MASCULINE INTERLUDES: MONSTROSITY AND COMPASSIONATE MANHOOD IN AMERICAN LITERATURE, 1845-1899

BY

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Abstract
This dissertation examines the textual formulation of “compassionate manhood”—a kind, gentle trope of masculinity—in nineteenth-century American literature. George Lippard, Mark Twain, J. Quinn Thornton, and Stephen Crane utilize figures who physically and morally deviate from the “norm” to promote compassionate manhood in texts that illustrate dominant constructions of masculinity structured on aggressive individualism. Compassionate manhood operates through the concept of the “masculine interlude,” the space where men perform kindness between the narrative’s other scenes. Both compassionate manhood and masculine interludes allow the authors to critique the types of men produced by market capitalism, reform movements, western expansion, and euthanasia debates. Though each author negates the compassionate figure at the end of his text—and thus we witness the conclusion of the masculine interlude—the moments of compassion throughout prevent the narrative as a whole from endorsing the aggressive, masculine trope it has critiqued.
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Introduction
Monstrosity, Compassion, and Nineteenth-Century American Manhood

“Masculine Interludes: Monstrosity and Compassionate Manhood in American Literature, 1845-1849” examines a textual trope, what I call “compassionate manhood,” in George Lippard’s The Quaker City; or, The Monks of Monk Hall (1845), Mark Twain’s “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins” (1869) and Those Extraordinary Twins (1894), J. Quinn Thornton’s Oregon and California in 1848 (1849) and other Donner Party narratives, and Stephen Crane’s The Monster (1898). Compassionate manhood is a narrative construction, a form of (often white) masculinity predicated on an idealized set of traits, actions, and attitudes. These qualities manifest in monstrous male figures whose bodies physically deviate from the “norm.” In each author’s imagination, compassionate manhood offers something different—a
gentler type of behavior—from the other types of men the text showcases: namely, dominant formulations of “normal” manhood which are ushered in by specific cultural transformations. One common authorial anxiety is that these new dominant codes for masculinity result in the subsequent fading of established identities. The authors I examine all prove uncomfortable with their culture’s changing expectations for white manhood.

*Because* the authors in “Masculine Interludes” are all white, male, middle-to-upper class, (presumably) heterosexual, and able-bodied, they indeed operate from within the cultural center that validates these same dominant gender codes. Thus, in reality, compassionate manhood does not play out as the rigid antithesis of the dominant, though the texts tend to fashion them as such. Rather, compassionate manhood moves *within* the larger narrative space controlled by the dominant. This close relationship means that one trope of manhood can at times overlap or collide with the other.

Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane’s texts each reflect a type of dominant, American manhood, one central to white normativity. At the same time, I argue that monstrous figures, who perform in “masculine interludes,” provide a momentary but kinder version of manhood for each author. Because they deviate from the standardized norm, monstrous figures serve as the vehicle for showcasing a “different,” compassionate manhood. This
different representation promotes a culturally-redemptive mode of identity for white, middle-class men in two decades—the 1840s and 1890s—that otherwise produce definitions of masculinity predicated on individualism, aggression, and competition. Although each narrative eventually reaffirms the dominant version of masculinity in wake of compassionate manhood’s disappearance, I argue that the masculine interludes situated within prevent the text as a whole from completely espousing the dominant “norm.” More broadly, masculine interludes and monstrous figures provide further understanding of how select white male writers challenged their own culture’s demands about the ways “normal” white men should behave.

At the outset, I want to explain what I mean by “monstrous figures” and “monstrosity.” I realize that “monstrosity” can be a pejorative and offensive term. In fact, I have repeatedly struggled with how to best define the types of “abnormal” figures in this study. Other terms such as “disability” or “disfigurement” do not seem appropriate. I have finally decided to use “monstrosity” because it is particularly useful for categorizing the various types of physical and moral “deviations” I address. It is difficult to call constructions of moral monstrosity “moral disability.” “Moral disfigurement” is perhaps more logical, but this term also runs the risk of sounding pejorative or offensive. The term “monstrosity” also works best for describing how the reader perceives these figures. Unlike virtuous,
comforting, and “disabled” figures such as Emily Graham in Maria Susanna Cummins’ *The Lamplighter* (1854), the “monstrous” figures I examine are shaped by the authors to create—on first glance—discomfort and even terror in the audience. Again, “disability” and “disfigurement” do not work well in characterizing the images these figures evoke in readers. Despite the negative connotations associated with the term “monstrosity,” however, my larger concern in this study is to show how the authors see “monstrous” figures not as monsters, but as the ideal male model of compassion.

None of the writers ever explicitly discuss their figures as “compassionate manhood.” Compassionate manhood is my own terminology, and it helps to explain the phenomenon I see shared in these different authors’ works. While there are slight differences, a number of similar factors characterize compassionate manhood. First, it is always about emotionally identifying with others. And the emotional identification leads to acts of kindness toward family, friends, and strangers. Thus compassionate manhood means sympathy, benevolence, and emotion. This kinder manhood also exhibits traits such as leadership, chivalry, loyalty, and moral principles. It should be noted that the authors I examine do not construct a new trope in their inscription of compassionate manhood. Rather, they recycle aspects of established ideologies: aspects which particularly recall the eighteenth-century man of feeling, who I will discuss later in this introduction. In the
nineteenth century, Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane’s texts construct a market-driven world where compassion has disappeared. But they also portray the market’s antithesis: moments where compassion reappears, offering alternatives to men living in 1840s and 1890s America.

I call these moments “masculine interludes” because they function much like interludes in dramatic performances. The *OED* defines an “interlude” in a number of ways; two definitions most useful for our discussion are “An interval in the performance of a play; the pause between the acts, or the means (dramatic or musical) employed to fill this up,” and “An interval in the course of some action or event; an intervening time or space of a different character or sort” (“interlude,” def. 2 and 3a). As with plays, interludes can also occur between the verses of psalms, hymns, concertos, and other performed pieces.

Thus masculine interludes encapsulate a performance and an ending to the performance. Interludes essentially serve as the moment, or space, within the larger narrative, where compassionate manhood plays out. Compassionate manhood performs between the acts, between the other parts of the narrative whole, yet works within this same whole. This kinder manhood is different from the dominant masculinities that come before and after. Another reason for imaging these textual performances as interludes is that an interlude is temporary. It performs something different, but
ultimately concludes, and the main performance continues. In all of the works I examine, the authors either kill off, socially marginalize, or simply cease to discuss their figures of compassionate manhood—thus the conclusion of the interlude. As I mentioned, the endings of all these texts appear to reaffirm white, middle-class culture’s privileging of dominant manhood. But despite masculine interludes’ fleetingness, their presence within the larger narrative prevent the endings from completely reaffirming the dominant manhood the text showcases. Interludes offset the narrative whole, and keep it from entirely acting as a closed, monologic signifier of white middle-class masculinity. In the discussion that follows, I largely focus on these moments where the authors fashion a kinder version of manhood.

Outside the performative space of the masculine interlude, I examine four textual tropes of dominant manhood that largely emerged out of actual 1840s and 1890s contexts: what I call market, reform, survivalist, and eugenic manhood. Briefly, I define each as follows. Market manhood serves as the focus of chapter one, which discusses Lippard’s *The Quaker City*. This trope arose in the antebellum period as the result of the Industrial Revolution, liberalism, and market capitalism, and it signaled the national shift from an agrarian to a commercial-driven society. In the novel, Lippard portrays these male figures as morally corrupt, constantly chasing commodities and women. In chapter two, on Twain’s *Those Extraordinary Twins* and “Personal Habits of
the Siamese Twins,” I examine reform manhood, which developed out of 1830s and 1840s U.S. reform movements. Twain textually depicts reform manhood as unfeeling, aggressive, self-involved, and driven by political competition. Chapter three centers on survivalist manhood in Thornton’s *Oregon and California in 1848* and other narratives written about the Donner Party experience. Survivalist manhood was the extreme, if not isolated, outcome of western expansion in the 1840s. Donner Party narratives construct survivalist manhood as morally depraved, driven by lust for human flesh, and motivated by aggressive self-interest. And finally, Crane’s *The Monster*, the subject of chapter four, discusses eugenic manhood. This trope was formulated out of eugenics and euthanasia debates of the later nineteenth century. Crane inscribes his figures of eugenic manhood as centered by empiricism, rationality, and objectivism, but under these guises they exhibit many of the same aggressive qualities as the other types of masculinity.

I want to address two issues regarding these tropes of dominant manhood. First, while all are clearly grounded in actual historical and cultural contexts, the authors often inscribe them in particular manners that at times contradict their ideological realities. For example, Twain inscribes reform manhood as one lacking sympathy, when in reality reformers often relied on sympathy (and sentimentality) as vehicles for social change. I
attempt to point out this discrepancy when I come across it in the chapters that follow.

Secondly, while each trope of emerging manhood holds certain characteristics that make it distinct from the others, it should be obvious that all four share common traits. As I already noted, these forms largely operate on the principles of individualism, aggression, competition, and emotional detachment. These men often resort to violence, and share an overall lack of concern for the well-being of others. For each author, the above factors prove repulsive, for they require men to forget sympathetic modes of conduct and instead embrace a rugged manly ethos. Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane all imagine the latter trope as increasingly defining the white male of the nineteenth century, and it is an identity that they feel reluctant to embrace, even as their texts do participate in the process of cementing these dominant forms within the culture.

Whether the author writes in the antebellum or postbellum periods, he textually fashions his concept of compassionate manhood as an alternative trope of manhood. He imagines it differently from dominant manhood, even though the opposite, in reality, is true. As Milette Shamir and Jennifer Travis maintain, “sentiment and anti-sentiment have always been closely knit . . . [N]either . . . exist independently” (2). However, in each writer’s mind, sympathetic identification and moral virtue do ideologically differentiate
compassionate manhood from dominant masculinities. The writers I examine highlight the tensions between textuality and actuality.

Linda Frost argues that Americans’ constructions of whiteness were not monolithic and imagined at the national level, but rather permeable and fashioned in different manners depending on the geographic region of the United States (3-4). Likewise, I want to make it clear that these authors’ representations did not articulate white male anxieties across the country and the nineteenth century. However, what I have found is that white male authors of the 1840s and 1890s particularly reacted to contemporary tropes of manhood defined by aggression and individualism.¹ I would add that these texts were also published before and during two U.S. wars, the Mexican-American War and the Spanish-American War, and before and after the cataclysmic Civil War. Thus these 1840s and 1890s texts are particularly useful for examining how certain authors react negatively to the rise of the aggressive, U.S. male self during two decades threatened by social change and war.

Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane (and their works) also matter for three other reasons. First, they are important because they provide specific examples of how white male authors did not always ideologically conform to the dominant culture, but rather challenged its programs for rugged masculinity.² These authors’ texts reveal that white masculinity was even more
complicated, multifaceted, and contradictory. As all four writers show, male
textual figures were not afraid to cry, feel, love, and care for others. Second,
the authors I examine provide new mediums—monstrous figures—for
understanding how men critiqued gender ideologies and advocated for kinder
masculine roles. Though the subject of abnormal bodies in itself is not new,
scholars have yet to intersect it with masculinity studies and male
sentimentality in nineteenth-century literary America. Third, the writers in
my study matter because they imagine wider, more culturally-inclusive roles
for monstrous bodies—bodies which have been historically marginalized,
and, in many cases, vilified. In contrast to other nineteenth-century authors,
who often portray physically-abnormal figures as deviants, criminals, or
tyrrannical monomaniacs, the writers in my study imagine monstrous figures
in positive, redeeming manners.³

In its focus on monstrosity and manhood, “Masculine Interludes”
enters three current critical conversations of nineteenth-century literary
studies. First, it joins scholars such as Glenn Hendler, Milette Shamir,
Jennifer Travis, and Mary Louise Kete, among others, who have in recent
years widened our understanding of sentimentality (and its manifestations)
by their attention to how nineteenth-century men, in addition to women,
acted as proponents of sentimental discourse.⁴ Hendler notes that men of all
races and backgrounds actively deployed sentimental ideologies across a
wide range of literary, market, and sociopolitical contexts in the pre-Civil War years. However, in my view, the authors I examine all inscribe these ideologies as lacking in men of both the antebellum and postbellum periods. Thus my project discusses how these writers resurrect sympathy in their works, and more importantly, how they envision compassionate manhood through the unlikely medium of monstrosity.

My project also builds on gender scholarship in literature, particularly men’s or masculinity studies. David Leverenz argues that American Renaissance writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Frederick Douglass, and Herman Melville, in addition to others, “felt self-consciously deviant from prevailing norms of manly behavior,” especially in relation to the marketplace (3). “Masculine Interludes” expands on Leverenz’ claim as it, again, addresses how nineteenth-century male authors used marginalized figures—male monstrosities—to critique not only market ideology and its demands on men’s behaviors, but also other emerging masculine formulations that all turned on the ethos of individualism and competition.

More recently, David Greven has analyzed male isolation in nineteenth-century American literature. Greven’s “inviolate male,” a figure “emotionally, sexually, and physically unavailable either to women or men,” reacted to both heterosexual marriage and homosocial fraternity and
“manifests and mirrors the growing schism between rising and competing antebellum ideologies and social programs that interpellated young males specifically” (1)—a central one being the hypermasculine Jacksonian self-made man, which the inviolate male critiques. Though inviolate males ideologically behave in a manner opposite to compassionate manhood, my study is simultaneously in conversation with Greven, as both figures arise as an alternate response to Jacksonian masculinity.

Building on the work of Benedict Anderson and Dana D. Nelson, Peter Coviello discusses how antebellum authors constructed U.S. national identity through “a quality of relation: as an affect or attachment, a feeling of mutual belonging that somehow transpires between strangers” (4, emphasis in original). For Coviello, this intimate belonging is dependent on whiteness. He links intimacy with “keywords” such as “sympathy (and its cognates: sensibility, sentiment, feeling, benevolence, compassion, friendship); belonging, allegiance, and fraternity” (6, emphasis in original). Coviello’s useful list of qualifiers for American male intimacy helps shape my own thinking about compassionate manhood in nineteenth-century America.

Finally, my project adds to scholarship in the field of disability studies. Lennard J. Davis has called disability “the missing term in the race, class, gender triad” (1). Thus critics have distinguished between “impairment” and “disability,” and view the latter as a social construction (Mitchell and Snyder,
As I mentioned, the disabled (or “disfigured,” or “monstrous”) have been interpreted as social deviant, immoral, criminal, poverty-stricken, and in need of rehabilitation and repair (Mitchell and Snyder, *Narrative* 1-10; Snyder, et al, *Disability Studies* 1-10; Garland-Thomson, *Extraordinary* 1-18). And others have seen these bodies as symbols of social, cultural, or political crises (Baldick 14; Cohen 6-7). While foundational work has been done on abnormal bodies, most of these interpretations resort to binaries; ways of reading that simply leave the “abnormal” person in marginal roles. These binaries are what disability studies seeks to overturn in the first place.

My study helps to expand the conversation about “abnormal” bodies, particularly as it argues that Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane imagined greater, more important identities for bodies deemed different from the imaginary “norm” — even if these identities were fleeting at best. In a study of eighteenth and nineteenth-century England, Paul Youngquist suggests that there is “nothing utopian or redemptive about . . . monstrosities” (xxviii). But my aim is to follow Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, David T. Mitchell, Sharon L. Snyder, Mary Klages, and Cynthia Wu, who argue that “abnormal” bodies can at times serve liberating or subversive functions.6

In masculine interludes, monstrous figures *do* act as the “utopian or redemptive” vision. They become the moral (and sometimes physical) norm
from which all other men deviate, and they serve as models for these fallen men to emulate. Even as each author eventually casts the monstrous figure from his text—and thus we are left wondering about the actual place of bodies deemed different in nineteenth-century literature—the masculine interludes offset the narrative ending that denies these bodies a place within the textual space. The interludes throughout create a textual presence that works against the ending’s demand for absence.

I also want to expand the ideological power of sympathy and sentiment in its relation to monstrous bodies. Scholars in disability studies point out that from the nineteenth century forward, sentimentality has served as the chief mode for representing disability. The abnormal body becomes a site for sympathy, which largely reinforces the middle-class self’s capacity for feeling and empathy while it places the disabled within a limited, passive framework: as something to be gazed upon and pitied (Klages 5; Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary 81-84; “Cultural Logic” 787). Indeed, in their construction of compassionate manhood, the writers I examine employ sentimental conventions. But in their texts, monstrous male figures do not act as sites for sympathy; they become the chief exemplars of sympathy. In a masculine culture void of compassion, the monstrous engage in wide-scale, redemptive cultural work as they offer a nineteenth-century version of the man of feeling. Through compassionate manhood, the traditional is
refashioned as the radical, and the monstrous becomes the normal. As is the case with monstrous figures, I see sentimental conventions largely serving positive—not negative—ends.

Before I conclude with a summary of each chapter, I want to briefly discuss other important cultural contexts. The imaging of two male figures—Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt—can help us centralize the four dominant tropes of manhood I examine in “Masculine Interludes” and in turn illuminate the models from which compassionate manhood deviates. In the 1840s, Jackson, known as Old Hickory, was represented—both by himself and mass culture—as the iconic figure of self-made manhood, the “man-on-the-make,” one that broke from European traditions of gentility and nobility (Slotkin 395). Jackson, a product of political transformations and changing market relations, signified, to the American mind, the new rugged white man in the antebellum period; mass culture saw him as the icon of individualism, self-reliance, self-fashioning, and self-control (Greven 4). He was known for his aggressive politics against the aristocracy, the United States Bank, and American Indians.

Jackson’s image, his culturally-marketed ruggedness, helped authors such as James Fenimore Cooper and Francis Parkman forge the literary mythos of the frontiersman. American folklore fashioned Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett much in the same Jacksonian manners. The imaging of
Jackson’s characteristics inevitably created a code for the mass of white American men, one that stressed the significance of the rugged loner. The culturally-invented frontiersman eventually evolved into the cow-puncher in the later nineteenth century. Today, the power of these rugged images—these cultural manifestations—can still be seen in the marketing of everything from tobacco products to U.S. presidents. Jackson was also promoted as the hypermasculine icon of white normative manhood. He railed against effeminacy, weakness, excess, maternity, sickness, sexual deviance, and racial Otherness (Kimmel, *Manhood* 34-36; Greven 5-9). The culturally-manufactured qualities Jackson represented became the standards upon which white American masculinity was judged by mass culture in the antebellum period, and the four tropes that I examine in this study all clearly display many of Jackson’s symbolic tenets.

Fifty years later, Theodore Roosevelt fashioned himself as Jackson’s heir. Even though Roosevelt’s presidency and many of his influential writings occurred after the scope of this project, the meanings both he and culture fashioned helped shape the ideologies of manhood in the late nineteenth century. Frederick Jackson Turner argued that the 1890s signaled the close of the American frontier, but U.S. manhood simultaneously began to look outward. The expansionist gaze shifted from the nation’s interior to overseas. Likewise, the American man shifted from an inner, Jacksonian
ethos of self-control to a Rooseveltian, outward display of physicality (Kaplan 662; Kimmel, *History* 45).

Roosevelt graduated from Harvard, where the cult of manhood’s ideologies were incorporated into the teaching curriculum. Later, he essentially replicated Jackson’s aggressive ideologies, as he set out to build his body, while also building the U.S. as a conquering imperial body in the Spanish-American War. In his speech and essay “The Strenuous Life,” (1899) he, Amy Kaplan argues, “deploys the body as a metaphor for international aggression” (661). Roosevelt became a decorated colonel in the war and, in the twentieth century, the 26th U.S. president. He fashioned a multifaceted masculinity, one combining the athlete, the ruthless war hero, the cow-puncher—immortalized in Owen Wister’s 1902 novel *The Virginian* (which Wister, Roosevelt’s Harvard friend, dedicated to him)—and the big-game hunter later adapted by Hemingway.

Roosevelt embodied many of the same characteristics as Jackson, and he defined himself against similar weaknesses. Jackson refashioned American manhood against the privileged aristocracy, and he exerted it within U.S. borders; conversely, Roosevelt reclaimed manhood via the physical, strong body, and he flexed his virile muscles across numerous social, cultural, and international political contexts. In the 1840s and the
1890s, Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane all react to the masculine values these public figures channeled to the nation’s white men.

Earlier I mentioned that compassionate manhood is essentially a nineteenth-century version of the man of feeling. This sensitive type of man graced the pages of countless eighteenth and early nineteenth century texts. Henry Mackenzie’s popular novel, *The Man of Feeling* (1771), was the first to coin the term. The novel’s hero, Harley, sympathizes with others and attempts to bring comfort to the downtrodden and those in distress. The man of feeling also emerged in other narratives, such as Royall Tyler’s drama *The Contrast* (1787), William Hill Brown’s epistolary novel *The Power of Sympathy* (1789), and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s *The Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774). Like Mackenzie, authors (and middle-class culture) portrayed this man as encapsulating sympathy and moral virtue, and often doing good for others. Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler argue that “the figure of the ‘man of feeling’ [was constructed] as a male body feminized by affect, a sort of emotional cross-dresser” (*Sentimental* 3). Both masculine and nurturing, the man of feeling conflated the discourses of manly virtue and republican motherhood (Chapman and Hendler, *Sentimental* 3).

The literary man of feeling was a product of the larger theory of sensibility, an eighteenth-century British conception of affect. Sensibility meant that those with well-developed moral consciences might acutely feel
the suffering of others. Philosophers such as Adam Smith argued in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) that there must be an intermediary of some type between sympathizer and sympathized (Hendler, Public 4). For Smith, this was the “imagination,” by which “we place ourselves in his [the sufferer’s] situation” (*Theory* 3-4). Through sympathetic identification, relationships based on bodily bonds were formed. Smith also suggested that sensibility or sympathy did not come naturally; rather, it needed to be cultivated (Hendler, Public 4). In the literary world, and in the name of social betterment, authors, characters, narrators—texts themselves—served as the bridges for sympathetic bonds between literary subject and reader. In the eighteenth-century, the man of feeling was one way that authors could bridge the connection between textual and actual subjects. However, at the century’s end, the man of feeling began to disappear, as virtue and benevolence became blurrier and associated with the sexually androgynous (Gould 113-114).

In the nineteenth century, sensibility (or sympathy) essentially transformed into sentimentality, but its core definitions, to large degrees, remained the same. It was the person of feeling who began to change. By the middle of the nineteenth century, as the separate spheres ideology took hold, sentiment became a hallmark of the feminine and maternal (Chapman and Hendler, *Sentimental* 3). In the age of Jacksonian rugged manhood, sentiment and sympathy did not a man make. This is the mass cultural belief that
Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane’s texts defy in nineteenth-century America. My project thus shows how nineteenth-century male writers stage a tension between male figures and their possibilities for masculine selfhood, especially the tension between a concept of self that focuses on individual desires and one that connects with others.

Finally, the chapters that follow focus on compassionate manhood and its relation to various formulations of dominant manhood. In chapter one, on Lippard’s *The Quaker City*, I examine Devil-Bug, the monstrous doorkeeper of Monk-Hall. This chapter joins recent scholarship on the novel that sees Lippard reacting negatively to market culture and in turn exploring modes of social resolution. At base levels, Lippard writes into cultural stereotypes about the monstrous as he depicts Devil-Bug as working-class, social misfit, and debased criminal. In the face of these readings, I argue—in contrast to other scholars—that Devil-Bug actually operates as Lippard’s vision for compassionate manhood: he is the gentler man who might redeem a market-driven Philadelphia (and America). Devil-Bug’s performative moments of sympathy for his daughter Mabel provide a different version of masculinity (and fatherhood) to that of men who are made corrupt and aggressive by industrial capitalism. Even as Devil-Bug commits suicide at the end of Lippard’s long novel, I argue that his sympathy and benevolence prevent the
text from reaffirming the ideologies of market men who dominate the textual landscape.

Chapter two discusses Angelo and Luigi in Twain’s *Those Extraordinary Twins* and, to a lesser extent, Chang and Eng in “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins.” Both sets of brothers are conjoined. This chapter enters recent critical conversations that analyze the social and political functions of twins in Twain’s works. Though the scholarly tendency has been to read the twins in the two narratives as incompatible, and thus as a metaphor for a nation divided by slavery and other political differences, I argue that Twain views both their bodies and their moments of compassion as the hallmarks of a truly united, democratic American manhood. Writing in the 1890s, Twain sets his story in 1830, at the onset of reform manhood, which splinters men into quarreling, competitive, aggressive individuals by way of their political differences. Though the twins are at times incompatible with each other, their moments of sympathetic compatibility—moments usually ignored by most critics—indeed provide a larger, visionary program for men’s behavior: a behavior that might in fact mend a nation of middle-class men splintered into political individuals. Though Angelo and Luigi die at the hands of the town’s men at the end of Twain’s narrative, I see their moments of compassionate compatibility offsetting the aggressive ideology the text appears to reaffirm in wake of their deaths.
Chapter three turns our attention westward. In *Oregon and California in 1848*, J. Quinn Thornton pits William Eddy, one of the Donner Party survivors who resorted to cannibalism, against the survivalist masculinity embodied in Lewis Keseberg—another member suspected of heartlessly murdering companions and enjoying the taste of their flesh. There is as of yet no scholarship in literary studies about Donner Party literature, and part of my intent in this chapter is to open up avenues of inquiry regarding masculinity and monstrosity in texts neglected by literary scholars. Unlike Lippard and Twain’s male figures, both Eddy and Keseberg—as representatives of compassionate and dominant manhood, respectively—are considered monstrous by Thornton and average white sensibilities due to the fact that both consumed human flesh in order to survive the harsh winter. Despite this, however, Thornton inscribes Eddy as his vision for compassionate manhood by way of Eddy’s sympathy and moral principles. In a textual space that represents the savage lawlessness of the American West, Eddy provides a compassionate alternative to the aggressive, self-interested manhood Keseberg represents. Again, although Thornton textually reduces Eddy at the end of his narrative, Eddy’s masculine interludes throughout prevent Thornton’s account from completely reaffirming Keseberg’s version of dominant manhood.
Chapter four, which focuses on Crane’s *The Monster*, writes into the growing body of scholarship that discusses Crane’s attitudes toward masculinity and his ambivalence about Rooseveltian manhood at the dawn of the twentieth century. Dr. Trescott serves as the icon of compassionate manhood in his role as caretaker of Henry Johnson, a mentally-disabled, physically-disfigured, African-American man. Crane seems to deny Henry the role of compassionate manhood due to his skin color; moreover, Trescott, unlike the other figures of compassionate manhood, is culturally acceptable in that he is white, male, and able-bodied. However, I argue that Trescott acts as an extension of Henry, and through him Crane imagines a compassionate option even as eugenic masculinities, who advocate for the euthanasia of “defectives,” take the stage. Although Crane follows the familiar pattern of negation by socially marginalizing Trescott and, more tellingly, ceasing to discuss Henry, the doctor’s acts of kindness again complicate the idea of *The Monster* as a monologic endorsement of involuntary euthanasia.

Lastly, the conclusion briefly discusses the lack of graphic depictions of monstrosity in nineteenth-century women writers and writers of color. At the same time, it also offers further suggestions for inquiry into representations of gender, disability, and disfigurement in nineteenth-century African-American writers such as Frederick Douglass, William Wells Brown,
Harriet Wilson, and Harriet Jacobs as well as late twentieth century texts by Lucy Grealy and Chuck Palahniuk.

