RAISING A PRAGMATIC ARMY
OFFICER EDUCATION AT THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE,
1946 - 1986

BY

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Submitted to the graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

RAISING A PRAGMATIC ARMY: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1946 – 1986

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This dissertation explains the evolution of the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 1946 to 1986. Examination of change at the United States Army’s Command and General Staff College focuses on the curriculum as a system—students, instructors, professional knowledge, and lessons—mixing within a framework to produce an educational outcome of varying quality. Consideration of non-resident courses and allied officer attendance marks two unique aspects of this study. The curriculum of the Command and General Staff College changed drastically over four decades because of the rapid expansion of professional jurisdiction, an inability to define the Army’s unique body of professional knowledge, and shifting social and professional characteristics of the U.S. Army officer corps, reflected in the faculty and students at the College. Combined, these factors diminished the role and significance of the Command and General Staff College.

The subjects taught to officers at the resident course shifted perceptibly during this period. The officer corps redefined professional expertise, moving away from “purely military” considerations towards a body of knowledge that was no longer unique. The institution, once the Army’s senior tactical institution, distributed its resources—the most critical being time devoted to learning—across a broad front. Political, technological, and military turbulence of the early Cold War hampered the Army’s efforts to adopt an effective curriculum to address the changed security environment until well past 1960. Constant changes in the Regular Course affected the non-resident studies program, which was never fully resourced. From 1960 to 1973, the curriculum’s form underwent fundamental changes. CGSC’s leaders attempted to balance the competing demands of peacetime and wartime subjects in a ten-month course, finding it difficult to accommodate the demands of both. The College shifted to a model of concentration and distribution, allowing students more choice.
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INTRODUCTION

Michael Howard once advised scholars and armed forces’ professionals to study military history in width, depth, and context so that they may fully understand the nature of military operations and “improve the officer’s competence in his profession.” Historian William Skelton has observed, “an intellectual component is central to a professional orientation: a claim to the exclusive control of a body of specialized knowledge essential to the fulfillment of an important social need.”

At the intersection of Howard’s admonition and Skelton’s observation is the military educational institution where officers become students in order to master their profession’s body of specialized knowledge.

Samuel Huntington’s 1957 classic, The Soldier and the State, may be said to have begun the modern scholarly treatment of Army professionalism and education. Huntington’s principal concern was describing civil-military relations, the set of obligations that derived from the officer’s principal responsibility to the nation. He outlined the origins of American military professionalism and put forth three characteristics that defined the professional: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Of particular interest here is the notion of expertise. Huntington stated that a professional was “an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. Expertise was acquired only by prolonged education and experience.” Delving further, he said, “The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer.” His work became the defining view of officer professionalism for the remainder of the twentieth century. Notably, however, Huntington’s simple theory belies complex relationships between experience, society, and professional knowledge.

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4 Huntington, 8-11. Harry Thie and others, Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 220. Adding to the complexity of defining officership as a profession, officers are sometimes seen as having four distinct roles: servants of the society, members of a time-honored profession, leaders of character, and last, but not least, war fighters.
One of the first books to attempt to define military education and the relation to military professionalism was published alongside Huntington’s theoretical study in 1957. John Masland and Laurence Radway of Dartmouth College explored the education of officers and how the military services prepared senior leaders for their emerging role in formulating national policy. Of interest here are the mere seven pages allocated to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which was an overview of the current curriculum related to national policy. The authors noted that Leavenworth did not devote much time to policy and strategy, although they found that recent changes initiated by the Commandant might lead the College in this direction. Masland and Radway recognized the changing nature of the military professional’s duties and the broadened scope of military professionalism. Their work anticipated the changes that would come to the College in later years.  

Unfortunately, the historiography of professional military education in general leaves a faint trail, and few scholarly works trace the College’s evolution. The touchstone work is Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army. Nenninger investigated CGSC’s role in professionalizing the officer corps from 1881-1918 and argued effectively for a close correlation between the education of the American officer corps and the rise in professionalism in the United States Army. Nenninger traced the humble beginnings of the course and underscored the role Leavenworth graduates played as staff officers throughout the Allied Expeditionary Force. He established the corporate nature of “Leavenworth men” relative to other officers. Nenninger found that commandants exercised a significant influence on the course content and on the professional views of graduates themselves. In his view, the faculty defined the institution during this period.

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Years passed before scholars examined other aspects of the Leavenworth experience. If, as Nenninger contended, the early Leavenworth school can be understood by study of the faculty, the focus shifted to the students during the interwar years, according to Peter J. Schifferle, who extended the historical perspective starting with Nenninger’s conclusion. Schifferle’s dissertation covered the interwar period and the Leavenworth courses during the Second World War, and he demonstrated the significant influence the interwar Leavenworth schools had on the Army’s success in World War Two. Graduates of the Leavenworth courses filled key command positions throughout the Army, and their collective view of ground combat made infantry divisions especially capable organizations. However, Schifferle also found that the Leavenworth experience had significant shortcomings. Courses excluded parallel developments in mobilization and airpower; deficiencies that led to mismanagement and inefficient practices sustaining front-line organizations. “Anticipating Armageddon” answered important questions about the effectiveness of the methods, curriculum, and graduates of Leavenworth. 7

A major gap in scholarship begins in 1945. 8 A single published book considers the Command and General Staff College after World War Two. The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History by Boyd L. Dastrup served as a ceremonial artifact, marking the 100th anniversary of the Leavenworth schools. 9 A Centennial History covered major developments within the college during the postwar period, including the effect of numerous officer education studies on the college curriculum in the fifties, adjustments made during the Vietnam War, and the effect of

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AirLand Battle doctrine. On the other hand, Dastrup relied heavily on secondary sources for much of the evidence, and some of his positive conclusions, such as those regarding the College’s curriculum revision under Major General Lionel C. McGarr, do not hint at the faculty resistance and turbulence underlying reform.

A more balanced historical view by Robert Doughty outlined the evolution of the postwar College. He provided a more balanced treatment of the school than did Dastrup. “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976” was Doughty’s special study project conducted at the behest of the Commandant, Major General John H. (Jack) Cushman. Doughty outlined the evolution of the post-war College and wrote with the backdrop of debate over General William E. DePuy’s FM 100-5. Its principal strength arises from the unique access the author had to the material. Doughty’s work established the role of senior leaders in guiding the postwar college through the changes of 1976, and he identified three principal tensions within the College during the period: education versus training, emphasis on training generalists or specialists, and the question of scope.\textsuperscript{10}

Of the histories of the postwar CGSC, Doughty best described institutional change. One must acknowledge, however, that Doughty produced a contemporary history, having written it concurrent with many of the events he described. A slight criticism is that Doughty paid scant attention, as happened in the other works, to the myriad of staff officers, faculty, and perhaps most telling, students. All studies—Doughty, Dastrup, and the official histories—credit the school’s senior leadership for much of the change that took place within the institution. Further examination of archival sources shows that Commandants played a role, but they were not always the central element in the story.

While decision making presumably occurred at the top of the hierarchical organization, lesser known officer-instructors, civilians, and the students themselves contributed to the form, substance, and purpose of the Command and General Staff College. The experience of students, faculty, and

administrators all contributed to the evolution of the College. During the postwar decades, outside agencies—both military and increasingly civilian institutions—began to shape the College’s form and the school’s educational content. Accordingly, the research presented here takes an expansive view of the College’s activities, including the non-resident course and allied officers in addition to the traditional focus on the Regular Course. Consideration of non-resident courses and allied officer attendance marks two unique aspects of this study. It is from this perspective that the history of American higher education, military professionalism, and American society must be integrated as part of CGSC’s story.

This study nests into a larger body of research on military education, military professionalism, and civilian higher education. One under-researched area of military education is the contrast in form and purposes between civilian higher education in America and that of the military’s system. This research, in part, relates the evolving purpose of the Fort Leavenworth schools to the current historical understanding of American higher education. The insight offered by the College’s experience with adapting the courses to the rapid change parallels similar challenges of the modern American university.

The Leavenworth courses taught during the interwar period have been credited in part for American success in World War Two. It is important to understand whether the college continued to provide the intellectual stimulus necessary to develop equally capable military officers. At the heart of this study is the question of military competence and how to create it.

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12 Operational success is not the only historiographical explanation for the Allies’ success. Historians question whether the American Army possessed operational skill, arguing perhaps the Allies won by industrial might. A convincing interpretation of World War Two’s outcome emphasizes the role logistics and national industrial power played, as opposed to battlefield prowess. One work that highlights the economic capability of the Allies, particularly the American role, is Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000). While not attributing victory solely to logistics, the authors claim “logistical superiority was crucial to the Allies’ victory, and America’s role as the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ made a critical difference.” Murray and Millett, ix. Other works stressing the role of logistics in the war are John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990); Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German Military Performance, 1914-1945 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Art of War Colloquium, U.S. Army War College, 1983); John Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994); and Alan S. Milward, War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).

current research on the Fort Leavenworth schools, which ended with an examination of the interwar years and the World War Two experience. The few works that have framed the subsequent period have not explained developments in the context of external events. Continuing forward from recent scholarship, this study narrows the gap in the historical record between 1946 and the present. The post-World War Two period saw a significant expansion of professional responsibilities; understanding how the institution adjusted to these changes is important.

The prominent historian of education, Frederick Rudolph, found that something more than a collection of courses formed a curriculum. He said “students, knowledge, teachers, and … courses” comprised curriculum. He also recognized that the curriculum’s structure and substance—its qualitative aspects—established the basis for judging outcomes. All of these elements manifested themselves in the curriculum. External influences forced the school to recognize new challenges, but the school’s response to an ever-broadening scope of officer responsibilities took decades to form. The development of new ideas competed with entrenched beliefs in the course. Therefore, this study adopts the same broad view of the curriculum as a system—students, instructors, professional knowledge, and lessons—mixing within a framework to produce an educational outcome of varying quality.

Since 1881, the Leavenworth schools educated the officer corps in the Army’s way of war, and the institution acquired a reputation, if not a mystique, for producing capable staff officers who were in high demand across the Army. At the onset of the Second World War, the school had been in existence for over sixty years. Significant breaks occurred during World Wars One and Two. The interwar years saw some of the most productive educational outcomes, leaving a legacy of excellence borne of demonstrated competence in the conduct of war. However, short courses taught during World War Two had neither the rigor nor the breadth of those taught during the interwar period.


Wartime emergency shortened the course to a few months with a scope limited to essential staff skills. When year-long classes resumed at Leavenworth in the fall of 1946, the professional school system that educated the Army’s World War Two senior leadership no longer existed.

The evolution of the curriculum and the subjects taught reflected, in part, what the Army considered important. How did the United States Army’s Command and General Staff College change from resumption of the regular course after the Second World War to 1986? Specifically, why did the Command and General Staff College move from a curriculum that taught division and corps operations to white, male, primarily Regular Army officers to a system that resembled the modern university? This study presented the hypothesis that the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College changed drastically over four decades because of the rapid expansion of professional jurisdiction, an inability to define the Army’s unique body of professional knowledge, and shifting social and professional characteristics of the U.S. Army officer corps, reflected in the faculty and students at the College. Combined, these factors diminished the role and significance of the Command and General Staff College following World War Two.

After World War Two, change came very slowly to the College’s curriculum.15 During the Cold War, subsequent commandants, faculty, and civilian experts never succeeded in re-establishing the rigorous academic environment experienced by interwar students. Conservatism reigned, due in part to service unification, changes in national security policy, waning budgets, and an unclear vision of the Army’s operational concept. Taken together, these factors retarded progress. Resumption of the Army War College, which began at Fort Leavenworth in 1950, disrupted steps forward. Efforts to define the Army’s role on the atomic battlefield thwarted the few adjustments made during the first years of the postwar era. The curriculum remained in stasis for over a decade while officers attempted to discern a viable role for land forces on an atomic battlefield.

15 Increasingly, historians have sought to explain the evolution of the U.S. military since the end of World War Two. Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War* (New York: Routledge, 2007) evaluated American military affairs from a cultural perspective and as a phenomenon of the human condition. Lewis cautioned against the growing American reliance on technology that had become apparent since the Second World War.
Beginning on January 14, 1959, Bell Hall, a purpose-designed building, served as the home of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the resident Command General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC), known as the Regular Course. When Bell Hall opened, faculty taught officers the art and science of war using a new curriculum developed in 1957. A new building brimming with updated, but well-worn, ideas greeted the class of 1960. What should this new school teach its students? Students could study the successes of past wars, or they could look ahead to conflicts in an imperfectly seen future. The College leadership could choose to emphasize command or staff duties. The routine use of tactical nuclear weapons competed with partisan wars for curriculum space.

In 1959, the Army’s leadership had not achieved consensus about the role and direction of the Army, much less what should be taught to students. The Army lacked a working definition of modern war. New ideas took hold slowly. Within the College, procedural barriers and manpower shortages exacerbated the delayed response to external developments. Most adjustments came as a result of outside developments, since structural inertia retarded the adoption of new ideas within the College for much of the era after World War Two. Most importantly, a fundamental flaw in course design prevented an agile response to rapid technological, organizational, and social changes.

From 1960 to 1973, the curriculum’s form underwent fundamental changes. The transformation of the course between 1960 and 1973 reveals a belated attempt by the faculty, and the Army, to catch up to developments, particularly the spread of communism and a newly emerging concept of professionalism. Expansion of the school, rather than contraction, marked the Vietnam era. By the end of the Vietnam War, the College had significantly altered the scope and method of the Leavenworth resident course. The promise of Bell Hall’s gleaming exterior did not materialize. A decade or so after occupying the new building, the College would reform the curriculum again.

although the American experience in Indochina had little to do with the development. By the mid-1970s, Army leaders initiated reform and modernization, acknowledging that significant components of the Army had decayed. The Army recast military doctrine, overhauled the officer education system, and turned its intellectual energy to conventional war in Europe against the Soviets.

The historian’s choice of periodization opens the historical study to immediate criticism as exceptionalists chip away with examples of events that do not fit neatly within the assigned dates. Thus, periodization can serve as an enabler or a hindrance in the historian’s quest to illuminate the past. Lynn Dumenil remarked that “history resists clear-cut periodization,” and she observed that much of American twentieth century scholarship attempted to group trends into decade-sized chunks—manageable for the historian but a view that favors events over connections. Similarly, this work reaches beyond decades to understand what changed and why. The beginning date carries forward from the latest historical research on the Leavenworth schools. The end date roughly coincides with three events that had significance for military education. First, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 forever changed officer education. The law directed the implementation of mandatory joint education and training for the officers of all services, and it radically changed the nature and focus of military education. Goldwater-Nichols represented an external intrusion into an area customarily reserved for practicing professionals, namely the content of professional education. 1986 also coincides with the publication of the third version of the Army’s FM 100-5 in less than a decade. This manual formalized AirLand Battle and reflected the culmination of the Army’s intellectual fervor that began with General William DePuy’s 1976 edition of FM 100-5. Lastly, 1986 allows the study to offer some perspective on the addition of the second-year course at CGSC. Known as the School of Advanced Military Studies, the second-year course offered selected officers the opportunity to explore operational art and large unit operations. The decision to resume a

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second-year course marked an important milestone in the Army education system, bringing back a frequent feature of the previous Leavenworth schools.

The research makes extensive use of primary materials available from the Command and General Staff College’s Combined Arms Research Library and the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth archives. The Programs of Instruction and individual lesson plans form the core of the material used to assess what was taught. This source is available through the archives of the college, and they exist for each year of the study. The Commandant’s Report, staff papers, and officer education studies done during the period will form the basis for determining why change took place. Key to understanding the earlier years of the school are the records of the Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces, and Continental Army Command at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. Additional material came from the Truman Presidential Library and the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Background material used to establish context comes from War Department and Continental Army Command guidance, officer education studies, graduate and instructor papers and records, and education policy documentation. Further sources of primary material include professional journals such as Military Review and Parameters. The Leavenworth Times and Kansas City Star contained local details as well as post and CGSC news. The post’s own Fort Leavenworth Lamp highlighted areas of concern, personalities, and changes in curriculum, organization, and personnel. The Bell, the CGSC equivalent of a grade school yearbook, provided an unexpected source of social and cultural commentary from students, as well as significant insights into academic concerns. Oral history formed another valuable set of sources. Transcripts exist of interviews with notable individuals such as commandants and General William DePuy. The oral history of the college’s first educational adviser, Dr. Ivan Birrer, establishes crucial details regarding decisions not contained in the official record. The study made use of interviews with participants in later phases of change such as Brigadier General (retired) Huba Wass de Czege to gain insights not available through other source material.
Additional material includes several biographies of graduates or commandants of the college. Student research projects highlight some of the less apparent undercurrents in the student body.

The research is presented in three major sections consisting of six chapters. This introduction establishes the scholarly context by surveying historical study of the College, including relevant works about military education and military professionalism. CGSC evolved after World War Two in three intertwined stages. The first two chapters cover the schools at Fort Leavenworth from 1946 to 1955. The Regular Course resumed in 1946 during a period of organizational disorder that characterized the immediate post-war period. The War Department sought to re-establish a peacetime educational program for the officer corps, but questions of scope and internal debates over resurrection of the U.S. Army War College delayed a satisfactory solution. Once this series of organizational issues was settled in the early 1950s, the College then began to focus on questions of mission and curriculum content. The second section discusses this period from 1954 to 1964. World War Two influenced the program significantly until 1957, when the College adopted the new course based upon the atomic battlefield. Political, technological, and military turbulence of the early Cold War hampered the Army’s efforts to adopt an effective curriculum to address the changed security environment until well past 1960. A third section addresses the school during the 1960s to 1986, exploring the adaptation as a result of the Vietnam experience followed by examination of the College’s post-Vietnam history up to the point of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 1986 law serves as a fitting end point since its requirements had a profound effect on professional military education. Lastly, the College faculty and administration began to make substantive changes, many unrelated to the ongoing war in Vietnam, which led to a completely new course of study by 1973. This study traces and seeks to explain the evolution of the CGSC curriculum and provide a context for analysis of what occurred.
CHAPTER 1

Organizing Officer Education, 1946-1950

It is hardly necessary for me to remind you of the importance of a sound school system for the post-war army. Not only must this system produce skilled leaders for wars of the future, but it must also develop a purely American doctrine that will stand the test of modern war. This will have to be done in spite of drastic reductions in funds and personnel.

Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow
Commandant of the Command and General Staff School
Opening comments, 1947 Army Ground Force Conference

Between 1946 and 1950, two formal boards and several lesser studies sought answers to the question of how best to educate U.S. Army mid-career officers for the next decade or more of their service. Reaching an acceptable balance of form and content took years, if one can say it occurred at all. War Department planning for the postwar system of officer education began during the Second World War, and the scheme approved by the Army’s Chief of Staff, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, was implemented in 1946. A core feature of the new system was a progressive, integrated arrangement that provided periodic training and education appropriate to successive levels of an officer’s career. In addition to the traditional branch schools and the Command and General Staff School, the War Department’s plan envisioned upper tiers similar to what had existed before the war, but the postwar arrangement—an Air University, an Armed Forces Staff College, an Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a National War College—diverged from past educational strategies. Notably absent from the arrangement was an Army War College.¹ As a result, the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) faculty taught a patchwork curriculum between 1946 and 1950 while the Army organized its officer education system.

Within the War Department’s broad concept, CGSS, later re-designated a College, filled a vital role of preparing mid-career officers for an increasingly uncertain world. The form, content, and instructional methods at the CGSC Regular Course varied significantly over time, but the pattern of CGSC organization remained remarkably stable during the first postwar decade. While specifics changed, the school had a hierarchical organization with an appointed, transitional commandant; administrative support staff; instructional departments; and full-time faculty. The College offered a broad range of courses from the year-long Regular Course to shorter classes tailored to specific subjects or groups. During these years, departments were renamed, intermediate layers were added, and responsibilities shifted, but the basic structural components of the College remained intact.

The College did not remain static, however. Significant changes did occur over this period, reflecting faculty, changes in composition of the student body, modifications in instructional methods, and evolving content of the Regular Course. More importantly, a system for providing education for the vast majority of officers who could not attend the ten-month course came into being, as the Army struggled with the burden of maintaining a large standing army in peacetime. It is fair to state that, along with the Army, the staff college’s prestige and effectiveness declined. Serious problems regarding methods, scope, and content challenged the school’s faculty and leaders.

