—is one example. I prefer the second alternative for the following reasons.

The first reason I prefer the second concept of ideology is because of its wide use in political science. According to Knight, “the simple idea that units of analysis can be arrayed on a left-right continuum” has been the dominant way of conceptualizing ideology since 1970s.¹¹⁰ This indicates that the results of this

¹⁰⁶ ———, "Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency Constraints: Congressional Voting on Strategic Weapons Systems," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 4 (1990); R Fleisher, "Economic Benefit, Ideology, and Senate Voting on the B-1 Bomber," *American Politics Research* 13, no. 2 (1985).

¹⁰⁷ E Burgin, "Influences Shaping Members' Decision Making: Congressional Voting on the Persian Gulf War," *Political Behavior* 16, no. 3 (1994).

¹⁰⁸ RG Carter, "Senate Defense Budgeting, 1981-1988: The Impacts of Ideology, Party, and Constituency Benefit on the Decision to Support the President," *American Politics Research* 17, no. 3 (1989).

¹⁰⁹ P Cronin and BO Fordham, "Timeless Principles or Today's Fashion? Testing the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate," *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 04 (1999); Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," in *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition*, ed. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995).

¹¹⁰ Knight, "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century."

dissertation can be understood in terms that many scholars use. Second, Huntington had a broad concept of ideology in his book. Feaver correctly pointed out “the seamless of Huntington’s view of the domestic and foreign components of liberalism.”¹¹¹ Focus on specific elements of liberalism may not adequately capture this overarching concept of ideology. In addition, the fact that a liberal-conservative continuum is the most widely used among the gap thesis scholars also supports my selection of this general concept of ideology.¹¹²

Last, the conceptualization and measurement of the ideology gap needs to be discussed. Huntington’s theory assumes that the military’s conservatism is a constant. Huntington viewed the conservatism as a defining factor for the military, the officer corps in particular.¹¹³ Scholars of gap thesis have found that Huntington’s analytical assumption is not tenable in the light of the empirical findings of ideological diversity and changes in the military.¹¹⁴ However, there seems to be a common ground between Huntington and gap thesis scholars: The ideology of the officer corps show a strong conservatism. Indeed, studies show that

¹¹¹ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 20.

¹¹² Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically Mainstreamed," 186-87; Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium," 27-34; Davis, "Attitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a US Cross-Section, 1998-99," 104-07. Holsti and Davis in their respective studies also used an alternative way of conceptualizing ideology that has economic and social dimensions.

¹¹³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, ch. 3, 4.

¹¹⁴ Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics"; ———, "Enduring Effects of the Uniform: Previous Military Experience and Voting Turnout."; JM Teigen, "Veterans' Party Identification, Candidate Affect, and Vote Choice in the 2004 US Presidential Election," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 3 (2007); Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms".

this tendency has been more or less stable over time.¹¹⁵ Adding together Huntington's emphasis on the officer corps as the backbone of the military with the findings of the gap thesis studies showing the stability of conservatism among military officers over time into account means this study treats military conservatism as an analytical constant. There is one more reason for this treatment. Although scholarly interests in the ideology gap date back several decades¹¹⁶, it is difficult to obtain data adequate for a long-term study.

As a consequence, this study conceptualizes the ideology gap as a relative, instead of absolute, distance in ideology between Congress and military conservatism. As the ideology in Congress moves toward conservatism, the ideology gap between Congress and the military decreases. When liberalism intensifies in Congress, the opposite is true: The ideology gap increases.

The discussions about ideology as a source of political preference on defense spending, adequate units of analysis, and conceptualization and measurement of ideology and the ideology gap can be summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: With external threat controlled the shift of ideology toward conservatism in Congress results in increase of defense spending

¹¹⁵ Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96."

¹¹⁶ M. Vincent Hayes, "Is the Military Taking Over?," in *New Priorities: A Magazine for Activists* ed. M. Vincent Hayes (London: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers Ltd. , 1973); Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*; Morton H. Halperin, "The President and the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 2 (1972).

An empirical examination of this claim fills a void in the literature of the determinants of military spending. The study of military spending has a long tradition. Interestingly, ideology has not been taken seriously as a major theoretical consideration in the literature. For an understandable reason, the realist, rational-actor models, which have been the most important pillar in the research tradition, conceive military spending as a response to the changes in external threats defined as potential enemies' conflict behavior, material capabilities¹¹⁷, alliance politics¹¹⁸, and wars. Along with this realist perspective, scholars have understood military spending as a function of domestic political and economic conditions. The regime types, electoral cycles, and macroeconomic conditions (such as recession and budget deficit) are some of the factors known to have a significant relationship with defense spending.¹¹⁹

Ideology has been considered in the literature on the determinants of military spending in two ways. First, some studies examined the impact of the partisan control of the executive branch on defense spending.¹²⁰ Second, others were interested in the role of ideological changes in Congress in explaining variations of military spending. Eichenberg and Stoll tested if the percentage of legislative seats

¹¹⁷ TR Cusack and D Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 3 (1981).

¹¹⁸ JR Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action: Nato Defense Burdens, 1950-1984," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 3 (1990).

¹¹⁹ A Mintz and MD Ward, "The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel," *The American Political Science Review* 83, no. 2 (1989).

¹²⁰ Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective."; Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."; William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978," *The American Political Science Review* 77, no. 1 (1983).

occupied by the conservative parties relates to defense outlays in five industrialized countries including the United States.¹²¹ Except for the Great Britain, the results show no evidence to support the thesis. A similar treatment of ideology and finding about the relationship between ideology in Congress and defense outlays is also found in the study by Su, Kamlet, and Mowery.¹²² Even though this dissertation shares with Eichenberg and Stoll the same theoretical interest in the role that ideology in Congress plays on defense spending, it uses a different concept and measurement of ideology. As explained earlier, I assume testing Huntington's theory requires the examination of central ideological tendency of Congress across time. This approach can thus capture the existence of conservative Democrats (e.g. Southern Democrats) that Eichenberg and Stoll did not take into consideration.¹²³ In sum, an explicit test of Huntington's theory will not only benefit the scholarship of civil-military relations, but will also broaden our understanding of the factors that determine the level of military spending in general.

¹²¹ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."

¹²² Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective."

¹²³ E Black and M Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Pr, 1989); John Sibley Butler and Margaret A. Johnson, "An Overview of the Relationship between Demographic Characteristics of Americans and Their Attitudes toward Military Issues," *Journal of political and military sociology* 19(Winter 1991); T Goertzel, "Public Opinion Concerning Military Spending in the United States, 1937-1985," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 15(Spring 1987).

2. Military Experience Gap and Defense Spending

Does military experience shape the views and perspectives of domestic and international policies? If so, how do the political attitudes and values of people with military experience differ from those of others without military exposure? What are the policy implications of the changes in the number of military veterans in society? These questions are not new¹²⁴, but interest in this topic has been renewed by the controversies concerning use of force, military personnel policies, and other policy-related issues in the Clinton administration and afterwards.

Some scholars likened the controversies over the foreign policies (e.g. Kosovo) to the conflicts between “chicken hawks” and “military doves.”¹²⁵ Civilians with little understanding of the military urge the use of force even in cases where military means are ineffective. On the contrary, the military is cautious about use of force, arguing that military force needs to be used selectively given its limitations.¹²⁶ The debate between Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the UN, and Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the use of force during the Clinton administration seems to penetrate this line of conflict. Powell wrote in his book, *My American Journey*,

The debate [over intervention in Bosnia in 1993] exploded at one session when Madeleine Albright, our ambassador to the UN, asked me in frustration, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use

¹²⁴

¹²⁵ Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*.

¹²⁶ BO Fordham, “A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to Use Force,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 5 (2004).

it?" I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.¹²⁷

One explanation that addresses these kinds of policy disagreements between civilians and the military focuses on military service as a source of policy preferences. Military experience, it is posited, leaves its former and current members with a better understanding and knowledge of military affairs. The logical conclusion from this perspective is that civilians who have not served the military have a set of political preferences that are likely different from those shared by military personnel and military veterans.

If military experience colors policy preference, the shrinking number of military veterans in the United States should be taken seriously.¹²⁸ The decline of military veterans may indicate the increasing divergence between society and the military in terms of understanding and appreciation of military matters, including the necessity and limitations of the military. The military establishment may find it difficult to persuade a militarily ignorant society that national defense should be a high priority. The decline of military veterans in political institutions is even more important, as political institutions with direct authority and responsibility for military policies may have a markedly different distributional priority from the military's

¹²⁷ C Powell and Joseph E Persico, *My American Journey* (New York, NY: Ballantine, 1995), 576-77. Quoted in Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force," 779.

¹²⁸ This subject matter can be conceived part of a broader academic interest in the gap thesis or the culture gap thesis. For representative studies, see Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations."; Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society "; Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell."

priorities. If political institutions have little sympathy and appreciation of military matters, a decline in military spending is likely. The voice of the military may fail to be included in policy-making process, given this cycle of mutual misunderstanding.¹²⁹

To address this possibility of the reciprocal connection between the extent of military experience in society and defense spending, this section examines theories and empirical findings regarding the impact of military experience on the political preference related to defense spending.

A. Decline in the Presence of Military Veterans

A recent trend that concerns scholars in civil-military relations is that the number of military veterans in the U.S. political institutions has declined over time.¹³⁰ Figure 4 shows this trend. The percentage of military veterans in the U.S. House of Representatives increased during the first half of the twentieth century. From the lowest point at 12.6 percent in 1913, the proportion increased significantly to the position where the House had about 58 percent of military veterans in 1953. This large percentage increase was primarily due to the two World Wars and the Korean War. Immediately after World War II, the percentage arrived at about 41

¹²⁹ Feaver and Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding."

¹³⁰ Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress." In Bianco and Markham's article, they calculated expected percentage of military veterans instead of actual percentage of veterans in the general population. This expected percentage may be somewhat different from the actual percentage, but this dissertation uses the former as if it were the latter for an illustrative purpose of giving a sense of rise and fall of the veteran presence in the public.

and at the end of the Korean War, about 48 percent of House of Representatives were military veterans.

In the latter half of the century, congressional military veterans dropped sharply after the zenith in 1969 at 73.8 percent. President Richard Nixon's campaign promise to end the draft was realized during his second term when the U.S. military shifted its personnel system from conscription to the All-Voluntary Force system in July 1973.¹³¹ Under this new personnel acquisition system, the decline of military veterans has been significant since then. The equivalent figure in 1999 was 34.8 percent. The presence of military veterans in the U.S. Senate has followed a similar pattern.¹³²


Bianco and Markham's study shows another interesting trend in the decline of military veterans: military veterans have been overrepresented for most of the last century.¹³³ According to the authors, the percentage of military veterans in the U.S. Congress was much higher compared to that in the public, which indicated potential electoral advantages from military service. The once seemingly constant pattern of overrepresentation of military veterans in Congress began to change in the early 1980s. This changing pattern continued throughout the 1990s. In 1995, the percentage of military veterans in the public who could seek office was about 39 percent, and the equivalent number in the House reached its lowest point at 28.9

¹³¹ Warner and Asch, "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States."

¹³² Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress," 276-79.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

percent. What we see in the contemporary Congress is underrepresentation rather than overrepresentation in congressional military experience.



Source: Bianco and Markham 2001.¹³⁴

B. Origins of Military Veterans' Political Behavior

The decrease of military veterans in Congress is important because of the expectation that the military experience provides a broad conceptual prism through which individuals through which individuals establish preferences towards social and political issues. Researchers have found two mechanisms that influence political values, opinions, and behaviors of military veterans: self-selection and socialization.

(1) Self-Selection

¹³⁴ Ibid. The author of this dissertation thanks William Bianco for his generosity to share his dataset.

The first mechanism, the self-selection effect, refers to “attitudinal difference existing at the time of enlistment.”¹³⁵ In other words, self-selection means that the military draws people whose beliefs and attitudes are sympathetic to those cherished by the military. Focusing on military cadets, Hammill, Segal, and Segal hypothesized that the cadets would prefer the importance of self-direction to conformity, given their success in school and their parents’ social status as middle class. Interestingly, the cadets, although they were still entry-level, almost completely agreed with the significance of conformity, demonstrating a strong evidence of self-selection effect.¹³⁶

Another group of researchers examined the self-selection effect by comparing the value orientations and perspectives of people who want to make military service a career versus those who do not. The attitudinal difference between the groups has been conceptualized as the prevalence of self-selection. To tap into this possibility, Goertzel and Hengst measured the level of ‘military mind’ of two groups: Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and their peer male undergraduates. What they found generally confirmed the hypothesis that the Army ROTC cadets group, on average, was more likely to show stronger preferences for such indicators as personality authoritarianism, intolerance, antagonistic nationalism,

¹³⁵ Franke, "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West Point Cadets and College Students," 92.

¹³⁶ John P. Hammill, David R. Segal, and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Self-Selection and Parental Socioeconomic Status as Determinants of the Values of West Point Cadets," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1995).

and conservatism in political-economic issues than their peers.¹³⁷ The research done by Franke also confirmed attitudinal differences between cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point and their civilian peer undergraduate students.¹³⁸ He found substantial differences existed in conservatism, patriotism, and warrior mind, with military cadets showing much stronger attachment to these values than their peers. A similar pattern of attitudinal differences between enlistees and their civilian counterparts towards various policy issues was found by Bachman et al.¹³⁹

The above findings can also be explained by a theory of *anticipatory socialization*.¹⁴⁰ This theory holds that people who want to be part of a particular occupation develop attitudes and values that characterize that occupation.¹⁴¹ Applying the theory, Caforio found that young people who apply for the military academies are to some extent already socialized as a member of an organization in the military.¹⁴² Although they do not have complete information on the tasks they will perform, they choose to be part of the military because they are willing to adhere to the set of values that the organization upholds.

¹³⁷ T Goertzel and A Hengst, "The Military Socialization of University Students," *Social Problems* 19, no. 2 (1971).

¹³⁸ Franke, "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West Point Cadets and College Students."

¹³⁹ Jerald G. Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 4 (2000).

¹⁴⁰ Soeters et al. use natural identification and presocialization to explain the same phenomena. JL Soeters, DJ Winslow, and A Weibull, "Military Culture," in *Handbook on the Sociology of the Military*, ed. G Caforio (New York, NY: Plenum Publishers, 2003).