At the risk of resurrecting a tired cliché, it is true that history repeats itself. Understanding the white male gender ideologies of today, especially in a post-September 11 political climate, can help us understand them in nineteenth-century literature. In turn, nineteenth-century literature can help us better read the culturally-marketed images and meanings of manhood in twenty-first century America. In the end, competing definitions of gender—most visibly, white manhood—continually vie for attention across the centuries. We now turn to chapter one.
Chapter One
“For a moment the soul of Devil-Bug was beautiful”: Masculine Interludes and Market Manhood in George Lippard’s The Quaker City

George Lippard’s The Quaker City; or, The Monks of Monk Hall (1845) was the nation’s most popular novel before Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Reynolds, George Lippard, Prophet 5). It is a book obsessed with human bodies. Page after page highlights characters negotiating the burgeoning liberal marketplace of antebellum America. In The Quaker City, Lippard presents his characters excessively. This is nowhere more apparent than in one of the novel’s central characters, Devil-Bug. Devil-Bug acts as the doorkeeper of Monk Hall, the social club in Philadelphia where the city’s elite go to drink, gamble, hatch schemes, and seduce unsuspecting women. The audience first encounters him early in the novel:
It [Devil-Bug] was a strange thickset specimen of flesh and blood, with a short body, marked by immensely broad shoulders, long arms and thin destorted [sic] legs. The head of the creature was ludicrously large in proportion to the body. Long masses of siff [sic] black hair fell tangled and matted over a wide forehead, protuberant to deformity. A flat nose with wide nostrils, shooting out into each cheek like the smaller wings of an insect, an immense mouth whose heavy lips disclosed long rows of bristling teeth, a pointed chin, blackened by a heavy beard, and massive eyebrows meeting over the nose, all furnished the details of a countenance, not exactly calculated to inspire the most pleasant feelings in the world. One eye, small black and shapen like a bead, stared steadily . . . while the other socket was empty, shriveled and orbless. The eyelids of the vacant socket were joined together like the opposing edges of a curtain . . . The shoulders of the Devil-Bug, protruding in unsightly knobs, the wide chest, and the long arms with the talon-like fingers, so vividly contrasted with the thin and distorted legs, all attested that the remarkable strength of the man was located in the upper part of his body. (QC 51-52)

As he does with all of his characters in *The Quaker City*, Lippard fixates upon Devil-Bug’s exterior physicality. What largely separates Devil-Bug from the rest are his physical deformities. As do all monstrous figures, Devil-Bug
indeed serves as a metaphor for a social body in crisis. His physical monstrosity emblematically figures the social monstrosity of men in 1840s market and industrial culture. Lippard also casts Devil-Bug as a criminal; as I noted in the introduction, scholars argue that criminality serves as a central mode of representation for the physically-“abnormal” body. But these two readings of Devil-Bug simply construct him as a passive marker of a social crisis or as a culturally-marginalized figure.

In contrast, I see “the remarkable strength of the man,” which Lippard locates “. . . in the upper part of his body,” as serving a central, important function. In key moments of the novel, compassion flows from Devil-Bug’s heart. Lippard sees compassion disappearing amid the rise of actual 1840s U.S. market culture. To this end, this chapter proposes that we read Devil-Bug as the figure of compassionate manhood, who appears in masculine interludes throughout the novel and offers a different possibility for manhood in the market culture of antebellum America.

In 1849, five years after the serialization of The Quaker City, Godey’s Ladies Book announced that Lippard:

has struck out on an entirely new path and stands isolated on a point inaccessible to the mass of writers of the present day . . . He is unquestionably the most popular writer of the day, and his books are sold, edition after edition, thousand after thousand, while those of
others accumulate like useless lumber on the shelves of publishers.

(qtd. in Denning 87)

The novel, set in 1840s Philadelphia, belongs to the “city mysteries” genre, a form made immensely popular by Eugene Sue’s 1843 *The Mysteries of Paris*. City mysteries novels served as responses to increased urbanization. After the publication of *The Quaker City*, a slew of American imitations appeared, all of them sharing a fascination with or repulsion to the urban space (Erickson 19). Like their European counterparts, American city mysteries novels (also termed sensation novels), in vogue from roughly 1840 to 1860, attempted to reveal a secret, to “remove the veil” from the hidden aspects of city and commercial life (Erickson 41-42). These novels and sketches equipped their contemporary readership with a way to navigate the urban space—although they often only reinforced the rural populace’s beliefs and preconceptions.

While sensation novelists drew on popular conventions such as sentimental fiction, the detective story and the Gothic, Lippard also fused his works with overt social criticism (Erickson 31). He saw it as his mission to expose the vile hypocrisy of the city’s most “respectable” members, namely bankers, businessmen, judges, and clergymen. As an American contemporary to Marx, Lippard also devoted his short life to criticizing the gross audacity of the rich, the atrocious working and health conditions of
factories, and capitalism’s assault on human bodies. Devil-Bug serves as Lippard’s prime vehicle for social criticism—particularly, for the types of men that market ethics produce.

Most of the novel takes place in Monk-Hall over three days and nights. Furthermore, three main plot lines make up The Quaker City. The first involves Byrnewood Arlington, his sister Mary, and the libertine Gustavus Lorrimer. The young Arlington meets Lorrimer at an oyster house, three days before Christmas Eve. Lorrimer plans to seduce Mary, a young woman from one of Philadelphia’s aristocratic families, by “marrying” her that night in Monk-Hall—little does Mary know that Lorrimer has intentionally planned a fake wedding which will be performed by a sham minister. Lorrimer mentions to Arlington his wedding plans for that evening. Unaware that this woman just happens to be his sister, Arlington places a friendly bet that any woman who would marry Lorrimer could not be from a respectable family. On the way to Monk-Hall, the two visit an astrologer, who predicts that one will kill the other at nightfall on Christmas Eve. Later, in Monk-Hall, Arlington discovers his sister in Lorrimer’s clutches, and attempts to save her. Devil-Bug imprisons Arlington within a room and tries to kill him, while Lorrimer rapes Mary. But Arlington survives and vows revenge upon the libertine. He spends the rest of the novel in pursuit, and true to the prophecy, murders Lorrimer at a riverbank on Christmas Eve.
The second plot centers around the wealthy merchant Mr. Livingstone, his wife Dora, and Luke Harvey. Livingstone discovers that his business firm is under siege by a market swindler, and that Dora has commenced an affair with another swindler, Colonel Fitz-Cowles. Livingstone spends the novel plotting revenge upon his wife. Toward the end, he poisons her in their country home. Devil-Bug appears and accidentally lights the estate on fire, and Livingstone dies in the blaze, but not before killing Dora.

Finally, the third main plot—and the one most central to my discussion—involves the sorcerer Ravoni, a young woman Mabel, the Reverend Pyne, and Devil-Bug. Ravoni appears in the city to found a new religion based on revolutionary principles. He preys on young, susceptible women for converts and takes an interest in Mabel. Reverend Pyne has reared Mabel, but we later discover that her biological father is none other than Devil-Bug. While rearing her, Pyne attempted to seduce Mabel on numerous occasions. Attempting to escape him, Mabel leaves home and eventually makes her way to Monk-Hall. But Pyne, a regular patron, inevitably discovers her; he attempts to seduce again and then sell her to Fitz-Cowles. Mabel once more escapes his advances but then finds herself prey to Ravoni. Before Ravoni has a chance to convert her, however, Devil-Bug murders him. In order to secure Mabel’s financial future, Devil-Bug fools Luke Harvey—an amateur detective in the second plot—into believing that
Mabel is the actual daughter of the wealthy Livingstone. At the end of the novel, Devil-Bug commits suicide. Mabel indeed inherits Livingstone’s fortune and marries Harvey (Ridgely 82-84). The novel itself is a large, monstrous, baggy book, a chaotic soap opera with various plots that diverge and intersect.

*The Quaker City*, in comparison to more canonical novels of the antebellum period, has relatively little criticism devoted to it. Before the 1980s, only a few scattered essays on the novel existed.\(^5\) In 1985, Richard Slotkin discussed it as a dystopian novel and called Devil-Bug an “urban savage,” a “connoisseur of cruelty and injustice” (*Fatal* 152). But David S. Reynolds brought *The Quaker City* centrally into American literary studies. Reynolds discusses it as “sensational” literature, a popular genre for the masses that—in terms of literary art and craft—was subordinate to works by canonical authors such as Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Melville. Like Slotkin, Reynolds views Devil-Bug as a sadistic murderer, who “takes delight in seeing the blood of his victims fall drop by drop” (*Beneath* 266) and is “one of the most despicable characters in American literature” (*QC* xxxix). These views tend to reposition Devil-Bug within the limited roles of social metaphor, criminal, and marginalized figure. Perhaps because of this, Devil-Bug usually only receives minimal critical attention.
In the more recent, small surge of work appearing on *The Quaker City*, scholars have moved even further away from a focus on Devil-Bug. Michael Sappol, David Anthony, Gary Ashwill, Dana D. Nelson, and Shelley Streeby discuss how the cultural environment of 1840s Philadelphia wreaks havoc on the novel’s other characters, inscribing itself in visual displays of corporeal excess and violence. In wake of this bodily desecration by market capitalism and predatory libertines, Nelson and Anthony maintain that Lippard’s work frantically attempts to preserve stable social boundaries. As a whole, the criticism of *The Quaker City* can be divided into two camps: the older, which discusses the novel as a popular genre as well as its literary merits and demerits, and the newer, which focuses on bodies and the historicist cultural work these bodies (and the novel) perform.

Joining these newer debates on *The Quaker City*, I examine how Lippard anxiously responds to the rise of market culture and, more particularly, the men it manufactures. In the novel, Lippard portrays an urban space where manly compassion is absent, but Devil-Bug steps in to fill the void. Devil-Bug performs his virtue in masculine interludes; he operates between and within the other scenes that frantically illustrate market manhood. His paternal sympathy and action for his lost love Ellen and daughter Mabel—ultimately, for figures beyond himself—serve as Lippard’s defining qualifiers for compassionate manhood.
Compassionate manhood, enacted through Devil-Bug, provides a different and needed option to the market masculinities dominating the novel and social landscape. “Market manhood” is manifested in *The Quaker City* through the prevailing greed, aggression, corruption, financial and sexual competition, self-involvement, selfishness, and lust. Albeit the “norm,” this market recipe for manhood illustrates the central *problem* for Lippard, at the beginning and ending of the novel. Devil-Bug’s traits qualify him as an exemplary model for middle-class men to emulate in a moment when market capitalism manufactures an aggressive version of masculinity. And at least during Lippard’s masculine interludes, Devil-Bug’s apparent racial hybridization implies that this ideal vision transcends the strict category of whiteness. Nonetheless, a masculine interlude contains an ending; it gives way to different, proceeding scenes. The conclusion seems to indicate that the novel reaffirms the aggressive masculine trope, but Devil-Bug’s masculine interludes throughout essentially prevent the text from completely reaffirming this hegemonic male “norm.” *The Quaker City* constantly reveals Lippard’s masculine crises, but it more importantly offers a solution to them.

My discussion particularly speaks to David Anthony, who sees the reestablishment of boundaries coming from a different angle: the “debtor male,” a figure characterized by credit, speculation, and moments of financial panic. The debtor male arose out of the nation’s increasing dependence on
credit rather than paper money in the wake of crises such as the Panic of 1837. In *The Quaker City*, the debtor male’s financial panic often leads to moments of humiliation, which in turn give way to sentiment’s hallmarks of feeling and emotion. Anthony argues that the debtor male’s emotion contains “. . . the texture and, ultimately, the ‘cultural prestige’ of something resembling a sentimentalized and recognizably middle-class manhood” (731). In the end, Lippard’s novel displays “. . . an apparent interest in a recuperative form of sentimentalized domesticity and upward mobility” (739).

While I build on Anthony’s insightful discussion, I also depart from him in two ways. First, middle-class market manhood, an identity category which includes the debtor male, serves as precisely the type of mass-produced trope that deeply troubles Lippard. While Devil-Bug at times replicates the dominant ideologies of market manhood, his working-class status and his marginalization as “monster” also socially and culturally distance him from middle-class businessmen. For Lippard, Devil-Bug’s ideological separation (and deviation) make him much more capable of achieving social resolution than do middle-class market men—emotional or not—who are more immediately embedded within the system of corruption. Secondly, debtor males’ embarrassment and emotion only, in the end, remain as affective responses. These characters, with the exception of Arlington,
never move from emotional response to emotion-prompted action.

Furthermore, their emotion turns inward to themselves over their failed business ventures, not outward; debtor males only reinforce the self-interest characteristic of market manhood. Again, Devil-Bug’s emotions and actions—not towards himself, but others—qualify him much more as a trope of masculine social resolution than do debtor males.

I am particularly interested in one element of market manhood, the libertine, and less so in the businessman. However, I do not (nor does Lippard) consider libertines and businessmen as separate figures, with separate characteristics. Most businessmen in the novel engage in a sexual trafficking of women. The book fuses the libertine of the English seduction novel with the emergent manhood of United States market ethics, creating a predatory figure out to satiate a desire that is at once economic and sexual.8 In other words, the greed, aggression, competition, and lust that characterize business deals and transactions, for Lippard, easily crosses over into the pursuit of women. Indeed, the seduction of women serves as one of the novel’s ultimate social problems.9 Michael Denning argues that “... as Monk-Hall comes to figure Philadelphia, so the seduction narrative comes to figure all the phases of its corrupt social system” (93); likewise, Dana D. Nelson points out that “it is toward women that Lippard insists we must look if we are to comprehend with outrage the corruptions of the Quaker City”
While almost all male figures in the novel display market logic’s key ethos—aggression, competition, and domination—in the business world and in the bedroom, I pay most attention to the “traditional” libertine figure in tension with Devil-Bug.

**Market Manhood, Devil-Bug, and Masculine Interludes**

As I have noted, market manhood dominates *The Quaker City*. The novel features an enormous barrage of middle and upper-class white men who aggressively prey on young women in the new arena of urban capitalism. They in fact threaten to overrun the text. However, Devil-Bug’s bodily formation deviates from the able-bodied male “norm”: market manhood in antebellum America. This physical distancing from the “norm” in turn creates the space for the concept of the interlude, which performs within the other parts or sections of the whole. In the first interlude which introduces him as the embodiment of compassionate manhood, Devil-Bug sits guard at the entrance to Monk-Hall, ruminating about the past:

‘A purty gal in love with a han’some man like Devil-Bug! . . . She used to say she loved me ‘cause I did’nt deceive my looks! For one year, me and that gal was man an’ wife! The year passed—one night she quit Monk-Hall—I ain’t never heerd on her since! . . . And what is a werry rimarkible circumstance, I never think o’ that gal, without my heart gettin’ soft, and the water comin’ in my eyes!’
. . .

Devil-Bug was silent . . . Deep in the heart of this monster, like a withered flower blooming from the very corruption of the grave, the memory of that fair young girl, who, eighteen years ago, had sought the shelter of Monk-Hall, lay hidden, fast entwined around the life-cords of his deformed soul. (QC 222-223, emphasis in original)

Lippard first inscribes his kinder version of manhood through Devil-Bug’s recollection of Ellen, his wife and Mabel’s mother. When Lippard includes women in the novel, he does so in connection with corrupt market men out to seduce them. Here, Devil-Bug’s remembrance of Ellen signals a loving relationship based on genuine (and reciprocal) affection, not the hollow sexual gratification that fuels market manhood’s pursuit of women. His ability to cry at her recollection results in an emotive performance remarkably different from market figures in the novel who, drained of sympathy by the marketplace, are void of emotion. In addition to the emotional display here, we also see Devil-Bug in other scenes haunted by the spectral images of his murdered victims; Lippard marks him as one of the few male figures in the novel to experience uncanny reminders of his own sordid deeds.

Devil-Bug goes on: “He [Livingstone] struck her a blow with his fist: I knocked him down. Gal liked me from that hour” (QC 222). The memory now shows him responding, moving into action, one of the key components
of compassionate manhood. Although Devil-Bug here replicates the violence associated with market manhood, Lippard links violence not with criminal corruption, but with devotion and protection (and thus he differentiates Devil-Bug’s violence from the other men). Livingstone as the market masculinity literally and symbolically falls as he confronts Devil-Bug’s rising benevolence, and the recollection is further sealed—and the violence justified—by Ellen’s reciprocal devotion. This scene serves as the first moment in the novel in which Lippard constructs a model male figure, one who moves against the grain of market manhood’s sexual cravings.

In contrast to the idealized Devil-Bug, Lippard rails against market capitalism and its production of predatory libertines:

. . . Oh, tell us, ye who with all these gifts and mercies, flung around you by the hand of God, have, after all, spurned his laws, and rotted in your very lives, with the foul pollution of libertinism and lust; tell us, who shall find most mercy at the bar of Avenging Justice—you, with your prostituted talents, gathering round your guilty souls, so many witnesses of your utter degradation, or Devil-Bug, the doorkeeper of Monk-Hall, in all his monstrous deformity of body and intellect, yet with one redeeming memory, gleaming like a star, from the chaos of his sins? (QC 223, emphasis in original)
For Lippard, Devil-Bug’s “one redeeming memory, gleaming like a star,” shines outward, providing a glimmering light for market men mired in their immoral darkness. Although in Devil-Bug’s case “there had never been a church, a Bible, or a God!” (223), his “one redeeming memory” of a normative marital union still, for Lippard, places him within the boundaries of Christian ethics and designates him as a traditional trope of manhood, a man dedicated solely to one woman. Devil-Bug’s devoted passion for and protection of Ellen offers something different from the new market manhood that conflates libertinism with market ethics.

Nineteenth-century market men, with their identities largely dependent on a ruthless and competitive capitalist ethos, worked against formerly established definitions of U.S. manhood. David Leverenz notes that “Earlier ideologies of manhood stabilized self-esteem by linking it to institutionalized social structures such as class and patriarchy. The ideology of manhood emerging with entrepreneurial capitalism made competition and power dynamics in the workplace the only source for valuing and measuring oneself” (85). Likewise, E. Anthony Rotundo suggests, “The individual was now the measure of things, and men were engrossed with themselves as selves. The dominant concerns were the concerns of the self—self-improvement, self-control, self-interest, self-advancement” (qtd. in Greven 3,
emphasis in source). These “concerns” would drastically shape middle-class white manhood across the nineteenth century.

With the explosion of industrial capitalism in the early nineteenth century, conceptions of masculinity shifted (Roediger 55). The Revolutionary fantasy about a nation of yeoman farmers became increasingly impossible with the growing number of jobs located in American cities. Michael Kimmel discusses the two contrasting types of masculinity, one waning and one emerging, in this period: the agrarian, “Genteel Patriarch” land owner, the independent farmer celebrated by Thomas Jefferson and J. Hector St. John de Crevecouer, and the “Marketplace Man.” The former was characterized by duty and devotion to family on the private estate. Conversely, the latter, the type of figure in The Quaker City, embodied the logic of Jacksonian self-making; market men rose into prominence in the 1830s and gained their identity though competition, speculation, power, and capital attained in the marketplace. They left the security of their homes for the unstable environment of the business world (Kimmel, History 38). The concern now was for men to define themselves within the individualist, competitive logic of the marketplace.

U.S. middle-class males in the 1830s and 1840s were encouraged by doctors, essayists, and self-help manuals to suppress their sexual desires in order to adequately perform in the economic marketplace (Kimmel, Manhood
Antebellum culture obviously saw men’s sexuality and marketplace success as mutually incompatible. Yet *The Quaker City* conflates capitalism with male sexual desires; the market economy becomes men’s nineteenth-century version of Viagra. Lippard shows how market culture actually undoes men’s self-control and self-restraint rather than fosters them: instead of suppressing their desires, males excessively flaunt their sexual and market conquests. And Lippard in turn marks these excesses upon their bodies.

In the nineteenth century, medical culture argued that individuals wore their moral depravity upon their physical bodies (Wilson 14). By mid-century, science and medicine would begin equating “degenerative” character traits with the physical anatomy of marginalized bodies, such as those of criminals or African Americans. These practices would continue into the later century with increased fervor as conceptions of middle-class white national identity were challenged by factors such as emancipation and immigration. Yet we can see the seeds of these discourses present also in the antebellum period, particularly in *The Quaker City*.

Devil-Bug himself is not, of course, immune from the marker of physical monstrosity; yet the types of market masculinities he operates against—the “norm”—also serve as corporeal texts upon which to read the physical monstrosity wrought by market life. As Shelley Streeby argues,
“Lippard exploits the disturbing properties of unruly and distressed bodies, juxtaposes them with republicanism’s disembodied norms” (“Haunted” 6). For instance, Lippard describes Livingstone as “. . . disfigured by a hideous frown, and his entire countenance, wore an expression, characteristic of a low bully, who has been accustomed to the vilest haunts, in the most corrupt cities of the South” (QC 155). In another scene, he illustrates a group of creditors fighting over a payment:

A forest of fists, rising up and down, a mass of angry faces, all mingled together, some four and thirty bodies of all sizes and descriptions, twisting and winding about, with so much rapidity, that they all looked like the different limbs of some strange monster, undergoing a violent epileptic fit. (172)

In both cases, market liberalism’s values and cultural expectations result in men’s bodies bearing the mark of “disfigured . . . strange monster[s],” moral deformities.

What largely separates Devil-Bug’s physical monstrosity from the mass of market men’s is that, under the exterior, he contains inner, redemptive attributes. His interior dually encompasses sensibility of the eighteenth and sentimentality of the nineteenth centuries, both of which connect exemplary character traits to the bodily experience of feeling. But the heart also moves the feeling body into action (Klages 59-61; Kete 3; Mielke 8).
Certainly, as David Anthony notes, market men occasionally experience emotion; but as I see it, the emotion never translates into benevolent action. More often, market manhood’s interiors contain nothing, as Lippard tells us, but rot and “foul pollution.” Ultimately, Lippard both endorses these beliefs that bodies register character traits and—through Devil-Bug—resists them.

Mabel flees to Monk-Hall in effort to thwart the Reverend Pyne’s (her supposed father’s) sexual advances. But, as a regular patron, he eventually manages to locate her. Entering Mabel’s room, Pyne watches her sleep and waits for Devil-Bug (yet unaware who is in the room) to bring him a potion in order to drug and rape her. “‘Mabel is quite beautiful!’ muttered the oily-faced parson gazing upon the girl with his watery eyes distended by an expression of animal admiration” (QC 293). Lippard inscribes Pyne’s sexual corruption upon his body. His incestuous lust for his adopted “daughter” deems him as “animal,” bestial, and his bestiality in turn manifests in his “watery eyes distended by” desire. Lippard’s use of “watery” to categorize Pyne’s eyes works in contrast to the previous trope of water: Devil-Bug’s sentimental tears, earlier shed upon the thought of Ellen—and, by extension, of Mabel. Put another way, Pyne’s watery eyes metonymically figure the predatory market masculinities who flood outward into Philadelphia, overtaking innocent women. At the same time, Devil-Bug’s earlier tears
indicate the releasing of compassionate manhood, whose eyes water for different, redemptive reasons.

Devil-Bug soon appears, and his presence offsets the scene dominated by Pyne. In other words, the interlude alongside (or within) the larger textual narrative of market manhood illustrates a different sideshow performance of paternal manhood. Bringing the potion to Pyne, Devil-Bug notices Mabel (who he has not seen in years) and who he mistakes for her mother, Ellen. Lippard writes, “He spoke in a voice clearly changed from his usual harsh and discordant tones. ‘Ellen!’ he said, in a low and softened voice, whose gentleness of tone presented a strange contrast to the harsh deformity of his visage” (QC 298, emphasis in original). Devil-Bug’s “low and softened voice” and “gentleness of tone” do not only contrast with his physical deformity, they also, as bodily qualities and reactions, deem him in opposition to Reverend Pyne and other loud, aggressive market men who fail to feel.

After Pyne sends him away, Devil-Bug mutters, “‘He’s alone with the gal! . . . And she called him father!’” (QC 297, emphasis in original). Then Lippard writes, “. . . Sweeping his thick hair aside, he bared his protuberant brow to the light . . . The shrunken eye-socket seemed to sink yet further beneath his overhanging brow, while his solitary eye, gathering a strange light, enlarged and dilated until its gleam grew like the glare of burning coals . . .” (297, emphasis in original). Earlier, Lippard parallels light imagery with
Devil-Bug’s emotions, his “one redeeming memory,” his love and devotion to Ellen. This light, as I suggested, reflects a traditional, Christianized model of manhood for market men steeped in their economic depravity. In this scene, Lippard moves from the emotional to the physical, as he links Devil-Bug’s bodily reactions again with light motifs. The light in this passage parallels Devil-Bug’s rising paternal concern for Mabel, and it signals a masculinity that works differently from the type of incestuous fatherhood Pyne—as an ideological emblem of market manhood—represents.

Devil-Bug’s fatherly concern for Mabel results in him tricking Luke Harvey into believing that Mabel is actually the daughter of the wealthy Livingstone. In the scene where Devil-Bug solidifies this plan to himself, and then thinks back to Ellen, Lippard writes, “For a moment the soul of Devil-Bug was beautiful . . . Had Devil-Bug’s soul assumed a tangible shape, his body in comparison, would have grown beautiful . . . Devil-Bug for a moment felt the existence of a God. For a moment he felt that he had a Father in the Universe” (QC 339, emphasis in original). Devil-Bug’s care of Mabel here overlaps with the capitalist scheming the book decries; however, Lippard justifies it—as he did earlier with Devil-Bug’s violence—for these financial ploys leads to a different, benevolent end. Here Lippard again offers the type of compassionate and ultimately Christian manhood that might offset the market masculinities overrunning the novel (and the United States).
The performance of compassionate manhood continues in the Ravoni plot. A scientist-philosopher-illusionist-anatomist-messiah in one, Ravoni appears in Philadelphia to convert followers to his “‘New Religion of hope to Man!’” (QC 442). Devil-Bug serves as a sort of slave to him, collecting bodies for his master’s dissecting experiments. At first, Devil-Bug cowers under Ravoni’s penetrating stare: “‘Devil-Bug walked tremblingly along the floor, and crouched at the feet of Ravoni like a spaniel at the call of his master . . . ‘Brave me thus but once again,’ whispered Ravoni, gazing steadily upon the monster at his feet, ‘and I will take from you the power to think or act without my consent’” (400). It is not until Mabel becomes involved in Ravoni’s scheme that Devil-Bug turns against him.

Casting a supreme, mesmeric gaze that goes well beyond what Foucault calls the clinical or “the classificatory gaze, which is sensitive only to surface divisions,” (6) Ravoni penetrates bodies—both with his eyes and with anatomical tools. As Michael Sappol puts it, “Other anatomists just map the body, flatten it out; Ravoni extracts its essence, plumbs its depths” (230). Mabel eventually becomes his latest targeted convert: “‘a fair and stainless woman,’” Ravoni announces, “‘whose heart is full of truth, whose soul is all enthusiasm! On this heart will I write the teachings of Ravoni; this soul shall throb with the impulses of my Will!’” (QC 464). Here Lippard merges the seducer’s sexual penetration with the scientist’s anatomical dissection;
Ravoni’s desire to insert his “Will” into Mabel’s throbbing “soul” casts him as yet another predatory libertine who preys on women. Lippard opposed anatomical dissection, seeing it “as a rape of the body and grave” (Sappol 236). The phallic connotations of the surgical tools and the corporeal violence underpinning dissection work as logical prosthetics of the seducer.

