WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
SAMUEL A. STOUFFER AND THE AMERICAN SOLDIER

BY

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Date defended: November 18, 2009
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Abstract

This study considers the life and career of Professor Samuel A. Stouffer (1900-1960) as it relates to the landmark sociological work *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volumes I and II*, more commonly known as *The American Soldier*. During the Second World War, Dr. Stouffer served as an expert consultant to the Secretary of War in his capacity as chief social science analyst of the US Army’s Research Branch, Information and Education Division. Stouffer and his colleagues surveyed approximately half a million soldiers to determine their attitudes, and the information Stouffer provided on attitudes had a profound effect on policy; influencing the content of the military newspaper *Stars and Stripes*, the awards system, demobilization plans, and scores of other aspects of personnel management, from race to the content of propaganda films. Although Stouffer’s immediate task was one of social engineering, his study represented the largest sociological survey conducted up to that time, and business, science, government, and a host of other institutions and agencies were quick to recognize the value of both the information he presented and his survey research techniques. In addition to exploring the impulses which gave rise to *The American Soldier*, how was it perceived, planned, and executed, and how it affected institutions and disciplines, this study also tracks the trajectory of Stouffer’s life and work and his effect on sociology, government policy, business, and the identity of American soldiers. Stouffer represents the rise of the expert and the growing importance of research over intuition as a basis of knowledge in both the American military and the United States as a whole in the twentieth century. He also represents what the United States was willing to bring to bear, in addition to traditional means, to ensure victory in World War II.
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As one reaches the end of an undertaking such as a dissertation, the vertical pronoun begins to slink unbidden into one’s thoughts. The author becomes increasingly aware of the thousands of hours he has spent wandering in the wilderness, and a rather sickening element of self-pity sidles up to accompany pride in his brain. He forgets that he has been accompanied throughout his wanderings by scholars both living and dead, long-suffering administrators, patient archivists and librarians, bemused friends, curious students, harried professors, and a host of others who have cajoled, wheedled, directed, guided, listened, provided, suggested, encouraged, and inspired his work. Mesmerized by the sight of his name on the cover of his *magnum opus*, he is often too quick to pat himself on the back while forgetting those who have challenged and helped him. Before I too am tempted drink from the waters of the Lethe, there are dozens needing thanking.

Primacy of place belongs to Professor Roger J. Spiller. When I taught in high school, one of my students defined a mentor as “the one who watches your brain.” That is precisely what Roger has done, lo these long years, with an elegance and skill that defines the words gentleman and scholar. Professor Theodore A. Wilson also had enough faith in me to take me on as a graduate student at the University of Kansas and give me the opportunity to complete this work, and I am in his debt for the many hours he has spent guiding me through the maze of academia. In that maze I met Professors Karl Boyd Brooks, Jonathan Earle, Steven A. Epstein, Sheyda Jahanbani, Paul Kelton, Bill Tuttle, Leslie Tuttle, Jennifer Weber, and others, all of whom deserve my thanks for their wisdom and guidance. I also had the unflagging support of the administrative team in the history department, chief among whom are Ellen Garber and Sandee Kennedy, without whom nothing gets done, and who had more faith in me than I did in myself.

While Professors Spiller and Wilson sat on my committee, so too did Professors Victor Bailey, Jeffrey P. Moran, and Janet Sharistanian. I had the privilege of taking several classes with Professor Bailey, who tirelessly and patiently demanded academic rigor, thoughtful analysis, and through his own writings and teachings demonstrated clearly and elegantly what a historian does, and how to do it exceedingly well. Professor Moran, through his sense of humor and gentle guidance helped me to put my work in context and opened up the world of the intellectual historian, and Professor Sharistanian provided additional insight and encouragement.

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A very special boon was the willingness of Samuel Stouffer’s daughters - Ann Stouffer Bisconti Dyke, and Jane Williams - to be interviewed for this project. Their insights into their father’s life and work could have come from nowhere else.

Also deserving of my thanks are my graduate student colleagues, all of whom helped make an already great place to work better. Of course I am also indebted to the outstanding
archivists at Harvard (Timothy Driscoll & co.), Princeton (Daniel J. Linke & co.), and the National Archives (Rich Boylan & co.), and to Sara E. Morris and the ever-helpful reference librarians here at the University of Kansas, as well as to the muses, Professors Sam Lewis and Mike Pearlman. And to my other friends - thanks for your patience and understanding during my sojourn in the Ivory Tower.

“If the heavens were all parchment, and the trees of the forest all pens, and every human being were a scribe, it would still be impossible for me to record all that I have learned from my teachers.” - Yohanan Ben Zakkai
Sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer was born on June 6, 1900 in Sac City, Iowa. The son of Samuel Marcellus Stouffer, a Sac City newspaper owner and editor, Stouffer took his B.A in Latin at Morningside College (1921), followed by an M.A. in English at Harvard (1923). He returned to Sac City from Cambridge to manage and edit his father’s newspaper until 1926, when he entered the University of Chicago to study sociology. Completing his PhD in 1930, he spent the following year as an instructor of statistics at Chicago and at the University of Wisconsin, and then departed for a postdoctoral year at the University of London for additional study of statistics. Upon his return to the United States in 1932, Stouffer served as a professor of social statistics at the University of Wisconsin. In 1935 he accepted a sociology professorship at the University of Chicago, where he remained until 1946. During the Second World War, Stouffer served as the senior sociologist of the U.S Army’s Research Branch, Information and Education Division, whose job it was to survey soldiers and recommend personnel policies based on their findings. In 1946, Stouffer became the founding director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard, where he remained until his death on August 24, 1960. During these years he produced two of the most influential works in American sociology - *The American Soldier* (1949), a two volume summary of the survey work of the Research Branch during the war, and *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (1955), a study of American attitudes towards communism in the McCarthy era. Stouffer also served as the 42nd president of the American Sociological Association (1953).
Chapter 1

Introduction: Samuel A. Stouffer

The Liberty Limited arrived in Washington, DC on August 4, 1941 - a day when everyone knew what a Pullman train was, and when women were about to learn how to draw stocking lines on their legs with eyebrow pencils. Alighting from the train was a diminutive man on his way to the War Department. He had no official status, no military rank, and although at forty-one he had reached a certain level of prominence in his field, no one would have noticed him much in a national capital that knew it was likely to go to war. The man stepped into the welter of pre-war activity, met a colleague for breakfast, and then headed for the Munitions Building. It was already hot, but it would get hotter still before the day was out - late summer in Washington, DC.¹

Nineteen years and twenty-one days later, The New York Times ran an extended obituary for the man, entitled “Samuel Stouffer, Sociologist, Dead.” Readers learned that Stouffer (1900-1960) was from Sac City Iowa, and that he had held sociology professorships at Wisconsin, Chicago, and Harvard. He had been the founding director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard, and president of both the American Sociological Association and the American Association for Public Opinion Research. Readers also learned what had come of Stouffer’s train trip from Chicago to Washington DC nineteen years before: “Dr. Stouffer was the principal author of ‘The American Soldier,’ an exhaustive study of the citizen-soldier….The book was a report developed from the research work he directed during World War II at the Education and Information Division of the War Department.” Lieutenant General James Gavin, commander of

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.” Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.
the famed 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division in World War II, was interviewed for the obituary, and he commented that Stouffer had made “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” The obituary also indicated that the knowledge gained in Stouffer’s studies applied to business, urban planning, population control, public-opinion polls, civil liberties, and economics. Those were the bare bones of an influential and innovative professional career.\footnote{“Samuel Stouffer, Sociologist, Dead: Chief Author of ‘American Soldier’ Led Harvard Unit - Studied Public Opinion.” \textit{The New York Times}, Thursday, August 24, 1960. 29.}

Stouffer’s work is cited in journals as diverse as \textit{Child Development Abstract, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology}, and \textit{Commentary}. He served as a consultant to scores of private and public institutions, including the American Standards Association, the Cooperative Test Service of the American Council on Education, the University of California, the American Economic Association, the Population Association of America, the National Committee on Atomic Information, and the American Psychoanalytic Association. He was also a delegate to the International Conference on Population in Paris (1938) as well as a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Philosophical Association, Phi Beta Kappa, the American Statistical Association, the Sociological Research Association, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics, the Population Association of America, the Psychometric Association, and reflecting part of his social life, the Harvard and Cosmos Clubs.\footnote{Stouffer Correspondence 1946-1960, Harvard University Archives.}

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army in World War II, believed that Stouffer’s \textit{The American Soldier} represented “the first quantitative studies of the impact of war on the mental and emotional life of the soldier.” Like others, Marshall also emphasized that
“the value of these books goes beyond their obvious importance to military training….“ After reading The American Soldier at La Finca Vigia in Cuba, Ernest Hemingway wrote to Charles Scribner that it was “An excellent and impressive work….“ And the eminent sociologist C. Wright Mills included in The Sociological Imagination (1959) the flat statement that “apart from the official history of the War, the most elaborate body of research is probably the several-year inquiry made for the American Army under the direction of Samuel Stouffer.”

By the time Princeton University Press published The American Soldier in 1949, many more influential figures both in and outside of government had recognized the value and potential applications of Stouffer’s work. Frank Stanton of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) wrote in 1944 that “the work Sam Stouffer has done for the Army is by all odds the best to come out of the war. For that matter, his program represents the most complete thing of its kind to date….in this mass of data there are buried the answers to many methodological problems in the entire field of sampling and attitude measurement….“ Without fail, credible authors writing of the American military experience in World War II, or sociological research methods, include The American Soldier in their bibliographies. The American Soldier has become what scholars refer to as a landmark work.

Landmark though it may be, it is seldom read. Like the classics or the Constitution, it is constantly referenced, praised as “standard,” and memorialized into quaintness. Although The American Soldier appears in multitudes of bibliographies, it is clear from many of these books

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4 George C. Marshall to Frederick H. Osborn, April 7, 1950. The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer. (HUG FP 31.6, Box 1), Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.
7 Frank Stanton to William Benton, June 17, 1944. Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.
that Stouffer’s findings were either never fully read or were misunderstood. Stouffer and the Research Branch of the War Department’s Information and Education Division surveyed over half a million servicemen during World War II; work which represents the largest scientifically-conducted survey of its kind. Sadly, what he learned is not widely taught, and what he knew is not generally known; as a result, social and particularly military history is often so fraught with myth, heritage, and nostalgia that it is becoming increasingly difficult to classify as history. More immediately, citizens and military policy makers reach decisions about the management of soldiers while ignorant of Stouffer’s extremely useful findings. Knowledge then of *The American Soldier* - which quite literally analyzes at least 500,000 primary documents - by any standard should be helpful in distinguishing fact from fiction, and in providing decision-makers with the fundamentals for understanding American soldier attitudes and behavior.

Sociologist C. Wright Mills believed that “no social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey.”\(^9\) The purpose of this study is to discover what impulses gave rise to *The American Soldier*, how was it perceived, planned, and executed, and how it affected institutions and disciplines - and to do so through the life and work of Samuel A. Stouffer. Specifically, this work undertakes to follow the advice of historian Sir Michael Howard regarding the three tasks of constructing narrative history: “First, find out what happened. Then, establish a chain of causation. Finally, apply critical judgment.”\(^10\) This study is not a biography of Stouffer. Rather, it is a synthesis of his ideas as a sociologist as they met and in some respects formed military culture. From this meeting emerged modern military sociology and modern survey research. A welcome result of this approach is a narrative that crosses genres - a story that includes

biographical, cultural, social, intellectual, and military histories, yet without the pretensions of grand narrative. Although somewhat out of fashion, the attempt is to follow von Ranke’s advice, as a goal, to render history as “wie es eigentlich gewesen,” rather than to engage in an historical-interpretive debate with other historians. And because Stouffer’s work is inseparable from both sociology and the military, the chapters will, perforce, telescope in and out of one another, as is common when tracing ideas that do not pass neatly from one person or institution or time to another. A continuing theme will be the lengths to which the United States Government was willing to go during World War II to keep the guns of its conscripted army pointed at the enemy.

Stouffer repeatedly stressed in the introduction to The American Soldier that his work during World War II was a task of social engineering rather than one of social science. “It must not be forgotten,” he wrote, “that the Research Branch was set up to do a fast, practical job; it was an engineering operation; if some of its work has value to for the future of social science this is a happy result, quite incidental to the mission of the branch in wartime.” (Hence the validity of General Gavin’s comment in Stouffer’s obituary. For his part, Stouffer would have been gratified to read that the general had defined Stouffer’s work as “science”). Still, Stouffer recognized the potential of his work when he also observed in the introduction that “we have here a mine of data, perhaps unparalleled in magnitude in the history of any single research enterprise in social psychology or sociology.”

The data of which Stouffer wrote have been largely unmined by historians, particularly when compared to their counterparts in sociology. The American Soldier echoes and reverberates in the scholarship of sociology, but most historians, though familiar with it, have yet to analyze it in detail. Two possible reasons for this historical neglect may have been

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the assumption that the findings about the recruiting, training, and performance of American soldiers in World War II were rendered moot by the coming of the atomic age, as well as the reflex and rush to document the actions of the great commanders.

Stouffer’s Research Branch was a sub-unit of the ever-evolving Army Information and Education Division. The organization, which had begun in March 1941 as the Morale Division, took on broader tasks and a new name as the Special Services Division before settling into its final incarnation as the Information and Education Division of the US Army Service Forces. The Division ultimately had four branches: (1) Information (2) Education (3) Orientation and (4) Research. None of the other three branches acted without consulting the Research Branch, however, as the data that Stouffer and his colleagues produced were often the basis for decisions on how best to inform, educate, and orient the soldier. In Stouffer’s words, “the information and Education Division…was an agency of communication. Most of its branches were concerned with imparting information to soldiers. The Research Branch was mainly concerned with analyzing and imparting information which it obtained from soldiers.” Research Branch was established in October 1941, within two months of Stouffer’s arrival in Washington, DC. Almost immediately, its utility as a social engineering mechanism became apparent.

“The army reported that at the point of embarkation in New York, there were a great many desertions,” remembered Major General Frederick H. Osborn, Chief of the Information and Education Division and Stouffer’s wartime boss. “The army got much disturbed and asked

12 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment during Army Life. 9-12. See also Frederick H. Osborn, “Recreation, Welfare, and Morale of the American Soldier.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 220, Organizing for Total War, (March 1942): 50-56. Osborn and others tend to use the words “branch” and “division” interchangeably. Osborn refers to his original organization as Morale Branch, which had six divisions: the Army Exchange Service, the Army Motion Picture Service, the Welfare and Recreation Division, the Services Division, the Morale Research Division, and the Information Division. Various reorganizations and name changes occurred as the war progressed.

the research division to make a study of what was happening.” Osborn explained that he had earlier “called in Sam Stauffer [sic] head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, whom I had gotten to know before the war. He was not only on the hard factual side of sociology, but he had also been a newspaper reporter and had a keen sense for getting things done.”

To address the army’s concerns about desertions, Stouffer ran a quick study. He discovered that the army was sending men home on leave in civilian clothes, and he recommended that they be required to go in uniform instead. “There were few desertions at the point of embarkation after that,” said Osborn, “It was a simple thing and such an amusing solution.” Stouffer’s recommendation was indeed simple to the point of elegance and doubtless amusing to a man with Stouffer’s sense of humor. Masters of their trades often make the complex look simple, the difficult look easy. If they are very good, they make it all look a bit amusing as well.

That Stouffer could solve a desertion problem with a change of clothing was not alchemy. He knew, as Osborn later remembered, “when soldiers went home or went to their families or friends in uniform they were made much of as soldiers. Their families were proud of

15 Ibid, Osborn Papers. The misspelling of Stouffer’s name by the typist is understandable. Osborn would have pronounced it that way. Stouffer insisted on that pronunciation, and would say “Stouffer, as in louse.” The pronunciation is one example of his self-effacing humor. (Interview with Mrs. Jane Williams, Samuel A. Stouffer’s daughter, Wicomico Church, VA, September 4, 2007).
16 Ibid, Osborn Papers. 17.
them and their girlfriends said they were heroes, and saw them back to camp.”¹⁷ Just how Stouffer understood such things is a compelling question, as ideas such as these do not simply spring from the ground. Stouffer’s own experience, personality, and education certainly come to bear, but they are the end, not the beginning, of a long chain of intellectual history that begins as far back as the Stoics and their commitment to empirical observation. Sociological survey research existed long before it was named, and sociology and armies have been lurching towards their dialectical relationship since ancient times. Around the turn of the twentieth century, there was a fierce contest between those who struggled to explain war in traditional human terms and those who were beginning to explain war in scientific terms. Stouffer was key to this debate, in showing how sociometrics could inform theories of human behavior in war. The cockpit of the contest was World War II, yet the argument was not entirely settled in the 1940’s, and continues today.

Stouffer reported that he and his staff were influenced greatly by the ideas about behavior and attitudes extant at the time they wrote *The American Soldier*. Of these, four were paramount: Dynamic Psychology - man not as a rational being, but rather as a creature moved by unconscious desires, Learning Theory - conditioned response through rewards and punishments, Social Anthropology and Sociology - “The plasticity of the human organism,” and social roles - class, adaptation, and “the individual as a member of the social system.”¹⁸

Stouffer conducted his first survey on December 8, 1941, and he continued through November 1945, as the millions of American soldiers who had been summoned to fight World War II were demobilized. In these years Stouffer noted, “more than half a million soldiers were to be questioned by the Research Branch in all parts of the world. Over 200 different

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¹⁷ Ibid, Osborn Papers.
questionnaires, many of which contained 100 or more separate items, were to be administered.” Stouffer’s business was to measure attitudes, and he did so, about everything from attitudes towards allies to attitudes of men in staging areas. As military operations expanded and revealed behavioral issues affecting the prosecution of the war, so did Stouffer’s mandate. By 1944, in addition to measuring attitudes, the Research Branch conducted psychiatric screening tests, explored postwar plans for black soldiers, studied psychoneurotics as they were then called within the Army, and inquired about soldier savings habits, among many other inquiries. All of this work fell within the broadly defined mission of the Research Branch, “to provide the Army command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and inferences, might be helpful in policy formation.”

The First World War had given the army experience with soldier attitudes, and some in the 1941 War Department remembered the rapid mobilization of 1917. They had learned the wisdom of caring about soldier attitudes in a large, democratic, and conscripted army, and had created in 1917 the Commission on Training Camp Activities, or CTCA. The mandate from Secretary of War Baker to Raymond B. Fosdick, the director of the CTCA, required him to see after the morale and, in Baker’s mind, the more important moral welfare of the troops. The army took up in World War II where it left off in World War I, creating the Morale Division which evolved into the Information and Education Division of which Stouffer’s Research Branch was a part. And the perceived need was great. Shortly before Stouffer conducted his first survey,

22 Newton D. Baker. Frontiers of Freedom. New York: George H. Doran, 1918. 94. Another guidepost for the World War II US Army was the experience with the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Great Depression.
the War Department had in its Victory Program “projected an Army with a peak strength of 213 divisions,” or about 3.2 million men, larger than World War I’s approximately 2.9 million. By 1945, counting non-divisional soldiers, the Army Air Corps, etc., the army fielded about 8.2 million men, most of them drafted. Stouffer surveyed nearly sixteen percent of them.

Notwithstanding World War I, Secretary Baker, and the CTCA, the intellectual line between ancient times and Stouffer is a long one, particularly when one considers the commentaries on soldier behavior to be found in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Homer. To be sure, the pawns of the gods in *The Iliad* seem terribly distant from Stouffer’s self-determining World War II G.I.s who read *Yank, the Army Weekly*, and *Stars & Stripes*, (written specifically for them), watched Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” films, (produced specifically for them), and made demands that resulted in revisions of pay scales, changed award policies, and created the point system for demobilization. Stouffer and his Research Branch were intimately involved in gathering the data which resulted in all of these measures - an undertaking which would have been incomprehensible to Agamemnon.

The yawning gap between Homer and Stouffer, or rather the evolution of military sociology, is not, however, without some significant mile markers. Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Grant and dozens more have noted soldier attitudes and behavior and commented on how they might be formed. Stouffer may not have read *Grant’s Memoirs*, but it is almost certain that he read at least some of *Caesar’s Commentaries*. His high school and college transcripts, as well as the institutional catalogues of his education, tell much about his intellectual development. Additionally, there are Stouffer’s own writings and behavior, all of which indicate a classically

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educated, insatiably curious modern Stoic going about finding hard data rather than relying on impressions, intuition, or conventional wisdom to make his case.  

Stouffer was born in Sac City Iowa on June 6, 1900. He could not have known during his boyhood that he would research and form the attitudes of American soldiers landing at Normandy forty-four years later. What he did know as he entered his teenage years was that war, and the behavior of men in it, was a compelling subject. His father, Samuel Marcellus Stouffer, had purchased the Sac City Sun newspaper in 1893, the year of the great Chicago Exposition where Frederick Jackson Turner had delivered his “Frontier Thesis,” and to which Iowa had sent goods and services worth a princely $125,000.00. On the cover of the Iowa Exposition’s report is a flag-waving, musket-bearing soldier, not unlike the bronze Union soldier placed on a pedestal opposite the Sac County Courthouse the year before. As a youth Stouffer often sat on the porch of his father’s newspaper office, listening to Civil War veterans spin yarns of their experiences. In 1923, when Stouffer returned from Harvard with his M.A., he edited the

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25 Ideas are elusive, almost untraceable chimera, particularly in the time before Guttenberg. Stouffer was perhaps unaware that Machiavelli (1469-1527) showed considerable interest in soldier attitudes in both The Prince, and The Art of War. He may not have known that Marshal of France Maurice de Saxe (1649-1750) ruminated at length on how to handle soldiers in his Reveries on the Art of War, that Napoleon’s chief surgeon Dominique Jean Larrey (1766-1842) made several observations on soldier attitudes, or that Syndam Poyntz (circa 1607-?), Benjamin Harris (circa 1781 - ?), Adrien J.B.F. Bourgoine (1785-1867), William Siborne (1797-1842) and Jakob Walter (1788-1864) all left memoirs or diaries that reflect, albeit through the refraction of memory, their attitudes as soldiers. He may or may not have read Grant and Lee’s memoirs, perhaps not, as his recreational reading tended toward Micky Spillane, Shakespeare, and Sherlock Holmes. He also probably missed Benjamin Athorp Gould’s Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers (1869), and although Colonel Ardant du Picq’s (1819-1870) Etudes sur le Combat, perhaps the first modern work that would fit nicely next to The American Soldier on a library shelf was translated into English in 1920, there is no evidence that Stouffer read it, in French or English.


28 Phillips, 16.

29 Interview with Mrs. Jane Williams, Samuel A. Stouffer’s daughter, Wicomico Church, VA, September 4, 2007.
newspaper until 1926 - a time when many Civil War veterans were dying, and their funeral announcements and obituaries regularly appeared in local newspapers.30

Of his early formal education, his transcripts reveal an emphasis on the classics common at the time. At Sac City High School he studied Latin through Caesar, Cicero, and Virgil, as well as English composition, French, German, history, and economics. These subjects were supplemented with a healthy dose of the hard sciences (physics, biology, and mathematics - both algebra and geometry). Graduating in 1918 and moving to nearby Morningside College in Sioux City, he took a B.A. in Latin in 1921, studying French, English, trigonometry, Bible literature, and military science.31 Although sociology was offered at Morningside as a major, Stouffer took no sociology courses.32 Instead, he concentrated on rhetoric, taking courses in public speaking and participating successfully in intercollegiate debate. One of his yearbooks mentions that Stouffer could “find more to say and say it in less time than any member of the class. He is always ready to take the lead and is always hunting new work. He disguises himself and many are the things he finds out. Among his accomplishments are those of a book agent, newspaper man, debater and comedian.” A dizzying array of extracurricular activities - Tennis, YMCA, Student Council, editor of the college paper, Republican Club, Literary Society - provide insight into his restless energy and devotion to self improvement.33 While in college he also met Ruth McBurney, whom he married in 1924, and with whom he had three children.

By the time Stouffer and his colleagues published The American Soldier in 1949, he was a master of the major ideas in sociology, psychology, and anthropology, and his formal

31 Transcripts courtesy of the Registrar and Alumni Relations of Morningside College, Sioux City, Iowa.
education was supplanted during the war with a rich array of scholarly contacts. The colleague
he breakfasted with upon his arrival in Washington in August 1941 was political scientist Harold
Lasswell, who had written his doctoral dissertation on World War I propaganda, and who was a
pioneer in the field of applied psychology. After lunch the same day Stouffer met with Walter
Bingham, holder of doctorates from both Harvard and the University of Chicago. Bingham was
founder and director of the Carnegie Institute of Technology’s Division of Applied Psychology,
and during World War I he had designed the classification, personality, and intelligence tests for
the Army that were the starting point for similar tests in World War II, and which became the
basis for modern Scholastic Aptitude Tests. During World War II, Bingham was the Army’s
head psychologist. The next day at lunch Stouffer met Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office
of Scientific and Research Development, which oversaw the beginnings of the Manhattan Project
and the development of, among other things, radar, the proximity fuse, and the Norden
bombsight.

Stouffer spent the war years working with these gentlemen and many like them. In
acknowledging the contributions of his colleagues to The American Soldier, Stouffer named
some of the most influential scholars, government officials, and businessmen in the country at
the time - from some of the most prestigious institutions. Like Stouffer, these contributors had

34 Ellen Herman. The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996. 24-25. Also the Jane Williams papers, Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival
in Washington DC.”
35 “Walter Van Dyke Bingham Collection, 1880-1952 [1900-1916]. Staff and Faculty Papers, Carnegie
(October 21, 2007). Also the Jane Williams papers: Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.”
Bingham was also instrumental, along with Bruce V. Moore, in developing questioning techniques, largely due to
his work in the interwar years with industrial psychologists. See Jean M. Converse. Survey Research in the United
36 The Jane Williams papers: Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.”
during Army Life. 18-29.
the ability to transcend their own disciplines to work with others on the problem at hand…winning the war. They did not live in a world of Cartesian separations which would have prevented them from apprehending the dynamics of a world war, or would have hindered their cooperation. The rigid divisions which exist today in many places between academic disciplines were not then yet in place.

The Research Branch, ostensibly a sociological organization, is notable for its significant role in Ellen Herman’s intellectual history of modern American psychology, *The Romance of American Psychology* (1995). She notes that Stouffer encouraged “an eclectic intellectual approach in the Research Branch that combined psychoanalysis, learning theory, cultural anthropology, and social systems theory, along with the latest statistical techniques in opinion polling.” No surprise then, that in the index to *The American Soldier*, one will find references to Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Gunnar Myrdal, I.P. Pavlov, and Max Weber.

Still, the Research Branch had a definite compass, found in its name. Stouffer believed in the value of research and empirical evidence. He commented early in the study on “the experimental tradition,” and went on to write that “just as medicine did not make distinctive progress until the exclusively clinical approach gave way to controlled experiments as a method of rigorous verification of hypotheses, so social psychology is likely to be limited in its development until the habit of required experimental verification is firmly established in research in social psychology.” His tool was the survey.

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A look at Stouffer’s doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago (1930) is instructive in this connection. In “An Experimental Comparison of Statistical and Case History Methods of Attitude Research,” Stouffer studied the attitudes of 238 University of Chicago students towards prohibition. He demonstrated that statistical methods rendered almost the same results as case-histories evaluated by experts, and he stressed that his conclusion “rests on experimental evidence,” which he presented in detail. Should any further focus beyond survey research have been required for Research Branch, there was of course the war. As Herman notes, “Dedicated throughout the war to enlarging their own sphere of influence, experts nonetheless quickly grasped that furthering a psychological science of social relations or theory of society was not the point. Winning the war was.”

After the war, academia, business, and government took full advantage of the Research Branch’s labors. The G.I. Bill, for instance, was based on Research Branch’s findings. Scholars, executives and government officials began to speak of human and social engineering, at first as a means to avoid future wars, and later as a means for better education, business, race relations, and government. Those who had worked with Research Branch in World War II took up prominent positions in universities, business, and government, from which they kept in touch with each other and exerted a major influence of post-war psychology and sociology. Seven of the twenty-four presidents of the American Sociological Association between 1945 and 1968 either served with or consulted with Research Branch during the war, and seemingly everyone

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41 Stouffer’s advisor was Ellsworth Faris (1874-1953), himself a psychologist (PhD University of Chicago, 1914). While Stouffer as a scholar tells us much about sociology, Faris tells us much about the permeability of discipline walls in his time. Although by education a psychologist, he served as both editor of the American Journal of Sociology and President of the American Sociological Association. See Robert E.L. Faris. Chicago Sociology: 1920-1932. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 158.
43 Herman, 21.
44 Herman, 127.
wanted Stouffer’s opinion on how to run things, from pollster Elmo Roper to the Greyhound Bus Company.\footnote{Harvard University Archives (HUG FP 31.6), the Stouffer Papers.} Shortly before his death in 1960, Stouffer was in Puerto Rico conducting research on population control, and only the swift progress of the cancer that killed him forced him to leave his work behind.\footnote{Jackson Toby. “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social Research as a Calling.” Robert K. Merton and Mathilda White Riley, eds. Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the American Experience. Norwood: Ablex, 1980. 131. Stouffer commented to his family shortly before his death that he believed the work he was doing was the most important in his life, and that he had so much more to do.}

Among the contributions of The American Soldier which has had a continuing influence on sociology is the concept of relative deprivation. Stouffer calls this idea “simple, almost obvious,” and defined it as comprehension of sacrifice in becoming a soldier as “greater for some than for others, depending on their standards of comparison.” He noted that the idea was related to “well known sociological concepts,” such as “‘social frame of reference, ‘patterns of expectation,’ or ‘definitions of situation.’” Relative deprivation was an idea that had legs. Sociologist Robert K. Merton developed the idea further in his Social Theory and Social Structure (1949), as did R.G. Runciman in his Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (1966). Relative deprivation is not the only concept Stouffer developed for sociology. In the late 1930’s he formulated the idea of “intervening opportunities” in migration, which considered the effect of enroute as well as destination opportunities and their affect on American migration patterns.\footnote{Gordon Marshall, ed. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1998.}

Stouffer could not have predicted his influence when, having returned to Sac City from graduate work in English at Harvard in 1923, he opted three years later to enter the PhD program in sociology at the University of Chicago. His decision to do so was in part attributable to the visit of sociologist E.A. Ross to Sac City. Once at Chicago, Stouffer was influenced by

psychologist L.L. Thurstone and sociologists Ellsworth Faris and William F. Ogburn, both of whom were heavily engaged in applied sociology. From this point onward, Stouffer became increasingly committed to what he would call “scientific sociology.” By 1948, he was arguing in a debate with a mathematician at Harvard that human behavior could in fact be predicted, and that, “the controlled experiment [in social sciences] is coming into its own.” He even claimed that the work of sociologists would “help regulate the complex civilization wrought by physical science and technology.”

Stouffer, like many in the “soft sciences” of his day, was doing what he could to harden his discipline into a proper science. Happily, his grounding in the liberal arts, particularly his graduate work in English and his experience as a newspaper editor never left him. His lectures were peppered with both Shakespeare and baseball statistics, making his work both enjoyable and accessible in a way they would not have been had he left these things behind. He also maintained a keen sense of history and geography, and much of his summer vacations were devoted to travelling with his family. He wanted his children to see every state capital, and when he visited the Tower of London he told them, with some relish, of the beheadings and imprisonments that had taken place there. He also ensured that his children had a good sense of sociological problems in the United States, at times taking them to the South to visit Jim Crow first hand, at other times allowing them to accompany him as he did his field work.

Part of the value then of *The American Soldier* is the voice in which it was written - clear, simple prose, free of bureaucratic or scientific jargon. Stouffer was also, refreshingly, quick in

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52 Bisconti-Stouffer-Dyke and Williams interviews.
The American Soldier to explain his survey and research methods and to point out their limitations. All of his written work reads as profoundly human, as if it has been written not by a man striving to be a scientist, but rather by a man wanting to convey complex ideas simply and elegantly. His attempt is to illuminate and to convince through evidence and reason, rather than to argue and advocate from an entrenched philosophical position. Stouffer’s voice is therefore a reflection of his personal life as well as his professional education.53

After completing his PhD at Chicago, Stouffer remained for a year (1930-31) and taught statistics there and at the University of Wisconsin. While he was teaching his Introduction to Statistics Course, some of the most famous sociologists in the United States were teaching with him. William F. Ogburn taught Research in Quantitative Sociology, Robert Ezra Park taught Human Migration and The Crowd and the Public, and Herbert Blumer taught Introduction to the Study of Society.54 Ogburn had previously taught sociology at Columbia, and had served as President of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1929. Park had been secretary to Booker T. Washington, and had also been ASA president (1925).55 Blumer was the first chair of sociology at Berkeley, and was also an ASA president (1956). Stouffer clearly was in on the ground floor as sociology developed as a discipline in the United States. (The American Sociological Association was founded in 1905). Additionally, Stouffer spent the academic year

53 Stouffer commented at the funeral of one of his mentors, William F. Ogburn, that “torturous prose sometimes is associated with profundity, but Ogburn never thought this correlation coefficient very high, and he was willing to take the calculated risk that lucid writing can all too easily be taken as evidence of lack of profoundity.” See “Some Notes on William Fielding Ogburn.” The Samuel Andrew Stouffer Papers. Speeches 1959-1930 Box 1 Voice of America engagement speech (1959) Speaking Engagements: Correspondence (1948-1956) HUG FP 31.45 The Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.

54 Summer Quarter Time Schedule, 1930, p. 9. University of Chicago Special Collections Research Center, ARC Ref. 1, LD 909.

55 Faris., 156, 159.
of 1931-1932 pursuing postdoctoral work in statistics at the University of London, where he studied with British statisticians Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher.  

Frederick H. Osborn, Stouffer’s wartime boss, persuaded the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) to bring Stouffer from the University of Chicago to Washington in the summer of 1941. The SSRC had funded Stouffer’s postdoctoral work in London, and had also during the 1930’s been keenly interested in the impact of the depression on American society. They had appointed Stouffer to oversee thirteen monographs on the subject, collectively entitled “Social Aspects of the Depression.” In addition to mastering the administrative duties needed to run such a project, Stouffer made contacts that would be useful during the war. He co-authored one of the monographs with Paul Lazarsfeld, who would later consult with the Research Branch and co-author one of the volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.  

Stouffer’s work with the SSRC as well as his academic labors prepared him well for the work the War Department assigned him in 1941. So too did his work with Gunnar Myrdal on the landmark 1944 study An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. Additionally, Stouffer had previously held a professorship at the University of Wisconsin (1932-1935).  

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58 Herbert H. Hyman. “Stouffer, Samuel Andrew,” in John A. Garraty, ed. *Dictionary of American Biography, 1956-1960 (supplement six)*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1980. 605. Stouffer’s work on the Myrdal study is relatively unknown, but according to Myrdal, it was critical. Myrdal himself returned to his native Sweden upon the German invasion of Norway in 1940, leaving Stouffer as director of the project, which Stouffer completed as the Battle of Britain began in September, 1940.  
59 Stouffer began his work in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Wisconsin in 1930 as a part time assistant professor of social statistics. (He also taught Introduction to Statistics at the University of Chicago). Upon his return from his post-doctoral year in London in 1932, he took on full time duties at Wisconsin, and was promoted to full professor in 1934. He taught undergraduate and graduate courses in social statistics, statistical methods in social psychology, statistics in population research, and statistical research in social pathology. He left Wisconsin in 1935 to take up a professorship at the University of Chicago, which he held until 1946 and his move to Harvard. University of Wisconsin Archives and Records Management: Bulletin of The University of Wisconsin - General Announcement of Courses, 1933-34. Prospective Candidates for Professor of Statistics, 1926-37, Series 7/33/1-1, Box 1, Department of Sociology, General Files, Correspondence. College of Letters and
where he worked with the Census Bureau and with the Central Statistic Board - later to become the Division of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget.\(^{60}\)

The most important result of these experiences was Stouffer’s ability to work as an outsider within a large bureaucracy, none of which was more intimidating and tribal than the United States Army. He was keenly aware that he had no official status as far as the Army was concerned. He wore no uniform, and although he was ultimately granted the rank and privileges of a brigadier general, he was wise enough never to don one, as many of his colleagues did. He knew that he had not been through the rights of passage required to wear a uniform, and he understood the totemic significance of the uniform within his society. Nor did he arrive in Washington full of demands for information, office space, a secretary, letterhead. He took the opposite approach, as he had done years earlier when he was an undergraduate newspaper editor: He disguised himself, and thus he was able to find out many things. He knew that he would, in his words, “not get to first base for SSRC without some kind of War Dept. status.” One of his friends in Washington told him that the War Department was the “hardest nut in Washington to crack,” and Stouffer understood the truth of it.\(^{61}\) One of the ways he cracked that nut was to feign and profess ignorance, thereby making himself non-threatening. A colleague remembered, “Sam traded beautifully on a studied innocence of military protocol.”\(^{62}\)

On Stouffer’s second day in Washington, Osborn arranged for him to be an expert consultant to the Secretary of War. “Expert,” commented Stouffer wryly in his notes, “quite a joke; know less about the army than about the Vatican.” But he also knew how to learn. “My

\(^{60}\) Young, 107.
\(^{61}\) Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.”
idea is to hunt the fellow actually carrying the ball; he may be far down in a hierarchy….I want to learn from ground up; not just what is officially said but what is really done.” That he understood there is a difference between the two would serve him well in the War Department.

Stouffer spent the remainder of his early days in Washington making contacts and asking polite questions, looking at records and talking with colleagues about how selection and classification of soldiers had been done in World War I. He remained all too aware of how easily he could be marginalized. “I don’t blame old army officers for looking at a layman like me as a nuisance…I know darned well how I’d feel if the V.P. of the university sent a layman around to cooperate with me on my teaching & research & I suspect the army is much more of a club than a university.”63 His sensitivity to the army’s institutional mores helped to produce an understanding, and even wisdom, that is not any less valuable because it was achieved sixty years ago.

After the war, Stouffer took up posts as Harvard professor of sociology and founding Director of Harvard’s new Laboratory of Social Relations, where he remained until his death in 1960. In addition to his many other duties and consulting projects, he chaired the Joint Committee of the National Research Council and Social Science Research Council, which continued to refine the survey research techniques he had employed to produce *The American Soldier*.64 In 1953 he served as the President of the American Sociological Association (ASA), and delivered the customary annual address at their meeting in Berkeley. Unsurprisingly, he chose for his subject “Measurement in Sociology.” He asked his audience to consider “the place of measurement in the process of invention in sociology itself, as a special case of the general working of invention in technology and science” and asked further, “if students of culture do not

63 Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.”
examine their own discipline as a specimen of culture, who else will do it better?” Clearly, he believed that sociology was a science. He spoke of “quantitative methods” and sociology’s ability to “measure interactions.” Nevertheless, he concluded his address by acknowledging the value of philosophy and art to sociology, and stated that the best sociological work is done by that sociologist or team of specialists who can combine philosophical, artistic and scientific methods. His prediction for the future of sociology was a bright one, ending with the phrase, “I bid you welcome into a brave new world.”

That summer at Berkeley in 1953, however, Stouffer was not content with simply giving an address, and what he did there demonstrates one of the dozens of reasons he has remained such an influential figure in sociology. Prior to the conference, he had asked each of the living former presidents of the ASA to record a two-minute message to “a young PhD just launching his or her sociological career.” The audience then heard from many of the scholars who had founded and formed American sociology. Among them were Emory S. Bogardus, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Henry Pratt Fairchild, Ellsworth Faris, John L. Gillin, George A. Lundberg, Howard W. Odum, William Fielding Ogburn, Talcott Parsons, and Rupert B. Vance. Their comments, which were duly recorded in the American Sociological Review, provide a brief but comprehensive background of the state of the art of sociology in and around the period in which The American Soldier was written.

Almost a year to the day after Stouffer delivered his address to the American Sociological Association, he had to fight a charge from the government that he had been “a close and

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sympathetic associate of members of organizations cited by the Attorney General of the United States as subversive, and of persons who have participated in the activities of such organizations and of organizations established as a front for subversive organizations.\textsuperscript{67} The charges were motivated by Stouffer’s work for the Ford Foundation, studying not only the Communist Party, but also the reaction of American citizens to government measures intended to curtail communist activities. An effort was made to deny Stouffer access to classified information, and he was required to show why such a denial should not be imposed.\textsuperscript{68} Ultimately, Stouffer won his case, and in 1955 published \textit{Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties}, a classic sociological study in which he found that few Americans knew who Senator McCarthy was, fewer were concerned about communism, and most just wanted to get on with their daily lives.\textsuperscript{69} It is difficult to imagine the outrage he must have felt at having to prove that he was trustworthy. Although the hysteria of the McCarthy era - largely an illusion according to Stouffer - was an aberration in the American body politic (although not without precedent), it hurt Stouffer and many others deeply. Fortunately, Stouffer did not allow bitterness to overshadow the five remaining years of his life. He remained an active scholar and consultant right up to the end.

As has been previously stated, this work is not simply a biography of Samuel A. Stouffer, but also an investigation into the people, institutions, events and ideas surrounding the creation of \textit{The American Soldier}. Still, a sense of Stouffer’s personality in the closing paragraphs of this introductory chapter may be useful.

\textsuperscript{67} Sworn Affidavit of Samuel Stouffer. The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer (HUG FP 31.35, Box 1). Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.
“Sam Stouffer was a wonderful human being,” remembered Rutgers sociology professor Jackson Toby. And that seems to be the prevailing attitude of those who knew him. Tom Pettigrew, a psychology and social science professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, remembered Stouffer as “a truly great social scientist and a wonderful human being,” a man of great “warmth and humor.” Sociologist Herbert H. Hyman wrote of Stouffer, “What an empiricist he was!” in a 1962 Public Opinion Quarterly article. Hyman wrote that unfortunately, even Stouffer’s writings are “too pallid a representation” of Stouffer’s style. “How passionately Sam could attack a table, or an IBM machine, and not only in the darkest hours of night, but all through the next day as well.” Howard Schuman, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan and a student of Stouffer at Harvard, dedicated two of his books to the chief author of The American Soldier: “Stouffer had a firm belief in the value of survey research, but at the same time a commitment to understanding its limitations and developing its potential so that it could be used more wisely for both practical and theoretical ends.”

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71 Tom Pettigrew to the author, June 29, 2006.
73 Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser. Questions & Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording, and Content. London: Sage, 1996. xiii. Research Branch also helped to solve a major problem in survey research and sociology by creating a clearer view of survey respondents not merely as individuals, but also as members of groups. “The applied uses of social research in consumer studies had, by the time of World War II, resulted in considerable knowledge about public opinion polling or survey techniques. Sampling, constructing questionnaires, interviewing, and other aspects of survey research had become quite refined. The relevance of survey methods for traditional sociological theory remained limited, however, because, it was thought, in survey research the investigated unit is the individual, whereas in theory sociology is interested in groups. But with World War II came the Research Branch and its massive studies by Stouffer and others. Having access to thousands of respondents who at the same time composed various ‘real’ groups, the Research Branch found it possible to collect information from and about individuals, summarize that information for all persons forming various groups, and then characterize the same person a second time with summary information of their groups. In this way, statements could be made about groups and about the effect of group membership on individuals. No longer would survey research have only a respondent’s report on the nature of his groups; now other members of those groups could also be questioned. It is true that some such technique had been used before, but the logic of its procedure had been little understood until the work of the Research Branch was published and commentary on the work followed.” Philip E. Hammond in Philip E. Hammond, ed. Sociologists at Work: Essays on the Craft of Social Research. New York: Basic Books, 1964.
A chain smoker who ended most of his working days covered in chalk dust and ashes, Stouffer was affable, warm, and possessed of a restless energy that never seemed to fail him. He held himself and those around him to high standards, was deeply interested in the education of his children, and was, in that hackneyed phrase - the consummate professional. James Davis, of the University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center and a former student of Stouffer’s, remembered him as looking “a bit like the men who played fussy bookkeepers in 1930’s screwball comedies,” and lacking “the combination of paternalism and narcissism that motivates the Great Man. Sam simply wanted to get on with the job….But Sam was a great sociologist.”

Modern social historians are deeply interested in identity and how it develops. But “identity,” observed historian Wayne E. Lee, “as many historians have discovered, is a funny thing. It is simultaneously defined by the self and the observer - usually not in the same way.” Hollywood and scores of books have co-opted the identity of the soldier, and in the United States particularly, the identity of the World War II American soldier. These modern Homers may film or write basing their findings largely on letters, diaries, Norman Rockwell paintings, recruiting posters, and oral histories, and their conclusions are often based on the exception rather than the norm. Their efforts do indeed add to the body of knowledge, but they tend to minister to modern demands for two-dimensional caricatures of soldiers as either heroes or villains. Neither of these cardboard cutouts is found in the pages of The American Soldier, but rather human beings caught up in events well beyond their control, and reacting and developing attitudes that are full of ambiguity and nuance. What Stouffer offers is much closer to a photograph than a portrait of the World War II American soldier.

Stouffer was a kind of circular conduit for soldiers - gathering their attitudes and using the data to influence soldier policies. Their attitudes were their identities, and he returned their identities to them with policy. Stouffer was asking, in as scientific a way as he knew, how soldiers interpret their own experience. He was, in a very real and verifiable way, the best and most informed advocate of their identities as they saw them. Here then is the value of Stouffer’s work, and a better understanding of the American World War II G.I. should, it seems, begin here. Too, soldier attitudes and Stouffer’s work with them helped to shape modern sociology - a contribution of which most of them would have been oblivious, but that was no less real for it. 

*The American Soldier* deserves a closer look, for as historian Carl Lotus Becker wrote, “the history that lies inert in unread books does no work in the world.” 76 Much of this history is not in *history* books, and some of it is in *The American Soldier*.

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Chapter 2

The American Soldier: Structure and Findings

In the months following its publication, The American Soldier received both rapturous praise and scathing criticism. Breathless tones of admiration, “Here is a book! Not since Thomas and Znaniecki’s Polish Peasant has there been a socio-psychological work of such scope, imaginativeness, technical rigor, and important results,”77 were answered with outbursts of excoriation, “The American Soldier is a ponderous demonstration in Newspeak.”78 Reviewed heavily in sociological and intellectual journals, though less so in military and historical ones, the two volumes of The American Soldier also made a bit of a splash in daily newspapers. The dailies generally published the main points about the books given to them by Princeton University Press, which stressed the comprehensive nature of the work, as well as its use of new methods in sociological research. Princeton favored such adjectives as “largest” “modern” “unique,” and “scientific.”79 The dailies also focused on some of the more provocative findings of the books, headlining their articles with titles such as “America’s Citizen Army in World War II Deeply Resented Privileges Given to Officers According to Recently Published Book.”80 The volumes were handsomely bound in blue-gray cloth, with the title in gold print on a dark blue background and bordered in gold stripes - reminiscent of a naval officer’s sleeve insignia. They sold for $7.50 each, or $13.50 for the set of two. In September 1951, Princeton University Press

78 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “The Statistical Soldier.” Partisan Review, vol. 16, no. 8 (August 1949): 852-856. Schlesinger could not have used more contemporary, derogatory language, as George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, from which the pejorative “Newspeak” comes, was published in the same year as The American Soldier (1949).
80 Knoxville News Sentinel, May 12, 1949. Comments such as this rested on as well as revived the findings of the Doolittle Board, 1946.
reported to the authors that over 3,000 sets of the two volumes had been sold and that “there is no sign that the sale is tending to stop.” What exactly were readers finding in *The American Soldier*, and what did the books say?

Prior to a detailed discussion of the structure and findings of *The American Soldier*, a note of explanation regarding the nomenclature and authors of the books may be helpful. *The American Soldier* consists of two volumes, the full titles of which are *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Volume I. The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*, and *Volume II. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath*. Princeton University Press also published an additional two volumes as part of the same series - *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Volume III. Experiments on Mass Communication*, and *Volume IV. Measurement and Prediction*. The first two volumes, published in 1949, have over time been lumped in with the third and fourth volumes, published in 1949 and 1950, respectively. All four volumes were written under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, and funded with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. For the sake of clarity and ease, as the volumes each have different and multiple authors, readers may find a complete listing of the four volumes, as well as additional explanatory information below. The present study is concerned in the main with *The

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American Soldier proper which, again, refers to the first two volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.

The American Soldier boasts ten authors: Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, Robin M. Williams, Jr., Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, M. Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. All of the authors worked in or consulted with Research Branch during World War II, and all of them were either former colleagues or students of Stouffer, and/or were prominent sociologists and psychologists. Most went on to have highly influential careers in foundations or academia, and three of them (Stouffer, Cottrell, and Williams), served as president of the American Sociological Association.

The authors of The American Soldier, Stouffer in particular, confronted the myriad of decisions common to all authors. Chief among these was what form The American Soldier would take, and how that form would subsequently be subdivided. The challenge was to condense four years of Research Branch work, including 500,000 soldier surveys, into a coherent narrative. Stouffer, reasonably if not entirely obviously, chose a two-volume format, separating adjustment to the Army from the signal event of a soldier’s life, combat. Within each volume he further subdivided his categories into chapters. The chapters represent not only an organizational structure, but also give a major hint at both the concerns of the Army and American society as a whole regarding their citizen soldiers. The chapters are also a reflection of the major interests

Andrew Abbott & James Sparrow point out the confusing nomenclature of the work: “The studies commonly known as The American Soldier were in fact issued by Princeton University Press in four separate volumes whose official series title is Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Of these four volumes, the first two share the main title The American Soldier, the first being subtitled Adjustment during Army Life and the second Combat and Its Aftermath. Historical convention has generalized the main title of these first two volumes to the whole series. Volume 3 is actually titled Experiments on Mass Communication and volume 4 Measurement and Prediction.” See Abbott & Sparrow. “Hot War, Cold War: The Structures of Sociological Action, 1940-1955,” in Craig Calhoun, ed. Sociology in America: A History. (Chicago, 2007), 281-313, fn 4, 288-289.
and findings of Research Branch, which in no small way dictated the structure of *The American Soldier*.

The process of creating *The American Soldier* formally began in the summer of 1945, shortly after the Japanese surrender. The Carnegie Corporation provided a $40,500 grant for the sifting of the data gathered during the war by Research Branch, with a view towards publication of the data in narrative form. The sifting and editing process was overseen by a special committee of the Social Science Research Council comprised of Frederick H. Osborn (chairman), Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Leland C. Devinney, Carl I. Hovland, John M. Russell, Stouffer, and Donald Young (ex officio and Director of the Social Science Research Council). All of the members, save Russell, had been members of or consulted with Research Branch during the war. Cottrell, DeVinney, Hovland, and Stouffer comprised the technical subcommittee which oversaw day-to-day operations.