¹⁴¹ M Rosenberg, *Occupations and Values* (New York: Arno Press Inc., 1957: 1980); ML Kohn and C Schooler, *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification* (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Pub, 1983).

¹⁴² G Caforio, "Military Officer Education," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2006).

Some recent studies paid attention to the self-selection effect on political identification. Studying the connection between military affiliation and political ideology, Rohall et al. found that U.S. Military Academy cadets are more likely to identify themselves as Republicans than civilian undergraduate students. In fact, the difference was substantial: whereas 24.1 percent of their civilian peers were classified as Republicans, the equivalent number among military academy cadets was 60.7 percent. They also found that this self-identified party affiliation has a direct impact on the level of support for the war in Afghanistan and Iraq: Republicans were more likely to support war efforts in those countries. The same tendency of an increasing Republicanization of entrees of the military is also evidenced by other scholars.¹⁴³

The selection process conducted by the military further sifts through those who fit well in the military.¹⁴⁴ The military selects those who will help keep the military mind set and the military culture that derives from its main functional imperative, “preparing for and fighting war.”¹⁴⁵ In addition, given the rigors of combat, the military prefer people who will be capable of enduring mental and physical hardships and show successful performances. Thus, personnel who are selected by the military can be seen as ready to accept the norms and values of that organization.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Thomas S. Langston, "The Civilian Side of Military Culture," *Parameters* (Autumn 2000).

¹⁴⁴ Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull, "Military Culture."

¹⁴⁵ Burk, "Military Culture," 448. Dunivin defines the “combat- masculine-warrior paradigm” as the essence of military culture. See KO Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 4 (1994): 534.

¹⁴⁶ Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull, "Military Culture."

(2) Socialization

The second mechanism is socialization: Once new members enter the military, they are inculcated with the significance of the values that the military deems essential.¹⁴⁷ Scholars studying organizational identification provide specific answers as to why the socialization process is particularly influential. According to Van Maanen, organizational socialization takes two dimensions: *investiture and divestiture processes*. Investiture process accepts the incoming members' identity to create a new organizational identity. On the other hand, divestiture process replaces the newcomers' identity for organizationally situated identities.¹⁴⁸ In particular, professional organizations and religious organizations have a special emphasis on divestiture process. "In order to reconstruct the newcomer's social identity, such organizations often remove symbols of newcomer's previous identities; restrict or isolate newcomers from external contact; disparage newcomer's status, knowledge, and ability; impose new identification symbols; rigidly prescribe and proscribe behavior and punish infractions; and reward assumption of the new identity."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Rohall, Ender, and Matthews, "The Effects of Military Affiliation, Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," 61.

¹⁴⁸ J Van Maanen, "Breaking In: Socialization to Work," in *Handbook of Work, Organization, and Society*, ed. Cynthia Dubin (Rand McNally College Pub. Co., 1976).

¹⁴⁹ Blake E. Ashforth and Fred Mael, "Social Identity Theory and the Organization," *The Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 1 (1989): 28. Also see, CD Fisher, "Organizational Socialization: An Integrative Review," *Research in personnel and human resources management* 4, no. 1 (1986); Van Maanen, "Breaking In: Socialization to Work."; J Van Maanen, "People Processing: Strategies of Organizational Socialization," *Organizational Dynamics* 7, no. 1 (1978).

Practices done in West Point¹⁵⁰ and the Marine Corps¹⁵¹ are good examples of this divestiture process. A similar process can be observed in the ROTC programs. The military educational system in civilian universities helps keep cadets from being civilized.¹⁵²

From this perspective, the divestiture process is especially distinguishable from that in other organizations. Military officers are “rebuilt” through a long period of military training, education, and exercise. The military as a “total institution”¹⁵³ requires members to go through a rigorous socialization process in which they learn to engage in “consistent and predictable behavior because they have learned that inconsistent behavior produces too many costs that may damage reputation, impose penalties, or deny promotions or other benefits.”¹⁵⁴ In addition, frequent field exercises function as an important mechanism through which the military facilitates organizational coherence among military officers.¹⁵⁵ In sum, a strong divestiture process—which inculcates military personnel with a very distinct set of organizational requirements, beliefs, and values that are different from the dominant societal life style—enables members to strongly identify with an organization and internalize organization norms. Thus, members of the military come to have a

¹⁵⁰ J Soeters and R Recht, "Culture and Discipline in Military Academies: An International Comparison," *Journal of political and military sociology* 26, no. 2 (1998).

¹⁵¹ Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society".

¹⁵² Goertzel and Hengst, "The Military Socialization of University Students."

¹⁵³ E Goffman, *Asylums* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961). Also see, Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull, "Military Culture."

¹⁵⁴ Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull, "Military Culture," 250.

¹⁵⁵ GL Siebold, "The Essence of Military Group Cohesion," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (2007); Anthony King, "The Existence of Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces: A Response to Guy Siebold," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 4 (2007).

common perspective that differs from civilians who have not gone through such a rigorous process. It is therefore expected that this process of socialization allows the military to “carry a claim to uniqueness.”¹⁵⁶

Group-oriented activities such as military exercises and combat operations also strengthen the conformity of individuals to military values.¹⁵⁷ According to social psychologists, as a result of the rigorous training and drills they undergo, soldiers learn the importance of following organizational rules that reduce the risks and maximize the possibility of accomplishing organizational goals.¹⁵⁸ These functionally oriented group activities “minimize the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by imposing order on it with a repertoire of patterned actions that they may use on their own initiative, or in coordination with others, quickly to adapt and to prevail in battle.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ J Martin et al., "The Uniqueness Paradox in Organizational Stories," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (1983).

¹⁵⁷ This feedback process that occurs both at individual and group level may create a side-effect that causes difficulties in retaining military personnel. One of such side-effects is the so-called “zero-defects” mentality. Individuals with mentality and behaviors deviant from what they conceive as the military norms decide to quit the military. To solve problems with retention, it has been recommended that the military try to ease that mentality. Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* (Carlisle, PA.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000). Also see C Moskos, "What Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective," *Parameters* 31, no. 2 (2001); Lee A. Staab, "Transforming Army Leadership-the Key to Officer Retention," (Carlisle, PA. : Army War College, 2001).

¹⁵⁸ Siebold, "The Essence of Military Group Cohesion." Also see King, "The Existence of Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces: A Response to Guy Siebold."; Charles Kirke, "Group Cohesion, Culture, and Practice," *Armed Forces & Society* 35, no. 4 (2009).

¹⁵⁹ Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture."

C. The Military, Military Veterans, and Defense Spending

The analyses in the previous section explain why military personnel are expected to have a set of values, perspectives, and opinions different from their civilian counterparts. In addition to that information, how different are military veterans from nonveterans in terms of preference on defense spending? Before answering this question, it is important to investigate what the military's preference is regarding defense spending. The logic of this examination is that as a result of self-selection and socialization, political preferences of military veterans are assumed to reflect what the military as an institution prefers.

The dominant view of military's preference on defense spending is that military always wants more resources. Various theories explain the penchant of the military for resources. First, some scholars argue that the military conservatism drives the military to demand a higher level of spending on military affairs. As we saw in the previous chapter, Huntington showed the reason why the military always tries to build a powerful force.¹⁶⁰ Because of its pessimistic view about interstate relations and the possibility of resolving interstate conflicts through diplomatic and economic means, the military wants to have available and usable means at hand. In addition, the tendency of the military to over exaggerate external military threats can be a source of the military's insatiable demand for more resources.

Second, other scholars point out that the military's preference for offensive doctrine and strategy can lead to military requests for a higher level of military funds

¹⁶⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

for national defense. According to Posen, offensive doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were the major cause of constant military build-up in the two countries. A central element of offensive military doctrine is to strike first in order to end the war in a short period of time. For this purpose, the two countries tried to better equip offensive capabilities, leading to an arms race.¹⁶¹

Snyder makes a similar point, arguing that the reason major participants of the First World War employed “self-defeating, war-causing” offensive strategies was because of the militaries’ tendency to “use wartime operational strategy to solve its institutional problems,” a phenomenon called “cult of the offensive.”¹⁶² As an effort to maintain institutional autonomy and status, and to resolve organizational disputes within the military, militaries sought offensive doctrines, a consequence of which was their insistence on augmenting military capabilities.

Third, the proclivity for advanced technology can be a source of the military’s constant pursuit for an increase in military spending. Based on insights of institutional culture, Murray argues that without the reality check of war, militaries tend to focus on the materialistic aspects of military capabilities (e.g. the number of weapons systems) in peace time. Among other things, this tendency often leads to a perceptual bias to consider the scale of resources that the military enjoys as the overall preparation for war. As a consequence, mental and doctrinal aspects of

¹⁶¹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars*.

¹⁶² J Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984): 109. Also see S Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984); ———, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).

military preparation are often neglected.¹⁶³ Other scholars point out that the penchant for technology is especially strong in the Air Force and Navy.¹⁶⁴

From different theoretical perspectives, the above mentioned theories reach the same conclusion about the preference of the military for military spending: it wants a larger share of the federal budget. If the military exhibits this penchant for more resources, we can assume that its members will have a similar preference for military spending.

What can be said about military veterans? Do they keep the military mind that they learned after they retire? The fundamental reason that scholars worry about the decreasing number of military veterans in the public, and especially in political institutions, reflects the expectation that military veterans represent military perspectives in society: “[S]ervice in the U.S. military is an important socialization experience that shapes individuals’ attitudes. The military teaches lessons about the role of military force in American foreign policy and lessons about how military force ought to be used. These lessons do not appear to be forgotten when individuals leave the military and enter civilian life.”¹⁶⁵ In this regard, Burk called veterans “cultural bearers” and emphasized that the socialization process continues even after the veterans are discharged:

Not to be overlooked as culture bearers are veterans. Recruiters for today's volunteer forces are well aware that veterans among family and friends

¹⁶³ W Murray, "Clausewitz out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris," *The National Interest* 48(1997).

¹⁶⁴ CH Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

¹⁶⁵ Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force," 791-92.

greatly influence the attitudes of young people toward enlisting in the service. Once discharged, some veterans have been sufficiently affected by the experience of military service to join veterans' associations. These associations typically provide opportunities for socializing in clubs with people who have shared experiences similar to one's own. But they are also engaged in local community service or vaguely patriotic civic education projects. And they are integrated into larger national networks that keep them apprised of military affairs and lobby for veterans' benefits.¹⁶⁶

Empirical research on military veterans' political attitudes and behavior provides some evidence on the notion that they maintain a set of norms, values, and expectations that differ from nonveterans. First of all, a number of scholars have examined whether a specific political ideology and party affiliation is prevalent among military veterans. Specifically, given the conservative nature of military service,¹⁶⁷ they expected that military veterans are more likely to associate themselves with conservatism.¹⁶⁸ Evidence supports this hypothesis. According to one of the most comprehensive studies, compared to 31.5 percent among civilian non-veteran leaders, 51.6 percent of civilian veteran leaders identified themselves as having somewhat or very conservative ideology.¹⁶⁹ The level of conservatism among military veterans was a little less apparent compared with active military leaders (66 percent), but it was still substantial. A similar pattern was also found between veterans and nonveterans in the general population.¹⁷⁰ A distinction between veterans and nonveterans is also found in their party affiliation. Civilian

¹⁶⁶ Burk, "Military Culture," 460.

¹⁶⁷ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*; Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture."

¹⁶⁸ Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War."

¹⁶⁹ Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium," 33.

¹⁷⁰ About a half of veterans in the general public said they have somewhat or very conservative ideology whereas about 38 percent of nonveterans were identified as conservatives. *Ibid.*

veteran leaders are more Republican than their non-veteran counterparts by about 16 percent. Even if scholars still have not reached an agreement on the source of this phenomenon,¹⁷¹ the result confirmed a growing tendency of Republicanization in the military and its enduring influence on military veterans.¹⁷²

This does not mean that the so-called veteran effect is a common phenomenon. If the veteran effect means a closely connected set of preferences quite different from those of non-veterans, this hypothesis has been partially supported. For example, an earlier panel study examined whether military veterans and their nonveteran peers show attitudinal differences in cynicism, support for the Vietnam War, and confidence in the performance of American leadership. They did not find a clear pattern of difference between the two groups.¹⁷³ A similar result was

¹⁷¹ The scholarship in the civil-military has debated over the source of this military mind of active and retired members of the military. Largely, self-selection and socialization have been the sources of a distinct set of values and perspectives of the current and former members of the military. For the purpose of this dissertation, this debate is insignificant. Whether the so-called military mind comes from self-selection or socialization, the outcome of the processes is similar, leading to a conclusion that, in many respects, military members are different from those without prior military experience. For the debate over the two sources of military mind, see Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization."; Jerald G. Bachman, Lee Sigelman, and Greg Diamond, "Self-Selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: Attitudes of High School Seniors," *Armed Forces & Society* 13, no. 2 (1987); JE Dorman, "Rotc Cadet Attitudes: A Product of Socialization or Self-Selection?," *Journal of political and military sociology* 4(1976); Goertzel and Hengst, "The Military Socialization of University Students."

¹⁷² For example, Desch argued that Republicanization of the military mainly originates from the fact that a substantial portion of military personnel comes from the Southern region of the United States where the Republican Party receives pretty strong support. On the other hand, Segal et al. maintained that a strong Republican preference in the military generally reflected a societal change that an increasing number of people identified themselves as Republicans. See M Desch, "Explaining the Gap: Assessing Alternative Theories of the Divergence of Civilian and Military Cultures," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. P Feaver and RH Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically Mainstreamed."

¹⁷³ MK Jennings and GB Markus, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study," *The American Political Science Review* 71, no. 1 (1977).

found in other studies as well.¹⁷⁴ This shows that the expectation of military veterans with a distinct and consistent pattern of preferences may depend on political contexts and issue areas.

Nonetheless, studies show the existence of strong veteran effects on key issues with direct bearing on military capabilities: “The only consistent distinctions on which the various researchers might agree relate to veterans’ high affect for the military and opinions regarding increased military preparedness.”¹⁷⁵ It may be that even if military veterans differ over the social issues, they can be in agreement with the necessity of a capable military. A strong influence of the exposure to the military on veterans’ opinions toward defense policies is documented by Fordham. With regard to the question of whether the military budget should be reduced to increase the federal budget for education, Fordham found that about 61 percent of military veterans were opposed to the policy recommendation.¹⁷⁶ This number was in contrast with the fact that only about 44 percent of civilians who had not served in the military were against the proposition. With the same question, about 85 percent of active-duty military officers were in opposition to the idea. A similar pattern was found in terms of veterans’ opinion on mandatory military service system for males. About 73 percent of the veterans surveyed agreed with the need for the adoption of conscription, whereas about 50 percent of non-veterans supported the idea. For an

¹⁷⁴ JG Bachman and MK Jennings, "The Impact of Vietnam on Trust in Government," *Journal of Social Issues* 31, no. 4 (1975).