Transition from War

The story of the period 1946-1949 begins during and to a degree prior to the Second World War. For it is in this period that the wartime performance of graduates cemented the reputation of the staff college. For much of World War Two, Major General Karl Truesdell served as commandant. In contrast to the one- or two-year course that had been the hallmark Leavenworth experience, the school offered an assortment of courses to meet the exigencies of war. Operating under the authority of the War Department G3, the school’s repertoire at war’s end consisted of a short training course

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for division staff officers, which had undergone several modifications during World War Two, a Pre-
General Staff Course for allied officers, a New Divisions Course for commanders and the staff of
newly-formed combat divisions, and a Command Course of five months’ duration. In all, the post
hosted nearly a half dozen courses by the end of the war, of which the Command and General Staff
School was the most important.  

The ten-week staff course differed significantly from prewar instruction given at
Leavenworth. Classes were much larger, more limited in scope, and practical to an extreme. A
newspaper feature observed in 1945: “Faculty members of the school are sent periodically to various
war theatres to assimilate the latest staff and tactical doctrines. They send back actual operational and
other orders that will enable the students at the school to work out in their map problems and in their
logistical tables some of the actual problems that our commanders at the front have solved.” Students
studied near-term tactical problems like the invasion of Normandy, the Rhine crossing, and urban
operations in Manila. The 25th class of the General Staff Course had been studying the upcoming
Battle of Japan when news of Tokyo’s surrender reached Leavenworth. The dawning of the atomic
age caught the school’s leadership by surprise. With no alternative available, the 1,024 officers
continued to plan an invasion that would not take place. By war’s end, over 17,000 officers had
graduated from the abbreviated staff training courses, which had begun in December 1940. 

Wartime necessity dictated a learning environment based on mass production techniques. The
ability to accommodate a large itinerant population was attributed to the system devised by the
Executive Officer of the Command and General Staff School, Colonel Dana C. Schmal. A 1946 Fort
Leavenworth News article praised the efficiency of the wartime course. “Graduating students leave on
Saturday, and new students arrive on Sunday. They are quickly housed and are prepared to attend

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5 “Training Generals for the Next War,” Fort Leavenworth News, September 29, 1945, 1, 8. Two more classes were held at Leavenworth before the first Regular Course in 1946. These additional classes raised the total to approximately 18,875. “Leavenworth Training,” Army Navy Journal 83 (May 4, 1946), 1057, 1060. Quote from Hanson B. Baldwin, “Leavenworth Tops Schools of Army,” New York Times, November 3, 1943, 12. His article shows the practical nature of the short course.
classes by eight o’clock on Monday morning.” Combined classes took place in Gruber Hall, a massive facility which required the instructor to use a loudspeaker. Interaction with instructors took place at a distance. “If a student wishes to ask a question, he stands up and a WAC brings a portable microphone to him.” The last of these mass production courses—the 27th Command and General Staff course—graduated on May 31, 1946, just months before the first postwar ten-month course began.

Prior to his departure, Major General Truesdell had launched a new educational initiative during the fall of 1945. He envisioned a follow-on course to the Command and General Staff School’s traditional General Staff Course aimed at officers who would be generals in 1955. The first Command Course began October 2, 1945 as an experimental effort to train future senior leaders. The content of this course resembled that of the former Army War College with theater planning, mobilization training, and regional studies the principal learning activities. The course admitted forty-six students with representation coming from the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces. Teaching methods varied significantly from those used in the staff course with each officer assigned to a student committee, or small group. Within this group, the students would collaborate to solve the strategic problem assigned to the staff group. Historian Robert Doughty called this experiment

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6 “Colonel Schmal Executive for Both Post and School,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, January 26, 1946, 1. Schmal was an artillery officer in World War One and served in France and the Army of Occupation.
7 “Training Generals for the Next War,” 8.
8 “School Graduates Last Wartime Class, the 27th,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, June 1, 1946, 1. The course graduated 588 officers. Two were Marines, 144 were international officers from Central and South America, China, the Philippines, Siam, the UK, Canada, and France.
9 “Training Generals for the Next War,” 1. The Command Course was a short-lived interim measure, which graduated two classes. Entry requirements were stringent. The officer had to be a combat-experienced lieutenant colonel or better, have superior ratings, and a C&GSS graduate. The highly selective nature of the course resulted from Truesdell’s intent to create an elite. “If we are successful in getting the right students for this course, its graduates will be the generals of 1955—and perhaps the generals of the next war.” The class graduated February 27, 1946. Representative of students in this first class were Colonels Hamilton H. Howze and Jefferson J. Irvin. Howze became known for his advocacy of Army aviation. Irvin served as a regimental commander in Korea and reached general officer rank, too. “Student Officers are Decorated,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, March 2, 1946, 8. The second class concluded in the summer of 1946 and graduated 101 students. “Second Command Class Graduates July 31,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, July 27, 1946, 1. “Command Class Completes Training Course,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, July 27, 1946, 3 details the five sub-courses of the second Command Class: general review of staff operations, regional studies, analysis of recent combat operations, analysis of current and future problems, and theater and task force planning. The course was supplemented by guest speakers such as J. Lawton Collins, Jacob L. Devers, William J. Donovan, James M. Gavin, and Curtis E. LeMay.
“perhaps the most sophisticated course ever presented at the College.”10 This short-lived course graduated two classes and ceased operations in 1946 with the resumption of the Regular Course.

A few months after V-J Day, Major General Karl Truesdell, who had shepherded the school through the war, relinquished his position as Commandant of the Command and General Staff School for a short time to Major General Otto C. Weyland, an Army Air Corps officer, who in turn handed over command in November to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow.11 As he prepared to depart, Truesdell expressed confidence in the American strategic position. “In the future only the large nations will be able to wage war. Only large nations can mobilize the total resources required. Witness the atomic bomb. The resources of more than one country were required to produce it.”12 Truesdell’s prescience proved limited, and the weapon upon which his confidence rested would vex practitioners of the art and science of land warfare for the next decade.

As Truesdell left the service, the Army had begun a massive demobilization; yet Gerow sensed that the future would not feature that global peace and prosperity which political leaders had predicted at war’s end. The need to educate officers for a new phase of modern war was clearly understood, even if the scope and content of such an education was not apparent.13 Gerow’s remarks quoted at the chapter’s opening foretold the many challenges that the Army and its school system would face in the coming decades. He left unstated his own vision of modern war, but he clearly thought the Army’s school system should have a significant role in shaping the concepts the new Army would employ. The previous interwar period had seen many advances in the tools and trade of war. As Peter J. Schifferle demonstrated in “Anticipating Armageddon,” the interwar officer corps

10 Doughty, History, 9.
13 When Gerow assumed command in 1945, discharges were proceeding at a rate of 40,000 per day. General Order 41, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 Nov 1945, Folder 300.4-General Orders, Box 212, “Project” File, 1945-50, RG 337, Records of the Army Field Forces Hqs, NARA II. At the time, the War Department expected to discharge approximately half of the servicemen on active duty, about 4.75 million, by the start of 1946. “Point Scores to Drop as Discharges Climb,” Fort Leavenworth News, November 3, 1945, 5.
engaged in a lively professional dialogue and educated itself despite sparse resources. The purpose of the staff college in those years was to serve as proxy to a skeleton army, in which divisions did not exist in appreciable numbers. Time spent at Leavenworth and duty as an instructor developed general staff skills in an officer corps who could only imagine what a division looked like. The net effect of that interwar period was an increase in professional knowledge and a shared understanding of how to fight large units on battlefields characterized by mobility, combined arms, and new weapons.

Officers in the next interwar period—1946 and beyond—faced a different environment. The postwar Army declined in fighting capability after World War Two, and it did so very soon after V-J Day. The crescendo of demobilization, occupation, unification, and civilianization took their toll on a combat-experienced force, which quickly became an embattled shell of its former self. External factors obliterated the Army’s collective sense of place. Formation of the Department of Defense, the Korean War, and austerity programs skewed the Army’s self-defined role. Internally, the Army had difficulty defining how it would fight on the atomic battlefield, discerning Soviet capabilities, adapting to a larger force structure, and integrating new technologies. New career management systems and increasing specialization across the officer corps created individual angst by blurring the

16 Major General Garrison Davidson commented on this difference in 1956. He said, “Prior to World War II the average graduate went from here to serve at some small army post. Very few of our graduates ever saw a full division in those days. We had one infantry division in Hawaii, the cavalry division in Texas, and as I remember it, a bobtailed division in Panama.” Orleans and others, 47.
path to the next rank. The host of internal and external adjustments dislocated the officer corps and left it wondering what sort of professional and political minefields lay ahead.

**Organization and Governance**

A series of boards and studies marked the period from 1945 to 1956 in which Army leaders sought to establish the structure and content of the postwar Army school system. Reviews ranged from Army-wide examinations directed by either the War Department or the Department of the Army to locally-initiated efforts in response to a specific problem of Leavenworth. Generally named for the board president, these committees studied a variety of issues ranging from school organization to curricular content to instructional methods. As will be established, the second comprehensive survey, the Eddy Board of 1949, became the most significant of the several studies done during this time.

During World War Two, the Army had begun preliminary inquiries into the nature of the professional school system it would presumably need at war’s end. Not until after the conclusion of the war, however, did the War Department begin to take concrete steps to define a follow-on educational system. On November 23, 1945, the Army’s new Chief of Staff, General Dwight Eisenhower, issued instructions to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, the Command and Staff School Commandant, to “prepare a plan for the postwar educational system of the Army.” Gerow, along with Major Generals William G. Livesay, Donald Wilson, and Stanley L. Scott, recommended a comprehensive plan, including suggestions on reactivating the Army War College. Eisenhower’s

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instructions included his guidance to consider the potential changes needed if the War Department was reorganized according to the Patch-Simpson Board recommendations. At war’s end, the Patch-Simpson Board had identified “a simpler and more flexible organization, with clear-cut command channels, to satisfy the requirements of economy and efficiency,” and their conclusions later led to the reorganization of the War Department and the Army.21

Gerow’s views about the school were shaped by his own experience as a student and as an assistant chief of staff.22 Gerow’s impressive record in World War Two included command of the 29th Infantry Division in 1942. On July 17, 1943, Gerow became the commanding general of V Corps and led the corps during its D-Day landings. As the allied forces advanced across France, Gerow advanced in rank and responsibility. He was appointed commander of the Fifteenth Army on January 15, 1945 and rose to Lieutenant General on February 6, 1945. He continued as an army commander until the end of the European campaign.

Gerow inherited a far different institution than the one he had attended twenty years earlier. Gone were the years of accumulated experience teaching division operations to a select group of officers. Missing too was the cohort of long time, qualified faculty members and an extended curriculum. The institution which had led Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to say, “It is no exaggeration to say that our victories in World War Two were won at Leavenworth…. Here our great war leaders learned the art of combined arms, the handling of large bodies of troops,” no longer existed.23

The War Department Military Education Board, commonly known as the Gerow Board, met at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas between December 4 and 27, 1945 to consider plans submitted by the

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21 Society for Military History, “Headquarters Gazette,” Military Affairs 10 (Spring 1946): 81. Livesay represented the Army Ground Forces; Wilson represented the Army Air Forces; and Scott spoke for the Army Service Forces. “WD Military Education Board is Meeting Here,” Fort Leavenworth News, December 15, 1945, 5.
22 During his days as a student, his study partner had been then Major Eisenhower. Gerow came close to matching Eisenhower’s academic accomplishment, graduating in 1926 as an honor graduate with a class rank of 11th out of 245 students—a cohort roughly half the size of a typical postwar class. Gerow returned to Leavenworth on December 16, 1940 as acting assistant chief of staff. Gerow later was named assistant chief of staff. He served in that position until February 15, 1942 when he left to assume command of the 29th Division. “Gen. Truesdell Will Retire Soon,” Fort Leavenworth News, October 20, 1945, 1.
three existing Army services: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. The time given the generals was extremely limited, for a reply was expected by the January 1, 1946—an impossible deadline. Gerow’s Board worked in parallel with the Patch-Simpson Board, aligning its recommendations for officer education with that group’s final plan regarding the Army’s overall postwar organization. In early January 1946, the board interviewed over seventy-five officers representing the various schools and general staff agencies across the Army in Washington, D.C. By mid-January, the Board had completed this task and returned to Fort Leavenworth to compile its findings.

When it issued its conclusions on February 5, 1946, the Board recommended an overarching mission for the Army’s educational system as well as eight objectives. The core of the Gerow Board report dealt with organizational issues. Going beyond its charter to study Army requirements, the Board recommended establishment of a National Security University to serve the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an Armed Forces College aimed at War Department requirements. For the Army services, Gerow’s panel recommended a multi-level educational structure for the Army designed to complement an officer’s experience gained in command and staff positions. Largely influenced by precedent and input from the Army Services, the Gerow Board recommended a parallel series of schools, one for each Army Service. Each Service was to have a hierarchical school system with basic, advanced, and mid-career schools.

Directly addressing the future of the Command and Staff College, the Gerow Board recommended a new Ground College for the Army Ground Forces. Instead of resuming the staff

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27 Gerow Board Report, 10, 27. The Board recommended a National Security University to meet the educational needs of officers serving the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Undersecretary of War. The University was to include five colleges: an Administrative College, an Intelligence College, a National War College, an Industrial College, and a State Department College. Henry Gerard Phillips’ biography of Manton S. Eddy notes that both Eisenhower and Bradley favored joint operations, and the omission of an Army War College represented a significant Army concession to this principle. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional, Manton S. Eddy USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 200-201.
28 Chart I, Educational System for Officers of the Army, Gerow Board Report, 91.
school classes at Fort Leavenworth, the Board proposed that the new school be located at Fort Benning, Georgia. The proposed Ground College was to focus on division and corps-level organizations, command and staff techniques in tactical units, and the integration of air and naval capabilities. The objectives of the newly proposed Ground College included an imperative to “keep aware of all developments in the means of warfare, to study their effect upon methods and doctrine of the Army Ground Forces, and to recommend changes indicated by these developments.” In doing so, Gerow’s panel anticipated the need to conduct research to develop a forward-looking doctrine which would serve as the Army’s guidepost for future missions. The Gerow Board’s overall proposal for this Ground Force’s school suggested an influence from recent World War Two experience and the Army’s current organization into three separate services; but it reflected only a minimal anticipation of future requirements such as the major revisions that would be needed after implementation of the National Security Act of 1947.

The War Department declined to implement the Gerow plan as submitted, approving instead a more limited scheme for Army schools. The education system followed a progression tied to rank and time in service with a four-month Basic School, covering common topics followed by a five-month branch technical course. An officer would later attend a ten-month advanced branch course. The most significant changes made by the War Department to the original recommendations involved retention of the mid-level career course at Fort Leavenworth and a more modest version of the senior level institution. Instead of a National Security University, two co-equal schools, a National War College and an Industrial College, were to provide education on strategic issues. The Army

29 Gerow Board Report, 60. "The establishment of the Ground College precludes the necessity for reestablishing the Command and General Staff School in its former status." Given the Board’s overall recommendation to make use of existing facilities, the proposed move to Fort Benning made sense in the context of the Board’s additional recommendation to resume the Army War College at Fort Leavenworth. Had the War Department accepted the recommendation, the Command and General Staff School would have ceased to exist.
30 Gerow Board Report, 59.
31 Masland and Radway attributed this decision in part to lack of support from General Eisenhower and later General Bradley, while Ball’s history of the Army War College pointed to the pending decision regarding unification of the services as a cause. Masland and Radway, 146–47; Ball, 268–69.
32 G.L. Eberle to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, memorandum, “Command and Staff College,” Washington, DC, 27 May 1946, CARL. Tab A, 8 shows the school responsibilities and relationships. Subsequently, the National Security Act of 1947 had a significant impact on the plan. One year later, the christening of the Air Force meant the Gerow Board educational structure was no longer valid. "Long Term Officer Education Provided in New Program," Fort Leavenworth News, June 1, 1946, 5. A contemporary description of
recognized the value of a progressive professional education system for officers, but this educational scheme did not resurrect the Army War College, and that omission would later directly affect the postwar staff school.

The War Department issued instructions on May 27 to Gerow as Commandant of the Command and Staff School directing implementation of a modified version of his own Board’s findings. The scheme placed the Leavenworth school not at the top of the officer education hierarchy but rather in the middle. New York Times reporter Harold B. Hinton equated Leavenworth with the Bachelor’s level of a civilian university, with the Armed Forces Staff College being the Master’s, and the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces being the Ph.D. equivalent. As expected, the War Department did not re-establish the Army War College, opting for joint schools.  

To meet mid-career needs, the War Department approved a ten-month Command and Staff College course and specified a college organization with four schools—personnel, intelligence, combined arms, and logistics.  

Brigadier General George L. Eberle, acting Director of the War Department’s Organization and Training Division, instructed the College to adopt a common curriculum covering division- to army group-level topics with specialized instruction necessary to meet the needs of the War Department.  

This last feature of the War Department instructions caused numerous problems for the College during the next few years. The War Department set the date for the first class of about 320 officers to begin in the fall of 1946, giving the faculty but a few months to prepare.

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33 Harold B. Hinton, “Liaison Taught at Army College,” New York Times, November 26, 1946, 31. Hinton’s view does not mesh with the Army’s concept of the Leavenworth school, which the institution held as equivalent to a graduate education.

34 Eberle memorandum, Tab A, 3-5. The College was to comprise a School of Combined Arms, School of Administration, School of Military Intelligence, and School of Logistics. War Department Circular 154 officially re-designated the Command and General Staff School to the Command and General Staff College. R.B. Patterson, General Order 25, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 June 1946. Folder 300.4, Box 147, Army Field Force Hqs, Classified Decimal File, 1942-48, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II. War Department Circular 202, dated 9 July 1946, later changed the names of the four schools to Personnel, Intelligence, Combined Arms, and Logistics.

35 Eberle memorandum, Tab A, 1. Three-fourths of the year was devoted to common subjects while one-fourth of the year was to contain instruction in specialized topics developed by the four schools.
The War Department’s instructions, Circular 202, specified objectives consistent with the Army’s perception of World War Two experience and the uncertainties of the Patch-Simpson report. The skills reflected the Army’s joint warfare experience from World War Two and the mobilization lessons from the interwar period. Graduates were to be able to support and employ Army forces and were to be familiar with air and naval procedures. The College’s mission was to “provide instruction in the light of war lessons and modern developments” and to insure “that officers were capable of four primary skills.” Of note was the forward-looking focus embodied by the mission statement, but the instructions did not specify what it considered modern. The guidance did restrict the school’s freedom to select sources, however. “The doctrine taught at the college will be as prescribed by the War Department.”

The course would last for forty-one weeks, with three-fourths of the course allocated to common subjects. Officers would then attend ten weeks of specialized training in one of the four schools. The focal point of this additional training was War Department functions. Officers were to be trained in one of four specialized fields: personnel, intelligence, tactical, or logistical procedures.

Further clarifying the expectations of the Command and Staff College, the War Department established three objectives for the Regular Course:

1. To prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the division and higher levels.
2. To keep aware of all developments in the means of warfare and personnel research, to study their effect upon methods and doctrine of the Army, and to recommend changes indicated by these developments.
3. To develop understanding and teamwork among officers of the Army of the United States.

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36 War Department, “War Department Circular 202, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,” Washington, DC, 9 July 1946.
37 “War Department Circular 202,” 1.
38 “Plan School Change,” Fort Leavenworth News, May 11, 1946, 1, 8. Students were not divided equally across the four schools. The plan foresaw a student load of 325 per regular course. During the specialized instruction period, 125 of the officers would go to the combined arms school with 50 attending the other three courses. Fifty international students were to make up the remainder of the class. An additional 200 officers would attend the thirteen-week associate course. This allocation was later modified such that the School of Personnel had about 60 students, the School of Intelligence approximately 60, the School of Combined Arms around 90 officers, and about 60 students in the School of Logistics.
In the coming years, the first objective assigned to the school caused two insurmountable challenges. Dividing instruction between command and staff duties left open to interpretation the school’s focus: command or staff. Worse, the inclusion of Department of the Army staff duties meant the course served two purposes: training staff officers for combined arms staffs plus training general staff officers for the War Department and U.S.-based Zone of the Interior headquarters. Leavenworth had to broaden its course well beyond its traditional forte. Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times* military editor, observed after his January 1949 visit that the combination of war college and general staff officer lessons “certainly cluttered the Leavenworth curriculum.” The school now had to present instruction sufficient to cover command and staff duties ranging from tactical operations at the division up to policy formulation at the War Department, rather than take up again its prewar mission of training tactical staff officers.