For the remainder of 1945 and through most of 1946, the sifting of the surveys took place. American University provided quarters for the workers, who included DeVinney, Beatrice N. Hardesty, Irving L. Janis, M. Brewster Smith, Shirley A. Star, Stouffer, and Edward A. Suchman. Simultaneously, at the Yale Institute of Human Relations, Carl I. Hovland, Frederick D. Sheffield, and Arthur A. Lumsdaine sifted the experimental studies, while at Cornell Louis Gutman and John A. Clausen, and at Columbia Paul F. Lazarsfeld, began work on what would become the methodological volumes of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. As was the case with the oversight and technical committees, all of the workers had been members of or consulted with Research Branch. The end result was the 1949-1950 publication by Princeton University Press of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. The first two volumes comprise *The American Soldier* proper, and deal primarily with survey data. The third volume,

Stouffer and the technical committee, using a carefully devised and deliberate process, made the significant decisions regarding what information from the surveys, experiments, and methodological issues would be included in the four volumes. Although they had spent considerable time and effort during the war researching micro-issues for the Army - laundry service, rations, etc. - they had also chosen during the war, and for inclusion in the volumes, to research and write on what they believed to be the more significant social issues of the time. Thus The American Soldier took on the weighty and often controversial issues of education, fear, race, class, leadership, veteran adjustment, etc. These subjects and themes run throughout the work, and serve to provide coherence and significance. In this way, the committee members believed they would be able to transcend the war and provide information which would be useful not only to the military, but to historians and sociologists as well. Once Stouffer and his colleagues had decided which issues would be most useful, they assigned authors to each subject, and chapters to each author. In most cases, the authors were assigned chapters which were closest to the specific subjects with which they had worked in Research Branch during the war.

As one of the major criticisms of The American Soldier is that data on specific subjects is difficult to find (issues on leadership appear in the chapter ostensibly devoted to race, etc.), what follows is a brief exegesis of the work to help orient the reader and to provide a sense of its richness, complexity, and utility.
Volume I: Adjustment during Army Life

Chapter One, “How These Volumes Came to be Produced.” Written by Stouffer, chapter one “represents, in general, the point of view of the technical subcommittee comprising Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Leland C. DeVinney, Carl I. Hovland, and Stouffer.”84 Stouffer was lead author on volumes I and II (The American Soldier proper), as well as volume IV (Measurement and Prediction). A contributor to volume I, Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney took over Research Branch in early 1945 from Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard, after having served as head of the branch in the Mediterranean. Psychologist Carl I. Hovland, of the Yale Institute of Human Relations, was the lead author on volume III (Experiments on Mass Communication), and served during the war as the chief of the Experimental Section, one of the two sections of Research Branch. Sociologist Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. served as the head of the other, Survey Section, and contributed to volume II of The American Soldier.85

The first chapter gives rudimentary details as to the structure and function of Research Branch as a part of the Information and Education Division, and also provides some information on the intellectual underpinnings of Research Branch operations. The chapter does not undertake to present a detailed history of Research Branch. That task Stouffer left to “the newer generation of historians,” as it was “not the purpose of these volumes to review the history of the Research Branch.” Stouffer identified his three major audiences - soldiers, historians, and his main audience, social psychologists and sociologists. He also took considerable pains to stress that The American Soldier was not a work of science or theory: “The Research Branch existed to do a practical engineering job, not a scientific job. Its purpose was to provide the Army command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and

84 TAS vol. I, 3 (fn1).
inferences, might be helpful in policy formation.” Many reviewers were singularly blind to these statements, and like many graduate students tended to judge The American Soldier by what it did not do, rather than what it did.

No ex-post facto science was attempted (although some hypotheses were presented) in the summary of what was a massive survey to gather evidence through empirical observation, and then to make generalizations upon which policy could be based. Stouffer did make clear, however, that The American Soldier represented “a mine of data, perhaps unparalleled in magnitude in the history of any single research enterprise in social psychology or sociology,” and wrote of its “potential value to social science.” Chapter 1 also introduced the reader to Stouffer’s lucid thinking and clear writing. Even Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the most caustic of The American Soldier reviewers, admitted that one must “praise the prevailing modesty and clarity with which the results of the research are written up.” Stouffer’s style is conversational, non-bureaucratic, and explanatory, with no hint of academic pretension. Stouffer was too mature and elegant a writer, and had too much respect for his readers, to thump them with the philosopher’s stone. He was secure enough to present his readers with the evidence and allow them to draw their own conclusions. He left the academic argument to the intellectuals, among which he did not number himself. The American Soldier reads as if it were written by a human being, unlike

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86 TAS vol. I. 1-5, 12. Stouffer repeats this thought a few pages later: “It must not be forgotten that the Research Branch was set up to do a fast, practical job; it was an engineering operation; if some of its work has value for the future of social science this is a happy result quite incidental to the mission of the Branch in wartime.” (p. 30).

87 TAS vol. I. 29-30. Charles Booth, chief of the massive survey of London, summarized in Life and Labour of the People in London (1892-1897) also described his work as producing “mines of information.” The implication from both authors was that these mines would need to be worked to yield their potential. Both authors received similar criticism for not pursuing their work in a scientific enough fashion and for not developing theories using the scientific method. See Rosemary O’Day and David Englander. Mr Charles Booth’s Inquiry: Life and Labour of the People In London Reconsidered. London: Hambledon, 1993. 1-24. Booth, like Stouffer, was engaged in a task of social engineering: “There seems to be little doubt that he [Booth] consciously compared the task which he saw before him with that of a department of state collecting the information it required before evolving appropriate policies.” (O’Day and Englander, 30).

many jargon-laden reports of its kind. The chapter is divided into two sections: (1) The Research Branch and its Mission, and (2) Indebtedness and Implications.

Chapter Two, “The Old Army and the New.” The second chapter describes the pre-war US Army, with special emphasis on the differences between the Regulars of that Army and the selectees drafted to fight the Second World War. The chapter was written by Stouffer, DeVinney, and Edward A. Suchman, the last of whom contributed to volume II of *The American Soldier* and to volume IV, *Measurement and Prediction*, of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. In his twenties during the war, Suchman had worked and studied with Columbia sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and after the war became a sociology professor at the University of Pittsburgh.

Education and the significance of the differences in levels of education for soldier motivation and behavior are the *leitmotifs* of the chapter, which also provides a preview of tone and style for the entire work. The authors presented empirical data both quantitatively and qualitatively through charts and diagrams as well as through anecdote - often direct quotes from soldiers themselves. It is in chapter two that the reader learns that in the Second World War the percentage of high school graduates and men with some college was four times as high as in the First World War.
Such charts and statistics are commonly followed by an anecdotal illustration of the significance of the facts they reveal, in this case the ramifications of time in service trumping education and competence. One soldier complained, “this length of service business is a luxury this Army can’t afford. The best man for the job is the most efficient way and the privates can see it. It is bad when the privates can see what the generals won’t admit or do anything about. It
doesn’t do any good to be bossed by men inferior in every way except length of service.”

The American Soldier is structured similarly throughout, often with follow-up accounts of what the Army did to address such findings.

Chapter Three, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army - Preliminary Considerations,” Chapter Four, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army - By Background Characteristics, and Chapter Five, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army - By Type of Experience in the Army,” deal with issues of direct concern to the military establishment. Authored by Stouffer and Devinney, chapters three through five considered adjustment to the Army, and to some extent the Army’s adjustment to its draftees. Stouffer and his co-authors chose four criteria with which to gauge adjustment:


- Esprit
- Commitment to the goals of the war
- Job and status satisfaction
- Criticism of and/or approval of the Army

The authors demonstrated that the factors are inter-related, and the theme of education remained strong - those soldiers who are more educated, Stouffer pointed out, had both better esprit and commitment, but were also not as satisfied with their jobs as less-educated soldiers, and were more critical of the Army. These three chapters also attempted to distinguish between individual and group attitudes and behavior, and the authors made comparisons between individuals and between groups to reach their findings and recommendations.

The authors considered factors such as marital status and age in addition to education. They brought childhood experiences to bear on the analysis, juxtaposed against disciplinary problems as soldiers. These chapters, as do many of the others, made use of “panel studies,”

those studies in which the soldier is interviewed more than once to determine the reliability of his answers. The authors were able to establish in chapter four a correlation between upbringing and success or failure in the Army - partly through an analysis of those soldiers who were referred to psychiatric care. In chapter five, the authors considered assignment, location, and length of service as these factors affected adjustment. Readers learn that the Infantry and the Air Corps represented the poles of dissatisfaction and satisfaction, respectively, that overseas assignments did not necessarily produce poor morale, and that esprit deteriorated as time in service lengthened. Chapter four is sectioned as follows: (1) Variations in Personal Esprit, Personal Commitment, Satisfaction with Status and Job, and Approval or Criticism of the Army as Associated with Education, Age, and Marital Status, (2) Personal Background Characteristics as They Related to Advancement or Maladjustment, (3) Personal Commitment, Personal Esprit, and the Concept of Relative Deprivation, (4) Pre-Army Experiences in Childhood and Later as They Related to Adjustment in the Army and to Background Characteristics of Soldiers, and (5) Attitudes Reflecting Adjustment to the Army as Related to Subsequent Promotion of the Respondents - a Case Study. (The case was comprised of 856 privates and privates first class).

Chapter Six, “Social Mobility in the Army.” Promotions and potential for promotion are the subject of chapter six, written by Suchman, and sectioned into (1) Promotion Opportunities, (2) Desire for Promotion, and (3) Factors Determining which Men Got Promoted. The major finding of Research Branch was that while soldiers were critical of the “caste system” which separated them from the officers, they were also keen to be promoted themselves. Ambition was mixed with a healthy dose of skepticism regarding chances for promotion, and the authors documented the satisfactions and disappointments soldiers experienced in the system of
promotions. The relationship between opportunities for and expectation of promotion is interesting and perhaps counterintuitive, and will be highlighted later.

Chapter Seven, “Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction.” Written by Stouffer, chapter seven reveals the scope and breadth of job possibilities within the Army, most of which have little or nothing to do with actual fighting. Seventy-five percent of soldiers did not even see a battlefield, fifty percent did manual labor of a sort, and twenty-five percent could be accurately described as clerks. The authors considered the actual job as it related to satisfaction and concomitant adjustment to the Army, and they also inquired into the affect that volition has upon job satisfaction - or the relationship between the soldier choosing his own job rather than having it assigned to him - and his satisfaction with the job and the Army. The authors also gauged how much satisfaction with one’s assignment affected efficiency. The chapter is divided into two sections: (1) Job Satisfaction as a Relationship between the Army’s Needs and Men’s Desires, and (2) Desires of the Men as Related to Job Satisfaction.

Chapter Eight, “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control,” written by Suchman, Stouffer, and DeVinney, represents the most sensitive of the inquiries Research Branch made into adjustment to Army life. The Army, with its hierarchical structure, mission orientation, obligation to follow orders, culture of loyalty, and acute self-consciousness, did not propose to lead by committee or poll. Still, with the support of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, Research Branch was tasked to look into the attitudes of soldiers towards their leaders. Many of their findings were later repeated in the postwar Doolittle Report on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships.

The authors divided their analysis into three parts: (1) Officers, (2) Noncommissioned Officers, and (3) Social Control - Attitudes Reflecting Adherence to Informal Codes as Well as
to Formal Codes of Behavior. As their findings will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, let it suffice for now that, predictably, soldiers found the privileges officers enjoyed to be, in modern parlance, “offensive” (as anecdotal evidence suggests they always have), and were loath to recognize the burden of responsibility that officers carried. Soldiers also, unsurprisingly, respected those officer most who shared their deprivations and dangers, and who led by example.

Chapter Nine, “The Orientation of Soldiers toward the War,” is divided into three sections which analyze the orientation of soldiers toward the war: (1) Attitudes toward the War, (2) Personal Identification with the War, and (3) Efforts to Raise the Level of Personal Commitment by Changing Attitudes towards the War. The section titles are revealing, as they accurately portray in micro the thrust of Research Branch’s efforts during the war - to identify attitudes, and based on their findings, recommend policy changes to affect those attitudes in a way that would equip conscripted soldiers to fight a modern war. The first section deals primarily with the impact Pearl Harbor had on attitudes towards the war in general, while pointing out that many remained foggy as to the background and aims of the war. The second section attempts to analyze the passive, if not detached way in which the soldier tended to view the war in relation to himself. The final section highlights those educational efforts expended to strengthen personal commitment to the war, and admits that such efforts had limited results. The chapter was written by Shirley A. Star, a former student of Stouffer’s at the University of Chicago, who after the war became a prominent figure at the National Opinion Research Center.

Chapter 10, “Negro Soldiers,” the last chapter of Adjustment during Army Life considers, in the parlance of the day, the attitudes of “Negro” soldiers, and was written by Star, Stouffer, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. After the war Cornell Professor Robin Williams served as American
Sociological Association president, and he was also the founding editor of *Sociological Forum*. He contributed to both volumes of *The American Soldier*.

The chapter might perhaps have been more appropriately entitled “Negro-White Relations,” as the main concern is just that. The chapter does not shy away from illuminating and documenting discrimination within the Army. What is perhaps more compelling, however, is that the authors made an honest effort to relate how black soldiers saw the Army, with an emphasis on the extent to which black soldiers tended to view day to day operations in racial terms. Though such an approach had its limitations, the authors were generally successful in revealing the ambivalence that many black soldiers had toward the Army and the war. The “Double V” campaign (victory against aggression abroad and victory against racism at home) looms large in chapter ten, as do the differences and similarities between black soldiers from the North and South. The chapter is divided into six sections: (1) The Negro Soldier Population and its Characteristics, (2) Negroes Defined Situations in Racial Terms (3) How Negro Soldiers Viewed Their Stake in the War (4) Reactions to Prospects of Overseas and Combat Duty, (5) General Adjustment of Negro Soldiers in the Army at Home and Overseas, and (6) Comparative Reactions to Being Stationed in the North and in the South.

**Volume II: Combat and its Aftermath**

Chapter One, “Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat.” Sectioned into (1) Company Attitudes and Nonbattle Casualty Rates in Combat, (2) Attitudes of Individuals in Training as Related to Performance in Combat, and (3) Basic Data and Technical Notes on Relation of Attitudes to Behavior in Combat, chapter one illuminates survey results primarily from the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 29th Infantry Divisions of the World War II US Army, a total survey sample of well over 9,000 officers and men. (Of these, the 1st, 4th, and 29th participated in the D-
Day landings, and the 9th followed on June 10, 1944). Many readers and reviewers have found this chapter compelling because it offers a prediction: those soldiers maintaining positive attitudes in training will do better than others in actual combat. Sociologists and statisticians have also found in section three detailed descriptions of indices and numerical manipulations used to generate data. The chapter was written by Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Marion Harper Lumsdaine. Arthur Lumsdaine contributed to volume II of *The American Soldier* and volume III (*Experiments on Mass Communication*), and Marion contributed to volume II, *The American Soldier*.

Chapter Two, “General Characteristics of Ground Combat,” is by Williams and M. Brewster Smith. A psychologist, Smith contributed to volume II of *The American Soldier*, and later served on the faculties of Vassar, New York University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California (Berkeley and Santa Cruz). Chapter two attempts to explain combat to the uninitiated. Unsectioned, it defines combat by both geography (distance from the firing) and activity, and to demonstrate the eternal verities of soldier reactions to combat. Chapter two is valuable, as one sociologist reviewer noted, as a conceptual discussion: “It is often assumed that the empirical research man just goes out and collects data as one might count pebbles on the seashore. Here it is shown how difficult it is to dissect terms like ‘combat situation,’ or ‘active theater,’ or ‘victory’ into their component elements so as to make them amenable to empirical study.”

Chapter two also offers a listing of the stresses which accompany soldiers to combat - a list thought to be common sense, but often revealed to be forgotten as laymen, with an air of discovery, are shocked at soldier behavior in combat. The list bears repeating:

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90 Paul F. Lazarsfeld. “*The American Soldier* - An Expository Review.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 3 (Fall 1949): 377-404. Lazarsfeld’s extensive review is extremely helpful in orienting one to *The American Soldier*’s structure, content, and findings. I am indebted to him for his work, which has made this section of the present work much simpler than it otherwise would have been.
1. Threats to life, limb and health.
2. Physical discomfort - from lack of shelter, excessive heat or cold, excessive moisture or dryness, inadequacy of food or water or clothing; from insects and disease; from filth; from injuries or wounds; from long-continued fatigue and lack of sleep.
3. Deprivation of sexual and concomitant social satisfactions.
4. Isolation from accustomed sources of affectional assurance.
5. Loss of comrades, and sight and sound of wounded and dying men.
6. Restriction of personal movement - ranging from the restrictions of military law to the immobility of the soldier pinned down under enemy fire.
7. Continual uncertainty and lack of adequate cognitive orientation.
8. Conflicts of values
   a. between the requirements of duty and the individual’s impulses toward safety and comfort.
   b. between military duty and obligations to family and dependents at home, to whose well-being the soldier’s survival is important.
   c. between informal group codes, as of loyalty to comrades, and the formal requirements of the military situation which may sometimes not permit mutual aid.
   d. between previously accepted moral codes and combat imperatives.
9. Being treated as a means rather than an end in oneself; seemingly arbitrary and impersonal demands of coercive authority; sense of not counting as an individual.
10. Lack of “privacy”; the incessant demands and petty irritations of close living within the group.
11. Long periods of enforced boredom, mingled with anxiety, between actions.
12. Lack of terminal individual goals; poverty and uncertainty of individual rewards.  

Chapter Three, “Combat Motivations among Ground Troops,” treated the question of why soldiers fought. Smith wrote chapter three, and pointed out the major factors which served as inoculations of a sort to help soldiers withstand the rigors of combat: Personal ideology and prayer, the primary group (normally the soldiers’ squad), coercion, beliefs concerning the war, and personal leadership. Those soldiers who increasingly relied on prayer as their combat tours progressed found it to be of some comfort. They also, however, found the idea that they could not let a comrade down to be a significant motivator. “Coercive Institutional Authority” was also

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91 T4S vol. II. 77.
a significant motivator. The threat of court martial, imprisonment, garnering of pay, and the accompanying shame or guilt helped keep the soldier facing the enemy, as did the comforting space of the primary group, and the leadership by example of his most immediate non-commissioned and commissioned officers. And although the soldier in general “was typically without deep personal commitment to a war which he nevertheless accepted as unavoidable,” he did concede that he had a part to play in finishing the job. Ideology tended to be a social faux pas in the context of the squad:

Probably the strongest group code, except for condemnation of expressions of flagrant disloyalty, was the taboo against any talk of the flag-waving variety. Accounts of many informal observers indicate that this code was universal among American combat troops, and widespread throughout the Army....The usual term by which disapproval of idealistic exhortation was invoked was ‘bullshit....’

Given this insight, the irony that the ideology of the American soldier in World War II, “the greatest generation,” has been used to justify and prolong subsequent conflicts is rich indeed.

Chapter Four, “Problems Related to the Control of Fear in Combat,” was written by psychologist Irving L. Janis, a contributor to volume II of *The American Soldier* and the Yale/Berkeley professor who later came up with the concept of “groupthink.” This chapter explores fear, controlling fear, and the difficulties of doing so. The Army made use of several practices to recognize, control, and attempt to prevent fear, as the chapter reports. Janis illuminated all of these practices in a discussion of the Army’s permissive approach toward fear - that it is a natural phenomenon and that everyone in harm’s way will feel it. Additionally, he discusses the methods and effects of screening out men who were “psychologically unfit for

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92 *TAS* vol. II, 149.
93 *TAS* vol. II, 150.
combat.” Finally, Janis reported on the various methods used in training to accustom and desensitize recruits to fear and the battlefield.

Chapter Five, “The Combat Replacement,” written by Smith, situates combat replacements firmly between unwilling (for combat) veterans and willing new soldiers in units which had not yet seen combat. Smith explains that the attitude of the combat replacement was heavily influenced by the presence, if not necessarily the experiences, of the veterans in the unit to which he was assigned. Replacements tended to be more loyal to their units and the Army than even veterans. Smith ends the chapter with a discussion of the efficacy, or lack thereof, of leaving soldiers in combat too long.

Chapter Six, “Attitudes of Ground Combat Troops toward Rear Echelons and the Home Front,” also written by Smith, catalogues the resentment frontline soldiers felt against those in the rear echelons, and to a lesser extent those in the United States. It is fair to classify this view as one in which frontline soldiers felt that anyone whose foxhole was behind theirs was the “rear echelon,” (a term of scorn) and the farther one got away from the front in overseas theaters, the less one was respected by frontline troops. While holding these feelings, frontline troops for the most part also felt that service troops were doing their best to support the fighting troops - an indicator of the complications and paradoxes inherent in attitudes. An additional indicator of such complexity was the illogical belief held by many frontline troops that “the people at home” were not doing enough to win the war, but that their own family and friends were:

94 TAS vol. II, 193.
Chapter six also reveals the relationship between proximity to the front and status. The closer a soldier got to the fighting, the more superior he tended to feel to those behind him. This attitude was underwritten by the increasing informal privileges he obtained the closer he got to the front. Distinctions between officers and enlisted men were much dampened by the sound of the guns, and the emphasis on spit and polish—"chickenshit"—often disappeared completely.

Chapter Seven, “Morale Attitudes of Combat Flying Personnel in the Air Corps,” and Chapter Eight, “Objective Factors Related to Morale Attitudes in the Aerial Combat Situation,”
were written by Janis, and consider the unique position of the Army Air Corps in the Second World War. Readers will immediately discover that morale in the Air Corps was much higher than in the Army as a whole, despite the dangers inherent in the job. Janis noted that the Army was very particular in its selection of Air Corps personnel, the crew design of the Air Corps limited the status differences between officers and enlisted men, and the prestige of Air Corps service was higher than anywhere else in the Army. All of these factors, Janis argued, contributed to high morale. Unsurprisingly, and despite high morale, the more missions a crew flew, the higher became their anxiety, and the lower their willingness for combat duty. Janis also pointed out that the survey data indicated a relationship between morale and the size of airplane flown, with the smaller aircraft pilots (fighters) demonstrating higher morale, and the larger aircraft pilots (bombers) lower morale. Janis offers several explanations for these differences in attitudes - confidence in aircraft design, the increased responsibility bomber pilots has vis a vis their crews as opposed to fighter pilots who flew alone, exposure to aerial combat, etc. None of his ideas, however, were definitive, and he wrote at the conclusion of chapter eight only that “a number of hypotheses were formulated, in terms of differentials in the conditions of combat flying which may account for attitude differences on items indicative of motivation for combat.”

Chapter Nine, “Psychoneurotic Symptoms in the Army,” written by Shirley A. Star, took on perhaps the most provocative and difficult topic in all of The American Soldier - psychoneurotics. Awash in cultural mores, and squabbled over continually by officers, physicians, and enlisted men, the point at which a soldier breaks down and becomes unfit for combat remains a subject of furious debate, as do the methods to prevent such breakdowns and subsequent actions when they occur. Star encapsulated the general distribution of psychoneurotic

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95 TAS vol. II, 410.
cases as they occurred within the Army, relating that it was no surprise that the governing factor was proximity to combat. She considered screening criteria, including the efficacy of screening devices, and she also summarized what the survey data indicated in relation to exogenous factors such as age, physical health, and education levels. The data as she interpreted it indicated that early breakdowns were most often seen in soldiers “who would ordinarily be considered psychologically predisposed” (or who should have been screened out). “Once these had been weeded out,” she continued, “the psychiatric rate was regarded as leveling off until the mounting tensions of combat brought a rise in breakdowns among men who would usually be regarded as within the normal ranges.”

She discussed what were commonly known at the time as “psychosomatic symptoms,” and concluded as tentatively as did Janis regarding the Air Corps, “While in many cases our data were suggestive rather than final, taken together they permit the tentative generalization that transition from one phase of the Army cycle [adjustment] to another [combat] was marked by a rise in the level of psychoneurotic symptoms.”

Chapter Ten, “Problems of Rotation and Reconversion” also written by Star, summarized Research Branch observations of soldiers returning to the United States from overseas before war’s end. In his expository review of The American Soldier, Paul F. Lazarsfeld described this chapter as “almost like a description of displaced persons in a new country, or a chapter in a textbook on social disorganization.” Star noted that the major challenge the War Department faced was settling on a rotation policy - which they did not do until 1944 - and then integrating

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96 TAS vol. II, 453.  
97 TAS vol. II, 455. It was statements such as these which drove many reviewers to distraction. Despite Stouffer’s insistence that The American Soldier was a non-scientific summary of data, many reviewers expected hard theory rather than tentative hypotheses. Several reviewers labeled such findings as “obvious” and “common sense.” So they may be, but it is also significant that such findings seem to be “discovered” repeatedly. As the United States has entered each conflict subsequent to the Second World War, the public and even the military seem to be shocked and surprised that soldiers exhibit psychoneurotic symptoms.  
men who had been deployed into stateside units successfully. Research Branch documented many cases of severe psychological displacement in the returnees. Veterans felt guilty for having returned home and having deserted their buddies, (three-fifths of them reported that they missed their overseas units), and their expectations of life at home often exceeded reality. Even with these attitudes, however, twenty-percent of returnees believed they should remain in the United States until those soldiers who had not served in overseas commands had done so.

The desires of returnees and the Army often ran at cross purposes. Returnees desired to be stationed near their homes, they wished to retain the rank and status they had held overseas, and they wanted to serve as trainers for those who had yet to deploy. Rarely could the Army - wrestling daily with the exigencies of an ongoing world war - accommodate such wishes, and when expectations collided with reality, the adjustment of the soldier to Army life in the states was retarded significantly. Returnees, Star concluded, “were a disgruntled group,” but “only a minority of returnees ever got so completely fed up as to wish they had never come back to the United States or had returned only for a brief furlough.”

Chapter Eleven, “The Point System for Redeployment and Discharge,” written by Stouffer himself, offered a summary of Research Branch findings related to the attitudes of soldiers towards demobilization and separation, and the point system created to manage them. The problem of demobilization was a thorny one. There were many more service than combat troops overseas, but the combat troops were most needed there to maintain order in the chaos that was post-war Europe and the Pacific. Yet combat troops felt that they had “done their bit” and were clamoring for immediate return to the United States. Nor could the Army haphazardly release the support personnel required to administer units and keep them running. The Army had learned to turn to Research Branch for policy recommendations when encountering such

99 TAS vol. II, 519.
problems, and it was Research Branch which came up with the point system in an effort to make the best of a bad situation. To decide which soldiers were to return home first, the Army under the point system considered total time in the Army, the number of months of overseas service, combat service to include wounds, and the number of dependent children the soldier had waiting for him at home, assigning each a point value.

In September 1944, the War Department announced the point system to the public, making it clear that the system was based on the attitudes and opinions of the soldiers themselves, as determined by Research Branch. Soldiers were to be returned not with their units, but rather as individuals ordered according to the points they had earned under the four criteria listed above. Reaction to the plan was overwhelmingly positive - it was seen as both fair and efficient by the majority of the American public. Most soldiers thought the plan was relatively fair, although many of those who had been in combat believed that their service at the front was not given enough weight.

Stouffer, perhaps more than any of the other *The American Soldier* authors, included in his summaries not only the charts and statistical data which helped to summarize Research Branch findings, but also considerable anecdotal evidence to help bring the data to life. Often he

100 There were of course those who differed, notably those responsible for maintaining continuity and order in their own units as well as in the overseas theaters as a whole. Among these was Major General James M. Gavin: “The system may have been scientifically perfect but from a unit commander’s view it was a nightmare. Regardless of military necessity, cooks, clerks, mechanics, medical personnel and technicians of all kinds essential to the administration and care of our soldiers and their equipment were shipped home. This at a time when the administrative demands were heaviest on all organizations. It was a wonder that more serious riots did not occur, and we were fortunate that we did not have to turn unexpectedly to war. Conducting the affairs of the army on the basis of a survey of the opinions of its members - admitting the interdependency of military efficiency and morale - is a dangerous luxury in our contemporary world.” (James M. Gavin. “A Monumental Study of the Citizen Soldier in War.” *New York Times*, May 29, 1949. p. BR3). Colonel W. S. Nye was equally skeptical: “The point system used in redeployment was inaugurated as a result of the attitude surveys. The authors [of *The American Soldier*] evince pride in this achievement, and claim that the B-Bag type demonstrations would have been much worse had some other system been employed. This reviewer feels some skepticism concerning the spontaneity of those demonstrations, and questions whether history will support the theory that national interest was well served by the pattern which redeployment took. A thing is not necessarily right nor does it contribute to the common welfare simply because it is called for in a poll of popular opinion.” (W.S. Nye. “Analysis of Our Citizen-Soldier.” *Field Artillery Journal* (July - August 1949):187-188).
include verbatim statements of soldiers, and those who complained about the point system give
readers a feeling both for the time and the mercurial attitudes of individual soldiers in a way no
chart can:

Letting men out of the Army after VE Day has become a joke. The Army let a lot of men out at first just to keep their word to the American people. Why let men get out as soon as they hit the States with 95 points when some of us got back four months ago, have 95-115 points and still can’t get out?

I thought the point system was very good prior to May 12. Since my discharge was turned down I am completely disgusted with the Army….I’ve been overseas for 39 months, then I get a dirty deal like this.

The point system is near perfect if it were worked right as possible.

I think somebody is pulling a fast one.

Frankly we are being held to give goldbricking officers a job which keeps them from going overseas.101

Anticipating a long war with Japan after VE Day, Research Branch nevertheless reacted immediately to VJ Day with recommendations for a revised point system. Although some in the War Department wanted to reduce or eliminate points for combat service after victory in the Pacific, Research Branch surveys indicated such a policy would be counter-productive, and the original system was kept in place. Stouffer also wrote in chapter eleven that it was the rate of discharge, (perceived by many as very slow) as much as the system itself, which created disgruntlement.

Stouffer’s conclusion in chapter eleven is heavy on history and its judgments: “Although in retrospect history may find that the greatest American Army ever created was broken up too rapidly, history also will record the irresistible political pressure to ‘bring the boys home,’ and

101 TAS vol. II, 535-537.
the impatience of the soldiers themselves, some units of whom behaved in a manner hardly describable in terms other than mutiny.” He also asks the reader to consider the enthusiasm with which soldiers preparing for the invasion of Japan would have approached their task had they “heard of the wholesale discharge at home of millions of men, including new recruits who had never left the States.”102 Here he reminds us of historical contingency, and the blindness which often attends hindsight. He concludes by defending the wisdom of the point system and the surveys used to advocate it in historical context:

There are ‘ifs’ which history cannot definitively answer. In taking its calculated risks, the Army won its gamble. One cannot say for certain what would have happened, after VJ Day as well as before, if there had not been an objective method of demobilization which the majority of men regarded as fair in principle. Because ‘military efficiency’ is not independent of ‘morale,’ there are grounds for believing that the War Department chose correctly when it broke all precedent and went to the enlisted men for their opinions before promulgating its redeployment and demobilization policy.103

Chapter Twelve, “The Aftermath of Hostilities,” offered in one sense a coda to the immediately preceding chapters. Its author, Leonard Cottrell, employed a rather unique device: He held one of his own memoranda, written in the late summer of 1944, up to historical scrutiny. Research Branch, and Cottrell in particular, had been asked by the War Department to outline “the major morale and discipline problems of the post VE Day period,” and to suggest “ways and means of meeting these problems through the I and E program.”104 Cottrell’s memorandum made several predictions regarding what would happen to soldier attitudes at the cessation of hostilities

102 TAS vol. II, 547.
103 TAS vol. II, 548.
104 TAS vol. II, 550. I and E refers to the Information and Education Division of the War Department, of which Research Branch was a part.
in Europe. As the memorandum is nine pages long, it is too long to reproduce here, but among the predictions were:

- The sense of purpose and need to cooperate for survival when facing an active enemy would weaken among soldiers, requiring the Army to strengthen coercive measures to ensure discipline within the ranks.

- Individual goals would eclipse collective goals among the men.

- Soldiers would go through the five stages of victory (verbatim from the memorandum):

  1. The thrill of being victorious.
  2. The desire for ‘celebrating’ (wine, women, song, hell raising).
  3. A general feeling of relief that their tough part of the war is over and they have survived it.
  4. These will be followed immediately by a rapidly growing feeling of: ‘Well, they don’t need us here any more so let’s get the hell home.’ (Meantime it should be remembered that the Pacific and CBI troops, still having tough going, will react to the news with the feeling, ‘Now they can really send us plenty of help to clean this job up fast’).
  5. Very shortly there will be the reaction, ‘I wonder what is going to happen to me now. Will I go home, stay here, or be sent to another theater?’

- Disgust at the destruction of the war would set in.

- Loss of motivation and preoccupation with self.

- Loss of aggression towards the enemy, and an increase in aggression towards the Army, the government, civilians, and allies.

Cottrell’s memorandum then predicted the different and by no means desirable reactions of troops sent to another theater, assigned to occupation in Europe, sent home as a strategic reserve, or demobilized. The reactions, he warned, would include bitterness, depression, resentment, lack of desire to train, demands for a timeline of release, frustration, and anxiety. To combat these reactions, the last half of Cottrell’s memorandum enumerates a number of

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105 TAS vol. II, 552 - 553. Cottrell noted that many of his predictions were based on World War I experience, and also that many were “common sense.” CBI = China-Burma-India.
strategies to mitigate the negative affects on the Army of the end of the war in Europe. Among these were propaganda designed to send the message that everyone was needed to successfully complete the war in Europe, occupy Germany, and finish Japan, entertainment, recreation, and education programs, strict attention by commanders to the morale of their men, and accurate news on the progress of the war.

Most of Cottrell’s predictions came to pass, as indicated in part by the following two charts:

While acknowledging that some predictions had not been realized to the degree laid out in the memorandum - notably resentment toward allies - Cottrell concluded his chapter by emphasizing that most of them did in fact come to pass, calling them “a fairly accurate forecast of the state of mind of the troops in Europe following the war.”

Cottrell, a sociology professor at the University of Chicago and Cornell, served as the 40th president of the American Sociological Association (1950) three years before Stouffer held the same post. He was also employed for seventeen years by the Russell Sage Foundation.

The final chapter of The American Soldier, thirteen, “The Soldier Becomes a Veteran,” was co-authored Stouffer and Cottrell. The authors were quick to admit that the study of veterans

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106 TAS vol. II, 595.
was outside their *writ* from the War Department and outside the scope of *The American Soldier*. Still, they commented early on in the chapter, referencing an “intensive survey of a small sample of discharged veterans” conducted shortly before the end of the war, that “perhaps the single most striking fact about the evidence available is the absence of any pronounced tendency either for personal bitterness or for social action.” The vast majority of veterans, it seemed, were simply absorbed again by American society.

Their summary of the survey sample revealed that although some soldiers felt minor anxiety about their prospects for civilian employment, most of them believed they would be fine. Paradoxically, however, they felt that their Army experience had hurt more than helped them. They also confined their concerns to themselves, and were little interested in the betterment of society. Most of them were able to bring to fruition employment plans they had formulated before or while serving in the Army; therefore their re-integration into civilian society was unremarkable. Twenty-one percent worried about what kind of employment they would pursue after the war. Nineteen percent were concerned that they would not be able to enter the fields upon which they had planned before their Army service. Sixteen percent worried that they might not be able to get a job at all after the war, and an equal number expressed some concern at their ability to “settle down.” Eleven percent evinced some concern about normalizing relations with their significant other, and only six percent expressed any concern at all over the fate of democracy in the United States after the war. Not, in short, the picture one gets for example in the Hollywood film “The Best Years of Their Lives.” Stouffer and Cottrell conclude this last chapter of *The American Soldier* as follows:

Books are likely to be written about the shattering experience of Army life. It is true that some men were physically ruined by the war and others

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107 *TAS* vol. II, 596.
108 *TAS* vol. II, 599.
bear scars which will never disappear. Others broke emotionally under the strain. But, unless the data reviewed in this chapter are to be largely disregarded, there has seemed little reason for doubting the reabsorption of the vast majority of American soldiers into the normal patterns of American life. These millions of young men, responses of samples of whom have been recorded in these volumes, gave their sweat and often their blood to winning a war which they accepted without enthusiasm as unavoidable. Loving American freedom, they chafed under the authoritarianism and social customs of an institution, which, though alien to democratic ways of life, was an agency for preserving those ways of life. This job done, they wanted to get out, get home, and by and large resume where they had left off. They had their prejudices, some of them bad by ideal standards. Although they were not postwar isolationists, they had plenty of ethnocentrism. From some points of view they were too complacent in their unreadiness to sponsor big social or political changes in the United States. There would be agreement on one fact: though our armies crossed all the seas and lived on all the continents, the men whose attitudes provided the data for these volumes came home, as they went out, indubitably American.\textsuperscript{109}

Although it would be neither useful nor wise to rehearse all of Research Branch’s findings here - there were hundreds, many with addenda, provisos, and sequela, - one may get a sense of the substance and tone of \textit{The American Soldier} by reviewing a few of the more significant discoveries in addition to those which have already been offered. The findings may be generally categorized in three ways: (1) Those findings which confirmed knowledge generally held to be true in the contemporary climate of opinion as of the mid-twentieth century, (2) Those findings which ran counter to contemporary conventional wisdom, but which were not counterintuitive, and (3) Those findings which not only contradicted conventional wisdom, but which also, in and of themselves, were counterintuitive. This last category is the most compelling, as of necessity it required the authors to explain conflicting data and phenomena. Category three was therefore most productive of hypothetical explanations for observations, if not necessarily productive of theoretical innovations. Three findings are offered as samples in

\textsuperscript{109} TAS vol. II, 644.
each category. All of the findings however, and indeed the purpose of Research Branch in
general, served to inform leaders on what best equipped (or most hindered) citizen soldiers
(draftees) to move to the sound of the guns.

Sample findings in Category I (the “no surprise” category): *The Old (Regular) and New
(Draftee) Armies Were Radically Different Institutions*. The Army leadership in 1940 was keenly
aware that the Army they were about to create was very different indeed from the one that they
had. With the exception of World War I, the United States had not conscripted since the
American Civil War, and the Army in the interwar years had returned to the constabulary and
imperial-policing habits it had developed between the Civil and First World Wars. In addition to
size (the Army grew from approximately ¼ million to 8 million soldiers between 1940 and
1945), there were two other major differences highlighted by *The American Soldier*. The first of
these was that the members of the draftee Army were on the whole much better educated than
their Regular Army counterparts. “In the first war,” Stouffer wrote in *The American Soldier*, the
percentage of high school graduates and college men was 9, in the second 41.” This difference,
he continued, “could hardly fail to be productive of tensions:”

The old peacetime Army was not accustomed to such a high educational Level among enlisted men as it was to get in World War II. The Regular Army enlisted man was a youth of less than average education, to whom the security of pay, low as it was, and the routines of Army life appealed more than the competitive struggle of civilian life. By self-selection he was not the kind of man who would be particularly critical of an institution characterized by authoritarian controls. He might get in trouble, of course there were problems of drunkenness, venereal disease, and AWOL [Absent With Out Leave]. But he would be more likely than the kind of new citizen-soldier to accept the Army’s traditional forms as right. This is the kind of soldier to whom the old Army was adapted and who on the eve of World War II would, as a noncom, be the immediate boss and teacher of the new selectee.110

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Evidence that there was a general understanding within American society of the difficulties in combining old regulars with new draftees can be found in the contemporary popular media. The Warner Brothers 1943 musical film “This is the Army” gave us not only the debut of “God Bless America,” sung by Kate Smith, but also a grumbling old regular, Sergeant McGee (Alan Hale), who groused, “I keep tellin’ em, you don’t get no soldiers outta no draft….Civilians, even in uniform, they’re still civilians.”

Civilians in uniform they may have been, but their education, as Research Branch demonstrated, proved to have a salutary affect on their performance in the Army. And while Stouffer was careful to highlight that education was “correlated with ability…and socio-economic status,” the better educated a soldier was, the more likely he was to succeed in the Army. They may have been more critical of the Army, but they also got better assignments, faster promotions, had better esprit, etc.

In addition to the difference in education, there was the separate but related issue of institutional culture. The old Army, as The American Soldier noted, was an institution bounded by a stratified, authoritarian structure where tradition trumped initiative. Stouffer and his co-authors realized that comparable institutions could be found in the civilian world, but also wrote of “the conflicts and the grinding of the gears within the Army” that resulted from the collision of the Regular Army, which tended to brook neither argument nor question from its lowest rankers, with a conscripted and well-educated horde of constantly questioning and challenging private soldiers. It was the recognition that those gears would need to be oiled that was the

111 Jack L. Warner and Hal B. Wallis. This Is The Army. Directed by Michael Curtiz. 115 min. Warner Bros., 1943. DVD. Movies, more often than not, do violence to the facts. In this case, however, Sergeant McGee reflected with verisimilitude the attitudes of his day. 62% of Regulars preferred to wear their uniforms while in furlough; only 30% of selectees did. Draftees saw themselves and maintained their identity as civilians. “Their basic orientation was civilian rather than military. They looked over their shoulders at the civilian life they had temporarily left behind them and already they were making plans about what they would do after the war.” (TAS vol. 1, 64-65).

112 TAS vol. I, 58-60.
113 TAS vol. I, 54-55.
impulse for founding Research Branch, or as, the officer told Sergeant McGee in the musical, “Sergeant, there’s a very necessary element in soldiering. It goes by various names, but let’s call it morale.”

Another of the findings in Category I was confirmation that *A Stable Upbringing Made for a Good Soldier*. Stouffer made inquiries into broken homes, child health, sociability, truancy, fighting, and dating to determine the backgrounds of soldiers as they related to adjustment to the Army. Not surprisingly, he found that the best soldiers were those who were the best adjusted in their childhoods, as reflected in the following chart:

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**REPORTED CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AS RELATED TO ADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BROKEN HOMES</th>
<th>&quot;Did your parents always live together up to the time you were 16 years old?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, due to Div. or sep.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHILD HEALTH</th>
<th>&quot;As far as you know, were you a healthy child or a rather sickly one?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rather sickly</td>
<td>Fairly healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIABILITY</th>
<th>&quot;Before you came into the Army did you usually go around with a bunch of others or by yourself?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By myself</td>
<td>No ans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUANCY</th>
<th>&quot;When you were a kid how often would you say you played hooky from school?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGHTING</th>
<th>&quot;How did you feel about fighting as a kid?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Didn't like or dislike</td>
<td>No ans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>&quot;Did you usually have dates with girls more often or less often than most other fellows of about your own age that you know?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not as often</td>
<td>No ans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST ADJUSTED</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS SECTION</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHONEUROTICS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL'S</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The American Soldier* vol. I, Chart VI, p. 133.
The chart is representative of scores like it found in *The American Soldier*. Stouffer and his colleagues rarely looked at one attribute, attitude, or situation individually. They almost always made comparisons and controlled variables based on their lines of inquiry, thus accounting for context by comparison as well as the specific case. In this particular case, the relationship between broken homes and poor adjustment to the Army is slight, while the relationship between sociability and adjustment is stronger.

A third example drawn from Category I was *The Problem of the Infantry*. Early in *The American Soldier*, Stouffer reported that “particular attention was given, at home and abroad, to the very serious morale problems of the Infantry.” These problems, he continued, “were too large and approached too late to be solved at any fundamental level.” Research Branch did, however, conduct studies that indicated the magnitude of attitude, morale, and adjustment problems in the Infantry, and made what recommendations they could to ameliorate these problems or mitigate their effects. These recommendations included “the revision of pay scales, the introduction of symbols such as the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and the Expert Infantryman’s Badge, and the development of an aggressive program of publicity.”

Among the conditions which contributed to morale problems within the Infantry were proximity to combat and all that such an exposed position entailed. Additionally, there was the bypassing of the replacement training center (basic training) for Infantry recruits at times when Infantrymen were in short supply, the desire of Infantrymen to switch to other branches, the belief of the Infantrymen that “he would be kept under enemy fire until he became a casualty or

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115 *TAS* vol. I. 8-9. “The Infantry,” the authors later stated, “in more than one respect, was the problem child of the Army from the standpoint of morale.” (*TAS* vol. I. 194).

116 *TAS* vol. I. 292.

117 *TAS* vol. II, 282.
the war ended, “118 and the inexorable math which indicated that although the Infantry represented only ten percent of the Army, they suffered seventy percent of the casualties. 119 Added to these factors was what Stouffer and his colleagues called “relative deprivation:” The Infantryman could compare his lot to that of his fellow soldiers in the service forces and see the glaring differences in danger and living conditions. He could also compare himself to those in the Army Air Corps, who suffered high casualty rates, but unlike him spent their final hours in relative comfort. 120 Though this last concept might have been eye-opening to the general reader, he would not have been surprised that the Infantry had the toughest lot in the war, as has been the case since time immemorial.

Sample findings in Category II: (those findings which ran counter to contemporary conventional wisdom, but which were not necessarily counterintuitive) include first: *Defining Combat*. Combat, as it turned out, proved to be “extraordinarily difficult to define,” according to *The American Soldier*. Part of the definitional problem had to do with the awards system, wherein campaign stars were awarded to soldiers in combat theaters, regardless of whether they had actually “seen the elephant.” Stouffer and his colleagues, ever with an eye towards correct historical interpretation, advised that the data they gained “are important for historians, because they represent the Army’s only source of tabulated information on the proportion of the Army engaged in combat.” “All in all,” the authors stress, “these are about the best data which historians are likely to get.” 121 The data to which the authors refer were summarized in the following chart:

118 TAS vol. I. 330.
119 TAS vol. I. 330.
120 TAS vol. I, 125.
121 TAS vol. I. 164.
The sample was of 17,000 enlisted men and 5,000 company grade officers stationed throughout the world, and the results indicated that a minority (27%) of them had actually seen
combat, though many of them serving in rear areas were subject to the occasional bombing raid. "2 out of 5 reported that they had been in actual combat, about 1 out of 5 reported that they had had been under enemy fire, but not in actual combat, while 2 out of five offers and men overseas had not, according to their own reports, even been under enemy fire," The American Soldier reported.\textsuperscript{122} Stouffer and his colleagues, basing their judgment on this data, remarked that "the old beat-up GI Joes of Mauldin’s cartoons or Ernie Pyle’s dispatches, or the airmen who flew in the substratosphere thorough flak and fighter opposition to wipe out another German or Japanese city may, in the public eye, too much symbolize the American soldiers overseas.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{Malaria pills.} In February 1944, Research Branch conducted a survey of men on Guadalcanal and New Georgia islands, all of whom were supposed to be taking atabrine regularly to prevent malaria. 25% admitted to not taking the pills, and about 40% told the surveyors that no one checked closely to see if they were taking their pills. Still, the proportion of men who took their pills was higher in units that did not check than in units that did check to see if their soldiers took the pills. The finding was counter to the conventional wisdom that disciplinary standards could solve these sorts of problems. What Research Branch discovered was that soldiers tended to take atabrine voluntarily in areas where the need for the pills seemed most apparent. In areas where the average soldier did not detect a need, the disciplinary measures in place to ensure he took the pills failed. The men, in the absence of a coherent educational program to demonstrate the need for atabrine, instead relied on rumor and surmise. 25% thought it was unhealthy, and another 25% thought it might be so. Some thought it would make them impotent. 10% believed that men contracting malaria were automatically returned to the United States, and saw malaria as a small price to pay for such a trip. The survey helped Pacific

\textsuperscript{122} TAS vol. I. 163-166.
\textsuperscript{123} TAS vol. I. 163-164.
commands to develop programs to educate soldiers effectively on the efficacy of atabrine and the dangers of malaria.

*Climate adjustment.* Conventional wisdom held, and still holds, that those from warm climates will have significant problems adjusting to cold climates, and *vice-versa.* “One might,” wrote the authors of *The American Soldier,* “expect men from Southern states to adapt somewhat better than men from the North to the heat of the tropics, and the reverse in Alaska.” What they found, however, after inquiring into climatic adjustment in Panama and Alaska, “was no significant difference in attitudes of Northern or Southern men to their physical condition - in either Alaska or Panama.” In fact, the *only* significant difference in attitudes between northerners and southerners concerned black-white relations.124 As with the definition of combat and the taking (or not) of malaria pills, conventional wisdom, which affected personnel selection, training regimens, equipment requests, and a host of other policy decisions, turned out to be flimsy material upon which to plan operations.

Sample findings in Categories I and II covered those findings which either confirmed knowledge generally held to be true or ran counter to contemporary conventional wisdom, but which were not necessarily counterintuitive. Category III findings were not only surprising but also counterintuitive. These findings not only contradicted conventional wisdom, but were also unpredictable without data to support them. They not only defied intuition, but would not occur by the normal means of deduction ascribed to “common sense.”

One startling example of findings in Category III (Counterintuitive) was: *White soldiers experiencing continual contact with black soldiers were less likely to oppose integration, and had better relationships with black soldiers than was anticipated.* Conventional wisdom had for centuries dictated that familiarity breeds contempt and that the best way to keep peace between

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124 *TAS* vol. I. 174-175.
the races was to keep them separated. This idea had become so strongly entrenched that it had become intuitive - a gut reaction to the problem of race relations. Surprised at the time, however, were soldiers, officers, and researchers who discovered that those companies which had black platoons serving within them were not only amenable to, but enthusiastic about the arrangement. Research Branch visited seven divisions which were so structured, and discovered that “in the companies in which Negro platoons served, the overwhelming majority of white officers and men gave their approval to their performance in combat…and there was some indication in the data that the performance of Negro troops was rated highest by the officers and men in the companies in which the colored platoons had had the most severe fighting.” 93% of the officers and 60% of the enlisted men surveyed reported that white and black soldiers got along well.\(^{125}\)

Notwithstanding the findings above, the authors of *The American Soldier* showed in this as in many of their findings their characteristic skepticism and unwillingness to give pat answers when they offered several different, more negative explanations for their findings:

> It should be remembered, however, that not all the white support of using Negroes as infantrymen necessarily reflected ‘democratic’ or ‘pro-Negro’ attitudes. It could be simply a reflection of the desire of combat men to have their own burden lightened by letting others do part of the fighting; it might even conceal the most extreme attitudes of racial superiority leading to the reasoning that inferior Negro lives should be sacrificed before white lives. Moreover, the Negroes were still in separate platoons, which, to some Southern respondents, preserved at least the principle of segregation.\(^{126}\)

*The American Soldier* is full of such addenda and proviso - one reason why it is not a didactic, theoretical, thesis-driven, or agenda-laden work. The authors offered the evidence, along with

\(^{125}\) *TAS* vol. I. 588-592.  
\(^{126}\) *TAS* vol. I. 590.
several alternative interpretive schema, yet they also distinguished clearly between facts and implications.127

The second counter-intuitive finding offered in this brief sampling was that soldiers did not necessarily improve with experience, as the following chart indicates:

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T.P. Schwartz and Robert M. March note in their 50th anniversary review of The American Soldier that the empirical findings of the work “are not codified or summarized according to an over-arching theoretical framework.” Diverse critics view this fact as either positive or negative; some claiming that such an approach gives weight to the work, while others believe that a conglomeration of empirical evidence without theory is relatively useless. Schwartz & Marsh. “The American Soldier Studies of WWII: A 50th Anniversary Commemorative.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 27, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 21-37 (21).
It is logical to assume that effectiveness increases with experience. What the authors of *The American Soldier* found, however, was that most soldiers enjoyed their peak of combat effectiveness at three or four months of combat, after which they experienced a sharp decline in their ability to perform effectively. Research Branch surveyors got at this information by interviewing eighty-seven rifle platoon leaders just before VE Day and asking them which three non-commissioned officers and which three riflemen (replacements) they would be most reluctant to lose. Once the names were obtained, the surveyors then determined how much combat experience each man had. The data indicated, as reported in *The American Soldier*, that “men who have had more than eight months of combat time are apparently less likely than men with less time in combat to be rated as the best men in their outfits.”\(^{128}\) The intuitive notion that experience and effectiveness have a positive relationship proved to be wrong in the case of soldiers in combat.