¹⁷⁵ Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics", 20.

¹⁷⁶ Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy." A similar pattern is also documented by Holsti. Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."

understandable reason, the active-duty military officers showed a prominent support for the policy recommendation with about 82 percent of respondents agreeing. These findings confirmed the results of earlier studies. An analysis by Schreiber showed that even if Vietnam veterans and World War II veterans were different in their confidence in the military leadership, with the former suspicious and the latter positive, they all agreed with a policy of spending more on the military.¹⁷⁷

D. Research Hypothesis

So far, this dissertation has reviewed theoretical reasons that military veterans have a pattern of preferences that differ from nonveterans, especially on defense spending. To summarize, military experience shapes values and perspectives of military personnel through such mechanisms as self-selection and socialization. Also, theories such as military conservatism, the military's preference for offensive doctrines, and technology show that the military wants to enjoy a larger share of societal resources. Empirical findings about veterans' political opinions confirm this expectation: military veterans are more likely to prefer a policy position that supports a higher proportion of national resource for the military.

Thus it can be argued that military veterans may work as a bridge between the military establishment and civilians who do not have a first-hand experience. In effect, veterans represent military preferences in public discussions and policymaking processes concerning military affairs. Conceptualized this way, we

¹⁷⁷ EM Schreiber, "Enduring Effects of Military Service-Opinion Differences between US Veterans and Nonveterans," *Social Forces* 57(1978).

can theorize the relationship between the prevalence of military experience in society and the realization of military preferences on policy outcomes. A larger number of military veterans in society would mean a narrow gap between the military and society, leading to an enhanced probability that what the military wants will be accepted by society. The more military veterans are in society, the more likely that military preferences are reflected and realized in decision making process.

Two mechanisms through which military veterans may influence policy making process over military budget are conceivable. First, it is possible that the opinions of military veterans in the *general public* may have an influence on policy decisions about military spending. States this way, theories of public opinions are relevant. A key mechanism behind theories of public opinions is the electoral connection between the preferences of the public and legislative behavior of politicians. Thus, any hypothesis explaining variations in military budget as a function of military veterans in the public necessarily uses the same inference of the electoral connection: the preferences of military veterans will be delivered to politicians, and the politicians respond to this due to the electoral influence of military veterans.

In the case of military veterans, however, it is not clear whether politicians recognize them as an influential voting bloc. Even though studies show military veterans in the public can act as a voting bloc under limited circumstances, the

instances such as this are rare.¹⁷⁸ The assumption of the electoral connection may be not particularly strong as a theoretical rationale¹⁷⁹, although we cannot completely rule out the influence of military veterans in the public: The impact may be indirect. A more direct influence on military budget can be evaluated by looking at the military veterans in political institutions.

An alternative way is to theorize the relationship between the prevalence of military veterans in *political institutions* and the variations of military spending. With the assumption of the veteran effects, Gelpi and Feaver examined how the prevalence of military experience in political institutions has affected the decisions related to use of force in interstate conflicts. They hypothesized that military preferences for use of force are more likely to be reflected in policy decisions when military veterans in political institutions increase. The findings showed that the extent of military veterans is negatively related to the instances of interstate conflicts and positively associated with the size of military force used, which confirmed the hypothesis.

¹⁷⁸ Teigen, "Veterans' Party Identification, Candidate Affect, and Vote Choice in the 2004 US Presidential Election." Bishin and Incantalupo call the expectation of veterans' voting as a bloc the "veterans' vote". They define it as "a cohesive group that votes as a bloc owing to shared (military experiences, socialization, interests, and outlook." BG Bishin and MB Incantalupo, "From Bullets to Ballots? The Role of Veterans in Contemporary Elections," (University of California, Riverside, 2008), 3. <http://www.themonkeycage.org/veterans.paper.named.pdf> (accessed 3 January 2010). For studies and public perceptions that military veterans vote as a cohesive bloc, see Ceci Connolly, "Battle for Veterans' Vote Heats up; Gore Cites Commitment to Military; GOP Rivals Lambaste Administration's Record," *Washington Post*, Jan. 27th 1999; David D. Kirkpatrick, "Kerry's Pitch to Veterans Meets G.O.P. Counterattack," *New York Times*, Aug. 3rd 2004.

¹⁷⁹ WT Bianco, "Last Post for" the Greatest Generation": The Policy Implications of the Decline of Military Experience in the US Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2005).

A study by Fordham attempted to test if a significant relationship exists between the changes in military veterans and the level of defense outlays.¹⁸⁰ I find two problems in his analysis that makes it difficult for a reader to draw meaningful conclusions. First, Fordham does not specify the causal mechanism. I agree with his general hypothesis that the decrease of military veterans would lead to a significant drop or fluctuations of the level of defense spending. What is missing in his analysis, however, is his claim about how the increase or decrease in the number of military veterans influences defense spending. Is it through political pressures of military veterans in the general public? Alternatively, do military veterans in political institutions impact these decisions? Fordham did not make clear through which causal mechanisms defense spending reflects the preference of military veterans. This was apparent when the key independent variable, the prevalence of military experience, was not adequately defined and measured. Therefore, his conclusion that there is no relationship between the prevalence of military experience and military spending is questionable.

Second, Fordham did not consider any control variables that may influence defense spending. Scholars have documented that the level of defense spending is determined by a set of factors such as external threat, economic conditions, and political and ideological variables. Controlling for those factors can provide a better understanding of the real impact of the civil-military gap on defense spending. In sum, Fordham's study does not shed much light on the relationship between civil-

¹⁸⁰ Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy."

military gap and defense spending due to ambiguous causal mechanisms and omitted variables.

The present study attempts to fill this research void left by Fordham by testing the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. *The more military veterans in political institutions, the larger the military spending will be.*

III. Research Method

1. Scope

The present research covers the period between fiscal years 1952 and 2000, which means that this study encompasses most of the Cold War period and the first decade of the post-Cold War era.¹⁸¹ This study covers 2000 because the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the nature of external threat to the U.S. national security. There have not been serious efforts to define and measure threats from international terrorist groups, and incorporate these new threats to the definitions of external threats focusing on conventional interstate relations. Recognizing that this new dimension indicates that additional areas will need to be studied, it seems appropriate to examine the period up until 2000.

2. Operationalization and Measurement of the Variables

A. Dependent Variable: Defense Spending

In scholarly discussions about military spending, I identify three widely used alternatives that measure fiscal efforts devoted to national defense: defense burden, defense budget outlays, and defense budget authority by Congress.¹⁸² Although the

¹⁸¹ Fordham noted that fiscal year 1951 was the first budget that was passed through the legislative process stipulated in NSC 68. Ibid. As will be shown later, this study takes one year lagged variables in the analysis in order to reflect the institutional decision making procedure concerning defense spending. I omitted FY 1951 from the analysis because I assume that FY 1952 better reflects the impact of the new budgetary process established by NSC 68.

¹⁸² Another possible measurement is defense budget request by presidents. Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970."

first indicator, defense burden, is widely used especially in comparative analyses of the determinants of defense spending, this current study uses two alternatives for the following reason. Defense burden, which measures defense expenditure as percentage of GDP, does not provide detailed information on military spending. Although this measurement has been widely used in comparative studies in order to solve the difficulties in determining comparable currency units across countries¹⁸³, defense burden does not contain information on defense efforts allocated to specific programs. The other two alternatives are preferable in this sense.

The second option, defense budget outlays, gauges actual government expenditure for national defense spent at a given fiscal year.¹⁸⁴ Military expenditure data in government spending documents provide not only the overall military spending level, but also the information on how much money the government spent for specific subfunctions. This can give researchers an analytical advantage to detect patterns that do not appear when only focusing on the overall scale of military spending.

The last alternative is defense budget authority. Budget authority indicates the amount of money that government agencies are allowed to use by Congress,

¹⁸³RP Smith, "Models of Military Expenditure," *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 4, no. 4 (1989); BE Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003). Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978."; E Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26, no. 2 (1978); Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?."; Chowdhury, "A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth."; DB Stewart, "Economic Growth and the Defense Burden in Africa and Latin America: Simulations from a Dynamic Model," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40, no. 1 (1991); G Palmer, "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending," *American Journal of Political Science* (1990).

¹⁸⁴Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy."

which does its business through authorizations and appropriations in a fiscal year. Budget authority as the analytical focus, like defense budget outlays, offers detailed information on military spending allocated to particular functions and subfunctions.

While defense expenditure and defense budget authority are useful indicators of defense spending, there is a critical difference. When we conceptualize defense spending as a realization of policy preferences generated by more fundamental factors such as ideology and military experience, defense outlays may cover rather than reveal any regular pattern of relationships between those factors and military spending. This is so because of the nature of defense outlays. A researcher makes clear the distinction between outlays and budget authority by using an analogy: “Annual budget authority is analogous to authority to contract for a new house this year. Outlays are analogous to the house payments that will pay off that contract over the next twenty or thirty years.”¹⁸⁵ In other words, defense outlays at a given year are the results of policy preferences that were imposed in the previous several years.

An illustration may help to clarify the distinction between defense outlays and defense budget authority described above. According to the Office of Management and Budget, budget authority recommended by Congress for FY 2011 is 3,691 billion dollars. About 2,933 billion dollars of budget authority for FY

¹⁸⁵ James True, "Historic Budget Records Converted to the Present Functional Categorization with Actual Results for Fy 1947-2008," Policy Agendas Project, <http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html> (accessed March 15, 2010). Also see, Office of Management and Budget, "Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011," ed. Government Printing Office (Government Printing Office, 2010).

2011—that is 79.4 percent—is to be spent in 2011. In other words, the remaining 757 billion dollars will be used in the future years. On the other hand, the total amount of federal budget outlays in 2011 is expected to be 3,824 billion dollars. The above mentioned 2,933 billion dollars of budget authority is included here. The remaining 901 billion dollars is the amount of money that was authorized, but not spent in the previous years.¹⁸⁶ This illustration demonstrates the reason why defense outlays is often preferred as an indicator of defense spending because it actually shows how much money is spent at a given year. Still, this study also pays attention to what Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson point out about the theoretical importance of budget authority from a different point of view: “[R]esearchers interested in analyzing budgeting decisions at the level of policy makers ... would find outlays to be an inferior choice.”¹⁸⁷

Given this often neglected difference of what constitutes defense outlays and budget authority, I assume that if there is any causal linkage between the main independent variables—ideology and military experience—and defense spending, it should be more apparent in budget authority than defense outlays. More broadly speaking, the two indicators of defense spending may be shaped by a different set of factors. Thus, dealing with the two indicators of defense spending, I will provide an indirect test of the relationships between those indicators and civil-military gaps. In this sense, this study contributes to both civil-military relations literature and studies

¹⁸⁶ Office of Management and Budget, "Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011," 126.

¹⁸⁷ H Dezhbakhsh, SM Tohamy, and PH Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism," *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 02 (2003): 548.

of defense spending by considering defense outlays and budget authority as separate dependent variables.

One thing to be noted here is that defense outlays and budget authority adopts functional classifications, which stress the purpose of the spending. What this means is that the financing for national defense is actually shared by several departments and agencies with relevance to national security. Table 2 below shows the structure of defense spending. Under the current functional categorization systems of the U.S. government budget arrangements, the function of national defense under the title '050' is divided into three key subfunctions. One of the subfunctions is named '051 Department of Defense-Military', which is most directly related to the development, maintenance, and equipment of the U.S. military.

This study operationalizes defense spending as defense outlays and budget authority under the title '050 National Defense'. When necessary, it uses data on defense spending with regard to specific subfunctions. For defense outlays, this study uses the official defense spending data published by the Government Printing Office (GPO). The defense outlays figures are calculated in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.¹⁸⁸ For budget authority information, this study employs the dataset provided by the Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas. The budget data is measured in fiscal year 2008 constant dollars.¹⁸⁹ Figure 6 shows changes in

¹⁸⁸ GPO, "Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2006," (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).


¹⁸⁹ This website was the recipient of the American Political Science Association's 2007 best instructional website award. The budget dataset can be obtained at <http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html> (accessed March 20, 2010).

budget authority between 1952 and 2000. Annual changes in defense outlays are shown in Figure 5.


Table 2. Structure of Defense Spending

function	050 National Defense		
Subfunctions	051 Department of Defense-Military - Military Personnel - Operation and Maintenance - Procurement - Military Construction - Family Housing - Other	052 Atomic energy defense activities	054 Defense-related activities

Source: *Historical Tables* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2010), Table 5.1—Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction: 1976–2015.



Source: *Budget of the United States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2006* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2005), Table 6.1—Composition of Outlays: 1940–2015.
 Note: The defense outlay figures are calculated in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.



Source: Policy Agendas Project (see footnote 185)

B. Independent Variables

(1) Strength of Conservatism in Congress

One of the main interests of this study is to examine the influence of ideological changes on military spending. As opposed to ideology of individual legislators, this study deals with changes in ideology at the institutional level. Thus, it employs a conceptualization and measurement of a 'central ideological tendency in Congress as a collectivity'.

To capture this central ideological tendency, this study uses the adjusted ADA scores to measure the intensity of conservatism in Congress in a given year.¹⁹⁰ The nominal scores come from the ratings of roll call votes of individual legislators by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Scholars have modified the original nominal ADA scores for individual congressmen and chambers to make them comparable across time.¹⁹¹ Employing the adjusted ADA scores enables researchers not only to assess how liberal or conservative each chamber is but also to estimate changes in ideological patterns in Congress over time.¹⁹² Although this method has been subject to criticisms and some scholars have provided alternatives to measure congressional ideological composition¹⁹³, the method of estimating

¹⁹⁰ The dataset for adjusted ADA scores between 1947 and 2007 can be obtained at <http://habel.siuc.edu/data/> (accessed March 28, 2010). Also see S Anderson and P Habel, "Revisiting Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress, 1947-2007," *Political Analysis* 17(Winter 2009).

¹⁹¹ T Groseclose, SD Levitt, and JM Snyder Jr, "Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress," *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 1 (1999).

