Freeing France: The Allies, the Résistance, and the JEDBURGHs

BY

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Abstract

General Dwight D. Eisenhower used the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur to conduct a guerilla war against German forces during the Allied campaigns in France. The study below examines the Allied politics, the nature and the development of the French Résistance, and the actions of the German forces in France to evaluate how useful the deployment of 93 JEDBURGH teams were in their role to conduct an effective guerilla war aiding Allied military objectives. Disagreements between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and resistance leader General Charles de Gaulle led to Eisenhower's inability to get the most out of the effort. Under certain conditions, Eisenhower and the French with British and American support achieved limited success. Eisenhower's recognition of de Gaulle's authority over the Résistance and his insistence on placing a French commander in charge of the effort proved to be the single greatest factor in the successes gained with the JEDBURGHS.

"The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."
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Glossary and Code Names – Foreign words in italics

AFHQ – Allied Forces Headquarters (Mediterranean Theater)
ANVIL – Allied invasion of Southern France
AS - Armée Secrète. French underground army
AMGOT – Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories
BCRA - Bureau Central Renseignements et d’Action
BRAL - Bureau de Renseignements et d’Action à Londres
BOA – Bureau d’Opérations Aériennes
CAIMEN – Airborne operation to be conducted by French Parachute forces
CDL – Comité départemental de Libération
CFLN - Comité français de la Libération nationale. French Committee of National Liberation.
CNR – Conseil nationale de la Résistance. National Council of the Resistance
COI - Coordinator of Information
COMAC - Comité d’action militaire. Committee for Military Action
COSSAC – Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command
DGSS - Direction générale des services spéciales.
DMR - Délegué Militaire Region. Military Regional Delegate
DMZ - Délegué Militaire Zone. Military Zonal Delegate
DRAGOON – Initial Operation for the invasion of southern France
EMFFI – Etat Major Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur. Headquarters of the FFI
FAI - Fédération anarchiste ibérique. Iberian Anarchist Federation
FFI - Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur. French Forces of the Interior
FN - Front national. Communist French resistance organization
G-3 – Operations Director or Staff
GMR – Groupes mobile de réserve. Vichy paramilitary units
JEDBURGH – Three man inter-allied teams sent to operate behind enemy lines
MBF - Miliärbefehshaber in Frankreich. Military Commander in France.
OB West – Oberbefehlshaber West. Military commander for France and Belgium
OG – Operational Group
OKW – Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Armed Forces High Command.
ORA – Organisation de Résistance de l’armée. French army units in the resistance
OSS - Office of Strategic Services
OSS/SO – Office of Strategic Services/Special Operations
OVERLORD – Allied plan to invade the continent of Europe set for 1944
PCF – Parti Communist Francais. French Communist Party
PIAT – Personnel, Individual Anti-Tank
PWE – Political Warfare Executive
POW – Prisoner of War
RAF – Royal Air Force
ROTC – Reserve Officer Training Corps
SAS – Special Air Service
SAARF – Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force
SD: Sicherheitsdienst. SS security service.
SS: Schutzstaffeln. Protection squads.
SHAEF – Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
STO – Service du travail obligatoire  German labor draft of French workers
SOE - Special Operations Executive
SPOC – Special Projects Operations Centre
SF Det. – Special Force Detachment
ULTRA – Allied program that provided decoded German radio messages to senior officials
USAAF – United States Army Air Forces
**Introduction**

There is more to war than fighting. What follows is a description of the battle for France in the summer of 1944. The French, British, Americans, and Germans involved in that battle either understood that there was more to war than fighting or suffered the consequences. If the battle for France can be viewed as a self-contained matter, that is to say the nature of the fighting would be defined by its own characteristics and distinct from the war in Italy, North Africa, the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union, Atlantic sea lanes, or the strategic bombing campaigns, then it should be viewed with a understanding and appreciation of those characteristics that made it unique. The complicated nature of the partisan warfare that occurred alongside the conventional invasions and air operations do not make it unique, however the planned use of partisan activity to support the conventional forces during their progress through France provide an opportunity to examine the impact of guerrilla style warfare; its successes and failures; and its utility as well as its thorny ethical dilemmas. WWII Allied commanders and the French Résistance agreed upon use of Special Force teams, code-named JEDBURGHS, to exploit French guerrilla warfare to support their conventional operations. But these three-man teams found themselves doing far more than combat tasks, and as some Allied planners had originally hoped, their cumulative effect was greater than the sum of their parts. Their role was more than fighting, but still inside of the realm of war.

The British and American political and military leaders viewed France as more of a military operation than a political one. It was, after all, *on the way* to
Berlin and furthermore, because the Germans had placed a large amount of their nations’ forces there it also served as a place to engage the enemy and destroy those forces. The Germans had 60 *Wehrmacht* and SS combat divisions in France, approximately 40 U-Boots in French ports, over 5,000 aircraft attempting to protect occupied French airspace in addition to an occupation civil-military force protecting and exploiting what were key war making resources. If both that military power and those resources were reduced, German war making would be substantially weakened. The German *Wehrmacht*, *Luftwaffe*, and *Kriegsmarine* based in France were therefore targets the Allies sought to destroy while at the same time denying Germany valuable French labor, mineral, and manufacturing resources required to wage industrial age war. With this in mind, the battle for France from the British and American point of view was largely a military problem that often obscured issues believed to be so pressing to their French allies.

The French viewed this battle as far more than simple geography and the enemy’s presence. For them this battle meant everything: their liberty, their independence as a nation, and so the French *Résistance* sought to define a new France that would achieve the lofty ideals of *Liberté, Egalité*, and *Fraternité* expressed in their 1789 Revolution. From their point of view, the very nature of the battle for France was political with the military issues supporting those fundamental political

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1 Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel, *The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5* (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006). The number of Divisions comes from their chart on page 474, the number of aircraft comes from their estimate in footnote 109 on page 528. The number of Submarines is based on the number given in German message traffic on the 5th of August, 1944 and decrypted by the British. See HW 1/3158, page 11 at the British National Archives.
goals that continued after the combat. As the novelist and résistant Albert Camus put it in the underground newspaper *Combat* in March of 1944, “… our common hope is that when that day comes, it [the Résistance] will retain enough momentum to inspire a new truth and a new France.”\(^2\) The French certainly agreed with the Atlantic Charter’s goal of self-determination as well as the American and British aim of “unconditional surrender,” but the Résistance had the added desire to re-achieve their own liberty, instead of the liberties of others as the British and Americans sought. Therefore, they sought the political goals of ending collaboration with Germany and making sure the Allies did not occupy them after combat had ejected the Germans. Such political aims, in addition to the tremendous wound the 1940 defeat struck in French pride, set the scene for several fundamental disagreements and much misunderstanding between the three parties.

The British had seriously contemplated many of these issues themselves in the summer and fall of 1940 when they greatly feared an invasion. They drew up contingency plans to fight “on the beaches, …,”\(^3\) in Winston Churchill’s famous speech, but they did more than talk and plan for it. The Royal Air Force fought a brave and fierce battle against the *Luftwaffe*, while the Royal Navy defended the sea approaches. The army, what there was of it after escaping destruction in Northern France, also reorganized a Home Guard that included a closely guarded secret of what

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they called Auxiliary Units. Should the Germans defeat and occupy Britain, these Auxiliary Units would then continue the fight using guerrilla warfare inside Britain.\(^4\)

As it happened the thinking and planning for these Auxiliary Units later led to the idea of doing that elsewhere in German occupied areas once invasion fears receded for Britain. Such an idea had great appeal due to the problem of coordinating the various resistance movements in occupied nations, and the British believed it would provide the needed training and more importantly, control of, irregular partisan bands of small resistance units scattered about occupied nations behind German main armies. What came to be known as JEDBURGH teams could be used, British planners believed, to maintain control over myriad resistance movements and harass German lines and conduct guerrilla warfare that supported the Allied military leadership’s wishes. In other words, it provided a measure of control of these very uncontrollable and distrusted groups who often sought their own political and military aims.

The United States, after a brief and unfounded fear of Japanese invasion, never seriously grappled with what should be done if the calamity of invasion and defeat occurred to it. Therefore, the American people and their political leaders never faced such defining political issues as intimately as circumstances forced upon the French. Indeed when it came to establishing national political aims, such as defeating Germany first or the profound political aim of unconditional surrender, there was no constructive national discussion. The American President Franklin D. Roosevelt

simply broached the topic of unconditional surrender with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and then, with the somewhat surprised Churchill sitting next to him, made it a *fait accompli* by announcing it at a press conference at the Casablanca conference in January of 1943. Clearly the manner in which President Roosevelt decided issues, even the grandest issues of them all such as unlimited war, and then forged ahead with them, often left his political allies both foreign and domestic in the lurch. Such resolution is often admired as being an essential element of statesmanlike leadership. However if it fails to keep pace with reality, the only term for it is stubbornness. Neither Roosevelt nor the Free French leader Charles de Gaulle ever managed to bridge this difference which arose due to the Anglo-American aim of defeating Germany by traveling through France. Free French goals were far grander than the Anglo-American ones. The French *Résistance* spoke in language of revolution and renewal and political aim while the Americans and British merely viewed France as a geographic waypoint on the road to Berlin. The gap then between each nation’s aims translated into tactical difficulties for the JEDBURGH teams as they attempted to work with the resistance groups in 93 different localities throughout France in the summer and fall of 1944.

Certainly political decisions have military and tactical consequences for troops in the field. The disagreement and misunderstanding between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle, with Churchill usually backing the President, fomented false notions of who might be a legitimate leader of the French *Résistance*,

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especially when the United States promoted a French General of its preference over
the preferences of thousands of French men and women risking their lives in its
various resistance movements. While one may have a constructive debate about the
legitimacy various Résistance movements possessed in order to select a leader for all
of France, one can conclude by Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s own words in the
Atlantic Charter that they had no standing in the matter. FDR and Churchill were
many things, but they were not French. Their persistence in pressuring the Free
French as to who would be their leaders led to distrust, deep suspicions, and
exasperation. Indeed, a great number of people in the various resistance groups often
found the lack of American support alarming. The British sent numerous agents into
France, tons of weapons, explosives, ammunition, and cash to various groups. The
United States did this as well, but since its efforts only gained traction in 1944,
suspicions persisted. The JEDBURGHs then, found themselves literally parachuting
into the gap created by the top-level political misunderstanding and lack of
appreciation of the other Ally’s war aims. Indeed, Roosevelt and de Gaulle never had
a constructive meeting where each man could explain face to face to the other their
nation’s concerns and goals. The two meetings they did have were largely staged
press events with the private discussions obscured by each man’s obdurate views on
the other’s role. Under certain conditions described below, the JEDBURGHs might
provide the locality where they operated a measure of political unity needed to
achieve their military mission. Many times, this pair of junior officers teamed with a
Non-Commissioned officer who served as the radio operator, could not bridge that
gap for reasons beyond their control. But nevertheless, the gap caused by disagreements between French resistance groups was often bridged with or without the aid of the Allied JEDBURGH units. For in the end, the French united themselves, on their own terms, and in ways reflecting their own history and culture.

Few were more grateful for that event than the man the Allies placed in charge of their military efforts in France, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. For him, it meant he would not have to become the military governor of France and could focus on organizing the American, British, French, Canadian, Polish, and other allied military forces to defeat Germany. When he took command at his Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), in January of 1944, Eisenhower understood two key issues regarding France. The first was that he would need the help of the Résistance to place pressure on the interior German lines of communications – their troops moving on roads and railroads would need to be impeded as they made their way to the invasion area, their communications would need to be interrupted as much as possible to keep the Germans from being able to organize an effective counter attack. Additionally, and perhaps the greatest thing the Résistance could provide, would be to perform local government functions, relieving Allied armies of this manpower intensive task. Eisenhower and de Gaulle had a frank and positive discussion just prior to Eisenhower taking up his new command. Eisenhower began planning with the French on all of the various matters involved and sought proper authority from the President and Prime Minister to do so more deeply. But Churchill
quickly stopped him, and Roosevelt’s approval did not come until well after the Allied invasion of France.

Nevertheless, from January of 1944 until D-Day on 6 June, despite the political difficulties, liaison and work with the French Résistance continued, if haltingly and inefficiently. Both the British and the Americans had organizations charged with guerilla warfare and these became the entities that brought about most of the constructive relations with the French and hazardous action against the Germans. The British organization charged with supporting, equipping, and training resistance groups in German occupied areas was the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Begun in the desperate clamor of June 1940 when Britain faced few options that would put it on the offensive, the SOE began to set up a worldwide network of clandestine agents and training schools. Eventually placed under the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), the SOE was led by a Scottish Major General Sir Colin Gubbins. Under Gubbin’s imaginative leadership, the SOE conducted sabotage and intelligence operations in every theater, while supplying indigenous resistance groups with weapons, training, and other resources. For operations in France, SOE created the “F Section” and gave it the charter to work independently of de Gaulle’s France Libre organization while the “RF Section” cooperated with de Gaulle’s Bureau Central Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA) or in English, the Central office of intelligence and action. Alternatively, “DF Section” set up myriad escape and evasion networks in order to spirit downed airmen out of enemy occupied France.6

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Many British political and military leaders had grave doubts about SOE and this kind of warfare. Churchill did not.

Winston Churchill had seen this kind of warfare personally when he experienced irregular warfare as a junior officer and newspaper reporter in Cuba, the Boer War, and subsequently as a cabinet member wrestling with the Irish question and the methods of the Irish Republican Army. These experiences placed solidly in Churchill’s mind the offensive role and power such irregular forces could have. As one of Churchill’s contemporary military strategists defined it, “Guerrilla warfare must always be dynamic and must maintain momentum.”

Basing these opinions largely on the writings and experiences of T. E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt against the Turks during the First World War, Basil H. Liddell Hart went on to say, “Static defense has no part in guerrilla action….” In other words, the nature of guerrilla warfare is inherently offensive. That attribute combined with the specter still resident in British memory of WWI casualties despite monumental national efforts made its political leaders loath, throughout the entirety of the Second World War to open up another western front. Therefore, to the British, in the dark days of 1940, and indeed even after America’s entry into WWII when hopes of victory brightened, the indirect quality of partisan warfare seemed a method Britain could use, along with strategic bombing, as they both offered an offensive action against the enemy while avoiding their fears of WWI-like stagnation and death.

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The United States found itself unprepared for combat as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor threw it into the Second World War. Among the capabilities it lacked was a centralized intelligence organization. Moreover, it had no one, with the exception of certain people in the Army and Marine Corps, who understood irregular warfare. Oddly enough every war in U. S. military history involved irregular warfare, but it was always over shadowed by what the regular forces had done in large unit actions. Only recently, among some historians has this kind of warfare begun to be noticed as a part of America’s history. So despite its experience fighting with and against Native American tribes since 1607, various guerrilla-style actions during the Civil War, the long running conflict that the United States conducted in the Philippines from 1899 to the 1930s, and numerous engagements in Asia, Latin America, and North Africa it has finally been recognized as America’s “First Way of War.”

The rare exception to this national amnesia was William J. Donovan. A Medal of Honor winner from the First World War and New York attorney, Donovan re-initiated an old school friendship with Democrat Party President Roosevelt despite being a solid Republican. After serving in President Coolidge’s Justice Department he started a New York City law firm specializing in Anti-Trust actions. He got into elective politics, which only led to a bitter and unsuccessful bid to succeed Roosevelt as New York’s governor in 1932. Afterward, he continued running his New York

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9 John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814* (Cambridge, UK : New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). In 2007, the Society of Military History awarded this work a co-winner of its Annual Book of the Year Award. Such accolades by professional military historians indicate the subject may now be more accepted and appreciated than before.
City law firm and became a wealthy man in the depression era world of corporate litigation. When rumors circulated that the President wanted to appoint a Republican to become his Secretary of War, Donovan believed he would be the man chosen. But despite initial positive indications from the President, and persistent lobbying by his co-Republican and even closer friend Navy Secretary Frank Knox, FDR nominated the venerable Henry L. Stimson for that post. Undeterred, Knox continued to push his friend to FDR and that resulted in sending Donovan to Britain to assess British fighting spirit and ability after France fell in 1940. Dispatched by Roosevelt on a globe trotting intelligence and fact finding mission in 1940, Donovan returned to provide FDR an impressive assessment of issues in the Mediterranean, Balkans, and British efforts to combat Hitler’s war efforts. Afterward, Donovan and journalist Edgar Mowrer, who had also been in London and seen, as Knox put it, “the French debacle” first hand authored a series of articles entitled “Fifth Column Lessons for America.” With these, they sought to enlighten Americans as to the methods used by Germany to weaken “the resistance of possible enemies and undermine the morale of countries they proposed to attack.” The articles may have served Roosevelt’s overall purpose of domestic propaganda in warning Americans of the real and not so real rising threats, but it and other discussions with Donovan

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12 Col. William J. Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, “Fifth Column Lessons for America” with an introduction by Frank Knox, American Council on Public Affairs, 1941. The term “Fifth Column” comes from General Emile Mola’s radio broadcast in the Spanish Civil War. He had four columns of troops marching on Madrid and spoke of a “Fifth Column” in Madrid ready to rise to support him. The term then became synonymous with enemy groups inside one’s borders. See David Stafford’s Churchill and Secret Service, p. 175.
fostered Roosevelt’s belief that he needed one centralized organization for intelligence. Convinced, Roosevelt made Donovan his Director of the newly established Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, before the Japanese attacked. When war declarations followed the attack on Pearl Harbor, Donovan convinced the President he needed more authority and again Roosevelt agreed this time making Donovan the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in June of 1942.

Roosevelt’s support did not guarantee smooth sailing for the new organization however. Donovan’s appointment as a Brigadier General with an independent budget and a direct line to the President did not sit well with many Generals and Admirals in Washington or, and more importantly, with the various theater commanders. But by establishing a network of spies and contacts in North Africa, before the theater commander was ever named to the post, Donovan earned the respect of that theater’s commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He proved to be an exception among General officers protecting their command prerogatives. When Eisenhower arrived in London to take over the command of OVERLORD and the effort to invade France, he was willing to support what the OSS and SOE had spent months planning. Fresh from a frank and constructive conversation with General de Gaulle, Eisenhower must have been pleased by the agents in France, the British efforts to airlift arms to them, and the cooperation with the French BCRA for the invasion of France then scheduled for May of 1944, just five months away. As he told de Gaulle, he needed the support

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of the French people and the OSS/SOE operations were going to be the means to communicate and exploit whatever the Résistance could accomplish.

While Eisenhower worked to get approval from Roosevelt for a fuller relationship with de Gaulle’s Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, (FFI) French planning continued, led by French Army officers in the BCRA. André Dewavrin, who used the pseudonym Colonel Passy, served as de Gaulle’s Director of the BCRA since its inception. He was an odd choice for such a role. In June of 1940 as Germany was defeating the French Army, Dewavrin was a young officer fresh off the boat from the failed British and French effort against the German army in Norway. Contemplating the national disaster of his nation occupied by the Germans and the new French government ordering officers to stand down in order to maintain neutrality, Dewavrin asked his commanding General if he should proceed on to North Africa with his unit or remain in the United Kingdom and join de Gaulle’s nascent, and at that point, still nameless effort. Encouraged to throw in with de Gaulle, Dewavrin appeared where the British had placed de Gaulle’s offices in London and reported for duty. De Gaulle looked over the 29-year-old and asked him the nature of his officer’s commission, what was he doing when the war broke out, what his degree was in, if he spoke English, and what he had just been doing in the Army up until that moment. It was a short and brief grilling with Dewavrin answering just as briefly. “Are you an active officer or reserve? Active. Brevet rank or permanent? Permanent. Where did you get your commission? Ecole Polytechnique. What degrees and qualifications do you have? Engineering and Law. What were you doing before mobilization? Teaching
at St. Cyr. Do you speak English? I have some conversational skills.” Finished with the interview and liking the answers de Gaulle replied, “Good. You are to be the chief of my 2nd and 3rd Bureaus in my headquarters.” In an instant, de Gaulle made Dewavrin his director of intelligence and operations. Thus the BCRA was born. Such is the state of affairs when beginning with nothing.

By the spring of 1944 and in cooperation with the SOE’s RF Section, the BCRA had sixty agents in France, serving as regional or national military delegates or assistants, beginning the final steps of asserting the French Provisional Government’s authority at the regional, departmental, and local level. The events of how the Résistance developed in this manner are covered in chapter two. However anyone who tries to convince an American audience of the courage, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and fortitude of the French during WWII is faced with a daunting challenge and people arguing the other side. Historian Douglas Porch’s articles and books on de Gaulle, the BCRA, and the Résistance all center around dispelling myths about their effectiveness. He catalogues their failures, mistakes, and missteps but more importantly persists with an underlying tone that de Gaulle was only in it for his own power and self-aggrandizement. At one point, he writes that the “Resistance had been created by spontaneous combustion in France, stoked by Churchill’s desire to

“set Europe ablaze” and de Gaulle’s search for legitimization.” While de Gaulle was certainly an arrogant man, arrogance in a nation’s leader is not uncommon nor should it be the sum of history’s judgment. Furthermore, he did not provoke the Résistance or work for its creation; it came about due to Germany’s actions in France and the hard work of others who sought liberation. De Gaulle started with nothing more than his determination to maintain the fight against Germany. Moreover, he did not start out with the aim of becoming France’s political or Résistance leader, but over the course of the war, took on the role when others would not and achieved his nation’s independence from the Germans and the Allies while largely succeeding at keeping the armed irregular resistance forces from running amok in liberated France.

France’s Second World War experience has persistently suffered from interpretations at odds with reality for a wide variety of reasons that will be more fully described below. But some of the more influential Journalists such as Alistair Horne and William L. Shirer and the highly regarded French historian Marc Bloch, pointed to deep societal weaknesses within French society as the cause of the disaster. Bloch’s book *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940* proved to be very influential due to his reputation as an historian, personal participant in the events described, and his later death at the hands of a firing squad for his

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17 Porch, "The Myth of the French Resistance."
activities in the *Résistance*. Many post-war French politicians used his book to
demonstrate the weaknesses in French society they sought to alter or abolish. In other
words, much of the post-war French memory of 1940 was used to demonstrate the
aspects of French society they had sought to destroy even before the German
invasion. Afterwards, viewing their own nation through the same lens, they loaded
the defeat of 1940 as new ammunition for their old arguments. However, others,
most notably Robert Young with his book *In Command of France: French Foreign
Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940* and Robert Doughty and his book *The
Breaking Point* related how the military was simply defeated at the Battle of Sedan in
June of 1940 due to doctrinal choices within the Defense Ministry and Army and that
was a sufficient explanation for France’s loss. Many other things about the chaotic
French government’s inability to manage their nation’s affairs may or may not be
ture, but they did not affect the outcome of Sedan.\(^\text{20}\)

Whichever side one may come down on about France’s defeat in 1940, what
is demonstrated below is that de Gaulle’s ability to unify Frenchmen of all political
backgrounds was real, and that French unity is what enabled it to achieve its Second
World War political and military goals to become the largest winner in the Battle for
France. Such a reality is often far from the discussion, even among many historians.
Any historian who argues otherwise is certainly swimming against the tide of public
opinion on the issue. Most Americans now believe that the French soldiers were

poorly equipped and led and that they were and continue to be, at their very core, cowardly. Or as the popular American television show, The Simpsons, infamously put it, the French are “cheese-eating-surrender-monkeys.”

Certainly, General Charles de Gaulle and those who chose to follow him could not be described in such ludicrous terms, nor could the two million French soldiers whose collaborationist government ordered them to surrender in June of 1940 be described with such an undeserving sobriquet. My own experience with French troops during an evacuation of American embassy staff and Peace Corps personnel on 10 June 1997 runs in glaring contrast to the belief that the French soldier lacks courage and ability compared to what the United States was willing to devote to that effort.

Nevertheless, there is enough evidence for any observer to pick and choose what they wish to argue given the complicated nature of wartime France. After all, French historians and philosophers, journalists, and politicians still struggle with how to describe the Résistance and after the war ended all of them developed meanings for the Résistance that served their post-war political purposes. Given that a wide

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22 For an account of the civil war and the fighting around the Brazzaville, Congo airport see: "Rivals Order Cease-Fire in Brazzaville, but Fighting Continues," The New York Times, June 12 1997. I personally witnessed French troops using their bodies to form a shield around 56 civilians in order to protect them. One French soldier was killed.

23 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). Rousso argues that in numerous facets of French cultural life, the historical facts of WWII France are shrouded by the nation’s failure to deal accurately with the events of 1940 immediately after the war and how the events of the 1944 Libération blurred the discussion. While his choice of the medical term “syndrome” to describe a nation’s culture is blurring itself, the discussion in his book is very revealing about French life, culture, and politics in the later half of the 20th century.
variety of people served in various capacities in the Résistance, and given the differing beginnings of these Résistance movements, it can be incredibly difficult to accurately describe its nature. Leading the confusion was de Gaulle himself, France’s “First Resister.” During and after the war he was on various sides of the issue describing the Résistance as a threat, then perpetuating the belief that France was a nation of resisters, and then later claiming that, “The Résistance was a bluff that came off.”

Certainly de Gaulle’s beliefs and comments of 1940, 1944, and 1958 came from different vantage points and by a man who saw things from different perspectives as he attempted to achieve different things. In 1940 he first wanted to rally regular French forces as a demonstration of the ability of a sovereign authority’s role in war. In 1944 and 1945 he sought to unify France and advanced a popular notion that the nation had resisted collaboration and German occupation. And finally, as French President during a new national crisis over the Algerian war, he wished to play down the role of the Résistance and the political traction the communists and others were getting out of their version of what the Résistance meant in order to diminish their importance as political rivals in 1958. Certainly one needs to be careful and understand the context in order to take the word of any of the participants at face value.

The rank and file of the Résistance further confuses the issue, and historians who have looked at those who were in the Résistance and why they joined have found all kinds of people in movements, groups, and units that are surprising. It would

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often be true that non-communists were in the communist movements and vice versa. The leadership of many *Maquis* or partisan units included “Vichyites” from the armistice army. And making the milieu even more complicated, a meaningful amount of the *Résistance* were immigrants from Spain, Italy, and Poland and deserters from German forces meaning that large parts of the French *Résistance* were not even French. The scholarship on this matter started slowly in the 1960s by mostly British and American scholars such as Peter Novick, H. R. Kedward, and John F. Sweets. And later, “Syndrome” or not, French scholarly work began in the late 1980s on the *Résistance* and now makes healthy and productive progress and is widely read by the French public. Their work attempts to describe more of the detail and the who, what, when, and where of the *Résistance*. So while the first works by the American and British historians, such as *The Résistance versus Vichy, In Search of the Maquis, The Politics of the Résistance in France, and Choices in Vichy France* began the process, the French historians along with British, French, and German historians have worked to further contextualized the *Résistance*, greatly clarifying my efforts to understand the Allied attempts to use the *Résistance* to support OVERLORD, ANVIL, and subsequent operations in France. The French historians efforts tend to fall along two major lines. First are regional histories, such as François Marcot’s, describing the *Résistance* efforts in various regions around France that have been incredibly useful and explain local issues, politics, and personalities allowing greater clarity with their decoding of many complex local issues. Along other lines, French Historians such as Laurent Douzou and his book on the resistance movement
Libération-Sud have allowed me to see what motivated certain resistance movements and gain insight into how they organized, how they were led, and what they sought to achieve.25

Some of the most intriguing issues on the Résistance lay within the topic of the relations between the Résistance in France, suffering under occupation, and the Résistance outside of France, residing in its colonies, Britain, or elsewhere. The relationship and tensions often define the nature of how the Résistance developed and matured and that impacted what the Résistance in France could do and for whom they would do it. But the two sides were of the same coin and they certainly realized they needed each other for various reasons, but due to their vastly different circumstances often failed to understand one another leading to rivalry, jealousy, and contempt. Often the greatest challenge then became smoothing over these issues in order to do what nearly all of the various leaders in the Résistance wished to do. Specifically, unite in order to fight the Germans and the collaborationist French government in Vichy in order to produce the France of their hopes, not the one that ended in calamity and defeat at the hands of German tanks.

Now that we have an understanding of the tensions involved in the vitally important relationship between the exterior Résistance, such as de Gaulle’s France Libre and the internal Résistance movements such as Henri Frenay’s Combat we can

begin to appreciate the complexities of governing the Résistance. Not only Sweets’ and Novick’s works, but also more recently two other former résistants from France Libre have completed impressive historical projects detailing this relationship. Jean Louis Crémieux-Brilhac’s work La France Libre: de l'appel du 18 juin à la Libération provides a comprehensive description of the establishment of what became France’s Provisional Government and how the interior movements came to join up with de Gaulle’s exterior efforts and formed a united Résistance. He describes how it coalesced and matured as well as how it governed North Africa and its relations with other nations, most notably the United States and Great Britain. For some of the more intriguing insights on the manner in which de Gaulle’s France Libre communicated with the interior Résistance, Daniel Cordier’s works on France’s most mysterious, mythologized, and romantic résistant, Jean Moulin has proved essential. He demonstrated the form in which the exterior and interior efforts first linked up and how they became more closely aligned, while never fully dispelling all the tensions.

Understanding the Résistance allows a greater clarity regarding the matter of why some JEDBURGH teams succeeded and others failed. Generally, as I will show below, if the local Résistance was well organized, successful at eluding the occupiers, and politically grounded locally as well as firmly linked with France Libre, the JEDBURGH team in such regions tended to succeed. If not, then their work became far more difficult. It is in this regard that this dissertation attempts to distinguish itself from other histories of Special Operations in France and especially other work on the JEDBURGHS. Dr. Samuel Lewis, a former professor of history at the Army
Command and Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, started work on the JEDBURGHs in the 1980s when the first of their reports were declassified. Subsequently, U. S. Army officers who spent time at the school produced Masters Theses on various aspects of the JEDBURGHs. Additionally, Arthur L. Funk, a Professor of History at the University of Florida has written books on Charles de Gaulle, Allied operations in North Africa, and in 1992 came out with, *Hidden Ally: The French Résistance, Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944.* Many of the JEDBURGH teams that operated in support of ANVIL are discussed in those pages. But Lewis and Funk, while first rate historians, were handicapped to a meaningful degree by the paucity of works on specific issues regarding the Résistance, as well as the unavailability of classified material that has only become available in the late 1990s and the first part of this decade. Since the British were the founders of the JEDBURGH plan, the opening of the SOE records, along with the released German coded messages or “ULTRA” decrypts, and the release of SOE agents’ personnel files in the custody of the Her Majesty’s Government has aided my efforts tremendously. In France the BCRA records are open, but with few exceptions, they have remained largely ignored. My own time with the BCRA records in Paris and the headquarters of the *Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur* records in the French Army Archives proved very valuable. More recently one of Lewis’ (and Sweets’) former students wrote a book on the JEDBURGHs that appeared in 2006 followed a few months later by writer Colin Beavan’s book. However, neither of these give any meaningful treatment of the nature of the Résistance nor do they provide context to
the issue due to the lack of research or discussion on the Germans and how they managed the Wehrmacht’s situation. They infer that Maquis action resulted from Allied and specifically, JEDBURGH team presence. I do not assume such a strong connection. In fact, the questions that animate my work are: how well did Eisenhower, via the JEDBURGH teams, control the French Résistance? To what extent did he have any control at all? When he did succeed, why, and under what conditions? Therefore, instead of assuming that everything the French accomplished toward their liberation was directly due to British and American support, I assume no such connection and seek to find the solid links and then test their utility against the backdrop of German operational goals.

As to the JEDBURGHs, the participants themselves, time has taken many from us. When I started research on them in 1997, there were few with whom I could speak, however persistence and some good fortune helped me locate, speak to, and write several of them. The former French JEDBURGH Joe de Francesco, who by that time had become an American citizen living in South Carolina, proved a great source. He had organized several reunions and provided me with recent addresses and phone numbers. In the end, I was fortunate to glean evidence from 13 American, French, and British JEDBURGHs. In 1943 and 1944 they had all taken oaths and signed promises not to talk for “50 years” according to one of them, but despite this, various things started leaking out.26 *Sub Rosa* by Thomas Braden and Stewart Alsop

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26 Michel de Bourbon-Parme, Interview with Author, 22 September 2007.
appeared in 1946 and discussed the OSS operations in WWII.\textsuperscript{27} Alsop had been a JEDBURGH and wrote vividly about a generic team and what the experience was like without using specifics. Another JEDBURGH, William Dreux published his account in 1971. \textit{No Bridges Blown} related his recruitment into the OSS, his training, his experiences in France and his overall frustration with the circumstances there.\textsuperscript{28} The title is telling for he expected to go into France and perform commando style work blowing up bridges but did none of that.

The British Jeds have also, for the most part, kept their silence. However Lieutenant Colonel Sir James Hutchison published his account \textit{That Drug Danger} in 1977.\textsuperscript{29} He was no run of the mill JEDBURGH as he ran SOE’s RF section before deploying to France and therefore had much more intimate knowledge of the French Underground. Another former JEDBURGH whose full and swashbuckling life can crowd out his JEDBURGH experiences was M. G. M. “Bing” Crosby. His book, \textit{Irregular Soldier} appeared in 1991.\textsuperscript{30} The French, with one notable exception, have kept their silence.\textsuperscript{31} Perhaps their silence hints at some of the differences between the Americans and British on one side and their French comrades on the other. With France moving directly from WWII into the brutal wars in Indo-China and Algeria, the French officers and NCOs maintained more of a wartime attitude about the nature

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Stewart Alsop and Thomas Wardell Braden, \textit{Sub Rosa; the O.-S.-S. And American Espionage} (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946).
  \item \textsuperscript{28} William B. Dreux, \textit{No Bridges Blown} (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Colonel Sir James Hutchison, \textit{That Drug Danger} (Montrose, Scotland, UK: Standard Press, 1977).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} M. G. M. “Bing” Crosby, \textit{Irregular Soldier} (Guernsey: Guernsey Press, Ltd., 1993).
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Paul Aussaresses, \textit{Pour La France: Services Spéciaux 1942-1954} (Monaco: Rocher, 2001), Paul Aussaresses, \textit{The Battle of the Casbah} (New York, N.Y. Lancaster: Enigma; Gazelle, 2002). In the second book, the former Jedburgh relates his experiences as the head of the Intelligence for his Battalion during the Battle of Algiers. His complete honesty of his actions shocked the French public and provoked the government to try him for various war crimes.
\end{itemize}
of their work. While there were 104 French JEDBURGHs, more than any other nation, they have kept their silence better (or worse if you wish to know their story) than the others.

But the men who knew the most about the program took what they knew about it to their graves. Leaving only the barest of descriptions in the Liddell Hart Centre at Kings College, London, Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman served as the SOE’s Chief of Western Europe and also as the British senior officer in the British-American amalgamated Headquarters called Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). He gave a few speeches after the war and may have written an unpublished memoir for his family, but in the end left few details about the utility and the wisdom of the JEDBURGH Plan. He passed away in 1978. His American counter part, Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, never spoke publicly about his role as the American Co-director of SFHQ, or about his time as Director of OSS London, Special Operations office. He did speak to some historians and authors, but provided only outlines of his work. He died in 1982 seemingly prouder of his time in the normal army and his service in the Battle of the Bulge. However, he did history one favor. He kept his papers, maps, photographs, and other items. After he passed away his daughters often wondered who might find them worthy of keeping. I did, and they rounded out other things I found in archives in the United States, Britain, and France. Mockler-Ferryman’s and Haskell’s French commander, General Pierre Koenig, also kept this effort secret. He was far more famous in France for other battles and actions in WWII and most of the French public preferred to hear about those activities and experiences, but had they
known how he fought the bureaucracy, with few but Eisenhower on his side, they may appreciate him all the more. General Koenig passed away in 1970 leaving very little behind about this matter, but a mound of his official papers that today are in the French Army Archives in Vincennes, France.

However, General Koenig, and his Chief of Staff, participated in a post-war U. S. Army History Office project to detail the role of the French *Résistance* in the *Libération* of France. The British also participated, but all three countries classified the result, a work of some 1600 pages of narrative, maps, and their original documents. Unfortunately, it has languished in the French Army Archives, in the US Army History Center at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and in the SOE archives nearly completely ignored ever since its declassification in the 1970s.\(^32\) But it is very revealing, and has, perhaps better than most other histories on the topic, laid out how the participants themselves viewed the role of the *Résistance* and how well the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces had exploited its ability toward Allied ends. For instance, it discusses the regional differences and how different *Résistance* groups operated throughout the country. It takes into account the various military and political roles the *Résistance* could and did play. And furthermore, it understands the overall strategic aims and the various phases of combat in France during 1944. Below, this work largely follows their lead, but enjoys the perspective

of more than 60 years, the fruit of numerous historians, and a great deal of German Army contemporaneous evidence.

Their history described eight operational phases regarding the involvement of the Résistance supporting overall Allied efforts in France. The first phase involved the actions supporting the Normandy invasion and that is chapter five below. The second phase was the liberation of Brittany to the west of the main Allied force and the effort to secure the ports and their right flank. I will discuss this aspect in chapter six. The third phase was the advance of the US 3rd Army along the Seine River towards the east. The forth phase was the actions to support the southern invasion operation. The fifth phase was the liberation of Paris. The sixth phase was the harassment of the enemy troops in their retreat from France’s southwest and south. I will use chapter seven to discuss these phases and the relevant actions of the JEDBURGHs. The seventh phase were the actions in the Vosges, Alsace, and Lorraine in eastern France, which will be chapter eight. The last phase was the actions in the Atlantic zone to keep pressure on the German forces in their positions around the French western ports. The pull of events and SHAEF’s demands alongside Hitler’s decisions drove these phases and their timing and the strategic nature and shape of the warfare in France. The phases, and thus the chapters often overlap chronologically, but for the sake of clarity, will be separated in the narrative below.

Their study concluded, in November 1945, that “the effort of the ‘Resistants’ is not capable of analysis in the form of a Balance Sheet. .... Clandestine and guerrilla warfare does not lend itself to an exact account of captives and materiel taken, such as would enable a figure to be given to the support provided by the FFI. The essential thing is that the importance of their contribution to the operations for the Liberation of FRANCE did not escape their Allies. The praise….which American Generals, and particularly General Eisenhower, have rendered to the FFI, handsomely takes the place of missing statistics.” The authors go on to state that better liaison methods should have been developed and better training provided to the Maquis. Then, piling on the opinions on the matter from the enemy as solid evidence, it quoted high-ranking German officers who also buttress the argument that the Ré sistance had a meaningful and important effect on the battle.34

But the story does not begin on 6 June with Operation OVERLORD. The idea of irregular warfare animates my study as much as the question of Eisenhower’s ability to control it. Therefore, the first four chapters of my study will discuss the creation of Allied Special Operations and how the Allies endeavored to use that capability with the French Ré sistance. Chapter one will show how the Allies created the capability to communicate with, train, and equip the resistance movements throughout German occupied territories, but specifically in France. British, and later American innovations in technology, specifically portable radios and heavy aircraft were key to the entire effort. Without such equipment, and the skilled military and

civilian people that operated and maintained them, the means to train, equip, and
direct the French Résistance simply would not have materialized. The Second World
War saw the first large-scale use of aircraft and radios to execute a guerilla war
behind the enemy’s lines and therefore it is a useful forum to examine its successes
and failures. The second chapter will discuss how the French Résistance began,
developed, and matured into a Provisional Government that gave political meaning to
France’s wartime efforts. The third and forth chapters will discuss Eisenhower’s
efforts to integrate the SOE/OSS/BCRA capability under the Résistance’s leadership
and the political headwinds he encountered from Roosevelt and Churchill.
Eisenhower, Koenig, Mockler-Ferryman, and Haskell certainly knew of all this at the
time, but their history does not explain these issues and much more has become clear
due to the fullness of time and the opening of all the nations’ records spread across
the relative military, civilian, and private archives.

But sixty-four years later, what have we learned about this issue that the
participants did not fully realize? How sincere or accurate were the Allied and
German comments immediately following the war? Is it really impossible to, as they
say above, produce a “Balance Sheet” to determine the effect of the Résistance?
What were the ill effects of histories written with ideological justifications or
motivated by revenge? Would it have been possible to better train and liaise with the
Résistance? Did Churchill, Roosevelt, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, Gubbins, Donovan,
Dewavrin and Koenig accurately assess the capabilities of the Résistance? Was the
JEDBURGH Plan adequate to the task? Why did events transpire differently in the
different regions? Or in sum, what was the nature of the partisan warfare and how well did the Allies work with the Résistance to achieve the aim of expelling the German Army?

As the novelist and Second World War SOE commando, Evelyn Waugh repeatedly wrote in his semi-autobiographical Sword of Honour trilogy, “quantitative judgments don’t apply.” Indeed, how can one measure results of the Battle of France when the United Kingdom, the United States, and France defined success so differently? Perhaps Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian and late Enlightenment thinker may prove helpful. In particular his thoughts regarding how a nation’s internal forces determine its wartime conduct are helpful. Clausewitz, having experienced war at the beginning of the Enlightenment era, his learning and thoughts on war were deeply influenced by Hegelian thought as well as patterned on the methods of Montesquieu. Not content with brief maxims and principles that sought, in an incomplete way, to describe warfare and provide a recipe for victory, Clausewitz endeavored to apply Enlightenment style methods and thinking to the problem of war and believed it could be better understood if issues that governed war, but lay beyond the battlefield, were rigorously explored. He also saw, as Peter Peret instructs us in his introductory essay in Clausewitz’s On War, that theory is best used as a way to seek understanding by providing a framework for asking questions and testing principles.


As Peret illustrated, Clausewitz did not think his theory should be viewed as the way things work universally, but rather as a means to generate the best questions in order to understand war. To this end, and with this realization in mind, Clausewitz asserted that war was governed by policy and therefore, due to human nature and the modern nation state, “when whole communities go to war – whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.”

He went on to warn that if war governed policy, or if war were a means in and of itself, it would quickly spiral out of control due to human emotions, frailties, and passions. “War is a pulsation of violence,” he wrote in his scientifically inspired prose, “variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges energy.”

Having seen war’s worst aspects personally in the Napoleonic wars and studying the bloody One Hundred Years War in Germany and then comparing them to the heavily stylized wars of that early Enlightenment, Clausewitz gained an insight illuminated by history. Noting the changes with the previous eras, specifically, the differences between how an aristocratic state conducts war and how a popular Republic may do so, he maintained that both kinds of polities remained governed by political aims in conducting their wars. There was no meaningful difference. But still wars, and even combatants in the same war, have their own unique character that “discharge energy” in their own way. Conducting a war with allies further complicates the matter as an Allied strategy is the fruit of their

37 Ibid., pp. 86 and 87.
38 Ibid., p. 87.
relationship and where there are gaps, there is a constant effort to sew the gaps together in order to conduct unified action against the common enemy. But the seams these Allies constantly had to sew together in order to unify their three sovereign authorities into coherent actions were often frayed and torn. My inquiry demonstrates that more often than not, the French, led by de Gaulle, were the most successful at knitting the seams of Allied policy together, while President Roosevelt was usually attempting to stitch into the fabric of French sovereignty his choice for who would lead France.

For the purposes of the events described below it may then be helpful to think of the American, British, French, and German “Paradoxical Trinity,” as Clausewitz referred to it, and the forces that governed how each nation’s trinity defined their unique war aims, how they hoped to achieve them, and the extent to which it endured hardships in order to create the capability required for victory on its terms. Or as he stated, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”39 Defining the “Paradoxical Trinity,” Clausewitz assigned to the government the aspect of “reason” and that it must govern the violence, the passion, and elicit the required endurance of the people commiserate with the war’s aims. The population, both in an aristocracy and in the liberal democratic states that would later emerge in Europe, was the source of the war’s passion and would define the extent to which violence could be used in the war. If the people could not endure, nor wished to respond with high levels of violence, it

39 Ibid., p. 87.
would impact the nature of the war and the extent to which arms and weapons could be employed against the enemy. To the army, and more pointedly, to the commander of that army, Clausewitz assigned the element of chance. “The scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army,” wrote Clausewitz and he and subsequent military professionals, have labored long and hard to devise methods for educating and training commanders attempting to reproduce Napoleon’s genius, in order to limit chance, unpredictability, the “fog of war,” or as it is often simply put, “bad luck.” But to further complicate matters, each one of the three “tendencies” of reason, (the government), violence (the people), and chance (the commander and army), are in an ever-changing relationship with the other two. Re-emphasizing that his thoughts were the basis of a theory, “Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies,” that would be useful for examining war’s nature. For the author, as well as for you the reader, these tendencies and the relationship between them may prove useful as we move between each of the four different combatants’ “Paradoxical Trinities” to understand the nature of the Battle for France. Clausewitz’s discussion of politics and war is useful because the four different combatants’ political aims were different, therefore how each one fought would be defined by what they sought.

The JEDBURGHS, the tool the Allies and the exterior FFI created to control the interior Résistance, often found themselves trying to tamp down local Maquis groups rather than incite them. Maquis passion sprang from significantly greater
French passion for achieving their more profound war aims relative to the interests of the U.S. and U.K. that regarded France as merely a military objective on the way to defeating Germany. For the French Résistance, freeing France demanded far more fundamental action. Controlling and focusing Maquis violence demanded that the JEDBURGHs understand that there was more to their war than fighting.
Chapter One
How the British and Americans designed and developed the JEDBURGHs

Partisan warfare’s roots reach back to ancient days, but it has changed in important ways. In the 6th Century B.C. Herodotus wrote of the Scythians and how they, unfettered by any link to specific territory could strike hard and then melt away just as quickly. In his terse reply back to Persian King Darius, the Scythian leader Idanthrysus explained, “We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to fight with you.” Unable to make the Scythians stand and fight, afraid of being cut off, fearing cryptic threats, weary of constant nightly ambushes, and running low on supplies, Herodotus wrote that Darius retreated. Herodotus’ fascination with what today is often called culture is central to understanding how any polity waged its wars. The nature of a culture’s structure defines what it believes worthy of risking defeat and death for while also determining how it will resist or if it will resist at all. For the ancient Scythians, they were deft enough to make their nomadic culture an advantage and managed to defeat a greater power. But it is important to note that neither they, nor almost any other partisan warfare leader, chooses the method today we would call unconventional warfare. They use it because that is their only option.

* The terms guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, fifth columns, unconventional warfare, and commandos
In the early and mid-20th century, the British had experiences, and a few heroes, who had fought in guerrilla or partisan campaigns in order to defend and maintain their expansive empire. But British tactical employment of offensive partisan warfare often masked the overall British strategic aim to maintain and defend what they had in India, east and southern Africa. It also, of course, had been carried out abroad giving it a romantic and exotic sense, the stuff of high adventure and allure that it would not have had if they had to soberly face the prospect of such things within Great Britain. Of course the Irish Question, the birth of the Irish Republican Army and their use of violence, terrorism, threats, brought guerrilla warfare to the forefront and the British government found itself having to contend with it and contrive a way to counter and defeat the IRA. Concurrently, T. E. Lawrence, one of the heroes and leading theorists of partisan warfare published articles and later his book, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, explaining the power of guerilla warfare and his experiences in the Arab Revolt. During the First World War, the British encouraged the Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans, forcing the Ottomans to have to worry about their rear areas in addition to fighting along a conventional front as the British Army attempted its drive out of Egypt into Palestine. Playing upon latent anti-Ottoman sentiment, and succeeding in uniting the Arabs just enough to enable them to work together, “Lawrence of Arabia” offered an influential and guiding theory for how and

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why such efforts succeeded. One of his most avid followers and enthusiastic disciples was Winston S. Churchill.

Churchill often over-emphasized the effectiveness of partisans fighting on their own while failing to fully recognize the required relationship between conventional units and partisan bands working together to fight a common enemy. His personal experience with guerrilla warfare, intelligence, spies, and espionage appealed to his imaginative and wide ranging intellect. As a young army officer and war correspondent, he had fought in Africa against the Sudanese tribes and the Boers. He covered actions in Cuba, Afghanistan, Egypt, and again back in Africa. He honed his writing skills on these experiences, publishing articles and books including the still highly regarded *The River War*. In politics he grew especially concerned about Bolshevik movements in Britain and developed his own intelligence apparatus to keep tabs on them. As a more senior member of parliament with portfolios of War and later Colonial Minister he worked hard to come to terms with the Irish Republican Army. After the spectacular and violent effects of the Easter Uprising and the “Bloody Sunday” assassinations, organized by the IRA Intelligence Chief Michael Collins, he proved a key negotiator in David Lloyd George’s government that granted some concessions for Irish Home Rule. In the 1930s while out of the government, Churchill developed a reliable intelligence network that kept him apprised of the growing German military capability. Whether in or out of government, he had a thirst and a love for all aspects of such partisan warfare,
intelligence, revolution, and revolt. It served as a driving force for much that he did as Prime Minister as the Second World War began.³

Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, provoked the British government to declare war and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to ask Churchill to leave the backbenches of Parliament and join the government. Now Churchill was in his element. The British Army had forces dispatched to Poland and with them some intelligence service operatives. Their presence was indeed fortunate, for while the Polish and the British Expeditionary Force were quickly defeated, they managed to spirit out of Poland the German Army’s encryption and cipher device known as the ENIGMA machine. Back in England, they began to use it to decrypt German army dispatches and, as the war progressed, other kinds of coded radio traffic as well. Miraculously, the Germans maintained their belief in their secure radio communications during the entire war giving the Allies no end of extremely useful intelligence and Churchill proved to be the kind of leader who delighted in what he called, his “golden eggs.”⁴

One of the British Army’s intelligence officers in the Polish expedition was Colonel Colin Gubbins. A WWI veteran who had served in Ireland as well where he soon found that he was “being shot at from behind hedges by men in trilbys and mackintoshes and not allowed to shoot back!”⁵ Additionally he served in the British Expeditionary forces in Murmansk that had attempted to fight the Bolsheviks during

⁴ Stafford, Churchill and the Secret Service., p. 189.
the Russian Revolution. A man of great intellect who handled new languages easily, the Army asked him to help author their 1939 instruction on subversive warfare. The effort resulted in the *Partisan Leaders’ Handbook* which emphasized tactical issues such as ambushes and killing enemy informers. But the next year, Gubbins’s thoughts matured and he now believed “if guerrilla warfare is coordinated and also related to main operations, it should, in favourable circumstances, cause such a diversion of enemy strength as eventually to present decisive opportunities to the main forces.” Historian David Stafford asserted “Knowingly or not, they [the British] were often following techniques that had been pioneered in Ireland by Michael Collins.” But certainly Gubbins and other British Army officers who read or knew Lawrence personally, fought against Collins and the IRA, and observed and pondered the meaning of the “Fifth Column” activities in the Spanish Civil War, realized this was a different method that might prove useful for the British to implement. Reflecting on their experiences they realized that partisan warfare was inherently offensive in nature and would be its most useful when coordinated with conventional land forces.

Gubbins and the rest of his unit, known as No. 4 Military Mission, escaped from Poland via Romania and then via sea. Also with him was Captain Peter Wilkinson. Wilkinson was a regular army officer, Cambridge graduate, and son of an Indian Army officer who had not survived WWI. Gubbins thought enough of Wilkinson to ask that he be in his liaison office back in London while Gubbins took No. 4 Military Mission to Paris, attempting to do better than they had done in Poland.

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Their mission was to liaise and cooperate with the preparation of French defenses while maintaining their links inside Poland and in the Balkans. Wilkinson greatly admired Gubbins and was relieved to be working with him again. However, their efforts in France ended when the Germans invaded France in May 1940. French forces had to fall back and the British Expeditionary Force found itself evacuating across the English Channel in a pell-mell flurry of activity from the end of May until the early June. Wilkinson had flown across from Paris and Gubbins found him in London and asked him to come to work with him on another assignment. Gubbins wanted Wilkinson to help set up a resistance movement inside Britain “in the event, which now seemed likely, that the Germans invaded the British Isles.”

It appears Gubbins and many in the British Army would press the fight, as Churchill now exhorted all the British to do, but with any available means. Now they began the planning to resist using their methods learned from Michael Collins, the Soviets, the Spanish, and T. E. Lawrence.

Churchill, who became Prime Minister when the Germans invaded France, now faced the daunting challenge of defending Britain against an attack but governed a demoralized nation and an army in a state of great confusion. Even more catastrophic to Britain, France’s capitulation left it with no solid ally on the European continent. British policy had assumed France would maintain its own defense and provide a bulwark for Britain that could effectively prevent the German Wehrmacht from reaching the English Channel. One can see Churchill’s predicament in a sober

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note to President Roosevelt late in the evening of 12 June 1940. He attempted to help French leaders maintain the fighting spirit by encouraging them and noting to Roosevelt that the new Undersecretary of State for National Defense, “a young General de Gaulle” was for fighting on but feared that “the aged Marshal Pétain who was none too good in April and July of 1918 is I fear ready to lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace for France.” Churchill pressed Roosevelt to help stiffen French resolve, related that he had emphasized to the French that Germany would ultimately lose the war and Britain would continue to fight on, alone, if necessary. But then fearing imminent invasion he begged U. S. Ambassador Joseph Kennedy for more aircraft and destroyers as the Royal Navy had lost two the previous day.8 Churchill’s cable to Roosevelt frames the issues as well as the people involved over the course of the war until the liberation of France. Both Britain and France had leaders who believed in the possibility of defeating Germany, but Britain’s greatest believer was able to maintain British will to fight, while General Charles de Gaulle was a junior general and according to his memoirs, unwilling to think of things outside his military role, despite his new position in France’s government. His entreaties to senior French generals fell on deaf ears or were met with scorn.9

But what tools would the British have? Pondering their fate, and infused with Churchill’s determination to fight on, the British believed that subversive warfare and


fomenting their own Fifth Columns within Occupied Europe was something they must begin to do. Furthermore, they had to create the capability within Britain to wage an insurgency should the Germans defeat and occupy them. The difficulty lay in how to organize such an office, should it be military or civilian? Should it report to the Cabinet or be represented itself there? And who should lead it? Furthermore, what would its overall objective be? The resulting deliberations, estimates, and discussions determined that the office should be headed by a civilian, it would report to the cabinet through the Minister for Economic Warfare, and its leader would be Hugh Dalton. Churchill appointed Dalton, a veteran of WWI’s French and Italian theaters and a well respected Labour MP, to be Minister of Economic Warfare overseeing all efforts to strangle Germany’s economy. The newly formed Special Operations Executive (SOE) would secretly reside inside the Ministry. In June and July of 1940, while Pétain was establishing his armistice with the Germans and his government in the spa town of Vichy, Churchill approved Dalton’s proposal that gave him pieces of intelligence organizations from the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). But more importantly, Churchill approved Dalton’s authority to create his own staff and add new capabilities as he saw fit. Such authority proved valuable to Dalton as the politics in establishing a new organization and taking pieces out of other well-established parts of the government were bruising.  

But Dalton proved up to the task. He believed subversion and sabotage had to be linked clearly to political wartime aims. His successor, the conservative MP Rondell Cecil Palmer, Third Earl of Selbourne, became head of SOE on 22 February 1942 and successfully maintained SOE’s existence by working diligently to keep his agents’ actions within the bounds of British policy so as not to be at cross purposes with the Foreign Office and theater commanders. Colin Gubbins had been brought into SOE at its inception and at first placed in charge of organizing the Auxiliary Units for conducting resistance against the Germans should they succeed in their invasion. Later, he took on training, linking SOE efforts with the Joint Planning Staff, and ensuring SOE procedures linked smoothly with the RAF and Navy. He performed these functions exceedingly well. He organized the establishment of over fifty secret training facilities and his reputation at working with other parts of the government enabled him to be named as the Executive of SOE in September of 1943 when a severe row occurred. SOE operations in the Balkans and Greece caused the theater commander to complain, forcing the issue to Churchill. Selbourne fired the Executive in charge of SOE, Charles Hambro, and promoted Gubbins, now a Major General to the position. Thus Selbourne maintained his position as Cabinet Member responsible for Political Warfare while Gubbins directed SOE. Further solidifying SOE’s stature in the war effort, the American-British planning staff responsible for designing the invasion of Northwest Europe assumed control of SOE for the purposes

of linking partisan action with their conventional efforts on 30 September 1943. As the author of the official history of SOE noted, a military man running SOE at the very time the Allied level of effort began to be concentrated more on the invasion of Europe proved to further legitimate SOE’s role. Dalton’s views on sabotage and subversion were often animated by his left-wing views, but Gubbin’s belief emphasizing coordination with conventional forces now nicely matched Allied needs. In other words, SOE was now led by a man believing the best way to use a fifth column centered on participating with the other “four columns” of conventional forces in a highly coordinated way.

However there are great difficulties of both military technique, coordination with partisan forces, defining strategic aims, and just as importantly, morality. Of the latter kind, Gubbin’s leading planner for the Auxiliary Units encountered resistance that he, almost glibly believed to be centered on defeatism. As Peter Wilkinson traveled about in the summer of 1940 organizing and preparing the Auxiliary Units to fight a German invasion he briefed senior Home Guard leaders letting them in on the very secret preparations and soliciting their advice on how local efforts could best be coordinated to Britain’s national defense. In what he called an “awkward interview” with Sir Will Spens, Regional Commissioner for East Anglia, he found himself unable to answer to his objections. Before the war Spens had been a Master at Cambridge and Wilkinson knew him from his days there as a student. He greatly

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admired him and briefed him in detail about the Auxiliary Units and their role in Spens’ area of responsibility. “He listened attentively,” Wilkinson later wrote,

“while I described what Auxiliary Units hoped to achieve. After a moment’s thought, he replied that he was not convinced that clandestine resistance of this sort could serve any useful purpose. It was moreover, bound to provoke severe reprisals against innocent civilians whom it was his first duty to protect. He felt obliged, therefore, to warn me in no uncertain terms that if any member of Auxiliary Units was found acting illegally in his region, either before or after a German occupation, he would be arrested and severely punished. This remark was in stark contrast to Mr. Churchill’s exhortations to fight on to the bitter end, but its logic was unanswerable and I walked sadly away for I had great respect for my Master’s intellectual integrity. It was my first encounter with the Pétainiste argument against which SOE was to strive, so often in vain, while trying to fan the sparks of French Résistance.”

Wilkinson’s inability to answer Spens’ objection reveals an important issue that remained unanswered during the entire war: Specifically, the western tradition of the use of armed forces as the right of the state, only. Spen’s concern is an age old one that was largely solved with the consolidation of state authority around a central government and its prerogative to be the sole authority over armed forces. Irregulars conducting combat operations and supporting conventional military forces were outside the tradition and as Spens believed, they were also outside the law. Wilkinson’s unfortunate use of the pejorative “Pétainiste” however, masked the issue. Who had the legitimate authority to use partisan forces and how would they be controlled? How would they be punished for excess and abuse when they went too far? The answers would determine how the British government, according to its constitution, laws, and tradition, could deal with the matter. Since the Germans never invaded, the British avoided the issue for their own nation. But as the British sought

to use irregular warfare against the Germans in occupied nations, with irregular forces comprised of people from other nations, under whose authority would they fall? As we will see, the issue remained a vital one for the French and will be discussed more in chapter two and aspects of it will play out throughout the remainder of this study.

By the fall of 1942, German invasion no longer seemed a realistic threat. Now the Soviet Union, which had signed a treaty of Non-Aggression with Germany in 1939, had been completely blindsided when Hitler launched Operation BARBAROSSA and invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. But by the fall of 1942 Germany’s efforts there were stalling. Proving equally beneficial for the British was the Japanese attack on the American Pacific naval base at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. That event brought the United States formally into the war with declarations of war from Germany and Italy upon the United States. Upon hearing the news that the United States was declaring war on Japan and would be openly joining the Second World War, Churchill reportedly slept soundly for the first time in months. However, new Allies drove shifting war aims and as Churchill later remarked, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, that is fighting without them!”\footnote{Alan Brooke Alanbrooke, Daniel Todman, and Alex Danchev, \textit{War Diaries, 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). p. 680.} So while having the Soviets and Americans as allies in the war against Germany, Italy, and Japan was beneficial, it now meant grander objectives were possible. No longer was air, naval, and irregular warfare around the periphery of occupied Europe the only option. Large-scale offensive operations and invasion of the European continent could be conducted, and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
demanded it. President Roosevelt and his generals developed a series of plans that
never saw implementation and produced little but animosity between the three allied
countries.\textsuperscript{17}

Wilkinson, now responsible for SOE’s contribution to the overall plan for
what became SLEDGEHAMMER, put his fertile mind to work. In the fall of 1942 he
and a colleague worked under the assumption that the Allies would invade Europe
during the following summer and this “would trigger a wave of spontaneous
insurgency in occupied Europe.”\textsuperscript{18} They also knew of large number of young men
joining the \textit{Résistance} in France, often described with the term \textit{Maquis},\textsuperscript{*} to avoid the
Vichy and German draft labor programs. Rather than be deported to Germany to
work, many young men were living in the hills and woods of southern France or left
their current home to hide with friends of family.\textsuperscript{19} Wilkinson and many SOE
planners believed the unpopular labor draft programs would provide the \textit{Résistance}
army its manpower. But how could they be trained and equipped to act according to
Allied plans? Over the course of that fall and winter, they conceived of the idea of
small parties of British soldiers, three men to be exact, who would parachute in to
pre-identified \textit{Maquis} bands and direct them in the accomplishment of tactical

\textsuperscript{17} Alex Danchev, “Biffing: The Saga of the Second Front,” in Theodore A. Wilson and Eisenhower
Foundation (Abilene Kan.), \textit{D-Day, 1944, Modern War Studies} (Lawrence, Kan.: Published for the
a detailed work on the relations and conduct of the Allied planning staffs see Mark A. Stoler, \textit{Allies
and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II}


\textsuperscript{*} \textit{Maquis} is French and is a word for a form of Corsican underbrush. It became a widely used
colloquialism describing the French resistance bands hiding in the forests of central and southern
France during the spring and summer of 1943.

\textsuperscript{19} Kedward, \textit{In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944}. pp. 73 – 160.
objectives. Thinking they had only six months before the Allies would invade France, Wilkinson, wrote, “The problem seemed to me to be two-fold. First, how to harness this considerable Résistance potential so as to support the regular invasion forces; and secondly, and no less important, how to prevent these volunteers getting in the way both of the regular operations and of SOE’s clandestine actions.” He proposed that an officer, a demolitions expert, and a radio operator be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines at the time of the invasion. They would coordinate the actions of the Résistance with the nearest British or American Corps commander who would have assigned to him a special force detachment with his operations staff. Gubbins directed Wilkinson and others to start serious planning and develop the idea more fully.

While Wilkinson and SOE Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rowlandson worked on the details, Gubbins started the approval process and began discussions with the Americans. In July of 1942, Gubbins or his representatives had won approval for the continued planning on the concept from the General Headquarters of the Home Forces to continue planning and to come up with schemes for exercising the concept. Also, the Americans agreed to contribute 50% of the men necessary to put the JEDBURGHs in the field. On 22 July, the British and Americans agreed on a planning number of 70 teams. Over the course of August and September, SOE and members of the American delegation discussed the challenges of recruiting the right

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21 Ibid. p. 128.
kind of men for the operation and what kind of Résistance they might find in France.\textsuperscript{22}

The earliest surviving planning document on the JEDBURGHs described the JEDBURGH mission as one of solving the dilemma of how to link the “Resistance Groups (‘Secret Armies’) with conventional forces on the day major combat operations commenced.” They were to conduct operations that furthered military aims when neither the SOE agent, nor the Résistance Group was believed to be capable of conducting them. Needing at least 72 hours to establish conduct and organize an operation, the authors of the paper believed JEDBURGHs should not be asked to undertake their task immediately upon arrival. Moreover, the paper stressed that JEDBURGHs should not be deployed too near the front or their work will be given “short shrift,” as SOE planners believed the Germans would have policed up all local Résistance near their front leaving few Maquis to direct. Wilkinson emphasized operations would concentrate on harassing or destroying aspects of the enemy’s line of communications, enemy railways, enemy aircraft, enemy commands and staff, vehicles and ammunition, supplies, and other opportunities that may present themselves. For friendly troops, JEDBURGHs would pass along intelligence on enemy movements, act as guides, or prevent the destruction of valuable resources the Allied command believed it may soon need.\textsuperscript{23} The focus of the paper is very tactical in that its tasks link the command of the JEDBURGHs to the closest Corps or

\textsuperscript{22} “JEDBURGH Operations,” 30 March 1943, Policy and Planning JEDBURGHs for OVERLORD, HS 8/288, British National Archives, Kew, UK.

\textsuperscript{23} “Review of SPARTAN,” 6 April 1943, HS 8/288, BNA.
Division and therefore JEDBURGH objectives focused on aiding that commander’s goals. However, the result of their exercise would alter the initial thinking on JEDBURGH employment.

Approved by Home Forces to participate in the Exercise SPARTAN, a training exercise carried out in March 1943, Wilkinson and other SOE and OSS officers brought 11 teams of JEDBURGHs to run operations against the Canadian army units. SOE’s teams of partisans and JEDBURGHs were integrated into the exercise and immediately their benefits came to the fore. The results however, “did not in all cases correspond with preconceived ideas on their employment.”24 The JEDBURGH teams consisted of a British officer, a second in command, and a wireless radio operator. They linked up with resistance groups, code named “Boykins” after the American hunting dog, and focused their efforts on reconnaissance and scouting duties for the main forces. They discovered that the Army headquarters staff needed more people to work the link with the Résistance and suggested specific functions and roles for those personnel. They also confirmed that the resistance tasks should not be too close to the front due to the time lag it takes to organize a Maquis group to strike a target. The exercise planners suggested a time allotment of at least 48 hours. Such a delay then forced the recognition that JEDBURGHs and resistance groups could be best used on Strategic targets instead of tactical targets benefiting one battalion or similar sized unit. Wilkinson and his

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fellow planners then believed that the idea would be best employed if linked at the Army H. Q. level and that it should be properly staffed.\textsuperscript{25}

The last major lesson learned from SPARTAN was also a fundamental one fraught with implications. Rather than simply putting an officer on the team who spoke the language of the country in which they operated, SOE now believed it should have an indigenous officer as a team member. Requiring this necessitated the recruitment of French, Dutch, and Belgians. Furthermore, they were to operate in uniform, be given a set of tasks to accomplish prior to their deployment, and be received by SOE agents already operating in the area. For these reasons as well as the reasons noted in the exercise report, the teams were considered as more strategic. That is to say the cumulative effect of many teams would be greater than the sum of each team. Moreover, they hoped that seeing a uniformed officer from their own nation on the team would have a positive effect on local morale and \textit{Résistance}.\textsuperscript{26}

The exercise had another important effect; it sold the Americans on the plan and solidified their participation. Early in 1942, the Office of Strategic Services began appearing in London in as a result of the first British/US cooperative efforts begun between William J. Donovan and William Stephenson. Stephenson was the man the British sent to New York to run intelligence for their operations in North America and his mission was two fold. First, to ingratiate British special operations and intelligence with the American counterparts, who were just now standing up their organization, and two to develop Canadian resources for such missions as SOE would

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. p. 5 – 6.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. p. 8.
need from them. Donovan also welcomed the coterie of people Stephenson arranged to train Americans in intelligence and covert operations. OSS then found various people to learn from them and acquired training facilities around Washington, D.C. (The current Camp David was one of them and became a site for JEDBURGH training.) The OSS and Donovan became dependent upon this British connection for expertise and sought to locate an office in London for work with the expected invasion of Europe. However, the British did not want the OSS, an organization that did both intelligence work and covert operations, in London so an agreement was reached that the OSS would not conduct unilateral operations. The agreement allowed the OSS to get into the game, so to speak, by putting an office in what was going to be a major theater of operations. However, living under the promise made between Donovan and the British chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Stewart Menzies in early 1942, grew more and more difficult by the beginning of 1944 when OSS in London believed they were able to go it alone outside their British tutors.27

Donovan sent David K. E. Bruce to London to run Secret Intelligence for the Western European Theater. Bruce was a Virginian and an accomplished lawyer, state legislator, and publisher who told Donovan he did not know anything about running an intelligence organization. Not dissuaded, Donovan, who had long ago earned the nickname “Wild Bill”, told him not to worry. “Nobody else does,” he replied. “And

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I’ve already provided for that.” He directed Bruce to see Stephenson in New York.