The second objective, which implied research and continuous adjustment, proved more troublesome to the school’s central mission. The need to remain abreast of emerging developments and to adapt the curriculum to the doctrinal, organizational, and technical changes of modern war proved problematic to the faculty and ultimately affected the relevance of instruction. Meeting this need proved far more challenging than any other issue faced by the College’s faculty and leadership.

Not only did the War Department specify the structure of the course, but it also dictated the school’s internal organization. Organizationally, the College was saddled with a structure that did not enable accomplishment of the overarching mission assigned by the War Department. The War Department Circular decreed a four-schools-within-a-school arrangement aligned with the principal general staff functions, and each of the four had a commandant. Brigadier General Robert N. Young, the wartime commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, served as the School of Combined Arms commandant. Colonel Horton V. White, a 1923 West Point graduate, became the School of Intelligence commandant. White had a number of general staff assignments as an Assistant Chief of

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Staff, Intelligence including three years as the Sixth Army G2 in New Guinea. Colonel Daniel H. Hundley led the School of Personnel, and Colonel Arthur W. Pence headed the Logistics school. Each school had a different objective. The personnel school focused on the “efficiency of its personnel management system.” In the intelligence school “principles of military intelligence as applied by commanders and staff officers in all types of military operations” became the principal concern, while the Combined Arms school emphasized “instruction in tactics, staff duties related to combat operations and the combat characteristics of the various arms and services.” Lastly, the School of Logistics covered “supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, services and management”

The two-fold mission, the practice of tracking students into functional courses, and even the practice of calling the heads of each school “commandant” led to confusion. As others would observe later, the college’s organization was especially crucial since the internal structure, not the educational needs of the students, dictated the future development of the College’s curriculum.

With the scope and organization already set by the War Department, the task of implementing the directive fell to the school’s leadership and faculty. And they faced tremendous challenges. Writing and implementing a new curriculum, adjusting to a new internal organization, and sifting through volumes of material to prepare new lesson content was a daunting task, but doing all of this before the 1946-47 academic year began caused the College to adopt a number of shortcuts to enable classes to begin in September 1946.

With the initial preparations underway and the last days of the wartime short courses approaching, questions about the College’s teaching and research approaches came to the forefront, with the Commandant taking steps that opened the military profession to the influence of civilian

42 “Command and Staff College is Capstone of Army Ground Forces School System,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1947, 3. A draft 1948 reorganization study cited the confusion caused by having four commandants, who in reality were departmental directors, later led to an internal reorganization and renaming of the components as departments. Draft memorandum to The Adjutant General, “Organizational Revision of Command and General Staff College” 7 June 1948, Binder 1, Box 1, The Command and General Staff College and Fort Leavenworth, KS, RG 337, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.
43 “C&GSC Top Army Officer Training School,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1948, 3.
educators. Following a meeting with the Chief of the Personnel Research Section in June 1946, the Commandant requested the Adjutant General detail a team from the Personnel Research Section to “advise and assist the faculty” in two areas: preparation and delivery of instruction and the integration of civilian expertise into the College.\footnote{Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow to War Department General Staff, G3, memorandum, “Use of Scientific and Technical Experts at the Command and Staff College,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 June 1946, 2, Box 10, Correspondence 1953-58, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.} Thus, the Henry Commission was formed.

Led by Dr. Edwin R. Henry of The Ohio State University, the four-man commission comprised experts in psychology and education.\footnote{“Four Well-Known Educators Here,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, August 16, 1946, 1.} The team’s mission encompassed three important areas of the College. As consultants, they looked at course content, instructor and student selection, instructional methods, and evaluation of learning. The commission met three times between August and December 1946. The Henry Commission report, issued in February 1947, was notable. First, it recommended the immediate establishment of civilian personnel positions in a number of areas related to the college administration and instruction.\footnote{Direct civilian participation in officer education would increase. The Adjutant General’s Office, “Survey of the Educational Program of the Command and Staff College,” Washington, DC, February 1947, 79-80, CARL. Hereafter referred to as the Henry Commission. The eight positions recommended for immediate creation or civilian fill were Psycho-educational Adviser to the Commandant, Personnel Technician-Tests and Measurements; Statistical Consultant and Professor of Statistical Methods, Librarian; Director of Instruction Training; Personnel Management and Professor of Personnel Administration; Professor of Military Psychology; and Business Administration Consultant and Professor of Business Administration. Reflecting the view of that time, each position description listed as its first requirement – “male.”} More importantly the Commission uncovered a major issue: the imperfect solution arrived at by the College to accomplish the massive educational task placed on it by the War Department.\footnote{Henry Commission, 15-18.} The Commission reinterpreted the three objectives established by War Department Circular 202 to read:

1. To prepare officers as commanders of divisions, corps, and army, and at comparable levels in the communications zone.
2. To prepare officers for any general staff assignment at division, corps and army level.
3. To prepare officers for key general staff assignment in one specialized area (that is in personnel, intelligence, combined arms, or logistics) at levels higher than army.\footnote{Henry Commission, 16.}

\begin{itemize}
\item [\footnote{Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow to War Department General Staff, G3, memorandum, “Use of Scientific and Technical Experts at the Command and Staff College,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 June 1946, 2, Box 10, Correspondence 1953-58, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.}]
\item [\footnote{“Four Well-Known Educators Here,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, August 16, 1946, 1. Henry’s background as a psychology professor at Ohio State and New York University, coupled with his experience as the chief of Personnel Research, Personnel Research and Procedures Branch, Adjutant General’s office made him a logical choice for leading the team. Other members of the commission were: Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, associate professor of education, City College of New York; Dr. Mitchell Dreeze, George Washington University; and Dr. Harold A. Edgerton, professor of psychology at Ohio State.}]
\item [\footnote{Henry Commission, 15-18.}]
\item [\footnote{Henry Commission, 16.}]
\end{itemize}
This amplification of the War Department directive formed the basis for the Commission’s analysis of what the curriculum was intended to achieve. It believed the focus on the first two objectives, while organized to accomplish the third, created a system that allowed departments to isolate their lessons from those of the other departments. Even this early in the first postwar Regular Course, the Commission recognized the dilemma created by having essentially two curriculums in the ten-month course. As both the Gerow Board and Henry Commission stressed, the Command and Staff College and its supporting faculty had too wide a scope of responsibility—a problem that would remain until 1950. To correct this error, the Commission said that the College should be reorganized into “two distinct institutions” with one, a college, to train officers on division through army level tasks and a second, a university, to specialize in operations above the army level.

The Commission’s findings reinforced the original Gerow Board plan for separate schools to teach tactical and policy matters to officers. Lieutenant General Gerow had not been a proponent of specialized training in the ten-month course and quite often reinforced his views as stated in the Gerow Board report. Gerow would use every opportunity to redesign the course to a curriculum appropriate to a staff college oriented on operations. Only six months into the first regular course, the College had determined that the scope of instruction desired by the War Department was too great to be covered in a single ten-month course. It had uncovered a structural flaw of immense consequence.

The Henry Commission marked one of the first uses of experienced civilian academic expertise to shape the professional education of military officers. This practice would continue and would expand to allow the direct participation of civilian instructors in the classroom. One member of the commission, Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, gained the attention of Lieutenant General Gerow, who asked

50 Harry P. Ball credited this latter recommendation for starting the reappraisal that eventually led to the establishment of the Army War College. Ball, 267.
51 In his 1976 study of the College, Robert Doughty stated that the system of a common core followed by specialized training was a Gerow Board concept, although it does not appear the general completely agreed with the specialization scheme. Doughty, History, 11-12.
Orleans to stay on as his consultant. In keeping with the commission’s recommendation to add civilian faculty, Orleans joined the staff as the school’s first Psycho-Educational Adviser. The Army’s school for warriors was slowly opening its doors to the world outside.

1946-47 Faculty

The qualifications, assignment pattern, development, and number of officers who served as faculty of CGSC varied widely during this period. The first two years—from 1946 to 1948—the Regular Course saw the most experienced military faculty the school would enjoy in this or subsequent decades. Instructors of the 1946-47 class included Pacific and European campaign veterans, a number of whom had commanded battalions or had served on large unit staffs in combat. Colonel Edward Postlewaite had led the amphibious assault to recapture Corregidor. He joined with Lieutenant Colonel John J. Tolson, III, who had been deputy commander of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment in the Philippines attack, to teach a lesson on airborne operations. Colonel Cyrus Dolph commanded the mechanized cavalry unit that crossed the Rhine after capture of the Remagen Bridge. Colonel George Martin, Chief of Staff of the 45th Division, and later the 44th, was on the faculty, too. Other experienced officers included Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Brookhart who was a turnaround instructor from the 21st General Staff Class from January, 1945. At the onset of World War Two, he was an infantry battalion commander, but was transferred to command an engineer boat battalion in 1943 and served in the Pacific with Sixth Army on New Guinea. The Army Air Forces were represented by officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Travis Hoover. Hoover piloted the first aircraft in the lead flight of B-25s during the Tokyo Raid of 1942. Having survived the crash-landing and repatriation from China, Hoover’s wartime experience took him to the European theater, where

53 L.T. Gerow to Director of Organization and Training, War Department, “Authority to Employ Civilian Experts,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 October 1946, Folder 1948, Box 92, Decimal File, Mar 17 to Dec 31, 1948, RG 337, NARA II.
he participated in the Ploesti raid as deputy commander of the 98th Bomb Group. Hoover came to Fort Leavenworth in March 1945 as a member of the 23rd class of the Command and General Staff School. After graduation, he became a member of the faculty.\(^{56}\) While many instructors carried the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, their time in service qualified them for permanent rank of first lieutenant or captain in the Regular Army.\(^{57}\) As can be seen, nearly all of these officers graduated from one of the wartime short courses. What mattered most to the students of the late forties was their instructors’ professional experience.

To help translate experience into effective teaching, the college instituted an instructor training program in 1946, which at the time was considered a novel development.\(^{58}\) Lessons covered the principles of educational psychology, student motivation, teaching techniques, public speaking, and use of audio-visual aids to enhance learning. A principal objective of this hands-on course was the perfection of platform presentation skills, with a significant amount of time devoted to public speaking.

The first postwar class reported for duty on September 4, 1946. Like their faculty, the initial cohort of Regular Course students represented an anomaly of the postwar period. The rank and combat experience of the students tended to be much higher than that of the interwar period. The student body was heavily weighted towards Lieutenant Colonel during the immediate postwar years. “The current class [1946-47] here includes men who are older and more war-experienced than subsequent ones are likely to be,” observed Harold Hinton.\(^{59}\) Representative of these students was Lieutenant Colonel Derrell M. Daniel, an officer in the First Class of the Command and General Staff College. Daniel had fought as an infantry battalion executive officer and commander in north Africa, Italy, France, and Germany, and he had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star


\(^{57}\) “More Officers Get R.A. Ranks,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, July 6, 1946, 1. Six lieutenant colonels and one major received permanent appointment to the rank of first lieutenant or captain.


with six oak leaf clusters, and the Bronze Star with two oak leaf clusters.\textsuperscript{60} The background of the first postwar class influenced the Assistant Commandant, Major General Dean, to say the purpose of the college as the “production of commanders for armies, corps and divisions, rather than staff officers.”\textsuperscript{61}

What was expected of a Leavenworth student in this early period? The Army’s senior leaders valued the education provided by the Leavenworth school, particularly the standardization imparted by the curriculum. General Eisenhower noted during a 1946 inspection tour of Fort Leavenworth, “any officer could be transferred from one army to another, or from one army group to another, without any loss of understanding of procedures and methods.”\textsuperscript{62}

From the beginning of the postwar school, an element of elitism made itself evident. Those selected to attend the course profited by inclusion. Shortly after the first Regular course began, Harold B. Hinton wrote in the \textit{New York Times}, “The apter officers, to the extent of 50 per cent of the total” would attend the course at Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{63} The premise that Leavenworth’s students represented the Army’s future senior leadership continued in later years. According to a 1949 \textit{New York Times} article, Leavenworth drew its student body from the upper tier of Army officers. “[P]upils, the top 50 per cent of the graduates of the schools of the individual arms and services, are, theoretically at least, the future commanders and staff officers of the United States Army.”\textsuperscript{64} The comments reflected the perception that selection for Leavenworth marked an officer as above his peers.

Student-officers assigned to the College in 1946 had to meet six official criteria. Officers were to have between seven and fifteen years of service, with 18 months service overseas since December 7, 1941. They had to be Regular Army officers, be a maximum age of 40 years, have graduated from a regular course at a branch advanced school or equivalent experience, and have an

\textsuperscript{60} “Seven Silver Stars,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, November 1, 1946, 1.
\textsuperscript{62} “Chief of Staff Visits Post, Commends Work of School,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, February 16, 1946, 5.
\textsuperscript{64} Baldwin, “Army College Expands,” 8.
efficiency rating of excellent or better for the period December 7, 1941 to December 31, 1945. None of the formal prerequisites for the course mentioned the top 50 percent as a discriminator; however, the Army Ground Forces G-1 did reveal that selecting the upper 50% was problematic, stating “there is no mathematically accurate means of determining that an officer is or is not in the upper 50% or any other portion of the scale.”

From the outset, student selection deviated from the published entrance requirements. The average age was 36.7 years, which was within the planned range. However, the War Department had granted waivers as “rewards for exceptionally meritorious service” for thirty-three officers over age 40. One was 47. Many of the students had been battalion commanders in World War Two or had served in general staff assignments. The officers’ ranks ranged from Colonel to First Lieutenant; seventy percent held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above (table 1). Quotas were heavily skewed towards the Army Ground Forces with 195 of 300 slots allocated to AGF officers, but 73 officers in the class came from technical or specialized branches. Regular Army officers accounted for 233 members of the class; Officer Reserve Corps, National Guard, and Army of the United States numbers were eleven, five, and four, respectively. Twenty-one percent of the first Regular Course came from allied nations, which is remarkable given the backlog of eligible U.S. officers.

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65 “Officers Report Sept. 4 for Ten Months Course,” Fort Leavenworth News, July 27, 1946, 1. “Selection of officers at present are made on the basis of available records and are intended to include only the best qualified. Selections include” efficiency ratings, age, type of assignments held and performance of them; level of military education and how gained (sch[ool] attendance or constructive credits); availability, (selections are limited to officers in the ZI and there are some restrictions on movement of officers who have been at their stations only a short time).” Memorandum for Record, attached to Memorandum by [Brigadier General Bruce?] Clarke, “Selection of Students, Command and General Staff College,” AGF G-1 Control Division, 23 Dec 1947, 3, Box 1, The Command and General Staff College, RG 337, NARA II.
66 Ibid.
68 Three possible explanations exist for the wide disparity in ranks. The ongoing demobilization created turmoil in the personnel system. The decentralized selection process gave the branches authority to select officers for the course. The reversion to permanent ranks as the Army shrank may account for some of the lower ranking officers attending, too.
69 Not all quotas were filled, either. “Officers Report Sept. 4, for Ten Months Course,” Fort Leavenworth News, July 27, 1946, 1. Other Army branch quotas were: Adjutant General Department, 4; Corps of Engineers, 24; Finance Department, 4; Ordnance Department, 13; Judge Advocate General’s Department, 3; Quartermaster Corps, 16; Transportation Corps, 9; Signal Corps, 12; Chemical Warfare Service, 3; Medical Department, 3; Provost Marshal, 2; Inspector General, 4; and Army Air Forces, 8. The limited number of students from Technical Services sidestepped a future issue of curricular breadth by narrowing the student body to combat arms officers.
Table 1. Comparison, Student Officer Ranks, 1946-47 and 1949-50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1946-47</th>
<th>1949-50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied</td>
<td>63 (14 nations)</td>
<td>45 (26 nations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Breakdown of the first regular class.70

Professional nepotism also influenced student selection and post-graduation assignments, if only indirectly. Field commanders contacted senior leaders to advance their candidates for the Regular Course.71 Conversely, post commanders submitted post-graduation requests to the Army Ground Forces or the Department of the Army for specific officers. In a letter to Major General Walter L. Weible, the AGF G-1, Major General Jens A. Doe asked for three lieutenant colonels by name from the 1948-49 class as they approached graduation. The value of the Leavenworth experience can be seen in the proposed assignments; Doe offered to place Lieutenant Colonel Clarence E. Reid in the division G-4 position, and he slatted the other two for the division’s G-3 section.72

As mentioned earlier, the Army faced a significant backlog of eligible officers. The College, War Department, and future educational boards would grapple with the accumulated demand for professional education. The War Department maintained that “50% of the Regular Army Officers of the ground forces attend the Command and General Staff College between their 7th and 15th years of service,” but the Regular Course had only 500 slots annually as of 1947. In 1947, the Army Ground Forces G-3 forecasted that CGSC could handle 700 officers in the 1947-48 course, increasing by another 200 spaces to a total of 900 in the 1948-49 school year. The truth was far less. Only 1,211

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70 “Command and Staff College is Capstone of Army Ground Forces School System,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1947, 3.
71 Jacob L. Devers to J.M. Swing, 9 Feb 1949. Major General Swing had written General Devers, commanding general of Army Ground Forces, about getting Lieutenant Colonels Arthur H. Wilson and John P. Connors of I Corps assigned as CGSC students. While Devers did not answer directly, he stated, “I am glad to say that the Personnel and Administration Division, Department of the Army, informs us both officers are on the list. In so far as can be determined at this time, they have an excellent chance of being assigned to the school.” Folder, 210.3 Assignments, Box 62, General Staff G-1 Section Officers Division Decimal File 1946—March 16, 194, RG 337, HQ Army Ground Forces, NARA II.
72 Jens A. Doe to Walter L. Weible, Fort Ord, CA, 28 January 1948, Folder 210.3, Box 62, RG 337, NARA II.
officers graduated from the Regular Course from 1946 to 1949—a number that included 164 Allied officers—reducing the total number of U.S. graduates to 1,047, which was barely above the number envisioned for one year. In an Army Ground Forces’ study conducted in 1948, Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Brinker reported that 2,256 Infantry, 223 Coast Artillery Corps, 1,079 Field Artillery Corps, and 625 Cavalry branch officers would not have credit for the Command and General Staff College by July 1948. Over 4,000 officers lacked credit for the course compared with 2,357 of their combat arms cohorts who had already attended. The Army Ground Forces proposed a five-year plan to eliminate the surplus of “Regular Officers of the Ground Arms” by 1953 using a combination of Regular Course and Associate Course slots, while limiting attendance by all others, namely officers in the specialized branches, other services, and allied nations.

Throughput hinged on a simple physics problem: a shortage of officer housing. Capacity at the course fell short of Army needs with about 400 sets of quarters for married officers available, and an additional 240 rooms for bachelors available. The school had to apportion housing between the Regular, Associate, and other short-term courses. As a result, in 1947, the War Department limited attendance to 500 officers, mainly due to the housing shortage at Fort Leavenworth.

None of this concerned the present class, as they had been lucky enough to get orders to the course. As the students settled in to the academic rhythm, instructors attempted to keep up with the daily demand. The course was forty-one weeks in length, with thirty-two weeks of common instruction and the remainder being instruction in one of the four tracks. Each day required instructional material, which had to be researched, written, reviewed, and printed. The instructors’

73 “Army Ground Forces Schools,” n.d., Folder Army Ground Forces Schools, Box 47 Army Field Forces HQs General Staff, G-3 Section Administrative Division, Subject Correspondence File 1942-49 Africa to Army Ground Force Units, RG 337 Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II. The study stated that the increased output at Leavenworth was one of the two critical actions within the AGF school system. Doughty, “CGSC in Transition,” Table 4, 138.

74 W.E. Brinker to Officer’s Division, CMB, CAS, GSUSA, Disposition Form (DF), “Requirements for the C&GSC,” 5 Jan 1948, Box 1, RG 337, Headquarters Army Ground Forces-The Command and General Staff College and Fort Leavenworth, KS, NARA II.

75 Army Ground Forces to Director of Organization and Training, War Department, memorandum, “Student Quotas for The Command and General Staff College,” 23 July 1947, Folder 1947, Box 212, Project File, RG 337, NARA II.

professional background and familiarity with the subject matter had an effect on student learning, since faculty formed the key interface between the students and the untested courseware. But students did not necessarily benefit as a result of the instructors’ credentials. To conserve manpower, one instructor taught subjects to the entire class of 300 officers in lecture format, much like the wartime classes. From 1946 until the adoption of smaller groups in 1948, three-fourths of the classes were taught by a single lecturer, even if the lesson plan said otherwise. “The instructors…are encouraged to narrow their specialty with a view to becoming an outstanding expert in it.” Many classes used a mass lecture format, which was an expedient measure adopted to allow the quick resumption of the course (appendix 1). In this environment, good presentation skills were considered highly important, and instructors developed proficiency in their delivery. Presentations became theatrical events, leading Ivan Birrer to comment, “it was a platform performance with kind of a capital P.” The approach limited the learning outcome since personal interaction between instructor and student proved difficult if not impossible. From the outset, one can see a decline of the applicatory method, a hallmark of the Leavenworth experience prior to World War Two.