¹⁹² Anderson and Habel, "Revisiting Adjusted Ada Scores for the US Congress, 1947-2007."

¹⁹³ For instance, Jackson and Kingdon criticized scholarly efforts to deduce ideological positions from voting behaviors by arguing that the method cannot avoid the risk of a tautology. They also argued that this method cannot capture the possibility that considerations in legislative votes may not be

members' ideologies using interest group ratings has been used by many in analyzing legislative behaviors.¹⁹⁴ In addition, the fact that ADA ideology scores are highly correlated with other alternatives such as Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores also supports the relevance of this method.¹⁹⁵

It is important to note that this study does not aim to analyze the influence of ideology on individual legislators' voting behavior concerning specific policy issues. Instead, it attempts to see if yearly changes of the central ideological tendency in Congress leads to increase or decrease in military spending. As a consequence, the aim of this study makes the usage of this methodology less susceptible to the problems that critics raised.¹⁹⁶

The data used in this study includes nominal and adjusted ADA scores for each chamber between 1947 and 2007, measured with yearly chamber means and

unidimensional, but multidimensional. See, John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, "Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes," *American Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 3 (1992). Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat pointed out that this method is "an indirect measure of ideology" and presented an alternative measurement that employs newspaper content analysis of legislators' remarks on policy issues. See Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Hanna, and Sahar Shafqat, "The Liberal-Conservative Ideology of U.S. Senators: A New Measure," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1997). Wittkopf and McCormick used Poole and Rosenthal's D-NOMINATE scores to measure ideology. See Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, "Congress, the President, and the End of the Cold War: Has Anything Changed?," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 4 (1998).

¹⁹⁴ GA Krause, "Partisan and Ideological Sources of Fiscal Deficits in the United States," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2000); S Ansolabehere, JM Snyder Jr, and C Stewart III, "Candidate Positioning in US House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001); W Bernhard and BR Sala, "The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and Ideological Responsiveness," *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 02 (2008); MA Bailey, "Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (2007).

¹⁹⁵ Barry C. Burden, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Tim Groseclose, "Measuring the Ideologies of U. S. Senators: The Song Remains the Same," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (2000). KT Poole and H Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Another alternative measure of ideology in Congress as a whole is the use of adjusted ADA median. I examined the level of correlation between adjusted ADA mean and median and found the two measures are highly correlated ($r = 0.87$).

¹⁹⁶ BG Bishin, "Independently Validating Ideology Measures: A Look at Nominate and Adjusted Ada Scores," *American Politics Research* 31, no. 4 (2003).


medians scores. Because this study focuses on the central ideological tendency of Congress, it uses annual chamber means scores between 1952 and 2000 to measure the tendency. Specifically, the strength of ideology for each year is calculated by summing the means scores of each chamber and then dividing by two. The values derived from this process are transformed so that higher values indicate increased conservatism at a given year. These transformed values are first-differenced to gauge annual changes in ideology.

Figure 7 shows the pattern of ideological change in Congress between 1952 and 2000. Conservatism in Congress was relatively strong until the late 1950s, which supports Huntington's argument of favorable political conditions for the military during this period.¹⁹⁷ This was followed by a significant change toward liberalism until the mid-1970s. This dramatic change seems to confirm such political transformations as liberalization of southern Democrats in Congress since the enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and other Civil Rights movements as well as the impact of the Vietnam War that led to the influx of liberal Democrats to Congress.¹⁹⁸ The conservatism in Congress increased during the early 1980s. It slowly declined since then until the mid-1990s when the Republican Party took the control of the House.


This study expects that changes in ideology toward conservatism will lead to increase in defense spending.

¹⁹⁷ Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 11.

¹⁹⁸ R Fleisher, "Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Southern Democrats," *The Journal of Politics* 55, no. 2 (1993). Also see KT Poole and H Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 141.



Source: Anderson and Habel 2009.



Source: The data between 1952 and 1992 come from Gelpi and Feaver 2002; For the data between 1993 and 2000, see footnote 221.

(2) Presence of Military Veterans in the House and Cabinet

Measuring the veteran status is straightforward: People who served in the military are considered military veterans. Thus, politicians with service experience in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and National Guard are all included in this category.

As stated in the previous chapter, this study focuses on military veterans in political institutions. It operationalizes the presence of military veterans as the percentage of military veterans in the House of Representatives and the Cabinet following the concept proposed by Gelpi and Feaver.¹⁹⁹ The original dataset gathered by Gelpi and Feaver covers until 1992. Therefore, the data between 1993 and 2000 were collected based on the coding scheme that Gelpi and Feaver employed.²⁰⁰

By adopting the same measurement concept, I examine if the major finding of Gelpi and Feaver's study—the influence of the varying degrees of the presence of military veterans in political institutions on the U.S. conflict behaviors—helps understand changes in military spending. Specifically, they found that the prevalence of military experience measured by the percentage of military veterans in the House and the Cabinet was positively related to the use of force for inter-state

¹⁹⁹ In a correspondence (received 1st February 2010) with one of the authors, Christopher Gelpi, he noted that a subsequent study that included military veterans in the Senate did not change the results they found in the previous study published in 2002. Also see Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force."

²⁰⁰ The data on the percentage of military veterans in the House were collected from the dataset by Bianco. Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress." The data for veteran status of the Cabinet members come from the following source. R Sobel and DB Sicilia, *The United States Executive Branch: A Biographical Directory of Heads of State and Cabinet Officials* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003).

conflicts—what they termed “realpolitik” purposes. In contrast, as the percentage of military veterans in political institutions decreased, they found that it was more likely that military force was used for “interventionalist” purposes which were less directly related to ensuring essential national interests.²⁰¹

Figure 8 shows the changes in the percentage of elite military veterans in the House and Cabinet. There are two noticeable trends to be found. First, up until the mid-1980s at least half of the politicians in the institutions were military veterans. This was largely the outcome of the draft system. Numbers were at their peak in 1973. Second, the decline of military veterans since the mid-1980s is obvious. As the new generation of politicians who did not need to serve in the military under the new All-Volunteer Force (AVF) personnel system takes a larger proportion of congressional seats and positions in the Cabinet, the number of politicians with any form of military experience are becoming rare. This was particularly the case during the Clinton administration. In 1996, only 28 percent of politicians had military experience. Annual changes in the military experience variable are measured by first-differencing the variable.

This study anticipates that the percentage of military veterans has a positive relationship with the level of defense spending.

C. Control Variables

(1) Incrementalism in Defense Budgeting

²⁰¹ Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*.

Incremental nature of the budgetary process has been widely researched and confirmed. Scholars have adopted various terms to explain this phenomenon. Satisficing²⁰², muddling through²⁰³, and budgetary incrementalism²⁰⁴ are some of those terms. Although budgetary incrementalism has been challenged over the extent of its pervasiveness²⁰⁵ and statistical adequacy of early studies²⁰⁶, scholars interested in the determinants of military spending still find it necessary to consider incremental budgetary strategies for theoretical and analytical reasons.²⁰⁷ Thus, to test the importance of the military spending in the previous year in estimating the level of current spending, this study includes a lagged dependent variable in the analysis.

(2) Presidential Administration

Studies on voting behavior have documented interesting findings about issue ownership. The theory of issue ownership tells us about the importance of voter perceptions on what each candidate is better able to handle and how individual

²⁰² HA Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69, no. 1 (1955).

²⁰³ CE Lindblom, "The Science of" Muddling Through", *Public administration review* 19, no. 2 (1959).

²⁰⁴ OA Davis, MAH Dempster, and A Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," *The American Political Science Review* 60, no. 3 (1966). Also see

²⁰⁵ For example, Jones, Baumgartner, and True challenged incrementalism by showing the existence of two large-scale punctuations in the United States. BD Jones, F Baumgartner, and J True, "Policy Punctuations: US Budget Authority, 1947-95," *Journal of Politics* 60, no. 1 (1998).

²⁰⁶ Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism."

²⁰⁷ Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?"; Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."; Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978."; Andrew Kydd, "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (2000); Palmer, "Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending."

candidates try to shape public perceptions so that they can win political benefits. Studies have also found these public perceptions are often associated with political parties: voters possess a sense of the “issue handling reputations of the parties.”²⁰⁸ and behave accordingly by supporting parties that they believe could solve the critical issues.²⁰⁹ In the U. S., the Democratic Party has been considered better at dealing with social welfare issues and education. And voters have regarded the Republican Party better at handling such issues as deficit, tax, and defense policy.²¹⁰ A recent survey study found that Republican issue ownership over military and security issues is also evident among the Army officers, even after years of hardship and struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan.²¹¹ The importance of issue ownership is also evidenced not only in the studies on voting behaviors but also strategic behaviors of parties and candidates to take advantage of positive images by emphasizing their relative strengths in election campaigns.²¹²

Particularly relevant to this dissertation is the question of whether issue ownership is actually manifested in the outcome of defense policy and military spending. The conventional wisdom gives us reasons to expect that Republican

²⁰⁸ John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3 (1996): 826.

²⁰⁹ JR Petrocik, WL Benoit, and GJ Hansen, "Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952-2000," *Political Science Quarterly* (2003); DF Damore, "The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Campaigns," *Political Research Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2004); KM Kaufmann and JR Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 3 (1999); WG Jacoby, "Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2000).

²¹⁰ Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study."

²¹¹ Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms".

²¹² É Bélanger and BM Meguid, "Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice," *Electoral Studies* 27, no. 3 (2008); D Hayes, "Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory of Trait Ownership," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (2005).

administrations take defense issues more seriously, and as a consequence allocate a higher share of national resource to national defense than do Democratic administrations. In fact, this was what many expected at the beginning of the Republican administration led by George W. Bush. After the Clinton administration, which was considered lacking an adequate appreciation and understanding of the military, the expectations about a healthy civil-military relations and a high priority in national defense were high among observers in and outside the military.²¹³

At the same time, there exist studies that make the realization of issue ownership in actual outcomes of defense policy process look suspicious. For example, Ippolito's analysis shows that defense policy, an area in which presidential dominance was once apparent due to the significance of national defense in the wake of the Cold War, has seen increasing number of participants including Congress. He argues that this decentralization has made it difficult for presidents to impose their preferences on defense policy. The consequence of decentralization is that allocation of defense budget has been unstable and unpredictable, and this undermines a consistent development of force structure and military strategy.²¹⁴ In addition, the rapid increase of nondiscretionary spending in federal budgets has

²¹³ MC Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Aff.* 86(2007); Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*.

²¹⁴ DS Ippolito, *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994). Also see B Rundquist and TM Carsey, *Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement* (Norman, Oklahoma: Univ of Oklahoma Pr, 2002); BM Blechman and WP Ellis, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and US Defense Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1992); JM Lindsay and RB Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (1992); RB Ripley and JM Lindsay, *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Univ of Michigan Pr, 1993).

reduced the amount of national resources that presidents, including Republican presidents, could use for their policy priority.²¹⁵ If this expectation holds, we will see no systematic relationship between presidential administrations and military spending.

We can also expect that military spending increases under Democratic administrations from a different theoretical perspective. Principal-agent models assume that there exists an information asymmetry between principals and agents.²¹⁶ They further assume that expertise and information control are the basis of the bureaucracy's power.²¹⁷ If we loosen the assumption of the information asymmetry to assume that principals have varying degrees of expertise, the information advantage of the bureaucracy becomes a variable, not a constant.²¹⁸ Applying this logic to the relationship between presidential administrations and the military, it may mean that the military influence is stronger in Democratic administrations than Republican administrations, to the extent that the latter possesses more competence and expertise in military affairs than the former. Given the military's strong preference for increases in defense spending, as noted earlier, this may indicate that

²¹⁵ TR Cusack, "On the Domestic Political-Economic Sources of American Military Spending," in *The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States*, ed. Alex Mintz (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992); Ippolito, *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense*.

²¹⁶ J Bendor, S Taylor, and R Van Gaalen, "Bureaucratic Expertise Versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting," *The American Political Science Review* (1985); ———, "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information," *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 4 (1987); JS Banks and BR Weingast, "The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information," *American Journal of Political Science* 36, no. 2 (1992).

²¹⁷ GJ Miller, "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8(2005).

²¹⁸ RW Waterman and KJ Meier, "Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8, no. 2 (1998).

we can expect higher military spending under Democratic than Republican administrations.

The theory of issue ownership can also be the rationale that we expect no meaningful difference between Republican and Democratic administrations, or instead higher defense spending in Democratic administrations. Studies have demonstrated the strategic behaviors of politicians to neutralize negative issue ownership images by engaging, rather than avoiding, political and social issues that their parties are considered as weak.²¹⁹ The findings are in line with the argument that parties' issue reputations are not a constant, giving the window of opportunity for parties and candidates to reestablish them.²²⁰ What this means is that politicians, including presidents, may attempt to steal issue ownership possessed by the other party or at least mitigate public concerns over issues that they are perceived to be weak: hence putting more policy emphasis on the issues.

Taking into consideration these different theoretical views about the relationship between presidential administrations and military spending, this dissertation tests in order to determine if a statistically significant increase in defense spending occurs under Republican administrations. This test is done by including a dummy variable, with Republican administrations coded as 1 and Democratic administrations as 0.

²¹⁹ L Sigelman and EH Buell Jr, "Avoidance or Engagement? Issue Convergence in US Presidential Campaigns, 1960–2000," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).

²²⁰

(3) Federal Surplus

Another factor expected to influence the level of military spending is the federal surplus. The logic is straightforward: the defense budget process is influenced by the domestic economic environment. Policymakers need to consider domestic fiscal conditions before deciding an affordable level of spending on defense.²²¹ If they try to allocate resources to national defense at the level that is much higher than its economic conditions allow, they will face strong domestic opposition.

Previous studies provide partial support for this relationship between the level of federal surplus or deficit and military spending. For example, Hartley and Russett found that increases in federal deficits are closely related to a reduction in military spending in the United States between 1965 and 1990.²²² Ostrom and Marra's study found a similar pattern. Examining presidential requests for the defense budget, they discovered that the size of federal deficit work as "constraint" on the amount of defense budget request.²²³ On the other hand, a study by Eichenberg and Stoll shows that the connection between federal budgetary conditions and military spending may not be strong. In an analysis of the

²²¹ SP Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1966).

²²² Hartley and Russett, "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?."