After some schooling from the British in the United States and some time in Washington as OSS got its feet under it, Donovan sent Bruce to London to replace his initial man there who, apparently had not been very well received. The British immediately viewed Bruce as a man they could work with and he kept his promise to run covert operations only in conjunction with the British.\(^{28}\) OSS needed to show results back in Washington as Donovan fought bureaucratic battles daily against those who did not understand or did not know what OSS could do for the war. Perhaps in this light OSS greatest strength, was also its greatest weakness. While its birth can be attributed to FDR’s friendship and belief in Donovan, that friendship and belief during the rest of Roosevelt’s life proved to be barely enough to maintain the OSS against its detractors. And when Roosevelt died, his successor closed it down.

Without Congressional approval, which would have given it a budget line and a measure of independence, FDR merely funded OSS out of his own wartime emergency funds.\(^{29}\) Furthermore, he subordinated OSS to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, OSS in Washington had to show tangible results that benefited the Army and Navy but the deal they made with the British, while getting them in the European theater, hobbled their ability to conduct operations for which they could claim sole credit. Therefore, when the OSS London observer, Captain Franklin Canfield watched exercise SPARTAN in March of 1943 he realized the JEDBURGH plan


provided a golden opportunity. The OSS could meaningfully participate in operations that supported the invasion while doing it with the British. So while the OSS got participation, the SOE and the British received the greatest attribute the United States was expected to contribute: men and materiel.

Enter the Americans

“Wild Bill” Donovan believed that one of America’s greatest strengths was its many ethnic groups. He intended for his Office of Strategic Services to tap into that knowledge of world cultures, language, and cultural savvy resident in the United States. He began the search for Americans of all ethnic groups in order to conduct intelligence and unconventional warfare around the world. But OSS organized itself along with the major divisions such as Secret Intelligence, Special Operations, Research and Analysis, and Morale Operations. The Research and Analysis Branch, for instance, recruited many academics from college campuses around the country, and men with backgrounds in European history, such as Crane Brinton, came to work for the OSS in that capacity. For the JEDBURGH plan, OSS London’s Frank Canfield needed to find approximately 100 French speakers, something that would not be difficult in and of itself, but the other qualifications made his job very difficult. The prospective JEDBURGHs had to be in the Army, Marines, or Navy, they had to be parachute qualified, they had to be willing to volunteer for duty behind the lines, and the Non-commissioned officers had to be highly proficient radio operators.

Canfield and the OSS put out the call in Army posts around the country and sometimes would draw large crowds only to see them dissipate when all the requirements were listed. But the men Canfield and others found started to appear at the OSS in Washington beginning that fall, some of them interviewing with Donovan personally in November and then reporting for training at what they called Area B-1, or the weekend retreat FDR referred to as “Shangri-La” and what is now Camp David. Donovan’s relationship with William Stephenson and the British made British instruction available and some of the JEDBURGH trainees received instruction from William Fairburn, the famous British commando instructor and former Hong Kong Policeman. They learned about lock picking, plastic explosives, foreign weapons, how to use a knife on an enemy soldier, and other things that focused on the micro-level of guerrilla warfare. But when it came to pondering guerrilla warfare, its strategies, or its efficacy, the OSS seemed to be largely content with letting British lead.

It is not as if the United States had no experience with such matters, but perhaps it did not put that experience down on paper to ponder what it meant. Perhaps the lone exception to the American lack of thinking on irregular or guerilla warfare could be found in the United States Marine Corps. For the United States Marines, “Small Wars,” as they called them, had been their experience in the Philippines, China, and even more profoundly in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and

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32 Michel de Bourbon-Parme, Interview, 22 September 2007.
Nicaragua. Spurred on by the debate about the Marine Corps mission and what it should be, Marine officers debated their role and whether they needed to think about formulating doctrine and principles of warfare. The debate became centered around definitions and methods and fed off the same debates that occurred in the Army. The Marine Corps finally pursued two doctrinal missions with Amphibious Warfare becoming the dominant one, but the USMC’s repeated Caribbean missions in the 1920s and 1930s prompted the drafting of their Small Wars Manual in 1940 with the hope that they would no longer have to “re-invent the wheel” upon being ordered to their next Small War.\(^{33}\) The Manual itself is a very well thought out attempt and recognizes the relationship between political aim and combat by starting out defining Small Wars as, “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.”\(^{34}\) Furthermore, the manual’s authors anticipated Marine operations in foreign countries that fell outside legally declared war realizing that, “This government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable regularity” and there was no reason to believe that would cease in the future.\(^{35}\) While the manual discusses all kinds of practical applications regarding mules, setting up camps, and sanitation concerns, it also gives the nod to the understanding that the


\(^{35}\) Ibid. p. 1 – 4.
politics and the “decisions of statesmen” will require a smaller kind of combat to achieve something of far less concern to the United States than the effort it put forth in the First World War. It also provides for what today military planners call a “Stability Phase” in which political power and authority is handed back in phases to the locally constituted government when necessary.

When President Roosevelt created the OSS on 13 June 1942, he signed a brief directive that described its duties to “collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required” by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and to “Plan and operate such special services as may be directed” by the Joint Chiefs. In it he also appointed Donovan to be its Director. Such vague language allowed Donovan to then pursue nearly any effort he thought worth pursuing. In a meeting of the JCS on 19 August the functions of the OSS regarding “Organized Sabotage and Guerrilla Warfare” were approved. The JCS approved sabotage actions and delineated six functions: organize and incite native groups in occupied territories, arrange for arms and equipment, provide training, direct or conduct sabotage activities, and set up reception committees “to meet and aid our armed forces” all in an effort to prepare the area for “offensive operations by our armed forces.” Guerrilla warfare would be conducted by groups comprised of foreign-born people loyal the United States and currently in the American military who met the physical and loyalty requirements. They were to be given at least three months training and would then participate in the theater commander’s main invasion force or operate behind the lines to perform sabotage of key targets, reconnaissance, and support resistance groups of that country. If there
was no theater commander for the area of operations the Joint Chiefs of Staff would retain control of the OSS efforts. The Army and Navy were to provide the personnel, training facilities, and trainers for these tasks. Noting that there had already been calls from the theaters for such people and support, the directive affirmed the JCS’s intent to meet the requests.36 One can also see Donovan’s influence regarding the use of foreign-born Americans or resident aliens to enable guerrilla warfare.

But when David K. E. Bruce arrived to lead OSS efforts in London he had to get its intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special operations up and running and he had to abide by agreements made with the British that proscribed unilateral American operations. As stated above, having little to work with at the beginning made the agreement feasible, but as American capability grew, the OSS chaffed under the requirement. However, the JEDBURGH plan, while not specifically designed as something the JCS had authorized it to do with an Ally like the British, allowed American participation in what was, in spirit something very much along the JCS’s outline. To make it happen, Bruce sent Canfield back to the United States on a recruiting drive to find French speaking soldiers, sailors, or Marines willing to volunteer for such duty. But he also had to staff up his operation in London and by the January of 1943, OSS Washington sent him personnel to conduct operations in support of what became Operation OVERLORD. Arriving to help in the effort was a former New York attorney, Paul van der Stricht, along with several others, who began to work side by side with the British to run agents into France. They also began

36 OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), Microfilm. Frames 2 and 14 – 19.
planning with the British-American military organization created to conduct detailed planning for re-entering the continent of Europe. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) had received the task to plan the invasion at the American-British July 1943 Quebec planning conference. COSSAC’s relationship with the SOE and OSS was a good one and they relied on them for ideas and information on the kind of help they could expect from the French Résistance. Apparently, COSSAC’s lead planner, Major General Harold Bull always thought whatever the Résistance could pull off would be a bonus and the Allies should not count on them for must do missions. Such a belief set in early and provoked arguments within the OSS London, the SOE Sections responsible for France, the Allied Staffs, between the Allies and the Free French, and as we will see, would only resolve themselves at the time of the invasion. But that sentiment became a key planning factor driving much of the resources the Allies were willing to devote to SOE and OSS efforts in France.

If done up to the hilt, such efforts could require a great deal of resources. Not only would one need officers and NCOs to implement the JEDBURGH Plan, but deploying them required dozens of aircraft, airfields, thousands of rifles, pistols, hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds and explosives, marshaling and packing facilities, hundreds of portable radios, dedicated radio frequencies, and people to monitor transmissions from France and encode and decode the messages and dispatch them to the correct place. In short, the OSS-SOE effort needed a grand capability

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37 Paul van der Stricht Papers, Letter to Arthur L. Funk, July 8th, 1968 and William Casey book manuscript, p. 5., Folder 1, Paul van der Stricht Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford, CA.
beyond several staff officers in London, and it had less than a year to assemble, beg, borrow, buy, construct, train, and get it organized. That very challenging task largely fell to two incredibly talented men: British Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman and American Colonel Joseph F. Haskell.

Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman had experience with Allied intelligence and issues involving France. He was introduced to an American “no one had ever heard of,” General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in August of 1942 soon after the American’s arrival in the United Kingdom. Eisenhower was then putting together the Allied staff in order to conduct what became Operation TORCH and the invasion of North Africa. The British put Mockler-Ferryman’s nomination in to Eisenhower to set up his intelligence staff and Eisenhower impressed him with his affability and acumen at not caring “which uniform an officer was wearing.” However, when German forces smashed the American units at Kasserine Pass, inflicting over 6,000 casualties and claiming 4026 prisoners, Mockler-Ferryman lost his job. Under pressure from Washington, Eisenhower fired him along with the American Corps Commander Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall. However, Mockler-Ferryman’s reputation seemed to be undiminished inside British Army circles, and Eisenhower decorated him for his service. All of it gave him the impression that his reassignment may have had little to do with any negative performance on his part. After the war, an unnamed but evidently reliable source who knew about the incident informed him that his

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38 Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier Eric E. (1896-1978), Personal Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, UK. The file consists of a partial biographical manuscript and speeches given about his wartime activities.
belief was correct and that the American government had insisted on a scapegoat from each country.\textsuperscript{40}

However, before any of that was ever confirmed to him he remained professional enough to hold no ill will toward Eisenhower and was certainly not cynical about cooperating with the Americans on major efforts. Gubbins snapped him up and made Mockler-Ferryman head of SOE’s Western European Section. Three months later Gubbins referred to him as an officer who, “quickly grasped a most intricate method of warfare.”\textsuperscript{41} As the head of SOE operations in Western Europe, his duties were twofold. First he was to control the Résistance in Western Europe and second he “was to prepare with OVERLORD planning staff a scheme to dovetail the action of Résistance with the strategic bombing plan….”\textsuperscript{42} Certainly SOE’s relations with COSSAC became close and the Western European Section formed what was informally called, “The London Group” with their American counterparts from the American OSS/Special Operations (OSS/SO) section in London.

The same month that Mockler-Ferryman became head of SOE operations in Western Europe, Colonel Joseph F. Haskell joined OSS London. A West Point graduate of the Class of 1930 and the son of an Army General, Haskell had been

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Mockler-Ferryman Papers, LHCMA, London, UK. These comments regarding his job description were written after the war by Mockler-Ferryman and the ellipsis indicates the end of the page and the next page was not in the collection. Unfortunately, little else is in the collection to illuminate any direct collaboration SOE may have had with the Strategic Bombing campaign.
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serving as an Intelligence officer on the COSSAC staff since his arrival in the theater in March of 1943. He arrived just as Wilkinson, Canfield, and others began to press their JEDBURGH plan to COSSAC as a means to control the Résistance.\textsuperscript{43} Haskell quickly became a believer in the operation and recommended it to COSSAC for acceptance. So when Bruce needed an officer to run his Special Operations section, Canfield suggested Haskell and this gained quick acceptance all the way up the OSS chain of command.\textsuperscript{44} Haskell’s father, who was at that time running as the Democratic candidate for New York’s Lieutenant Governor’s, had been one of Donovan’s WWI commanders. Furthermore, Joseph Haskell’s older brother John was already in OSS and would later be OSS London’s head of the Secret Intelligence branch, or SI.\textsuperscript{45} Donovan and Major General Bull, the chief of COSSAC Plans and later Eisenhower’s Director of Operations for OVERLORD, both liked the idea as they had a military officer they could trust in that key position. Haskell was urbane and handsome, a Cavalry officer who had gone from post to post prior to the war competing on Army polo teams. He was able to speak French, and possessed the tact to work coalition and allied issues in an organization largely comprised of non-career officers.\textsuperscript{46} Requesting his assignment to OSS, Bruce wrote to COSSAC that “no other officer” could undertake this work due to the short time before the invasion and

\textsuperscript{43} Military Record and Report of Separation Certificate of Service, 30 November 1946, Papers of Joseph F. Haskell, Private Collection.

\textsuperscript{44} Casey book manuscript, p. 5, Paul van der Stricht Papers, Hoover, Stanford, CA. "Report by F/O Pearl Cornioley (Witherington)," 23 November 1944, HS 6/587, British National Archives, Kew, UK.

\textsuperscript{45} R. Harris Smith, \textit{OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency} (Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 94 – 95.

\textsuperscript{46} Casey book manuscript, p. 6; Pau van der Stricht Papers, Hoover, Stanford, CA; interview with Julia Paine, daughter of Joseph F. Haskell, July 14, 2007.
all the work Haskell had already done on the plan made him able to come to the job without missing a beat. COSSAC approved Haskell’s transfer to OSS London on 23 August 1943 at the same time it approved the JEDBURGH Plan and the London Group’s efforts to control the Résistance.47

With the plan approved and the British and American leadership falling into place, now the resources had to be created and organized in order to enable the plan to come to fruition. The staff functions had to be thought out, the process designed and decided upon, training facilities and instruction provided for, supplies and equipment for the JEDBURGHs and the Résistance groups procured, organized, and maintained. Furthermore, it was one thing to have the agreement with COSSAC, but COSSAC would change when the commander for OVERLORD was named and his ideas might shift procedures dramatically. The London Group would have to come to an agreement with the new commander about the role the Résistance would play and how they would control it.

By December 1943, the London Group established the role of the JEDBURGH Plan in support of the overall effort. The JEDBURGH teams would be sent into the field based upon the need of the Supreme Allied Commander and his desire to control the Résistance in order to support the main armies. They would be sent to a known resistance group and be given at least 72 hours to organize the initial effort. The teams needed to be briefed on their mission and the local resistance in the

area, conducted from their holding area to their briefing and isolation area in London and then on to one of the special duty airfields. At the airfield they would receive a meal, their equipment, and the aircraft would be filled with their gear tailored for their tasks. Their radios would each have unique encoding crystals determined by the communications plan created for that team. The British would supply 50 officers, the Americans 50, the French 92, the Dutch 9, and the Belgians 9. The British would provide 35 W/T operators, the Americans 50, and the French 15. Furthermore, the Special Force Detachments with each of the main Allied Armies had to be constituted, organized, and trained. These SF Detachments would serve as the means to call the JEDBURGHs into the field based on how the situation developed after the initial invasion.

However it must be understood, that organizing all the support machinery did not start from scratch at the end of 1943. The British had been conducting operations in occupied Europe since 1940 and since 1941 had maintained networks of agents in France. The British had also learned from their mistakes and these experiences shaped their understanding of the Résistance and German efforts to thwart Allied efforts, and had taught them valuable lessons about how to run operations behind German lines. In fact, their efforts with agents and German successes at catching them and rolling up networks, was the SOE’s biggest reason for wanting the JEDBURGH program in the first place. They believed they needed a strategic

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reserve of agents to operate after the invasion when all indications pointed to Germany rounding up large resistance groups and their associated networks. In other words, they realized their agent networks were always on the knife’s edge of survival and would not be able to last long due to the fundamental changes they expected to occur after the Allies invaded France. The Germans and Vichy would step up their anti-partisan efforts and the JEDBURGHs then would be the strategic reserve replacing all the SOE and OSS agents expected to be arrested, tortured, and killed.\textsuperscript{49} The JEDBURGHs could still use much of the infrastructure built to support their current operations, but they would need a far greater support base. Moreover, the French had to be brought into the planning in a more robust way than they had been up to that point. The details of the French efforts and how the SOE and OSS coordinated with them will be discussed in the next chapter.

\textit{Communications}

With agents going in and out of France, aircraft dropping supplies, and intelligence to send London, reliable communications had to be established. The technology was limited, but the Allies found two different communications means to overcome the challenge. The first being the radio or wireless transmitter (W/T), and the second method was the British Broadcasting Company. The key person in any circuit was the radio operator and his or her ability to communicate meant the difference between life and death. News of a circuit being discovered, a traitor agent,\textsuperscript{49} “Jedburgh Procedure,” 12 October 1943, Policy and Planning JEDBURGHS for OVERLORD, HS 8/288, BNA, Kew, UK.
or an incoming *parachutages*, were key, and if the agents were incommunicado, things went terribly wrong. Secure communications were more critical for the JEDBURGH teams as they had direct military responsibilities regarding OVERLORD.

Unfortunately, the Germans quickly realized they could triangulate the signal and locate the radio. The German intelligence and police units used Directional Finding vans to locate illegal transmitters aided by a special military police (or *Feldgendarmes*) ready to arrest whoever sent the signal. In large cities finding the exact room radio signals emanated from was more difficult. To help them hone in, they would switch the power off in the city section by section and when the signal stopped they knew where the radio was. Radio operators soon learned broadcasting short messages meant better security and made it more difficult for the Germans to discover their location.  

However, even short messages sooner or later gave away their location and it often became impossible or impractical to send and receive on a dedicated radio set. To alleviate the amount of messages to send or receive, SOE’s first successful agent, Georges Begué, came up with the idea of *messages personnels* over the BBC. The Allies broadcast pre-arranged phrases, poems, or sentences meaning something only to the person receiving the message. Thus began the nightly broadcast by BBC announcers with their seemingly endless nonsense, but to resistance cells they became orders or news of friends and comrades. To the circuit leaders it could be

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confirmation of an incoming flight of weapons or the orders to start an agreed upon operation. ⁵¹

To further aid aircraft in getting to their drop zones, the Allies developed and parachuted in S-phones to the Résistance. An S-phone could transmit voice radio signals in a secure way from the operator to the airplane. But with a range of only eight to ten miles, and special training required, the Maquis rarely used the device. The French Résistance had little interest in such an odd contraption and went for the rifles, ammunition, and money instead, leaving the strange radio idle. If the Maquis were properly trained, the device may have prevented many agents and materials from being parachuted miles off target. Instead, guiding aircraft to a drop zone could range from the primitive to a more intricately scripted operation depending upon the skill and experience of the resistance group working the drop zone. In the most basic of receptions, four men used electric torches, formed a large “L” and signaled when they heard the sound of the aircraft. The reception party signaled a previously agreed upon Morse letter, and the aircraft dropped the load over the “L” and flew on to another location to drop leaflets elsewhere in an effort to make the Germans believe propaganda was the plane’s only mission. ⁵²

Realizing that the JEDBURGHs needed a well-made W/T able to meet their task, SOE and OSS set to work to develop a proper one. Their efforts resulted in a small suit case sized radio powered by a six-volt battery that could reach London. All

⁵¹ Foot, SOE in France:: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944. p. 162.
⁵² Ibid., p. 83 – 86.
the team members trained in Morse code, in case the W/T operator was killed or captured. However, the W/T required a high level of skill when operating under combat conditions. Not only did one need to be an expert at Morse code, but also be deft with coding and decoding. To quickly code Morse messages the JEDBURGHs used a process known as “one time pads.” A “one time pad” had a set of letters five across and five down so the operator could overlay the normal alphabet on the pad, giving him a new order of letters. Discarded after one use, the operator would then use the next code sheet. The person receiving the messages would have the same series of pages in order to unscramble the letters just as the sender had scrambled them. A simple code for the Germans to break, but only if used twice.21

*Air Support*

Modern war also brought a new tool for reaching partisans behind the lines - the airplane. But airpower thinkers focused on strategic bombing, not sneaking behind enemy lines and parachuting men and supplies. Initial efforts to convert bombers for special operations ran up against many challenges, not the least of which was the unwillingness of the Royal Air Force to provide aircraft. By August 1941, SOE operated sixteen aircraft from Newmarket Racecourse. The British used Halifaxes, Whitleys, and single engine Lysanders, with the Lysander being the only aircraft truly designed for SOE. A high-wing monoplane, stripped of arms and equipped with an auxiliary fuel tank, the plane could fly 450 miles and carry four

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21 William Thompson, interview with author, January 14, 1999; Foot, 102.
passengers. It proved extremely valuable due to its ability to land in short, unimproved fields, and provided the required flexibility, but could not be used for parachute operations. Lysanders were used to pick up and drop off passengers and equipment, and with the engine running, take on passengers and cargo for the trip home.53

Flying special operations missions required very different tactics and procedures from massed strategic bombing. Flying massed formations would not suffice when clandestinely parachuting people and equipment. A single aircraft flying a low altitude mission at night was necessary, requiring re-fitting aircraft and different training for aircrews. Initial mission success rate was a disappointing 45%. The problems stemmed from poor navigation, weather, low fog, and/or no reception committee near the drop zone.23 Of course the air crews contended with Luftwaffe night fighters as well, and endeavored to fool German radar by flying with bombing formations until required to break off to their target area. And according to one SOE officer, the “moon was a goddess,” as the moon’s phases directed air operations. Aircraft could not land without some moon and parachuting operations were best when the moon was at half or better, so with the moon down, the Résistance could not expect any parachutages.24

Despite the obstacles, the RAF pressed ahead and developed its capabilities. By November 1942, SOE operated twenty-seven aircraft and accomplished ninety-five missions.54

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53 Foot, 75 – 89.
23 Ibid., 87.
24 Ibid., 61.
three sorties. Delivered to France were agents or “Joes,” and twenty-three tons of weapons and supplies. Operations stepped up considerably during 1943 and by flying 615 sorties they delivered 214 “Joes” and 578 tons of weapons and supplies.

American efforts from the United Kingdom were still nil. However, from the Mediterranean theater, the United States flew ten sorties delivering nine “Joes” and eight tons.\(^{25}\) The US Army Air Force’s 122\(^{nd}\) Air Liaison Squadron attempted to deliver arms and parachutists to France and elsewhere in the theater but initially was disorganized and poorly equipped.

**Conclusion**

The JEDBURGH plan became a coalition project due to both nations needing the other, while having little to do with the utility that an Allied team would prove more effective than a normal team. While the Allied aspect of the teams was thought to be a bonus, the OSS joined in the project in order to get into the theater. The agreement they made with their British counterparts early in 1942, began to be a source of tension, and the JEDBURGH plan offered Donovan the opportunity to support the invasion of Europe and demonstrate to detractors back home that the OSS was participating and useful. The British needed what is often needed from American capacity: soldiers. These would have to be very well trained and specialized men who were hard to find in Britain, but with America contributing to the effort, 100 teams now seemed a realistic goal. Moreover, the American contribution in aircraft

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 473.
and crews also helped solve much of the shortage of capability for night flying and aerial re-supply of the networks in France. Nevertheless, relations between the British and United States would prove somewhat challenging. However, from the British point of view, they must have looked much more inviting than relations with the Free French and de Gaulle.
Chapter Two
Recreating France and the Rise of the Résistance

Germany’s diplomatic and military successes in 1939 and 1940 were stunning. After their loss in the First World War and their bitter resentment over the humiliating Versailles Peace Treaty, the Germans were devastated by the Great Depression. In these circumstances they had turned to Adolph Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (the Nazi Party), voting the Nazis into power in Germany in January 1933.1 Hitler began reorganizing the German Army or Wehrmacht and due to many factors beyond the scope of this study, the revitalized Wehrmacht became not only a source of his political power, but also developed doctrine emphasizing the offensive and exploitation of maneuver through the combined use of tanks, infantry, and aircraft all directed with coded radio communications.2 France’s doctrine of defense proved to be no match against the Wehrmacht’s doctrine of innovation and mobility led by aggressive German officers. After the 1938 Munich agreement with Hitler, the French and British suffered months of successive and embarrassing setbacks. From conceding Germany’s right to the Czechoslovakian territory to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, the loss of Poland, the Soviet – Finnish War, the German defeat of Denmark, Norway, and Yugoslavia that culminated in Britain’s loss of Crete, the British and French

2 See Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 22-23 for a summation of recent scholarship on the Wehrmacht’s and Germany’s adoption of their new doctrines during the 1930s.
governments seemed at a complete loss as to how to resist German and Italian armed actions.

Germany quickly followed their remarkable successes by invading Belgium on 10 May 1940. While their tanks and aircraft were of similar quality to the French, the German use of surprise organized around their offensive and mobility focused doctrine, led by officers encouraged to take the initiative, the Wehrmacht burst through Belgian and French defenses. The French attempted a gamble in order to shore up the Belgian defenses, but they failed largely due to their army’s inability to maneuver effectively following years of preparation to fight a defensive war. From the 13 to 17 May the Germans succeeded at breaking through the French defenses at Sedan, Monthermé, and Houx on the River Meuse and wisely exploited their early successes by cutting off the British and French Armies in northern France from French forces to the south.³ By racing to the English Channel the Germans dislocated Allied efforts to defend France leading the French Army Commander Weygand to admit to Churchill on 12 June that the French army could no longer conduct “coordinated war.”⁴

Indeed a complete lack of coordination and effective governance racked France, its relations with the Belgians and the British, as well as its Army. Belgian King Leopold began armistice negotiations with the Germans on the 28th. Fearing his army was going to be completely destroyed, the British commander began an

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⁴ Kesaris et al., *Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945 Microform*. Frame 74.
evacuation at Dunkirk on 29 May and by 1 June 350,000 troops including 60,000 French, had escaped across the English Channel. Moreover, Britain refused to employ Fighter Command’s aircraft to defend French airspace.\(^5\) German troops had made it to the English Channel and other large formations were slicing southward getting behind the Maginot line cutting off French forces on the east side of the country. And to add to the consternation, Mussolini joined in with his Fascist ally and declared war on France on 10 June. “It’s only fair, don’t you see?” Churchill quipped upon hearing the news, “They were on our side the last time.”\(^6\) But France needed more than pithy remarks and cheerleading. When General Weygand spoke to the British delegation two days later, Churchill’s cajoling and threatening of the French government to remain in the fight must have seemed obscenely incongruent with Britain’s own actions.

France was now besieged with confusion. Parts of its army continued fighting in piecemeal and un-coordinated actions while others, some 2 million men, were captured and eventually shipped off to POW camps in Germany. The members of France’s parliament scattered on the road to Bordeaux or southern ports. People in Paris and eastern cities were evacuating and choking the roads the army needed to try to assemble its defenses.\(^7\) For many, such disorder and chaos were a greater threat than the Germans. On 16 June, Pétain did as Churchill feared and accepted the post as the head of the French government. The crafting of this 84 year-old national hero

\(^7\) Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 119-120.
into anyone could see what they wished to see, was largely the work of Pierre Laval. Laval was a politician who had been in and out of French governments during the proceeding decade. Fervently anti-communist, contemptuous of the socialists, the free masons, and the unions, he took the opportunity to make France into what he had long desired. In Pétain, he found a man he could use to renew France and who could symbolize justice and French national pride. Although Pétain did not trust him completely, he shared in the notion that an armistice with Germany should be sought.

But the cause for the rise of Pétain and Laval and their Vichy government cannot be placed entirely with these two men. As Robert Paxton wrote, “In truth, there was rather an instinctive shrinking from chaos that made war to the end against Germany simply unthinkable. The final weapon of a people whose conventional army has disintegrated is chaos.”8 Pétain was old enough to remember the last time the German army had conquered France in 1871. He could recall the subsequent chaos, revolution, and the installation of the constitution he now viewed as weak and fundamentally flawed. He and many others had a reason to fear the very real threat of what continuing the war would mean: Guerilla warfare, roving criminals, answered by German reprisals.

But while the authority of the state is a long and deeply held tradition in France, there was another way to maintain the state while avoiding chaos. The most junior general in the French army took a plane from Bordeaux to England the day after Pétain became President of the Council of Ministers. The next day, Charles de

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Gaulle got permission from the British government to broadcast a message on the British Broadcasting Company’s programming where he, perhaps nervously and beginning in a shaky voice called for, “French officers and soldiers on British territory. . . to join forces with me.” He explicitly stated his intent to use a “superior mechanized force” to ultimately defeat Germany and insisted the war was not lost.\(^9\)

In a very real way, this call was not the beginning of de Gaulle as a political leader of any future French Résistance movement, but rather the culmination of his army career in which he had persistently advocated for tanks and aircraft and the doctrine to exploit mechanized warfare.\(^10\) At that time and in the bleak days that followed, de Gaulle sought to organize such a French force. He hoped to use weapons salvaged from France and purchased from the United Kingdom and the United States in order to enter France again alongside Allied armies.

However, when no political party or leader emerged from the ruin of France’s pre-war political class, de Gaulle picked up the baton. As historian Arthur L. Funk demonstrated, de Gaulle was poorly prepared and had never shown any inclination for national level political leadership. Just days before the French government collapsed, Premier Paul Reynaud named him to a junior cabinet position as he was impressed with de Gaulle’s ideas on how to organize an offensive minded army. But a few days as Assistant Secretary of State for War was nothing compared to the experiences of others in national politics, others he believed would step forward to

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\(^10\) Ibid., p. 79.
lead while he re-constituted something on the order of an Brigade or Division to operate alongside the British. But later in 1940 when other parts of the French Empire began to support him, he was forced to think about political aspects as well as military ones. When no political leader outside of France, took up the mantle of leadership, de Gaulle seemed the sole person for people to rally behind, even if they were civilians. When Pétain met with Hitler, de Gaulle and his burgeoning Free French organization issued a Manifesto in Brazzaville, Congo, where they claimed to speak for France as Pétain’s government was subject to the will of an invader and therefore illegal.\(^\text{11}\) The government at Vichy returned the favor and issued charges against de Gaulle condemning him to death.\(^\text{12}\)

Claiming sovereign authority had substantial consequences and forced other governments to choose sides. Speaking to de Gaulle on the evening of 27 June before the Brazzaville declaration, Churchill decided to “recognize you alone” as he could not surmount the Foreign Office’s reservations in recognizing de Gaulle as someone who spoke for France. The following day, the British government announced that they recognized de Gaulle to be the, “leader of all the Free French, wherever they may be found, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause.”\(^\text{13}\) But later when de Gaulle’s group claimed the authority to speak for France, the Free France-British relationship began a long and stormy relationship as it careened from one point of contention to another over the next five years. That relationship found its first test

with the incident at Mers-el-Kébir. When Pétain refused to order all French naval ships to sail to England or neutral ports, Churchill believed he had to order the Royal Navy to seize or destroy them. When they did so at Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran, Algeria, on 3 July killing nearly 1300 French sailors, de Gaulle reacted with his furious temper, at first. After some time to collect his thoughts, Churchill was struck with de Gaulle’s understanding and his explanation to the French people regarding the matter. As de Gaulle stated bluntly, “No Frenchman worthy of the name can for a moment doubt that a British defeat would seal for ever his country’s bondage.”¹⁴ De Gaulle made clear that France’s future was heavily invested in British fortunes. And when, as explained in the previous chapter, a few weeks later the British created the SOE, that organization proved to be the best vehicle for de Gaulle’s links with the independently developing resistance movements inside France.

But interior movements had to have an animating idea that would motivate their inception and birth. As long as the shock of defeat continued and the Pétain government presented itself to the French as its savior from chaos, few movements had the animus to begin. Pétain’s meeting with Hitler at Montoire in late October and his subsequent pursuit of a policy of collaboration provoked a tiny few toward opposing him. However the vast majority of Frenchmen believed Pétain, and his ministers such as Laval and Admiral François Darlan, were doing their best to defend France, maintain order, and negotiate the release of French POWs. As historian Julian Jackson accurately wrote, “Before it could be joined, the Résistance had to be

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 85.
invented."¹⁵ Therefore, animating ideas that appeared in the form of newspapers and posters extolling political goals were France’s first forms of resistance. The first of the newspapers began to appear in the Fall of 1940 while the more enduring and influential underground newspapers such as Libération and Combat saw their first editions roll off the clandestine presses in the summer of 1941.¹⁶ The driving force inside the early papers were complaints about how Pétain’s government was not the protector of France, as it claimed to be, but more and more showing itself as a vehicle for Germany’s abuse of France.

Pétain may have realized this himself when in December 1940 he arrested Laval and reshuffled his cabinet and placed Admiral Darlan in charge of his government. While the drastic nature of Pétain’s move has been ascribed various dramatic meanings, the result was not dramatic at all. Over the course of the next year, Darlan accumulated more and more government posts and by August of 1941 was the Vice President of the Council while also holding the Foreign, Interior, Naval, Information, and the Defense Ministry posts. But despite all these responsibilities he was unable to repair the damage done to relations with Germany when Laval was arrested. Furthermore, he supervised a deteriorating relationship with the British and a puzzling one with the Americans. To Darlan fell the dubious task of convincing the Germans to collaborate with France in its recasting of Europe under Nazism, but under a more subtle guise. He sought to go beyond the Armistice agreement of 1940

and formalize a relationship with Germany that would grant France a more respectable status. He persisted in this until replaced by Laval who had convinced Pétain he could do better. After Darlan failed to win any improvement in France’s standing with Germany, Pétain submitted a list of replacement candidates to the German AND the United States Ambassadors. Both disapproved of the list and Laval used the consternation to emerge from the political doldrums of house arrest to become Prime Minister for a second time.¹⁷ Pétain had hoped Darlan would get the agreements he sought. But such agreement was not forthcoming from the German government, as was bluntly stated by the German State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, “Squeeze the country dry,” but give nothing to them in return.¹⁸ Darlan retained his Defense and Navy posts however and remained a power in the Vichy until the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942.

One can quickly see Hitler’s war aim for France by the map the Germans drew defining occupied and un-occupied territory. The occupied zone gave the Germans full control over the industrial north, Paris, and French ports on the North Sea, English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean. Hitler’s modern industrial warfare now had more factories, workers, and mineral resources and the German Navy and Luftwaffe now had the facilities they would need to conduct operations against Britain. Alsace and Lorraine were incorporated officially into the German Reich and the Italians got an occupation zone in the south along their border with France. The

¹⁸ Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, *The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5*, p. 465.
Line of Demarcation between occupied and un-occupied France became a “virtual border” requiring identification cards, permission to cross, and restrictions on the amount of mail and goods allowed to cross. Running from central eastern France, south of Paris, and taking a southerly turn at Tours, it terminated at Spanish border east of Hendaye. Those living along that line now underwent the curious change in life of becoming citizens near a border town where wartime want and rationing made smuggling an underground industry.¹⁹ But as German aims shifted from defeating Britain towards operations in the east against the Soviet Union, its focus on France became more ambivalent and clear direction for the MBF in governing France was often absent.

Germany needed France’s resources, and Hitler still viewed France as a mortal enemy due to the France’s victory in the First World War but the German need for first-rate troops in the east had an effect on how it could operate in France. Hitler, as in other areas, failed to govern or provide his commanders in France a coherent or unifying idea for occupation. He wanted racial cleansing, but the Army commander for the occupation, the MilitärBefehlshaber im Frankreich (MBF), General Otto von Stülpnagel did not enforce or follow up in such efforts. He was not a NAZI ideologue but instead a traditional Prussian officer who believed such activities were unprofessional and dangerous. Von Stülpnagel had within his command FeldKommandanturn, an organization similar to Military Police that he stationed

throughout France, even in the Un-occupied Zone where they were coyly called Liaison offices. MBF also had an office that focused on extracting economic and material wealth from France. Lastly MBF possessed a staff element that produced intelligence, propaganda, and maintained a Secret Police. His attitude toward the treatment of the French people was one of severity for Germans who broke the law or murdered Frenchmen. Punishments against German soldiers acting illegally were severe. However, von Stüpnagel’s days were numbered in that position as he was finally ousted on 16 February 1942, by the political maneuvering of the other powerful people in the German occupation of France.\(^\text{20}\)

In addition to the MBF, the German Foreign Office, Reichmarschall Hermann Göring, and the SS all believed they had an interest in how Germany governed France. The Foreign Office dispatched Otto Abetz to France to see to its concerns. In his two meetings with Hitler, Abetz was told to work toward collaboration with Pétain. But most evidence suggests Hitler was merely attempting to play Abetz, as it was not what he really sought from France. He did not trust Abetz since he was married to a French woman, but he believed Abetz could play a useful role if manipulated well. Abetz worked to encourage the anti-Jewish laws Vichy passed while urging his superiors in Berlin to collaborate with the Vichy Regime. He also furthered Vichy’s aims of their anti-Jewish laws and assisted with the process of deporting French Jews to Germany. While Göring had considerable sway with Hitler, commanded the Luftwaffe, and controlled a great deal of the economic effort to

support the war, his interests in France came down to his personal interests in fine art and other French goods. His tirades about matters often left Stülpnagel confused and angry.

Another German entity and powerful player, the SS led by Heinrich Himmler, arrived in France without the knowledge or permission of the MBF authorities and overtime developed a working relationship with Abetz. Both organizations sought French collaboration and both supported the elements in the Vichy government that were pro-Fascist and pro-German. Overtime, the SS would become a powerful force in the radicalization of the war in France and become an influential player regarding security, police, intelligence, propaganda and education. But as Thomas Laub concluded, the Army’s MBF had been better prepared for occupying a nation while the Foreign Office, Göring, and the SS all sought to advance their own agendas which were often counter to MBF’s aims. The dysfunctional relationship within the German hierarchy contributed to Germany’s confused efforts to occupy and govern France.21

In important ways, the MBF found itself somewhat lulled into complacency by the slow development of any widespread and well-organized resistance. Their complacency, coupled with the overall German occupation comprised of competing Army and other NAZI organizations made governing France incoherent on many issues. But the Germans did not really have to go up against a Résistance resembling a military organization until the summer and fall of 1943. By that time Germany’s strategic situation had shifted. Its invasion of the Soviet Union had stalled and its

21 Ibid., pp. 82 - 119
forces were defeated at Stalingrad in a long and protracted mauling. The Americans, British, and Free French had gained control of North Africa, Sicily, and had launched operations on the Italian peninsula. Due to these realities Hitler issued strategic guidance on 3 November 1943, communicating his views regarding the west as “the crucial scene of the war due to the expected Allied invasion of France.” These two events changed the nature of the MBF’s mission but found it wanting for the forces that could defend France from the Allies and deal with a rapidly growing, reckless, and sometimes fierce, resistance.

The Résistance however needed to grow beyond newspapers for it to be effective. While this occurred, it proved to be a very slow process hampered by an incoherent animating aim and the development of effective German methods for arresting resistance leadership. The reasons for its slow development can be attributed to the shock of the 1940 defeat, the popular belief that Pétain and his government were working toward what was best for the country, and a lack of an underground society or culture able to sustain the long struggle of the Résistance. Such a society would eventually be built, but it took time and whenever it got to a point where it could claim some kind of organization and sense of itself, a wave of arrests would deal it severe blows. Due to the nature of clandestine living comprised of pseudonyms, illegal identification cards, thieving money and weapons, passing of coded messages, and the fear of arrest and death, it is not hard to see why those who

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remained inside France took umbrage with those who attempted to direct resistance activities from abroad. There is a pride in living, and surviving under such conditions that encourages the belief that because one is bravely suffering under occupation, one’s actions are more legitimate than those who do not undergo such traumatizing experiences. Tapping into that legitimacy proved to be the desire of de Gaulle’s Free French organization, for while he could get war fighting resources through foreign backing, political power would have to come from France.

The Occupied and Unoccupied Zones also provided another political dividing line. Therefore, with ineffective political parties and the different circumstances of occupation, the Résistance became the purview of those with no political party record, who conducted themselves differently in the north than in the south. With German troops, barracks, parades, and aircraft flying overhead, the Résistance in the north had the more immediate aim of fighting the Germans, but in the south, resistance movements took a more political approach and the groups often argued with one another for members, influence, and resources. The difference became a source of conflict between southern and northern groups. After traveling around the unoccupied zone, a northern movement’s member acidly remarked, “What they lack is a few Germans on the street.”

As John Sweets points out, southern movements had far more political rhetoric on their newspapers while northern movements tended to focus on organizing military action.

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24 Ibid., pp. 22.
The three main non-communist southern movements, *Libération*, *Combat*, and *Franc-Tireur* came from, in a very real way, the work of each of their leaders’ enthusiasm, stubbornness, charisma, and ability to survive the clandestine life. Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie began organizing the movement that eventually used the name *Libération* in the late summer of 1940, almost immediately after the defeat. French Army Captain Henri Frenay started his group in mid-1941 after realizing that Pétain and his mid-level intelligence and security officers were not interested in resisting occupation. He merged with another group whose focus was more on politics while he still retained his desire for armed action and so he named the paper, and later their group *Combat*. Jean-Pierre Lévy joined a group of philosophical and more politically experienced people than in most movements. Urbane and charismatic, he became the head of *Franc-Tireur* after the arrest of its previous leader in March of 1942. There were other movements, but these three became the largest and most influential in the Unoccupied Zone.

In northern France the German presence governed the groups’ development. Many of their newspapers failed to maintain any publication continuity and many of them pursued assassination or sabotage against German and Vichy targets from early in the Occupation. These attacks, mostly in Paris, provoked severe German reprisals. Hitler and the German authorities viewed such acts as illegal violations of the armistice and international law. Under this kind of attitude, acts of *Résistance* were...

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viewed as simply terrorism and punishable by death. But when the Germans began to be assassinated in Paris, this was not enough for Hitler. He wanted the clear signal sent to the wider French population and sought 100 French Jews to be executed and 1000 Jews and 500 communists to be deported in reprisals for the continued attacks on Germans in France.  

The Communist participation is perhaps the most complicated aspect of the interior movements but they serve to demonstrate how unified the Résistance became by the time the Allies invaded. The Parti Communiste français (PCF) or French Communist Party was a presence, with waxing and waning Parliamentary membership in French politics from the 1920s to the present day. However, they have traditionally maintained two key characteristics: their independence and their views on action. The PCF eschews forming or participating in coalition governments as they regard the purity of their cause to be more important than the price they would inevitably pay by participating in a coalition government that would insist on bargaining away certain communist aims in unavoidable political horse trading. Therefore, before the Second World War, they had supported various left wing governments but did not join them in a formal sense. They believed doing so sent the wrong signal to the French people that the PCF maintained an independence that it would not have if it joined a coalition government. Even during the Popular Front

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government of Leon Blum in the mid-1930s, the PCF supported the government while not joining it.\(^{30}\)

The second aspect of the communists in the Résistance was how they had to navigate the PCF’s reputation both before the war and in the early stage of the Occupation. The PCF’s leadership supported and participated in the international communist organization, the COMINTERN and took direction from it. In the 1930s, that meant taking their cues from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. When Stalin’s foreign minister signed the non-aggression pact with Hitler, the PCF was obliged to propagandize, as Stalin directed them to do, that the Germans were not the enemy but rather capitalist nations such as Britain and the United States continued to be. When Germany invaded Poland, officially beginning the Second World War in September of 1939, it forced the PCF into attempting to hold to that party line, but the reality of it led many to believe that by doing so, they were indeed supporting German capitalists in a war on Poland. But the logic became even harder to maintain when Germany invaded France before it invaded the Soviet Union, and the PCF maintained their advocacy of an alliance with Germany while the German Army invaded and occupied France. Such advocacy laid bare the bankruptcy of PCF’s position. Such a situation forced considerable defections from the party resulting in a split.\(^{31}\) Maurice Thorez, the head of the PCF went into exile in the Soviet Union for the duration of the war, while a new communist organization formed, taking the name the \textit{Front}


National (FN). While the communists directed the FN, it sought to maintain a non-political image and sought to fight German occupation and the Vichy collaborationist policies. Therefore, the FN dropped the international aspect of communist ideology from its cause, while it held firmly onto the central tenet of communist ideology calling for armed action to force the revolutionary change. Its desire to fight attracted many adherents, whether they were communist or not into its armed Résistance organization, the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Français (FTPF or often simply the FTP).\textsuperscript{32} For the Front National, and later the PCF, Résistance meant violence, not simply printing underground newspapers or spirit ing downed Allied airmen back into Allied hands. They wanted to kill Germans and Vichy officials despite the very real threat of reprisals. Action was more important and worth the price.\textsuperscript{33}

Their assassination of various German officers or Vichy officials played into the occupation authority’s propaganda. The Germans and Vichy could then claim that the Résistance was a fringe movement of communists and Jews in an excuse to arrest any they found and label its efforts as a part of the global communist/Jewish movement the Nazi’s had portrayed as a great threat. When the Germans enacted counter-terrorist policies in Paris focusing on communists and Jews, it ironically furthered the Front National’s and later the PCF’s own propaganda attempting to convince the French people of their status as the leading way to resist occupation and collaboration. The belief, or myth, that the communists were more active, violent,

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 120 – 121. The FN’s FTP should not be confused with the Résistance movement Franc-Tireurs, largely affiliated with a centrist ideology.

\textsuperscript{33} Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944. P. 423 – 425.
and effective than all other resistance movements persists due to effective NAZI, 
*Front National*, and PCF propaganda during and immediately following the war.\(^\text{34}\)

But things changed again when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 21 June 1941. Now Stalin directed the PCF to resist Germany. Moreover, when Germany declared war on the United States on 8 December 1941, Stalin eventually directed Thorez and his PCF back in France to support the Allies and fight against the German occupation. With Stalin’s backing, communist participation in de Gaulle’s Free French movement was just a matter of working out the details with the politically feeble PCF.\(^\text{35}\) But the *Front National*’s leadership had more to bargain with and signing on under de Gaulle’s banner was not a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, their FTP units, mostly in southern France, proved to be a popular alternative when Vichy persisted in making one very particular policy that directly affected men in their 20s and 30s.

In February of 1943, Laval and the German labor minister agreed to institute a labor draft to man factories in Germany. Numbers of people involved in the *Résistance* increased as a result. Popular reaction to the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO) was the single greatest cause for young men to join the *Résistance*. The German Labor Minister, Fritz Sauckel came to be known at the time the “recruiter, *par excellence*, for the army of the *Maquis*.\(^\text{36}\)

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But how many people were in such movements? Or more important for this work, how many Frenchmen were willing to pick up arms to fight under the Allied Command? Membership numbers in all of these groups is very difficult thing to establish with certainty. *Libération* had told de Gaulle’s BCRA Chief Dewavrin in January of 1943 they had 23,000 members to be armed while *Franc-Tireur* claimed 16,000. It appears *Combat* had 70,000 – 75,000 total active members in its organization by the end of 1942. When a document from the *Résistance* to the OSS requesting arms, ammunition, and funds fell into the hands of the Vichy police during the winter of 1943, it estimated the national total, including the communists, to be at 241,350 men. Such numbers may be high due to a group’s exaggerations and or double counting, and certainly they are off considerably if a SHAEF intelligence report is correct. Completed in November 1944, as the combat in France shifted from guerrilla action to static fronts in the east and west of the nation, SHAEF’s intelligence analysts took numbers from the JEDBURGHS and the reconstituted French Army headquarters. It explained that the armed FFI numbered 91,500 during the summer months and that the numbers in the French Army by October, which had mustered in FFI units swelled the regular forces to approximately 300,000 men.

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While the interior groups created themselves according to the needs of their conditions and actions and re-actions of the occupying Germans and the Vichy Regime, de Gaulle’s understanding of them was slight. His BCRA chief André Dewavrin had, with the help of the British SOE RF Section, sent agents into France but had gleaned no useful insight into how the movements worked, who they were led by, and suffered from a complete lack of appreciation for their circumstances and the factors that created them. The position of the Free French relative to the Allies continued to be a tenuous one, as discussed in the next chapter, de Gaulle had persistently poor relations with the British and Americans. Their fortune changed however when Jean Moulin found his way to London and met General de Gaulle on 25 October 1941.

Before the war Jean Moulin had been a Department Prefect, roughly comparable to an American Governor, for the Departments of l’Aveyron and was serving as Prefect of the d’Eure-et-Loire Department when the war began. He had been educated to be in the French national bureaucratic manner, but was not the typical government manager. After he had served as an aide to the Air Minister, he supported the Spanish Republicans by smuggling arms across the Pyrenees Mountains during their Civil War despite the French government’s embargo. His energy and skill impressed the government, which lead to his appointment as the youngest Prefect in France. When the government signed the armistice with Germany he attempted to work with the Germans for the good of his department, but

He then made good use of his time in the wilderness before boarding a British plane from Lisbon. Before leaving France, his activities are not precisely known, but he tried to meet and ingratiate himself into various resistance groups with modest success so that when he spoke to the BCRA and SOE de-briefers upon his arrival he impressed them with his understanding of matters inside France. Of course when they knew next to nothing of them, increasing their understanding would not be difficult. Moulin had met Henri Frenay, for instance, and knew something of the emerging \textit{Combat} movement. But during his private meeting with de Gaulle, he made such an impression, as de Gaulle did with Moulin, that the two men decided they needed each other and that Moulin should return to France as de Gaulle’s representative in an effort to unite the movements.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 71 – 80.} De Gaulle provided him with money and arranged with the British to parachute him back into France via an SOE operated aircraft. Moulin’s letter and directive from de Gaulle was written in a tone of equals and stated that military actions and political actions should be separated. It left open the option of political leadership and encouraged the movements to intensify their propaganda efforts. He also sent some money to be split among the movements with a promise of more funds to follow. De Gaulle also asked for regular reports on
their progress and setbacks. The only thing he demanded was that all military action should be coordinated through him in London. Moulin returned to France on New Year’s Day, 1942.43

1942 was a turning point year for the Résistance. Certainly the entry of the United States into the war, it was hoped, would be a boon to a Free France and the defeat of Germany. But due to an incidents over French colonial possessions, especially in the Caribbean and off the Canadian coast, President Roosevelt now forced issues with de Gaulle while at the same time losing faith that Vichy would ever resist German aims. Moreover Vichy cost itself dearly in public support when it conducted trials against those in the government of France in the 1930s attempting to prove that they were the ones culpable for France’s defeat due to mismanagement and bankrupt ideologies. The trials quickly demonstrated no such thing and Darlan had to abandon the effort. This embarrassing event, plus Darlan’s failure to gain German agreement for collaboration, forced Pétain to return Laval to the government in April. On 10 June, General Koenig, a French commander of an armored division scored a victory against the Germans at Bir Hacheim in North Africa. The morale boost this provided cannot be underestimated, as it became the rallying cry for Frenchmen everywhere and proof that the French Army could defeat the Germans on the battlefield. General Koenig became famous and the battle became a rallying cry for Résistance movements, including several Maquis group that called themselves Bir Hacheim.

On 8 November, the Allies invaded French North Africa in a move that caught Vichy, de Gaulle, and most especially the Germans by surprise. General Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the Allied forces landing in Morocco and Algeria with the goal of seizing ports along North Africa’s coast, picking up French support, and getting into action against German and Italian troops in Tunisia and Libya. However, since it violated Vichy’s neutrality, Eisenhower had been secretly working with the senior French General Henri Giraud in the hope the landings would be unopposed. Giraud, the intrepid General who had been a prisoner of the Germans and then managed to escape, had an arrogance that the affable Kansan Eisenhower could not take in large doses. But there was another surprise, and this one was for Eisenhower. Admiral Darlan, who still retained control of the Navy after Laval returned as Prime Minister, surprised the American negotiators when they were informed that he was in North Africa to see his polio-stricken son. The French Generals advised the American State Department envoy, Robert Murphy that Darlan was the senior Vichy official and the one person he should deal with. Murphy and Eisenhower did so and the sporadic firefights that did take place ended when Darlan ordered a cease-fire.\(^4\) Germany could not allow this to happen, threatening as it did their forces in Libya attempting to press toward Cairo and control the Suez Canal. Hitler’s reaction made it clear to all who was really in charge in France when he directed his forces to rush across the Demarcation Line and occupy all of France. Now Germany possessed the deep-water port of Marseilles as a point of control on

the Mediterranean Sea. Apparently realizing Vichy’s complete impotence in the matter when told that Hitler was going to occupy the entirety of France, Laval’s only comment was, “Those Jews on the Riviera are in for a nasty surprise.”

The effect this event had created a precipitous drop in the support for Pétain by the people inside France. As John Sweets points out, “the most dramatic and definitive loss of prestige for the Marshal accompanied the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa and the occupation of southern France in November of 1942.” Events such as this drove more people into the Maquis and the southern resistance movements for they now had, “Germans on the street,” and combined with the STO which came the following February, much of Vichy’s legitimacy vanished. But while Allied intentions were seen to be finally coming through to meaningful action, the Free French could not have been more disgusted with the Darlan-Eisenhower agreement. De Gaulle and the movements greeted this news with a white-hot rage. Writing to American Admiral Stark, the American de facto representative to the Free French, de Gaulle’s remarked caustically, “I understand that the United States buys the treachery of traitors, if this appears profitable, but payment must not be made against the honor of France.” While Stark chose to ignore the letter, and de Gaulle apologized, Stark got the point again when the gist of the letter appeared in the London press. But the discomfiture and embarrassment that Churchill, Roosevelt, and Eisenhower was suddenly alleviated when a twenty-year old Royalist named

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Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle walked up to Admiral Darlan in a hallway near his office and shot two bullets in his chest. The short stout former head of the Vichy government died instantly. As the next in line, General Giraud took charge and had Bonnier de la Chapelle executed the next morning. The motive of who was behind the assassination or how large the conspiracy was remains unknown, but certainly Churchill, FDR, de Gaulle and Giraud in their own way all benefited by it. FDR wished now to advance Giraud and make him the head of the French in North Africa while maintaining Eisenhower as the overall governor of the French territory. The French saw FDR as having no right to make such decisions. And as time progressed the next expected Allied action, their invasion of France, or lack of, forced the Free French and the resistance movements along two lines of thought that would animate their hopes: inevitable German defeat brought about largely by an Allied invasion. As 1942 ended, German defeat seemed all the more certain.

But the greatest proof that the Germans would lose the war came when the Soviet Red Army successfully held out and then annihilated an entire German Army at Stalingrad at the end of 1942. Certainly the belief of German invincibility was collapsing. The communist underground newspapers especially extolled this victory while nearly all the underground newspapers in early 1943 showed their great anticipation about when the Allies may land in France and begin the final push to defeat Germany. As their expectation continued unrequited for the next year and a

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half, their sentiments toward Britain and the United States turned more and more harsh.\textsuperscript{49} Living under occupation was long past tolerable for the committed resister.

In January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met for a conference near Casablanca, Morocco, and discussed Allied strategy for the coming year. Starting on the 14\textsuperscript{th} and continuing on for 10 days, the British prevailed in convincing the Americans that the conditions were not yet favorable for landings in France and to continue operations in the Mediterranean theater.\textsuperscript{50} FDR also sought to merge the two senior representatives of France, Giraud, who was largely his man, and de Gaulle whom he distrusted.

Roosevelt and de Gaulle had planned to meet in Washington in early January. In preparation for the visit, de Gaulle had spoken to Admiral Stark and stated that the governing class of France had found itself lacking in French history, but leadership talent was so diffuse within the population that a new class of leaders could always be found. De Gaulle impressed Stark with his description of how Joan of Arc and Clemenceau appeared in French history from different parts of the population to successfully save the country and thoughtfully expressed to Stark that, “perhaps at this time I am one of those thrust into leadership by circumstances, and by the failure of other leaders.”\textsuperscript{51} Stark believed de Gaulle could make a useful and positive

\textsuperscript{49} Libération-Sud, Combat, L’Insurgé and the regional L’Humanité newspapers are replete with their increasing disgust with the United States on this issue. They can be found on Microfilm from the Center for Research Libraries, in the “Périodiques clandestins, 1939-1945.” General Donovan, as will be described below, related this to the President with no result.

\textsuperscript{50} Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, p. 299.

\textsuperscript{51} Funk, Charles De Gaulle: The Crucial Years, 1943-1944, p. 48.
impression upon FDR and encouraged the trip. But when Darlan’s assassination occurred, events overcame the meeting and de Gaulle never left for the United States.

When de Gaulle and Roosevelt did finally meet during the Casablanca Conference the tone had shifted a great deal. When it was apparent to de Gaulle that Roosevelt and Churchill believed they had the right to name the leadership of France, de Gaulle became very defensive and wary. He was also upset that Churchill had threatened to cut off his funds if he did not attend the meeting at Casablanca. FDR’s continued pressing of Churchill to produce the “unwilling bride” (de Gaulle) for the “bridegroom” (Giraud) only rankled Churchill on the matter. When they finally did meet, after the swelling of all these tensions, things got even worse. After some polite discussions between the two French Generals, the two shook hands for the press’ cameras, but both left completely unsatisfied. De Gaulle had attempted his historical illusions that had worked so well with Admiral Stark. But perhaps due to a muddle of translations, FDR understood de Gaulle to be saying that de Gaulle was indeed Joan of Arc. The event became the signal event in FDR’s subsequent discussions about de Gaulle to others and often embellished it to make de Gaulle seem outlandish.52

Seeing how FDR and Churchill tried to govern affairs for the French, “de Gaulle tried to coordinate, with even greater focus, all the efforts of metropolitan France.”53 Legitimacy had to be expressed and de Gaulle began pursuing that expression via two paths. The first involved getting the interior resistance

52 Ibid. p. 73.
movements to unite behind him and the second path was to create a governing entity that they could join. These efforts would consume him and the Résistance for the next year and a half. Nevertheless, looking back at this time, de Gaulle wrote that he was full of hope for, “The die was cast; the scales began to tip the other way. The huge resources of the United States were transformed into means of battle; Russia had made a recovery, as we were to see at Stalingrad; the British managed to re-establish themselves in Egypt; Fighting France was growing… An operation of major scope was under way in the west.”

But he was beginning to realize that the Allied landings he was referring to required successful linkage with the Résistance’s actions. Such conditions required unity of action and that meant constituting a provisional government that would be widely recognized in North Africa and the interior of France. How could it be constituted in such a way that all the movements and groups recognized it sufficiently enough to follow its orders? A normal course of action in a Republic would be for the political parties to participate, but their stock was gone and most of the more powerful movements wanted nothing to do with pre-war political parties that they believed had so disastrously let their nation down. Moulin who had returned from France with news of the movements, and the BCRA’s chief Dewavrin had to impress upon the movements that only de Gaulle’s political leadership could unify France and provide the necessary legitimacy. Both men would go into France in an effort to do

so, and provide the necessary plans of what to do when asked by that legitimate and
unified political leader.

Dewavrin parachuted into France in February of 1943 with Pierre Brossolette
with a mix of things to accomplish. Planning had been done in London on what they
wanted their Secret Army to do, and to begin their preparations, they carried with
them the microfilmed versions of *Plan Vert*, the effort to cut rail way lines in certain
key locations around France. They also brought more funds and attempted to pull the
northern resistance movements together and under de Gaulle’s banner. Moulin,
operating somewhat independently of Dewavrin and Brossolette sought to get the
southern movements in order and working together. His efforts reached dramatic
success four months after his re-entry into France.

The *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) was formed and on 27 May
1943, and its first major decision promised to follow General de Gaulle. The Conseil
was a mix of compromises and nearly did not happen due to Frenay’s independent
dealings with the American OSS. For months Frenay’s delegate had correspondence
and meetings with the OSS Station chief in Bern, Switzerland, Allen Dulles. Dulles
had been taking information and giving Frenay’s *Combat* financial support.
Realizing that this meant the Americans had independent power directly into one of
the movements, Moulin became furious. It demonstrated further proof of de Gaulle’s
point of view that the United States meant to control the governing of France. But the
issue was smoothed over. Largely because of reservations about Frenay by leaders of

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movements that had recently joined Combat, allowing Moulin to skillfully manage the rivalries within them to work out the agreement he sought. The seats on the council were divided up among northern and southern movements and some of political parties, including the communists. While the unification was tenuous, de Gaulle announced it as proof he was more in tune with and more legitimate than Giraud.

With Moulin’s mission enjoying success, de Gaulle left London for Algiers in order to work on the political unification of the exterior Résistance. Now firmly in the belief that he would have to be a political leader after some thoughtful communication from Léon Blum and other French politicians, de Gaulle arrived with an aim. The organization he sought to create was a committee that could govern French interests in the colonies, but de Gaulle worked to make sure it could develop as a French provisional government and be recognized as such by foreign powers. As both John Sweets and Peter Novick have observed, de Gaulle was far shrewder than Giraud. Each of the two Generals got to name members of the committee and de Gaulle’s members were more politically skilled while Giraud’s were more technically oriented, and over time, they were turned or removed from the committee. As Novick stated, “When subsequent appointments were made, de Gaulle’s nominees formed a solid bloc of able politicians, while Giraud’s – mostly technicians – were not equally loyal to their sponsor and voted individually according to the issue under

De Gaulle and Giraud constituted The Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (CFLN) on 3 June 1943, but over the course of the rest of the year, de Gaulle’s political skill compared to Giraud’s complete lack thereof, began to emerge. By November 1943, they had also constituted a legislative assembly called the Assemblée Consultative Provisoire and a few days after its constitution, the CFLN members voted de Gaulle their sole head and Giraud left the committee.

Churchill and Roosevelt quickly realized how Giraud was being maneuvered aside and feared their waning influence. In a memorandum to the SOE chief Lord Selborne regarding funds to the Résistance in France, Churchill instructed him, “to take care that the direction of the movement of Résistance does not fall under control of de Gaulle or his satellites in England; if not, he will use of this enormous capacity at its own political ends in France and not in the interest of the allied effort of war.”

Roosevelt also feared de Gaulle’s efforts to decrease American control over affairs in France and became furious when French officials in North Africa had been removed and some were arrested. FDR had General Marshall send Eisenhower the terse note, “Please inform the French committee as follows: . . . you are directed to take no action against them at this time.” Continuing, FDR told Eisenhower and Churchill that, “It seems to me that this is the proper time effectively to eliminate the JEANNE D’ARC complex and to return to realism.” However, he gave no means or suggested no

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58 Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre: De L’appel Du 18 Juin À La Libération, Tome I. p. 868, as quoted from PM Minute to Lord Selborne, PREM 3/184/6 at the British National Archives.
59 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1) [Sept. 1943 – April 1945], Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-
method to do so. FDR did not because, short of assassination, or some ham handed attempt to arrest de Gaulle, it seemed apparent to all that de Gaulle was the person with whom the Allies would have to deal on matters regarding France.

But while de Gaulle struggled to make the American President have to deal with reality, the Free French did not use their time idly. Dewavrin and his colleagues in London were busy planning on how they could make *Plan Vert* better and came up with other plans to enhance the Allied invasion when it occurred. Their effort was known as “Bloc Planning.” Roughly translated into English it means Unit or Group planning. Created in December 1943, the Bloc Planning group designed detailed plans to cripple the Railroads (*Plan Vert*), sabotage of the underground long distance telephone system (*Plan Violet*), and the sabotage of electrical installations (*Plan Bleu*). These plans had been roughed out from an early planning group, and due to reorganizations the continuation of these efforts fell to the BCRA office in London on Duke Street, about a 15-minute walk from the SOE’s main office on Baker Street. General François d’Astier de la Vigerie led the effort in his position as the commander of the French Forces in the United Kingdom. In late 1943 and January of 1944 they conducted two staff studies to assess the best use of the *Maquis* in France and how they could assist in the Allied landings. When they shared the results of these plans with their SOE and OSS counterparts, they were greeted with great
interest. For not only did they have plans on what to do, but they began to see that the French had an organization in France more and more able to carry them out.⁶⁰

The leadership of the interior Résistance had worked out many command and control arrangements with the Free French via their contacts and by working with Dewavrin during his visits to France. They agreed that France would be divided into regions, largely along historical lines, and led by a political head, but he would also have a Délégué Militaire Régional (DMR) or a Regional Military Delegate who spoke for de Gaulle. In all practicality that meant he worked for the senior general in London or Algiers, depending upon what part of France fell under those two Allied spheres of operation. Northern France would fall under SHAEF in London and southern France would fall under Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in the Mediterranean commanded by the British General Maitland Wilson. That meant that General d’Astier de la Vigerie would command the Résistance in the north while General Gabriel Cochet, whom the CFLN had appointed as their representative to AFHQ, would command the southern Maquis. After deciding upon this basic regional organization, the interior and BCRA would have to agree upon leadership of them, from the pool available for work in France. While beginning the appointment and training of some of them in September of 1943, the effort of inserting them began in January of 1944 and continued on as necessary through the spring. The BCRA and the SOE’s RF section selected, trained, and deployed men to be de Gaulle’s DMR’s in France and supplied them with funds, radio sets, radio operators, weapons,

⁶⁰ Historical Division, The French Forces of the Interior: Their Organization and Their Participation in the Liberation of France, 1944. Part 1, Chapter 1, pp. 73 – 79.
and assistants to prepare for the Allied landings. But much of their planning continued separately, causing problems in meshing the JEDBURGH and other Allied plans. The issue had to be solved at a higher level and involved the political concerns of the United States, the United Kingdom, and CFLN.

As the resistance movements inside France came together and organized with de Gaulle’s France Libre organization, pressure continued to build upon Pétain due to the lack of Germany’s interest in collaboration and the loss of North Africa. The interior movements had been born, matured, coalesced, and with Moulin, Dewavrin, and Brossolette’s effective negotiations and courage, merged with General de Gaulle’s France Libre. De Gaulle managed to assert French rights on the international scene and never failed to maintain the notion of French sovereignty as an idea that still existed despite Vichy, the Occupation, and lack of diplomatic recognition. The communist Front National’s agreement to join in should have demonstrated to all that those who sought to defeat Germany and Vichy all followed de Gaulle. The United States, with the exception of the OSS, made no material support to the movements, even when they clearly announced their unified support of de Gaulle. In fact, Roosevelt hindered the resistance movements’ wishes by supporting Giraud, a man the movements saw as far too close to Vichy. As 1942 wore on, it became evident that Giraud’s sole source of power came almost exclusively from the White House. American support was not worthless as it meant materiel for rebuilding the French Army and re-entering the war with forces equipped

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to fight alongside the Allies. But it did not mean recognition from Roosevelt, nor did it gain the internal resistance movement’s approval of Giraud. In fact, it weakened him when compared to de Gaulle who railed about the United State’s insisting on how the French handled their affairs. Roosevelt kept recognition off the table, to be used as a bargaining chip when the time was right.

While recognition is somewhat of a diplomatic exercise, it meant the OVERLORD commander could not relate operational details regarding the landings to the French. That forced the SFHQ and BCRA planning staffs, some of whom had become good colleagues and friends, to keep secrets from each other. With the row continuing between FDR and Churchill on one side and de Gaulle on the other, it remained to be seen how the soon to be named commander of Operation OVERLORD would approach the effort.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized de Gaulle’s success and sought to exploit the *Résistance* for Allied purposes. As the commander who led Operation TORCH and the Allies into North Africa, he had halting success negotiating with French leaders while also making successful progress against Axis forces. Undoubtedly, the experience taught Eisenhower a great deal. Specifically regarding matters with the French, he learned more about how to conduct the necessary diplomacy in his role as the Supreme Allied Commander. Second, he learned what decisions were his, and what President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill would allow him to make on his own. Thirdly, he had grown to trust General Donovon’s OSS and evidently had no prejudice against British intelligence or the SOE. Lastly, and just as importantly, he learned critical lessons about Intra-French politics, the emerging leaders, and what motivated their aims. FDR and Churchill could not have chosen a man better suited to work with de Gaulle or who understood the utility of French legitimacy, despite their efforts that ignored it. Ironically, his experience working with the French appeared to have no bearing on his selection. Nevertheless, Eisenhower made considerable effort to reach out to General de Gaulle, create a capability to organize and train the *Résistance*, and provide a command and control organization that would support his mission to “enter the continent of Europe and, in

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conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”

Eisenhower’s North African Rehearsal

“They shot the little fellow!” exclaimed Robert Murphy, the senior American diplomat in North Africa, as he burst into General Mark Clark’s office. Clark served as Eisenhower’s deputy and had been conducting the secret negotiations with the French in the days prior to Operation TORCH and the Allied landings in French North Africa. The assassinated man Murphy referred to was Admiral Jean-Louis Darlan. Darlan came to Algiers just prior to the Allied invasion in November 1942 to visit his Polio-stricken son but in his capacity as the senior French official in Algiers, found himself dealing with Eisenhower, Clark, and Murphy. His death threatened to derail Eisenhower’s plans, but in the end proved to resolve a problem between Eisenhower and nearly everyone else.