Such findings dovetailed nicely with information that had been gathered previously. Psychologists Roy L. Swank and Walter E. Marchand made observations of soldiers while following an Infantry battalion inland for eighty days after their landing at Normandy. Like the authors of *The American Soldier*, they came up with a combat effectiveness/time in combat chart which is known famously as the Swank & Marchand Curve:

\(^{128}\) *TAS* vol. II. 288.
Swank & Marchand Curve

The curve, much like the combat effectiveness chart in *The American Soldier*, indicates that fatigue and bitterness trump experience within a relatively short period (depending on the duration and intensity of combat). While *The American Soldier* offered no hard theoretical explanation for the evidence, the authors did observe that “it represents a limitation inherent in the individual replacement system,” and the data itself seemed to gainsay the almost intuitive image of the grizzled non-commissioned officer who leads his replacements safely through combat. ¹²⁹

The final sample from Category III (counterintuitive findings) has to do with one of the age-old assumptions regarding what background makes a good soldier - soldiers from the farms did not adjust to the Army more readily than those from the cities. Intuition, or common sense, has dictated for millennia that a rural background, with its hardships, makes for a better soldier.\footnote{Vegetius (\textit{circa} 390 a.d.) ideal recruit was from the country rather than the city, as city dwellers were known to be effete and unused to the harshness of the elements. “Fishermen, fowlers, confectioners, weavers, and in general all whose professions more properly belong [sic] to women should, in my opinion, by no means be admitted into the service.” Vegetius preferred “smiths, carpenters, butchers, and huntsmen.” Vegetius, \textit{De Re Militari}, in T.R. Phillips, ed. \textit{Roots of Strategy}, Book I. John Clarke, trans. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1985. 75-80. The relationship between background and effectiveness is still little challenged, although sociological data from World War II indicates that the average American G.I was a twenty-six year old, slightly overweight clerk, even though the U.S. rejected a million possible recruits during the war. Yet one searches in vain for these clerks in \textit{Saving Private Ryan}. Between the Roman soldier and the American, there was little variance to the soldierly model. Michel Foucault, in \textit{Discipline and Punish} (1975) quotes J. de Montgommery’s (ed.) \textit{La Milice Francaise} (1636): “The signs for recognizing those most suited to this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs…” It was assumed that such qualities were much more prevalent in those from the country than those from the city.} Research Branch discovered no such correlation existed, particularly as it regarded the esprit of individual soldiers. Nor did soldiers with rural backgrounds gravitate towards the Infantry. The opposite was true: “The men who were least enthusiastic about Infantry or overseas service were…the less educated rural men.” \textit{The American Soldier}, for a fleeting moment, did away with “one stereotype of the kind of man who would like the Infantry, or at least would like overseas combat service…a man with low education from a farm or village, the kind of man ‘who can shoot a squirrel’s eye out at ninety feet.’”\footnote{\textit{TAS} vol. I. 92-96 and 332-336.}

The structure and findings of \textit{The American Soldier} tell us a great deal about the concerns of its authors, their willingness to question conventional wisdom, and to some extent their efforts to offer alternate explanations for soldier attitudes and behavior. What they do not tell us is what impulses led to the creation of Research Branch and how they went about their labors, and it is to these issues we now turn.
Chapter 3

Impulses: World War I and the Interwar Years

Stouffer’s notes about his initial visit to Washington DC in the late summer of 1941 have survived. Written in his crabbed hand, they reveal much about where Research Branch began its work of discovering and managing the attitudes of American soldiers in World War II. “I must read a good deal about the experience in the last war,” Stouffer told himself, “Got two books on the Personnel program in the last war from Army library.” He also “saw some reports from G-2 [Army Intelligence] on morale in the French & German armies; rather interesting.” The material that caught Stouffer’s attention most, however, were the papers and reports of Raymond B. Fosdick, who had been the Army’s “Morale Czar” in the First World War. “Fosdick’s report to the Secy of War in 1918,” Stouffer wrote, “about the YMCA. Officer-private relations, etc. Plenty of Dynamite in that report if it had got out at the time.” Stouffer recorded that he also “spent rest of afternoon and all evening [August 11, 1941] reading a detailed history of the building of classification & testing programs in the last war. They started from scratch and made plenty of mistakes, which are frankly recorded. From what little I know, the present system is built on the 1918 experience. But how much?” As it turned out, a great deal. The Army’s experience in World War I led its personnel officers to concentrate on aptitude and morals, and that is where they began in 1941. Stouffer and Research Branch would formally change the Army’s focus to attitude and morale, but there were other forces in the interwar years which were already moving the Army in that direction.132

The first impulse that led to the founding of Research Branch and ultimately to The American Soldier was the Army’s experience in the First World War, out of which came the

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Morale Branch, as well as the idea of psychological testing to delimit and classify recruits. Additionally, the pressures of 1940-1941 as the US geared up for war resulted in a major morale crisis in the Army, a crisis of sufficient seriousness to cause General Marshall to turn to Stouffer and survey research to understand and manipulate soldier attitudes. Finally, Stouffer brought his own education and experience as a sociologist in the interwar years - a time when psychology and sociology were moving towards empiricism - to Morale Branch, and converted it into an organization based on survey research.

While the First World War brought questions about the fragility of civilization and the influence of militarism to the sociological world, some US Army officers had learned from the conflict - much to their alarm - that their combat power could be significantly reduced by dynamics located in the psychological and sociological realms, collectively referred to as “morale.” They also learned that authoritarian modes of coercion - particularly in democratic societies - no longer ministered with complete effectiveness to the management of mass, conscripted armies in the era of industrial warfare. Even as most of their fellow officers clung to authoritarian modes, these officers began to shift, as sociologists Morris Janowitz and Roger Little have observed, “from domination to increased reliance on manipulation or managerial authority.” In 1937, historian Alfred Vagts suggested that the US Army in World War I and the interwar years had slipped into militarism. Because militarism exaggerated the differences between officers and enlisted men, Vagts observed that in the First World War, “signs of resentment appeared.” The resentment of enlisted men against their officers in the US Army, and the seeming obliviousness of most officers to this dynamic, became a key stimulus to the study

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of enlisted attitudes - culminating in the interwar years with the founding of Research Branch and their work during World War II. As the war approached, General Marshall was prepared if not happy to enlist psychology and sociology to help the Army make the transition from authoritarian to managerial models, and psychologists and sociologists were prepared to help. They had been doing some work of their own on the military, and they had also begun to develop survey research models to assist them in their work.134

Psychiatrists, psychologists, social psychologists, and sociologists had no little interest in things military, which they saw both as a source of funding and of professional legitimacy. Sociologists Kurt Lang in his review of sociological literature related to the military (1972) noted 1,325 journal articles and books on the subject, of which a full 120 (9%) were written before 1945. A sample of some 10% of these writings includes:

A. Hamon. Psychologie de miltaire professional, 1904.
C. Gini. Problemi sociologici della guerra, 1921.
K. Hesse Der Feldherr Psychologos, 1922.
M. H. Cornejo. La guerre au point de vue sociologique, 1930.
H.E. Fick. Der deutsche Militarismus der Vorkriegszeit: ein Beitrag zur Sociologie des Militarismus (German militarism in the prewar era; an inquiry into the sociology of militarism), 1932.
J.D. Clarkson and T.C. Cochran, eds. War as a Social Institution, 1941.


Lang’s analysis of these and other works draws a direct line between First World War experience, the scholarship of the interwar years on military sociology, and Research Branch:

World War I revealed dramatically, as other wars had before, the inadequacies of traditional orientations regarding military discipline and troop leadership. These had always been exclusively under the direction of the military, and it must be recognized that some military men despite professional and class biases exhibited considerable acuity analyzing the interplay between material and moral, i.e., social factors in war, the direction of war, the nature of military leadership, and the factors in combat effectiveness. One illustration of this is the work of Colonel Ardant du Picq, who in his *Battle Studies* developed generalizations based on 19th-century wars that in many ways anticipate sociological propositions subsequently rediscovered by social scientists once they turned their attention to the behavior of troops in combat and in captivity. A sizeable body of literature on this topic was produced during and after World War I, most of it by medical specialists including psychologists. Although the rigor with which these studies were conducted fell far short of present-day standards, they nevertheless amounted in their totality to a damning indictment of the traditional philosophy of military leadership and manpower management….As methodology in the behavioral sciences advanced in the interwar years, officials gradually recognized that techniques useful in studying other areas could yield similar returns for military management….Initially sociologists had little to do with these innovations. The first major step toward their full involvement came in the United States where the Army Research Branch, formed in 1941 and headed by an academic sociologist [Stouffer], conducted attitude surveys among servicemen to locate and diagnose morale problems that would inevitably arise during rapid mobilization.135

Lang included in his bibliography the 1921 translation of Ardant du Picq's *Etudes sur le Combat*, the translation that Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy - who would later review *The American Soldier* - read as a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the interwar years.\(^{136}\) The pattern from the samples is easy to see: The Europeans, hurt and disillusioned much more by the First World War than the Americans, began their military sociology inquiries earlier, but the Americans, *pace* Lang, caught up with “a high sociological output in the United States over several decades.”\(^{137}\)

Interest in mental hygiene, intelligence and aptitude testing gave way in the interwar years to attitude formation and emphasis on morale, while intuition and “common sense” gave way to empirical research and statistics. The state would come to rely more on hard data than on the opinions of learned and experienced officers and gentlemen. So many advances were made in the interwar years that Stouffer was able to write in 1943:

At the time of World War I social psychology and sociology, as the journals of that period will show, had not advanced particularly far beyond the essay stage. Theories flourished, but it was the practice to illustrate them with examples somewhat as a preacher illustrates his sermons rather than to submit ideas to empirical tests. There was a great deal of bandying-about of the word ‘science,’ but one does not need to engage in a controversy on the definition of science to say that at least one of the important elements of science, namely, verification, was usually missing. The two decades after the Treaty of Versailles have been decades of unprecedented advance in sociology and social psychology. A serious effort has been made to phrase some of the theories in forms permitting at least beginnings of scientific verification. At the same time, the techniques developed by statisticians, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and other have been refined. It would be silly to say that, when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, social psychologists and sociologists were ready with a set of theories and techniques perfectly adapted for aiding the Army. But it is true that the accumulated experience of years of patient work has given the sociologist and social psychologist an opportunity in the war effort which he could not have taken advantage of two decades ago.\(^{138}\)
Sociologists had indeed made advances in the interwar years, and Stouffer was a key figure in bringing about those advances. The Army, based on their World War I experience, had made some changes in the way they did business, but its leaders for the most part remained reflexively tied to intuition rather than science when it came to leading enlisted men and managing their attitudes. Still, they had availed themselves of psychology in World War I, turning to psychologists Robert M. Yerkes (1876-1956) and Walter V. Bingham (1880-1952) to help them manage screening and classification of new recruits. Yerkes was a comparative psychologist interested in social control who took charge of the Army’s World War I intelligence testing, and who continually hectored official Washington for a place at the World War II table for psychology. He once said that “theoretically man is just as measurable as is a bar of steel.”

During World War II, Bingham was the Army’s head psychologist, having been appointed a colonel and chairman of the Committee on Classification of Military Personnel. After first meeting Bingham in 1941, Stouffer described him as “gray, friendly, maybe a little tedious. He is now chief consultant to army personnel service; don’t know quite what it means. Only one in Washington, he says, who built the personnel & testing programs in last war.”

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In terms of setting up psychologists and sociologists for success in World War II, the World War I psychological program had mixed results. On one hand it confirmed the side of Progressive Era thinking which cleaved to experts and scientific management, on the other, it rejected the opinions and attitudes of the masses as guides for policy decisions. First World War American psychology was also not innocent of the principles of eugenics, and many of the 69,394 recruits rejected for military service were rejected on those grounds. Still, the thought that there could be a systematic, scientific process for screening and assigning soldiers gave weight to the idea in the interwar years that there might be a similar process for determining and modifying their attitudes.¹⁴² Stouffer, writing in the middle of the Second World War, saw nothing but value in the participation of psychologists in World War I test design and testing. “In World War I a distinguished American psychologist was asked, ‘What can psychology contribute to winning the war?’ He is reported to have replied, ‘Nothing.’ He was, of course, quite wrong.”¹⁴³

¹⁴² Ellen Herman. *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 23, 55, 85. See also Eli Ginzberg, James K. Anderson, Sol W. Ginsberg, and John L. Herma. *The Ineffective Soldier*, vol. I. *The Lost Divisions*, and vol. III, *Patterns of Performance*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. vol. I: 12-13, 30-40, 137-194. vol. III: 141-159. Ginzberg et. al. reported 68,000 rejections in WWI (14 per 1,000) and 1,686,000 in WWII (94 per 1,000). They also illuminated just how fraught with peril “selective service” could be: “The military planners knew very little about the characteristics of the nation’s human resources. Many policies, some sound, and many unsound, were developed. It was indeed unfortunate that the Armed Services had to learn by trial and error once the war [WWII] was under way. Yet this was the inevitable consequence of lack of knowledge and prior planning. For instance, it was only after several years of experience with Selective Service that the Army came to appreciate the variability in the American population and the need for caution in applying national norms. It had to make special allowance in assessing the potential usability of men from some parts of the South, who because they had been brought up in relatively isolated rural areas, had had only a limited amount of schooling, had little knowledge of modern technology, and had only limited exposure to group life. Many a man was unnecessarily lost to the Army because the screening officers were unfamiliar with the cultural mores of different regions. For instance, a medical officer from New York or Chicago frequently had little or no experience with the behavior patterns of rural Americans. Errors of judgment occurred when inexperienced officers confronted with the excessive taciturnity of a Tennessee mountaineer or the feigned ‘dumbness’ of an Alabama Negro concluded that they were dealing with mentally deficient persons.” See also Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little. *Sociology and the Military Establishment*. London: Sage, 1974. 25-26.

¹⁴³ Samuel A. Stouffer. “Social Science and the Soldier,” in William Fielding Ogburn, ed. *American Society in Wartime*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. 105-117. Stouffer continued, “World War I marked the first large-scale application of psychological tests of intelligence and vocational aptitudes. The impact of this work on psychology after the war was of tremendous importance, and techniques of psychological measurement subsequently made their influence felt everywhere in education and in industry. This work also paved the way for
The Army also recognized, late in the First World War, that something had to be done to create and husband good morale for those soldiers it decided to keep. In the early months of the war, most officers in the War Department believed morale to be the province of individual commanders, even though the psychologists in their employ were advocating for an Army-wide morale strategy. Experience on the Western Front, the collapse of Russia, and the French Army mutinies in 1917, however, began to turn the tide in favor of some form of systematic morale management. Captured documents helped the case - illuminating the German Army’s program of psychological indoctrination for troop motivation. All that was needed was an advocate, and one presented himself in the person of Army physician Colonel Edward Lyman Munson (1869-1947). Already a legend when he began his campaign for a Morale Branch, Munson had followed his medical training at Yale with service in China during the Spanish-American War, and had been one of the surgeons who attended President McKinley after the president was shot by an assassin. He had been Professor of Military Hygiene at the Army Service School in Washington, and had designed the boots worn by doughboys in World War I. Munson was persistent. He told his superiors that “men, money, and munitions” might provide the Army with a soldier ready to fight, but to keep him that way, “psychological stimulus” was needed. Munson won the battle, and in May 1918, a Morale Section was created as part of the War Department’s new approaches in psychological theory. The work of Dr. L.L. Thurstone and his colleagues at the University of Chicago, and of scores of others who are laboring in the development of quantitative psychological theories, rests upon the cultural base of hundreds of man-years of experience in test construction which was given its greatest impetus in the crisis of World War I. This development in the measurement of intelligence and vocational aptitudes is bearing rich, practical fruit in our Army and Navy today.” (Stouffer’s essay is also available in Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, eds. *Sociological Analysis: An Introductory Text and Case Book*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949. 44-51). Psychology was indeed a major part of both war efforts, and an integral part of Research Branch: “Although often seen as sociological, the Research Branch projects were squarely on the boundary between sociology and psychology.” Andrew Abbott and James T. Sparrow “Hot War, Cold War: The Structures of Sociological Action, 1940-1955,” in Craig Calhoun, ed. *Sociology in America: A History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 288-289.
Training and instruction branch. For his pains, Munson was given the task of organizing the Morale Section.\textsuperscript{144}

Munson’s work in many respects prefigured Stouffer’s, and if Stouffer was attempting to bring sociology onto a more scientific footing, Munson was doing the same with the Army and morale. Shortly after he founded and was appointed director of the Army’s Morale Section, he published an 800 page treatise entitled \textit{The Management of Men: A Handbook on the Systematic Development of Morale and the Control of Behavior} (1921), which he dedicated “to the younger officers of the service and all future leaders of men.” Munson saw little utility in continuing with the intuitional methods of the past, and he hoped his audience of young officers would be receptive to his ideas. He knew that their somewhat hidebound superiors would not be.

The first few sentences of \textit{The Management of Men} are instructive for Munson’s dismissal of intuition and “leadership” as a basis upon which to build and maintain consistently high morale:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The management of men and the development of morale are so inseparably associated that they are properly to be considered together. Each has heretofore been regarded as an art, in the application of which success by the individual largely depended on the relative degree in which the latter possessed inherent qualities of leadership. The purpose of this book is to show that they should also be considered as a science, whereby mental state and human behavior can be comprehensively and effectively controlled by the scientific application of the fundamental laws governing human nature itself.}
\end{quote}

Despite Munson’s efforts, the Army was not quite ready to embrace progressive psychology or science in the pursuit of morale. Instead, physical fitness and morality became the emphasis of Morale Section, and there the emphasis remained - dampened by the end of the First War - until those frantic few months before Pearl Harbor and the reactivation of a moribund

Morale Branch under Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. Nevertheless, Munson did exert influence on Stouffer and Research Branch. Early in their labors, Stouffer asked one of his colleagues, Leonard S. Cottrell, to review the literature on morale. Cottrell went to both the War College Library and the Library of Congress, and produced a report for Stouffer in which Munson’s work, particularly *The Management of Men*, figured largely. Additionally, Munson’s son, E.L. Munson, Jr., was one of the military chiefs of Research Branch.

As noted previously, Stouffer began his research of the Army’s World War I experience at the most compelling, succinct, and obvious place: Raymond B. Fosdick’s “Report of the Chairman on Training Camp Activities to the Secretary of War, 1918,” and various of Fosdick’s other papers and writings from the First World War. Appointed by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Fosdick had been a lawyer, progressive reformer, and investigator for the Bureau of Social Hygiene, and had investigated troop conditions on the Mexican Border in 1916 during the

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146 Edward Lyman Munson. *The Management of Men: A Handbook on the Systematic Development of Morale and the Control of Behavior*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1921. iii-v. Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., one of the co-authors of *The American Soldier*, who later, like Stouffer, would serve as President of the American Sociological Association, did some reading in the summer of 1942. “I started the work of reviewing the literature on military morale available in the War College Library and the Library of Congress….to ascertain what, if any, elements in morale observers studying the problem have emphasized….“ Cottrell’s research led him to the work of Munson. He spent several hours with Munson’s *The Management of Men*, because “his treatment of the subject has been the most comprehensive and complete.” Cottrell’s review of the literature and subsequent report to Stouffer highlighted the ideas that soldiers had to be oriented to the aims of war, believe in their leaders, believe in the value of discipline, feel strong bonds to their comrades, perceive a “record to live up to,” have confidence in themselves, and enjoy decent living conditions. It is fair to say that all of Research Branch’s subsequent work focused on these and related ideas. Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. to Samuel A. Stouffer, Aug. 27, 1942. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 969. (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File 1941- June 1955, Consultation Service to History of Research Division. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
pursuit of Pancho Villa. Fosdick’s report of what he found on the border made for interesting 
and alarming reading. Focusing on the military installations in or near San Antonio, Brownsville, 
El Paso, Nogales, and other Texas locales, Fosdick wrote of the increase of prostitution 
coincident with the arrival of the Army - with prostitutes “flocking” to swell the red light 
districts adjacent to Army camps. San Antonio, as described by Fosdick, was burnishing its “evil 
reputation,” and was filled with scarlet women and libertine soldiers. The provost guards, he 
observed, did almost nothing, and he made a quick connection between the debauchery he 
witnessed and the high rate of venereal disease.

Fosdick recommended to Baker that the War Department threaten to move the camps if 
the towns did not “clean house,” energize the provosts, abandon the idea that prostitution could 
be regulated or controlled, and recognize the “scar on a man’s life” that prostitution and all its 
evils could render. He ended the section of his report on prostitution - the other section, on 
saloons, painted an equally grim picture - by telling Baker that none of these measures were 
more than stop-gaps, and that what was really needed was a “committee or council of army 
officers, physicians of modern training and scientific spirit, and perhaps civilians who have had 
experience with the problem.”

Ostensibly the problem was a moral one, but Fosdick, Baker, and most Army officers 
viewed it from the perspective of preservation of combat power. Bad morals meant bad morale 
which produced the poor discipline that ultimately rendered poor combat performance. As 
American entry into the European struggle looked to be increasingly likely in the year following 
Fosdick’s 1916 report from the Mexican Border, the Army’s leaders decided that the nation

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could not afford the drunkenness, venereal disease and poor morale that came with such loose morals, and they certainly could not afford it in the numbers that conscription would bring. Something had to be done, and therefore Baker in April 1917 created the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA),149 placing Fosdick at its head.150

The report Fosdick provided Baker on the CTCA at the completion of the First World War was every bit as full of “dynamite” as Stouffer, reading it in the summer of 1941, had written in his personal notes. The dynamite, however, was perhaps a bit old - more useful for the Progressive Era than the era of scientific sociology. Fosdick reported to Baker that the purpose of the CTCA had been “to keep the man in uniform healthy and clean, physically and mentally, by safeguarding him against evil influences [liquor, prostitutes, and venereal disease] and surrounding him with opportunity for sane, beneficial occupation for his spare time.” Toward that end, Fosdick had organized the CTCA into six divisions, departments and committees: The Athletic, Social Hygiene, and Law Enforcement Divisions, the Camp Music Department, The Military Entertainment Committee, and the National Smileage Committee, which dedicated itself to selling coupon books which would fund tickets for soldiers to attend wholesome

149 Secretary of War Baker wrote to Raymond Fosdick, “I have decided to appoint a commission on training camp activities to act under the immediate direction of the Secretary of War. The commission, when appointed, will act as a clearing house for suggestions of various kinds in relation to the question of providing rational recreational and other facilities for men in training camps. The functions of the commission will be largely advisory, but I will expect to consult it upon the whole question of police regulations outside the limits of military camps.” By war’s end, the CTCA would be much more than a purely advisory board, and one could make the argument that this organization was a nascent Research Branch. Newton D. Baker to Raymond B. Fosdick, April 18, 1917. Raymond B. Fosdick Papers, 1917-1957, MC#055, Correspondence-Subjects, Box 21, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

150 Allan M. Brandt. No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 56-59. “Rather than frame the problem as a moral one, Baker and Fosdick effectively redirected the discussion to the themes of rationality and efficiency (56).” The rhetoric may have been about providing to soldiers “invisible armor” against vice, but the real concern was preservation of combat power. (See Fred D. Baldwin. “The Invisible Armor.” American Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1 (Autumn 1964): 432-444). Another impulse for the creation of the CTCA was the need for “a clearinghouse for the various social agencies anxious to do service for the soldiers….” Fearing that draftees might be overrun by uplifters, Fosdick proposed that a federal agency should direct voluntary efforts for recreation and amusement in the camps (59).” See also Nancy K. Bristow. Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War. New York: New York University Press, 1996. 1-8.
entertainments. It was the job of these organizations “to keep the camps and surrounding neighborhoods free from vicious influences which would render the soldier mentally and physically unfit for military service; and to supply so far as could be done social and recreational facilities to replace in his new environment the normal conditions of life he enjoyed at home.”

Aiding (and often vexing) Fosdick in his work, and supervised by the CTCA were The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), National Catholic War Council (Knights of Columbus), the Jewish Welfare Board, War Camp Community Service, the American Library Association, and the Salvation Army.151

More along the lines of still viable “dynamite” for Stouffer was Fosdick’s report on officer-enlisted relations - a major issue in the Second World War.152 After having spent four months with the A.E.F. in France, Fosdick reported to Baker than many soldiers would be returning to the US “disgruntled,” and that the root of this disgruntlement could be “found in what may be called a misfit in the relationship between officers and men,” that was “galling to the democratic spirit of the troops.” Prefiguring the findings of Research Branch as reported in The American Soldier, Fosdick’s “dynamite” on this issue was explosive indeed:

In our army both officers and men are drawn from a common economic and social reservoir. There are plenty of men of superior education and high mental and moral qualities in the ranks of the A.E.F. Conversely there are plenty of commissioned and non-commissioned officers who


152 The issue was so significant, and remained so throughout World War II, that it garnered the special attention of the Secretary of War and a special panel to deal with it at the end of the war. The famous “Doolittle Report” of 1946 is a revisiting of the problems identified by Fosdick twenty-seven years before, among which were the unexpected higher-caliber soldiers, tradition bound officers, and a Regular Army completely unprepared to deal with the swelling of its ranks brought by conscription. The report referenced both Fosdick’s 1919 report on officer-enlisted relations and Research Branch’s World War II surveys. “Doolittle Report: The Report of the Secretary of War’s Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships.” Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.
have none of these attributes. I do not believe that an army was ever recruited in which the common soldier possessed such a high average of intelligence and social experience as in the American Army of 1917 to 1919. By the same reasoning it must be admitted that in no army have the officers been superior to their men by so small a margin. Yet the differences between officers and men in point of the privileges and social position conferred upon the former has been emphasized to what seems to me to be a totally unnecessary degree. Under foreign service conditions, both officers and men are limited to practically the same public facilities for their means of recreation and relaxation. Yet the possession of a Sam Browne belt in the A.E.F. has carried with it advantages out of all proportion to disciplinary requirements or to the needs of the occasion, and officers have been allowed and encouraged to claim and even monopolize such advantages in ways that have shown a total lack of the spirit of fair play.  

Fosdick went on to cite examples: Officers peremptorily taking the seats occupied by soldiers at theater performances and athletic events, blithely moving to the head of any line, placing local villages out of bounds for enlisted men but not themselves, and using enlisted men for menial labor. He attributed the situation to “Regular Line Officers” who failed to recognize “that the army of America which this war called into being is made up of men of a far different stripe and caliber from those represented by the post and garrison troops who he was accustomed to command in pre-war days.” These men were to Fosdick, “independent young Americans, full of initiative and imagination,” and they harbored considerable bitterness against “a caste system which has no sanction in America.” American soldiers, Fosdick continued, “are too wide awake, too critical by habit, and too well educated to concede special privileges that have no military significance or value to officers who are the mental and moral inferiors of half of their subordinates.”  

One can easily see why Stouffer saw “dynamite” in this report, and it is clear

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154 Ibid. 6-9. Clearly the World War I experience was a major reference point for the Army as it oriented itself for the Second World War. However, that experience was brief, the right lessons were not always learned, and much was forgotten in the interwar years. “The Army was particularly handicapped by the fact that its experience with modern war was limited to the less than twenty months that we participated in World War I. In that war our Allies initially carried us, while in World War II, especially in the later years, we carried our Allies. Some of the
from his subsequent actions that his approach to this particular problem would be to introduce, as it were, enlisted men to officers through an illumination of enlisted attitudes. Also striking is Fosdick’s own change of attitude and emphasis. In 1916, and well into 1918, Fosdick remained convinced that the two great threats to morale were liquor and prostitutes, and that athletics and singing could largely deal with these threats. By 1919 he was seeing something else - the production of poor attitudes in soldiers by the poor attitudes of officers, and he named this particular malady as the most significant that confronted Army. Indeed, the officer-enlisted problem remained a tough nut to crack, and even survived the Second World War despite the efforts of Stouffer and his colleagues. One of Bill Mauldin’s best World War II cartoons summed up the issue in Mauldin’s characteristically wry and insightful way:

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experiences of World War I were so deeply engrained that they led to serious defects in policy, such as the conviction about the limited value of Negro manpower. Other valuable experience was lost and had to be discovered anew at high cost. An outstanding example of this was the failure of the General Staff and of the Surgeon General of the Army to make effective use of Volume X of the History of the Medical Department of World War I, which summarized the experience with soldiers who suffered from emotional disturbances and which detailed the best ways of avoiding such manpower losses. The British sought out copies of this volume but we neglected it.” Eli Ginzberg, James K. Anderson, Sol W. Ginsberg, and John L. Herma. The Ineffective Soldier, vol. I. The Lost Divisions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 13-14. For additional ideas on what was and was not learned from the First World War, particularly as it pertains to “emotional disturbances,” see Edward A. Strecker and Kenneth E. Appel. Psychiatry in Modern Warfare. New York: Macmillan, 1945. iii-v.
“Beautiful view! Is there one for the enlisted men.”

Even as Stouffer was studying Fosdick’s papers in the summer of 1941, the Army was in crisis over the very issues upon which Fosdick had placed his thumb in 1919 - officer-enlisted

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relations and the wide gulf between the Regular and conscripted Armies. Largely erased from popular memory by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had a unifying effect on the Army to be sure, this morale crisis six months before the attack was palpable indeed, and demonstrated starkly the need for systemic methods to study soldier attitudes and make policy decisions based on those findings.

In response to the war in Europe, President Roosevelt had begun to federalize National Guard units in September 1940, as well as instituting conscription, with the understanding that draftees would only serve for one year. In July 1941, with the Germans ransacking the Ukraine and Japanese assets frozen in the United States, the president asked Congress for a six month extension, which passed by only one vote.\textsuperscript{156} The divisions in Congress also applied to the Army, where conscripts chaffed against what many of them saw at best as a breach of contract and at worst as an outright betrayal. Kept away from home and family and living in spartan Army camps on about thirty dollars a month, many of the draftees began writing to their congressmen - a breach of both tradition (one does not jump the chain of command, it just is not done) and of the Articles of War. Some started the “OHIO” campaign, for Over the Hill (desertion) in October, while others saved their invective for officers whom they felt were both incompetent and out of touch. (For their part, many Regular Army officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers tended to view the draftees as spoiled, soft, and - crime of crimes - disloyal).\textsuperscript{157}

Morale became so poor in the summer of 1941 that it seeped into both the Congressional Record and the national press. The debates therein searched for causes for the low morale, which


included the aforementioned softness, the lack of clarity presented by the war in Europe (in stark contrast to the First World War, when American ships had been torpedoed by the Germans (not to mention the notorious Zimmerman Telegram), and the failure of leaders to orient their men to the war (to instill in them the urgency of the situation and the proper fighting spirit). Senator Chavez of New Mexico held forth in Congress on the need for “purpose,” and Representative Wilson of Indiana decried the “lack of fighting spirit” in the young men of the day. Articles on morale began to appear in *Life*, *The New Republic*, *Look*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, and the *Atlantic Monthly*, as well as scores of newspapers across the country. The Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, conceded that World War I and the problems illuminated by it had brought “that French word [morale] from comparative obscurity to widespread usage.”

Even more disturbing than the low morale resulting from extended commitments was the major rifts the morale crisis illuminated between officers and enlisted men and the Regular and draftee armies. In June 1940, the Army carried 267,767 men on its roster. Only a year later, that number had risen to 1,460,998 - a 500% increase in 12 months. Historian Lee Kennett likened the massive influx of civilians into the tradition bound, regimented life of the constabulary Regular Army to a chemical reaction: “Pouring millions of men into the Army in a short space of time was like pouring a rich chemical solution into a receptacle that already contained quite a

158 Research Branch studies later determined that orientation had limited utility in affecting attitudes. “The Research Branch concluded that the central fault with the Army’s orientation strategy was the assumption that increased factual knowledge about the war would produce changes in opinion that would then motivate the troops. Writing four years after the war, the Research Branch suggested that people might simply not be as rationally motivated as the orientation program assumed.” Benjamin L. Alpers. “This is the Army: Imagining a Democratic Military in World War II.” *The Journal of American History*, vol. 85, no. 1 (June 1998): 129-163 (157).


different solution; and interaction, a reaction, was inevitable.”¹⁶¹ The reaction was the morale crisis of the summer of 1941.

The Regular Army, in addition to having to house, clothe, feed, and train over a million more men than it had been required to do the previous summer, was also faced with something of a cultural crisis. The draftees simply refused to toe the line. They questioned orders, they slouched, they failed to salute, and they “did not have,” according to Kennett, “the regular soldier’s notion of subordination or his respect for channels.”¹⁶² They bypassed the chain of command, they complained endlessly, and they wrote to their congressmen and to the Chief of Staff with their complaints (unheard of in the Regular Army).¹⁶³

Although Marshall was quick to recognize the morale problem, his training and experience led him to initially conclude, as Fosdick had, that much of the problem could be addressed with bolstered morals and hygiene - cleanliness, diet, church, and above all, athletics.¹⁶⁴ The problem was serious enough, however, that Marshall agreed to release National Guardsmen and draftees after fourteen to eighteen months of service “unless the world situation

¹⁶² Kennett. 67.
¹⁶³ Occasionally General Marshall would answer these letters. To one private he wrote, “Since the receipt of your letter, complaining about the lack of attention you have received, your case has been investigated by the Commanding General at Fort Bragg. I am told you believe you are suffering from arthritis, but that the surgeon has been unable to make a definite diagnosis. But what is more to the point, I am told that prior to December 31, 1940, your service was satisfactory, but since that date it has not been satisfactory. You married without permission; you were absent without leave on January 6th and again for three days from January 15th; you entered the hospital on January 18, and were absent without leave on January 19th. There are more than one million young men in the Army today. If conduct such as yours was a frequent occurrence, it would be impossible to build up an efficient army and utterly impossible to administer it. The fact that the Chief of Staff of the Army has taken the time to write to you directly should indicate to you the harm done by unjustifiable complaints such as yours. It is your job now as a citizen and soldier in this great emergency to do your duty without further derelictions.” George C. Marshall to Frank W. Clay, April 7, 1941 (Document #2-416). George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
¹⁶⁴ Marshall had a message published in Ladies Home Journal which sought to soothe the worries of mothers of citizen soldiers. He told them that “Morale and physical fitness are attributes of a good soldier. In this new Army of ours we are paying a great deal of attention to both. Our men…have been trained and conditioned during the past month like athletes….Their religious welfare has been most carefully provided for and is the subject of continuous inspection.” George C. Marshall. “A Message to the Women of America,” Ladies Home Journal vol. 58 (August 1941): 6.
becomes more serious.” Marshall also sent a memo about Army morale to President Roosevelt,¹⁶⁵ agreed to an external review, and appointed Frederick H. Osborn to head the Morale Branch of the Army on August 19, 1941.¹⁶⁶ (Morale Division - later renamed Morale Branch - had been created in July 1940 and oversaw such matters as athletics, libraries, leave policies, and postal services).¹⁶⁷ Marshall also included in the May 22, 1941 edition of Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations - Operations the idea that intuition, common sense, and “leadership” were insufficient to ensure strong morale. “Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised; they must be thoroughly planned and systematically promoted.”¹⁶⁸

The confidential external review of Army morale, conducted by Hilton H. Railey of The New York Times, confirmed for Marshall that church and cleanliness and boxing would not be enough to manage the morale of the 1941 draftee and National Guard Army. Railey, a World War I veteran, began the research for his 200 page report “Morale in the US Army” on August

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¹⁶⁵ Marshall’s memo to the president was measured in its tone, but acknowledged that morale in the Army had become “a very difficult problem,” for which “prompt action is necessary.” In this particular memo, Marshall identified the culprit as “the home influence….Parents have been so confused as to the facts or logic of the situation [by Congressional debates on conscription and news reports] and so influenced by what they read of a critical nature that something must be done to bring them to an understanding of the national emergency and the necessity for a highly trained Army.” George C. Marshall to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 6, 1941. (Document #2-544). George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia. “Unless the world situation becomes more serious” from “Army Service Set.” The New York Times, August 20, 1941. 1.

¹⁶⁶ Notwithstanding Osborn’s other qualifications and connections, the most important fact about him in the summer of 1941 was that he was a civilian. The front page New York Times article announcing his appointment highlighted the fact in its title: “F.H. Osborn, Civilian, Named Morale Officer with Rank of Brigadier General.” The article also highlighted the rift between Regular Army Officers, draftees, and civilians: “Army officers feel that, on the whole, morale is high, but that public wrangling over extension of service, which has pandered to the complaints of grumblers in the service, created for a time a situation which should have been avoided.” The same article announced that the War Department had decided to release draftees and National Guardsmen from service after fourteen to eighteen months, a move which was “designed to heighten Army morale.” “Army Service Set.” The New York Times, August 20, 1941. 1. See also Roger Barry Fosdick. “A Call to Arms: The American Enlisted Soldier in World War II.” Phd dissertation, history, Claremont College, 1985. 27-28.

¹⁶⁷ Stephen D. Wesbrook. “The Railey Report and Army Morale.” Military Review vol. 60 (June 1980): 22. Specifically, Morale Division was created on July 22, 1940 as part of the Office of the Adjutant General. On March 14, 1941 it was redesignated Morale Branch and placed under the direct supervision of the Army Chief of Staff.

19, 1941 – about two weeks after Stouffer’s initial visit to Washington, and the same day Marshall appointed Osborn to head Morale Branch. Railey turned the confidential report over to the Army on September 29th, and it has henceforth been known as “The Railey Report.” Within its pages were Railey’s findings after having interviewed over 1,000 soldiers of all ranks, visited seven posts, and observed the Louisiana Maneuvers. Historians Lee Kennett, Stephen Wesbrook, and Roger Fosdick (not to be confused with Raymond B. Fosdick) have written that the Railey Report made for sobering reading in the early fall of 1941. Among the problems Railey found were junior officers afraid of their soldiers, senior officers out of touch with their men, blatant insubordination, and, of course, rock bottom morale. One division commander, emblematic of many of his peers, was convinced that his soldiers’ morale was high, although he admitted that “I don’t pretend to know what my men think of the world situation, or anything else, for that matter, and I don’t see the point of asking them.” Railey, impressed by this particular brand of invincible ignorance, reported to the War Department that “Command, vintage of 1917…appears naively and disconcertingly unaware that its men, vintage of 1940, are a different breed of cat….The present breed (mark well) is questioning everything from God Almighty to themselves.” 169 Railey’s bottom line was: “With extraordinary uniformity…the morale of the

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169 “The authors of The American Soldier discovered that resentment of privilege was basic to the G.I.’s makeup, and moreover that resentment increased as the war progressed. Stouffer and his colleagues concluded that privilege in the Army was objectionable because it was more precisely defined and more blatant than privilege in civilian life. A poor man might some day hope to receive an invitation to the country club; a private would never be invited to the officer’s club. The Army’s caste system came close to racial segregation in civilian life; for black soldiers adaptation to the military life was easier in this respect. There are no doubt other explanations for the American soldier’s attitude toward officers and their privileges. There was no heritage, no cultural ‘memory’ of legally distinguished classes as there was in Europe, and thus there was no tradition of deference to the officer-nobleman. The American officer’s ‘title’ was essentially his college degree, and among Americans the bachelor of arts diploma does not automatically inspire respect in those who do not possess one.” Lee Kennett. G.I: The American Soldier in World War II. New York: Scribner, 1987. 6-71, 84. See also Stephen D. Wesbrook. “The Railey Report and Army Morale.” Military Review vol. 60 (June 1980): 22. “Railey asserted that a great gulf existed between the higher commanders’ confident belief in their knowledge of what the men thought and said and what the men actually thought and said.”
United States Army, as I have sampled and verified it from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is not reassuring.”

Railey also observed that what the Army had done to date to see to morale had been insufficient. The responsibility for morale rested with unit recreation officers, indicating the Army’s idea of where the locus of morale rested. Per Railey, “this is virtually the only morale work done. The entire emphasis is on entertainment and amusement.” At the time Railey made his assessment, he was correct. Even as late as December 5, 1941, Osborn was extolling to Congress the virtues of athletics and recreation in improving morale. What Railey did not know was that since August Osborn had assigned Stouffer and his team to work on a more sophisticated, scientific way of assessing morale and to recommend policies to shape it. General Marshall was also leaning further towards a more effective way of gauging and improving morale, and was casting about for better ideas to solve the issue among subordinates in the War Department. Additionally, Morale Branch by early 1942 had become a much more influential and articulated organization - an organization that had moved well beyond athletics and camp sing-alongs. According to a 1942 article by its chief, (Osborn), “under the impetus of the new

172 Historian Lee Kennett recounts the advent of Research Branch and its studies on attitudes: “The crisis of 1941 registered with Army leadership, and especially with General Marshall. During the hectic summer he had found no better way to gauge the mood in the barracks than to have the Adjutant General’s people open soldier’s letters, a very dubious procedure at best. In October he took steps to find out the G.I.’s view of things by the simple but revolutionary expedient of asking him. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was opposed to opinion surveys among the troops, as were a number of generals, but Marshall had his way. In December the first cautious survey was conducted among men of the 9th Division at Fort Bragg. As time went on, Research Branch of the Information and Education Division perfected its polling techniques and broadened the range of its questions until it was asking privates what they would do if they were company commander. By the end of the war Research Branch had administered over two hundred surveys. It issued a periodic report called “What the Soldier Thinks,” and after the war Samuel Stouffer and other veterans of the branch drew the polling results together in a comprehensive work called The American Soldier. Its two volumes are the point of departure for all inquiries into the average G.I.’s attitudes and preoccupations.” Lee Kennett. G.I: The American Soldier in World War II. New York: Scribner, 1987. 71. See also John Madge. The Origins of Scientific Sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1962. 287-332. Madge’s chapter “Social Science and the Soldier” provides an excellent summary of Research Branch during World War II.
science of psychology, the War Department set up a Morale Branch charged with research into factors affecting the morale of the troops and with development of remedial measures.” The branch by that time had around 70 officers and 150 civilians on its roster, and 6 divisions - “the Army Exchange Service, the Army Motion Picture Service, the Welfare and Recreation Division, the Services Division, the Morale Research Division, and the Information Division.” (A comparison of these divisions with those of Raymod B. Fosdick’s CTCA speaks volumes about the evolution of thinking when it came to morale. Fosdick’s divisions were the Athletic, Social Hygiene, and Law Enforcement Divisions, the Camp Music Department, The Military Entertainment Committee, and the National Smileage Committee).

Osborn’s description of the Research and Information Divisions gives one an idea of how far the concept of “morale” and its maintenance had evolved in the interwar and early World War II years:

The Morale Branch is concerned with studies on factors affecting the morale of the soldier, and methods of orientation to help him to adjust to his new life in the Army and to understand his purpose and role in the country’s defense. These functions of Morale Branch are carried out by the Research Division and the Information Division… The work of the Research Division develops recommendations on factors affecting morale in the whole of the soldier’s environment…. The Information Division supervises the publication of camp newspapers, conducts radio programs within and without the camps, develops orientation films under the supervision of an experienced motion picture director commissioned in the Signal Corps and assigned to the Morale Branch, and employs other personnel for lectures and public relations contacts.174

Although Osborn entitled his article “Recreation, Welfare, and the Morale of the American Soldier,” it is clear from the article that those terms meant something different in 1942 than they had in 1917. It was a different war, a different time, and thinking on morale had evolved to the point that it did not revert to form in an emergency but rather gained “added

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impetus” from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Osborn closed his article, which he published in the “Organizing for Total War” issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, with the acknowledgement that “more is being done [for morale] than has ever been done for any army before. But in the final analysis of results, innumerable factors must be taken into account: new levels of civilian education, new civilian ideals, a new cause, and the different character and quality of the present generation.”

The Army’s leadership, through the efforts of men like Raymond Fosdick, Edward Munson and Hilton Railey, had learned in the interwar years, and were clearly moving away from intuition and towards science when it came to morale.

By the time Osborn wrote his article for the *Annals*, Stouffer had been working for him for about eight months. What of Stouffer do we see in Osborn’s article, which described the state of the art on morale and attitude research and formation? What was Stouffer’s particular part in sociological advances between the wars? What was he doing from 1920-1940, and who was influencing him in these years? The Army had showed some willingness to move in the direction of scientific sociology…what was Stouffer doing to bring scientific sociology and survey research about? The next chapter attempts to answer these questions.

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Chapter 4
Stouffer in the Interwar Years

After completing his bachelor’s degree in Latin at Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa, (1921) Stouffer took an M.A. in English at Harvard, and then returned to his hometown of Sac City Iowa in 1923 to take over the editorship of his ailing father’s newspaper, the Sac City Sun. The Lives of Harvard Scholars reports that while Stouffer was pursuing journalism, the sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951) visited Sac City and encouraged, either directly or indirectly, Stouffer to pursue a career in sociology.176

Stouffer sold the Sac City Sun in 1926 and headed for the University of Chicago, closing the deal only three days before the fall term began. “Here we are, two blocks from the University,” he wrote to his brother Tom, “in a cozy little apartment which we are renting from the University…..We are quite a distance from the machine gun belt, and our only experience with Chicago outdoor sport thus far is to have our baby carriage stolen.” Despite the distractions of a city like Chicago, Stouffer was committed to his studies. “I don’t know how long we’ll be here and I don’t care much; I’m going to keep on studying and sinking foundation piers until I am satisfied that the superstructure won’t cave in a few years from now,” he told his brother.177

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176 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. The Lives of Harvard Scholars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 45. The answer to exactly why Stouffer decided to become a sociologist is maddeningly elusive. The Lives of Harvard Scholars reports only that “partly stimulated by a visit there [Sac City] of E.A. Ross, he [Stouffer] took an abrupt turn and enrolled in the University of Chicago as a candidate for the PhD in sociology.” There is no indication that Ross went to Sac City specifically to see Stouffer. More likely Ross had a speaking engagement there. Neither of Stouffer’s surviving children remembers their father mentioning why he went into sociology, and there is nothing definitive in the literature. The best additional clues comes from an interview he gave to Helen Dudar of the New York Post in 1955. Dudar wrote that Stouffer “didn’t get around to discovering he had an academic interest in people’s conceptions and misconceptions until his late twenties,” and that after working at the Sac City Sun for a time “his interest in political and social events had been aroused and he headed for the U. of Chicago for a doctorate in sociology.” (Helen Dudar. “Prof. Stouffer’s Startling ‘Stuff.’” New York Post, Sunday, April 14, 1955).

177 Samuel A. Stouffer to Tom Stouffer, Jan. 31, 1927. The Private Papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer. Wicomico Church, VA.
Chicago during Stouffer’s graduate student days was indeed the home of Al Capone, and Stouffer would have doubtless read of the St. Valentines Day Massacre (1929) and other gang activities. But Chicago was also, and had been for some time, the home of sociology in the United States. Sociologist Don Martindale in his essay “American Sociology before World War II” refers to “the virtual knowledge explosion that occurred in the Chicago School” in the 1920s and 1930s. Eastern schools, particularly New York University, Harvard, and Columbia would in the second half of the twentieth century develop excellent schools of sociology, but the first half belonged to Chicago.

Although the intellectual trajectory of Stouffer’s life peaks only at his death at sixty in 1960, the chronological arc peaks in 1930, at the end of his graduate studies in Chicago. In addition to the influence of E.A. Ross, Stouffer remembered that he was motivated to go to Chicago by his “first hand experience in human nature” gained while running the Sac City Sun. “I got to know everybody and all their troubles,” he said, “The main thing, it seemed to me, is that people were tossing a lot of bunk around and it seemed a good idea to try to pin some of these things down.” The question was how to do that, and his professors at the University of Chicago had the answers: survey research and statistics.

Louis Leon Thurstone (1877-1955), William Fielding Ogburn (1886-1959), and Ellsworth Faris (1874-1953) exerted the most influence on Stouffer at Chicago. Thurstone crossed disciplinary lines in a manner almost unimaginable today. He received his master’s degree from Cornell in 1912, in mechanical engineering, before beginning his psychology.

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178 Don Martindale. “American Sociology before World War II.” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 2 (1976): 137-139. “Among the advantages of the Chicago [sociology] department was the presence throughout the university of the same spirit that infused the sociology department: a disinclination to pursue abstractions or philosophical principles for their own sake, a concern for empirical investigation, and faith in the ultimately practical importance of knowledge.”

studies at the University of Chicago (PhD, 1917). Thurstone was interested in measurement, particularly in the education and psychology fields - what has come to be known as psychometrics. In January 1928 he published “Attitudes Can Be Measured” in the *American Journal of Sociology*, which Stouffer referenced on the first page of his doctoral dissertation. Thurstone used terms such as “base line” and “frequency distribution.” He defined his terms, he differentiated carefully between attitude and opinion, and he confined himself to a “linear continuum.” He sounded every bit the scientist, and his essay is as far away from intuition masquerading as knowledge as one can get.180

William Fielding Ogburn arrived at the University of Chicago in the same academic year as Stouffer (1926-1927). A Columbia PhD (1912), he had come from eight years as a sociology professor at Columbia, and would later serve as sociology department chair at Chicago from 1936 until his retirement in 1951. Ogburn also served as president of the American Sociological Society in 1929, and entitled his presidential address, “The Folkways of Scientific Sociology,” wherein he spoke of a “differentiating process…of methods” as the future of sociology, when “the more strictly scientific methods will be differentiated from methods that more properly belong to activities other than those of science.” These other than scientific activities he named as “ethics, religion, commerce, education, journalism, literature and propaganda,” a listing that bears a considerable resemblance to the original departments of early American social science.181

181 William F. Ogburn 1929 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Society, “The Folkways of Scientific Sociology.” American Sociological Society website: http://www.asanet.org/galleries/default-file/OgburnPresidentialAddress.pdf (July 21, 2008). Despite the arrival at Chicago, with Ogburn, of quantitative methods, those interested in qualitative research also found a fair place for study in the sociology department. Sociologist Ethel Shanas, who arrived at Chicago in 1933 as a graduate student, remembered that “we students were
Ogburn saw science as progress. His teaching dwelt on statistics, and he was a natural for the presidency of the American Statistical Association in 1931, and the chairmanship of the Social Science Research Council, 1937-1939. Upon his death in 1959, *Social Forces* journal remembered him as “the statistician, conversant with the current census, the Cost of Living Index, and the latest figures on the national product.” Ogburn was one of the first to congratulate Stouffer on the publication of *The American Soldier*, writing to him in April, 1949, “I can see it is just the kind of book I like to see published.” When he died ten years later, only a year before Stouffer’s own death, Stouffer remembered him as a dealer in science and wisdom. The Ogburn-Stouffer Center for the Study of Social Organizations, part of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, memorializes their professional relations and friendship.