Lippard continues to interject interludes within the Ravoni plot to offset the hegemonic narrative of market manhood. Discovering that Mabel will soon be indoctrinated into Ravoni’s cult, Devil-Bug confronts the sorcerer before a throng of religious disciples. Lippard writes:

The Savage [Devil-Bug] looked from one to the other, first on the pale face of . . .[Mabel], then in dark the countenance of the Sorcerer, he raised his arms aloft, with a cry of vengeance, he sprung forward. A murmur of horror escaped from the lips of the Disciples. Devil-Bug sprung forward, his hands quivering, and his eye flashing, but the calm dark eye of Ravoni was upon him, he made an effort to overcome the witch of that burning glance, he clutched his brawny chest with his talon fingers, and then fell back recoiling on one knee. (QC 532)

As with the watery eyes of Pyne and the weeping eye of Devil-Bug, Lippard showcases two divergent definitions of masculinity as he once more pits eyes against each other: those of the “dark” market man and that of the “flashing,” compassionate man. But for the moment again, Ravoni, the violator of
women and corpses, gains the upper hand, dominating—as do all figures of market manhood—the space within the narrative.

Soon, however, Devil-Bug moves back into action, and the masculine interlude continues. Ravoni "beheld a huge hand, rising above his head, with a glittering knife, grasped in the clutch of talon fingers" (QC 534). Mistakenly believing that Devil-Bug plans to murder Mabel, Ravoni:

started forward, a hoarse laugh broke on the air, mingled with a deep groan of agony! The knife had entered the back of Ravoni, driven with all the force of a frenzied arm, it sunk into the flesh between the shoulder blades . . . he grew purple in the face and pale by turns, he quivered from head to foot, he tottered along the floor, he fell. (534)

Ravoni’s dramatic murder works similarly to the action of an earlier interlude in which Livingstone falls as Devil-Bug rises. Here Lippard contrasts Devil-Bug’s "rising hand" with the sinking of the knife into Ravoni’s body—market culture’s men sink as compassionate manhood rises again into cultural prominence. As in other moments of the novel, Devil-Bug’s recourse is to murder. On one hand, this serves as a reminder that the compassionate trope of manhood always works within the boundaries of the dominant. On the other hand, Lippard here implies that murder leads to different, benevolent ends.
I disagree with Michael Denning, who argues, “Though Ravoni is killed . . . Lippard’s and the reader’s sympathies are mobilized for him; he offers the only alternative to Monk-hall and the corrupt Quaker City” (98). Ravoni too closely embodies the sexual violence and violation of market men to remain “the only alternative.” Devil-Bug, if anyone, performs in the interlude as the masculine alternative to capitalist culture and the types of male identities it produces. But the interlude—and the differing version of manhood—can only perform so long before it reaches its end.

Thus Lippard negates Devil-Bug near the novel’s end, but not before Luke Harvey accepts the story about Livingstone as the true father of Mabel. With this belief secured, Devil-Bug feels certain that Mabel will indeed inherit Livingstone’s wealth, thereby saving her from a life of poverty. Meanwhile, the police grow savvy to the sordid deeds committed in Monk-Hall, and they arrive in full force to break down the doors. Devil-Bug flees to the basement, where he directs his black henchmen Glo-Worm and Musquito—two racialized characters worthy of lengthy discussion elsewhere—to drop a boulder down a trapdoor. Believing they will hide the body of Gabriel Von Gelt (earlier murdered by a mob of working-class characters), the two men instead topple the boulder upon Devil-Bug, who places himself directly in its path. Entering the basement, Devil-Bug mutters, “Cursed queer! I don’t see nayther of ‘em—the man with the broken jaw, the woman with the holler
His guilty conscience, which incessantly plagues him about his murder victims, now finds atonement. Before Devil-Bug steps into position, Lippard writes, “Then folding his arms, with that column of light, from the distant roof, pouring on his head, Devil-Bug stood silent and erect. His tangled hair fell waving round his face, while his compressed lips and glaring eye, indicated a deep and settled resolve” (556). This passage, like the others, reveals images of light, references to eyes, and a symbolically rising, “erect” manhood. Lippard pardons Devil-Bug’s suicide, for he kills himself out of service to others—in this case, the well-being of Mabel. In payment for his selflessness, the “light” of God seemingly shines down upon Devil-Bug, “pouring” across his benevolent body. In this final interlude, under Lippard (and God’s) approval, Devil-Bug stands as an immortalized icon of compassionate manhood.

Then Glow-Worm and Musquito release the boulder. Lippard continues, “The light shone over his face; it was agitated by a frightful smile. ‘Good bye Nell’ [Mabel’s nickname] he said, and smiled . . . There was a heavy crash, and all was darkness, save that dim column of light, streaming from the distant trap-door” (QC 556). With the final conclusion of the masculine interlude, the narrative fades to black. At one level, this darkness reflects the domineering presence of market manhood in the novel and U.S. culture—a formulation of manhood so tightly enmeshed within the American
imagination that even Lippard cannot finally escape and, by way of Devil-Bug’s death, circulates back to at the end. But in the above passage, he infuses the dark textual space with traces of light. Even as Lippard physically casts him from the text, thus ridding it of compassionate manhood, this last image of light means that Lippard also leaves a trace of Devil-Bug (and his actions and attitudes) within the space of the narrative. They still linger as a possibility of a different form of masculinity in antebellum America, and therefore lessen the finality of his actual disappearance from the narrative.

**Devil-Bug, Maiden-Men, and Byrnewood Arlington**

At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that Lippard kills off his model of compassionate manhood. As critical of mass culture’s men as he is, Lippard also seems uncomfortable with the manly ideal he envisions in moments throughout *The Quaker City*. In one passage, he breaks from his fictional narrative to lambaste his audience, particularly sentimental men:

> Shallow pated critic with your smooth face whose syllabub insipidity is well-relieved by wiry curls of flaxen hair, soft maker of verses so utterly blank, that a single original idea never mars their consistent nothingness, penner of paragraphs so daintily perfumed with quaint phrases and stilted nonsense, we do not want you here; Pass on sweet maiden-man! . . . your innocent and girlish soul would be shocked by the very idea of such a hideous cavern, hidden far below the red brick
surface of broad-brimmed Quakertown. Pass by delightful trifler . . .
but for the sake of Heaven, do not criticize this chapter! Our taste is
different from yours . . . But as for you, sweet virgin-man . . . when you
are dead, should we survive your loss, we’ll raise above your grave a
monument of deep regard for your memory . . . A be-pantalooned girl,
with a smooth face and wiry hair . . . (QC 305)

Lippard positions Devil-Bug and Monk-Hall as the antithesis of sentimental
literature’s dainty subject matter, the latter which he obviously believes male
critics favor. Identifying himself with the tough, collective “we” in contrast
to the singular, effeminate “you” allows the audience to see him within the
rugged male majority: Jacksonian manhood opposed to weakness and
effeminacy (Greven 5-9). And as with Devil-Bug, Lippard negates the effete
male—the “be-pantalooned girl”—by anticipating his death. Shelley Streeby
discusses the “emerging opposition between a ‘feminized’ sentimentality and
a ‘masculine’ sensationalism” in the antebellum period and points out that
“ . . . Lippard depicts this world of sentimentality as feminized,emasculating,
and bourgeois, while he describes his own sensational style . . . as a more
masculine and realistic form of representation” (American 33). The passage
illustrates Lippard’s own anxieties about effeminacy as it reveals him writing
within the same ideological qualifiers that he despises in his characters.
On one hand, his antithetical relationship to flowery prose and dainty sentimental men in the above passage safely moves Devil-Bug from his effeminate role and back to replicating mass culture’s rough, aggressive men. Devil-Bug’s hypermasculinity in turn helps Lippard market himself professionally as a tough guy author, not unlike Ernest Hemingway and Norman Mailer 100 years later. While he dislikes market men’s aggression, Lippard also fears that his audience might mistakenly associate him with the more emotional aspects of sentimental literature and thus as a “maiden-man.” Ridding the novel of these girlish threats serves as one way for readers to avoid making this mistake.

On the other hand, as much as Lippard defines gendered writing and inscribes himself and his characters against sentimentalists, Devil-Bug’s compassionate actions—of course delineated by Lippard—return him to embodying “feminine” ideologies. In a cultural moment that continually constructs men as hardened and aggressive, Lippard often appears more attracted to the softer sides of masculinity than he admits or even realizes. It is arguably his conscious or unconscious understanding of this that in turn results in Devil-Bug’s negation, even as the image following Devil-Bug’s death shows him unwilling to completely close down this kinder possibility.

As the novel concludes, the narrative seems to reaffirm Byrnewood Arlington’s version of masculinity—which, because of its aggression and
violence, closely replicates market manhood. This textual shift does not necessarily suggest Lippard’s vocal endorsement of the dominant trope, but more likely his resignation to overwhelming market pressures, which structure all aspects of social and cultural relations (Macpherson, qtd. in Gilmore 5). In Lippard’s novel, written during the height of U.S. market anxieties, he can never completely write beyond the boundaries of market manhood and the privileging of whiteness. As Dana D. Nelson points out, “Devil-Bug . . . only epitomizes . . . the irregular and hybrid results of a forfeited pure group ideal . . . this threat is precisely one aimed at the purity and boundedness of the white nation” (148). If before, Lippard’s vision of compassionate manhood included racial and class diversity, his erasure of the apparently biracial Devil-Bug in favor of Arlington’s whiteness narrowly (re)envisions mass culture’s manhood as one white and middle-class, the standards of American normativity.

In the final scene of the novel, Arlington stares at a painting of Lorrimer, who Arlington kills in retribution for Mary’s seduction. Lippard writes, “The Avenger knew he was right in the sight of God, in the execution of the fearful deed which had been death to the Libertine” (QC 574). As Devil-Bug proves “right in the sight of God,” on multiple occasions, so now does Arlington. He comes close to embodying the dominant manhood
Lippard critiques, and serves as the textually-present form of masculinity the reader witnesses and internalizes as the long novel ends.

**Conclusion**

But as I stated in the introduction, the multiple interludes throughout each author’s text—in this case, Lippard’s *The Quaker City*—serve as moments that reveal a different program for manhood. They provide the writer an opportunity to challenge the emerging formulations of masculinity in middle-class culture. *The Quaker City*, as a whole, both reacts to and participates in market culture’s production of competitive, aggressive manhood. But the masculine interludes throughout the novel do not only allow Lippard to argue against his own culture’s aggressive expectations for manhood, they in the end prevent him from completely reaffirming the dominant, masculine market logic the ending sets up. In key moments of the text, Devil-Bug reflects an empathetic male alternative, one who performs amid the other narrative acts of market masculinity. Likewise, his physical monstrosity, which deviates from the standardized “norm,” serves as the ideal, corporeal text upon which Lippard inscribes his kinder version of manhood. As we move now into chapter two, we will see that Mark Twain, almost forty years later in *Those Extraordinary Twins*, rehearses many of the same anxieties as he uses his conjoined twins, Angelo and Luigi, to work against mass culture’s creation of reform manhood.
Chapter Two
“that weird strange thing that was so soft spoken and so gentle of manner”: Masculine Interludes and Reform Manhood in Mark Twain’s *Those Extraordinary Twins* and “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins”

Mark Twain’s *Those Extraordinary Twins* (1894) tells the tale of Angelo and Luigi Capello, conjoined Italian twins who, after a tour of Europe and a stint in various freak shows, make their way to the fictional Mississippi River town of Dawson’s Landing. As might be expected, they create quite a stir in the sleepy Missouri community, both due to their physical (mal)formation and their pursuit of diverging political and religious interests. Twain—his own pseudonym meaning “two”—maintained a fascination with twins his entire life, and they served as a recurring literary subject in *Pudd’nhead Wilson* (1894), *Those Extraordinary Twins*, and “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins” (1869), among others.
In the preface to *Those Extraordinary Twins*, Twain discusses what led him to write the narrative:

I had seen a picture of a youthful Italian ‘freak’—or ‘freaks’—which was—or which were—on exhibition in our cities—a combination consisting of two heads and four arms joined to a single body and a single pair of legs—and I thought I would write an extravagantly fantastic little story with this freak of nature for hero—or heroes.

(PW126).1

At base level, one might read the body of the twins as registering Otherness, as Twain, like Lippard, directs his readership’s gaze to the physical anatomy of the circus freak. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues that the freak show “was a cultural ritual that dramatized the era’s physical and social hierarchy by spotlighting bodily stigmata that could be choreographed as an absolute contrast to ‘normal’ American embodiment and authenticated as corporeal truth” (*Extraordinary* 63). But I would suggest that, in key moments, Twain utilizes the body of the twins to achieve much different—in fact, opposite—ends; he inverts the freak show dichotomy that Garland-Thomson assumes. Rather than having us see them as the antithesis of the (imaginary) American “normal,” Twain’s periodic, masculine interludes showcase compassionate, democratic values amid the larger narrative whole. These interludes play out within a text that constructs an aggressive, competitive trope—“reform
manhood”—which works against a sentimental and united American masculinity, and thus for Twain serves as the true “monster.” In fact, as he tells us above, in a perfect, idealized world the twins might become the “heroes,” ideal representations for other men to emulate.

Unlike *The Quaker City*, the plot of *Those Extraordinary Twins* is fairly straightforward. The narrative takes place in 1830, and Angelo and Luigi serve as the central protagonist(s). They arrive in Dawson’s Landing, where they rent a room from Aunt Patsy Cooper. At first, the entire community seems united in their awe of the twins, and Angelo and Luigi become local celebrities. But as the narrative goes on, we learn of their overall incompatibility, as each brother aligns himself with different reform groups, political parties, and religious beliefs. For instance, Angelo becomes a Baptist; Luigi instead a progressive “free-thinker.” Angelo identifies himself as a teetotaler; Luigi drinks alcohol. Their differences create tension (as well as comedy), for the brothers of course cannot escape each other due to their bodily configuration. At a temperance meeting, Luigi kicks Tom Driscoll, and both brothers go on trial. The jury does not see how to fairly punish Luigi without also punishing Angelo, and so, to the chagrin of the judge, they acquit the brothers of their charges. Later the judge challenges Luigi to a duel, who accepts against Angelo’s wishes. By some mysterious power, each brother takes charge of their legs one week at a time. The week of the duel,
Angelo mans them. When the judge begins firing, Angelo flees, leaving Luigi no choice but to follow. Soon the rest of the community hears of the duel. Those who view as Angelo correct in fleeing form the Angelo party, and those siding with Luigi assemble the Luigi party. Further adventures and mishaps occur, but the community grows to see them as a public nuisance, largely due to Luigi’s actions. The sketch ends with the town members hanging Luigi from a tree, of course killing Angelo in the process. Thus goes Those Extraordinary Twins.

The narrative arose out of Twain’s longer novel, Pudd’nhead Wilson. Both texts feature the twins. In the novel, Twain portrays them as separate brothers, unlike the shorter sketch. Those Extraordinary Twins presents Angelo as having lighter skin, while Luigi is of a darker complexion—thus some critics have interpreted the twins as biracial. As I mentioned, Twain originally intended to write a humorous story about the Siamese twins. But the tale apparently deviated from its original subject(s), growing and evolving into what would become Pudd’nhead Wilson — on the one hand, a messy, often contradictory meditation on race and on the other, a detective novel complete with fingerprinting and dramatic courtroom scenes.

This textual metamorphosis left Twain frustrated. In the preface to Those Extraordinary Twins, he explains: “. . . it changed itself from a farce to a tragedy while I was going along with it . . . But what was a great deal worse
was, that it was not one story, but two stories tangled together; and they obstructed and interrupted each other at every turn and created no end of confusion or annoyance” (PW125). But this realization did not occur immediately; Twain claims that it took a few months and a number of trips across the Atlantic and back for him to discover the problem. Finally,“ . . . I saw where the difficulty lay. I had no further trouble. I pulled one of the stories out by the roots, and left the other one—a kind of literary Caesarean operation” (125). Essentially, Twain went on to publish Pudd’nhead Wilson in serial form in 1893 and 1894, without the newly-separated Those Extraordinary Twins. Later in 1894, he sold the shorter text to the American Publishing Company for $1500, which released both works in a single volume.3 What began as a short, humorous account ultimately transformed into another set of “twins”: a novel and a novella.

Those Extraordinary Twins does not receive a large amount of critical attention. (For that matter, neither does “Personal Habits.”) Despite Susan Gillman’s assertion that “These twin novels must be read together” (Dark 55), critics often largely ignore the shorter sketch in favor of Pudd’nhead Wilson.4 If scholars do discuss Those Extraordinary Twins, they usually do so only briefly and as a precursor to their analysis of the novel. Gillman, Robert L. Patten, Nancy Frederick, John Bird, George E. Marcus, Gregg Camfield, Barbara Ladd, Derek Parker Royal, and Catherine O’Connell have extensively covered
the subjects of twins and twinning in Twain, especially in relation to questions of race and national identity—but again, these discussions more often focus on *Pudd’nhead Wilson*. In both works, the brothers prove largely incompatible with each other, and thus critics argue that their incompatibility, among other things, displays the tensions of slavery and the national body, freedom and authority, and individual self-interests and a united American body. Indeed, important work has been done on twins, race, national identity, and incompatibility. My discussion writes into this recent scholarship, but it focuses exclusively on *Those Extraordinary Twins*—not *Pudd’nhead Wilson*—in order to interrogate Twain’s concerns about national identity from another, hardly-discussed angle: monstrosity, especially as it pertains to modes of identity for men.

To this end, I am in closest dialogue with Alex Nissen and Cynthia Wu. Nissen discusses intimacy and male romantic friendship in Twain’s *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884). He notes that men’s “romantic friendships,” a genre explored by white male writers such as Twain, Henry James, William Dean Howells, and Bret Harte, were founded upon “values such as voluntariness, intimacy, equality, reciprocity, and selflessness” (65). He also suggests, “Like quite a few nineteenth-century men, Twain dreamed of a world in which relations between males would not always be governed and structured by competitiveness and self-interest” (62). Nissen mostly
focuses on an analysis of male friendships and homoerotic relationships. However, Nissen’s list of qualifiers for male friendships—like Peter Coviello’s, who I discussed earlier—and his argument about Twain’s dream go hand and hand with compassionate manhood’s chief ethics. For Twain, this means a democratic, united manhood, where men feel for and do for each other. Sympathy creates an equal playing field and a united bond, for it links sympathizer and sympathized, reader and literary figure, man and man. Compassionate manhood is interested in bringing men together, not dividing them. Joined by fellow feeling, Americans dwell—in Twain’s ideal and ultimately impossible vision—in a utopian, harmonious existence.

In her recent essay on the figure of the Siamese Twins in popular culture and in “narratives of conflict and resolution,” Wu argues that “Personal Habits” “use[s] the racial difference and anatomical materiality of the [Chang and Eng] Bunker twins as a rhetorical device.” Twain’s sketch, Wu contends, “invokes[s] a reconciliatory politics during times of civil unrest” but also “demonstrates[s] an uneasy ambivalence about the national unity” it “advocate[s]” (30). Ultimately the twins “served as a useful, albeit problematic, trope for the nineteenth-century Anglo-American subject grappling with the contradictions of a single nation-state containing multiple political and cultural contingencies across region, race, and class” (37). The twins’ bodily configurations, for Wu, represent national, racial unity—“role
models for white America”—as well as the larger challenges to it (40). I also examine the twins’ body as a trope for national cohesiveness, but I largely approach it from the angle of gender, more particularly, masculinity. Wu overall links disability with race, and she does not center on issues of gender. And while I also discuss the challenges to national male unity, and the ending that seems to suggest its impossibility, I privilege the interludes, the interstitial moments between the other acts that promote a compatible and ultimately kinder national manhood.

Thus the much-discussed subject of the twins’ incompatibility serves as the jumping-off point for my own discussion. At one level, Angelo and Luigi certainly might be read as incompatible, not to mention as metaphors, like Devil-Bug, of a crisis in the social body. But these readings again remain limited. As I see it, the cultural roles and ideologies the twins periodically represent invariably go against critics’ ideas about incompatibility; they in important moments work as the idealized “solution” to this problem. In this chapter, I argue that twins, as depicted in certain, key moments of Those Extraordinary Twins and “Personal Habits,” serve as Twain’s vision of compassionate manhood; in masculine interludes, the brothers perform differently from the larger culture that produces reform manhood—the type of males that trouble Twain in his narratives. And as with Devil-Bug, the twins’ possible biracialness in turn indicates that compassionate manhood
extends beyond the boundaries of whiteness to encompass racial diversity: the true hallmark of a democratic nation. But the masculine interlude is ephemeral. The conclusion, which shows the twins’ death, leaves the audience with the townsmen’s more aggressive version of manhood. As with Lippard, this ending might at first indicate that the narrative reaffirms reform culture’s ethics. But the twins’ moments of compassionate manhood throughout again prevent the sketch’s ending from completely endorsing this dominant trope of masculinity. Those Extraordinary Twins and “Personal Habits” displays Twain’s cultural criticism of one type of nineteenth-century manhood, but it also offers glimpses of different possibilities.

Again, as with all the authors I examine, there is discrepancy between textuality and reality in Twain. In his narratives, he fashion compassionate manhood as a marked alternative, something very different from reform manhood. Twain inscribes compassionate manhood as difference even as its chief traits, namely sympathy and emotion, were indeed part and parcel to actual reform—in other words, dominant—manhood of 1830s and 1840s white, middle-class culture. In Twain’s narratives, reform movements ideologically splinter Angelo and Luigi as well as other men into aggressive individuals. This is textually the case, even though in reality reform movements, such as abolition and temperance groups, brought citizens together under a more benevolent ethos. Twain’s narratives ultimately serve
as the space where he can both tap into and ignore the realities of actual middle-class culture.

**Reform Men, the Conjoined Twins, and Masculine Interludes**

The early nineteenth century served as the era of American reform movements, which peaked in the 1830s and 1840s. Abolition, temperance, women’s rights, religion, education, prisons, asylums, and utopian communities, among many other issues, sparked heated debates. Political groups also rapidly arose. In 1833 and 1834, the Whig Party formed in opposition to Jackson’s aggressive politics. This period proved as a moment of intensity, with almost everything in American life the subject of scrutiny. Individuals and entire groups took sides against each other.

As I just noted, Twain inscribes compassion as antithetical to white, middle-class reform groups. But in actual antebellum culture, sympathy and compassion served as components of the dominant white middle-class, and were often deployed by reform groups. For example, Glenn Hendler examines how Washingtonian Temperance movements in the 1840s gained tremendous popularity and membership by teaching that those with drinking problems could be redeemed and encouraging men to sympathize with the plight of other alcoholic men; this movement existed in contrast to earlier temperance movements that stressed the worthlessness of alcoholics and predicted their eventual extinction (Public 32-33). Other instances of reform
based on sympathy for others included abolitionist and women’s rights movements. Yet as I will suggest in *Those Extraordinary Twins*, reform manhood behaves in manners clearly antithetical to Twain’s conception of sympathy. Likewise, in the 1830s and 1840s, many working and middle-class reform movements formed out of dissatisfaction with market logic’s unfair working conditions (Kimmel, *Manhood* 31-36; Roediger 3-92). But, as Twain illustrates, reform manhood often only ends up replicating the market ethics that it originally revolted against.

Despite the difference Twain often evokes between actuality and textuality, he still bases his textual reform men on actual reform culture. What seems to particularly bother him about reform manhood are its paradoxes; most crucially, that it allowed individual men to identify with other men, but also concurrently define themselves against other men (e.g., Whigs vs. Democrats; teetotalers vs. drinkers). In Twain’s view, reform manhood—by way of its political and social divisiveness—simultaneously threatens a larger, united sense of middle-class U.S. manhood. For example, Angelo “was not merely representing Whigism,” Twain tells us, “he was representing something immensely finer and greater—to wit, Reform. In him was centered the hopes of the whole reform element of the town; he was the chosen and admired champion of every clique that had a pet reform of any sort or kind at heart” (*PW*181). Here, we see many men united under one
political identity, but yet simultaneously split off from a national, truly united identity.

Thus in *Those Extraordinary Twins*, reform manhood results in both a divisive self and community, men defined through opposition. Twain writes:

Whenever Luigi had possession of the legs, he carried Angelo to balls, rum shops, Sons of Liberty parades, horse races, campaign riots, and everywhere else that could damge [sic] him with his party and church; and when it was Angelo’s week he carried Luigi diligently to all manner of moral and religious gatherings, and did his best to get back the ground which he had lost before. (*PW* 181)

The twins move in differing directions, taking and reclaiming each other’s political and social “ground.” They transform into individuals, their identities shaped through opposing viewpoints which prohibit larger national cohesiveness. And their differences in turn affect how they treat each other.

In one example of this, the twins retire to their bedroom on their first night in Dawson’s Landing and get into one of many arguments. Angelo complains about Luigi’s tight boots. Luigi retorts, “’My friend, when I am in command of our body, I choose my apparel according to my own convenience’” (*PW* 134). Rather than identifying empathetically with his brother, Luigi feels only for himself; he displays the self-centeredness and
self-interest inherent in Twain’s construction of reform logic. Twain depicts reform movements as emotionally compartmentalizing men with men, but also men from men. Their sequestering signals sympathy’s failure to nationally unite men by feeling. Even if in reality reform movements are formulated out of good intentions, Twain textually fashions them as leading to men’s isolation.

However, despite the twins’ individual paths and alliances, we see a few masculine interludes in Those Extraordinary Twins where Twain clearly idealizes them as compassionate manhood. One scene occurs the next morning at Aunt Patsy’s breakfast table. Angelo comments, “‘Our natures differ a good deal from each other, and our tastes also’” (PW 137). Here, Twain sets up the individualism that usually results in dispute for the brothers. But before this, he frames the scene as ideal, noting that a “. . . cheery feeling of friendliness and comradeship . . .” hangs over the room (137). Twain’s association of the “cheery feeling” with the twins’ compassionate manhood is similar to Lippard’s linking of light with Devil-Bug. Here Twain shines the spotlight on the narrative’s side stage, where a different masculine performance occurs.

Aunt Patsy watches the brothers eat and notices that “the hand that picked up a biscuit carried it to the wrong head, as often as any other way, and the wrong mouth devoured it” (PW 137). When she eventually admits
that she has noticed the “mistake,” Luigi tells her, “‘Dear madam, there wasn’t any mistake. We are always helping each other that way. . .’” (138, emphasis mine). The twins’ rhetoric and actions at the breakfast table reveal a unified body of men who work together as compassionate comrades. Furthermore, in Twain’s vision, differing male individualities can exist while simultaneously blending, through their outwardly-directed actions, into a larger body. This *e pluribus unum* ethic plays out in the brothers’ corporeal (mal)formation. Rather than a body that registers monstrosity, the body of the conjoined twins showcases Twain’s dream of united men in America, one that is both different and yet democratically “normal.” As Lippard depicts Devil-Bug rising into action, so does Twain with the twins: the “hand that picked up a biscuit” and “carried it to the wrong head” indicates the rising of compassionate manhood amid male political individualism. It is a simple moment and gesture, but this interlude of the twins emblematically works within and against the divisiveness that reform manhood signifies in the rest of the narrative.