The British and American landings in Morocco and Algeria had gone as well as the Allies might expect, with some French troops resisting, but most, after Darlan’s orders went out to the French units, joined with the Allies. The agreement meant that American and British soldiers could then begin their attempt to push east into Tunisia putting pressure on the German and Italian forces there. Their work negotiating with

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1 "CAB 79/70," Item 2., Minutes of Meetings, Nos. 31 - 60., BNA, Kew, UK.
Generals Giraud, Alphonse Juin, and other senior French Army commanders had proved frustrating, and at moments embarrassing, especially when Giraud met Eisenhower and asked when command of TORCH would pass from Eisenhower to him. The misunderstanding probably resulted from Murphy and Clark’s cagey discussions with Giraud’s supporters in Algiers as they were not able to reveal the when and where of Allied plans. But their work proved not to be a total loss. Murphy had been working in North Africa from summer of 1940 negotiating trade and other agreements with French officials and before that had served in the American Embassy in Paris. His efforts had paid off in many ways and seemed prescient when FDR and Churchill agreed to invade North Africa as the State Department and Donovan’s OSS knowledge of the area did much to enable the landings. Murphy laid the groundwork for re-armament agreements, mineral trade agreements and had learned how to ingratiate himself to the senior French authorities in North Africa.³ With the decision to invade North Africa, Eisenhower needed French support to stall Axis efforts at the front and govern French territory in his rear areas, as well as not engage in combat with American and British soldiers. But the effort was not without gaffs or outright mistakes intolerable at the political level.

Eisenhower set up his command center on the island of Gibraltar, as the invasion forces positioned themselves secretly off the coast. From there he hoped to maintain secure communications with the landing forces, London, Washington, and

to maintain contact with Murphy and Clark working with the French in Algiers. As the invasion began, Eisenhower however felt anything but informed of what was occurring. Nervous and unsure of himself in his first major operation, the chain-smoking Kansan found himself in the dark about how the landings were proceeding and anxious to smooth out matters with the French.⁴

Murphy had made arrangements for Giraud to go to Gibraltar and meet with Eisenhower. When the two met, the senior French Commander was under the impression that he would be named the Allied Commander of TORCH, once the landings began. When he met Eisenhower on Gibraltar, just as the invasion was beginning he asked when the command would be transferred to him and Eisenhower had to disabuse him of this misunderstanding. But it had to be done gently as Ike might lose the support of the French commander in doing so and the whole effort could become a disaster. The first conversation did not impress Eisenhower at all. He believed Giraud to be arrogant, “difficult to deal with-wants much in power, equipment, etc. but seems little disposed to do his part to stop the fighting.”⁵ Giraud sought the Allied command, but Eisenhower who reported to the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff, could not grant that request but the next day, they worked out their differences and Giraud began to cooperate.

When the message arrived from Murphy that Admiral Darlan was in Algiers and he had begun negotiations with the former Vichy Prime Minister, Ike took the

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surprising opportunity to deal at an even higher level and perhaps skip Giraud’s ego for a more effective deal. If the French would negotiate a cease-fire that would stop the fighting and bring the French forces over to the Allied side, he would seize it. But while Roosevelt and Churchill were aware of the negotiations with Giraud and some of the other French generals, they were shocked to discover a deal was in the works with Darlan, a man too closely linked with collaboration and Germany. So while he did not have authorization to negotiate with Darlan, Eisenhower took advantage of the unexpected presence of the senior Vichy official, hoping to pull the French forces over to the Allied side. While this made sense at the military level, his political masters found it a loathsome move and when it became public, the British and American people and press were shocked.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been eager to work with French General Henri Giraud, a leader who they believed would provide unity to the French in North Africa while not being seen as linked with Vichy. Giraud had been captured by the Germans in 1940 and made an escape from his German prison camp. And as discussed above, his proclivity to disregard politics made him the perfect choice from Roosevelt’s point of view as he could be asked to do what Roosevelt wanted. But when Darlan appeared on the scene they found the more senior Vichy official willing to discuss matters and more able to deliver for the Allies from his more senior position and could bring the French Navy along in the deal. Over the next six weeks, Eisenhower and Darlan attempted to hammer out various civil and military details while Roosevelt and Churchill
persistently thundered out their disapproval of the arrangement in messages to Ike and expressed their displeasure in the press. Darlan could see that he would not prove to be lasting part of any agreement with the Allies. Writing to Eisenhower he lamented, “I did what I did only because the American Government took the solemn engagement to restore French sovereignty in its integrity as it existed in 1939 and because the armistice between Axis Powers and France was broken by the occupation of the whole of French Metropolitan territory…..” He went on to complain about the Allies implying Roosevelt and Churchill were “spreading doubts” about his work to unite Frenchmen.\(^6\) But when Bonnier de la Chapelle shot the Admiral on Christmas Eve, Eisenhower feared his tenuous deal would evaporate. Eisenhower was several hours away by car when he got the news and raced back to Algiers immediately.\(^7\)

Over the course of the next two days, Ike listened to the French Generals in North Africa regarding who they thought should be the civil and military leader, received telegrams from de Gaulle in London expressing his alarm about the assassination, and received messages from Roosevelt and Churchill. All the input pointed to Giraud replacing Darlan as such an arrangement would quiet down fears of internal disorder within the French population in North Africa, make Churchill and Roosevelt happy, and those loyal to de Gaulle also seemed to approve.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Letter from Darlan to Eisenhower, Nov 21 1942, Butcher Dairy, Pre-Presidential: 1916 – 1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. After seeing the letter at some unknown time later, Churchill told Eisenhower that it was both “pathetic and dignified.”


\(^8\) Entry for Dec 26, 1942 and p. a-113, Butcher Diary Series, November 7, 1942 to January 30, 1943, Pre-Presidential: 1916 – 1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
But Eisenhower asked for input from more than just high ranking officials and his superiors. French Lieutenant Joseph de Francesco served in the Allied HQ doing odd jobs and helping the American staff find its way in Algiers. From time to time he drove senior officers. De Francesco, who had been captured in 1940, escaped and made his way to North Africa, believed Darlan deserved what he got for collaborating with Germany. At some point shortly after Admiral Darlan’s assassination, Ike got into the staff car driven by de Francesco and asked the French lieutenant what he thought they should do with the assassin evidently unaware that Giraud was deciding to have him executed. De Francesco bluntly replied, “They ought to give the guy a medal.” Ike sat in the backseat checking his temper, but he was beginning to learn that French politics would be an ever-present concern.

Their short conversation in the staff car serves as metaphor for Eisenhower’s learning and negotiating his way through French politics. Fourteen months after his short conversation with Eisenhower in the staff car, de Francesco joined the Allied Special Forces and parachuted into German held territory near Calmar, France on 10 September 1944. But in December 1942, serving as his driver, and his future commander, he registered his visceral disgust with collaboration. More importantly, as discussed above, such beliefs were widely held among the French in North Africa while inside metropolitan France, sentiments were shifting from Vichy and toward Résistance while the French underground groups evolved and merged under the

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9 de Francesco, Interview with author, 3 March 1999.
leadership of Charles de Gaulle. To Eisenhower, Darlan’s assassination appeared to be symptomatic of French chaos, but to de Francesco, it was justice.

Immersed in military operations and the diplomacy required to support them, Eisenhower wanted nothing to do with French politics. For him, the military objective was paramount but nevertheless he could not escape political issues as they defined his military aims. But Eisenhower learned from Darlan’s assassination and several other disagreements with the French over the course of the next year. He determined that the French Résistance would follow the Supreme Allied Commander, if led by a man chosen by the Résistance itself, not by the governments in London or Washington.

Eisenhower’s journal and other personal correspondence demonstrate his persistent frustration with those detached from his situation, holding views, and persisting in policies he believed were unworkable. Perhaps he realized that those comprising the resistance movements should determine its leadership. Those resistance movements would confer upon a national leader the authority to deal with the Allies as well as organize a government able to take over from Vichy after the Allied invasion. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on Eisenhower taking command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in December 1943 and charged him with leading the Allied forces in entering northwest Europe and destroying the German forces. Doing this task meant going through France and this necessitated support from the French people. But if Eisenhower could get active resistance cooperation to support Operation OVERLORD, it could constitute a severe challenge to the German army’s
rear areas by wrecking havoc on communications, transport, and ambushing German combat units. The Résistance could also provide vast quantities of tactical intelligence for more effective operational use of Allied forces. They could also, if armed and organized for it, comprise a guerilla force that might prove useful under the right circumstances. But even more importantly, a provisional government would relieve the Allies of the troublesome and manifestly complex task of setting up an interim civil government.

Realizing what the CFLN meant to his efforts for OVERLORD, Eisenhower made a point to see de Gaulle before he left the Mediterranean theater for his new command in London. He had corresponded and met with de Gaulle on other occasions over the past year and a half. When Darlan was assassinated, Ike attempted to get Giraud to meet with de Gaulle in order to help unite the French and passed messages between them over his cipher communications. One message portended de Gaulle’s achievement with the CFLN. After receiving a rebuff from Giraud on 29 December 1942 that they meet, de Gaulle persisted and in his second request de Gaulle was clear in what he wanted the two to achieve. He wrote, “only a provisional central French authority, based on a national association for the prosecution of the war is capable of guaranteeing direction of French effort, the maintenance intact of French sovereignty and the just representation of France in foreign lands.”

De Gaulle understood the difficulty and uncertainty in Algiers and offered to meet in

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10 Butcher Diary Series, November 7, 1942 to January 30, 1943, Pre-Presidential: 1916 – 1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. The translation was done by Eisenhower’s staff and the messages are appended to the diary on page a-132.
Brazzaville, Beirut, or wherever the senior ranking Giraud chose to meet. However
his second request failed to change Giraud’s mind. The two would not meet until
Roosevelt and Churchill awkwardly forced them to shake hands at Casablanca as
described in the previous chapter.

FDR made it clear to Eisenhower and to Churchill in various messages in
early January of 1943 that North Africa was under Eisenhower’s military occupation.
However, having to deal with the reality of Giraud and governing the French
demonstrated to Eisenhower that things were not that simple. He did not want to be
in the position of telling Giraud to do something and then have the awkward silence
that would follow if Giraud should refuse. Eisenhower and Giraud had worked out
how to get French forces in the action against the Germans at the front and if Giraud
were to cause problems, those valuable troops would have to be pulled out of the line
and the French forces covering Allied lines of communications could not be trusted
with this key task. 11 The Allies needed a sovereign authority de Gaulle described
above to cover those issues and support Allied military efforts. And when it emerged
in June of 1943 in the form of the CFLN, Eisenhower cautiously recognized its utility
to him and his military operations.

Nevertheless, Roosevelt and Churchill did not. In a message dated 8 July,
FDR directed Eisenhower and Robert Murphy to stop contemplating offering official
recognition to the CFLN. “Under no condition are you to recognize the Committee

11 Ibid., January 4, 1943 p. a-138 and a-139.
without the full consultation and approval of The President."\textsuperscript{12} As President FDR certainly had the authority to direct his Generals on matters, especially ones of a political and diplomatic nature, but he never worked to resolve issues with de Gaulle at his level. FDR pressed this position and restated it whenever he felt necessary over the course of the next year. De Gaulle on the other hand apparently got along well with General Eisenhower and the two men’s correspondence provides evidence of their mutual respect and cordiality. In a congratulatory note soon after Eisenhower’s selection to command the OVERLORD, de Gaulle graciously declared that the CFLN had “full confidence in you for employing French forces under your command for the next Allied operation.”\textsuperscript{13} So while de Gaulle and the CFLN granted Eisenhower the authority to command its forces, FDR and Churchill, denied de Gaulle the authority to make such a grant. But if the French \textit{Résistance} groups were now united behind de Gaulle, the people in those groups and movements might consider Roosevelt and Churchill as much of a threat to French sovereignty as Germany.

For the President and the Prime Minister the issue revolved around their suspicion of de Gaulle and the fact that French people had no opportunity to express their approval of the CFLN. Of course, while the Germans occupied France, a vote was impossible. Nevertheless, there was overwhelming evidence that de Gaulle and the CFLN were viewed as the sole leadership of the \textit{Résistance}. Paradoxically, the

\textsuperscript{12} “Message from AGWAR, 8 July 1943. No. 2016,” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers: Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principle File, Box 100, FDR Correspondence.," Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

only other source of authority in France was Pétain’s collaborators. But how legitimate was the CFLN and de Gaulle’s leadership of France? The American Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Division produced a detailed and revealing seventy-page report on the various Résistance movements and their political, trade union, and religious sub-groups. In the first sentence it answered the President’s unfounded belief with the blunt assessment of, “The French underground enjoys the support of the vast majority of Frenchmen.” The report continued on, “Since 1942 the underground has recognized the leadership of de Gaulle.”

Furthermore, as I’ve described in Chapter 2 above, post-WWII scholarship has demonstrated this to be true. De Gaulle was the undisputed leader of the unified Résistance movements.

So if the underground enjoyed the support of a majority of Frenchmen who recognized de Gaulle’s leadership why would the President insist on resolving the matter with a post-war election? What could make him go against his commanders and his chief of intelligence? The reason may be in the influence of one particularly well-placed French émigré who had arrived in Washington, D. C. just after France’s defeat in 1940. Alexis Léger was an accomplished poet and an experienced diplomat who could command attention within the State Department and the White House due

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15 See Julian Jackson’s work *France: The Dark Years* for a synthetic account of France during the war. The list of scholars who agree on this point begins with Sweets, Paxton, Michel, Kedward, Funk, and Novick whose works are all listed in the bibliography.
to his reputation and ingratiating style. Soon after his arrival he began a connection with the U. S. State Department with several descriptions and his opinions on European events. President Roosevelt came to hold Léger in “high esteem.” Léger had been fired from Paul Reynaud’s government just before de Gaulle was brought into it. This may have been the source of his hatred and distrust of de Gaulle, a man he never met, but nevertheless persisted in denouncing de Gaulle to Roosevelt and State Department officials.\footnote{Aglion, \textit{Roosevelt and De Gaulle: Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir}. pp. 184 – 187.} It is certain that FDR sought Léger’s advice often and always received words back that de Gaulle’s efforts were illegal and that de Gaulle would prove to be dictatorial.\footnote{David G. Haglund, "Roosevelt As "Friend of France" - but Which One?," \textit{Diplomatic History} 31, no. 5 (2007), pp. 895 – 898. Haglund attributes FDR’s anti-Imperialism as the source of his zeal to ensure de Gaulle remained unrecognized.} Hearing anti-de Gaulle beliefs come repeatedly from such a qualified source bolstered advice he was getting from the former ambassador to France. After de Gaulle visited Stalin and brought the communist resistance under his umbrella, William Bullitt misinterpreted what was happening and told FDR that de Gaulle was in the pockets of the Communists. Furthermore, Bullitt theorized that Stalin and de Gaulle had an agreement on post-war France. Bullitt feared an alliance of the political right and the Communists would team up and “crush democratic elements.”\footnote{Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, \textit{For the President, Personal and Secret; Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt} (Boston,: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). p. 581.} Such an event would defy imagination however, as de Gaulle’s conservative politics and devout Catholicism would never allow him to team up with left wing atheists to do anything but to save France. After the war, such a political alliance seems exceedingly fanciful.
If de Gaulle did not want an Allied Military government administering France, neither did Eisenhower. After leading successful combat operations against the Germans and Italians in Algeria, Tunisia, and Sicily, Eisenhower now prepared to do so in France on the Allies’ way to Germany. However he had more than good experience as an allied combat commander. Before his departure from the Mediterranean theater, Eisenhower requested an appointment with de Gaulle. De Gaulle had sent him a note congratulations and Christmas note on 23 December declaring that he had, “full confidence in” Eisenhower and furthermore would place French forces under his command “for the next inter-allied operation.”

Eisenhower then visited de Gaulle and as de Gaulle recounted later, their conversation was vital for both men to initiate the kind of relationship and support they needed from the other. Eisenhower reportedly told de Gaulle, “‘You were originally described to me’, he said, ‘in an unfavorable sense. Today, I realize that that judgment was in error.” Ike went on to say, according to de Gaulle, that a successful invasion required the participation and coordination of de Gaulle’s forces and the “moral support of the French people.” De Gaulle reportedly responded, “‘Splendid! … You are a man! For you know how to say, I was wrong.’”

Whether he had ever been wrong or not, Eisenhower seemed convinced at least by January of 1944, soon after arriving in his new position, that to avoid “political and civil confusion and excessive commitments in personnel and supply

19 Letter to General Eisenhower from General De Gaulle, 28 December 1943, Box 100, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers: 1916-1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
after the invasion that he must be in a position to deal with a government of France. Eisenhower recognized the situation and laid his cards on the table. The CFLN would have to serve as that government. Stating in a telegram to General Marshall on the 19\textsuperscript{th} he dictated that, “the French National Committee, whatever its faults might be, represented the beginnings of civil government in France.” Furthermore, he believed the President, and the War and State Departments largely concurred.\textsuperscript{21} Pressing this policy, he met with the senior French military representative General d’Astier de la Vigerie on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of January where they discussed several issues. During the conversation that ranged from the desire for liaison officers in Eisenhower’s staff to a role for medical supplies of recaptured French territory, they also discussed the role of the \textit{Résistance}. Ike told d’Astier that he had spoken with “de Gaulle and Giraud [about] the role of the \textit{Résistance} and the problems involved in combining their action with allied forces.”\textsuperscript{22}

Unfortunately indications that Ike was going to treat the CFLN as an entity possessing some authority caused the Darlan episode to play out again. In a Minute dated 25 January, Churchill rebuked Eisenhower by stating he did not think Roosevelt would be “prepared to trust to the French Liberation Committee as the dominant authority.” Furthermore, he intimated that the Allies agree to the selection of those who represented the French Committee, and that Eisenhower should not simply

\textsuperscript{21} SHAEF SGS Records, 381 France: French Participation in OVERLORD, Microfilm, Box 6, Reel 52, Frame 248, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., Roll 52, Frame 1242.
accept whomever they sent.\textsuperscript{23} Carrying on the attitude exhibited regarding earlier disagreements with the CFLN, Churchill and Roosevelt pressed their right to select who the French could have in key roles. When Churchill met with de Gaulle in London five days later, he highlighted the British and American long list of complaints, and related to de Gaulle that he and FDR had little confidence in the CFLN, “nor by implication, in its head.” Churchill dryly commented to FDR that de Gaulle, “seemed upset by this.”\textsuperscript{24}

But Roosevelt’s arrogance outmatched Churchill’s. In early February of 1944 the Prime Minister and the President conducted a debate via message, concerning who should have which parts of Europe as their sphere of influence. Previous conferences had determined the general guidance, but now the War Department was cueing up OVERLORD planning, and post war occupation duties requiring decisions from Roosevelt. In setting up the nature of the issue with the British he baldly told Churchill, “France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time.”\textsuperscript{25} So while he insisted on setting up, as the Allies had in Italy, an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT), over Eisenhower’s request not to, he knew he could not commit the forces required and was going to lean on the British to do so.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., Frame 240.
\textsuperscript{24} Paul Kesaris et al., \textit{Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945 Microform} (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981). 9 Microfilm Reels, Reel 3, Frame 831.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., Reel 3, Frame 852.
When the Combined Chiefs of Staff formalized Eisenhower’s mission in a directive on 12 February 1944, it not only told him what to do, but made provisions about his task, logistics, forces, and other broad brush issues. It also gave him the use of agencies that conducted sabotage, subversion, and propaganda. However, the last paragraph of the order concerning relations with liberated Allied Territories conveyed to Eisenhower that, “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.”26 With the invasion scheduled for May, just four months away, he needed to make arrangements with France but Roosevelt and Churchill refused to grant political recognition. De Gaulle later referred to this entire episode in his memoirs and observed that FDR’s similar attempt in North Africa had come to naught, and yet he attempted it again in metropolitan France. The French leader wrote “the President’s intentions seemed to me on the same order as Alice’s adventures in Wonderland.”27 The Free French had always wished to accomplish two major goals. The first was the defeat of Germany, the second was the purge of the Vichy government. But a new one developed around the fear of an AMGOT, and it was largely fueled by FDR’s actions. De Gaulle and the CFLN were prepared to press this matter like a game of chicken, and it seemed FDR’s obstinacy was prepared to crash OVERLORD’s success over the issue. Exasperated, Eisenhower wrote in his private journal on 22 March, that the President “has thrown back in my lap” the Résistance issue, telling him to work with anyone “capable of assisting us.” He

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26 Paragraph 8, CAB 79/70. BNA, Kew, UK.
desired to work with de Gaulle, but not singularly, and de Gaulle would not work with SHAEF unless the Allies recognized him as the sole political authority.\textsuperscript{28}

**OVERLORD and Allied Planning to use the Résistance**

Shortly after the creation of Anglo-American SOE/SO, or the London Group, COSSAC Published on 20 December 1943, the “Basic Directive” on JEDBURGHs that defined objectives, roles, team composition, tasks, and other details. The teams were to support the invasion of Europe and consist of “three men, of whom at least one will be a native of the country in which the team is to operate. Teams will consist of a leader, a second-in-command, both of whom will normally be officers, and one wireless operator.” Functioning as a liaison with any *Maquis* in their area, JEDBURGHs were not to command the Résistance, “but it is felt that the arrival of Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind the enemy lines, will have a marked effect on patriotic morale and that these teams, representing as they do the Allied High Command, will act as a focus for local Résistance.” Sent to areas with known resistance elements, the teams would communicate the Allied Command’s orders to the local groups. The team would then train the *résistants* on sabotage, organize guerrilla operations, arrange for arms to be delivered via nighttime parachute drops, and coordinate the *Maquis* group’s operations with OVERLORD objectives. Surprisingly, the directive contained no guidance on how to coordinate JEDBURGH

operations with conventional units, despite the British long held belief that the
JEDBURGH teams would be called into the field by the nearest Allied land force.29

COSSAC’s work on the possible use of the Résistance had been informed by
SOE, OSS, and other intelligence agencies. Its director had the staff finalize a
detailed planning document in July 1943. It was lengthy and attempted to cover
Résistance Groups in France” defined Allied assumptions and potential missions for
the resistance groups. It assumed four things about the situation that COSSAC would
not be able to control. First that the “general situation in France will be substantially
the same as that of 1st June, 1943.” Second, that the resistance groups would maintain
themselves until the invasion date and the “labour draft will be successfully
countered.” Third, they would not be called upon, other than various and directed
sabotage activities, to take action prior to D-Day. Their last assumption was that the
required material would be made available for them to carry out their plan of action.30

COSSAC got the second and third assumptions correct. However, adequate
weapons and materials would not be made available to the Maquis, due to an
argument over resources and Allied senior leaders who believed it would be a waste
of resources and valuable airlift missions with little to gain. Furthermore, this lack of
capability was exacerbated when the landings occurred due to the larger than believed
numbers of Maquis needing weapons and ammunition. Thinking conventionally,

29 Kimball, p. 231.
30 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command,
Office of G-3: Records, 1943 – 1946 (Harold R. Bull), Box 1, Reel 2, Frame 1238. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, KS.
most army leaders did not support the idea of using scarce bomber sorties to arm thousands of civilians in the hope of coordinated military action. Furthermore, pre-invasion estimates on what would be required to equip the Résistance were woefully short.

While the Résistance was united at the senior levels the local resistance groups presented another reality. The typical Maquis member was a runaway, hiding out from the German labor draft. Indeed the unpopular Vichy policies, which attempted to extract concessions from Germany on various key issues, only served to fuel popular French discontent with Vichy and drive the discontented workers into the Résistance. Groups of Maquis began to form in early 1942 and by 1943, especially in southern France, they began to set up localities where they were the actual power. Vichy authorities and the German army and Gestapo continually worked to eradicate their growth, but it was a futile cause. By 1944 many of them were linked with the CFLN or groups outside of France via networks of spies and underground newspapers. They maintained a political culture seeking the twin goal of toppling Vichy and ejecting the Germans. The groups emerged whose desire for liberation exceeded their belief in Pétain and collaboration. These groups often took on the mold of the French pre-war political groups, but with one difference: whatever pre-war goals their political party or group may have advanced, they now all had the twin

31 Vigneras, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: Rearming the French. p. 300.
32 After action Jedburgh team reports universally complained of the lack of weapons due to the greater than expected number of Maquis. See OSS/London War Diary Vol. 8. Microfilm.
goals of overthrowing Pétain and removing the invader. Nevertheless, while those goals united, they often had no firm agreement among themselves as to local roles and responsibilities.

As the groups matured no national leader could claim to exercise firm control at the local level, in many locales until after D-Day. Local leaders were independent and conducted themselves in ways garnering the local assistance necessary for survival. Their activities were often centered on local political or military necessity and they often felt detached from their national level leaders in London or Algiers. Nearby inhabitants required the Résistance demonstrate its usefulness by carrying out local aims, not necessarily those desired by de Gaulle or the British government. Toward this goal, Maquis attacked targets supplying themselves with clothes, arms, or other equipment or vandalized property symbolizing Vichy or Germany, demonstrating how the Résistance played on local resentment against Germany.

British and American knowledge and understanding about the interior Résistance groups and how they worked at the local and regional level could only be described as vague. Britain confronted the challenge of supporting them, but without knowing how, or whether it should support de Gaulle, General Giraud, or any other French personality. Indeed, the British were not above working with even the most ideologically motivated Communists, as their open alliance with the Soviets.


34 Kedward, 73-115.
demonstrated. Furthermore, they supported Josip Broz Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia in order to fight the Nazis. Indeed, could putting British efforts behind one man who failed be too much of a setback to overcome? France was not the only country with an active Résistance and the British learned a lesson from supporting the wrong Yugoslav group when they backed the Royalists and then found out about the Yugoslav King’s people and their double-dealing. When they were found collaborating with Germany, Britain shifted and backed the communists, siding with their ideological enemies to combat the Germans.35

**SFHQ Planning with the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur**

When SOE first organized to conduct operations in France its leaders did not wish to throw all their bets on de Gaulle’s ability to become the political leader he later became, nor could they risk trusting him with their secrets. Such distrust is not necessarily or only a distrust of him, per se, but also a pragmatic concern about de Gaulle’s and the Free French being able to keep secrets, codes, and communications out of the hands of an extremely tenacious and effective German intelligence operation. Therefore, SOE established two offices to work in France. Unknown to the French, “F Section” was for unilateral British activity while “RF Section” coordinated activities with the BCRA. However, RF Section and BCRA relations are complex and in many ways it is inaccurate to conceive of them as two operations or separate entities who happened to talk to each other and share the results of their

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independent labor. Instead their operations were largely co-conceived and planned while the agents saw themselves as French who merely used British resources.

Furthermore, the secret nature of F Section lost its secret status from the Free French when de Gaulle found out about its existence by November 1941.  

The typical way in which the RF/BCRA agent became an operative occurred something along the following lines. A French man or woman would find his or her own way out of France to London and attempt to contact the Free French. But British authorities normally detained them before they could speak to Free French representatives. The British Secret Intelligence Service questioned them to ensure they were not an enemy agent. If the SIS approved of them, they would be conveyed to BCRA headquarters and would undergo something of an acculturation process at the “Patriotic School” run by the BCRA in southern England. If they made it out of that with their loyalty affirmed and expressed an interest in going back to Occupied France, the BCRA would devise a mission for them based on its needs and an assessment of what kind of mission would fit the skills of the agent. Then the BCRA would arrange with RF section for the agent’s training and clandestine insertion back into France. Training consisted of parachute jumps, small arms skills and maintenance, using explosives, codes and radio equipment, and any special training.

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36 Mackenzie, *The Secret History of S. O. E.: Special Operations Executive 1940-1945*, p. 284. It is unclear when de Gaulle discovered F Section and SIS were running operations in France without his approval or knowledge, but on November 6th, 1941 he “berated” the SOE officer responsible. But while he knew about it, he could not shut it down, at least not until late in 1944.
an agent may need for special tasks pertaining to the mission at hand. Jean Moulin’s path back into France mirrors what is described above.37

The system largely worked with modest success considering all the bureaucracies involved and their secretive and conspiratorial nature. The SOE, SIS, and BCRA had hammered out this process over the course of their early relations and if one of the organizations broke the agreement, nasty letters from senior administrators quickly attempted to correct the matter. The letters, files, and records in British and French archives affirm a level of consternation at the time that would rise again over the course of the war when someone misbehaved. The bureaucracies operated along a seam of sovereignty creating a vagueness of loyalties for the bureaucracy, but the individual agent grasped his individual loyalty very clearly. Navigating through the archives makes that apparent, especially when one sees dozens of dedicated French patriots like Jean Moulin listed as “British agents.” It is hard to believe that Jean Moulin would have thought of himself in those terms. Nevertheless, the F and RF Sections were distinctions with a difference due to the type of agent that might gravitate toward and be useful to one section or another.38 Of course, de Gaulle and the BCRA could not stop the British from running their own operations in France in full ignorance of the BCRA. From an operational standpoint this lead to duplicative efforts while from a political and sovereign point of view, it empowered local groups to assert their own independence from a Résistance uniting

37 See Ibid. For the details of how the agreements came to be. See BNA HS 8/1000 and HS 8/1001 as they are used to gain the fuller appreciation on the process and method described.
38 Ibid., pp. 257 – 261.
around de Gaulle when it could be resourced from Britain via F Section. As will be described in the following chapters, various FTP Maquis groups asserted their power with money and weapons from F Section agents who did not care as to the political leanings of the group they armed, nor did they always understand the local politics and how it would affect national political formations after the war. When everyone sought the defeat of Germany, this point may seem petty, but when de Gaulle and the French would have to assert civil control and order in the confusion of 1944 France, their work was made far more difficult due to F Section activities.

RF and BCRA cooperation had become well rehearsed by the beginning of 1944, but nevertheless, the JEDBURGH plan seemed to have to catch up to much of their efforts. As the head of RF section, Lt Col James Hutchison wrote that “there was continuous consultation” with Dewavrin and others of the BCRA. That may have been, but with the standing up of SHEAF and the arrival of Eisenhower, the planning for D-Day began to push their cooperation in different ways. The French had begun to be briefed on the JEDBURGH plan and enthusiastically grasped the opportunity it provided them; but not without shifting it to meet their needs. In Bloc Planning’s staff estimate dated 4 January 1944, they believed that, “It was not a question of creating a new doctrine of employment for the JEDBURGHs, but of adapting their employment to the doctrine of the l’Armée Intérieure defined in our proceeding projects.” In other words, the JEDBURGH Plan could best be implemented in ways that furthered their current planning with the interior resistance

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groups and the AS. The document discouraged its leadership from attempting to get the Allies to change their current plans for the use of the JEDBURGHs, but advocates the creation of a French military command to direct the JEDBURGHs and to look after the interests of the l’Armée Intérieure. Within this context, the JEDBURGHs would be an operational reserve. These words are eerily similar to the two year old SOE thinking that the JEDBURGHs would be a reserve of agents that would replace their pre D-Day agents that would presumably be arrested soon after OVERLORD began. Both the British and the French assumed they would lose their networks of agents currently operating in France and see the JEDBURGHs as the means to overcome that loss. But Bloc Planning realized that the JEDBURGHs provided another means for the assertion of authority. The French understood that if F Section ran the JEDBURGHs, this would bring another source of consternation and political illegitimacy into France at the very moment of its liberation.

The French seized on the opportunity presented by the JEDBURGHs and began recruiting French officers and radio operators in order to participate. The requirement levied on the French was high considering the paucity of qualified officers in the French Army for such work. Since every team would have a French officer that meant having around a hundred such officers. They set up a JEDBURGH Planning section and appointed officers to flesh out the details from their point of view. Realizing that their desires exceeded the availability, one of the planners still believed that 200 teams would be a minimum of what they would need and advocated recruiting in the U. K. among their airborne units and staff elements. Knowing that
they only had 11 such candidates in the U. K., General d’Astier de la Vigerie telegrammed Algiers on 11 January emphasizing that it was “absolutely necessary that you send to me 80 officers of the first rank.”\textsuperscript{41} Recruiting even the London Group’s request of 82 officers and 15 radio operators would be an amazing feat given their late start. It had taken the United States nearly a year to find, recruit and train their promised JEDBURGHs numbering 50 officers and 50 radio operators. When d’Astier met with Eisenhower on the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, there is no record of them discussing the specifics of the JEDBURGH Plan, but it is clear d’Astier and his staff in Bloc Planning were attempting to use the JEDBURGHs as a link to the Armée Secrète.

Colonel Dewavrin discussed the JEDBURGHs with the SHAEF and SOE liaison officer Lt Col Robin Brooke during various meetings from the 14\textsuperscript{th} to the 20\textsuperscript{th} of January. Noting that it was useless to discuss changing the doctrine the British had so far devised for the JEDBURGHs, internally the French decided to press the issues of how to best use them given the current status of the Résistance. The BCRA was very concerned about the confused command arrangement that would ensue if the JEDBURGHs reported to the SOE while the Résistance reported to General d’Astier. With no command relationship for the French forces established within SHAEF, such a situation was bound to create consternation in the field at the time of the invasion.\textsuperscript{42} The fact that some Maquis groups would follow SOE as they had been doing for months, drove the BCRA to wonder if they and the CFLN could quickly assert its authority. Also, how would the Military Delegates they were sending into France

\textsuperscript{41} BCRA Planning Documents. "3 AJ 2 462,". AN, Paris, France. 
resolve conflicts with SOE controlled JEDBURGH teams even when it had a BCRA approved officer on it? Who would decide the priorities for air re-supply? How could they maintain effective coordination with the nearest conventional force commander? Myriad issues could arise causing consternation if they could not achieve a unified command arrangement integrated into the Allied organization for their Armée Secrète, the DMRs, and the JEDBURGHS.

Bloc Planning also recommended sending Capitaine William Jean Savy, a.k.a. Jean Millet, on a mission to reconnoiter drop zones and areas for JEDBURGH operations. Savy and his small team were directed to find 100 safe houses for JEDBURGH teams and to find sufficient drop zones and reception committees for the JEDBURGH teams’ initial arrival in France. Such an effort demonstrates the BCRA’s suspicion of British led JEDBURGH planning as the documents demonstrate that SOE F Section would be calling the teams into the field. BCRA planners feared a loss of control, duplicative efforts, and political intrigue if F Section ran the JEDBURGH Plan unilaterally. Afraid of losing the argument with them, BCRA apparently sought to deploy Millet to France to set up circuits independent of F Section circuits in existence in order to maintain some shared control over JEDBURGH operations.

Millet’s mission earned the code name ECLAIREUR, which is French for “SCOUT” and departed for France on 2 March with two radio operators. The mission is an oddity for many reasons. First, it is the only JEDBURGH mission that

43 Ibid. pp. 3-4.
44 Page 1, ECLAIREUR Team Report, HS 6/504, BNA, Kew, UK.
deployed prior to D-Day. Second, the team commander, did not train at Milton Hall, but appeared to have been selected unilaterally by BCRA, but agreed upon by F Section and the OSS. Third, there seems to be some internal subterfuge occurring between BCRA and perhaps RF Section and F Section. The American OSS liaison officer to the French, Paul van der Stricht recalled that Millet “was a real eminance grise to General de Gaulle.” His distrust of the English evidently led them to conduct their mission under another guise. M. R. D. Foot’s work *The SOE in France* lists Savy as the head of the WIZARD Circuit that was active in France the same time as the ECLAIREUR Mission and with the same radio operator. He also reports that the WIZARD circuit discovered the location of 1000 V-1 Rockets in a depot near Creil and that Bomber Command attacked the site in July. The details about the V-1 rockets were explained in Churchill’s memoirs, but frustratingly there is no mention of them in the ECLAIREUR report. No report for a WIZARD mission exists in SOE files. Was the BCRA hiding the true nature of their mission from F Section and then throwing them a bone of prized intelligence so F Section officers would not ask any questions about what Savy had been up to in France? It seems very possible, but until further information comes to light, it is unknown what may have provoked the double game.

But Savy’s real mission is more interesting than finding a large number of V-1 rockets. Done when the BCRA and perhaps the British still planned on using

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JEDBURGH Teams relatively near the front, Savy parachuted far from the planned invasion area, as he was most certainly not privy to D-Day planning, he landed near Châteauroux and eventually met with General Dejussieu, the current commander of the Armée Secrète. He and Dejussieu traveled around and gathered information on Maquis strengths by region, their weapons requirements, and located possible drop zones. In total, it was quite a very large and successful fact finding mission that did far more than find safe houses and drop zones. Meeting in Paris with many of the regional leaders and national ones as well, Savy and Dejussieu, “made a detailed and impartial examination of the situation of each region and tasks were assigned to all.”

The senior FFI planners now knew the latest planning regarding the use of the teams and began working them into their planning of sabotage and guerilla warfare. But more importantly, it armed the French JEDBURGH planners in the BCRA with up to date information they could trust from one of their own sources. But catastrophe stuck when the Gestapo arrested General Dejussieu in Paris on 5 May, two months after Savy returned to the UK. For Dejussieu, the rest of the war meant concentration camps with a final release coming as the war ended. Additionally, Savy’s radio operator, Eileen Nearne who had stayed on in France to serve with another circuit organizer, was also arrested in July and spent the rest of the war in German forced labor camps.

Furthermore, the SOE F Section Circuit organizer into whose region Savy parachuted, was arrested just a few days before Dejussieu. Maurice Southgate’s

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circuit then was split between his second in command, Rene Maingard and his radio operator Pearl Witherington. Southgate also survived the war, but endured the camp at Buchenwald. Did the Gestapo learn anything regarding the JEDBURGH operations from Southgate and Nairne, who Savy may have kept in the dark? Or did they learn anything from Dejussieu, with whom Savy discussed the details of the JEDBURGH plan with? It is unknown.

Nevertheless, the ECLAIREUR mission results, as useful as they were for planning, were toned down in the report currently in the British archives while the same details are expounded upon in BCRA documents. But now that BCRA had run a “Scout” mission into France, determined a great deal about the lay of the land and had accurate information on Maquis units throughout the country, it still could not prevail upon the British or Americans to allow them into the command organization which for the French rendered “execution impractical” and “unacceptable.” That issue still lay churning at the highest levels.

Conclusion

Eisenhower’s work to integrate de Gaulle’s military representative into SHAEF was blocked by Roosevelt and de Gaulle. Learning from his experiences in North Africa about crossing the two, he chose to let General Marshall and others who may influence the President to work out the issue hoping to receive the clearance to

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50 “3 AJ 2 462,” BCRA Planning Documents., p. 11.
work with de Gaulle. But while he had to wait, the staff planning began and the SOE and OSS planners let the BCRA planners in on the general context of the JEDBURGH plan. In doing so the French found exactly the kind of problem Eisenhower feared. The BCRA and General d’Astier supported the JEDBURGH concept and recognized its utility. But, their concern was one of how to organize its command structure and they realized immediately that the way the British and Americans currently had it, would lead to confusion, unless the FFI and the JEDBURGHs reported to the same commander who was subordinate to Eisenhower. But instead of arguing with them, the French sent out a mission to help organize their circuits in France and prepare for their reception. They also began recruiting soldiers to meet their commitment to it. France had the largest burden to meet regarding officers and they intended on fulfilling it. While they did so, the Americans and the British began assembling the JEDBURGHs.
Chapter Four

_**Milton Hall and the JEDBURGH Preparations**_

Getting the most out of the French _Maquis_ required well-trained JEDBURGHs. Frank Canfield had gone to the U. S. to recruit the American contingent but first, the men must be found who could operate behind enemy lines, speak French, parachute, and show the ability to operate independently. Every team needed a parachute qualified radio operator showing great skill at Morse code. A 1 September 1943 OSS London memo asked OSS Washington for forty-four staff officers, fifty officers fluent in French, and fifty enlisted W/T operators. Washington viewed recruiting JEDBURGHs as more important than any other requirement and refrained from recruiting for other units until they filled all JEDBURGH positions. The OSS believed French speaking junior officers the most difficult qualification, so they focused their search on New York, New Orleans, and the Fort Benning paratrooper school where they believed more qualified officers existed. The OSS posted signs at Fort Benning asking for French speaking officers willing to operate behind enemy lines and by the end of November, OSS filled the requirement.¹

Getting qualified candidates released from their current duties often proved exceedingly difficult and bureaucratic. The candidate who became the senior JEDBURGH, Horace “Hod” Fuller had served in the French Army from May to July of 1940, joined the U. S. Marines in 1941 and commanded a machine gun company in

action on Guadalcanal in 1942. Initially requesting his transfer from instructor duty at Quantico, Virginia to the OSS in May, Fuller finally got the word of his reassignment to OSS in September. The son of a Harvard archeologist and a well-connected man, Fuller pulled out all the stops to get reassigned to OSS and to go to the European theater. The Marine Corps posted him to instructor duty at Quantico after he had sustained an injury in the Pacific. Fuller described it as “a fate worse than death.”

President Roosevelt’s son James, Fuller’s Naval ROTC classmate at Harvard, wrote to General Donovan urging Donovan to write directly to the Marine Corps to “shake him loose.” Once in the OSS, Frank Canfield worked to get him assigned to the JEDBURGH project where his French skills and combat experience afforded him a great deal of respect among most of the JEDBURGH candidates who had little military experience and no combat experience. After the war, one of the JEDBURGHs wrote that Fuller, “most typified the JEDBURGH.”

Fifty-five American JEDBURGH candidates left New York on the Queen Mary and arrived in Glasgow, Scotland on 23 December 1943, after zigzagging across the North Atlantic evading U-Boot patrols. Once back on dry land, they traveled to Arisaig, Scotland, for further training and evaluation. The instructors took trainees on cross-country hikes in the rugged Scottish hills, small arms training, hand-to-hand combat as well as going down to Stodham Park, in three, one-week cycles for more psychological testing. After the mental tests determined how the subject

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2 FOIA Request to CIA, Ref F-2007-01590, Letter from Fuller to E. C. Huntington, Jr., 19 May, 1943.
3 Ibid., Letter from James Roosevelt to William J. Donovan, July 26, 1943.
handled stress and emotional stain, the instructors told him he failed. By observing how the man handled rejection, and the other aspects of the test, examiners measured his strength of character and will power.\(^5\) One British candidate was asked when had he stopped wetting the bed? Without missing a beat the Welsh officer replied, “When my father took me to see a psychologist!” He passed the test.\(^6\)

Those who made it past the evaluations proceeded to Milton Hall for final training and team selection. The large Milton Hall estate, four miles north of Peterborough, England, became the main JEDBURGH training and holding area. A large country manor with many rooms for billets and offices, Her Majesty’s government acquired the estate and scheduled it for use by 1 January 1944. The W/T operators joined the officers after three weeks radio training at Henley-on-Thames, west of London. Almost all the JEDBURGHs were at Milton Hall by 1 February, and started more training in demolition, map reading and field craft, German and Allied small arms, guerrilla tactics, German tactics, reception committee work, anti-tank mines, street fighting, motor cycle and car driving, German Army vehicle and equipment recognition, and more physical training. JEDBURGH commanders and seconds-in-command received a general history of resistance movements in northwest Europe, ways to utilize the Résistance, functions of JEDBURGHs, first-aid,


practical wireless training, French geography, and observation and memory training. SFHQ scheduled training to be completed by 1 April.\footnote{OSS/SO London microfilm, Vol. 12, 42-3.}

Unfortunately, Milton Hall was not ready for the officers so temporary training sites were found at Fairford, Gumley Hall, and Walsingham. All JEDBURGHS visited one final training school at Altrincham, Manchester prior to going to their designated home. Even the men already parachute qualified attended the training as jumping out of the B-24 “Joe hole” varied enough to require more familiarization. The school scheduled three jumps; the first two would be daylight jumps from a balloon at 700 feet and the third jump would be a night jump from 500 feet. For the seventeen-year-old Prince Michel de Bourbon-Parme, parachute training proved trying. While waiting for the proper command before parachuting from the balloon American W/T operator Sergeant Bill Thompson and French Michel de Bourbon-Parme, and the British instructor lost their balance from unexpected winds causing the Prince to fall out. Descending toward the earth, the Prince yelled to his instructor, “I’m sorry!” and the British officer calmly replied, “That’s all right chap, don’t bother to come back.”\footnote{Irwin, 124; and Thompson interview.}

Milton Hall finally became available for JEDBURGH use the first week in February 1944. The British modified the old mansion for classrooms, offices, and billets and set up temporary buildings for NCO housing. Beginning in late January the French soldiers arrived, but they were not all there until early April. OSS and SOE recruiters made a concerted recruiting effort through North Africa, the Middle
East, the United States; and one French JEDBURGH even came from Guatemala. The 70 French Jeds began to mix with the rest, and curiously politics were rarely discussed. The factions gripping French society and crippling French unified action failed to have any impact on these soldiers. One French JEDBURGH remarked, “they were professional soldiers and didn’t think much about politics.” Apparently, de Gaulle knew about the French Jeds but never visited Milton Hall, nor did any of his generals. In a brief interview with one of the Frenchmen, who as circumstances had it, served in the U. S. Army, de Gaulle said to him, “Oh, you are going off with those people? Fine.”

However, a Washington OSS civilian did visit Milton Hall late on a Friday afternoon forcing delay of their weekend pass. The British commandant of Milton Hall, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spooner, was an unpopular man and the JEDBURGHs felt no obligation not to embarrass him in front of the distinguished visitor. Prior to the visit the American Jeds started a tradition showing when they believed superiors ordered them to do something stupid. An officer arrived late to a formation and the British NCO asked the officer to drop and do fifty pushups. The officer counted them off in front of the formation and getting to punishment’s end counted, “48, 49, 50,” got on his feet and said, “some shit!” The group laughed and in short order it became a sign of JEDBURGH indignation where one in a group

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9 Irwin, 124; and Joseph de Francesco, telephone conversation with author, 3 March, 1999. My conversations with French Jedburghs Paul Moniez and Paul Aussaresses re-inforce the lack of arguments within the Jedburghs regarding politics. When they argued, it tended to be more about proper tactics, procedures, or personal issues.

10 Michel de Bourbon-Parme, Interview, 22 September 2007.
would yell, “48!” another chimed in “49!” a third “50!” and all yelled, “Some Shit!”

The surprised Washington visitor heard such a cheer and dropped his speech on the platform. Lieutenant Colonel Spooner let out a characteristic snort in shock and disappointment. Spooner also had been under investigation for some unpaid bills and perhaps Gubbins and Mockler-Ferryman were somewhat exasperated with him. The Rhodesian Lieutenant Colonel G. Richard Musgrave replaced him shortly afterward. The JEDBURGHs were an unconventional unit, not afraid to speak their minds and unafraid of normal military punishment when they did so.

One more thing remained prior to deployment, the teams had to be put together. SFHQ allowed them to “get married,” in other words they would choose their own team mates. Over the remaining time before D-Day, the JEDBURGH officers paired up and then selected their W/T operator. Training together gave many of them the opportunity to form friendships and learn who they could trust. Soon they would be in combat, and despite the rigorous training, none knew what to expect. Choosing their teammates then came down to personality traits each JEDBURGH thought to be most crucial. Since there was a French officer on each team, they had a certain amount of say over who they “married.” Paul Moniez had wanted to go back to France with an American, but impressed with the French

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11 Dreux, 58-59; and Thompson interview. Michel de Bourbon de Parme recalls that 8th Air Force Commander, General James Doolittle got the same treatment when he promised to drop them right on target. The Jedburghs didn’t care for such boasting. For Spooner’s difficulties see his SOE Personnel File, HS 9/1400/1.

12 Thompson interview; de Francesco telephone conversation; Daphne Friele, telephone conversation with author, 2 March, 1999; and Mamie Gauthier, telephone conversation with author, 6 March, 1999.
speaking abilities of British Captain James O’Brien-Tear, he opted to pair up with him. “I thought it was a very important skill,” Moniez told me very sternly. Speaking sixty-three Septembers after his deployment to France, one could still see his great despair over the French defeat in 1940. He wanted to make sure they did well and so he wanted to go into combat with the best team mate he could find.\footnote{Paul Moniez, Interview, 17 September 2007.}

Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and Colonel Haskell also wanted the JEDBURGHS to do as well as possible. On 24 February they went up to Milton Hall and broke the details to the JEDBURGHS about what they would be doing in occupied Europe. Most of them were going to France while others would go to Belgium and The Netherlands. Their function was strategic, the Brigadier told them, and they would work with the \textit{Résistance} on three main missions: liaison, organization, and leadership. Liaison meant representing SHAEF and General Eisenhower to the local \textit{Maquis}, using their Wireless transmitter for the necessary communications, act as advisors on methods and tactics, and supplying weapons via clandestine air-drops. Organization meant designing their \textit{Maquis} groups along the lines required by the group’s task or function. And if the group had lost its leadership due to German efforts, they must be prepared to step into that role. Noting that each team’s situation would vary greatly from the next, Mockler-Ferryman emphasized that whichever the three missions they did, “liaison was the most important one of all.”\footnote{“Role of the Jedburghs – Summaray of Speech byh E. E. Mockler-Ferryman to Jedburgh Students on 24\textsuperscript{th} February 1944,” HS 8/288,” 10 March 1944, Policy and Planning JEDBURGHS for}
Brigadier replied “not many over half a million.” After a silence, one of them said, “Oh, that’s all?” and the room erupted in laughter.\(^{15}\)

\textit{Air Special Operations picks up the pace}

General de Gaulle took every opportunity, both publicly in press conferences and privately with Winston Churchill, to get the RAF and SOE to do more to equip the interior resistance groups. De Gaulle met with Churchill in Marrakech in January 1944 while the Prime Minister was traveling back to London from Cairo. When Churchill returned to London, he met with Minister Seaborne, and the Commander of Bomber Command, General Harris and Air Minister Sir Charles Portal on 27 January and pressed them to do more. He sought to make southeast France similar to Yugoslavia in its effective partisan bands. His prodding resulted in a raising of the priority of the \textit{Maquis’} needs to second only to the strategic bombing effort and making it more important than SOE’s own circuits, attacks on German V Rocket installations, and sea-mining. It also resulted in more monthly sorties: 120 more sorties from the Mediterranean, 60 more sorties from the RAF transport group No. 38. As Crémieux-Brilhac remarked, “for the first time, in the course of the first three months of the year, the BCRA networks were better supplied than the Allied circuits.”\(^{16}\) Furthermore, they agreed to help train up the American bomber crews

\(^{15}\) Alsop and Braden, \textit{Sub Rosa; the O.-S.-S. And American Espionage}. p. 144.

just now coming into the effort of Special Operations air missions. If the number of sorties held, it would mean 16000 more men could be armed each month.  

The Americans decided to get their air power involved in late 1943. Colonel C. S. Vanderblue, commander of the European Theater, Office of Strategic Services sent a letter proposing the creation of two squadrons to supply European resistance groups. Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the United States Army, European Theater of Operations, approved the concept within a week, but it took more than two months before 8th Air Force’s commanding officer General Ira C. Eaker, designated two squadrons and created the “Carpetbagger” project. A memo dated 30 December 1943 gave OSS operational control of the aircraft, but 8th Air Force retained a measure of administrative control. That meant that missions would be determined by the OSS SO London requirements, but the aircraft and people retained their US Army Air Forces status for all other matters. SOE/SO, later SFHQ, set out missions each moon period and 8th Bomber Command detailed a liaison officer to approve them.  

Lieutenant Colonel Clifford Heflin commanded the 801st Bomb Group or “Carpetbaggers.” When their squadron’s mission of flying anti-submarine missions from the Azores was discontinued, Heflin and other officers were reassigned to fly their modified B-24 bombers into occupied territory. Heflin joined the Army immediately after graduating from Fresno State University in 1939 and received his

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commission the same year. With the onset of war he won quick promotions and at Twenty-nine, he took command of two squadrons each maintaining 16 aircraft.\textsuperscript{19}

When Eaker took command of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Air Force in the Mediterranean theater he found the OSS air capability in a shambles. The unit that was airlifting supplies to the Maquis in France and the resistance groups in the Balkans was poorly equipped and trained. After three months of asking and arguing with General Arnold in Washington for the authority to reorganize what he had in the theater in order to do the task at hand, he finally got permission. It did not come without a lot of support however. On Eaker’s side was General Eisenhower, General Devers, General Donovan and British RAF Air Marshal Charles Portal, among others. After several weeks of back and forth, General Marshall and the JCS decided to grant Eaker the authority to create a special operations squadron at Blida, near Algiers with three B-17s and 15 B-24s and the required crews and support personnel. By May 1944, the new unit flew eighty-eight missions. In what became the 885\textsuperscript{th} Bombardment Squadron (Heavy)(Special), commanded by Colonel Monro MacCloskey, the Americans contributed to the special operations airlift to France from the Mediterranean Theater.\textsuperscript{20}

But organization was one thing, flying effective missions proved to be quite another. The crews, unfamiliar with the correct flying procedures, had to spend a month flying with British crews. Moreover, the required facilities were not ready at

\textsuperscript{19} OSS/SO London microfilm Vol. 11, p. 9.

RAF Alconbury, nor did Alconbury possess adequate room so the Carpetbaggers moved to RAF Harrington in Northamptonshire.\textsuperscript{21} Also the B-24s required several changes to make them OSS mission ready. The two waist gun positions were eliminated saving weight, and the aircraft painted black to elude searchlights. Mechanics removed the bottom machine gun turret and converted the space to a “Joe hole” covered by a round plywood center hinged door. They placed reinforced static line points above the “Joe hole” with a static line long enough for eight parachutists. The bombardier and navigator required more room to work, so they removed all unnecessary equipment. Next, the Carpetbaggers installed green and red jump signal lights, and static lines in the bomb bay for dropping cargo. To aid navigation, crews trained in celestial, dead-reckoning, pilotage, and radio navigation. The bombardier became a second navigator, a waist gunner became the “Joe” dispatcher, and the pilot, co-pilot, engineer, radio operator, and tail gunner filled out the rest, for a total of eight. Crews trained to drop “joes” at an altitude of 600 feet traveling 125 to 135 miles per hour. Any higher and the person would land off target, any lower and the chute would not have time to deploy.\textsuperscript{22}

Rigging and packing all the weapons, fuel, ammunition, leaflets, radios, and personnel chutes required a special facility close to Harrington. Approximately one hundred men worked at the facility and during the first quarter of 1944 they packed 2,348 containers and the second quarter they packed 13,071 containers and 8,323 personnel chutes. By D-Day, the French \textit{Résistance} received 7,404 containers filled

\textsuperscript{21} Parnell, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{22} Parnell, p. 15-28.
with explosives, light machine guns, pistols, carbines, anti-tank weapons, and
grenades.\textsuperscript{23} The standard drop consisted of twelve containers with the following
supplies: six Brens with 1,000 rounds, 36 rifles with 150 rounds, twenty seven Stens
with 300 rounds per gun, five pistols with 50 rounds per weapon, fifty-two grenades
with eighteen pounds of plastic explosives, 156 field dressings, 6,600 9mm rounds,
3,168 .303 rounds, and 40 empty magazines. If more containers were dropped to the
same drop zone, they contained more ammunition, not weapons.\textsuperscript{24}

Not satisfied with merely a two-squadron effort, SHAEF sought more aircraft.
In January 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces received a strongly worded
letter complaining about the lack of support.\textsuperscript{25} Both Churchill and Roosevelt became
concerned about the possible poor perception caused by lagging arms deliveries.
Anxious, General Donovan believed if the French Résistance regarded the United
States and Britain poorly, the Allied missions to France like the JEDBURGHs’
viability would suffer.\textsuperscript{26} On 11 February 1944, Eisenhower signed a Donovan drafted
cable to Eaker saying, “Believe it extremely important from viewpoint our
government that United States participate as fully as possible this program and that
anything you can do to expedite delivery of modified planes necessary for this
purpose will be of great assistance.”\textsuperscript{27} A phone call between Major General Bull,
Director of Operations for SHAEF, and General Spaatz, 8th Air Force Commander,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] OSS/SO London microfilm. Vol. 6, p. 84.
\item[24] Foot, p. 475.
\item[25] SHAEF SGS microfilm, Reel 12, Frame 645.
\item[27] SHAEF SGS microfilm, Reel 52, Frame 1030.
\end{footnotes}
resulted in no more American aircraft devoted to SOE/SO. General Spaatz refused to degrade the strategic bombing effort so the two discussed the possibility of having planes perform conventional bombing missions during the non-moon period and then make them available for special operations sorties. However, the time and effort required to convert the bombers to special operations and back to bombing, made it impractical.\(^\text{28}\) The OSS received no more than their already assigned two squadrons.

But while the higher headquarters tried to solve a problem of too little support to the Résistance, the Carpetbaggers and their British counterparts apparently delivered more than current circuits could hide. The SOE/SO March report to SHAEF related if deliveries increased, the Allied French Résistance groups had to absorb most of the additional supplies. Up to March, the parachutages concentrated on areas under the control of F section and the British supplied Résistance. However by the May report, little difference existed as the F and RF sections appear to be receiving supplies based on the health of their circuit, not political alignment. The next month, the airdrop reports no longer distinguish tonnage by their SOE affiliation.\(^\text{29}\) The fusing of the two categories may also be an effect of the command arrangements Eisenhower worked out with General Koenig by the beginning of June. By June, 1944 the British and American efforts delivered 1,549 tons of weapons and supplies in 3,468 sorties. More than half of the total sorties flown were between April and June, 1944.\(^\text{30}\) Losses totaled 41 British and American aircraft due to enemy

\(^{28}\) Ibid., Reel 52, Frame 1063.  
\(^{29}\) Ibid., Reel 12, Frames 588-616.  
\(^{30}\) Foot, p. 473.
action and accidents. Now up to the task, the air forces could deploy and re-supply the JEDBURGH led Résistance, at least along the assumptions SHAEF and SFHQ held in early June regarding *Maquis* numbers and related needs.

*The Politics Running into D-Day*

FDR’s confrontational approach with de Gaulle was ineffective and perilous and Prime Minister Churchill began to come around to the same conclusion. In April and May, while FDR enjoyed some vacation time at what is now Camp David, a draft policy letter on how to guide SHAEF’s relationship with the French painstakingly made its way though the War Department, the British Cabinet, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Churchill wanted FDR to hash out the issue with de Gaulle in Washington but FDR would not invite him and wanted de Gaulle’s representatives to request a visit. Only then would he agree to see him and by that time it would be the middle of May with only two or three weeks of time for Eisenhower to coordinate plans with the *Forces Français l’Interior* (FFI). De Gaulle, still in the dark as to when OVERLORD would launch, had returned to Algiers to stew over the AMGOT issue. When he found out that SHAEF would be the sole authority for French currency as well as other civil matters he fumed all the more. But he was no longer the lone crusader of 1940, casting about for men and equipment. He now had them and the Prime Minister felt the need to remind his friend of it. “He commands considerable forces,” he telegraphed Roosevelt, “including naval forces…he presides

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over a vast empire, all the strategic points of which are at our disposal.”

Furthermore, in an intelligence report forwarded to the President on 3 April by OSS Director Donovan, more information arrived confirming the interior Résistance’s allegiance to de Gaulle. Not only that, it ominously stated the Résistance’s disillusionment with the Americans in particular, and its increasing bewilderment at Roosevelt’s delay in recognizing the CFLN. All of France knew, according to the OSS source, of the Soviet Army’s Eastern front successes and its high casualty rate. They knew the British were dropping tons of weapons and ammunition to the Maquis in France. In comparison the U. S. presence in the war, seemed suspiciously weak.

Such attitudes were punctuated by what the Germans did to a large Résistance encampment near Glières, France. On the same day Donovan passed the report to the President in Washington, General d’Astier in London reported to the SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, that 700 Résistance fighters had been “annihilated by the troops of occupation, without receiving the aid they had asked of us.” Repeated requests for RAF strikes only resulted in a meeting fifteen days after their deaths explaining that such a location was too far and the danger too great for the RAF. Pointing out that there were “no known” anti-aircraft batteries in the region, d’Astier pointedly wrote to Eisenhower, “The Forces of the French Résistance have the honor of being amongst the first troops engaged in combat against the common enemy in

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the theater of operations under your command.”

After Vichy forces failed at negotiating with the *Maquis*, then made a faint attempt at fighting them, a task force comprised of elements of the *Wehrmacht’s* 157th Reserve Infantry Division attacked the redoubt in the French Alps. They made a concentrated and well coordinated attack and defeated the *Maquis* in a three day effort. Churchill’s desire to get more arms to that part of France was succeeding, but he had not thought through the implications and results of such actions. The next few weeks and into May, while the political problem festered, SHAEF pressed ahead with planning on what it wanted the hoped controlled *Résistance* to do once the Allies landed.

A 23 March 1944 SHAEF Operations Directive ordered SOE/SO London to have seventy JEDBURGH teams trained for D-Day. Eisenhower gave SOE/SO total control of *Résistance* groups, who were as yet not clearly, SHAEF thought, united behind any one person, and directed the *Résistance* to concentrate efforts against German air forces, lower the morale of German forces by sabotage, inflict damage on the German war effort in general, and *prepare for the return of Allied Forces to the continent*. It seems SHAEF expected the JEDBURGHs would deploy well ahead of the conventional invasion force, despite SOE and OSS planning that the JEDBURGHs were a reserve and a back up for their clandestine networks that were assumed to be endangered when OVERLORD commenced. Although JEDBURGHs and Operational Groups (American commando teams deployed for the specific

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purpose of destroying specified targets) were to be ready by 1 April, SHAEF insisted that no invasion plan details, especially the date, should be conveyed to any resistance group.  

What targets did SHAEF want the Résistance to attack? In a dispatch sent to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General Maitland Wilson, Eisenhower stated his priorities. The railroad from Montauban-Limoges-Vierzon on D + 1 through D + 3 was first, then the railroads from Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours on D + 4 to D + 7. The cable listed other railroads as well as roads, indicating Germans moving north should be impeded as much as possible. Significantly the JEDBURGHs were not to enter France sooner than 10 days before D-Day. Eisenhower thought it too risky and a security hazard to have anyone in France with OVERLORD plans. As D-Day neared, SHAEF passed even more restrictive orders to Special Forces Headquarters. The JEDBURGHs could not deploy to France prior to the night of D-Day - 1. SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, warned of the need to do everything possible to safeguard OVERLORD, and feared that dropping JEDBURGHs into enemy territory risked compromise, with doubtful gain. It is unclear whether the security concern was a cover story being used by Eisenhower and Smith to conceal the political disagreements from SHAEF staff officers. And while later SOE and OSS official histories write that the intent for the JEDBURGHs was to

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37 Ibid., Reel 5, Frames 847 - 850.
38 Walter B. Smith, Collection of WWII Documents, Box 24, Cable Log-out (May 1944), Eisenhower Library. Abilene, KS.
use them after D-Day, the contemporaneous SHAEF documents and indeed some of the JEDBURGH memories reinforce what may have been the original plan: to go into France sometime between 1 April 1944, and D-Day.39

The actions described above are based upon the BCRA plan *Vert*, which by now had become SFHQ’s plan. Plan *Tortue*, and later when more regions were added it was called *BIBENDUM*, focused on German military road traffic and armored columns. But SFHQ planners were uncertain about its viability due to the arrest of its BCRA organizer in May of 1944; the last word from him was that he was far short of the armed teams required to put it into full effect. Plans *Jaune, Noire*, and *Rouge* were plans for small-scale guerilla attacks against enemy munitions dumps, German military command posts and major headquarters, and fuel storage depots respectively. Their effectiveness was also in doubt as planning had not passed its initial stages when *Maquis* units began to grow and new challenges arose as to how to organize more and more units into the guerilla warfare plans. BCRA cancelled those plans on 2 March but SOE put in their place a merged plan that was to be carried out by region or area as required. There were other plans, not sufficiently accepted by SFHQ and SOE planners. One that even the BCRA cast a doubtful eye upon was the *Grenouille* plan that involved French railway workers of the *Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer* (SNCF) who plotted to misroute trains and discreetly but effectively sabotage key machinery and signals when ordered. But the most controversial plan was *Vidal*, the

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39 Former Jedburgh Jack Poche, email to author, 4/13/07, and the SHAEF item quoted in fn 43 above contrasted with OSS London War Diary, Roll 8, Book I, p. ii. where it states, “they will be dropped by parachute at pre-arranged spots behind enemy lines in France, Belgium, and Holland on and after D-Day.” Written after D-Day, it contrasts with Jedburgh memories of their intended use as well as SHAEF documents.
plan for widespread ‘national insurrection.’ Few, outside of France advocated this kind of widespread action and Gubbins, Mockler-Ferryman, and Haskell believed that it bore little relation to the landings or support to the regular forces. In their estimation it would have little benefit while risking brutal reprisals upon the civilian population. They had no issue on this point with senior French leadership, with the exception of some of the interior Résistance, often the communists, who saw Vidal effort as key to the experience of liberation.40

General de Gaulle, who by now had clearly learned how to use the people for their greatest effectiveness, appointed the Commander of the French victor at Bir Heichem to replace General d’Astier. General Marie-Pierre Koenig arrived in London at the end of March and assumed his duties on the 1 April. The rank and file Maquis loved Koenig, if the underground newspapers are any guide, and other Allied generals found him to be professional, eager to get along, and effective. Even the acerbic General Lord Alan Brooke thought him to be, “quite pleasant and ready to cooperate.”41 Eisenhower met with Koenig after his arrival and believed he could be trusted with the invasion month; however he did not want the information leaked to the French commanders in Algeria.42 Indeed, one of the results of Churchill and Roosevelt’s distrust of the Free French was their insistence that no messages be sent from their liaison officers in London to Algiers for fear of leaks. OVERLORD’s

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40 Historical Division, The French Forces of the Interior: Their Organization and Their Participation in the Liberation of France, 1944, pp. 73 – 86.
42 Message, 9 May 1944, in Smith, Walter Bedell: Collection of WWII Documents, 1941 – 1945, Box 24, Cable Log-Out (May 1944), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
greatest asset and most closely guarded secret was the unknown location of the initial attack and the date. Keeping the Germans guessing forced them to keep their forces spread thin and reserves would have to be further back from the coast to allow greater flexibility in moving them toward the front line when that was known. Eisenhower guarded the location beaches, time of attack, and kind of forces with an elaborate deception campaign on an immense scale. A leak from a collaborator to the Germans would be disastrous. However, just as in North Africa he was caught between working with the French to achieve his military aim and waiting for clearance from FDR on proceeding with the CFLN. Nevertheless, he was willing to share details of the plan with the right person.

Assuming command of what had grown from the small number of émigrés and adrift soldiers in June of 1940, the France Libre organization had more staff, and now working toward placing a Division under Eisenhower’s command for OVERLORD. Koenig served as the commander of all French forces in the U. K. and as the senior military liaison to SHAEF and the British General Staff. However, Koenig’s other title was that of the Commander of the l’Etat Major Forces Français l’Interieur, (EMFFI). In other words, General Koenig would be “commanding” the Résistance and in that capacity, he was the perfect person for Eisenhower to cooperate with. On 19 April Koenig met with General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff who told him that Ike intended to bring him into the SHAEF organization and that in effect he would become a subordinate commander of

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43 SHAEF SGS Records, 381 France: French Participation in OVERLORD. Box 6, Reel 52, Frame 217. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
forces similar to the American, British, and Canadian commanders who led forces in combat. Furthermore, Ike told Koenig he intended to bring Koenig in on the planning “well in advance to their being committed to these operations.”

But while Eisenhower and Koenig may have made some progress on getting their respective efforts to mesh, de Gaulle kept doing things that upset the White House. In Algiers on 25 April de Gaulle had a press conference in which he reiterated a list of his war aims and made it clear that France would “accept no administration that is not French.” In a charitable moment he praised allied efforts to arm the *Maquis* over the past 3 months and probably recalling his own conversation with Churchill in January he added the words, “thanks to the British.” On FDR’s copy of the description of de Gaulle’s press conference, this slight to the U. S. effort, despite two more squadrons and tons of materiel, elicited more disgust. Then reinforcing FDR’s fear about post war colonialism, de Gaulle also expressed French concern of the Pacific war and that “France did not yield rights to any Pacific possessions.”