See also Dorothy Ross. *The Origins of American Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 430-431. Ross notes the influence of psychology on Ogburn, as well as his reluctance, despite his belief in the efficacy of science, to ascribe to it god-like powers of explanation.
a short sojourn teaching philosophy at Texas Christian University on his return from Africa, Faris entered graduate school at the University of Chicago, where he studied philosophy and psychology. He taught psychology at both Chicago and the University of Iowa, and was later brought into the sociology department at Chicago, where he became department chair in 1925. Faris served as ASA president in 1937, seven years after he signed Stouffer’s doctoral dissertation.187 Stouffer remembered Faris warmly in his dissertation, “Besides his obligation to many other faculty members and graduate students, the writer is under particularly deep indebtedness to his teacher, Professor Ellsworth Faris, whose criticisms of attitude research encouraged the present study and kept it from going off the track even more times than future research may prove it to have done.”188

Stouffer chose a timely topic for his dissertation, prohibition, and sought to prove that statistical analysis of attitudes would yield the same results as the traditional case-history method of study, and would be more reliable due to a larger sample and a repeatable methodology. Stouffer surveyed 238 students at the University of Chicago, while a panel of four judges, each working alone, read and evaluated case histories. (The judges were Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., a later member of Research Branch and co-author of The American Soldier, Robert E. L. Faris, Everett V. Stonequist, and Edgar T. Thompson). “The judges were told to use whatever concepts of attitudes of prohibition they chose, to set their own standards of favorable or unfavorable, and to try to judge all papers by the same standards.”189 The dissertation yielded the expected and desired results, “attitudes as measured by the test and attitudes as measured by the case history

189 Ibid., iv.
ratings are quantitatively very much the same.”\textsuperscript{190} What Stouffer had proved, and what would be so critical to his work with Research Branch in World War II, was that a well designed test, or survey, was just as reliable as a panel of experts. No such panel, however hard working, could possibly have evaluated the 500,000 soldiers Research Branch surveyed in the Second World War. Nor could they have provided results in a timely enough manner to affect policy with the speed required by a world war.

The case-history method required subjects to provide a “brief, interesting, sincere sketch of your experiences from childhood to the present day which affected your attitudes toward drinking yourself and toward prohibition laws.”\textsuperscript{191} The sketch was to be no longer than 1,000 words. Under these instructions, Case #22, a nineteen-year-old male wrote, “My earliest recollections are that my father would send me to the neighborhood saloon, and there was one on every corner in those days.” He continued to record that even so, his father had advocated moderation, he himself did not drink in high school, he understood the relationship between Al Capone and bootlegging, and concluded that “prohibition laws, thus far, have proven a failure, and should receive careful study for a complete remodification.”\textsuperscript{192} The four judges, graduate students “among those best equipped, by technical experience in the interpretation of case materials,” had three weeks in which to read 238 papers such as this one in their “spare hours.”\textsuperscript{193}

The test, or survey, employed the following questionnaire, which was developed by Dr. Hattie N. Smith using L.L. Thurstone’s method of equal appearing intervals:\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., v. See Also Andrew Abbott. Department & Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 211-212.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 226.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 22-25.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 3, 13.
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<td>(If foreign born, give country in above space)</td>
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<td>5. If foreign born, in what year did you come to the United States?</td>
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<td>Freshman</td>
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<td>8. How many times (try to recall exactly) in the past two (2) months have you attended church?</td>
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<td>9. Country of birth of your father mother father’s father mother’s mother</td>
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<td>10. Years you have lived in suburbs, yrs. in various or cities, communities over 100, (before you entered City or University)</td>
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<td>11. Did your father tend to drink regularly occasionally none at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Do you consider the immediate neighborhoods where you spent most of your childhood as wet? dry? can’t say?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. To what extent were those neighborhoods inhabited by people of a foreign nationality? To a large extent Somewhat Practically none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Of what nationality or nationalities were they?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Was liquor served in your home when you were a child? Regularly occasionally never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. At liquor elections did your father tend to vote wet? dry? can’t say</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Have you ever drunk a glass of intoxicating liquor?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. In all your life, about how many times, if any, have you been drunk? time(s). Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Did you ever sign a temperance pledge? Yes No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. At the last presidential election, whose stand on PROHIBITION did you like better? Smith’s? Hoover’s? Can’t say</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Have you had a drink of liquor within the past two (2) months?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. If so, on how many occasions (try to recall exactly) in the past two (2) months have you drunk beer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Do you smoke cigarettes regularly? occasionally? never?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Would you marry a person who drinks occasionally? Yes No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case #22’s survey compared favorably, as did most all surveys, to the case history analysis done by the four judges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validity and Reliability</th>
<th>Original Score</th>
<th>Standard Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Composite case history rating by four judges as to attitude on prohibition laws</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>+.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith attitude test score</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>+1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-rating on attitude on prohibition laws</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>+1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case history ratings by individual judges as to attitude on prohibition laws--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottrell</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>+.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faris</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonequist</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>+1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>+.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite case history rating by four judges as to attitude on drinking liquor</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-rating on attitude on drinking liquor</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case history ratings by individual judges as to attitude on drinking liquor--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottrell</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faris</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>+.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonequist</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>+.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison of reliability of test score and composite case history rating as to attitude on prohibition laws.

| Mean deviation of four individual judges' standard scores | .35 |
| Difference between score on two parallel forms of Smith test, in absolute scale units | .3 |

Note: A large negative standard score (-1.00 or below) means, presumably, a strongly favorable tendency. A large positive standard score (+1.00 or above) means, presumably, a strongly unfavorable tendency. A score near zero suggests neutrality.

Long before Research Branch, Stouffer understood the implications of his prohibition survey:

The value for attitude research should be rather far-reaching…. The fact that a simple test, which can be taken in 10 or 15 minutes and scored rapidly and objectively, is a fairly valid measure of attitudes would make it possible to study cheaply in a single investigation the relationship between the attitudes of several thousand subjects… The fact that, contrary to the expectation of some students of attitudes, the present study has shown that it is possible to get fairly high agreement, even among laymen with extremely diverse viewpoints, in interpretation of attitudes from case history materials should lend encouragement to those who see in the case history a useful tool of attitude research. The case history provides a sequence of events in their cultural setting.

Stouffer the scientist had hit upon the statistical formula, rather than demography alone, for attitude research, (it certainly would have been difficult to deny the utility of a purpose-built survey) but Stouffer the classically-educated newspaper-man who had taken his M.A. in English at Harvard and loved Shakespeare understood the importance of anecdotal evidence from the “cultural setting,” analyzed by experts who could put experience into context. Science and wisdom. In other words, the statisticians of Research Branch could tell Stouffer how many draftees went absent-with-out-leave (AWOL) at a port of embarkation, but it took the imagination and wisdom of the seasoned expert to connect that number to a solution as simple as a change of clothing.

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196 Stouffer had solved a desertion problem by recommending that the army send soldiers home on their pre-deployment leaves in uniform rather than in civilian clothing.
In the introduction to *The American Soldier*, written almost twenty years after publishing his dissertation, and in a much more seasoned voice, Stouffer explained the need for both imagination and statistics in understanding attitudes:

Among social scientists, as in the public at large, there are those who feel that literary descriptions are so useful that any other form of inquiry is supernumerary. One book by Ernie Pyle or Richard Tregaskis or Bill Mauldin, one drama like *A Bell for Adano* or *Command Decision*, it will be said, gives one more of a sensitive feeling for the “realities” of World War II than any collection of statistics, however competently analyzed. This position is quite plausible if we do not examine a word like “realities” too closely. No one can doubt that the “feel” of a hurricane is better communicated through the pages of Joseph Conrad than through the Weather Bureau’s statistical records of the barometric pressure and wind velocity. But it is no reflection on the artistry of Conrad to point out that society also finds uses for a science of meteorology.\(^{197}\)

Stouffer was in a sense a transitional figure. Or, as sociologist Andrew Abbot commented in *Department & Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred*, “men like Stouffer had one foot in the old and one foot in the new,” as they conducted their research.\(^{198}\) Stouffer did not think of empirical evidence and intuition in terms of the sacred and the profane. He would proclaim throughout his career that sociology was indeed a science, but science did not hold the final answer to human attitudes and behavior. The cultural setting for Research Branch was an

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\(^{198}\) Andrew Abbott. *Department & Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 215. Fellow sociologist Philip M. Hauser remembered that “Samuel Stouffer, like Ogburn, was a pioneer in promoting quantitative methods of research in sociology. Probably more than any other sociologist of his own generation, he focused his activity on bridging the gap between global speculative theorizing, on the one hand, and the blind collection of data, on the other. Stouffer was equally impatient with ‘talky-talk’ sociology and with theoretically unoriented gathering of data. He felt that progress in sociology could be achieved primarily through the interplay of theory and empirical research - either, alone, was sterile.” Philip M. Hauser. “In Memoriam: Samuel A. Stouffer, 1900-1960.” *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, no. 4 (January 1966): 364-365.
eight-million-man draftee American Army engaged in a world war. And as Stouffer wrote, “There were…many problems which could not have been treated on an impressionistic basis even if the impressions were trustworthy.” His task during the war was one of social engineering, including “estimating how many soldiers would go back to school after the war, how many would open new businesses, how many would go to farms, how many would work for an employer, how many would go back to their home towns, and how many would settle in regions different from their home. Qualitative pretesting was particularly necessary for framing questions which would separate actual plans from wishful thinking.”

With the award of his PhD in 1930, Stouffer, and his ideas on empirical survey research, became part of what was rapidly becoming the mainstream in sociology in the United States. In the decade to follow he became a major figure in the discipline and in the academic community at large, as well as within the institutions and government organizations which sought his particular talents in survey research. But first, as for all professors, there was the teaching and the post-doctoral work.

Stouffer began his formal sociological work in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Wisconsin in 1930-1931 as a part time assistant professor of social statistics. (He also taught an introductory course in statistics at Chicago that same academic year). The following academic year (1931-1932) he spent in postdoctoral work on statistics at the University of London with Ronald A. Fisher and Karl Pearson. Upon his return from London in 1932, he took on full time duties at Wisconsin, and was promoted to full professor in 1934. (An organization connected to the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to hire him at a much larger salary than he was earning there, which resulted in his immediate promotion to full professor).

Rockefeller would not be the last organization to offer Stouffer a lucrative position in the private sector. While at Wisconsin, Stouffer taught undergraduate and graduate courses in social statistics, statistical methods in social psychology, statistics in population research, and statistical research in social pathology. His colleagues at Wisconsin included E.A. Ross, chairman of the sociology department and former president of the ASA (1914 and 1915), who had been instrumental in influencing Stouffer to begin an academic career, John L. Gillin (president of the ASA in 1926), John H. Kolb, Ralph Linton, Kimball Young (later to consult for Research Branch and to serve as ASA president in 1945), Ellis Kirkpatrick, Helen I. Clark, Charlotte Day Gower, Elizabeth Yerxa, and Charles Birt. Stouffer left Wisconsin in 1935 to take up a professorship at the University of Chicago, a post which he held until 1946 and his move to Harvard. Ross was sorry to lose him, but wrote to the Dean of the College of Letters and Science at Wisconsin (G.C. Sellery), “I do not in the least blame him for Chicago is his alma mater and the department there is certainly as strong as any department in the world.”

By the 1935-1936 academic year, Chicago sociology had divided its discipline into six subgroups: General and Historical Sociology, Social Psychology, The Community and Social Institutions, Statistics and Population, The Theory of Culture, and Social Pathology. Teaching then in the department along with Stouffer were Herbert Blumer, Ernest W. Burgess, Michael M. Davis, Ellsworth Faris, (chair), Philip M. Hauser (later a Research Branch consultant), Earl S.

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200 Ross was attempting to get Stouffer at Wisconsin for good. He let it be known to both Stouffer and Ellsworth Faris, chairman of the sociology department at Chicago, that Wisconsin “contemplate a permanent relationship.” University of Wisconsin Archives and Records Management.: Bulletin of The University of Wisconsin – General Announcement of Courses, 1933-34. Prospective Candidates for Professor of Statistics, 1926-37, Series 7/33/1-1, Box 1, Department of Sociology, General Files, Correspondence. College of Letters and Science, Administration (Dean’s Office), General Correspondence, George C. Sellery, 1935-36 R-Z, folder R 1935-36.

201 University of Wisconsin Archives and Records Management.: Bulletin of The University of Wisconsin – General Announcement of Courses, 1933-34. Prospective Candidates for Professor of Statistics, 1926-37, Series 7/33/1-1, Box 1, Department of Sociology, General Files, Correspondence. College of Letters and Science, Administration (Dean’s Office), General Correspondence, George C. Sellery, 1935-36 R-Z, folder R 1935-36.
Johnson, William F. Ogburn, Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Puttkammer, Robert Redfield, Clifford R. Shaw, William L. Warner, and Louis Wirth. Warner held a joint appointment in sociology and anthropology, Puttkamer was a professor of law, and Redfield was a professor of anthropology. Half of the professors in the department that year had been or would later become presidents of the American Sociological Association (Park - 1925, Ogburn - 1929, Burgess - 1934, Faris - 1937, Wirth - 1947, Stouffer - 1953, Blumer-1956). The department also hosted professors from economics, social ethics, comparative religion, social economy, and philosophy. In addition to Stouffer’s statistical and quantitative methods classes, students had available to them classes in 1935-1936 entitled “Play and the Social Utilization of Leisure Time” (Warner), “Folkways and Fashions” (Blumer), “Human Nature” (Faris), “Races and Nationalities” (Redfield), “Culture and Sociology” (Ogburn) and “The Growth of the City” (Burgess) among dozens of others.\footnote{The University of Chicago Sociology Department Catalogue, 1935-1936. p. 338 and 343.}

Throughout the 1930’s, American sociology turned to the problem of that decade: the Great Depression and its effects on American society. Social workers took center stage in dealing with the disaster, along with economists and political scientists. The New Deal provided massive employment opportunities for social work and inquiry on which to base such work, and although sociologists sought to distance themselves philosophically from social workers, the nation faced, much as did Stouffer in World War II, an immediate problem of social engineering. Demand for statisticians skyrocketed, and although the focus was on those trained in economics, men such as Stouffer soon found themselves both tied to and funded by New Deal agencies seeking useful study of and solutions to economic woes. Sociologist Charles Camic reported that Ogburn, “seemingly omnipresent,” sat on the National Resources Committee, advised the Resettlement Administration, and directed the National Recovery Agency’s Consumer Advisory Board. Statistician and sociologist (University of Pennsylvania) Stuart Rice, one of Stouffer’s
first and most important contacts in Washington DC in 1941, was the Census Bureau’s assistant
director in mid 1930, headed the Central Statistical Board, and from his chairmanship of the
Committee on Government Statistics and Information Services brought Stouffer in to measure
unemployment.203

Like many of his colleagues in statistical and survey research sociology, Stouffer’s work
in the 1930’s was bound up with the Depression. The Social Science Research Council sought
out Stouffer to help document the effects of the Depression on American society, and the
initiative resulted in the 1937 “Social Aspects of the Depression” series of thirteen monographs,
each by separate authors under Stouffer’s direction, which dealt with aspects of the Depression
from crime to reading to rural life to consumption. Stouffer wrote with Paul F. Lazarsfeld (later
a consultant to Research Branch), a “Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression”
which helped to make the case that there was more to the Depression than economics - and that
effective recovery would be predicated on an understanding of culture, particularly that of the
American family.204

Stouffer had begun the decade with several studies featuring the quantitative data and
analysis of survey research. Among them were “Local Option and Public Opinion,” (1930) in
which Stouffer and his co-author Carroll H. Wooddy took on the question of the relationship
between voting and the stability of public opinion. A few months later, Stouffer, Ruth S. Cavan,
and Philip M. Hauser published “Note on the Statistical Treatment of Life-History Material.” By

203 Theoretical and purely academic sociologist may have seen themselves as somewhat ignored in the

1933, Stouffer was willing to write beyond specific cases, and without co-authors. In “A Technique for Analyzing Sociological Data Classified in Non-Quantitative Groups,” he referenced his dissertation research as an example of “a method of statistical treatment which would seem to have possibilities of quite wide application in sociology when the dependent variable is on a quantitative scale and the independent variables are not” - once again stating his amenability to qualitative as well as quantitative data. The following year he brought out, with Clark Tibbitts, “Testing the Significance of Comparison in Sociological Data,” and the techniques of which he wrote he applied in 1935 to a study published as “Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics.” The round is a familiar one to scientists - testing of the waters in specific cases, development of methods which one shares with one’s colleagues, and then application of those methods to a specific case.205 Jean M. Converse, in her masterful Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960, points out another Stouffer article, which she classified as “something of a watershed between the old social survey and the emerging sample survey.” In “Statistical Induction in Rural Social Research,” Stouffer, through criticism of an earlier work, advocated for both more structure in survey research, and for consideration of attitudes as well as facts.206

The 1920’s and 1930’s was also the time of the great social inquiry, philanthropic, and government organizations which have come to be so relied upon by sociologists and others


interested in survey research. Chief among these was the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) founded in 1923 to study social issues with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation.\textsuperscript{207} The SSRC provided support and funding for both Stouffer’s postdoctoral year in London and his initial work with Research Branch during World War II. Rockefeller also supported the Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISSR), founded in 1921, which had funded \textit{Middletown}, among over seventy other projects during the 1920’s through the mid 1930’s. The Rockefeller Foundation maintained its own Division of Social Sciences after 1929, but even before then (1923-1928) had allocated over $20 million for social research.\textsuperscript{208} (The support of philanthropic organizations such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford cannot be overstated, either in general discussion of sociology in the United States or as they relate to Stouffer’s survey research work in particular. Carnegie funded \textit{The American Soldier}, and the Ford Foundation’s Fund for the Republic supported Stouffer’s 1955 \textit{Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties}). The list of government, academic, and private social research organizations is almost endless. Many were part of New Deal alphabet-soup organizations, such as the Works Progress Administration’s (WPA) Division of Social Research. Others sprang from already existing government departments, such as the Division of Rural Attitudes and Opinions of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Still others were and/or are conglomerations of university professors, private citizens, and government interest, such as the National Opinion Research Center (founded in 1941), and The American Association for Public Opinion Research (founded in 1947). Stouffer served as president of the latter.


By the latter half of the 1930’s, Stouffer had become a major figure in American survey research. As such, he was sought out by Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987), a Swedish economist, to assist him with his landmark study *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944). What historians often refer to as The Great Migration - the movement of millions of black Americans from the rural south to industrial cities in the north, circa 1905-1941 - had brought black-white race relations into sharp relief in the 1930’s. Carnegie funded Myrdal’s massive multi-volume study in 1937, which sought to understand the paradox between the American creed of liberty and equality for all, and the continuing and often virulent racism that severely circumscribed black participation in civic life. Stouffer’s work on the Myrdal study is not clearly understood, but according to Myrdal, it was critical. Myrdal himself returned to his native Sweden upon the German invasion of Norway in 1940, leaving Stouffer as director of the project, which he completed as the Battle of Britain began in September, 1940. William F. Ogburn and Donald R. Young (the latter a consultant to Research Branch) were also involved in the project.²⁰⁹

Stouffer wrote shortly before his death in 1960 that he had been interested in race studies since before he had joined Myrdal. Later, work with black soldiers was integral to *The American Soldier*, and, as Stouffer commented, “these studies have been cited perhaps as frequently as any product of the Research Branch.” Probably the most visible result of Stouffer’s race work during World War II is “The Negro Soldier” propaganda film (1944), part of Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” series produced during the war. Detailed discussion of the critical nature of Research Branch’s work with black soldiers will follow in a succeeding chapter. As for the Myrdal study and the study of race in general, Stouffer believed “that quantitative studies will play an ever

increasing role in studies of race relations in the United States.” He also believed that the focus on ideology in the Myrdal study had perhaps eclipsed three of the more important factors resulting from the Great Migration. The first of these was the increased political power of black Americans in northern and western states. Secondly, with the increased opportunities for blacks outside the south, they would be able to demonstrate “that color not only should be, but is, irrelevant to achievement.” Thirdly, the combination of these two forces would “emerge as a social force with a sledge-hammer effect on values as old as slavery.” Had Stouffer lived beyond 1960, he would doubtless be pleased to see that his predictions were coming true.  

Stouffer ended the decade of the 1930’s and entered the 1940’s with four additional articles demonstrating the increasing influence that both he and survey research were having on American sociology. In “Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce,” (1939) Stouffer and his co-author, Lyle M. Spencer, surveyed twenty-seven states and suggested a possible correlation between economic recovery from the Depression and a rise in marriage and divorce rates. While the relationship may seem an obvious one, Stouffer throughout his career was much more interested in what he could prove through quantitative study rather than what everyone knew to be “common sense.” As a newspaperman he had learned that common sense soon becomes conventional wisdom, which is often wrong.

His next article, “Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating to Mobility and Distance” (1940), established what is sometimes referred to as “Stouffer’s Law of Intervening Opportunities.” As he set forth the theoretical rationale in his paper, “the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and

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inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities.” His interest was in migration patterns, and his paper helped to explain why significant numbers of people, intending to migrate to one location, ended up settling somewhere else enroute because an opportunity arose for them there. As always, Stouffer was quick to point out the limitations of his mathematically-based theory. Race, he noted, had a significant affect on migration, as did government policy. But he also believed that “it may be found that other sociological phenomena, such as the relationship of spatial propinquity to the selection of marriage mates, the relationship between certain types of crime and the residence of criminals, the choice of colleges, and the utilization of leisure time in vacation travel, may be illuminated by application of the general theory.” The proposition of a theory is a bold and risky move - inviting the criticism if not derision of colleagues and others. “Intervening Opportunities” then, is a measure of the maturity of Stouffer at age forty, and the efficacy of survey research in the United States in 1940. Additionally, the theory of intervening opportunities has stood the test of time so far and if nothing else has helped reinforce retailers’ and advertisers’ sly tactic of placing tempting items for consumers in highly visible places.\footnote{Samuel A. Stouffer. “Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance. America Sociological Review, vol. 5, no. 6 (December, 1940): 845-867. 846, 867.}

With “How a Mathematician Can Help a Sociologist” (1941) Stouffer gave a fair, if brief portrait of the state of the art of sociology in the United States in that year. He wrote that sociologists were engaged in two activities: “constructing theories of society on a grand scale,” and conducting “a good deal of quasi-historical research, usually on contemporary problems.” He then offered that mathematics could help in these endeavors by letting the sociologist know in advance of his study “how to design his problem and control disturbing factors such that the particular test he will use at the end is appropriate and decisive.” In other words, he wrote, “in the shadows behind a successful study, at the beginning as well as at the end, stands the
mathematical statistician.” It was fortunate for Stouffer that by World War II, International Business Machines (IBM) had developed their punch-card tabulating system, for Stouffer was soon to become the chief statistician for half a million soldiers.²¹³

Stouffer, ostensibly committed to mathematics and statistics, returned to the topic of case-studies in his November 1941 “Notes on the Case-Study and the Unique Case,” which once again explored the “perennial controversy in the social and psychological sciences…between advocates of statistics and advocates of the case-study method.” He came out strongly as an advocate of both case-study and quantitative study, a position which accrued to the benefit of both the American soldier and The American Soldier, because the numbers and the anecdotal data used to study soldiers proved to be mutually supporting.²¹⁴ By the time Stouffer published this last article, he had been working for Frederick Osborn and the War Department for four months, bringing his education and experience to the problem of morale in the US Army.

The “Road to Research Branch” was clearly not a road at all, but rather a web of sometimes competing, sometimes complementary influences, ideas, impulses, events, and personalities in the interwar years which, taken together, informed the decisions of academics, military officers, and politicians. Out of this web came the controlling ideas that morale and morale studies were not the exclusive province of military officers relying on their experience and intuition, and that psychology and sociology had matured sufficiently as disciplines to contribute, scientifically, to the management of millions of conscripted soldiers.

Sociology, as demonstrated by the interest of sociologists in soldiers and the experience of Stouffer, moved increasingly towards empirical observation, the tool of which became

Stouffer’s survey research. Stouffer was in turn informed by the work and observations of Raymond B. Fosdick, who learned during the First World War that there was more to morale than keeping soldiers away from liquor and prostitutes, and who had discovered that officer-enlisted relations and the animosity between the Regular and draftee armies constituted the morale issue of the First World War. Cognizant of the statistical work done by Bingham and Yerkes in World War I intelligence and classification testing, Stouffer was also likely influenced by the morale crisis of the summer of 1941, encapsulated in Hilton Railey’s report “Morale in the US Army,” (his boss, Osborn, and Osborn’s boss, Marshall, most certainly were) as he was by Edward Lyman Munson’s writings on morale and Munson’s establishment of the Morale Section of the Army immediately after World War I.

Historian of science Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) posited in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) that science inhabits what he called “paradigms,” or climates of opinion, which not only control the ideas of the day, but which also dictate the tools of analysis and the terms of debate. Scientists (and for the purposes of the present study military officers and politicians) were like fish to Kuhn, swimming in an element in which they are comfortable, yet oblivious that they are wet. As the locus of change (some would say progress) is discomfort, it followed for Kuhn that a “crisis” must occur to shake people out of complacency. Kuhn’s crises present themselves as anomalies that cannot be explained by - to torture still further the fish analogy - water. When the anomaly is great enough (quality) or there are several anomalies (quantity), the contemporary paradigm is shattered, another replaces it, and the process begins anew, yet no paradigm ignores those that came before it (Osborn and Fosdick carried on extensive discussions during World War II). Two world wars and the crises in morale they presented sufficed for the US Army - enough at least for some officers to reconsider their faith in
their infallibility when it came to managing men. The quality of morale and the quantity of
draftees were enough to demand re-thinking about the issue. Such a reconsideration, in no small
way influenced by Stouffer and his colleagues, moved the *sine qua non* of soldier management
away from morals and aptitude and toward morale and attitude. Rather than telling the soldier
what he should be doing and what he was able to do, the Army in World War II asked the soldier
what he thought, and used his responses to support him. New thinking, the Army determined,
required new data. How Research Branch gathered that data - what Stouffer and his colleagues
did and how they did it during World War II - is the subject of the next two chapters.  

\[215 \text{ “Just as World War I gave new impetus to the study of human *aptitudes,*” Stouffer wrote in *The}
\text{American Soldier,* “so World War II has given new impetus to the study of *attitudes.* TAS vol. I, 5.}\]
Chapter 5

Stouffer and Research Branch during World War II - Beginnings

Thirty-three months after Pearl Harbor and twelve months before Hiroshima, Research Branch produced a standard operating procedure (SOP). The document, dated August 19, 1944, attempted to formalize their herculean efforts, in General Gavin’s words, to make “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” 216 The SOP signaled the arrival and legitimacy of Research Branch as an integral part of the War Department, and its acceptance, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes with enthusiasm, as part of the vast mechanism the United States had assembled to fight a war of national survival. In forty pages, it described the efforts to which the US had gone and would continue to go to equip its soldiers with the motivation to fight a modern war. It was written on the hoof, and represented more a summation of experience gained during the first three years of American involvement in the war than a pre-conceived model from which to work. The SOP also, unmistakably, bore the mark of Samuel Stouffer, who as director of the professional staff of Research Branch, more than any other individual, civilian or military, guided the effort to survey soldiers and use their responses to formulate Army policy. From first to last, Research Branch was Stouffer’s creation. 217

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217 In a “Memorandum for Historical Record,” the historical officer of Army Service Forces gave Stouffer his due: “Dr. Samuel A. Stouffer...has coordinated the survey work and had done most of the planning and policy making throughout the existence of the branch. He has had longer continuous service with the branch than any other one individual, and is perhaps the best authority on the work of the branch.” (Rankin R. Boone “Memorandum for Historical Record – Subject: Organization of Research Division in the Morale Branch.” August 19, 1943. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 969, (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File 1941- June 1955, Consultation Service to History of Research Division. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD).
There was, however, no “Road to the SOP.” The variables were so many, the cultural currents so strong, and the times so dire that one would have expected the Army to revert to form in an emergency - to fall back on authoritarian methods of soldier management which had gotten them through in the past - and indeed the Army tried to do so. Resistance to the idea of polling soldiers was deeply entrenched, and had to be continually overcome or bypassed throughout the war. Organizational structures had to be changed, personnel had to be assigned, missions had to be defined, methodology had to be developed, and a myriad of problems had to be faced in a culture which was institutionally hostile to the work Research Branch sought to accomplish. In the introduction to *The American Soldier*, Stouffer posed the operative question:

> The Research Branch was officially established in October 1941 within what was known successively as the Morale Division, Special Services Division, and Information and Education Division. Earlier efforts to set up such a machinery within the Army had been blocked by a directive from the Secretary of War, which said: ‘Our Army must be a cohesive unit, with a definite purpose shared by all. Such an army can be built only by the responsible effort of all of its members, commissioned and enlisted. Anonymous opinion or criticism, good or bad, is destructive in its effect on a military organization where accepted responsibility on the part of every individual is fundamental. It is therefore directed that because of their anonymous nature, polls will not be permitted among the personnel of the Army of the United States.’ The full story of how the War Department changed from a position of flat opposition to such research to one in which it would use such research not only for internal planning but as justification to the American people for such a vital program as its demobilization system should some day make instructive reading.”

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218 *TAS* vol. I, 12. See also “History of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff,” February 1, 1946, p. 3. Stimson’s ban on polls and surveys was issued by the Bureau of Public Relations on May 24, 1941 - only six months before Research Branch was established. (Record Group 330, Box 970, Entry 89, Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel & Reserve, Research Division Historical File 1941 - June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD). The finger pointing between the Army and the Navy that ensued immediately after Pearl Harbor is also instructive in this context. The visceral reaction of the Secretary of the Navy (Frank Knox) on December 17, 1941, was to quash the free expression of opinions within the armed forces. “Irresponsible criticism or unfavorable comments regarding the Army or any Army action will not be tolerated. The best results in cooperation and coordination between the two services can only be obtained by mutual respect for each other and each other’s efforts.” Knox sent a letter on that date to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, requesting that Stimson send a similar
Instructive reading it makes indeed. The volte-face Stouffer described happened subtly, over a period of years, and began well before Pearl Harbor. Nor was it a change of policy per se so much as a change in culture, which was reflected in policy - with the understanding that there were many who disagreed with final policy decisions. Though it can be said with some authority that Research Branch had arrived by the time they published their SOP in 1944, their presence was just as often tolerated as it was accepted. It took the subtle maneuverings and hard facts presented to the War Department by Stouffer, and the political machinations of his boss, Frederick H. Osborn, to bring Research Branch into being and allow it to make “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” Once that acceptance was gained, they could concentrate on some of the more vexing problems of morale, to include the problems presented by the Infantry, officer - enlisted relations, neuropsychiatric casualties, race relations, and demobilization. Work began in earnest when Stouffer visited the War Department in the summer of 1941.219

Stouffer was brought to Washington DC by Frederick Henry Osborn (1903-1980). Osborn was the nephew of Henry Fairfield Osborn, the president of the American Museum of Natural History, and was a longtime friend of Franklin Roosevelt. A Princeton graduate and millionaire businessman who had made his money in banking and railroads, Osborn had served

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219 Shortly before D-Day, a War Department major wrote to the Commanding General of Army Service Forces, “there is a tendency on the part of Army Ground Forces to pay little attention to the efforts of Morale Division. This is logical and to be expected from a group of men who regard the personnel of the Morale Division as academic theorists ‘long haireds’ and Hollywood goons in contrast with the fighting soldiers they attempt to indoctrinate. There are some intelligent and competent men in Morale Division, but they are merely shadow boxing as long as this attitude prevails. Though many of them know more about American mass psychology and motivations than do a great many Ground Force Officers, they are lacking in experience with troops or in combat. Why not invest a dozen or so experienced combat officers and leaven the Morale Division with these officers?” (Munro Leaf. “Memorandum for the Commanding General, ASF. Subject: Morale Division.” May 11, 1944. Record Group 160, Box 73. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD).
with the Red Cross in the First World War, sat on the board of the Carnegie Corporation, and by
August 1941 when he asked Stouffer to come to Washington DC, he held the chairs of the
Civilian Advisory Committee on Selective Service and the Joint Army and Navy Committee on
Welfare and Recreation. In September 1941 he was given a direct commission as a brigadier
general and appointed head of Morale Branch (later renamed the Information and Education
Division, of which Stouffer’s Research Branch was a part). Osborn had General Marshall’s ear
and support, and had experience with survey research from his service with the Social Science
Research Council. In *The American Soldier*, Stouffer recounts the “factors [which] converged to
make possible the establishment of the Research Branch” of which there were many. Primacy of
place, however, he gave to Osborn, praising his “personal prestige…persuasive skill…and his
deep sincerity.” Notwithstanding Osborn’s personality, experience, and savoir-faire however,
Stouffer also stressed that “there were times when even these assets might have availed little
against occasional opposition at intermediate echelons had not General Marshall unequivocally
supported the strange new program.” Osborn was fortunate to be in close contact with
Raymond B. Fosdick, who was a source of constant encouragement. “Because I handled the
Corresponding job in the last war,” Fosdick wrote Osborn in the fall of 1943, “I understand what
you are doing….I hope you won’t get discouraged….more than once in the last war I was
tempted to quit because General March, the Chief of Staff, had little use for what he thought was

170-175. *TAS* vol. I, 12-13. Osborn’s name will forever be connected with his main interest - eugenics - a loaded
word to be sure, particularly after Auschwitz. He was, however, not of the racist stamp. In the 1930’s his studies led
him to reject racism and to instead focus on the laws of heredity. See also the American Philosophical Society’s
our ‘frills’….The importance of what you are doing will grow with time, and so will the appreciation of the Army.”

Osborn, after having spoken with Stouffer in August 1941, used his position as chair of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation “to confer with the most qualified persons in this country in their respective fields and to seek their advice and help in the many problems which are constantly arising.” Shortly thereafter, Osborn officially offered Stouffer the opportunity to be part of a subcommittee which would “advise with the Planning and Research Division of the Morale Branch of the Army on psychological factors affecting the morale of our service men.” Simultaneously, Osborn sought to capitalize on work done in the Intelligence Division of the War Department (G-2), which was moving toward soldier attitude studies. “Slowly,” Stouffer wrote in The American Soldier, “a small Research Branch evolved, with a military chief [Major Edward L. Munson, Jr.], a civilian technical director [Stouffer], and a mixed staff of military and civilian personnel.” (Research Branch had four military chiefs during the war – Munson, John B. Stanley, Charles Dollard, and Leland C. DeVinney. Stouffer provided the continuity).

Aware that the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was viscerally opposed to attitude surveys, Osborn had to move very carefully. He wrote to Stouffer, “Confidentially, a group of
psychologists already in the War Department have developed a very intelligent plan for studying various factors in Army attitudes and are turning it over for the Morale Branch to sponsor. The basic idea seems to be excellent; it needs working out in detail.” Stouffer, along with Rensis Likert of the US Department of Agriculture, and Quinn McNemar of Stanford comprised the entire subcommittee, and worked out the details of a nascent Research Branch.

Stouffer wasted no time. Writing from the Capitol Limited train enroute from Washington DC to Chicago on October 20, 1941, he outlined for Osborn his thoughts about survey research in the Army. He and his colleagues had visited Camp Lee, Virginia, on October 19 and had interviewed enlisted men. “About 30 questions were eliminated and many rewritten,” Stouffer wrote to Osborn. While he believed they had made a “very promising start,” Stouffer thought that “too many questions were shotgun assaults into thin air on the general topic of morale. Not enough were rifle shots at situations about which branches of the Army concerned might be able to take action.” Ever conscious of the hazard of being labeled a “pointy headed intellectual,” and understanding his task was one of social engineering, Stouffer in the initial planning stages for Research Branch sought utility above all else. He told Osborn he wanted to provide the Army with “convincing evidence…of the need for a regular, continuous reporting system based on interviewing samples of soldiers.” “Every plan,” Stouffer continued, “should be aimed straight at that purpose.” Then he got down to the specifics that demonstrated his mastery

225 Frederick H. Osborn to Samuel A. Stouffer, October 2, 1941. Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.

226 Stouffer and his comrades were not alone. As conscripts were flowing into training camps throughout the United States in 1940-1941, hard scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and statisticians were flowing into Washington at the request of the government. In addition to Research Branch, the major social science agencies were the Surveys Division of the Office of War Information and the Program Surveys of the US Department of Agriculture. In 1941-1942, the federal civil service increased by 97,000 per month, and included the scientists of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which were to produce the atomic bomb. See Jean M. Converse. *Survey Research in the United States: Roots & Emergence, 1890-1960.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 162-163. Additionally, civilians as well as the military were surveyed. See Ellen Herman. *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 48-81.
of sociology and survey research: Questions that took pot-shots at officers were to be avoided. Study of the affect of individual interviewers on interviewees was needed. Survey results had to be made available to policy makers as quickly as possible, and the sampling scheme had to be beyond reproach. What Stouffer was mulling over in the fall of 1941 matured, with much labor, into a system of gathering and processing data which was useful to the Army and others, and was ultimately summarized in 1949 in *The American Soldier*. Due to Stouffer’s quick work, Research Branch (then called Research Division) was formally established within Morale Branch on October 28, 1941. At its inception, it consisted of three officers and twelve civilians, including clerk typists. In August 1942, Stouffer took a leave of absence from the University of Chicago, moved to Washington, and was officially appointed as a social science analyst at an annual salary of $8,000.00.

The survey system Stouffer and his colleagues painstakingly developed, as depicted in a Research Branch briefing, had twelve steps:

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227 Samuel A. Stouffer to Frederick H. Osborn, Oct. 20, 1941. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 969. (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File, 1941- June 1955, Consultation Service to History of Research Division. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.


1. RESEARCH BRANCH CONSULTS WITH MEMBERS OF STAFF SECTION REQUESTING SURVEY

2. TRAINED FIELD MAN INFORMALLY INTERVIEWS GI’s ON PROBLEMS BEARING ON STUDY
3. AFTER CAREFULLY TESTING ALL QUESTIONS, FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE FORM IS PREPARED

4. UNITS TO BE SAMPLED ARE SELECTED IN ORDER TO INSURE REPRESENTATIVENESS
5. Short talk explains survey purpose; given to men by a trained class leader.

6. Each man in the assembled group fills out questionnaire form anonymously.
7. Questionnaires are processed by having each answer assigned a numerical code.

8. Codes representing soldiers' answers are punched as holes on IBM (MRU) cards.
9. THE INFORMATION IS PLACED ON THESE IBM CARDS WITH ELECTRICAL PUNCH MACHINES

10. HOLES ENABLE CARDS TO BE ELECTRICALLY SORTED AND TABULATED: 7 PER SECOND
11. EXPERT TECHNICIAN OF RESEARCH BRANCH ANALYZES DATA AND SUMMARIZES FINDINGS

12. A REPORT OF FINDINGS IS PREPARED AND THEN SUBMITTED TO AGENCIES CONCERNED

Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 969. (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File, 1941- June 1955, Consultation Service to History of Research Division. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.
Much like an impressionist painting, however, the devil was in the details. Each of the steps presented its own particular challenges, and before any of them could be accomplished systematically, Army resistance to troop polling had to be overcome, or at least reduced and bypassed. Osborn and Stouffer were walking on eggshells when they conducted their first survey, faced with what mass communications Professor J. Michael Sproule called “an officer corps blithely unaware of advances in the study of society and symbols.” Fortunately for Research Branch, one of those officers was not Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, who, according to Stouffer, “unequivocally supported the strange new program” of surveying soldiers. In its initial, tentative activities, the tactic of Research Branch seemed to be to seek forgiveness rather than permission. Sensing that Secretary of War Stimson would not enforce his moratorium on troop surveys, knowing that Marshall was on their side, and as historian and survey researcher Jean M. Converse described it, “through some legerdemain,” Research Branch went ahead with their surveys. Impressed with the results, the Army officially agreed to Research Branch activities in principle, but throughout the war Osborn and Stouffer had to repeatedly convince skittish officers that troop surveys would not undermine officer authority. Officially the Army was ready to enlist the help of sociologists and psychologists to manage their citizen-soldiers, but this readiness did not necessarily signal a definitive change in Army culture.

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231 *TAS* vol. I, 13. Marshall became such a supporter of the idea that what soldiers had to say might matter that he sent some soldier comments to MacArthur. One can only imagine MacArthur’s vexation at Marshall’s suggestion that “a large number of complaints refer to preferential treatment given officers of a character that does not appear justified purely on the ground of commissioned status.” Marshall required MacArthur, based on soldier comments, to “delegate to a particular officer, of keen perception and sound judgment, the sole job of keeping under constant observation the situation in this matter throughout the rear areas of your theater.” (Marshall to MacArthur, October 26, 1944. Record Group 407, Entry 360, Box 2112, Army AG, Classified Decimal File 1943-45, 330.1-330.11. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD).

With Stimson looking the other way and Marshall’s weight behind them, Osborn and Stouffer still had to “sell” Research Branch to field commanders. A typical negotiation of this sort took place between Osborn and Lieutenant General George Brett, Commanding General of the Caribbean Defense Command. In a letter to Brett of July 31, 1943, Osborn sang the praises of Research Branch, indicated that other commanders had requested surveys, and assured Brett that “reports are presented in such a fashion as to be of maximum utility to the command.” 233 In his August 31, 1943 reply, Brett admitted to being “slightly skeptical as to any definite results that might be obtained,” but acknowledged that “an outside agency unencumbered with local atmosphere undoubtedly would bring matters to our attention which we have neglected to discover.” He closed his letter to Osborn by promising cooperation with Research Branch. 234

Resistance was often stiffest when Research Branch reports bumped up against long held dogma in the Army, such as the value of hating one’s enemy as a combat motivator, or the need for the proper, yet always ill-defined “fighting spirit.” On December 23, 1943 Osborn submitted to Marshall a five-page memorandum summarizing a report on the 1st Infantry Division - a unit which by that time had seen combat in both North Africa and Sicily. Among his fourteen findings and recommendations he explained that “few men report credible evidence of ‘dirty or unhuman [sic] tactics’ on the part of the Germans. This fact may relate to lack of hatred for Germans, and may suggest that attempts to picture the Germans as dirty fighters can boomerang and impair confidence in our training doctrine.” Osborn went further: “Contact with the Germans does not produce hatred of the enemy. If anything, those men whose mental attitude toward


further combat is relatively most healthy show less vindictiveness than other men.” Osborn also reported on the chronic problem of poor officers, and suggested that “it may be proper to consider the more rapid weeding out during training of those junior officers who demonstrate marked lack of leadership in their personal relations with their men.”

Osborn had touched a nerve - or several. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the commanding general of Army Ground Forces, and as such the officer responsible for soldier and officer training and preparation for combat, wasted no time in giving Marshall his opinion on Osborn’s report. His tone, as well as the content of his memo to Marshall, reveal a great deal about the attitudes of some officers towards the work of Research Branch. The report, McNair wrote, was “interesting and informing to those who study and appreciate such data.” But to him the information provided by Research Branch was insignificant: “I detect no item which of itself calls for action by the War Department.” Then he applied a series of peculiar logical contortions, stating that he did not believe “that the division selected for sampling is a representative one. The first division, to my knowledge, did not fight well at Oran and in the last battle of the Tunisia campaign.” McNair simply reversed Osborn’s argument, stating that the failures of the 1st Division could be attributed to their lack of hatred for the enemy:

It may well be that the fact that the 1st Division did not hate the enemy was a primary factor in their lack of fighting ability. My own impression was perfectly definite that the division lacked the fighting spirit in an astounding degree. On the other hand, if I remember correctly, the 1st Division of the World War hated the German so thoroughly that General Pershing was obliged to give the German high command certain assurances that the division thereafter would

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confine its actions to those accustomed by the laws of war.236

McNair also argued that some of the blame belonged to the division commander, Major General Terry Allen, Sr. Allen, McNair wrote to Marshall, had bypassed the system for replacement soldiers and “went to the replacement depot and chose his men individually, regardless of arm or specialty, based primarily on their appearance or actions - somewhat as one would buy a horse.”237

To McNair then, the problem was the method employed in Research Branch’s study, not the findings and recommendations. The 1st Infantry Division had poisoned the well because it was a bad division, led by a commander who did not follow procedures - *quod erat demonstratum*. Like many officers, McNair was more comfortable with his own impressions and memories than he was with data. More fighting spirit - *elan vitale* - would do the trick. His attitude toward Research Branch revealed his attitude toward soldiering – a set of prejudices which guided his actions.

Major General Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff also commented on Osborn’s memo, and McNair’s appraisal. While Handy did not agree with McNair that the 1st Division was not representative, he rated Research Branch findings as “findings,” including the ironic quotes in his memo to Marshall. He wrote to the chief of staff that what Osborn had reported was obvious: “Most of the ‘findings’ of General Osborn’s report are about what is normally to be expected from soldiers, particularly when they have a chance - as they probably did in this case - to ‘bellyache’ without restriction.” Handy, however, more thoughtful than McNair, was struck by a different finding of Research Branch:


237 Ibid.
There is one matter, however, that to my mind is serious if General Osborn’s survey indicates the real feeling of the men - that is the attitude toward company officers. When 38% of the men in a company, even though they are ‘veterans classified as relatively not ready for combat,’ and when half the companies in a regiment have more than half their men who want to serve in combat under ‘few or none’ of their company officers, something is radically wrong. I am not sure that General Osborn’s report presents the true picture. If it does and the feeling in this division is representative of that throughout the service, I would state that our army is in a very, very bad condition. I am sure that in the last war I was never associated with an outfit where the condition shown by General Osborn existed.

I suggest: (1) that General Osborn be directed to examine his method of sampling with a view to determining definitely that it does or does not represent the real feeling of the men; (2) that General Osborn be directed to investigate several other divisions, particularly to determine the attitude of their men toward company officers. I feel that we must first determine whether the conditions shown by General Osborn’s report actually exist. That having been done, corrective steps can be taken if necessary.  

Handy clearly was a man in transition from the McNair’s old, intuitive understanding of morale, to one based on empirical data. He was suspicious of data, yet he saw its value. He too, like McNair, relied heavily on his First World War experience and impressions, yet his recommended solution to a morale problem was to gather more data - to confirm or deny his initial data. One salutary if unexpected byproduct of Research Branch’s work during World War II, focused as it was on enlisted men, was that it provides a window into officer attitudes of the time. And it was men like Handy, whose attitude was in transition, who helped Research Branch to overcome resistance to survey research.  

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239 The old adage is - “What Peter says about Paul tells us more about Peter than Paul.”
American Soldier, “natural to professional men everywhere, and often particularly ascribed to the professional soldier, was broken down by the imaginative grasp of the abler leaders.”

Research Branch did indeed overcome much resistance - at least officially. By the end of 1943, the organization was well established and recognized. In a November 1943 letter to a fellow Research Branch officer in the China-India-Burma theatre, the chief military officer of Research Branch in Europe, Major Charles Dollard, exulted, “as a result of directives issued by the Chief of Staff we now have not only the right, but the obligation, to set up research programs in every theater, and, through Osborn, to furnish theater units with questions which we think are important and on which comparable data from all theaters are necessary, in order to construct the complete picture for the Chief of Staff.” Stouffer was able to state with confidence to Osborn that by the beginning of 1944, “there will be research units in nine theaters and commands outside the Continental United States. This will give us virtually complete world coverage.” In August 1944, Dollard reported from the European Theater “no substantial resistance to research work anywhere in the theater.” His chief problem at that time - shortly after the D-Day invasion - was “keeping up with an army engaged in the most dramatic drive in history.”

242 Samuel A. Stouffer “Memorandum for General Osborn - Subject: Activities of Research Branch.” December 6, 1943. Record Group 330, Box 970. Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve), Research Division Historical File, 1941 - June 1945, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. Overseas areas included the European Theater of Operations, the Middle East, the Southwest, Central, and South Pacific Areas, the Panama Canal and Alaskan Departments, the China-India-Burma Theater, and the Mediterranean Theater. See “History of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff,” February 1, 1946, p. 26. (Record Group 330, Box 970, Entry 89 Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel & Reserve, Research Division Historical File 1941 - June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports . National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD).
On July 1, 1942, Research Branch’s organization table showed 52 personnel positions within the branch, 17 of which were vacant. By September 1 of that same year, the branch had grown to 85 positions with 29 vacancies - growing faster than it could man its authorized positions. The branch also had a mission statement: “The mission of the Research Branch is to cooperate with heads of other agencies in the Army in discovering problems of the soldier needing study; to use scientific techniques in obtaining directly from the enlisted men, and from other sources, facts about the problems of the soldier; to analyze these facts; and report them to the Chief of the Special Service Division for his own guidance and for transmission to the chain of command as an aid in making policy.”

By war’s end, 55 military and 68 civilians had worked or were working in the Washington DC headquarters of Research Branch, many of them prominent sociologists and psychologists. The branch produced well over 350 surveys, studies, and information papers, and the voluminous correspondence attendant with any bureaucracy. Their surveys were eclectic, with titles ranging from “Memorandum on the Attitudes of New Recruits” (March 1942) to “Attitudes of Dischargees Toward Separation and Evaluation of Information Provided at the Separation Center (October 1945).”