Twain continues with the masculine interlude. Angelo informs the group that “‘We have much to be thankful for . . .we have been greatly blessed. As a rule, what one has lacked, the other, by the bounty of Providence, has been able to supply. My brother is hardy, I am not; he is very masculine, assertive, aggressive, I am much less so. I am subject to illnesses,”
he is never ill . . . ” (PW 140). In this scene, Twain does two things. At one level, his feminization of Angelo in contrast to Luigi’s Jacksonian “masculine, assertive, aggressive” qualities allows his audience to see him upholding the traditionally gendered logic that deems sensitivity, emotion, and sickness as exclusive to the feminine sphere and aggression, masculinity, and health as part of a virulently male domain. In this moment, Twain can safely explore sensitivity and illness in men as long as it is gendered feminine and in an oppositional relationship to hardy manhood. Here he clearly works from the center rather than at the margins. Regarding Twain’s “bad-boy” novels such as The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876), Hendler suggests that “Sympathetic identification induced by the display or depiction of suffering, characteristic of women’s sentimental novels and didactic children’s fiction, is anathema to a ‘real boy’” (Public 190). We see Hendler’s points apply to Those Extraordinary Twins as well.

However, Twain simultaneously resists this divisive, gendered logic in his masculine interlude. In this idealized space, men do not have to act aggressively; they might adapt sensitive roles increasingly not allowed of real “men” in the U.S. nineteenth century. Additionally, their relationships to each other are not marked by competition, but instead by giving and taking. Identifying with each other results in a whole: supply meets up with lack; illness is met with health; men look out for one another. In this moment at
the breakfast table, Twain both operates within and outside the dominant cultural expectations of American manhood.

This manly interlude, of course, still struggles against the before and after scenes that showcase reform manhood’s divisive ethos. On the first night in Dawson’s Landing, Twain reveals the cold attributes of reform men—again represented in Luigi—as Angelo responds, “. . . when you are in command [of the legs] you treat me as an intruder, you make me feel unwelcome” (PW 134). At other points, Twain shows how both brothers revert to following their individual political causes; in the scene proceeding the duel, when the twins and their respective followers split into two factions, Twain writes, “The Luigi faction carried its strength into the Democratic party, [and] the Angelo faction entered into a combination with the Whigs” (181). Again, the paradox: the brothers’ individual paths allow them to identify with other men in their respective political parties, but these parties only translate into a larger, national body of splintered factions: men poised against each other, not working toward a greater united whole. And still in other scenes, Twain highlights how Luigi, in particular, embodies the aggression—and not compassion—that too often characterizes reform manhood. In the courtroom, Tom Driscoll’s lawyer announces to the jury that the twins “. . . kicked my client, at the Market Hall last night; they kicked him with violence; with extraordinary violence; with even unprecedented
violence; I may say; insomuch that he was lifted entirely off his feet and discharged into the midst of the audience” (152). Here Twain inscribes a manhood structured on 1840s Jacksonian violence. And Twain illustrates Angelo’s “. . . sorest point, i.e., his conviction that his brother’s presence was welcomer everywhere than his own” (144). In more ways than one, reform manhood often crowds the narrative (and national) stage, leaving little room for masculine interludes.

But despite the fact that *Those Extraordinary Twins* depicts a social landscape where aggressive political manhood largely dominates, Twain still presents moments of a sensitive, gentler performance. Another interlude occurs when, on their first full day in town, Judge Driscoll gives the twins a tour of Dawson’s Landing; this scene serves as the only time in the narrative that Twain reveals Angelo’s thoughts (including the quoted musings above). He writes, “A sensitive nature like this is necessarily subject to moods; moods which traverse the whole gamut of feelings . . .” (*PW* 144). As they drive through the streets, Twain writes:

At times, in his seasons of deepest depression, Angelo almost wished that he and his brother might become segregated from each other and be separate individuals, like other men. But as soon as his mind cleared and these diseased imaginings passed away, he shuddered at the repulsive thought . . . To be separate, and as other men are! How
awkward it would seem; how unendurable . . . How odd, and strange, and grotesque every action, attitude, movement, gesture would be. To sleep by himself, eat by himself—how lonely, how unspeakably lonely! No, no, any fate but that. In every way and from every point, the idea was revolting.

This was of course natural; to have felt otherwise would have been unnatural. He had known no life but the combined one; he had been familiar with it from his birth; he was not able to conceive of any other as being agreeable, or even bearable. To him, in the privacy of his secret thoughts, all other men were monsters, deformities; and during three-fourths of his life their aspect had filled him with what promised to be an unconquerable aversion . . . (144)

In this moment, Twain quite explicitly inverts constructions of physical normalcy and abnormality. Here, the monstrous body not only serves as the regularized standard from which all other individualized men deviate, thus becoming “monsters” and “deformities,” it also articulates Twain’s national vision. His is a “sensitive” and “combined” body of men, one united day and night, which works within and against the sick, “diseased” bodies of men fractured by competing political interests. Twain illustrates another mode of sympathetic identity, and then illustrates how nineteenth-century political values, pushed upon men, result in them becoming “grotesque” and
“unnatural.” Angelo’s inability to imagine any “life but the combined one” indicates the nation’s original democratic promise. But it is a promise that has almost disappeared in post-Gilded Age America. Nonetheless, through the masculine interludes, Twain still attempts to retrain men made monstrous by political ideologies.

Twain’s exploration of sympathetic brothers did not begin in the 1890s with *Those Extraordinary Twins*, but years earlier in 1869 with “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins,” which appeared in the August edition of *Packard’s Monthly*. His sketch entails a short parody of Chang and Eng Bunker, the “original” Siamese Twins. As a whole, “Personal Habits” deals with many of the same incompatibility issues that Twain would later address in *Those Extraordinary Twins*; its central difference lies in the comedic marriage plot. But, as with the longer sketch, “Personal Habits” simultaneously inscribes the twins’ body as the ideological exemplar of compassionate manhood. In one masculine interlude, Twain writes:

The Siamese Twins are naturally tender and affectionate in disposition, and have clung to each other with a singular fidelity throughout a long and eventful life . . . And yet these creatures were ignorant and unlettered—barbarians themselves and the offspring of barbarians, who knew not the light of philosophy and science. What a withering
rebuke is this to our boasted civilization, with its quarrellings, its
wrangling, and its separation of brothers! (“Personal” par. 2)

Underneath the sarcasm lies Twain’s orientalist idealization. He looks to an
idyllic, Eastern past in light of Western modernity, with its political forces
that splice men into hardened individuals. Opposite the “separation” of U.S.
brothers is the “singular . . . life” of the conjoined twins, one that is “naturally
tender and affectionate in disposition.” Twain uses “life” instead of “lives” in
regards to the twins; they embody unity in pre-industrial Asia, and for
Twain’s western purposes, united sympathy and the Revolutionary logic of e
*pluribus unum*.

Even as a young writer, Twain sees men who look out for one another,
who behave in a “tender and affectionate” manner as democratically natural.
It is the fragmentary nature of U.S. political life that results in “withering,”
social degeneration, and “quarrellings . . . wrangling, and . . . separation of
brothers!” What Twain sees differentiating the united Chang and Eng from
U.S. men is affection, sympathy, and sensitivity, and hence why he shows the
brothers living a unified existence while American men simply devolve into
“quarrelling” and “wrangling” individuals. Regarding “Personal Habits,”
Cynthia Wu muses, “During this time of national healing, Twain seems to
urge, let the (white citizens of the) United States look upon this model of
racial, cultural, and anatomical difference and bury the hatchet that threatens
the goal of reunification” (40). I would add masculine “difference” to the “model.” Years before *Those Extraordinary Twins* appeared, Twain already felt alarm over the state of American men’s behaviors. He thus looked to monstrous bodies, with their cultural meanings, as another manly option.

Later in “Personal Habits,” Twain again inscribes the recipe for compassionate manhood: “The sympathy existing between these two brothers is so close and so refined that the feelings, the impulses, the emotions of the one are instantly experienced by the other. When one is sick, the other is sick; when one feels pain, the other feels it; when one is angered, the other’s temper takes fire” (“Personal” par. 7). Unlike reform manhood, which for Twain fails to feel beyond the self and therefore follows individual pursuits, compassionate manhood moves beyond the immediate self to achieve sympathetic identification with another. Sympathetic identification erases difference and distance and bridges communities; it places all parties on an equal plain through the homogenizing act of identification (Hendler, *Public* 3-5; Klages 18-22; Mielke 8). For Twain, the idea of “community” moves beyond the localized collective of the reform movement and to the national level. The transgression of sympathy across the boundaries of physical bodies creates a bodily bond, an ultimately democratic space, a place where men both retain their physical individualism but, through their feelings and actions, simultaneously blend into a collective whole. In this
masculine interlude, sympathetic identification creates sensitive men and thus harmony.

But, as soon as Twain moves from idealizing the twins to discussing nineteenth-century temperance movements, the fragmentation of brothers occurs: “Now, Chang is bitterly opposed to all forms of intemperance, on principle; but Eng is the reverse—for, while these men’s feelings and emotions are so closely wedded, their reasoning faculties are unfettered; their thoughts are free” (“Personal” par. 6, emphasis in original.) Modern political life drives a wedge through the democratic body, manufacturing conflicting beliefs, which then lead to individualism. Outside the interlude, Twain still finds emotion, but it is emotion to its own individual end, emotion without reciprocity. He continues, “Chang belongs to the Good Templars, and is a hard-working and enthusiastic supporter of all temperance reforms. But, to his bitter distress, every now and then Eng gets drunk, and, of course, that makes Chang drunk too. This unfortunate thing has been a great sorrow to Chang . . .” (par. 6) Their differing viewpoints mark them as “free” in a nation where individuals light out for their own territories, but Twain also sadly views American men, American brothers as “free,” or divided, from a unified national manhood.
Twain, Lippard, and the Conclusion of the Masculine Interlude

But despite Twain’s masculine interludes throughout *Those Extraordinary Twins*, the author kills off his potential at the end. The townsmen of Dawson’s Landing hang the brothers from a tree after Luigi continually creates trouble within the local political system. Twain writes, “So they hanged Luigi. And so ends the history of ‘Those Extraordinary Twins’” (*PW* 184). Twain’s final conclusion of his masculine interlude and thus compassionate manhood is matter-of-fact and quick, without the sentimental fanfare of Lippard’s.

One reason for this, besides the difference in literary genres, may be that Twain lived into the twentieth century and saw, among other things, the Civil War, emancipation, Lincoln’s assassination, Reconstruction and its failures, the corporate Gilded Age, the rise of lynching and white supremacy, and the dawning of U.S. imperialism overseas. Lippard, who died in 1854, missed many of the factors that further splintered men into competitive individuals. The killing of the twins, light-skinned and dark, might be, for Twain, the final result of an America shattered by slavery, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and corporate bureaucracy and greed. It does suggest that Twain, like Lippard, may not have seen race as integral to the new male identities his narrative nearly reaffirms at the end. In any case, he simply experienced more that made him seriously doubtful about whether American
males might ever be able to treat each other by the nation’s founding
democratic codes, and his quick erasure of the twins reflects his own bleak
emotional outlook.

As I mentioned in chapter one, Lippard’s narrative nearly champions
the kind of dominant masculinity embodied in Byrnewood Arlington. We
see a similar motif in Twain, as we do in all the authors I examine. Upon
Angelo and Luigi’s death, the community members essentially close down
the sketch; the men who hang the twins more or less replicate the violence
and aggression associated with reform manhood. Twain never loudly
lambastes “maiden-men” in Lippard’s manner, but he is quick to associate
emotion, feeling, and sensitivity with femininity; thus he and Lippard tend to
share similar attitudes not only toward dominant manhoods, but also
sentimental men—even as their texts clearly advocate for these types of men
in periodic masculine interludes. While neither Lippard nor Twain feel at
ease with market and reform men, and neither vocally endorse them, the
authors’ endings essentially acquiesce to the larger culture that insists men
behave without compassion.

But the masculine interludes throughout *Those Extraordinary Twins* and
“Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins” help resist the teleological finality of
the longer narrative’s ending. In his conclusion, Twain announces, “As you
see, it was an extravagant sort of tale, and had no purpose but to exhibit that
monstrous ‘freak’ in all sorts of grotesque lights” (PW 184). Certainly, Twain achieves his exhibition at the limited level with the twins as bodily spectacle, but he also exhibits them, in certain moments and in certain “lights,” as icons of compassionate manhood. For Lippard and Twain, their respective historical periods could be equated as periods of lack—lack of financial and social equality, lack of sentiment and sympathy for others, and lack of fraternity and unity. Thus they looked to monstrous male bodies—to “difference”—in effort to inscribe another manly option.

The beginning of Those Extraordinary Twins serves as a fitting way to discuss the ending, in which Angelo and Luigi die at the hands of the town’s men. Twain describes Aunt Patsy Cooper and her daughter Rowena after the brothers, on their first night in Dawson’s Landing, retire to the guest bedroom: “The two sat . . . conscious of nothing but that prodigy, that uncanny apparition that had come and gone so suddenly—that weird strange thing that was so soft spoken and so gentle of manner, and yet had shaken them up like an earthquake with the shock of its grewsome [sic] aspect” (PW 131). Twain inscribes the twins as “uncanny,” “weird,” “strange,” and “grewsome”; he narrates them from the perspective of the cultural “norm,” the masses, here figured in Patsy and Rowena. Though they come and go “so suddenly” in the house and, albeit less suddenly, in Twain’s narrative, their “soft spoken and so gentle of [a] manner” leaves a tremendous impact on the
women, and by extension, Twain’s readership. Throughout *The Quaker City*, Devil-Bug’s masculine interludes lessen the ideological meanings behind his death while also providing cultural critique and a different behavioral model for men. In *Those Extraordinary Twins*, Twain’s audience also witnesses interludes which do the same. Their gentleness, among other factors, remain as different cultural behaviors for men, even as Twain casts their physical bodies out of the narratives.

I have already discussed some of the major similarities and differences between Lippard and Twain. But, before concluding this chapter, I want to say more about bodily representation in the two authors. Unlike Lippard, Twain’s overall representation of the twins does not so heavily depend upon explicit corporeal detail. There are a few scenes that do focus particularly on the twins’ monstrosity. For one, we have the introductory passage to Angelo and Luigi that I have already quoted: “Then followed a stupefying apparition—a double-headed human creature with four arms, one body, and a single pair of legs!” (*PW* 130). Soon after the twins arrive, Mrs. Cooper comments, “‘There was just a wormy squirming of arms in the air—seemed to be a couple of dozen of them, all writhing at once, and it just made me dizzy to see them go’” (132). But the details never move beyond the above two examples. When contrasted against *The Quaker City*, which overflows
with voyeuristic descriptions of bodies, Twain’s bodily representations are controlled.

I would suggest that he provides less corporeal detail than Lippard because he draws from the actual bodies of the Tocci brothers and Chang and Eng Bunker—images that were familiar to working-class and middle-class culture. Lippard’s Devil-Bug is a fictional creation, and thus needs ample description. On the other hand, freak shows, popularized by P.T. Barnum in the latter half of the nineteenth century, formed a staple part of American entertainment—and conjoined twins were often featured. Even if U.S. citizens did not attend actual circuses and freak shows, daguerreotypes and other forms of photography made it possible for the images of the Toccis and the Bunkers to appear on posters, penny papers, and other forms of print and visual culture. From the 1850s forward, there was a good chance that many white, working- and middle-class Americans witnessed images of the Tocci and Bunker twins in one cultural medium or another. In other words, as a popular writer himself, Twain focuses less on graphic bodily descriptions because he imagines his readership to already have familiarity with these popular cultural images.

But there remain other differences in bodily representation, differences that move beyond entertainment forms and into the sociopolitical. While Lippard inscribes Devil-Bug’s compassion as better options for men, he
simultaneously marks his character, through excessive bodily passages, as monstrous Other. This assertion returns us to the limited readings associated with Devil-Bug, but it is a fact that needs addressing. Lippard’s audience probably enjoyed the titillating scenes of Devil-Bug more for what they suggested about abnormalcy and monstrosity. It seems less likely that they would have seen him as the iconic figure of masculine change. This is one of the main dangers of Lippard’s mode of representing monstrous bodies—the sensational modes largely run the risk of only replicating oppositions for an audience, particularly the distance between Self and Other, rather than serving as agents of cultural resolution. As I have mentioned, I am most concerned with masculine interludes rather than the endings that nearly, but not completely, close down these different possibilities. At the same time, Lippard’s modes of representation undeniably lessen the political agency of monstrous figures.

Twain, on the other hand, places less visual emphasis on the twins as Other. This prevents representation of the twins through a simplistic binary, and more immediately encourages Twain’s audience to look at the pressing cultural meanings attached to the twins’ body—for good or for ill. And, as I mentioned earlier, Twain even argues that their bodily configuration is both the “norm” from which all others deviate. As Aunt Patsy Cooper proclaims, “. . . there’s more about them that’s wonderful than their just being made in
the image of God like the rest of His creatures’” (PW 172). Twain’s representations of the brothers are a far cry from Devil-Bug’s, for who “there had never been a church, a Bible, or a God!” (QC 223). In short, Lippard’s excessive bodily depictions often replicate binary oppositions of difference; Twain’s visual minimalism, alternately, constructs the twins less as monstrous difference and instead as the democratic icon for the masses of American men.

Conclusion

Axel Nissen, among other scholars, argues that the historical novel—or, in this case, the historical sketch—“. . . can tell us more about the time it was written in and for than about the time it was written about” (64, emphasis in original). My main concern in this chapter has been with the reverse, in the types of textualized antebellum reform men that Twain writes “about” and constructs in the text. However, many of the white men at the end of the Gilded Age and in Twain’s 1890s—especially those scripted by the cult of manhood, market life and corporations, and imperialism—also served as an actual source for the types of men he constructs in Those Extraordinary Twins and “Personal Habits.” Though my focus has been on the antebellum period, these texts indeed speak to Twain’s own actual moments of manhood at the end of the nineteenth century.
In fact, Clemens himself worked within mass culture’s expectations for white, middle-to-upper class men. Most immediately, he did so through his role as a popular writer and in his own desires for fame and success. Clemens married into New York wealth through Olivia Langdon, but his books also made him “Mark Twain,” one of America’s wealthiest nineteenth-century authors. He spent much of his adult life losing money through failed business deals and inventions, and he viewed writing as a means to financial security. Clemens loved technology and progress, even as these chipped away at the old U.S. societal foundations of democratic equality. And he himself was often competitive when it came to literary and business ventures. While clearly not the embodiment of reform manhood, Clemens—and, for that matter, “Mark Twain”—is the epitome of the self-made market man. And Clemens was aware of this. It is safe to suggest that he viewed his own successes and failures as contributing to a culture that often prevented men from attaining truly equal, democratic relationships; he likely understood his own participation in a system predicated on liberal individualism and capitalism. Clemens operated at the center of mass culture, even as he worked from its margins, and he probably included himself in the figure of the incompatible twins.

Despite this, however, his texts indicate that he still questioned social and political systems that produced individualistic men. On a limited,
interpretive level, and like Devil-Bug, the monstrous twins denote a larger masculine culture in crisis because of social and political transformations. But Twain simultaneously (albeit more quietly than Lippard) showcases the twins as a potentially more sensitive and ultimately democratic mode of behavior and conduct for men mired in these transformations. As we now move into chapter three, we will see how J. Quinn Thornton situates masculine interludes within a larger narrative detailing rugged, cannibalistic manhood. Authorial anxieties move from eastern market and political arenas and into the western mountains.
Chapter Three

“a duty which he owed to suffering humanity”: Masculine Interludes and Survivalist Manhood in J. Quinn Thornton’s *Oregon and California in 1848* and Other Donner Party Narratives

With the California Gold Rush, the Donner Party incident figures as one of the most well-known chapters in the narrative of nineteenth-century westward expansion. In the twentieth century, the 1846-1847 event was portrayed in fiction, poetry, paintings, television shows, films, music, and on the stage.¹ The reason why the Donner Party holds such fascination for modern Americans is because a number of the starving members resorted to eating their dead companions in order to survive the brutal winter. The idea of white U.S. citizens pushed to the extremes, making choices of whether to consume human flesh or starve, has always found a place within the twentieth-century American cultural imagination. But the events
surrounding the Donner Party proved just as fascinating for nineteenth-century American citizens, and print culture served as the medium for articulating this fascination—and anxiety.

Authors of narratives about the Donner Party usually mark their figures with two tropes of monstrosity: the physical and the ethical. For example, in *Oregon and California in 1848* (1849), J. Quinn Thornton describes the emaciated appearance of one emigrant, William Eddy, and his companions: “They were all reduced to mere skeletons. The skin upon the face, particularly, was drawn tight over the bones; the eyes were sunken, and had a fierce and wild expression” (*OC* 136). Thornton invites the readership to gaze at Eddy and the other emigrants. Their bodies have devolved into signifiers of lack; they are physical texts which narrate western expansion’s failure to deliver the Promised Land. But, unlike Lippard and Twain’s monstrous characters, Eddy and the other Donner Party members’ emaciation prove less emblematic, at base level, of a social crisis or cultural challenge to masculinity than do their conscious decisions to consume humans.

Take, for another instance, H.A. Wise, whose narrative *Los Gringos* (1849) includes a brief section on the Donner Party. Wise describes a scene when rescuers reach the Donner camps in early 1847. He reports that a number of survivors:
were found rolling in filth, parents eating their own offspring, denizens of different cabins exchanging limbs and meat—little children tearing and devouring the livers and hearts of the dead . . . [an adult] feasted on her good papa, but on making soup of her lover’s head, she confessed to some inner qualms of conscience.

("Unfortunate”135)

While taking care to note his own horror, Wise nevertheless enjoys describing the spectacle. His verbs and alliteration aid in depicting the Donner Party members as swine-like monsters, humans who have morally and ethically degenerated into unfeeling savages and sensually revel in their culturally-perverse abundance: human flesh. Taken together, their starved bodies and cannibal actions, on base levels, signal a crisis in white, middle-class morality and cultural identity. Like Devil-Bug and the twins, Donner Party figures such as Eddy and the others work on limited levels as emblems of cultural crises. Many sensational narratives similar to Wise’s began appearing immediately following the Donner Party events and continued well into the twentieth century.

This chapter focuses on representations of William Eddy, who survived the winter in part by resorting to cannibalism, in Thornton’s Oregon and California in 1848. I examine Eddy against the trope of “survivalist manhood,” a textual representation most extremely embodied by Lewis
Keseberg, another survivor (and another cannibal). Keseberg not only appears in Thornton’s narrative, but also in most nineteenth-century written accounts about the Donner Party. A few words about representations of Keseberg and Eddy. Because Keseberg was such a fascinating subject for Americans as a whole, I focus on Thornton and other authors’ portrayals of him. I do this to show how a wider web of male writers collectively inscribe what I call “survivalist manhood.” Many accounts of Keseberg are similar, but some include sensational details that others do not address. Taken together, these texts more fully participate in the textual construction of survivalist manhood. Eddy, on the other hand, was lesser-known by the general public, and thus less-discussed in the written accounts. However, he is the main subject of Thornton’s text. As I see it, the inscription of Eddy as compassionate manhood offers a different possibility to the survivalist manhood both Thornton and other authors construct.

One central manner in which Thornton differs from Lippard and Twain lies in his representations of monstrosity. Whereas the latter two authors’ narratives showcase “normal” and monstrous tropes of masculinity, such as market men and Devil-Bug or the townsmen and the twins, Thornton seems to see both Eddy and Keseberg as monstrous. In reality, starvation disfigures them, and more importantly—to average sensibilities, including Thornton’s—their decisions to consume human bodies make them morally
monstrous. In the end, as Thornton puts it, human flesh is “this most monstrous food” (OC 224). Yet he still goes about inscribing Eddy and Keseberg as differing tropes of manhood in the same manners as Lippard and Twain. The defining qualifiers, in Thornton’s representations, arise from Eddy and Keseberg’s emotions (or lack thereof), actions toward others, and attitudes about cannibalism.

Out of the forty-eight who lived through the brutal winter in the Sierras, Keseberg, a German emigrant, figures as the most vilified member of the Donner Party. The last to be rescued in April 1847, he endured almost six months in the mountains, the final month or so entirely on his own. He survived largely by consuming the bodies of his deceased companions. In *Eldorado; or, Adventures in the Path of Empire* (1850), Bayard Taylor gives his account of Keseberg:

He was of a stout, large frame, with an exceedingly coarse, sensual expression of countenance, and even had I not heard his revolting history, I should have marked his as a wholly animal face. It remains in my memory now like that of an ogre . . . One of those [rescuers] who went out to the Camp of Death, after the snows were melted, described to me the horrid circumstances under which they found him—seated, like a ghoul, in the midst of dead bodies, with his face and hands
smeared with blood, and a kettle of human flesh boiling over the fire.

He had become a creature too foul and devilish for this earth . . . (170)

As we will see, Taylor’s account serves as only one of many in nineteenth-century print culture; the narratives usually emphasize, among other things, Keseberg’s “ogre” nature, his devolution from human to savage monster.

For the average “native” American (meaning born in America) in the 1840s, Keseberg is automatically Other because he is an immigrant. Though writers of the Donner Party experience usually do not focus on Keseberg as a German emigrant, one cannot help but wonder if his marking of foreigner did not contribute to his vilification. More explicitly, Donner Party members and their chroniclers deemed him a monstrous “ogre” because of his putative actions and attitudes. Unlike Eddy and the rest, Keseberg apparently murdered companions and enjoyed the taste of human flesh, even long after the winter ordeal ended—or so the rumors had it. As Thornton writes:

I would without hesitancy express the opinion that Kiesburg [sic] was at the time insane, had he not, long after his subsequent arrival in the settlements of California, shown himself to be a wild beast, by declaring with a profane expletive, that ‘A man is a fool who prefers poor California beef to human flesh’ . . . this man is perhaps without a parallel in history. (OC 225)
For Thornton, Keseberg’s culinary preferences mark his fall from humanity; they place him beyond the scope of historical and cultural comparison. In *Sights in the Gold Region, and Scenes on the Way* (1849), Theodore T. Johnson also mentions Keseberg’s supposed palate for human flesh: “It is said that the taste which Keysburg [sic] then acquired has not left him, and that he often declares with evident gusto, ‘I would like to eat a piece of you’; and several have sworn to shoot him, if he ventures such fond declarations to them” (136-137, emphasis in original). No one, then or now, has definitively proven whether Keseberg did kill others to survive, and no charges were ever formally brought against him. He did, however, freely admit to eating humans. Later, some whispered—probably untruthfully—that he opened a restaurant in Sacramento called the “Cannibal Tent” (McDougall, qtd. in Johnson, “Unfortunate” 179). This mixture of rumors, facts, lies, and exaggerations circulated orally and in print for years after that winter, and Keseberg became an iconic figure perhaps only matched later by Alfred Packer. He represented, in many ways, the sensationalized face of the Donner Party in the popular nineteenth-century imagination.

In turn, most narratives about the Donner Party portray Keseberg as a frightening figure, one who threatens to overtake the textual space. He operates as an extremely aggressive individual. Thornton presents himself as truly repulsed by Keseberg, but his text also participates in the print culture
that simultaneously immortalized Keseberg. To offset his own repulsion, 
Thornton interjects his vision of compassionate manhood—one structured 
upon compassion—through William Eddy’s persona.