²²³ Ostrom Jr and Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate." Also see CW Ostrom Jr and L Brian, "Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force.," *American Political Science Review* 80(1986); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid and Arms Races," in *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2927* (2002). Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."; Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism."

determinants of defense spending in the United States and four of its NATO allies, they found the deficit was a strong determinant of military spending only in Great Britain.²²⁴ Thus, the results of this study will provide additional information on whether or not defense spending is conditional on macro budgetary constraints.

For federal surplus or deficit figures, this study uses official government budget data provided by the Office of Management and Budget.²²⁵ The surplus/deficit value for a given year is derived by subtracting outlays from receipts and then dividing by GDP. The surplus/deficit values used in this study range from -6.0 in 1983 to 2.4 percent in 2000 with positive figures indicating surplus.

Following the studies mentioned above, I expect that the government will decrease military spending under the condition of federal deficit and increase it in the existence of a surplus. A positive coefficient in the results will demonstrate this relationship. Although I am aware that scholars have also used other indicators of macro fiscal constraints, such as annual growth in GDP²²⁶ and change in revenue²²⁷, this study only uses federal surplus/deficit for the sake of parsimony.

(4) External Threats

²²⁴ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."

²²⁵ The data on federal surplus or deficit can be obtained at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals/> (accessed March 25, 2010). Specifically, the data is on Table 1.2—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930–2015.

²²⁶ Ostrom Jr and Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate."

²²⁷ Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?."

The basic logic behind examining the impact of external threats on defense spending is the expectation that states respond to the varying degrees of external threats by increasing or decreasing military capabilities. The notion of states' defense policy as a strategic response to external threat has been widely taken in the studies of defense spending. Arms race and balance of power are some of the well known concepts to depict this phenomenon.²²⁸ Scholars have defined external threat in many different ways, and they confirmed the importance of it in explaining the level of defense spending.²²⁹ Indeed, studies interested in the role that domestic political and economic factors play as the determinants of defense spending have been attempts to make counterarguments against the dominance of this realist approach to accounting for the pattern of resource allocation for national defense.²³⁰

Acknowledging the significance of external threats, this study makes a modification to the existing scholarship in terms of how to operationalize the nature and level of external threat to the U.S. security. Given that this dissertation attempts to examine the determinants of military spending in the U.S. during the period that covers the first decade of the post-Cold War era, I find a caveat in the extant literature on the U.S. military spending: Most of the research has not taken China

²²⁸ Cusack and Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China."; LF Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War* (Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press, 1960); KN Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

²²⁹
²³⁰ Benjamin O. Fordham, "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending," *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 1 (2002).

into consideration.²³¹ This is understandable because the Soviet Union was considered the most formidable potential enemy of the U.S.

This conceptualization of external threat, focusing on the Soviet Union could be misleading. Many studies show that China was deemed important to U.S. foreign policy and U.S. allies in Asia long before China began to replace Russia as a potential peer competitor of the United States.²³² In addition, focusing solely on the Soviet Union is not adequate during post-Cold War. It is necessary to consider external threats from both the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China at the same time. As a consequence, this dissertation operationalizes the level of external threats as the differentials in national capabilities between the combination of the Soviet Union and China, on the one hand, and the U.S., on the other hand. This can provide a framework useful both during the Cold War and post-Cold War period.

As for how to measure the extent of external threat, many scholars have used military expenditure as an indicator, but the validity of the measurement has been questioned.²³³ This is especially so in the cases of the Soviet Union and China. The communist regimes have kept secret the overall structure of defense postures, including military spending. Therefore, various western institutions seeking

²³¹ Cusack and Ward examined the influence of China's threat employing defense spending as an indicator on the U.S. military expenditure. Cusack and Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China."

²³² D Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994); MG Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994); D Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival* 36, no. 2 (1994); H Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1994), ch. 25-28.

²³³ Smith, "Models of Military Expenditure."; Paul Dunne and Sam Perlo-Freeman, "The Demand for Military Spending in Developing Countries," in *The Second Cesa/IDN International Conference on Defense Economics and Security in Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa* (Lisbon2001); Ostrom Jr and Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate."; Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action: Nato Defense Burdens, 1950-1984."

information on the military establishments of these states have had to rely on different theories of what constitutes defense spending in the Soviet Union and China.²³⁴ These different theories have created quite diverse estimations of military spending. Comparing five of the most widely used defense spending datasets, for instance, Cusack and Ward found that the results of hypothesis tests for the impact of military spending of potential enemies on a state's military expenditure are largely dependent on which dataset a researcher uses.²³⁵ This shows one should be careful in drawing causal inferences from military expenditure data especially covering the two countries. Other scholars raised concerns over the difficulty in obtaining reliable military expenditure data on communist states even in the post-Cold War era. Bernstein and Munro argued that the actual military expenditure in China is ten times larger than the official figure provided by the government.²³⁶

Considering that China needs to be taken seriously and the sensitivity of inferences to military spending datasets, this dissertation adopts an alternative measurement. Instead of using the level of military expenditure of the Soviet Union and China as an indicator of external threat to the United States, this study employs the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores in the National Material

²³⁴ Cusack and Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China."

²³⁵ Cusack and Ward in their study compare five datasets on military spending of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The datasets are produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research International (SIPRI), the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Lee, and Rubin. Ibid. Also see WT Lee, *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures 1955-1975: An Unconventional Approach* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977); W. Rubin, *Estimates of Military Expenditures in the People's Republic of China* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1978).

²³⁶ R Bernstein and RH Munro, "The Coming Conflict with China," *Foreign Aff.* 76, no. 2 (1997).

Capabilities (version 3.02) dataset.²³⁷ This dataset is part of Correlates of War (COW) project, which has been widely used by scholars in international relations.²³⁸ The level of external threat at a given year is measured by summing the CINC scores of the Soviet Union (Russia) and China, and then subtracting the CINC score of the United States.

It is expected that the level of external threat is positively related to the level of defense spending in the United States.

(5) War

Major wars are known to increase defense spending.²³⁹ This study considers wars that the U.S. was involved. Following the coding scheme of the Correlates of War dataset²⁴⁰, the Korean War and Vietnam War are included as a dummy variable.

(6) The Post-Cold War

The last control variable is the Post-Cold War. To test if there is any significant difference during and after the Cold War, this study uses a dummy variable. Years until 1989 are coded as 0 and the remaining years are coded as 1.

²³⁷ The National Material Capabilities dataset (version 3.02) can be obtained at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (accessed March 28, 2010).

²³⁸ DS Geller, "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993); E Gartzke and DJ Jo, "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009); DM Gibler and S Wolford, "Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (2006).

²³⁹ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."

²⁴⁰ A detailed coding scheme can be obtained at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID310.html> (assessed May 23, 2010)

3. Model Specification

This study considered the following two theoretical and methodological issues to finally decide which model to use: the inclusion of lagged variables and autocorrelation.

A. Inclusion of Lagged Variables

First, it is necessary for this study to include lagged variables given the nature of the budgetary process. A particularly relevant aspect of the process is that defense budget for a given fiscal year is determined a year before the budget is spent or authorized.²⁴¹ In other words, the level of defense spending at time t is determined by factors that exist at time $t - 1$ or even before that. An example can make this clear. President Barack Obama sent to Congress his defense budget proposal for fiscal year 2010 on May 7, 2009. After receiving the President's budget request, Congress held hearings to examine whether the President's proposal was sound and manageable given the factors such as economic conditions, and finally passed the Congressional Budget Resolution in December 2009. This shows that military spending for fiscal year 2010 is determined by the factors that existed in 2009. Inclusion of lagged variables in the model reflects this organizational decision.

B. Autocorrelation and Differencing

Another methodological consideration is the concern for autocorrelation. As previous studies show, using the defense budget data often involves dealing with

²⁴¹ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."

autocorrelation of the error terms.²⁴² Although we can still get unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates, the existence of autocorrelation violates a key ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption that the error terms are independent. The violation of this assumption makes significance tests from OLS analyses meaningless because the standard errors get underestimated and the t-scores overestimated as a consequence.²⁴³

Researchers have found that inclusion of a lagged dependent variable at times addresses autocorrelation because autocorrelation is often the result of misspecification.²⁴⁴ Thus, using a lagged dependent variable in this dissertation is theoretically and methodologically sound. It not only captures incrementalism in budget process, but it also works as a methodological control mechanism to confront autocorrelation.

Still, it is possible that autocorrelation remains even after the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. To cope with this possibility, this dissertation transforms the dependent and independent variables so as to measure *annual changes* (ΔY or ΔX_k), following convention by scholars dealing with defense spending.²⁴⁵

²⁴² Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy."

²⁴³ Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978."

²⁴⁴ Christopher Dougherty, *Introduction to Econometrics* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 358.

²⁴⁵ William K. Domke, "Fiscal Constraints and Defense Planning in Advanced Industrial Democracies" in *The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspectives*, ed. Andrew L. Ross (New York: Greenwood, 1991), 24; Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."; Hartley and Russett, "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?."

To sum up, this study employs multivariate linear regression analyses and use ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques for estimators and significance tests. In order to test each of the hypotheses developed in this study, it formulates the following model specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Defense \text{ Spending}_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta Defense \text{ Spending}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta Conservatism_{t-1} + \\ & \beta_3 \Delta Elite \text{ Veterans}_{t-1} + \beta_4 \Delta Federal \text{ Surplus}_{t-1} + \\ & \beta_5 Republican \text{ Administration}_{t-1} + \beta_6 \Delta External \text{ Threat}_{t-1} + \\ & \beta_7 War_{t-1} + \beta_8 Post-Cold \text{ War}_{t-1} + e_t \end{aligned}$$

Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses that this study tests.

Table 3. Summary of hypotheses

	<i>Hypotheses (Variable Name in the Models)</i>	<i>Direction of Expected Effect on defense spending</i>
H ₁	Intensity of Conservatism (Conservatism)	Positive
H ₂	Presence of Military Veterans (Elite Veterans)	Positive
H ₃	Incrementalism in Defense Budgeting (A Lagged dependent variable)	Positive
H ₄	Republican Administrations (Republican Administration)	Positive
H ₅	Surplus in Federal Budget (Federal Surplus)	Positive
H ₆	External Threats (External Threats)	Positive
H ₇	War (War)	Positive
H ₈	The Post-Cold War (Post-Cold War)	Negative

IV. Data Analysis

1. Regression Analysis

Recall that the main research question this dissertation seeks to answer is this: When we control for other factors that potentially impact the annual changes in defense spending, can we find evidence that the ideology and military experience gap systematically explain the variations of defense spending? In order to answer this question, this study employed two proxy measurements of the gaps: strength of conservatism in Congress and the proportion of military veterans in the House and Cabinet. This study also defined defense spending in two ways: defense outlays and defense budget authority. Table 4 reports the estimates of ordinary least squares regressions, which indicate no signs of autoregression.²⁴⁶

Based on the results, the answer to the question above is no. The analysis shows that changes in ideology and military experience in the House and Cabinet do not affect annual increase or decrease of defense spending regardless of how we define it.

Intensity of Conservatism. In the previous chapter, this study hypothesized that the intensity of conservatism in Congress would have a positive relationship with the level of defense spending. The results show that the direction of the relationship between conservatism in Congress and defense spending is against the

²⁴⁶ This study used Stata (version 9.2) for data analyses. It employed Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation, and the results showed no presence of autocorrelation for both models. For the first model, chi2 (1) was 0.759 ($p > 0.38$). For the second model, chi2 (1) was 0.353 ($p > 0.55$). In order to avoid biases from heteroskedasticity, this study employed robust standard errors for both models.

hypothesis in both defense outlays and budget authority. This interpretation, however, is not conclusive due to the statistical insignificance of the coefficients.

Military Experience. As noted earlier, this study intended to test if Fordham's conclusion that variations in the extent of military experience does not have an independent explicative ability to predict the level of defense spending still holds with a more systematic research design. Fordham in his study took military outlays as the dependent variable for a trend analysis between 1951 and 1992 to find no clear difference in the pattern of military expenditure across the research period.²⁴⁷ This study differs from his study in that it considers a number of control variables, an explicit measurement of military experience, and an additional indicator of military spending, that is, defense budget authority. This study also extended the research period by covering between 1952 and 2000. In so doing, this study also attempted to examine if Gelpi and Feaver's conceptualization of the prevalence of military experience, which was demonstrated to systematically impact the decisions over use of force in their studies, is still applicable to defense spending.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy."

²⁴⁸ Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force."

Table 4: Results of regression analysis
(first differencing)

	Δ Defense Outlays _t	Δ Budget Authority _t
Δ Conservatism _{t-1}	-0.14 (2.32)	-0.12 (3.58)
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1}	0.10 (0.53)	-0.82 (0.91)
Δ Lagged Dependent Variable _{t-1}	0.69* (0.27)	0.13 (0.13)
Republican Administration _{t-1}	-10.20 (7.43)	-26.08 [†] (13.04)
Δ Federal Surplus _{t-1}	7.82 [†] (4.61)	4.49 (4.00)
Δ External Threats _{t-1}	988.61* (465.59)	793.11* (358.76)
War _{t-1}	-6.32 (9.21)	-4.29 (11.72)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	5.67 (13.36)	-9.64 (14.72)
_cons	4.40 (5.85)	16.25 (13.50)
<i>N</i>	49	49
R-sq	0.50	0.33

The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests.

[†] p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

This study, however, still does not find a statistically significant relation between the prevalence of military experience in Congress and defense spending. Also, the level of military experience in the political institutions is not an influential factor that determines defense spending. In addition, the proportion of military veterans in the House and Cabinet does not exhibit a consistent pattern of relationship with the dependent variables. These results in this regard appear to confirm Fordham's conclusion but question the applicability of Gelpi and Feaver's conceptualization of military experience for explaining phenomena other than foreign policy decisions related to use of force in interstate conflicts.

Budgetary Incrementalism. In order to test the influence of incrementalist spending pressures, this study included lagged dependent variables. The results indicate that the impact of incremental decision making is not a universal phenomenon. As the first column of Table 4 shows, budgetary incrementalism is strongly related to defense outlays. In other words, change in defense outlays in a particular year has a strong impact on that in the following year. This is what the conventional wisdom suggest, which has been evidenced by previous findings of the importance of incrementalism in budgetary politics concerning defense burden²⁴⁹ and defense outlays.²⁵⁰ The results of this current study confirm this conventional wisdom.

²⁴⁹ Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?."

²⁵⁰ Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective."