Surveys were generally based on attitudes of soldiers in a specific theater, or attitudes towards a specific issue. Sometimes, as Stouffer wrote in *The American Soldier*, the research questions were small, such as the “laundry situation in Panama.” Sometimes, however, they were challenging in nature and extremely large in scope. Among the latter was the “very serious morale problems of the Infantry,” which

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Stouffer noted resulted in “revision of pay scales, the introduction of symbols such as the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and the Expert Infantryman’s Badge, and the development of an aggressive program of publicity.”²⁴⁶ The following charts indicate studies undertaken and results disseminated and, as well, Research Branch’s personnel count:

²⁴⁶ TAS vol. I, 6-9.
Research Branch completed its first full-scale survey of the 9th Division on December 8, 1941, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after they had sweated out the details revealed in their October 19, 1941 test survey at Camp Lee. On November 5th, General Marshall had agreed to the survey, despite the non-concurrence of the G-3 (Army operations officer) who had objected “on the grounds that the project would interfere with training.” Osborn called the G-3 and persuaded him to concur, but even then, the commanding general of the target division - originally the 7th, not the 9th - refused to cooperate, and as Marshall’s agreement with Osborn “did not make it compulsory for the CG of a division to cooperate,” the 7th was dropped in favor of the 9th.247

Working to develop the twelve-step formula on which they would settle by 1944, Stouffer and two colleagues selected sixty-five enlisted men as potential group leaders, a group which they culled to thirty-two. These men completed surveys on 1,878 soldiers over three days (December 8-10), and during the entire period no officers interfered with the process. One of the findings that presented itself immediately when the survey data was analyzed was the lack of promotions for well-qualified recruits. Research Branch undertook an exhaustive investigation to confirm or deny whether this situation was peculiar to the 9th Division only, or whether it was a problem throughout the Army. Confirming the latter, the Army amended its policies immediately - revising its Officer Candidate School Requirements, and balancing the number of well-educated men between the Army and the Army Air Forces. General Marshall was pleased with the survey, and ordered that more be conducted as the need arose. The Army’s “History of the Research Branch” (February 1, 1944) credited Stouffer with the success of the survey of 9th Division and for his guidance of Research Branch throughout the war: “Major credit for the

247 “History of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division War Department Special Staff,” February 1, 1946, p. 7. Record Group 330, Box 970, Entry 89 Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel & Reserve, Research Division Historical File 1941 - June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.
organization and success of the Research operation belongs to the Chief of the Professional Staff [Stouffer] who guided the organization from its inception through the war and up until the present time. His vision and resourcefulness and driving energy were the ‘sine qua non’ of the Branch."

As the war progressed, Research Branch became more articulated in both structure and method, and before war’s end they would do much more than conduct planning surveys. By 1944, the duties of civilian and military personnel within the branch had solidified, with Army officers seeing to administration, while civilians and enlisted men served as technicians or clerks. The branch divided itself into the Office of the Chief, where policies were established, and where the military Chief of Branch (in succession Munson Jr., Stanley, C. Dollard, and DeVinney) and Stouffer as the chief social scientist resided. Reporting to these individuals were the Survey, Experimental, Overseas, Statistical, Developmental, Field Study, Production, Editorial, and Overseas Analysis Sections. 249

248 “History of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff,” February 1, 1946, p. 8-12. Record Group 330, Box 970, Entry 89 Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel & Reserve, Research Division Historical File 1941 - June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.

249 From the Research Branch SOP: “The office of the Chief of the Branch is of course where policies are planned, over-all programs are laid out, and major administrative problems decided. Concerned at this level are also the Chief Social Scientist, Chief Psychologist, and Office of the Chief of Overseas Section….The Chief Social Scientist oversees all the research done in the Branch, the Chief psychologist is Head of the Experimental Section, and the Chief Sociologist is head of the Surveys Section. The Chief of Overseas is responsible for plans, procedures, and administrative matters pertaining to Research Units outside of the United States. The Statistical, Survey, Experimental, and Developmental Sections are composed of analysts. The Statistical Section is responsible for the interpretation of ‘objective’ statistics and for the designing of samples used in the research process. The Survey Section does the ‘cross section’ studies of soldier attitudes, and the Experimental Section tests the effectiveness of various Army procedures and programs. The Developmental Section was established to do fundamental exploratory research; partly on problems already included in this program of the Branch, and partly to detect, and then define and structuralize, morale problems not currently receiving attention. The field study section has the primary function of collecting data in the field, with its attendant responsibilities. The Production Section is in charge of processing returned questionnaires, which includes all coding and machine work. The Editorial Section is responsible for the reports published by the Research Branch. The Overseas Analysis Section directs the analysis of data returned from overseas, and directs or coordinates the work on construction of questionnaires in this country that are to be administered overseas.” “Preliminary Draft: Research Branch, Information and Education Division Standard Operating Procedure,” August 19, 1944. 3 - 4. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 970, (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File,
A visitor to Research Branch from the YMCA in World War I would be mystified by the SOP - where, he would have asked, is the music section?

Research Branch, with this organization, pursued not only planning surveys of specific units, but also cross-section studies of the entire Army. In addition, they analyzed statistics readily available in the Army, such as Absent With Out Leave (AWOL) rates. They transmitted their findings to the War Department in a variety of ways, which included results of completed surveys, reports on specific issues requested by the Chief of Staff or individual unit commanders, and beginning in 1943, through a monthly report, distributed information to commanders in the field (down to company grade), which came to be called “What the Soldier Thinks.”

1941 - June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.
DECEMBER, 1943

WHAT IS MORALE? ........................................... 1

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BUSY SOLDIERS TEND TO BE SATISFIED SOLDIERS ... 16

Much as *The American Soldier* is a post-war summary of the many diverse surveys and studies conducted by the Research Branch, “What the Soldier Thinks” reports were monthly summaries *during* the war of Research Branch’s work. In addition to issue-specific reports, the Research Branch also published these sixteen “*Reader’s Digest* condensed versions” of their
findings. These reports provided commanders and staffs with information on soldier attitudes - what today would be called “actionable intelligence” - on their own soldiers. The first issue bears a publication date of December 1943, and includes a primer on morale, an article about the relationship between fighting spirit and physical conditioning, and a comforting re-affirmation of the old saw that busy soldiers are happy soldiers. Commanders read that the purpose of the report was “that of bringing to officers concerned information of practical value in maintaining the morale and the fighting efficiency of troops under their command.” For doubters, and those comfortable with their own ability to monitor their soldiers’ morale through intuition, the report announced, “Studies of soldier attitudes reported here are based on the statistical analysis of replies made anonymously to questions asked of thousands of soldiers in overseas theaters in [sic] Continental United States. Such factual evidence is more representative - and therefore more generally applicable - than the personal impressions of even the most experienced and able officer-observers.”

In addition to the more prosaic articles in the first “What the Soldier Thinks” report, there was an article on the pricklier subject of enlisted men’s attitudes towards their officers. Wisely, the authors, under Stouffer’s guidance, connected each finding with an army regulation to prevent “who the hell cares what they think” grousing amongst officers. Here, Stouffer showed his acumen in dealing with a large bureaucracy traditionally convinced of its superiority and uncomfortable with outsiders. (All civilians were, are, and ever shall be outsiders to the military). Stouffer also had a keen grasp of the dynamics of research within Washington, DC. In 1937, he

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had made an analysis of Washington research agencies for the National Resources Planning Board. Reflecting on the experience as he thought about the direction of Research Branch in 1942, he came to the conclusion that unless researchers and policy makers remained in close contact, “research tends to become an assembling of miscellaneous facts in which nobody but the research agency is interested.” If there was no vital connection between policy formation and research:

A vicious circle develops - I have seen it happen several times in Washington. The research men, frustrated because their stuff is not being sought or used, become more and more ‘academic,’ satisfying their desire for expression by doing what may be good work from a scientific standpoint, but useless from a standpoint of policy determination. This must not happen here.

Stouffer’s lofty goal for Research Branch matched his writ from the War Department - “We want our Division to be a model in Washington for its marriage of honest, competent research to statesman-like policy.”

Reaching this goal was not easy. The urgency of a world war coupled with Stouffer’s drive caused recurring tensions and one minor rebellion of sorts among some of the academics with whom he worked. Unused to long office hours, the tedium of government management and analysis, and the pressure to produce usable rather than merely interesting results, some of

Stouffer’s colleagues began to complain that they were being overworked. Stouffer understood the problem, but his reply was always the same: “We are at war.” He was able to win the day on such issues more because of his personal example, however, than because of anything he said. Of greater concern to Stouffer and some of his colleagues was the efficacy of providing large quantities of information to the War Department at the expense of quality. Stouffer had in effect created a bit of a monster with Research Branch. The Army became dependent upon the data they provided, and was constantly asking for more, and more frequent reports to be distributed to an increasing number of individuals and units. By 1944, Charles Dollard, the military chief of Research Branch was even questioning the value and quality of “What the Soldier Thinks:” “I am increasingly concerned that the necessity of publishing ‘What the Soldier Thinks’ on a monthly basis may eventually force us to a superficial analysis of our data, and to overemphasis of dramatic stories.” The war ended, however, before the issue of quality vs. quantity reached the stage of crisis.

In addition to the issue of the quality of Research Branch work versus the increasing demands for output, there was another crisis within Research Branch which came very close to causing Stouffer to resign. Had that happened, the entire enterprise might have been shut down. In April 1943, Stouffer wrote to Osborn, expressing his frustration at the proposed idea of a

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252 Interview with Dr. Ann Bisconti-Stouffer-Dyke, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, August 7, 2006, Washington, DC. Throughout his life, Dr. Bisconti stressed, Stouffer maintained a strong work ethic and consummate professionalism. A chain-smoker full of restless energy, he never took sabbaticals and could be found at work late into the night - not only during the war years. He preferred to see raw data himself before it was processed and analyzed.

military chief of research “without research training” as the primary decision-maker in Research Branch, to the exclusion of “a man who knows research.” Stouffer told Osborn that his frustration lay in the age-old problem of responsibility without authority:

You have told me time and again that I am responsible for research… you want me to continue to be, even though a new army career man were to be brought in as active head. There are really only three possibilities if this new man comes. (1) The new man and I share responsibility. (2) The new man be a ceremonial director of research, and I continue to have responsibility. (3) The new man be director of research in fact as well as name.

After analyzing the three possibilities for Osborn, Stouffer concluded that “two men cannot run the same organization.” He recommended to Osborn that the third option was the only feasible course, and admitted that “this, of necessity, eliminates me from the picture.”

If there must be a new man, this is the only solution, both from the military standpoint and the psychological standpoint…It is obviously bad organization to demote the head, bring in a new man, and keep the demoted man around as ‘adviser.’ If the demoted head didn’t have sense enough to resign under the circumstances, he should be fired. I have helped build this staff, man by man, job by job. My heart has gone into it, because it is as bright a dream of practical accomplishment in a crisis as social science ever had in all history…We are just at the dawn of tremendously increased possibilities of usefulness to you and the Army. If the new head is brought in, he must not be handicapped by any staff loyalty to me as ex-director….Therefore, the correct thing under the circumstances is for me to tender my resignation now. 254

The issue hung in the balance for several weeks. Osborn did not accept Stouffer’s resignation, yet it remained on the table. In early May, several of the sociologists and psychologist of Research Branch sent Stouffer a telegram:

We are much perturbed to hear of the possibility that you might leave the Research Branch. All of us came here with the vision of aiding the war effort in the best way we knew how. Bringing social science to the Army is a tremendous task. Under your leadership and guidance, we have

254 Samuel A. Stouffer to Frederick H. Osborn, April 18, 1943. Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.
come a long way. All of us honestly feel you are the only social scientist who could have done the job. We feel that the most important part of the task still lies ahead. The war is far from won, and the factor of morale will be increasingly recognized as necessary in winning it. After the war there will be the problem of reintegrating the soldier into a new kind of civilian life. The Army needs progressive ideas and scientific facts. The job ahead of us will require a determined fight. We need you to lead this fight. We need you to develop a long range program of research and to develop theory and methods in the service of our government. Without you as head of the professional staff, the program of the Research Branch might degenerate into mere hack work. Working closely with you, we can keep our work vital.  

There is more than a little tone of contrition in the telegram, and it may have been that the complaints of overwork had prompted the Army to consider appointing a military head of research. In his letter to Osborn, Stouffer mentioned “whatever rumors may have come to you,” but did not elaborate. In the event, most likely through the machinations of Osborn and the second threatened mutiny of the Research Branch Staff (this time over the loss of Stouffer, rather than overwork), no career officer came to replace Stouffer, and he remained the head of the professional staff through the end of the war. During the six weeks or so surrounding these events in Research Branch, the Allies took Tunisia, leading to an Axis surrender in North Africa, the SS began to reduce Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto, US airplanes shot down Admiral Yamamoto’s plane, and the British began to recruit women into their Home Guard. In Stouffer’s home, in the atmosphere of rationing, his daughter Ann was crushing orange pellets into white margarine to make it look like butter.  

Stouffer’s statement to his sometimes recalcitrant staff that “we are at war” was more than just a slogan.

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256 Interview with Dr. Ann Bisconti-Stouffer-Dyke, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, August 7, 2006, Washington, DC.
Notwithstanding the disagreements - sometimes outright arguments - Research Branch had amongst themselves and with other individuals and agencies, they remained a surprisingly cohesive and self-critical organization throughout the war. They were constantly refining methods, searching for new ways to survey, and submitting their thought processes to rigorous criticism and analysis. They also continually sought the advice of other experts, and made considerable efforts to expand their sources of information.
Chapter 6

Stouffer and Research Branch during World War II - Refinement

In the fall of 1944, when it might be expected that a successful research organization connected to a great bureaucracy would have rested a bit on its laurels and settled into a routine, Stouffer was still looking for ways to refine and improve Research Branch operations. He was looking ahead, not behind, and hoped his thoughts would help Research Branch in “charting our future plans.” Although he acknowledged that his ideas were “pretty obvious,” he sought to classify the levels of research he was then conducting as “observation,” “controlled observation,” and “controlled experiment.” Stouffer was chary about observation. He warned his colleagues that simple observational reports lend themselves to “editorializing.” “Moreover,” he wrote, “if a report merely exposes defects without specifically suggesting corrective action, it can be punishing, and backfire on the researcher.” In addition to the “anxiety” such reports aroused, they could provide “ammunition which can be used by the devil as well as by the angels.” While not dismissing observation as a tool, Stouffer thought its major flaw was that it did not render a “prima facie case for making any given recommendation.” Observations had severe limitations, although Stouffer acknowledged that they were the starting point of all research.

Controlled observations were of a higher order in Stouffer’s mind, as they limited the observation to two or more preselected groups. The results rendered “approximate those of a controlled experiment,” with the proviso that the controlled experiment offered greater reliability than controlled observations because variables were more easily controlled in the former. Therefore, Stouffer favored the controlled experiment because it “represents the only research method which embodies in the research the recommendations for action.” Stouffer was seeking to find ways of raising the level of Research Branch’s labors to controlled experiment and away
from simple observation, while recognizing that the best he would often be able to get was
controlled observation rather than controlled experiment. He was also, he wrote, somewhat
frustrated with the difficulty in getting verification of findings even from controlled
observations, and was keenly aware of the criticism that would be leveled at Research Branch
were he unable to do so:

If the Division is concerned with helping the Army discover what
practices really will improve morale - both as a contribution to winning
this war and erecting doctrines for leadership of the post-war army -
some effort must be made to follow up the method of controlled observation
by explicitly getting put into practice in certain units the presumptive lessons
learned therefrom and then observing whether they really work….If the
war were to end today and if the Army should ask us what single practice
General Osborn’s million-dollar research operation has proved to be
helpful to morale, we honestly could not cite a scrap of scientific evidence.
The curtain would go up on the stage and there we would stand - stark
naked.257

Ever scientific and ever thoughtful, Stouffer was also frustrated by the lack of
preparedness of social science before the war, and the inability during the war years for Research
Branch to move beyond the practical and into the theoretical - a problem of which he was well
aware even while the war was underway. Shortly before the end of the war, he expressed his
frustrations to the president of the University of Chicago:

We here are forever haunted by the fact that what we are accomplishing
is such a small fraction of what might have been done if the science of
social psychology had been ready at Pearl Harbor with a body of tested
theory. I believe that one of the great obligations of those of us in social
sciences who go back to our universities after the war will be to reexamine
critically the shortcomings of the kind of crude pressure job we have done,
and to help reformulate social psychological theory sharply so that hypotheses
can be tested by crucial controlled experiments, with the aid of new
quantitative tools.258

257 Samuel A. Stouffer. “Some Notes on Research Methods,” October 13, 1944. Samuel Andrew Stouffer:
Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 2: Princeton University - Dr. K. Young
HUG (FP) 31.8. The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer, Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge,
MA. See also Ellen Herman. The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts.
Stouffer was a good as his word, as *The American Soldier* proves. Although *The American Soldier* is in fact primarily a work of data, it is not a work of unprocessed data. And there are examples of discrete theory in it, such as that of relative deprivation.\(^{259}\) Still, Stouffer was all too aware of the poor state of psychology and sociology in practical application when the war began, and wary of the temptation to fall back on “common sense” when science proved unequal to the task at hand:

> The truth is that, except for providing broad and none too explicit ways of looking at problems, most of the theories of social psychology and sociology were not in very good shape for practical application. As a substitute, one had to fall back on empirical generalizations from common sense experience, and these, when dressed up in the jargon of our profession, became quickly confused with propositions deducible from scientific theory.\(^{260}\)

While their main concern remained gathering data and making recommendations to the War Department, Research Branch staff members found time to analyze carefully the holes in their program. In early 1945, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., one of the contributors to *The American Soldier*, sent Stouffer a three-page memorandum entitled “Gaps in the Research Program.” He identified several, to include problems in validity and prediction, experimental design, interview

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\(^{260}\) Samuel A. Stouffer. “Studying the Attitudes of Soldiers.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*. vol. 92, no. 5 (November 1948): 337. Stouffer continued, “The prediction ‘If you hold your hand in the fire you will burn it,’ is verifiable, but it is hardly a law of physics, chemistry, or psychology. Most of the precepts which we use in training our children or those which sell books like Dale Carnegie’s are about at this level. And, quite candidly, it is precepts like these, based, if you will, on enlightened common sense, upon which most of our social engineering falls back. It takes only a few demonstrations, like the classic examples of post-hypnotic suggestion, which dealt a body blow to common sense ideas about rationality, to indicate how wrong so-called common sense sometimes can be. When we are using common sense and not explicit scientific theory, it is highly important that we be aware of what we are doing and especially that we do not wrap up what we say in a fancy package with a lot of polysyllables which eventually can beguile us as they beguile others.”
techniques, and the very “nature of combat morale,” the knowledge of which he determined was “woefully inadequate.” Cottrell’s memo was representative rather than exceptional, and revealed much about the attitudes of Research Branch, even as Research Branch was attempting to understand the attitudes of soldiers. The branch remained self-critical throughout the war, despite its crushing burden of surveys, reports, and analysis of the Army as a whole.\textsuperscript{261}

Cottrell attached to his memo a nine page list of “Embarrassing Questions.” Everyone in the branch was asked to “imagine yourself two years hence talking with an intelligent and interested social scientist of psychological or sociological background.” What questions would they be asked? How would they answer them? The exhaustive list they compiled contained questions about the definition and theory of morale, methodology and the soundness of the methodology Research Branch had used during the war, theory of attitudes, problems of cause and effect, etc. Most of these questions had no concrete answers, though \textit{The American Soldier} attempted to deal with many of them. Sociology, even after the experience of Research Branch during World War II, remained young as a science.\textsuperscript{262}

Perhaps because of their discomfort with their methods, Research Branch, and their parent organization, the Information and Education Division, were tireless seekers of data, and they were willing to go to extreme lengths to get it. “On 29 January 1945,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Goodfriend in a twenty page report to Osborn, “I exchanged my status as an officer and editor-in-chief of \textit{The Stars and Stripes} for that of a private in the Reinforcement Command.” Goodfriend’s subsequent report made for some interesting reading. In addition to


editing *Stars & Stripes*, Goodfriend had also edited *Warweek* and *Army Talks* - all War Department house organs designed to keep soldiers informed. Goodfriend, in becoming a private replacement, was seeking not only to experience winter warfare in Germany, but also “to have the infantry soldier’s reaction to the work of the Special and Information Services.” He recognized that his experience was a unique one, and not transferable to the entire Army - what Stouffer would call an observation rather than a controlled observation or controlled experiment - yet his report remains compelling.

Goodfriend joined the 86th Reinforcement Battalion at Aachen, where he spent one night before joining the 78th Infantry Division while it attacked the Siegfried Line. He observed that the way the reinforcement battalion and Infantry division had received him was “simple, humane, and as good as conditions and operations permit.” Goodfriend then identified the soldiers’ four enemies, “The German. The weather. Squalor. And poor equipment.” The soldiers he observed rated the statement that American soldiers were the best equipped in the world as a “boast,” and they marveled at the superiority of German equipment, which they “made every effort” to substitute for their own. He also observed that in addition to the equipment the Infantryman took into combat, he was also loaded down with “great quantities of impracticable and unusable equipment,” which “he leaves in the rear when he goes into combat,” and “never sees it again.” Of special interest to Stouffer and Research Branch would have been Goodfriend’s observation that the Infantryman “is conscious of the fact that while he suffers, others do not - and those who do not, seem to have no understanding of his problems, nor sympathy for his plight.” While respecting his company officers, Goodfriend noted, the Infantryman “resents the chicken shit that comes down from the higher brass.”
Goodfriend’s next observations revealed much about what anthropologists would call the “lifeways” of the World War II American soldier when it came to attitudes, morale and expectations (the last of which Stouffer and his colleagues made much of in *The American Soldier*):

Hot chow comes twice a day, with cold K rations at mid-day. Cigarettes are fairly plentiful; matches are scarce. PX rations...amounted to half a package of tootsie rolls. Other amenities are either totally lacking or are pitifully scant. One copy of the *Stars and Stripes* reached our platoon in three ...days. Even in the 86th Reinforcement Battalion at Aachen, the day room had no radio. The portable phonograph was broken....There were no movies because the generator was broken. There was no light for the same reason, so that the men could neither read nor play cards, but only sit and talk in the darkness. Promises of large quantities of improved equipment arriving in the theater, or of lavish entertainment, or of special service facilities - promises of any sort which are unkept - seriously depress morale and lower respect for the Army. The fact that the Air Force and Armored Divisions get well designed, warm, attractive clothing further deflates the infantry soldier’s ego and efficiency.

Goodfriend ended his detailed report to Osborn, which included a list of exactly what equipment he was issued at the Reinforcement Depot, with a reminder that his findings and recommendations were “subjective,” and he suggested that “a more broadly based analysis of winter fighting conditions be undertaken. Those conclusions which are not supported by such an analysis should be disregarded. Others, which find collaboration in a sufficiently large percentage of cases should be the basis of remedial action.”

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263 Arthur Goodfriend to Chief, Special and Information Services (Osborn), February 7, 1945. Record Group 319, Box 285, Entry 322. Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of Chief of Information, Decimal File, 1942-1948, 311.23E-319.1. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. While American soldiers may have been envious of German combat equipment, German soldiers were envious of American luxury. German POWs taken shortly after the D-Day landing were amazed at the American cornucopia, which included ice cream machines and mobile movie theaters, and which indicated much about what the War Department felt was necessary, and were willing to do, to keep their citizen Army fighting. Additionally, one of the few but lasting theoretical constructs to come out of Research Branch and *The American Soldier* was the idea of relative deprivation - individuals do not judge their status in absolute terms, but rather by comparison with others. That idea is clear in Goodfriend’s comments about Infantrymen comparing themselves to the Air Corps and armored troops. See also *TAS* vol. I, 125 and vol. II, 303 and 508-510. For a veteran’s exegesis on “chickenshit,” see Paul
Goodfriend’s report - an individual, subjective observation though it may have been - was valuable to Research Branch for several reasons, not the least of which was that it confirmed that some of the work they had done on morale in the Infantry had taken effect. Goodfriend recorded the passing comment of a soldier - “You don’t get a combat infantry badge in this division if you come down with trench foot.” The Combat Infantryman’s Badge was one of many measures recommended by Research Branch which became (and still is) Army policy. Low Infantry morale, in addition to neuropsychiatric casualties, race relations, officer-enlisted relations, and demobilization, was one of the five most difficult problems Research Branch took on during the war. One of the ways the War Department sought to raise Infantry morale was with the Combat Infantryman’s Badge - authorized in November 1944 and retroactive to December 7, 1941. The award came with an extra $10.00 a month, and all those Infantrymen who had exhibited “satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against the enemy” were eligible for the badge. Additional measures included a revision of Infantry pay scales, and a publicity campaign to help “glamorize the infantryman.”

After the war, Stouffer described for the American Philosophical Society the problems in the Infantry and the attempted solutions. Many Infantry soldiers, particularly as they compared themselves with the Air Corps, felt they were poorly paid, badly trained, and had little chance for advancement. They often saw their branch as a dumping ground for the draft. There was nothing


264 Arthur Goodfriend to Chief, Special and Information Services (Osborn), February 7, 1945. Pages 8 and 12. Record Group 319, Box 285, Entry 322. Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of Chief of Information, Decimal File, 1942-1948, 311.23E-319.1. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. Goodfriend passed along this comment to the 78th Division Commander, General Parker, who immediately rescinded his order to that effect - an excellent example in micro of research affecting policy.

special about being an Infantryman, they felt, despite their difficult mission. Mechanized warfare had not removed the need for “boots on the ground,” nor had it reduced Infantry mortality rates. When General Marshall became aware of the extent of low Infantry morale, he ordered a specific study on the issue, which Research Branch conducted. Out of the study came morale improvement measures such as the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and increased pay. There is, of course, little Stouffer could have done about the major factor in low Infantry morale - their high rate of casualties. In the two months succeeding D-Day alone, US forces suffered about 100,000 casualties, 85,000 of which were Infantrymen.

As Research branch continued to seek data, both formally and informally, the picture they formed for the War Department of morale was bleak indeed. Hadley Cantril, of Princeton’s Office of Public Opinion Research and a consultant to Research Branch, had suggested early in the war that some sort of “panel of correspondents in army camps be established” from among former students who had entered the service. “My thought was that…these letters might be very revealing of Army morale.” Stouffer deemed the idea “swell,” and some of the letters Research

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266 Samuel A. Stouffer. “Studying the Attitudes of Soldiers” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. vol. 92, no. 5 (November 1948): 338-339. “Compared with the more glamorous Air Corps, the men in training in the Infantry felt discriminated against in pay, ratings, long and grueling training, and in obsolete training methods. They felt that the Infantry was being used as a dumping ground for healthy but stupid soldiers who could not qualify as specialists in the Air Corps or Service branches - an allegation, incidentally, which was pretty well confirmed by statistical analysis of the qualifications of soldiers in various branches. The Army Ground Forces, as far as we know, paid almost no attention to these studies, though the reports may have stimulated efforts through posters and other publicity to sell the idea that the Infantry was a good branch to be in. Basic to the problem was the selection factor and the Army, neither in its publicity nor in its practice, made any pretense that an Infantryman, like a Marine, was a picked man. Time passed. It presently became evident that the Infantry would have a much larger role to play in the War than some of the air-minded and mechanized minded soldiers had thought. Our studies showed no improvement in attitudes of Infantrymen in training, and not much attention was paid to the findings, until the Chief of Staff personally read one of the reports. Thereupon he ordered the commanding general of Ground Forces to make an immediate staff study, with recommendations. Out of this staff study, in which our research unit participated, came a series of new policies, calling for an increase in pay and ratings, the institution of the Expert Infantryman’s badge and the Combat Infantryman’s badge, and an intensive publicity program. That these policies improved attitudes slightly was later demonstrated, but by this time it was too late to attack the problem at its fundamentals - that is, to sell the idea, by showing that it was in fact true, that in some respects the Infantryman, like the Marine, was a picked man.”

Branch received, although certainly not the scientific surveys which Stouffer favored, were revealing of at least some soldiers’ morale.²⁶⁸ Cantril forwarded to Stouffer almost immediately an eleven page letter from Sergeant Rutledge Jay, assigned to a stateside Army Corps Headquarters. His position there as a records clerk gave him the opportunity to “see everything that comes in or goes out on the subject of training.” He hoped from this position “to be able to abstract a kind of boiled down description of the army’s conception of its methods and intentions.”

Jay’s letter is - unexpected. It conforms to neither the stereotypical G.I. rant about “chickenshit,” nor to the patriotic dreams of American ideology. One is tempted to quote the whole, typed letter. Jay wrote to Cantril that he had no contact with “people who possess in themselves that continuing, persistent interest in observation of life which is so important to me.” Instead, Jay found himself “stifling in the dust of small daily acts and fatigues,” which caused him to observe his surroundings even more keenly. “Some of the fellows,” Jay told Cantril, “call civilian life ‘the real world.’ I get a kick out of the implication they express in that phrase, namely the sense of cultural loss. Civilian life means also for them ‘the grown-up world,’ for the army atmosphere, so far as the enlisted men are concerned, resembles in many ways the constrained and limited little world they last experienced as children in school.” Jay went on to discuss, intelligently and in detail, military psychology, morale, and the place of the army in society. Notwithstanding some hyperbole, Jay indicated also that the problem Raymond B. Fosdick had identified at the end of World War I - that of officer-enlisted relations - had not gone

away: “This is a caste system we live in, rigid. The enlisted man is an untouchable. The more able enlisted men subvert the orders of their officers….The cultural conflict is very acute. The fact is that the military leaders feel insecure….The more insecure they are the heavy [sic] the hand of oppression….More democratic leadership is absolutely and urgently required.”

Not all of the letters Stouffer received were as focused or insightful as Jay’s. Many were more conversational and less analytical. Still, they offered him insights which he must have found valuable. One man wrote to him in January 1942, one month after Pearl Harbor, from a training exercise in the California desert:

A noticeable change occurred in the temper of our men here. Some of the old cadremen of long army service haven’t borne up so well. They’ve been too accustomed to a garrison existence, town life, and spit and polish. They’ve become too convinced that they would never see action. I still place my chief reliance in the recently inducted men who haven’t been imbued with the harmful characteristics of [sic] meaningless training over a long period provides. They don’t like the army and want to fight the war….We’ve had a striking example of the effects of furloughs on morale these past weeks. Immediately on publicizing the granting of furloughs, the group esprit drops. Each man becomes a self-seeking individual, thinking of nothing but the possibility of getting home for a week. The men feel lazy and lack spirit, and I wish it were possible to let the whole battalion go at a time…. The problems have wide ramifications…..

The letter would have interested Stouffer, because it conflicted with received wisdom and intuition. There seem to be no crusty old NCOs who look after the draftees in a fatherly way, but rather slightly past their prime NCOs with no initiative. It is, rather, the recruits who inspire

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confidence. Nor is leave, as was generally thought, necessarily good for morale. These are the types of issues Stouffer would put to further study. (It is also interesting to note that in G.I. letters of the World War II era, unlike today, “army” is almost never capitalized. Indeed, the prevailing attitude among soldiers seemed to be, as this soldier wrote to Stouffer, “they don’t like the army and want to fight the war.”) Stouffer, though far on the side of survey research, was clearly aware of the value of such anecdotal evidence as well - much of which he included in The American Soldier.

In addition to these letters and many like them - from students of psychology, social psychology, or sociology - Stouffer also received many unsolicited letters. Several of these came from draftees who were seeking jobs in Research Branch. One particularly colorful letter came from Joe Rosenstein, a conscript stationed at Fort Ord in February, 1942. He enclosed his transcripts from his work in sociology and political science at the University of Chicago, pointed out to Stouffer that he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and concluded in no uncertain terms: “My presence in this moth-eaten, horse drawn 76th FA Bn [76th Field Artillery Battalion] can hardly be called crucial to national defense + I feel in all sincerity that I could do my country + the army a greater service in some work such as that which you are helping to direct.” Rosenstein had been in the service for three months. 271 He did, however, do more than ask for a job. Shortly after Stouffer received Rosenstein’s letter, he got one from his sociologist colleague at the University of Chicago, E.W. Burgess. Burgess forwarded a paper by Rosenstein entitled “A Study of the Adjustment of the Civilian to the Army Occupational Structure,” and asked Stouffer for some time “to talk with you then about Rosenstein not only of him but as a type of young

sociologist in the army that might utilize his sociological training in the interest of the national effort.”  

Stouffer also received other, more disconcerting letters. Keith Kane, the Assistant Director in Charge of the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of Facts and Figures - bureaucracy in wartime knows no bounds - wrote to Stouffer in May 1942 to tell him that “we have received a letter from the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety reporting a widespread rumor that a large number of Jewish men have, through dishonest methods, escaped the draft.” Kane requested that Stouffer provide him with figures to refute the rumor. Stouffer replied to Kane that the rumor had come to his attention on several occasions, but that he could offer little help, as Research Branch had “no data, either available or obtainable on the number of Jewish men in the Army. No record is kept of religion, in any office.” He suggested perhaps a pilot study of a city, or checking with the Selective Service. The rumor seems to have persisted, as Harvard psychologist and member of the Committee for National Morale Gordon Allport wrote to Stouffer a few months later that “the most current and mischievous rumors in the country are ...
anti-Semitic in character. Of these the most frequent rumor is that Jews are evading the draft.”

He urged Stouffer to take a sampling, or to at least “get the matter before proper officials.”

The rumor problem, much like rumors themselves, would not go away. Stouffer corresponded about it with the writer Leo Rosten, who had earned a PhD in sociology at the University of Chicago and in 1942 was working at the Office of War Information (OWI), of which he would become deputy director. Rosten sent Stouffer some guidance OWI had sent to newspaper editors and publishers on rumor control, and expressed the hope that Stouffer could conduct a study on rumor in the Army. Stouffer replied, “I wish it would be possible for us to make a really decent study of rumor in the Army….We tried an open ended question in which we asked - ‘What rumors have you heard recently and do you believe them?’ - with no results that were worth a damn. What we drew was almost exclusively gossip about future movements of the outfit.”

The correspondence between Rosten and Stouffer indicated in more ways than one the lengths to which the United States was willing to go to keep citizens-soldiers, and citizens, focused on winning the war. The intellectual power dedicated to these functions, spread out over dozens of federal agencies created for the war effort, and the resources allocated to these agencies indicate that the United States understood it was engaged in a war of national survival,
and that everything possible had to be done to win that war - to include assessing and controlling attitudes. It also indicated what a difficult problem Stouffer, who considered himself a scientist, had on his hands, as some questions remained maddeningly resistant to the ministrations of survey research.

Research Branch had better luck with fear and neuropsychiatric casualties. After the rather lackluster performance of American troops during Operation Torch - their debut in the European Theater in North Africa - and the debacle at Kasserine Pass, Research Branch, in cooperation with the Neuropsychiatry Branch of the Surgeon General’s Office, conducted a survey and produced “Report B-66: Fear of German Weapons.” Dated October 1, 1943, the report was based on responses to questions by over 700 enlisted men who had recently been evacuated from North Africa, and indicated at first glance the strange, almost bizarre nature of attitudes which resist all logic:

“1. The German 88 mm. gun is considered by the men to be both the most frightening and most dangerous German weapon.

2. Men rate the dive bomber as the second most frightening weapon, despite the fact that they consider it relatively ineffective in inflicting casualties.

3. The light machine gun and rifle are seldom rated as most frightening or most dangerous weapons, although their effectiveness is shown by the fact that they account for a high proportion of the wounds among the men interviewed.

4. Only about half of the men say that combat experience reduced their fear of the weapon that was most frightening to them.

5. The proportion of men considering bombing most frightening decreases with increased combat experience, while the proportion fearing artillery increases.”

Soldiers here revealed that factors other than what is most likely to hurt them accounted for their fear, which is not quite as strange as one might think, when one remembers that we are
all as children more afraid of the dark and the boogeyman than we are of car accidents. Normal men in abnormal circumstances may tend to revert to a more childlike state, and the psychologists and sociologists of Research Branch acknowledged in the report that “To bring about some balance between the known effectiveness of weapons and the degree to which men fear them is a major problem of soldier training.” Recommendations for solving this problem from the surveyed soldiers included more training under live ammunition, training with captured enemy weapons, more training on protection from German weapons, discussions on fear, and more realistic combat simulations.276 Within six weeks of the release of Report B-66, the National Defense Research Council requested a copy of the report on behalf of the Navy, which was considering “the usefulness of battle noise equipment in the selection and training of Naval personnel.”277 So it went with the majority of Research Branch’s work - everyone wanted a copy.

In April-May of 1944, Research Branch questioned 454 men for Survey Number S-126, “Psychoneurotic Survey.” The survey included men in the 96th Station Hospital “that are not deemed curable in the European Theater of Operations, and are to be shipped back to the United States,” and “men from the 312th General Hospital who are less severe psychoneurotic cases.” 189 of these men had never seen combat. The survey proceeded as most all of them did, with questions designed to obtain demographic data: Age, education, marital status, time in and branch of army service, etc. Then the questions moved on to demographic inquiries that might bear on the problem of psychoneurosis in combat, such as birth order, employment history -

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277 Charles W. Bray to Special Services Division, War Department, Nov. 11, 1943. Record Group 319, Entry285, Box 303. C/S US Army Chief of Information, Troop Information and Education Division, Decimal File 061.2 1942-1948. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.
“Before you came into the army, had you ever been fired or asked to resign from a job?” - and participation in “Blood Sports,” defined as “Football, boxing, basketball…and any other vigorous sport involving bodily contact.” Bedwetting, fingernail biting, and fighting all figured in the survey, but most compelling are the questions on attitudes:

Question #16: In general, what sort of a time do you have in the army?

Of 454:

62  1. I have a pretty good time in the army
222  2. It’s about fifty-fifty
154  3. I have a pretty rotten time
16  0. No answer

Question #26: Do you think the things we are fighting for are worth risking your life for?

290  1. Yes.
76  2. I think so, but I’m not sure.
31  3. No
42  4. Undecided
15  0. No answer

Question #27: If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?

131  1. In a combat outfit overseas
86  2. In a non-combat outfit overseas
191  3. In an outfit that will stay in the United States
46  0. No answer

Question #28 If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?

90  1. As a soldier
279  2. As a war worker
69  3. Undecided
16  0. No answer

Question #29 If it were up to you, and you yourself had to decide, would you choose to be a soldier or a civilian?

110  1. Would choose to be a soldier
260  2. Would choose to be a civilian
What Research Branch learned particularly from this survey, among a great many other insights, was that while 290 of 454 respondents thought that what they were fighting for was worth risking their lives, 260 of the same 454 would choose to be a civilian rather than a soldier. These kinds of findings would typically translate into propaganda about the issues through Army newspapers and films, to include *Stars & Stripes* and Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” films, and Research Branch would conduct follow up surveys to determine the effectiveness of this propaganda in reshaping soldier attitudes. (Psychologists analyzing this particular survey determined that 175 of the soldiers surveyed were normal, while 279 were psychoneurotic).

Although there was great frustration among Army psychiatrists and psychologists during the war regarding the Army’s ineptness at anticipating and handling neuropsychiatric casualties, Research Branch staff did what they could to dig into the subject and offer assistance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there was a vibrant, rigorous, and public discussion of what would later be called post-traumatic-stress-disorder *during the war*. Not only were the personnel in Research branch heavily engaged in these investigations, but so also were scores of their consultants scattered at universities throughout the nation. Chief among these latter was John Dollard - brother of Charles Dollard, one of the military chiefs of Research Branch - of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale. Stouffer’s correspondence with John Dollard during the war was

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278 When Stouffer left the Research Branch and World War II Records were closed out, many of the original punch cards and survey questionnaires were turned over to the Roper Center. The University of Virginia Library has subsequently made them available online at [http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/amso/docs/amsoS-126cbook.txt](http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/amso/docs/amsoS-126cbook.txt) (Feb 18, 2008).
extensive, as both men tried to get beyond the feeble conceptions of cowardice and malingering that surrounded neuropsychiatric casualties.279

Seeking to counter the abysmal record of screening for psychosis and other psychiatric disorders during the initial expansion of the US Armed Forces, one of the contributions Research Branch made in the area of neuropsychiatric casualties was to assist the Surgeon General’s office in developing screening criteria. In late 1944, the War Department required that all draftees complete the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct, developed by Robin Williams, Shirley Star, and Louis Guttman - all later contributors to The American Soldier. The adjunct consisted of twenty-three questions, and was designed to weed-out those recruits most likely to suffer neuropsychiatric symptoms if allowed into the Army:

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279 Many of the lessons learned about neuropsychiatric casualties in the First World War had been ignored or forgotten. Published well after the war, The Army Medical Department’s assessment of the issue included in the foreword a statement by the Surgeon General that “the experiences of military psychiatry in two world wars have been extensive, and the lessons learned from them equally so. In both wars, the basic therapies were the same. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the major lesson from World War I had to be largely rediscovered and relearned in the Second World War: that treatment of the acute breakdown must begin as close to the site of its inception as possible.” (William S. Mullins, ed. Neuropsychiatry in World War II, vol. II, Overseas Theaters. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973, xv). Another physician and contributor to Neuropsychiatry in World War II remembered it this way: “It is not easy to picture the scene as it seemed to those of us who lived it. Any brief statement is an oversimplification, and every observer is limited by his necessarily curtailed personal experience and his own personal bias as well as by those inevitable distortions of memory which occur during the years which have passed. However, the documentation which is available enables even a biased observer to cite evidence for major trends. Unfortunately, the official language of both published regulations and unpublished reports does not convey sufficiently the strength of the rejection of psychological problems in the Army from the very beginning. Informally and privately, many Regular Army officers of all branches would express concern over the so-called psychiatric problem, which was really one facet of the need ‘to conserve fighting strength.’ Officially, however, particularly in the higher ranks, there was no realistic appraisal and willingness to take active responsibility for Army-wide correction of the difficulties, as seen by Brig. Gen. Elliot D. Cooke, USA; by Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn, Director, Information and Education Division, War Department, in his survey, or by the Doolittle Board. The attempts by the Information and Education Division, in 1943 and 1944, to improve morale were, at best, rather piecemeal, half-hearted, and inadequate to the task.” Robert S. Anderson, ed. Neuropsychiatry in World War II, vol. I, Zone of Interior. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1966, xix).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Never</th>
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<td>1. Do you have any particular physical or health problem?</td>
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<td>2. Have you ever had any fainting spells?</td>
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<td>3. Are you ever bothered by having nightmares (dreams that frighten or</td>
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<td>waking you very much)?</td>
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<td>4. Have you ever had spells of dizziness?</td>
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<td>5. Have you ever been bothered by shortness of breath when you were</td>
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<td>not exercising or working hard?</td>
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<td>6. Are you ever troubled by your hands sweating so that they feel</td>
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<td>damp and clammy?</td>
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<td>7. How often are you bothered by having an upset stomach?</td>
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<td>8. Have you ever been troubled by &quot;cold sweats&quot;?</td>
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<td>9. Have you ever been bothered by your heart beating hard when you</td>
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<td>were not exercising or doing heavy work?</td>
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<td>10. Have you ever been bothered by pressure or pains in the head?</td>
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<td>11. Do you often have trouble in getting to sleep or staying asleep?</td>
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<td>12. Do you tend to tremble enough to bother you?</td>
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<td>13. Do you ever bite your fingernails?</td>
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<td>14. Are you ever troubled by acid headaches?</td>
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<td>15. Are you ever bothered by nervousness?</td>
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<td>16. Have you ever had stomach ulcers?</td>
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<td>17. Do you take dope?</td>
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<td>18. Have you ever had fits or convulsions since you were ten years old?</td>
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<td>19. Did you ever have a nervous breakdown?</td>
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<td>20. Were you ever a patient in a mental hospital (because of your nerve)</td>
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<td>21. Were you ever sent to reform school?</td>
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<td>22. Have you ever gotten into serious trouble or lost your job because</td>
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<td>of drinking?</td>
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<td>23. Do you ever wet the bed? (This means urinating in bed, NOT wet</td>
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<td>dreams.)</td>
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Unfortunately, such instruments proved to come too late and to be rather blunt. Selective Service screened twenty-million men during the war, and called fourteen-million of them to active service.\textsuperscript{280} The Army disqualified for service on the basis of emotional disorders 970,000 men - 169,624 for psychiatric reasons.\textsuperscript{281} And still there were 929, 307 neuropsychiatric casualties, a number almost equal to those disqualified for emotional disorders.\textsuperscript{282}

Research Branch and their consultants were more successful in initiating an informed and public discussion of neuropsychiatric casualties during the war. Their jumping-off point was John Dollard’s study of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War - then in progress and published in 1944 as \textit{Fear in Battle} by \textit{The Infantry Journal}. Although the Lincoln Brigade was for the most part made up of ideologically driven volunteers who differed markedly from the draft-driven conscripts of the Second World War, Dollard for his study interviewed three-hundred Lincoln Brigade veterans, and exchanged information with Stouffer not only on content, but on survey strategies. “There are a lot of interesting problems on sampling on which I will need your advice,” Dollard wrote to Stouffer, “The chief one concerns how finical to be about sampling the Spanish vets; since we want to predict behavior in American soldiers wherever possible and since there is considerable difference between the two groups.” Dollard was not

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writing his study on the Lincoln Brigade simply as an academic exercise. He hoped, as did Stouffer, that it would be useful during the contemporary war.283

Useful it was, but perhaps even more useful was a handbook published in 1943 entitled *Psychology for the Fighting Man: What You Should Know About Yourself and Others*. A product of the National Research Council and the Science Service, the book was edited by H.S. Langfeld, Walter V. Bingham, Gordon W. Allport, and E.R. Guthrie, with the responsibility for final edit belonging to E.G. Boring of Harvard and M. Van de Water of Science Service. Listed as “collaborators” on the work are sixty contributors, representing such institutions and agencies as Brown, Harvard, Princeton, Queens College, the Personnel Procedures and Special Services Sections of the War Department, the Offices of War Information and Public Opinion Research, Pennsylvania and St. Elizabeth’s Hospitals, and the Universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Among the contributors were psychologists, military physicians and officers, and sociologists of national reputation, to include J.W. Appel, A.W. Kornhauser, E.L. Munson, Jr., Stouffer, and Kimball Young. Many were members of or consultants to Research Branch.

The directions to contributors from the editors are instructive beyond their time, as they illuminate what the editors were willing, unashamedly, to ask in the context of a world war. They wanted a basic psychological text directed solely at officers. They wanted facts, simply stated, and no theorizing whatsoever. No thought was to be given to “academic colleagues,” utility was to be paramount, and the editors reserved the right not only to edit, but to completely rewrite contributions if they felt it necessary to do so. The contributors and editors also received no fee.

It is difficult to imagine the contributors responding at all to such demands outside of the context of a world war.\textsuperscript{284}

Respond they did, however, producing a handbook that was devoted to the normalization and management of fear. \textit{Psychology for the Fighting Man} told its readers that soldiers were normal, but that circumstances for them were abnormal. Therefore, abnormal reactions were in fact normal, and understanding men and their adjustment to Army life and to combat were critical to maintaining sound morale:

For instance, soldiers need to understand men in order to understand themselves and their comrades, and officers must learn how to interpret and influence the conduct of those for whom they are responsible. The soldier must know about human needs, motives, and emotions - about fear, when it comes, and what to do about it - about anger, when it is useful, when it makes trouble - about zest which is the core of good morale in a unit - about anxiety and the sense of insecurity - about indignation against the enemy and irritation against comrades - about the relation of food and of sex to the military life. He should also know the relation of all these things to morale and thus learn how to avoid bad morale and build up good morale.\textsuperscript{285}

After serialization and initial publication in 1943 and reprinting in 1944, \textit{Psychology for the Fighting Man}, at twenty-five cents per copy, sold 400,000 copies.\textsuperscript{286}

\textsuperscript{284} “Military Psychology (textbook),” June 11, 1942, and Gordon W. Allport to Samuel A. Stouffer, June 15, 1942. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 1: \textit{American Journal of Sociology} Post War Plans of Soldiers, HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. “The text is directed to officers of the armed forces. It presents the basic psychological facts with which every officer should become familiar. Its use with college students, while probable, is wholly secondary and should be ignored. The style should be direct, simple, and factual….In short: Avoid pedantries! Stick to facts, and to theories so well established that they have become facts! If a view is so doubtful that its dubiety must be discussed, omit it. As a rule omit the names of men who made the discoveries or formulated the views. Do not write with academic colleagues in mind; for the purposes of this book colleagues do not exist. Facts, facts, facts! - for the Army officer who may never have studied psychology. Let him see what psychology has that is useful for him, but do not try to sell psychology to him. Help him in his psychological orientation in the military situation, and psychology will then have sold itself. The target is the Army officer! Write always to him -- every sentence! Forget everybody else….the editors will edit their sections freely in order to achieve unity and the military style. The editor-in-chief will edit again - freely. If it is necessary to have to book edited by an expert in this kind of writing or even to have it entirely rewritten, that too will be done….There will be no royalties for collaborators, editors, or the Committee.”


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Psychology for the Fighting Man, although addressed to military officers, did not go to press without securing the intellectual underpinnings and interest of the academic community. Shortly before it was published, the University of Chicago and the Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions had organized a series of lectures on the impact of war on society, which were delivered in the late fall of 1942. William F. Ogburn, one of Stouffer’s mentors and head of the sociology department at Chicago, asked Stouffer to contribute a lecture. Originally entitled “War and the Soldier,” Stouffer gave his lecture on November 10, 1942, and it was subsequently published, along with several of the other lectures, as “Social Science and the Soldier” in American Society in Wartime (1943). In his lecture, Stouffer detailed the trajectory of attitude research from its psychological beginnings in World War I through the survey research of World War II to 1943. He also detailed the work of the Information and Education Division under Frederick Osborn, and described the activities of Research Branch. As with all lectures or articles of this kind, the War Department had to approve public dissemination, which they did yet another indication of what the government was willing to do to keep citizen soldiers fighting. The psychological and sociological research dedicated to the war was no secret.287 Stouffer delivered his lecture two days after the Americans invaded North Africa.

By 1944, Stouffer’s discoveries in military psychology and sociology had made it to Hollywood. In a frank and open depiction of that most delicate and painful of wartime

phenomena - neuropsychiatric casualties (NPs) - Selznick International Pictures released “I’ll Be Seeing You,” starring Joseph Cotten, Ginger Rogers, and Shirley Temple. Cotten, playing Sergeant First Class Zachary Morgan, an NP who had sustained his psychological wounds in the Pacific, returns home on leave, and struggles to maintain control by talking to himself:

Don’t get worried Zack. Don’t get worried Zack. That bayonet wound is all healed, but the wound in your mind is going to take a little more time. That’s why the doctors gave you this ten day leave from the hospital, to prove to you that you can go out in the world again and find a place for yourself. It’s going to take a little while to get your timing back. You’ll drop things and be a little slow but you’ll get well. They told you you would. The important thing is not to get too tired, not to give in. Then you won’t get any of those, those things that wind up with a shot in the arm or a tub or that little room with the barred window. You can fight those things off Zack if you’ll believe that you’ll get well. Stop thinking about yourself Zack. You’ll get well, you’ll get well, you’ll get well.

During Cotten’s monologue, the camera cuts briefly to an open magazine article on his bed - “The Problem of the Neuropsychiatric Soldier.”