Outdated instructional methods were not the only shortfall. New material required research. Rather than rely on the individual efforts of the faculty to create new knowledge, the school formed a Department of Analysis and Research. Colonel Don Faith was assigned in May 1946 as director. The department had interdisciplinary functions ranging from student testing, doctrine reviews, and recommending changes to the various schools to teaching responsibilities for orientation subjects and “the application of the new weapons, devices and techniques and modern warfare.” The department performed an important function for the College, commenting on proposals sent to it by AGF.

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77 Christopher J. Lucas points out that lecturing served a practical purpose in medieval times because of the scarcity of books. CGSC had no such paucity of printed material. Christopher J. Lucas, American Higher Education: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994), 55-58. 
81 H.F. Harding, “Policies on Instruction at the Command and General Staff College,” 20 June 1953, 7, N-13423.97, CARL.
headquarters, other Army agencies, and the War Department’s Research, Development, and Testing Division. As such, Faith’s department became very influential because it had inter-departmental responsibilities. Inside the school, partly due to its curriculum oversight role, the instructors detested the department.83

In the early spring of 1947, the Army Ground Forces convened an executive-level conference on the AGF school system hosted at Fort Leavenworth. In response to the transfer of Army education supervision from the War Department G3 to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the commandants’ conference considered twenty-one proposals made during an earlier meeting held at Fort Leavenworth in February 1947.84 During the February staff-level meeting, the participants identified three lingering questions affecting the Command and Staff College from the Gerow Board: organization, preparation of technical and administrative service officers, and “establishment of the College as the Ground University in fact as well as in name.”85 The proceedings from the three-day March 1947 meeting reflected the ongoing concerns of the educational leadership, especially with the personnel policies governing assignment of instructors and the problem of student throughput to meet the demands of the postwar “bubble.”86 The Conference did not solve any problems, but it did highlight a number of issues facing the Army-wide educational system.

After the conference, tensions continued between the War Department and the Army Ground Forces over the requirement to present both tactical and administrative courses. Having seen first-

85 The establishment of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base prodded the Army to consider an equivalent title for Leavenworth. “Conference of Commandants Army Ground Force Schools to be Held at Fort Leavenworth in March,” Fort Leavenworth News, February 14, 1947, 1, 4. Other agenda items included “coordination of doctrine in the Army Ground Forces School system; capacity at Army Ground Forces schools to meet the needs of the increased strength of the Army; use of extension courses as pre-study for certain courses; common subjects, scope, and levels of instruction in the school system; and plans for conversion of Army Ground Forces school system to meet wartime needs.”
hand the dysfunctional nature of the dual curriculum, General Gerow wrote the commander of Army Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers, about the College’s experience with its dual mission.

Instruction on command and staff functions in a combat zone or communications zone met Army Ground Force needs, while the ten-week general staff courses supported War Department general staff requirements. Gerow questioned the War Department’s directive to teach the content of two courses, observing that “specialized instruction,” meaning the War Department general staff functions, “should be conducted at a level higher than the Command and Staff College.” He further explained “The available time is scant for thorough presentation of fields now included within the scope of instruction. The entire 41 weeks of student residence is needed for proper presentation of the Combat Zone and the Communications Zone.”

Devers and his staff supported Gerow’s recommendations, and the War Department’s reply from Lieutenant General C.P. Hall acknowledged the gap in the Army officer education system. Unfortunately, funds did not exist to remedy the situation, ensuring a bifurcated curriculum for the coming year.

A few months later, the War Department re-designated the school as the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). On May 8, the War Department issued instructions that would “make the name more in keeping with the aim of the school.” The name added precision to the College’s descriptor, although it did little to solve the principal problem of too much material and a dysfunctional internal organization.

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87 L.T. Gerow to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “Specialized Instruction at Command and Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 March 1947, 2, Box 147, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II. “Similarly, if specialized instruction were conducted in Washington, D.C., where both faculty and students had the advantages of frequent [sic]consultation with members of the War Department General Staff and of attendance at selected conferences at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, such instruction could if necessary be expanded from its present ten weeks to a longer period.” Gerow stopped short of recommending re-establishment of the Army War College, recommending instead that the Department start general staff schools for personnel, intelligence, and logistics near Washington, D.C.

88 Jacob L. Devers to Director of Organization and Training, WDGS, memorandum, “1st Indorsement,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 12 March 1947, Box 147, RG 337, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II. General Hall’s reply to Devers stated that the War Department concurred with the basic dilemma of the staff college: “This division recognizes the necessity for an additional level of education in the Army School System.” He noted that the War Department would undertake a study and attempt to gain funding for an added education level in Fiscal Year 49. Lieutenant General C.P. Hall to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “2nd Indorsement,” 28 May 1947, 1, Box 147, RG 337, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.

89 “C&SC Redesignated by War Department C&GSC,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, May 23, 1947, 1. The renaming happened concurrent with the realignment under the Army Ground Forces. This marked the first of five realignments for the College prior to its subordination to the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
The first Regular Course graduated on July 3, 1947. Assessment of the first postwar course by General Gerow and his staff echoed the findings of the Henry Commission. “[G]raduates of the present Command and General Staff College will be reasonably familiar with the staff and command problems at division, corps and army levels, and comparable communications zone levels,” while being “technically prepared from an academic viewpoint to operate effectively in general staff positions at those levels provided always that they possess the requisite personal traits.” Even at this early date, few believed that the College provided sufficient education to prepare officers to command divisions. However, Gerow demonstrated reluctance to make changes to the school system, despite recognizing the limitations of the current scheme, partly due to the ongoing debate over service unification.  

Looking back at the first postwar course, resumption of the ten-month course in 1946 may have been premature. Instructors wrote courseware concurrent with the resumption of instruction. Later experience would demonstrate that the War Department expectations of the College were far beyond the capability of the commandants, faculty, and staff of the College.

The summer of 1947 saw a rotation of experienced instructors. Colonel William R. Grove, Course Director of the Regular Course since February 1947, left for duty with the Army Advisory Group, Nanking, China. A small number of the faculty went on to higher level schooling. Two officers went to the 1947-48 National War College class, and Colonel James W. Holsinger and Lieutenant Colonel William J. Eyerly went to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Three instructors departed to attend the Armed Forces Staff College. Other assignments included duty at the War Department or overseas tours. Following the first significant rotation of instructors in 1947,

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90 Lieutenant General L.T. Gerow to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “4th Indorsement,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 July 1947, 1-3, Box 147, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II.
91 “Colonel Grove Assigned to Army Advisory Group, Nanking, China,” Fort Leavenworth News, June 13, 1947, 4. Grove had been a senior logistics instructor since December 1945. A USMA graduate of 1923, his wartime experience included executive officer of 13th Airborne Division Artillery and XVI Corps Artillery. He was a turnaround instructor from the 25th General Staff class.
the school’s faculty would decline in number and quality—an impediment which would later confound the school’s leaders and frustrate students for decades to come.

Constant turnover of the faculty assured a shortage of experienced instructors. The Henry Commission’s findings of 1947 revealed the extent of the College’s difficulty regarding the pattern of instructor assignment and qualification for teaching duties. At a minimum, development of an individual from fledgling instructor to lesson author required three years, making the triennial turnover particularly troublesome. The Commission perceived that an instructor “learned the ropes” during the first two years of his assignment. He then operated at peak efficiency for his last year—if he stayed for the full three years. While largely complimentary of instructor performance, the Commission asked for a change in assignment policy to extend tours to four years to get the greatest utilization out of the instructors’ talents.\footnote{Henry Commission, 49, 73. Tyler’s History of Fort Leavenworth claimed that Gerow believed three years to be too short, desiring tours to be a minimum of four years. Tyler, 27.} Meanwhile, the War Department and Army Ground Forces headquarters negotiated officer assignment policies, including stipulations for instructor duty. War Department Memorandum 108, issued on November 27, 1946, allowed instructors at CGSC to stay for up to four years, and the guidelines discouraged reassignment during the academic year.\footnote{War Department, “Interim Measure to Stabilize Certain War Department Agencies and Faculties and Student Bodies of Schools,” Memorandum 600-145-1, 27 November 1946 set the initial assignment policy. War Department, “Stabilization of Officer Personnel,” War Department Circular 108, 29 April 1947, modified the original guidance and prohibited the retention of officers at the staff college for more than four years. Both policies referenced in Colonel J.B. Sweet, “Stabilization of Assignment in Zone of Interior, Information Paper, 13 May 1947, Army Ground Forces G1, Folder 3, 210.3 Assignments, Box 62, General Staff G1 Section Officers Division Decimal File 1946—March 16, 1948, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II.} For the most part, however, instructors taught three courses at Leavenworth and then departed. In the coming years, the frequent rotation policy would have a detrimental effect on the institutional memory of the College. As the postwar faculty left and new officers took their place, the outpouring of instructors precipitated a crisis each spring, as the uncertainty of replacements clashed with known losses.\footnote{Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) Inspection Reports for 1952, 1953, and 1954 all mentioned the pending departure of experienced instructors, and the dearth of identified replacements, as a concern.}

Replacement of one-third of the instructors each year took persistence and creativity. The importance of instructor duty was questionable to career progression, but it was desirable duty for the
individual. Early on, the Henry Commission detected an informal system in the method for assigning instructors, likening it to a good-old-boy network. Personal connections often resulted in assignment. The preponderance of each cohort of new instructors came from within the class just graduated. Each year, the faculty would assess current students for possible follow-on assignment as an instructor. Over time, the school developed an assessment process, relying principally upon in-class observations by instructors and subsequent recommendations for candidates. Little was done to formally assess candidates’ leadership and instructional abilities, possibly by having them “to act as group discussion leaders, as chiefs of staff, and as assistant instructors during the middle and latter phases of the Regular Course.” While some leaders criticized the practice and proportion of turnaround instructors, the College benefitted in that the officer had some familiarity with the school’s operation, lessening the orientation requirements for newly-assigned teachers.

One initiative begun at Orleans’ behest was the Reserve Officers Research Program, which brought civilian educators to CGSC for limited periods (three weeks to two months). The program began in the summer of 1947 to “develop new methods and improve existing procedures in the College institution, establish a pool of qualified instructors for the C&GSC in case of an emergency, improve the Army’s relations with civilian educational institutions and to familiarize Reserve officers with military activities similar to their civilian pursuits.” Participants worked for the Department of Analysis and Research, and the program grew quickly. Forty-seven officers in 1948 represented academic institutions ranging from the country’s top tier such as Yale, Harvard, and Stanford to smaller schools such as Western State Teacher’s College of Macomb, Illinois. The academics worked on twenty-two projects in the areas of personnel management instruction, military psychology, remedial reading and arithmetic, study habits, student counseling, and library organization, plus they

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96 Eight faculty members were selected for the Armed Forces Staff College the summer of 1949. “Assign Eight Officers to A.F. Staff College,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, July 15, 1949, 1.

97 Henry Commission, 73. The practice continued as evidenced in a phone conversation between Colonel John J. Lane, Deputy Chief of Personnel, Office, Chief of Staff for Logistics and Colonel Franklin, the school Secretary. Colonel Lane claimed he was “instrumental in recommending a Lt Col Jean P. Sams, TC [Transportation Corps]” for duty as an instructor. Telephone conversation between Colonel Franklin and Colonel John J. Lane, notes, “Personnel Matters,” 1440 28 July 1955, 2, Box 13, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.

assisted with instructor training courses.\textsuperscript{99} Regardless, the College did not get the full benefit of their experience because the program was limited to the summer months, corresponding to the break in instruction at both civilian universities and CGSC. More importantly, the search for experience outside the school demonstrated an early attempt to improve educational outcomes, as well as a tacit admission that the College did not have the expertise in-house.

The Instructor Training Courses begun the previous year continued in 1947 and 1948, reaching three weeks length and roughly thirty hours per week. Although few lessons at the time used discussions, the second instructor training class had introduced the Conference Method, which brought the student into the learning process.\textsuperscript{100} Within a few years, even the faculty admitted the value of the course. Other institutions, including the Armed Forces Staff College and Texas A&M University, recognized the course’s value and sought to learn more about the subjects.\textsuperscript{101} The summer of 1948 saw two instructor training classes taught by the Instructor Training section, and the section conducted a third course for the new Special Associate Course instructors in October. Four officers from the Reserve Officer Research Program assisted in preparing and teaching the lessons.\textsuperscript{102}

With Gerow still in command, the second Regular Course commenced in September.

Capacity for the 1947-48 course was set at 500.\textsuperscript{103} As officers in the second Regular Course settled in

\textsuperscript{99} “Reserve Officers Do Research Work,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, August 6, 1948, 1, 4. The summer of 1949 saw 35 reserve officers assigned to the program. Over time, the program had mixed results. Colonel Harding’s 1951 and 1953 studies merited serious attention, while the work of Colonel Clyde R. Nichols, who worked in the program for four summers, left an unfavorable impression. In recommending refusal of Nichols’ request to gain designation as a CGSC mobilization augmentee, Colonel Seth L. Weld, director of the Research and Analysis section, cited a number of small incidents of unprofessional behavior as grounds for turning down Nichols’ request. Seth L. Weld to Assistant Commandant, DF, “Mobilization Designation to CGSC,” 9 September 1955. The letter dispatched to Nichols did not cite these incidents, since the staff believed doing so would open the matter to protest. Secretary, CGSC to Assistant Commandant, “Comment 3, Mobilization Designation to CGSC,” 12 November 1955, Box 12, Correspondence, 1953-58, RG 546, NARA II.

\textsuperscript{100} “Group of Pedagogues Receives Instruction,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, July 11, 1947, 1.


\textsuperscript{103} Lieutenant General C.P. Hall to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “Quotas at the Command and General Staff College—1947-48,” Washington 25, D.C., 4 August 1947, and B.F. Caffey, Jr. to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “Student Capacity at Command and Staff College,” 11 February 1947, Box 147, Army Field Force Hqs, Classified Decimal File, 1942-48, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II. 400 slots went to land forces, and 100 were allocated to Army Air Forces, Navy, and allied nations. Of the 400 “army” spaces, 283 slots went to Army Ground Forces officers. The War Department allocated the remainder as follows: Adjutant General Department-3, Corps of Engineers-31, Finance Department-5, Judge Advocate General’s
for their ten-month education, General Jacob L. Devers, the commanding general of Army Ground Forces, opened the school year with compliments and a challenge. “The leadership for all of our other schools starts here. You officers have been specially selected to attend this school on your past records; you have an obligation to live up to. I’m sure you will.”

Expectation of Leavenworth students remained high, even as some in attendance demonstrated their inability to successfully complete the course. Despite claims that students came from the top 50% of the officer corps, a number experienced difficulty completing their studies. Shortly after the Second Regular Course began, Lieutenant General Gerow wrote General Devers with his assessment that “some students lack the competence necessary for satisfactory accomplishment of the course.”

307 officers graduated from the First Class on July 3, 1947. 249 U.S. officers completed the course; 58 were international officers. Only one failed to complete the work. Of the two U.S. officers not graduating in 1947, one had been killed in a car accident while on Christmas leave. The remainder of the class had gone on to field assignments or instructor duties.

During his opening remarks to the 1947-48 class, General Jacob Devers noted: “The purpose of this school is to get uniformity of techniques, but techniques change. This last war was won because of this school—because of the uniformity in techniques taught here.”

To accomplish this objective, the second Regular Course had six phases. Five were common instruction, and one was the specialized track taught by one of the College’s four schools. Phase one was the course overview and introduction. As an early description of the second regular course said, “Phase two deals with the Combat Zone, and covers the infantry, airborne and armored divisions in attack and defense and

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106 “Col. Lindquist is Killed in Automobile Accident,” Fort Leavenworth News, January 10, 1947, 1. Lieutenant Colonel Garfield L. Lindquist, died on January 2, 1947 in a car accident while on leave. Lindquist was traveling with his family. He had been a National Guard officer with combat experience in North Africa and Italy.

includes airborne and amphibious operations followed by the corps and army in combat.” The third phase covered the Communications Zone, and the fourth phase looked at the Zone of Interior and the War Department. At this point, students split into four groups and attended specialized instruction in personnel, intelligence, combined arms, or logistics functions of the War Department. Students then attended a final phase on joint operations and future warfare.\(^{108}\) This final phase of the Regular Course lasted about two weeks, with one week spent on joint operations and a second week allocated to future war. Future war did not capture much attention in the course. Students spent three days on a defensive problem and two days on an attack scenario. This comprised less than seven percent of the common instruction and just five percent of the total course.\(^{109}\)

Measuring student performance followed similar patterns of the interwar period, but it did have some slight differences. Five elements comprised the evaluation program: an inventory test, the ROTC qualifying examination, performance in selected exercises, personality ratings by instructors, and examinations after each phase. Despite a Henry Commission recommendation to do so, the evaluation plan required no term papers or written staff studies, nor did the program ask the student to reflect on his learning through self-evaluation. The faculty assessed student learning subjectively on both examinations and map exercises and graded examinations round-robin style. Up to three instructors would assign marks to the exam, compensating for individual variations and lack of instructional experience. The Henry Commission noted, “Far too large a part of the time of the instructional staff is devoted to the grading of examinations.”\(^{110}\) The practice of ranking students by a composite score derived from their grades and “personality ratings” continued in this early period, although it became more difficult with the four-school system to achieve uniformity.\(^{111}\)

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110 Henry Commission, 7. “A study made by the School of Personnel showed that more than a third of the total of 900 hours, devoted to 5 topics, was spent in connection with the grading of exercises.” Henry Commission, 56.
111 Henry Commission, 6-7. “By means of a statistical procedure, known as the McNair “Law of Merit,” the grades on the pay exercises and the trait ratings are combined into a final grade. This grade is the measure of the student officer’s level of accomplishment in the course and his standing in his class.” Henry Commission, 54.
One unique feature of the new curriculum was the practical experience in joint operations offered through field trips. Students in the early classes took trips to California, Florida, and Georgia to observe amphibious and airborne maneuvers. Students and faculty from the School of Logistics visited four sites in the eastern U.S. during the 1946-47 course. In October 1948, 450 staff, instructors, and students traveled by air from the Olathe Naval Air Base to southern California to observe an amphibious exercise with a force of 30,000 sailors and marines, 60 ships, and 275 aircraft. A few weeks later, the class went to Fort Benning, Georgia and Eglin Field, Florida. The massive logistical effort required to move the entire class, combined with the Korean War, led to a cessation of the practice in 1950.

Schools reached out to industry and academia to augment their substance. Logistics students went on trips reflecting a broad range of interests. During May 1948, officers went to the Sears-Roebuck mail order facility and Quartermaster Depot at Kansas City, Missouri, and they visited the Natural Cooler Storage Company at Atchison, Kansas. They toured Tinker Air Force Base and the Decatur, Illinois Signal Depot. In June, the School of Personnel hosted a five-day industrial relations conference with representatives from ten companies and the University of Kansas. The students met in small groups to “study the practical application of personnel management methods in modern industry.” Learning activities for the week began with ten groups of ten officers visiting one of the companies to “make a complete study of the company’s personnel management program.”

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112 Memorandum to Director of Service, Supply and Procurement, War Department, Ft. Monroe, VA, 1 April 1947, Box 147, Army Field Force Hq, Classified Decimal File, 1942-48, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II.


After two days, the students returned to Leavenworth to prepare their committee reports. A further half-day was devoted to seminars taught by University of Kansas School of Business professors. The remainder of the week was spent to completing and presenting their findings. Early efforts to import knowledge from other professions and fields began with the first courses, and the practice would expand in later years.

In the midst of the second postwar course, Lieutenant General Gerow received word of his reassignment to command of the Second Army. At the time of his departure, the Command and Staff College had the barest trappings of a modern graduate school with a faculty, students, a curriculum, and a professional journal. Gerow had overseen the transformation of the College from a collection of unrelated short courses to a functioning long course in just a few months. His staff and faculty had managed to resume both the Regular and Associate courses; the instructor training course showed promise; the Department of Analysis and Research had begun to grapple with future concepts; and he had made tentative steps towards adding civilian faculty to the staff. Much remained to be done, however, to regain the influence and vigor of the interwar school.