With that press conference, de Gaulle succeeded at confirming FDR’s fears regarding post-war French aims and de Gaulle’s lack of appreciation for the increased American efforts to arm the *Maquis*.

The first meeting between relevant SHAEF officials and Koenig and his staff occurred on 28 April. It consisted largely of some polite statements, introductions of staff members, and a statement of each side’s aims. SHAEF made the statement up

44 “Folder 3,” Butcher Dairy, Pre-Presidential Papers., April 22, 1944 p. 1219. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
45 Folder 011 - French National Committee, Map Room Files, Special Files. FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. The comment about the absence of a thank you regarding American efforts drew a “!!” in the margins from FDR.
front to General Koenig that they had no problem with members of the French side being comprised of civilians, since many of their issues concerned civil affairs. Perhaps this venue could provide them some room to maneuver while still staying within the President’s and Prime Minister’s guidance to avoid any hint of recognizing the CFLN. They closed the meeting by dividing up issues to be worked and created sub-committees to handle the various tasks. Present at the meeting was Colonel André Dewavrin, who of course knew the inner workings of the resistance and who had probably participated in recruiting the French members of the JEDBURGHs. But there seems to be no indication that the French realized their planning time was short and indeed, Koenig and his staff were still not aware of the invasion date. But this level of effort, was not going to suffice and it had become alarming to Eisenhower and more clear to Churchill.

On 1 May the British and American special operations traded in the name SOE/SO for Special Force Headquarters and pressed ahead with integrating the French, as far as possible, while they finalized their own D-Day plans. On the 8th SHAEF approved the Annex to OVERLORD regarding the use of the Résistance. Added to the main OVERLORD plan several days after the rest had been completed, SHAEF formalized that SFHQ was to direct the Maquis in

“widespread, pre-arranged and to a certain extent controlled, -- acts of sabotage will be carried out against specific types of targets, principally railway and telecommunications. Action will also be taken to delay the road

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movements of ENEMY reserves, especially armored units. In addition, widespread guerilla activity by small bands of lightly armed FRENCHMEN operating in the ENEMY’s back areas will undoubtedly take place. This activity will be organized and coordinated to the fullest extent possible by SOE/SO Headquarters, LONDON through BRITISH, FRENCH and AMERICAN officers already in the field and by others who will be dispatched before and after the invasion.”

The directive concluded its first paragraph with the low expectation that, “guerrilla warfare may reach a scale approaching that of minor military diversions.”

The lessons of exercise SPARTAN the previous year resonated in the directive.

SHAEF made the provision for Special Force Detachments to be created in the 21st Army Group, and its subordinate Armies in order to enable coordination with the main forces. It also reiterated that the effect of the Résistance was thought to be strategic and not tactical, in other words the cumulative effect of widespread, small scale attacks might have an impact. It also highlighted the two main kinds of resistance groups – those “Allied French” meaning the groups that had been taking direction from the BCRA since the unification of the movements with de Gaulle’s Free French, and the “SOE/SO directly controlled groups” that the British and to some extent the Americans had been running without French coordination.47 If the “Allied French” failed to act, at least the others might. SHAEF and SFHQ also could direct the Maquis groups, by using the BCRA plans, without informing the BCRA.

On the same day the Director of SHAEF Operations, Major General Harold Bull signed a directive telling SFHQ to arrange with the BBC the broadcast of the warning messages on Y Day and Y + 1, and then the action messages at H Hour

minus 7.5 hours. Y Day and Y + 1 meant 1 and 2 June while H Hour minus 7.5 meant seven and a half hours before the first landings commenced on the Normandy beaches codenamed UTAH, OMAHA, JUNO, GOLD, and SWORD. Mockler-Ferryman then had to coordinate with the BBC for more broadcast time as the increased number of messages went beyond their normal allotment time.\(^{48}\)

Furthermore, it meant doing this around General Koenig as no details could be related to the French, even when Eisenhower and made it plain to Koenig that he would do so. FDR’s running argument with de Gaulle made it impossible for Ike to keep that promise. It also put into question whether the orders, if broadcast without Koenig’s concurrence and participation, would be carried out. Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Bull, Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell would have to sort out the timing of telling Koenig and have the tact to do it.

Also on 8 May the *Capetown Castle* arrived at the port of Mers el-Kébir and 14 JEDBURGH teams stepped off the ship. The forty-two JEDBURGHs, including Major “Hod” Fuller, transferred their gear onto a train for Algiers and the SOE/OSS Massingham base.\(^{49}\) These teams would be inserted into southern France from North Africa because the night was not affording enough time for aircraft to reach southern locations and make it back to Britain. Prior to their departure, the JEDBURGHs who had grown to be friends and their competitive nature was often a measure of their friendship. With the 14 teams departing Milton Hall, American Bill Colby proposed

\(^{48}\)“SHAEB 17240/17/Ops 8 May 1944, Directions to BBC,” HS 6/610, BNA, Kew, UK

a contest to see who could make it through one of their obstacle courses first. Then a little betting occurred with Colby’s money on French Lieutenant Paul Aussaresses. Aussaresses came in third and Dutch Captain Arie Berstebreurtje won the race, while Colby lost his money. 50 The Jedburghs, now considered trained for their missions by Colonel Musgrave, also had a chance to enjoy some leave in London. “It was a wonderful time,” recalled Michel de Bourbon-Parme. “If you were in uniform you could not pay for anything in a restaurant or night club. It was absolutely fantastic. I’ll never forget it. …. All the nationalities were there…We were all there together, Poles, French, . . . everybody. All united…. All wanting to go to Germany to kick the Germans . . . in . . . the . . . butt.” 51

Unfortunately for Eisenhower, SHAEF, Special Force Headquarters, and the Résistance, Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle were not so unified. Several issues remained in contention, particularly occupational civil affairs as D-Day neared. The political leaders’ inability to work out details of occupation policies, including whether Allied currency or only French printed notes would be used, caused Eisenhower great embarrassment. On 11 May, he cabled Washington asking Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall for further guidance. “The limitations under which we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous.” 52 Until the leaders reached an agreement, Roosevelt would not sanction de Gaulle as the legitimate French leader.

52 Message 11 May 1944 in Smith, Walter Bedell: Collection of WWII Documents, 1941 – 1945, Box 24, Cable Log-Out (May 1944), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
With no one for Eisenhower to communicate an active *Résistance* plan to, a valuable asset would be squandered. Would de Gaulle countermand the BBC action messages? Would Eisenhower be forced to invade France without aid from the FFI?

Perhaps it would all come to nothing as some SFHQ planners feared. The larger number of “message personnels” that the SOE asked to be broadcast would certainly draw attention from the Germans. Few arguments between the British SOE and certain French leaders had a longer history. The British sought a decentralized resistance organization for security purposes, but some of the French leaders wanted a centralized French resistance organization inside France. Their efforts to go against the British seemed to have often been effectively stopped by the Gestapo with arrest after arrest of senior Résistance leaders. There was even debate about General Koenig parachuting into France, but that never got serious consideration.53 In any event, the *Plan Vidal* was not intended to be brought about by the BBC action messages broadcast on D-1, but due to the way in which they were broadcast, some *Maquis* units got that impression.

The debate with the CFLN and its constituent elements on this point was a long and continuing conversation. What did it mean to espouse a “national insurrection” from a political point of view? What would its utility be to the military effort? The British and later the Americans only sought *Maquis* activity that supported the Allied landings and subsequent operations. Many French leaders, including de Gaulle, Koenig, and the BCRA staff officers agreed with this, but

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various communications, broadcasts, and their official newspapers parachuted into France used language that could be read the other way. For instance during the *Glières* battle, the French language accounts about the battle on the BBC contained vivid descriptions and were a source of inspiration to other like minded *Maquis*. De Gaulle’s own language often elevated the issue and he failed to clearly dissuade those *résistants* from pursuing such a course of action, if they wished.\(^54\) Churchill’s supply of weapons and ammunition further reinforced the wrong message. SHAEF’s decision to broadcast all the action messages for Plans *Vert*, *Tortue*, the aggregated Guerrilla war plans, and the telecommunication plans to all the French regions as well as the SOE circuit leaders could be construed as Plan *Vidal*. But this was not SHAEF’s or General Koenig’s intent.

Progress was clearly achieved however in a long and substantial meeting between Koenig’s Chief of Staff Colonel Henry Zeigler, BCRA planners, and the SFHQ planners on 20 May at Finchampstead west of London. SFHQ had scheduled the meeting with detailed discussions about the military effectiveness and estimates of various regions and sought BCRA’s advice. Done so that the invasion area was not divulged, it nevertheless resulted in some detailed planning and some guidance from Koenig on regions of France that should received SFHQ’s attention with aerial re-supply, JEDBURGH team deployments, and SAS missions. The purpose was to, “provide agreed upon recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander” for activities after D-Day. Furthermore the icing was melting regarding a single

command under Koenig. The British representatives noted that it was Eisenhower’s
wish and that Ike also wanted command exercised from London. With all in
agreement, the discussion turned to what assets would be deployed to what area
inside France. The group discussed the Vosges, central France, the Morvan, and
Brittany. With the recent arrest of the DMR in Brittany, the BCRA had selected a
replacement to deploy as soon as the British could arrange it. They noted that they
had to notify their agents in eastern France that the summer moons prohibited flights
there for at least two cycles. In the Drôme, and the Grenoble area, Massingham was
to prepare re-supply of ammunition and that the Maquis there were not to attack the
enemy installation in Grenoble until directed. When Koenig was later briefed on all
these issues, he concurred but overruled one thing. The Morvan should be raised in
priority and be classified a réduit, or protected place from which raids could be staged
against enemy lines of communications.\(^55\) SFHQ accepted this idea and assigned a
mission to that area led by the former RF Section Chief, Lt Col James Hutchison.\(^56\)

But while SHAEF and its Special Forces were making progress with the
French, no word came from FDR regarding an agreement or a way forward with de
Gaulle. Realizing the gravity of the situation now, Churchill sent a cable to FDR on
26 May taking up the cause. He tried to make clear that de Gaulle was becoming
more and more important, the situation was becoming more and more dire, and that
the press, parliament, and political considerations were forcing their hand. Churchill
believed that if their disagreement caused unavoidable casualties, the cost could be a

\(^55\) “Conference Meeting Minutes” 20 May 1944, HS 6/607, BNA, Kew, UK.
\(^56\) “ISAAC Mission,” HS 6/366, BNA, Kew, UK.
political one as well. In what can only be describe as obvious, Churchill bluntly reminded the President, “after all it is very difficult to cut the French out of the liberation of France.”

Carrying on, SFHQ did achieve some progress at lower levels when it succeeded at merging their Algiers brothers with them for operations in France. In April AFHQ had agreed to take direction regarding their activities with the French Résistance and on 23 May, the Special Projects Office Command (SPOC) stood up under General Maitland Wilson’s Allied Force Headquarters, which governed Allied military operations in the Mediterranean. General Wilson now had SOE and OSS personnel in his theater working together on French issues and SHAEF agreements with AFHQ regarding each Headquarters’ role in OVERLORD and the hoped for Operation DRAGOON could not be conducted on a more equal footing in that both headquarters had an entity conducting Allied unconventional war in France.

Furthermore, the first JEDBURGH team orders were finalized on the 27th and the 28th of May. JEDBURGH Team HUGH was ordered to deploy near Châteauroux in central France with some elements of the 1st SAS Battalion comprised of British commandos. HUGH’s mission was to “act as a liaison between the SAS troops and such Résistance as may be available in the area.” The SAS unit was to assess the feasibility of establishing a base of operations from which it could conduct raids on the enemy’s lines of communications. SFHQ gave F Section responsibility for

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57 Paul Kesaris, Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945 Microform. Reel 4, Frame 602.
58 April Report dated, 7 May and May Report dated 10 June, SOE/SO Monthly Reports, SHAEF, SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
running the operation and would arrange the SAS and Team HUGH’s reception and drop zone. Remaining compartmentalized however, it also directed that the BCRA “will not be consulted during preparation.” Team Harry’s mission was similar in that it was going in with elements of the 1st SAS Battalion and to be conducted under the auspices of F Section with no notice given to BCRA during the planning. SFHQ directed HARRY to be parachuted into the Morvan area approximately 200 kilometers east of HUGH.59

Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith met with General Koenig on 30 May, five short days to the launch of OVERLORD, to discuss command arrangements and integrating the French into SHAEF’s structure. Bedell Smith, reiterated Ike’s long held desire, told Koenig, “those dropped with the role of making contact with Résistance groups should be under your command.” In all practical terms this would mean JEDBURGH teams, SAS units, and all other missions sent to the Maquis would be commanded by General Koenig and his London staff element.60

Evidence suggests that Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and the OSS London chief Colonel Bruce also met with General Koenig, late on the 30th to tell him that the warning messages were going to be sent out on 1 and 2 June.61 The meeting was a courtesy as SHAEF had directed them to be sent, not only to the Anglo-American circuits in France, but also to the resistance regions controlled by the BCRA. How

60 To General Koenig, 31 May 1944, Folder 2 of 2, Frame 862, Command and Control of French Forces of the Interior, SHAEF SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
61 Untitled Memo, 30 May 1944, HS 6/610, BNA, Kew, UK.
firmly they were controlled in this case by SHAEF, is demonstrated in the fact that
SHAEF bypassed the FFI’s own commander to direct his forces to prepare to
accomplish their part of Plan *Vert, Tortue*, conduct Guerrilla war, and attack enemy’s
telecommunications in accordance with the BCRA plans, which had now become
SHAEF operations. After the conversation, Colonel Bruce took a train to meet up
with General Donovan who had arrived from Washington. Together they boarded the
*USS Tuscaloosa* and were on board it as it participated in the maritime operations
supporting the landings on D-Day. Bruce did not return to London until 10 June.62

The Prime Minister’s patience with the President seemed to have evaporated
so that when he still had not heard from FDR about inviting de Gaulle to Washington,
he decided to handle the matter himself. He wrote to Eisenhower that he believed, “it
essential that the French Committee should be told before the operation starts and the
only safe place to tell them is here where we have them under our influence.”
Agreeing quickly, Eisenhower wrote back to Churchill that “it would be of the
greatest possible value” to have de Gaulle make a broadcast along with the other
heads of exile governments.63 Churchill invited him and made a plane available for
him and a small group to bring him from Algiers to London.

Koenig now awaited de Gaulle’s arrival knowing that the BBC messages had
been broadcast on the 1st but he did not know that on the next day SFHQ drafted up

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63 Butcher Dairy, 1 June – 27 June 1944 (1), Butcher DIARY, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916 – 1952, Box 168, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
another set of orders for JEDBURGH teams FREDERICK and GEORGE to go to Brittany with elements of a French SAS Battalion. SFHQ also directed this French SAS unit to establish a base from which they could raid in south central Brittany while other French SAS would establish a base further to the west. Both GEORGE and FREDERICK were to “arrange such assistance from the Résistance” as the SAS needed. The JEDBURGH teams were in effect working for the SAS and were to arrange local Résistance support for whatever the French SAS commander may desire. The London BCRA office was not to be informed of the use of French forces in combat until after they had departed. But certainly Koenig knew the great event was near. The time between the broadcast of the warning messages and the broadcast of the action messages could not be more than a week, probably even less.

Around 6 p. m. on the 3rd, de Gaulle landed on English soil and received a note from Churchill inviting him to lunch the following day. The Prime Minister asked to meet him near Portsmith where he was inspecting the invasion preparations. The result of the meeting was important for Eisenhower as he wrote in his diary, “We have direct means of communication with the Résistance groups of France but all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these Résistance groups desire to recognize is that of de Gaulle and his committee. However, since de Gaulle is apparently willing to cooperate only on the basis of our dealing with him exclusively, the whole thing falls into a rather sorry mess.” But of

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64 Orders No.5 and No. 6, Ordres d’EMFFI, 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France.
course he had more to see to than only the French *Maquis*. The magnitude and level of effort regarding OVERLORD was staggering. It involved over 7000 ships, 11,590 aircraft, carrying and supporting 150,000 soldiers across the English Channel onto the Normandy beaches and northern France. 67

Around 9:30 that same evening Eisenhower assembled his senior staff and commanders to hear the last details. For the invasion machinery to effect the operations on the intended day of 5 June, Ike had to confirm the go order by the morning of the 4\(^{th}\) giving the amphibious landings, the airborne landings, the air support, the maritime activity, and the deception operations enough time to get to their final assembly points. Thousands of soldiers had to board ships and aircraft which took hours. The RAF meteorologist gave a pessimistic report, and Ike determined to see what the weather looked like in a few hours and requested the same group to reassemble at 4:30 the next morning. If the weather prohibited the landings on the 5\(^{th}\), they would still have time to postpone. 68

Before dawn on Sunday, 4 June the same group was back at SHAEF Advance, near Portsmouth only to learn the weather was not improving for tomorrow morning. They decided to postpone for 24 hours. Ike, who had not been feeling well, returned to his bunk. Around 6 a.m. General Bull called to speak with Ike, and when his aid told him Eisenhower was sleeping, Bull passed along the bad news that the press office had mistakenly sent the teletype message that Allied forces had landed in

Europe. The story was immediately cancelled, but the Soviets, Germans, and some of 
the wire services in the U. S. had the story. Butcher also exclaimed in his diary, 
“Cripes, even de Gaulle coming to this camp today, to see Ike of course.”

Ike’s SHAEF Advance headquarters was a popular and exciting place.

As news arrived of the Allied victory and the fall of Rome, staff cars brought 
Generals de Gaulle and Koenig and other French officials to meet Churchill along 
with his ministers Bevin, Eden, and his Generals Ismay and Smuts of the Imperial 
General Staff. Both Ismay and Smuts, a South African, had a great deal of experience 
in unconventional warfare with Smuts participating in the Boer War forty years 
before when Churchill was an enemy lieutenant on the British side. For Churchill, it 
seems, experience in Guerrilla war was a cause for befriending someone, it did not 
matter what side they had been on. De Gaulle and Churchill discussed the invasion 
and Churchill informed him that the time was imminent. De Gaulle responded that he 
thought so, since the sudden increase in BBC messages led many in Algiers to 
conclude it must be near. After lunch the subject turned to politics. The Prime 
Minister tried to get de Gaulle to concur about the American and British occupation 
policies. With such an agreement that day, Churchill indicated that he could arrange 
for de Gaulle to go to the White House for a cordial and fruitful meeting with FDR. 
Now deeply suspicious, de Gaulle wondered how sincere the Americans and British 
governments were in this matter since he had attempted to do meet with them and 
discuss these issues nine months before. After a long list of affronts, that had, until

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69 Butcher Diary, 1 June – 27 June 1944 (1), entry for 4 June, p. 1327. Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916 - 
1952, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

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now, been reined in, he ended by raising the currency issue and registered his complaint about the Allies printing French money without his consent. The discussion degenerated into a shouting match culminating with Churchill exclaiming, “Between Europe and the deep blue sea, I should always choose the sea. Each time that you force me to choose between Roosevelt and you, I will always choose Roosevelt!” Labour Minister Ernest Bevin quietly commented that Churchill’s views were not those of the entire cabinet. With the air somewhat tense, Churchill proposed a toast and de Gaulle answered the toast with, “To England, To Victory, to Europe.” Like de Gaulle’s final decision on Mers el-Kébir nearly four years before, he knew France’s future still depended upon British victory.\footnote{Kersaudy, Churchill and De Gaulle, pp. 339 – 343. Kersaudy provides an amazingly well woven reconstruction of the meeting from over 7 different dairies and official records. All the quotes in the paragraph are found on these pages.}

At 4:30 the meeting adjourned and they made their way to Eisenhower’s headquarters where they were greeted with an honor guard. Eisenhower briefed de Gaulle and the other French leaders on the amphibious assault portion of OVERLORD and de Gaulle, very much impressed with all the preparations, congratulated Ike on the efforts. Then Ike discussed things alone with de Gaulle on the path outside where de Gaulle would have room to “to wave his arms and talk.”\footnote{Butcher Dairy, 1 June – 27 June 1944 (1), p. 1343. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.} Their discussion centered on the task at hand, specifically the broadcast de Gaulle had agreed to make. Eisenhower handed de Gaulle a version he had written, saying it was a draft. De Gaulle agreed to review it, but did not like the tone and the content
regarding inferences that Eisenhower was the chief authority in France. General Koenig promised to bring back a copy of a completed draft on the next day for review. If done in time SHAEF’s chief of psychological operations Brigadier General Robert McClure could complete the recording for use during D-Day. With that tenuous agreement done, de Gaulle would make the broadcast, Eisenhower returned to his tent and after supper grunted when given the false Associated Press release. Between that mistake, the high volume of BBC messages, and everything else that might tip off the Germans, it seemed a trifle at that point.

The next day, with the weather still causing great concern, Bedell Smith informed Captain Butcher that de Gaulle refused to broadcast, and Butcher thought it was due to the words regarding civil control of France belonging to Eisenhower. When Butcher informed his boss of this, Eisenhower replied, “to hell with him….if he doesn’t come through we’ll deal with someone else.” Of course there was no one else. That evening, beginning at 9:15 p.m. the BBC broadcast one hundred and eighty-five action messages requiring 15 minutes of air-time. Most of them were nonsense, such as “the duck’s wings are still busy.” But others were inspired. The SOE code writers, in this very fitting moment also used a line from *Cyrano de Bergerac*, “A la fin de l’envoi, je touche.” But how sharp was this sword, so hotly contested, doubted, and long prepared? And how

73 Memorandum of Record: SAC Meeting Minutes, 4 June, 1944, Eisenhower Library, p. 3.
74 Butcher Diary, 1 June – 27 June 1944 (1), p. 1343. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
75 Ibid. p. 1334.
76 DR/1654, 2nd June 1944, “Directions to BBC,” HS 6/610, BNA, Kew, UK.
many swords were there? SFHQ gave SHAEF a fairly sanguine estimate that it believed 577 targets would be attacked in the Railway plan, 30 roads would be cut, and 32 telecommunications sites would be sabotaged. Additionally, SFHQ backed up those efforts with the Guerilla plan and sent the message for Guerilla warfare to engage in maximum interference with road, rail, and telecommunications at the same time. More targets could be attacked, but the Maquis still lacked arms.\textsuperscript{78} A somewhat pessimistic account came from a British planner in SOE to his American counterpart when asked that same question. The SOE planner revealed that the plans all together started with 100 men rising on D + 1 and culminated four days later with 100,000 having participated in operations at some point during that time. But he warned the figures were only estimates not to be used for planning any other operation that required their support. After all, the Résistance was, “an entirely unpredictable and nebulous force.”\textsuperscript{79} 

\textsuperscript{79} 31 May 1944, untitled memorandum From DR/S to DR/US, HS 6/610, BNA, Kew, UK.
Chapter FIVE

Included in Prime Minister Churchill’s daily read file shortly after the invasion was the following message from France: “The task of the French Résistance organization are… 1) In the landing area, direct guerilla support, 2) in the hinterland demolitions and minor harassing operations, 3) In the interior mobilization zones – organization for major operations.” Continuing on, this intercepted Wehrmacht message to its army units in France warned that the Allies intended to parachute detachments of uniformed officers, “along with a considerable increase in weapon dropping” to accomplish the missions above during the weeks of 28 May to 9 June when the moon provided the required illumination for night operations.¹ German assessments of Allied intentions for the Résistance proved to be largely accurate. Furthermore, their information on the intentions of the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur was substantial. Their persistent arrests provided a great deal of fidelity regarding the directives from London and Algiers to the interior. For example, on 22 April 1944 the MBF distributed a translated copy of the directive from the Savoie’s regional FFI leader to his department leaders. The Germans acquired the document in its entirety, translated it, and sent it throughout France.²

But the MBF, the Wehrmacht’s senior element in France Oberbefehlshaber

¹ HW 1/2937. This source and all others below from the HW series in the British National Archives are decoded messages of German radio traffic. Many of these “Special Messages,” as Churchill and the head of the British SIS Stewart Menzies, called them, are now available to researchers and provide a very valuable resource on Wehrmacht operations, since many of Germans documents were destroyed during the war.

² 22 April 1944, Bandenbekampfung. Enthalt: Befehle; Strafverfahren gegen Terroristen; Bekämpfung der Widerstandsbewegung. RW 35/551. BA-MA, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.
West (OB West), and the Vichy authority’s Milice and Gendarmes were often at a loss to effectively stop Allied actions with the Résistance. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the Germans was caused simply by the wide variety of forces the Allies and the CFLN inserted into occupied France over the course of the next four months. The multiplicity of the kinds of special units and intelligence agents parachuted into France before and after the invasion signal the wide variety of tasks, as well as the necessity for redundancy SHAEF, SFHQ, and the BCRA thought were necessary to harness the Maquis. Besides the JEDBURGH teams, the Allies parachuted in British and French SAS teams and American Operational Groups (OGs) in order to attack specific targets or to defend key assets such as bridges or power plants. The Allies also inserted SUSSEX, BRISSEX, and OSSEX teams to observe enemy troop movements and radio that information back to Britain. The SOE, OSS, and BCRA all had networks of spies attempting to store explosives and ammunition for D-Day and subsequent operations. More recently, at Finchampstead on 20 May, the three nations also conceived of Inter-Allied Teams comprised of military officers directed to represent Allied political aims to various Réduits, or centers of guerilla activity where relatively large Maquis formations would probably rally and where Allied leadership would be needed.³

But probably the most important and long-term asset of all the various kinds of clandestine people deployed to occupied France were the previously discussed Délégués Militaire Régionales, charged with consolidating the CFLN’s authority in

³ HS 6/601, BNA, Kew UK.
that region. Many of the DMRs had been parachuted into France in late 1943 or early 1944 and the ones who had survived to the Allied invasion on 6 June began to consolidate the CFLN’s authority as the various FTP, AS, ORA, and other assorted Maquis units drew more and more men and boys into their ranks. The seventeen men in the twelve regions who attempted to perform this key duty were charged by de Gaulle to unify the military effort under the authority of the CFLN. Or as Clausewitz might say, they were responsible for bringing military action in line with the CFLN’s political aims. Specifically, that meant France’s liberation from Germany, the punishment of the collaborators, and the avoidance of an Allied Military Government of Occupation. Waiting in the wings, the CFLN had regional liberation committees in Algiers or in France expecting to take the reins of civil power before the Allies could. Their mission then was to unify the Résistance at the regional level, mirroring what de Gaulle had achieved at the national level. Toward that end, the support of the JEDBURGH teams, working for General Koenig, as did the DMRs, meant an increased chance in their political unity translating into effective military effort.

But to many, that day was far off and to the Germans, the specter of defeat had not yet settled upon them. Leading German combat operations in France was Oberbefehlshaber West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt headquartered in Paris. He took orders from Adolph Hitler in Berlin supported by his overall German Army staff headquarters, Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). The Luftwaffe and

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Kriegsmarine headquarters in Berlin, in actual practice, commanded their air and naval forces in France so not only did von Rundstedt not have the authority over much of the MBF’s occupation forces, but he did not command the air and naval forces in France. OKW and von Rundstedt had organized his forces into two army groups, Heersgruppe B commanded by Erwin Rommel and Heersgruppe G commanded by Johannes Blaskowitz. Rommel then commanded two armies, the 15th Arme held quartered in Belgium that had the task of defending the Channel coast-line from Belgium to the Seine River and 7th Arme at Le Mans covering Normandy and Brittany and back to the Loire River. Blaskowitz’s forces covered southern France with the 1st Arme in Bordeaux and the 19th Arme in Avignon. In addition to active forces covering France’s perimeter, numerous reserve divisions were stationed around the interior, training and awaiting the arrival of more replacement soldiers and equipment in order to become fully mission capable. The Wehrmacht unit already discussed at Glières, the 157th Reserve Infantry Division, was one of these units. Another was the 2nd SS Panzer “Das Reich” Division undergoing refit in the southern French town of Montauban. SHAEF wanted the transportation routes cut so this very powerful division could not participate in Normandy combat.

In the opening days of the invasion, Eisenhower’s objective for SFHQ and the Résistance was for them to assist in the first phase of OVERLORD, meaning the assault and establishment of the beach head in Normandy, and the second phase which entailed assisting in the enlargement of Allied territory “west of the Seine and

5 RH 19 IV/64 Karte – 2, BAMA, Freiburg, Germany.
north of the Loire” rivers. The sixteen JEDBURGH Teams deployed during this first phase of operation will be described in this chapter. Their tasks were to ensure certain railroads and roads were cut making it difficult for the Wehrmacht to bring up reserves, and that communication lines were sabotaged making it hard for the enemy to coordinate a coherent defense, and to liaise with the local Maquis in order to train them for appropriate guerilla activities when directed by SHAEF. In Koenig’s first order to the FFI he declared their mission was to fight. But he was careful to remind his forces to fight in a prudent and effective manner. Those who were armed were to remain available as directed and those unarmed were to remain in contact with their commanders in order to receive weapons and training when arms arrived. In other words, they were directed to wait until they could fight. Koenig and his British and American counterparts at SFHQ prepared JEDBURGH teams to deploy to France along with SAS parties and were drafting orders, briefing teams and over the course of the first and second phases of OVERLORD would send in sixteen JEDBURGH teams to liaise with the FFI and train their Maquis units. The following chapter describes the activities of some of those teams and their experiences in France as Eisenhower’s direct means of communication to the Maquis.

Team HUGH

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7 Ordre No. 1 de General Koenig à DMN, DMZ, DMRs et MASSINGHAM, 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France.
Just after 11 p.m. on 5 June, an RAF Halifax bomber took off from Tempsford air base with JEDBURGH Team HUGH. After getting through “quite a bit of FLAK” from German anti-aircraft guns along the route, the team parachuted into the French darkness, north of the small town of Saint-Gaultier in the department of L’Indre. Along with them were two of the officers of the British Special Air Service (SAS) mission, codenamed BULBASKET. French Captain Louis L’Helgouach, using the nom-de-guerre Louis Legrand, led the JEDBURGH team.\(^8\) The second officer was British Captain William Crawshay and the radio operator was the French non-commissioned officer Rene Meyer, using the name Rene Mersiol. L’Helgouach had been recruited out of the Colonial Spahi Regiments in North Africa for JEDBURGH duty.\(^9\) Crawshay found his way into the SOE via a very circuitous route. When the war started, he was a student at the University of Poitiers in southwestern France. His step-grandfather was Ambassador to France and he had spent a great deal of his childhood in Paris.\(^10\) When available for service in the British Army, he was too young to serve in his home regiment of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and so volunteered for the 5\(^{th}\) Battalion, Kings African Rifles training Masai and Sawili soldiers in Somalia. While serving in that unit, he was mistakenly strafed and wounded by a South African Fokker-Wolfe fighter. That wound and a subsequent severe case of malaria sidelined him in Mombassa, Kenya for over a year. After

\(^8\) HS 6/526 p. 1-2. All the French JEDBURGHs and agents used false names to protect their families from German or Vichy punishment should they be arrested. Few knew their real names in fact the British and American JEDBURGHs did not learn their French partners’ real names until long after the war.
being placed back on active service he volunteered for the British Military Mission as a liaison officer to the Free French Brigade in Egypt where he met General Koenig just after his successful defense of Bir Heichem. “I see that you have chosen a good regiment,” said Koenig, meaning to insult the English while at the same time being kind to the young Welsh officer. After watching, and missing, the battle of El Alamein from the heights above, he sought out more exciting work than he believed his current posting would provide. A friend arranged for Crawshay to meet with General Gubbins in Cairo and during that discussion Gubbins agreed to take Crawshay into the SOE and sent him off to the JEDBURGH program, without revealing to Crawshay what the duties were. The Welshman returned to the UK in November 1943 with orders to report to Milton Hall for training. Comments in his records are not that hopeful however, with one of his superior officers, American instructor Lieutenant Bill Dreux remarking that Crawshay was “inept in many phases of military training.” Crawshay must have improved however, as Colonel Musgrave allowed him to be on the first team into France.

Crawshay was familiar with this part of France having studied in Poitiers, just south west of his drop zone, and knew the region to be comprised of many small villages and farms. The 1936 census counted the population of **L’Indre** at 245,622 with a population density of 36 people per square kilometer, making it one of the least populated departments in France. **Châteauroux** was the largest town with a

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12 Ibid., and HS 9/371/2, Crawshay PF, BNA, Kew, UK.
population of no more than 6000 people. Most people lived in small villages or on farms. There were large swaths of wooded areas in the south side of the department and the terrain rose into what emerges as the Massif Central south of L’Indre. The department is defined by rivers with the Creuse River on the southwest, the Indre River running through the department’s center, and the Cher River running past the town of Issoudon on the east side, all flowing into the Loire River to the north. The farmland, woods, and vacant buildings all were conducive to hiding weapons and small bands of men. Other than agriculture, a small aircraft engine factory, two small automobile factories in Châteauroux and a bicycle factory in La Chatre contributed to the department’s economy. On l’Indre’s southern edge was one of France’s principle hydroelectric plants along with the requisite high-tension power lines leading to Normandy and the Paris region. Further increasing the area’s strategic value were the rail lines that transited the department. A national north-south line running from Paris to Toulouse bisected L’Indre while the east west rail line serving Nantes and Lyon also ran through L’Indre. 13 In the 1936 elections, the last real indication of political sentiments, the Popular Front won 57.5% of the votes and 64% of the seats in the National Assembly with the PCF winning just under 10% of the vote. Therefore the department could be described as center left. 14 But the railroads were SHAEF’s primary concern and with Plan Vert in operation, they were receiving a great deal of


attention from the local *Maquis*.

The area’s attributes were well known to the SOE as its present circuits in the area were the inheritors of the first successful insertion of an SOE agent in France in 1941.¹⁵ Maurice Southgate’s arrest mentioned above had left the department in the hands of his two assistants, René Maingard and radio operator Pearl Witherington. They made the decision to divide up Southgate’s network of contacts and associated *Maquis* with Maingard planning to move off to the east into the *Vienne* Department while Witherington remained in northern *L’Indre*. These two ran the F Section circuits HUGH had been ordered to contact and whose *Maquis* HUGH was to train for guerilla work.

Recognizing the incongruent tasks between their SAS colleagues and their own JEDBURGH work, the members of HUGH and the BULBASKET mission all agreed to ignore their SFHQ orders and separate. Maingard concurred with this and after receiving more weapons and gear in a parachute drop on 6 June, inspecting the department’s *Maquis* units on 7 June, and receiving more of the SAS team members on the June 9, team HUGH and the SAS parted company.¹⁶ On 7 and 8 June HUGH’s messages back to SFHQ signal their certainty at keeping the rail line from Toulouse cut, and noting that the population was enthusiastic, declared that the “existing *Maquis* groups were doubling in 48 hours” and they asked for more equipment, radios, arms, and another JEDBURGH team to help with more work than they could

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¹⁶ HS 6/526, pp. 1-2 of the French version of the report. BNA, Kew, UK.
accomplish. SFHQ responded that their first priority was keeping the rail line cut, in order to keep units like the 2nd SS Panzer from coming north, but also tempering Legrand’s and Crawshay’s enthusiasm somewhat by warning them to “keep out the undesirables” and limit the growth of the *Maquis* to those they could arm and train due to loss of mobility and inadequate supplies. Radio operator Meyer signaled back, “Impossible to limit the numbers joining the *Résistance* owing to spontaneous uprising,” and he confirmed their need of the second JEDBURGH team.  

The spontaneous uprising of the *Maquis* occurred in more than just HUGH’s area. SFHQ received reports from other places in central France, in Brittany, and in the southeast between the Rhône River and the Italian border. Such a rising was not what SFHQ wanted and neither did Koenig. Only four days after the invasion, the situation compelled Koenig to send an order to the DMRs, and *Bureau d’Opérations Aériennes* (BOA) the Free French organization running the drop zones, to limit their actions. For many reasons, Koenig did not want widespread action and feared its chaotic results. Koenig’s order came to the DMRs in clipped telegraph language, “CURRENTLY IMPOSSIBLE PREDICT NORMAL SUPPLY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION YOU LIMIT TO A SIMMER ALL GUERILLA ACTION STOP WHEN POSSIBLE BREAK CONTACT EVERYWHERE WHILE WAITING FOR PHASE OF REORGANISATION STOP . . . THIS IS A FORMAL ORDER STOP CONSTITUTE SMALL GROUPS RATHER THAN LARGE GATHERINGS STOP

GOODBYE”18 Having broadcast the order for general guerrilla warfare on 5 June, SHAEF did not now like the surprise it had on its hands. The “unpredictable and nebulous force” that all believed would fail to rise in significant numbers, had exceeded SHAEF’s expectations considerably. As one of the senior BCRA leaders in France at the time later wrote, the order, but more importantly the slowing down of the aerial resupply of arms, “effectively contributed to the avoidance of the useless sacrifice of the French population.”19 Koenig had a tenuous command structure in place that could not operate in the open, therefore, if SHAEF did not want the Maquis to do anything, it simply would not authorize aerial resupply of weapons. The flights now became a blunt instrument for Eisenhower to control the Résistance.

Nevertheless, having an increasing number of JEDBURGH teams in France would be a more effective way of controlling the Maquis so their deployment kept pace. A “Carpetbagger” B-24 took off from RAF Harrington with Team HAMISH and their 12 containers of equipment and weapons at 10:32 pm on 12 June. The 8-man crew, commanded by Major Robert W. Fish, flew their aircraft to the drop zone with no enemy opposition and good weather. HAMISH and its 12 containers of equipment departed the aircraft over the drop zone at 2:08 am, and in keeping with the procedure to avoid detection, dropped the men and equipment from only 580 feet above the ground. After dropping off the JEDBURGHs, the crew circled back around to drop off one container that got hung up, and then flew a route dropping propaganda

18 “Telegram à ELLIPSE,” 10 JUIN 1944, 3 AG 2 562, AN, Paris, France.
leaflets over three towns in France. Fish and his crew arrived safely back at their base a little after 5:00 am. Team HAMISH, comprised of American Lieutenant Robert Anstett, French Lt René Schmitt, using the *nom de guerre* Lucien Blacere, and American Sergeant Lee Watters had arrived, fulfilling HUGH’s request for more help, and just in time. German combat units were organizing themselves and activity in the region was beginning. SOE agent Pearl Witherington was nearly caught on 11 June and her organization was momentarily scattered. HUGH and HAMISH could now fulfill the long intended use of JEDBURGH teams as a reserve force taking the place of arrested or disestablished F Section agents.

Over the course of the next two weeks, these two teams moved around the region splitting the work load and coordinating their activities not only with each other, to the degree possible given the German ability to intercept radio communications, but also with the F Section agents and the FFI leadership. So instead of replacing, JEDBURGH teams often augmented them. They received at least three more night parachute re-supply missions and attempted to organize the *Maquis* in manageable groups defined by their ability to arm, train, and equip them. HAMISH radioed SFHQ on the 24th reporting that, “RAILROAD AND

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20 Mission Report of Drop – Fish Crew- 0629, 13 June 1944, Carpetbagger Archive, [http://home.comcast.net/~801492bg.historian/Index.html](http://home.comcast.net/~801492bg.historian/Index.html). This Web site is run by the son of a former “Carpetbagger.” Over the course of the last 20 years, Mr. Tom Ensminger, Lt Col J. W. Bradbury, USAF (Ret.) and many others have taken documents from the national archives regarding Carpetbagger operations and placed them on the web site. Mr. Ensminger’s work supporting this endeavor is a marvel.

21 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Book IV, pp. 22 and 46.

22 (Witherington), Pearl Cornioley, Report by F/O Pearl Cornioley (nee Witherington), 23 November 1944, HS 6/587, British National Archives, Kew, UK.
TELEPHONE FINISHED, ROADS DIFFICULT IMPOSSIBLE STOP BOCHE

BUT CAN SLOW DOWN BY AMBUSH FOR THIS NEED MINES AND BOOBY
TRAPS. .... BEEN PLAYING GAMES WITH BOCHE PATROLS ITS FUN’’

But what was not “fun” was the multiplicity of French units, many unaware of
the others, beginning to impede coordinated action. The Maquis in the area,
comprised of FTP, AS, and an ORA unit were unable to coordinate actions at this
point forcing the JEDBURGH teams to consider evacuating the area and head south
since the Germans were conducting such strong actions in Indre. Making the issue
more complicated was the belief in the region, true or not, that the British had favored
the FTP in their policy of arming the local groups, leaving the AS and the ORA not
only bereft of weapons, but suspicious of any link to the Free French and SHAEF in
London. On 20 June, JEDBURGHs Crawshay and Legrand met with Colonel
Raymond Chomel who was the commander of the ORA in the department. 24
Chomel used the pseudonym “Charles Martel” which recalled France’s successful defense of
Christendom from the Muslims near Poitiers in 732 A.D. A regular Army officer, he
commanded a unit comprised of regular infantry and was “horrified” that he might
have to take orders from Theogene Briant, pseudo Alex, who was the FTP’s leader in
that part of L’Indre. 25 During two meetings they began to defrost the local groups
incompatibility, aided by the BCRA’s Operations officer for the region, Georges
Heritier, pseudo CROC, who had parachuted into the region in January. Heritier was

23 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Target 1, Vol V, Book I, p. 52. The term “Boche” is a pejorative
often used by WWII soldiers, especially the French, referring to the Germans.
25 Ibid, p. 4 and Crawshay sound file 12521, reel 2, IWM.
captured in April but escaped and now served as the Assistant DMR. But their meetings were halted on two occasions due to raiding parties of Germans. In one instance, they all had a narrow escape with Merisol having to hide in a pile of coal and Crawshay in a basement closet across from a wine cellar. The Gestapo officer, seeing the wine cellar and not wanting his men to get into it, ordered them all to leave the basement where the JEDBURGHs hid.

Nevertheless, they again attempted negotiations and overcame the disagreements when Legrand and Crawshay agreed to pass orders to the ORA, the AS, and the FTP, on the guise that those orders were coming from Eisenhower through Koenig. Chomel agreed to take orders from SURCOUF, the commander of the AS in the region. Chomel would command “mobile” units, and they also created sector chiefs for static troops. Moreover they agreed to leave many in reserve since they did not have arms for all. On 25 and 26 June, they managed a two-day discussion at HUGH’s command post without being hunted by Germans. Not only was Chomel, Heritier, and other FTP leaders there, but the DMR Eugene Dechelette arrived and led the discussions. Dechelette had been in France since February, a few days after marrying a British woman in London. The BCRA then arranged for Dechelette to parachute into France but his jump was not as fortunate as the JEDBURGHs’ had been since he broke his ankle upon landing. But by June his leg had healed and

26 “Biographical file, George Hertier, HS 8/1001, BNA, Kew, UK
27 Crawshay sound file 12521, reel 2, IWM.
28 HS 6/526, BNA, Kew, UK, pp. 4 and 5.
29 “Telegrams de ELLIPSE” 10 Feb 44, 3 AG 2 561, AN, Paris, France.
now he was attempting to assert the authority of the CFLN in the R5 Region. Crawford and Legrand wrote later that during his two-day discussion with all the leaders, Dechelette approved of their previous arrangements but wanted to undertake more action against the Germans. The Jeds disagreed. They believed, and London concurred, that few of the Maquis units were ready for major action against the Germans. But impressed with Dechelette, the JEDBURGHSs later commented that he, “was most clear headed” and “completely dominated the situation” during this key meeting that settled command of the Indre, the northern most department in R5, with the FTP and AS Résistance firmly under the control of Koenig.

But in all this, Team HUGH seem not to recognize that Dechelette also reported to General Koenig, and that Dechelette’s own radio messages were also informing SFHQ and Koenig of what was occurring. Koenig seemed to take more notice when contacted by Dechelette and often gave personal direction to DMRs few JEDBURGH teams received. In this case, the Allied JEDBURGHs, with more tactical liaison duties, seem to be regarded as a reinforcing mechanism for DMR actions. In telegrams to Dechelette on 24 and 25 June, while the meeting was being conducted at Team HUGH’s headquarters, EMFFI told Dechelette, we “WARMLY THANK YOU FOR THIS VERY PRECIOUS INFORMATION” and furthermore relayed to Dechelette that Koenig was glad that he had conferred with Bourgès-Maunoury who was serving as the southern zones Délégué Militaire and Dechelette’s superior. Koenig also “CONFIRM[ED] THE COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

30 HS 6/526, p. 6. BNA, Kew.
DECISIONS” in a message to Dechelette, that he and HUGH had made. While the JEDBURGH team’s report comes off sounding like HUGH acted in the absence of coherent direction from SFHQ and Koenig, in the military hierarchy, there is little reason to see why Koenig would send a message to a junior team of JEDBURGHs when he had related his wishes and congratulations to Dechelette, the senior man on the scene. While growing more fused, the Allied and FFI certainly had redundant ways to liaise with localities all over France with F Section agents, RF Section agents, DMRs, Inter-Allied Teams, and JEDBURGH teams. General Koenig, SHAEF’s commander for the Résistance was deferring to his senior person while retaining the ability and prerogative to communicate directly to anyone of his assets in France he wished to. Therefore, it may look, and indeed be, a confusing array to control the FFI inside France, but Koenig was leading the effort to get the Résistance to come together.

Organizing the Résistance in the MORVAN

For instance, in the Morvan, Koenig’s late May direction to his staff to consider sending liaison capability to this region resulted in the deployment of nearly all types of teams to the area. Teams ISAAC and HARRY, the SAS HOUNDSORTH mission, and the Inter-Allied or political mission codenamed VERVEINE all deployed there in early June. Lieutenant Colonel Hutchison, mentioned above who had been the director of the RF Section and later requested assignment to the

31 “Telegram à ELLIPSE,” 25 JUIN 1944, 3 AG 2 562, AN, Paris, France.
JEDBURGH teams, was chosen to lead both team ISAAC and the political mission VERVEINE. A French officer, Ferdinand Viat who used the pseudonym, Commandant Dubac, would later deploy to take command but in the meantime, Hutchison and his radio operator were to deploy and establish the initial base while attempting to ascertain the efficacy of Maquis activity in the region.  

Alerted by Musgrave to prepare to depart from Milton Hall to London, Hutchison and his W/T, Sergeant John Sharp were briefed in a London flat SOE used to brief agents prior to their deployment. They looked at and studied maps of the area with the briefing officer in order to familiarize themselves with the departments of Nièvre, where he was to go, and the surrounding departments of Yonne, Côte D’Or, Cher, Allier, Loire, and Saône et Loire southeast of Paris and directly east of where HUGH was also being prepared to deploy. Hutchison realized, as General Koenig had two weeks before, that the confluence of roads, railroads, and rivers all winding through the forests made it, “a part of France which the enemy was likely to use, as he hurried troops towards Normandy through the Vosges or as he made his way south to the Mediterranean.”  

Not only that, but later the Germans could be harassed going the other direction as well, for in their movement east, they would find the Maquis perhaps better ready to deal with them. In either case, Koenig’s selection of this region and ranking it higher in priority seemed wise, but when Koenig had suggested on 20 May, that the area may become a réduit, and making it high on SFHQ’s list of

33 Hutchison, That Drug Danger.  p. 104.
regions to cultivate, there now seemed to be no shift from sending ISAAC there to provoke action rather than tamp it down. Specifically, as it stated in Team HARRY’s orders, the JEDBURGHs were warned against pre-mature *Maquis* operations due to the fact that the distance from Britain and the phases of the moon made flying to this part of France prohibitive after 9 June. With no way to get weapons to the *Maquis*, Hutchison’s duties were to be confined to relaying directions from London and finding out the nature of the local *Maquis* groups. But Hutchison never realized the implications of his orders, nor how desperate he would be in the months of June and July.

Hutchison’s and Sharp’s cohorts on team HARRY were supposed to depart with their elements of a British SAS mission on 4 June, but weather delayed them until 6 June. While boarding the plane, British Captain Duncan Guthrie, HARRY’s team leader received a copy of ISAAC’s orders telling him at the last moment, that he would be under the combined mission of ISAAC/VERVEINE once in the field. HARRY was to liaise with any *Maquis* that may come to work with the SAS in order to conduct raids on enemy lines of communications, keep SFHQ informed regarding *Résistance* strength in the area while being careful not to “encourage any mass rising by resistance unless ordered to by SFHQ.”

The difficulty this presented to the JEDBURGHs proved to be substantial. They could relay orders and send information back, but being reduced to passing messages from SHAEF to *Maquis* incapable of much action, went against the very nature of their training and what the JEDBURGHs

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34 “Order No. 3,” Odres des EMFFI, 3 AG 2 473, p. 2.
believed their mission was to be. Furthermore, it de-legitimated their authority in the eyes of the *Maquis* when they arrived and promised weapons and then failed to keep those promises.

But the subtle shift in mission was only one aspect for which the Jeds had not been prepared. Hutchison later complained that this merging of his JEDBURGH mission with the political mission of VERVEINE, compounded by the late arrival of his commander only served to increase his confusion regarding his mission’s intent and his role in the local resistance organizations. Hutchison also complained that Viat and other French personnel were not coming to the field until the following moon cycle, “For reasons which were never explained to me.” Perhaps it was because the French personnel could not be released without the knowledge of the BCRA and General Koenig as SFHQ directed that the planning for this mission be done without informing the French. However, Hutchison and Viat had lunch at the Cavalry Club prior to Hutchison’s departure and they discussed their mission and agreed on their methods and general philosophy about issues.35 It is curious that if Viat could not deploy until later, and if the French could not be informed, it seems against orders to have met at all.

Once there, ISAAC and HARRY linked up with each other and began their work with the DMR for areas P1 and P2, André Rondenay, who went under the code name LEMINSCATE and his assistant for drop zones, Alain Grout de Beaufort who used the pseudonym PAIR. PAIR’s duties of controlling drop zones meant that he

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controlled who was given weapons and was therefore a major player in regional or local Maquis. Having heard the BBC messages on 1 and 5 June, the two met in Paris with their group and with a few vehicles and arms, made their way out of the capital toward the Morvan where they were to implement their portion of plans Vert and Tortue, the attack on the rail ways and on the roads thought to be used by German armored units reinforcing the front. However, since their plan had been designed believing that the invasion would occur north of them at the Pas de Calais instead of further west at Normandy, the German traffic through the region was not as heavy as they expected. 36 Rondenay, who was a railway employee and engineer, had also studied the best tactics for stopping and delaying armored columns. Knowing how they operated, “it was essential to make the charges explode only to the immediate contact of the armored columns, after the passage of the motor cycles” that escorted the columns. Surprise was essential to get the desired log jam of traffic and avoid the motorcyclists diverting the column or calling for support. 37 Having managed to carry out many of their Plan Vert actions, Rondenay met up with JEDBURGHs of team HARRY on 10 June. On 14 June Team ISAAC was directed to them in their small forest village of Lormes, 260 kilometers southeast of Paris. 38

Together they began to select the Maquis units that all agreed were worthy of maintaining and began the process to train them and receive weapons via air drops.

37 Ibid., p. 89.
38 HS 6/522, Team HARRY, p. 1 and Team ISAAC, HS 6/366, p. 3. BNA, Kew, UK.
But due to the distance from Britain, the shortened nighttime hours, and the moon phase no supplies would be sent. Hutchison, who protested this situation on the 21st, evidently was not informed of this key issue prior to his departure on the 10th even though team HARRY was briefed about this prior to its departure. Also on the 21st a row began over the command of the region’s Maquis. Arriving to see Hutchison was Colonel Dupin who claimed to be their new commander. Buttressing his claim was a letter of appointment from the COMAC. Here we see the influence of the Comité d’action militaire du CNR or COMAC, the committee created by the interior Résistance charged with overseeing military actions. One can also see the struggles then within the Résistance and the Allies as to the control of the Maquis’ actions. The COMAC has often been referred to as the voice of the communists and it represented probably the most consolidated influence they had upon the Libération. But their role was redundant with Koenig’s role in London as both entities claimed command of the FFI. Both de Gaulle and Koenig agreed to their creation and existence largely due to the COMAC’s limited geographical influence and the need for their participation. As historian Julian Jackson remarked quite accurately, “COMAC controlled less of France than the early Capetians.”39 So while the communists may have controlled COMAC, COMAC itself proved unable to control more than even Koenig did. Furthermore, de Gaulle and Koenig participated in choosing COMAC’s members, furthering Koenig’s influence and creating a sponsorship role for him over the committee. However, from Hutchison’s as well as

39 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 549.
Rondenay’s point of view, Dupin’s arrival only sowed seeds of discord and confusion. In an usually long message, Hutchison updated SFHQ on many things, requested arms, more JEDBURGH teams for the region, and stated that COMAC’s Colonel Dupin had arrived to command in the region but would recognize Koenig’s and SHAEF’s authority. While Hutchison believed this kind of arrangement to be essential, since those in France were better able to command in France, the question then became, what exactly was Rondenay’s role as DMR? On 3 July Hutchison received instructions from SFHQ that he was “to treat no further with Colonel Dupin” to which Hutchison protested only to be directed to not compete with Rondenay. Hutchison was now completely mystified. It was “a gratuitous piece of advice that showed that London was not conversant” with his original orders or mission and he chaffed now under the reality of having to wait for weapons as well as Colonel Viat, who had yet to be deployed and assume command of VERVEINE.

But while Hutchison and Dupin dealt with command issues, HARRY and the SAS kept organizing hit and run ambushes with some of the Maquis units when arms permitted. Their ability to conduct railway cuts and run ambushes was modestly successful and infuriated the Germans who pressed the hunt to find the Maquis groups and the Allied units. Due to an ambush done by the village Maquis units, the Wehrmacht “completely burnt” the village of Montsauche “as a reprisal.” Fifteen villagers were killed the next day as well as another severe reprisal conducted on the

42“Team HARRY,” p. 3.
village of Dun le Places, north of Montsauche. Instead of effectively discouraging further actions, this only inspired and infuriated the local French *Maquis*. The only restraint the JEDBURGHs could maintain on the *Maquis* was the ever-diminishing supply of weapons. As one of the first air supply missions to reach them was closing in on the drop zone, the RAF aircraft struck a USAAF B-24 in the mid air darkness. All the British and American airmen were killed and Captain Guthrie feared the Germans would discover the drop zone. He worked quickly with some of the local villagers and *Maquis* to bury the bodies and cart off pieces of one of the aircraft so the Germans would incorrectly assume that only one aircraft had crashed due to FLAK instead of finding two and deducing the crash site was an active drop zone. Guthrie’s plan succeeded and “the Germans never realized anything more than one place crashed.”

While HARRY and ISAAC in the Morvan and HUGH and HAMISH in *L’Indre* struggled to create unity of action in their regions, the same struggles were continuing at the national level between the United States and de Gaulle’s CFLN. In the mind of FDR, D-Day seemed to change nothing regarding American recognition of de Gaulle’s leadership and the CFLN. Two days before D-Day, the OSS sent maps with overlays and other briefing papers to the President. The materials demonstrated the *Maquis* groups were in various states of organization and readiness, that the British and Americans had links with some groups but not others, and that the French

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43 Ibid., p. 4 and OSS London Microfilm, Air Operations, Reel 9, Frame 0928.
44 “Team Harry,” p. 4.
had their own, and much larger, Maquis independent of the Maquis that the British had fostered beginning in 1941. The Résistance Regions were all precisely shown and included the DMRs’ code names, their assistants and operations officers as of the latest information. The OSS also provided the estimate that their aggregate strength of the Résistance in France was 313,180. In raw numbers, this translates into the equivalent of nearly twenty-one American Army infantry divisions. Of course, as the OSS made clear to Roosevelt, only a mere 6,630 of the Allied French Maquis, meaning the Maquis unequipped or connected with the SOE or OSS, were considered “well armed” while 18,200 were considered armed who were in contact with SOE or OSS circuits. Furthermore, these numbers were best guesses and in many ways irrelevant. The questions most animating Roosevelt had to do with de Gaulle’s actions now that the invasion had begun.

On 8 June, the American ambassador to the Court of St. James, John Winant telegraphed Secretary of State Hull and related the frustration the British government had toward de Gaulle’s actions since his arrival. De Gaulle had made the D-Day broadcast, but not without consternation and only in de Gaulle’s words later in the day so he would not appear to be last among all the exiled European governments. But now that the broadcast was done, the currency and French liaison officer issues needed attention in order to aid Division and Brigade commanders dealing directly with the French population near the combat zone. De Gaulle had blocked both, but

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45 “Maps of French Resistance,” Audiovisual Collection, Map Room Files, SPECIAL FILES, Papers of Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Papers as President. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.
Winant now told Hull that the French had released some of the liaison officers for duties with American and British units. The currency was another matter and as of yet, unresolved. De Gaulle believed that it was indicative of “France was being treated in this respect precisely like Italy” and was grating upon French fears of an AMGOT. The Allied proclamation regarding the currency would be broadcast at mid-night, when it would not receive much attention since it did not have de Gaulle’s consent. Furthermore, Winant hinted that British popular sentiments, as Churchill had warned FDR about in May, were beginning to coalesce around de Gaulle and the CFLN and that the Parliament and press believed de Gaulle “was not being given proper consideration.” Winant went on to suggest that as leader of the CFLN, de Gaulle could be invited to Washington to “agree to the plans which have been worked out for the civil administration of France.”

A tactful urging to Hull and the President that something must be done or relations with France would sour post-war relations with the United States. However, this was lost on the President. Admiral Leahy drafted a reply which FDR approved on the 13th stating that he looked forward to de Gaulle’s visit where he would “direct his attention to our war effort toward the liberation of France.” In other words, FDR believed that de Gaulle should do what the United States wished simply because of American actions to free France from German occupation while de Gaulle saw too much evidence that the Allies sought to govern France and separate it from its colonies.

46 Telegram Winant to Hull, 8 June 1944. Box 11, Franklin D. Roosevelt-John D. Winant, 1944, MAP ROOM FILES, FDR Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.
But de Gaulle had his supporters in the US government and they were finally gaining some ground on the State Department and FDR. The day after FDR replied to Winant’s telegram, Secretary of War Stimson spoke with his Deputy John J. McCloy about the issues with France. Stimson was very concerned that American soldiers would not be able to purchase needed supplies and materials from the French population if they refused to accept the Allied currency. Several weeks of progress in and work regarding the matter before the invasion seemed to be vanishing.

Furthermore, the liaison officer issue had found its way into the press, probably due to McCloy feeding it to reporter, Stimson believed while General Marshall had “dressed down” two of de Gaulle’s “chief lieutenants” during his recent visit to London. Stimson could see that Eisenhower was in a very poor position regarding de Gaulle and grew frustrated with Secretary of State Hull who “hates de Gaulle with such fierce feeling that he rambles into incoherence whenever we talk about him.”

Stimson was arguably the most experienced person regarding foreign affairs in FDR’s cabinet. He had served as the Secretary of War for President Taft, then as a Colonel in the artillery in France during WWI. He had successfully mediated a civil dispute in Nicaragua for President Coolidge and later became his Governor General of the Philippines. President Hoover appointed him Secretary of State and in that capacity he had overseen the American negotiations of the London Naval Treaty, a major accomplishment in interwar disarmament. Now in his second stint as Secretary of War, for a President of the other party, he was overseeing the largest ever

48 Henry L. Stimson et al., The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries in the Yale University Library (New Haven, CT: Yale University Library, 1973), Microfilm. See entries for 14 and 16 June, 1944.
expansion of American military might and the arming, training, and equipping of over
eight million men and women. All that experience served him well and he could
understand Eisenhower’s embarrassment and desire for the United States and Great
Britain to get together with de Gaulle on the issue. FDR’s draft policy remained in
London unsigned due to Eden and other members of the cabinet staying Churchill’s
pen. Stimson distrusted de Gaulle, but realized that while FDR’s and Hull’s policy
sounded good in theory, it was not working in practice. France would not be treated
like a minor nation that allowed the United States to show it how to run its own
affairs. In an hour-long phone conversation with FDR, Stimson tried to talk to him
about all this and after hearing the President speak glowingly of how the Maquis were
slowing down two divisions in France’s interior, he then said that General Donovan
had told him there may be other options for French leadership. 49

Suspicious of this claim, Stimson and McCloy talked to Donovan the next day.
Donovan backed off such a positive aspect of other possibilities. In fact, he had
written a memo to FDR based on his discussions with de Gaulle’s representatives in
London and Washington, his recent trip to the invasion zone, and evidently was
pressing FDR to fully recognize de Gaulle and the CFLN. But after speaking with
Secretary Stimson, Donovan tore it up. Stimson and Donovan realized that FDR was

49 Stimson diary, entry for 15 June, 1944. Donovan often sent raw intelligence to FDR and reports he
had received from his own field offices. He simply attached a cover note and passed them along to the
President’s secretary Grace Tully who placed them at the President’s disposal in the Map
Room adjacent to the Oval Office. The President could then read about Jedburgh Team operations,
and for instance knew that HUGH and HAMISH were in central France, their tactical difficulties,
as well as other very detailed issues regarding the status of Allied Special Operations and the
Maquis. The two divisions were probably the 2nd SS “Das Reich” Panzer Division and the 11th
Panzer Division which will be discussed below. Seeing, interpreting, and judging raw intelligence
was evidently what FDR wanted to do. However, it is not a practice continued today.
not going to change his mind, so they changed their tack hoping to make some progress. Instead Donovan recommended to the President that Eisenhower recognize de Gaulle as a military leader and in that capacity, which was already being filled largely by Koenig in London and Cochet in Algiers, de Gaulle could be broached regarding French civil affairs concerning Allied operations. Such a plan seems completely unworkable from de Gaulle’s point of view and perhaps after discussions with Stimson, who also wished to push the matter and McCloy, who had been an advocate of de Gaulle’s for over a year, demonstrated that the three were no longer willing to continue to sing a tune the President refused to hear. As FDR’s close advisor Harry Hopkins remarked, “One more crack from McCloy to the boss about de Gaulle and McCloy leaves town.” While they were Republicans, serving in a Democrat’s administration, Stimson and Donovan may never have felt the same pressure regarding a political future that McCloy and others would as Democrats, nevertheless, their advice still, at this late date, became self-muted by FDR’s and Hull’s feelings and fear of about de Gaulle’s intentions. The issue of recognition that Stimson and Donovan sought to get behind them, continued to fester.

But while the President and his senior officials still pondered how to recognize de Gaulle, Eisenhower’s efforts to bring in French military command of the Résistance was getting into gear. However, it would not come without severe

reshuffling and dislocation of SFHQ at the very time they were now executing their long planned use of the *Maquis*. Koenig had been officially recognized as the commander of the FFI on 6 June, but was not given the resources to execute his mission. Obviously those resources already existed in the form of the SFHQ staff comprised of the British and American officers as well as his own *Bloc Planning* staff in what was now the *Bureau Renseignements et d’Action Londres* or *BRAL*, as the BCRA had shifted to Algiers with the rest of the French provisional government. On 9 June, Koenig informed Ike’s chief of Staff General Bedell Smith that he had received de Gaulle’s approval to form a tripartite command under SHAEF, that he was declaring the creation his headquarters element *l’Etat Major Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur* (EMFFI) and named his French Air Force officer Colonel Henri Zeigler who used the pseudonym “Colonel Vernon,” to be his Chief of Staff. Koenig’s final statement to Bedell Smith was that he awaited Eisenhower’s directives regarding the activities he desired from the *Résistance*.

General Eisenhower’s directive established that the priorities were first to “foster[ing] active *Résistance* to the Bridgehead area and in Brittany” and to be ready at a later date for larger scale guerilla activity in Brittany. The second priority was to delay the movement of German troops to the battle area by focusing on the railway lines linking Normandy to the rest of France. Thirdly, Eisenhower directed EMFFI to attack the telecommunication system so the Germans and Vichy regime would

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continue experiencing difficulties coordinating their own actions. But the directive also reminded Koenig that since the primary means of supply came from aircraft, he should “bear in mind the limitations of airlift” such as weight, weather, moon periods, enemy anti-aircraft capability, and the numbers of aircraft available for such work. Eisenhower also coordinated these issues with General Wilson Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean so he could coordinate SPOC towards SHAEF priorities.

How much did SHFQ and its nascent parent for operations in France EMFFI, manage to deliver to the Maquis in June and what were the results? Sixty short tons of explosives, 9937 Sten light machine guns, 8800 pistols, 5677 rifles, 5505 Carbines, 2110 Marlins, 932 Bazookas, 70 anti-tank mines, 2142 Light machine guns, and 64,618 grenades. Accompanied with the weapons were over eight million rounds of 9mm ammunition, over 6 million rounds of .303 caliber rifle ammunition, 13,048 rockets for the bazookas, nearly two million rounds of Carbine ammunition, and 288 shoulder fired anti-tank PIATs. These arms and the weapons supplied previously had enabled the Maquis to make, as SHAEF touted somewhat gleefully, 500 railroad cuts in France due to FFI’s planning with the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) and the efforts around Plan Vert. Post war inquiries into this have demonstrated the SNCF, the FFI, and Plan Vert were indeed effective with, for instance, 171 sabotage attempts in the eastern region – between Paris and the Belgium

53 “SHAEF/17245/6/5/2/Ops(A), Directive to the Commanding General French Forces of the Interior,” 17 June 1944, Box 2, 322 FFI Command and Control of the French Forces of the Interior, SHAEF SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
54 “Brief of Tenth Monthly Progress Report to SHAEF from SFHQ,” 14 July 1944, Appendix B, Box 2, 319.1/10 Monthly SOE/SO Reports. SHAEF SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
border – that produced 136 successfully cut tracks. 55 “The results achieved by the FFI have far surpassed the results generally expected” believed SFHQ but “in spite of warnings, Résistance groups have been taking premature overt action before they were fully armed.” Ominously now the FFI and the civilian population suffered from reprisals “at the hands of superior German troops.” Nevertheless SFHQ believed those enemy forces conducting the reprisals were then delayed from coming to the invasion area, seemingly failing to understand the reprisals were often carried out by soldiers under the MBF or reserve forces that were never going to be ordered to the front. But SHAEF no longer believed the number of aircraft available to supply the Résistance was the limiting factor. Instead, the limiting factors were those aspects regarding planning air operations described above such as weather, moon phases and enemy action; two of the three SHAEF and its forces could do nothing about. As the factors limiting the Maquis it was “the lack of arms, stores, funds, and trained leaders.” Furthermore, the report advised SHAEF that, “SFHQ’s original estimate of future supply requirements will be entirely inadequate.” 56 The numbers of Maquis flocking to join Allied efforts against the Germans and Vichy overwhelmed SHAEF’s ability to supply them, but not due to lack of aircraft, instead meteorology and moon phases were the limiting factors.

But SHAEF’s growing faith in the use of the Résistance brought a greater

awareness of its ordeals, risks, and along with an obligation to supply more weapons. SHAEF directed the US Air Force to make up to 300 aircraft available for a single daylight operation codenamed ZEBRA. On 18 June, SFHQ received confirmation from SHAEF of the aircraft, logistical support from the British War Office, and it promulgated its own orders to have all the containers ready for a massive mission on the 24th. SFHQ representatives met with the US 8th Air Force planners to sort out the vast details of this complicated operation attempting to supply weapons to the Maquis of four separate SOE Circuits: MARKSMAN, DIRECTOR, SALESMAN, and TRAINER. SFHQ made arrangements to distribute the containers from five different depots to nine different 8th Air Force bases and also devised BBC messages for broadcast on the day before the aircraft departed. Weather forced a delay of a day, but on the 25th, the same day HUGH met with Dechelette and the Maquis leaders in L’Indre, one hundred and ninety seven B-17s entered French airspace and flew to four different drop zones. One hundred and seventy six aircraft dropped their containers on their assigned drop zones while two aircraft were lost due to enemy action. The aircraft that turned back did so due to the lack of a good confirming signal from the ground. The Maquis and SFHQ personnel on the ground were relieved to get the weapons. One American agent on the ground working in the R5 and R6 regions signaled, “MAQUIS THANKS TO U S AIR FORCE FOR DAMNED GOOD SHOW. WHEN IS THE NEXT?” However, that same agent painted a much bleaker picture upon his return. Lieutenant Jean Claude Guiet, of the US Army, preferred to

receive weapons from the British because American air drops became infamous for an apparent lack of concern about the rigging’s quality. When the Americans dropped weapons, “we had to run all over the country to find the containers” and during the daylight operations 359 of the 1296 containers suffered nearly a complete loss when their chutes failed to open. “The impression we got,” stated this American officer, “was that the Americans did not care where they dropped the stuff or how they dropped it.” But Operation ZEBRA was not done by the American “Carpetbaggers,” who had by this time gained proficiency in their work. Instead, it was a first ever drop for bomber crews, the aircrews had little time to learn the tradecraft of flying at low altitude and dropping equipment rigged with parachutes, instead of their usual load of bombs from high altitude. The fact that seventy-five percent of SALESMAN’s containers actually survived intact is fairly remarkable given the short planning time and the complexity of such an operation.