Shortly after the war, Hollywood offered “The Best Years of Their Lives,” which also dealt openly and frankly with the emotional trauma of soldiers returning from the war, and John Huston produced a documentary, “Let Their Be Light,” about the recovery of neuropsychiatric casualties. The issue was out in the open and fundamentally informed by the work of Stouffer and Research Branch. Cowardice, the lack of “fighting spirit,” and malingering, the intuitional answers for such casualties, would no longer be accepted without question. Because fear cannot be replicated in training, the lessons learned regarding neuropsychiatric casualties tend to be

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forgotten between wars, and the intuitional answers reassert themselves until enough sufferers of what has come to be called PTSD stress the system to force a return to research and reason.\footnote{The Associate Director, Military Psychology and Leadership, Department of Tactics, West Point inquired about malingering studies in 1946. Stouffer replied that he could offer no help - “The Research Branch of the Information and Education Division with which I was associated during the war made no studies on malingering.” (Samuel A. Stouffer to Colonel T. Ernest Newland, November 12, 1946. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 6 Correspondence: M – Polls, Election HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA).}

In addition to low Infantry morale, neuropsychiatric casualties, and demobilization, race relations between black and white soldiers were also a major concern of Research Branch. Stouffer as it turned out once again happened to be the right man in the right place and time. He had considerable experience with issues of race, having participated in Gunnar Myrdal’s landmark study \textit{An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy}. In 1942, however, Stouffer’s concerns were less philosophical and more prosaic. His task then was one of social engineering within the army - a task which required close study of race relations and the problems inherent therein. By June 1942, with the organization up and running, Stouffer was looking ahead to the major issues Research Branch would have to tackle. Among these he listed “Attitudes of Negroes.” The need was great, for the information the War Department was receiving on black soldiers and their Army experience revealed several major problems.\footnote{Samuel A. Stouffer. “Memorandum for the Chief of Special Service. Subject: Some Reflections on the Progress of the Research Division,” June 3, 1942. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 2: Princeton University - Dr. K. Young, HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.} A study done on the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia in the summer of 1942 prompted Stouffer to send a memorandum to the military chief of Research Branch (then John B. Stanley) on the “Attitude of White Soldiers Toward Use of Facilities by Negroes:”

The expected differences in attitude of Northern and Southern soldiers shows up, although it may be surprising how many Northerners would deny Negroes any share in white facilities even if this meant the Negroes would have to go without facilities. The better educated within each region are somewhat more liberal than the less educated, as would be
expected. Differences are small in the South but quite sharp in the North, the less educated Northerners tending to be about half way between other Northerners and Southerners in their attitudes. 291

A few weeks after Stanley received Stouffer’s memo, he received a secret study by the Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Information on “Memphis Negroes and the War.” The study was part of a series entitled “Negroes in a Democracy at War.” The report illuminated the grievances of black soldiers. Chief among these was their realization that they were “not being treated democratically” and that they were not “given adequate opportunity to participate in the war effort.” The report also revealed a dynamic critical to Stouffer’s thinking about survey design: “‘Yes suh, the Army is all right to our people.’ When asked whether the Army treats Negroes fairly, seven out of ten Memphis Negroes gave this sort of answer to white interviewers. But only four in ten said that the Army is fair to Negroes when talking to interviewers of their own race.” Stouffer knew that the identity of the interviewer was critical, which is why he chose interviewers and survey administrators from among the units he studied. 292

The Army in World War II was segregated, and remained so until 1948, when President Truman desegregated the military under Executive Order 9981. “Separate but equal” proved to be a vexing problem for the War Department and Research Branch as indicated by a military censor’s report from New Orleans in 1943. The censor had examined 3,146 letters of the 494th Port Battalion (made up of mostly black, or “colored” troops) in the final week of May of that year. Most of the letters were addressed to families in the North or Midwest, where segregation existed more by tradition than by law, and was often not enforced. The censor reported that “the


general tone of the letters indicate that the men have not become adjusted to local conditions and they resent not being accorded the same privileges they received in the North and Middlewest.”

“Local conditions” as seen by these soldiers:

They treat us like dumb brutes and not men.

These white folks are afraid of Northern colored people and there is trouble all the time.

It is getting dangerous down here…the white people and the colored people can’t get along together. We are getting tired of being treated like we are. We are planning on starting a race riot.

I witnessed my first race riot down here and they was shooting at each other in the street just like in the cowboy pictures.

If they don’t move the 494th away from here there won’t be any Louisiana.  

The censor’s report, with nine pages of such excerpts from soldiers’ letters, was duly forwarded to the Special Services Division, of which Osborn’s Information and Education Division and Stouffer’s Research Branch was a part.

It seemed there was more to fear then than combat. In a report to the Chief of Army Service Forces, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, summarizing a survey on transportation facilities for black troops which Somervell had requested, Osborn noted “an undercurrent of feeling on the part of officers in the field that preferential treatment accorded the Negro soldier is undermining disciplinary control. In some instances, this lack of discipline

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causes white officers to fear their Negro troops.”

Still, Osborn was sanguine about the attitudes of black soldiers, despite the fear of their white counterparts. Shortly after he sent his note to Somervell, he wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, “Negroes appreciate the attempts on the part of the Army to accord them fair and equitable treatment,” he stressed, and they “have a capacity for developing pride in their outfit and in the Army.”

The issue of race, however, bore careful watching, and Osborn designated Research Branch consultant and University of Pennsylvania sociologist Donald Young as his advisor on race relations. Young summarized the policy implications of Research Branch surveys on the attitudes of black soldiers, beginning from the premise revealed in the research that “Negro soldiers have more doubt than white soldiers concerning the importance of their role in the Army in comparison with their role in civilian life, and since they have serious doubts concerning the status of Negro civilians both during and after the war, there is need for morale building information on the stake and role of the Negro in the war.” Young, initially careful not to make outright recommendations, suggested, or rather noted that Research Branch surveys had suggested more news on the achievements of black soldiers, assignment of black soldiers to “important military duties, including combat,” and more news on enemy racial policies.

Warming to his task, Young then became almost directive:

The War Department should take all possible measures to assure full respect by both military and civilian personnel for the man in uniform, whether he be white or colored. This involves (1) Effort to impress on white military personnel the necessity for avoiding behavior towards Negro soldiers, either on or off duty, which is patronising or plainly

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indicative of a belief that the Negro is not capable or worthy of being a soldier. (2) Acceptance of responsibility by commanding officers for the protection of their men from abuse and exploitation by civilians.

Young accepted segregation as a necessary evil, but stressed the need for it to be “kept at a minimum.” He also stressed that “since Negro soldiers prefer Negro lieutenants, efforts should be made to increase the supply of colored officers.” He ended his summary by reminding the War Department that, despite what was not depicted in Frank Capra’s “The Negro Soldier,” “the development of high morale among colored soldiers is closely related to the history of their treatment as a disadvantaged minority in the United States.” He also pinned success or failure squarely on the Army leadership. The success or failure of black soldiers was “in large measure dependent on the success which the Army may have in gaining a better understanding of the causes of dissatisfaction and on the utilization of such knowledge by the higher War Department authorities in their advice and direction of commanding officers in the field.”

The War Department accepted and implemented almost all of Research Branch’s proposals as outlined by Young, codifying them in early 1944 in a pamphlet entitled “Command of Negro Troops.” The introduction closely paraphrased Young’s comments: “The purpose of this booklet is to help officers command their troops more effectively by giving them information which will increase their understanding of their men….The Negro in the Army has special problems. This is the result of the fact that the Negro group has had a history materially different from that of the majority in the Army.”

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of “Command of Negro Troops,” the Americans had reduced the Japanese naval bases at Truk and Rabaul, landed at Anzio, and bombed Monte Cassino.

The final major problem faced by Stouffer and Research Branch during the war was demobilization, both in preparing soldiers to be demobilized, and in the method to carry out the movement and civilianization of eight million soldiers. “According to reports,” Osborn wrote in October 1943, “made by Raymond B. Fosdick in 1920, and all Army comment on the period of demobilization after the last war, insufficient training was given to troops in preparation for their return to civilian life, while at the same time discipline and morale deteriorated rapidly because the men were not usefully occupied or informed during the period from the cessation of hostilities to the time when they could be discharged from the service.”

As the war drew to a close, Research Branch focused increasingly on soldier attitudes toward demobilization, and as was their habit, they began with Army experience from the First World War. Marshall wanted a comprehensive plan that would encompass both educational and recreational activities, but Research Branch provided more than that - they also provided the mechanism for demobilization in the point system. After several surveys, Research Branch recommended that soldiers be redeployed to the United States and released from active duty based on a system of points accrued for time in service, overseas tours, awards, and combat duty. Stouffer wrote somewhat proudly in The American Soldier, “The idea of a point system for demobilization had been conceived in the Research Branch and accepted by the War Department and the President.”

The work that Stouffer and Research Branch were doing drove a great deal of the massive effort to educate and prepare soldiers for demobilization. Their preliminary conclusions

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300 TAS vol. I, 7.
prompted Osborn to request that his superiors “prepare informational facilities, i.e., daily news service, newspapers, radio, and film, so that at the proper time it can inform the soldier and the Command on the progress….This program must be full blown and ready to go into effect upon cessation of hostilities.” Fortunately, the Army had at its disposal vast resources for this kind of education, so Stouffer’s findings and recommendations could make it into the field quickly. The Armed Forces Radio Service broadcasted from 176 stations, supplemented by 54 foreign stations. Their feature films, documentaries, and newsreels reached millions of soldiers; the Army News Service sent 80,000 words a day to newspapers and radio stations, and the circulation of the Army newspaper Stars & Stripes reached 1,200,000 in the European Theater of Operations alone. 3,000 posts and Army units published their own papers, Yank magazine printed 2,400,000 copies a week, with 1,000 weekly contributions from soldiers and 1,500 weekly letters to the editor. The Army also produced “Newsmaps,” which portrayed graphically the progress of the war on one side, and on the other provided command and other messages to troops. As for formal education, the Army offered in cooperation with 85 universities over 200 vocational and technical courses through correspondence. Enrollment shortly after the end of the war exceeded 1,300,000. The Army also provided classroom versions of these and other courses, with an enrollment of over 700,000 in approximately 1,000 schools.


302 “Recommendations and Report to the Secretaries of War and Navy from The Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation,” May 1, 1946. Raymond B. Fosdick Papers, 1917-1957, MC#055, Correspondence-Serials 23418, Box 18, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. For additional information on the Army’s massive survey, educational, and demobilization efforts, see Christopher P. Loss. “‘The Most Wonderful Thing Has Happened to Me in the Army’: Psychology, Citizenship, and American Higher Education in World War II.” The Journal of American History, vol. 92, no. 3 (December 2005): 865-891. See also the papers of Francis Trow Spaulding. In 1942, Spaulding, Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, was appointed a colonel in the Army and assigned to manage Army education. Like Stouffer, he worked directly for Frederick H. Osborn in the Information and Education Division. (Francis Trow Spaulding: Material Related to Military Service, 1942-46, HUG 4800.20. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA).
Research Branch undertook several studies on demobilization. Their concerns as they wrote them down, were “vocational and educational anticipation of men after discharge,” and determining “weights of the factors (length of time in the Army, length of time overseas, decorations, and number of dependents) to be used in deciding which men will be released from the Army first.” They also investigated soldier preferences on educational courses, soldier knowledge of and opinions about the G.I. Bill, attitudes toward the proposed post-war changes to soldier life insurance, adjustment of returnees, and “post-armistice psychological problems,” to include “aggression towards various groups, dissatisfaction with stated and avowed war aims, the causes of the war, etc.”  

All of these studies were carried out with Stouffer’s characteristic rigor. One of the European Theater of Operations surveys required the commander to administer the survey to 2,400 soldiers, 1,600 of which were to be combat troops, and 800 service troops. 5% were to have one year or less of service, 50% 13-24 months, 25% 25-36 months, and 20% 37 months or over. Cross tabulations were to be made by age, marital status, number of children, length of service, length of time overseas, and number of campaigns. The request for this information went out on July 24, 1944, six weeks after D-Day, and a reply was required by August 15. 

In the intervening three weeks, the US Army launched “Operation Cobra” to break out of defensive positions in Cherbourg, Patton’s Third Army was activated for the dash across France into Germany, and the US Fifth Army crossed the Arno. That the War Department was

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willing to undertake such massive and distracting surveys during the major closing offensives of the war indicates the importance they attached to Stouffer’s work. Clearly, for most senior civilian and military leaders, intuition had given way to policies grounded in research.\footnote{305 Social research under combat conditions presented particular challenges not only for the Army, but also for the researchers - yet it also provided researchers with a perspective unavailable away from the front lines. Robin M. Williams, Jr. who conducted such research, remembered: “Participation in the daily life of an infantry division in a combat zone revealed and emphasized the constrained and particularized character of the soldier’s experience. Most striking, perhaps, was the prevalence of extreme restriction, ignorance and uncertainty. What one could do was narrowly constrained not only by military discipline, scanty resources and stringent informal social controls, but also by danger from the enemy and by physical obstacles and hazards. In periods of rapid movement and in those of intensive fighting, the “fog of battle” became unforgettably evident - i.e., the lack of information not only of the wider context but even of what was happening in one’s immediate situation. From the perspective of the rifleman, for example, ‘chaos’ was often a typical situation; it is normal for things to go wrong - often with fatal consequences. To understand the simultaneous impact of great danger and cognitive disorientation was to gain a new insight into the significance of military organization and group interactions.” Robin M. William, Jr. “Field Observations and Surveys in Combat Zones.” \textit{Social Psychology Quarterly.} vol. 47, no. 2 (1984): 188.}

The rigor did not end with survey design, however. Stouffer’s work really began when he received the survey results. He had to run the survey data cards through International Business Machines (IBM) tabulators, control variables, ensure validity, reliability, and consistency, and finally write up a report of findings and recommendations. Methodology then, was paramount to his work, and he and his colleagues in Research Branch were developing the methodology in the context of a world war, which required state of the art analysis of vast amounts of data.

Fortunately, Stouffer had Cornell Professor Louis Guttman on his team, who developed the scalogram to help manage information. As Guttman described his scalogram in its development phase to Stouffer in 1942, “it would once and for all do away with weighting problems,” and “form a rapid, efficient, theoretically sound, and quite easily understandable method of scale construction.”\footnote{306 Louis Guttman to Samuel A Stouffer, Subject: Work of Dr. Guttman for the past six weeks,’ September 1, 1942. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 969. (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File 1941- June 1955, Consultation Service to History of Research Division. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. See also Jean M. Converse, \textit{Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence, 1890-1960}. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 189-195. The details of the scalogram, and all of Research Branch’s methodological discoveries and developments may be found in Samuel A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, Edward A. Suchman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Shirley A. Star, and}
rendered not only a verification of questions through repetitive similar questions, but also correlated each item under study with the others. Coupled with Rensis Likert’s scale for determining the intensity of attitudes, Lazarsfeld’s theory of latent structures, and other checks on reliability and validity, the survey results Stouffer and Research Branch handed to the War Department were as near as scientifically sound as possible at the time.\textsuperscript{307}

The responses of soldiers to demobilization surveys indicated that they believed “older, married combat veterans with long overseas service should be the first men out.” On the face of it, this declaration seemed relatively simple. But they also wanted combat, overseas service, length of service, physical condition, number of dependents, age, and civilian occupation to be considered. When one applied Research Branch’s analysis to the problem, it became clear just how complicated this, and most other issues studied by Research Branch during the war truly were, and why tools such as Guttman’s scalogram and the general rigor with which Stouffer approached his duties were so vital - as was a recognition of limitations:

The problem becomes that of evaluating the relative importance of the various factors when certain of them apply to an individual while others do not - for example, should the married men with one child and two years service in the States be released before or after John A. Clausen. \textit{Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, vol. IV, Measurement and Prediction}. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

\textsuperscript{307} In 1955, Stouffer commented briefly on the progress made in quantitative analysis methodology in a speech at Fisk University: “I cannot take time here to elaborate on the progress made in a single decade on the subject of scaling. Historically, it is of interest to note that the cumulative scaling technique associated with the name of Guttman is a refinement of the idea introduced by Bogardus in his famous scale of social distance. Guttman’s theory of principal components and Lazarsfeld’s theory of latent structures are exciting intellectual events that are important, not just methodologically as measuring devices, but substantively in formulating conceptual schemes as to the nature of attitudes. On the practical operations side, we are learning how to construct scales with remarkable internal consistency.” Samuel A. Stouffer. \textit{Social Research to Test Ideas}. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 235. Sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld pointed out that in addition to the statistical analysis tools Stouffer used such as the scalogram, he was also imaginative and rigorous in his approach to survey questions: “He wanted to know whether the food provided for army units had an affect on soldiers’ morale. If he had asked the soldiers to rate the food he would not have known whether their morale did not affect their rating of the food. So he asked the noncommissioned officers to judge the food and correlated their average rating with the average morale score of the soldiers; the elements of the correlation were of course the army units studied.” Raymond Boudon, ed. \textit{Paul F. Lazarsfeld: On Social Research and its Language}. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 185.
the single man who has served overseas for two years and has seen combat…? The problem of establishing weights is made extremely complex by the fact that in the men’s thinking these factors are not discrete, operating with equal importance in all cases…. It seems unlikely, therefore, that any exact weighting scheme can be worked out on the basis of percentages of men who favor release of individuals characterized by any complex of the factors under consideration. What probably can be done is to establish a ranking of importance of certain specific complexes or combinations of factors, from which deductions may be made as to the weight men consider fair.  

The Research Branch SOP, detailed though it might have been, only went so far in providing guidance for determining soldier attitudes. But it went much, much further than anything which had been applied prior to Stouffer’s arrival in Washington. That the Army was even willing to consider soldier attitudes in making decisions was a major change in the 

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308 “Enlisted Men’s Opinions on Who Should Be Demobilized First.” Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 1: *American Journal of Sociology* - Post War Plans of Soldiers, HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. Stouffer later described the challenge of demobilization to colleagues at the Symposium on Research Frontiers in Human Relations: “The problem which the Army expected to face was unprecedented. After the defeat of Germany, it was necessary to assume that at least another year would elapse before the defeat of Japan, and that not all the soldiers in uniform as of V-E Day would be needed in the Pacific. Hence with a war still going on, several million soldiers would be discharged. Who should these soldiers be? One school of thought favored blanket discharges on a unit basis. The obvious advantages would be that this would keep the remaining units intact as going organizations. Another school of thought pointed out that most units overseas comprised a mixture of worn-out veterans as well as fresh replacements. To discharge men on a unit basis would involve sending home thousands of men with relatively short service. This, it was felt, would be utterly destructive to the morale of those remaining, especially if, as had been further suggested, men who had not even completed their training in the United States were to be among the first discharged in order to obviate the need for further training. If, however, the second school of thought was to prevail, how would the priority of discharge be determined? Members of the Research Branch proposed that the best results would be obtained if the priority of discharge was one which seemed most just to the majority of men, provided it did not wreck military plans. The planners bought this idea, and as early as the winter of 1943-1944, the Research Branch was polling soldiers to get their ideas about who should get out of the Army first after the defeat of Germany. This was not easy, because opinions were not sharply structured at this time. Continuing studies were made and the priorities adopted by the Army involved the four factors which studies of the men had shown to be most important in their minds - length of time in the Army, length of time overseas, extent of combat service, and number of children. The program was carefully explained to the soldiers and to the public and was accepted as just by the majority of both, as polls showed. The plan was designed to minimize, not eliminate, complaints. And it had defects. Ideally, one should have been able to use a more accurate measure of combat experience than merely the number of campaign stars and decorations, and some of the combat infantrymen overseas were quite burned up about this. But, in general, all polls taken showed that the majority of soldiers at home and overseas thought the system a fair one and this was true even amid the explosive situation caused by the alleged slowness of demobilization. It will be remembered that there were some near mutinies which were reported in the press. These were concerned with the rate of discharge, not the order of discharge. If, in this highly charged atmosphere, the men had also been convinced of favoritism or injustice in the priority system, it is not pleasant to imagine the consequences, especially if relatives at home had shared the conviction.” Samuel A. Stouffer. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society.* vol. 92, no. 5 (November 1948): 339.
philosophy of managing men at war. Answers to such questions, had they even been asked prior to the groundbreaking work of Research Branch, would have been “whatever the mission of the moment requires,” “whatever is convenient for commanders,” or “whatever can be enforced through authoritarian means.” By the close of the Second World War, major policy decisions were no longer governed solely by the intuition of commanders. The US Army was willing to expend considerable resources in determining what soldiers thought, and applied that research to its decisions.

“The late Samuel Stouffer,” remembered sociologist Thomas Pettigrew, “one of America’s greatest sociologists,

always became incensed when a layman blithely reacted to a finding of behavioral science with, ‘Who didn’t know that?” He countered with a simple true-false test of ten items, the ‘obvious, common sense’ answers to which had all been demonstrated to be incorrect by rigorous social research. Most of those who take Stouffer’s test miss every item. The moral is clear: many behavioral science findings appear obvious only after the fact.309

Intuition, then, in Stouffer’s mind, was not a good basis for making decisions or forming policy. Additionally, Stouffer showed great dedication and effort in all his work. In preparing a report for the President, “he slept on the desk Saturday night,” remembered Research Branch alumnus Jack Elinson. “Sunday he entered the numbers and revised the prior report. Monday it was typed and delivered to the President.”310 As the guiding force of Research Branch, Stouffer personified

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310 Herbert H. Hyman. Taking Society’s Measure: A Personal History of Survey Research. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1991. 82. Stouffer’s diligence and commitment were legendary. One if his War Department colleagues, Francis Keppel, remembered, “There was no question in anyone’s mind that Sam was the leader….What Sam brought to it [Research Branch], in addition to his scholarly qualifications, were three qualities: transparent honesty and patriotism, bubbling enthusiasm, and a good eye for talent. The group he helped to assemble, as I remember it, would have made a first-rate faculty anywhere, anytime.” Sociologist Jackson Toby “can still see Sam in [his] mind’s eye, moving rapidly from place to place, partly, I suppose, because of his reservoirs of energy, but also because of a zest for the task at hand.” Jackson Toby. “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social
James Gavin’s characterization of the work of Research Branch as a “monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.”

Chapter 7

Postbellum: Legacy and Relevance of Research Branch and The American Soldier

“In the event of remobilization of research functions,” reads a hastily typed memo of 1955 in the files of the National Archives, “valuable counsel, based on past experience with attitude assessment among military personnel, should be sought from the following.” The list of names recorded was short and distinguished, but could have been longer. It included Stouffer, who had gone to Harvard to found and direct the Laboratory of Social Relations, Leland C. DeVinney, Acting Director of the Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, Charles Dollard, President of the Carnegie Corporation, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Secretary and Director of Research at the Russell Sage Foundation, Carl I. Hovland, Sterling Professor of Psychology at Yale and founding director of the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program, and William W. McPeak, Vice President of the Ford Foundation. Though short, the list was representative of the post-war positions and influence of the sociologists and psychologists who had worked with Stouffer in Research Branch. Eight Research Branch alumni served as president of the American Sociological Association. Veterans of Research Branch maintained contact with one another, often served as advisors and consultants for the Department of Defense, and from their universities, government positions, foundations, or businesses, exerted a considerable influence on the military and sociology.

311 Untitled Memorandum, November 17, 1955. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 970, (Secretary of Defense) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve) Research Division Historical File, 1941- June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.


The American Soldier was similarly influential within professional circles. Military sociologist Charles C. Moskos, Jr. named The American Soldier “perhaps the most valuable source of information on the World War II serviceman,” and historian John Madge devoted an entire chapter of his Origins of Scientific Sociology to Research Branch and The American Soldier, noting that “the United States Army was extremely fortunate in securing the scientific services of many fine social scientists in Research Branch under the highly professional leadership of Samuel A. Stouffer.” Sociologist Libby Schweber, writing for the Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines in 2002 labeled The American Soldier “a turning point in the history of American sociology. The book heralded the ascendance of statistics as the authoritative method and an associated rise of instrumental positivism as the dominant style of reasoning.”

In his introduction to The American Soldier, Stouffer identified three audiences: military officers, historians, and social psychologists and sociologists. It was Stouffer’s hope that “if our nation again should be forced to defend itself in a global conflict, some of the findings may help prevent in another war mistakes which were made in this one. If we are to be vouchsafed a generation of peace, scholars can add these experiences to other experiences and use them as a help in building a social science.” These audiences have indeed found the work of Research Branch, as summarized in The American Soldier, interesting, useful, and even compelling. But

Carnegie Corporation. He knew leading figures in the Social Science Research Council and recruited a number of them to serve in other parts of the Information and Education Division. The result was that those fortunate enough to be working in the Research Branch had both an extraordinarily talented group of mentors and consultants and an extraordinary set of ties that would open doors and facilitate access to a wide variety of opportunities. As Nathan Maccoby put it: “The Research Branch not only established one of the best old-boy (or girl) networks ever, but an alumnus of the Branch had an open door to most relevant jobs and career lines. We were a lucky bunch.”


there were also three unintended audiences who showed as much interest in Stouffer’s survey research as the intended audiences - businessmen, government, and pollsters. An analysis of all six audiences yields a compelling picture of the influence of Stouffer and *The American Soldier*; providing not only a view of the ascendance of survey research over intuition, but also a confirmation of what the US government had done during the war and continued to do after it to equip not only their soldiers, but their society as well. “Just as World War I gave new impetus to the study of aptitudes,” Stouffer observed, “World War II has given new impetus to the study of attitudes.” Even after the war, the work of Research Branch had an irresistible inertia - a momentum that demanded scientific analysis of social questions in the face of the reflexive force of intuition.

Despite the dismissive tone of the 1955 note, the military has continued to regard survey research as a valuable tool. The offices change, the names are reworked, and organizational structures come and go, but surveys remain a key component in military personal management, as Stouffer predicted they would in the first pages of *The American Soldier*:

> Since the war, the Research and Development Board which reports Directly to the Secretary of Defense has established a committee on Human Resources. This is a recognition, both by scientists and the military, of the fact not only that social and psychological problems are crucial in modern war…but also that they are now amenable to scientific study. In the peacetime Army, Navy, and Air Force there may be a good many officers, especially among those teaching in Service schools or among those developing new training and personnel plans, who can find in the Army’s experience, as recorded here and there in these volumes, an idea which they can translate into a program of experimentation for the future.  

In the years immediately following World War II, the Defense Department kept in close contact with Stouffer, who in 1946 had left both the War Department and the University of

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316 *TAS* vol. I, 3-5, 53.
317 *TAS* vol. I, 3-4.
Chicago to take up a sociology professorship at Harvard and to direct the new Laboratory of Social Relations there. Stouffer’s papers at Harvard are full of Defense requests, both formal and informal, for advice, service, comments, consultations, classes, and speeches, as new officers filled personnel and military school management positions and learned the lessons Stouffer had taught their predecessors:

Dear Dr. Stouffer,

February 12, 1949

I hope I can count on your availability to help us out from time to time on the many problems which we encounter in the fields in which you have done such distinguished work.

James Forrestal
Secretary of Defense

A few months after Stouffer received this note from Forrestal, the Information and Education Division - which had been renamed “Army - Air Force Troop Information and Education Division” - was transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and renamed once again, becoming the “Armed Forces Information and Education Division.” The original Information and Education Division, of which Stouffer’s Research Branch was a part, had been purely an Army affair during the war, but its success had been such that the survey program was

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318 James Forrestal to Samuel A. Stouffer, February 12, 1949. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 1, Correspondence: D - Federal Security Agency. HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. Forrestal had invited Stouffer to chair “a Committee which I am establishing on Human Behavior under the Conditions of Military Service.” The Secretary wrote to Stouffer that “one of the most important problems facing the National Military Establishment today is the need for increased knowledge of human behavior under all military conditions, including those of combat, and the practical application of this knowledge to military policies and operating procedures. I have decided, therefore, to constitute a group, composed of outstanding psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists, as well as interested laymen and selected officers of the three Services to study this subject and to make recommendations as to concrete steps which the Military Establishment might undertake in order more effectively to utilize the services of its men and women….In my opinion your qualifications for the Chairmanship of this Committee are unsurpassed. I refer to your preeminence in the field of social science; your forthcoming publication in the field of this Committee’s interest [The American Soldier]; and during the last war, your leadership in the development of the Army’s excellent troop attitude research program.” Stouffer had to turn the position down due to an overcrowded calendar, but the creation of such a committee speaks volumes about the change in attitude toward survey research in the military, and the influence Stouffer held with them. (James Forrestal to Samuel A. Stouffer, February 2, 1949. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 1, Correspondence: D - Federal Security Agency. HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA).
extended to include all the services. The chief of the Division, Paul Guernsey, wrote to Stouffer in 1946: “You would be absolutely amazed to see the current pile up of study requests in our shop for Army alone….There are some very interesting projects, including several experimental studies.” Guernsey also noted that he was extremely short-handed: “With our present staff, however, to attempt to do all or any great number of these studies would represent a 3-5 year project. At least we are not lacking for work.”319 As had the rest of the Army, Research Branch had been considerably downsized at the end of the war. Still, it maintained an ambitious research agenda. Guernsey wrote to Stouffer again in 1951, in the midst of the Korean Conflict, indicating the scope of the new Armed Forces Information and Education Division activities:

16 January 1951

Dr. Samuel A. Stouffer
Laboratory of Social Relations
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Sam:

I thoroughly enjoyed having the chance to talk with you about things in general and the Branch in particular, while I was in Boston in December.

I also want to tell you how much Marie and I enjoyed the beautiful Christmas card we received from the Stouffers.

All the projects about which I talked with you in December are in the mill, and new ones have been added. We are up to our necks and short-staffed. Reuben Cohen has resigned to work with his brother's advertising firm in Washington. We haven't filled his vacancy, or found a Mathematical Statistician to fill that newly created position.

We sent out six field officers over last week-end on the second phase of the big study among personnel in the current mobilization. This time we are concerned with enlisted men in their 6th week of basic training at 20 installations over the country. The next time you are in town for a meeting of the Committee on Human Resources, we'd be glad to have you visit the shop for a look at the findings on this study.

Since I saw you, General Devine has asked the Branch to undertake the job of rapid evaluation of certain films which the Division may consider purchasing for use among service personnel as part of the I&I program. We have conducted a questionnaire study among local Navy, Air Force and Army enlisted personnel on one film, "Letter to a Rebel", and are now taking on a similar job for Air Force I&I shop.

Ira Cisin is at Ft. Dix today discussing with General Harrison the design of an experimental study to evaluate a pamphlet (comic book format) on "MilitaryCourtesy", which we hope to conduct at Dix. Army Field Force, Army G-1 and G-3 are requesting this job.

The Army's Provost Marshall is concerned about the growing number of OA in guardhouses. Colonel Holland of that office, Col. Caldwell of SSD's Psychiatry & Neurology Consultants Division, and I are meeting this afternoon to discuss the problem and try to determine what an attitude assessment study among prisoners could contribute to its solution.
Air Force has asked us for a study similar to the big one we are now doing for Army. And so it goes.

Inclosed is a letter, with inclosures, mailed to you at the U of C from New York on 5 January, and forwarded by U of C to this address. Celia opened it.

Come and see us. We are still in T-7, Room 2619, same old telephone extension: 72146.

Very sincerely,

[Signature]

FAUL D. GUERNSEY
Lt Col, GSC
Chief, Attitude Research Branch
Among the scores of consultation requests Stouffer received, he was asked by Johns Hopkins, then undertaking research for the Army, to consult on their project, and he was also asked and agreed to direct a study for the RAND Corporation, contracted to the Department of Defense, on attitude measurement. 320 The Army Surgeon General’s Office contacted him when they were considering continued use of the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct, the Deputy Director of the Women’s Army Corps asked him to consult on the “adjustment of service women to group living,” and the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department asked him to travel to Germany as part of a team to evaluate post-war German publications. 321 Stouffer was also repeatedly asked for recommendations on personnel who could work in research for the Department of Defense. An example of one of these requests came from John B. Stanley, former military chief of Research Branch and in 1951 the chief of the Intelligence and Evaluation Division of the Army’s Psychological Warfare Office. Stanley was “visiting several of the Eastern universities in an effort to beat the bushes for personnel who might be useful in the psychological warfare intelligence field,” and wanted to know if Stouffer could direct him to “someone at Harvard with whom I might discuss this problem or to individuals who might be interested in this field.” 322 Requests of all kinds continued unabated until Stouffer’s death in 1960, and among his many projects for the military were consultations in 1954 on the Vietnam area study, and extensive work on Project Revere, an analysis of the effectiveness of propaganda


322 John B. Stanley to Samuel A. Stouffer, April 4, 1951. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 7, Correspondence: Positions Open - S, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.

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During these years it appeared that neither the Department of Defense itself, nor institutions conducting personnel research for the Department of Defense, were willing to reach conclusions on sociological issues without Stouffer’s advice.

Some of the requests for Stouffer’s advice and insights were less formal, coming from officers working in the field. One such inquiry, referred to Stouffer, came from an Army clinical psychologist interested in “working on the problem of educating the families…of neuropsychiatric casualties:”

I have been working with neuropsychiatric casualties in Army hospitals for two years, and I have been frequently confronted with the problems created by unfortunate attitudes in the family or community of the casualty. So far as I know, the only attempts to deal with these problems have been magazine articles and the like, which have had a limited audience and have probably not done too much good. My belief that ordinary people can be taught to have the right kind of attitude toward psychiatric illness derives from my work in group therapy, where the casualties themselves were able to overcome their secondary anxiety through understanding as well as through authoritative assurance.

There were many more such requests, including one from a Navy officer heading the Personnel Psychology Branch of the Naval Medical Research Laboratory who wanted to attend one of Stouffer’s seminars at Harvard. The officer was working with Fordham University on the “submariner stereotype.”

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325 D.L. Briggs to Samuel A. Stouffer, September 24, 1951. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1950-1953, Box 12, Correspondence: B - Cancer Committee, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.
Stouffer never went out of style with the military in his lifetime, partly because one of the abiding realities of military life is the constant rotation of personnel who must learn the ropes of their new jobs quickly, and just as quickly are moved to other jobs. Stouffer often received requests such as this one, from a harried Air Force officer who in 1953, apparently unaware of *The American Soldier* (or the spelling of Stouffer’s name) found himself responsible for a morale survey:
Stouffer also received a request for assistance from a better informed officer who wanted to carry Stouffer’s research further:
Dr. Samuel Stouffer,
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Stouffer:

In the process of trying to develop an experimental design on the study of morale of a medical population (physicians, dentists, nurses and allied medical personnel) who are presently attached to this base, I find in surveying the literature that there is little or no research that I can locate in this area.

Knowing of your work during World War II in conjunction with the studies published on "The American Soldier", I would like to obtain your assistance in this area. Specifically, could you advise as to any previous morale studies undertaken with a medical population on duty in the military and, if so, could you be kind enough to inform me as to the sources of publication of such research.

In the light of the ever increasing lack of supply of medical personnel available to the military, and the increasing need to draft such personnel, I feel that there is a real need to study morale of this population, determine the resistances toward staying on with the military and developing techniques that might lend to at least a small per-cent remaining with the military. Should you have the opportunity in the near future for a personal interview during which time the research could be gone into with greater detail, I would be most appreciative to meet with you at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Herman R. Weiss
Capt., USAF(MC)
Clinical Psychologist

Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1950-1953, Box 20, Correspondence: T - XYZ, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.

Among the formal presentations Stouffer delivered to the military in the post war years
was one at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in late 1957, untitled, but described by him as a talk about “the social sciences and some of the implications that they may have in the world today, particularly with respect to the military.” He told his audience he had visited a business in the Midwest (unnamed) which was conducting over forty social science surveys, and spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to do so. He then told them that the Air Force had just cut from their budget about thirty sociologists and psychologists, who immediately found employment in the business world, and that some had received four or five offers. He decried the loss, and then tried to explain to his audience why social science research was of great value to the military:

I think this is a very serious loss. Some of these people were working on what might be called basic research, and I know there were probably people in the Defense Department who did not think too much of basic research. I saw an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune a few days ago quoting the late Secretary of Defense as saying that basic research is when you don’t know what you are doing. And there is a feeling that this is a kind of luxury. This is not a new feeling for America. DeTocqueville, 100 years ago, commented that Americans didn’t seem to be too much interested in basic ideas, but they were tremendously interested in inventing gadgets, in making applications. I think this has been true, as people in the physical sciences would tell you. But there has been, in the last generation, at least, a serious effort in America to develop some real research of a first-class character, some real thinking in the basic social sciences, with the thought that this does pay off. For example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, in the Bell Laboratories, have established a Social Science Unit which explicitly is told that, ‘We are not interested in your doing anything of immediate value to the Bell Laboratories, but we are concerned here that you get down and work at the kind of fundamental problems whose application some way might be of importance to telephone people, but we don’t really care.’ The people who were working on the transistor in the Bell Labs were not working on a practical job at the time. They were fooling around with some basic ideas, and out came the transistor. There is some reason to believe that in the field of the social sciences and in psychology basic research will pay off.
As he did throughout his career, Stouffer demonstrated the unreliability of “common sense,” for his audience through a discussion of relative deprivation. He then discussed a study funded by the Office of Naval Research on small group leadership, and another devoted to determining what kind of person is willing to accept new ideas - both significant issues for the military. He discussed propaganda, training, Skinner, Pavlov, and Marx. And he told his audience that he hoped the Russians “have some of their psychologists and their sociologists working on problems like tail fins, and not all of them working on the problems of how to improve the efficiency and striking power of their Armed Forces. “As a patriotic American,” he concluded, “I hope that we will not lose this one, that we will not let anybody get ahead of us on the utilization of the truth that the social sciences can contribute.” He was, as ever, appealing to reason over intuition, and hoping that his audience would continue, as they had done in the Second World War, to bring social science to bear to equip American soldiers to fight.

The perceived value of particular departments within any institution can be measured by those which survive downsizing. Although its value was well-recognized, Research Branch was not immune to the massive demobilization which took place at the close of World War II, followed later by additional downsizing as President Eisenhower, relying on the growing American nuclear arsenal, introduced the “New Look” military. Rejecting wholesale dissolution of the functions of Research Branch, the Army, and later the Defense Department sought, as all institutions facing budget cuts do, to farm out attitudinal surveys and analysis of results to diverse agencies in an effort to save money, and some of this dispersal did occur in the years

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326 Stouffer defined relative derivation for his audience: “What does that mean? Well, it means something like this - that a person’s attitudes are not absolute, but they are relative to some kind of level of expectation that a person has. If he has a high level of expectation and does not attain it, he may feel a lot worse, even though he stands at a higher level, than a person who has a low level of expectation and attains it.” See also TAS vol. I, 125.

immediately following the Second World War. However, Research Branch made its case for excusal from the chopping block clearly. In a mince-no-words reply to justify its existence, the branch reminded Chief of Staff Eisenhower that “It has long been recognized that command decisions made without consideration of morale factors may lead to disaster.” The reply also highlighted the special nature of survey research: “It must be remembered that attitude research...represents, in fact, a field of specialized social science research,” requiring skilled professionals educated in that field. (In other words, people like Stouffer, who could tell the Army to cut AWOL rates by changing uniforms, did not grow on trees). The argument worked initially, but as the Army downsized and America’s nuclear arsenal grew, the perceived need for a large staff of sociologists and psychologists in the Department of Defense dimmed. Although the defense establishment maintained some of these in their headquarters, many were only brought in for temporary consultations, and the Research Branch morphed by 1948 into the smaller Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Still, attitude research has never entirely left the Army, and after some dropping-off in the late fifties and early sixties, strengthened successively with each new conflict.

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328 Stouffer himself referred an inquiry about personnel research in 1952 not only to the Troop Attitudes Research Branch, but also to the Army Human Relations Research Office in the Department of the Army, the Human Relations Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, and the Committee on Human Resources of the Research and Development Board in Washington, DC. (Samuel A. Stouffer to Robert C. Myers, January 31, 1952. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1950-1953, Box 16, Correspondence: K-N. HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.

329 Memorandum in Reference to Memorandum for the Chief, I&E Division, WDSS, WDCSA 200.3 (20 Nov 46) dated 20 December 46, Subject: Report of WDMB Survey of I&E Division, WDSS. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 970. (Secretary of Defense) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve) Research Division Historical File 1941 - June 1955. Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.

Although the Army currently maintains its own research organizations and personnel, it also has farmed out a considerable amount of its research tasks to contractors. Chief among these is the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation in Santa Monica, California. RAND has been conducting research and publishing studies for the Department of Defense and others for more than sixty years, and Stouffer participated in some of its early studies. Two of RAND’s latest studies, *Psychological and Psychosocial Consequences of Combat and Deployment with Special Emphasis on the Gulf War*, and *Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery* list Stouffer and *The American Soldier* in their bibliographies. RAND researcher Bruce Newsome also used *The American Soldier* for an article entitled “The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation.” Perhaps more significant for Stouffer’s legacy and relevance, however, was his presence at the inception of RAND. If, as author Alex Abella claims in *Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of American Empire*, “RAND has literally reshaped the modern world,” Stouffer’s reach is long indeed.

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Sixty years after Princeton published the work of Stouffer and Research Branch in *The American Soldier*, US Army personnel research is conducted by The US Army Research Institute (ARI), which maintains a Personnel Survey Office. Additionally, ARI conducts research in the areas of training, leader development, and selection and classification of soldiers, and also maintains Basic Research and Occupational Analysis sections. ARI traces its beginning to the activities of psychologists during World War I, who developed the first systematic screening and classification systems for soldiers. World War II, however, provided what ARI refers to as their “direct ancestor” - the U.S. Army Personnel Research Office in the Office of the Adjutant General, which worked closely with Stouffer’s Research Branch in the Information and Education Division. ARI’s mission:

The mission of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences is to enhance individual and group performance along with group decision making and individual decision making. Advances in the behavioral and social sciences are being made to meet Army operational requirements. ARI is the primary research institute for conducting research and analysis on personnel performance and training. The research contributes to recruiting, selection, assignment, training, mission performance, and situational awareness. Technical assistance is provided for the organization, the people, and the technologies for the future affecting all parts of the Army. Quality people, leader development, and training are the Army’s Imperatives that ARI’s programs support.

ARI is the Army’s primary laboratory conducting research and analysis on personnel, training, and leader development. Our focus is on the human element in the Army. Our research and analysis contributes to the entire life cycle of recruiting, selection, assignment, training, and mission performance. ARI:

provides new technology to meet the personnel and training challenges of the Army;
conducts studies and analyses to address short-term issues and respond to emerging "hot topics"; and
provides technical assistance on critical issues affecting all parts of the Army - the organization, the people, and the technologies for the future.

ARI's programs support three of the Army's Imperatives: Quality People, Leader Development, and Training.

Twice a year at a minimum, every year since 1958, the Army has conducted the Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP). ARI provides installations with a random sampling of names of soldiers to be surveyed, and asks standard questions generally related to quality of life, as well as additional questions on specific issues on a rotating basis. If special issues present themselves, questions pertaining to those issues are often added, sometimes at the direction of the Army leadership, sometimes at the request of special constituencies within the Army - such as branches or specific commands or installations. Responses are not mandatory, and the Army has seen a decline in responses over the years, most recently due to the suspicion soldiers have of web-based surveys as “phishing” traps to gather personal and financial information, or their annoyance with spam. Still, even though most surveys are web-based, the Army receives enough responses (thousands) to create and process statically significant data files which they analyze to assist commanders in forming policy. The Army gathers anecdotal as well as statistical data through interviews in addition to the SSMP, and the issues at hand drive both the focus of surveys and the formation of questions.332

332 Telephonic interview with Dr. Lynn M. Milan, Army Personnel Survey Office, US Army Research Institute, Taylor Building (NC3) 2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202-2926, June 16, 2009. Dr. Morris Peterson, Chief, Army Personnel Survey Office, US Army Research Institute to the author, June 22, 2009. See also ARI Newsletter vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 2002), and the US Army Research Institute website: http://www.hqda.army.mil/ari/about/index.shtml, (June 18, 2009). The SSMP has its origins in the Personnel Survey of the Army, which Chief of Staff George C. Marshall ordered in 1943. The SSMP in the early 21st century tracks trends relating to “morale, readiness, career intent, plans to stay in or leave the Army, reasons for leaving the Army before retirement, aspects of job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay and benefits, satisfaction with aspects of the quality of Army life, career prospects for remaining in or leaving the Army, time away from duty station, spouse
After the military, Stouffer named his next audience for *The America Soldier* - historians:

Another audience is the historians. If by some miracle a cache should be found of manuscript materials telling of the attitudes towards combat of a representative sample of, say, a hundred men in Stonewall Jackson’s army, the discovery would interest Civil War historians. We have in these volumes [*The American Soldier*] data drawn from the expressions about their Army experiences, at home and abroad, of more than half a million American young men who were queried at one time or another during World War II. What these men had to say is a page of the history of the war and of the history of America. The data should be of special interest to the newer generation of historians, who are as much interested in institutions and the rank and file comprising them as they are interested in big personalities and big dramatic events, and some of whom are now getting training in the interpretation of statistics along with other techniques of contemporary social science investigation. From some points of view, the attitudes of soldiers, especially toward many of the traditional practices of Army life, do not make a pretty historical picture. But these young men were Americans. Their unwillingness to accept with complacency some of the ways in which the Army did things may not have been out of keeping with historic American traditions of resistance to authoritarian controls, especially when authority was coupled, as in the leadership system of the Army, with special social privileges for the wielders of power.333

employment status, family adaptation to Army life, volunteering for combat and volunteering for Operations Other than War.” ARI is keenly aware of their history: “Legacy from World War II: During World War II America’s best and brightest stepped forward to contribute to the Allies’ war effort. Some served in combat on the front lines in the European and Pacific Theaters. Others made their contributions elsewhere in ways that capitalized on their unique skills and abilities. At the U.S. War Department, a very select few used their social science skills, supported by that relatively new data collection tool - the attitude and opinion survey. Survey research pioneer Elmo Roper advised the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in April 1941 to make use of surveys to collect information from soldiers to guide military administration and policies. The list of the names of those in supporting roles in the Research Branch of the Morale Division reads like a Who’s Who in behavioral science, starting with Samuel A. Stouffer, lead author of *The American Soldier*. The findings of the four-volume work [sic] were based on the surveys done by the Research Branch to ‘provide a base of factual knowledge which would help the director of the Army Information and Education Division [Osborn] (formerly the Morale Division) in his administrative policy decisions. Some of the survey questions asked during WWII addressed basic personnel matters, such as soldiers’ expectations for promotion, job satisfaction and job assignments. Other questions directly addressed levels of morale after survey findings had indicated that units with the lowest levels of morale before entering combat had higher non-battle casualty rates during battle than did units with higher levels of morale. Another survey found that soldiers with three or more years of overseas duty were less likely than those with less than three years of service and no overseas duty to be willing to serve longer. Those soldiers with no prior overseas duty were willing to serve longer, regardless of number of years already served. One of the key outcomes of the survey work was obtaining soldiers’ preferences in the development of the ‘point system,’ the basis for discharge after the war.” ARI makes as much use of counterintuitives as Stouffer and others, such as Paul Lazarsfeld did. They began their Spring 2002 Newsletter by asking “Do you believe this statement? ‘In today’s Army, senior noncommissioned officers have weaker computer backgrounds than the young enlisted soldiers.’ Contrary to the beliefs of many, we found this statement was invalid. Just the opposite was typically the case.”

In this paragraph, Stouffer not only identifies one of his audiences, but also suggests the value of *The American Soldier* (and the American soldier) as a resource for historians, and even hints at a line of historical inquiry. How have historians responded?

Historical response to *The American Soldier* has been mixed to be sure, and defies neat, categorical classifications. That it has left its mark on historiography and remains a landmark work is beyond doubt, but the use, or lack of use, historians have put it to has varied over the decades after its publication. Sometimes they use it without knowing it, sometimes they reference it as a scholarly, reflexive genuflect to a landmark work, and sometimes they analyze it in detail. Few have looked behind *The American Soldier* to the sources and archives which describe its making. Others, as did Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have consigned it to the realm of bureaucratic, statistical, inhuman explication of “common sense,” unworthy of inclusion in a humanist academic discipline.

Although some historians have been uninterested in or dismissive of *The American Soldier*, Stouffer was clearly interested in historians and their work. In the spring of 1948, one of Stouffer’s wartime colleagues, Celia Gibeaux, let him know that the first volume of the Army’s official history of World War II was available for purchase. Three days later, Stouffer ordered the book from the US Government Printing Office. The volume included a partial description of demobilization planning, of which Stouffer’s Research Branch was an important part. Research Branch operations, then, were written into history even before publication of *The American Soldier*. The Army’s official history of World War II, commonly known as the “Greenbooks” after the color of their covers, is to historians of the Second World War what the *Official Records*
of the War of the Rebellion (OR) is to Civil War historians - a landmark, indispensable resource.\textsuperscript{334}

_The American Soldier_ echoes and reverberates in historical literature in ways that are also much more subtle. In his masterful _That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession_, historian Peter Novick described the state of historians’ salaries in the early to middle part of the twentieth century: “The sense of relative deprivation was furthered by the decline between 1890 and 1940 in the ratio between average academic salary and that of the unskilled laborer from more than 5:1 to less than 2:1.” One cannot know whether Novick, publishing in 1988, knew the idea of relative deprivation came from _The American Soldier_. Whether or not he knew, he used the term without definition (other than context), assuming that his readers - mostly other historians - would understand a major sociological theory. One of the ideas from Research Branch has entered common academic discourse.\textsuperscript{335}

Novick also engaged in a lively discussion of the atmosphere of the post-World War II historical profession. A debate was raging among historians at the time about the value, or lack thereof, of the empirical approach to history. “Postwar sociology and political science, not to mention economics, Novick wrote, “were in their most hyperempiricist period,” and

a handful of aggressive promoters of social scientific history, most prominently Lee Benson…made far reaching claims for the fruits historians could reap from the codification of systematic procedures drawn from the social sciences….But Carl Bridenbaugh inveighed against those who would ‘worship at the shrine of that bitch - goddess QUANTIFICATION.’ And Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. insisted that ‘Almost all important questions are important precisely because they are _not_

\textsuperscript{334} Celia L. Gibeaux to Samuel A. Stouffer, April 2, 1948. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 4, Freshman Questionnaire – Correspondence K, HUG (FP) 31.6. Samuel A. Stouffer to the US Government Printing Office, April 5, 1948. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1946-50, Box 6, Correspondence: M - Polls, Election, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.

susceptible to quantitative answers."³³⁶

Schlesinger had an almost visceral negative reaction to the quantitative data in *The American Soldier*. He remained unconvinced by Stouffer’s inclusion in the volumes of a considerable amount of anecdotal information, as well as Stouffer’s argument that Joseph Conrad’s description of a hurricane was just as important for historical understanding as barometric pressure readings.