The same theoretical factor, however, exerts little influence over budget authority, as the second column of Table 4 demonstrates. Although a complete answer to this difference in the role of budgetary Incrementalism is beyond the scope of this study, one reason could be outlay-budget authority side payments. According to Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, presidents often employ a strategy of adjusting budget authority as a way to control the level of outlays.²⁵¹ This is so because the growth of federal deficit is an important political issue. In an effort to reduce federal deficits, presidents may make a tacit deal with agencies by cutting government funding for a particular year, but promising additional spending in the future years through budget authority. In other words, “[G]iven periodic concern about budget deficit, and consequently spending, the OMB might be tempted to increase agency appropriations in exchange for agency acquiescence on lower levels of outlays.”²⁵² This strategy may make budget authority independent of the previous spending.

Federal Surplus. In terms of the influence of federal surplus/deficit on the two indicators of defense spending, the relationships are signed in the expected positive direction. As for the significance test, it is shown that only budget outlays are closely related to the level of federal surplus at 0.1 level. Thus, other things being equal, increases in federal surplus lead to defense outlays increase. Under the

²⁵¹ DC Mowery, MS Kamlet, and JP Crecine, "Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 3 (1980).

²⁵² Dezhbakhsh, Tohamy, and Aranson, "A New Approach for Testing Budgetary Incrementalism," 548. In the similar vein, Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine maintains that “[W]hile outlays represent the critical planning variable for fiscal and economic policy in a given year, and thus are of major concern to White House personnel, budget authority, because it often carries with it multiyear spending implications, may be of far more importance to agency bureaucrats concerned with the long-run health of their programs.” Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, "Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking," 400.

condition of federal deficit, the opposite is true. In budget outlays, holding the other variables constant, a 1% increase in federal surplus leads to a growth in outlays by about 8 billion dollars, plus or minus 4.7 billion dollars.²⁵³ A similar influence of federal surplus or deficit is not seen in the case of budget authority.

Presidential Administration. The results of particular interest are about the impact of partisan control of the executive. As noted earlier, the expectation that Republican administrations spend more on national defense than Democratic counterparts is the conventional wisdom. The coefficients of this variable in Table 4 shows this is not the case. There are two interesting findings here. First, in both measures of defense spending, the direction of the relationships is the opposite of what the conventional wisdom indicates: It is negative, rather than positive, which means that it is under Democratic administrations that we see increase in defense spending.

Second, the coefficient of presidential administration variable is statistically significant only in budget authority at 0.1 level ($p = 0.052$). The coefficient of the same variable fails to pass the significance test in the first model with defense outlays as the dependent variable. The magnitude of the difference between Democratic and Republican administrations as for budget authority is substantial.

²⁵³ This study used the statistical software, CLARIFY, to estimate the impact of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable. King, Tomz, and Wittenberg presented the logic and usage of the computer program in their 2000 paper. The software and detailed documentation can be obtained by visiting <http://GKing.Harvard.Edu> (accessed 18 February, 2010). Also see G King, M Tomz, and J Wittenberg, "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (2000).

Other things being equal, defense budget authority decreases under Republican administrations by about 25.6 billion dollars, plus or minus 21 billion dollars.

External threat. The most consistent and substantial influence on defense spending derives from external threats. This study expected that annual changes in the U.S. defense spending is positively associated with the changes in the national material capabilities gap between of the Soviet Union and China combined, on the one hand, and that of the U.S., on the other hand. In other words, it is expected that the U.S. defense spending would go up when the capability differential between the two communist countries and the U.S increases as a way to make up for the gap. The coefficients in both models are significant at 0.05 level.

As for defense outlays, when the gap in national material capabilities increases one standard deviation from the mean, it is expected that the U.S. defense outlays would rise up 11.3 billion dollars, plus or minus about 10 billion dollars. With regard to budget authority, the rate of change is slightly higher: With the gap change of one standard deviation from the mean, it is anticipated that defense budget authority would increase by about 12.7 billion dollars, plus or minus 11.4 billion dollars.

War. The results indicate that wars the United States involved did not lead to a statistically significant increase in defense spending.

Post-Cold War. The results show that the end of the Cold War did not bring about a significant decline in defense spending during the first decade in the Post-

Cold War era. Not only do the coefficients fail to pass the significance test, but also the direction is not consistent.²⁵⁴

2. Interaction Effects

Although the previous section of this study showed changes in ideology and military experience do not have a statistically significant relationship with defense spending, it is still possible that the influence of the variables may be dependent upon other variables. This section examines interaction effects, focusing on the relationships between the two main variables of interests of this study and other variables—that is, presidential administrations and external threat. Examining interaction effects, I do not discuss the independent effects of variables, following the advice that when multiplicative terms are included in an effort to tap into the possibility of the existence of interaction effects, it become less important to discuss statistical significance of the main variables.²⁵⁵

Table 5 provides the estimates of regressions on defense outlays, which include several interaction terms. The results indicate that neither the partisan control of the executive nor external threat has a statistically significant interaction effect with strength of conservatism. However, it shows that there is an interaction effect between the percentage of military veterans and external threats at 0.1 level.

²⁵⁴ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."

²⁵⁵ BF Braumoeller, "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms," *International Organization* 58, no. 04 (2004).

A statistically significant interaction effect is not seen between military veterans and the presidential administrations.

Table 6, however, tells a slightly different story. It indicates that the impact of ideology on defense budget authority *is* conditional upon the interaction with the partisanship of the president. The interaction coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level, and has a positive sign, which demonstrates that budget authority increases as conservative ideology gets stronger in Congress under Republican administrations. As for the interaction between ideology and external threat, the results do not show such a statistically significant relationship.

An equally interesting finding is detected with regard to the interaction of elite military veterans with external threats. As we see from Table 6, the coefficient for the interactive term between the two variables is statistically significant at 0.1 level ($p = 0.056$) and positive. In other words, in a situation where the level of external threat increases, the more veterans there are in the Congress and the Cabinet, the more likely there will be an increase in defense budget authority. This indicates that the budgetary sensitivity in response to increased external threats is influenced by the proportion of military veterans in political institutions. The coefficient of the interaction term for the relationship between military veterans and the presidency is not statistically significant, although the sign is positive.

Table 5: Interaction effects 1 (first differencing)

	Δ Defense Outlays _t			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Conservatism _{t-1}	-1.07 (4.99)	-0.62 (3.20)	-0.40 (2.49)	-1.15 (2.04)
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1}	-0.0008 (0.54)	0.11 (0.53)	-0.09 (0.57)	-0.40 (0.74)
Δ Lagged Dependent Variable _{t-1}	0.71* (0.26)	0.69* (0.28)	0.70* (0.27)	0.82* (0.29)
Republican Administration _{t-1}	-10.07 (7.35)	-10.18 (7.47)	-10.16 (7.45)	-10.10 (8.08)
Δ Federal Surplus _{t-1}	7.68 (4.86)	7.69 (4.70)	7.78 (4.70)	7.92 (4.46)
Δ External Threats _{t-1}	1045.20* (415.76)	1006.92* (490.67)	987.17* (473.59)	968.25* (411.52)
War _{t-1}	-6.47 (9.14)	-6.51 (9.24)	-6.98 (9.35)	-6.01 (11.59)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	7.05 (12.39)	5.86 (13.78)	5.91 (13.40)	-13.70 (13.72)
Δ Conservatism _{t-1} × Republican Admin _{t-1}	1.58 (5.69)	-	-	-
Δ Conservatism _{t-1} × Δ External Threats _{t-1}	-	33.59 (117.90)	-	-
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1} × Republican Admin _{t-1}	-	-	0.40 (0.96)	-
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1} × Δ External Threats _{t-1}	-	-	-	100.84 [†] (51.13)
N/ R-sq	49 / 0.50	49 / 0.50	49 / 0.50	49 / 0.50

The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests. The constant term was included in the results. Due to the limited space, it was omitted above. [†] p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 6: Interaction effects 2 (first differencing)

	Δ Budget Authority _t			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Conservatism _{t-1}	-7.21 (3.67)	-0.32 (5.12)	0.01 (3.67)	-0.97 (3.46)
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1}	-1.68 (1.00)	-0.82 (0.93)	-0.71 (1.27)	-1.39 (0.84)
Δ Lagged Dependent Variable _{t-1}	0.18 (0.15)	0.13 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)
Republican Administration _{t-1}	-26.33* (12.88)	-26.06 [†] (13.18)	-26.03 [†] (7.45)	-28.07* (12.97)
Δ Federal Surplus _{t-1}	2.79 (3.81)	4.43 (4.13)	4.53 (4.11)	3.91 (3.86)
Δ External Threats _{t-1}	1081.30** (348.62)	800.85* (368.12)	798.07* (351.72)	607.56** (197.19)
War _{t-1}	-6.71 (11.41)	-4.37 (11.73)	-3.86 (14.05)	-6.01 (11.59)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	-3.12 (14.96)	-9.55 (15.02)	-9.61 (15.01)	-13.70 (13.72)
Δ Conservatism _{t-1} × Republican Admin _{t-1}	12.31* (5.24)	-	-	-
Δ Conservatism _{t-1} × Δ External Threats _{t-1}	-	13.92 (168.22)	-	-
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1} × Republican Admin _{t-1}	-	-	-0.23 (2.27)	-
Δ Elite Veterans _{t-1} × Δ External Threats _{t-1}	-	-	-	91.52 [†] (60.99)
N/ R-sq	49 / 0.39	49 / 0.33	50 / 0.32	50 / 0.37

The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests. The constant term was included in the results. Due to the limited space, it was omitted above. [†] p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

3. The Reagan Effect

An interesting finding that this study has discovered so far is the conventional wisdom of an increase in defense spending under Republican administrations is not correct. This is in stark contrast with the relatively recent memory of an unprecedented military buildup during the Reagan administration. Indeed, his presidency left an indelible mark on civil-military relations. Some scholars argue that Reagan saved the military from the agony of the Vietnam War. Colin Powell once complimented Reagan for his emphasis on the importance of the military by saying “[F]or me ... Ronald Reagan will always be the president who restored the fighting strength and spirit of America’s Armed Forces.”²⁵⁶ The way Reagan approached the military and military matters was so different from Carter that it created an image of “clear differences between the parties in their approaches to defense and national security policy questions and, equally visibly, their devotion to traditional military values.”²⁵⁷ This difference leads some scholars to conclude that Reagan’s efforts to rebuild the military out of the trauma of Vietnam could be ascribed as the cause of Republicanization of the military.²⁵⁸

Indeed, the defense buildup during the Reagan administration was quite noticeable. Defense budget authority in 1985 was twice as much as that of 1980 in

²⁵⁶ Quoted in Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans - Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force," 24.

²⁵⁷ Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq", 117.

²⁵⁸ Holsti, "Politicization of the United States Military-Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot."; Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq".

nominal terms, increasing in real terms by almost 55 percent.²⁵⁹ During the same period, the annual growth rate of defense budget was nearly 9.3 percent in real terms. Whereas defense budget rose significantly, domestic discretionary spending declined from 5.7 in 1981 to 3.8 percent in 1987.²⁶⁰

Given the findings in the previous sections, a significant increase in defense spending under a Republican administration is an anomaly. In an effort to examine the impact of the Reagan administration on the defense spending trend, I reran the models with Reagan's first and second terms excluded, and compared the restricted models with the original ones.

Table 7 provides the results of the original and revised models. Three findings are of particular interests. First, as the comparison of the model (1) with model (2) shows, while the coefficient of the presidential administration variable was not statistically significant in the original model, it is significant at 0.1 level in the revised model ($p = 0.09$). In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient almost doubles, meaning that the difference in the size of defense spending between Republican and Democratic administrations becomes much bigger with the years under the Reagan administration not included in the model. The same effect is also found in the model (3) and (4). With defense budget authority as the dependent

²⁵⁹ Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Playing the Add-on Game in Congress: The Increasing Importance of Constituent Interests and Budget Constraints in Determining Defense Policy," in *The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending*, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999).

²⁶⁰ D Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1992).

variable, the size of the coefficient for the presidency is much larger in the revised model (4) than the original model (3).

Second, model (5) examines the interaction effect of the partisan control of the presidency with ideology without Reagan years in the model. In the original model in Table 6, the coefficient of the interaction term was significant at 0.05 level. The model (5) in Table 7 indicates that this interaction effect in the original model is largely due to the Reagan administration. Without including the years under President Reagan, the interaction effect is no longer statistically significant.

Third, the interaction effect between the level of military experience and external threats gets stronger without the Reagan years. In the original model of Table 6, the coefficient for the interaction term was statistically significant at 0.1 level ($p = 0.054$). In the revised model (6) in Table 7, the interaction effect is much stronger, being significant at 0.01 level ($p = 0.005$). In addition, I find that the magnitude of the coefficient is much larger in the revised model (110.56) than in the original model (97.93).

In sum, the Regan era is important in understanding the factors that influence defense spending. It showed a very different pattern of defense spending than the previous Republican administrations in terms of the size of defense spending. It was also an important period in which the interaction effect between the rise of conservatism in Congress and Republican presidents becomes apparent.

Table 7: Reagan effects 1 (first differencing)

	Δ Defense Outlays _{<i>t</i>}		Δ Budget Authority _{<i>t</i>}			
	(1) Original	(2) Reagan Excluded	(3) Original	(4) Reagan Excluded	(5) Reagan Excluded	(6) Reagan Excluded
Δ Conservatism _{<i>t-1</i>}	-0.14 (2.32)	-1.86 (2.70)	-0.12 (3.58)	-4.06 (3.24)	-5.83 (3.51)	-5.25 [†] (2.71)
Δ Elite Veterans _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.10 (0.53)	-0.13 (0.51)	-0.82 (0.91)	-1.24 (0.99)	-1.47 (1.04)	-2.00* (0.80)
Republican Administration _{<i>t-1</i>}	-10.20 (7.43)	-16.39 [†] (8.96)	-26.08 [†] (13.04)	-40.22** (13.78)	-39.15* (14.67)	-42.47** (13.42)
Δ Federal Surplus _{<i>t-1</i>}	7.82 [†] (4.61)	8.83 (5.28)	4.49 (4.00)	7.46 (4.56)	6.50 (5.49)	6.97 (4.39)
Δ External Threats _{<i>t-1</i>}	988.61* (465.59)	1046.29* (490.71)	793.11* (358.76)	797.33* (317.84)	899.13* (369.96)	584.73** (174.53)
Δ Conservatism _{<i>t-1</i>} × Republican Admin _{<i>t-1</i>}	-	-	-	-	4.02 (7.20)	-
Δ Elite Veterans _{<i>t-1</i>} × Δ External Threats _{<i>t-1</i>}	-	-	-	-	-	110.14** (38.66)
_cons	4.40 (5.85)	2.62 (5.66)	16.25 (13.50)	15.36 (13.09)	15.91 (13.60)	17.93 (12.90)
<i>N</i> / <i>R</i> -sq	49 / 0.50	41 / 0.53	49 / 0.33	41 / 0.46	41 / 0.47	41 / 0.51

The models used the same independent variables that were employed in the previous models. The results above show only the variables of interest. The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests.