One of the other targets for the 8th Air Force and SFHQ’s efforts with ZEBRA was the Vercors and the growing numbers of Maquis now gathering on this rugged terrain east of the Rhone River about 100 kilometers south-south east of Lyon. At this drop zone, the 35 aircraft dropped 450 containers. SFHQ received the signal from the Vercors organizers that they were “able to arm another 1500 men.” The F Section agent here was Francis Cammaerts who used the pseudonym ROGER. A pacifist who joined SOE after his brother had been killed in action, he established the

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58 Ibid., Vol. 13, pp. 251, 1085-86.
59 Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 25.
JOCKEY circuit in March of 1943. He left France later that year but returned during a harrowing stormy night when the aircraft he was to parachute from caught fire 250 miles from his intended drop zone. He and the crew all parachuted from an altitude of 10,000 feet while watching their aircraft burn and descend through the darkness, fog, and rain. Despite the harrowing experience, he reestablished and matured his circuit, and the Résistance in the region had come to rely on him for his resourcefulness, courage, and imagination. On 6 June, the Allies designated him second in command to the regional leader and ORA Colonel Zeller, who used the pseudo FAISEAU or sometimes, Colonel JOSEPH. In the rapidly shifting leadership roles of the interior Résistance, Zeller had been appointed to take command of the FFI for both R1 and R2 by the CFLN in Algiers. They had lost their DMR, Laurent Burdet, code named CIRCONFERENCE, to arrest soon after D-Day and he remained imprisoned until around 25 June.

The loss of the DMR was only the beginning of the confusion. Having received the orders from London over the BBC for guerilla warfare, the Region’s FFI headquarters Chief of Staff, Colonel Descour interpreted it to mean all out guerrilla warfare. The F Section leader Cammaerts had to plead complete ignorance of a regional redoubt in the Vercors and the Guerilla actions of Plan Rouge as well as argue against the commonly held belief among the Maquis that the Allies were going to conduct a major Airborne operation on the Vercors plateau. As June wore on it brought the deployment of JEDBURGH teams VEGANIN, CHLOROFORM, and the

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subsequent inter-allied teams and an American Operational Group to the Vercors area. All this activity served to reinforce the mistaken but nevertheless hardening belief that the Allies were going to mount a major operation and that they should hold out.

The team members of VEGANIN came up to the Vercors separately and from that point on remained apart. British Major Neil Marten had gone up to meet Cammaerts and the other Maquis leaders prior to the ZEBRA parachuting of supplies. The day after ZEBRA, French Captain Gaston Vuchot, using the nom de guerre C. L. Noir climbed up to the growing and now fairly well armed Maquis camp. VEGANIN’s orders were to “harass to the maximum German communications” in the Rhone Valley with small groups of Maquis. The team had departed Algiers on the evening of 8 June with radio man Sergeant D. Gardner. But during the jump, Sergeant Gardner’s static line failed and he was killed. After burying him with honors, the team spent the next two weeks meeting and assessing the situation in the region near the town of Beaupaire, north of Vercors. Before they arrived, the BBC messages provoked the local Maquis to attack various German installations for which the Germans called for air support. The Luftwaffe responded with great effect and elements of other ground units hunted for the “Terrorists” in the villages. Failing to find any, they burned them and raped instead. The reprisals gripped the local residents in fear and they wished the Résistance would stop any more attacks. The

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62 All the Allied officers had to fight this rumor. Specifically for the Vercors see EUCALYPTUS Mission Report in OSS/London Microfilm, Roll 7, Vol. 3, Frame 1449.
FTP units, who had not participated in any of these attacks, then used local sentiments against their AS rivals, and VEGANIN, now just parachuting into this cauldron of revenge and hatred, had to rally the demoralized AS Maquis while Vuchot tried to organize the local Maquis units, including the FTP, but found the latter lacking in more than weapons, equipment, and know how. The FTP lacked any sense of appreciation for military authority, but more dangerously, had made their way in life prior to VEGANIN’s arrival largely thieving and bartering for food while showing no interest whatsoever in fighting. Vuchot commented that their reputation in the region was poor and their sense of honor completely absent. But having nothing else to work with, he tried to convince them of their new mission given by the Allied command. Additionally, he believed the two leaders of the various units had great courage and showed potential. Referring to one of his leaders at the end of VEGANIN’s mission, Vuchot wrote with a dark sense of irony, “Malboux was remarkable brave and audacious … [but] was without scruple . . . He died heroically at the very moment when I was planning to have him arrested.” The other local Maquis commander was called “Bozambo” and had a reputation in the region for running a good Maquis, one that could attract men to join it, but he was out for his own interests and Vuchot rarely got him to understand his part in the war. Vuchot, a French soldier imbued with a deep sense of honor forced himself to cajole, persuade,

64 Ibid., p. 12.

65 Ibid., p. 8.

66 Team VEGANIN & DODGE, HS 6/501. Counter to this is Manierre’s kind words regarding Bozambo in his statement after returning from the LuftStalag in May, 1945.
and plead with these two while he attempted to achieve his mission.

Notified of Gardner’s death, SPOC deployed a replacement JEDBURGH Team DODGE to reinforce VEGANIN with a W/T operator; they also sent American Captain Cyrus Manierre. A West Point graduate and boxing coach, Manierre had served as an instructor prior to becoming a JEDBURGH. Canadian L. Durocher served as VEGANIN’s new radio operator. DODGE parachuted in and met up with Vuchot on the 24th and accompanied him up into the Vercors. Vuchot had been told of the plans to make Vercors a Maquis stronghold and not only disagreed with this course of action, but wished to inform the Maquis leaders on the plateau that it was counter to Allied orders. Taking Manierre and Durocher with him, they hiked the 50 miles up into the region and were reunited with VEGANIN’s commander Major Neil Marten as well as Cammaerts. But up on the Vercors plateau, with a fresh supply of weapons for more than one thousand Maquis the attitude was different regarding the possibilities of Maquis action when compared to the Maquis Vuchot had to the north.

When they arrived to discuss things with Cammaerts, and the local FFI Commander for the region, Colonel François Huet who went by Colonel Hervieux, Vuchot could not persuade them to disperse. Unlike VEGANIN’s original orders, they were convinced their orders were valid, had a higher priority than VEGANIN’s and that they needed VEGANIN’s Maquis to join them on the plateau. Huet sought to create a redoubt capable of staging raids along the Rhône valley on large enemy units.

Cammaerts informed Vuchot that the Allied Command in Algiers had made Cammaerts the senior Allied officer and that all the JEDBURGH teams reported to
him. That was not so much an issue, but then he proceeded to confirm the plans about the redoubt orders, that it took a higher priority than team VEGANIN’s orders, and that he was to send the Maquis groups he had been in contact with up to him. Vuchot could not see the wisdom of any of this and looked to his British teammate for confirmation that Algiers had indeed altered VEGANIN’s orders.

But more was occurring than Vuchot could understand. Marten mysteriously said nothing to support his teammate and Cammaerts was firm and persuasive. In the end they compromised and Vuchot was allowed to keep two Maquis units, but lost the argument about the validity of congregating at the Vercors as well as his radio operator, Sergeant Durocher. “With rage in my heart, I descended to the valley.”

Now with no full time communications link to Algiers or London, Vuchot and Manierre attempted to manage their FTP Maquis groups toward persistent harassment of the enemy.

They focused on sabotage, which Manierre specialized in having been directed to focus his attention on the electrical plant at Beaumont-Monteux in the Isère department. By taking the plant out of action, they could deny the Germans the electrical power they would need in the region. Within the Maquis was a former electrical plant employee. Using his inside knowledge, they devised a plan and with about 25 men, approached the plant at night, killing the guards as silently as possible and then entered it. Manierre placed 30 kilos of explosives on the control panel and set the timer for 45 seconds and ran out of the area with his Maquis fleeing with him.

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68 Ibid. p. 7-8.
When the charges exploded, not only was the control room destroyed, so was the roof and there were numerous secondary explosions, large electrical hums and pops reflected and arced around the standing lines and the shock of it all shattered windows of the nearby homes. “We felt we had succeeded,” stated Manierre dryly. 69

Manierre spent the month of July conducting more sabotage and insisted on being part of the actions or leading them, even when Vuchot wanted him to remain behind. But Manierre insisted and often succeeded in his work, sabotaging troop trains, electrical facilities, and ambushing the enemy. He established relations with some of the local Armée Secrète Maquis and they proved to be very effective. But the banditry continued. Manierre and Vuchot’s greatest trouble was with a small group of FTP who called themselves the “equipe speciale” or “special team.” Their job was to procure supplies for the rest of the area’s Maquis. To them, this meant a license to steal, bribe, and vandalize. Having had enough, and with the persistent complaints of the local people, Manierre gathered a group who found them hiding out in a home. They refused to come out and a “brisk fire fight ensued, reminiscent of prohibition days in Chicago.” The rifle fire and grenades killed them all, including the 2 women inside the house. 70

With the Maquis swelling in the region to “six to seven thousand men” Vuchot and Manierre, now rejoined by Durocher, requested more JEDBURGHs to help them arm and train them. Manierre continued with his sabotage work and went

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70 Ibid., p. 6.
everywhere in civilian clothes. EMFFI organized another major daylight drop of weapons to the Vercors as well as several other drop zones. Operation CADILLAC, similar in scope to ZEBRA, occurred on 14 July, further infuriating the Germans. VEGANIN however, was conducting their own operations and fortunately for them, were not on the plateau during the long battle that occurred from 21 July until 6 August. However, the day before the Wehrmacht succeeded at sweeping the Maquis off the Vercors plateau, Captain Manierre’s luck ran out. Stopped at a road block in what he believed to be a different Maquis group, he got out of his truck only to be handcuffed. While Manierre still believed it was all a mistake, the group found his US Army dog tags and their leader came up to him and chillingly said, “You Yankees must understand that there is one boss in France and that is Marshal Pétain.” Captain Manierre now realized that he “was in the hands of the Milice.”

It was 5 August, ten days before the Allies would begin their second invasion of France with Operation DRAGOON.

Teams IAN and ANDY

As F Section agent Rene Maingard left Team HUGH in L'Indre, he arrived in Vienne and asked for a JEDBURGH team for that area. On 14 June SFHQ drew up the team’s orders to deploy to Vienne and work with Maingard. Together they were to make sure that “the general uprising must not take place” as well as make it clear there would be no supplies for such efforts. Instead, IAN was to shut down the

Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours and Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur railway lines in SHAEF’s effort to block enemy reinforcements. The orders also stated that IAN should radio back to SFHQ about the possibility of controlling a large enough area to support daylight drops. With planning underway for ZEBRA, they wanted to get an assessment of doing something similar for IAN when it could be arranged. On 18 June 1944, the Carpetbaggers attempted to take Team IAN to France; however the aircrew could not find the drop zone and refused to parachute IAN blind. They attempted it again taking off at 10:39 p.m. on 20 June. This time the crew experienced good weather all the way to the drop zone and clearly saw the bon fires and code letters from the ground and dropped the team and their equipment in two passes. But for one of the JEDBURGHs, the drop went poorly. W/T operator American First Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin’s parachute opened late and at an altitude of 400 to 500 feet, every moment was critical. Fortunately, Bourgoin landed safely; however he found his radios severely damaged. Team leader American Major John Gildee and second-in-command French Captain Alex Desfarges, using the nom-de-guerre Yves Delormes, arrived in fine shape. Maingard’s reception team met IAN, collected its equipment, and drove the team to a farm serving as Maingard’s headquarters. The team got off to a very slow start organizing the local *Maquis* as their damaged radios hindered the effort. Bourgoin did partially fix one of the W/T

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sets, but for nearly ten days the only communication was via Maingard’s radio.

SFHQ dropped ninety containers of arms prior to IAN’s arrival, and Samuel related information to SFHQ concerning the area’s Maquis. SFHQ briefed IAN prior to departure of three groups numbering “150 highly disciplined men,” another 1500 man group in the former unoccupied zone, and a third 2000 man group in the former occupied zone. IAN was to train and organize these men into an effective force while also keeping the Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours and the Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur railroads cut. IAN deployed with a modified JEDBURGH kit with fewer Brens and carbines and took more special rail charges to enable more sabotage, and enable guerrilla activity. Samuel hoped to send them toward Chatellerault in northern Vienne giving them an area adjacent to HUGH, but unfortunately, heavy German activity caused Samuel to change his mind, and instead he sent them to southern Vienne and northern Charente.

On 22 June, SFHQ sent a message to IAN warning them, “German Infantry Division moving north Toulouse - Normandy. Keep us posted movement. Attack wherever possible.” Unfortunately, IAN’s damaged radios failed to receive the message and IAN spent the next week attempting to get a strong reception from their W/T. Nevertheless, IAN organized the sabotage of the Bordeaux - Paris railroad and kept it cut until 26 June. The JEDBURGHs also arranged to sabotage charcoal factories vital for German vehicles and attacked locomotive supply pumps along the railroad to Paris. When the Germans quickly repaired the railway damage, IAN asked

SFHQ to bomb it. 76

While pursuing minor operations, IAN conducted regional
reconnaissance and attempted to arm and train the swelling Maquis ranks. As they
traveled from village to village they found groups and leaders willing to rally and
recognize IAN’s role as a command link to SHAEF and de Gaulle. Working an
approximately one hundred square mile area south of Poitiers, IAN placed a nucleus
of Maquis in villages encircling the area. Using seven villages on cross roads, IAN
created what they hoped would be a safe perimeter where they could train more
Maquis and run drop zones. Another group of Maquis specialized in demolition and
sabotage, called “Sape,” they ran their own drop zone, keeping themselves supplied.
Major Gildee, possessed great organizational skills and set training schedules,
controlled supplies, and managed the drop zones. French Captain Desfarges made a
point to show the French people his presence and “spoke to the assembled
populations to encourage them and request their aid for future actions.” 77

As Maquis units received arms and trained and the sabotage unit became
ready, they struck out to attack. From 20 July on, they turned their perimeter into a
“fortified bastion” with tree barricades, masonry, and mined bridges. IAN also put
officers and NCOs from the French regular and reserve army into their four
battalions, which swelled to six thousand men, freeing IAN to oversee the entire
effort. The team soon became a “regimental commander,” directing operations while

76 Ibid., p. 308.

77 Ibid., p. 308-310 and Gauthier Interview, 6 March 1999.
leaving supply, discipline, and administration up to the separate Maquis “battalions.” IAN arranged communications with telephone lines, motorcycle couriers, and carrier pigeons. Short of money required to carry on operations, IAN arranged a no-interest twelve million Franc loan through the Free French from the Bank of Algiers. Also, some of the local French gendarmeries worked with the Maquis to set up police in their communities. Moreover, IAN recruited four doctors, set up two hospitals, and arranged for SFHQ to send medical supplies. All these events increasingly eliminated Vichy authority as well as Germany’s.  

On 20 July, an estimated eight hundred Germans broke through the defenses and lodged themselves in Champagne-Mouton, a village the Maquis had retaken. The enemy set up barbed-wire, ditches, and fortified their positions. Taking numerous hostages, the Germans threatened to shoot hostages and burn the town if attacked. From Champagne-Mouton, they sent out patrols for five days and attempted to reconnoiter Maquis positions. Enemy columns probed the perimeter at other locations, but when met with strong organized Résistance, the Germans disengaged. However, the Germans managed to cut IAN’s telephone network, causing other sectors to lose communications and slowing reinforcements, making a Maquis counterattack impossible. On 26 July, Germany launched a 400 soldier attack near Ambernenac, but as local Maquis were not yet fully armed they withdrew several

78 OSS/London Microfilm, Roll 8, Vol 4, Book II, p. 302, 311-312. Indeed it is clear that Vichy had little authority at all even before IAN arrived. For a discussion on the Vichy’s authority in France after the Allied invasion of North Africa see Sweets, Choices in Vichy France, or Kedward, In Search of the Maquis which has several detailed discussions on localities in southern France and how the Maquis groups worked to assert local authority from Vichy.
kilometers leaving the village to the enemy. The Germans pillaged the town and shot civilians, but soon IAN arrived with reinforcements and forced the enemy back to Confolens. Over the next few days, more forceful attacks continued and IAN considered a withdrawal to Dordogne as their entire position “was at stake.” Nevertheless, the enthused and spirited young Maquis fought extremely hard and despite little training and having only small arms, managed to use the blown bridges over the Vienne, woods, and other natural defenses to bog down the enemy offensive.

On 1 August, IAN reported “FOUR DAYS FIGHTING NEAR CHAMPAGNE ROUTED GERMANS,” and they claimed the action cost “30 GERMANS KILLED AND 3 PRISONERS. 2 MAQUIS KILLED AND 10 WOUNDED.” News of a larger battle followed the next day and IAN requested more weapons, ammunition, and “SHOES AND SOCKS.” The Germans finally retreated toward the south, but the attack killed an estimated 100 Maquis and an estimated 200 Germans. However, the determined Wehrmacht tried again on 2 August to penetrate the French perimeter. Team IAN hoped to spring a trap near the village of Champagne-Mouton but instead, IAN drove into an ambush.

Captain Desfarges drove the team along with Louis Mondinaud, and information agent André Very of the Maquis group Bir Hacheim. In their four-door Citroen they carried around 1,800,000 Francs, their radios, and the BBC code phrases for their upcoming parachute drops. As they arrived in the village on this warm day,

79 Ibid., pp. 313-315
80 Ibid., 315-316.
they heard a woman yell, “Malheureux, les Boches!” It was “too late!” as Desfarges later wrote, for as they rounded a curve and tried to stop, a German column opened fire with automatic weapons and small arms. Desfarges, wounded in the cheek, put the car in a maneuver protecting the passengers and everyone attempted to return fire. But the car was now immobilized and Mondinaud severely wounded. Everyone left the vehicle darting into available cover behind a house and in alleys. Desfarges, Gildee, and Very made an escape through a barn adjacent to the street. Captain Desfarges found a window at the other end of the barn and went through. Major Gildee, a bigger man, needed to be pulled from one side and pushed from the other to squeeze through. Sergeant Bourgoin realized the codes, money, radio, and radio crystals remained in the Citroen and returned to get them. But the Germans cut him down before he escaped a second time. The three survivors made it to a farm outside the village and found twenty Maquis, then made their way back to the truck to retrieve their equipment and find out where their comrades were. “10 meters from the car we were again spotted by the Germans” and they retreated into a wooded area, covering themselves with dirt and debris. Fortunately the Germans had no dogs and they came out of hiding after the Wehrmacht left twenty-three hours later.

Bourgouin’s body remained near the trees he attempted to enter for cover, while the Germans looked for the others. Unable to run, Mondinaud could not get

81 Gauthier interview and “Combat de PLEUVILLE, 2 Aout 1944” found in HS 5/527, BNA, Kew, UK. Mamie Gauthier related to me the description as French Jedburgh Desfarges described it to her in 1994 during her visit to the village where her brother was killed. Her description is largely similar to the report in the SOE records of the event Desfarges wrote in 1944.
away fast enough and a German soldier struck him in the head delivering a fatal blow. After the German troops left to look for the others, a Pleuville woman walked over to Bourgoin’s body and covered his face with a handkerchief and other local men came and moved the bodies into the church. The two were buried the next day in the church cemetery. Gildee and Desfarges, failing to retrieve their radio and other equipment, attempted to pull their operation back together, but were bereft of their comrade and vital communication with London. Years later, Desfarges remarked, “I never saw Gildee show any emotion, but when the Sergeant was killed I thought he’d never stop crying.” Unable to radio London for six days, the team finally found their wireless set at a farm of a former French Mercantile Marine radio officer and sent, “Our automobile attacked by column of 400 Germans at Poëvill [sic]. Bourgoin and chauffeur killed.” The message also explained the loss of all their gear, requested an air drop to replace the missing equipment, money, and gasoline and an additional arms for one thousand men.

Southwestern France

One of SHAEF’s major interests was in the 2nd SS Panzer “Das Reich” Division. The unit was in southern France reconstituting, training replacement soldiers, and resting after years of murderously difficult combat against the Red Army in the east. On 6 June, this armored division of roughly 19,000 soldiers was located in Montauban, France 50 kilometers north of Toulouse and approximately

82 Gauthier, telephone conversation; and OSS/London Microfilm, Roll 8, Book II, 302, 316-317. The Pleuville church stone floor still retains Bourgoin’s and Mondinaud’s blood stains.
800 kilometers from Normandy. Another of the armored units in southern France was the 11th Panzer Division located near Bordeaux. But both of these units were under their normal strength. In fact, the influx of new soldiers and the shortages of replacements in soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers make it questionable how much of a quality unit they were, given the lack of experience of a majority of their soldiers. The 11th Panzer Division had no more than 50 percent of its soldiers and approximately 45 percent of its officers and NCOs when it arrived in Bordeaux in April of 1944. The 2nd SS Panzer “Das Reich” Division suffered from similar issues and had to integrate a high number of Alsatian soldiers into their ranks. These two armored Divisions, while feared by SHAEF planners, and certainly capable of action, were not the units they had been. Nevertheless, the 2nd SS Panzer Division’s Commander, Heinz Lammerding, received orders to move to Normandy on 8 June and directed his command to smash the “gangs” and assert the authority of Germany and the Vichy government.

In an effort to delay and impede their movements, SPOC deployed JEDBURGH teams QUININE on 8 June, AMMONIA on 10 June and BUGATTI on 20 June. Team QUININE, comprised of British Major Sir Tommy MacPherson, Frenchman (but in the U. S. Army) Michel de Bourbon de Parme who used the nom de guerre Michel Bourdon, and British radio operator Oliver Brown, arrived to great

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84 Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44, Quellen Und Darstellungen Zur Zeitgeschichte; Bd. 69 (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), pp. 360 and 364.
celebration at their drop zone. Since MacPherson parachuted into combat wearing his highlander kilt, one résistant called out to his comrades that there is a French officer here, and he’s brought his wife!” But MacPherson, who had been in the war for 3 years now and had experience behind the lines and as a POW, found that few in this Maquis were really eager to fight against the Germans. Determined to do something, QUININE set about sabotaging whatever they believed would do some damage to the Germans while demonstrating to the locals that the Allies were present and were fighting. SPOC directed MacPherson to contact DROITE, the DMR for the region whose real name was Bernard Schlumberger. However, no one MacPherson spoke to had ever heard of him.

Instead the teams worked with F Section agents such as George Starr and Philippe Liewers, a.k.a. Geoffrey Staunton, who were running circuits in the region, had built up groups of Maquis and operatives they could trust, and had organized to execute Plan Vert, Tortue and the others when given the signal on 5 June. Since the JEDBURGHs were not inserted until D-Day and after, and since it took time to establish a team’s operations due to smashed radios, injured or dead JEDBURGHs, independent Maquis leaders and groups, and being pursued by Milice, Gendarmes, Wehrmacht, and Gestapo, it all became too much to overcome in such a short time. But then, since the JEDBURGHs were always designed as an operational reserve, asking them to literally jump into the situation, ignorant of that locality’s ability to

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85 Bourbon-Parme Interview, 22 September 2007.

86 Hastings, *Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd Ss Panzer Division through France, June 1944*, p. 138; HS 8/1001 Biographies, and HS 9/1325/4, BNA, Kew, UK.
conduct operations, makes AMMONIA’s primary mission of the immediate “destruction of communication and harassing troop movements between Brive and Montauban” seem unrealistic. For instance, on 13 June, Sergeant Jack Berlin of AMMONIA radioed to SPOC that, “2 SS IS BETWEEN PERIGEUX – BRIVE. RESISTANCE GROUPS ATTACKING. NEED SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION URGENTLY.”

Ambushing and delaying the 2nd SS “Das Reich” Division was accomplished, and AMMONIA and QUININE participated in the effort, but more than likely it would have happened whether they had been there or not. The multiplicity of commands, both Allied and French, both exterior and interior stymied unity of action until JEDBURGH teams, DMRs, and FFI commanders on the scene could agree on who would be issuing orders and who would be taking them. But in the mean time the individual teams, often acting under the aegis of one of the BCRA Plans, were what provoked the first few days of Maquis operations.

As AMMONIA’s commander American Captain Benton Austin had Berlin radio back to SPOC, “LOCAL ORGANIZATION GOOD BUT REGIONAL BAD. TOO MANY CHIEFS.” Too many chiefs were indeed an issue and the regional DMR structure was for this part of France in complete disarray. Schlumbarger had been appointed as DMR for R3 and R4 and was sending messages to EMFFI from the Lot wishing to get help from Koenig to publicly assert his authority in the region. In other messages he described attacks on Germans during the first week of June and his hope of liberating the area before the Allies arrived. However his area was large and

87 “REPORT of AMMONIA,” Box 2, Entry 99, RG 226, NARA II, College Park, MD.
he had to play catch up with others who had been there longer. In many cases the F Section agent, such as George Starr who had been there for over a year, or even Pearl Witherington, to the north, who had to recreate a circuit upon the remains of her arrested boss’ foundation, had a far easier time than EMFFI’s own man who had just parachuted in days before the invasion with little regional knowledge.  

All three JEDBURGH teams foundered to some degree attempting to harass these major German armored divisions, but arrived too late to measurably impact or improve upon what the Maquis would have done without them. While the 2nd SS “Das Reich” Division did take longer to arrive in Normandy than it would have had the Résistance not interfered, it is difficult, if not impossible to credit JEDBURGH operations for slowing it down. Instead, as Max Hastings and Peter Lieb have shown, the decision by the Germans themselves to deal with the Maquis along the way was essential and to some degree self-imposed. That decision was provoked due to Maquis, or as the Germans called them, “terrorists” actions prior to D-Day. The provocations that continued to occur after D-Day only heightened the SS Division’s NAZI ideological sensitivities regarding Maquis’ communists and the FTP’s sloganeering. Such activities drew in the SS who did not like such taunting. The ideologically minded Germans could not allow them to continue.  

Therefore, having not yet received orders to proceed to Normandy,  

88 Fonds du Colonel Zeigler, 1 K 374, de R4 Telegrams, Vincennes, France, Telegrams 2 et 4 Juni 44.  
89 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44, pp. 357 – 386.
Lammerding dispatched one of his Battalions to strike “immediately and brutally” against the terrorist bands.” They sought to make the local population too afraid to support the *Maquis*. In the village of Oradour-sur-Glane on the 10th about 22 kilometers from Limoges, the SS arrived searching for the *Maquis* who had killed one of their comrades. Finding none, they shot all the men in the village and with the women and children in the village church, burned the structure to the ground. To make sure they met their death, they threw grenades into the burning church and fired at whomever escaped the inferno. Within four hours, 642 villagers were massacred.\(^9^0\)

*de Facto Recognition*

In Washington, Donovan had shifted again from his previous position in his 15 June memo where he recommended that de Gaulle be treated as a senior military official only. On 4 July, with de Gaulle’s visit finally scheduled later in the week, Donovan sent Harvard French Literature Professor, now serving in Algiers, Ramon Guthrie’s assessment on France and the looming problems regarding recognition and the costs of continuing on the current policy. Guthrie argued that the situation called for a clear statement from FDR on what the United States sought to achieve because the press reports, speculation, and rumors were persisting and doing real damage to Franco-US relations. Also, Guthrie noted that most of the French in Algiers, “fail to see the validity of the American contention that the Committee does not represent French opinion.” He pointed out that the committee may be the fairest embodiment

\(^9^0\) Bruno Leroux, “10 juin 1944: le massacre d’Oradour-sur-Glane” *Dictionnaire Historique de la Resistance*, p. 634.
of French public opinion and sentiments in its history. Furthermore, the FFI’s impact and American operations such as ZEBRA were having an effect beyond French drop zones. When Colonel Haskell’s report of the event got to Donovan, the OSS Director showed it off to the Joint Chiefs and sent a copy to the President. It included all the detailed planning information, the locations of the drops, weapons provided to the French, and even dramatic photos that may have been taken by Haskell himself. But Donovan, Marshall, and Roosevelt received a first hand account as well due to the fact that Colonel Haskell came to Washington, evidently to bring his report personally. On Thursday 6 July General Donovan and Haskell appear on the President’s appointment calendar, apparently as last minute additions to the President’s schedule. It is not recorded what they discussed, but with only 15 minutes allotted to them, it could not have been a detailed conversation. It was a fairly busy day for FDR with de Gaulle arriving for the first time later that afternoon. OSS Bern had also recently sent some of the first reports of the 2nd SS “Das Reich” Division’s atrocities and Donovan also sent those on to FDR. However, none of it brought FDR any further toward recognizing the CFLN or de Gaulle. The meeting would be about less concrete issues.

92 Robert Lester et al., President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1990), microfilm reels Part 4, Reel 27, Frames 1-36.
93 7/6/1944, FDR: Day by Day – The Pare Lorentz Chronology, Grace Tully’s Appointment Book, FDR Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY.
But while FDR treated it as something less than a state visit, de Gaulle, with a great deal of public support and sympathy, maintained a schedule that had all the trappings of a visiting head of state. He paid a visit to General John J. Pershing in his Walter Reid hospital room and their discussion of Germany’s future made the papers. He paid his respects to George Washington at Mount Vernon and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery. He arrived at the White House at 4:30, three and a half hours after Donovan and Haskell met with FDR. Photos were taken and the next day he arrived for a formal luncheon after a one-hour discussion and working session with the President.\(^4\)

Their discussions that day and during the following day were not focused on civil administration in France and other matters of immediate concern as Stimson had hoped, but rather on the fruits of victory and the international system Roosevelt hoped to achieve. “It was by light touches that he sketched in his notions, and so skilfully that it was difficult to contradict this artist, this seducer, in any categorical way.”\(^5\)

Indeed de Gaulle wrote how the still unwinding Allied victory, which he fully realized had been brought about by the United States and Great Britain, fueled FDR’s and America’s dangerous optimism. The continuing and assured successes created a rising optimism on the belief in America that the nation must be involved in the world, instead of isolated as it had remained in the past. De Gaulle believed it meant


that, the United States would now pass “from one extreme to the other, it was a permanent system of intervention that [FDR] intended to institute by international law.”

After a trip to New York, and a stop in Canada, de Gaulle headed back to Algiers where it was apparent to all that the CFLN was indeed the legitimate authority in France in territories controlled by Allied Armies. For at the local and regional levels, the provisional government’s organization was planned and in most instances the personnel named. Since the summer of 1943, the CFLN had worked on a structure to seize power from Vichy at the moment of liberation. Each department in France would be governed by a committee comprised of local resistance leaders and notables overseen at the regional level by a kind of super-prefect. Most of the appointed leaders of the *Committees Departmental de la Libération* (CDL) and the *commissaries de la République* were from the Résistance. Of course this had all happened while FDR and the State Department insisted on participating in how and who within the Résistance would participate in the process and when they could not do that, they hindered it at every opportunity. The resisters all agreed that this was an issue for the French - alone. As combat operations continued through June and July, and the first localities saw the implementation of the CDLs and the emergence of the Regional Commissaires, US and British Civil Affairs soldiers realized their work was going to be far lighter than originally planned. The Résistance however continued to be perplexed by America’s policy toward it. The underground newspaper *Libération*

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96 Ibid., p. 573.
had an short article on the bottom of the last page in its edition immediately after de Gaulle’s visit. The article scoffed at FDR’s announcement of the CFLN as the “de Facto authority” in liberated France. Such terms were confusing given the circumstances the article’s author believed. Searching for the reason why, the writer attributed FDR’s persistent confusion on the matter to Camille Chautemps and Alexis Leger, discussed above, for influencing him far too much. But more importantly, it stated in muted glee, “Adieu, therefore to the shadow of this AMGOT which did not have time to approach our shores.”98 The Résistance had long worked for its Revolution and recently coalesced on how to achieve it. At that moment in France it sought, via the Maquis to fight for it, and through the CDLs to begin the political path toward their France. The Allies, no matter how much they had done and were doing, were not to be a part of such an intimate matter.

Conclusion

The halting military progress the JEDBURGHs made toward Eisenhower’s aim of harassing the movement of German reinforcements to Normandy was a manifestation of more than battlefield confusion and difficulty. Enemy action, Gestapo arrests, lack of resources and airlift, and the physical limitations such as the weather and the moon’s phases all played a role. But the political ambiguity had its impact too. FDR’s delay and “de Facto recognition” at the Allied level reflected

down at the military level in the still consolidating and not yet fully formed EMFFI, and at the local level with the JEDBURGHs striving for local unity of action among markedly different Maquis groups. Where there were competing local objectives or groups, Eugene Dechelette’s successes in R5 began to mollify them. Teams HUGH, HAMISH, and IAN were unfortunately parachuted into this chasm of political ambiguity, but would assist in sewing the gaps together. What they found was greater enthusiasm embodied in more Maquisards than they could train and equip, but now that they had arrived and face to face with those wishing to fight, the teams immediately sought to do so, even when their orders were to discourage such widespread guerrilla operations. Ambiguity afflicted clarity of action and purpose at each plane of political expression and each node from the strategic to the tactical.

While the American, British and French allied staff officers continued to plan and while their comrades in operational units worked to execute missions along these seams of sovereignty, their clarity of action was brought into stark focus by the presence and effects of the Wehrmacht, Gestapo, and Milice.

The unexpected and overwhelming numbers in the Maquis proved the SOE planner correct when he remarked that the Résistance was a unpredictable and nebulous force, but he believed it would be low, not the high and swelling numbers that materialized after 6 June. Not wishing to have this occur and getting constant reports of reprisals, Eisenhower and EMFFI were forced to spend a great deal of their message traffic dampening enthusiasm, directing JEDBURGHs and others in France to refrain from anything other than sabotage and small scale hit and run activities.
Therefore, the liaison the JEDBURGHs thought they would be doing, specifically exhorting the people to join the Allied cause became instead trying to control the growing numbers, keep a check on their passions, while not dampening their morale so much they would not contribute when needed.

As July ended, Allied forces had painfully and slowly established themselves in Normandy, and now American General Omar Bradley was planning his next move. Becoming the Commander of the 12th Army Group on 1 August he had to take the ports on the Brittany peninsula that were required to sustain the Allied armies. He also had the task of preparing to move east toward Germany. On the western wing of the Allied line, he sought to punch a hole through the portions of the German 2nd SS Division, 352nd Infantry Division, and the 3rd Parachute Division directly on his front. This “Breakout” began around 25 July. It would be reinforced by General George S. Patton’s newly constituted 3rd U. S. Army that shifted from its deception mission, fooling Hitler into fearing an attack on the northeastern coast of France at the Pas de Calais, into one of very real combat. Embedded in 3rd Army was a Special Forces Detachment led by Lt Col Robert I. “RIP” Powell. His unit’s role was to coordinate Patton’s actions with the Résistance directly behind the enemy it faced. But Koenig’s, Powell’s, and all those within the EMFFI sphere’s highest priority was the liberation of Brittany and the advancement of Patton’s forces to the Atlantic ports. That mission had been developing since D-Day and is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Six
The Battle for Brittany and the resolution of the FFI within SHAEF

The same night that HUGH left for L’Indre and HARRY deployed to Morvan, two JEDBURGH teams were to depart for Brittany. Eisenhower made Brittany a high priority and SFHQ and General Koenig focused a great deal of their attention on the peninsula over the months of June, July, and into August when it was finally liberated. Winning Brittany back from the Wehrmacht would protect the Allies’ western flank and provide them the vital ports they needed in order to sustain their forces in France. Furthermore, taking those ports away from Germany meant denying the Kriegsmarine direct access to the Atlantic further hobbling its ability to sink Allied shipping. For the same reason, Brittany was vital to Germany and Hitler had directed that the ports be made into fortresses, or Festungs, so that they could hold out indefinitely. Therefore the pulling of the Wehrmacht forces toward the two ends of Brittany to repel the invasion coming from the east and to hold the ports in the west, often clogged the roads with moving troops. The relative closeness of Allied airfields in Britain compared to central or eastern France, allowed air power to have a greater operational influence with both daylight close air support and the night time re-supply air drops. Also due to its proximity, SHAEF never had to be concerned with handing off portions of Brittany to AFHQ and therefore SFHQ never contended with SPOC for directing the Résistance there. But SFHQ was blinded by the Gestapo’s ability to continually break up the SOE’s and BCRA’s networks so that
there was no operational contact in Brittany on D-Day. However, the SFHQ and BCRA planners did benefit, in a way, from the fact that there was, with rare exception, one resistance organization in Brittany and it was the FTP. While *Libération-Nord* and the others had a presence and some leadership, they had very few armed *Maquis* groups. Therefore the JEDBURGHs in Brittany rarely had to contend with politics and polemics as they attempted to organize the *Maquis* into tactical operations. Lastly, the distinct culture and history of Brittany played a role as many of the villagers and farmers did not speak French, but instead used their Breton language and so the French JEDBURGHs who came from the region proved critical, as did educated Breton school teachers and professionals who spoke French well. All these issues determined the nature of the war in Brittany and shaped it in different ways from the other parts of France.

The *Wehrmacht*’s presence in Brittany was largely in the form of the *XXV Armee Korps* commanded by Lieutenant General Wilhelm Fahrmbacher in Pontivy. His command reported to the 7th *Armee OberKommando* commanded by General Oberst Friedrich Dollmann in Le Mans.\(^1\) When the Allied invasion occurred in Normandy, General Dollman’s forces shared the weight of the attack along with the 15th *Armee OberKommando* in Lille as the dividing line for the two forces fell nearly in the middle of the Normandy invasion beaches. Both these commanders reported to *Armee Gruppe B* commanded by General Feld Marshal Erwin Rommel who reported to General Feld Marshal Gerhardt von Rundstedt commander of *OB West* in Paris.

\(^1\) RH 24-25-75 and Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, *The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5*, p. 517.
Forced to pull combat forces from Brittany at the onset of the Allied invasion, Dollman left Fahrmbacher largely responsible for the defense of the peninsula along with the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD at Rennes commanded by Obersturmbannführer Hartmut Pulmer. Both Fahrmbacher and Pulmer had been involved in Germany’s eastern campaigns with Pulmer conducting Einsatzkommando actions in Poland. These two had their views of how to deal with irregular forces and they believed the law and justice required the harshest of measures. But so did OKW and on 4 March it declared partisans involved in sabotage or irregular warfare were not to be taken prisoner. The implication of what to do with them was clear.

Fahrmbacher’s combat forces remaining for Brittany were largely comprised of the 266th, 343rd, 265th Infantrie Divisions with the 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division in reserve. The 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division was reconstituting and not yet at full strength and its commander, Lieutenant General Ramcke, had not yet arrived. Accordingly, it was placed at Landerviseau at the peninsula’s extreme western edge. The readiness and combat capability of all these units was similar to others in France in that they lacked men and equipment that would, under different circumstances make their consideration for combat use questionable. The 265th Division for example reported only 221 Officers, 1651 NCOs and 7513 soldiers along with their

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2 Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg Oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung Und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44*. p. 525. The infamous Geheim Staatspolizei, often referred to as the Gestapo, had by this time subsumed this into their organization and so the JEDBURGHs often refer to the region’s KdS agents and soldiers as the Gestapo.

3 Ibid. pp. 65 and 536.

4 “OKW Nr. 002143/44 g.K./WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1) Bekämpfung von Terroristen-Gerichtsbarkeit” 4.3.44, RW 35-551, BA-MA.

5 “Kriegsgliederungen 44. Juni” 24/25-256, BA-MA.
allotment of foreign soldiers of 341 for a total of 9726 and its commander rated his Division suitable for defense only. Not only was Berlin unable to supply the necessary strength in men to their divisions, but pre-invasion combat had also taken a toll. During the month of May the 265th Division suffered 8 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 missing due to “energetic action against the terrorists.” The 343rd Division commander did not make any comments limiting his capabilities as he was not in as weakened state, but did note 8 killed, 4 wounded, and 3 missing due to enemy action while being short a total of 110 soldiers at the end of May. But in addition to these somewhat weakened Wehrmacht divisions, Fahrmbacher could call on Pulmer’s Gestapo and the Feldgendarmerie units scattered around Brittany at St Malo, Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire.

SFHQ’s plan for Brittany had been thought out before D-Day and it consisted of dividing the peninsula into a northern and southern half. Each zone would have a detachment of the 4th French Parachute Brigade which was now a part of the Special Air Service (SAS). Commanded by French Lieutenant Colonel Bourgoin, this unit was to parachute into Brittany and establish operating bases for the Maquis to create a focal point for the region’s Résistance. Bourgoin was about 45 years old and a veteran who had lost an arm in combat. With only one arm, special arrangements had to be made with four of his soldiers jumping with him in order to break his fall. One JEDBURGH team was to accompany each detachment and serve as a liaison with the

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area’s *Maquis*, however they would report to Bourgoin in the field while having their own radio and command link back to SFHQ for airlift allocations and orders. Since the SAS reported to SHAEF and later General Koenig when working with the *Résistance*, the problems inherent in a bifurcated arrangement like this may not have seemed all too difficult for the SFHQ planners, but the teams tasked with this mission struggled with the problem straight away. Team GEORGE, consisting of American Captain Paul Cyr, French Captain Philippe Rageneau using the name Philippe Erard, and French radioman Pierre Gay who used the nom de guerre Christien Lejeune were directed to accompany the SAS and the DMRs for Regions M3 and M4 Alain Willk (FONCTION) and Maurice Barthélemy (HAUTEUR) and establish base DINGSON. In their orders they were told of the other JEDBURGH team, that they could call for an additional three more teams, and where the boundaries were between their southern zone and Brittany’s northern zone. The orders make it clear that this was an F Section operation and that BRAL was not to be notified.⁸

Captain Cyr could not understand who SAS reported to, for it appeared to him they were their own private army. Fortunately, Ragueneau had worked with the SAS commander previously and their initial troubles were cleared up enabling them to come to a working arrangement. On 8 June, Cyr’s 22nd birthday, the team boarded the aircraft around 11:30 pm with sixteen others and when over the drop zone jumped differently than their Milton Hall training. Cyr complained upon returning to

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England, “We all stood up and ran down towards the tail of the plane, jumping out in a very unorthodox manner.” Fifteen to twenty French met them and immediately “pounced” with joy at their arrival. They pulled them up, gathered the gear and made such a noise, Cyr thought they would certainly attract too much attention. Confirming his fear the Maquis told him the Germans were only two kilometers away. The Maquis brought Team GEORGE and the SAS soldiers to a farm, which then became the SAS base DINGSON.9

The welcome given to GEORGE and the SAS party was a grand one. Cyr, Ragueneau, and Gay wrote when they returned England, “Women, children and men were laughing and crying with joy. At 3:00 in the morning girls came running out kissing us and giving us flowers and wine. The men between the ages of 12 to 75 were ready that night to march on the German garrison. . . .” In the morning, all went out to assemble and organize their gear. The JEDBURGHs discovered their W/T sets were not among the rest of the equipment. Later that afternoon, a farmer arrived with them in his cart. According to the farmer, the equipment parachuted into his field about 9 a.m. approximately 2 to 3 kilometers from the drop zone. But to make matters worse, the Germans immediately jammed the frequency, forcing Sergeant Gay to broadcast on their secondary frequency. Soon the Germans jammed the secondary frequency, forcing GEORGE to broadcast sparingly on their emergency channel and ask SFHQ for a new primary channel. Estimating the need to arm 4000 men, GEORGE asked for arms, and related which reception ground should be used.

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9 Team GEORGE Report in Mendelsohn, p. 157-158.
They also asked for one million francs adding, “PLEASE WE BEG YOU SEND EQUIPMENT IMMEDIATELY.”

Rather than building and maturing an SOE circuit as HUGH did, GEORGE worked with the SAS to destroy bridges, cut rail roads, and arm the French. Camp DINGSON became a base of operations for SAS nightly patrols out to a target and a rallying point for Maquisards. For the first few days, while the communications to SFHQ was intermittent, five to ten planes came each night dropping arms, fuel, and supplies. The SAS and GEORGE began organizing and arming the Maquis, re-established contacts between the Résistance groups, and tried to keep London informed. Initially, a great deal of confusion clouded the situation concerning who was who in the Maquis. Thick with recriminations, some pointed to others as spies and double agents forcing GEORGE to question almost every piece of information until verified by others they trusted or until they grew to respect the man or woman through their own experiences.\footnote{Ibid., p. 161-162.}

Communications became worse as GEORGE continued pressing SFHQ for a new frequency and new W/T sets. SFHQ never granted their request because they grew dubious about GEORGE’s security and suspected the Gestapo sent the messages. Using poor security practices, GEORGE repeatedly failed to authenticate its messages properly, causing SFHQ to grow more and more suspicious. Headquarters’ fears were unknown to the JEDBURGH team and they continued their

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 43 and 158-160.}
mission but lamented in their final report, “Our radio communications were very, very poor and we sweat blood on them.”

As more and more arms and men came into the camp, DINGSON attracted considerable attention from the Wehrmacht and it was only a matter of time before Fahrmacher’s XXV Korps attacked. Maquis, poorly controlled and amateurishly led, made several attacks on German garrisons and depots provoking the Germans to do something about it. Moreover, Frenchmen came from as far as one hundred kilometers to receive weapons, then returned to their homes and farms spreading the word to others. With 5000 men armed and another 5000 men soon to be armed, GEORGE discussed their role with the SAS Commander Bourgoin who decided to detail them to the Loire Inferieure area, southeast of their present position. GEORGE considered the Maquis there to be “the worst department in Brittany” and also concluded along with the SAS commander that the region was too vital to ignore. GEORGE made preparations to leave and selected local men to guide them.

Unfortunately, GEORGE stayed too long. Awakened by exploding grenades and machine gun fire on 18 June, the team began a desperate fight along with the remaining SAS and approximately 600 to 1000 Maquis. Noticing the persistent supply drops and parachutes, the Germans organized a task force comprised of some of the 2nd Fallschirmjägers, Infantry and Feldgendarmes. Bringing in forces from the west and north, the Germans were impressed with the size of the base and estimated it at 500 men. The phone calls back to their headquarters noted that the partisans and

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12 Ibid., p. 164.
13 Ibid., pp. 164-165.
SAS fought “skillfully behind hedges, walls, and trees.”[^14] The Jeds burned documents, hid their code books, and made arrangements on rendezvous points in case they became separated. When the German attack met more resistance than expected, it ceased for about an hour, but restarted after more enemy troops came into the fray. The SAS radioed for air strikes and the RAF strafed the *Wehrmacht* around 4 p.m. But the air support was ineffective, as the Germans found cover in nearby trees. After sunset, Cyr and Ragueneau took command of two *Maquis* companies and led counter attacks hoping to stifle German momentum and force the enemy further away from the camp’s headquarters. Meanwhile, the SAS unit sustained several casualties and the commander ordered all wounded loaded on trucks and the supplies they could not bring with them were to be destroyed. A great deal of arms meant for the *Résistance* went up in flames.[^15]

Ordered to break through the German lines and carry on guerrilla operations, the GEORGE teammates found each other and decided to take six British airmen with them. The airman had parachuted out of crippled aircraft and found their way to the SAS camp days before. Forcing their way through the lines with a *Maquis* group, GEORGE soon found itself slowed down by the pilots unfamiliar with small unit tactics. After getting through the lines and dodging numerous patrols, GEORGE and the airmen traveled approximately ten miles when nearly thrown to the ground by an explosion lighting up the night sky. The SAS and *Maquis* arms depot finally blew up

in a tremendous explosion. Laden with their packs and radios the Jeds spent the rest of the night avoiding fire fights. Getting a few hours sleep in a wheat field, the team found its way to the rendezvous point meeting the SAS Commander, the remainder of his SAS team, and some of the Maquis leaders. French women and girls cared for the wounded doing the best they could with inadequate supplies. GEORGE then teamed up with Willk and Barthélémy, and split off from SAS toward their area of Loire Inferieure. SFHQ had prepared to send another JEDBURGH Team to DINGSON, and prepared the orders on the 16th but when the attack forced DINGSON to scatter, Team GREGORY was scrubbed. Scheduled to deploy on the very day the Germans attacked DINGSON, French Jed Albert de Schonen, and British Jeds K. D. Bennett and Ron Brierley were cancelled and instead sent on 8 July as Team DANIEL into Côtes du Nord. Had they been sent as planned, SFHQ could have easily lost the three JEDBURGHS.

Starting from a point twenty-five miles from base DINGSON, GEORGE made its way slowly, relying on local men and women as guides. Taking nearly a week to make their way carefully past enemy patrols, they traveled through several small villages on back roads and finally to the Maquis camp near the village of Saffre. Now nearly 35 miles north of Nantes, Gay radioed London, “Arrived safely ‘Alarme’ ground, Loire Inferieure. Begin tomorrow 28 dropping for 2,000 in slices of 500. Reception committee standing by every night from 28th.” Hoping to impress the local Maquis with the team’s ability to make arms appear from the sky, the team lost

16 Ibid., pp. 171-173.
17 Operations Order No. 10, 16 June, Ordres d’EMFFI, 3 AG 2 473, AN. Paris, France.
a great deal of respect night after night when no planes appeared. On 30 June, SFHQ requested GEORGE to pass the word to Barthelémy and his aide to “Go to safe place and lie low for a few days. Keep in contact and await any instructions.” Evidently, London wanted to see if it could salvage their agents from what it assumed was a Gestapo penetrated JEDBURGH team. They gave no instructions, causing Ragueneau, Cyr, and Gay great concern and undercutting their validity with the Maquis.¹⁸

To add to the terrible luck, a double agent betrayed the Maquis camp’s defensive positions to the enemy. When GEORGE arrived, they found the defenses inadequate, fired the camp commander, and rearranged the defenses just in time. As Sergeant Gay decoded messages on the morning of the 28th, the Germans attacked and the W/T set had to be packed up “while the Jerries could be heard only 100 to 200 yards away.” Miraculously making their way past two machine gun positions, GEORGE hid with Barthelémy in a clump of bushes so thick that the Germans could not find them and grenades tossed into them exploded harmlessly. The Germans used dogs, but they proved useless as so many people tracked around the area and the dogs could not pinpoint any particular person. After the Germans had given up and departed the area, the group made their way to a wheat field and then decided to split, not telling others their destination. Team GEORGE lamented its sorry state and later

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 45 and 177.
described its condition bereft of nearly all equipment and possessing only “one radio, one battery, a few weapons and our clothes” as it made its way toward Ancenis.19

While GEORGE’s operations in Brittany were sliding into disaster, Team FREDERICK was not faring much better. It deployed with an SAS element of the same unit as at DINGSON and arrived near the Duault Forest southwest of Guincamp on 10 June. This team was led by British Major Adrian Wise with French Captain Paul Bloch-Auroch using the nom de guerre Paul Aguriec, and American Sergeant Robert Kehoe. RF Section and SAS was to control this mission, but again BRAL was not to be informed until after D-Day.20 The team arrived to similar fanfare that GEORGE had experienced but lost one of the SAS men during the jump. The dead man had wrapped primer cord around his legs for some reason and it had accidentally ignited killing him before he hit the ground. Also alarming to Kehoe was the loud and excited people who had come up to meet them at their rendezvous point, the fires set to signal the aircraft were still burning, and his recollection of a German headquarters near their location. There seemed to be no security practices whatsoever and he feared the Germans would discover them immediately.21

The Jeds were transported off to a farmer’s home, provided with breakfast and met up with the rest of the SAS team that had arrived with them but slightly scattered during the parachuting. French Captain Le Blanc of the 4th Parachute Battalion commanded the SAS base SAMWEST. He and some of the leading elements of the

19 Ibid., pp. 179-183.
20 Order No. 6, 2 June 1944, Team FREDERICK, 3 AG 2 463, AN, Paris, France.
SAS party had arrived the day before and distributed weapons among the *Maquis* who had been with the reception committee. They also held some “spies” prisoner and the local Breton *Maquis* and French SAS had beaten them regularly and finally executed them. Wise seemed disgusted with his first impression of the *Résistance* and wrote, “in my opinion subsequent brutal treatment of SAS prisoners may have had something to do with this.”

As the JEDBURGH team was making its way to SAMWEST, a German officer stopped by a home in the near by village of Carhaix to ask directions. The answer he received was Sten fire from one of those who had been at the drop zone the day before. The untrained and uncontrolled *Maquis* were already drawing too much of the wrong kind of attention with their passionate desire to kill Germans.

Wise, Bloch-Auroch, and Kehoe did not successfully transmit their message on the first day and discovered they got better reception at higher ground. On the 11th Kehoe managed to transmit their confirmation message to SFHQ saying, “Arrived safely with all containers and equipment. Have contacted local groups. Great possibilities Cotes du Nord area. Send Jed team and arms for them. Advise soonest possible dropping ground.” However this would be his last message as the unprovoked attack on the 2nd *Fallschirmjäger* officer from the day before brought the Division into the area hunting them. The German soldiers returned to the farm where the German officer had been killed the previous day and shot those they found and

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burned down the farm house and the out buildings. After a brief fire fight between the Germans at the farm and the nearest SAS check point, the SAS commander gave the order to move south to DINGSON, which was still operating at this time. The Jeds moved east a few miles accompanied by an RAF pilot who had bailed out a few days previously. The move was so rapid that Wise lamented they, “lost nearly all of our kit in the process.”24 The total SAMWEST group, now numbering over 100 of the French SAS and the Jeds, moved out in small groups attempting to avoid a pitched battle in what had grown from an attack of approximately 40 Germans into a “an estimated 400” methodically working through the area.25

Since D-Day the 266th Infantrie Division commanded by Lieutenant General Karl Spang had received all kinds of warnings and indications of paratroopers landing in north-west Brittany. One report claimed that 300 enemy parachutists had landed near the coast. The Allied use of dummies, as well as the nighttime bombardments, and obvious fatigue and fear by the German soldiers is evident in their logbooks.26 They quickly constituted a task force comprised of elements of Spang’s division and elements of the 2nd Fallschirmjägers to conduct a repression column through the area.

Having hidden one radio and planning to take their other with them the Jed team started moving out on the 12th. But the nearby shooting seemed to heighten their fear of capture and they decided to hide the remaining radio as well. Also with them was an RAF officer who had come in with the SAS and who decided not to go

26 K. T. B. 6.6.44 – 7.6.44, RH 26-266, BA-MA.
with them on to Camp DINGSON. Wise thought they should bring him along with them, but not being used to or fit for long nighttime journeys laden with gear, the tall man in his forties slowed the Jeds down. But Kehoe noted that, “conventional military forces prefer to work in units and fear being isolated or surrounded.” That gave the Jeds an advantage in speed and flexibility while the *Wehrmacht* worked methodically through the forest.²⁷

Working to get as far from the forest as they could, they risked it and kept moving during daylight. Again, Brittany’s proximity to British airfields and the RAF patrols paid off as they were only seconds from coming upon a German patrol. Instead, they heard the fighter overhead and its strafing attack on something immediately in front of them. When the aircraft had flown off, they looked up to see the frightened enemy motorcyclists fleeing in the other direction. Determined now to stay off the roads, the team hid for the night and next day in a ditch next to a farmhouse but realized that they could not ask for help from the locals as it would mean death to those who aided them should the Germans ever discover it. But the next morning, wet, exhausted, and starving, Bloch-Aroch went to the farmhouse to ask for food. The Breton speaking woman scared him as he did not understand what she was saying and feared she was German. Realizing his mistake he was relieved when her daughter, a school teacher who spoke French agreed to help them.²⁸

Their luck was beginning to change. Not only did the women provide them a wonderful breakfast, but the meeting led to more contact with the Côtes du Nord

²⁸ Ibid., p. 18.
Résistance. Over the next few days, they moved again, established a command post and began planning their operations. The women, Simone Le Gœeffic and Louise Quennec, proved remarkably able to bicycle around the region passing messages to the nearby Front National and FFI leadership who ultimately made their way to the farmhouse. With the arrival of Yves Le Hegarat, using the nom de guerre Marceau, they met the leader of the Côtes du Nord’s FFI. Le Hegarat who had come to the fore in the Maquis leadership of the FTP, had become the departmental leader of the FFI as he successfully convinced the members of the Libération-Nord movement to merge just prior to D-Day. He successfully convinced them they would all work to achieve military aims and so they made him the FFI leader and agreed to share the weapons that the Allies supplied.\(^\text{29}\) Now the JEDBURGHs had someone with whom they could work, supply, and train. They decided to stay in the region and not make their way south to Camp DINGSON. Another reason called them to remain for the women had taken in some of the wounded SAS soldiers. Wise believed they should remain and help them while the women arranged for a surgeon from Guincamp to come and see what he could do. In the end, the doctor saved the lives of the soldiers by performing an operation and provided enough care to allow them to survive.\(^\text{30}\)

Now with trusted contacts and their decision to remain in the region the team needed their radio to operate. Kehoe would have to recover it from its hidden spot in the forest where had had buried it and was worried about how quickly he could make

\(^{29}\) Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 Á 1945. p. 78.

\(^{30}\) HS 6/509, pp. 3-4.
the trip bringing back the 40 pound radio. But he was surprised to be offered a car. Over the years of occupation, one of their new contacts had stored a vehicle, hid the wheels, and had snuck enough fuel over time to have several gallons for a vital moment such as now. With two of their new *Maquis* and one of the SAS Sergeants, Kehoe took the car and traveled in the darkness to search for his team’s means of communication with SFHQ. With no radio, they were just three uniformed men but with it they were SFHQ’s and Koenig’s liaison. A lot rode on Kehoe’s night-time search. They arrived back in the forest and found the area. Kehoe had buried the radio next to a very distinctive boulder, but now every boulder looked alike. While the SAS Sergeant went in search of his own equipment, and the two *Maquis* stood guard with the car, Kehoe went from boulder to boulder searching. Finally, just as dawn was breaking, Kehoe had dug at the right spot and found it. Lugging it back to the car, his relieved comrades loaded it into the car and jubilantly drove back to their new hide out. Kehoe later wrote, “This was to be the rebirth of Team FREDERICK.”

It was just in time, the same day the 2nd *Fallschirmjägers* attacked the former Camp SAMWEST with an impressive and concentrated force. Unlike the SAS at DINGS, they had taken the opportunity to disperse so the Germans came in expecting a difficult fight, but instead only found pockets of *Maquis* and a few of the uniformed SAS – but no JEDBURGHs or their valuable radio. But while the Jeds had found their radio, *OB West* was now gaining more and more information on

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Allied actions with the interior Résistance. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Fallschirmjägers claimed that during the two battles, they had killed an estimated 50 of the enemy. The intelligence report about the actions against the Maquis concentrations in Brittany resulted in the discovery of French uniformed parachutists and the understanding that they were SAS and then had obvious links to the Allies in London.\footnote{Ic Nr. 4203/44, 21.6.1944, RH 19 IV, 133, Fiche 1, BA-MA.} But there is no guess as to their overall mission. Were these parachutists an advance force indicating larger airborne operations? The German commanders were left to wonder and to make preparations throughout the interior zone.

FREDERICK spent the next two weeks in one place, a luxury considering they were only 10 kilometers from the Forêt de Duault. Now back in business with their radio they sent London, “SAS ATTACKED MONDAY AND DISPERSED. JEDS OKAY. HAVE CONTACTED GUERRILLA LEADERS. PARIS-BREST UNDERGROUND CABLE CUT BY US…” Due to Kehoe’s use of the correct security procedure to omit certain pre-determined letter groups, London was quickly satisfied that FREDERICK was indeed back up and the team’s request for air dropped supplies was quickly answered. After two weeks there, they moved to another location in order to arm another Maquis group. Newly located about 34 kilometers due south of Guincamp, they remained only a few days and had to move again when a German patrol noticed their radio antenna and investigated. Shots fired at their farmhouse provoked them to grab their codes and crystals and run into the woods. After hiding out during the day, they managed to escape, now for a third time, and
make their way north. At this location, near St. Nicolas du Pelem, the team eventually coordinated the reception of two more JEDBURGH Teams.\textsuperscript{33}

FREDERICK’s ability to survive re-energized General Koenig and the SFHQ staff. The GILES mission was back on for Finistère, east of FREDERICK and as a part of a larger plan, so were 6 other teams. After being delayed for weather and on another night for lack of a confirmed drop zone signal, Team GILES arrived to much the same fanfare as the other teams. Choosing the location based on Team GEORGE’s and FERNAND’s recommendation, SFHQ began pondering how to deploy a more sophisticated command and control mission.\textsuperscript{34} GILES was to be the first team in among the broader plan. They believed there were 9600 *Wehrmacht* along with the 5000 Paratroopers of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} *Fallschirmjäger* and 9000 naval, marine, and anti-aircraft or FLAK troops for a total of 37,000 in Finistère alone. But Barthélemy’s most recent cable led them to believe there were 30,000 men waiting to join the *Maquis*. Such information, along with the imperative from SHAEF to control Brittany provoked EMFFI to now begin a more comprehensive plan that they then attempted to put in motion. It consisted of sending more JEDBURGH Teams to FREDERICK, and ended with sending in an inter allied command and control element led by Colonel Albert Eon, and seconded by none other than Colonel Dewavrin.\textsuperscript{35} However, American Captain Bernard Knox and French Captain Paul

\textsuperscript{33} Report of Major Wise, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{34} Report of Team GILES, OSS London Microfilm, Roll 8, Target 1, Vol. 4, Book II, p. 324.
Grall of the Team GILES seem to be oblivious to this part of the puzzle. Probably left out of the broader plan for security reasons, GILES’ ignorance proved costly.

Specifically their point of confusion seemed to center around SFHQ’s directive to not take “offensive action” until directed to do so. By the end of June, with 13 teams in France, and reports of sabotage, spectacular numbers of people joining the Réistance, and the belief that armored divisions such as the 2nd SS “Das Reich” had been effectively delayed, they began to believe in their effectiveness. Certainly getting 8th Air Force to provide the 3rd Air Division on 25 June indicates that even SHAEF had begun to believe in what was happening. But as the scale began to tip and as numbers in the Maquis grew throughout France, their enthusiasm and passion altered the role of the JEDBURGHs. Instead of inspiring, provoking, and leading the Maquis to action, now the teams’ presence was to dampen and pass along the directive to wait. Instead of providing the fuel, they had to put on the brake. The JEDBURGHs who had been in France before the end of June had experiences and matured along with their Maquis and could temper the Maquis’ passions better than new teams, such as GILES now parachuting in, who did not have enough time to establish a report with the groups they met.

Team GILES Deploys

American Captain Bernard M. Knox, French Captain Paul Grall using the nom-de-guerre Paul Lebel, and British Sergeant Gordon H. Tack comprised the

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seventh team dispatched from Britain to France. On 16 June, SFHQ alerted and briefed GILES its mission to deploy to the Finistère region of eastern Brittany and organize and arm Résistance forces. SFHQ knew very little about the region’s Maquis and prior to departing General Koenig himself briefed the team and emphasized the region’s importance and how vital it was to learn more about the Maquis’ potential for combat. Also, Koenig sternly warned Knox to act like a gentleman and behave himself as a good guest of France should. Evidently, he thought Americans chased women too much and would be parachuting into France with stockings and chocolates.37 Immediately prior to the team’s departure, Captain Grall went back to London to agree on the BBC signal for the Brittany large-scale attack. Grall suggested and SFHQ agreed the signal would be “Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec?” (“Is Napoleon’s hat still at Perros-Guirec?”). After an unsuccessful attempt on 4 July, GILES finally parachuted into the French night on 8/9 July from a Carpetbagger B-24.47 Their mission flew in on a night that saw 15 sorties, from two airfields, to four drop zones now under the control of Maquis who were coordinating with Team FREDERICK.38

Captain Knox parachuted first out the “Joe hole.” Born in England and educated in languages at St. John’s College, Cambridge, Knox had joined the International Brigade and fought in the Spanish Civil War. After he was wounded, he left Spain for Paris and fell in love with an American writer. They moved to

37 Bernard Knox, Interview, 8 June 2001.
47 Ibid., 338-9 and Knox, letter. Napolean’s Hat is the name of a rock formation off the coast of France near the town of Perros-Guirec.
38 “FREDERICK, June Moon through August non-Moon,” HS 8/148, BNA.
Connecticut, and Knox became a naturalized citizen in 1943. When Pearl Harbor occurred he joined the U. S. Army that mindlessly trained him as an air defense officer. At the beginning of 1944 he was serving in England and when he heard about the OSS and he volunteered hoping to see some action. He served as an explosives and French instructor a Milton Hall and after some parachute training, was put in the mix to deploy on a team. Twenty-nine year-old Knox acted as GILES’ team commander. Captain Paul Grall joined the JEDBURGHs from the North Africa recruiting drive. The Germans had captured Grall in 1940 and held him as a POW in Poland. He escaped and somehow got to Morocco. A member of the French Colonial Army, Grall was a well-built man with a large scar down his cheek from an automobile accident. Sergeant Tack served as W/T operator and Captain Knox considered him a first class radio operator. Tack followed Knox down the “Joe hole” with Grall exiting last.48

The drop went well with Knox and Tack landing close together, they found Captain Grall within two or three minutes. Excited young Frenchmen welcomed them almost immediately, greeting them with kisses. The reception party gathered up their gear and much to the JEDBURGHs’ delight, had vehicles to transport them to a safe area. Riding in cars and a truck carrying their equipment, GILES hoped to make it to its base before dawn. But due to the distance the team did not make it there until daylight. There it found not quite fifty men whose leader was in Côtes-du-Nord, FREDERICK’s area, attempting to acquire weapons. Captain Grall organized the

48 Ibid., 339 and 623; de Francesco telephone conversation; Bernard Knox to author, April 2, 1999, Knox interview, June 2001.
defenses and distributed the weapons giving instruction as he went along. Later that afternoon, the team heard the BBC message informing them of another drop on the same ground as the previous night. Leary of making the trip back to the drop zone, GILES decided to risk it in order to get the weapons. They also sent word to London relating the different Résistance situation than they had been briefed since Gestapo and Milice had recently arrested and shot many local leaders. GILES lamented, “situation at Finistere is not as informed,” requested three more JEDBURGH teams to work other parts of the region, and an additional one million francs.  

GILES retrieved their supplies from the drop zone just in time. They discovered the next afternoon, that the 2nd Fallschirmjägers had an estimated 300 troops going through farms searching for Résistance forces. The suspicious Germans heard the aircraft and arrived on the drop zone just five minutes after team GILES’ and their reception team left. After the near miss, GILES distributed the arms to another Maquis group and met the returning Maquis leader, Yues Legal, who led the most active Brittany group, the communist FTP. Team GILES and Legal quickly came to an agreement on dropping grounds and the strategy that GILES should remain in Brittany’s center while letting the follow-on JEDBURGH teams work the coastal areas.  