Still, many historians have embraced Stouffer’s work as critical to their own. Few historians writing about American soldiers in the Second World War fail to include *The American Soldier* in their bibliographies, and some have found it critical to their arguments about the identity of World War II G.I.’s. Among these are Lee Kennett (*G.I: The American Soldier in World War II*), Gerald F. Lindemann (*The World Within War: America’s Combat Experience in World War II*), and Michael D. Doubler (*Closing with the Enemy: How G.I.’s Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945*). Perhaps more significantly, Sir John Keegan, one of the world’s foremost historians, included *The American Soldier* in the bibliography of his landmark *The Face of Battle*. This book, more than any other in the twentieth century, directed the attention of military historians away from general officers and maneuver, and on to soldiers and their behavior. If one recognizes that attitudes often govern behavior, the next stop for the historian of American soldiers in World War II is *The American Soldier*.³³⁷

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Stouffer and *The American Soldier* normally do not appear in general reference history books about the military, warfare, or the Second World War, although he is mentioned under the heading of “Combat Effectiveness” in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*. Close by in the same entry appears a much more recognizable name, that of Army historian S.L.A. Marshall, described by the *Oxford Companion* as “a persuasive, self-promoting reserve officer who wrote convincingly if controversially of his after-action interviews with infantry units.” Marshall published in 1947 a fabulously popular book which held the US Army in virtual thrall for the next thirty years - *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*. In it, he proceeded from a polemic against the folly of atomic reliance to the ostensible thesis of the work; that only twenty-five percent of American Infantrymen fired their weapons in combat during World War II. The remainder is his interpretation of the behavior of American Infantrymen in combat. Although not the first man in modern times to recreate battle experience through after-action reports, he gives only a slight nod to the man who was (Ardant du Picq in *Etudes Sur Le Combat*). Marshall’s was a nationalist interpretation; he claimed that American society’s superior superego stayed the trigger finger. The low ratio of fire was in fact attributable to more practical considerations: The man who fires exposes himself to fire, and what happens if to him if he fires, kills, and is later captured? In short, fear.

Marshall did prove that he could distill some generalities of combat from those specifics relating only to one incident, yet his points of departure were deliberately flawed to help him

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339 The distinction between an Army historian and a military historian is an important one, particularly in Marshall’s case. He belonged more properly to the nineteenth century generation of officers who wrote military history, than to the twentieth century generation of academically trained historians who write about war and the military.

make his argument. He is included here because of his influence on the American officer corps, where his ideas were accepted without any deep analysis - largely because Marshall traded on his own soldierly identity as a combat veteran of World War I. His was an official song of praise to the superior Judeo-Christian ethic of the American soldier, and he is still widely read and discussed in Army professional schools. Marshall is also notable for what he does not say - the logic of his position necessarily delimits neuropsychiatric casualties from occurring at all. Most important for the purposes of this study, it is possible that The American Soldier did not have a greater affect on the Army, or at least on the average line officer, because Men Against Fire did. The later was published two years before the two-volume, 1,274 page The American Soldier, and at a breathlessly paced 215 pages, Men Against Fire was and remains just the kind of book which appeals to busy, bottom-line oriented officers. Additionally, Men Against Fire found its way onto service school reading lists, while The American Soldier did not, and sociologist C. Wright Mills found Men Against Fire “of greater substantive worth than The American Soldier.”

The eclipsing of The American Soldier by Men Against Fire has problematic ramifications. Men Against Fire was succeeded in its wild popularity among Army officers and others in 1995 by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman’s On Killing. Grossman is often quoted and referenced in military and psychological circles, as well as in the popular press, and he bases many of his arguments on Marshall’s Men Against Fire. While he also referenced The American Soldier, he does so only on four pages of On Killing, while Marshall’s work garnered twenty-one pages. Grossman also mistakenly cites five volumes of The American Soldier, of which there are only two, although he could have been forgiven for assuming four, as the last two volumes of Studies on Social Psychology in World War II are often lumped in with the first two, which constitute The American Soldier proper. One can reasonably postulate that Grossman was as put-off by the length and detail of The American Soldier as many of his fellow officers, and although he knew of it and consulted it, one can question whether he studied it. Had he done so, he would not have made statements in On Killing such as “no one has looked into the specific nature of the act of killing,” (p. xiii) which Stouffer and Research Branch had looked at in detail and reported faithfully in The American Soldier. The picture Stouffer presented was a complex one, resistant to generalization. In July 2009, The New Yorker published “The Kill Company: Did a Colonel’s Fiery Rhetoric Set the Conditions for a Massacre?” by Raffi Khatchadourian. The piece explored the murder of three detainees by American soldiers in Iraq in May of 2006. Khatchadourian reported that the brigade commander of the unit involved had purchased and distributed copies of On Killing to his brigade. Grossman’s premise is simple enough: Humans are hard-wired to resist killing. But “with the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will kill.” (p. 4). The brigade commander seems to have taken that idea to heart, and did his best to condition his men to kill, while also reminding them of the laws of land warfare. In the event of the murder, Grossman’s simple argument broke down. Khatchadourian noted that an Iraqi had used a baby as a human shield shortly before the murder, and quoted Grossman: “If the [women and children] become threatened…the psychology of battle changes from one of carefully controlled ceremonial combat among males to the unconstrained ferocity of an animal who is defending its

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dynamic may apply to historians, who generally have given Marshall greater play than Stouffer. Historians tend to read the work of other historians, and Marshall held that title, while Stouffer did not. Still, wise historians have taken Marshall with a grain of salt. Keegan gave him considerable praise in *The Face of Battle*, but also noted the glibness of Marshall’s arguments: “They are arguments of which the academic historian, trained not to simplify but to portray the complexity of human affairs, ought to beware.” Keegan’s instincts were correct. A dozen years after he wrote these words, historian Roger Spiller uncovered and published evidence that Marshall had essentially cooked his numbers.\(^\text{342}\)

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\(^{342}\)John Keegan. *The Face of Battle*. New York: Penguin, 1978 (originally published by in the UK by Jonathan Cape, 1976), 73. Roger J. Spiller. “S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire.” *The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 133, no.4 (December 4, 1988): 63-71. S.L.A. Marshall also had a considerable influence on policy during the war. In at least one instance, however, it was the statistics with which Stouffer supplied him rather than his after-action report findings which gave teeth to his arguments. In June 1943, shortly before the Allied landing in Sicily, Osborn asked S.L.A. Marshall to prepare a memorandum for higher commanders which the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, could use to impress upon the Army the need for full commitment to the war effort: “The chief of staff particularly desires to impress upon his higher commands the necessity for strengthening their leadership with respect to those factors which affect the attitudes of the men to give them enthusiasm for their training, efficiency in combat, and the mental and spiritual endurance to carry them through a long pull. He will desire to make some generalizations on the attitudes of troops with respect to the cause in which they are fighting....And, briefly, to back these generalizations with appropriate factual and, preferably research material....Dr. Stouffer has been asked to give you every collaboration.” In the resulting memorandum, drafted by S.L.A. Marshall, George Marshall told his commanders that “the ranks are moved more by a desire to get out of uniform as quickly as possible than to proceed toward total victory.” He supported his statement with statistics supplied to S.L.A. Marshall by Stouffer: “Asked in the late stage of training if they felt they were ready to go and were anxious to get into the fighting, but 30 percent of the men sampled in the six infantry divisions replied in the affirmative. Twenty-seven percent felt that they were not ready, and 28 percent were hopeful that they would not have to go. Yet 56 percent of the men in these divisions, according to the sampling, felt that they did not hear enough talks on ‘what this war is all about’ and 46 percent of the officers agreed that the men did not hear enough discussion of this subject.” (Record Group 319, Entry 285, Box 309. C/S US Army, Chief of Information, Troop Information and Education Division,
The American Soldier has proven significantly flexible (or has been bent far enough by historians), to be listed in the bibliographies of those who write heroic versions of the war as well as those whose work attempts to de-romanticize World War II, and to be left out of books about the war altogether. One will find it listed and referenced in G.I. hagiographer John C. McManus’ The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II, as well as in Michael C.C. Adams’ ironically titled The Best War Ever: America and World War II. And Stouffer makes no appearance at all in three of the best history books about the attitudes and behavior of G.I.’s in World War II, though none were written by historians: Paul Fussell’s Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War, John Glenn Gray’s The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, and Eugene B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa.343 Pete Maslowski found The American Soldier useful in 1970 for a journal article about Civil War Soldiers, and Benjamin Alpers found it indispensable to his 1998 article on the democratic US Army in World War II.344

Stouffer and The American Soldier have proven perhaps most invaluable to social, rather than military historians, and it is they who have put both the man and his work to their best use. Sometimes these historians explore issues related to the war, such as William M. Tuttle, Jr. in Daddy’s Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America’s Children. More often, they are looking directly at social science and the history of sociology, psychology, and survey

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research. Since its publication in 1987, Jean Converse’s *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence, 1890 - 1960* has become somewhat of a bible in this area of study, and as Converse’s periodization runs almost congruently with Stouffer’s life, he is a leading member of her *dramatis personae*, and Research Branch and *The American Soldier* are key to her work. (Converse is more properly by training a sociologist rather than an historian. However, as *Survey Research* has had such a major influence on both disciplines, it is proper to include her among historians). Converse’s *Survey Research* was preceded by John Madge’s *The Origins of Scientific Sociology*, (1962) also a landmark work, which includes a chapter entitled “Social Science and the Soldier” - almost wholly devoted to Research Branch and *The American Soldier*.345

In 1967, Northwestern University professor of history Robert Wiebe published an inquiry into the institutionalization and organization of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* touched off a flurry of interest - mostly from intellectual and social historians - in American modes of thought, the transfer of ideas, and the people and institutions which housed, developed, and propagated those ideas.346 Wiebe, ending his inquiry at 1920, while Stouffer was still and undergraduate, does not mention him. It is difficult, however, to find an historian who Wiebe inspired that does not. And while it would be impossible here to list all or even a majority of the works influenced by Stouffer and his World War II labors, a few of the more recent works will help in giving one a sense of Stouffer’s

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historical legacy, relevance, and the scope of his influence - as reflected in their titles and publication dates:


In short, historians, much as they do with any source, take Stouffer and *The American Soldier* as they find them, do not find them at all, find them and choose not to use them, employ them selectively to make their arguments, or embrace them as an invaluable resource in

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understanding American society and its Army in World War II - as many historians have done.

There is no denying that *The American Soldier* is a yardstick of sorts, by which works on
American soldiers in World War II and works on sociology, psychology, and survey research are
often measured. Historian Richard H. Kohn described it in 1981 as “the most famous study ever
done on American enlisted men,” based as it was “on extensive interviews with the troops during
World War II and the product of sophisticated analysis by a team of outstanding scholars.”
Few studies of American soldiers in the Second World War are completely credible without at
least some grounding in *The American Soldier*, and readers picking up any work on American
soldiers in that war would do well to check the bibliography for Stouffer and *The American
Soldier*.

Stouffer’s third specified audience was social psychologists and sociologists: “This is the
main audience to which these books are addressed,” he wrote. “The study of personal and
institutional adjustment to new social situations may be stimulated both by the findings in these
volumes and their shortcomings.” And sociologists and social psychologists have indeed
shown a keen and enduring interest in *The American Soldier*. It signals for them more than an

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Research.” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 86, no. 3 (June 1981): 553-567. (562). Stouffer and *The American Soldier* continue to appear in professional historical journals. One of the more recent articles which depended a great deal on Stouffer’s work is Christopher P. Loss’s 2005 essay “‘The Most Wonderful Thing has Happened to me in the Army:’ Psychology, Citizenship, and American Higher Education in World War II.” *The Journal of American History*, vol. 92, no. 3 (December 2005): 864-891. Richard H. Kohn, professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was for ten years (1981-1991) the chief of history for the US Air Force. Kohn stressed to his historian colleagues in his essay that “the problem, in both scholarship and popular thinking, is our propensity to
search for universal generalizations that fit across all of American history. The truth of the matter is that the ‘American soldier’ never existed; the most pernicious myth of all is that there has ever been a prototypical American in uniform. Common sense ought to remind us that the past was different: the pace of life, values and attitudes, occupations, the classes and social structure of the nation, technology and the conditions of battle, the character of discipline, the nature of war and military life. Our experience as scholars should warn us that few, if any, generalizations for something as varied as military service, experienced by so many diverse individuals under such disparate circumstances, can hold over as long a span of time as three centuries. We ought particularly to suspect broad surveys in the absence of very detailed research on specific periods of time. And what we as historians should seek is not some set of large generalizations, but history - change over time, evolution, development.” Anyone spending even a few minutes with *The American Soldier* will see that Stouffer and his colleagues presented, through detailed research, a very complex picture indeed.

349 *TAS* vol. I, 4.
indicator of their importance and influence. They also see in it the methods and influence of survey research, the relationship during the war between the government and their discipline, some nascent theory such as relative deprivation, and a host of lines of inquiry which it began. It also can be credited with starting an entire new subfield - military sociology.

In 1999, sociologists T.P Schwartz and Robert M. Marsh published “The American Soldier Studies of World War II: A 50th Anniversary Commemorative” in the *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. While they recognized the value of *The American Soldier*, they also commented that it had been somewhat neglected. According to Schwartz and Marsh, by 1999, *The American Soldier* had become, even in sociological circles, a work that was more known about rather than known - the fate of many a classic.

1999 marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of *The American Soldier*, a book in four volumes that has been called one of the most influential social science studies during this century and the beginning of empirical studies in military sociology. And yet, its actual findings, about social relations between officers and enlisted personnel, Blacks and Whites, combat veterans and raw recruits, and many other topics, seem to be neglected in contemporary social science.

Schwartz and Marsh went on to highlight some of the more enduring and provocative findings in *The American Soldier*, to include contextual impact on attitude and behavior, reference groups and relative deprivation, the complex dynamics of mass media, the interaction of social structure and military morale, cohesion and performance, the findings related to fear, hostility, and aggression, and the power of peer groups. Hoping that their essay would encourage “more social scientists, in the U.S. and abroad, to build upon its monumental achievements,” Schwartz and Marsh also highlighted some of the counterintuitive findings in *The American Soldier*, and observed that perhaps the reason the volumes had fell somewhat into disuse was that “they are not codified or summarized according to an over-arching theoretical framework,” and
that “despite its simple and clear language, its many empirical findings are mired deep within long and descriptive paragraphs that are dispersed throughout the four large and weighty volumes that constitute TAS.”

Such an analysis borrows much, and reasonably so, from the reviews of The American Soldier which followed its publication in 1949. Chief among the complaints were a lack of theory set into an easily accessible structure and the length of the work, which many found, and still find, somewhat daunting. It also borrows, not insignificantly, from Stouffer himself, who stated repeatedly and emphatically that The American Soldier was designed neither to provide theory nor to be an easy read, but was instead a “mine of data,” meant to stimulate further research. The American Soldier, in short, makes no argument. It presents evidence and largely leaves conclusions to the beholder. It is a product of social engineering during a war of national survival, and its pretensions to anything other than evidence from which others could build arguments are limited. Schwartz and March quote John Clausen, a member of Research Branch, who underlined Stouffer’s emphasis: “The Research Branch was not established to advance social science research.” But they also quote another Research Branch alumnus, Robin Williams, Jr., who explains succinctly the enduring value of The American Soldier: “Many of the ideas and analyses of The American Soldier seem now to have diffused into the general culture of social science. In the process, the shipping tags often are lost. But the important fact is that permanent additions to our knowledge have remained.”350 One of these permanent additions was the journal

350 T.P. Schwartz and Robert M. Marsh. “The American Soldier Studies of WWII: A 50th Anniversary Commemorative. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 27 no.1 (Summer 1999): 21-37. TAS vol. I, 3-53. Schwartz and Marsh refer to the four volumes of TAS. Technically, TAS is comprised of two volumes. The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life, and The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath. An additional two volumes of the Studies in Social Psychology during World War II series, Experiments on Mass Communications, and Measurement and Prediction have, over the years, been increasingly lumped in with the first two volumes. The “lumping,” ostensibly insignificant, may perhaps help to explain why busy military officers, historians, and sociologists have read the work with decreasing frequency. Two volumes can be intimidating, and four can only make it worse. Schwartz and Marsh understand the distinction, as they indicate in their first footnote.
in which Schwartz and Marsh wrote, for the work of Research Branch was instrumental in establishing military sociology as a sub-field of their discipline.

The diffusion to which Williams referred was evident during the war, and even moreso immediately afterward, when sociologists had a chance to catch their breaths and reflect on what World War II had brought to their discipline. Over the next half century they would, many of them, publish prolifically, and whether or not their subjects dealt specifically with The American Soldier, their experience during the war affected them for their entire careers, and in turn affected their discipline. “It was” as Williams remembered sixty years later, “the Experience of a 20th Century lifetime.” Most of the participants in Research Branch agreed with Williams. Seventy-five percent of twenty-four of them surveyed in the early 1980’s by Research Branch alumnus John A. Clausen reported the experience as having a significant influence on their careers. Nor did interest in The American Soldier confine itself simply to those who had been members of or consulted with Research Branch. Other sociologists were keenly interested in what had been learned during the war.

In March 1946, the entire issue of The American Journal of Sociology was devoted to matters military, with World War II providing the primary body of evidence. Entitled “Human

Williams, sixty years after the fact, remembered his service with Research Branch as a patriotic effort for the nation as well as a way to further the influence of sociology. “On the zeitgeist level, I think a main factor was our conviction that WWII was both a necessary and a just war. We saw our work as a direct contribution to that effort and we were determined to prove - in the face of much skepticism and downright hostility - that social science had something important to contribute. On the personal-social level, we were a gang of enthusiastic (close to fanatical) collaborations [sic], arguing furiously, taking risks, and (unknowingly) forging lifetime bonds of respect and friendship. It was the Experience of a 20th Century lifetime.” (Robin M. Williams, Jr. to the author, October 13, 2003).

351 John A. Clausen. “The American Soldier as a Career Contingency.” Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1984): 207-213. (210). Among the comments from Research Branch alumni in Clausen’s survey: “The Research Branch was a high grade university for me.” “Influenced me to become an expert in research design and analysis.” “Because I worked with Carl Hovland, my experience probably sealed my fate as becoming permanent faculty at Yale.” “Gave me direct experience with field research - made a social psychologist out of me.” “I learned technical skills…I formed lifelong friendships (and professional ties with the brightest and best social scientists of my generation). I learned data analysis from Stouffer and I was caught up in the enthusiasm of the entire staff for doing high quality work on subjects of importance.” “Contact with Sam Stouffer and an amazingly capable staff was a priceless post-graduate experience which could not have been duplicated in an academic milieu.”
Behavior in Military Society,” the issue included essays on “Group Psychotherapy of Military Offenders,” “Informal Social Organization in the Army,” “The Making of the Infantryman,” “Characteristics of Military Society” “Aggressiveness in Military Training,” “Research on Veterans Adjustment,” and several others. The editors noted that “So far, very little has been published on the social psychology of the soldier,” and what had been published had by written “almost solely by professional writers, by veterans with a flair for the dramatic, by journalists, and by cartoonists.” They felt it was time for sociologists to write about a subject of considerable importance: “This issue of The Journal of American Sociology is devoted to the social psychology of military life. It is an attempt to describe and interpret a central phenomenon of wartime: the transformation of the civilian into the fighting man. This gigantic demonstration of the vast remaking of human nature constitutes, for the various sciences of human behavior, a research challenge of the first magnitude.” The editors also prefigured Stouffer and The American Soldier in their approach and goals: “The papers in this symposium are admittedly exploratory and their conclusions are tentative….The papers are presented to throw light on a neglected but important area of human experience and to stimulate interest in further and more systematic research.” And although The American Soldier was still three years from publication, one of the contributors, Arnold Rose, was an alumnus of Research Branch. His essay considered “The Social Structure of the Army.”^352


survives the Attack on Positivism?” (1984), and John Clausen wrote “Research on The American Soldier as a Career Contingency,” (1984). The last two essays, along with Williams’ “Field Observations” an essay by Arthur Lumsdaine “Mass Communication Experiments in Wartime and Thereafter” and an introduction by John Clausen were part of a social psychology symposium entitled “The American Soldier and Social Psychology,” given at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in 1983, and printed in Social Psychology Quarterly in 1984. Lumsdaine was a member of Research Branch, and though not an author of The American Soldier proper, was one of three authors (the other two were Carl I. Hovland and Fred T. Sheffield) of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume III: Experiments on Mass Communication.353

Publication of The American Soldier in 1949 resulted, and in short order, in a symposium on the work which described it as “a body of empirical findings that push forward on several frontiers of social psychology and sociology.” The hosts, sociologists Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, sought in the symposium, “to explore the nature of the social science terrain that has been opened up.” The papers of the symposium were published in book form in 1950 as Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier,” and included essays by Edward A. Shils, “The Primary Group in the American Army” Robert K. Merton and Alice Kitt, “Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior,” Hans Speier


While running the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard, Stouffer himself wrote extensively and published eclectically in the years after the Second World War, and while some of his essays and articles dealt directly with Research Branch and their activities, many reached beyond that specific experience. For Scientific Monthly he wrote “Government and the Measurement of Opinion” (1946), for American Sociological Review “An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms” (1949), and for The American Journal of Sociology “Some Observations on Study Design” (1950), to name just a few. In 1954 he published in The Public Opinion Quarterly “1665 and 1954,” his presidential address to the American Association of Public Opinion Research. The address deftly compared and contrasted the plague of the seventeenth century with the atomic threat of the twentieth, including the excesses of McCarthyism. Stouffer told his audience that social scientists were key to understanding the human condition and offering assistance to policy makers, but that much work had yet to be done. “Psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, and even economics,” he said, “are still in their infancy. The few thousand research studies a year published in all these fields are a mere handful as compared with the researches indexed annually in physics, biology, and


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chemistry. Some of us grossly under-estimate the time and sweat and money required to test a hypothesis in social science." Stouffer’s drive and exhortations to his colleagues for additional achievement in the social sciences were a significant part of his legacy.

Stouffer used his year as President of the American Sociological Association (1953) to stress the need for scientific approaches to sociology, and to guide young sociologists just beginning their careers. His presidential address, delivered at Berkeley that year and later printed in the American Sociological Review, was entitled “Measurement in Sociology.” He asked his audience “Why should not we, as sociologists, take an explicit look at the process of invention in the discipline of sociology itself, as a special case of the general working of invention in technology and science?” He then went on to explain that invention is not solely a process of gadgetry, and that culture -“the readiness to see” - was just as important:

A central proposition in the theory of inventions is the postulate that an invention in technology or science ordinarily is not a discovery like an uncharted island emerging from the Pacific mist before the eyes of a Captain Cook, but rather is a long process of juxtaposing, in new combinations, complexes of elements all or most of which are already well known. Among the obvious conditions for such a new juxtaposition are readiness to see if it happens and the technical possibilities of seeing it.

Stouffer’s message was that sociologists were in the best position to be prepared to see, and that they therefore should become the innovative, scientific thinkers of the future:

I think that many, if not all, of the necessary ingredients are now present in our sociological culture. The ingredients are highly complex collections of ideas, of recorded experience, and of research techniques, some of them mathematical. Who will put these ingredients together in sociology? Not the philosopher, speculating in his arm chair. Not the sensitive artist, watching human activity with a dramatist’s eye. Not the statistician who is solely concerned with making a better probability model or measuring device. Rather, the sociologist who combines several of these skills in his own head, or the small sociological team which brings a few specialists together.

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together in a concerted enterprise.\textsuperscript{357}

Stouffer also included in the ASA meeting for 1953 pre-recorded messages from each of the ex-presidents of the ASA. He had asked them to answer, for new members, the question “What are the best words of counsel you can give to a young Ph.D. just launching his or her sociological career?” In addressing the future and his younger colleagues, Stouffer demonstrated clear interest in his influence and legacy for his profession.\textsuperscript{358}

Stouffer also assisted a new generation of sociologists in their studies of the military. A few years before Morris Janowitz published \textit{The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait}, (1960), he was asking Stouffer assist him with a bulletin he was writing for a Russell Sage Foundation series on sociology in military organizations. “The idea behind it,” Janowitz wrote to Stouffer, “apparently is for me to write a brief overview of what has been done and how sociology might relate itself to the problems of changing military organization.” Stouffer consented to serve on Janowitz’s advisory committee, and Janowitz sent him the bulletin manuscript with a request that he “mark up the manuscript, or tell me about your reactions.” Janowitz would go on to found and preside for twenty-two years over the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), a direct result of his work with Russell Sage and Stouffer.\textsuperscript{359}


\textsuperscript{358} Presidential Advice to Younger Sociologists.” \textit{American Sociological Review}, vol. 18, no. 6 (December 1953): 597-604.


Stouffer’s major work subsequent to *The American Soldier* confirmed his legacy in sociology. In addition to his influence as the director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard and his publications in professional journals, he published in 1955 what many believe to be his most influential work—*Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind*. Again using survey research, Stouffer demonstrated that the average American was much less concerned with communism than the demagogue Senator Joseph McCarthy wanted people to believe. For his pains, Stouffer received special attention from J.  

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Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and had to show cause to retain his security clearance - a case he won. Having recovered from McCarthyism, in the months immediately before his death Stouffer turned his attention to population studies.  

Stouffer’s death in 1960 prompted the publication of a collection of some of his essays, *Social Research to Test Ideas*, (1962) and additional articles, to include Phillip Hauser’s “On Stouffer’s Social Research to Test Ideas” (1962), and Herbert H. Hyman’s “Samuel A. Stouffer and Social Research” (1962). *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* was reprinted in 1992, and remains a classic in survey research along with *The American Soldier*. Stouffer was also honored with a chapter on his life and work in *The Lives of Harvard Scholars* in 1968.

Sociologists have written their own history of their profession, and few of them have left Stouffer out. A sampling includes Andrew Abbott’s *Department and Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred* (1999): “Samuel Stouffer, the leader of the modern survey researchers, believed that only modern survey analysis could produce the building blocks of a discipline.” Martin Bulmer’s *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research* (1984): “Ogburn’s most brilliant and distinguished student was Samuel Stouffer….Stouffer is so much identified with *The American Soldier* and his later career at Harvard that his graduate origins at Chicago are frequently overlooked.” Herbert H.  

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Hyman’s *Taking Society’s Measure: A Personal History of Survey Research* (1991) includes an entire chapter on “Stouffer’s Surveys: Research Branch of the War Department.” Merton and Riley’s *Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the American Experience* (1980) includes an essay by Jackson Toby entitled “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social Research as a Calling.” Jennifer Platt’s *A History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 1920-1960* (1996): “The work done [by Stouffer and Research Branch] had high disciplinary prestige, cemented by the publication of the *American Soldier* volumes. Modern survey method had in effect been created, and was both institutionalised in the survey research units now in universities and theorised in the spate of publications on method which followed.” And when the American Sociological Association celebrated its centennial with Craig Calhoun’s *Sociology in America: A History*, (2007), they were careful to include considerable information on Stouffer, Research Branch, and *The American Soldier*. Stouffer also may be found in both the *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* and the *Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology*.

Stouffer’s influence on sociologists, as well as historians and the military, seems clear, and would doubtless lead him to some satisfaction that he reached his intended audiences. There

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were, however, three additional audiences which were keen to know what Stouffer had discovered about survey research: businessmen, government, and pollsters. Seemingly everyone wanted Stouffer’s judgments on how to analyze attitudes and opinions, from Standard Oil to Elmo Roper.  

A few months after the war, the National Research Council and the Social Science Research Council formed the joint “Committee on Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants,” for the purpose of “promoting the exchange of information and experience among workers in business, government, and the universities who are facing similar problems in developing increasingly efficient methods of measurement.” Stouffer was named chairman, and Princeton mathematics professor Samuel S. Wilkes vice-chairman. The executive committee included Frank Stanton who would within a year be named president of the Columbia Broadcasting System and Research Branch consultant Rensis Likert of the US Department of Agriculture and creator of the Likert Scale for attitude measurement. Other members included pollsters George Gallup and Elmo Roper, Edward Battey of Compton Advertising, Walter Shewart of Bell Telephone, and Research Branch alumni or consultants Paul Lazarsfeld of Columbia, Hadley Cantril of Princeton, Philip Hauser of the US Department of Commerce, and Carl Hovland of Yale. Of the eighteen total members, six, or fully one-third, had worked with Stouffer and Research Branch during the war.

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364 The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer. HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.
365 Stanton and Stouffer had maintained close contact during the war. In mid-1942, Stouffer mooted Stanton to head Research Branch activities in Europe, but the combination of Stanton’s duties as Director of Research at CBS and Eisenhower’s reluctance to bring him to Europe at that early date mitigated against such an assignment. (Samuel A. Stouffer to Frederick H. Osborn, August 27, 1942. W.B. Smith to Frederick H. Osborn, September 14, 1942. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 1: American Journal of Sociology - Post War Plans of Soldiers, HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA).
In addition to his work with the Committee on Measurements, Stouffer was a member of the American Standards Association, the American Economic Association, the Population Association of America, the National Committee on Atomic Information, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Philosophical Association, Phi Betta Cappa, the American Statistical Association, the Sociological Research Association, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics, the Population Association of America, the Psychometric Association, and the Harvard and Cosmos clubs. He was also appointed to the Board of Syndics at Harvard, granted an honorary degree at Princeton, and in 1950 elected to the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences.\footnote{Stouffer was a busy man. His papers are full of letters begging him to please write some in reply. One of these came from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, who had to request of him, five months after he was elected, to please accept the fellowship. Henry B. Phillips to Samuel A. Stouffer, October 20, 1950. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Correspondence, 1946-50; 1950-1953, Box 10, Harvard War Memorial Correspondence - Williamstown Public Opinion Conference Correspondence: A - American Sociological Society, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.}

celebration. The Atomic Scientists of Chicago wanted a bulletin on the recent polls on Atomic Energy. The Committee for Mass Education in Race Relations of The American Film Center, Inc., wanted some of his wartime reports for a “program of films in race relations.” The head of listener research at the BBC wanted to talk to him. McCann-Erickson Advertising wanted him to see their research on teenagers and “their consumer habits.” Syracuse University wanted to know who to hire as a social statistician, and so on. Stouffer’s papers contain correspondence from the White House, the US State Department, American Telephone & Telegraph, the Educational Testing Service, the Ford Foundation, General Motors, RCA, Kimberly Clark Corporation, the National Education Association, the Library of Congress, the Organization of American States, The University of Liverpool, the US Department of Commerce, International Business Machines, the National Broadcasting Company, the Lipton Tea Company, the NAACP, International Harvester, Boeing, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and so on. Who should we hire? Is our study sound? Will you consult for us? Will you speak/write/advocate/review/listen/comment? Sometimes, retailers would conduct their own studies, and then refer them to Stouffer for comment. One of the more interesting of these was a detailed study by Schlitz in 1958 on the demographics, psychology, and preferences of American beer drinkers.369

Pollsters, in particular Elmo Roper, had been interested in Research Branch and its work well before the United States entered World War II. Osborn was corresponding with him in the fall of 1941, and two years later, when Roper read the second edition of “What the Soldier Thinks,” he wrote to Osborn with congratulations: “It seems to me you are amply demonstrating the great worth of public opinion research on a scale and for a purpose which we old practitioners had little chance to do. I think your job is a meritorious one, and everyone

369 Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1953-1960, Box 32, Correspondence: S - W, HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA.
connected with it should feel justly proud.” Osborn forwarded Roper’s letter to Stouffer, and the two stayed in close contact for the remainder of their careers. In the final days of the war, summing up for Roper the major activities of Research Branch, Stouffer added, “no comment on our work would be complete without reference to the debt we owe, in particular, to you and Gallup, not only for personal help and encouragement from time to time, but also for the long accumulation of experience in your organization upon which we have so freely drawn, and for the training in civilian life which you gave to some of our key personnel.” In the postwar years, Roper would turn often to Stouffer to draw upon the latter’s experience. Roper, in addition to working with Stouffer on the Committee on Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants, asked for his advice on personnel hires, studied with him after the disastrous results of presidential election polling in 1948, employed him as a consultant for the 1956 presidential election, and relied on his expertise as a colleague for professional conferences and panels.

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370 Frederick H. Osborn to Elmo Roper, October 27, 1941. Elmo Roper to Frederick H. Osborn, September 24, 1943. Frederick H. Osborn to Elmo Roper, September 27, 1943. Record Group 330, Entry 89, Box 970. (Secretary of Defense), Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Research Division Historical File, 1941- June 1955, Justification for Research Division to Thursday Reports. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. The Army Research Institute, aware of the connection between Roper and Research Branch, noted in one of their newsletters, “Survey research pioneer Elmo Roper advised the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in April 1941 to make use of surveys to collect information from soldiers to guide military administration and policies.” ARI Newsletter vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 2002).


In 1951, Stouffer acknowledged that his work with Research Branch had applicability beyond his stated three audiences in *The American Soldier*. In an NBC radio discussion for the University of Chicago Roundtable, Robert K. Merton asked him “what did all this research work amount to?” Stouffer replied:

> It is a little hard to say. I am probably a biased witness on the subject, but I am inclined to think that the kind of research we did in the army has been proved to be applicable to industry and to education, and that it will help make democracy work more efficiently. Of course, there are skeptics about the kinds of things we did. One of the most interesting skeptics reared his head just the other day when *Red Star*, the official journal of the Soviet army, paid us the compliment of saying that in serving our bourgeois masters we were doing very ridiculous things for democracy. I am a little proud of that review.\(^{373}\)

Stouffer as a professional and a human being had an influence also on those in his immediate orbit. But the most important legacy of Stouffer is his contribution to survey research. The reflex to dig through census records for demographic information and social conclusions was transformed into asking specific questions to answer specific problems - survey research - largely due to the efforts of Stouffer and the importance of Research Branch and *The American Soldier*.\(^{374}\)

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\(^{374}\) See Herbert H. Hyman. “Samuel A. Stouffer and Social Research.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn, 1962), 323–328. 327. “As an empirical social researcher, young Sam had a rough life. In his early career, when he had already begun to employ multivariate analysis, the large scale sample survey had hardly set up in business. Now, it is easy for a young man. Back then, one couldn’t just manufacture the data appropriate to a problem by conducting a new survey. Whatever was available had to be converted to one’s needs, and this meant digging into neglected archives in the U.S. Census, or somewhere in Massachusetts, or even in Australia. Then one had to transform what one found into the appropriate indices to suit the problem and, simultaneously, modify or translate the problem to suit the data. From such hardship comes the gifted empiricist who has a mind well-stocked with data accumulated by others and who can think cleverly. This was the intellectual capital one needed in those days. Now, by contrast, the only capital one needs is money to finance a new survey, and that is not much of a problem in our affluent society.”
Chapter 8

Reviews and Criticism of *The American Soldier*

Princeton University Press prepared for the release of *The American Soldier* as most publishers do - press releases, synopses, and descriptions of the scope and content of the work. This preparation was enough to gain the attention of the three constituencies most likely to have an interest in the work: soldiers, historians, and sociologists - Stouffer’s audiences. These three groups tended to key on the same findings, and offered criticisms in the same areas. The findings which most interested them were the point system for redeployment at the conclusion of World War II, the problems with the Infantry, race relations, neuropsychiatric casualties, officer-enlisted relations, primary groups, combat, selection and training of recruits and their subsequent classification and assignments, and the Air Corps. Their criticisms of *The American Soldier* included the length and complexity of the work, the obviousness of some of the findings, its lack of theory and the related complaint that the work was not real science, the idea that the surveys and *The American Soldier* itself was inimical to democracy, the charge that the work was nothing but an exercise in committee consensus and as a result was somewhat mechanical, and the accusation that the methods employed were inappropriate to the subject being studied. Charts I and II below highlight the major critics, the journals in which they wrote, and their interest in findings, as well as their specific criticisms:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reviewer</th>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>P/N</th>
<th>Point System</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>NPs</th>
<th>Off/Enl Rel</th>
<th>Pri Gp</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Sel/Tng</th>
<th>Clas/Asgn</th>
<th>Air Corps</th>
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<tr>
<td>Allport, G.</td>
<td>Abnormal &amp; Social Psych</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>Blakesly, H.</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Demerath, N.</td>
<td>Social Forces</td>
<td>P/N</td>
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<td>Dupsay, R.</td>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Commentary</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Hittle, J.</td>
<td>US Navy Proceedings</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>Lazarsfeld, P.</td>
<td>Public Opinion Quarterly</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Lee, A.</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Lynd, R.</td>
<td>New Republic</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Newhall, R.</td>
<td>MS. Valley Hist. Review</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>Nye, W.</td>
<td>Field Artillery Journal</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Reid, R.</td>
<td>Negro History</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>Ropp, T.</td>
<td>South Atlantic Quarterly</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Shanas, E.</td>
<td>Amer. Journal of Sociology</td>
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<td>Schlesinger, A. Jr.</td>
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<td>&quot;V., G.&quot;</td>
<td>Infantry Journal</td>
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Notes: P/N = positive or negative review (Demerath's is balanced).

Point System refers to the demobilization point system used to determine which soldiers would redeploy first.

Infantry refers to the major problems in maintaining infantry morale due to their high casualty rate.

Race refers to Black-White relations.

Education refers to educational levels and their affect on diverse aspects of soldier adjustment and performance.

NPs refers to Neuropsychiatric issues related to fear and adjustment to combat.

Off/Enl Rel refers to officer/enlisted relations as part of a hierarchical status system.

Pri Gp refers to primary groups and their affect on morale.

Combat refers to all issues related to combat.

Sel/Tng refers to issues of selection and training and Clas/Asgn refers to classification and assignment.

Air Corps refers to finding specific to the Air Corps.

Some reviewers went into detail regarding the findings, while others merely mentioned them. Mention garnered an X on the chart, even if the comment was as general as that of Alfred Lee's: "how they liked their assignments, how they reacted to the status system." (X for Clas/Asgn and X for Off/Enl Rel).

The full name of the journal in which Lee's review appears is Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reviewer</th>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>P/N</th>
<th>Long/Complex</th>
<th>Obvious</th>
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<th>Mechanical</th>
<th>Method</th>
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<td>Allport, G.</td>
<td>Abnormal &amp; Social Psych</td>
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P/N = positive or negative review. Demerath’s review was balanced.

Long/Complex refers to the work being indegestible to the layman.

Obvious refers to findings that are “common sense.”

No/Weak Theory refers to the absence of universal explanatory or predictive schema.

Not Real Science refers to claims that TAS is masquerading as science.

Harmful refers to the methods and findings of TAS as destructive of democracy through authoritarian social engineering, or misleading sociologists.

Committee Work refers to the insidious effect of consensus upon scholarship.

Mechanical refers to suspicion of the IBM machines that tabulated the data for TAS findings.

Method refers to suspicion of the constructs and or process of gathering and analyzing data for TAS.

The full name of the journal for which Lee reviewed TAS is Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Primacy of place for the military reviewers goes to Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, commander of the famed 82nd Airborne Division during the war. Writing in the New York Times, Gavin aptly titled his review “A Monumental Study of the Citizen Soldier in War,” and placed his finger on the reason Research Branch was created: “One of the most difficult command requirements in a democracy’s army is that of reconciling the hardships of war with the personal needs of the citizens under arms.” He recognized the tension between the demands...
of winning battles and the maintenance of troop morale, as well as the need for an organization such as Research Branch to keep commanders apprised of the attitudes of their soldiers.

Although he noted that *The American Soldier* offered evidence that was “carefully examined and well presented,” he also observed that the information was “loosely organized at points and a bit given to mathematical explanations at times.” As did many other reviewers of *The American Soldier*, he offered a tacit request for a shorter, easier to read work.

As an officer himself, Gavin noted the with some regret the paucity of officer surveys conducted by Research Branch, and hinted at a desire for more hard theory rather than just evidence, “The authors put the question but offer no answer: ‘To what extent can it be assumed that the men of the United States Army were in fact willing to subordinate their personal aims to the goal of winning the war?’” Sympathetic as he was to the work of Research Branch and to *The American Soldier*, Gavin’s stars show in this comment: “Conducting the affairs of an army on the basis of a survey of the opinions of its members - admitting the interdependence of military efficiency and morale - is a dangerous luxury in our contemporary world.” Still, Gavin’s review was overwhelmingly positive, and he praises *The American Soldier* as “unique in the history of war,” and “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.”

Writing in the *Field Artillery Journal*, Colonel W. S. Nye leavened his largely positive review with a refrain common to most all of the military reviewers. Recognizing that the authors did not intend “to compile a report for popular consumption,” Nye wrote that “the material probably is not yet in a form usable by senior officers charged with making and implementing high-level decisions,” and that “the flow of professional jargon in the opening chapter is apt to

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frighten away the casual lay reader.” Nye’s analysis encompasses the tension between running an
army on consensus and the impulse to understand soldiers and managing in particular the
relationship between officers and enlisted men. “Anything,” he observed, “which can contribute
to better leadership is worth exploring.” After reviewing some of the major findings in *The
American Soldier*, among which he lists getting the job done rather than ideology as the prime
motivator for soldiers, the control of fear, and the dynamics which led to the point system for
redeployment, Nye concluded his review by registering some skepticism with the idea of
determining the rightness of a policy based on its popularity.376

Identifying himself only as “G.V.,” the reviewer for *Infantry Journal* fairly gushed about
*The American Soldier*, writing that the work done to gather the data that went into it is “an utter
necessity for the future of every armed service.” *The American Soldier*, G.V. wrote, proved “that
there is only one scientific way of discovering the true morale of troops.” Obviousness, intuition,
and common sense are to G.V. the inadequate tools of the past. G.V. does not, however,
recommend the book be read by “every leader,” because, like many other reviewers, he is put off
by “the technical language of statistics.” G.V. longs for a shorter, better organized version of the
book - an executive summary. “To the present material thus cut down and simplified should be
added some brief suggestions of the best ways for leaders to use such information.” G.V.
recommended that such a simplification be done by an “Army man” and a “social psychologist”
working together. Their first task, G.V. stressed, would be to “set down their own biases as
completely as possible,” because “bias with respect to military matters is apparent in more than
one place in the present book.” The book that would come out of such a transparent
collaboration, G.V. believed, should be “read by all students at schools at which leadership is

any part of the curriculum,” for “no book could be more convincing than a readable transfer into layman’s language of the material this book…contains.”

Reviewing for *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, Marine Lieutenant Colonel (and military historian) J.D. Hittle found no fault with *The American Soldier*. The books to him “comprise what is probably the most comprehensive, scientific, and valuable study of the thoughts of combat personnel yet to appear in print.” And Hittle set the bar high, comparing *The American Soldier* favorably with Ardant Du Picq’s classic *Etudes Sur Le Combat*. The *American Soldier*, Hittle wrote, served to “carry the study of the mind of the soldier far beyond Col. Du Picq’s initial exploration of the subject….So extensive is the coverage of subject matter, that it is difficult to think of a military personnel question or problem that is not included somewhere in these two books.” Unlike G.V., the reviewer for *Infantry Journal*, Hittle saw no bias lurking in the shadows. “Unquestionably, one of the principal attributes of these books is the obvious objectivity of its authors.” Nor, unlike most of the other military reviewers, did Hittle pine for a shorter version of the work.

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377 G.V. “What the Soldier Thought.” *Infantry Journal*, vol. 64, no. 6 (June 1949): 55-56. Princeton University Press was indeed sensitive to the desire for a shorter version of *The American Soldier*. Despite the jargonless, clear language in which *The American Soldier* is written, within three years of publication, Princeton approached Stouffer with “the idea of a shortened and more popular version of THE AMERICAN SOLDIER.” Because the abridger proposed a more “intuitional” than “scientific” approach to the short version, Stouffer’s papers reveal no interest in the idea. (He never replied to repeated requests for comment from Princeton). Additionally, the abridger, a Mr. John W. Donaldson, viewed *The American Soldier* with suspicion, “The general affect of the book was narcotic, what with its myriad statistics not always simple and not always illuminating what mattered.” What mattered to Donaldson was conventional wisdom “the real force that sustains combat troops (loyalty),” and “high command stupidity and lack of imagination,” In the end, Donaldson suggested that Princeton drop the project as too “’controversial.’” (John W. Donaldson to Datus Smith, Nov. 3, 1952, and Herbert S. Bailey, Jr. to Samuel A. Stouffer, Nov. 12, 1952. The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer. Box 17 HUG (FP) 31.6: Correspondence 1950-1953, National Science Foundation - Positions, Current. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA).

378 Colonel Ardant du Picq (1821-1870) produced the first modern work of survey research on soldier attitudes and behavior with *Etudes Sur Le Combat* (1868). Archaic to the modern ear, du Picq nevertheless was asking the same type of questions that Stouffer and Research Branch asked, much to the chagrin of many of his fellow officers. Hittle wrote the standard work on the evolution of the general staff - *The Military Staff: It’s History and Development*.

Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy’s review for *The Christian Science Monitor* can only be described as bitter. He took issue not only with the length and complexity of *The American Soldier*, but also with its obviousness and lack of theory. Dupuy, like Hittle, invoked Ardant du Picq, but claimed that nothing more than du Picq was needed. Content to sojourn in the 19th Century, Dupuy wrote that “nothing in this work has not been set forth in one fashion or another by Col. Ardant du Picq.” Dupuy was content with du Picq’s “theory” of soldiers in war, which rotated around the idea that the heart of man never changes, a conclusion “sadly lacking here [in *The American Soldier*].” *The American Soldier* was also to Dupuy a bit of a rat maze - “ponderous tomes” of “academic minutiae.” The only praise he could offer the work was that it was “an honest effort.” He marvels that “the amazing point is that the writers evidently believe that they have made remarkable discoveries,” and lets his colonelcy show in the chagrin he demonstrated at not sharing the privileges of “the bestarred.” His criticisms were shared by several of the historians and sociologists who reviewed the work, but only the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. approached his level of disdain for *The American Soldier*.380

The last of the military commentators discussed here is Major General H. W. Blakely, who reviewed *The American Soldier* for *Armed Force*. Blakely’s only complaint, a now familiar refrain, was that *The American Soldier* was too long and complicated. “It is to be hoped that some experienced field soldier, blessed with time and intelligence, will condense the wealth of information in these volumes into a brief presentation.” While not, as some other reviewers did, charging the authors with bias, Blakely comes close in warning “these books must be approached with some care. The ‘main audience’ [sociologists] talks a language of its own and has its special viewpoint.” Blakely separates his review into the sociologist and military viewpoints, and is

clearly not comfortable with some of the methodology used to produce *The American Soldier*. “It is easy to believe that some of the tables indicate conclusions that a detailed study of the text will prove not to be valid.” Still, and fairly, Blakely points out that some of these doubts may be “unjustified.” Blakely keyed on several of the findings in *The American Soldier*, but concludes that “the main value of these volumes, however, is in their study of the soldier during training and combat.”

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. published the most acerbic of all the reviews of *The American Soldier* in the *Partisan Review*. Schlesinger was so caustic that Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport, wrote to his colleague Samuel Stouffer, “I can only say there is no vanity like that of historians. They feel ‘threatened’ and hastily rearrange their feathers.”\(^{381}\) Schlesinger pulls no punches, challenging the value of *The American Soldier* with an *ad hominem* attack, “Sociology has whored after the natural sciences from the start.” He goes on to belittle the work as obvious, unscientific, mechanical, and the product of a committee employing bad methodology. Because the tone of Schlesinger’s review is perhaps more significant than the content, quotation at length is appropriate:

Bursting onto university campuses after the war, overflowing with portentous if vague hints of mighty wartime achievements (not, alas, to be disclosed because of security), fanatical zeal and shameless in their claims, they persuaded or panicked many university administrations into giving their studies top priorities…. The idea of research by committee, six men always being accounted better than one and the responsibility being distributed like the credit lists in a Hollywood film….Well, the social science machinery has been grinding away for some years now….Most of *The American Soldier* is a ponderous demonstration in Newspeak….Indeed, one can find little in the 1200 pages of text and the innumerable surveys which

is not described more vividly and compactly, and with far greater psychological insight, in a small book entitled *Up Front* by Bill Mauldin. What Mauldin may have missed will turn up in the pages of Ernie Pyle. The authors of *The American Soldier* show a sporadic and apprehensive recognition of their lack of originality. ‘Social science,’ thus, does not discover; it systematizes through quantification and thereby places knowledge on a truly ‘scientific’ basis. The individual human experience is supposed to vanish away in the whirl of punch cards and IBM machines. As for history, the authors of *The American Soldier* have almost achieved the tour-de-force of writing about the American in World War II with practically no reference to the historical context from which he came. Its practitioners are in the stage of alchemy, not of chemistry.

Schlesinger allowed that the work was “harmless,” written with “modesty and clarity,” and acknowledges the usefulness of Research Branch to the Army. These, however, are the only words of praise he can muster.  

Robert D. Reid reviewed *The American Soldier* for *The Journal of Negro History*. Reid was one of the few reviewers to discuss the process which resulted in *The American Soldier*, namely the work of Research Branch during the war. “Complete cooperation did not always exist between policy makers and Research Branch. Much of the information was hastily compiled; some conclusions were reached from insufficient data, and there was hesitancy on occasions in making explicit recommendations.” Stouffer would have agreed with all of that, as he indicated in the first chapter of *The American Soldier*. Reid, after explaining some of the major findings in *The American Soldier* also, like many other reviewers, mentioned the length and complexity of the work. “It is the belief of this reviewer that the material in the volume could have been compressed into fewer pages by eliminating constant repetition,” he concluded.

382 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “The Statistical Soldier.” *The Partisan Review* vol. 16, no. 8 (August 1949): 852-856. *The American Soldier* is not, as Schlesinger wrote, a-historical. Although Stouffer was primarily concerned with recording findings made during the Second World War, he goes to considerable lengths to seat the World War II G.I. historically - particularly with reference to the First World War and the interwar years.
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review asked Richard A. Newhall to review The American Soldier. Newhall’s only complaint was that the work was too obvious. “To the laymen they often seem to labor the obvious, and to give statistical proof for something already taken for granted by men with army experience.” As if he was writing directly to Schlesinger, however, Newhall also commented that “occasionally they suggest an optimism as to what may be possible with improved techniques in social science which a skeptical historian may not share.” Newhall seemed to understand the work better than many of his contemporaries. He recognized that the purpose of what Research Branch did during the war was “to turn reluctant civilians into effective soldiers quickly,” and that “the army was primarily an instrument for fighting a war and only incidentally a sociological laboratory.” In other words, Newhall seems to have actually read and understood the first chapter of The American Soldier, wherein Stouffer repeatedly makes these same points.

Duke University military history professor Theodore Ropp wrote The American Soldier review for The South Atlantic Quarterly, and described the work as “the record of one of the lesser victories of the war, that of the professional pollsters over an originally hostile and skeptical United States Army.” While he noted that “in their solemn documentation of the obvious, they are beyond belief” he also praised the authors for their “transparent honesty.” To Ropp, who like other reviewers took issue with some of Research Branch’s methods, the authors of The American Soldier “amply proved one of their main contentions. It is possible to test a unit’s morale and to find and correct some of the factors which seriously affect its combat efficiency.”

Among the sociologists (Stouffer’s main audience), the most balanced review came from N. J. Demerath in *Social Forces*. Unlike Schlesinger, who said more could be gained from Bill Mauldin and Ernie Pyle than from *The American Soldier*, Demerath commented, “Much of the reading is as lively as Mauldin and Pyle, though much is necessarily tough going, too.” Demerath was tough on *The American Soldier* for weak theory and conceptualization - “One feels that even at this stage of our science, more might have been done with the data at hand” - length, complexity, and possibly unsuitable methodology, but he praised it for “imaginativeness, technical rigor, and important results.” He also noted that the book was “no mere rehash of Research Bureau [Branch] reports,” and judged the work “overpowering in its empirical reach and theoretic promise.” He ended his review with the salutary comment, “Social science is coming of age.”