In *Oregon and California*, Thornton documents the “plot” of the Donner 
Party incident itself. In April 1846, George Donner and James Reed left 
Springfield, Illinois with their families to set out on the Overland Trail. Near 
the end of June, they arrived at Fort Laramie, Wyoming, having faced little 
difficulty on their journey. Beyond the Fort lay the Little Sandy River. Here 
the party faced a decision of whether to continue following the more traveled 
and established route to California or take a shortcut promoted by Lansford 
Hastings in his popular *The Emigrants’ Guide to Oregon and California* (1845). 
The shortcut, promising “a very good, and much more direct wagon way,” 
snaked through Wyoming, cut south into Utah, and finally reconnected with 
the main California trail (Hastings 137). A number of families and parties 
chose the main route, but others, including the Donners and Reeds, opted for 
the Hastings cutoff. Thus 87 people, who would be known as the Donner-Reed Party, set out on July 31. But the shortcut proved to be a grave mistake, 
as it put them far behind schedule. It was not until late August that they 
reached the Great Salt Lake Valley.

In late October, the party—now fewer due to deaths along the way— 
arrived in present day Reno, staying almost a week before attempting to
journey across the mountains to California. When they left, they split into three separate groups. Early snow began to fall in late October and continued until mid-November. The first two parties arrived at Truckee Lake on October 31. Here, they attempted to continue over the mountains, but the heavy snow forced a return to the lake where they set up shelter. The last party, comprised of the Donner family, also pitched camp at Alder Creek, about five miles from the lake camps. The parties tried to cross the pass three different times, but in each instance the majority of people had to turn back. Volunteers in the San Francisco area also repeatedly attempted rescue missions and were prohibited by the record-breaking snowfall. Ultimately the three parties remained at Truckee Lake and Alder Creek most of the winter. In early February the first rescue mission arrived. Two more followed in late February and early March. The final group of rescuers made it in mid-April and found only Keseberg still alive. In total, 48 of the original 87 members survived (Hardesty 9-18; McLynn 306-309; Stewart 23-60). Soon after Keseberg’s rescue, the sensational written accounts began appearing.

As a western regionalist and amateur historian, Thornton is unknown to scholars of literary studies. His account spreads across two volumes; much of it deals with issues unrelated to the Donner Party, such as the gold rush in California and territorial issues in Oregon. A lengthy section in volume 2 focuses on the 1846-1847 incident, and it is to this that I will limit my
discussion. Thornton, who Frank McLynn calls “quite firmly a member of the elite,” was a Missouri lawyer educated in London (284). He and his wife traveled with members of the Donner Party from May until June 1846, at which point some of the wagons bound for Oregon, including Thornton’s, separated from the others heading to California. In 1847, on his way to petition Oregon’s territorial status to Congress, Thornton stopped in San Francisco. There, he visited survivors of the Donner Party, who asked him to publish their own factual testimonies, as the press had run rampant with inaccurate accounts. Thornton agreed, and in 1849, Harper and Brothers published his own Overland Trail narrative along with the emigrants’ stories in *Oregon and California in 1848*.

In the end, Thornton relied heavily on William Eddy’s story, thus Eddy often appears as the “protagonist” of the narrative (Johnson, “*Unfortunate*” 6-8). Historians have pointed out that Thornton’s limited sources, lack of research and time, and concern with sensational and sentimental depictions resulted in a sometimes very unreliable account. My main concern, however, is not so much with accuracy—for there are far more credible historical sources than Thornton—but with how he textually constructs Eddy.

Unlike Lippard and Twain, Thornton never sees racial diversity performing a part in his masculine interlude. Though he does not explicitly
state it, the reason for his privileging of Eddy’s whiteness stems from the fact that race too closely mirrors the cannibal, racial Other, whose apparent lust for human flesh revealed, to the white mind, an undeveloped moral conscience. The cannibal Other was a staple of U.S. print culture in the 1830s and 1840s. Among many other antebellum texts, Herman Melville’s *Typee* (1846) provided readers with an exciting account of the author’s adventures among cannibals in the South Seas; though he makes friends with the natives, Melville’s persona eventually escapes for fear of being eaten (and tattooed).

Cannibals were also frequent subjects in the newspapers of the period. For one example, an 1835 article in *The Floridian* recounts the narrative of an English sea captain, who, after the wreck of his ship, found himself and his crew at the hands of “monsters,” the unnamed New Zealand tribes:

We were now reduced from 28 to 14 in number, many being killed as we fought, and those who were wounded having been obliged to remain behind, were soon despatched [sic] by the savages, & cut up in small portions convenient for cooking, and their devilish [sic] appetites, for they consider it a luxury to feast on their enemies. Later, referencing a different tribe, he states, “They kept thrusting their tomahawks, &c, in our faces, and with the most abominable threats and gestures said they would eat ‘our hearts,’ &c” (“Cannibalism,” col. A). In another instance, an 1843 article in *The North American and Daily Advertiser*
quoted Captain Sir Edward Belcher, who contends, “‘Cannibalism to a frightful degree still prevails amongst this people [Fijians], almost as one of their highest enjoyments’” (“Cannibalism” col. F). And finally, an anonymous writer of an 1849 article in the Arkansas State Democrat gossips, “We are told by travelers that the Feegee Islanders indulge in the delectable practice of broiling and eating human bodies, and they train their children to the taste by rubbing the flesh over the infant lips . . . a slice of humanity is better than any other kind of food” (“Cannibalism in Feejee,” col. C). One could not very easily read about cannibalism in the 1830s and 1840s without connecting it to race, savagery, and Otherness. Keeping racial mixture out of Eddy’s white persona not only allows Thornton to reduce the risk of drawing parallels to the cannibal Other, but also to further emphasize Eddy’s superior moral development—a trait lacking in racial Others and, more immediately, in Keseberg.

Historians, anthropologists, archaeologists, and scholars of anthropophagy have all studied the Donner Party, but literary critics have yet to develop a body of scholarship on the often popular and obscure texts written about the event and its participants. I hope with this chapter to open up new avenues of inquiry into texts usually neglected by literary scholars. An analysis of how a little-known historian negotiates masculinities and monstrosities allows us to see that white male nineteenth-century American
authors articulated their anxieties in very similar ways—despite differences in geography, literary and cultural prestige, class brackets, and age. From this perspective, Thornton is very much a bedfellow with Lippard, Twain, and Crane.

In this chapter, I move beyond seeing Eddy as a simple sign for a culture and manhood in crisis. Instead, I argue that Thornton inscribes him as a compassionate, manly alternative that plays out differently between the larger acts of Keseberg’s survivalist manhood. Thornton emphasizes Eddy’s virtuous qualities—namely leadership, selflessness, good works, sympathy, compassion, emotion, and restraint (when it comes to consuming dead bodies). Yet the masculine interludes prove temporary, as the narrative nearly reaffirms Keseberg’s version of manhood amid the casting out of Eddy. Oregon and California in 1848 documents Thornton’s anxieties about manhood’s devolution on the snowy western frontier but, more importantly, also offers brief glimpses of a kinder, gentler alternative.

Keseberg and Eddy: Survivalist Manhood and Masculine Interludes

Thornton’s fear of Keseberg can always be felt in the entire Donner Party section, even when Keseberg himself does not play an active role. He appears much less than Eddy, and usually the two men do not inhabit the same textual scenes. But Keseberg’s masculine meanings always linger within the narrative space. In one scene, Thornton writes that Keseberg:
. . . took a child of Mr. [William] Foster’s, aged about four years, and
devoured it before morning. What adds, if possible, to the horror of
this horrible meal, is the fact that the child was alive when taken to
bed; leading to the suspicion that he strangled it, though he denies this
charge. This man also devoured Mr. Eddy’s child, before noon on the
next day, and was among the first to communicate the facts to him.

(OC 224)

Like Lippard’s market men, Keseberg behaves—in Thornton’s view—as a
violent predator, one lustfully stalking children and women. He hunts them
down and dismembers them in order to satiate his carnal preferences for
human flesh. He aggressively competes with others in the “marketplace” to
survive. He is anti-paternity and anti-compassion; he destroys life and
families. Amid these bestial signifiers, Thornton offers a kinder option in
William Eddy.

Toward the beginning, Thornton inscribes Eddy’s virtuous actions and
emotional responses as he depicts Eddy, his wife Eleanor, and their young
son and infant painstakingly treading across the desert between the
Humboldt Sink in Nevada and the Truckee River in California. Thornton
states:

The Indians were upon the adjacent hills, looking down upon them,
and absolutely laughing at their calamity . . . Dejected and sullen, he
. . . took up his boy in his arms while his afflicted Eleanor carried their still more helpless infant, and in this most miserable and forlorn plight, they set out once more on foot to make their way through the pitiless wilderness. Trackless, snowclad mountains intercepted their progress, and seemed to present an impassable barrier to all human succor . . . Nature disputed their passage, and Heaven seemed to be offended . . . They struggled on, however, with their precious charge, without food or water, until . . . the 14th [of October], when they arrived at a spring . . . Having obtained some coffee from Mrs. [Tamsen] Donner, Mr. Eddy put it into a pot, and thus boiled it in the spring for the nourishment of his wife and children, refusing to partake of it himself. He told me that he should never forget the inexpressible emotions he felt on seeing them thus revive . . . (OC 117-118).

Thornton invokes the religious iconography of the New England Puritan on an errand into the howling American wilderness, the human and natural threats around them intentionally orchestrated by a wrathful, angry God. His rhetoric recalls the colonial spiritual narratives of William Bradford, Cotton Mather, and Mary Rowlandson. The linking of these archetypes (the spiritual test, the wilderness, the lurking evil, the angry God) with the more secular focus on Eddy as the caring husband helps elevate him to another realm of mythic, American manhood—one that works differently to Jacksonian
aggression and self-sufficiency as it privileges others over the self. The references to water prelude the release of Eddy’s own “inexpressible emotions,” his own ability to sympathize with and cry for others—like Devil-Bug or Angelo—rather than murder and eat them. Before they even find themselves trapped in the mountains, Thornton situates his first masculine interlude within the text; Eddy performs compassionately (and thus differently) from the upcoming scenes of the fearful Keseberg.

Eddy’s compassion emerges more frequently once the party becomes stranded. He volunteers to travel with the “Forlorn Hope,” one of the three expeditions that tried to escape. In another scene, Thornton depicts Eleanor and the children remaining behind in the camps, and Eddy saying good-bye to them. He writes, “The hollow cheek, the wasted form, and the deep sunken eye of his wife, Mr. Eddy told me he should never forget. ‘Oh,’ said he, ‘the bitter anguish of my wrung and agonized spirit, when I turned away from her, and yet no tear would flow to relieve my suffering’” (OC 129). Here, tears fail Eddy, but what he temporarily lacks in physical emotion he makes up for in sentimental rhetoric. The elevated language again insists on Eddy’s capacity for emotionally identifying with others.

As with Devil-Bug and, to a lesser degree, Twain’s twins, the man’s emotion—in true middle-class fashion—leads to empathetic response and action. When the expedition grows exhausted, “and all laid down to die,”
Eddy actively operates outside himself, as “the picture of his wife and children, perishing among the terrible snows of the Sierra Nevada, filled the spirit of Mr. Eddy with unspeakable anguish, and he resolved to get to where relief for them could be obtained, or to perish by the way” (OC 153). And later, pushed to the brink of emotional despair, he still sets his personal grief aside to service his companions: “Mr. Eddy had heard that his wife and one of his children had perished, but . . . in any event he felt it to be a duty which he owed to suffering humanity, to do all in his power to rescue others” (217-218). In key moments, Eddy’s sympathetic identification structures him as the antithesis to all Keseberg represents.

Survivalist manhood—the type I see Thornton and others inscribing—is fashioned, in part, from market values. More specifically, it hinges upon actual Jacksonian ethics of rugged self-sufficiency. But the textual representations also show Keseberg taking these modes of masculine identity to the utmost extreme, far beyond the pale, through his acts of cannibalism, which raise anxieties about selfhood and Otherness.9 Keseberg adds the ultimate new threat to the mix, one that Lippard and Twain probably never imagined. Keseberg works as an extreme version of the Jacksonian, solitary male. As I noted in the introduction, the ideology of Jacksonian rugged male individualism was already deeply ingrained within American middle-class
culture in the 1840s. Keseberg exhibits the overall self-interest that Lippard, Twain, and now Thornton find distasteful.

We can consider literature about the Donner Party to be what SueEllen Campbell calls “wilderness narratives,” where the authors or their characters “leave ‘civilization’ to immerse themselves in the ‘wilderness’” (1). In popular and literary culture, the independent, rugged male means Jackson, of course, but also Hawkeye in Last of the Mohicans (1826), Parkman’s persona in The Oregon Trail (1847), Daniel Boone, and Davy Crockett. At the same time, Keseberg’s murderous, cannibalistic actions and aggressive attitudes move him far beyond these figures; he achieves selfhood in ways most men, fictional or real, do not. But the parallels to frontier manliness in literary print culture and Donner Party narratives cannot be ignored. Keseberg represents extreme ruggedness as he dominates over others through murder, and he masters the natural elements to emerge as the final survivor. The death of others is the intensification of the competition model of market ideology. Instead of the business or political world, Keseberg performs his hardened manhood in the mountains. Through their exaggerated depictions of Keseberg, Thornton and the other authors simultaneously write into these integral values of white American maleness, even as they nervously react to Keseberg’s extreme actions.
Though textual depictions of Keseberg partially formulate out of actual cultural discourses about American manhood, the trope of survivalist manhood does not apply to a large body of American middle-class men in the manners that market and reform masculinities do in Lippard and Twain. Rather it works at the “local” level of the Sierra Nevadas and California, but as an emerging formulation of manhood it is by no means any less of an anxiety for Thornton and the other writers.

In contrast to Eddy, narratives about Keseberg inscribe him as a monster; they present him satiating his own terrible lusts. His carnivorous actions and heartless attitudes result in a turning back inward toward himself rather than sympathetically outward toward others. But at the same time, these narratives fashion Keseberg as still straddling the borders of manhood. Like other authors, Thornton provides sensationalist stories about the rescuers finding Keseberg. He reprints an account of William Fallon, one of the men who participated in the final rescue party. Fallon describes how three other men in the party discover Keseberg:

. . . upon entering [the cabin], [they] discovered Kiesburg [sic] lying down amidst the human bones, and beside him a large pan full of fresh liver and lights [lungs]. They asked him what had become of his companions . . . He answered them by stating that they were all dead
. . . He ate her [Tamsen Donner’s] body, and found her flesh the best he ever tasted. He further stated, that he obtained from her body at least four pounds of fat . . . In the cabin with Kiesburg were found two kettles of human blood. [John] Rhodes asked him where he had got the blood. He answered, ‘There is blood in dead bodies.’ (OC 234-235)

Thornton, through Fallon, portrays Keseberg in three ways. First, he fashions him as driven by market competition. Human bodies turn into hoarded commodities in the effort to dominate (and survive) the wilderness arena. Secondly, Keseberg represents a sexual threat. Eddy operates as the manly savior to females—his wife and daughter—and Keseberg as their hypersexualized terror. He dismembers women in the same manner as Ravoni. And third, he acts as a monster. Thornton and Fallon mark him as falling from respectable manhood and humanity by his love for human flesh. Yet they simultaneously inscribe a new, hybrid masculinity, a new self that combines the beast and the man. These three modes of portrayal all indicate that Keseberg’s actions do not radiate outward, as do Eddy’s, but enfold back upon himself. They eliminate instead of uplift others in the process.

Thornton continues to relay Fallon’s narrative:

. . . We asked Kiesburg why he did not use the meat of the bullock and horse instead of human flesh. He replied, he had not seen them. We
then told him we knew better, and asked him why the meat in the chair had not been consumed. He said, ‘Oh, it’s too dry eating! the liver the lights were a great deal better, and the brains made good soup!’ (OC 238)

The focus here is on Keseberg’s attitude about cannibalism, particularly his excitement over “liver,” “lights,” and “brains” instead of the culturally-acceptable “bullock” and “horse” meat. Keseberg embodies a fearful version of manhood; he threatens Thornton, Fallon, and the other rescuers’ white middle-class formulations of proper conduct.

The media also enjoyed reporting stories about Keseberg. Another account similar to Bayard Taylor’s appeared years later in the March 25, 1864 edition of the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin. The anonymous writer states:

He was found reclining on the floor of his cabin smoking a pipe. Near his head a fire was blazing, and in the fire rested a camp-kettle half filled with human flesh. Near him stood a bucket partly filled with blood, and pieces of flesh, fresh and bloody, were strewn around. The scene realized the fabulous horror of an ogre’s cave, and the appearance of the inmate filled out the terrible picture. His beard was of great length, his finger nails grown to resemble claws. In aspect he was
ragged to an indecent degree, and filthy and ferocious as a wild beast.

(“The ‘Donner Case,’” 5, col. B, emphasis mine)

This writer’s concentration on the “ogre’s cave” aids in explaining both Keseberg’s physical surroundings and his inner deformities. As I mentioned in chapter one, Lippard served as a precursor to later scientific and medical discourses that linked the physical exterior of “degenerates” to their inner lack of morality and development. The above writer does the same. Of course, the focus on Keseberg as “ferocious,” with “claws . . . as a wild beast” shows not only how he has fallen into degeneracy, but also how far he has fallen from humanity. Yet at the same time, his human, particularly male identifiers, such as his “comrades,” his “smoking a pipe,” and his “beard,” indicate the emergence of a pre-Naturalist form of animalistic manhood. And this paradox of animal and man parallels the oxymoron inherent in this and all writers’ representations of Keseberg: the “fabulous horror.” He is both a white anxiety and a “horror,” and yet a “fabulous” masculine figure whose actions and legacies play out across the pages of countless narratives.

One manner in which Thornton offers another masculine option is in Eddy’s attitude toward cannibalism. The emigrants for some time sustained themselves through eating game, livestock, leather hides—even their boots, moccasins, and shoelaces. However, in late December they ran out of all viable options for food. In the meantime, some died due to starvation or
hypothermia. The same fate befell a few of those in the “Forlorn Hope” party. Amid the scenes of cannibalism, Thornton presents an interlude. He writes, "The horrible expedient of eating human flesh was now . . . proposed. This Mr. Eddy declined doing, but his miserable companions cut the flesh from the arms and legs of Patrick Dolan, and roasted and ate it, averting their faces from each other . . .” (OC 136). Here Thornton emphasizes Eddy’s moral principles. These traits ideologically contrast him against the other men who consume humans, albeit without Keseberg’s supposed relish. Eddy’s attitude, or more accurately, his lack of cannibalistic actions aids Thornton in his inscription of a different man.

But there comes a time when even Eddy has to acquiesce. Thornton goes on:

His companions told him that he was dying . . . Although he felt no hunger, his body imperiously demanded nourishment. Such were the circumstances under which he made his first cannibal meal . . . He experienced no loathing or disgust, but his reason, which he thought was never more unclouded, told him that it was a horrible repast. The hard hand of necessity was upon him, and he was compelled to eat or die. (OC 138)

Despite Eddy’s cannibalism, Thornton still presents him as ultimately centered by “reason” and moral principles. If a man must consume human
flesh, then his act needs proper framing by “reason,” restraint, and an explicit reminder that it is indeed “a horrible repast.” Eddy and his rational cannibalism momentarily perform against Keseberg and his uncontrollable gluttony. Thornton’s prose in this scene—brief, rational, matter-of-fact—also helps frame Eddy’s controlled act of cannibalism. The writing here works in marked contrast to the excessive sensationalism that often characterizes his and others’ textual representations of Keseberg. Even though in reality Eddy lingers very near Keseberg in terms of monstrous subject positions, Thornton still inscribes him as a different option to survivalist manhood.

Overall, however, Thornton prefers not to spend time discussing Eddy’s cannibalism, but instead his benevolent actions. Two examples of this occur in interludes dealing with Indians. Lewis and Salvador, possibly Ochehamne and Consumne Miwoks, guided the “Forlorn Hope.” They had been sent in October with animals and other provisions from Sutter’s Fort before the major snows began falling.10 One night, as the party encamped, a starving member suggested that they kill the Indians for food. Thornton states, “Mr. Eddy remonstrated, but finding that the deed was resolved upon, he determined to prevent it by whatever means God and nature might enable him to use . . . he secretly informed Lewis of the fate that awaited him and his companion, and concluded by advising him to fly” (OC 139). Eddy’s sympathy for Lewis and Salvador presents a much kinder option for manly
behavior. Thornton then inscribes Eddy’s attitude toward the thought of killing the Indians: “. . . the thing proposed, he [Eddy] could not but regard with feeling of abhorrence. His very soul recoiled at the thought” (140).

Heeding Eddy’s advice, Lewis and Salvadore abandon the others immediately. While Thornton’s vision of compassionate manhood does not itself hinge upon racial diversity, it still advocates for Others.

Later, the party finds Lewis and Salvador lying in the snow, nearly dead of starvation and hypothermia. One of the men again suggests that they shoot them for food. And Eddy again objects. Thornton adds, “Mr. Eddy was conscious of doing right” (OC 149). He goes on: “They could not, probably, have lived more than two or three hours; nevertheless, Eddy remonstrated against their being killed” (150). Eddy stands in Lewis and Salvador’s defense; his compassion toward others presents a different code of masculine behavior. This interlude plays out within the scenes that illustrate the unsympathetic actions of the other men and Keseberg. Ultimately, however, the starving party ignores Eddy’s pleas and shoots the Indians—and thus compassion fades away. But the two interludes prior to their killing momentarily signal a kinder alternative for manly behavior.

In another scene, Eddy again performs as the emotional figure—but now one capable of shedding tears. He and Mary Graves, a fellow Donner Party member, leave the “Forlorn Hope” to go hunting. After traveling some
distance, they find a spot in the snow where they believe a deer had slept the night before. Upon this discovery, Thornton states, “In an instant a feeling took possession of his [Eddy’s] heart to which it had been a stranger. He knew not what were all the elements of his emotions; but gratitude to God, and a hope in his providence were at least two. Tears immediately began to flow down his haggard cheeks” (OC 142). Eddy’s tears in part flow for himself, but they also fall over the possibility that Graves, the “Forlorn Hope,” and the rest of the Donner Party will, due to God’s grace, even momentarily thwart starvation. As with Devil-Bug, Eddy’s weeping indicates an outwardness, a sympathy for others, rather than Keseberg’s sole concern for himself.

Eddy also performs sympathy in one of the narrative’s most graphic scenes. Thornton describes the horror of “Starved Camp,” the main Truckee Lake site, in winter 1847. He writes:

They [Patrick and Margaret Breen] had consumed the two children of Jacob Donner. Mrs. [Elizabeth] Graves’ body was lying there with almost all the flesh cut away from her arms and limbs. Her breasts were cut off, and her heart, and liver taken out, and all were being boiled in a pot then by the fire. Her little child, about thirteen months old, sat at her side, with one arm upon the body of its mangled mother sobbing bitterly, cried, Ma! ma! ma! It was a helpless and innocent
lamb among the wolves of the wilderness. Mr. Eddy took up its wasted form in his arms, and touched even to tears with the sight he witnessed, kissed its wan cheeks again and again; and wept even more bitterly . . . The child looked up imploringly into his face, and with a silent but expressive eloquence, besought him to be its protector. In a few minutes it nestled in his bosom, and seemed to feel assured that it once more had a friend. As soon as possible, he made some thin soup for the infant, which revived it, and, with the exception of an occasional short convulsive sob or sigh, it again appeared quiet and happy. (OC 220-221)

Kristin Johnson, among other historians, argues that this “scene reported by Thornton is suspect” (“Unfortunate” 104). Regardless of whether or not the events occurred in the sensational manner that Eddy and Thornton depict them, this moment provides the perfect, if not conflicted, opportunity for situating another masculine interlude within the narrative.

Here Thornton inscribes a scene that recalls similar depictions in nineteenth-century paintings and in early national fiction such as Cooper’s *The Last of the Mohicans* and Catherine Maria Sedgwick’s *Hope Leslie* (1827): the infant scalped, or dashed against a tree, before its distraught mother. But this time it is women, not children, who are “scalped”—and it is whites, not Indians, who act as savages. Amid the horror that surrounds the campsite,
Thornton infuses Eddy as the sentimental, paternal protector. His emotional identification, and thus lifting of the child away from horror, marks the rise of a kinder masculinity. At the same time, Eddy enfolds the child to his “bosom,” not his manly chest; he figuratively nurses the baby in the absence of her mother’s breasts. Thornton essentially maternalizes Eddy, and underlying this masculine interlude is the simultaneous anxiety about effeminacy that we also witness in Lippard and Twain.

Despite this momentary, gendered wavering, Eddy’s emotional responses, directed toward others, move outward to counteract the brutal self-interest of survivalist manhood. And to seal the passage, Thornton shows Eddy once again performing selfless actions as he prepares soup for the infant (though Thornton remains silent about the ingredients). In this interlude, the child’s receptiveness to Eddy as nurturer essentially restages an ordered family dynamic, one where reciprocal affection evoke difference from the before and after scenes of masculine aggression that dominates the narrative.

Eddy and Keseberg come together in the scene where Keseberg reportedly consumes Eddy’s child. “Such was the horrible and emaciated appearance of this man [Keseberg],” Thornton writes, “that Mr. Eddy, as he informed me, could not shed his blood there; but resolved to kill him upon his landing at San Francisco, if he ever came to the place” (OC 224-225).
Competing tropes of paternity fight for attention, as they did in the scenes of Devil-Bug, Reverend Pyne, and Ravoni. Eddy at first appears, like Devil-Bug, as the protective father; Keseberg surpasses the threatening Pyne and Ravoni as he penetrates, dismembers, and consumes innocent offspring. Thornton shows Eddy planning violence, even as he kindly decides to kill Keseberg after he regains health and holds a fighting chance.

Lippard, as I argued, justifies Devil-Bug’s occasional lapses into violence, for they are conducted out of love for Ellen and Dora, his family. The same applies here with Thornton. Though we need to remember that the core values of compassionate manhood are slippery and capable at times of overlapping with the dominant, the larger issue is what ideological ends these borrowed values serve. In this case, Eddy’s plan to murder Keseberg for the subsequent killing of his child underscores a different ideological, and even redemptive, form of violence than Keseberg simply murdering to satisfy his own gratuitous needs. For Thornton, even Eddy’s plan to murder hinges upon service to others, in this case, his dead child. In other words, murder can at times result in idealized tropes of masculinity.

Keseberg and the Conclusion of Masculine Interludes

Despite Thornton’s constant idealizing of Eddy, however, he essentially casts him from his narrative. In other words, he ceases his series of masculine interludes. In the final paragraph of his section on the Donner
Party, Thornton revisits the scene I discussed earlier in which Eddy first resorts to cannibalism. He summarizes the general characteristics of starvation, and states:

Such was the condition, both mental, and physical, into which Mr. Eddy felt himself sinking, at the time of his making his first meal of human flesh. He had ceased to experience the sensation of hunger . . . But he felt a general prostration of body and mind, and a heaviness and lethargy almost imperceptible stealing upon him. Those who were with him, told him that he was dying. This, however, he did not believe, but he, nevertheless, had witnessed enough to convince him that these were primary symptoms, which, if he did not resist them, would certainly terminate in his death in a few hours. He reasoned clearly concerning his condition, and he knew perfectly well that nothing but courage could rescue him from that state of stupor and mental imbecility into which he was falling. (OC 245-246)

Unlike Lippard and Twain, Thornton’s “killing” of Eddy does not occur literally; rather, the passage depicts the hallucinatory effects that come with starvation. But this scene also metaphorically shows Eddy falling into insubstantiality—in other words, textually concluding. Thornton’s rhetoric—the verbs “sinking,” “ceased,” “prostration,” “dying,” “terminate,” “falling,” and his prime noun “death”—helps close down the masculine interlude and
thus Eddy’s narrative performance. As I mentioned earlier, Eddy did survive the winter, and lived until 1859. But within the narrative, there appears to be no lasting textual place for him.