The night of 9/10 July, two more JEDBURGH teams parachuted onto one of GILES’ drop zones without its knowledge and the next day SFHQ radioed GILES informing it of Teams FRANCIS and GILBERT’s arrival. These two teams

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50 Ibid., 341-42.
proceeded to the villages Quimper and Quimperlé and by the time the ground
received a drop of weapons for GILES’ Maquis four days later, the ground was
“blown.” Hearing the noise four nights previously, the Germans suspected something
was going on in the area and attacked the Maquis as they finished their work at the
drop zone. However, the Maquis put up stiff Résistance surprising the Wehrmacht
and Captain Knox thought the casualties the Germans sustained were not worth their
effort.\textsuperscript{51}

The FTP sent their men from Finistère to GILES’ camp to receive training,
weapons, and organized Résistance activities for the region. GILES worked to
coordinate every supply drop in an effort to control the Maquis and keep the materials
out of German hands. GILES and the FTP selected seven drop zones and informed
London of their location while training numerous Maquis on reception ground
procedures. On 12 July, the Free French (FFI) chief, Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud
visited GILES’ command post and discussed Résistance operations. GILES and
Berthaud established a professional relationship at first and related their respective
goals agreeing to stay in contact with each other via Legal. Unfortunately, Berthaud,
whose real name was Bourrières, and who had taken over from the recently arrested
Libération-Nord leader in the area just before the GILES’ arrival, lacked the quality
and quantity of the organization enjoyed by the FTP. While meeting with
him, one of the Maquis recognized a man in Bourrières’ car as a spy and GILES’
report coldly stated, “we had to shoot one of the men in his car, who was a known

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 327 and 342.
Gestapo agent.” Due to fears Bourrières organization had been compromised, GILES avoided working with him.\textsuperscript{52}

The fears proved true when the next day the mayor of the nearby village told GILES that “large German forces were in the area looking for us,” using a map with “red marks against the name of the farm where we were taking our meals.” GILES packed up camp and moved that night with its 100 man company. Traveling by foot for the next two nights, they arrived at a high plateau near St. Thors. GILES set up operations and managed to stay for a week. While at St. Thors, they met with more FTP departmental chiefs anxious to begin offensive actions. Ordered by Koenig to avoid open warfare until directed, GILES worked to convince them the \textit{Maquis} that they fell under the orders of SHAEF and their orders were to wait until the correct time. After a long discussion the FTP chiefs agreed they would follow the Allied orders.

Unfortunately, Colonel Bourrières became jealous and complained to London concerning the FTP’s influence with GILES. Radioing London in response GILES stated the assertions were, “true enough because in our region \textit{Résistance} is mostly \textit{Maquis} FTP.” The message went on to remind London that the “arrangement was made at an interview between us and Berthaud.” GILES appeared tired of Bourrières’ complaining and London agreed with GILES and its arrangements with the region’s FTP.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 342-43 and Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, \textit{Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 À 1945}. p. 285.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 328-29 and 343-44.
Meanwhile, GILES received teams HORACE and HILARY and three other French parachutists at one of its drop zones. GILES arranged for them to take up positions on the north Brittany coast and sent them off to their areas. To add to the confusion one of the suspected Milice prisoners escaped forcing GILES to relocate again. The JEDBURGH team crossed the Aulne canal and set up camp in a valley three kilometers from the village of Lennon. GILES increased their number by one with Canadian Flight Lieutenant Brown. Shot down over Brest, Brown wandered into the team’s area and remained with them as the normal escape routes ceased when the Allies invaded Normandy. Brown spent nearly three weeks with the team helping Sergeant Tack handle the radio traffic. At this point, five teams worked in Finistère but the Fallschirmjägers still controlled major roads and aggressively sought to ferret out the Maquis.⁵⁴

GILES also met with Major Colin Ogden-Smith and Captain Guy Leborgne of team FRANCIS and clarified each team’s operating area. They discussed policy regarding the Résistance and Brittany’s political groups. Unfortunately the details of the discussion are not noted but they presumably delineated each team’s operating area and drop zones and exchanged information on the FTP and Bourrières. Agreeing on every point, they parted and Knox lamented, “This was the last time I ever saw Colin.”⁵⁵ FRANCIS had parachuted near Quimperlé on 10 July. Leborgne, who used the nom de guerre Guy Le Zachmeur, and radio man British Sergeant A. J. Dallow landed on their drop zone at approximately 2:30 in the morning. The team

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⁵⁴ Ibid., 344-45.
⁵⁵ Ibid., 345.
leader, Ogden-Smith was nowhere to be found. Leborgne met up with the Maquis leader in the region and Colonel Bourrières and reported no problems with his organization but seemed to work well with their FTP, who were again the most numerous in the area. Having dropped right near a town that was, “the center of counter-terrorist” activity for the Wehrmacht, they feared for their missing colleague and sent out some of the Maquis to search for him while they established links with the region’s groups, arranged more weapons drops, and organized arms among them. Fortunately, on the 14th they found Ogden-Smith who had been hiding out the last four days. Their pre-arranged rendezvous point proved to be the town with the region’s Wehrmacht garrison making life difficult then for the team to find each other. Together now, they met with GILES on the 16th and again on the 19th, while both were evading the enemy. But having had modest success in finding and equipping Maquis, by the 24th they claimed to have armed 500 men near Carhaix, another 500 near Scear and 300 near Guisgriff. Establishing a company near the coast presented a problem as their were fewer men there and the density of the enemy greater, nevertheless they claimed to have armed approximately 200. They had also been joined by one of the stray SAS soldiers, Sergeant Maurice Myodon. As to the overall plan for Brittany, Team FRANCIS seems to have understood the overall nature of the Allied aims in the region for they wrote how they were storing up arms for later operations and worked to coordinate their operating areas and share communications not only with GILES but Team GILBERT.39

Ogden-Smith was an experienced commando, having participated in the British Small Scale Raiding Force and had served in North Africa. Returning to the U. K. he was reassigned within the SOE to the JEDBURGH program and did very well in training. He befriended Knox while at Milton Hall and they had spent time discussing their mutual interests and their separate experiences, each curious about the others combat time. Ogden-Smith told Knox how he was jealous of his ability to have gone to college and expressed an interest in getting back to university after the war.\(^{40}\) He had been recently married and his wife lived in London. His pre-war occupation was working in the family business manufacturing and selling fishing tackle and fly rods.\(^{41}\)

Having survived the separation from his team immediately upon arrival and one close call on the 19\(^{th}\), Ogden-Smith now led the augmented team of Leborgne, Dallow, Myoden, and two Maquis that helped keep watch and operate the radio. They made their headquarters at a farm in the village of Querrien, 12 kilometers north of the small port of Quimperlé. On 29 July, they found themselves surrounded by “approximately 100 Feldgendarmes,” led directly to their location by a neighbor. A burst of machine gun fire and a grenade was their first warning that Germans were near by. Unfortunately, Ogden-Smith and Myoden were wounded immediately while Leborgne fired back and by chance killed the officer leading the operation. In the confusion that followed, Leborgne was able to escape. Sergeant Dallow, who had

\(^{40}\) Knox. Interview.  
\(^{41}\) PF HS 9/1377/2; The Ogden Smith company no longer exists, but their equipment, rods, reels, and tackle still command a great following and high prices.
been about a hundred yards away, grabbed his carbine and some of the radio equipment and ran toward the house where his teammates were exchanging fire. As he was climbing up out of the ditch, he fell into some bushes and could not get out of them. Laying there unable to move, but unseen by the enemy he watched helpless as the firefight ensued. Ogden-Smith lay wounded but managed to give himself morphine and fire his weapon at the enemy putting down some of the Germans. Myoden, wounded from the grenade, defended himself exhausting four clips of rounds before calling out, “you need not be afraid, I have got no more ammunition.” Laying there in the open firing at the Germans he had enabled Leborgne and the two Maquis to escape. The Germans carefully approached and then shot Ogden-Smith dead. Another Feldgendarme walked up to Myoden warily, but killed him with a burst of machine gun fire and finally a bullet to the temple. Dallow remained in the bush the entire time with nothing but his pistol and unable to help. After two hours, with the Germans gone, he managed to climb out and departed the area.\textsuperscript{42}

Informed of Major Ogden-Smith’s death by radio message from GILES, SFHQ related the news to Major General Gubbins, on or about 3 August. Gubbins had taken special interest in the JEDBURGHs and had interviewed Ogden–Smith personally for SOE. Now he wished to know more of the details about his death and the first reports were not enough. His son Michael Gubbins had been killed at Anzio in February. Having been informed of his own son’s death by finding the War Office

message in his morning in box, Gubbins sought something more in order to write a meaningful letter to Ogden-Smith’s family. But that was not the only thing he was searching for. The French were now fully involved in the operations in France and SOE’s influence in France was beginning to wane.

**General Koenig takes over guerilla warfare in France**

On 23 June, Eisenhower announced to his superiors and subordinates that General Koenig was now equivalent to any Allied commander serving under him in the Allied Expeditionary Forces. In Washington, General Marshall greeted this news with the directive that it should be publicly announced at once. But saying it was so and actually making it so proved to be two different issues. Bureaucratic loyalties, diminished egos, ignorance of the implications, firm opinions on the matter and a lack of resources in war weary London hampered the quick creation of the headquarters staff of the FFI. Koenig wished to stand up his machinery in order to control the quickly expanding FFI inside France. Doing so required offices, vehicles, phones, and accreditations for his planning staff in order to get to work managing the SAS, the OGs, the Inter-Allied Missions, the DMRs, as well as the JEDBURGHS. Much of it already existed in the French Desk of the Anglo-American SFHQ. Still he had his own ideas, outranked the SFHQ co-directors Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and Colonel Haskell and indeed outranked the head of the SOE and the OSS.

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44 “Designation of the Commander of the FRENCH Forces of the Interior,” 23 June 1944, Command and Control of French Forces of Interior, SHAEF SGS, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
45 Ibid., AGWAR FROM MARSHALL to ETOUSA.
Furthermore, he had Eisenhower’s backing on the matter and used that trump card with the SHAEF staff or anyone else involved at every opportunity. In the end, he won every argument, but opponents appeared frequently and came from many corners.

While it seems he could simply become the commander of the SFHQ with an addition of some French officers, it was more complicated than that. SFHQ’s portfolio was grander than just France as it ran guerrilla warfare in every country in SHAEF’s theater and it would not be wise to place a French General in charge of every nation’s Résistance. The compromise finally crafted was that the staff section from SFHQ running French operations would be chopped, so to speak, to EMFFI and General Koenig while the rest of SFHQ continued with their work in the other nations. Therefore, Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell would now have three jobs. Each was his nation’s senior irregular warfare officer for the theater. Each of the men were also Co-Directors of SFHQ. While these positions may sound like the same job, they can be quite different. For instance, Haskell was responsible to Col Bruce and General Donovan in Washington for requesting and justifying his personnel needs, equipment, and the funds that kept his operation going. He also, with his British colleague, approved of operations and assessed how well their activities were being conducted and what may need to be done next. Together these two tasks can be a burden, but when Eisenhower added the third task of being the US or UK Deputy to

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46 Today such duties are referred to as Administrative Control and Operational Command.
the French Commander of the FFI, it brought about too much incongruence for Mockler-Ferryman.

While Mockler-Ferryman got along well with Haskell, the same could not be said for Koenig. The specific issue can not be determined from their written communication that survives in the various archives, but the tone of the letters and their habit of having to clarify what was said during meetings with follow up memorandums indicates their relationship was professional but strained. With the British Brigadier and the American Colonel on the verge of taking on another Deputy job title for EMFFI, while maintaining their Anglo-American Co-Director position for SFHQ and their national responsibilities as well, they found themselves having to develop methods for solving Résistance issues for France by doing it the way Koenig wanted it while continuing with their agreed upon procedures for their Anglo-American SFHQ for Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Germany. Therefore, there were to be two methods for doing things, one for France and another for the rest of the theater.

Eisenhower seems to have anticipated this as his meeting with de Gaulle in December of 1943 indicated. However, Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s delay in coming to an understanding with de Gaulle meant that organizational agreements would not be agreed upon until events forced them to be. That time had now come. On 2 June while Mockler-Ferryman was working with Koenig on the BBC messages, it appears he and perhaps Haskell, were working under the assumption that they would soon be,
“bringing them [the French] into our headquarters.” But instead, Koenig believed he would be bringing applicable portions of SFHQ into his. Since he was the senior officer, with the directive from Eisenhower, Koenig’s belief is understandable. By 12 June, the disagreement must have continued however because now Gubbins and senior staff at SHAEF are involved in the matter. British Major General J. F. M. Whiteley who was deputy Chief of Staff to Bedell Smith, wrote Gubbins that Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell will contribute to SHAEF’s operational planning and requirements but would not have access to them for France. Instead, their role in EMFFI would be that of securing logistical capability such as air lift and weapons stores for France as the French were not conversant in that machinery nor was it acceptable to anyone in SHAEF that officers of one nation have so much control over foreign assets. The reason boiled down to, as Whiteley wrote, “As the smooth running of the whole affair must depend on mutual trust and confidence, there must be no occasion for a suspicion to arise in General Koenig’s mind that Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell can approach SHAEF behind his back.”

Furthermore, Koenig’s view on what the JEDBURGHs were to do was very clear. They were a liaison element. Koenig had DMRs, and regional and departmental FFI commanders for commanding the Résistance, the JEDBURGHs’ role was to communicate and equip, not to lead. As described in Chapter 4, Mockler-Ferryman would apparently concur, since during his speech at Milton Hall he emphasized that the JEDBURGHs, whatever else they might do, their mission would

47 “Integration with the French,” 2.6.44, HS 6/607, BNA.
48 SHAEF/17945/6/5/Ops,” 12.6.44, HS 6/607, BNA.
always be of one of liaison. However, since so much planning from the beginning of the JEDBURGH program had anticipated that the Jeds would replace arrested F Section cadres, Mockler-Ferryman and perhaps all the SOE and OSS planners were operating under the assumption that the SHAEF’s means of controlling the Résistance would be via the JEDBURGH teams and messages sent to them from SHAEF. But with SHAEF’s long sought after French General reporting to it, who had been accredited by the Provisional Government for commanding the Résistance, Koenig could direct the Maquis via his own machinery. The JEDBURGHs were viewed by Koenig and his planners in BRAL as merely a means to reach more Maquis units, assess their needs, communicate them back to EMFFI, who would then decide whether to fulfill it or not depending upon their priorities as they understood their directives from Eisenhower. Koenig’s differentiation of the JEDBURGH mission still served Eisenhower, while it left SFHQ, with a somewhat diminished operational role, and often perplexed the JEDBURGHs in the field. Lt Col Hutchinson’s and Major MacPherson’s frustrations in the previous chapter are an example of this.

Mockler-Ferryman however saw it happening first hand, and as operations progressed he grew more and more frustrated with his lack of influence. Memos went back and forth between him and Koenig about how EMFFI should be structured and finally Koenig had enough. Reviewing the paperwork on the matter, General Bedell Smith wrote in the margins of one that he did “not like the tone” of Mockler-Ferryman’s letter. “Let’s not have a childish squabble.”49 With SHAEF bearing

49 “No. D478/FILA, Subject – F. F. I. Hq. 5 July 1944,” Command and Control of the French Forces of
down on the matter in order to resolve the issue without any further delay, Bedell Smith called a meeting to make it clear. On 10 July, two days after Roosevelt announced his recognition that de Gaulle and the CFLN would be the “de facto authority” for France, Bedell Smith again emphasized Eisenhower’s views on the matter and backed up Koenig.\footnote{“Notes of Decisions Made at a Meeting Held at SHAEF on 10th JULY, 1944,” Command and Control of French Forces of the Interior, SHAEF SGS, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.}

Keeping up his efforts to get his headquarters going, Koenig asked for Haskell to stay on but instead wished to have Major General Robert Laycock as his British Deputy. Laycock was one of the most experienced and well respected British commando officers and perhaps more importantly, was not SOE. The British did not release him from being their Chief of Combined Operations, a tame name for their Headquarters of their commando forces. But the Americans granted Haskell to the coalescing EMFFI as long as he could remain in his other two roles. Haskell’s ingratiating style backed up by his ability to pull off air operations like ZEBRA and CADILLAC impressed Koenig. Mockler-Ferryman however saw the writing on the wall and tendered his resignation to Gubbins on 27 July. Stating that he understood Eisenhower’s reasoning on the matter, but that every French officer viewed him with suspicion, something Whiteley had warned he did not want to see happen, Mockler-Ferryman believed resigning was his only option. Gubbins saw no other way out either and accepted it on the same day that Ogden-Smith was killed near Querrien.\footnote{“Eric Edward MOCKLER-FERRYMAN – born 27.06.1896,” HS 9/510/1.} But this did not mean Mockler-Ferryman was leaving SOE, nor even SFHQ. He simply left EMFFI and therefore SFHQ’s French operations.
Retaining his other positions clouded the whole incident and has evidently led M. R. D. Foot and William McKenzie to miss the whole affair.\textsuperscript{52} In his place, the British sent Major General Harold H. Redman, a man with little to no experience running special operations. He was not an SOE officer but was a French speaker serving on the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{53}

The American OSS did not put up such resistance, but General Donovan did fear the incapacitation of his London station’s ability to continue its effort in Europe, just as OSS planning was beginning against Germany. Knowing that he would need agents and teams in central Europe and expecting that OSS London would run them, he feared that much of his machinery was being turned over to the French. In a response to Haskell’s description of how the reorganization was progressing and what SFHQ assets would come under Koenig’s command, Donovan fired off a message to Eisenhower claiming that, “by tearing out certain vital tissues of our organization in your theater, compels me to ask for a reconsideration as to these matters.”\textsuperscript{54} Donovan went on to hint that he might be forced to take what was left of the Allied SFHQ and present OSS capabilities to SHAEF without the British.

But it was too late. Eisenhower had striven since January to empower such an organization and while he admired and appreciated Donovan and the OSS, he was not going to reconsider, nor slow the progress that was finally taking place. Furthermore, he was not going to let an Allied organization charged with working with the

\textsuperscript{52} Neither Foot’s \textit{SOE in France} nor McKenzies’ \textit{The Secret History of the S. O. E.} mention this, nor does Redman’s name appear in either work.

\textsuperscript{53} British Army Registry, HMSO, Kew, UK.

\textsuperscript{54} “Eisenhower from Donovan, OSS,” August 2, 1944, Officer of the Director’s Files, Microfilm, Roll 81, Frame 14.
resistance in the other countries of his theater be broken up. He liked SFHQ and since the other exiled governments in occupied Europe were being comparatively pliant, he was going to run them as he saw fit. On the 9th Eisenhower told Donovan and Marshall that he disapproved of anything that dissolved SFHQ, “for any countries except France.” If Donovan needed OSS assets for issues in Central Europe, that was not Eisenhower’s concern and he reminded Donovan that it was not SFHQ’s either since it was a SHAEF organization. Bruce and Haskell followed the theater commander’s telegram with a message that quite accurately reminded Donovan that Eisenhower had no responsibility for Central Europe and it was expecting a lot for Eisenhower to give up personnel for missions outside his theater. By sending the message to Marshall, Eisenhower was making sure that his superior understood his point of view. Assuming Donovan was not willing to go to the President on the matter, Ike called his bluff.

General Koenig and his Chief of Staff Colonel Vernon had not waited for final resolution on the matter, but had been, since mid-June or so, taking over operations in France that related to the Résistance. Koenig focused his resources largely on Brittany and since the BCRA and SOE contacts had been arrested, they now relied on the JEDBURGH teams to make use of the growing Maquis. Their one functioning DMR for Brittany had been sending messages since his arrival with Team GEORGE and the SAS at DINGSON. On 18 June Maurice Barthélemy who used the code name HAUTEUR, radioed he was meeting with the Region’s principle Maquis

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55 Ibid., Frames 36 and 39.
group leaders and they were agreeing to the overall plan for their organization.\textsuperscript{56} But that was the same day as the attack on DINGSON, and was his preliminary assessment, significantly altered by the enemy’s actions. The scattering of DINGSON and SAMWEST had forced SFHQ and EMFFI to reassess their timing of their next steps. Fulfilling their orders meant more than deploying several JEDBURGH teams, and EMFFI began putting together a French led Inter-Allied mission that would serve as the overall command element for Brittany. SHAEF allotted 35 air sorties a night for Koenig’s SAS and EMFFI forces, less than what was possible due to the concern of indicating too much to the enemy about how important Brittany was to the Allies. Eisenhower’s orders to Koenig were clear, “The whole object of FFI planning and operations in BRITTANY is to give as much help as possible to enable the AMERICANS to capture BREST in the shortest possible time.”\textsuperscript{57} The US forces approaching Brittany now required FFI support and Koenig believed he needed to send a command element to Brittany to coordinate the effort. The mission was commanded by a French Army Colonel Albert Eon and his second in command would be Dewavrin. EMFFI gave it the codename of ALOES and put them on standby to be ready to go when the time was judged right to go over to open guerrilla warfare. In the meantime, military command remained with the SAS commander Commandant Bourgoi n and the JEDBURGH Teams were reminded of that in messages.\textsuperscript{58} ALOES planning included working with the 21\textsuperscript{st} Army

\textsuperscript{56} Fichier 2, Carton 8, Fonds Ziegler, 1 K 374, SHD, Vincennes, France.
\textsuperscript{57} “SITUATION OF RÉSISTANCE IN BRITTANY AS AT JULY 29, 1944,” Folder 12, Box 329, Entry 190, RG 226. National Archives, College Park, MD.
\textsuperscript{58} “FFI/214,” 21st July 1944, Jedburgh Documents, 3 AG 2 462, Archive National, Paris, France.
operations staff as it progressed west, increasing the parachuting of arms to the region, and Eon traveled to Milton Hall to brief the teams alerted for work in Brittany. ALOES planning began in early July, just as GILES departed for France and their planning continued on through to the very day of their deployment on the night of 4 August. Team GILES missed all of this as their departure put them into combat prior to being informed of the tactical planning considerations.

Knox, Grall, and Tack were suffering from this as well as suffering under the Gestapo’s control of Brittany. Under the threat of being found, the team moved again. Striking out north across the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road, GILES marched until 4 a.m. The team hoped to settle there, but by the next day it learned the Germans had captured one of Sergeant Tack’s former radio assistants. Knowing they must keep moving, they decided to go back across the canal toward Kernoux that night. While on the move, they saw German signal flares and sent part of their company ahead to investigate. They failed to return and GILES decided to strike out on their own, but the remaining men and boys were now without their own cadre and simply could not sustain a long forced march. Forced to take to roads, rather than going across country due to the weary men, GILES reconnoitered a small village and could not believe its luck when they found an unguarded canal bridge. Just as they were all across machine gun fire inspired GILES’ men to keep going as long as possible, but by 7:30 the next morning only eight men remained with the team.

However, during their movements they happened upon a great opportunity. GILES discovered the German main position in the region and hoped to capitalize on the information. The Germans had commandeered a chateau situated on the area’s predominant hill. With such a position they could view a great deal of the surrounding area, but GILES informed London of the position and asked for the RAF to strike. On 30 July, three dive-bombers rolled in on the target filled with hung over German soldiers still groggy from a party the previous evening. GILES radioed SFHQ and gleefully exclaimed the air strike “Couldn’t have been better.”

By late July, the FTP Maquis and especially the FTP leadership sought to take the fight to the Germans, but the direction to do so still had not arrived. GILES informed London of some uncontrollable groups and complained, “FTP getting very hard to control and we may not be able to do it much longer. . . .FTP are reaching boiling point and explosion may occur if Boche continues to hunt them.” But apparently GILES, and perhaps other JEDBURGHS teams, mis-understood a key aspect of their orders. SFHQ wanted the Maquis to refrain from general open activity, but not systematic and persistent guerrilla activity. In other words small scale harassment and well planned guerrilla attacks were fine. But GILES, believing all such activity was off limits worked hard to convince the Maquis to refrain from any type of engagement while London wished only to stop open warfare. In their exchange of messages GILES and EMFFI seem to be talking past one another to the extent that Grall and Knox responded to it all in their longest messages yet saying,

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61 Ibid., p. 346-350.
“You (EMFFI) did not answer our question at all. We are not thinking of our own skins but of success of operation. We repeat in words of one syllable, if Boche attacks Maquis in this area, no power on earth can stop a general explosion. They can only attack if they have precise information. They can only get precise information through Feldgendarmerie. It may be already too late. Information this morning Boche about to install 25 companies between Callac and Chateauneuf. At least 500 at Chateauneuf. Our liaison is being completely cut by action of Feldgendarmerie. Messengers are arrested, tortured and shot every day. In these circumstances our work is becoming almost impossible. Central Finistère a powder magazine which needs only a spark and the Boche is going to provide the spark. As for moving when we are in danger, we have moved five times since our arrival. But 15 armed companies in the center. Cannot keep moving all the time. We have managed to keep Maquis quiet until now but if they are attacked, nothing can stop open fighting in Finistère.”

London radioed GILES on 30 July saying, “We quite agree about action by small groups against field gendarmerie. Only mistake in interpretation made you interrupt all operations. Must keep enemy in danger everywhere ceaselessly by guerilla [sic] action, that is to say, generalized mobile offensive action by surprise and refusing large scale battle.” Aggressively continuing the weapon supply drops, GILES kept warning London they needed the message about Napoleon’s hat, otherwise they would not be able to control the FTP. Now, London gave them a way to relieve the pressure caused by the misunderstanding but they still seemed not to understand the nuances of their mission.

Moving for the last time on 31 July, GILES found its last headquarters back in its first headquarters, the village of Plessis. They carried out reconnaissance on the chateau recently attacked by the RAF. Piles of rubble and the odor of decaying

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58 Ibid., 330.
bodies greeted them and they reported killing 17 more Germans. The Germans evacuated the ruins the next day and GILES intensified the drop zone activity hoping the wait would not be long until given the order. On 2 August team FRANCIS radioed GILES with the news of Ogden-Smith’s death and GILES radioed London that all FRANCIS’ drop zones were blown as Ogden-Smith had the locations on him when he died.63

But on the evening of 2 August, the BBC transmitted the desired message “Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec,” and team GILES quickly set up an attack on columns of Germans moving east. As the 2nd Fallschirmjägers moved toward the Allied forces now around Dinan in eastern Brittany, GILES brought the guerrillas to bear while sending London the message, “Lack arms and ammo. Going over to offensive tonight.” GILES and the Maquis could press the fighting, but they continued to require more arms. The next day London obliged and the Maquis received four loads on one drop zone and one load on another. GILES succeeded at getting the orders and arms to the northern part of their sector and also succeeded at penning in the Germans by blowing up a bridge on the main east-bound road while running ambushes on the roads to the east where the Germans were attempting to head toward the front. The Germans, now forced to travel cross country rather than by road, slowed down considerably and took out their frustration on the French villages and farms by burning, looting, and other vicious actions. FREDERICK radioed that it had 2000 men ready for work along the road to

63 Ibid., p. 350
be used by the Americans as they came toward Brest. Their work made the progress of the American tanks along the road from Dinan to Brest much quicker in that now they worked to preserve bridges while staging hit and run attacks on the Germans as they fled the advance of Middleton’s armored units. In all the chaos, GILES and the *Maquis* captured enemy prisoners and Captain Knox questioned them and reported that, “all of them were Hitlerites to a man. They admitted to the atrocities they had committed, refused to believe that the Americans had taken Rennes, refused to discuss the Hitler regime and refused to explain why they had French jewelry, money, and identity cards on them.” Knox added, that the prisoners amounted to a, “considerable number. . .” and “were all subsequently shot by the FFI.” The JEDBURGHs could not stop the *Maquis* from killing the prisoners even had they tried, due to the tremendous pent up hostility over the four-year occupation punctuated by the recent wave of repression and reprisals.

JEDBURGH Teams FELIX, GUY, and GAVIN in eastern Brittany received orders to preserve bridges the 1st U. S. Army needed to advance and relay information on the *Maquis* that could perform reconnaissance for leading elements of the conventional forces. FELIX radioed the SF Detachment assigned to the 1st U. S. Army that it believed it had 4 to 6 thousand men partially armed and organized just ahead of their front and provided their location to the American operations planners. By 4 August The SF Detachment in General Patton’s 3rd Army radioed EMFFI that they had also contacted FELIX and that the JEDBURGHs had organized the

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64 Kehoe, pp. 34-35.
65 Ibid., p. 333 and 351-52.
protection of the bridges and roads they intended to use from Dinan all the way to Guincamp and Morlaix in western Brittany. They also confirmed contact with the Inter-Allied mission led by Colonel Eon and Dewavrin on 7 August. Team FELIX had parachuted into Brittany east of Team FREDERICK and consisted of French Major Jean Souquat who used the nom de guerre Jean Kernevel, British Captain John Marchant and British W/T operator P. Calvin. Having had less than a month to establish themselves, they were probably at their most effective in explaining the FFI to the conventional forces who were abysmally ignorant of key issues. “In fact,” Marchant wrote in his final report, “we met one Civil Affairs Captain at Dinan who did not know the name of General Koenig or what the initials FFI stood for. However we found him very cooperative.”

On the same night the action messages went out EMFFI deployed the ALOES mission from England to act as the leading element of General Koenig’s command. Colonel Eon’s men numbered about 30 as they deployed into Brittany to set up their headquarters. With them was a JEDBURGH liaison officer who hoped to build a healthy liaison between ALOES and the area’s JEDBURGHs teams. On 6 August, SFHQ notified GILES about ALOES, and directed GILES to contact them and placed GILES under their command as it was doing with all the other JEDBURGH teams. Because GILES was in a central position, ALOES appointed them to be their main liaison to the Maquis throughout Finistère. Captain Grall

67 Ibid., p. 377.
concentrated on this new mission putting him in a key position regarding Brittany’s Résistance. Captain Knox also made reconnaissance trips with the ALOES commander and organized mopping up operations as the German army clung to scattered positions. Knox also met up with American commanders entering the area, advised them on local conditions, and assigned French scouts to their headquarters.\(^68\)

With the arrival of American conventional troops, led by Major General Troy Middleton’s VIII Armored Corps, the teams’ role shifted to liaison work assisting the conventional forces. Crozon, a town on the end of the Brittany peninsula, served as the last German hold out in GILES’ area. \textit{OB West} had directed Ramcke’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} \textit{Fallschirmjägers} to hold on to the port of Brest and he and General Fahrmbacher’s XXV Armee Korps had been preparing for such a mission for weeks. GILES aided the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 15th Cavalry Squadrons’ attack on the approaches to Crozon by coordinating actions with the FFI and in the words of the Team GILES report, the Americans and French “cooperated magnificently.”\(^69\) EMFFI brought GILES back to England by sea prior to the final reduction of Crozon.\(^70\)

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 336 and 353; Claude E. Boillot, \textit{U. S. Representative, Suez Canal Company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez)}, 1952-78. Papers, 1924 - 1984, Eisenhower Library. 4; and Foot, 407-408.

\(^{69}\) HS 6/515, BNA, Kew, UK. This is the SOE version of the OSS copy of the report used above for all my sourcing regarding GILES. The difference between the two reports is only in their format. However, in January of 1945, Captain Grall read the final version of what he and Knox had written. He was disappointed that the translation into English and some of the recrafting of the report by the SOE translater and Knox after Grall departed the UK. He believed they made it appear to the reader that Knox had been the team’s leader. He did not agree with that, but amicably wished to emphasize their team’s good relationship was one of cooperation. Furthermore, Knox’s views on the ALOES mission was not Grall’s and he provided more context on what Eon, Dewavrin, and the mission was attempting to do. In sum, he thought ALOES performed well in the operations against the German fortifications around Brest. Furthermore, he wished to go on another mission with Knox and Tack. GILES was placed on reserve for a second mission in the east of France, but was not deployed.

Team GEORGE evades and attempts to reorganize the Loire-Inferieure

Team GEORGE had reconstituted their mission after nearly three weeks of evading German patrols. Still working with the DMR Barthélemy they finally gained sound footing with a Maquis network to the north-east of Nantes. Once there and meeting in the home of a friendly local leader they discussed how to get something going in their new area. Barthélemy, acting in his capacity as the DMR, prevailed upon the French JEDBURGH Captain Rageneau to become the DM for the Department of Loire-Inferieure. Rageneau protested since he believed this was beyond the scope of his mission. But since Barthélemy had no one else to do it, he agreed. So team GEORGE became the de facto DMD for the department on 4 July. As they attempted to create a guerrilla force capable of operating against the Germans they discovered that this department had a wider variety of Résistance groups than the singularity enjoyed by the FTP in most of Brittany. Those differences complicated their efforts. “The political situation was a nightmare,” Cyr and Rageneau later wrote. In their view, the groups fell into four kinds: “political groups interested in resistance, resistance groups interested in politics, political groups pretending to be interested in the Résistance but only really interested in politics, and resistance groups not interested in politics (these being the angels.)” Noting there may be more than one group for each category, they had their work cut out for them attempting to ascertain who could do what mission and whom they could trust. The Jeds believed that the Front National leaders were in the first group and the ORA fell in the angelic
last group. However, the ORA was not without fault as numbers reported in their Battalions were often barely enough to fill a company. Realizing that the lack of weapons depressed Maquis numbers, GEORGE attempted to get more arms but never did as EMFFI suspected their transmissions to be a Gestapo deception and therefore sent them nothing.\(^{71}\) They spent the month of July and into August working to consolidate groups they believed would actually conduct sabotage and raids. Having prevailed upon the local groups to unite behind them to fight the Germans, they succeeded in establishing some sense of unity. They even met and were on excellent terms with Yves Lemoan who was the regional delegate for the Comité de Libération. But they also had to maintain their freedom against German infiltration of their growing organization, and in many ways had become more like underground agents than soldiers behind the lines. They were in civilian clothes and had blended into the local scenery so cleverly that they often had lunch in their local bistro with the same Gestapo officer occupying the table next to them.\(^{72}\)

But as the U. S. 3\(^{rd}\) Army approached and their operations became more important to Eisenhower’s operations, Team GEORGE found little success. EMFFI’s disbelief in GEORGE’s radio transmissions for weapons deliveries resulted in nothing and their reputation with the local Résistance groups dropped considerably after spending weeks establishing it. “We were desolated and felt that our credit and authority could not stand much longer on mere good words and promises,” the team

\(^{71}\) United States. Office of Strategic Services., OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 1944, [Microfilm]. pp. 186-188; and “JEDBURGHS,” 22\(^{nd}\) July 1944, 3 AG 462, AN. Note next to GEORGE’s status says, “may be Gestapo-controlled.”

wrote after their return. Upon hearing the BBC message declaring open guerrilla warfare, “we cried like kids considering our useless set, our useless work and all the dangers the patriots of the Loire Inferieure had gone through to get that point, remembering how many guys in prison or under the earth had paid for their trouble they had looking for useless grounds and organizing useless reception committees for planes which never came.”\footnote{Ibid. p. 209.} Their department’s Maquis, which they estimated at around 4000 men, lacked the weapons that would make them a part of the Allied effort. EMFFI did not believe GEORGE was actually who they said they were until 10 August when Cyr and Rageneau infiltrated Allied lines and presented themselves and some captured documents regarding the St. Nazaire port fortifications to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army’s intelligence director. Next they ran into Lt Col Powell. He recognized them by their OSS jackets and finally now Team GEORGE could get weapons for their Maquis. They went back across the lines and in the end equipped their Maquis for the action against the German FESTUNG at St. Nazaire and to help protect the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army’s southern flank.\footnote{Ibid. p. 217.}

\textit{Brittany Conclusion}

opinion, perhaps it would be fair to say that ALOES was too late to effect the guerilla warfare of July and early August, but that its presence served to support Major General Middleton very well when the Germans retreated into their defenses around Brest. Relations with ALOES was certainly strained as Knox’s language describing Eon’s mission is heavy with sarcasm due to his disagreement regarding how GILES should be employed. Dewavrin reacted unkindly toward the American Captain Knox and told him that, “the sight of my uniform made him feel ill.” By arriving so late the ALOES mission became superfluous. According to Knox, he left Colonel Eon, “and his useless staff alone.” But the command of Brittany’s Maquis, was largely performed by the SAS commander Bourgoin operating in concert with the DMRs. Certainly, their ability to coordinate suffered due to the need to stay on the move and avoid arrest, but as a command element behind the lines, Bourgoin, Willk and Barthélemy and their JEDBURGH teams pulled off some successes. The high density of German troops, the importance attached to the region by both the Allies and the Germans, and the relative political unity of the Maquis all created unique conditions in the region. The JEDBURGH team deployments to Brittany exemplified the original operational concept the early SOE planners envisaged. In all EMFFI deployed 12 JEDBURGH teams to the peninsula, several SAS missions with over 300 soldiers, and coordinated 206 tons of weapons drops during the month of July resulting in Willk’s belief that they had armed 18,489 Breton Maquisards by the time

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77 Knox.
78 Knox letter and Foot, p. 403.
they gave the order to commence hostilities on 3 August. Recalling the early planning discussed in Chapter 1, the EMFFI deployed the JEDBURGHs to Brittany anticipating the widespread loss of their SOE and BCRA agents wanting the JEDBURGHs to act as their replacements. However the creation of a French led organization, the EMFFI, running the whole operation was not foreseen by SOE nor did the SOE foresee the Gaullists eclipsing them as SHAEF’s primary means to command the Résistance. Mockler-Ferryman was gone and there was, due to enemy successes and French assumption of control of the operations for France, no meaningful F Section presence in Brittany. General Koenig had succeeded in gaining complete command of all the SOE and OSS assets as well as the Breton Maquis. Some scholars estimate that the FFI in Brittany numbered around 35,000 armed men. Luc Capdevila notes the problem with such an assessment given the nature of the “spontaneous mobilization.” However, the number the Allies believed they armed at the time largely comports with post war historians estimations of what was within the realm of the possible. So, if they did indeed have nearly 20,000 FFI under their command at the beginning of August, how well did they utilize them?

Due to a single Résistance group in Brittany, the JEDBURGH teams rarely had to mediate between political factions nor contemplate ramifications of supporting one group over the other. Team GEORGE is the exception to this and its members

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did have to negotiate their way through the local politics but once established, would have enjoyed some success had their communications not been suspect. Either politics, poor communications, or lack of arms proved to be the source of JEDBURGH failures in France. Bernard Knox believed the communist philosophy had very little hold on such a rural and religious area and with the FTP filled with non-idealistic young men who simply wanted to fight the Germans, Knox believed politics was “unimportant.”

Since that was the case, and since EMFFI arranged for many of the drops that the JEDBURGHs, DMRs, and SAS requested, the Brittany FFI was largely successful during the first week of August in harassing the German forces as the American conventional units made their way into the region. However, there was a great deal of murder and mayhem, in addition to the legitimate military action Eisenhower and his commanders sought. German General Fahrbachter’s policy of ruthless actions against anyone suspected of supporting the Résistance turned back against the Wehrmacht with the shooting of prisoners and spies as Knox, Grall, and Tack’s report makes clear. But it seems a stretch to blame the JEDBURGH or SAS mere presence for provoking the shooting of prisoners. Indeed, the presence of the JEDBURGHs and their work with the Maquis mitigated such actions and kept the FFI leashed to Eisenhower’s intent. Indeed Bob Kehoe wrote after the war that while the headquarters staff may often “talk of ‘command and control’ our role was better described as ‘convince and induce’” when it came to the

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81 Knox, letter to author.
Maquis.\textsuperscript{82} Such is the nature of partisan warfare and attempting to reign in the passion of the people, to use Clausewitz’s words.

\textsuperscript{82} Kehoe, p. 34.
Chapter Seven
Setting the Trap

While Eisenhower and Koenig consolidated and reorganized French control over the FFI, Allied operations in France continued. American Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s 1st Army and British Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey’s 2nd Army had spent the days since D-Day attempting to capture the Cherbourg port and the city of Caen respectively. Possessing Cherbourg would give the Allies one of the ports required to nourish their growing numbers while Caen sat astride key roads Eisenhower needed to drive to the east and south out of Normandy. On 26 June the Germans surrendered Cherbourg and Caen finally fell on 8 July, the same day Bernard Knox, Paul Grall, and Gordon Tack of Team GILES landed in Brittany. The Wehrmacht countered the Allies with most of their armored forces facing the Dempsey’s British and Canadians while the Wehrmacht forces that faced Bradley’s US forces were largely comprised of Infantry and Airborne units. The 2nd SS “Das Reich” Division that had been ordered to stop its “clearing operations” in southern France as they were committing their deadly work in Oradour-sur-Glane, struggled mightily to pass through the Maquis and Allied fighter bomber harassment. They finally arrived, regrouped, and began participating in the Normandy combat on 20 June.¹ Teams QUININE and AMMONIA had assisted in that delay, but the

¹ “2nd SS Panzer Division, formerly 7th Army Reserve now designated Army H Group Reserve,” 22 June, 1944, Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, HW 1/3003, BNA, Kew, UK; and Hastings, Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France,
infamous Division’s delayed arrival can also be attributed to F Section Agents and their networks, as well as the BCRA controlled networks such as those run by DMR Eugene Dechelette in R5 implementing their part of Plan Vert. Additionally, as Max Hastings has pointed out, OB West did not issue the order for the Division to move north until 10 June. Therefore, part of the credit for the delay should be given to Gerd von Rundstedt.²

The Wehrmacht succeeded in slowing down Allied efforts in Normandy while they mistakenly waited for what they believed would be Lieutenant General George Patton’s First U. S. Army Group (FUSAG) to hit the beaches in the Pas de Calais in Northeastern France. But Hitler’s suspicions were entrenched into firm belief by a sophisticated Allied deception campaign. In reality, Patton’s force, the 3rd US Army, began to arrive in France in the middle of July and became officially active on 1 August.³ With that force was Special Forces Detachment 11 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert I. “Rip” Powell. His role was to be a part of the operations staff, or G-3, in Patton’s Headquarters and enable cooperation with the FFI as the 3rd Army pressed the attack into France. Each of the numbered Allied Armies had their own SF Detachment but not all used it as Patton did, nor did they have the need for FFI support.⁴ As Patton’s superior Lt Gen Bradley shifted his emphasis

² Hastings, Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd Ss Panzer Division through France, June 1944. p. 127.
south and east along the north side of the Loire River. Patton wanted to race as fast as his tanks, fuel, and soldiers could go. This necessitated aid from two different methods of warfare than the 3rd Army could summon with their own soldiers and vehicles. To do it, Patton relied on the US Army Air Forces to provide close air support, but he also relied upon the irregular forces of the FFI to his south. Patton’s fellow Army commanders to his north were not in a position that exposed their flanks, nor were they encouraged to race as far as they could, so for them FFI support was not as crucial.

The Allied invasion of southern France was finally approved on 2 July. Not knowing whether he would get the landing craft necessary for placing his forces ashore, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch began final planning and rehearsals for what was called ANVIL and he was given the go ahead to land between Toulon and Nice on 15 August. But Churchill, who had never favored an invasion of southern France and sought to use those forces for further landings in Italy or in the Balkans continued to argue against it. He failed to convince Ike to call off the southern invasion, and Eisenhower told him that if it was a political issue, he would have to appeal to directly to Roosevelt. He did so in a message to the President’s close aid Harry Hopkins only a week before the invasion was to begin. Opening up with compliments regarding American forces and their quick movement into Brittany as well as east into central France, the Prime Minister complained that, “I’m grieved

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to find that not even splendid victories and widening opportunities do not bring us
together on strategy.” He went on for another five pages on the reasons for canceling
or diverting what had now been renamed DRAGOON. Hopkins would have none of
it and answering for the President who was at his Hyde Park home at the time, he
replied to Churchill that it was far too late to shift things now, and that the way north
“will be much more rapid than you anticipate. They have nothing to stop us.” He
went on to add, “The French will rise and abyssinate [sic] large numbers of Germans,
including, I trust, Monsieur Laval.” While the word abyssinate is not in the
dictionary, Hopkins apparently meant to imply that the Wehrmacht would suffer the
same fate as Italian Dictator Mussolini’s stalwart troops had in the Horn of Africa the
year before. While Hopkins’ hopes may have been more rhetorical than Eisenhower
would have himself stated, the Allies did want Patch’s 7th Army to drive up the
Rhone River valley and eventually link up with Eisenhower’s forces coming across
France from the west. Patch and Patton were to shut the door on fleeing German
forces as quickly as possible. If successful, the Allies could potentially trap
thousands of German soldiers in France. So while Patton wanted the FFI to protect
his southern flank, Patch sought FFI intelligence for his forward movement and
wanted Cochet’s and Koenig’s Maquis to harass the Germans along their routes to
and from the battle area, cut their lines of communication, and sabotage enemy
supplies and facilities. Attempting to control this would be Special Forces Unit No. 4

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6 "PM to Harry Hopkins," 6 August 1944, MAP ROOM FILES, To and From Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY.
7 "Number 36 Personal and Top Secret, For the Prime Minister from Mr. Harry Hopkins," 7 August 1944, MAP ROOM FILES, To and From Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY.

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commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Bartlett. Like his counterparts in SHAEF, Bartlett served within Patch’s operations division and had a liaison to his intelligence staff as well as his subordinate units.⁸

Of course Hopkins was exaggerating quite a bit when he told the Prime Minister that the Germans had nothing to stop Allied troops. The 11th Panzer Division and the portions of the 9th Panzer Division were still in the south, as well as several Reserve Infantry and Mountain Light Infantry Divisions. Additionally, there were anti-aircraft or FLAK units, naval and marine forces in the port areas, the Feldgendarmes scattered around the main cities, and thousands of civilian administrators working for the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF). But for the Allies, the focus of attention was the armored units, as they afforded the enemy an offensive combat force. The location and combat status of the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions and smaller mobile units were of great interest to the Allied commanders. Therefore as the Allies maneuvered through France, they sought to use the Maquis to stifle the enemy’s mobility and focused on these two Divisions where possible.

As Patton’s 3rd Army began coming ashore in Normandy behind Lt General Bradley’s forces in the middle of July, the Allies, including Churchill and Roosevelt, began to see the utility of Maquis action and sought to bring more of it to bear. De Gaulle’s views were more circumspect however and he appreciated the situation with greater sobriety. He sought to emphasize what the French were doing for their

nation’s liberation but did not think things had gone smoothly. Writing to General Wilson at Algiers, de Gaulle believed the Résistance in Brittany, the French Alps, and the Massif Central were having the desired effect, but believed that especially in the Vercors, “There is no doubt the opening of guerrilla activity was begun too soon” and that the supplies insufficient and too late.\(^9\) SHAEF staffers however seem to be amazed at what was occurring and viewed the German attacks on the Vercors as a strategic benefit. SFHQ’s monthly report summed up the action as having diverted portions of the 11\(^{th}\) Panzer Division, as well as infantry, artillery, and airborne troops estimated at 10,000 soldiers. “The forces of the FFI thus were able to divert a considerable ENEMY force which might have been used elsewhere.”\(^10\)

Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Harry Butcher remarked that the “Résistance groups in France have stopped considerable rail traffic, out [sic] three main canals and have blown up 10,000 tons of ammunition and a depot.” He also noted “severe fighting” in central and southern France and remarked that, “We are still dropping into France SAS troops, JEDBURGH teams, jeeps, armor and ammunition not only from England, but from North Africa.”\(^11\) SFHQ and its parent for France EMFFI sought to utilize the Maquis, but the swelling numbers necessitated careful selection of where to send those arms Butcher spoke of, and how quickly to deploy the Jeds.

\(^9\) 370.64 France Vol. II, French Resistance Groups, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
With nearly 100 JEDBURGH Teams in reserve for France, as of 17 July only
19 had been deployed and that demonstrated a hesitance based upon several factors.
So far SFHQ had deployed the Jeds focusing on central France with teams HUGH,
HAMISH, ANDY, and ISAAC, Southern France with team BUGATTI, AMMONIA
and QUININE, the Rhone River valley with teams WILLYS, VEGANIN, DODGE,
and CHLOROFORM, and Brittany with teams FREDERICK, GEORGE, GILES,
HILARY, FRANCIS, GILBERT, GAVIN, and GUY. When the Maquis swelled to
uncontrollable numbers, the Allies went through a major re-assessment of how to use
the JEDBURGH teams along with a careful evaluation on their ability to supply the
FFI. They also ascertained the available airlift with an appreciation for enemy
interference, moon phases, and the certain delays from weather. Their planning was
based on new assumptions now learned from experience, but in many cases
implemented by the new French staff officers as Koenig took over. His control can
clearly be seen as F Section requests for sending teams to France went through either
Koenig or his Chief of Staff Colonel Henri Ziegler as a note of 28 July suggests. F
Section requested a JEDBURGH Team to be sent to various locations in France and
the operations section of EMFFI considered them and approved of most, but did so
with an appreciation of the DMRs views, inter-allied missions that were already in the
area, and disapproved others based on the belief that uniformed teams were not yet
appropriate to the region around Paris. One thing the British, French, and American
officers who now comprised EMFFI wished to do was to send JEDBURGHs to
eastern France and the departments of Doubs, Haute Saône, Aisne, Cote d’Or and
Vosges. The F Section officer, apparently Lt Col Buckmaster, did not object to any of Zeigler’s points as his notes in the margins agree with all of the comments.\textsuperscript{12}

Written the day after Mockler-Ferryman’s resignation, but a day before Gubbins approved of it, Buckmaster, who was now EMFFI’s British Deputy for Operations along with American Lt Col Paul van der Stricht, evidently understood Koenig’s growing role in France.

While the Allies did not all agree or understand the effect the \textit{Maquis} might actually be having on the enemy, the Germans suffered considerable consternation themselves. Not only were they overwhelmed with enemy action, fuel shortages, sabotaged communications, and hit and run attacks throughout France, but the normal fog of war became increasingly thick when on 20 July elements inside the army nearly pulled off an assassination of Hitler and an Army coup against the Nazis. In Paris on the 20\textsuperscript{th}, the commander of the MBF, Carl Heinrich von Stülpenagel received the first and incorrect report that Hitler was dead, and he began to arrest the Paris based SS officers and troops. But when von Kluge, who had taken over from Rundstedt at \textit{OB West}, refused to join the coups and everyone heard the truth of Hitler’s survival, the estimated 1200 SS who had been arrested were politely released the next day. Stülpenagel’s days were numbered and he was recalled to Germany on the 21\textsuperscript{st}. His suicide attempt enroute to Berlin only landed him in a hospital and after a summary trial he was executed on 30 August.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} "USE OF JEDBURGHS," 28 July 1944, BCRA Documents - Jedburghs, 3 AG 2 462, Archives National, Paris, France.

However, throughout it all the *Wehrmacht* was able to develop a fairly clear understanding of what the Allies were attempting to get the *Maquis* to do. By the end of July the Germans turned their understanding into propaganda. In the *Pariser Zeitung* of 29/30 July ran a long article claiming that the Allies were conducting an illegal war in France due to the use of “so-called regular armed forces of General Koenig which consist of the French *Résistance* organization formed under English leadership. Englishmen, Americans, and de Gaullists form the framework and are parachuted in to try in vain to produce a rising of the people.”14 Clearly the Gestapo had succeeded in untangling the difference between the SAS or OG commando missions and what the JEDBURGHs were sent to do. How did they know this? By the end of July, the JEDBURGH reports of FREDERICK, GILES, as well as others discussed their discovery of security leaks and traitors in their *Maquis*. The intelligence gained by these moles must have informed the Gestapo of the three-man Allied missions. Moreover, William Savy had told the internal commander of the FFI of the JEDBURGH plan and it may have come up during General Dejussieu’s interrogation after his arrest in May. So while no Jeds had yet been killed or taken prisoner, the Gestapo’s penetration of various *Résistance* groups aided German and Vichy efforts in understanding how the Allies were actively working with them against the *Wehrmacht*. Furthermore, their propaganda, by basing its argument on what was legal to do within the framework of the Armistice Germany and France signed in 1940, was a point that the Allies and General Koenig were also concerned

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14 “*Ausserhalb des Gesetzes!*,” copie des *Pariser Zeitung*, RW 35/551, BA-MA.
about. De Gaulle’s position had always been that because an armed enemy had invaded France, the Armistice of 1940 was null. His legal view of the matter flowed from this belief while the Germans of course thought otherwise and believed instead that what the Allies were doing was inciting an illegal rebellion against the legal government of France. While the Germans may have thought this way, they of course did not act like it since their occupation of the entirety of France demonstrated who Hitler believed was the real authority in France. As for the JEDBURGHs doing the inciting of the Maquis violence, it is clear the German propagandist also misunderstood the source of the inciting. It was German actions over the course of the long occupation that provoked the “Terroristen” as the Wehrmacht called them. Ironically the Jeds, in most circumstances, were asserting a break on the spasm of violence and, in theory at least, would be de Gaulle’s voice, through Eisenhower and Koenig, regarding what violence was legitimate and useful.

Now too far along in the effort to reconsider or significantly alter course regarding the legality of the FFI, the Allies themselves groped for a way to present the FFI as a legally constituted force. Before the invasion, on 20 May, General Koenig was given copies of the First World War’s Armistice agreement of November 1918, the Geneva Convention of July 1929, and a copy of the German and Italian Armistice agreements with Pétain from June of 1940. He may have requested these documents to see how far he could use irregular forces and the nature of their rights in a treaty that Germany had signed. Before D-Day SHAEF was also concerned about

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15 Dossiers 1, GB Cabinet du Koenig, 8 P 1, SHD, Vincennes, France.
irregular warfare and decided to support the issue of armbands to the FFI and parachute them in with the weapons and other supplies. On 9 June, the Provisional Government of France officially adopted the FFI as an armed force under its authority. SFHQ arranged for 14,000 armbands to be dropped on 25 June during the daylight Operation BUICK. The Germans soon noticed the armbands on FFI and reports of them quickly began filtering in to OB West noting the presence of Maquis with the armbands by late June. Furthermore, EMFFI messages to the DMRs emphasized wearing the armbands and that the “Brassards” as the French called them, would be included in the equipment drops. However, Colonel Zeigler radioed Dechelette that it was unclear to what extent the Germans would recognize this makeshift uniform. SHAEF staff did not know either and did not think the French Provisional Government’s proclamations, nor the armbands would be sufficient for the typical German soldier. General Whiteley of Eisenhower’s staff requested General Koenig to work out how he could begin the process of enrolling the Maquis into the French Army and provide the Maquis with a service book “which while not bulky” due to airlift constraints, could be viewed by the Germans as a bone fide military document similar to what the Germans had done for their own

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18 "K. T. B.," Juni 1944, OB West Ic, RH 19 IV/133, BA-MA, Freiburg im Briesgau, Germany.
19 "Commandement Supérieur Des Forces Françaises en Grande Bretagne," 1944, GB Cabinet du Gen Koenig, Dossiers 1, 8 P 1, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
“Organisation Todt” members who were now being used as combatants. All of this was being done in a large-scale game of catch up due to the lack of ability to plan out such key elements prior to starting OVERLORD. The argument between FDR and de Gaulle had deep ramifications.

Setting the Trap
Conventional Forces and coordinating with the Maquis

On the same day that Operation CADILLAC occurred July 14, SHAEF wished to initiate a third such operation and EMFFI began organizing another daylight airdrop of weapons and supplies to the *Maquis*. SHAEF and EMFFI gave the highest priority to The Vosges region of eastern France but after more than a week, EMFFI scrubbed that part of the operation due to, “enemy action there being too great to allow a daylight reception.” For the nearly two hundred B-17s to reach their targets using low altitude daylight runs, enemy antiaircraft concentration had to be light and the Vosges did not qualify. After some reassessment, Operation BUICK was conducted on 1 August delivering 2,286 containers from 192 aircraft to four drop zones in southern and eastern France. BUICK provided weapons to groups between Lyon and Dijon and to groups east of Lyon near the towns of Albertville and Annecy.

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20 “French Forces of the Interior,” 22 July 1944, Command and Control of French Forces of the Interior, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, OFFICE OF SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF: Records, 1943-45, 322, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. The German Organisation Todt was constituted of many eastern Europeans pressed into service in order to build France’s coastal defenses. The German government broadcast that many of these people were now bona fide members of their armed forces and should be viewed as legal combatants.

21 “EMFFI Operation Order No. 18, Amendment No. 2 Operation BUICK,” 28 July 1944, EMFFI Ordres, 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France.
in three different *Departements*. But this was not enough and did nothing for the high priority Vosges *Maquis*. EMFFI began planning another daylight mission and more of the normal Special Operations nighttime missions would have to make up the difference.

The day before BUICK, EMFFI made arrangements to make up for the fact that the Vosges would not be supplied during the next day’s operation. EMFFI began planning a JEDBURGH and SAS mission for the region with the hope of sending Team JACOB “to arm up to a maximum of about 7000 men…and keep them supplied” for this key region. Indeed throughout the month of July, as EMFFI was organizing, SHAEF had instructed Koenig to arm “approximately 77,000” men by the first of August and to sustain them. Doing so meant canceling a French proposed Airborne Operation code named “CAIMAN” that was intended to develop one of the *Maquis* concentrations into a more potent sore point behind the German lines. But there was simply not enough airlift to mount it and so Eisenhower was forced to cancel it. SHAEF planners knew there was a shortage of parachutes as well as airlift sorties but believed that 77,000 men was a realistic number. With Operation ANVIL given a firm go, the intent was for those airlift missions to support the *Maquis* who in turn would conduct widespread guerilla actions in support of General Patch’s invasion in the south, as well as Eisenhower’s progress east across France.

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23 “Operations Order No. 21, 31 July 1944” 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France.
The southern theater’s rough equivalent of SFHQ, the Special Projects Operations Centre (SPOC) communicated their priorities to General Koenig that explained how they sought to use the *Maquis*. The same day that Operation BUICK dropped weapons north and east of Lyon, SPOC drew up its planning on how to use its 15 JEDBURGH Teams. SPOC wanted teams to deploy to the Aveyron, Savoie, Hautes Alpes, and the Basses Alpes departments and cut the roads and railroads while the last three teams would also foment guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, two more teams would be sent to the Gard and a team to cover the Ariège and Pyrenées Orientales in order to cut roads and railroads out of Tarbes and Avignon while using the *Maquis* to block the Spanish border so *Wehrmacht* troops could not flee south into neutral Spain. SPOC’s seven teams already in France were also to step up pressure on certain lines of communication, and in one instance, Team CHLOROFORM would be shifted from its present location in the Haute Alps near Italy to come back to the Rhone Valley in order to harass German troops behind the main invasion area. Team PACKARD, comprised of American Captain Aaron Bank, French Captain Henri Denis, and Canadian radio operator F. Montfort had departed Algiers the night before and were to cut the road Bozouls – Mende Pont d’Espret and the St. Flour to Campagnac railway. One JEDBURGH team was held in reserve and Operational Groups and Inter-Allied Missions were also factored into SPOC’s planning for how it would get the *Maquis* to support General Patch’s invading forces for his D-Day on 15 August.25 The effect of it all was to have the *Maquis* harass German forces as they

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came to the invasion area down from the center of France through the Rhone River valley or from Toulouse and further west in France. Primarily the planners were concerned about the 11th Panzer Division north of Toulouse at Montauban, as the largest threat to Patch’s invasion force; and if the Maquis could successfully sabotage rail roads, and conduct hit and run raids, they could buy the invasion forces some time.

The planning and cooperation between the two Allied theaters now began in earnest. On 1 August, Eisenhower directed EMFFI to equip 120,000 men into the FFI by the end of the year and use 400 sorties per month to do so. On 2 August, the day Sergeant Bourgoin was killed in Pleuville, EMFFI told SPOC that they were sending two JEDBURGH officers, British Major Osborne Grenfell and American Lieutenant Lucien Conien, to Algiers. They would be leaving for Algiers on the 6th and take the communications equipment and supporting plans for six teams that would be controlled by London. The teams had to deploy from Algiers due to aircraft range limitations. General Koenig approved the deployment of Teams JEREMY, JOSEPH, JOHN, MARK, MILES, and MARTIN to various F Section agents in south-western France. The message added that General Cochet could use the remaining four of the ten teams that had previously arrived in North Africa, for “whatever you think fit.” The same day SHAEF received the Mediterranean Theater’s Commander airlift priorities. General Wilson directed that 55 missions

26 FWD-12522, 1 Aug 44, 370.64, France Vol. II, French Resistance Groups, (Guerrilla Warfare), SHAEF, Office of Secretary, General Staff Records, 1943 – 1945, DDE Library, Abilene, KS.
27 2 August 1944, 3 AG 2 462, Archives National, Paris, France. From the nomenclature of the teams it is clear that male first names are being used by London while Algiers is using automobile names or chemicals. “Team JOSEPH” never came to fruition.
supply the *Maquis* in the Vercors hoping to sustain them now under a concentrated attack by elements of the 157\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division. The Drôme, Haute Savoie, Savoie and Isère outside of Vercors were to get 30 sorties of weapons and supplies. The Departement of Ardeche was to get 50 sorties, while Aveyron was to get 30, Lozère 25 and Lot et Garonne, Tarn et Garonne 15 and Pyrenees et Gers was to get 15 and then after the invasion it was to get 70 airlift sorties.\textsuperscript{28} It appears AFHQ and SPOC planners were betting that the 11\textsuperscript{th} Panzer Division would not leave their camps north of Toulouse until ANVIL began and the planners believed inserting the JEDBURGH teams just before the southern invasion’s first day would be sufficient time to impact the 11\textsuperscript{th} Panzer Division’s attempt to reinforce German defenses.

While the plans for the Allied invasion of southern France were beginning to crystallize, EMFFI’s plan on how to use the *Maquis* to support operations outside of Brittany seemed to get scant attention in early August. General Patton’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army officially came into being on 1 August with the schizophrenic mission of moving west to take Brest while moving south and east toward Rennes, Angers, and Le Mans. When German forces facing the northern Allied invasion withdrew to a line around Mortain in order to establish stronger defenses, it created a vacuum and Patton intended to fill it. Here one can see how events began to unfold due to circumstances rather than any specific Allied intent. In other words planning what you sought to achieve was easier than actually conducting operations due to their constantly changing nature.

\textsuperscript{28} FX-78011, 2 August 1944, France Vol. II, French Resistance Groups, (Guerrilla Warfare), SHAEF, Office of Secretary, General Staff Records, 1943 – 1945, DDE Library, Abilene, KS.
Not only did operational planning for the use of new JEDBURGH teams have to keep pace, the JEDBURGH teams in the field had to be maintained and directed. Team HAMISH in Indre worked the region between Châteauroux and Bourges. They had been there since 13 June and needed help organizing the Maquis just east of their area in the Cher south of Bourges. They realized the need in the Cher and related it to SFHQ on 28 July saying, “500 men located southeast of Bourges without arms. Evidently could use Jed team.” HAMISH offered to receive a team on one of their drop zones and help them move to the region to begin arming and training those 500 men. Here, as well as in most of France, getting men into the Maquis was also no problem as Hitler had released a “mobilization order sending our recruiting way up.” However, the problem was how to equip, train, and employ them all.

EMFFI was probably aware of this issue, however offered no realistic solution for dealing with it. Illuminating the increasing problem, Captain Anstett of HAMISH told SFHQ that organizing the Cher had just become easier as “We have found a French colonel who will take command… He has 12,000 men and all request arms.” EMFFI staff decided to fulfill HAMISH’s request for another team and on 3 August completed orders for Team IVOR. The team was comprised of British Captain John Cox, French Lieutenant Robert Colin using the nom-de-guerre Yves Dantec and American Sergeant Robert Goddard. The team was to deploy south of the village of St. Armand in the Cher, establish a relationship with the local FFI commander,

identify more drop zones, and to organize them into units of no more than 100 men.\textsuperscript{30}

On 6 August, SFHQ told HAMISH, “sending Jed team IVOR and 1 million in containers marked with white cross on ground Paris tonight.” Looking forward to seeing his friends, American Sergeant Watters of HAMISH replied enthusiastically, “All set. Tell the boys to bring some American cigarettes for us.”\textsuperscript{31}

However, the tone changed dramatically in the very next message following team IVOR’s arrival. “Goddard killed. Do not know how but he died instantly upon hitting ground. Chute opened but not completely. … Burial tomorrow. More later.”\textsuperscript{32}

The American W/T operator’s chute never opened properly and he and the radio equipment, did not survive. Cox, Colin, and the Jeds of HAMISH along with some of their \textit{Maquis} buried Goddard near Beddes, about 40 kilometers southwest of St. Armand-Montrond. The Cher’s \textit{Maquis} and Colonel Bertrand who was attempting to get organized and armed were now set back further until a replacement could be found for Goddard. SFHQ knew that team ANDY’s officers suffered severe injuries on their parachute jump making it a non-operational team. However the radioman, British Sergeant Glen Loosmore, was able to perform his duties so they made arrangements for Loosmore to travel to the Cher to replace Goddard and become IVOR’s W/T operator. On the 13\textsuperscript{th} Loosmore got there and then had to resolve the technical difficulties attempting to use his ANDY encoded radio while serving in

\textsuperscript{30} “Operations Order No. 28,” 3 August, 1944, EMFFI Ordres, 3 AG 2 473, Archives National, Paris, France.


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. Roll 8, Target 2, Vol., 4, Book II, p. 271.
Team IVOR.\textsuperscript{33} For several days, EMFFI could not understand why ANDY was broadcasting when the team had been deactivated and Loosmore had to convince them he was now with IVOR in the Cher.\textsuperscript{34}

Not only did the situation on the ground alter their intentions forcing administrative and policy shifts, but the take over of operations by EMFFI led to a great deal of confusion. Primarily the efficient routing of communications traffic became a source of failure within the staff. Coordinating communications within EMFFI and their counterparts at SOE who managed the stations became so poor that by the end of August two teams had actually deployed to France without the knowledge of the communications section.\textsuperscript{35} That meant that when Team ALEC, which deployed on the 10\textsuperscript{th} and Team BUNNY that was in France on 18 August broadcast on their appointed frequency at the appointed time, no one was listening. ALEC’s officers, never realizing what had occurred, later complained that, “shortly after our arrival [in France] it became evident that we were not going to receive much assistance from London.”\textsuperscript{36} Instead they coordinated as best they could with the local FFI and later the conventional forces that operated near their area. Team ALEXANDER’s radio operator, Dick Franklin realized his messages would be answered and understood if sent in French, but not English. In fact it was clear to him that EMFFI had completely ignored all his messages as EMFFI sent him his first

\textsuperscript{33} Team Report of IVOR, HS 6/528, BNA, Kew, UK.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., Loosmore’s messages in Vernon’s papers in SHD, Vincennes are from IVOR but read that they are from ANDY. The pencil markings on the original message question how this could be.
\textsuperscript{35} Note from Bourne-Patterson, 10 August 1944, Laisse 1, 3 AG 2 462. NA, Paris, France.
message, in French, after the team had been in France for some time. Franklin realized that London still believed him to be in Creuse when the team had been in Charente for the last ten days.\(^{37}\)

Airlift also became something too great to manage among the EMFFI staff largely comprised of French officers unaccustomed to marshalling Allied capacity. Airlift estimates that the SFHQ had done in mid and late June demonstrate their understanding of airlift’s capability and how many FFI could be initially supplied and then maintained for continuous operations. The Anglo-American planners had worked out that one plane load of 15 containers could arm 60 *Maquis*, and that another plane load of 15 containers packed with replacement arms and additional ammunition would re-supply 100 *Maquis*, the planners thought that their current force of 15,000 men would require 200-250 successful sorties to re-supply and that the 78,000 unarmed volunteers would require *1300 successful airlift sorties each month* just to give them their initial weapons and ammunition.\(^{38}\) Therefore, for SHAEF to arm this number, it would need more than 1500 successful missions each month. However, just before OVERLORD, SFHQ staff planners indicated that no more than 575 successful airlift sorties per month could be expected from the 115 British and American clandestine aircraft available in the UK and North Africa due to enemy activity, maintenance issues, moon phases, weather, and reception parties. Adding as they did the B-17s for the large-scale daylight missions contributed only an average


\(^{38}\)”Position in Zone Sud and Need for Arms,” undated (likely 15 to 25 June) Appendix A, HS 6/377, BNA, Kew, UK.
of 200 more sorties each month.” Therefore, when Ike directed EMFFI on 1 August to arm and maintain 120,000 FFI by the end of 1944 but only granted them 400 sorties per month, he seemed to be setting them up for failure. Re-supplying 120,000 FFI would require 1800 successful sorties per month while 400 sorties re-supplied only an estimated 26,667 Maquis. The situation became even more problematic when one considers the sortie success rate was expected to be around 50%. For the Maquis this meant weapons would have to come from other sources and the FFI would never get enough from air drops.