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Given these findings, one might be tempted to draw a conclusion that the interaction effect between ideology and the presidency is temporary, largely limited to the Reagan administrations. One may further want to conclude that there is no interaction effect in general. Is this a fair conclusion? Some scholars have demonstrated that aggregate spending data may underestimate the dynamics of defense budget changes that exist in the subcategories. For example, Kanter found that Congress tended to have a larger influence on Procurement as well as Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) subfunctions than Personnel and Operations and Management (O&M).²⁶¹

In order to further investigate whether the interaction effect of ideology with the partisan control of the presidency is restricted to the Reagan administration, I employed disaggregate defense spending data. Because the defense outlays dataset used in this study does not allow in-depth analyses on disaggregate data, I used detailed information on annual spending levels of subfunctions that the original budget authority dataset provides. The data on subfunctions cover the period between 1957 and 2000. As was the case with an examination of the Reagan effect above, I excluded the Reagan terms and reran the models with the same independent variables and an interaction term for ideology and the presidency.

Table 8 shows the estimates of the restricted models having five major budget authority subfunctions as the dependent variables. In four out of five subfunctions, a statistically meaningful interaction effect was found. In other words,

²⁶¹ Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970."

even though excluding the Reagan terms from the models made the interaction effect nonexistent at the aggregate level, the same effect was still present in some of the subfunctions. As expected, the direction of the relationship was positive, meaning that under Republican administrations, increase in conservatism leads to growth of defense budget authority. Specifically, in such subfunctions as Military Personnel, Procurement, RDT&E, and Military Construction, the interaction effect was significant at 0.05 level. No such statistically meaningful relationship was found in Operation and Management (O&M) subfunction. As Kanter correctly noted, this shows that focusing on aggregate spending data may make researchers underestimate the existence of causal relationships at the disaggregated level. In sum, it seems safe to conclude from Table 8 that the interaction effect between conservatism and the Republican presidents represents a consistent characteristic of resource allocation in defense spending.

Table 8: Reagan effects 2 (first differencing)

	Δ Budget Authority _{<i>t</i>}				
	(1) Military Personnel _{<i>t</i>}	(2) Procurement _{<i>t</i>}	(3) RDT&E _{<i>t</i>} ^a	(4) Operations & Management _{<i>t</i>}	(5) Military Construction _{<i>t</i>}
Δ Conservatism _{<i>t-1</i>}	-1.30** (0.19)	-3.39 (2.17)	-0.47 [†] (0.25)	-0.20 (1.37)	-0.47 [†] (0.22)
Δ Elite Veterans _{<i>t-1</i>}	-0.08 (.10)	0.14 (0.30)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.08 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.10)
Lagged Dependent Variable _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.43* (0.19)	0.09 (0.15)	0.31 (0.24)	-0.19 (0.36)	0.31 (0.24)
Republican Administration _{<i>t-1</i>}	-3.79 [†] (1.91)	-7.81 [†] (4.46)	0.85 (1.32)	-6.92 (6.28)	0.85 (1.32)
Δ Federal Surplus _{<i>t-1</i>}	-0.26 (0.52)	-3.37 [†] (1.66)	-0.53 (0.58)	-0.57 (1.45)	-0.53 (0.58)
Δ External Threats _{<i>t-1</i>}	14.93 (82.79)	407.08** (106.20)	104.85** (29.03)	-293.20 (321.56)	101.85** (29.03)
War _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.45 (1.68)	-7.89 (4.87)	-2.36 [†] (1.31)	-0.009 (3.08)	-2.36 [†] (1.31)
Post-Cold War _{<i>t-1</i>}	-1.92 (1.92)	-1.93 (3.86)	-0.07 (1.22)	-8.17 (6.38)	-0.07 (1.22)
Δ Conservatism _{<i>t-1</i>} × Republican Admin _{<i>t-1</i>}	1.63* (0.72)	6.30* (2.83)	1.59* (0.74)	-0.43 (2.43)	1.59* (0.74)
<i>n</i> / R-sq	34 / 0.60	34 / 0.51	34 / 0.40	34 / 0.25	34 / 0.40

a: RDT&E indicates Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation. The models used the same independent variables that were employed in the previous models. The models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance tests are two-tailed tests. Due to the limited space, constants in the equations are omitted above. [†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

V. Discussion

1. Summary

This study began because of the sparse scholarly information about the role that civil-military gap plays on military effectiveness. To the extent that scholars have examined the topic, I found that studies either focused on topics not directly related to military effectiveness or had theoretical and methodological weaknesses such as ambiguous causal mechanism and omission of relevant variables. As a consequence, I argued that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about whether or not the civil-military gap matters in explaining the level of military effectiveness.

The lack of systematic evidence appears to have created a perception that any perceived gap matters among proponents of gap thesis. Critics have argued that proponents of gap thesis have not found enough evidence that proves the causal relationship between the civil-military gap and military effectiveness. They, however, have neglected to provide evidence that civil-military gap does not matter. The lack of attention to empirical analyses of the civil-military gap and its influence on military effectiveness is not only detrimental to the scholarship of civil-military relations, but it also may have serious practical impacts on policy when it overstates the implications of civil-military gap. As a result of the lack of research, the subfield of civil-military relations could be described as ignorant regarding the implications of civil-military gap for military effectiveness. What scholars need to do is to

identify the existence and extent of policy-relevant gaps. In doing so, they will be able to dissect the myth associated with the implications of the civil-military gap.

In an effort to fill this void in civil-military relations literature, this study examined the influence of two types of civil-military gaps on military effectiveness: ideology and military experience gap. Accepting the basic logic of proponents of gap thesis, I hypothesized that the size of civil-military gap has an inverse relationship with defense spending. When there is a small civil-military gap, it is expected that civilians and the military possess a common understanding about measures to enhance military effectiveness, leading to increases in defense spending. With a substantial civil-military gap, decreases in defense spending are anticipated. I further theorized that the impact of these civil-military gaps is manifested in defense spending through political institutions.

Specifically, this study came up with the following hypotheses. First, I hypothesized that the strength of conservatism in the U.S. Congress—a proxy measure for the ideology gap—has a positive relationship with defense spending. I expected that given the military’s conservatism and its preference for a higher military spending, as conservatism gets stronger in Congress, the ideological gap will be reduced, which will lead to defense spending increases. Second, this study also hypothesized that the proportion of military veterans in the United States House and Cabinet—a proxy measure for military experience gap—is positively associated with defense spending. Given the similarity between military personnel and military veterans, in terms of values and perspectives toward the adequate level of military

spending, it was expected that as the proportion of military veterans gets higher, the military experience gap shrinks. As a consequence, defense spending increases.

I tested these two hypotheses by employing multivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression analyses with defense outlays and defense budget authority as the indicators of military spending. The research period was between 1952 and 2000, focusing on the case of the United States. This study included a number of control variables such a lagged dependent variable, partisan control of the presidency, and external threats in order to estimate the effect of ideology and military experience gap with precision.

The results demonstrated the need for a more nuanced understanding of the effect of the ideology and military experience gap on defense spending. First, this study found that, in opposition to Huntington's theories, ideology did not have a main effect on defense outlays and defense budget authority. Contrary to Feaver's criticism of Huntington, however, it also found that there is an interaction effect between ideology and the presidency. To be specific, under Republican administrations, as conservatism in Congress intensifies, budget authority increases. With defense outlays as the dependent variable, this study did not find any interaction effect between ideology and partisan control of the presidency. Thus, this study yields evidence of a limited role of ideology gap on defense spending.

Second, this study also demonstrated that there is a limited impact of military experience gap on defense spending. No significant main effect of the military experience gap was found in both measures of defense spending, confirming

Fordham's findings.²⁶² This study, however, provides evidence that an interaction effect between the level of military experience in political institutions and external threats on both measures of defense spending exists. This suggests that Fordham's conclusion needs to be revisited in light of the findings of this study.

Third, this study provided evidence that challenges conventional wisdom about the difference between Republican and Democratic administrations in terms of defense spending patterns. Some scholars studying civil-military relations have raised concerns about the potential negative effects on defense spending under Democratic administrations.²⁶³ Part of the reason for the concerns is the ideological distance between Democratic administrations and the military given the prevalence of conservatism, especially in the officer corps. According to this logic, a more favorable defense budget condition is expected under Republican administrations. The results of this study do not support this view. Instead, under Democratic administrations defense budget authority increased between 1952 and 2000. A statistically significant increase under Democratic administrations was not detected in defense outlays. Possible reasons for this finding will be discussed in the next section.

Fourth, this study examined the impact of the Reagan administration and found the Reagan era was a significant departure from previous Republican

²⁶² Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military "Gap" on Peacetime Military Policy."

²⁶³ Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."; Bacevich and Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the US Military Become a Partisan Force?."

administrations with regard to defense spending. When I excluded the Reagan years from the model, the results showed were statistically meaningful that Republican administrations spent less on defense spending—both defense outlays and budget authority—than Democratic administration. In addition, the results presented evidence that previously observable interaction effects between ideology and partisan control of the presidency lost its statistical significance, although the interaction term for military veterans and external threats remained significant. The fact that the interaction effect between ideology in Congress and the presidency vanished when I excluded the Reagan era makes it difficult to draw a conclusion about this effect. In order to further investigate the influence of the Reagan terms on defense spending patterns, this study employed the disaggregated budget authority data to find that the interaction effect was present in four of five budget authority subfunctions. This finding proved that although the interaction effect at the aggregate level is dependent upon the Reagan terms, the same effect is a consistent pattern at the disaggregated level regardless of whether or not the Reagan administrations are included. Overall, the findings demonstrated that Republican administrations except for the Reagan administrations had a tendency to spend less on national defense than Democratic administration. Furthermore, it provided evidence that the interaction effect between ideology and the presidential administrations was a regular pattern in most of the subfunctions of defense budget authority.

Because the Reagan administration is an outlier in defense spending patterns, the findings problematize the idea of visiting the Reagan administration in order to deduce what the budget priorities of a Republican administration would look like.²⁶⁴ If the history is any indication, the results suggest that there is little reason to expect a significant increase in defense spending under Republican administrations. Furthermore, the findings suggest that understanding the relationship between the military and presidential administrations from the ideological perspective—which is quite prevalent in civil-military relations literature—needs to be reexamined. On the defense spending issue, the opposite of the conventional wisdom is true.

Last, this study found the importance of some control variables in explaining changes in defense spending. In particular, this study revealed that external threat has a consistent and substantial impact on defense spending. This study also observed that budgetary incrementalism and federal deficit are important factors for defense outlays but not for defense budget authority. This difference seems to derive from the different nature of the two defense spending measures. In particular, it appears that political institutions strategically use budget authority as a mechanism to control the level of expenditure, which has an important political bearing on national debates about fiscal and budgetary policies.²⁶⁵

2. Implications of the Findings

²⁶⁴ Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), xi; Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq".

²⁶⁵ Kanter, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970."

The notion that ideology is an important determinant of opinions and voting decisions at the individual level is widely held. When it comes to defense spending, however, previous studies have found little evidence to support the significance of changes in ideology at the institutional level, particularly in Congress.²⁶⁶ In fact, in most of those quantitative studies, the variable of ideological variations in Congress was not the main analytical focus. Rather, it was one of control variables, reflecting a lack of attention to the role that ideology plays on defense spending. The findings of this study concerning the interactive relationship between ideology, the presidency, and defense spending are a valuable contribution not only to the scholarship of civil-military relations but also to the studies of the determinants of defense spending.

What do these results mean for the gap thesis literature? As noted earlier, the ideological gap and its implications for military effectiveness are some of the focal points in the studies of civil-military gap. This study does not find any main effect of the ideological gap challenges claims made by proponents of gap thesis. In this regard, it seems that proponents of gap thesis have exaggerated the role that the ideological gap plays on military effectiveness. Although this study demonstrated the existence of an interaction effect between ideology and the presidency, this effect does not seem to be a decisive factor in determining the level of defense spending. In this regard, the results of this study are reassuring because they suggest that the

²⁶⁶ Eichenberg and Stoll, "Representing Defense: Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe."; Su, Kamlet, and Mowery, "Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective."

resource allocation pattern in Congress has not been shaped by the ideological gap except under certain conditions. To sum it up, the results indicate that there is little reason to worry about the implications of ideological gap for defense spending.

Another important contribution that this dissertation found is an interaction effect between the military experience gap and external threats on defense spending. So far, the relationship between the extent of military experience in political institutions and defense spending has received little scholarly attention, and this study was an effort to fill this void.

The findings related to the military experience gap merit further investigation. The decline of military veterans in the United States has been well documented and viewed with great concern.²⁶⁷ This was especially so during the 1990s when, as noted in Chapter One, many policy controversies concerning military policies and foreign policy decisions were regarded as symptoms of a seemingly inevitable conflict between the military and society with little understanding of military matters. Given what seems to be an irreversible trend, the policy implication of the decrease of military veterans has been an important topic in civil-military relations literature.

The findings of this current study help ease the concerns of those who worry about potential adverse effects of decrease of military veterans on defense spending. As shown earlier, the proportion of military veterans in political institutions did not

²⁶⁷ Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress."; Bianco, "Last Post for" the Greatest Generation": The Policy Implications of the Decline of Military Experience in the US Congress."; Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War."

have an independent impact on the level of military spending. This study found an interaction effect between the level of military experience and external threat, but this impact does not appear to be a key variable that dictates the scale of defense spending. In this regard, this study demystifies an unwarranted apprehension concerning the decreasing number of military veterans and its implication on resource allocation.