Not only did the Army personnel system affect Gerow but it also touched the students. Graduation came early for forty-four students of the second class. As would happen periodically throughout the postwar period, external emergencies would intrude on the educational experience. The War Department directed the early reporting of the officers “to cope with the planning for UMT [Universal Military Training] and Selective Service.” All of these students received full credit for the course. Ironically, these officers missed the specialized instruction that was to prepare them for the positions they were to assume.

117 Gerow’s farewell article in the *Fort Leavenworth News* highlighted the following accomplishments: “reestablishing the Regular and Associate Courses in scope and purpose, based on World War II experience; the improvements in methods of instruction through better instructor training and the introduction of civilian specialists in some fields; the Instructor Training Section was established; the establishing of the Department of Analysis and Research to provide instruction in future warfare; more effective instruction in Army, Navy, and Air Force operation; and the establishment of a program under which Reserve officers who are educators are brought to the College to assist in instruction.” “Gen. Gerow Leaves by Plane Sunday,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, January 9, 1948, 1.

118 Tyler, 64. The Personnel and Administration Division of the War Department called for seven; Plans and Operations Division, five; and Organization and Training, seven. the Intelligence Division needed seven officers early. One went to the Comptroller’s office. The 17 remaining officers went to the Logistics Division.
A Homegrown Leader

Major General Manton S. Eddy’s arrival in January 1948 signaled a new phase in the Army’s attempt to craft a professional military education system for the postwar Army. Gerow’s replacement had tours as both student and instructor, returning to Fort Leavenworth some ten years after his tour as an instructor. Eddy graduated from the two-year course in the early thirties and remained as a tactics instructor from 1934 to 1938. Like Gerow, Eddy had extensive combat command experience, having been a division commander and corps commander in Europe, but his instructor experience would allow him to shape the curriculum and officer education system to correct some of the remaining problems from the War Department’s original scheme.¹¹⁹

Eddy arrived on a chilly day, greeted at Sherman Army Airfield by Lieutenant General Gerow. They spent the next few days conferring about the College’s future and the need for continued progress in professional education. General Gerow soon departed, leaving Eddy to assess his new command.¹²⁰ Eddy’s prior Leavenworth experience, the advice of professional educators, and the experience of the first two postwar classes informed his decisions. His tenure would also be marked by the intrusion of contemporary events into the curriculum, as Truman Administration initiatives and inter-service rivalry became topics of discussion and distraction among the students and faculty. Perhaps most importantly for Leavenworth, the outcome of yet another Army officer education board under Eddy’s supervision would bring much needed change to the curriculum.

Soon after General Eddy’s arrival, a professor of psychology from Fort Hays State College, Ivan J. Birrer, reported to Fort Leavenworth to take up a position as a statistical consultant with the Department of Analysis and Research. Birrer was a slight man, who had experienced World War Two as a captain in the Adjutant General’s Corps. The February 6 announcement of Birrer’s appointment named his official duties with the College as consulting, instruction, and research in the application of

¹¹⁹ “Gen. Eddy Led Ninth Infantry Division in Africa, Europe,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1948, 1. Assumption of command orders in Box 212, “Project” File, RG 337, NARA II. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional, Manton S. Eddy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000) is an useful resource about Eddy’s career, with emphasis on his World War Two experience. Berlin’s work on corps commanders also captured some of the key statistics, noting that Eddy was one of the few who had not been a West Point graduate.

¹²⁰ “Gen. Gerow Leaves by Plane Sunday,” Fort Leavenworth News, January 9, 1948, 1. Birrer would find himself involved in, or would initiate, some of the most lasting changes in the institution.
statistical methods. The professor of psychology would soon become much more than his simple job title implied. As happens with many who possess a unique competence, Dr. Birrer would cultivate a career with the College—one which would cover thirty years of continuous service to the school and its leaders.\(^\text{121}\)

A few months later, another Leavenworth veteran would return to serve as a senior leader. Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness joined Eddy with the title of Assistant Commandant. Hartness’ educational background typified the experience of a successful general officer, with attendance at the two-year course and three years as an instructor. He had also attended the German General Staff School in 1936-37. Like the Commandant, Hartness had served as a division commander in Europe, commanding the 26\(^{\text{th}}\) Infantry Division from 1943 to 1945. Hartness came to Leavenworth from Korea, where he had commanded the 7\(^{\text{th}}\) Infantry Division.\(^\text{122}\) General Hartness, together with General Eddy and Dr. Birrer, would nudge the College towards the future of modern warfare, while adopting a structure and instructional methods more conducive to the education of military professionals. None of this would occur quickly, nor would progress be without pitfalls or active resistance.

The College’s first major internal reorganization after postwar resumption of classes occurred in 1948. Eddy, now a three-star general, approved the reorganization, which sought to correct some of the deficiencies created by the War Department’s original education system plan. Much of the input for change came from below as department directors and other faculty sought to fix problems created by the four-school arrangement.\(^\text{123}\) The plan for the college structure organized the faculty into departments corresponding to the common curriculum rather than the specialized instruction. The

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121 “Dr. Birrer Appointed to A&R Department,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, February 6, 1948, 1. Birrer had previous experience with the College, having attended the Service Staff Course of the 24th General Staff School in 1945.
123 Salet, 7-8. Dr. Orleans, a member of the Henry Commission and the commandant’s psycho-educational advisor, participated in this reorganization study as a consultant.
moniker of commandant, applied to the four colonels of the 1947-48 schools, had caused confusion.\textsuperscript{124}

By adding a fifth school—the School of the Commander and General Staff—and changing the name of the School of Combined Arms to the School of Operations and Training, the leadership hoped to make the instruction more effective. This reorganization took effect in July 1948 but left intact the bureaucratic tensions that existed among the departments.\textsuperscript{125}

The most significant change was a modification to the instructional methods used for the common curriculum, which was an outgrowth of a Department of Analysis and Research recommendation.\textsuperscript{126} The class was divided into twelve groups of thirty-five to thirty-eight students to receive the common instruction. As will be shown later, this shift, while intended to increase student learning and participation, diluted the talent of the instructor pool and led to decreased instructional effectiveness.

Instructional methods affected the required number and qualifications of instructors. In the first two Regular Courses, instructors taught a few classes, or only one, during the year. By 1948, 140 military officers and two civilians comprised the faculty.\textsuperscript{127} With the student body set at 500, this led to a very favorable 3.5:1 student to faculty ratio. However, the school’s two civilian staff, Doctors Orleans and Birrer, used the occasion of Eddy’s arrival to resurface the Henry Commission proposal for a smaller class size, believing that the school could increase instructional effectiveness.\textsuperscript{128} Their co-authored paper, presented to Lieutenant General Eddy in early 1948, recommended that “the class be broken down into smaller sections;” which led to a meeting between Eddy, the four school commandants, and the civilian advisors.\textsuperscript{129} With some hesitancy, the Commandant accepted their proposal and directed that the school further study implementing the proposition. Colonel Stuart

\textsuperscript{124} Robert M. Bathurst to Director, Organization and Training, General Staff, memorandum, “Organizational Revision of Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 7 June 1948, Folder 1948, Box 92, Decimal File, RG 337, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{125} “Reorganize Command College as Another School is Added,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, May 14, 1948, 1.
\textsuperscript{127} Orleans, 360.
\textsuperscript{128} Salet, 6. The Henry Commission had advocated a reduced instructor-student ratio during lessons to increase student comprehension.
\textsuperscript{129} Doughty, \textit{History}, 13-17. Quote on 15.
Wood led the study group, which rendered its report on March 18, 1948. In addition to an internal reorganization of the school faculty, the Board affirmed the decision to adopt a forty-man classroom. Shortly afterward, Lieutenant General Eddy made his intentions known to General Jacob Devers, Commander of Army Field Forces, on April 8, stating “I am strongly of the opinion that this practice—instructing 500 students in one classroom—constitutes an inferior instructional procedure which is not conducive to the most effective learning.” Army Field Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Charles L. Bolte, responded quickly, granting Eddy the authority to pursue the reorganization.

The Wood Report found that the prevalence of Gruber Hall lectures “prevents that degree of student activity and participation fundamental to satisfactory learning” and recognized that the method “creates a strictly impersonal relationship between faculty and students.” The solution, according to the report, was to divide the students into smaller groups. The intent was to bring to life a key feature of the Henry Commission: create “smaller classes whereby applicatory and experimental learning will be encouraged as will reflective thinking; and passive learning by the student eliminated.”

Implementing the Wood Board system involved more than mere division of labor. The continued mandate to teach a bifurcated curriculum caused the college to consolidate the core lessons under a new, fifth school, initially named the School of Common Instruction, which had responsibility “to prepare officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers of divisions, corps, armies, and comparable levels in the communications zone.” The remaining four schools had a more limited scope, primarily teaching the DA-level subjects during the last ten weeks of the course. The decision in May 1948 to go ahead with implementing the plan had an immediate

130 Salet, 6.
131 Salet, 8. The School of Common Instruction was renamed the School of Commander and General Staff before the 1948-49 course began.
consequence—an exponential increase in the faculty’s workload. Unfortunately for students preparing for the future, Colonel E.A. Salet informed the Army that “…the content and character of instruction will remain unchanged.” The course exposed students to a variety of subjects, but the limited time available for each topic meant that students had few opportunities to develop their expertise as staff officers or commanders in division or higher units. The division into five departments and the adoption of smaller sections constituted the first major change in the postwar CGSC. The shift to smaller classes represented a much-needed overhaul of instructional methods, given that nearly three years had passed since the war’s end, yet the college remained mired in the mass-production process used during the Second World War. Change, however, did not come easily to a faculty accustomed to limited responsibilities. As a result of the reorganization and smaller instructional groups, instructors would need broad expertise in a number of lessons. No longer master of a single lesson, some instructors found their duties increased twentyfold, teaching roughly once per week under the rotational system devised to spread the workload. Inside the School of Commander and General Staff, the school created five teaching teams of twelve instructors each—one team for each day of the week. Compounding the problem was the haphazard method used to allocate teaching responsibilities across the five instructional groups. Ivan Birrer described the process as one in which the new teams:

put together a set of 3 x 5 cards in which all the subjects were listed, and they actually just dealt them out. It was not quite one at a time, because you had to take into account the length of the subject. But they divided them up equally in terms of hours.

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132 Manton S. Eddy to Jacob Devers, memorandum, “Composition of Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, April 8, 1948, Folder 1948, Box 92, Decimal File, RG 337, NARA II. Eddy went on to say, “I am convinced that it is desirable and practicable, without increasing the strength of the Faculty, to conduct common instruction next year in twelve groups of approximately forty students each.” Quotes on 1. Bolte’s response found in Charles L. Bolte to M.S. Eddy, memorandum, “1st Indorsement, Composition of Command and General Staff College,” Ft, Monroe, VA, April 12, 1948. Doughty, History, 13-17. Salet, 10, 12.

133 Salet, 3. The Henry Commission’s discussion about students’ perceptions indicated their widespread disaffection with the course, which increased as the course progressed. “The most severe criticisms, and they appeared to increase in intensity with the passage of time, were of the extent and nature of passive learning as exemplified especially but the conference hours, and the discrete elements of content which, at the time they were presented, appeared without reference to the settings in which they belong. These elements enhance the impression of a vast amount of content that is to be learned at a rapid rate, a condition that in the minds of some of the students produced appreciable tension.” Henry Commission, 5.

134 Salet, 3. CGSC Organization Chart, Enclosure to M.S. Eddy to Chief, Army Field Forces, “Composition of Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, April 8, 1948, Folder 1948, Box 92, Decimal File, RG 337, NARA II.

135 Doughty, History, 18.
In part, the faculty had to take such shortcuts for they had little time to do otherwise. The 1947-48 course would not end for another month, and instructors had to be realigned with their new departments. The new scheme represented a significant departure from previous practices with the potential to affect every aspect of the school, ranging from grading to the conduct of exercises. Significantly, instructors had to master the “conference method,” which entailed more interaction between the faculty and the students. Further, lesson authors had little opportunity to consider integrating new material, as the late decision compressed the time available to prepare for the September 1st class start.

In the midst of reorganization, Dr. Orleans’ wife died unexpectedly. Orleans chose to depart soon afterwards. In his end-of-tour report, Dr. Orleans made important observations regarding the internal organization of the College and the methods employed in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 courses. He said that the internal structure of the College and its four schools led to the design and content of the curriculum and highlighted the unintended effect the original War Department Circular had on the College’s educational mission. Dr. Orleans strongly criticized the impact the College’s organization had on the curriculum of the regular course, noting one of the first instances of a recurring issue that would plague the College in later years. Rather than working together to achieve a common purpose, departments had quickly become fiefs more concerned with their limited subject matter rather than producing a general staff officer. The phenomena noted by Dr. Orleans, a feature of the modern American university, would have harmful consequences for later forms of the College.

Orleans greatly influenced the College in its ongoing reorganization and helped define the structure of the College. He also demonstrated the efficacy of using civilian expertise in designing the

136 “Dr. J.S. Orleans Leaves High Post in C&GSC,” Fort Leavenworth News, August 20, 1948, 1. Dr. Orleans assumed that role in January 1947 and remained at Leavenworth until August 20, 1948, when he returned to the City College of New York as a Professor of Education. Dr. Orleans left Fort Leavenworth in part because of his wife’s untimely death. She passed away April 25, 1948 at Fort Leavenworth. “Mrs. Jacob S. Orleans,” New York Times, April 26, 1948, 23.
137 Orleans Report, 5-9.
138 Orleans Report, 5-6 and 9. Dr. Orleans’ report gives an intimate view of the College’s actions on the Henry Commission recommendations as well as his new observations after his extended stay at the College.
educational experience. Integration of civilian faculty into the College may seem to have been a recent development, yet nascent steps towards civilianization of the faculty took place soon after the school resumed the Regular Course. As noted earlier, Lieutenant General Gerow reached out to civilian experts to study the organization and employment of the faculty. Orleans’ continuation as an advisor, followed by Dr. Birrer’s thirty years, established continuity in an expanding search for expertise outside the military profession. Outsiders lent their knowledge, especially in educational techniques and methods and measurement of student learning.

In addition to his contributions to the internal college reorganization, Dr. Orleans had studied issues with student performance. Unsatisfactory student performance, first noted in the 1946-47 class, had increased with the second. Failures of the “top 50 percent” had continued with the second resident class—portents of looming problems with the selection process and officer competence.139 During the second year, fourteen officers—3.5 percent of the class—failed, and this development led to joint action between the Commandant and his civilian advisors.140 They began explorations about establishing entrance requirements for the course, given the wide range of World War Two experience and constructive credit for officer education. Using expertise from the psycho-educational advisor, Dr. Orleans, Eddy recommended a screening exam to reduce the failure rates in August 1948.141 Under a plan put together by Dr. Orleans and Birrer, the College proposed a two-part screening exam, consisting of a CGSC Inventory Test and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Qualifying Examination to identify officers of low aptitude. The staff proposed testing prospective students for the 1949-50 and 1950-51 courses with the intent to turn away potential students with

139 Of the fourteen who failed the next year, thirteen had not attended a branch advanced course and had aptitude scores less than 70. Memorandum, “Final Academic Standing of Thirty Five Officers in 1947-48 Class, Command and General Staff College, with Aptitude Standard Scores Below Seventy.” Inclosure to Lieutenant General L.T. Gerow to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “Selection of Students, Command and General Staff College” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 November 1947, 1-3, and CO Ft. Leavenworth, KS to OCAFF, message, 231930Z, 24 July 1948. Quote on page 1 of the Inclosure, Box 147, RG 337, NARA II. The school had given the Command and General Staff College Inventory Test and the ROTC Qualifying Examination to officers in the 1946–47 and 1947–48 classes.


141 “Final Academic Standing.” “In view of the large percentage of student officers at C&GSC whose test records indicate that they are of a relatively low order of competence, it is apparent that the officers assigned as students represent the entire range of eligible officers rather than a sampling from the prospective better half of eligible officers.”
below average scores. Devers accepted this plan in 1948, and the Army G3 recognized the issue with basic competencies. "Army wide pre-selection testing was discontinued following the testing for the 50-51 course." A few non-combat arms branches continued the practice in the next two years, but the practice ceased entirely by the mid-fifties.

Even with this concession, the Commandant looked to other ways to reduce the failure rate, especially for the current class, which had 24 officers with substandard test scores. Eddy followed up with a request to General Devers to expel students at the Christmas break "whose work by the end of December, 1948, is so unsatisfactory as to make eventual non-graduation almost certain." Visiting academics supported Eddy’s recommendation. "Even though a careful screening is made of students before they come to the CGSC, there are many officers detailed here who probably should not be allowed to complete the full course." Devers agreed with Eddy’s additional suggestion, and he directed the staff to coordinate with Department of the Army for final approval. The screening did not prevent unqualified officers from attending the third class; however.

142 "The unusually large number of student officers found deficient in the qualifying map reading examinations of the three (3) postwar regular classes, Command and General Staff College, has caused considerable concern to the Department of the Army." J.W. Cunningham to Chief Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Inventory Test, Command and General Staff College,” Washington, DC, January 27, 1949, Binder 1, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

143 Walter R. Bruyere III to H.D. Kehm, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 March 1953, Box 4, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Army Continental Army Command, NARA II. Selection of students by an external body marks one significant difference between the College’s situation and that of a modern American university. The screening test represents an attempt by the College to exert some control over entrance criteria to the institution. Elite institutions with a strong tradition of faculty influence have a larger role. "Faculty in departments and through academic senate committees retain authority to make faculty hiring and promotion decisions, select graduate students, determine the curriculum, and with the administration, set the broad outlines for campus priorities and directions." Altbach, 147. There is some similarity of screening tests to that of the SAT for the purpose of selective admissions, which had been in existence since the early part of the twentieth century as a check on American meritocracy. John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 302-303.

144 John M. Devine to Director of Personnel and Administration, General Staff, United States Army, memorandum, “5th Ind.,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 18 November 1948, Binder 1, Box 94, Decimal File, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, NARA II.

145 Harding, “Observation on Instruction at the Command and General Staff College, 1948-1951,” 16. N-13423.97. CARL. Harding went on to write, "In the graduate schools of the better universities, the unqualified student is discouraged or dismissed for low grades (failing to maintain a B average) at the end of the first semester, or, in the case of PhD candidates, at the end of the first year of residence. If the CGSC is a college on the graduate level, it would seem that some such policy is indicated here." In addition to his insistence of standards, Harding offered suggestions for positive incentives to raise the standard of performance.

146 W.B. Bradford to Commandant, CGSC, memorandum, “Lack of Proficiency in Basic Subjects of Students Upon Arrival at Command and General Staff College,” 20 October 1949. In September, CGSC had provided AFF with the results of preliminary examinations in map reading and arithmetic. Binder 2, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.
How effectively instructors could lead this curriculum hinged on their ability to adapt to the new system, and things were not going well. In practice, the course redesign in 1948 did change the “content and character of instruction.” Colonel H.F. Harding explained the problem.

The requirement of having one officer write a unit of instruction and then brief a dozen less qualified and less well-informed officers on its complexities presents a number of objections. In the first place officers of the technical services are at a disadvantage when teaching a combat subject – just as officers of the arms would be if they had to teach a specialized and technical subject. Again, the classes lose the value of the wide reading and knowledge developed by the original author when a subject is put on only once by a dozen different instructors as much experience cannot be gained to improve the teaching method, as for example, if the subject were to be taught by a group of three or four instructors for two or three successive days. Predictably, the dilution of expertise resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of instruction.

The new system led to curious happenings, as the College tried to standardize the educational experience across the student body. In one extreme instance, instructors were ordered to issue instructions for map problems in all sections simultaneously, because the College did not want to give some students a slight advantage that might affect class standings. In some cases, instructor’s lack of familiarity with the material led to detestable practices, such as “the tendency” on the part of some less-qualified faculty “to read word for word from the Lesson Plan.”