Such shortages mandated priorities be set and rigidly adhered to. Noting that more than the 400 sorties were unlikely, as well as the shortage of parachute silk making things even more difficult, Eisenhower defined his priorities on 15 August as Operation DRAGOON’s forces worked their way ashore near St. Tropez. Regions P1, P2, and P3 around Paris; C2 and C3 covering the Meuse and Moselle valleys and the Vosges; and A4 and A5 alongside the Belgium border were first priority. AFHQ’s missions in R1 discussed above were second priority and the rest of France was third.39 R5 and R6, the zones needed to protect the Eisenhower’s southern flank were last in priority as were Regions D1 and D2 which comprised the Jura, Doubs, Côtes d’Or and the Haute Marne Départements. Furthermore, the same directive complained to General Koenig that Brittany had received far more of its allotment while his current airlift pace supporting General Wilson’s request in southern France

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39 SHAEF 17240/23/Ops, 15 August 1944, 370.64 France Vol II, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), SHAEF SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
was not going to be met for August.\textsuperscript{40} So not only was the capability not enabling the requirement, but the sorties they did generate in the first half of August were not getting to the priority regions. Mockler-Ferryman commented in his resignation letter on 27 July that he knew deliveries were “going to the wrong places” but was unable to direct corrections due to French suspicions of him.\textsuperscript{41} Clearly the swelling \textit{Maquis} could not count on the Allies to re-supply them nor could they count on them for initial arms and equipment.

Despite the paucity of weapons for the overwhelming numbers, EMFFI began the process to deploy more teams into southern France, an area that was the lowest priority. In addition to Team IVOR, EMFFI confirmed plans to send Team ALEC to the northern section of Cher along with an SAS element. The Team was to report to the F Section Circuit leader Philippe de Vomécourt and maintain a liaison between him and any \textit{Maquis} groups they could establish contact with. They were to organize them into groups of no more than 100 “and that as soon as equipment is available they should start guerilla activity but not repeat not open warfare.”\textsuperscript{42} The same day, Colonel Zeigler ordered three more teams and three small groups of French SAS were to deploy to central France. JEDBURGH Teams JAMES was to go to the Correze, ALEXANDER to the Creuse, and LEE to Vienne and Zeigler directed them to “prevent enemy movements on the railway lines Perigeux-Limoges-Chateauroux and Toulouse-Limoges-Chateauroux.” The presence of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Panzer Division must

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} “To C.D.” 27 July, 1944, HS 9/510/1, BNA, Kew, UK.
\textsuperscript{42} “EMFFI Operation Order No. 30,” 6 August 1944, Ordres d'Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 3 AG 2 473, Archives National, Paris, France.
have been what provoked the interest in those railway lines as the 11th now was placed just north of Toulouse. The SAS and presumably the Jeds, were not to “encourage formation of large units by resistance and will confine themselves to guerilla actions, avoiding pitched battles and open warfare.”⁴³ Teams ALEC and LEE deployed to France on the 10th, Team JAMES deployed on the 11th and Team ALEXANDER got off late not arriving until the 13th. The 11th Panzer Division received orders from Hitler to move to east to Avignon on the 9th and started leaving on the 14th.⁴⁴ Eisenhower need not worry about these tanks coming north because the 11th Pz headed east to prepare to counter the expected Allied invasion somewhere on the southern coast. The day after the Division began moving, that invasion became a reality.

When ANVIL, now renamed DRAGOON, occurred on 15 August, Hitler and his commanders in France realized the nature of their situation had significantly changed and they began making different moves in order to save the German forces from being trapped. Partisan operations, which had gained a certain regularity for teams like IAN, HUGH, HAMISH, and HARRY in July and early August now began to be more chaotic as the Germans decided to evacuate south-western France. On 16 August Hitler directed the Wehrmacht, Feldgendarmeres, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and all other German administrators to evacuate and they began making a concerted effort to leave resistance Regions B2, B1, R5, and R6. The Wehrmacht’s 16th

⁴³ “Order No. 31” 6 August 1944. 3 AG 2 473, AN, Paris, France.
⁴⁴ Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5. p. 561.
InfantrieDivision was to be the northern covering force using the Loire River as a screen to protect their comrades from the Eisenhower’s forces to their north. The 16th InfantrieDivision was a new designation for the 158th Reserve Division. Its commander, Generalleutnant Ernst Häckel, a veteran of the eastern front in 1941 and 42, was to organize the defense of the German forces and personnel while they attempted to flee France via Dijon, then on through the Belfort Gap in Alsace, and from there into Germany. Currently headquartered in a village south-east of Nantes, and just south of where Team GEORGE was beginning to finally succeed in organizing local resistance, the Division began to move east to defend bridges at key locations on the Loire River. Unknown to the Germans was the fact that their planned escape route lay in areas Eisenhower had made the lowest priority for arming. The DMRs Eugene Dechelette (ELLIPSE) in R5, Alexandre de Courson de la Villeneuve (PYRAMIDE) in R6, Bernard Schlumberger (DROITE) in R4, Jacques Davout d’Auerstaet (OVALE) in D1 and Pierre Hanneton (LIGNE) in D2 along with their Maquis and JEDBURGH missions would have to perform their tasks with the weapons they currently possessed fortified only by the left over sorties that might come when other areas could not be serviced. Evidently Eisenhower was more concerned with what lay directly in front of his forces, than what lay on his flanks.

45 Blumenson and Center of Military History., Breakout and Pursuit. p. 567.
46 HW 1/3173. BNA, Kew, UK.
47 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44. p. 542.
The Résistance in R5 and R4 was a mix of nearly every southern group that had existed since the Armistice. The Provisional Government’s Délégué Militaire Zone (DMZ) was Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury who went by the codename of POLYGONE. A politically astute man who turned 30 on 19 August 1944, he had originally come to France as the DMR for R1, the Lyon and upper Rhone River valley area. Due to persistent arrests he was promoted to DMZ for the southern Zone in February of 1944 and for a time was acting National Delegate who “reorganized regions C and D after mass arrests there in March of 1944 with extraordinary speed and efficiency.” When Chaban-Delmas was named as the permanent DMN, Bourgès-Maunoury then served as his assistant or adjoint, while maintaining his DMZ position for the southern zone.49 Upon his shoulders fell the task to create a unity of action on behalf of de Gaulle and the provisional government in Algiers for southern France. He had even known of the JEDBURGH plan as early as April when William Savy came to France on the ECLAIREUR Mission, and provided intelligence to Savy about the nature of the Maquis, their numbers, and possible drop zones for the JEDBURGH mission planners to use.50 He had worked tirelessly and clandestinely for the Résistance and maintained communication with BRAL and Koenig in London, the BCRA and Cochet in Algiers, his subordinate DMRs in the south like Dechelette, and the various FFI commanders in the ORA, AS, MUR, and FTP. Few understood the organization and nature of the southern Résistance as well as he. By late July and

49 HS 8/1001, Biographies, BNA, Kew, UK.
August of 1944, the months of the *Libération*, he was continually working with myriad local leaders, striking deals, demanding unity, and succeeding in his efforts. For instance, in August he visited R5 at least twice working with Dechelette and almost always succeeded at gaining the agreement among the parties that military action was what was necessary and that political issues needed to wait.\(^51\) By their success, Bourgès-Maunoury, Chaban-Delmas, the DMRs and the Commissaires de la République, who took regional political control on behalf of the Provisional Government during the *Libération*, proved to be the ones laying the foundation for post-war French political institutions. Their work was crucial.

Teams BUGATTI and QUININE were now enjoying fits and starts of success in southern France and their work helped create the conditions that could slow down the 11\(^{th}\) Panzer Division and capture as many other Germans as possible that were directed to evacuate on the 16\(^{th}\). Still lacking arms Fuller and de la Roche of BUGATTI continually complained that, “we were greatly handicapped by our lack of arms and explosives in spite of our daily message to Algiers for the same.”\(^52\)

Nevertheless, when they received orders to begin “full scale guerilla warfare” on the 14\(^{th}\), they succeeded in organizing ambushes along the road between Tarbes and Toulouse and on the 18\(^{th}\) captured the commander of *Hauptverbindungsstab* or HVSt

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\(^{51}\) Ibid. These are copies of some of his messages to London while in France. One can also see many of his messages in 3 AG 2 482 and 483, Archive National, Paris, France. He is persistently working to coordinate activities, warn colleagues of who was arrested, appoint replacement subordinate leaders, arranging meetings, and passing on news to London and Algiers. Many times during the summer of 1944 he sends and receives multiple messages each day using several radio operators. The amount of traffic from one person under such circumstances is impressive. For his success in the Correze in August see Louis and Marcel Barbanceys Le Moigne, *Sedentaires, Refractaires, Et Maquisards: L'armée Secrète En Haute Correze, 1942 - 1944* (Moulins: Les Imprimiers Reunies, 1979). p. 362.

\(^{52}\) “BUGATTI Report”, undated, Team BUGATTI, HS 6/490, British National Archives, Kew, UK.
Generalmajor Leo Mayr, commander of the occupation forces for the Tarbes region. With the Germans now attempting to flee, the Jeds focused efforts on protecting the Spanish frontier hoping to prevent “the Boches” from escaping into neutral Spain. With both Jed officers able to fly, the team managed to get 10 small aircraft and de la Roche used an aircraft to scout out the best way to march their estimated 1000 FFI up to Angoulême for operations against the Germans north of their area. On 6 September they also met with General Cochet on his visit to the area and worked to get their Maquis back from Angoulême and muster them into the French regular army now standing up in the region. Joining in on the Libération of Tarbes, Fuller was the Allied representative in the city’s ceremony. But while, as one of the F Section assistants noted, BUGATTI “was a terrific morale lifter on their arrival…. the supplies they were promised and that they asked for were never sent and bit by bit disappointment followed enthusiasm.”53 While they achieved some successes in southwest of France, in the end BUGATTI was too far east to harass the 11th Panzer Division and too poorly supplied to fully exploit the areas’ Maquis.

But despite receiving nearly no weapons and poor communication, the JEDBURGHs in the region shifted their mission from what they were ordered to do to fit their changing circumstances. MacPherson’s team QUININE immediately began blowing bridges and tunnels when they heard of the invasion in the south and the Germans started to move, as there was no point in doing it until ANVIL started. Tommy MacPherson believed the number of dropped bridges and tunnels to be

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around a dozen in the Lot in the Massif Central, all attempting to prevent Germans from moving east, and the road from Aurillac to Saint Fleur received special attention. In one instance they contrived an elaborate ambush to trap Germans and Vichy Miliciens in a tunnel and succeeded in killing and wounding several hundred enemy soldiers.\textsuperscript{54} Their success in cutting this road is greater when realizing what the teams north of them were also able to do.

Teams JOHN, COLLODION, PACKARD, and MINARET were in perfect position to harass the 11\textsuperscript{th} Panzer’s march from Montauban to Avignon. However all of them ran into difficulties too great to surmount given the short time they had to work against the already moving 11\textsuperscript{th} Panzer Division. Team JOHN got to Montauban on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} just in time to radio back that the Division’s former base was “liberated and department probably free of Boche.”\textsuperscript{55} Team COLLODIAN parachuted into the Lot, was met by MacPherson, and went into Aveyron as ordered to ambush Germans traveling through that department. But the FTP and the other Maquis in the region were too concerned about each other and interested in using their weapons after the Germans had left. The team did manage to get an arms drop, and coordinate some ambushes, between Montauban – Rode - Millar, but their mission in the Aveyron was largely ineffective and when there were no longer enemy units in the area they sought to take some Maquis east to harass the departing Germans.\textsuperscript{56} Team PACKARD had parachuted into the Lozere, on 1 August and thus

\textsuperscript{54} Thomas MacPherson, June 21 2002.; Bourbon-Parme.
\textsuperscript{56} “Team Report,” undated, HS 6/498, British National Archives, Kew, UK.
had some time to devise plans and implement sabotage on roads and bridges in the Department. By 22 August the Team and the local FFI leader had achieved some measure of unity and set ambushes and booby traps on the road from Ales to Uzez, to the west of Avignon. But by that time, the 11th Panzer Division had already passed through the area and was in the Avignon area and preparing to cover the Wehrmacht’s retreat to the north. Team MINARET, that had been on alert for “nearly three weeks” finally deployed on 14 August to support PACKARD and concentrated on the road from Ganges to Alzon. However, this also was to the west of where most of the 11th Panzer was and thus these four teams were ineffective if SPOC’s intent was slowing down the 11th Panzer Division. While the teams succeed with many ambushes, killing, wounding and delaying hundreds of the enemy from Montauban to Nimes, the Maquis only provided, as French historian Noguères noted in 1981, “a solid experience against guerillas,” for the Germans but not a firm block to their escape.

SPOC sent Team CHRYSLER to the Ariège to work with the Fédération anarchiste ibérique (FAI), or the Federation of the Iberian Anarchists, a group that had been losers in the Spanish Civil War from 1938 and had taken up residence in France. Many of the former Spanish Republicans were in Maquis groups in the region and the French Provisional Government dealt with them warily. Team CHRYSLER, comprised of British Captain Cyril Sell, French Lieutenant Paul

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57 “Team Report” undated, HS 6/549, British National Archives, Kew, UK
58 K. T. B. Ia, 19 AOK, RH-19 IV, 133, BA-MA.
59 Noguères, Degliame-Fouché, and Vigier, Histoire De La Résistance En France, De 1940 À 1945.
Aussaresses, and British Sergeant Ronal Chatten arrived in the Pyrenees on 16 August with the mission of working with the FAI to prevent German formations from escaping across the border into Spain. Originally their mission was to have begun on the 13th, but when the pilot could not confirm the drop zone, he headed back to the airfield near Algiers. The mission’s slip forced a shift in focus. The team would not have a good opportunity now to work against the 11th Panzer Division so they focused on interrupting enemy lines of communication between Toulouse and Narbonne. They spent the last half of August sabotaging the road between these two cities, working to block Germans escaping into Spain, and coordinating with SOE’s George Starr and fellow JEDBURGHs Fuller, MacPherson, and Sharpe. By the end of the month they began to be more concerned about stopping reprisals and after meeting General Cochet on 1 September, the team began to work their Maquis into service further east and to do communication duties for General Cochet as required. They originally had tried to find the DMR Schlumberger, but even on 2 September noted that he was “unknown in the region.”

*The Libération in R5*

When Team JAMES, comprised of American First Lieutenant John K. Singlaub, French Lieutenant Jacques de la Penguilly using the name Jacques le Bel, and American Sergeant A. J. Denneau parachuted into the Correze with an SAS element it began to cut the road running from Tulle-Ussel-Clermont-Ferrand.

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60 Team CHRYSLER Report, HS 6/495, BNA, Kew, UK.
Mission TILLUEL, an Inter-Allied mission commanded by Major Jacques Robert, one of the BCRA Bloc Planning officers; was also in the area. Their mission had received air dropped weapons during July and they had given them to the FTP unit while one of the other AS units had received some and another AS unit had not. R5’s Operations officer had partially armed some in the other AS units making about 8000 armed of the total 12000 FTP and AS Maquis. When JAMES arrived, the various units each surrounded a German garrison along Route National 89. The Germans “did not come out, either because they were ordered to stay and hold or because they were afraid.”61 The team’s weapons and capability status would not improve during the course of its mission as JAMES “received absolutely nothing” while the SAS, OGs, and mission TILLUEL received their drops. After they arrived they met the FTP and AS leadership and agreed to attack the German garrison at Egletons, which lay along that road. Inexplicably, the FTP began the attack hours before the agreed upon time and the AS leader and Team JAMES were forced to join the attack. Later that day, the BBC message came that every effort was to be made to attack German garrisons between the Loire and Garonne Rivers.62 “During the battle of Egletons, Jacques [de la Penguilly] and I made an effort to be seen in the combat area where the shooting was going on and do training right there.” Singlaub later recalled his leadership example validated his teaching and combat credentials to the Maquis. “It showed them what one guy could do, who had some knowledge of the weapons.”63

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During the attack the rumor began to circulate that *Wehrmacht* columns were coming from the southwest, which proved untrue, and the northeast, which was true. The *Maquis* partially lifted the sieges of these villages and took some men to conduct ambushes. But Singlaub and de la Penguilly believed they should completely abandon the sieges in order to have manpower to harass and ambush the traveling columns along Route 89. Unable to convince the FTP commander to contribute forces for this new operation, JAMES and AS *Maquis* did what they could to ambush the enemy between Tulle and Egletons. After the *Wehrmacht* column retreated back toward Clermont-Ferrand and the region quieted down, the Jeds spent the next few days instructing the FTP on operating their weapons. When they believed that was complete, they decided to contact Dechelette in Limoges and arrange for a new mission. By this time, 28 August, the Germans in the Gironde, Charente, and Dordogne were attempting to exit France via the route running roughly from Limoges-Angoulême-Châteauroux-Troyes and attempt to make Dijon where the major combat elements, led by the 11<sup>th</sup> Panzer Division, were already drawing a protective line. They had to go this way due to the FFI’s success at harassing and ambushing the routes, such as Route 89, that would have been more direct.

When JAMES found Dechelette, he had a mission for the team and the AS unit from the Correze. He dispatched the AS unit to the Creuse and radioed London that he was sending Singlaub and de Penguilly back to Britain to get heavy weapons needed to handle the major German column now marching up from Bordeaux. He wanted heavier weapons, 60 machine guns, 50 mortars with plenty of ammunition.
and gasoline within he next 5 days.  Time was critical and the two Jeds along with Major Robert of the TILLEUL mission departed via a C-47 on the 10\textsuperscript{th} while Sergeant Danneau remained in Limoges.  On the same day, Dechelette informed London that Team LEE’s work was done in Vienne but that he had another mission for them and requested them to remain in France.  LEE had, along with British officer of an Inter-Allied mission named BERGAMOTTE worked with the FTP leader Georges Guingouin.  Dechelette had named Guingouin the head of the FFI for the Department of Haute Vienne and Captain Brown of team LEE estimated that he had around 5500 men. They knew that they needed to create obstacles for the retreating German forces so set about doing it. On the 14\textsuperscript{th} they teamed up with some of the Operational Group members and blew a bridge on the only remaining railway line that exited the city to the east. The next day EMFFI radioed them a message with the news that the “German 159\textsuperscript{th} Division reported on move northwards to battle zone. Make maximum effort prevent or hold them up.”

Dechelette’s Maquis need not to be told to do this. The destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, and communication lines occurred non-stop all over the Region.

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64 “de ELLIPSE,” 6 September 1944, ELLIPSE Telegrams, 3 AG 2 561, Archive National, Paris, France.
65 Team JAMES Report, HS 6/530, BNA. p. 12.
68 13 P 156, SHD, Vincennes, France. This is a collection of records and files provided to the French Army sometime after the war for R5. Colonel Riviere, the FFI commander for the Region under Dechelette apparently approved what was included. Guingouin, Raymond Chomel, and Theogene Briant, and many of the other leaders are included in this haphazard but comprehensive file numbering nearly 200 pages. It is filled with detailed accounts of daily activity from before D-Day to when the area was liberated in late September. The sheer volume of destruction is
Additionally, the JEDBURGHs requested air strikes when large groups of Germans could be expected to be moving on the roads. Team LEE, ALEXANDER, JAMES, HUGH, HAMISH, JULIAN and IAN along with the SAS and Operational Group in the region all contributed to the chaos by leading or planning some of the sabotage and when the enemy troop concentrations invited it, wired messages back to EMFFI giving locations of where to conduct air strikes. In the Vienne, Colonel Guingouin succeeded at getting the GMR to desert the Vichy side and join the Résistance. With the city surrounded and the GMR no longer on their side, Generalmajor Walter Gleiniger, Kommandant des Verbindungsstabs 586 decided to surrender what was left of his 300-man occupation force in Limoges. But Gleiniger was arrested by the “German police” when he informed them of the surrender and hustled out of the city, escaping all the Maquis ambushes.\(^{69}\) He committed suicide on 21 August, not ever knowing that most of his command had succeeded in their escape back to Germany.\(^{70}\)

As the destruction of roads, bridges, and railroads continued it was clear the 159\(^{th}\) Division was attempting to flee. Divided into Marching Groups, over 20,000 Germans from the coastal area were working their way through the region under the command of Generalmajor Botho Elster.

Believing that Elster’s force of sailors, Luftwaffe, customs police, soldiers, and civilian administrators was the “159\(^{th}\) Reserve Division,” provoked a response from 3\(^{rd}\) Army’s SF Detachment led by Lt Col Powell. Since 2 August the 3\(^{rd}\) Army and


\(^{70}\) Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder Ns-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung Und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44. P. 454-5.
the FFI had been coordinating their operations via Powell’s Special Forces Detachment. On the 18th Colonel Haskell, Lt Col Paul van der Stricht of the EMFFI staff and Lt Col Powell met with General Patton to discuss the role the FFI would play as the 3rd Army moved east. Recalling that meeting, van der Stricht later noted the absence of British participation in the planning. “No mention whatsoever was made of British participation or personnel in connection with the resistance matters discussed. This would of course have been entirely unthinkable only eighteen months earlier . . .” Van der Stricht also remarked that when Paris was liberated, “there was no sign of any British SOE officer. Circumstances, and not any policy decision, had made the paramilitary operations of French Resistance a Franco-American affair.”  

The Franco-American relationship continued when Generals Patton and Koenig met on the 24th and agreed in principle that the FFI could prove useful to Patton’s drive east. Their agreement then followed regular coordination between 3rd Army operations planners, and Powell’s small group of officers and local FFI commanders. As the 3rd Army aggressively pressed east, covering the 435 kilometers from Rennes to Troyes in the next 7 days, they continued to work issues with the FFI in formal meetings and informal communications that occurred along the way. On the 31st Powell met with F Section agent Philippe de Vomécourt and FFI commanders at Sens, 120 kilometers southeast of Paris. Taking information from the

71 “Letter to R. Harris Smith,” April 14, 1971, Paul van der Stricht Papers, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.
72 FFI History, Brittany HQ 3rd Army After Action Report, p. 724.
73 Le Blanc Interview, 22 January 2008. Robert Le Blanc served as one of Powell’s officers in SF Detachment 11. He was detailed out to work with different units and would always work to keep the Corps commander up to date on what the FFI could do for him.
FFI commanders Powell plotted out what they told him onto a map in order to get a sense of who was where and how strong each unit claimed to be. Third Army’s next objective was Troyes, 72 kilometers to the east, but its southern flank’s lines now ran from Nantes to Sens, a distance of 500 exposed kilometers. With the reports from the FFI talking of tens of thousands of enemy troops on the move all corroborated by dozens of messages from JEDBURGH Teams south of the Loire, Powell and Patton may have had a cause to be concerned. However, seeing the disposition of the FFI all along the river, and having coordinated with them over the past two weeks, Powell recognized a capability and sought to make it useful. After the conference where he was informed as to the paucity of weapons the FFI possessed he knew he had get them arms in order to make their capability come to fruition. Lt Col Powell sent a frantic message to EMFFI that evening requesting more JEDBURGH teams and weapons for the Maquis in the three departments soon to be on his southern flank. At around 1 am on 1 September, SFHQ received Powell’s plea for arms for the area around the city of Dijon and Bourges, bluntly stating that “if Germans organize that area present drive may halt because of threat to flanks.” Powell went on to request that JEDBURGH teams ALEC, BRUCE, CEDRIC, and HARRY needed to be given “top priority” for air dropped weapons, and ended with the following ominous warning, “IF THESE DEPARTMENTS DO NOT RECEIVE ARMS THIRD ARMY NOW FEW MILES FROM GERMANY MAY STOP.”74 Few in 3rd Army wanted to tell General Patton to have to slow down, much less stop.

74 “TO WATERMARK,” 31 August 1944, Laisse 479, 3 AG 2 479, Archives National, Paris, France.
But Powell’s reaction may have been excessive considering the type of enemy column coming in his direction. Generalmajor Botho Elster’s *Marchgruppe Süd*, as it called itself numbered just under 20,000 soldiers, marines, sailors, and assorted other kinds of personnel and was not looking for a fight, it was simply trying to make it to safety beyond Dijon and then on to Germany. Until the middle of August, Elster was the *Feldkommandatur* at Mont-de-Marsan south of Bordeaux. When OVERLORD started, he had attempted to quell the “terrorists” in his area with the “most ruthless and harshest means.” But now the tables were turned and he was fearful of similar methods being turned upon him by the very people he had directed such actions against. Forced to move north due to the *Maquis* and Jeds cutting off routes through the Correze, Lot, and Cantal which would be a more direct route, his motley collection of troops now found themselves attempting to move north and then east through the Vienne, L’Indre, and the Cher and being harassed all the way by the FFI of R5. Dechelette, one of the most successful DMRs in France had by the beginning of August succeeded in achieving a great deal of political unity. For instance his negotiations brought in the FTP of the Colonel Georges Guingouin’s in the Vienne and Theogene Briant’s in L’Indre. Additionally, L’Indre had a substantial *Organisation de la Résistance l’Armée* unit led by Colonel Raymond Chomel with around 2400 men. Chomel’s ORA were not civilians who simply wanted to fight, but regular soldiers who had stayed in their homes as a result of the 1940 Armistice. They were light infantry, artillery, and paratroopers accustomed to organized military

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75 “K. T. B. Nr. 5” 11 June 1944, GenKdo. LXXXVI A. K. Abt. Ia RH 24-86-11, BA-MA, Freiburg im Briesgau, Germany.
operations. Additionally there was as a substantial force of *Armée Secrète* and various other smaller *Maquis* groups. Furthermore, one of Tommy MacPherson’s *Maquis* groups now organized as the “Schneider column” or “colonne Schneider” was across the Allier River firing artillery rounds at portions of Elster’s *Marchgruppe Süd* by 10 September, just as Chomel’s forces had achieved his surrender. The region Lt Col Powell urgently requested arms for, would never see these particular Germans as Dechelette’s combined groups or FFI, Allied Special Forces, SOE agents, the threat of the US Division to the north, and the ever present Allied bombing forced Elster to capitulate before they could get that far.

The surrender of Generalmajor Elster’s *Marchgruppe Süd* proved to be a certainty, but was comprised of many steps in which many different people participated at different times, allowing the Germans to achieve a remarkably good deal. Elster was the only person who participated in every step of the negotiations and used that as an advantage to gain as much as he could from the rolling negotiations that occurred from late August until completed around 16 September. During the process, three different JEDBURGH teams participated in those negotiations along with Colonel Chomel and officers from his FFI unit, intelligence officers from the 329th Infantry Battalion (US) and the commander of the American 83rd Infantry Division, Major General Robert C. Macon. Indirectly participating in the negotiations were F Section Agents Pearl Witherington and Philippe de Vomécourt; and the Allied Air Forces that persistently bombed the German forces on

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76 Beavan’s interview with MacPherson, June 2002.
their march through L’Indre. Team HUGH was by now in full operational swing having been in the department since 6 June and they kept up constant pressure on Elster harassing and obstructing his movements and attempting to cut up his columns while radioing air strike locations. However, HUGH was completely unaware of Elster’s willingness to surrender and took no part in the negotiations. But despite Elster’s overall weakness up against such odds, Elster’s deal became progressively better as the negotiations progressed.

Feelers between the FFI and Elster began on 29 August when JEDBURGH JULIAN sent a message to SFHQ that a demand for Elster’s surrender had been sent to him and they awaited his reply. The demand was made by the FFI in the region and JULIAN was merely informing EMFFI. On the 30th Chomel sent out a notice to the FFI in L’Indre that the manner of warfare remained guerilla warfare and that since large groups of Germans were expected to continue through the department, his Brigade and all the other formations were to coordinate their activities in order to harass the enemy. Next, JULIAN received a request from Colonel Chomel that the US forces north of the Loire River were going to send liaison agents to him and he wanted JULIAN to facilitate the meeting near the Loire River. There was a great deal of confusion about when this would occur with a window of 1 to 14 September. Martel wanted to meet the 83rd Division and arranged to get mines and mortars in order to impress upon Elster the futility of his position. SFHQ, perhaps encouraged

77 “JULIAN report,” HS 6/536, BNA, Kew, UK.  
by Powell’s message also stepped up aerial delivery of weapons and dropped supplies on 1, 4, 8, and 9 September. Additionally, Colonel Chomel’s efforts to contact the 83rd Division directly paid off when JULIAN facilitated a meeting with the 83rd Division that arranged the transportation of 100 anti-tank landmines to Chomel’s brigade.79

On the 8th representatives of Martel’s command met with Elster and the German General told them “When I meet with a real obstacle provided by the Americans then I will see what I have to do but not before. I will not deliver my troops to the Maquis.”80 The discussions were short but they agreed to meet the next day while Martel’s men coordinated with JULIAN to get representatives of the 83rd Division to participate with them. On the 9th, Allied efforts began to coalesce. Notified of a time and place to meet, General Elster met with Colonel Chislain, an officer in Chomel’s Brigade and perhaps Lieutenant Magill of the 83rd Division.81 Elster agreed in principle on the terms of his surrender, but expressed his desire to surrender to the regulars. He had good cause to be afraid of the FFI since members of his command had committed reprisals and shot civilians in Vienne at the end of August.82 Chomel considered his options and requested team JULIAN to represent the Allies at the next meeting set for 3 pm the following day. On the same day

79 JULIAN report, BNA, Kew, UK.
80 Fond R5 – Indre, 13 P 156, SHD, Vincennes, France.
81 Julian’s report states that no one from their team was at this meeting but says that Lt Magill was there. The French report does not mention Magill until the following day. See p. 730 and “Exposé sur le déroulement des négociations relatives à la reddition du Généralmajor ELSTER, commandant la Marchgruppe sud” in 13 P 156, Region 5 Fond 2, SHD, Vincennes, France.
82 Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg Oder Ns-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung Und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44. p. 459.
JULIAN noted a planeload of supplies but needing more told SFHQ, “If FFI this area still to operate against enemy troops further supplies essential.” On the 9th The French and the US Delegation met with Elster again where they agreed to call in a demonstration air strike so Elster’s soldiers could see what the nearly 300 kilometer walk to Dijon would be like if they chose to continue. Elster seemed to need the exhibition in order to convince his soldiers to agree to surrender. They agreed to meet again the next day at Issoudun where Elster had his headquarters. After the discussion with Elster was finished on the 9th, JULIAN took Colonel Martel up to the Loire River bridge and introduced him to Major General Macon. Macon agreed to participate in the discussions and on the 10th he represented the United States while English Major Arthur H. Clutton of JULIAN participated in the negotiations on behalf of the British. Macon also brought along two Colonels of his staff for the discussions at the sous prefecture office. Since Macon did not speak French, and Elster did not wish to speak French, they spoke in English forcing Chomel to continually ask what was being discussed. Furthermore, “Elster showed himself to be a very skilled negotiator and he succeeded in converting the exceedingly unfavorable situation in which he found himself to one of relatively great advantage.” General Macon began the discussions agreeing with Clutton that the FFI and SAS could be useful in maintaining control of the Germans, but after hearing Elster’s tale of woe regarding how the FFI had been acting, Macon agreed to let

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83 Team JULIAN message on 8 Sept. 44, Colonel Ziegler’s, Messages de R5, Carton 9, Fichier 4, 1 K 374. SHT, Vincennes, France.
Elster’s soldiers retain their weapons until they crossed the Loire and could come under the protection of his Division. By the end of the conversation, Macon was convinced and agreed in order to save the Germans from the “bloodthirsty” Maquis. But Macon also agreed that when the Germans handed their small arms over to the Americans, they would be given to the FFI.85

Marching armed Germans through French countryside and expecting there to be no violence required a precise agreement and all sides with each soldier knowing there was to be no shooting. On the 11th, Jeds John Cox from Team IVOR and MacPherson from QUININE took part in another discussion with Elster along with an American Colonel from the 83rd Division. They worked out a procedure to place liaison officers along with the marching Germans, not to go through villages where possible, and to not purchase anything from the French population. Elster was difficult but finally agreed. Despite some violent incidents and one German killing a French civilian, Elster’s forces made it to American lines across the Loire at Orléans on the 15th successfully.86

Macon’s promise to return French looted property and hand over German weapons to the FFI was not kept, and Major Clutton found himself arguing with SFHQ, and senior American officers in late September still attempting to enforce the deal. Due to Macon’s unkept promise, the Americans kept the booty and allowed Elster to surrender with full military honors on 16 September after marching through Cher while the French fumed in humiliation. Their people had been killed and their

85 Ibid., p. 733.
86 IVOR, Roll 8, Target 4, Vol., 4 – Book IV, p. 656.
property taken; their farms and villages looted and burned, but the 83rd Division was completely ignorant of this and forced Clutton to go to de Gaulle directly to get his approval for the return of the French property. Not one to be put off, Clutton went to Paris, got de Gaulle’s signature and returned to Le Mans to pursue the matter further. But it was taking too long and EMFFI ordered team JULIAN back to London.87 The British Jeds and SOE agents involved in the matter could not stifle their frustration with the 83rd Division, General Macon, nor the Americans in general. The stalwart F Section Agent Pearl Witherington who had been in France since September of 1943 wrote, “The Americans went so far as to ask the Maquis to lend lorries for the transportation of those “gentlemen,” which was promptly refused. When the Germans arrived on the Loire they were received by the American Red Cross with cigarettes, chocolates and oranges (things unknown to French civilians for the past five years), and were soon to walk arm in arm in French towns. This capitulation was a heavy blow to FFI pride, and totally underserved, when it is considered that no Americans were anywhere near our circuit or further south.”88

The surrender of General Elster is one of the fables of the Résistance but it has also been claimed by the 83rd Division and in one account made to look as if Lieutenant Magill stood down Elster all by himself. Press accounts in American newspapers at the time all pumped this strange story and credited Magill and Macon with the entire affair barely mentioning the FFI. Since Clutton, Cox, MacPherson, and Witherington were clandestine and their work classified, they avoided the

87 Ibid., Team JULIAN Report, pp. 735-736.
questions from the press. Therefore the link they provided between the FFI and American regular forces remained unknown in English language publications until Colin Beavan revealed more about the surrender in his book in 2006.\(^{89}\) Even the US Army Air Force General attached to 3\(^{rd}\) Army, Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland believed he was the one responsible for Elster’s surrender and at least one author agrees, writing that, “For the first time in history airplanes, unaided by ground troops, had forced the surrender of a large enemy force.”\(^{90}\) Such hyperbole is completely out of touch with the causes of Elster’s surrender and reinforces dangerous beliefs many are all too willing to grasp onto. The truth of the matter is that the FFI, in this case largely comprised of French Regular officers and soldiers armed with weapons supplied through clandestine Allied air drops, surrounded a large German formation comprised mostly of non-combat troops being pounded by Allied bombing and weary from their long march. Unfortunately, French Colonel Chomel’s only fault was

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\(^{89}\) Colin Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War* (New York: Viking, 2006). Beavan’s main source for the whole event is his interview done with Sir Tommy MacPherson in June of 2002. In his interview with Beavan, MacPherson seems to be unaware of his fellow Jedburgh colleague Arthur H. Clutton’s work the day before he talked with Elster and there is no mention of Colonel Chomel at all. In Beavan’s notes of his interviews, which he kindly made available to me, Cox claimed to be just a liaison and to have not taken part in the negotiations. But despite Cox telling this to Beavan and his book listing many of the sources I use above with the exception of SHD, he still gives MacPherson, all the weight in the story and makes it look as if Magill merely “skidded up in a jeep” just as MacPherson and Elster supposedly concluded the whole arrangement. It appears that Beavan inflated MacPherson’s and Cox’s conversation with Elster on the 11\(^{th}\) in which they were merely ironing out procedures and not conducting the hard negotiations that occurred on the 9\(^{th}\) and 10\(^{th}\). In fact Beavan’s notes of his conversation with John Cox reveal that, “we [Cox and MacPherson] never had anything to do with telling Elster to stop. That was the resistance chap.” Which must refer to Colonel Chomel. But unfortunately, the resulting description in Beavan’s book on pages 285 to 291 drops Clutton, Chomel, Macon and their staff officers completely from the negotiations. Thus the event’s complex nature is completely obscured and instead of the US forces of the 83\(^{rd}\) Division getting all the credit, two British JEDBURGHs appear to have achieved a miracle.

believing in General Macon who seemed to prefer to take the word of the enemy Major General as if he were a peer, instead of the word of Colonel Chomel and Major Clutton who were telling him otherwise. The insult is particularly harsh when L’Indre’s Maquis suffered casualties of 368 killed and 547 wounded between 1943 to 1945.\footnote{“Regions R5 etats des pertes,” 13 P 62, SHD, Vincennes, France.} Chomel’s unit, often referred to as the “Charles Martel Brigade” suffered 73 killed and 66 wounded.\footnote{“NOTE sur la Brigade CHARLES MARTEL,” 13 P 156, Region 5 Fond 2, SHD, Vincennes, France.}

Chaos still reigned within the command and control structures in various regions however, and Lt Colonel Hutchison of Team ISAAC still had to contend with various notables coming to him and his French colleague attempting to assert authority. The commander of the FFI for the Region P, Claude Monod, wished to stage an attack on Dijon while 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army, most likely in the form of Powell’s SF Detachment had requested the Maquis guard Patton’s right flank. With not enough weapons to do both, ISAAC disagreed with Monod. But Hutchison had to get written approval from General Koenig in order to enforce this mission instead of the head on attack on the Germans.

By 11 September Hutchison had also made contact with General De Lattre de Tassigny’s forces moving up from the south and he agreed to get the FFI to cover their left or western flank. “This task fitted in perfectly with the protection of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} U. S. Army’s right flank and all F.F.I. companies and Battalions were ordered to thicken the number of ambushes and harry the enemy wherever they could find
The FFI successfully formed a blocking line from Decize – Cercy-la-Tour – Luzy – Autun to prevent the Germans from making it to Dijon, and enabling the link up of Patton’s and Patch’s Armies’ on the 11th, 30 kilometers west of Dijon. But Hutchison was not exceedingly cheery about their accomplishments and blamed London. His repeated “forlorn request for PIATs and Bazookas so urgently needed … while we were able to report something on the order of fifty small [engagements] were taking place, it was a swan song which produced no result.” Not only could his team not get the weapons they requested, but orders from London often were not in accordance with local reality. In one case, 3rd Army wanted the Loire Bridges blown, but EMFFI ordered everything to be preserved. By the time EMFFI changed its mind, the Germans destroyed the bridges provoking Hutchison to remark acerbically, “thereby presumably satisfying everyone.”

But now the OVERLORD forces and the ANVIL forces had linked up with the FFI’s poorly supplied forces killing or capturing approximately 79,000 Germans. While this is probably more than Eisenhower would have thought possible on 6 June, it was less than what could have been done. Elster’s Marchgruppe Süd was 25% of the prize. But the ineffective use of the Maquis against the 11th Panzer Division, both on its march to reinforce the invasion area, and then while it led the German 19th Army to the Dijon area is disappointing when considering what the FFI might have done if organized more coherently and armed more effectively. The completely unexpected numbers

94 Ibid. p. 11.
95 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5, p. 661
swelling the Maquis caught SHAEF and AFHQ by surprise. Had they been ready for them, their trap could have had a quicker bite.

Why did some regions or areas succeed while others faltered? Understanding what worked and what did not is important but one should understand the complicated series of events and actors as well to see how it all came to together. Regarding Elster, not one of the people involved can honestly lay claim to Elster’s surrender on their own. However, it is no coincidence that this event occurred in Dechelette’s region. Since his recovery from his broken bone after parachuting into France in January, he had hammered out agreements to create one of the most unified FFI-FTP in nearly every department. For instance in L’Indre, the ORA’s Colonel Raymond Chomel was the commander of the FFI while in Vienne, Colonel Georges Guingouin of the FTP was the commander of the FFI. While all was not completely harmonious, there was a strong sense of political unity that brought about more effective military action. Furthermore, R5 was last in the priority list making the accomplishment all that much more surprising. The same could not be said of Regions 3 and 4. They suffered from less effective DMRs, a higher density of enemy troops, a significant Maquis population of Spanish all tenuously woven together by the British SOE agents the most notable of which was George Starr. Complicating matters even more for R4 and R3 was that FFI military operations were externally commanded and administered by SFHQ that evolved into EMFFI, but other times during the summer they were led by SPOC that changed locations and later evolved.
into Special Force Unit 4. The timing of those changes depended upon military and political necessities that had nothing to do with Regional issues. Sorting out who was in charge during the months of June, July, and August depended completely upon when, where, and who you asked. In R4 and R3 there were many seams working to define how French sovereignty was knit together. But in R5, all the evidence points to the wide acknowledgement that Eugene Dechelette was the man in charge and he reported to General Koenig. And by 25 August Koenig was no longer in London, but in Paris where he was also the Military Governor of the city. Sovereignty was beginning to come home.

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96 Kloman Telephone Interview, 21 August 2005.
Chapter Eight
The fog of war in eastern France

Once the Allied armies from the two invasion areas linked up near Dijon the nature of the war in France changed again. The first three phases: OVERLORD’s initial landing; followed by the breakout of the Allies toward the end of July; and the southern landings on 15 August and subsequent decision by Hitler to retreat; all created slightly different conditions for the Maquis and how EMFFI could use them. When the Germans retreated to a defensive line running from the Swiss border east of Besançon to the Belgian town of Bruges on about 15 September, the nature of the war changed again and EMFFI may have tried to lay the groundwork for the last phase of irregular combat for the war in France since early August. That is to say, their actions of inserting teams into eastern France could have paid great dividends, but other circumstances slowed these preparations and largely diminished their ability to render the Maquis as a coherent force for Eisenhower. Prior to the link up of Patton and Patch in the middle of September, EMFFI deployed nineteen JEDBURGH teams into eastern France. These teams experienced a far different mission than teams such as BUGATTI, HUGH, or FREDERICK who had gone to areas early, contended with relatively few enemy, and had time to get to know the Maquis in their area. Such a luxury was not afforded to Teams such as AUGUSTUS, JACOB, or BENJAMIN. As EMFFI attempted to support Eisenhower with Maquis in this region, a region Eisenhower made his greatest priority as described in chapter 7, EMFFI did not grasp
the shift in the nature of the fighting, but since it differed so greatly from their planning and recent operational experience, the staff of EMFFI failed to conduct a coherent operation.

The speed with which the Allied advance had developed from 1 August to the middle of September had many senior officers and staff planners mired in complacency and many convinced that the Germans were about ready to buckle. The coup attempt against Hitler, the quick retreats, the continuous shuffle and recreations of German units, little to no air cover from the *Luftwaffe*, and the paucity of fuel for enemy *Panzers* were all signs that the Germans were about ready to completely collapse. Reading the *OB West’s* message traffic provided by ULTRA gave the Allies a skewed window into the German commanders’ sense of frustration and their long list of difficulties. But one does not get the sense of fighting determination exhibited by their soldiers largely unaware of their nation’s desperate state.

JEDBURGHS who interrogated prisoners captured in France were often shocked the POWs did not know that various towns had been captured, or that their entire army was suffering as much as they were.¹ The typical German soldier’s belief in an eventual victory enabled Hitler to continue the war despite his dwindling ability to do so. The exception to this stalwart belief in the Nazi war effort came from the soldiers captured around Dijon in the middle of September.²

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¹ See Team report of GILES HS 6/515 and LEE HS 6/538. BNA, Kew, UK.
² Compare Team GILES comments of interrogation with Team MAURICE’s. The latter found Germans exhausted from a long march, many of whom were not front line combat troops. GILES found prisoners unwilling to believe that Rennes had fallen and that Allied troops were that far into France.
But between the middle of August and the middle of September, there appears to be two contending mindsets governing EMFFI’s actions and the dispatch of JEDBURGH teams. First was the desire to get them into France while they could still have an effect on operations. JEDBURGH teams were gaining a reputation for making a significant impact since the Résistance was doing much more than expected. Perhaps there was some chauvinism at work since most at SHAEF believed before D-Day that the Maquis would not have any meaningful affect. After the D-Day results began to come in, the doubters quickly became believers and credited the JEDBURGH plan, the SAS, and the Operational Groups with bringing it about. Donovan’s continued use of Maquis exploits with the President is an example that indicates what the Résistance was doing when tied to the SOE and OSS efforts. The assumption one could easily make from the materials Donovan forwarded to the President was that it was all happening only with groups “stimulated” by SOE and OSS operations. Instead of soberly evaluating the conditions of any given success, a great desire developed within SHAEF and EMFFI to override the initial plan to put them in when requested by those in the field, and insert them in as soon as possible. Such a desire now competed against the original notion that the JEDBURGHS were to be a reserve, replacing arrested agents to conduct open guerilla warfare when the time called for it. But perhaps due to the fear that the pace of operations would continue leaving several unused teams in England, Maquis successes, which may or may not be due to the JEDBURGHS, began to take a life of its own and overrode the original plan of using them as uniformed back ups when the time was right.
The second factor that originally served as a brake on JEDBURGH deployments was a sense of reluctance brought about by fears that informed some of the original planning. First was the fear that deploying too many teams, too quickly, would leave them no reserve if needed later. Staff officers also feared sending them to areas thick with enemy troops and therefore, they considered sending them in civilian clothes. But in the desire to play an active role, the original SOE planning that the JEDBURGHs were to be a reserve for arrested SOE agents and operate in uniform was hastily revised in the first and second week of August. EMFFI’s persistent use of the teams to go into areas along with SAS parties or Operational Groups developed into the norm also that was completely new to the original SOE and OSS operational planning. But since it had been done since D-Day with various success, it continued even though no modifications were instituted in the training of the JEDBURGHs, still in reserve at Milton Hall.3 By the end of July, it became standard practice within the EMFFI staff that JEDBURGH teams were sent in with SAS or OGs to be their liaison with any Maquis that might be in the area. In other words, it appears that even the EMFFI did not want to rely on a Maquis unit to carry out a specific task when French, British, or American regular and well-trained troops were available to do it. The Jeds could be a firm liaison with various groups, not only to London, but to other Allied commando units operating nearby. JEDBURGH teams were then used explicitly as liaison between the SAS and Operational Groups,

and their communication links facilitated working with the local *Maquis*, where their language skills could augment the special operations tasks of the SAS party or OG.

EMFFI now began cueing up JEDBURGH Teams for supporting Eisenhower’s forces as they marched east toward Paris at the same time it began deploying teams to central France that could harass German forces that might come north toward Ike’s forces or go east and south toward the southern invasion beaches. Beginning in the middle of July, the staff had planned the deployment of JEDBURGH teams for the August moon period and wished to send 2 teams to the Vosges and 1 team each to the Ardennes, Oise, Seine et Marne, Marne, Meuse, Meurthe et Moselle, and Haute Marne Departements. Colonel Ziegler, Koenig’s Chief of Staff, deleted the Oise, Seine et Marne, and Marne Departements from the approved regions because they, “do not appear to be ready” for uniformed JEDBURGH teams and reminded the SFHQ planners, that those in the field requesting the teams should be asked to give an evaluation of their regions readiness for uniformed teams. Zeigler did approve the deployment of 2 teams each to the Doubs, Haute Saône, Aisne, and Côte d’Or, apparently anticipating the priorities EMFFI received from SHAEF’s on 15 August.4

But the Vosges region in eastern France drew interest from General Montgomery’s 21st Army Group and its Special Air Service was tasked to send a mission to the area. The idea of conducting an operation in the Vosges had begun in June but only coalesced into Operation LOYTON in early August. 21st Army Group

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tasked 2 SAS to send ten men as an initial reconnaissance party to attempt to harass German lines of communication from Paris east toward Saarbrucken and Strasbourg. A JEDBURGH team was to accompany the mission. During the same days EMFFI was deep in the effort to get the ALOES mission organized for the command and control of the Brittany Résistance, it drafted the plans for team JACOB to accompany the 2 SAS on its mission to the Vosges. SAS was to run the mission, but since part of the mission involved working with the local Maquis, who were, to quote the SAS order, “not fully organized,” EMFFI was interested in its conduct. Team JACOB consisted of British Captain Victor Gough, French Lieutenant Maurice Boissarie, and British Sergeant Kenneth Seymour. Gough was one of the British Jeds who had started the war as an Intelligence officer in the Auxiliaries that were to have fought behind the lines in England, should the Germans have succeeded in invading back in 1940. In November 1943 he was transferred from the Auxiliary Units to the JEDBURGHs as an instructor, and in the spring joined the regular list in order to deploy on a mission. Divorced the January before his deployment, Gough listed the woman running the boarding house he resided in as the next of kin. His French team mate Boissaire and he both left their belongings at that boarding house while at Milton Hall and deployed to France. He was educated as an engineer and his drawing skills were so good that he won the competition among the Jeds to decide their Special Force patch.\footnote{Emails and unpublished work by Colin Burbidge, nephew of Victor Gough, 18 May, 2008. Possession of author.}
But Gough was not sent along with the SAS element to win drawing contests. They were to meet up with the DMR and train and equip his *Maquis*. The *Résistance* in the area was led by Gilbert Grandval a man of great local prestige and a rare DMR who had not been sent by the BCRA, but instead had been appointed to the position after taking over the region’s military affairs for the *Résistance* group *Ceux de la Résistance*. Nevertheless, he believed in the efforts of the centralized authority of de Gaulle, regarded General Koenig’s authority for military matters to be synonymous with de Gaulle’s, and viewed the politics around COMAC to be harmful to France. When Bourgès-Maunoury suggested him, the BCRA in London replied, “that he would work out perfectly.”6 When members of COMAC advocated that effective action could only be directed from inside France, Grandval did not believe it. “They knew perfectly,” he wrote after the war, “that regarding the scandalous and stupid intention of the Americans entrusting the government to the AMGOT; what counted before all this was the unity of France and only de Gaulle could assume it.”7 Grandval was just the kind of man they were looking for, loyal to de Gaulle, had knowledge of the local area, and possessed great leadership skills. Gough, Boussarie, Seymour and the SAS parachuted from their aircraft to one of Grandval’s drop zones lit up and looking “like bonfires on Guy Fawkes night,” one of the SAS reflected after the war.8 The landing went well but Seymour broke his toe and it began to swell so badly he could not go as fast as the rest of them. Upon landing, the team quickly

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8 John Hislop. *Anything but a Soldier* as quoted in Burbidge Manuscript.
regrouped with the SAS and were met by one of Grandval’s assistants. The Vosges, is rugged country with thick forests and steep hills rising up from the river Saône that runs to the southwest, and the Moselle which runs to the north into Germany. The valleys and forest naturally channel the region’s roads and railroads into narrow valleys closeted with the thick trees. The country is great for guerrilla tactics.

The *Maquis* made their command post on the top of one of the mountains about 6 miles from their drop zone and they guided the newcomers back to it before the sun rose. Over the next two days, they made their initial plans.\(^9\) Gough requested one of the SAS radio operators to send JACOB’s first message to London saying that Seymour had been injured on the jump but would be recovered within a week, and they believed they would be contacting Grandval soon. Team JACOB also sent a message on the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) with the briefest of details on the local *Maquis*, which numbered 800 men, of whom 50 were armed. They had still not contacted Grandval, but expected to on that day. For security reasons, they had to travel 5 miles from their command post in order to come up on the radio.\(^{10}\) Germans were thick in the area, and by this time, the enemy was evacuating France and the roads were crowded with moving vehicles going into Germany. But the regional Gestapo was also aware of their presence and organizing an effort to catch them.

On 17 August, two days after the landings in the south, one day after Hitler gave the order for much of the occupation forces in southern France to evacuate, and

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at a time when Patton’s 3rd Army was still approximately 500 kilometers to the west, Team JACOB and their SAS comrades heard that the Germans were coming up the mountain toward them and took stock of their situation. With the Jeds were approximately 100 men, inadequately armed with some weapons that had been dropped when they parachuted in, some of the weapons provided by previous drops, but mostly older rifles the Maquis had managed to hide after the armistice. They decided to leave a small rear guard at their position while most would attempt to make their way down to escape the trap. They set off around 4 pm with the SAS, Gough, and Boissarie up front and Sergeant Seymour in the middle of the column still hobbled by his injured toe. Unfortunately, there were enemy troops on this side of the mountain too and when the shooting started Sergeant Seymour, “could not discover what was going on” after the group scattered into the trees and boulders to escape what was now a firmly closing trap. The Maquis, according to Seymour dropped their weapons and moved off leaving him alone and unaware of what was happening to his fellow Jeds. He took cover behind a large jutting boulder and fired at the enemy with his Bern gun, then when that ammunition was gone, fired at them with his carbine, and lastly shot at them with his pistol, expending every round. When a grenade landed near him, but did not go off, he breathed a sigh of relief but while they drew nearer, he burned his radio codes and cipher pads. Realizing that he was alone and out of ammunition a German soldier shouted something at him Seymour assumed meant to come out and give himself up. Left with little choice and not knowing what happened to the rest of his group, he surrendered. He was marched
over to “the nearest tree and stood against it. Two of the enemy were detailed as a firing party and were just preparing to take aim when a senior officer came rushing up to them.” He wanted to interrogate Seymour instead of shoot him and after taking a walk down the mountain and a ride to an office at a nearby German camp, he was asked what he was doing and what his mission was. Seymour replied that he was in a “recce party,” and that his S. F. badge meant that he was a paratrooper. The interrogator seemed to be content with that and Seymour was moved to a prison at Schirmeck, France. He did not know what had become of his teammates and did not know what would become of him. But when later presented with some of the SAS team’s radio equipment and codebooks, he insisted he did not know whose they were or anything about them.\(^\text{11}\) Neither did EMFFI as they had no more messages from JACOB for several days.

But word did reach them regarding the fate of Captain Cyrus Manierre of Team DODGE who had been captured on 3 August near Grenoble. A telegram from SPOC to Colonel Haskell read that Manierre “HAS BEEN TAKEN TO VICHY” and went on to say that the same had been passed to the DMR in the area in the hope that he could affect some kind of escape.\(^\text{12}\) Hearing nothing more about it for two days, Haskell directed Paul Van der Stricht to let him know the status of SPOC’s attempt to get Manierre out of prison as the telegram from Algiers threw “some doubt on the question of whether everything possible” was being done to get him out of Gestapo custody. Shortly thereafter, three men from Operational Group ALICE were directed

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\(^{11}\) Team JACOB Report, HS 6/529, BNA, Kew, UK, pp. 2-3.

\(^{12}\) Telegram from SPOC to Haskell, 18 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France.
to proceed to Vichy with the intent of snatching him.\textsuperscript{13} Their effort to free Manierre from the Gestapo was buoyed by the escape of Francis Cammaerts in the same area due to the quick thinking and cunning of one of his agents. Christine Granville convinced Cammaerts’ captors to release him due to the eminent arrival of the Allied forces and they did so just three hours before he was to be executed. Cammaerts “has been released through quick wits” of Granville, SPOC wrote Haskell on the 18\textsuperscript{th} but went on to indicate that the Drôme’s FFI commander believed the “Americans were not interested” in what happened to Manierre.\textsuperscript{14} Nothing could have been further from the truth, with SPOC sending a team to retrieve him and JEDBURGH team MONOCLE reporting on the 20\textsuperscript{th} that they believed Manierre was “in prison but alright.”\textsuperscript{15}

Unfortunately, the three members of Operational Group ALICE, who were tasked by SPOC to rescue Manierre were unable to do so before “the Allied invasion of Southern France and subsequent northward advance of the Allied armies persuaded the Germans to send Manierre back to Germany…”\textsuperscript{16} They had indeed. After several days of suffering through beatings and interrogations, but divulging nothing of OSS, Manierre was greeted one morning by a new German Army officer wondering how an American had come into the Gestapo Prison. Manierre convinced him that he was a downed flyer and had been caught with some \textit{Maquis}. This German “swallowed the story, hook, line, and sinker.” A few days later the order to

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\textsuperscript{13} Haskell to Van der Stricht, 22 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France.
\textsuperscript{14} Rosell to Haskell, 22 Aug 44, Dossier 1, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Letter from OG ALICE member Francis Coleman, March 10, 1987 to Carter Manierre as quoted in Manierre and Manierre, "Pop's War." p. 79.
\end{flushleft}
came to evacuate, and in the subsequent confusion, his new German guards sent him
to Stalag Luft 1. He arrived there and was questioned by a Luftwaffe officer who had
records that he had graduated from West Point, was commissioned in the Cavalry,
and had been known to have taken pilot training. All this was true and very
unnerving for Manierre, but the Luftwaffe did not know that he had failed in flight
school and had joined the OSS.\footnote{Team Report of DODGE, HS 6/501, BNA, Kew, UK.}
Omitted from their records was all of the
information the Gestapo interrogators had gleaned, and as SPOC later became aware,
that the Milice who had arrested Manierre knew what his mission was as they had an
informant inside the Manierre’s Maquis group. But while the Gestapo hoped to beat
out more details after their evacuation from Lyon, those records and the interrogators
who created them were killed in air strikes while being transported on trains out of
Lyon.\footnote{Manierre and Manierre, ”Pop’s War.” p. 79.}

\textit{Capturing Paris and supporting 12\textsuperscript{th} Army Group}

Anticipating the SHAEF priority areas of eastern France EMFFI finished
plans for, at least it thought, the last of the JEDBURGH missions for France. On the
8\textsuperscript{th} the staff drew up the orders for the deployment of 25 teams to leave “as quickly as
possible.” These 25 teams were, in the main, finalizing the July requests described
above. Their mission was to: assist in the organization of the FFI; provide additional
means of delivering arms; and provide additional communications between London
and the FFI groups. The teams would be sent to the \textit{Délégués Militaire Regional}
Grandval, Hanneton, and Davout d’Auerstaet; the CITRONELLE mission on the Belgian border; and the F Section Circuits SPIRITUALIST, PEDLAR, HISTORIAN, and DIGGER among others. Clearly now little favoritism remained as EMFFI determined to send missions to all possible operatives in France. The teams would be commanded by EMFFI unless the situation mandated them to be directed by those to whom they were being sent. Their planned dates of deployment were to begin on the 11th and continue until the 18th, going long beyond the August moon period.19

But the rapid pace of Patton’s Third Army, forced a change. On the same day that Le Mans and Angers, were retaken placing Allied forces less than 200 kilometers from Paris, Colonel Joseph Haskell requested that the staff consider deploying three teams to work a line from Paris-Orleans-Blois on 8 August but wanted to ensure it made sense to send them as they would be operating in uniform. Two days later, this idea altered radically and had developed into an operations order from Koenig that eight teams should be deployed to support the Allied advance, working the area south and east of Paris. The order itself is revealing as it shows how well, at least in theory, EMFFI sought to manage the JEDBURGH missions in a coordinated way with their Délegués Militaire Régionales. In a complete shift, these eight teams were to be inserted in civilian clothes in order to work clandestinely with the local DMR, FFI commander, or circuit organizer and then send Maquis volunteers toward Allied lines with the goal of making it through to American or British intelligence officers.20

19 “EMFFI Operation Order No. 34, 8 August 1944, Ordres d’Etat Major Forces Française l'Interieur, 3 AG 2 473, Archives National, Paris, France.
20 Ibid.
Such a mission was direct intelligence work for which others, such as F Section agents, or BCRA agents would be far more suited. While there were such agents in Paris region such as the Spiritualist circuit, EMFFI’s action now shows a willingness to severely alter the JEDBURGH operational methods in order to get a capability to the Paris region in front of the swiftly moving Allied armies. Much of this meant a major change in how the teams were originally planning to operate. In addition to deploying in civilian clothes, handwriting samples were hurriedly gathered in order to validate that the Maquis bringing messages from the JEDBURGH team commander to the Army intelligence staff were legitimate. The JEDBURGHs who were still awaiting deployment must grant their consent about being inserted in civilian clothes. Not wanting to place undue pressure on them individually, Haskell directed that the Jeds be assembled by Milton Hall commander Lt Col Musgrave and asked of they would agree to becoming clandestine. Haskell was clear on the matter and wrote that, “On no account should the various teams be approached individually with a request that they operate in civilian clothes.” Everyone knew what Hitler directed the Wehrmacht to do with such people. But the Jeds, itching to get to France supported the change and a staff officer replied back to Haskell on the 14th that their response was “almost unanimous” and that Musgrave had more than enough for the efforts east of Paris.21

Paris lay in front of the Allies. Eisenhower’s initial desire to by pass the city proved impossible to sustain in the face of de Gaulle’s clear desire to liberate it, and

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21 “From Major Cox to Col Haskell,” 14 August 1944, 3 AG 2 462, microfilm 171/178, AN, Paris, France.
the way events were playing out there. 12th Army Group’s rapid advance east, that spurred Haskell and SFHQ to suddenly consider sending civilian clothed JEDBURGHs there proved to be so quick that those missions to the area west and south of Paris never deployed. Teams HENRY, GODFREY, FRANK, JIM, RAYMOND, QUENTIN, RODERICK, and STANLEY that were put on alert for the Paris area were then placed back in reserve status to await further requirements.22 Here also may be some dissonance between the internal Résistance power structure and the external leadership of the FFI in London. The Délégué Militaire National, Jacques Delmas, pseudo ARC or CHABAN, returned to France on 14 August at the same time the JEDBURGH teams for the region were cancelled. Arriving at the newly liberated Le Mans airfield via an American aircraft, Delmas then traveled through the lines and arrived in Paris on the 16th.23 Chaban-Delmas, as he later came to be called, and the Comité d’action militaire or COMAC had sought to direct the Maquis from inside France instead of from London.∗ But after some time in London meeting with Koenig and others in EMFFI, he now realized the utility of cooperating under Koenig’s orders in order to cooperate with Eisenhower’s efforts. He agreed that the unity that could only be provided by London was the best way to proceed. Two days after Chaban’s arrival in Paris, the city’s Résistance began labor strikes as well as shooting at German soldiers and taking over key parts of the city. Paris’

22 Most of these teams bounce from one operations order to the next until the last teams are sent to France in mid-September.
∗ Lt Col Hutchison’s exasperation with SFHQ discussed in Chapters Six and Seven demonstrated one aspect of this tension between those who believed EMFFI London needed to direct the FFI while those in France, whether French, British or American, often believed that direction should be done from within the country.
German commander, General Dietrich von Choltitz, who had only taken that post on the 9th following the failed coup of Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, now attempted to hold the city. Hitler’s orders demanded Paris be held or given to the Allies as “a pile of rubble.”

While the rapid pace of Allied advance scuttled a comprehensive JEDBURGH plan for the Paris region, one team did deploy east of Paris. Sent to the Seine-et-Marne Department on 12 August, as a part of the planned employment of 25 teams, Team AUBREY had agreed to go into France in civilian clothes and was the first team to do so. After parachuting to a drop zone south of the Seine, the Jeds were met by the leader of SPIRITUALIST, Frenchman René Dumont-Guillemet. The team’s two officers bicycled into the Paris with members of the Spiritualist Circuit the next day. Over the course of the next week British Captain Godfrey Marchant gave lessons in sabotage in an auto mechanic’s garage, while French Jed Jean-Françoise Chaigneau traveled around Paris ascertaining who within the circuit might be able to do various tasks. Sergeant Hooker remained in the village of Forfey ill with the measles, but still able to send and receive messages. By the 21st with more and more violence erupting in Paris provoking the Germans to respond with reprisals, Marchant and Dumont-Guillemet left the city and headed back to join British Sergeant Ivor Hooker at their safe house near the village of Forfry. Chaigneau arrived the next day with several other circuit members. But the fleeing Germans had taken up residence in the villages and woods all around them and the team, along with the Spiritualist

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24 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, *The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5*, p. 614.
circuit became involved in at least two battles involving the *Wehrmacht*. On the 27th of August, the JEDBURGHs and the men and women of the circuit became involved in a shoot out with tanks whose fire, “was like God’s thunder.”²⁵ The tanks had driven into the part of the forest in which they were hiding and Dumont-Guiillemet, Hooker, Marchant, and Chaigneau were forced to remain where they were as running would reveal their location. While they and other members of Dumont-Guiillemet’s group were able to fight back, doing so threatened their comrades hiding in trees around the German positions. Many of their weapons were still on trucks packed up with the manufacturing grease still coating them. Confusion reigned as some were hiding within the *Wehrmacht’s* position and the others were ineffectively using weapons they were not trained to use. Very little went well and Chaigneau was killed by a round from an enemy tank while attempting to escape along a stream.²⁶ As the SOE history of the JEDBURGHs stated, “As had been foreseen, the first overt action of this Résistance group resulted in its complete dispersal, and the death of the French Officer of the Team.” Who actually had foreseen this was perhaps the British staff or the SOE planners who took the opportunity to make clear their disapproval of deploying AUBREY while the French leadership of EMFFI sent them anyway. The British SOE staff that wrote the line above took the opportunity to make clear their reluctance to send in a team in civilian clothes to operate like spies in an area teeming with enemy troops.

But AUBREY was not the only one to deploy in this way. Team AUGUSTUS, another of the teams included in the 8 August order, deployed on 15 August to the northwest of the village of Colomfay in the Aisne Department. After the confirmation from the A5 Region’s operations officer, the team was given the green light to depart.²⁷ American Major John Bonsall led the team. He was a Princeton graduate, who had received his commission through ROTC and planned to practice law like his father. But he was called to active duty in August of 1941 and had subsequently joined the OSS. The 25-year-old had just been promoted to Major in April. The French member of the team was Jean Delviche who knew the region well having grown up ten kilometers north of Laon. Few JEDBURGHs had greater knowledge of the area they worked than Delviche. The radio operator was American Technical Sergeant Roger Cote.²⁸ The team’s mission was to link up with the region’s operations officer, Pierre Marie Deshayes, who used the code name GRAMME, and support his efforts in the area to arm his Maquis. Deshayes had parachuted into France in December 1942, the day before his 24th birthday and successfully rose through the ranks of the BCRA network sent to liaise with the movement La Voix du Nord. The Region’s DMR was Guy Chaumet who operated under the code name CISSOIDE and had taken part in the same movement as Deshayes. Together they had helped establish the Bureau d’Opérations Aériennes

(BOA) in this part of France. The team radioed to London on the 17th that all was well and, “reception perfect.” The arrival of the team brought spirits high as they all “managed a grand life in their house with good food (French) good wine etc....” Their next message on the 19th told EMFFI that they had met with Chaumet and expected to meet with other leaders soon. They did so the next day and radioed back local Maquis strengths, general locations, and weapons requirements: 1100 men were trained and had arms while 4900 were not armed. By the 21st the team’s messages began discussing German movements through the department and providing locations for air strikes. They also acquired the German plans for the destruction of the port at Le Harve. Their work cutting the railroad lines soon became impossible due to the number of enemy troops. “Essential RR line be cut by bombing,” the team told EMFFI on the 22nd. Two days later the bombing, the Maquis actions, and the high traffic on the roads all were getting to be too much for the enemy as Cote radioed that the Germans were, “completely disorganized. Incapable of self defense against force.” But the team and the region’s FFI were having their own problems. The team listed them on the 25th. First the area was too thick with enemy troops. Second, the region did not have areas to shelter or hide. Third, they lacked arms. Apparently they did arrange at

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least one weapons drop as they continued on to say that when the arms arrived, they divided them up and split up into small bands and used guerilla tactics when the opportunity arose. EMFFI did not respond. On the 26th the team radioed that they saw the Germans were preparing defensive positions but not placing mines on the bridges. That seems to have finally earned EMFFI’s attention and it radioed back on the 30th that the Allied Army commander had ordered the “FFI to take all possible steps to preserve” the region’s bridges from destruction and then specifically listed them.\footnote{Ibid. Reel 8, Target 6, Vol IV, Book 4, pp. 25.}

But there is no way of knowing if the team received that message. By the end of the month, British forces had made their way into the area and the team had successfully made their way to Allied lines traveling with one of the Maquis companies. At one point they were in several vehicles, but had become spread out as each one had to travel through German check points individually. While waiting for AUGUSTUS to catch up, one of the FFI complained the JEDBURGHs slowed them down. The FFI commander reflected and answered, “Perhaps they are good shots” and therefore worth a bit of a wait. They arrived without incident within the Allied lines, secured some equipment and gear for themselves and passed on what they knew about the enemy in the area. They decided to return back across the lines. Captain Delviche, secured a car from a friend in the area and they drove back toward the lines at night in a torrential rain. At a check point near the town of Barenton-sur-Serre the JEDBURGHs and some of their Maquis were stopped. They may not have seen the
soldiers initially due to the weather but as some enemy soldiers came out of the darkness, they may have attempted to bolt from their vehicle with their Maquis. But despite their civilian clothes and fake identity cards, the Jeds may have known the game was up due to all their radio equipment with them in the car. Two shots rang out killing Delviche and Bonsall, Cote must have attempted a run for it but as he did five more shots were heard in the rainy night. Later that night the two officers were found in the car and Sergeant Cote was found face down in the mud about a dozen meters from the car, all had severe head wounds. The German soldiers left the area without bothering to take anything. The next day, the FFI arranged for their burial and later told the US Army investigator that they made sure to have an honor guard and a military burial despite the continued presence Germans traveling through the area. Completely ignorant of what had happened to their team, EMFFI radioed AUGUSTUS on 16 September to say that their mission was ended and to return to London via Paris.