The *American Sociological Review* ran two reviews of *The American Soldier*, the first by John W. Riley, Jr., considered the first volume of *The American Soldier, Adjustment during Army Life*. The second, by George Peter Murdock, dealt with the second volume, *Combat and Its Aftermath*. Riley’s review was overwhelmingly positive. One of the few reviewers who wrote directly about the authors, Riley characterized them as the top in their fields. “From this list, any university, starting from scratch, might easily select sociologists and social psychologists to form the strongest departments in these two fields.” He described *The American Soldier* as “one of the most significant publications in the social sciences during the last twenty years.” Riley was impressed with “the implications - for theory and methodology,” and implied that Research Branch had brought the Army and citizen-soldiers together: “The Army *qua* institution did adapt, and individuals *qua* soldiers did adjust.” Riley praised the methodology used by Research Branch and highlighted in *The American Soldier*, to include scaling techniques in constructing

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questionnaires, the efficacy of relative deprivation, and the recognition of the significance of
intervening variables as they relate to attitude formation. He was most impressed, however, with
consistency, which the historian Robert Reid misconstrued as repetitiveness for its own sake.
Riley also indicated that the work represented “a series of logically integrated monographs,”
unlike some other reviewers, notably Ethel Shanas, who did not believe the individual chapters
had been successfully integrated.

Murdock’s review of volume II was equally enthusiastic. Although Murdock by training
was an anthropologist, he worked at a time before the walls between the disciplines of
psychology, sociology, and anthropology had solidified. Unlike many other reviewers, Murdock
believed that The American Soldier was well balanced between empirical observation and
theory. “The authors steer a judicious course between the Scylla and Charybdis of social science
- elaboration of the trite to starboard and, on the port side, over-refinement of theory in relation
to the factual material controlled.” He dubbed The American Soldier “an intelligent
presentation,” and did not stop there. The book to him was “epoch-making,” and he recognized
the true function and value of Research Branch: “A military establishment which fully accepted
and acted upon the social science conclusions and implications of this and the companion
volumes could double the effectiveness of its armed forces.”

Ethel Shanas, writing for The American Journal of Sociology, was not convinced. She
believed The American Soldier was not only methodologically unsound and devoid of theory, but
also that it was downright harmful:

In one sense the publication of these volumes is unfortunate. Younger
scholars, impressed by the number and stature of its contributors, its
distinguished sponsors, and its size, may think that The American
Soldier represents ‘scientific’ sociology at its best. To use the method of
study in this work as the standard for social-psychological research would
be regrettable. In the main, the method of study demonstrated is the devising
and use of questionnaires to treat with separate and scattered matters, without the guidance of coherent theory or careful formulation of theoretical premises.

Shanas thought that *The American Soldier* had “no value” for either understanding behavior or sociological theory. The findings could not be extended beyond their immediate context, the methods used led to “spurious verification” of findings, and the work offered little of predictive value.385 Ever the acerbic wit, Gordon Allport, as he had done upon reading the Schlesinger review, sent Stouffer his appreciation of Shanas’ review:

> With one exception I have never read a more incompetent article in a technical journal than the Shanas review. Is she an undergraduate or a graduate student with a worms eye view of life and science? Like a cockroach she crawls along perceiving nothing in context or in relation. Her horizon is filled with fly specks and her soul with cinders.386

Allport’s own review of *The American Soldier* in *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* was predictably more positive. “Someday,” Allport wrote, “an historian of social science will be able to place this magnificent monographic report in proper perspective.” Allport attempts to do a bit of that himself, conjuring the days during the First World War “when a small handful of psychologists rattled around in the Sanitary Corps.” He goes, however, much further than that, labeling *The American Soldier* as something of an academic and political bellwether:

> I suspect that hereafter one can separate progressives and conservatives in social science according to their opinions of *The American Soldier*. Progressives will regard it as little less than a portent of salvation. Conservatives will say it is “nothing new” and thus conveniently rearrange the feathers of their professional complacency.

386 Gordon W. Allport to Samuel A. Stouffer. *Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence 1946-50*. Box Correspondence: A - American Statistical Association - Programs for Sessions HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. In the fullness of time regarding *The American Soldier*, Allport has proven to be more correct than Shanas.
Unlike Shanas, Allport believed that the study of the American soldier during World War II had yielded “a source book of information on contemporary American culture.” Allport also anticipated the major criticism of the work, “that they do not fully highlight their implications for social science.” He believed, however, “that the authors would have merited severer criticism if they had turned their immensely valuable source-book into an interpretive treatise. Far better to let each reader stretch his own mind and test his own views with the material presented.” He ended his review with a special note to historians: “never again, so it seems to me, can historians generalize as easily as some of them have in the past concerning the thoughts, feelings, or state of morale of troops, officers, or of the classes of society from which they are drawn.”

Nathan Glazer wrote the review for Commentary, with the telling title “The American Soldier’ as Science: Can Sociology Fulfil Its Ambitions?” Glazer, thoughtful and careful in his review, unfortunately went off the rails from the first sentence: “The ambition of American social science is to arrive at general laws of society and human behavior: laws that shall be as universal, as precise, and as useful as Newton’s.” While such an ambition was indeed in the minds of many mid-twentieth century American sociologists, it was not the ambition of Stouffer and his co-authors in The American Soldier. Glazer charges the authors with being obsessed with the physical sciences, slaves to committee work, unproductive of theory, careless in method, and mechanical in process. “Unquestionably,” Glazer wrote, “we have scientific method in The American Soldier….The question however remains, do we have an approach to the organized body of conclusions that form a science?” Glazer, in addition to his questions about science, was clearly suspicious of what he called “The Machines” - IBM machines which Stouffer used to calculate and collate the data he received from surveys. The machine, Glazer believed, had

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dictated “a large part of the contents of such a volume….And the clicking of these intricate machines so impressively resembles the cold, hard rhythm of real science!” The authors of The American Soldier, in Glazer’s mind, were comparable to Faust’s man searching for knowledge “‘With greedy hand he digs for treasures, and is happy when he finds earthworms.’” His final conclusion is that “rarely was so little useful information about so large a question spread over so many pages. All because the aim was science, not understanding; the mechanical and formal confining of knowledge, not the increase of it.”

In a letter to a colleague, Stouffer responded, uncharacteristically, with some pique about Glazer’s review:

I thought that Glazer’s review was quite a thoughtful job, even if many things which he said were just plain stupid….I think that we were overly modest in presenting some of our theoretical contributions. I think that our concept of relative deprivation, for instance, which Glazer treats quite condescendingly, is an extremely important general orientation. It perhaps should not be called a theory, and yet using it we were able to make a lot of predictions, some of which were quite contrary to common sense….I personally do not want to get involved in arguments with people about the merits or lack of merits of our stuff. In any case, I’m a prejudiced witness, and I do think that the fact that we tried to lean over backwards in the modesty of claims has resulted in our work not putting in the hands of those who would like to defend this type of work the best possible ammunition with which to meet the critics who represent a very different school of thought.

Writing for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Alfred McClung Lee introduced a new criticism of The American Soldier - it was inimical to

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democracy. “Let us hope,” Lee wrote, “that the consequences of this and similar studies for the military and for industry will be to strengthen social science rather than to strengthen authoritarian human engineering.” Lee clearly saw Research Branch and *The American Soldier* as instruments of the government, designed to turn American citizen-soldiers into automatons. He is chary in his language - Stouffer and his colleagues could “tell themselves that they were helping to make an authoritarian framework into one which would both work better to win the war and do less damage to the citizens temporarily wearing uniforms and through them to our democracy,” but his point is clear. Like other reviewers, he is also suspicious of “‘committee thinking,’” with all that that process implies. “‘Committee thinking’ places a premium on the plausible, the pat, and the salable.” His real problem with the work, however, remained his perception that “service to citizens in a democracy” through such organizations as Research Branch can become “service for those who temporarily control and who wish to control segments of our society.”

He was supremely suspicious of the lengths to which the government had gone to get citizen-soldiers to fight a world war.

Robert S. Lynd wrote the review of *The American Soldier* for *New Republic*, and he shared Lee’s concerns, as indicated by his title - “The Science of Inhuman Relations.” “These volumes,” Lynd wrote, “carry magnificent promise and serious threat,” the threat being that “these volumes depict science being used with great skill to sort out and to control men for purposes not of their own willing.” “Each advance in its [social science] use,” Lynd warned, “tends to make it an instrument of mass control, and thereby a further threat to democracy.” Punctuating his point, Lynd ended his review with the oracular words, “these dragon’s teeth may

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yet breed strife against the very values of democracy and peace for which they [citizen-soldiers] presumably fought.”

The final review of this sampling is from Paul F. Lazarsfeld, contributor to volume IV (Measurement and Prediction) of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Lazarsfeld began his extended (twenty-eight page) expository review in The Public Opinion Quarterly by hoodwinking his readers. Noting that many readers of The American Soldier found “that surveys only put into complicated form observations which are already obvious to everyone,” he listed some of the “common sense” ideas extant at the time The American Soldier was written:

Educated men are prone to neuropsychosis, men from rural areas adjust to army life better than those from the cities, southern soldiers adapted better to hot climates, white privates were more ambitious than their black counterparts, black soldiers preferred southern rather than northern white officers, and men wished to return to the States from overseas more before the war was over than after it. Anticipating the reader’s nod of approval and understanding (“why yes, of course, everyone knows these things are true”) Lazarsfeld then lowered the boom: “Every one of these statements is the direct opposite of what actually was found.” Having handily dispensed with the criticism of obviousness, Lazarsfeld then reviewed the basic themes of The American Soldier - among which are the significance of the primary group, the importance of frames of reference in determining attitudes (relative deprivation), and roles and positions in the army and their affect on attitudes. He then summarized the contents of each chapter of both volumes of

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The American Soldier, and concluded by asking where additional data such as that gathered in The American Soldier may be found. Lazarsfeld was clear on the shortcomings of The American Soldier in respect to theory and method, but reiterated that the job of Research Branch was one of social engineering in the context and with the urgency of a world war.\footnote{Paul F. Lazarsfeld. “The American Soldier - An Expository Review.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.13, no. 3 (Fall 1949): 377-404. There were of course other reviews of The American Soldier. One that is notable for the later prominence of its author is by Caspar Weinberger, whose review was overwhelmingly positive. (Caspar Weinberger. “A Study of the Adjustments to Army Life.” San Francisco Chronicle, June 5, 1949. 20).}

In 1950, Columbia sociologist Robert K. Merton joined Lazarsfeld in hosting a symposium on The American Soldier, the purpose of which was “to explore the nature of the social science terrain that has been opened up.”\footnote{Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds. Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier.” Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950.} Out of the symposium came an edited collection of contributor’s essays - Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier.” The book represents the final contemporaneous word on the structure, findings, and criticism of The American Soldier, and included essays by Edward Shils on primary groups, Merton and Alice Kitt on the theory of reference group behavior, Hans Speier on the sociology of military organization, Patricia Kendall and Lazarsfeld on survey analysis, Stouffer on his afterthoughts as contributor to The American Soldier, and Daniel Lerner on The American Soldier and the public. Continuities thoughtfully considered both The American Soldier itself and the initial criticism of the work, and was the first formal step in mining the “mine of data” provided in the work.

What then does all of this criticism tell us about Samuel A. Stouffer and The American Soldier? Firstly, The American Soldier was not a work of theory, despite the cries of sociologists and others who demanded it be one. As Stouffer, a survey researcher primarily concerned with empirical observation, repeated over and over in The American Soldier and other publications,
Research Branch was engaged in a social engineering task designed to equip conscripts to fight a modern world war. The data they gathered, summarized in The American Soldier, represented only the first step on the march toward theory, and while it offered findings and recommendations for further study, Stouffer did not ever intend it to be a theoretical work. Unfortunately, its lack of theory may have resulted in its relatively quick shelving - after the initial arguments over its efficacy. Like a dictionary or encyclopedia that is referenced less and less, what it has to say about attitude determination and soldier behavior over the years has become an echo rather than a shout.\(^{394}\)

Secondly, the comments of the reviewers tend to tell us more about the concerns of the military, historians, and sociologists at mid-twentieth century than they illuminate in detail The American Soldier. As such, they offer a valuable window of American society at that time: The cries for a shorter version of The American Soldier indicate impatience with scholarly literature, suspiciously arising simultaneously with the dominance of radio and the television. The claims of obviousness and the resistance to “the machine” indicate the loudness of the debate between scientific empirical research and the humanist approach to creating and understanding knowledge. The demands for theory shed light on a discipline trying to find itself.

Chapter 9

Epilogue

What then, do the lives of Samuel A. Stouffer and The American Soldier signify? - for books as well as men have lives, and often not perhaps the lives their authors intended. The previous chapters have suggested that the evolution of attitude research in the military, the mid-twentieth century apotheosis of which was The American Soldier, represented a fundamental shift in the way soldiers and the control of soldiers were viewed by society. Stouffer’s life ran concurrently with this sea change, the flow of which produced the volitional soldier - a being, and many of him, who had to be persuaded rather than flogged, considered rather than ignored, and managed by modern, scientific knowledge rather than led by intuition. American politicians and military officers were expected by the end of the Second World War not only to acknowledge their soldiers, but also to ask them about their thoughts, attitudes, and feelings, and to make policy relative to the answers. One article of faith which had been extant for centuries - that soldiers were primarily physical beings devoid of intellect or morals and well suited as transportation and employment devices for weapons - had been replaced by another, that victory, though not guaranteed by good morale, would with it be more assured. And moreover, that good morale could be gained by taking into account the attitudes of one’s soldiers, and that could only be done correctly by polling them scientifically.\footnote{See Alan Sheridan, trans. Michel Foucault, \textit{Discipline and Punish}. New York: Random House, 1977. 188. Foucault recounts that Grand Duke Mikhail of Russia (1878-1918) was quite pleased with his soldiers, with the notable exception that they breathed while standing at present-arms. (Doubtless such an attitude hastened His Grace’s death at the hands of Soviet revolutionaries). The example is not as extreme as it may seem, when one remembers the gulf of class separating officers and soldiers for most of recorded history. Wellington’s famous description of his soldiers as “scum” leaps to mind, as do draconian measures of military discipline common until the second half of the twentieth century.}

Myth, legend, impression, supposition, experience, tradition, and intuition as the total constituent parts of sociological knowledge would no longer do. The change was not confined to
the military, but as applied to the American Army in World War II, the invitation to mutiny assumed to accompany the production of modern knowledge (polls and surveys), and the rejection of modern knowledge which accompanied that idea, transformed as if by magic into polls and surveys to prevent mutiny - polls which were enumerated, analyzed, summarized, and to some extent sanctified by *The American Soldier*. Reluctance to survey became acquiescence and finally enthusiasm at the high rate of speed that attends change during wartime, and as much as research on the atomic bomb, indicated the lengths to which the US Government was willing to go to equip its soldiers to fight a modern war - and perhaps what it was not willing to do as well. World War I had brought concerns to democracies regarding the brutalizing properties of war. One way to avoid brutalizing one’s soldiers was to show concern for their opinions and attitudes. In practice, those opinions and attitudes were projected onto American soldiers by Progressives such as Raymond B. Fosdick, and the superego of American society ended up stressing morals rather than morale, as we have seen. Still, by the end of the First World War, Fosdick had identified the traditional, authoritarian way of managing soldiers as hopelessly anachronistic, and also as morale issue number one. Also by the end of the war, measurement had become the way to produce sociological knowledge. Pronouncements by great men, such

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397 Michael D. Pearlman. *Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. 189. Woodrow Wilson commented that “to fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life.” The war itself, of course, was a signal that the old ways of doing business were sadly lacking.

398 Jessie Bernard. “A Woman’s Twentieth Century,” in *Authors of Their Own Lives: Intellectual Biographies of Twenty American Sociologists*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 331. “World War I had enormously stimulated growth in measuring instruments. I was in the audience when L.L. Thurstone told us that even attitudes could be measured (1929).”
as that of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, that “Men must live straight if they are to shoot straight,” were no longer sufficient.  

By the end of the Second World War, attitudes had changed so radically that a popular and successful American general was excoriated for slapping a soldier, and the execution of another soldier for cowardice and desertion - the first such execution in the United States since the Civil War - touched off a major controversy. Also by the end of World War II, the United States had amassed a huge bureaucracy to prosecute the war, part of which was the first ever branch of specialists to study soldier attitudes and recommend policies based on their findings. Historian John Madge wrote in The Origins of Scientific Sociology, “With the United States precipitated into World War II, the full range of talents was inevitably mobilized.” While one may question the precipitation and the inevitability, one cannot argue the fact of Research Branch nor its significance. A sea change had occurred.

And then there was the issue of numbers. Fosdick had some help, both literally and figuratively, from The Masses, a socialist magazine which as early as 1916 was lampooning the old, authoritarian view of soldiers:

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400 The general was of course George S. Patton, and there were actually two incidents, the first on August 3, 1943, and the second a week later. See Max Hastings, ed. The Oxford Book of Military Anecdotes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 430-432. For a contemporaneous report see “Patton’s Slap.” Newsweek, December 6, 1943. 60-64. For the most thoughtful account of the execution, see William Bradford Huie. The Execution of Private Slovik. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1954.


While *The Masses* was shut down temporarily in 1917 by the government for undermining conscription, the masses themselves could not be denied. There they were, the nation in arms: well over three million draftees, over six times the number Napoleon had
marched into Russia a century before. Three million conscripts, all of whom had grown up in a republic with the creed if not the reality of sacred individualism and democratic principles. How could they be merely ordered and whipped into combat without rebelling? Some accommodation had to take place between the state and its soldiers, which began with aptitude tests and sing-alongs and lots of sports in the First World War, and progressed to the survey research of the eight million men in the US Army of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{402} And while intuition and the Articles of War, military discipline and the will of the commander were not completely left behind, they no longer, in themselves, comprised the \textit{sine qua non} of leadership, a leadership that was becoming more and more to resemble \textit{management}. Max Weber would describe such a change as traditional authority, derived from custom, myth, and legend, and wielded by kings and priests, evolving into rational authority, derived from rules, bureaucratic procedures, and systems administered by specialists. After the First World War political and military patricians, acting out of their noble instincts, no longer completely controlled the discourse of authority.

Change such as this took place in a national and international context, and the velocity of change in social science had never been so rapid as it was during Stouffer’s lifetime. Social science was not slouching, but rather leaping towards empiricism. Sociology in the United States had found its professional sea-legs in the flood of organization that broke in the late nineteenth-century. The professions in those days were frenetically solidifying, and the unfortunately acronymed American Sociological Society formed in 1905, when the similarly precariously named Andrew Samuel Stouffer was five years old. It is not a stretch then to say that American sociology and Stouffer grew up together. (Stouffer, when old enough to understand the implication, insisted on a reversal of his first and middle names, just as the A.S.S. later changed

\footnote{What doubts remained about the wisdom of surveying one’s soldiers were challenged by the Army morale crisis of the summer of 1941 - highlighted by the “Over the Hill in October” campaign and the Railey Report - and quieted somewhat by the early successes of Research Branch.}
its name to the American Sociological Association). While the professions were institutionalizing and business was pursuing efficiency, the United States was quivering on the edge of its first empire. All of this activity contributed to the intangible sense that developments needed to be understood, controlled, counted, measured - managed. Order was the order of the day, and while men still sought to understand the world as they had in the past, this understanding was to come through observation and measurement rather than through received wisdom. Science, science, and science.

Their was the culmination of a long journey. When Lester Frank Ward rose to address The American Sociological Society as its first president in 1906, his speech had the tenor of Mark Antony’s funeral oration in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*. “I do not propose,” he said, “on this occasion to enter into any defense of the claims of sociology to be called a science.” He then proceeded to state that not only did sociology have every reasonable claim as a science, but at its inception it was in fact superior to well-established sciences which had all proven to be founded on theories later discarded. He gleefully mentioned phlogiston in reference to chemistry, and the major reversals in astronomy as examples. “No science,” he declared, “was absolutely fixed,” but “the place of sociology among the sciences has been definitely fixed.” Ward’s address was entitled “The Establishment of Sociology.” Sociology had arrived, and it was a science. Science of course, is based on observation and measurement, a fact well known to the Chicago School of Sociology, who inscribed on their building Lord Kelvin’s dictum, “When you cannot

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measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory.” Stouffer’s tool of measurement was the survey.

During his graduate years, Stouffer encountered at the University of Chicago the ideas that would give primacy in policy making to facts rather than intuition. Frederick Winslow Taylor summed up this change succinctly in his *magnum opus* of 1911, *The Principles of Scientific Management*: “In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first.” Stouffer simply took Taylor one step further - his idea being to create and use a system to understand men and their behaviors and attitudes. As remembered by one of Stouffer’s colleagues, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Stouffer’s “academic life coincided with the development of empirical social research in the United States.” The reflex to dig through census records for demographic information and social conclusions was to transform into asking specific questions to answer specific problems - survey research - in part due to Stouffer’s efforts.

While many sociologists, including Stouffer, were partially motivated by catholic interests, they also believed fervently that for sociology to be a true science, it had to commit itself to developing theories based on sound methodologies. Stouffer made this requirement abundantly clear in *The American Soldier*:

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410 Martin Bulmer. *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. 179. See also Jean M. Converse. *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence, 1890-1960*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 70. Stouffer was a member of the elite, and because much of his work was directed at the masses, he might have been taken for perhaps a bit Bolshie by other elites. That he was not is a tribute to his search for the truth, rather than an attempt to ply a socialist agenda. His identity as a newspaper editor - a position requiring the most rigorous confirmation of facts, remained with him throughout his life.
If one were to attempt to sum up the experience in the Research Branch and in the preparation of these volumes, in terms of its indications for the future needs of social science, one might make the following points:

1. Social science requires theories, at least of some limited generality, which can be operationally formulated such that verification is possible, and from which predictions can be made successfully to new specific instances.

2. Such theories demand that the objects of study be isolated and accurately described, preferably by measurement.

3. Once the variables are identified, the test of the adequacy of the theory, in comparison with alternative theories, must be rigorous, preferably evidenced by controlled experiment, and preferably replicated.411

For American sociology as a whole and for survey research in particular - a huge part of American sociology - Stouffer’s influence cannot be overstated. “At the turn of the twentieth century,” Sara Igo observed in her 2007 The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the making of a Mass Public, “surveys were the province of statisticians, social reformers, the federal Census Bureau, and scattered businessmen and entrepreneurs. By the century’s end, social scientific methods, findings, and vocabularies were omnipresent. What had been quite unfamiliar several generations earlier had become as natural - and invisible - as the air Americans breathed.” The American Soldier, and the work Samuel Stouffer and Research Branch did to produce it, stands in the middle of the twentieth century as a defining waypoint in the trend of American sociology Igo highlights. The American Soldier was the beneficiary of works such as The Polish Peasant and Middletown which came before it, and was the precursor to the later work of Kinsey, Gallup, Roper, and scores of political, sociological, and market research organizations. Stouffer helped to change the language of social inquiry from that of

intuition and supposition to that of science. Every time one hears or reads of surveys, polls and pollsters, Stouffer is in the background, informing their work.412

In 1949, the same year that Stouffer published *The American Soldier*, Republic Pictures released “The Sands of Iwo Jima,” starring John Wayne as Sergeant John M. Stryker. It would be pleasingly symmetrical to report that *The American Soldier* and Sergeant Stryker have been at war ever since, as their portrayals of American servicemen in World War II could not possibly be more dissimilar. Hollywood’s heroism, personified by the grizzled Stryker, shows little resemblance to the American soldier of *The American Soldier*, a draftee who was there because he had to be, or a regular non-commissioned officer who sometimes did not demonstrate initiative, much less heroism. The fact is that in the popular imagination in particular, Stryker quickly defeated Stouffer - yet for those who seek a more realistic picture of not only the American soldier but also of America itself in World War II, *The American Soldier* remains a touchstone. If *The American Soldier* demonstrates anything, is demonstrates that the American military is, as are all militaries, inextricably linked to the society from which it comes.413

It has become fashionable for historians to “complicate” history - to attempt to show the nuance, contingency, chaos, contradiction, and unpredictability in historical dynamics. Part of this movement has been to write history from the “bottom up,” in an attempt to show “identity” and “agency” in the lives of ordinary people. Sometimes such approaches, interpretations, arguments, and agendas have led to thesis-driven and agenda-laden works which smack not only


of fights between historians but also of condescension to one’s subjects. Works such as *The American Soldier*, a history not written by historians, but rather a massive primary document, can aid the historian and the general reader in understanding both the complexity of the human condition as well as the idea that few need to be *given* identity and agency by the historian. Attorneys would say of *The American Soldier*, *res ipsa loquitur* - the thing speaks for itself. If read, it is *the* corrective for two-dimensional histories of America in World War II. Written between 1945 -1949, it gives not only a valuable picture of America during the war, but also reflects the concerns of American social science emerging from that conflict and into the nuclear age. And while introductions and analyses such as this one hopefully are of some value in furthering knowledge by bringing a contemporary perspective to the work, there is no substitute for time with *The American Soldier*. 
Appendix

Et. Al: The Co-Authors of *The American Soldier*

Stouffer’s name has become so reflexively associated with *The America Soldier* it is easy to forget that he had a strong supporting cast of co-authors; all of whom worked with him in Research Branch during World War II. Most all of the co-authors - Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Robin M. Williams, Jr., Irving L. Janis, M. Brewster Smith, Leland C. Devinney, Shirley A. Star, Edward A. Suchman, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Marion Harper Lumsdaine - had distinguished and influential careers after the war. Their work in bringing social science and survey research to what had been largely an area of thought governed by intuition, and the willingness of the military to modify its thinking based on their work is a testimony to their influence both during and after the war. Their later prominence also reflects their influence well beyond the military. Cottrell and Williams served as president of the American Sociological Association and Smith as president of the American Psychological Association. Cottrell and DeVinney took positions at the Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundations (respectively), and of the remaining seven co-authors, six held positions at one or several top American universities. To consider Research Branch and *The American Soldier* without them, or vice-versa, would be the last thing Stouffer would want.

The co-authors were relatively young when they undertook their labors in the War Department, and three of them - DeVinney, Smith, and Williams - served in Research Branch in uniform. In 1943 their average age was only thirty, with Cottrell at forty-four the oldest and Smith at twenty-four the youngest. Their PhD’s came from Chicago, Columbia, Harvard and Stanford, earned between 1933 and 1950. Williams and DeVinney earned their PhD’s during the war, and five of the nine co-authors earned theirs after the war - making them graduate students
under Stouffer during their time in Research Branch. His influence, as well as that of the experience of working in Washington DC during the war itself, had a profound affect on them for the remainder of their careers.\textsuperscript{414}

The \textit{milieu} Stouffer established at Research Branch was intellectually rigorous, challenging, and exciting. A newspaperman who thrived on data and deadlines, Stouffer, as one Research Branch worker remembered, “would give you a problem of concern to someone somewhere in the War Department, and you would pursue it all the way from the first perplexity to the final report….I felt that nowhere else in America could I have been part of such an important group.” As Jean Converse summed up the atmosphere in \textit{Survey Research in the United States}, Research Branch “did the course…they interviewed, coded, ran the machines, constructed the tables, wrote the reports.” Stouffer ran Research Branch with a sense of urgency, and such an intense atmosphere could not fail to be productive of bonds that would long outlast the war.\textsuperscript{415}

Cottrell and Williams provide a good example of the intertwining nature of Research Branch alumni. Even before the war ended, negotiations were beginning for postwar employment. Cottrell wanted Williams to join him at Cornell, and Stouffer, still planning on returning to the University of Chicago, wanted Williams to join him there. In the end Williams opted for Cornell. Cottrell asked Stouffer to write an official appraisal of Williams, which Stouffer did, noting the loss to Chicago. By 1948, Suchman had also joined Cottrell and Williams at Cornell. This sort of activity was common among Research Branch alumni in the decades following the war. They used their influence and connections to help one another, and


like spokes through the hub of a wheel, their connections often ran through Stouffer. To consider briefly their individual biographies is to see more clearly the influence of Stouffer and *The American Soldier*.  

Leonard Slater “Slats” Cottrell, Jr. (1899-1985): Cottrell wrote chapter twelve, volume II, “The Aftermath of Hostilities,” and together with Stouffer wrote chapter thirteen, volume II, “The Soldier Becomes a Veteran.” Born in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Cottrell completed his undergraduate work at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (pre-med) in 1922, and went on to earn a master’s degree (sociology) at Vanderbilt (1926) and a PhD in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1933. It was in Chicago that he met Stouffer, and served as one of the judges of the data for Stouffer’s doctoral dissertation, while also serving as a probation officer. A few years later, Cottrell joined Stouffer in the sociology faculty at Chicago before accepting an assistant professorship at Cornell. He was appointed professor of sociology at Cornell in 1938, a post in which he served until 1951 - with time off of course for his work in Research Branch during the war. During his last four years at Cornell, he served as Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. From 1952-1967 he worked for the Russell Sage Foundation as Secretary and then Director of Research. From 1968-1972 he served as a visiting professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, from whence he retired. His academic interests included juvenile delinquency, family interactions, and self-development. He died at his home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Cottrell was the chief of Research Branch’s Survey Section, one of the chief analysts of the European and Mediterranean Theaters for Research Branch, and along with Stouffer, Leland C. DeVinney, and Carl I. Hovland, served as a member of the technical subcommittee for the writing of *The American Soldier*. He was also one of the select few of Research Branch to begin, in the summer of 1946, the conversion of the data gained by the branch during the war into the volumes of *The American Soldier*.\(^\text{417}\)

Cottrell served as the fortieth president of the American Sociological Association (1950), delivering an address on “Some Neglected Problems in Social Research” to the Association in September of that year. His publications include *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (with Ernest W. Burgess - 1939), and *American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age* (with Sylvia Eberhardt -1948). Frederick H. Osborn, head of the Army Information and Education Division, of which Research Branch was a part, wrote the foreword for the latter. In 1955 Cottrell published, with Nelson N. Foote, *Identity and Interpersonal Competence*. He also served with the New Deal Federal Emergency Relief and Works Progress Administrations during the Depression, and as a member of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council from 1944-1952. After the war he remained close to the military, serving as Chairman of the Department of Defense’s Advisory Group on Unconventional and Psychological Warfare (1952-1953), and also as a science advisor for the Air Force (1954-1958). Additionally, he sat on the Army Scientific Advisory Panel (1956-1958), in 1957 published with J.W. Riley, Jr. “Research for Psychological Warfare” in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and in 1960 published “Social Research and Psychological Warfare” in *Sociometry*. He served as president of the Sociological

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Robin Murphy Williams, Jr. (1914 - 2006): Together with Stouffer and Shirley Star, Williams wrote volume I, chapter ten “Negro Soldiers,” and with M. Brewster Smith wrote volume II, chapter two “General Characteristics of Ground Combat.” Williams was born in Hillsborough, North Carolina, and by the time he was nineteen in 1933 had his BS degree from North Carolina State College. Two years later he had an MS from the University of North Carolina, which he followed with a year of graduate study at Cornell (1935-1936) as a teaching fellow in the Department of Rural Sociology. An MA from Harvard followed in 1939, and he completed his PhD there in 1943. After the war Williams returned to Cornell, where he remained until 1985, and where he served as the Director of Cornell’s Social Science Research Center from 1949-1954. He remained active at Cornell as an emeritus professor until 2003, and from 1990 until his death in 2006 split his time between Cornell and the University of California at Irvine. He died at Irvine Regional Hospital of complications from heart surgery.
Williams’ service with Research Branch during World War II included a posting to the European Theater, where in addition to his duties as senior statistical analyst surveying Army and Air Corps personnel in Britain, he accompanied Infantry troops through Belgium and into Germany from Normandy. The experience affected him deeply, and he later wrote about it in Social Psychology Quarterly, in an article entitled “Field Observations and Surveys in Combat Zones.” He also took a look back at his experience in Research Branch and the writing of The American Soldier forty years after The American Soldier was published, contributing to Public Opinion Quarterly “The American Soldier: An Assessment, Several Wars Later” in 1989.

Immediately after the war - even before The American Soldier was published - Williams had written “Some Observations on Sociological Research in Government during the War” for the American Sociological Review, based on his experiences in Research Branch. Williams maintained both his interest in the military and his contacts with Research Branch colleagues. In 1953 he co-authored “Student Reaction to Impending Military Service” for the American Sociological Review with The American Soldier co-author Edward A. Suchman, and Rose K. Goldsen. In 1958 Williams collaborated with Stouffer and The American Soldier co-author Shirley A. Star on “Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies” for Readings in Social Psychology, and in 1962 wrote “Are Americans and Their Cultural Values Adaptable to the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?” for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Like Cottrell and Stouffer, Williams served as president of the American Sociological Association, delivering “Continuity and Change in Sociological Study” as his presidential address in 1958. He also published over 150 books, articles and chapters during his career. Among his more significant works are The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (1947), Strangers
Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities (1964), which he co-authored with John P. Dean and The American Soldier co-author Edward A. Suchman, three editions of American Society: A Sociological Interpretation (1951, 1960, and 1970), and The Wars Within: Peoples and States in Conflict (2003). He was a member of the National Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and also served as president of the Eastern Sociological Association, for whom he founded and edited Sociological Forum. His interests ran towards group conflict and cooperation, race relations, and peace and war. At the time of his death he was teaching a course at Irvine entitled “Altruism and Cooperation.”

Mahlon Brewster Smith (1919 - ): Smith co-wrote volume II, chapter two “General Characteristics of Ground Combat” with Robin Williams, Jr., and wrote alone volume II chapter three “Combat Motivations among Ground Troops.” He also wrote volume II chapter five “The

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M. Brewster Smith was born in Syracuse, New York. Still a graduate student when he went to work for Stouffer in Research Branch, he gained his PhD in social psychology from Harvard in 1947. (His BA and MA came from Stanford, in 1939 and 1940). After the war Smith took successive academic positions at Vassar, New York University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California (Berkeley and Santa Cruz). He retired in 1988, but has remained active; pursuing his interests in definitions of self, political opinions, and the joint between society and individual personality.

Smith, like Cottrell, worked immediately after the war to begin the process of converting Research Branch data into what would become *The American Soldier*. He also found time during that period to write “The Differential Impact of Selective Service Inductions on Occupations in the United States” for the *American Sociological Review*. His work with Research Branch during the war was as an analyst in the Experimental Section under Carl I. Hovland, although he had originally come to Washington DC as a junior analyst for the Office of Coordinator of Information in 1941. In 1984, Smith wrote for *Social Psychology Quarterly* “The American Soldier and Its Critics: What Survives the Attack on Positivism,” and he retains his interest in the position of the military in the body politic and in the significance of *The American Soldier*.

Smith served as president of the American Psychological Association in 1978, and chose for the topic of his presidential address “Perspectives on Selfhood.” He also served on the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1952-1956), as director of Berkeley’s Institute of Human Development (1965-1968), as vice-chancellor for social sciences at UC Santa Cruz (1970-1975), and as president of the Western Psychological Association (1986). His major


Irving Lester Janis (1918 - 1990): Janis wrote volume II, chapter four, “Problems Related to the Control of Fear in Combat,” volume II, chapter seven, “Morale Attitudes of Combat Flying Personnel in the Air Corps,” and volume II, chapter eight, “Objective Factors Related to Morale Attitudes in the Aerial Combat Situation.” Janis was born in Buffalo, New York. He received a BS from the University of Chicago in 1939 and his PhD in psychology from Columbia in 1948. Before Janis was drafted into the Army, he analyzed fascist propaganda with Harold Lasswell in Washington DC, and afterwards he went to work for Stouffer in Research Branch. At the urging of Carl Hovland, he joined the faculty at Yale in 1947, and remained there.

until his retirement in 1985. Janis then moved to the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked in the psychology department until his death of lung cancer at his home in Santa Rosa.

Janis worked in the Experimental Section of Research Branch under Carl I. Hovland, and in the European Theater. He also joined the small staff who in 1946 began to prepare the data gathered by Research Branch into what would become *The American Soldier*, while simultaneously working as a research associate for the Social Science Research Council and as a research fellow at Yale, as well as publishing “Psychodynamic Aspects of Adjustment to Army Life.” in *Psychiatry* in 1945. From 1948-1960, Janis was a research consultant for RAND, for whom he wrote *The Psychological Impact of Air Attacks* in 1949, the same year *The American Soldier* was published. During these years he continued to write on military themes and publish with Research Branch colleagues, particularly Hovland. In 1951 he published *Air War and Emotional Stress*, based on his earlier work for RAND, and together and with Hovland and H.H. Kelly, *Communication and Persuasion* in 1953. The following year he wrote and presented *Psychological Effects of Atomic Bombing* for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Throughout his careers at both Yale and Berkeley, Janis remained interested in decision-making, conflict and conflict resolution, and crisis management. His most famous work is without a doubt *Victims of Groupthink*, (1972), which was released ten years later as simply *Groupthink*. The title has entered into common speech, and refers to the tendency of groups to value consensus over sound decisions. Janis continued to write until shortly before his death, publishing *Crucial Decisions* in 1989. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Academy of Behavioral Medicine Research. M. Brewster Smith co-authored his obituary for *American Psychologist*. 421

Shirley Ann Star (1918 - 1976): Star wrote volume I, chapter nine, “The Orientation of Soldiers toward the War,” and with Robin Williams and Stouffer wrote volume I, chapter ten, “Negro Soldiers.” She also wrote volume II, chapter nine, “Psychoneurotic Symptoms in the Army,” and volume II, chapter ten, “Problems of Rotation and Reconversion.” Star was born in Chicago, and earned her BA (1939) and PhD (1950) at the University of Chicago. She also earned an AA in computer data processing from Merritt Community College, Oakland, California, in 1972. After her work with Research Branch, Star returned to the University of Chicago as a senior study director for the National Opinion Research Center (1947-1960). She then took two years with Johns Hopkins as an associate professor of mental hygiene in the School of Hygiene and Public Health, followed by two years as an independent consultant in research design. Returning to Chicago in 1964, she spent her next two years as a project director for the University of Chicago’s Center for Urban Studies. From 1966-1968, she lectured in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. After another few years as a consultant on research design, she accepted a position as a senior research associate at the Bureau of Social


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Science Research in 1973. While attending a meeting in the bureau’s Washington DC offices in 1976, she suffered a heart attack and died at George Washington Hospital.

Star initially turned down a position in Research Branch, writing to Stouffer in June of 1942 that she feared the low salary, the expense of living in Washington DC, and most importantly, that she would be consigned to clerical work. When she did finally accept, later that year, Stouffer assigned her to the Survey Section of Research Branch, and he also kept her on to do the initial work that would turn the results of 500,000 individual surveys and hundreds of reports into *The American Soldier*.

Although Star’s interests turned towards race relations and mental health, and she did not publish with the frequency of many of her Research Branch colleagues, she did in 1958 contribute, along with Stouffer and Williams to *Readings in Social Psychology*, with an essay entitled “Negro Platoons in White Companies.” She also, as did many of her Research Branch colleagues, stayed in close contact with Stouffer, and sought him out for advice and counsel - particularly concerning employment. Her published works include a 1956 pamphlet, *Psychiatry, the Press, and the Public*, which she wrote with others for the American Psychiatric Association, and she collaborated with others on *The Midway Office: An Experiment in the Coordination of Work Groups* (1972). Star also was associate editor for *Sociometry* (1956-1963) and *Social Problems* (1958-1961), and advisory editor for *Sociological Methodology*. Among the clients for whom she consulted were the National Science Foundation, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, the US Census Bureau, and the California Department of Public Health.\(^\text{422}\)

Edward Allen Suchman (1915 - 1969): Suchman wrote volume I, chapter two “The Old Army and the New,” along with Leland C. DeVinney and Stouffer. He also wrote volume I, chapter six, “Social Mobility in the Army,” and with Devinney and Stouffer, volume I, chapter eight, “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control.” Suchman was born in New York and gained his BA at Cornell in 1936 and his MA there in 1937. He earned his PhD at Columbia in 1947. Just prior to the war he was a research assistant for Princeton’s Radio Research Project, and continued that work at Columbia’s Office of Radio Research, where he was executive officer and research director from 1940 to 1942. He joined Stouffer at Research Branch in 1942, remaining there until 1946, and returned to Cornell as a professor of sociology in 1947, where he remained until 1958, when he became New York’s Department of Health Director of Social Science Activities (1958-1963). Suchman finished his career as a professor of sociology at the University of Pittsburg, remaining there from 1963 until his death.

Suchman arrived in Washington DC in 1942 to work in the Survey Section of Research Branch - well after he had published “Who Answers Questionnaires?” in the Journal of Applied Psychology (1940) - and remained in Washington through most of 1946 to collaborate on the initial stages of The American Soldier. He was also allowed by Columbia to use the portion of The American Soldier which he wrote as his PhD dissertation. Like Star and most other members of Research Branch, Suchman stayed in close touch with Stouffer, and remained interested in the

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work all of them had done during the war. When the next war arrived, Suchman joined with *The American Soldier* co-author Robin Williams and Rose K. Goldsen to write “Attitudes toward the Korean War” for *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and in the same year (1953), collaborated with the same authors for “Student Reaction to Impending Military Service,” published in the *American Sociological Review*. Eleven years later he worked with Williams again, and others, on *Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities*.

Suchman’s post war interests ran towards public health. He served as a consultant to both the US Public Health Service and Puerto Rico’s Department of Health. From 1959-1963 he was a member of the Association for the Aid of Crippled Children’s Advisory Committee, and he also served from 1960-1963 on the New York City Mayor’s Committee on Narcotics Addiction. His many publications include *An Introduction to Social Research* (1954), which he assisted in editing, *Occupations and Values* (with Morris Rosenberg and Rose K. Goldsen, 1958), and *Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs* (1967), published by the Russell Sage Foundation.423

Leland C. DeVinney (1906 - 1998): DeVinney wrote volume I, chapter two, “The Old Army and the New” with Stouffer and Suchman, and volume I chapter three “How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army - Preliminary Considerations,” with Stouffer. He also wrote

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volume I chapter four “How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army - by Background Characteristics of the Soldiers” with Stouffer, and volume I chapter five “How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army - by Type of Experience in the Army,” also with Stouffer. Additionally, he wrote volume I, chapter eight “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control” with Stouffer and Suchman. Leland C. DeVinney earned his BA at Albion College in 1931, his MA at the University of Wisconsin two years later, and his PhD at the University of Chicago in 1941. He spent 1941-1942 as a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, joining Research Branch in January 1943 first as its executive officer and later as military chief of branch. He also supervised Mediterranean Theater research and for a short time served in Cairo, undertaking studies of Iran and Egypt. (DeVinney, along with Janis and Smith, made up the three *The American Soldier* co-authors who served in uniform during the war).

DeVinney was among those Stouffer chose at the end of the war to help prepare Research Branch materials for publication. He then accompanied Stouffer to Harvard as the first associate director of Stouffer’s Laboratory of Social Relations, and served on the technical committee, along with Stouffer, Cottrell, and Carl I. Hovland, for *The American Soldier*. In 1948 he went to work for the Rockefeller Foundation, first as Assistant Director of Social Sciences (1948-1950), then as Associate Director (1950-1962), and finally as Deputy Director of the Humanities and Social Sciences. He retired from Rockefeller in 1971, and maintained a private life thereafter, occasionally doing consulting work. He corresponded with Stouffer until shortly before Stouffer’s death in 1960. DeVinney’s publications include, with Earl S. Johnson, “General Introductory Courses in the Social Sciences” for *American Sociological Review* (1942).424

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Arthur Allen Lumsdaine (1913 - 1989): Arthur Lumsdaine wrote volume II, chapter one “Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat” with Stouffer and Marion Harper Lumsdaine. Arthur Lumsdaine was born in Seattle, earned his BS at the University of Washington in 1937, and his PhD at Stanford in 1949. He was an instructor of psychology at Stanford (1939-1940), and Princeton (1940-1946), and worked with Stouffer and Research Branch from 1942-1946. After the war he held a research assistant professorship at Yale (1946-1949) and then took on duties at the US Air Force Human Resources and Personnel Training Research Center as a research scientist and laboratory director from 1949-1958. Following his work with the Air Force, Lumsdaine worked for a year as a visiting professor of psychology at the University of California at Berkeley, and then for two years as a program director for the American Institute for Research in Pittsburg. He returned to California and took up a post as a professor of education at the University of California Los Angeles in 1960, where he remained until 1965. In that year, he returned to the University of Washington, where he served as professor of psychology and education until 1971. Lumsdaine remained a faulty member at the University of Washington until his retirement in 1981.

Lumsdaine worked as a chief analyst in the Experimental Section of Research Branch, as well as in the European Theater Branch. He also, immediately after the war, worked on experimental studies at Yale with Carl I. Hovland and Frederick D. Sheffield - work that was eventually published in volume III of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Experiments*.
on Mass Communication (1949). (Star and Suchman, along with Stouffer and others, co-authored the fourth and final volume of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Measurement and Prediction - 1950). Additionally, Lumsdaine’s nine years working with the US Air Force Human Resources and Personnel Training Research Center, where he began as the Chief of the Audio-Visual Research Division, are evidence of his continued interest in military studies.425

Lumsdaine consulted for the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Battelle Human Affairs Resource Center, and the Population Study Center, among many other institutions, both public and private. His publications include Learning from Films (1958) - a work resulting from his collaboration with Mark May at the Yale Motion Picture Research Project - Brain Function and Learning, (editor) with Donald B. Lindsley (1967), which came out of studies he had done jointly with UCLA’s Brain Research Institute and the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and Evaluation and Experiment: Some Critical Issues in Assessing Social Programs (editor) with Carl A. Bennett (1975). He also served as the media editor for Contemporary Psychology (1959-1967). In 1984 he looked back on his work in Research Branch for Social Psychology Quarterly with “Experiments in Wartime and Thereafter,” in which he discussed the beginnings of field experiments on mass communication during the war.

Throughout his career Lumsdaine remained interested in systems as well as people and methodology.

Marion Harper Lumsdaine (1913 - 2001): Marion Lumsdaine wrote volume II, chapter one “Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat” along with Stouffer and Arthur Lumsdaine. There is little public information on Marion Lumsdaine, *nee* Marion Rebecca Harper. She was born in Seattle and attended the University of Washington, and she earned her MA in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1936. She worked in the Survey Section of Research Branch as a chief analyst, and also in the European Theater Branch, and helped to prepare the raw data gained during the war for inclusion in *The American Soldier*. In 1945 she married Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and returned with him later in life to Seattle, where she died.426

Although each chapter in *The American Soldier* has named authors, the authors themselves, as well as the technical team of Stouffer, Cottrell, Devinney, and Hovland were quick to point out the contributions of other authors and members of Research Branch to their individual chapters. Each chapter of *The American Soldier* opens with a footnote identifying not only the author or authors proper of the chapter, but also those whose work was most critical to the chapter. A typical footnote of this type reads, “This chapter was written by Shirley A. Star, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Samuel A. Stouffer. In addition to the authors, analysts who did major work in this area include Lyonel C. Florant, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. Dean Manheimer, William W. McPeak, Arnold M. Rose, and Robert N. Ford.”427

When one considers that Research Branch had, as listed in *The American Soldier*, 134 people working in it or consulting for it during the war, many later to become prominent - such as John Dollard, Frank Stanton, and Robert Merton - the influence on and through such people of Stouffer and Research Branch becomes apparent. Of the authors of *The American Soldier* proper, four (Stouffer, Cottrell, Suchman, and Williams) were as early as 1950 judged by the

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427 *TAS* vol. I, 486.
Sociological Research Association to be “major sociologists,” or some of the most influential men in their field.\footnote{Howard W. Odum, \textit{American Sociology: The Story of Sociology in the United States through 1950}. New York: Greenwood Press, 1951. 381-383. Included also in this list were Research Branch participants John A. Clausen, Louis Guttman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Donald Young, and Kimball Young.}

Of the co-authors of \textit{The American Soldier}, none had a greater impression made on them by Stouffer than M. Brewster Smith and Robin M. Williams, Jr. Their recollections of him paint a vivid picture of a conscientious man who was working very hard during the war to overcome intuition with science, give a valuable glimpse into his personality, and demonstrate his influence. Smith remembers the chief author of \textit{The American Soldier} as a man who internalized an image of himself from his newspaper editing days in Iowa as \textit{The Front Page}. The ruffled clothes, the ashes, the eternal cigarette… He was a good fit for the director of Research Branch… lots of chutzpah, enormous energy, indefatigable, lots of imagination, always trying to promote his officers meteorically for the good of the work.\footnote{Jean M. Converse, \textit{Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence, 1890-1960}. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 169. “He was enormously enthusiastic,” Converse wrote, “with a walk that was almost a run, a capacity to stay up most of the night feeding punch cards into the counter-sorter, and a passion for social science data.” Sociologist Herbert Hyman confirmed these impressions: “Despite the sociological overlay, Stouffer never lost the look, straight talk, and breakneck tempo of the proverbial reporter. Jacket off, shirtsleeves rolled up, cigarette dangling from his mouth, ashes strewn all over his vest from chain-smoking, bleary-eyed from lack of sleep and working through the night against a deadline - such colorful eccentricities are relevant, albeit not crucial, to explaining his influence on the staff.” (Herbert H. Hyman. \textit{Taking Society’s Measure: A Personal History of Survey Research}. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991). 81.}

Williams confirmed Smith’s impressions:

Sam was a person of amazing energy. My image of him is one of ceaseless motion and intense mobilization. When he walked, his pace was what to most people would have been running. He chain-smoked - dropping ashes heedlessly. His mind seemed always to be racing beyond what could be said or done in any given period of time… He was wholly committed to the task. If one thing didn’t work, he would try another and another and another. It follows that he was ingenious and inventive. He was an entrepreneur of legendary alertness and adaptability - always under the flag of social science.\footnote{Jackson Toby, “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social Research as a Calling,” in Robert K. Merton and Matilda White Riley, ed. \textit{Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the American Experience}. Norwood: Ablex, 1980. 133.}
It would indeed take a man of Stouffer’s abilities and charisma to navigate the War Department during a world war, while coordinating the activities of Research Branch. Moreover, it took someone of his imagination and skill to manage the nine very talented co-authors of *The American Soldier*, both during the war in Research Branch and afterwards as they wrote *The American Soldier*. His contributions were furthered through theirs, and his influence, and that of *The American Soldier*, can be readily seen in their publications, their correspondence, in the journals which they edited, and in the projects in which they chose to become involved - and in the case of Cottrell and DeVinney, fund. They, as much as Stouffer himself, are an integral part of the story of Research Branch and *The American Soldier*. 
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