As we have seen, Thornton clearly applauds Eddy’s compassionate version of manhood throughout his section on the Donner Party. Yet there seems unspoken reasons why he textually cannot remain. I would argue that Eddy’s kinder actions—which, for Thornton, tread the boundaries of the feminine—serve as one. Though it seems a stretch to argue that Thornton nearly sides with Keseberg, I would suggest that he does implicitly lean toward some of Keseberg’s ideological values, particularly as they pertain to Jacksonian ruggedness. In the end, Eddy—with his feminized sympathy—does not seem to live up to the truly rugged ethos of American individualist masculinity. The logic of hardy manhood seems especially relevant in the new playground of the Western territories, the newest space for white American men to define themselves.

Keseberg figuratively stands in at the end as Eddy in turn disappears. Like all the authors in this study, Thornton always already works from the center even as he reacts to the center’s aggressive program for manhood. The passage I quoted earlier about Keseberg’s possible insanity and his arrival in the California settlements *rhetorically* shows him existing in the after: beyond the interlude and beyond the winter of 1846-1847. Of course this is logical, if
Thornton committed to reporting the incidents as described to him by Eddy. But this commitment to actuality also frames Keseberg as a lasting trope of manhood. Keseberg did reunite with his wife and two children, who were rescued by an earlier relief party. He engaged in a number of failed business ventures after the Donner Party and lived until 1895, much longer than Eddy. Even as Thornton vilifies Keseberg throughout, and explicitly disagrees with his actions, he in the end grants him a “place” both within the narrative and California. If at the beginning Thornton set out to vocally forge Eddy as a compassionate, manly archetype, he in the end quietly achieves the same with Keseberg as the dominant male icon, the extreme embodiment of Western male ruggedness.

Lippard, Twain, and Thornton

In chapter two, I mentioned that Twain’s representations of disfigurement largely spring from visibly-present cultural forms such as freak shows and daguerreotypes, and that Lippard more excessively sketches the monstrous Devil-Bug. Thornton and other Donner Party writers behave similarly to Lippard and Twain when it comes to their textual representations of bodies. One manner in which they are similar to Lippard is in their excessive depictions of Keseberg and the other Donner Party members. These authors appear more fascinated by what their monstrous figures do (cannibalize people) rather than how they look (emaciated). Thornton and
the others work similarly to Twain in the cultural forms available to them. The former wrote for an antebellum culture in which images of cannibalism circulated widely in the popular literature, travel writing, and journalism. But, unlike Twain, they did not allow this abundance of popular forms to lessen their own sensationalist depictions.

There are also similar tactics in Thornton and Lippard when it comes to the sociopolitical realm of corporeal representation. While I argued that Twain’s minimalism helps him resist the logic of the Self and Other binary, I also pointed out that Lippard’s ultimately runs the risk of replicating it. The same applies to Donner Party representations. Though Thornton’s compassionate construction of Eddy undoes certain cultural assumptions about the identities monstrous bodies have historically inhabited, it also reinforces other dichotomies about selfhood and Otherness, “normalcy” and “abnormalcy,” morality and deviance. While Thornton—through his depiction of Eddy—implies a criticism of established ideas about the monstrous or disfigured as deviant, he also restages them in his portrayal of Keseberg, who was physically disabled as well as “monstrous” due to his emaciation and cannibalism. All writers who discussed Keseberg ultimately linked him to such stereotypical cultural beliefs about the disabled Other. As we have seen, he was portrayed as evil, a conniving criminal and murderer, a social deviant, and morally and ethically bereft. With Keseberg alone,
Thornton reestablishes a strict boundary between “normal” and “abnormal” even as he loosens it in other moments.

**Conclusion**

Though survivalist manhood entailed a much smaller, localized trope than did market and reform masculinities, I want to repeat that it elicited equal anxiety for Thornton as the other emerging forms did for Lippard and Twain. In the wilderness space that *Oregon and California in 1848* constructs, Thornton responds to a frightening form of manhood, one that threatens to dismantle what it means to be a white, civilized man. Thus he promotes a compassionate masculine alternative in William Eddy, even as Eddy cannot seem to remain by the conclusion. But most importantly, Eddy’s many masculine performances in interludes throughout *Oregon and California in 1848* prevent the ending from completely defining the entire text as a monologic endorsement of survivalist manhood. As we move now into chapter four, we will see how Stephen Crane, years later, inscribes compassionate manhood in the wake of eugenics movements and euthanasia debates.
Chapter Four

“‘You would do anything on earth for him’": Masculine Interludes and Eugenic Manhood in Stephen Crane’s The Monster

First published in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine in August 1898, Stephen Crane’s novella The Monster appeared amid scientific, medical, racial, and imperial debates in the U.S. and Europe.¹ The story takes place in Whilomville, New York, a fictional community modeled after Port Jervis, New York, where Crane spent time as a youth. The Monster tells of Henry Johnson, an African-American who is physically disfigured and mentally disabled in a laboratory fire while saving the life of Jimmie Trescott, the young son of his employer, Dr. Trescott. Crane writes, “His [Henry’s] body was frightfully seared, but more than that, he now had no face. His face had simply been burned away” (Great 211). In the same stylistic vein as Twain, and thus without antebellum corporeal excess, Crane directs his readership to
the key, physical emblem of Henry’s identity—his face, or rather, his lack of one.

Henry’s disfigurement, as critics have duly noted, becomes a metaphor for various white social anxieties about black mobility, racial amalgamation, and black degeneration in the post-Reconstruction U.S. The narrative also presents a broader look into how late-nineteenth-century American citizens, both black and white, react to physical deformities. Crane’s fictional townspeople interpret Henry’s disfigurement as social deviance. As in much of Crane’s work, a tension emerges between the individual and the collective. But one figure resists the group mentality. Indebted to him for saving Jimmie’s life, Dr. Trescott cares for Henry against the wishes of the town’s prominent white male members. As the story progresses, Whilomville’s members grow increasingly terrified of Henry due to his physical appearance; despite his harmlessness, they read him as a threatening “monster.” By the end, the community completely ostracizes him as well as Dr. Trescott and his family.

This final chapter examines how Crane inscribes compassionate manhood in an age of racial and biological improvement. While Henry’s act of saving Jimmie undoubtedly qualifies him as a selfless hero, Crane can never fully write beyond the late-century racial discourses that deny Henry this designation. In other words, because of his black skin color, it seems that
Henry cannot serve as the representation of compassionate manhood. But Crane uses Dr. Trescott, Henry’s caregiver, as his masculine alternative to the town’s affluent white men, who embody what I call “eugenic manhood.” Despite what appears to be his complicity in dominant racial thought, Crane, through Trescott’s masculine interludes, simultaneously works against other supremacist discourses emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely eugenics and euthanasia debates. These debates reflect men who operate on aggressive principles of racial superiority. Through Dr. Trescott, Crane offers a compassionate alternative to eugenic manhood’s destructive logic.

At the outset, let me clarify what I mean by euthanasia. I am unconcerned with its “right to die” sense, an issue that began in the 1860s, reemerged in the early twentieth century and again received wide-scale media attention in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, I am interested in forced, or involuntary euthanasia, and its relation to eugenics. By forced or involuntary, I mean the act of euthanizing a subject against her/his will for the purposes of ethnic and racial cleansing. Although Crane published the novella before euthanasia practices became wide scale in the early twentieth century, it appeared at the moment when euthanasia discussions began to shift from a doctor or patient’s own right to end a suffering life instead to eliminating non-white, disabled and other “unfit,” “feebleminded” members
of society (Appel 629-630; Cheyfitz 12). I should also point out that no character literally euthanizes another character in *The Monster*. Instead, the topic of euthanasia works more subtly: as a rhetorical construct that structures normal conversation among a wide variety of white men. This rhetoric parallels the late-nineteenth-century European and American discussions about forcefully yet humanely eliminating “defectives.” Crane sees eugenic manhood’s conversations (about possible actions) as troublesome, and the rhetoric of *The Monster* clearly anticipates the twentieth century’s ethnic cleansing tactics.

Voluntary euthanasia debates came to a head in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, eventually giving way to instances of involuntary euthanasia. The rhetoric of euthanizing “defectives,” the disfigured and disabled, the insane, the lower classes, and various races had its origins in the years following the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871). Additionally, Francis Galton’s *Hereditary Genius* (1869) set the stage for what would eventually be known as the field of eugenics. Galton, Darwin’s cousin, demanded that the superior, Anglo-Saxon races multiply before, as Peter Quinn puts it, “they were overwhelmed by the prolific mating habits of the pauper classes” (2). “It may seem monstrous,” Galton states, “that the weak should be crowded out by the strong, but it is still more monstrous that the races best fitted to play their
part on the stage of life should be crowded out by the incompetent, the ailing, and the desponding” (321). His work had its critics, but would also later influence men such as Theodore Roosevelt and Adolph Hitler.

Galton’s theories spoke to late-nineteenth-century cultural anxieties about human degeneration. Along with these worries came simultaneous interest in racial improvement. As immigrants flooded the U.S. in the 1890s, further fears arose over the purity of bodies inhabiting American soil. Eugenics developed as a “hegemonic formula” out of a variety of Victorian ideologies: the need of institutions to hide the “feebleminded” from public view, the rise of social Darwinism, the passing of strict immigration laws regarding citizens with “deviant” bodies, the increased rise of industrialism and its demand for labor efficiency, and the professionalization of medicine (Snyder and Mitchell, Cultural Locations 73). By the end of the nineteenth century, many in the United States were obsessed with the idea of “better breeding” and white racial degeneration, the latter a supposed consequence of interracial marriage. Thus calls emerged for the elimination of those “defectives” responsible for both the downfall of society and the contamination of white bloodlines.5

Proposals to actually end the lives of the “feebleminded” and “defectives,” with some exceptions, largely remained as rhetoric in the United States. Eugenicists instead often performed another type of cultural
euthanasia by institutionalizing “defectives” and hiding them from public view (Snyder and Mitchell, Cultural Locations 80; Garland-Thomson, “Cultural Logic” 791). However, in Nazi Germany, an estimated 100,000 disabled, retarded, insane, alcoholic, and gay and lesbian people would be exterminated between 1939 and 1941 (Cheyfitz 8). In the twentieth century, the fusion of eugenics and euthanasia saw its most terrible manifestation.

*The Monster* has a long critical history. Well into the 1990s and even the first years of the twenty-first century, some scholars ignored its cultural and historical tensions and continued to focus upon its “symbolic unity” and other motifs informed by New Criticism. In addition to this curious persistence of ahistorical readings, scholars such as Lee Clark Mitchell, Price McMurray, Bill Brown, William M. Morgan, John Cleman, and Molly Hiro, among others, discuss the novella in light of the post-Gilded Age’s politics of racism, racial degeneration, lynching, imperialism, and social science. Furthermore, in the last ten years, a small but growing trend has been for scholars to move beyond New Critical readings and race issues to focus on representations of masculinity in *The Monster*. But critics have yet to discuss manhood, monstrosity, and their intersection with transatlantic euthanasia debates.

I am most in dialogue with William M. Morgan and Price McMurray. In an insightful essay, Morgan discusses Crane’s ambivalence toward the
white, imperial manhood that Theodore Roosevelt came to represent. He argues:

On the one hand, the displacement of an inward-looking, sentimental, Victorian American cultural order by a more outward-looking and militant formation of United States culture is readily decipherable in the novella. Still, the most profound result of the grotesque effacement of Henry Johnson . . . is to call this cultural reorientation into question. As the character of Dr. Trescott is partially maternalized through his care and sense of responsibility for the maimed patient, Crane’s novella recuperates a nurturing masculine ethos with links to the tropes of a woman’s domesticity. In addition, during the final four years of Crane’s life, he increasingly turned away from a masculinist ethos of self-control, physical virility, and racial conquest and toward one of communal care, intersubjective compassion, and responsibility.

(64)

I agree with Morgan that Crane appears uncomfortable with imperial manhood and its desire for domination. Indeed, we clearly witness moments in the text where the author imagines different possibilities for men other than those based on the cult of manhood’s domineering logic. As in the previous chapters, I am most interested in these moments, these masculine interludes, more so than the ending. Morgan argues that Crane utilizes
Trescott and Henry to largely question imperialism’s ethos of control, even as the text simultaneously participates in the ideologies of the cult of manhood. We can use his thinking about imperial manhood to further expand the conversation, to understand how Crane inscribes another parallel trope during this period: eugenic manhood.

While themselves two very different things, imperial and eugenic manhood do inform each other. Part of the imperial rationale for involvement in Cuba, the Philippines, and Hawaii stemmed from racial degeneration theories about the Others’ collapse into ethical and evolutionary darkness, and thus the need for moral guidance and management by fitter races. These racial degeneration theories worked hand-in-hand with eugenics and euthanasia concerns. An analysis of The Monster as it pertains to eugenics debates and contexts ushers in further considerations, some that Morgan acknowledges and others that he does not address in his focus on imperial manhood.

To a lesser extent, I am at odds with Price McMurray about the historical and cultural relevance of euthanasia itself. McMurray argues that “The ‘old problem’” facing Dr. Trescott and the rest of Whilomville “is less scientific hubris or simple euthanasia than the familiar race question” (par. 10). But “simple euthanasia” very much merged with eugenics, race, racial progress, and imperialism, and thus “the familiar race question” paralleled
discussions of euthanasia. The late nineteenth century, the age of racial improvement, saw no neat division between race and euthanasia, as McMurray seems to suggest. His analysis, however, mostly focuses on debates about black extinction and the politics of segregation, not euthanasia. I depart from McMurray in that I consider euthanasia an important cultural context in the novella and for more narrowly understanding the textual white men Crane constructs in *The Monster*.

This chapter argues that against the rise of eugenic manhood, with its destructive logic (and practices), Dr. Trescott operates as Crane’s ideal alternative. Whereas market, reform, and survivalist masculinities stress individualism and competition among men, eugenic manhood conceives whiteness and able-bodiedness themselves as collective identities, and it endorses competition among races and the “inept,” but also scientific domination over them. Against this emerging version of manhood, Crane fashions his alternative in Dr. Trescott, who embodies, by now, familiar traits: sympathy, compassion, and benevolence.

As I mentioned in the introduction, the authors I examine always inscribe compassionate manhood as *antithetical* to emerging, dominant tropes. This is the case in both the antebellum or postbellum periods, even as compassion, sympathy, and sentimentality were entrenched within dominant middle-class culture in the pre-War years. Even as Lippard and Thornton
fashion texts where these values have disappeared, the 1820s through the 1850s served as the prime years of sentimentality, both as a literary genre and rhetoric and as a sociopolitical instrument. But these authors inscribe textual worlds where aggression is the norm, and thus their figures of compassionate manhood act as alternatives—even if, in reality, they are not.

After the Civil War, however, sentimentality, as a literary convention and sociopolitical discourse, began to wane. Certainly novels adapting sentimental conventions did appear in the years following the Civil War, but with much less frequency than in the antebellum period. While it is completely inaccurate to see the late-century literary genres of realism and Naturalism as simply anti-sentimental, the literary tenets of sympathy and compassion did tend to take a backseat in texts of the Reconstruction and Gilded Age periods. And while it did not completely disappear as a sociopolitical tool, sentimentality—as I will later discuss in this chapter—also took a backseat as evolution, naturalism, and the rise of other social sciences made white sociopolitical views less dependent on an exclusively Protestant, Christian-based model of forgiveness and redemption (where sympathy and sentimentality have their roots in the antebellum period) and more on empirical principles of objectivity and rationality. Whereas Lippard and Thornton saw compassion disappearing in the antebellum period, for Crane and Twain it more realistically was in fact dwindling. Thus Dr. Trescott, like
Angelo, textually and *realistically* operates as a marked alternative to the majority of late-nineteenth-century white men in the novella.

For much of the twentieth century, scholars read Crane ironically, and understood irony as integral to his literary explorations of human nature, heroism, cowardice, freewill, fate, hope, and despair. One following this established mode of inquiry might argue that Crane’s attitude toward racial degeneration and eugenic manhood is not illustrative of how Crane actually thinks and feels, but only ironic. Or, perhaps, that his idealization of Trescott is tongue-and-cheek at best. In this chapter, I join the recent scholarship that attempts to see beyond irony in Crane and finds flashes of literal sincerity—in this case, flashes of literal sympathy and compassion—even if these moments remain fleeting. While we should not completely dismiss the focus of irony, we would do well to continue negotiating these other dimensions of Crane and his writing.

The doctor differs from the other representations of compassionate manhood I have examined in that he is culturally acceptable, the standardized norm: white, male, mid-to-upper class, and able-bodied. In other words, he does not reflect “monstrosity,” physical and ethical, as do the other figures in Lippard, Twain, and Thornton. Yet he cares for a monstrous figure, Henry, who Crane inscribes as both black and physically-disfigured. As Carol E. Henderson points out, black bodies, by historical default, are
always already deformed due to skin color (7). While I believe it
inappropriate to see Henry and Trescott as doubles or twins, I treat Trescott
as an ideological extension of Henry. In a novella where white men fear both
black males and the disabled, Trescott’s sympathetic care for Henry nearly
makes him monstrous, as well, in the eyes of the community. I am indeed not
arguing that Trescott bears any form of “monstrosity,” but I do see him
operating in direct relation to a doubly-marked figure.

I am also well aware that, as a medical doctor, Trescott can easily be
grouped into the category of eugenic manhood. As McMurray points out,
“. . . the role the nineteenth-century medical community played in
establishing and promulgating racist ideology is well documented” (par. 6).
And some physicians served as vocal advocates for the administration of
euthanasia.8 But Crane uses a professionalized medical figure in his
masculine interludes differently amid the emerging euthanasia ethos of
medical communities. Trescott’s compassion sets him apart, in key moments,
from the rest of the narrative’s affluent white men, whose own practical
solutions for Henry encapsulate the cultural logic of euthanasia.9 As Morgan
puts it, “Trescott’s actions thwart this compulsive need of the white
community to purge itself of the unassimilable other” (79).

As always, the masculine interlude of compassion reflects a different
performance within a larger text indicative of dominant manhood, and the
interlude ultimately concludes, again giving way to the larger. By the end of
the novella, Trescott’s social exclusion and Henry’s overall disappearance
indicate that the narrative nearly reaffirms eugenic manhood’s tenets; it
leaves us with the image of Judge Hagenthorpe, one of the town’s chief
advocates for euthanasia. At the same time, the masculine interludes
throughout The Monster prevent the ending (and the novella) from completely
endorsing the dominant logic of euthanasia. The text reveals Crane critiquing
another trope of manhood at the dawn of the twentieth century, and more
importantly offers glimpses of a compassionate, manly alternative.

**Henry Johnson, Dr. Trescott, Masculine Interludes, and Eugenics Manhood**

On one hand, Henry’s heroic act of saving Jimmie from the burning
house serves as the most important moment of selflessness in The Monster.

Out for a night on the town, Henry hears that the Trescott home is afire.
Crane writes, “Many feet pattered swiftly on the stones. There was one man
[Henry] who ran with an almost fabulous speed . . . As Henry reached the
front door, Hannigan had just broken the lock with a kick. A thick cloud of
smoke poured over them, and Henry, ducking his head, rushed into it” (Great
202). On the other hand, before and during the scene of his disfigurement,
Henry buttresses the late-century racial logic that narrates African-Americans
as child-like, racially and morally degenerating, and mindlessly loyal and
obedient to whites: he clearly figures as the antithesis of heroism *and*
compassionate manhood. Likewise, the later scene where Henry peers in a window and frightens a young white girl attending a birthday party expresses the white cultural paranoia about degenerating black men as sexual predators, at the bottom rungs of humanity. In short, Crane faces the dilemma of how to celebrate Henry’s deed in a contemporary cultural moment that denies the possibility of black agency and thus heroism. Rather than work around this dilemma, he instead conforms to the late-century racial ideologies in Henry’s textual depiction.

After his accident, which Bill Brown calls the “metamorphosis from minstrelsy to monstrosity,” we see little of Henry, as Crane largely casts him to the margins of the text (214). At this moment, two important factors arise. First, Henry’s mark of both black and “defective” triggers the rhetoric of eugenic manhood, which plays out in the conversations of the town’s affluent men. Second, we see Dr. Trescott emerge as the compassionate alternative to eugenic manhood’s destructive logic.

Within Trescott’s masculine interludes, Crane promotes paternity, dedication to friends and family (or extensions of family), sympathetic identification, selflessness, compassion, and good works. The doctor also goes against the grain of other realist and naturalist writers’ typical male characters; as Morgan states, “By depicting Trescott as a somewhat feminized alternative to the strenuous man, Crane allows us to question the usual
realist-naturalist trajectory of hyper-masculinity ushered in by [Frank] Norris and [Jack] London” (77). In more ways than one, Crane showcases a different mode of behavior for men living in the moments of Roosevelt, imperialism, and white racial supremacy.

Trescott operates within the larger structure (and narrative showcasing) of Whilomville’s white men. Dominating the novella, and increasingly dominating medical and scientific circles at the end of the nineteenth century, is the subject of involuntary euthanasia—with Whilomville’s white, patrician men as its chief advocates. Judge Hagenthorpe, who opens his residence to the doctor and his family, visits with Trescott as he cares for Henry.12 At dinner, Hagenthorpe tells Trescott, “‘No one wants to advance such ideas, but somehow I think that that poor fellow ought to die’” (Great 213). Trescott “merely sighed and answered ‘Who knows?’”(213). At first, he remains passive, ambivalent in the ideological role he will assume. The judge, who “retreated to the cold manner of the bench,” goes on: “‘. . . I am induced to say that you are performing a questionable charity in preserving this negro’s life. As near as I can understand, he will hereafter be a monster, a perfect monster, and probably with an affected brain. . . . I am afraid, my friend, that it is one of the blunders of virtue’” (213). Crane writes, “The doctor made a weary gesture. ‘He saved my boy’s life’” (213). Here Crane begins situating his masculine
interlude within the larger textual performance of eugenic manhood. The judge replies, “‘Yes, I know!’” (213). Then, “‘And what am I to do?’ said Trescott, his eyes suddenly lighting like an outburst from smouldering peat. ‘What am I to do? He gave himself for—for Jimmie. What am I to do for him?’” (213). With the “outburst” or emergence of Crane’s compassionate manhood comes images of light and references to eyes—a similar motif that we saw with Lippard’s Devil-Bug. This scene ushers in the ideological tensions between compassionate manhood’s dutiful preservation of life and eugenic manhood’s “cold manner” of calling for its extinction.

Although Judge Hagenthorpe claims that “‘No one wants to advance such ideas,’” euthanasia, as I have pointed out, clearly played a part in medical, legal, and public discourse when The Monster first appeared in 1898. Crane’s text speaks to (and anticipates) the emergence of involuntary euthanasia, and Judge Hagenthorpe and Whilomville’s other affluent white men embody the logic of what I have been calling “eugenic manhood.” Again, eugenic manhood works more subtly; it does not manifest in inner and outer traits, as does market manhood. Rather, it exists as a rhetorical construct in Crane’s text and permeates everyday conversation among a wide variety of white men. Eugenic manhood is an offshoot of Roosevelt and his imperial manhood, and is also imbricated in similar discourses of competition, violence, aggression, and domination.
Eugenic manhood calls for the euthanizing of racial and “defective” Others in The Monster. The main difference between this formation and the other dominant manhoods lies in how it articulates this desire. Lippard and Thornton’s dominant male figures, and to a lesser degree Twain’s, are excessive in their illustration of unsavory characteristics and their articulation of wants; conversely, eugenic manhood controls its competition, violence, aggression, and domination. It tempers these attributes in civil discussions which take place in forums such as Judge Hagenthorpe’s residence and, as we will see, town barbershops.

Eugenic manhood also puts on the face of benevolence. It partially embodies what Wai-Chee Dimock calls “rational benevolence,” a later nineteenth century form of philanthropy which Josephine Shaw Lowell, founder of the New York City Charity Organization, staunchly advocated. Rational benevolence meant “not simply to do good but to do so efficiently, scientifically, wasting no sentiment and no expense” (Dimock 153). In other words, rational benevolence combines antebellum benevolent acts of charity with postbellum industrial capitalist labor efficiency. It, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues, “is the conceptual link between an earlier Christian-inflected sympathetic benevolence and Social Darwinism, along with its dire manifestation, eugenics” (“Cultural Logic” 796). Garland-Thomson sees rational benevolence’s logic structuring the narrator of Melville’s “Bartleby,
the Scrivener” (1853). The narrator ultimately fires his strange, “abnormal” employee, Bartleby, after the latter famously refuses to take orders. Garland-Thomson writes, “A this-is-best-for-everyone rationale grounds what is actually a desperate tactic by the increasingly distressed and threatened narrator. There is neither patience nor venue here for the singularly and flamboyantly suffering body” (796). Dimock and Garland-Thomson’s arguments about rational benevolence help theorize what I see structuring eugenic manhood in The Monster. Like science and medicine itself, Crane fashions the white, patrician men of Whilomville as empirical, rational, and propelled by logic, and these qualities manifest in their purportedly disinterested benevolence (and rhetoric)—while they also cloak more sinister intentions.

By the end of the nineteenth century, benevolence also merged with eugenic manhood. Garland-Thomson suggests, “Even though Malthusian, Darwinian, eugenic, or marketplace ethics might underlie the drive to eliminate the disabled, the suffering argument puts the face of compassion on the lives-not-worth-living argument that sanctions death as the sympathetic alleviation of suffering” (“Cultural Logic” 793). The benevolent aspects of eugenic manhood should remind us that the core attributes of dominant and compassionate manhoods do in reality overlap with each other, even as the authors I have examined inscribe them differently. We see the logic of
benevolence and eugenic manhood’s empirical objectivism when the judge states, “‘No one wants to advance such ideas, but somehow I think that that poor fellow ought to die’” and, in “the cold manner of the bench,” also mentions “‘. . . I am induced to say that you are performing a questionable charity in preserving this negro’s life. As near as I can understand, he will hereafter be a monster, a perfect monster, and probably with an affected brain.’” Hagenthorpe couches his propositions in a controlled and paradoxically impatient manner, and yet shapes his comments to be benevolent—but he also utters them “in the cold manner of the bench.” His comments are loaded with an underlying, ideologically violent meaning.

After Trescott’s objection, the judge replies, in an allusion to Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* (1818): “‘Nature has very evidently given him up. He is dead. You are restoring him to life. You are making him, and he will be a monster, with no mind’” (Great 213). Again, Hagenthorpe embodies the destructive ethos of eugenic manhood as he tempers his propositions in practical terms. Here he legitimizes Henry’s death as he fuses racial degeneration with euthanasia: “‘Nature has very evidently given him up,’” and thus the rational decision is for the doctor to do the same. Eugenic manhood proves equivocal to all the other masculinities I have discussed in its hypermasculine desire for domination; it only channels these wants differently through the managerial decimation of Others. Through its
professionalism, eugenic manhood curbs those qualities that Crane finds so distasteful.