The Final Push – The JEDBURGHs rush in

EMFFI’s lack of understanding of what occurred with AUGUSTUS is only one instance of a number of examples of EMFFI’s inability to know what was going on in France. Their order to deploy the 25 teams had been implemented slowly due to an inability to generate airlift sorties and for the Maquis to identify secure drop

34 Ibid., p. 25.
zones. These two factors provoked delay after delay for the alerted teams. Originally, the 25 teams were to all have been deployed by 18 August, a rate of deployment that Colonel Zeigler seemed to doubt would be possible. But while AUBREY deployed as scheduled, no other team did and the order went through 4 Amendments attempting to keep up with the changes forced by the delays. But to the JEDBURGHs still cooling their heels at Milton Hall, it must have been difficult to see the war progressing merely left to wonder if it would ever involve them. The day after Paris was liberated, Koenig’s British deputy, Major General Redman must have known their dissatisfaction with their situation and wrote a long letter to be read by all the JEDBURGHs awaiting deployment to France. Vaguely, he wrote that the reasons for the delay “have been many,” but that “It has been necessary to keep a reserve to meet future eventualities.” Continuing on he stated that, “the battle has moved much more quickly than had been anticipated. Dispatch by air to the areas required has not always been possible.” But still emphatic that the JEDBURGHs had a mission to do he went on to write, “Should the enemy take up defensive positions on the frontier, it would be necessary to organize intensive guerilla activity behind any such line taken up in order to reduce in so far as it may be possible his power to resist effectively the advance of the main armies.” Noting that for the teams to be effective they would need to be inserted as early as possible, but “the rapid turn of

35 In Zeigler’s hand writing on one of the planning documents is his list of teams by region and his math in the margins with the comment: “4 par jours” noting the rate they would be deployed if the plan went as designed. The emphasis is Zeigler’s. Not able to achieve that kind of pace on a regular basis, EMFFI did manage to deploy four teams on the 28th.

36 Operations Order No. 34, 8 August 1944, Ordres d’Etat Major Forces Française l’Interieur, 3 AG 473, Archives National, Paris, France; with amendments 1 – 4.
events, unfortunately, has reduced considerably the time available, but we must make
the best of the situation as it exists, and have confidence that most valuable work can
be done by all now being sent in.” Then seemingly contradicting himself as he had
listed all the considerations regarding the methodical use of the teams General
Redman finished by announcing that, “Orders have now been given for all
JEDBURGH teams trained and available and now remaining in this country to be
employed as soon as the necessary aircraft deliveries can be arranged.” With this
sentence, the Deputy Commander of EMFFI notified the Jeds of the order that
General Koenig approved on 24 August that all available teams were to deploy as
soon as possible.

But doing this proved incredibly difficult. Not only had the rapid pace of
conventional operations proven too quick for EMFFI to adjust to, but as they
proceeded through their operations in August, EMFFI built more complexity into
their war. For example, the EMFFI operations bureau wanted to conduct another
mission similar to ALOES, that had operated in Brittany in order to deploy a
command staff to the regions in eastern France. EMFFI began a planning effort to
learn the lessons from ALOES and send as many as four similar missions to eastern
France. But realizing that ALOES’s mission suffered from a great many faults, they
sought to eliminate the errors they made in late July and early August when they
deployed ALOES too late via a very muddled process. These new missions would
take JEDBURGH teams as communication links and liaison units to the various

37 “To: All JEDBURGH teams for France still in England,” 26 August 1944, BCRA Documents –
Jedburghs, 3 AG 2 462, AN, Paris, France.
Maquis units and operate in the regions along side the DMR and FFI commanders. Furthermore, each team would be able to talk to other teams directly, something that generally was not being done due to security and technical capacity. If correctly conducted and supported with airlift and weapons, this effort could have proven to be very beneficial to the land forces as they made their way east.

From the middle of August until the first day of September, EMFFI’s focus was on the area around Lyon and then north to Chalons-sur-Saône to Dijon and then blossoming out to an area from St. Dizier to Belfort and north to Verdun. Their aim was to harass the escaping Germans as they attempted to establish a defensive line on the west of the Rhine River. On the 15th ANTHONY deployed north of Chalons-sur-Saône and JUDE deployed south of Lyon with an SAS team. When JUDE arrived, it discovered more of a reception committee than they required. The way the Maquis had interpreted the BBC message they thought there would be 40 aircraft arriving, instead of 40 people, and so they had 2000 people there with 100 vehicles in order to handled what would certainly have been a lot of weapons. On the 16th ANDREW deployed to join an inter-allied party near the Belgian border and Team AUGUSTUS left on its fateful mission to the Aisne. On the 18th BRUCE, BUNNY, and TONY departed the UK for Yonne, Haute Marne, and the Vendee respectively. TONY went to assist the effort now concentrating against the German garrison holding out at La Rochelle. On the 19th Teams ARTHUR and PAUL left for Côte d’Or to the northeast and east of Dijon. On the 21st Teams BENJAMIN and BERNARD deployed to the

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Meuse with BENJAMIN going north of Verdun and BERNARD to the south of the city. It was not until the 25th that any more teams left with ALFRED deploying north of Paris and ARNOLD deploying east of Paris in the Marne. On the 26th Team CECIL landed south of Troyes, ARCHIBALD north of Nancy and BASIL managed to become the first team into the Belfort Gap, east of Besançon. On the 28th a record four teams departed with ALASTAIR deployed to the Vosges, CEDRIC to the Haute Saône, NORMAN to the Doubs south of Team BASIL, and MAURICE was supposed to deploy and work with NORMAN, but their crew believed the signal lights from the drop zone were anti-aircraft search lights. No amount of arguing between the Jeds who realized the other aircraft dropped their loads on the correct place could convince the aircraft commander that they should go around and try again. Instead, the pilot returned to England and aborted the deployment. MAURICE finally made it to France on 1 September, after many false starts, and successfully landed in Jura east of Chalons-sur-Saône.39

Summing up the frustration felt by many of the teams, MAURICE’s officer in charge, American Captain Charles Carmen, began his report with this rebuke – perhaps inspired by how he was spending his time while waiting to get into the war. “By the time we arrived in France,” he wrote, “our state of mind was somewhat that of a woman whose lover has left without saying goodbye.” He continued on bitterly, “We had been led to expect that we would be sent in well before D-Day.

39 All the team deployment dates were taken from HS 7/19 maps. BNA, Kew, UK. Maurice’s deployment date is listen incorrectly on the map. The argument with the crew is related in the Team’s report, HS 6/542, pp. 2-3.
Consequently, for three months we expected daily to be alerted. And for two weeks after we were alerted, the operation was daily postponed. Finally, on 28 August 1944, we arrive at Harrington Aerodrome for the third time, donned our parachutes for the second time, and climbed into the plane for the first time. His report went on to vividly describe the inept and inexperienced B-24 crewmen that took part in a four aircraft formation to insert two teams and the required arms for the area’s Maquis. But when the reception party’s signal lights were incorrectly thought to be Anti-aircraft search lights, the crew decided to abort and return to England. Carmen and his French teammate Hubert Dumesnil went up to the cockpit and argued with the pilot, but to no avail. The B-24 returned to Harrington. MAURICE waited for two more days and then left on 31 August in a British aircraft from Tempsford. Finally in France they were enjoying life too much perhaps even though there were only “four kilometers away” from the Germans who were actively engaged with an FFI force. While Dumesnil developed their initial plans with the local FTP leader Lucien Chazeaux, Carmen and the radio man Technical Sergeant Francis Cole sent off their first message. Carmen, in keeping with his playful writing admitted that the two Jeds, “had to do it twice because of the Champagne.” MAURICE finally had arrived and linked up with the local FTP leaders who had just 16 days before merged

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41 Marcot and Baud, La Résistance Dans Le Jura. p. 86.
42 Ibid., p. 3.
under the FFI’s leadership and therefore the DMR. The Jura’s Résistance had gained a measure of unity without any Allied pressure.\footnote{Marcot and Baud, \textit{La Résistance Dans Le Jura}. P. 108. Marcot does not mention the DMR, Pierre Hanneton, in his book on the Jura.}

Also on 1 September teams PHILIP arrived east of Nancy, RODERICK deployed south of Belfort, and GREGORY parachuted on the eastern edge of Jura near the Swiss border. GREGORY was the last of those that had originally been planned to deploy on 8 August and their on again, off again, alert posture was a function of them being a part of the command and control mission ORGEAT that will be discussed below. Team NICHOLAS parachuted into the eastern Vosges on the 9\textsuperscript{th} and Team HENRY arrived on the 10\textsuperscript{th} to a very friendly reception. In fact, it was nowhere near the German lines. By the time they had arrived, the Americans controlled the region north of Belfort. “YOU KNOW DONT YOU,” Team HENRY radioed to EMFFI, “THAT THIS AREA WAS OVERRUN BEFORE WE ARRIVED,” meaning that they had parachuted into friendly territory. Disappointed that their mission was entirely futile they continued on saying, “WE HAVE DONE NOTHING AT ALL STOP FUNNY WAR.”\footnote{“Telegrams de Region D,” Fonds du Ziegler, 1 K 374, Carton 9, Fichier 3, SHT, Vincennes, France.} But HENRY was not the last of the Jeds into France, Team GODFREY arrived in Haut-Rhin on 12 September, and four days later Teams DOUGLAS II, TIMOTHY, and JIM arrived in Jura as well. The French officer on JIM was none other than Lieutenant Joe de Francesco, Eisenhower’s driver in Algiers who wanted Darlan’s assassin to receive a medal.\footnote{Joe de Francesco, Letter, 3 March 1999.} Joe had finally gotten to France twenty-one long months after that discussion with
General Eisenhower. Discussing how he felt about that many years later, Joe stated, ‘‘there were a lot of angry guys at Milton Hall.’’ Because, as Carmen stated above, they had been led to believe that they were going to be used before D-Day. According to de Francesco, the disappointment was especially sharp among the French officers.

But while their deployment seemed to be done in such a scattershot manner, it was not planned that way. Instead the process was a victim of circumstances brought about by the positive events due to the advancing front lines and the negative aspect of the fog, rain, and cloudy weather everyone contended with in late August and September of 1944. The messages from the DMRs, as well as the Jeds continually scream for weapons, but when the aircraft can not deliver them due to the weather, there was not much that could be done. EMFFI did consider another daylight drop and planned a large mission similar to the previous ones. The planning for Operation BENTLEY began in the middle of August and the first of the written directives on it appeared on the 20th, long before the two invasion forces from the north and south linked up. Originally planning to drop supplies to 8 drop zones in the 6 Departements of Ain, Doubs, Jura, Haute Savoie, Haute Marne, and Saône et Loire, the EMFFI planners believed there to be 27,000 FFI willing to join in the combat, but lacked the needed weapons. They estimated that an approximately 13,000 were armed and believed to be in action. But the effort was beleaguered by the strict requirements for there to be no enemy anti-aircraft capability within 20 kilometers of the drop zones.

\footnote{De Francesco telephone conversation with author, 3 March 1999.}
That requirement alone, no matter the weather, would be hard for any JEDBURGH team, BCRA, or SOE agent to ensure given the constant traffic of German units moving through the region. Furthermore, the order directed that, “In each case an assurance will be obtained from the Field that the ground situation provides adequate security, i.e. there must not be active enemy forces which might include light or heavy flak in the vicinity of the selected dropping point.” Given the thick population of Germans now crowding the region, such assurances would be hard to attain. But that was EMFFI’s plan with Operation BENTLEY on 20 August.

Then the changes began. The very next day the drop zone area shifted to the south, striking the Jura and Doubs from the list and adding Ardeche and oddly enough the Vercors whose Maquis had been forced to flee the region and give up the ground to the concerted German offensive that had concluded on 6 August. With the DRAGOON operation proceeding north with good success, it did make sense to resupply those now engaged in fighting. But on the 24th, a shortage of Bren guns and carbine rifles forced a shift in the weapons that could be sent and therefore the effort had to be reconfigured, meaning further delays. On the 25th the progress of General Patch’s forces forced a new change, and the Vercors and Ardeche were taken off and the old list put back in the operation. On the 27th the operation was completely reorganized from an American daylight operation to a British night time one and given the name BENTLEY. On the 28th more Allied advances forced the striking of


the Haute Savoie from the DZ list. The order also noted that SHAEF had yet to approve of the operation and without that, the RAF 38 Group, cued up for the effort remained waiting.\footnote{Ibid., Amendments 1 – 5, 20 to 28 August 1944.}

As were the Maquis leaders. Apparently trying to get his weapons starved region on the list of drop zones for the operation, Gilbert Grandval, the DMR for the C Region radioed on 3 September that “NO FLAK PROXIMITY OF THE FIVE PROPOSED TERRAINS.”\footnote{“Telegram de PLANETE,” 3 September 1944, 1 K 374, AN, Paris.} But for all the effort, BENTLEY never happened as the permission from SHAEF was slow to come. On 6 September, Eisenhower sent a message to Major General Redman describing his reluctance to supply the Maquis too “lavishly.” Ike highlighted his reservations regarding the possibility that there may be “too many armed Frenchmen when hostilities cease who are not subject to military discipline” and that the soldiers now enrolling in the French regular army would go without while the Résistance was still receiving arms. Adding that it was Koenig’s decision, Eisenhower told Redman to discuss the matter with Koenig and “issue a categorical directive.” Furthermore, Ike wanted Koenig to notify the groups who were not going to receive arms of that fact.\footnote{“FWD-13971, FROM SHAEF FORWARD TO SHAEF MISSION TO FRENCH FOR REDMAN, 6 Sept 44.” “Various,” Various, France Vol. II. French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, OFFICE OF SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF: RECORDS, 1943 - 45, SERIES II, 370.64, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. (alternately Reel 52, Frames 516-7).}

Redman responded to the Supreme Allied Commander on the 11\textsuperscript{th}, that Koenig had directed Haskell and Zeigler, who were visiting Paris, to focus on the areas both Eisenhower and Koenig agreed were still worthwhile but told Eisenhower that some latitude might be necessary. The areas
around La Rochelle on the western coast were still firmly held by the enemy and it is unclear if Koenig knew Elster had surrendered in L’Indre.\textsuperscript{52} But by now the RAF’s 38 Group was no longer available for BENTLEY. On 1 September the unit was given to the British 1\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Army for Operation MARKET GARDEN.\textsuperscript{53} This operation was the largest Allied airborne operation of the war and began on 14 September. Every aircraft suitable for paratroopers was required for it.

Eisenhower’s fears of “lavishly” arming the \textit{Maquis} seem completely incongruous with the views of Region D’s DMR Pierre Hanneton. In a message to EMFFI on 26 August he decried as “deplorable” his ability to conduct operations “due to the total absence of any aerial operations for the last three months.” but despite this the FFI had “perfect confidence in the French organization.”\textsuperscript{54} Hanneton is overstating the situation, but not by much as the SFHQ reports to SHEAF bear out. Only three tons of arms had been parachuted to Region D since D-Day.\textsuperscript{55}

Attempting to operate in Eisenhower’s highest priority area, the Vosges, at the end of August JEDBURGH Team ALASTAIR found their mission impossible and asked the obvious question in a message to EMFFI on 5 September. “IF YOU DID NOT INTEND TO GIVE US ANY SUPPORT WHY DID YOU SEND US” and the team, led by British Major Oliver Brown with French Captain Rene Karriere went on

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., “SHAEF AEF MISSION TO FRANCE FROM REDMAN TO SHAEF FWD” 11 September, 1944.
\textsuperscript{54} 26 August 1944, Cables a EMFFI Londres par D et P, Zielger Papers, 1 K 374/9, SHAT, Vincennes, France.
\textsuperscript{55} “June and July EMFFI Monthly Reports to SHAEF,” SGS Reports, DDE Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.
to demand that EMFFI act and “FOR GODS SAKE DO SOMETHING.” London answered meekly stating that, “DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES AND REASONS BEYOND OUR CONTROL IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEND YOU OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.” EMFFI went on to say that Grandval had been notified of this and that things were in the works but the timing of them was unknown. Zeigler’s message back to ALASTAIR ended with, “SORRY.” Shortly afterwards, a message arrived from EMFFI telling the Jeds that the daylight weapons delivery was cancelled because Grandval “had not complied with some of the conditions under which the operations would be undertaken.” Grandval however had been going back and forth with EMFFI over mounting a large daylight drop over several drop zones on the same day in Alsace and Vosges. He protested saying that the enemy would make it impossible to perform and that he simply wanted all the weapons they were prepared to send on one drop zone in the Vosges for the moment and later they could see about it in Alsace when conditions might be more favorable. Grandval pressed his case in messages to EMFFI in London as well as sending people to Paris to meet Koenig personally. But it was never worked out as it was impossible to expect the Wehrmacht to remain static which would allow the information regarding the drop zones to remain valid for as long as it took the staff and aircrews to generate the plans and then execute their missions.

56 “from ALASTAIR to EMFFI,” 5 Sept 1944, Cables a EMFFI Londres par D et P, Zielger Papers, 1 K 374/9, SHAT, Vincennes, France.
Therefore, instead of the RAF conducting Operation BENTLEY and delivering some of the stores to the Vosges region, USAAF B-17s conducted Operation GRASSY to the Doubs only. In keeping with American practice, the operation switched back to being a daylight drop. On the 9 September, 68 aircraft succeeded in dropping supplies, but to only one drop zone southwest of Besançon. Tasked by SHAEF to deliver arms to the Vosges, EMFFI coordinated the USAAF effort that involved the drop zone being changed “four times before the operation was finally flown,” according to the Carpetbagger history of the effort. Furthermore, as the JEDBURGHS in the area could attest, the area south and west of Besançon was not really behind the lines at the time of the drop, but perhaps it was more accurate to say the area was in a state of flux. The Germans were leaving the area so on any given day from 16 August to 15 September, it was unpredictable what drop zones would be secure and which ones were not. This condition persisted in Jura and Doubs until the Wehrmacht succeeded at establishing a fairly firm defensive line roughly half way between Besançon and Belfort on about 15 September.

Nevertheless, Albert de Schonen, of JEDBURGH Team GREGORY had Sergeant Ron Brierley radio to EMFFI that GRASSY was a great success for them and that, “OPERATION HUGE SUCCESS.” Furthermore, he radioed that Colonel Ziegler should “CONSIDER THIS AREA ARMED.” However, they asked that EMFFI, “TELL US WHERE OTHER DROPPINGS TOOK PLACE,” as if they expected

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60 Boog, Krebs, and Vogel, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5. p. 667.
there to have been other drop zones serviced. There were no others and GRASSY was the last large-scale operation in France.

Communications with the DMRs was a constant source of confusion. While it was not the single greatest issue EMFFI and the DMRs faced, it seemed to be one that EMFFI believed it could solve and looked to the JEDBURGH teams to do it. Learning from their deployed headquarters experience for Brittany and the ALOES mission, the FFI’s leadership in London thought they would, “form, equip and despatch [sic] to Eastern France seven small mobile staffs to assist the local commanders of the F. F. I., particularly by the provision of communications both between groups in the field and between these groups and LONDON.” Grandval would get three of these detachments, Hanneton was to receive three and one detachment was going to be sent to Ardennes. The effort, which was easily the most complicated single mission EMFFI had yet designed, was to leave for France beginning on 4 September, “subject to the procurement of the necessary equipment.”61 It is clear from that statement as well as the flurry of paperwork, amendments, notes, and memos regarding the mission that they did not have the radios, codes, drop zones, air sorties, or JEDBURGH teams selected, nor did they even have the specific non-JEDBURGH mission members identified. Over the course of the next three weeks, 10 amendments were published and portions of the effort were canceled resulting in only Teams GREGORY, JIM, DOUGLAS, and TIMOTHY deploying instead of the original effort to send 7 as a part of 7

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61 “MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING PLANS,” August 1, 1944, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Folder 12, Box 329, Entry 190, RG 226, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
independent headquarters elements. Reasons were largely due to lack of capacity of communications, something that ironically enough was caused by a lack of communication between EMFFI’s communications and operations staffs. The two parts of the staff rarely worked well together, as some of the examples discussed in previous chapters attest, nor did their relationship improve with the advancing complications and ambitions of the operations efforts.

By the end of August all of the JEDBURGH missions in eastern France were transitioning to becoming reconnaissance assets for the advancing Allied armies. Usually, within a few days after their arrival, if not immediately, they met up with the conventional forces and decided to go back behind the lines and coordinate the actions of the Maquis but with the specific guidance of the conventional forces in the area. In many cases, they found the Special Forces Detachment and coordinated their activities with its planners. Team BENJAMIN, comprised of British Major James O’Brien-Tear, French Lieutenant Paul Moniez and French radio operator Sous Lieutenant H. Kaminski, arrived west of Verdun at a very hastily arranged drop zone. The reception committee had only been notified, “a few day [sic] previously to find a DZ at all costs and had never received any detailed instructions” on how to run such an operation. O’Brien-Tear and Moniez later wrote that, “the net result was that 2 days and 3 nights were spent rounding up and collecting the stores and parachutes, most of which were elegantly draping the topmost branches of the highest trees.” Furthermore the Germans had recently moved some soldiers to within 350 yards of
the drop zone.\textsuperscript{62} Further complicating their pre-arrival plans, was their smashed radio and the injuries to Kaminski and the nearby team BERNARD’s French Captain Etienne Nasica. Therefore the two teams decided to work together on the western side of the Meuse instead of the original plan for BENJAMIN to work the eastern Meuse while BERNARD worked the west of the department. But the local Maquis led by Grandval were in a great state of confusion as he was attempting to bring about the large drop for the Vosges described above and was not in the area. Furthermore, the Gestapo and the local Milice succeeded in arresting many of the local group shortly after the Jeds arrived.\textsuperscript{63} Those arrests gave the Germans the locations of all the drop zones that group intended to use and “in effect,” the team wrote, “all our immediate contacts with the local FFI were severed in one swoop.”\textsuperscript{64} Left with few choices or means to arm the Maquis, the two teams moved west at the direction of EMFFI to link up and perform reconnaissance for the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army. Moniez took some of the Maquis and conducted a patrol into Sainte-Menehould killing four Germans, but they had to depart when shelled by artillery and mortars by Wehrmacht reinforcing the village. The teams continued similar activities for the next two days and in one action BERNARD’s Captain Nasica was wounded in the hip.\textsuperscript{65}

Meanwhile, the lead elements of the US 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army were rapidly overtaking their region. Finding the SF Detachment and Lt Col Powell on 3 September, the


\textsuperscript{63} Moniez.


\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. p. 15-16.
teams were held with him for a new mission while Powell gave them a new radio to replace the one destroyed during their parachute jump nearly two weeks before. He wanted to arrange for the teams to go south to the area between St. Dizier and Chaumont and assist the FFI’s effort to protect the 3rd Army’s southern flank. The team arrived in on the 15th where they received their first and only aerial re-supply. By the later half of the month they were coordinating tasks the 3rd Army wanted the *Maquis* to do such as guarding captured enemy equipment and some tactical reconnaissance. The team wrapped up that mission and EMFFI directed them to return to London, which they did on 2 October. Pondering their mission’s effectiveness, O’Brien-Tear and Moniez believed the harm done to them by the arrests could have been mended but, “mending takes time in conditions where it takes 3 days for a message to be sent 10 miles and 3 more days for an answer to be received. And time is what we lacked.”\(^6^6\) Adding to the critique more than six decades later, Paul Moniez thought that his training did not emphasize adaptation or creative thinking enough. Little in what they did was what they expected to do. His role in using the *Maquis* for rear area duties, or organizing *Maquisards* to penetrate Allied lines to provide intelligence was not something he had been prepared to do. Furthermore, his lack of local knowledge, the very thing the Frenchman was to add to the operation, was also debilitating. His complete unfamiliarity the Meuse was such

\(^{66}\) Ibid., p. 18.
that, “By parachuting me into the Meuse was just as if they had parachuted me into Arizona.”

**German counterinsurgency and the tragedy of Team JACOB**

Team JACOB’s relatively early arrival to the east of BENJAMIN did not make things easier for its members. In fact, Gough, Boissarie, and Seymour were effectively destroyed as a team on 17 August while descending down into the Wehrmacht’s sweep of the area under a small task force hastily organized called *Kommando Schoner*. That force succeeded in capturing Seymour and forcing the Maquis to disperse and sending the SAS and JEDBURGHs scattering into the Vosges woods. The German task force commander Major Schoner, who had lived in New York before the war, stopped Seymour’s summary execution immediately after his capture, brought him to their command post and questioned him. “He spoke excellent English with an American accent,” Seymour noted. Seymour was questioned and according to testimony after the war gave the enemy enough information to spare his life and garner decent treatment. The next day the Germans moved Seymour to Schirmeck camp, “an ordinary slave jail,” as Seymour called it and part of the Natzweiler prison system where he remained for 10 days.

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67 Moniez, interview
70 Statement of Wilhelm Schneider in “Murder of Parachutists in northeast France Aug-Oct 1944:
But what happened to Captains Gough and Boissarie? EMFFI had heard nothing of Team JACOB since 16 August, the day before Seymour’s capture. The German counterinsurgency operations proved to be completely able to foil any coherent Résistance in Region C, but also able to capture and kill much of the Maquis, the British SAS, and the Allied JEDBURGHs sent to work with them. But Gough and Boissarie had escaped the trap on the 17th and while they had no means to communicate to EMFFI themselves, Grandval’s message on 3 September reported only that he knew of the team, but did not give any details of what they were doing or indicate anything involving their present condition.\(^\text{72}\) Attempting to coordinate other things, it is clear that Grandval was merely repeating rumors back to EMFFI. But on the 26th Captain Gough succeeded with the aid of one of the BCRA radio operators in the area to send word that he needed new equipment and a new team. In a second message from a second operator he asked for “ARMS, AMMUNITION, GRENADES URGENTLY NEEDED FOR 600 MEN,” and that he needed a parachute drop of no more than 70 containers, and a radio. It ended with, “AREA GETTING HOTTER DAILY.”\(^\text{73}\) However those messages probably did not get through as being from JACOB as they were sent from another radio operators equipment. In an EMFFI status report of JEDBURGH teams done on 27 August it laments that no communication from JACOB had been received since the 16th.\(^\text{74}\) But on 5 September Gough managed to get off two more messages. The first asked that

\(^\text{72}\) “Telegram de PLANETE,” 3 Sept 44, 1 K 374, AN.
\(^\text{73}\) OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Target 4, Vol. 4, Book IV, p. 766.
\(^\text{74}\) “Status of JEDBURGHs” Amended 27 August, 1944, 3 AJ 2 462, AN.
his equipment be sent via the SAS air drop to take place in a few days and that he could not receive arms before due to being attacked. He needed money and remarked that getting food was difficult. Also on the 15th he telegraphed that Seymour had been captured and he feared that the Germans had executed him. He also stated that Boissarie was killed. “I AM NOW SOLE MEMBER OF TEAM JACOB. 100 MAQUIS KILLED 100 CAPTURED IN SAME BATTLE. REST DISPERSED.” The next day his spirits seem to have been risen somewhat. Gough apologized for such little communication, stated that his Maquis leader was under surveillance and therefore he could not operate but that he had rallied 200 Maquis and armed them with SAS provided weapons. He signed off with the plucky remark, “CHINS UP.” Finally on the 19th EMFFI replied saying it was sending money. On the 23rd EMFFI telegraphed Gough again requesting details as to the fate of Seymour and Boissarie. They received nothing back from Captain Gough.75

Gough was EMFFI’s only man in the area Eisenhower had made a top priority and they now sought to utilize him. On 27 September with Allied armies now approaching the Vosges and crossing the Meurthe River, Gough’s operations could prove very valuable.76 But it is unclear what messages Gough was receiving from London. Reports of the SAS note that Gough was operating independently of them and working with a group known as Maquis de Reciproque in October. But by early November he, like Seymour, had also been captured.

75 OSS London Microfilm, Reel 8, Target 4, Vol. 4, Book IV, p. 767.
76 Clarke, Smith, and Center of Military History., Riviera to the Rhine. P. 260.
The Gestapo had organized two operations in the area to defeat the insurgency after the Wehrmacht’s initial efforts in the middle of August failed to do so. Operations WALDFEST 1 and 2 began in September and were organized by the SS commander in Strasbourg, Dr. Eric Isselhorst, and his deputy Wilhelm Schneider. Isselhorst, had been a member of the Nazi party since 1932 and had worked his way up the party’s ladder in Gestapo offices in Berlin, Erfurt, Munich, and after participating and organizing Einsatzkommando detachments in Poland he became the head of the Strasbourg Gestapo in 1943. His effective actions had largely succeeded in rounding up all of the SAS of another mission codenamed PISTOL and nearly all of the SAS with LOYTON. With the killing of Boissarie on or about 4 September and the capture of Gough at the end of October, Team JACOB was also gone. Gough and Seymour were still alive but while Gough was held at Schirmeck and later moved to a prison in Strasbourg, Seymour had been moved on into Germany. The camp was organized to place special prisoners such as these parachutists in their own cells. So along with Gough were five SAS, four US Airmen who had parachuted out of disabled aircraft and three priests, and another Frenchmen. All were held there due to being taken while working with or being with the Résistance. Also with them was a German NCO who had thrown his sawn off shotgun in the river and ordered his soldiers to do the same. His name was Werner

79 Burbidge manuscript, p. 13. Burbidge lists the airmen as Lt G. P. Jacoby, Sgt Michael Pipock, Sgt Curtis Hodges, and Sgt Maynard Latten. The Priests were Abbe Roth, Abbe Claude, and Father Pennarath. The Frenchman’s name was Werner Jakob.
Helfen and he had been in the *Schutz Polizei*. His unit was ordered to turn over their legal weapons to front line soldiers. He told his men to throw their shotguns into the river due to the fear that if he were captured, the Allies would try him for having a weapon that was against the international conventions. However, he had been caught by his own for destroying property of the *Reich* and brought to Schirmeck as a prisoner. While there he was given light duties bringing him in contact with the other inmates. He often did favors for them such as getting them medical attention, passing messages among them, and simply speaking kindly to them.\(^8^0\)

As the Allies advanced, the camp commander Karl Buck, received orders from Isselhorst to shoot any special prisoners that he might select, release the women and burn down the camp. Buck did not carry out these orders because he “did not consider it wise to leave fresh mass graves behind, and secondly I considered the camp might have been useful to the *Wehrmacht* who were retreating.” Instead, he arranged to transport the prisoners across the Rhine River to Germany and a prison at Gaggenau, on 21 November. Having been told they were leaving, Gough made a present of his silk SOE escape map for the kindnesses Werner Helfen had shown him. The next day, while they were all on trucks, Helfen the only one of them that had been told of his death sentence, jumped from the truck and escaped. The others arrived at the camp at Gaggenau, Germany on 23 November. Witnesses after the war attested that they were all still at the camp at midday on the 25\(^{th}\) but later that day the

\(^{8^0}\) Ibid. p. 13.
SAS, the three priests, the four airmen, the French civilian, and Gough were put back into a truck with soldiers and shovels.\(^81\)

The truck drove through the town of Gaggenau and then into the Erlich Forest and pulled alongside a bomb crater. The execution unit took three prisoners out of the truck at a time, marched them into the bomb crater, and shot each of them in the back of the head. One of the priests attempted to flee, but was shot down by the three men of the execution squad as he stumbled and fell in the trees. After killing them they stripped them of their clothing, set fire to the bodies and pilfered the best of the belongings from the pile of clothes, boots, and other meager possessions the prisoners had.\(^82\) After the war, despite the quagmire of Allied and judicial procedure and bureaucracies, Major Eric Barkworth of 2 SAS spent months attempting to uncover what had happened to the members of mission LOYTON and team JACOB. His relentless efforts resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the three executioners, Isselhorst, and his deputy, Wilhelm Schneider who had conducted the WALDFEST operations. The executioners received prison terms of no more then 10 years. Schneider, despite Sergeant Seymour testifying in his defense, was executed in January of 1947. Isselhorst, who was tried for several other crimes, was finally shot by a French firing squad in February of 1948. The Camp Schirmeck commander Karl Buck survived being punished for Gaggenau murders due to the sentence not

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\(^81\) Burbidge manuscript, p. 14. Quoted from Buck’s sworn statement of 22 Sept 1945 from WO 218/222.

\(^82\) Ibid., p. 18-19.
being legally confirmed under British law. But he too had plenty to answer for and was finally sentenced to death in the 1950s.83

That still leaves one JEDBURGH unaccounted for, American Captain Cyrus Manierre. Sergeant Seymour who returned to the UK after being liberated from Stalag 9C near Frankfurt in April 1945 reported that he had seen Manierre while in a holding station awaiting further transportation. He caught just a glimpse but was sure it was him.84 Manierre had successfully convinced his new interrogators in Lyon that he was an aircrew member and they turned him over to the Luftwaffe who took him into their system. While at the transit camp where Seymour saw him, Manierre realized his brother was just a few feet away among the crowd of POWs. William Manierre had been shot down with his bomber crew after flying his 31st mission one week after Cyrus had been captured. When the brothers made a bit of a commotion and the Germans realized two brothers were in the same camp, they made a publicity event of it and due to their publicity the Red Cross was able to notify their mother of the two brothers’ fate. Also making it somewhat easier Manierre recognized many of his West Point friends in the camp with him, which buoyed his morale a great deal. Having been promoted to Major, he served the rest of the war as the Adjutant to the Group Commander, Lt Col Francis S. Gabreski, the famous WWII Ace. On 2 May 1945, the Soviet Army liberated the camp and the last unaccounted for JEDBURGH was finally free to return home.85

84 Team JACOB, HS 6/529, pp. 4, 6.
Conclusion

EMFFI could not overcome the conditions that inhibited its ability to adequately support the Maquis in eastern France. The constant churning of the staff, the rapidly progressing front lines, the intermittent information and muddled awareness of what occurred inside France, the bifurcated command arrangements with the southern forces, and the ambitious overconfidence to send teams without the ability to back them up with arms all were self-inflicted problems. EMFFI’s lead JEDBURGH planner, Lt Col Dudley Guy Lancelot Carleton-Smith must have been completely disgusted with the squabbling among the operations and communications planners and the lack of facilities in London needed to brief the teams when doing so many in such a short amount of time. Furthermore, he and the other American and British officers on the EMFFI staff often had to chase down what went wrong when a Jed in the field chewed them out for doing so poorly. One can only wonder how many of these issues could have been avoided had General Koenig been allowed to be fully integrated into SHAEF when Eisenhower wanted to in January. The fear of letting the French in on the secret was a valid concern, but despite waiting to bring the FFI in on the planning and conduct of operations, it is clear the Germans knew nearly everything about what SHAEF wanted the Résistance to do and how it was going to do it. But only in northeast France did they succeed and disabling the FFI. The fates of team AUGUSTUS, the only team to be completely eliminated, and casualties and prisoners of teams AUBREY, JACOB, and the ineffectiveness of teams such as
MAURICE, BENJAMIN, and HENRY attest to the fruitlessness of the effort despite the number of teams deployed to the area.

To arm the Résistance, EMFFI needed to have secure drop zones and favorable weather. But more than that, it needed to have secure drop zones that would remain secure for nearly 2 days. That was the time it took to make all the arrangements and fly the missions bringing supplies. While such conditions may have existed in eastern France before D-Day, or even before the middle of August when Hitler ordered the forces in the south and southwest to evacuate, those conditions did not exist when Eisenhower and Koenig needed to have them. The Wehrmacht’s persistent traffic and movement through the region meant that Grandval, Hanneton, the Jeds, the SAS and the Maquisards could not guarantee that the security of the area they identified would remain so when the Germans moved about as they wished. Moreover, the Gestapo’s merciless actions against anyone found working with, as they called them, the Terroristen, proved to be extremely effective, if not ultimately illegal, at rolling up FFI networks. Despite thousands of potential FFI, operating in excellent terrain for guerilla warfare and enjoying growing political support for the Libération, the effort never gained traction due to the 36 hour planning cycle needed to line up aircraft, chose the proper containers of weapons, transfer the loads from the marshalling area to the proper aerodrome, properly rig the aircraft, and then fly them through the foggy moonless nights to the reception committee among the bonfires in the rainy forests of France. However, it was not for the lack of persistence and the “chins up” attitude displayed by many.
The Jeds did need more time to establish themselves with Grandval’s and Hanneton’s organizations. But more than mere time on the ground, the teams would have had to had them armed and trained so that when the Wehrmacht’s combat units transited the area, the Maquis could successfully harass them with hit and run raids coupled with persistent sabotage of key roads and railways. Of course these operations, had they been able to occur, would have also had to maintain secure drop zones amidst the retreating and reorganizing Wehrmacht and SS units. A difficult prospect, no matter when the teams arrived in the area.
Conclusion

During the course of France’s Libération, the Allies deployed 93 JEDBURGH teams to France. Those teams were a part of EMFFI’s effort to guide the use of the arms delivered to France before and after they arrived. From 1941 until 1944, the Allies delivered 594,010 kilograms of explosives, 197,480 Sten light machine guns, 20,518 Bren heavy machine guns, 127,330 rifles, 57,849 pistols, 722,271 grenades, 2,440 Bazookas, 285 mortars, 9,373 Carbines, and 1,893 Marlin machine guns. The number of armed FFI is elusive, but SHAEF estimated it to be 114,000 by late October of 1944, nearly beating Eisenhower’s goal of having 120,000 armed men by the end of the year. Within this atmosphere, we can examine JEDBURGH operations during the summer and early fall of 1944 in order to see why some teams failed while others succeeded in order to get at the wisdom of using the method of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore it allows us to examine the idea of using irregular warfare by nation states, and in the case of the Fighting French, the emerging nation state making use of irregulars and how it dealt with the problems that arose.

Along with the JEDBURGHS, SHAEF and AFHQ deployed over 18 SAS missions, 20 Operational Groups, and 26 inter-allied missions to France. But of these

87 SHAEF G-2 Memo, “MF/GBI/OI/180,” 25 November 1944, France Vol. III, French Resistance Groups, Reel 52, Frame 396, SHAEF SGS Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. These 114,000 did not include those involved in combat in western or eastern France. Therefore the total armed by clandestine methods may be far higher. But the number also includes, the FFI armed from French Armistice Army weapons brought out during the Libération or captured German weapons.
Special Operations efforts the JEDBURGH plan was the first, most rigorously thought out and exercised effort the Allies put together. Not only were they specifically developed to liaise with another nation’s irregular forces, but also the JEDBURGHs were Allied units working for an Allied headquarters that reported to the Supreme Allied Commander. Such an attribute is a rare thing to see in military units and so it is important to recognize how that came about and under what conditions it occurred. Coalition warfare is an incredibly complex affair to manage, which is why Alliances tend to maintain their coalition character at the highest level. Doing so allows the operational level commanders and tactical units to operate more freely from political issues and maintain their own unique cultural cohesion allowing for clarity of thought and action. Placing alliance politics down to the tactical level forces 23-year-old Captains, Lieutenants, and 19-year-old Sergeants to either be cognizant of international politics or suffer the consequences. It is a rare occurrence that expresses a coalition’s nature at the tactical level.

I do not suggest that the JEDBURGHs sought to become involved in the local politics; they always wished to avoid it in order to conduct their military mission. But many were forced to deal with politics when there were competing groups in their locality. When the enemy attacked, unity often appeared within the groups who earnestly sought to fight back. But even in areas that had come together, Libération politics became more pronounced as the various political parties and groups vied for control in September or October as the Germans were defeated. As Team HUGH, the first team into France wrote at the end of their mission, “Fighting was over, politics
began, HUGH left. Major William Crawshay, Captain Louis L’Helgouach, and radio operator Rene Meyer operated in France from 6 June to the end of September performing various military tasks, but they could do very little without local political unity of action. When that political unity was honed under L’Helgouach’s auspices locally with their team, regionally with the DMR Eugene Dechelette and nationally with General Koenig, then unified military action could occur and had a chance at being effective. Furthermore, operating inside the political sovereignty of de Gaulle and the CFLN, the teams exercised the CFLN’s sovereignty along with Allied authority. Therefore, what the JEDBURGHs did, was give the CFLN’s military commanders 93 more ways to reach the irregular forces scattered around France, assert some measure of control from EMFFI via the DMRs or other representatives, in an effort to, as Clausewitz might say, control the peoples’ passions.

A nation’s will, expressed by its own sense of sovereign authority and the expression of its power contends with other nations whether they are at war or not. As we have seen above, those contentions are not only with enemies but also with Allies. Free France’s desire to reassert what it believed was the proper authority made it an aim, first and foremost to allow no seams to its sovereignty. Pétain had no choice, he believed, but to bargain with Nazi Germany for as much sovereignty as he could get, but found only political illegitimacy. His fear of a communist led internal revolution so clouded his views on the matter that he would rather have collaboration with Fascist Germany than lose the France he sought. De Gaulle on the other hand,

declared an outlaw in 1940, risked everything in order to liberate France of foreign powers, to include the United States and Britain. He was so driven to do so in fact, that when he found SOE agents in France in September of 1944, he demanded that they leave immediately. “We don’t need you here.” He scolded one British SOE officer who had been working clandestinely in France for months, “It only remains for you to leave. I have already told one ARISTIDE, who was indulging in politics, to get out. Another that I have dispatched is HILAIRE in Toulouse. You too must go home. Return, return quickly, . . . Au revoir.”

De Gaulle would have no more seams to French sovereignty. The Germans were to be driven out with combat while the British SOE, in September of 1944 could be chased out with his scorn. General Koenig’s easing the SOE out of the command and control of the French FFI via Mockler-Ferryman’s resignation at the end of July is a portent to all of this. While on the one hand it seems obscenely ungracious and petty to lash out like de Gaulle did at the three SOE agents, since they had risked their lives for months. Nevertheless, ever since de Gaulle discovered that SOE’s F Section was operating in France conducting British policy there as Britain saw fit, and not as a part of an alliance, it seems only natural that he would want them to go, since they were uninvited foreign intelligence and sabotage agents. Interestingly, there is no

89 “Report of Captain Lake, DIGGER Circuit,” 27 September 1944, HS 6/574, BNA, Kew, UK. p. 4. ARISTIDE’s real name was Roger Landes who directed Team AMMONIA while in Bordeaux but assumed that role, as EMFFI never gave him any authority there. HILAIRE’s real name was George Starr, probably the most influential British subject in France at the time, who attempted to make Teams BUGATTI, QUININE, MARK, CHRYSLER, MILES, and MARTIN as effective and useful as possible and integrate their actions with his and SFHQ’s plans. Starr’s own effectiveness may be the reason why the DMR could not gain any meaningful power in the region. No historical work on the DMRs has been done to examine their effectiveness, so this is merely a guess.
record of him seeking the hasty departure of JEDBURGH teams who had the
imprimatur of General Koenig in addition to having French officers on each team. In
this regard, Eisenhower succeeded at gaining French participation the moment
OVERLORD began by seeking to place them in charge of France’s partisan warfare.
He learned from his North African invasion experiences and improved markedly
upon what occurred there.

Given the strong evidence that suggests that partisan warfare in France was at
its most effective when enemy troops were under strength, spread out, and forced to
move through an environment where the population’s hatred of them brought out
more guerrillas than the Allies could work into their overall plans, it seems
incongruent to see why the method would be so popular as the twentieth century
progressed. It is difficult to see how it could be replicated later under other
conditions. But then there never was a thorough vetting of how well and under what
conditions the JEDBURGHs or the French Résistance proved to be successful. If all
JEDBURGH teams had met the same fate as Team JACOB and AUGUSTUS, then
perhaps the institutionalized memory within the British, French, and American
intelligence services and Special Forces would have sought a useful and sober
assessment of why it failed.

Instead, the Vercors, Elster’s surrender, and the operations on the Brittany
peninsula were touted as examples of what is possible to SHAEF and Eisenhower and
many of the commanders at the time accepted it while never seeking to understand
why it was a success. But as shown above, these events were not what SFHQ
believed them to be. The FFI view Vercors as a disaster while the Wehrmacht units used there would not have threatened Patton or Patch. However the fact that the units employed by the Wehrmacht to conduct their anti-partisan actions in the south of France were units that never would have been moved to threaten main Allied forces in the first place never seems to have been appreciated by SFHQ, SPOC, or EMFFI. Vercors did nothing to divert those forces from being employed against Patton and the rest of Eisenhower’s forces because they were units that never would have moved against them. The German 157th Infantrie Division, the main combat force at the Vercors, did fight against the Allied invasion force commanded by Patch, but only because Patch came to where they were. Elster was a grand success, due to the characteristics of: reliable re-supply, JEDBURGH teams with good communications and the ability to hide when combat was not wise, weakened enemy troops forced to travel, close air support, reliable intelligence, all operating in an environment of political unity. The operations in Brittany utilized the same characteristics, with more even more teams and greater air support for supplies and air strikes. These striking events, as well as the day to day sabotage and mayhem done to cut German lines of communications from D-Day through to the end of the Libération reinforced the efficacy of partisan warfare in their minds, even when the anatomy of the operations were not truly appreciated.

Lt Col Robert Powell’s 31 August message requesting arms for the FFI on his southern flank make it clear he believed the FFI could play a serious role. But it is also clear that the Wehrmacht to his south were only interested in securing their own
northern flank along the Loire River in order to allow them to escape through the Bourges – Dijon – Besançon – Belfort Gap corridor. Lt Col Hutchison’s comment that the German destruction of the Loire River bridges “satisfied everyone” is absolutely correct. Neither side wished to attack the other at the Loire River crossings; they merely sought to outtrace each other to Germany. Not even Hitler’s starry eyed confidence in the ability of his armies believed the newly re-designated 16th Infantrie Division was up to the task of outflanking the US 3rd Army. Instead, salvaging his forces from southwestern France was more important and the 16th Infantrie Division’s mission was to shield its comrades from any Allied forces that might seek to come in their direction. But Patton, quite correctly, was far too interested in racing eastward and happy to leave the chore to the FFI. Therefore, the success the FFI had there had more to do with Wehrmacht choices then it did with their own actions. Given what the Germans faced and what their goals were after DRAGOON began 15 August 1944, they succeeded in establishing a defensive line, and successfully managed the escape of a significant portion of their forces. Koenig, Redman, Mockler-Ferryman, Haskell, et al, would have served Eisenhower and Wilson better had they argued to make central and southern France the first priority instead of the last. Had EMFFI succeeded in pouring arms into those regions by the day DRAGOON began, perhaps the Wehrmacht’s 19th Armee would have been destroyed. Instead, the Herculean but ill fated effort to mount a coherent operation in eastern France in order to use the Maquis as a blocking force merely resulted in some successful advanced reconnaissance while costing the lives of SAS and
JEDBURGHs, *Maquis*, and reprisals against civilians. The only JEDBURGH teams completely decimated, AUGUSTUS and JACOB, are a testament to the futility of EMFFI’s efforts in Eastern France. Since the Germans traveling though eastern France were often battle experienced and well led mobile combat units operating with the benefit of interior lines, at a distance limiting aerial re-supply and combat air support, Allied efforts to use guerilla warfare there was ill considered.

My intention is not to criticize Koenig, Redman, Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell, but rather to soberly assess their actions and to see why some of their efforts worked and while others did not. Operations in Brittany did meet with success and were the best of the four operational phases described in chapters five through eight. Taking their mission from Eisenhower to assist the advance of Allied forces in capturing the Breton ports, SFHQ and EMFFI developed a coherent plan and put it into action, albeit with some self-inflicted organizational tribulations caused by the poor relationship between Roosevelt and de Gaulle. Despite the lack of a solid long term DMR for the region, the replacement DMRs did manage to make an impact and Colonel Bourgouin’s role in commanding the area until *ALOES* arrived provided sufficient command and control for the region. The singular nature of the region’s *Maquis*, largely FTP, meant little infighting and coupled with sufficient French leadership, unity of action characterized Brittany’s FFI operations. But the greatest impact was the ability of the aerial re-supply to continue without any substantial German interruption. Drop zones were certainly lost, but when SFHQ succeeded in arming over 18,000 men by 1 August, it indicates that the region was the best and
most reliably equipped of any in France. This was especially true considering that Brittany received no major daylight re-supply operations such as CADILLAC. Furthermore, all the Wehrmacht units in Brittany were under strength and not equipped for rapid maneuver, an attribute that was required to chase down partisans and defend oneself from air attack. Even the 2nd Fallschirmjäger Division, the fiercest and arguably best led of any division in the region, was harried and unable to stop the Maquis from conducting much of what it sought to do. However, Eisenhower’s whole aim was to capture the port at Brest in a usable state. But by the time German General Ramcke surrendered in mid September, the port’s facilities were so badly damaged that Ike’s aim was never achieved.

It is no coincidence that the Elster surrender occurred in the region run by the arguably the most effective DMR. Eugene Dechelette did all the things the JEDBURGHs wished they could have done. He arrived in his region in early March, established a relationship with the various Maquis groups, learned the region’s geography, enemy make up, secured the BBC code words for the alert and action messages and had managed some drop zones. By the time D-Day occurred, he had things organized and a small but capable organization that could operate independently should communications with him be cut. After the Normandy landings occurred, and changed the nature of what the Germans were doing and what the Maquis could do, he successfully executed his BCRA plans, worked with JEDBURGH teams sent to him, requested more, and assigned them areas in which to work. By the time the southern landings occurred and OB West ordered the German
forces in the region to retreat, changing the nature of things in his region again, he was ready to take advantage of the opportunity for guerilla warfare. Over the course of the summer he had successfully united the Résistance within his region comprised of FTP, AS, and ORA. Their effective unification mitigated his region falling to Eisenhower’s lowest priority area for arms after 1 August.

Ike may have mis-prioritized which Regions to arm; and he and his staff may have dangerously underestimated the numbers of Maquis that would be pleading for weapons. He also may have been too afraid of over arming some of them at one point, but he did make the correct judgment on one big thing. He knew that for the Maquis to have any meaningful impact on Allied progress through France, a French commander had to lead it while being part and parcel of SHAEF. Roosevelt and Churchill had visions of controlling France or aspects of its Résistance and its government in exile. The SOE and OSS had designs on controlling the Maquis with hundreds of agents and JEDBURGH teams. The former is too high a level and the latter is too complicated and diffuse. But Eisenhower largely solved the dilemma when he brought General Koenig into SHAEF and treated him as one of his field commanders on par with Generals Montgomery, Bradley, Spaatz, and Admiral Ramsay. Had he been able to do so immediately upon his arrival at SHAEF in January of 1944, the FFI would have had time to make their Plans Vert, Tortue, Rouge and BIBENDUM roll in stages, as they were needed. Instead, fearful that not much would occur, Eisenhower decided to turn them all on full steam, only to have to
clamor to turn them off four short days later when he was stunned at what was occurring in France.

One may argue that security reasons were valid enough to keep EMFFI from so closely coordinating their planning with SHAEF. French communications, codes, and the BCRA were infamous for their lack of security. However, even the leak of JEDBURGH information made no difference. As described in Chapter Three, William Savy went to France on the ECLAIREUR mission, in order to scout out JEDBURGH safe houses and relate the nature of the missions to General Dejessieu the interior commander of the FFI. Some of the DMRs and F Section agents were made aware of SFHQ’s and the BCRA intent regarding the JEDBURGH mission. The information was severely compromised with Dejessieu’s, Nearne’s, and Southgate’s arrest. Certainly, as the Pariser Zeitung article makes clear, the Gestapo knew a great deal about the JEDBURGH plan. But it made no difference. They could not stop JEDBURGH operations everywhere and only had consistent success in eastern France due to reasons unrelated to any specific knowledge of what occurred at Milton Hall. Indeed it seems that if Haskell or Mockler-Ferryman had fallen into Nazi hands, it would have no effect, as long as the date, location, and size of the invasion force for D-Day remained secret. Therefore, more integrated planning with the BCRA, earlier in the process, could have paid off had Roosevelt and Churchill not been so upset with de Gaulle for asserting the sovereignty almost all the French in North Africa, nearly every resistance movement, General Donovan and his OSS
analysts, General Eisenhower, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and American Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy knew him to have.

Did the FDR-de Gaulle argument prevent the pre D-Day deployment of the JEDBURGHs or was that never the intention? The record is mixed. The SOE and OSS histories and all their pre D-Day planning documents seem consistent in that the JEDBURGHs were to be a reserve for post D-Day. However, SHAEF direction to SFHQ appears that there was some consideration of sending them in before D-Day. SHAEF directed that they be ready by 1 April, even when D-Day was originally scheduled for May. Later, as D-Day neared, General Smith directed SFHQ to not deploy them until D-Day minus ten, and then later directed that they not be sent in until D-Day minus one at the earliest. If SFHQ never intended to deploy them until after D-Day, why would SHAEF have to tell them not to do so? Furthermore, the Jeds who were told they would be in France before D-Day, adds to the consternation. That belief seems most evident with the French and the BCRA recruiters may have sincerely believed it at the time, but since the BCRA was locked out of planning until the end of May, they were making promises they could not keep. Therefore, the Jed belief that they were to be in before D-Day may simply have been the result of exuberant recruiters saying something they believed would attract the kind of men they wanted. Soldiers being soldiers, that promise to a few, became rumor, which then became their tri-partite reality.

The availability and the relatively late decision to use Special Air Service missions in France also caught the JEDBURGH planners to be out of form. The
decision to insert Jeds along with SAS and OG missions, who had a markedly different mission from them, was also costly. Not only were there procedural issues that caused confusion, but the SAS mission of striking out at enemy targets despite the local Maquis’ readiness to join such ventures was harmful to the JEDBURGH’s mission of deploying, assessing the local groups capabilities, getting arms to them and training them, and then at the appropriate time taking manageable numbers into hit and run actions against carefully selected enemy targets. The SAS wished to do its operations immediately and was supplied out of airlift sortie allocations separate from SFHQ’s. Therefore, when Eisenhower ordered the Maquis to cease guerilla warfare and restricted air drops, the SAS continued to get their weapons, making the JEDBURGHS working in concert with the nearby Maquis look impotent and illegitimate. While the Maquis in some regions were then forced to wait due to lack of weapons or a persuasive Jed officer telling them to, the SAS continued on their merry way making mayhem. The swelling of DINGSON with hundreds of Maquis and their subsequent dispersal due to German attacks on 18 June was something Team GEORGE did not recover from until the beginning of August. Team FREDERICK only avoided a tragic fate due to the help of some local Maquis and their decision to disperse before the 2nd Fallschirmjäger arrived in strength to hunt them. Moreover, one can look at the map of France noting where the SAS were and then noting where the reprisals were and it is no coincidence that where there was an SAS mission, reprisals on French civilians often occurred nearby. If Jeds had been sent in on their own, they could have called in SAS teams to do missions beyond the
ability of the local *Maquis* while being cognizant of local concerns. Team HUGH’s decision to disobey its orders and split from the BULBASKET mission proved wise in light of the fact that the Germans mauled BULBASKET.

Of the 265 JEDBURGHs deployed to France, 13 were killed in combat, two died when their parachutes failed to open, one was killed by accident from a *Maquisard*’s unintended discharge of his weapon, and two subsequently died of combat wounds. 13 were wounded in combat but recovered, while six were severely injured in their parachute jumps. Two of three JEDBURGHs survived being taken prisoner. The casualty rate was far lower than many expected. When Bernard Knox of Team GILES checked out his equipment prior to leaving for France in July, he was shocked when told he need not sign for his gear. Assuming he would be killed in France, the supply officer did not expect to get it back.\(^90\) But as it turned out, 9 out of every 10 Jeds returned.

Many of those who survived France became an influential force in the post WWII world. But there was no serious taking stock of the JEDBURGH operations in France as Germany and Japan still remained undefeated. After the JEDBURGH missions were wound up in France and Holland many of the Jeds volunteered for other operations as the war had another year to go before it ended. American Lt Colonel Hod Fuller and French Lieutenant Paul Aussaresses deployed on Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force (SAARF) teams attempting to ensure the

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\(^90\) Knox interview, June 2001. Since he survived, but did not sign for his gear, Captain Knox did not return it. His souvenirs of the war are indeed impressive and include an SS Colonel’s hat whom he conned into surrendering in April of 1945 in Italy.
Germans did not mistreat POWs in captivity during the waning days of the war. William Colby of Team BRUCE commanded an Operational Group to Norway, Bernard Knox went on an OSS mission to Italy and Tommy MacPherson also served in an SOE mission there. Several served in China or Indo-China, 12 of whom were killed. Michel de Bourbon-Parme, the French Jed on Team QUININE was taken prisoner by communist insurgents in Indo-China and held for nearly a year. His third escape attempt finally succeeded. Team GEORGE’s American Captain Paul Cyr took in a Chinese Commando unit on Mission HOUND and blew up the Yellow River Bridge while a Japanese troop train passed over it on the same day Nagasaki was destroyed on 9 August 1945. But with the exception of the SAARF missions, the nations went their own way with their Special Forces and Allied unconventional warfare faded away.

The British ran JEDBURGH teams into Austria with some anti-Nazi Germans and Austrians, but despite their perceived success in Western Europe, small Allied teams were not employed again during the Second World War. The coalition politics that brought them into being had changed significantly by late 1944 and the senior SOE, OSS, and BCRA (which by 1945 became the Direction générale des services spéciales or DGSS) leaders seemed eager for less complications. In October, President Roosevelt finally recognized the Gaullist Résistance as the provisional government of France. But political recognition did not increase Franco-American understanding when fighting the Japanese in south East Asia in 1945. Here American

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91 De Bourbon-Parme, interview September 22nd 2007.
92 Telephone interview with Donna Cyr, 30 March 1999.
policy remained similar to what it had been in France. Specifically, this meant working with whomever could defeat the Japanese. Consequently, the OSS supported Ho Chi Minh’s insurgents in order to defeat the Japanese, while the French fought both the Japanese and Ho Chi Minh in order to re-establish control of their colony.93 The former French American JEDBURGHs then worked at cross purposes and Americans Aaron Bank and Lucien Conein fell out of favor with their French colleagues who were determined to wrest control of their colony back from the American supported Ho Chi Minh. American OSS officers and the Viet Minh insurgents who would became bitter adversaries in the 1960s and 70s literally stood together when Ho Chi Minh declared independence from Japan and France, on 13 August 1945.94 Such declarations seemed fine with the United States, but France had other political aims with their colonies and worked hard, if unsuccessfully, to maintain its authority over Vietnam and later Algeria. Its efforts in those two conflicts kept former French JEDBURGH’s employed at those tasks and using the lessons they had learned in conducting their own guerilla warfare. Paul Aussaresses of Team CHRYSLER served as the chief of intelligence in Algeria and in that capacity tortured and murdered to get the information he needed.95

France’s failed efforts in south east Asia were followed by American attempts as well. Former JEDBURGH’s, William Colby and Lucien Conein got similar results

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93 See Dixiee R. Bartholomew-Feis, *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War Against Japan*. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007)
in their roles as CIA officers, and John Singlaub as commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG) when they picked up the baton to run a counter insurgency against the communist North Vietnamese in the 1960s. President Kennedy, who was enthusiastic about unconventional warfare sought to not only defend against what communist movements were doing abroad, but to conduct an insurgency of his own against Ho Chi Minh’s communist North Vietnam. In an interview granted in 1962 to journalist and former JEDBURGH, Stewart Alsop, President Kennedy stated that the way the world was at that time made it necessary for the United States to have choices in how it could respond to aggression abroad. Finding himself in a situation similar to Churchill’s in 1940 when he grasped for options to go on the offensive and created the SOE, Kennedy sought more options than only nuclear weapons and told Alsop that he needed to develop choices. Reacting to how the communists were conducting their approach to the problem he was heavily influenced by Chinese leader Mao Tse-Tung. “Guerillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swim,” Kennedy said quoting Mao. Kennedy went on to tell this former Jed that, “the best way – perhaps in the long run the only way – to deal with the internal Communist-guerrilla threat, is to “control the temperature of the water” emphasizing this meant a political effort. Such was the case in WWII France too, but as Kennedy’s

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predecessor, the former Supreme Allied Commander, President Eisenhower could have pointed out to his successor, the French did their own controlling.

Ultimately, American efforts against North Vietnam failed for the same reasons the French efforts did. As Richard Shultz points out, there was little popular support for an insurgency against the Ho Chi Minh regime. But President John F. Kennedy, buttressed by his faith in unconventional warfare, sought to use it against the communists everywhere but failed to think through the conditions required in order to make it work for American interests at the time. The US sponsored insurgency against North Vietnam started under former JEDBURGH William Colby as a CIA effort. Kennedy believed the CIA did not have the resources to do it with the vigor he wished so he gave the mission to the Defense Department. The Army and the theater commanders then created MACVSOG and the Army’s relatively young Special Forces began to run it. When asked what he thought of his efforts to oversee the insurgency against Ho Chi Minh, former JEDBURGH John Singlaub admitted that by the time he took command of MACVSOG in 1966 the insurgency against North Vietnam was doomed. Indeed, he thought it was doomed long before his arrival due to the agreements made in 1954 that drew the dividing line between north and South Vietnam and allowed for those who wished to leave the communist north to do so. All the Vietnamese who did not wish to live in the North went elsewhere deflating nearly all native political sentiments opposed to Ho Chi Minh’s version of nationalism. All Colonel Singlaub could do was suspect that the saboteurs and agents MACVSOG had inserted were turned by the enemy and triple turn them.
In other words, all the effort was good for was attempting to trick North Vietnam into thinking that the United States did not know that North Vietnam knew of its operations and feed disinformation back to “his” agents behind enemy lines. He could not control the temperature of the water in which he sent fish to swim, and so he tried that tack instead of completely quitting and cutting bait.

For Eisenhower, who grasped the issues better than most, controlling the French Résistance was a matter of bringing them into SHAEF and then letting the French run it while supporting their efforts with air sorties, arms, money, and training. The BCRA, with the Bloc Planning effort, organized the sabotage plans in France and worked with the SOE and OSS to arm, train, and equip their agents before D-Day and that effort is what succeeded in supporting the initial invasion in Normandy. Frenchmen and women comprised the vast majority of “agents” sent into France by the SOE as well as the BCRA. But more importantly, the French Résistance was not a creation of the British SOE, or the American OSS. It sprang from France itself, reflected French traditions of political action, French notions of the state, and sought French political aims that expressed French will. Eisenhower may not have understood all of this as clearly in 1944, as he never expressed it in those terms, but his recognition that General de Gaulle was the single leader, and his stubborn insistence on working with General Koenig to make him a subordinate commander when Roosevelt, Churchill, Gubbins, Mockler-Ferryman,
and Donovan protested, demonstrate he understood the fundamentals of the situation more clearly than anyone.

As Peter Novick, Charles-Louis Foulon, John Sweets, Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, and other historians have clearly demonstrated, the Résistance’s greatest achievement was the political overthrow of Vichy and the unified effort it pulled together to resist Germany and then govern post-war France. It succeeded in offering an alternative to those people in France increasingly alienated from Pétain’s feckless government and German occupation. There lies the difference between a failed insurgency and a successful revolution. De Gaulle offered an alternative for enough of the French population weary of war and occupation while avoiding much of the chaos he feared as much as Pétain. While terming what de Gaulle achieved as a revolution may be dubious since its immediate result was the Fourth Republic that was very similar to the Third, his actions generally worked to avoid the worst aspects of chaos an insurgency often brings when it works at dissolving the fabric of institutions, authority, and society in order to bring down a government. De Gaulle successfully avoided these problems when he brought the bands of FFI into the regular French Army and convinced those who maintained weapons supplied by the Allies, to keep them discretely in their homes or surrender them to the government. Historians before me have demonstrated all these issues.

Where the JEDBURGHs succeeded, they did so because the Résistance created the conditions necessary for success. The military conditions such as the operational objectives of the German and Allied forces and the effects that resulted
from them, the ability to secure drop zones, reliable communications, and the reliability of re-supply sorties all were crucial. But they were not the hardest things to achieve as French political will could not be parachuted into France. Nothing the British SOE or the American OSS could do, would achieve what the Résistance succeeded in achieving. In this light, Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s persistent undercutting of de Gaulle in an effort to control France seems increasingly harmful to Allied objectives. But then it is apparent that they, perhaps understandably, were not as concerned with France as the French themselves were. General Koenig’s intermittent ability to control the Résistance then is a testament to him, the BCRA, the EMFFI staff, and the myriad movements all-determining for themselves to submit to his authority. Therefore, the Allied desire to control the French Résistance did not come about because of JEDBURGH teams as SOE originally wished, but because Eisenhower made Koenig subordinate to his Allied Command. That act was not something SOE foresaw when it first developed the JEDBURGH plan, but it was the greatest constructive step the Allies made toward freeing France.
Annex I

Commando – Anglicized form of the Afrikaans word, Kommando, which means small unit or group of militia. The word first appeared in English as a cross over during the Boer War around 1902. Since the beginning of WWII, it has shifted to mean highly trained soldiers performing quick raids or strikes against a specific target.

Counter-insurgency – an effort by a government to defeat an indigenous force seeking to overthrow it.

Guerrilla Warfare – First entered the English language around 1809 during the Peninsular War when the Duke of Wellington’s troops fought Napoleon’s forces in Spain. Guerrilla is a Spanish word that means “small war.” The “Guerrillas” were those indigenous Spanish that fought with the British to drive the French out.

Insurgency – an effort by a group within a nation-state to either overthrow the constituted government or to separate a desired territory from that government’s control.

Irregular Warfare – Non-professionally trained people who conduct violence against a government or another nation’s forces. The legal status of these combatants, as they are often outside any sovereign nation’s authority is a source of great debate. Are they criminals or fighting for a just cause?

Partisan Warfare - An Italian term for a kind of spear, it now has come to mean a member of a small band of irregulars, akin to guerrilla warfare. Entered the English language with this connation around 1810.

Small Wars or “Petite-Guerre” – defined in Diderot’s famous Encyclopédie, published in the 18th century, as tactics performed behind the lines or between the lines by professional forces of “detachment or parties, whose object is to scout out the enemy’s intent, to observe its movements, to harass it or badger it in all its operations, to surprise its convoys, to establish commissary and sustainment, etc.”

Unconventional War – a term widely used for nearly anything that does not involve the use of massed formations of troops or aircraft. Many times, even nuclear warfare comes under this rubric, but normally it is meant to describe the use of non-professional forces within the interior of the enemy’s territory. Current United States doctrinal definition of this term describes the use of irregulars against an enemy.

- Source is the Oxford English Dictionary Online, or Diderot’s Encyclopédie, found in Spencer Library.
Annex II

Final Jedburgh Team map from HS 7/16, BNA, Kew, UK.
Source: U. S. Army
Europe, FFI History,
Locations of DMRs
Indicate the map was created
In early August, 1944
Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, 3rd from left with General Pierre Koenig standing next to him. Whitney Shepardson of OSS London is 2nd from left. The rest of the individuals are members of the “Carpetbaggers.”

September 1944, RAF Harrington, UK - Joseph F. Haskell Papers
Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, HS 9/510/1, BNA.

Lieutenant Paul Moniez and Major James O’Brien-Tear, officers of Team BENJAMIN, courtesy of General Moniez
Major Colin Ogden-Smith of Team FRANCIS
Captain Victor Gough of Team JACOB, courtesy of Colin Burbidge
Lieutenant Paul Bloch-Auroch, MSgt Robert Kehoe, Major Adrian Wise, of Team FREDERICK, US National Archives
Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, DMZ-Sud, HS 8/1001, BNA

Eugene Dechelette, DMR for R5 HS 8/1001, BNA
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  FO Series
  HS Series
  HW Series
  WO Series

Imperial War Museum, London
  Sound Archive – Irregular Warfare

Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London

France
Archives National, Paris
3 AG 2
3 AG 3

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