Indeed, despite empirical findings showing the difference in values and perspectives between military veterans and their nonveteran counterparts, studies examining policy implications of military experience have found little evidence of veteran effects. Most of the studies examining policy effects of military experience have focused on whether or not military experience has an independent impact on legislators' voting decisions. For instance, Bianco and Markham found that veterans are not much different from nonveterans in congressional voting decisions on defense spending, defense policy, and foreign policy in the 102nd to 104th Congress. They further argued that it is difficult to recognize any discernable patterns of difference that military experience may generate even when they grouped the votes depending on the nature of issues (e.g. culture or military lifestyle). This led them to conclude that military experience may have indirect rather than direct impact on policy for example, in agenda settings in congressional committees.²⁶⁸

This study is one of the few that tested the hypothesis about the relationship between the prevalence of military experience in political institutions and actual

²⁶⁸ Bianco and Markham, "Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress."

defense spending. It provides further evidence of limited role of prior military service on policy outcomes. Teisen argued that military veterans' preference for increased military preparedness is the most consistent finding in analyses of values and opinions of military veterans.²⁶⁹ If Teisen is correct, the causal connection between the prevalence of military experience in political institutions and military spending should be easily confirmed. As the results of this study indicate, the impact of military experience is not direct. Rather, it may be situational, as the interaction effect suggests.

The interactive effect between the level of military experience and external threats presents a possibility that military service may provide former members of the military with a latent characteristic. In order to be effective, it needs to be activated by either certain social and political situations. The finding of an interaction of military experience with external threats suggests that the influence of military experience on defense spending might become effective when there is a sense of heightened insecurity, as the external threats intensify.

Although civil-military relations literature does not have a direct answer to this interaction effect, some previous studies may help us understand this phenomenon. According to Holsti, a strong militant internationalism exists among military officers, which emphasizes "a world of conflict, and the necessity to be

²⁶⁹ Teigen, "The Role of Previous Military Service in American Electoral Politics", 120.

prepared and willing to use force to address it.”²⁷⁰ A similar finding of strong support for use of force was also evidenced among people considering a military career.²⁷¹ It was found that among American youth, those willing to serve the military were more likely to support the idea of U.S. military supremacy than others not considering a military career. Furthermore, Segal et al. found that by comparing the changes of political attitudes of enlisted military personnel to those of civilian peers, enlistees tended to have a higher level of military interventionism before entering the military and while in military service.²⁷² To the extent that military veterans keep this preference, it may become intensified when international threats increase. When there is little concern for outside threats, the preference for military intervention and other policy preferences related to it (e.g., defense spending) may be dormant. With an increased sense of external threats, military veterans may strongly feel obliged or pressured to prepare for military intervention, thus leading to increase in defense spending.

Gelpi and Feaver’s study provide further insight into this phenomenon.²⁷³

They found that the proportion of military veterans in the House and Cabinet has a positive relationship with the size of military force used in interstate conflicts in the

²⁷⁰ Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."; ———, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96."

²⁷¹ Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond, "Self-Selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: Attitudes of High School Seniors."; Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization."

²⁷² Segal et al., "Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically Mainstreamed."

²⁷³ Gelpi and Feaver, "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force."; Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*.

United States. They argued that the preference of military veterans for a larger military force to be employed in military conflicts derives from the preference for a decisive military victory. If this is true, it may be that under the condition of increased external threats, political institutions with a higher percentage of military veterans are likely to increase defense spending in an effort to seek a decisive victory.

In any case, it seems apparent that the decline of military veterans does not seriously undermine military effectiveness when the latter is defined as defense spending. Although Gelpi and Feaver found the extent of military experience in political institutions has an important direct impact on decisions related to use of force, it does not seem to have an influence on defense spending. The findings thus suggest another approach to veterans' behaviors on defense spending. In addition to a direct effect of military experience, a search for possible interaction effects with political and economic conditions could be equally fruitful.

The findings that show a systematic difference in defense spending pattern between Democratic and Republican administrations also deserve further comments. Why is the conventional wisdom wrong? I suggest two possible answers to this difference. First, some scholars have found that Democratic and Republican presidents have sought different types of military strategy and force structure as a way to build and maintain political coalitions.²⁷⁴ To be specific, scholars found that whereas Democratic presidents emphasized building conventional military forces,

²⁷⁴ JL Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford university press, 1982); A Mintz, *The Politics of Resource Allocation in the US Department of Defense: International Crises and Domestic Constraints* (New York and London: Routledge, 1988).

Republican preferred force structure with air power and nuclear weapons capabilities as the main pillars. For example, President Eisenhower, who inherited massive amount of federal budget deficit from the Truman administration, won political support by promising significant reduction in the overall government expenditure and defense spending in particular. The so-called “New Look” for a defense force posture was the solution.²⁷⁵ This policy, which is well known as the strategy of massive retaliation, emphasized utilizing strategic air power and nuclear weapons, enabling the President to cut funding for conventional forces. In other words, Eisenhower attempted to balance the demands for national security and budget by stressing the strategic force structure, which required a smaller defense budget than a conventional force posture.

This trade-off between strategic and conventional force was reversed during the Kennedy administration. The Democratic President redirected force structure by pursuing the so-called strategy of flexible response, which put more emphasis on the importance of conventional force.²⁷⁶ Importantly, this reorientation of military strategy was a reflection not only of a different look at how to best deal with the Soviet threat but also of the Kennedy administration’s fiscal policy. A large increase in military spending, especially on a conventional force, during the Kennedy administration echoed the Democratic Party’s policy perspective that economic

²⁷⁵ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

²⁷⁶ RM Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); RP Haffa, *The Half War: Planning US Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983* (Boulder, CO: Westview Pr, 1984).

development, which would reduce unemployment, could be maintained via expansion in government spending.

What these examples indicate is that there is a partisan difference between Democratic and Republican presidents with regard to military strategy and force structure, and this difference has significant implications on the size and substance of defense spending. Fordham's study provides systematic evidence for this trade-off between strategic and conventional force posture derived from partisan differences.²⁷⁷ It is important to note that this discussion of the trade-off presents a possible explanation for my results: the level of defense spending was significantly higher under Democratic administrations than Republican. Given the strategic emphasis on conventional military force, which requires more resources than strategic weapons systems to build and maintain, Democratic administrations spent more on national defense than Republican administrations.

The second possible explanation for increase in defense spending under Democratic presidents can be found in a theoretical synthesis of principal-agent models and issue ownership thesis. Rationalist principal-agent approach has recently been regarded as an alternative to the traditional civil-military relations theories in which Huntington and Janowitz are the towering figures.²⁷⁸ In particular, Feaver's agency theory argues that the relative influence of the political principals vis-à-vis the military is shaped by the following three factors: the preference gap, the

²⁷⁷ Fordham, "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending."

²⁷⁸ James Burk, "Review of Peter Feaver's *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*," *Armed Forces & Society* 30, no. 3 (2004).

possibility of punishment when the principals find the shirking of the military, and the modes of monitoring mechanisms (intrusive vs. non-intrusive).²⁷⁹

Particularly relevant to this dissertation is the first two variables. Various combinations of the preference gap and the punishability produce different outcomes for decision making. Civil-military controversies during the Clinton administration over foreign policy decisions related to interventions in Haiti and Kosovo can be explained employing the two factors. According to agency theory, in the Clinton administration, the preference gap between civilians and the military was wide, as was the case during the Cold War era. Yet, the military's expectation of punishment was substantially low due to the perceptions among the public and in the military that President Clinton was weak on defense issues. The combination of these two factors led to the shirking of the military, which was manifested when the military was trying to impose its own preference for use of force on decision making process.

A recent study by Holm attempted to create a theoretical synthesis of Feaver's agency model and the issue ownership thesis in order to explain how the military's political party affiliation distorts policy outcomes. Holm argued that the size of the policy preference gap between the military and the presidents is dependent upon the party of the president.²⁸⁰ This is a modified version of Feaver's agency theory because Feaver claims the preference gap between civilians and the military remains at the same width regardless of who the civilians are.²⁸¹ Holm

²⁷⁹ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*.

²⁸⁰ Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq".

²⁸¹ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, ch. 3.

maintained that under the Democratic control of the presidency, the preference gap tends to diverge whereas the opposite is true under the Republican presidents because of the military's Republican Party affiliation. The increased policy preference gap between the military and the Democratic presidents may intensify civil-military conflicts over the policy directions.

Lacking ownership over issues of national defense, the Democratic presidents may attempt to minimize civil-military conflicts by compromising their policy goals and producing policy outcomes closer to the preference of the military.²⁸² The Democratic presidents may disregard military advice or even punish the leadership of the military over civil-military disagreements. Yet Holm argues that Democratic presidents are more likely to be incentivized to take compromised positions due to their perceived weaker images on national defense. For Democratic presidents, policy disputes with the military would further undermine public confidence for their government over military matters. Thus, by deferring to military officers to avoid conflicts, the Democratic presidents can create an image of enjoying harmonious civil-military relations, and gain public support. Bacevich appears to agree with this line of thought when he says that "in comparison to their Republican counterparts, [Democrats] are at least as deferential to military officers and probably more reluctant to question claims of military expertise."²⁸³

²⁸² JR Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3 (1996); Urban, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms".

²⁸³ AJ Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). This quote was cited by Holm, "Military Partisanship: Its Origins and Consequences from Vietnam to Iraq", 54.

In contrast to the Democratic presidents' perceived need to appear in harmony with the military, the issue ownership theorists expect that Republican administrations will have an advantage in dealing with the military. Given the public perception of their competence in defense and national security matters, the Republican presidents will have more leeway when they interact with the military leadership: they can use the threat of punishment—an important means of civilian control of the military—under less constraints than the Democratic presidents. The perception of the higher possibility of punishment under Republican administrations may provide the military with incentives to agree with civilians' policy preferences, instead of challenging them. As a consequence, the military's influence on policy outcomes would diminish under Republican administrations.

Holm's argument can be applied to the finding of this study: If we assume that the level of defense spending indicates the extent of military influence²⁸⁴, a greater increase in defense spending under Democratic administrations can be explained by a theoretical combination of principal-agent models and issue ownership thesis. Due to the public perception that they lack competence in military policies, and because this creates a condition in which they feel constrained in using the threat or actual use of punishment against the military, Democratic presidents may be more willing to accept the military's preference than their Republican counterparts. This seems to explain a higher military spending under the Democratic administrations than the Republican ones.

²⁸⁴ SW Choi and P James, "Civil-Military Relations in a Neo-Kantian World, 1886-1992," *Armed Forces & Society* 30, no. 2 (2004).

To summarize, the results of this study suggest that the complexity of defense budget politics requires a modification of the conventional wisdom associated with ideology, military experience, and the partisan control of the presidency. In particular, it is important to note that the civil-military gap is one of many factors that influence the level of defense spending. Although the study presents a set of interesting findings that demand further investigation, probably the most important finding is that the impact of civil-military gap on defense spending is limited, contrary to the expectation of the proponents of gap thesis.

I treated defense spending as an element of military effectiveness. Military effectiveness has many dimensions and factors, and that indicates that there are a wide range of questions that await attention from scholars studying civil-military relations, the gap thesis in particular. It is apparent that not all civil-military gaps are policy-relevant. Even when they have relevance, the relationship of the gaps with policy outcomes may be limited or against expectations. Without empirical studies, however, we cannot rule out the null hypothesis that civil-military gaps have important policy implications. As Nielson correctly pointed out, the preoccupation with civilian control of the military among scholars of civil-military relations has left many important areas—including military effectiveness—understudied.²⁸⁵ This bias in the current scholarship of civil-military relations should be corrected by future studies.

²⁸⁵ Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Public Administration and Management* 10, no. 2 (2005).

3. Suggestions for Future Studies

This dissertation makes two suggestions for future studies. First, a theoretical synthesis of principal-agent models and issue ownership thesis can be a fruitful area of research in civil-military relations literature. In the previous section, I combined the two theoretical approaches to provide a possible explanation for the difference in defense spending patterns between Democratic and Republican administrations. A future study can explicitly test this tentative explanation by employing a more dynamic concept of issue ownership. I adopted a static concept of issue ownership, suggesting that Democratic presidents are under more constraints than Republican counterparts when controlling the military agent. However, some studies found that issue ownership is not static, but changeable.²⁸⁶ Particularly relevant is the influence of presidents' performance on the perception of issue ownership and its implication with regard to military spending. The changing extent of issue ownership due to successes and failures in defense policies and military operations may bring about varying degrees of constraints and opportunities for presidents. In other words, although the party of the president is a structural factor in claiming issue ownership, the public perception on how competently that president is dealing with military and security issues at a given time may determine the degree of political maneuvering of presidents, at least temporarily. In sum, theorizing the

²⁸⁶ Urben, "Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms"; DB Holian, "He's Stealing My Issues! Clinton's Crime Rhetoric and the Dynamics of Issue Ownership," *Political Behavior* 26, no. 2 (2004).

relationship between the dynamics of issue ownership and military spending, as well as other aspects of civil-military relations, is an area that awaits scholarly efforts.

Second, the possibility of military experience as a latent variable needs to be fully examined. A particularly interesting area of study would be the political behavior of military veterans concerning election and vote choices. In these research areas, scholars have found mixed results about the influence of military veterans on political behaviors.²⁸⁷ Theorizing the impact of military experience as a variable to be activated under certain political, economic and social conditions will broaden our understanding of what it means to be a military veteran in one's political life.

As this study showed, external threat as a potential factor that triggers the veteran effect can be a useful starting point. Studies of the role of perceived threats on behaviors have found that in the face of threat of mortality, people tend to take a conservative outlook as a way to eliminate uncertainty and to defend themselves.²⁸⁸ In this sense, Jost et al. define political conservatism as "motivated social cognition."²⁸⁹ If this tendency is true, it may be the case that military veterans are those who sensitively respond to external political threats due to their somewhat

²⁸⁷ Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War."; Bianco, "Last Post for" the Greatest Generation": The Policy Implications of the Decline of Military Experience in the US Congress."

²⁸⁸ J Duckitt and K Fisher, "The Impact of Social Threat on Worldview and Ideological Attitudes," *Political Psychology* 24, no. 1 (2003); JT Jost, BA Nosek, and SD Gosling, "Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3, no. 2 (2008).

²⁸⁹ JT Jost et al., "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition," *Psychological bulletin* 129, no. 3 (2003). Also see ———, "Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 33, no. 7 (2007).

cautious perspective toward interstate relations.²⁹⁰ This increased conservatism among military veterans may lead to a higher support for government policies and presidents than other subgroups.

²⁹⁰ Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium."

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