External concerns continued to impinge on staff officer education. Unification and service cooperation came to the forefront during General Eddy’s tenure. The bitter infighting occurring in Washington and across the services resounded through Gruber Hall. In spite of the expanded national responsibilities and increased size of standing forces, the Army faced questions of relevance in the dawning atomic age. Russell Weigley noted, “For most Americans, including most of the government, the Army in the late 1940’s seemed almost irrelevant to the Communist challenge.” In his pre-Christmas lecture, Eddy’s address to the faculty, staff, and students captured the Army’s

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147 Charles L. Bolte to M.S. Eddy, 1.
disagreement with the emerging concept of modern war. Eddy declared, “the most advanced prophets of Buck Rogers have, so far, shown nothing to vitiate this concept for the future.” Eddy went on to say that each service—aer, naval, and land forces—had a role in national defense and that there existed a proper balance between the three. The Commandant further explained that the services ought to be “unified in spirit and in doctrine,” rather than adopting a unitary view of their roles. He hinted that if the services themselves could not agree, then the civilian authorities would make the decision for the services. “In my mind, the sooner that is done, the better.” At their graduation, students of the 1948-49 Regular Course would hear more about these concerns. In his graduation remarks, General Omar N. Bradley spoke of the need for a more effective joint force, while cautioning that “our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism and commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces which might oppose us.” Both Bradley’s and Eddy’s comments reflected an early appreciation of the deleterious effect of the inter-service rivalry; neither anticipated the direction later administrations would choose and the corresponding effect on the Army. In the coming decades, the Army would expend significant energy in debate and disagreement over the decision made for the services.151

General Eddy opened the 1949-50 course in September with the admonition to “Make the most of your time here, because never again will you have ten uninterrupted months, free of all administrative and other duties, to devote to the study of your profession.” The school had slightly modified the curriculum, but continuation of the split approach can be seen in the hours devoted to each major phase. Common instruction in the revised program was extended for an additional four weeks, but the course still retained the troublesome specialized subjects. The 1949-50 school year featured 1,200 hours of instruction. Students spent slightly over half of the course, 618 hours, in lessons related to command and staff duties in the combat zone. Eddy actively participated in

151 “Unity of Services is Theme of C.G.’s Talk to Students,” Fort Leavenworth News, December 24, 1948, 1, 4. Eddy labeled the idea that land power had been overtaken by the possibilities of atomic weapons as “thinking that was either warped, immature or overoptimistic about the nature of war today.” Service unity and the Army’s contribution to the National Military Establishment would again make headlines on Army Day in April 1949. “Unification of Armed Forces Emphasized on Army Day,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 6, 1949, 1, 4. “Tension to Last, Bradley Asserts,” New York Times, July 2, 1949, 3 for Bradley’s remarks.
152 “International Amity is a Daily Occurrence at Fort Leavenworth; Says General Eddy,” Fort Leavenworth News, September 9, 1949, 1-2.
classroom activities, leading two of the tactical lessons himself. The communications zone phase included 144 hours of class time. Overviews of the Department of the Army and Zone of Interior comprised thirty-six hours. Topics more appropriate to the War College-level took up more than one-fourth of the course. The departments teaching the specialized subjects had 312 hours. The last few weeks before graduation included fifty-four hours of joint and future warfare topics. The remaining hours were consumed in orientation and instruction in fundamentals.

Much of Eddy’s effort in the next few months regarding officer education attempted to solve the perceived gap in officer education at the highest level. The absence of an Army War College disturbed those generals presently responsible for officer education. Studies in 1947, 1948, and 1949 recommended reinstatement of a course to fill the educational gap.153

On February 4, 1949, the Department of the Army appointed another board to consider the education of commissioned officers. Lieutenant General Eddy, as the Commandant at CGSC, was appointed President. The Eddy Board was to have a much more decisive impact on the Army’s officer education system than previous studies. The wide scope of the task given the board resembled that of the Gerow Board, but it also had a specific task to determine if the Army War College “should be included in the Army School System.”154 One might conclude that the answer had already been decided upon, given the instructions to “provide for an Army War College in the revised plan for the Army Educational System.”155

Comprised of eight officers, the Board met at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and three other posts as it examined evidence regarding its business. The scope of the study was not limited simply to the War College question. A major function of the board was “determining the adequacy of the present system to meet educational requirements for commissioned officers in the Army, and the appropriateness of the scope of curricula at the various educational levels as they are now

153 Phillips’ biography of Eddy tells of a conversation between Bradley and Eddy in which the Chief of Staff told Eddy the time to look at resuming the Army War College had come. Phillips, 196-197.
155 Eddy Board, 11. To be fair, the Army directive qualified the statement with “If the investigation of the Board indicates the need for an Army War College,” although the subsequent paragraph detailed the components to be included in the plan.
established.” According to news reports announcing the board, the purpose of the Army school system was to “educate officers in means and methods of future warfare, in responsibilities of an Army in a democracy, and in leadership of the citizen-soldier.” The Army’s announcement emphasized the joint aspects of the Army officer, hinting at the ongoing debate over unification and the role of land power.

Findings of the Board ranged from minimum civilian education requirements for officers to more clearly defined criteria for selection of students. Although the Army Chief of Staff chose not to implement all of the Board’s recommendations, the ones that were adopted in whole or in part marked a new stage in the development of the Army education system. Significantly, the thirteen recommendations of the Eddy Board recognized the fundamental issues already identified with the existing Army school structure. What distinguished this study from previous reports was that the Army Chief of Staff acted upon most of its recommendations.

From an organizational standpoint, the Eddy Board’s recommendations were significant. The four educational levels proposed by the Eddy Board became the educational scheme for Army officers for the next three decades. Officers would progress through an integrated system beginning with a basic course for new lieutenants, followed by an advanced course for captains, with opportunities for attendance at a staff college and war college in later years. Not until the advent of the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) did the Army significantly alter the educational progression scheme for officers.

The Eddy Board resolved the problem that had plagued the officer education system since the end of World War Two. The report proposed an Advanced Course—a revival of the Army War College—to follow the regular Command and General Staff Course. The board reiterated the fundamental weakness of the War Department arrangement that had forced the College to cover too

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157 Ibid., 4.
much material in the ten months allotted for the course.\textsuperscript{158} The final report observed “it has been demonstrated from 3 year’s experience that too much instruction is crowded into the 10-month Regular Course.” The finding continued: “As already pointed out, this course covers in 10 months what was formerly accomplished before World War Two in 2 years at the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.” The reinstatement of the Army War College narrowed the scope of the CGSC curriculum. The board’s version of the Command and General Staff Course gave the school a more limited mission.\textsuperscript{159} By addressing CGSC’s role scope, the Eddy Board’s findings reduced the expectations of the course to something more manageable within the time allotted.\textsuperscript{160}

As happened with the Henry Commission, the Board was very critical of the specialized instruction given as part of the existing course.\textsuperscript{161} The elimination of the specialized material related to the curriculum of the new Army War College reduced the scope of the new Regular Course. No longer split between large unit and higher level concerns, the College’s new charter focused on tactical operations in the divisions, corps and armies with familiarization with the functions of echelons above army and Department of the Army staff responsibilities a secondary concern. On October 26, 1949, the Department of the Army provisionally approved the Eddy Board report proposals for the Regular Course. Final approval of the Board’s recommendations came on December 29, 1950.\textsuperscript{162}

The recommendations did not fix all the existing issues as the Board left in place the requirement for educating officers in both command and staff functions. This objective reflected the

\textsuperscript{158} Eddy Board, 37.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 45-46. The Board recommended the following mission for the Regular Course: “To prepare officers-- a. For duty as commanders at division, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications zone. b. For duty on the general staff of division, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications zone. 2. To provide instruction in the light of modern developments and war lessons to ensure- a. Effective development and employment of all field forces within the framework of the field army and the communications zone. b. Efficient administrative, intelligence, and logistical support of the fighting forces.”
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{161} Eddy Board, 37-38. Each of the four schools of the college had developed a ten-week course, known as Phase V, to provide instruction on Department of the Army duties appropriate to their area of expertise. The Eddy Board criticized these courses as too narrow in scope since nowhere in the curriculum were the separate courses tied together to give an officer a broad overview of the structure and functioning of the Department of the Army.
belief that officers would eventually form the cadre of mobilized divisions and corps following the World War Two model. In recommending new subjects for CGSC, the Eddy Board cited three complex issues that the Army needed to study as a result of America’s changed strategic situation. The atomic age, forward-deployed forced in strategically important areas, and “modern and scientific business methods of administration” needed intellectual attention. The Board had noted that the peacetime Army had to face an “increased number of problems…as a result of new developments in warfare….” While the report did not specify what it meant by “new developments,” the atomic battlefield was only one of them.\textsuperscript{163} Although the College proclaimed that it “constantly plans ahead, taking cognizance of new developments in weapons, atomic warfare, advanced means of transportation, administrative and management methods, and all other problems which might someday influence the security and peace of our country,” the truth was something less.\textsuperscript{164} The report lacked a recommended method for accelerated research into the conceptual underpinnings of future warfare. Still, the Army had addressed the structural flaw in its officer education system—the lack of an Army War College. The CGSC leadership could now attempt to fix the content of the Regular Course.

\textsuperscript{163} Eddy Board, 37.
\textsuperscript{164} “C&GSC Value to U.S. Proven in War,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, April 6, 1949, 3.
CHAPTER 2

A Course Correction, 1950-1955

One of the most important characteristics of the successful officer today is his ability to improve continuously his techniques and methods, and, at times, almost even his mental processes, not only to keep abreast of the constant changes of modern science, but to effect a harmonious and effective relationship with elements of the armed services of one or many of the allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Lieutenant Colonel Carl N. DeVaney
CGSC Instructor, 1953

As the Department of the Army considered approval of the Eddy Board reforms, the College faculty studied the subjects that they would teach in the 1950-51 school year. Anticipating approval of the Eddy Board report, the Assistant Commandant ordered the Director of the Department of the Commander and General Staff to “prepare plans for the Regular Course, Command and General Staff College.” Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness recognized the changes needed as a result of the re-establishment of the Army War College and those originating from the new strategic situation. The new course had four phases designed to achieve the mission “to prepare officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers of divisions, corps, armies and comparable levels in the communications zone.”¹ Significantly, the directive eliminated the thirteen-week specialized training task levied on the College by the original War Department Circular of 1946.

The Eddy Board’s 1949 recommendations reflected some understanding of future trends, the joint nature of warfare, the effect of atomic weapons on war, and the integration of business practices into military education. While the Army had made efforts to incorporate joint subjects into its CGSC curriculum, the latter two were largely absent in 1949. From the outset, generals had demonstrated an uncertainty about the future of land combat with atomic weapons. Asked in September 1945 what effect the atomic bomb would have on instruction at Leavenworth, Major General Truesdell replied,

“We cannot yet clearly see the implications of such a weapon.” Truesdell went on to observe, “It is certain, however, that our military methods will have to be overhauled and renovated.”

Research and experimentation, a hallmark of the pre-World War Two period, might have ameliorated the situation or illuminated potential solutions, but it proved difficult. The creation of new knowledge—a pillar of civilian academia—fell further behind external developments in the art of war as a result of instructor shortages and overwork. Typically, instructor duties included more than classroom delivery and lesson writing. Instructors devoted time to the preparation of course material for extension courses, grading of exams, writing articles for professional journals, reviewing Army manuals, performing staff assistance visits to USAR schools, and visits to other Army schools. Instructors divided their time among other courses, too. The ten-month course was the college’s flagship, but the three-month Associate course; a one-week course for National Guard and Reserve division staffs; the short-lived civilian orientation course; instructor training courses; and an eight-week allied officer preparatory course required faculty as well. Among the faculty, isolated instances of pure academic research akin to the modern American university occurred, but the average instructor gave little attention to professional research and writing. True, professional dialogue took place in journals, and the College had one of its own—Military Review. Writings in Military Review served to inform the officer corps of doctrinal concepts, notions of future warfare, and school activities, although debate was minimal given the editorial policy of not accepting letters. College instructors made frequent contributions, often under duress. The 1946 “Information for Instructors” specified that “as part of his regular duties, each instructor will contribute to the Military Review.”

2 “C&GSC Value to U.S. Proven in War,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 6, 1949, 3. Brigadier General William F. Train, Assistant Commandant in 1955, believed instructor duty to be demanding but under-appreciated. He observed that instructors wrote lessons, taught, researched, coordinated within the College, developed expertise in instructional methods, wrote for Military Review, represented the College at Army events, and perhaps taught other instructors. William F. Train, memorandum, “Efficiency Reports,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 August 1955, Box 12, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.

3 War Department, Circular No. 378, Washington, DC, 25 December 1946, Box 147, RG 337, Records of the Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.

4 “Lt. Col. C.T. Newton Receives $2600 Scholarship for Use in Research,” Fort Leavenworth News, August 20, 1948, 1. Lieutenant Col. Carroll T. Newton received a Boston Society of Engineers research scholarship in August 1948. Newton had taught in the Department of Logistics since August 1947. His engineering qualifications included a Bachelor’s and Master’s from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he had worked on a number of public works projects with the Corps of Engineers.
Quite often, the College staff resorted to impressment of departments to fill the journal, issuing monthly quotas for articles.\(^6\)

The scope of the Army’s dilemma can be seen in Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.’s 1952 comments:

The Army must prepare itself for possible global war against an enemy who outnumbers us on the ground—an enemy capable of marshaling his resources to strike without warning at a time and place of his own choosing. If global war does not suit his purpose, this enemy can also incite “local wars” anywhere along the global boundary between the Free and Communist worlds. The Army can choose neither the time nor the place of war, nor the type of war to be fought. Ours must be a flexible plan of defense.\(^7\)

America’s position as a European and Asian power, a new national defense structure, and an overhaul of the officer personnel system led to expanded professional requirements; however, military intellect, that of the officer corps in particular, labored to accommodate the exponential growth in technology and new trials arising from growing national involvement in world affairs.\(^8\) Before the College could grapple with future war though, it had to settle issues arising from implementation of the amended Eddy Board reports.

A Wartime School

Shortly after the release of the report, Eddy received a new assignment to lead Seventh Army in Europe, repeating a pattern of leaving reform, and consequences of decisions made, to a successor. As Eddy prepared to depart, he left behind a nascent Army War College, which existed in name only. During the transition, Fort Leavenworth had two commandants—Major General Horace McBride led CGSC, and Major General Joe Swing headed the Army War College. Implementation of the Eddy Board’s recommendation would therefore pit McBride, who assumed command on October 6, 1950,

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\(^5\) “Any institution at the graduate level is as good as the capabilities of its staff to undertake original and independent research.” Found in Harding, “Observation,” 5.

\(^6\) Command and Staff College, “Information for Instructors,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, August 1946, 15, Box 47, RG 337, Records of Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II. At the time, each school had a monthly allocation: Personnel—2, Intelligence—2, Arms—2, Logistics—2, and the Air Section—1. One finds no evidence that instructors at USAR schools had a quota. In general, reserve component officers contributed few articles.

\(^7\) Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. quoted in Military Review 32 (November 1952): 28.

\(^8\) For a discussion of the strategic policy influencing the Army’s regeneration during the early 1950s, David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,” Journal of Military History 61 (January 1997): 93-120. Fautua argued that NSC 68 gave the Army the strategic rationale to remake itself institutionally and to claim a balanced share of defense resources.
against Swing.\(^9\) Harry P. Ball’s *Of Responsible Command* outlines the positive outcomes of the resumption of the Army War College, but 1950 was a turbulent year at Fort Leavenworth.\(^10\) As the senior officer, Swing had overall responsibility for the post, and his position led him to favor the War College’s needs over those of the staff college. This created tension between the institutions, leading to claims that Swing took the most talented faculty and left McBride with the remainder. In addition, War College faculty enjoyed more prestige, leading to further strains.\(^11\) CGSC’s faculty had few opportunities to look at future concepts during this time, as they focused attention on divesting their course of the specialized track, creating new courseware to fill thirteen weeks, and reorganizing into departments.\(^12\)

The North Korean attack in June 1950 complicated, but did not halt, the task of restructuring. The Korean War itself appears to have had little overall influence on the content of the Regular Course, other than hastening graduation for the 1950-51 CGSC class, which graduated a month earlier than planned.\(^13\) The Army needed their talent.

In December, 1950, the Army staff revisited the question of capacity and throughput at CGSC. The arbitrary nature of who attended the staff college came to light in the discussions that followed; for in this year, the Army admitted it did not know how many staff college graduates it needed:

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\(^10\) Ball, 282-283. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Condition of the Army,” *New York Times*, June 22, 1950, 5. Baldwin wrote of nine areas of significant concern, including inadequate discipline, lax or unethical officers, and inexperienced non-commissioned officers. On the eve of the Korean attack, Baldwin observed, “the Army in the United States is today in the best shape since the [Second World] war.”


\(^12\) J.H. Hills to Chief, Army Field Forces, “Staff, Faculty, and Student Spaces for Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 1950. Attached to the letter is a copy of an Army War College letter dated 1 June 1950 that stated CGSC would transfer forty officer, four enlisted, and ten civilian spaces to the War College. Binder 3, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

Precise requirements for the total yearly requirements for graduates of Command and General Staff College have never been determined. Estimates indicate that in the Department of the Army Administrative Area alone, the yearly increment of graduates will meet only about one-third (1/3) of the number of requests. Since the yearly requirements for the Command and General Staff College graduates have not been specifically determined, the Department of the Army believes that a minimum of fifty per cent (50%) of all Regular Army officers should be graduates of the Command and General Staff College.\(^{14}\)

Still, the Army remained attached to the random figure, asking for “Any other recommendations to reduce the backlog and achieve the current objective of graduating a minimum of fifty per cent (50%) of the officers of the Regular Army from the Command and General Staff College?” In his response, AFF’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Francis H. Oxx said that 4,603 officers of all branches were eligible but would not attend the 1950-51 course. While about the same number as the 1947 study, the figures were grossly inflated by the inclusion of 2,398 technical and specialized branch officers, leading AFF to question the basis for figuring the school’s required capacity.\(^{15}\) Army Field Forces recommended that the Regular Course capacity be set at “600 U.S. Army officers plus Air Force, Navy, inactive Civilian components and Foreign officers as required, with the total capacity of class not to exceed 700.”\(^{16}\)

Reducing the still troublesome postwar bulge of officers hinged on solving practical problems. Foremost among these were physical classroom space and student housing. Because Leavenworth hosted other courses, the staff had to set aside some classroom space for these events. Scheduling these courses a year in advance allowed the staff to sequence them so that available facilities could handle the need. Housing a large itinerant population posed a greater concern.

Attempts to increase the output of the course could not overcome the housing shortage. As pressure mounted to increase the course capacity, CGSC informed AFF that “Ft Leavenworth can provide

\(^{14}\) Adjutant General to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Capacity and Frequency of Regular Course, Command and General Staff College,” Washington, DC, 17 August 1950, Binder 3, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

\(^{15}\) The Adjutant General to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Capacity and Frequency of Regular Course, Command and General Staff College,” Washington, D.C., 17 August 1950 and Memorandum to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, ATTN: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations, 8 September 1950, Binder 3, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

\(^{16}\) L.E. Barber to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, memorandum, “1st Indorsement to Plans for Sch[ool] Year 1951-52, C&GSC,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 14 December 1950, Binder 4, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.
adequate housing and classroom facilities for 600,” while retaining 200 sets of bachelor quarters for the Associate Course and other classes.\(^\text{17}\)

The quality of students who did attend continued to vary widely. Professional reputations could be made, and ruined, at Leavenworth. One instance of the latter occurred over the Thanksgiving holiday in 1953. Due to contractor delays during the summer break, Lieutenant Colonel Milton I. Wallace’s quarters had not been painted. The garrison reluctantly scheduled the paint job the Wednesday before the holiday—an arrangement to which Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, an engineer officer, objected. According to Lieutenant General Hodes, commandant at the time of the incident, Wallace “made violent and repeated protests to several echelons including me.” Wallace’s lack of professional decorum led Hodes to enter on his academic efficiency report “Officer should have troop duty. One incident while a student indicated positively that officer needs further training in customs of the service and military discipline.” Hodes wrote the Assistant Commandant, William F. Train to say “I don’t ever want him serving with me in any capacity and regret now that I didn’t take more positive action at the time.”\(^\text{18}\)

Overall, the Leavenworth student of the early fifties had less professional experience than did his immediate predecessors. The College Secretary, Colonel John F. Franklin, Jr. noted a decline in student experience as early as 1954. “Whereas in the years immediately following World War II the students possessed an extremely high experience level, today the student body is made up of officers whose experience is much less than that of the immediate post-war classes.” The 1954-55 class had 540 U.S. officers. Forty-six percent were lieutenant colonels, reflecting the continued backlog of World War Two officers, but forty-one captains attended—seven percent of the class—indicating the gradual drift towards a less-experienced student body that concerned Colonel Franklin.\(^\text{19}\) Given the entrance requirement of seven to fifteen years of service, incoming officers would have been junior

\(^{17}\) OCAFF Memorandum for Record, “Plans for Sch[ool] Year 1951-52, C&GSC,” n.d, Binder 4, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

\(^{18}\) Circumstances and efficiency report entry in H.I. Hodes to William F. Train, Headquarters, Seventh United States Army, 22 September 1955. Hodes’ regret expressed in personal correspondence. H.I. Hodes to William F. Train, Headquarters, Seventh United States Army, 21 September 1955, Box 12, RG 546, NARA II.
officers during, or have missed entirely, World War Two. Colonel Franklin stressed to Fifth Army that “it appears that the student experience level will drop even lower before it stabilizes.” Not only did the students have less experience, the continued use of turnaround instructors meant that the overall experience level of the faculty declined.