Thus Dr. Trescott, who wishes to preserve life instead of destroy it, counters the emerging masculinities in *The Monster*; he plays out in masculine interludes, offering something different in between the before and after acts of eugenics manhood. In the scene between the judge and Trescott, the doctor ultimately resists Hagenthorpe’s suggestions and instead recruits Alek Williams, another African American, to care for Henry at his home. As he drives Henry to the Williams’ residence in his buggy, Trescott tells him, “‘You will have everything you want to eat and a good place to sleep, and I hope you will get along there all right. I will pay all your expenses, and come to see you as often as I can. If you don’t get along, I want you to let me know as soon as possible, and then we will do what we can to make it better’” (*Great* 215). Here Crane highlights compassionate manhood through the contrasting tropes of sympathy: the doctor’s rational and genuinely sympathetic, caring comments to Henry operate antithetically to the judge’s rational and falsely sympathetic—in reality, destructive—petitions. In other words, Crane resurrects sympathy, channeling it through the doctor whose very benevolence—void of euthanasia implications—challenges the role of many late-century medical men.
When they arrive at Williams’ home, Trescott climbs out of the buggy first. Then, "The doctor turned and held both arms to the figure. It crawled to him painfully like a man going down a ladder" (Great 216). With Trescott’s arms stretched outward in Christ-like benevolence to embrace the disabled, mentally-ill Henry, Crane again constructs a different type of man in the age of eugenics and racial cleansing. His passing of Henry to Williams also signals a gentler alternative—home care—to the judge’s call for euthanasia and the public institutionalization that often serves as the fate of “defectives” in America during this period. In this masculine interlude, the doctor offers better possibilities to the rational and destructive choices proposed by eugenics manhood.

In another scene, Crane again spotlights eugenic manhood’s emergence on the western world’s stage, but he also directs his audience to witness a different performance. The discussions of euthanasia extend beyond the private confines of Judge Hagenthorpe’s residence to encompass Whilomville’s male-dominated public sphere, the barbershop. The customers and barber, Reifsnyder, discuss Dr. Trescott’s care of Henry and the town’s fearful reactions to him. A railway engineer, Bainbridge, flatly states, “Oh, he should have let him die.” The barber responds, “Let him die? . . . How was that? How can you let a man die?” “By letting him die, you chump,” Bainbridge retorts (Great 221). Bainbridge’s terse, practical comments,
characteristic of eugenic manhood, operate in contrast to Reifsnyder’s sympathetic reaction. Here, in the temporary absence of Dr. Trescott, Crane still disrupts eugenic manhood’s domineering performance by the infusion of Reifsnyder.

Another man announces, “‘If I had been the doctor, I would have done the same thing’” (Great 222). Reifsnyder states, “‘Of course . . . Any man would do it’” (222). Yet a different customer comments: “‘They say he is the most terrible thing in the world. Young Johnnie Bernard—that drives the grocery wagon—saw him up at Alek Williams’ shanty, and he says he couldn’t eat anything for two days’” (222). When asked “‘what makes him so terrible?,’” the barber and engineer respond, “‘Because he hasn’t got any face’” (222). Again, practicality structures eugenic manhood—discomfort serves as the causal result of deformity, and euthanasia in turn alleviates discomfort and deformity. Bainbridge asks, “‘I wonder what the doctor says to himself? . . . He may be sorry he made him live’” (223). Another man responds, “‘It was the only thing he could do’” (223). One man asks, “‘What would you do?’” A different man answers, “‘You would do anything on earth for him. You’d take all the trouble in the world for him. And spend your last dollar on him’” (223).

The conversation in a community space over the subject of “what to do” with Henry quite clearly works as a small-scale representation of the
larger late-century transatlantic discussions among doctors, lawyers, lawmakers, and average citizens (in private and print / public spaces) over the ethical and practical decisions of using euthanasia on “defectives” versus alternative treatments, such as institutionalization. However, Crane offsets the domineering ideological presence of eugenic manhood in this scene as more men gravitate toward the compassionate alternative. Morgan writes, “In The Monster, the latent ethos of masculine service and communal care—a barely glimpsed utopian possibility in the text which is all but invisible in recent studies of turn-of-the-century masculinity—is vindicated (however fleetingly) over the manifest ones” (84). As with Twain, it is an ideal moment where men model their actions, emotions, and thoughts similarly to other compassionate men.

But, as do all of them, this masculine interlude gives way to new scenes of eugenic manhood. Henry occasionally resurfaces, but his appearance only strikes panic in the community, and thus he serves as the impetus by which the town’s men continue their euthanasia discussions. After Henry escapes from the Williams’ residence, peers in the window, and frightens the children attending the birthday party, the police eventually catch him. Informing Dr. Trescott that they have housed Henry in the local jail, the police chief states, “I didn’t know what else to do with him. That’s what I want you to tell me. Of course we can’t keep him” (Great 230).
Henry’s imprisonment mirrors the U.S. public institutionalization of the feebleminded in the late nineteenth century, but the chief’s statement that “‘we can’t keep him’” also anticipates the shift from institutionalization to the sterilization and extermination policies of the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{14} “‘He [the jailer] says you can have your man whenever you want,’” the chief mentions. “‘He’s got no use for him’” (231). For eugenic manhood, Henry serves no practical use value in the jail cell—or, for that matter, in society.

Soon, however, Dr. Trescott appears again in another masculine interlude. He not only offsets the before and after scenes of eugenic masculinity, but also market manhood. After Henry’s escape from William’s residence, the doctor resumes care at his newly-built home. One afternoon, Jimmie—recovered from his wounds—entertains a group of friends, and Henry serves as their source of fun. Crane writes:

\ldots the monster was seated on a box behind the stable basking in the rays of the afternoon sun. A heavy crêpe veil was swathed about its head . . . Jimmie waved his hand with the air of a proprietor. ‘There he is,’ he said. ‘O-o-o!’ murmured all the little boys—‘o-o-o!’ . . . Jimmie seemed to reap all the joys of the owner and exhibitor of one of the world’s marvels, while his audience remained at a distance—awed and entranced, fearful and envious. (Great 234-235)
Here Henry clearly functions as a circus freak, and Jimmie his cunning proprietor, who makes profit from showcasing curiosities. The boys and Jimmie become so involved in the show that they do not hear the doctor drive up. Crane writes, “Trescott looked gravely at the boys, and asked them to please go home” (238). In this interlude, compassionate manhood counters market manhood; its concern for others momentarily overpowers males mired in the spectacle of commodity culture.

The next morning, Trescott asks, “‘Jimmie, what were you doing in the back garden yesterday—you and the other boys—to Henry?’” (Great 239). Upon hearing the reply that “‘We weren’t doing anything, pa,’” the doctor “sternly” scolds Jimmie (239). Again Crane depicts compassionate manhood ideologically curbing businessmen’s destructive actions. At the same time, this interlude spotlights Trescott’s compassionate and emotional performance. Jimmie eventually confesses that he and his friends were daring each other to touch Henry when the doctor arrived. Crane states, “Trescott groaned deeply. His countenance was so clouded in sorrow that the lad . . . burst suddenly forth in dismal lamentations. ‘There, there. Don’t cry, Jim,’ said Trescott, going round the desk . . . He sat in a great leather reading-chair, and took the boy on his knee” (239). Emotions freely flow. Morgan writes of this scene, “Indeed, Trescott becomes marked. . . by his compassion” (80). Not only does compassionate manhood offer an
alternative to market manhood’s unfeeling ethos, it also encourages these same men to express their own sensitive sides. As with the scene in the barbershop, Crane’s masculine interlude here illustrates males emotionally identifying with each other, not working against one another.

Eugenic manhood dominates the narrative space near the conclusion of The Monster, but Crane simultaneously integrates his final masculine interlude within the same scene. A group of prominent white men—Judge Hagenthorpe and three others—arrive at Trescott’s house. The doctor asks them the nature of their business; one of the men, a wealthy grocer named John Twelve, responds, “‘It’s about what nobody talks of—much . . . It’s about Henry Johnson’” (Great 244). As Trescott invites him to continue, Twelve states, “‘. . . I am not going to keep quiet and see you ruin yourself. And that’s how we all feel’” (245). Following the ethos of eugenic manhood, Twelve prefaces his propositions in practical terms; he presents himself and the others foremost as having Trescott’s professional reputation in mind. Yet under the civil logic lie the ulterior, aggressive intentions. “‘I am not ruining myself,’ answered Trescott” (245). “‘You have changed,’” Twelve continues, “‘from being the leading doctor in town to about the last one . . . Even if there are a lot of fools in this world, we can’t see any reason why you should ruin yourself by opposing them. You can’t teach them anything, you know . . .’” (245). Besides appealing to his professional status, Twelve takes the next
logical step by suggesting that Trescott’s sympathetic efforts have proven fruitless. “‘I am not trying to teach them anything,’ Trescott smiled wearily” (245). Regardless of whether or not the doctor’s intentions have been to teach anyone, Crane has attempted to teach his audience. As Morgan suggests, “Trescott offers one of Crane’s best expressions of his own longing for a masculine ethos of social care and communal commitment” (87).

The surface reason soon give way, however, to exposing the darker undersides of Twelve’s eugenic manhood. Seeing that his rational appeals have failed to sway Trescott, he now explicitly comes to the point:

“‘...we’ve talked it over, and we’ve come to the conclusion that the only way to do is to get Johnson a place off up the valley, and—’” (Great 245).

Figurative of larger eugenic trends in the United States in the 1890s, Twelve’s statement encompasses the logic of public institutionalization; the rational “‘only way to do is to’” sequester Henry away from view.

But Trescott again performs a manly alternative to eugenic manhood’s dehumanizing and destructive proposals. He replies, “‘You don’t know, my friend. Everybody is so afraid of him, they can’t even give him good care. Nobody can attend to him as I do myself’” (Great 245). Unsatisfied, Twelve protests, “‘...all the boys were prepared to take him right off your hands, and—and—’” (246). The rhetoric shifts from figurative institutionalization to figurative euthanasia: the white “‘boys,’” as representatives of eugenic
manhood, show willingness “‘to take him right off your hands’” — whether through lynching or, more “humanely,” through mercy killing. In either case, extinction articulates what Twelve cannot bring himself to utter. His statement figures the shift in eugenic policy from sequestering “defectives” and the “feebleminded” in asylums and other institutions at the end of the nineteenth century to their forced extermination at the dawn of the twentieth. The ethos of euthanasia, in its various forms, dominates the spotlight in this scene.

But amid its performance, Crane infuses his masculine interlude; he directs his audience’s gaze from center stage to the side, where a different possibility plays out. Trescott replies: “‘No, John Twelve . . . it can’t be done’” (Great 246). However, the narrative departs from the interlude and moves back to center stage, as another man offers, “‘Well, then, a public institution—’” (246). Eugenic manhood’s propositions, even as they take a step back from extermination to institutionalization, nonetheless now literally reflect the need for the sequestering of “defectives.” But Trescott again steals the spotlight, getting the final word: “‘No . . . public institutions are all very good, but he is not going to one’” (246). And thus this scene of the penultimate chapter concludes. Despite the fact that no further words pass among the men, Crane closes down with a contrasting image to Trescott’s version of masculinity: “old Judge Hagenthorpe [who] was thoughtfully
smoothing the polished ivory head of his cane” (246). In the final moments of the novel, the icon of eugenic manhood—presented in a phallic manner—seems to stand in, among the other like-minded men, as the rising, manly trope of the twentieth century.

Henry’s Textual Absence and the Conclusion of Masculine Interludes

As with all the authors I have examined, Crane’s narrative nearly reaffirms the dominant manhood he has critiqued throughout *The Monster*. It casts the Trescotts aside in the last chapter, as the doctor arrives home to find that Mrs. Trescott’s friends, expected for midday tea, have all skipped the occasion. The novella closes with Trescott consoling his sobbing wife and counting the empty teacups. But their social marginalization seems less indicative of the text’s near acquiescence to eugenic manhood than is Henry’s disappearance. Surprisingly, scholars never seem to take note of this, and it is a subject that deserves attention.

In the scene of Henry, Jimmie, and the neighborhood boys, Crane writes, “The monster on the box had turned its black crepe countenance to the sky, and was waving its arms in time to a religious chant . . . The wail of the melody was mournful and slow. They drew back. It seemed to spellbind them with the power of a funeral” (*Great* 238). This moment marks the last appearance of Henry in the novella, so Crane’s reference to “a funeral” in some ways feels appropriate. From this point to the end, he does remain as a
textual subject, meaning that he continues to exist in various characters’ conversations. But he himself physically disappears. Crane never specifies where Henry resides and who sees him, or provides details regarding his daily activities and actions. The townsmen’s proposals to Trescott in the penultimate chapter logically indicate that he is alive and remains in the care of Dr. Trescott, but Crane does not even mention if or where Trescott keeps him. Henry’s absence proves emblematically telling in light of the degeneration and euthanasia discourses The Monster traverses. However, all the texts I examine leave traces of their compassionate men embedded within. Crane’s behaves no differently. As an extension of Henry, and as his empathetic caretaker, Trescott’s marginal presence in the final chapter—rather than Hagenthorpe’s—still provides an alternative glimpse, a different mode of behavior for Crane’s audience. Furthermore, the interspersed, masculine interludes throughout the novella result in manly heteroglossia, manly possibilities; they keep the ending from completely reaffirming the destructive logic of eugenic manhood.

Conclusion: Crane, Thornton, Twain, and Lippard

Because of his race, Henry works as the most visibly marked figure out of all those I have examined in this study. The case might be made that had Crane inscribed Henry as white or even biracial, he—and not Trescott—might have served as the icon of compassionate manhood. This should remind us
that Crane works from within the confines of the dominant culture’s attitudes about race, even as he critiques other emerging masculinities constructed on the exclusion and decimation of Others. From the outset, it seems Henry threatens Crane. This is unlike the other models of compassionate manhood and their authors, who negate or marginalize their biracial and even white characters at a much slower pace.

At the same time, Crane does resist certain cultural constructions through his minimal corporeal descriptions, even as he depends in other moments on racialist stereotypes. He never provides a detailed physical description of Henry either before or after his accident. After the fire scene, he only mentions Henry’s monstrosity occasionally in passing, and even then with little detail. In this minimalist manner, he operates similarly to Twain in how he portrays the monstrous body. Crane’s refusal to present excessive corporeality in part extends from his revolt against overt sentimental conventions of the earlier century as well as later Victorian novels, which he called “pink valentines” (Hiro 181). Crane also fashioned his sparse prose against the logic of journalistic Naturalism.

But the overall lack of bodily detail goes beyond literary genres to serve sociopolitical functions. In chapter two, I argued that Twain’s narrative minimalism resists excessive depictions of monstrosity and instead casts the brothers as viable instruments of democratic, compassionate manhood.
Henry does not reflect these same ideological roles. While Crane cannot seem to work beyond black stereotypes and racial degeneration theories he, like Twain, resists other cultural profiling by refusing to excessively inscribe Henry’s disfigurement. Doing so would put Crane in the same camp as Lippard and Thornton; as I mentioned, this dependence on excessive corporeality runs the risk of neatly replicating the dichotomy between “normal” and “abnormal” body formulations. Granted, Crane replicates this binary when it come to negotiating blackness, but his unwillingness to make Henry’s monstrosity a spectacle and a measurement of difference resists other corporeal dualisms.

Crane also holds familiar attitudes about effeminacy. Though he idealizes Trescott, modeling him as a sympathetic alternative to hypermasculinity, he takes care to also shape him as motherly, not manly. As Morgan suggests, Crane advocates for “. . . a nurturing masculine ethos with links to the tropes of a woman’s domesticity,” even as American culture itself moved toward a formulation of militant, Rooseveltian white manhood. But in addition to his sympathy, Trescott’s effeminacy seems partially responsible for his ostracization at the end of the novella. Like Twain and Thornton, Crane does not loudly lambaste his effeminized subjects in the way Lippard chooses. But his subtle preoccupations with effeminacy signal his near compliance with Rooseveltian manhood. Crane knew Roosevelt from his
experiences as a reporter in the Spanish-American War, and was often at odds with him over his war-time persona (Morgan 69-70; 72). Crane’s subtlety regarding effeminacy both plays into the cult of manhood’s hypermasculine demands as it also quietly resists Roosevelt’s public image.

Yet in the end, Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane all seem to tap into their dominant culture’s anxieties about effeminate men.

A final manner in which Crane differs from the other writers I have examined is in the use of Dr. Trescott as compassionate manhood. While Crane refrains from excessively sketching Henry’s monstrosity, he tellingly substitutes him with the physically-“normal” doctor. Devil-Bug, Angelo and Luigi, and William Eddy all are, in various ways, marked as monstrous—physically, morally, or both. But they as monstrous figures perform in masculine interludes throughout, and then shrink away near or at the endings. The fact that Crane’s ideal is not a monstrous character, but instead the able-bodied, “normal” Dr. Trescott seems to illustrate the multiple nodes of intolerance that gripped the nation by the end of the nineteenth century. Like Twain, Crane experienced a different century than Lippard and Thornton, and the Civil War, emancipation, Reconstruction, racial degeneration, the cult of manhood, the rise of the New Woman and women’s rights, realism, naturalism, the Gilded Age, imperialism overseas, and
eugenics all played parts in helping to define masculinity in ways probably imperceptible to Lippard and Thornton.

Despite this, however, Crane still looks critically upon his own moment, and clearly sees men declining in terms of compassion. Trescott provides him with a very real, honest possibility of different behavior for men in the late nineteenth century. At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that one of my intentions was to move beyond the critical tendency to read Crane ironically. My other goal has been to surpass the naturalist and realist critical frameworks that often see Crane as detached and instead consider him as personally invested within the complexities and contradictions of 1890s U.S. culture. Crane is, no doubt, a product of his moment. But at the dawn of the twentieth century, he also offers glimpses of men behaving differently.
Conclusion
Manhood, Gender, and “Difference”: Then and Now

I came to write an analysis of white male authors, monstrosity, and masculinity by accident. While reading for my comprehensive exams, I began noticing the disabled and disfigured characters that graced the pages of nineteenth-century American literature. At first, I had no idea what to do with them. But they peaked my interest, and I eventually realized I had stumbled upon a dissertation topic. I read and read, keeping my eyes peeled for characters whose bodies deviated from the physical “norm.”

My initial idea for this project entailed representations of disability and disfigurement in writers of different races, classes, and backgrounds. But the more I read, the more I became interested in graphic depictions of monstrosity, such as what we have seen in the writers I have examined. I eventually noticed how difficult it was difficult to find these graphic
depictions of monstrosity in nineteenth-century white women writers and writers of color. Certainly, Catherine Maria Sedgwick’s *Hope Leslie* (1827) featured Magawisca with her missing arm; Maria Susanna Cummins’ *The Lamplighter* discussed the blind, virtuous Emily Graham; Elizabeth Stuart Phelps’ *The Silent Partner* (1871) showcased the mentally-challenged Catty; and Rebecca Harding Davis’ *Life in the Iron Mills* (1860) told the working-class story of the hunchback Deborah. And among other slave narratives, Frederick Douglass’ *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845) and Harriet Jacobs’ *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl* (1861) detailed how white slave owners inflicted horrific wounds upon the narrators’ bodies. The one graphic (but brief) exception seemed to be in William Wells Brown’s 1867 edition of *Clotelle*, where a black Union soldier, Jerome, is decapitated by a cannon. One could easily find representations of disability and disfigurement in these writers.

On the other hand, sensational, monstrous representations by women writers and writers of color were much harder to locate. In fact, after Brown’s novel (and with the exception of Henry in *The Monster*), graphic depictions of the wounded black male body largely disappeared until the mid-twentieth century (James 51). I eventually realized that it was white male writers who seemed most often to sketch graphic pictures of monstrosity, or were the
most likely to mark their characters with major afflictions, such as conjoined bodies or total facial disfigurement. I grew curious as to why.

At the time, I had heard of “disability studies,” but knew next to nothing about it as a critical field of inquiry. So I immersed myself in works by Lennard J. Davis, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Sharon L. Mitchell, and David T. Snyder, among other scholars. I quickly learned that, with the exception of Greek culture, representations of disability have historically been associated with negative traits such as criminal deviance, sexual immorality, other moral “deficiencies,” and poverty. And from Biblical scripture forward, disability has often been articulated as something in need of repair or “fixing.”

But the more I thought about nineteenth-century white male writers, the more I realized that, in key moments, they associated “abnormal,” monstrous bodies—strangely enough—with positive, enduring, culturally-redeeming factors, at least when it came to issues of masculinity. And even if these characters still played marginal roles in the narrative—a factor also attributed to disabled figures—certain white male authors saw them as a welcome alternative to the dominant tropes of manhood around them.

My focus in this study has been exclusively on how nineteenth-century white male writers use representations of monstrous figures to offer kinder, more compassionate options for manhood: options that work differently to
those demanded by mass culture in the wake of numerous social transformations. Indeed, there is more critical work to be done in this area. However, we can and should expand the conversation of “abnormal” bodies and gender to include African American writers such as Douglass, Jacobs, and Harriet Wilson who—unlike the white authors I have examined—narrate their own experiences, and thus their disabilities and disfigurements brought on by white slave owners (both male and female). In his *Narrative*, Douglass seems to see white manhood best defined by his master Covey’s aggressive violence. But Douglass also uses the scene where Covey violently whips and beats him to define his own version of manhood—one largely forged through Douglass’ pain and disfigurement. In Wilson’s *Our Nig* (1859), Frado’s constant illnesses help Wilson claim the ideology of the sick, middle-class white woman, but they also allow her to create a feminine alternative to her cruel white mistress. These depictions of disability and disfigurement in black writers are often much less sensational than representations of monstrosity in white writers, but they can still provide a critical framework for analyzing different modes of gender behavior and identity. Besides the character Jerome, Brown’s novel *Clotelle* contains representations of other disfigured and disabled black figures, and the same critical frameworks might be applied.
The late twentieth century is also a prime period for discussing monstrosity and gender. Two fairly recent works especially deserve attention. In *Autobiography of a Face* (1994), Lucy Grealy writes of her experiences in New York City in the 1970s, where she and her family emigrated from Ireland. She also discusses the rare type of facial cancer she was diagnosed with as a child, the many facial reconstructive surgeries she endured in junior high and high school, and her struggle to live with disfigurement. Grealy especially uses her experiences to question Western culture’s notions of beauty and monstrosity. And, while she describes her loneliness and social marginalization as a child and an adult, Grealy also sees her disfigurement as a liberating escape from dominant notions of Americanness, femininity, and physical normality.

Similarly, Chuck Palahniuk’s novel *Invisible Monsters* (1999) tells of a supermodel whose face is also horribly disfigured in an automobile accident. (Later we find out that the supermodel intentionally shot herself in the head while driving.) Although Palahniuk’s novel is sensational and at times tacky in its approach, it essentially treats the protagonist’s disfigurement as an escape from rigid gender constraints, capitalist culture, beauty magazines, and fashion runways, and it views disfigurement as the ultimate key to fashioning a completely new, liberating identity. In their own ways, Grealy’s autobiography and Palahniuk’s novel use monstrosity to search for
alternative modes of behavior, gender, and identity to those demanded by modern American culture. More importantly, they treat “abnormal” bodies in largely positive—not negative—manners.

My intention in “Masculine Interludes” has not been to pardon the aggressive, domineering, and imperialist ideologies that have always underpinned historical formulations of white American manhood, and that especially continue today in the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As I have shown throughout, the authors’ narratives, in the end, nearly reaffirm the aggressive tenets of dominant white masculinity. However, my intention has been to argue that nineteenth-century white male writers, some well-known and others unknown, did not always agree with their mass culture’s programs for white manhood—and that they saw compassion as integral, not detrimental, to white male identity.

Of course, one might argue that Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane’s endings—the moments when they negate the “abnormal” body—automatically cancel out the prior scenes of sympathy and compassion. Or, one could suggest that the endings only end up (re)casting the monstrous figure into limited, one-dimensional roles and identities. As I have repeatedly noted, I do not deny the existence of these endings or these limited roles and identities. But to solely read these narratives for the endings only restages the binary thinking that so permeates Western thought, and leaves
no room for possibilities other than those that privilege toughness, aggression, and hypermasculinity. And, by only reading for the ending, we allow these dominant factors of manhood—both in the nineteenth century and today—to remain as privileged qualifiers. At worst, we replicate these aggressive values ourselves as we indict white male authors for doing the same.

In the end, I do not feel that George Lippard, Mark Twain, J. Quinn Thornton, and Stephen Crane have completely dismantled what it means to be an average, middle-to-upper class white man in the nineteenth century, but they also have not completely conformed to its (often narrow and limiting) demands, either. While I wish that each author did not negate their monstrous and compassionate figures, and thereby reinforce what it means to be a white, aggressive man, I take solace in the fact that their masculine interludes also challenge these dominant values. These authors have offered other options, however fleeting or temporary. In an American arena often bombarded by manly discourses of aggression, individuality, ruggedness, competition, and violence—then and now, in nineteenth-century narratives and in our own period—these interludes at least provide some hope and some models for kinder, more compassionate masculine roles. We should look for masculine interludes not only in nineteenth-century writing, but also within the social, political, economic, and entertainment arenas of twenty-first
century American society. And wherever and whenever we find these interludes, we would all do well to pay attention.
Notes to Introduction

1 These dominant, negative tropes of manhood in Lippard, Twain, Thornton, and Crane’s texts work opposite to texts that were published in other decades, or that represented other decades, which often inscribed members of the dominant male culture positively. For three examples, Walt Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass*, first published in 1855, celebrated the common, average white American man. In turn, Whitman’s war journals, later published in *Specimen Days & Collect* (1892), and Louisa May Alcott’s *Hospital Sketches* (1863) represented white American manhood—the Civil War soldier—as the epitome of heroism and virtue. While there are of course exceptions, the 1840s and 1890s are important in that they tend to reveal white male authors responding negatively to dominant white manhood (and its offshoots).

2 For example, the writers I examine work against the logic of the rugged male individual in James Fenimore Cooper’s novels, Henry David Thoreau’s *Walden* (1854), Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essays, Francis Parkman’s *The Oregon Trail* (1847), Jack London’s fiction, and Owen Wister’s *The Virginian* (1902), among many others.

3 I am particularly thinking of Hop-Frog in Edgar Allen Poe’s tale “Hop-Frog” (1849), a dwarf who is a court jester and who murders the king and his men, and Ahab in Herman Melville’s *Moby-Dick* (1851), who obsessively hunts down the white whale in retribution for severing his leg.