Over the summer of 1951, the Army War College moved to Carlisle Barracks, creating physical space in addition to the gulf that had grown between the two institutions during the preceding year. Soon thereafter, new questions arose concerning the mission of CGSC relative to the War College. McBride’s letter to Ned Almond, who had assumed leadership of the War College, summed up the perceived educational gap between the two. “I feel our school system gives reasonably good coverage of tactical and strategical [sic] instruction but I see a definite gap in the logistical field, particularly the Communications Zone. Communications Zone instruction appears to fall within the scope of both the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. We cannot materially increase our instruction in that field without sacrificing our tactical instruction. I understand you feel the same regarding Army War College instruction.”

During the three years of the Korean War, few changes were made to the curriculum, except those necessary in response to the Eddy Board and restart of the Army War College. What is notable is that Leavenworth did not close the Regular Course during the war as had happened in both the First and Second World Wars. Instead, class sizes increased by approximately 200 U.S. officers in 1951-52 and 1952-53. The indirect influence of the Korean War can be seen in the hesitation to make major modifications to the course, although the war itself had little direct consequence on the subjects. However, the college had adequate links to theater to understand the situation. Monthly reports about combat actions in Korea funneled lessons learned to the faculty. One early observation

19 “Roster, 1954-55 Regular Course, CGSC.” Folder 2 352.15 Students, Box 7, Command & General Staff Correspondence 1953-1958, RG 546, NARA II.
21 Horace L. McBride to Edward M. Almond, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 January 1952, N14423.5-B, CARL.
22 Perhaps explanations can be found in the limited mobilization and the larger standing Army in existence at the time.
about North Korean practices indicated the need for a modified view of modern war, although little suggests that the College acted upon this insight. Later, the 1954-55 school year had two lectures based on experiences in the Korean War, rooted in early tactical lessons about defensive operations. One lesson concentrated on staff techniques, and the second examined the defense of the Naktong River Line.

The wartime school of the early fifties had two general problems. First was a worsening of the faculty situation, already bad because of the shift to smaller class sections and exacerbated by the war. Second was a growing deficiency in the state of professional knowledge. History lessons about World War Two combat actions proved compelling, but technological developments and a wider array of international commitments added new questions to what officers needed to know for future duties. The curriculum could no longer rest on its laurels and produce “officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers at division, corps, and army levels, and at comparable levels in the communications zone.” Attending to the growing deficit of professional knowledge pivoted on having sufficient faculty, for the two were intertwined.

What constituted a qualified instructor? In 1947, the College had no formal statement of credentials, other than a loose description of desirable attributes. One seemingly obvious

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24 The Dissemination of Combat Information series was distributed throughout to the Department of the Army staff, field headquarters, and service schools from 5 November 1951 to 9 December 1953. Many of the reports highlighted technical issues, such as equipment failures or personnel shortfalls in Tables of Organization and Equipment. Others signaled enemy practices at odds with American methods, such as the use of unconventional tactics. The December 1951 report stated, “The enemy used partisan and guerrilla warfare as an integral part of his military doctrine. He is not bound by Western concepts of the rules of warfare, nor is he bound by past treaties or conventions. He, therefore, resorts to disguising himself in civilian clothing to infiltrate. Hence, civilians must be evacuated from the battle area, and no civilian movement permitted in the direction of the enemy. (When both friend and enemy are of the same nationality, it is especially difficult to detect espionage agents, or enemy troops, disguised in civilian clothing.) In the event the enemy makes use of airpower more stringent measures would be required to prevent the enemy in civilian clothing from giving ground to air signals. It is recommended that partisan and guerrilla warfare and espionage activities, studied at first hand in Korea, fill more space in the Intelligence Bloc [sic] of the Programs of Instruction at the Service Schools, particularly those for the combat arms. We should not handicap future replacements by putting an atrocity label or a war crime label on what might better be defined as normal enemy doctrines and tactics.” Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, “Dissemination of Combat Information,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 7 December 195, CARL.
26 The Eddy Board’s two-part purpose plus the school’s mission from “Program of Instruction, 1954-55,” 1.
27 According to the Henry Commission, instructors should be a field grade officer, possessing an “outstanding military record,” “specialized knowledge of a field of instruction,” an “ability to speak effectively or evidence of sufficient ability to qualify after further instruction,” and “preferably a graduate of Command and Staff College.” Henry Commission, 49.
requirement, added by 1952, was that the officer had graduated from the Regular Course. A visiting faculty member suggested in 1953 that a “Description of Desirable Qualifications for CGSC Duty” be developed. By 1954, the Commandant articulated five standards: command and/or staff experience in combat; a graduate of the Regular Course, recommended as a potential instructor; suitable rank and branch according to the school’s established manpower authorizations; an experienced instructor (desired); and a college graduate. In 1955, the Secretary clarified CGSC’s expectations to Fifth Army’s G1, stating that the College used two criteria: recommendation by one or more instructional departments and professional background, which included much of the criteria outlined in 1954. Thus, the College established a threshold for faculty members that emphasized a professional and educational background necessary to teach combined arms operations to field grade officers.

Excellence in teaching did merit comment. “An important factor in the learning process” the Eddy Report noted, “is the development of an atmosphere for creative study and the ability of the instructors to inspire thinking on the part of the student.” Colonel H.F. Harding’s reflections on years of study at the early postwar CGSC confirmed this point. Having watched four cycles of the Regular Course as a part-time advisor, Harding wrote: “In spite of the care exercised in the past it is my observation over a period of four years that a number of officers, perhaps as high as 20-25%, are not suited by personality, temperament, or military background to become excellent CGSC instructors. It is true that they are assigned to the Instructor Training Course and they often do a passable job in the classroom, But passable is by no means good enough.” Presumably, an ability to

28 William S. Lawton to The Adjutant General, “Assignment of Officer Personnel to Staff and Faculty, Command and General Staff College,” March 21, 1952, found in “Report of Inspection of the Command and General Staff College.” Other desired traits included “the highest professional qualifications and be of a grade comparable or senior to the student body.” Folder 4, Box 66, RG 337, Army Field Forces Hqs, Chief of Staff, Combat Arms Advisory Group, Inspection Reports, 1952, NARA II.
31 John F. Franklin, Jr. to James F. Lewis, January 21, 1955, Box 12, RG 546, NARA II. Professional background considered six factors: civilian education, combat experience, CGSC academic standing, aptitude score, instructor and peer ratings, and no “undesirable personal traits.” CGSC’s inability to articulate earlier their standards was part of a larger Army problem. Lewis had asked CGSC for their criteria so he could determine “a method and criteria for selection of students to remain as instructors at special service schools.” James F. Lewis to School Secretary, CGSC, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, December 22, 1954, Box 12, RG 546, NARA II.
32 Eddy Board Report, 40.
create this favorable classroom environment stood as another attribute. Still, despite having a widely-recognized instructor training program, one senior faculty member admitted, “If we are successful and if the average instructor is successful in the classroom we are not especially sure why or by what means!”

On paper, the College had sufficient personnel to accomplish their mission. Despite having the full complement of instructors, faculty workload increased, often to excess. The 1952 Office of Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) inspection team noted, “the average workload of the faculty of the Command and General Staff College is 54 hours per week. Under peak conditions, certain individuals of the teaching staff are required to work as many as 70 hours in some weeks.” As noted earlier, an instructor’s first year was essentially an apprenticeship. A shortage of officers fully versed in the college’s courses and methods shifted the burden of revising and creating lessons onto the remaining faculty. Increased hours were expected under wartime conditions, but research into new developments, particularly atomic warfare, suffered. A subsequent 1953 staff visit by OCAFF noted, “Research appears to be lagging due to the personnel situation and the extremely heavy load of rewriting training literature” The report expressed particular concern that the section created specifically for the purpose of research had “not yet produced any original thinking because of the heavy load imposed by projects assigned by outside agencies.” Post’s report acknowledged the general confusion about the nascent Cold War and U.S. defense planning, placing some of the blame on lack of direction regarding “national objectives, national capabilities, and world-wide strategy for any future war....” The school requested an increase in instructor spaces to allow “research on a number of projects involving the curriculum.” After initial approval, the augmentation got rejected...
as part of an overall DA reduction in manpower associated with the new defense budget. In 1954, the school reported a shortage of eleven officers, yet the seven instructional departments had nearly 100% of their authorizations filled.\(^{37}\) A Fifth Army directive in October 1954 to replace military with civilians met with astonishment. A draft reclama by CGSC stated the obvious: “it is most essential that the officers not only be of the combat arms but that they also have broad experience, training, and background, to include a maximum degree of combat. In none of these positions is it considered feasible to substitute a civilian."\(^{38}\)

Frequent comments about instructor workload warrant a look into the effort required to prepare a lesson under the 1940s system. Upon approval of the Program of Instruction by Army Field Forces, the College staff allocated lessons among the five departments, who further distributed lesson responsibility to a lesson author. Lesson authorship combined research, writing, marketing, and editorial responsibilities. If the subject was new to the coming year’s curriculum, the author researched and wrote the problem from scratch. If he were fortunate, an existing lesson required only minor revision and updates. Once a he had drafted the lesson, the author submitted it to the College for formal review. Submission involved much more than circulation of a written product for comments. Lesson review boards met to see the material as it would be presented in class. Grading the presentation would be the Director of the Academic Staff, the department head, a representative from the problem’s functional area (operations, logistics), and possibly a representative from another service or a technical branch. College guidance left little room for competing viewpoints. At a July 1953 staff and faculty meeting, the Commandant reinforced the uniformity required within the school. “Two or more departments covering the same particular item must be sure they are presenting the same information to the students.”\(^{39}\) Again, the school’s desire for uniformity trumped inquiry and

\(^{37}\) Command and General Staff College Strength Report as of 30 September 1954. Two departments showed one open space each, but the other five had from one to eight extra. Folder 3, 320.1 Commissioned Strength, Box 9, Command & General Staff Correspondence 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.

\(^{38}\) CGSC to Fifth Army, ATTN: ALFGA-MC, Draft TWX, ca. October 1954. Box 13, RG 546, NARA II.

\(^{39}\) Colonel James M. Lamont to Department Directors and Section Chiefs, memorandum, “Staff and Faculty Briefing of 11 July 1953,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2, Box 1, Correspondence 1953-1958, RG 546, NARA II.
debate as a mode of learning. Once the lesson author had satisfied any of the panel’s concerns, he submitted it to the staff for editing and printing.

As time to present the lesson approached, the author next briefed the instructors responsible for the delivery of the lesson. This session would take place not long before the class itself. The presentation could be exhaustive, with a review of the intent, visual aids, maps, and, in the case of a map exercise, the preferred solution. Depending on the instructors’ level of familiarity with the subject, and their agreement—or lack thereof—with the proposed solution, these sessions could get quite emotional. More often though, the review process had smoothed out any points of disagreement and the instructors accepted the material. They then begin their own personal preparation to deliver the lesson to students.

At last, the day came to deliver the lesson to students. Instructors busied themselves with last-minute review of the material, final preparation of their notes, and confirmation that the classroom was ready for the students. In what seems to be a standard in military schools, the class lasted for fifty minutes. The instructor came in, told a joke (perhaps “off-color”), presented around five points, and the class took a break. Students absorbed what they could, for they had few opportunities to interact with the teacher. Attempting to square what the lecturer said with past professional experience created conflict. Officers attempting to reconcile “a conflict between the fundamentals and doctrine taught at the school and the student’s own experience in combat” had little chance of carrying the argument. A student’s personal combat experience counted for little in the classroom. Officer-students who recognized what the school taught bore no resemblance to the situation in Korea found themselves in a difficult situation. If they applied their experiential knowledge to a map exercise, they risked the derision of the instructor. In his 1953 Military Review article acquainting students with school methods, Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry Joseph O. Gerot admonished the officer selected for Army

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40 Whether it applied to large unit operations or not, students valued their past experience. When asked about the quality of instruction, “57 students (11.4%) commented that instruction here does not exploit to the maximum the great wealth of military experience available in the student body.” Memorandum by Robert C. Cassibry, “Evaluation of Course-End Questionnaires, Regular Course, 1954-55,” attachment to Seth L. Weld to Secretary, CGSC, memorandum, “Evaluation of Course-End Questionnaires, Regular Course, 1954-55,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 September 1955, Box 15, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, NARA II.
schools to “adapt himself quickly to his new surroundings and develop an appreciation of why he is being schooled.” Gerot, a CGSC instructor and Korean War veteran himself, reflected intellectual intransigence, claiming “the fundamentals and doctrine taught are sound.” This attitude existed among instructors, and it closed off the possibility that the doctrine might be wrong or inappropriate to the situation. Gerot concluded, “Students have been fighting the problem for years—the Army schools will continue to teach fundamentals and doctrine.” As happened in the classroom, the instructor got the last word. The school solution invariably trumped years of combat experience and, perhaps, hard-won common sense.

What did students think of the Leavenworth system? Their perceptions of the curriculum can be seen in remarks made at year’s end. As for depth of instruction, portions of it resembled the recitation model in the early American classical curriculum. “63 students (12.6%) recommended that the extent of memorization now required in order to pass this course be dramatically reduced.” “Instructors should avoid giving ‘hints’ as to what is on exams,” said one group of respondents, while others believed “that the College [should] tell the student that he will be required to memorize in the Regular Course and then guide the student as to what should be memorized.” Interestingly, the Henry Commission had made a similar observation years earlier:

But it is difficult to justify such an expenditure when the result is learning certain forms, the numbers and names of the paragraphs of an estimate, the characteristics of a condition, or the like…. The nature of the curriculum would appear to give such items undue significance. More important than learning such details, which the students should

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41 Joseph O. Gerot, “Why Fight the Problem?” Military Review 33, no. 2 (May 1953): 19. Gerot himself had combat experience in both World War Two and the initial phases of the Korean War. Gerot had served with the 97th Infantry Division in Europe as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The division was committed on April 1, 1945 and saw 31 days of combat. http://www.history.army.mil/documents/eto-ob/97ID-ETO.htm (accessed September 27, 2009). He may have drawn his illustration from personal experience. Gerot served as Executive Officer of the 9th Regimental Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division as it was committed to the defense of Korea and received the Silver Star. http://www.2id.org/indoctrination.htm.

42 Gerot, 19. Gerot justified his point, saying “an officer who has returned from Korea, and has experienced situations where a regiment has, through necessity, defended a sector some 38,000 yards wide, finds it rather confusing when a school problem states ‘that an infantry division can defend a 10,000-yard sector in a position defense,’ and that ‘this is the ideal maximum frontage.’ In explanation, the student must recognize that the school teaches fundamentals and doctrine, and that his combat experience does not invalidate such fundamentals and doctrine, but illustrates how they are applied to particular situations.” One wonders who was more confused in this situation—the pupil or the teacher.

43 Gerot, 21.

44 Lucas, 109-110.
be able to learn on their own, is learning when such items are needed, where to locate them quickly when needed, and how to use them.\footnote{Henry Commission, 24.}

Measuring student achievement proved problematic, as illustrated by the attention directed at the topic by all of the formal boards.\footnote{The 1946 instructor handbook makes no mention of evaluating student learning.} The faculty employed curious practices, which approached intellectual hazing. “In previous years the title and scope of examinations has not been announced; during the war, not even the time was published.” For the Class of 1953, the school made a concession, announcing that “during this school year the College announced the general title and scope of examinations in the weekly schedule.”\footnote{Question 7, “Course-end Questionnaire, Regular Course 1952-53,” CGSC, n.d., Box 12, RG 546, NARA II.}

The exams themselves often confused the students as to what was being tested. Students asked for “Clear specific questions on exams and requirements that do not permit misinterpretation.”\footnote{Response to Question 11, “Course-end Questionnaire, Regular Course 1952-53,” CGSC, n.d., Box 12, RG 546, NARA II.} The Commandant acknowledged that his faculty had a problem in a conference with an AFF inspection team. “The problem of proper evaluation of students was discussed at length by General Hodge and General Hodes. The college has new methods of evaluation under study in an attempt to insure that only fully qualified graduates are certified as qualified general staff officers. Neither General Hodge nor General Hodes consider an academic standing basis alone as sound.”\footnote{B.G. Baetcke to Chief of Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Report of Staff Visit to The Command and General Staff College, The Army General School, Camp Carson, and the Anti-aircraft and Guided Missile Branch of The Artillery School, 10-18 July,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 July 1952, 1-2, Box 66, Chief of Staff, Combat Arms Advisory Group, Inspection Reports, 1952, RG 337, Records of Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.}

One incremental improvement was the addition of peer evaluations to the student evaluation system mentioned in 1953.\footnote{One finds little improvement in instruction compared to the first Regular Course. During lesson delivery, originality, spontaneity, and individualism played little role. Students asked the leadership “prohibit reading from the platform and put more emphasis on the discussion technique.” The press to cram all of the material in to each 50-minute block meant that “student discussion [was] }
stifled by [a] desire not to take from [the] instructor’s time.” If they asked for clarification, students feared they may miss exam questions. Students took note of the standardization demanded by the departments, saying that “too many instructors were ‘tied’ to the lesson plan,” offering instead “that the College should require the instructor to thoroughly research his problem then release him from following the lesson plan, except as the broadest type of guide.” Likewise, the practice of judging student work against the school solution led to calls for “more units whose solution will require more imagination by the students.” Nearly ten percent of the survey group recommended that “seminar type instruction be adopted.”

After presentation, the final step in the life of a lesson began with the post-instructional observations by the instructors about the lesson’s strengths and weaknesses. The lesson author compiled and submitted these to the academic staff for consideration as they prepared the subsequent year’s program of instruction—a process that began in the fall with the start of each new class.

Given the limited experience of some faculty and the fact that authors prepared material for others to deliver, the labyrinth of checks and balances had some advantages. The structure forced lesson authors to put some effort into preparing a polished product, but one with a limited shelf life. Some problems with this elaborate system become apparent upon close inspection. After delivery, faculty attention turned to the next day’s material. The delay between the conduct of the lesson in one year and the revision in a subsequent year dulled memories. Turnover amongst lesson authors was high, breaking the continuity and intellectual underpinnings of a problem, and the requirement for a new review each year introduced yet another variable as personal and professional differences from

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50 E.D. Post to Chief of Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Report of Staff Visit to the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 9-10 March,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 March 1953, 2, Box 83, Chief of Staff, Combat Arms Advisory Group, Inspection Reports, 1953, RG 337, Records of Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.
51 Robert C. Cassibry, “Evaluation of Course-End Questionaires, Regular Course, 1954-55,” attachment to Seth L. Weld to Secretary, CGSC, memorandum, “Evaluation of Course-End Questionaires, Regular Course, 1954-55,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 September 1955, Box 15, RG 546, NARA II. While the percentages may seem statistically small, one must take into account these were voluntary comments and reflected a topic the respondent strongly about. The consolidation of data by the researchers may have had some effect as well. Out of 500 students, the College tabulated 636 individual comments on the topic of instructional methods alone. Note the date, too. The summary of student feedback came several weeks into the subsequent course, leaving no time to make adjustments to the subsequent year’s course.
52 “Information for Instructors,” August 1946, 11-15. The five-page section contained details about the school’s procedures for the preparation and review of lessons, minus the requirement to brief other instructors, which was a requirement added after the 1948 reorganization. The 1955 version may be located in Box 54, Circulars, Command Reports, RG 546, NARA II.
one panel to the next could lead to a shift in emphasis. Further, the ballet of approval, preparation, review, was an exercise in just-in-time courseware, as the typing pool could not possibly prepare all products in advance of the course. The system had little flexibility to incorporate new material in response to recent developments. Internal College personnel moves and the departure of experienced instructors each year almost guaranteed that any experience with the subject gained by the present year’s instructors would be diluted as new faces joined the faculty. Lastly, the great effort put into revising each lesson on an annual basis took time. Lots of time. Independent research suffered, if it occurred at all. Rather than accept this year’s “good enough” lesson, departments required each problem to undergo the cycle again. As a result, the faculty had little time to think about the future. In particular, the alterations caused by doctrinal shifts were singled out as an irritant to departments. Colonel S.W. Foote claimed that new doctrine caused confusion to students, instructors, and lesson authors, declaring “Changes in doctrine or techniques should be held to the absolute minimum during any one academic year.”