4 For a good portion of the twentieth century, scholars—no doubt influenced by F.O. Matthiessen’s *The American Renaissance* (1941) and R.W.B. Lewis’ *The American Adam* (1955)—treated sentimentality as juvenile. Many saw it as a genre written solely by nineteenth-century women writers. As Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler point out, even long after the famous debate between Ann Douglas’ *The Feminization of American Culture* (1977) and Jane Tompkins’ *Sensational Designs* (1985) over the conservatism or political subversion of
sentimentality, scholars still discussed sentiment as largely a feminine genre (Sentimental 5-7). But recently, this viewpoint has changed. In Public Sentiments (2001), Hendler argues “that sympathy in the nineteenth century was a paradigmatically public sphere” (12)—one politically and socially-articulated by men as well as women. Hendler and Chapman’s collection of essays, Sentimental Men (1999), aims to “demonstrate that men did in fact participate in sentimental discourse” (8). Milette Shamir and Jennifer Travis’ more recent collection, Boys Don’t Cry? (2002), takes its cue from Hendler and Chapman as it examines the intersection of emotion and masculinity in a wide range of American male writers. And Mary Louise Kete, in Sentimental Collaborations (2000), examines female writers such as Harriet Gould and Lydia Sigourney, but also Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and Twain. Kete’s focus is on mourning and loss, and she argues that sentiment “structures a collaboration through which individuals can join together in solving the seemingly local problem of grief in the face of death” (3).

5 Greven is also interested in the inviolate male as a response to sexual and health reform, conduct literature, and temperance movements.

6 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson does suggest that, at times, disability representations can be “liberating” and reveal “possibilities for signification that go beyond a monologic interpretation of corporeal difference as deviance” (Extraordinary 9). Likewise, David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder note that disability, in certain moments, might serve “transgressive, subversive potential” (The Body 21). Mary Klages does not see such radical potential and points out that representations of disability in Victorian America did not “liberate” the impaired, but—through sentimentality—“provided a particular model of selfhood within which a disabled body could becomes something more than just a ‘poster’ arousing the compassion of able-bodied others” (5). And most recently, Cynthia Wu argues
that “... behind every text containing a politically problematic disabled figure there exists the possibility of a redemptive or subversive reading that contest and challenges ableist norms” (35).

7 Jackson was a complex, often contradictory man. I want to make it clear that I am centering on one image of his persona—the violent, often temperamental image. Scholars have noted how Jackson presented himself as a sympathetic, paternal figure, especially to the Indians he waged expansionist campaigns against. For three examples, see Burnham 103; Kimmel, Manhood 35; Mielke 9, 60. Others point out his conflation of the gentleman and the “bloodthirsty ruffian” (Watson 30). See Watson 30; Greven 6. Following David G. Pugh and other scholars, I am most interested in the rugged and often violent persona Jackson projected to the masses, the idea of him as “... a cultural symbol, a mythological character embodying the manliness ethos” (Pugh 31). As Michael Kimmel notes, “Jackson’s gendered rage at weakness, feminizing luxury, and sensuous pleasure resonated for a generation of symbolically fatherless sons, the first generation of American men born after the Revolution” (Manhood 36). For more on Jackson as hypermasculine and violent, see Kimmel, Manhood 33-36; Greven 3-7; Burstein 56; Pugh 3.

8 A good discussion of Jackson, especially as a mythic, archetypal figure in nineteenth-century culture, can be found in Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence.

9 For more about the cult of manhood, particularly as it became integral to Harvard’s curriculum in the late nineteenth century, see Townsend.

10 According to Townsend, “When he [Roosevelt] was twelve, a doctor told him that if he did not set about making his body, his mind would be held back—‘It is hard drudgery to make one’s body,’ he told him, ‘but I know you will do it.’ Thereupon Teddy immediately vowed,
'I’ll make my body’” (258). This statement, in many ways, speaks perfectly to the cult of manhood that would infiltrate the nation when Roosevelt was an adult.

11 There is an enormous body of scholarship on eighteenth-century sensibility and the man of feeling. For more on sensibility in its relation to issues of masculinity, femininity, sexuality, and race, see, among others, Burgett; Hendler, Public Sentiments and Sentimental Men; Barker-Benfield; and Elli.

Notes to Chapter One

1 For more on Sue and his influence on the city mysteries genre, see Ashwill 293; Erickson 42-42; Denning 85; and Reynolds, Beneath 82.

2 Between 1800 and 1860, Philadelphia’s wealth, controlled by the richest 10% of the city’s population, almost doubled, rising from 50% to 90%; at the same time, wealth owned by the poorest 75% of the city’s population plummeted from 30% to less than 3% (Reynolds, Prophet 12). The gap between the few, elite rich and the mass of poor continually widened, as it did in most American cities.

3 For more on the reading public and its conceptions about the city, see Ashwill 297; Denning 88; Erickson 44; and Stewart 680. On a similar note, David Stewart has analyzed the kinds of cultural work that crime literature (a genre that includes sensation novels) performed for the antebellum reading public. He argues that increasing technology, industrialism and the marketplace placed demands on citizens to become, in the Marxist and Foucauldian senses, able-bodied, productive workers, continually regulated and checked by the time clock, working hours, and “the period’s growing commitment to emotional prudence and restraint” (679). Crime literature, with its “astonishing displays of violence,” ultimately served as a “transgressive experience” for readers (690). As Stewart sees it, “the urban body was the preferred locus of transgression. Drained of ‘vital energy’ by the conditions of urban life and
work, this [reading] body enjoyed the threat of violence as much needed stimulation. Fear, titillation, hostility, rage: all were consumed and enjoyed by readers increasingly denied such feelings by the demands of constraint culture” (690). Sensation novels paradoxically expressed anxiety and paranoia over city life and yet allowed nineteenth-century readers, both rural and urban, to vicariously participate in a fascinating world of crime and danger.

4 Lippard was born April 10, 1822, and died at the age of 31 of tuberculosis on February 9, 1854. According to Reynolds, Lippard apparently never read the works of Marx (Beneath 205).

5 For one example from the early 1970s, see Ridgely.

6 Sappol argues that “The Quaker City approximates a fever delirium. Characters sweat, spasm, ache, tremble, and hallucinate” (221). Similarly, Anthony analyzes the debtor figure, “the panic-stricken professional male . . . Eyes bulging, hair standing on end, often in flight from the persecutions of a malevolent (inevitably male) enemy” (719). Ashwill in turn discusses market culture and its effects on workers in the novel. Nelson suggests that “Men’s criminal dramas are mapped across female bodies” (151). And Streeby positions “bodies, affects, and sensations” (“Haunted,” par. 3) in relation to urbanization and the marketplace.

7 For Nelson, Lippard’s preservation of social boundaries is dependent on the protection of white women from male sexual predators, who are often of different races and classes. She states, “Analogizing the vices of a city and an economic system to the seduction of an ‘innocent’ woman and seathing female sexual ‘purity’ in her soul, Lippard locates questions of civic order in women’s mysterious interiors” (151).

8 For more on the seduction novel and the libertine in Europe and America, see Barnes, Armstrong and Tennenhouse, Bontatibus, Burgett, and Stern.

9 The infusion of capitalism and seduction thus signals the collapse of boundaries between the home and marketplace in The Quaker City. As I mentioned, Nelson notes that one of
Lippard’s main concerns is the upkeep of these social boundaries. Though many critics have in recent years shown that the “separate spheres” ideology during the antebellum period was not in fact always separate, I agree with Nelson that the collapsing of public and private spheres serves indeed a prime source of anxiety for Lippard. Some scholars also tend to see Lippard poking fun at established sentimental conventions. For example, Reynolds views scenes of fireside domesticity as a “Parody of the sentimental-domestic genre” (Intro. QC, xxiii). Denning, similarly, calls Monk-Hall “a nightmare parody of the bourgeois home” (97). I view it differently: Lippard is uninterested in jabbing at middle-class culture and instead much more upset, in fact, by market capitalism’s attack on middle-class culture’s most treasured emblem, the home. The inscribing of compassionate manhood within the novel is the first step in textually reestablishing these boundaries.

Notes to Chapter Two

1 Twain refers to Giacomo and Giovanni Batista Tocci, the famous conjoined twins. The Toccis were born sometime between 1875 and 1878 in Locana, Italy. Their parents put them on display only a month after they were born. They traveled from freak show to freak show, eventually making their way to the U.S. in the 1880s. The twins, like Luigi and Angelo, were dicephalus, joined at their sixth rib. They had four arms and two legs, essentially sharing the same body. Twain’s fascination with conjoined twins, however, did not begin with the Tocci brothers, but with Chang and Eng Bunker, the famous and “original” twins born in Siam in 1811. Chang and Eng became celebrities in Europe and America, largely due to their own self-marketing as well as their minimal association with Barnum’s traveling sideshow. Chang and Eng, unlike the Capello brothers, had two complete and separate bodies, but were joined by a ligature. They served as the basis for Twain’s “Personal Habits of the Siamese Twins.” In December 1891, the Scientific American published an article on the brothers. For
more on the Capellos and Chang and Eng, see Gillman, *Dark Twins* 55-61. For a detailed analysis of Chang and Eng in relation to U.S. identity and anxiety, see Pingree in Cohen. Also see Wu.

2 See the below endnote #5, particularly Bird, Camfield, and O’Connell, for interpretations of the twins as biracial.

3 Wigger, McKeithan, Parker and Binder all provide a detailed history of Twain’s two narratives.

4 Following Gilman’s lead, some critics more recently have noted the importance of both texts. Messent argues that “The stories may have been pulled apart, but they remain, nonetheless, connected” (135). O’Connell “assert[s] that *Pudd’nhead Wilson* and *Those Extraordinary Twins* together form a novel” (100). And Bird has also mentioned the critical trend in ignoring *Those Extraordinary Twins* and maintains “that the two are a single story: that Mark Twain intended for us to read them (it) as one, and that we cannot understand the main novel without its twin” (442).

5 Twinning in Twain has received extensive critical treatment. Gillman and Patten write that the twins “raise a fundamental question: whether one can tell people apart, differentiate among them. Without such differentiation, social order, predicated as it is on division—of class, race, gender—is threatened” (“Dickens” 448-449). Gillman’s *Dark Twins: Imposture and Identity* connects Twain’s usage of twins to questions of national brotherhood. Frederick maintains that “The connected twins embody problems of identity and difference because they are literally identical, in the sense that they are one, and different, that is, two, simultaneously” (498). While taking a similar viewpoint, Marcus positions Twain alongside thinkers such as William James and Friedrich Nietzsche. Writing against the “autonomous individualism” of the antebellum period, Twain, in *Pudd’nhead Wilson*, subscribes to all three
tactics that represent, for Marcus, “less-than-whole selves in American novels of the later
nineteenth century: those of divided, doubled, and crossed selves” (193). Likewise, for Ladd,
“the Twins are perfectly constructed to function as tools for the anatomizing of U.S.
pretensions toward a redemptive national unity” (107). And Royal posits that “If the tales of
the twins . . . suggest anything, it is the impossibility of an autonomous identity” (414). And,
focusing on the twins’ different skin colors, scholars such as Bird discuss their “conjoined
identity (in the form of black and white dependency and the fiction of difference . . .” (445),
Camfield “the ideas of filial connection between the races, a central component of the
culture’s debate over race” (191), and O’Connell “the unnatural adhesion and division
created through slavery” (102). These examples are only some of a much larger critical
cornerstone about twinning in Twain.

6 For example, see Royal 417; O’Connell 102; Mitchell, “‘De Nigger’” 299; Wigger 99; Ladd
107-108.

7 Likewise, Kete argues that Twain longs for a “pre-Civil War world,” one
where sentimentality structures thought and – I would add – action (147).

8 In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in Twain, gender, and
sexuality, both biographically and textually. For instance, Andrew Hoffman attempts to
challenge popular notions of Clemens as staunchly heterosexual by arguing “that between
1862 and 1865 Clemens engaged in a series of romances with men” during his time in the
West (25). Susan K. Harris notes “. . . that, between the mining country and San Francisco,
he [Clemens] gained a sophisticated knowledge about all kinds of sexualities, even if his own
participation was not excessive” (73). As I note above, Nissen explores homoeroticism and
“male friendships” in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Most recently, Linda A. Morris
argues that Clemens’ interest in cross dressing, tomboys, and same-sex married couples,
among other things, in fact upsets traditional gender identities delineated along sharply separate oppositions.

9 The actual Chang and Eng did marry sisters, and the four settled down to life on a plantation in Georgia.

10 There is a vast criticism devoted to Twain, twins, business and authorship, and his own sense of doubleness and contradiction. For a few examples, see Gillman, *Dark Twins* 5-8; Camfield 15, 128-130; Michelson 233-236.

Notes to Chapter Three

1 The examples are too numerous to mention in their entirety. For some examples of the Donner Party in late twentieth and early twenty-first century popular culture, see Richard Rhodes’ novel *The Ungodly: A Novel of the Donner Party* (1973), Ric Burns’ PBS documentary *The Donner Party* (1992), Ruth Whitman’s collection of poems, *Tamsen Donner: A Woman’s Journey* (1977), and the cult film *Ravenous* (1999). Recently, Ron Cunningham’s *A Woman’s Journey: the Tamsen Donner Story*, an interpretation of Whitman’s poems, was performed at the Sacramento Community Theater. The Donner Party has even found its way into underground music: in San Francisco, 1983, the band Donner Party formed; its members would go on to play in numerous independent rock bands. More recently, the band Alkaline Trio released their album *Good Mourning* (2003), which contains a track, told in the first-person view of one of the survivors, entitled “Donner Party (All Night).”

2 As Valerie Babb and other scholars maintain, whiteness as an identity category increasingly became key to a sense of nation-state belonging throughout the eighteenth century (37). By the mid-nineteenth century, it was crucial to a conception of the dominant, middle-class self. Predicated on (imaginary) physical and moral superiority, whiteness of course largely defined itself against racial Otherness—whether black, American Indian, Jewish, Irish,
Hispanic, Italian, and so on. One of many ways for Americans to define whiteness against Otherness was through the popular print mediums of 1840s American culture. Middle-class citizens could (re)assert their perceived notions of civility and moral superiority against the idea of the cannibal Other who worked antithetically to the dominant imagination’s notions of whiteness and progress. But at the same time, cannibalism extends beyond Otherness to also call into question humanness. As Probyn maintains, “the figure of the cannibal emphasizes the most human of attributes” but also designates “the limit beyond which humanity is thought to cease . . . the cannibal brings together competing aspects underlying Western identity . . . as a monstrous example the figure of the cannibal reminds us of our inhumanity; as an object of fascination, it questions what we may be becoming” (80-81).

Likewise, Sanborn remarks, in regards to authors of eighteenth and nineteenth-century shipwreck narratives, “For at least some of these writers, humanity does indeed flicker out at the moment when human flesh is consumed—. . . in other words, eating human flesh could be said to entail the deformation or annihilation of the eater’s moral nature” (42).

3 C.F. McGlashan interviewed Keseberg for his History of the Donner Party: A Tragedy of the Sierra (1879). In it, Keseberg attempts to dispel many of the lies and rumors attributed to him, including the fact that he enjoyed eating humans. To the contrary, Keseberg states, “I can not describe the unutterable repugnance with which I tasted the first mouthfuls of human flesh . . . There is an instinct in our nature that revolts at the thought of touching, much less eating, a corpse. It makes my blood curdle to think of it! . . . I am conversant with four different languages. I speak and write them with equal fluency; yet in all four I do not find words enough to express the horror . . . [of eating humans]”(210-211).

4 These descriptions of Keseberg write into mid-nineteenth-century culture’s beliefs about the cannibal’s supposed addiction to human flesh. For example, W. Cooke Taylor believed that,
“a depraved and unnatural appetite, when once formed, has a tendency, not only to continue, but to increase”; similarly, Arthur Thomson argued that “sensual love of human flesh invariably influenced the continuance of the custom” (both qtd. in Sanborn 28). By 1857, Robley Dunglison’s Medical Lexicon. A Dictionary of Medical Science would see “anthropophagy” as a medical disorder: “. . . A disease in which there is a great desire to eat it [human flesh]” (71). The entry institutionalizes and pathologizes cannibalism as a sickness of and within the body as it medically “proves” the addiction to human flesh. The rumor that Keseberg apparently desired human flesh long after being rescued helps, in these narratives, to inscribe a type of monstrous permanence upon him—his addiction to human flesh prevents him from ever reclaiming humanity and civil manhood.

5 In 1874, Alfred Packer, a prospector in the Colorado Rockies, apparently killed five men and ate their flesh. For more on Packer, and for a discussion of fraternal “codes” and “etiquette” in the outdoor West, see De Stefano.

6 The irony is that Hastings included this shortcut in his travel book without actually ever having traveled the route. At the moment the Donner Party reached the jumping-off point, Hastings was traversing the shortcut for the first time.

7 For example, see Johnson, “Unfortunate” 8-12.

8 Some of the major historical accounts, besides Thornton and McGlashan, include Eliza Donner Houghton, The Expedition of the Donner Party and its Tragic Fate (1911) and George R. Stewart, Ordeal by Hunger: The Story of the Donner Party (1936). Houghton and Stewart’s works were largely viewed as the standards for Donner Party scholarship until the appearance of a revisionist history, Joseph A. King’s Winter of Entrapment: A New Look at the Donner Party (1992). There have been a few other accounts published in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but Kristin Johnson sees the above titles, along with Thornton and
McGlashan, as the major contributors to the popular construction of the Donner Party. While noting each of the title’s merits, Johnson also points out their problems and inconsistencies (1-3). For a combined historical and archeological approach, see Hardesty, ed., *The Archaeology of the Donner Party.* And, for two examples of anthropological and anthropophagical studies, albeit ones that only briefly mention the Donner Party, see Goldman, ed., *The Anthropology of Cannibalism* and Petrinovich, *The Cannibal Within.* Literary scholars have analyzed cannibalism in literature, but never texts written about the Donner Party. For some recent examples of cannibalism in literature, see Berglund, Sanborn, and Guest.

9 For example, Kilgour argues that while the act of cannibalism “depends upon and reinforces an absolute division between inside and outside” it nevertheless “dissolves the structures it appears to produce” (4). Likewise, Berglund states, “Defining the Other as a barbaric cannibal, one who may extinguish your life, clearly distinguishes the boundaries between good and evil, between me and you. However, consumption by another collapses identity boundaries: in being consumed, You becomes Me, I become You-Me . . . Being cannibalized makes one estranged from one’s familiar self/selves” (8, emphasis in original). And, like Kilgour and Berglund, Guest posits that “If we look beyond the oppositional logic of cannibalism as a discourse, we see that as a taboo its efficacy relies not on its participation in differential systems of meaning but rather on its recognition of corporeal similarity . . . Indeed, the idea of cannibalism prompts a visceral reaction among people precisely because it activates our horror of consuming others like ourselves” (3).

10 Kristin Johnson points out that it is uncertain as to which exact tribe Lewis and Salvador were members. She mentions that Joseph A. King researched the early baptismal records at San Jose Mission for converts given the Christian names Lewis (sometimes spelled” Luis”)
and Salvador (occasionally “Salvadore”). King believed that Eema, a Miwok who would have been about 19 in 1846, might have been Lewis, and Queyuen, a Miwok about 28, was Salvador. See Johnson, *New Light*.

11 Early in their entrapment, Eddy and the others had decent luck in terms of hunting. At one point, according to Thornton, Eddy was even able to shoot and kill a large grizzly bear, which provided food for some time. But when massive amounts of snow began falling, the emigrants apparently found very little game, as it assumed the animals took shelter.

12 In McGlashan’s *History of the Donner Party*, Keseberg explains how he became disabled while hunting, before the party became stranded: “Becoming excited with the sport, and eagerly watching the game, I stepped down a steep bank. Some willows had been burned off, and the short, sharp stubs were sticking up just where I stepped. I had on buckskin moccasins, and one of these stubs ran into the ball of my foot, between the bones and the toes. From this time, until we arrived at Donner Lake, I was unable to walk, or even to put my foot to the ground . . . I mention this particularly, because I have been frequently accused of remaining at the Donner cabins from selfish or sinister motives, when in fact I was utterly unable to join the relief parties” (207-208).

Notes to Chapter Four


2 For two such examples, see Mitchell, “Race, Face” and McMurray.

3 For informative historical and cultural discussions of euthanasia and its relation to eugenics, see Emanuel, Cheyfitz, Lavi, and Appel.
Before 1870, doctors such as John Warren argued that medical men might use ether “in mitigating the agonies of death” (qtd. in Emanuel 3). But in 1870, Samuel D. Williams suggested that chloroform might not only alleviate pain in dying, but also might be given, in an act of mercy, to prematurely end a patient’s life. His suggestion (later published as a book) spurred controversy in medical circles, and doctors published their views in medical periodicals as well as in daily and weekly newspapers. These discussions continued into the last decade of the nineteenth-century, and by 1906, the Ohio legislature debated the first U.S. law to allow doctors to euthanize their seriously ill patients. A good summary of the 1906 Ohio legislature can be found in Appel.

In the late 1890s, U.S. doctors such as A. J. Ochsner argued that performing vasectomies on criminals and “inebriates, imbeciles, perverts, and paupers” would vastly reduce crime (qtd. in Quinn 2). A year after the first publication of *The Monster*, Simeon E. Baldwin, in an 1899 article, suggested that one might not only offer euthanasia to the dying “old man,” but also administer it to the “unfortunate babe, that is born into the world with physical defects” (qtd. in Lavi 200). The following year, W. Duncan McKim, a New York doctor and author, advocated a painless death for people with physical and mental disabilities. McKim also suggested that epileptics, the retarded, alcoholics, and criminals served as worthy candidates for death by carbonic gas (Cheyfitz 12). In 1903, Dr. Charles Bacon encouraged whites to “help along the [natural] process of [black] extinction” (qtd. in Haller, Jr. 209). And a 1906 legislation bill, this time in Iowa, proposed that parents be allowed the right to have doctors euthanize infants with birth defects so as to hinder “the rearing of children who are hideously deformed or hopelessly idiotic” (qtd. in Appel 620).

For an older example, see Gullason 663-668. For more recent critical treatments that either ignore the issues of race completely or only mention them in passing, see Giles, who
discusses Crane’s narrative technique and “the reader’s participation in the structural subtext” (46); and Nagel, who focuses on themes, plot summary, structural organization, and “moral conflict” (51).

In 1990, Mitchell pointed out that issues such as the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in Ferguson vs. Plessy, the Jim Crow laws of the south, the imperialist “white man’s burden” in the Philippines and elsewhere, and the dramatic increase in the lynching of black men following Reconstruction all create a contextual backdrop for Crane’s story. Mitchell particularly investigates the issues of race and facial disfigurement, asking what it means to be black and deformed in the U.S. and suggests that “The narrative’s larger horror . . . lies in its representation of race itself as at once a morally transcendent yet ineluctably social and indeed verbal dilemma” (175). McMurray follows Mitchell’s footsteps; he suggests that factors such as Plessy vs. Ferguson and the 1892 Port Jervis lynching of a black man named Robert Lewis reveal that Crane’s “thinking about race (and realism) was more complex than is generally acknowledged” and thus the story “restages a debate about [scientific theories of] black extinction and white philanthropy” (par. 3). An influential study to appear in recent years, Brown’s The Material Unconscious, continues the work of situating Crane within cultural discourses – particularly entertainment relics of mass culture, “the material unconscious.” For Brown, Crane links monstrosity with race in The Monster and “monstrous spectacle . . . entails the assimilation of two histories of the theatricalized black body, the freak and the minstrel” (204). Morgan, who I will discuss in detail, argues that Crane writes against the strenuous ethos promoted by the cult of manhood and, particularly, Theodore Roosevelt. But, in contrast, Cleman sees Crane in step with racial and xenophobic anxieties in the wake of increased immigration, arguing that Crane’s attitudes towards race in The Monster are fairly obvious if one only pays attention to his “anti-minority and specifically
racist views in a number of his journalistic and other lesser-known pieces” (121). And Hiro discusses the “reorientation of sympathy” in the novella. She argues that “Crane’s story performs a sort of experiment on the nature of sympathy, and in this way reflects upon and participates in the analysis of the social functions of sympathy underway within the emerging social-scientific discourse of the turn of the twentieth-century” (180). Hiro goes on to suggest that, “. . . in this period, emotion itself was increasingly conceived as a component both of the social and of the exteriors of persons, rather than being opposed to or blotted out by the dominance thereof” (184). As the above examples should indicate, the trend in reading The Monster ahistorically is on the decrease.

8 The scholars I mention above, among others, greatly detail the roles that physicians, for and against euthanasia, played in late nineteenth and early twentieth century euthanasia debates.

9 For a discussion of “the cultural logic of euthanasia,” both as it pertains to Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener” and as an “umbrella concept, a mode of thought manifest in particular notions of choice, control, happiness, and suffering that underpin a wide range of practices and perceptions” (779) in Western culture, see Garland-Thomson, “The Cultural Logic.”

10 For example, in Hereditary Genius, Galton notes that blacks in the U.S. and Africa” [are] so childish, stupid, and simpleton-like, as frequently to make me ashamed of my own species” (306-307). Not only were African Americans often equated to children, they were predicted to become extinct. As Haller, Jr. argues, “the belief in the Negro’s extinction became one of the most pervasive ideas in American medical and anthropological thought during the late nineteenth century. It was also a fitting culmination to the concept of racial inferiority in American life” (41). In one 1902 case Haller, Jr. uses to illustrate his point, Seale Harris, a member of the American Medical Association, linked the African-American with other
“defectives” and soon predicted “the final destruction of the race” (qtd. in Haller, Jr. 47).
Frederickson sees statistics stemming from the 1870 U.S. census, which showed a dramatic
decrease in post-War black births, as responsible for the popular beliefs about African-
American extinction (238). And African Americans, as the white mind fashioned it, proved
endlessly devoted to their white superiors. Cleman suggests, “Henry’s actions also fit the
stereotype of the loyal slave carrying out his duties” (128). From this viewpoint, his heroic
act is nothing but rather simple duty conducted out of “negro” devotion. For more on the
medical, scientific, and cultural ideologies surrounding African Americans in the late
nineteenth century, especially as they pertain to racial degeneration and extinction, see
Haller, Frederickson, and Cassuto.

11 See McMurray for a discussion on how the birthday party scene and others speak to white
fears about black male sexual predators.

12 It seems no coincidence that Crane features a judge in The Monster. Law and medicine
were joined at the hip at the end of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s, euthanasia debates
moved beyond medical circles to include the legal and social science communities (Emanuel,
par. 17). In 1891, Felix Adler, a scholar and educator, issued a call for laws to allow doctors to
end the lives of their terminally ill patients. Adler suggested the formulation of a six-member
commission, comprised of physicians and judges, to ensure that doctors only would be
allowed to euthanize their patients if the commission could all agree that the individual’s
case was hopeless (Cheyfitz 12). And by the twentieth century, courts began hearing endless
cases about voluntary and involuntary euthanasia proposals.

13 Susan Ryan makes a more detailed distinction between sentimental and anti-sentimental
benevolence in the antebellum period; see Ryan 19-22.
For further information on the growing numbers of the “feebleminded” in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and of the various classificatory tools—IQ tests, family trees, and behavioral assessments—that eugenicists used to “diagnose” patients, see Snyder and Mitchell, 74-99. Snyder and Mitchell also note that the rhetoric of incarceration in popular journals and medical articles in the period from the 1890s to the 1920s shows a shift from a narrative of training and self-help to one that curtly speaks of the menace the “feebleminded” pose to society (118).

See Brown for more on the novella’s relation to freak shows.

Notes to Conclusion

There is an enormous amount of scholarship in trauma studies on black bodies and tropes of wounding—indeed, there is much more than can be cited here. For only a few examples, see Burrows 8-11; 45-46; Morton; Putzi 99-129; James; Henderson; and Titus.
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