As has been mentioned, both the leadership and the school knew that their profession needed to adapt. Outside the gates of Fort Leavenworth, America and the world around it had changed. The problem was articulating what to do. Looking inside the school, a 1951 study by the College’s Department of Analysis and Research, led by Colonel Albert S. Britt, examined several problems that had arisen after implementation of the Eddy Board reforms. In its conclusion, the study called for increased instruction on staff duties at all levels of command. His view represented a distinct shift in that CGSC had since World War Two claimed to prepare graduates for command positions. The Army continued to assume that graduates, much like had occurred in the Second World War, would command divisions and higher units upon mobilization. Britt’s recommendation was a subtle shift concerning the emphasis of the school. To support his position, the study analyzed the Army

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54 Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999). Rose argued that the American public came to a full realization of the potential of the Cold War in 1950.
requirements for graduates. It summarized a new belief that “the concept that the College ‘prepares officers for duty as commanders of division, corps, and army, etc.’ has contributed to the misunderstanding of the true requirements for educating officers at the C&GSC.” The study correctly observed that the likelihood of a graduate of the course reaching division or corps command was small. At the same time, graduates were expected to serve in any number of staff assignments, to include Department of the Army staff, immediately upon graduation, but the curriculum’s wide scope prevented coverage of the broad range of staff functions. More tellingly, Britt recognized that the American Army’s strategic position had changed. The officer corps had a larger reservoir of professional experience, and students who might become corps and division commanders in the future would serve in a number of developmental positions before assuming command of a large tactical unit. Later, in 1953, the Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General Max S. Johnson, would make a similar observation for more practical demographic and contingent reasons. “But as the experience level of our students drops, and the complexity of military operations increases, and for the short-term future [meaning the Korean War], I believe the major emphasis of our instruction should be on the development of capable staff officers.” For the next few years, the pendulum would vacillate between one emphasis (staff officer) and the other (large unit command) as Robert Doughty noted in his study of the College.

A second study in the fall of 1951 attempted to help the faculty come to grips with unfamiliar aspects of the world situation. Like Lisle A. Rose’s observation regarding the American public, professional officers had sensed a need for change in intellectual direction. The College staff reviewed the Regular Course curriculum at the direction of the College’s new Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General Max S. Johnson. Johnson recognized that future warfare included the potential for tactical use of atomic weapons. But this was not his only concern. He wanted study of the Aggressor

55 Albert S. Britt and Charles J. Denholm to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Staff Study – College Mission,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 July 1951. Quote on page 2 of the study itself. This modest report contained the seeds of the modern perspective on the function and role of today’s Command and General Staff Officer’s Course. CARL.
tactical methods, leadership, and terrain-specific combat to be incorporated into the revised course. Led by Colonel R. H. Moore of the G4 staff, a team of officers sought to articulate a suitable curriculum based on a study of the graduate’s needs based upon an analysis of past courses from 1938 to 1951.

The Moore study’s results suggested an attitudinal shift towards a more practical orientation for the curriculum. With solidification of the U.S. – Soviet axis, the group proposed updates to the curriculum largely derived from a desire to study future situations that might exist. Their recommendations anticipated likely shortfalls in U.S. capabilities, and they recommended new approaches. Moore thought map exercises against Aggressor forces, set in areas where confrontation with the Soviets was deemed likely, would be beneficial to students. In a departure from the World War Two experience, he further recommended some situations depict ground operations in the absence of air superiority and an orientation towards destroying enemy forces vice capturing terrain.

The study also uncovered a subtle shift in military mindset. For much of World War Two, the U.S. Army had engaged in offensive operations. But Colonel S.W. Foote pointed out the necessity of studying defensive operations in more detail. Believing both the Korean War and potential combat against the Soviets argued for more extensive study of defensive doctrine, he encouraged the committee to retain lessons on defensive operations.

Despite the changes proposed in the Moore Report, a conservative trait was evident. Moore observed that it was too soon to undertake a major reconfiguration of the curriculum with regards to

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57 Rose, 327.
59 Colonel R.H. Moore and Lieutenant Colonel L.N. Taylor, “Staff Study: Analysis of Mission, Curriculum, and Methodology of Command and General Staff College,” enclosed with Colonel R.H. Moore and others, “Analysis of the Curricula of the Regular Course,” CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 November 1951, CARL. Referred to as “Moore Report.” The findings of this study will be covered in more detail later in this paper. The team restated their given problem as follows: “To analyze the mission of the Command and General Staff College, as it pertains to the Regular Course, to include determination of the end sought and the general nature of the curriculum, methodology and organization for instruction best suited to the achievement of that end.”
60 Moore Report, 1-3.
61 Colonel S.W. Foote, memorandum, “Retention of Subject 6023 – 1952-53,” CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 31 October 1951, CARL. The review of the 1952-53 course content confirms this emphasis on the offense with 250 hours of map exercises devoted to offensive scenarios with 165 hours allocated to defense and retrograde operations. From “Study – Curriculum Review Board 1952; Analysis of the Regular
tactical atomic weapons. He pointed out that the subject had not existed a few years prior and that study and field experimentation would be necessary before instruction could be developed. He observed, “[I]f all the implications of this [tactical atomic] weapon were definitely known at this time, including the required changes in organization, etc.…,” changes to the curriculum could be made.⁶² In this one instant, it is apparent that the College was not leading the intellectual growth of the Army nor was it seeking to participate in shaping the Army’s future. Yet Moore’s report had also called for a plan to stimulate the intellectual development of officers.⁶³ The contradiction inherent in the report between institutional caution and a desire for increasing the mental faculties of the student officers is difficult to reconcile. Instead of serving as a catalyst to Army thought, the College awaited a more concrete definition of its role in the post-World War Two battlefield. As a result, the College accepted a lesser role as purveyor of current doctrine with slight attention to the future.

Adjustments to instructional methods marked one of the few real reforms made during the initial postwar period, but a far greater need was a comprehensive curriculum that reflected the emerging requirements of the professional officer. Despite the admonitions of the Eddy Board, Leavenworth was not forcefully leading change nor, it appears, keeping up with it either. Back in 1950, Eddy himself had captured half of the issue. General Eddy’s talk to the Associate Course showed how reliant on doctrine his instructors were:

What of the subject matter? The doctrine we teach is approved Department of the Army policy. We are neither Monday morning quarterbacks nor Sunday supplement strategists. We would be violating our mission if we taught or propounded unsubstantiated principles and methods of war. Yet the significant aspect of our teachings is forward thinking. We use World War II only as a line of departure. Throughout all the instruction you receive, you will recognize the implication of future warfare—of latest organization, weapons, and tactics. At the end of your course you will be called upon to project your thinking far into the future. When you are, approach it with confidence founded on your understanding of the basic principles. Remember that technique progresses but the principles remain unchanged.⁶⁴
The dilemma of content weighed heavily on the faculty and staff of CGSC. How far could one go with projecting the future? By the end of 1950, senior Army leaders, such as Major General James A. Gavin, would claim “the A-bomb is an excellent tactical weapon.” Defining the "body of specialized knowledge" unique to the profession in the 1950s became a barrier, for without doctrine—the Army education system’s equivalent of new knowledge—the school could not accommodate the future. Boyd Dastrup excused the inaction of the College leadership during the Korean War with respect to new fields of study, particularly operations on the atomic battlefield. In his view, the Army “did not have any solid reason to revise the college’s curriculum and accentuate nuclear warfare any more than they were doing.” Dastrup’s examination, however, neglects the evidence supplied by the 1951 internal survey of Regular Course design which demonstrated that the officer corps had already concluded that the future no longer resembled the past—or the present.

Before renovation could happen, much work had to be done. A growing inability to define the nature of modern war had a pronounced effect on the school because of the linkage between doctrine and lessons. Slow progress on curricular reform caused a growing education gap between the professional needs of officers and the Army’s situation outside the gates of Fort Leavenworth. In fact, ten years would pass between the conclusion of World War Two and first full-blown attempt at modernization of the lessons.

Initial efforts to orient students to current developments came in the form of guest speakers. Brigadier General William A. Borden, Director of the War Department’s New Developments Division, addressed the class in January 1946 on the topic of “Current Developments in Warfare.” Borden’s lecture established a pattern which would continue for decades. In order to accommodate

66 Dastrup, 101.
67 The Moore Report mentioned earlier is one such report. The findings of this study will be covered in more detail later in this paper. Colonel Frank J. Sackton, “The Changing Nature of War” Military Review 34 (November 1954): 52-62.
new topics or emerging developments, the school would invite a guest speaker to update the students. In time, the curriculum might be modified to include a lesson on the subject, if it proved of enduring interest and could be squeezed into the curriculum.

Within the rigid curricular model, the guest speaker program represented one area which had flexibility. The guest speaker program served as a conduit from senior government and military leaders directly to the students. The extent of the program can be found in a sample of the 1952-53 series. The staff invited speakers, ranging from university professors to the Army’s legislative liaison. Topics varied widely, but indicate a breadth of professional interest. “Communism in the United States,” “Labor-Management Relations,” and “The Army Information Program” contrasted with technological updates from the Navy, Air Force, and Army Field Forces. Notably, few lecturers discussed war fighting, but those talks that did came from unique perspectives. Retired Lieutenant General Raymond McLain gave the students a first-hand view of corps operations, Major General (retired) E.H. Harmon lectured on “Imponderables of the Battlefield,” and Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall discussed his view on “The Human Equation in Combat.”69 The next year, Congressman Dewey Short, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, spoke to the class on “Congressional Relations.” The parade of dignitaries simultaneously enlightened and dulled students.70 “Col Underwoods [sic] “Land Mine Warfare” was not good,” wrote one student.71 Not all students got the benefit of these updates, though, as many of the technology and current event topics were classified.72

In the case of future warfare, the curriculum gradually added a series of lessons to cover new material. A few years earlier, the College’s Assistant Commandant had referred to instruction

69 James M. Lamont to Commandant, The Infantry School, “Guest Speakers,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 1953, Box 5, Correspondence 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II. McLain assumed command of the 90th Division in 1944 and later led XIX Corps. McLain was the only National Guard officer to lead a corps in combat; of note, he was a 1938 graduate of the three-month staff college course. Berlin, 11, 19.
72 Arthur G. Trudeau to H.I. Hodes, Washington, DC, 29 December 1953, Box 5, RG 546, NARA II.
regarding future warfare as the “'Buck Rogers’ phase.” Reflective both of his times and of a general satisfaction about the Army’s recent experience, Major General Dean’s quip embodied skepticism of the future and a satisfaction with the results of World War Two, which may have been detrimental to the needs of professional officers of the fifties. Anticipating changes after the Soviet’s detonation of an atomic weapon, Brigadier General Hartness charged the faculty with a new task. “The preparation of all old and new instructional material will recognize the fact that the United States no longer possesses a monopoly on atomic weapons.” Additions to the course indicated the growing belief that fighting the Soviet Union on an atomic battlefield was the principal threat. The Foreign Armies series included briefings on the military capability of the Soviet Union. Employment of atomic weapons had been introduced, and by 1951 the topic had risen to seventy-one hours of class time. The school added hours in 1952-53, increasing the total hours of instruction in atomics to 210. Army Field Forces left their 1953 inspection tour impressed with the latest efforts, saying “Tactical employment of special weapons is now thoroughly integrated into the Regular Course.” Students, on the other hand, believed atomic weapons needed more emphasis. For the most part, atomic weapon instruction took place in the Special Weapons Course—a specialized program begun in Fiscal Year 54 to teach staff officers how to plan the use of atomic weapons in support of ground units. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union rose in later years, the proportion of lessons devoted to, or substantially incorporating, atomic conditions grew at an exponential rate.

73 W.F. Dean, “AGF Conference Proceedings,” 6, CARL. Dean referred to a three-day lesson on future warfare that was part of Phase VI of the 1946-47 Regular Course.
74 Harlan N. Hartness, “Directive for 1950-51 Regular Course, 28 February 1950, 6, CARL.
75 CGSC, “Staff Study: Instruction of Allied Officer Students at C/GSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 December 1951, 5; Annex 3, 1, Folder “Staff Study,” Box 55, Classified Central Files, 1951-52, RG 337, NARA II.
76 E.D. Post to Chief of Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Report of Staff Visit to the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 9-10 March,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 March 1953, 4, Box 83, RG 337, NARA II.
77 “Course-end Questionnaire, Regular Course 1952-53,” CGSC, n.d., Box 12, RG 546, NARA II.
The Problem of Allies

Combined warfare was a central feature of the American experience in the Second World War. From the resumption of classes after World War Two to the present, one outstanding feature of the Regular Course has been the diversity of international representation among the student body. As mentioned earlier, the 1946 class had sixty-three foreign officers, representing twenty-one percent of the class. This figure is especially significant when measured against the number of U.S. officers of the combat arms, for example, who comprised sixty-five percent of the first class. Between 1946 and 1956, hundreds of international officers graduated from CGSC. Surprisingly, historians have paid scant attention to the participation of international students and even less to the unique problems their attendance presented to the faculty and leadership.

In his 1953 letter to the staff and faculty, Major General Hodes explained the importance of international representation at CGSC. “The presence of these Allied officers and their families affords us a unique opportunity to further the effective military training of our potential allies; to cultivate mutual understanding, respect, and friendships; to contribute to the prestige and admiration of the United States Armed Forces, the American people and nation as a whole.”79 Thus, international officer participation at CGSC served U.S. national interests, acting as an extension of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and other nations. The school also served symbolic purposes as an icon of national prestige. International delegations frequently visited the College. For example, eight officers from Central America visited C&GS the week of October 1, 1945.80 The role of CGSC as an instrument of national diplomacy led Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, to declare after a 1949 visit to the College that CGSC had supplanted the German Kriegsakademie and France’s Ecole Superieure de Guerre as “the international magnets which attracted students from all over the world” and had become an institution of “international esteem.”81

80 “Central American Officers in Visit Here,” Fort Leavenworth News, October 6, 1945, 1.
dignitaries continued throughout the forties and fifties, but the principal contact between Leavenworth and other nations was through the students.

CGSC drew its authority from a broad range of defense programs tied to U.S. interests. As articulated in a Department of the Army letter, the:

over-all objectives of the training program for Allied military personnel are to supplement and enhance the military training which friendly nations, using their own resources and combined training facilities are providing; to undertake selected training programs which are in consonance with over-all strategic objectives …; and assist in the establishment and standardization of such training and operational procedures as can be supported by foreign governments when U.S. participation is withdrawn.

Foreign attendance at schools served as a barometer of U.S. relations. A disagreement between the U.S. and the students’ home country could affect the student. Partly in response to increased diplomatic disagreements over Cold War policies, Chile recalled eleven of the twelve Chilean officers attending the First Class of the Regular Course in February 1947. It would not be the last time CGSC played a part in a diplomatic spat between nations.

International participation was not without its difficulties. Two endemic conditions—students’ English language proficiency and classified instruction—concerned the staff and faculty from the outset. Other issues, ranging from as student conduct to blatant racism directed at students, surfaced periodically, but student English skills and the increasing number of hours devoted to sensitive topics weighed on the staff constantly.

English language skills proved the single largest challenge the school had with international officers. The nature of the course, being lecture- and discussion-based, mandated “not only a


minimum ability to read English but in addition some familiarity with spoken English.” The writer, Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Bruyere III, went on to say, “Indeed, this familiarity with spoken English is crucial in that more than half of the classroom instruction time is spent in oral discussion.”

To assist in managing the problem, the College instituted a screening test for prospective students in the early fifties. Officially, test results were intended to be used in preparing courseware for the Allied Officers Preparatory Course. However, the College staff clearly desired that potential students with substandard English skills be disqualified from attendance. Commenting on the situation in 1952-53, Lieutenant Bruyere said that “thirteen Allied officers in the current Regular Course” possessed “completely inadequate English language backgrounds.” Thirteen officers represented a significant proportion of the foreign contingent. Clearly the College attempted to limit the number of students who would understand little, if any, of the instruction, primarily because it did not possess the resources needed for individual attention. Still, students with “meager” English skills continued to show up at Leavenworth.

To improve proficiency in English, the school attempted a number of schemes. One obvious remedy was classes in basic English skills. In 1946, “Classes for Chinese students in pronunciation and enunciation of the English Language began last week at the Army YMCA. The classes were started at the instigation of Major Roger D. Wolcott of the Command and Staff College.” Two years later, Major Peter A. Helfert, who served as Officer in Charge of English instruction in the 1948 Allied Officers’ Preparatory Course, knew of the need to improve language proficiency of students. Helfert consulted Dr. George B. Smith, Dean of the School of Education at the University of Kansas.

85 Walter R. Bruyere III to The Adjutant General, memorandum, “English Language Test for Prospective Allied Student Officers at the Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 February 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. Robert E. Jones to The Adjutant General, memorandum, “English Language Test for Prospective Allied Student Officers at the Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 1951, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II.
86 Ibid. and Carl V. Cash to The Adjutant General, memorandum, “Basic English Test for Prospective Allied Student Officers at the Command and General Staff College.” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 December 1953. The test was “given to all Allied officers of non-English speaking countries who are to attend the Command and General Staff College. The letter, and the Bruyere source, reference similar tests given to the 1952-53 and 1953-54 inbound classes. Box 2, RG 546, NARA II.
87 Caption to photo. Fort Leavenworth News, September 27, 1946, 1.
for guidance. The university provided direct assistance through Professors Cloy S. Hobson and Henry P. Smith of the School of Education and Agnes M. Brady, a professor in the Spanish department. Together with the dean and Major Helfert, this team revised the language laboratory materials and tests, and the team came up with new instructional methods. Helfert judged the venture a success, observing “the new methods used enabled the Allied officers to build up a more comprehensive knowledge of English than was possible using the old methods.”

After the Korean War, CGSC installed a language laboratory to reduce the burden on instructors while increasing the direct participation of the foreign officer in the English course.

On occasion, the postwar school used translators in the classroom, usually for Special Associate Courses conducted for officers of a single nation. This was not without precedent. As the wartime Commandant, Truesdell established the “Latin American Class” during his tour. The course used a separate group of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking instructors to breach the language barrier. For the most part, once an international student arrived and joined his fellow U.S. students in the Regular Course, the foreign officer was left to his own to cope with the language barrier.

Leavenworth took positive steps to ease the adjustment to both military and civilian society and culture, building an extensive support structure. To supervise administration and acculturation, CGSC created an Allied Officer’s section. Incoming international officers attended a two-part Allied

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88 “Kansas University Educators Help Reorganize Prep Course,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, August 26, 1949, 1, 4. Quote on page 4. As part of the cooperative effort, Major Helfert attended courses in the School of Education, which led to him being awarded a Bachelor’s degree in Education in 1949. He was also elected to Phi Delta Kappa.

89 Memorandum to The Adjutant General, “Installation of Audio-Visual Language Laboratory at Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 3 December 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. The College requested $8,500, later increased to $12,000, for the purchase and installation. C.C. Eddleman, G3, Department of the Army to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, Washington [sic] 25, D.C., 30 December 1953. Russell G. Misick to Command General, CONARC, memorandum, “BINAURAL System of Language Training,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 1957 assessed the system’s effectiveness as satisfactory but only as an augmentation to “live” instruction. Box 23, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II.

90 General J. Lawton Collins to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Training of Non-English Speaking ROK Officers in Regular Course, CGSC,” 5 February 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. In early 1953, General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, inquired as to the feasibility of increasing the quota for Republic of Korea officers. CGSC responded with a proposal to create a parallel course for the Korean officers, rather than integrate them in the mainstream course. To do so, CGSC requested ten interpreters, ten instructors, and an additional $56,310 to cover printing and supplies unique to this initiative, which never materialized. F.W. Farrell to Chief, Army Field Forces, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, Washington, DC, 13 January 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. The Department of the Army preferred integration of the ROK officers into the Regular Course. CGSC’s previous experience with Korean officers led Colonel James M. Lamont, School Secretary, to respond regarding the plan, saying “Past experience has shown that only about one-third of the ROKA officers selected to attend the Regular Course have had, in the opinion of this College, sufficient knowledge of the English language to obtain maximum benefit from the course of instruction.” James M. Lamont to Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Department of the Army, “Selection of Republic of Korea Officers to Attend 1954-1955 Regular Course, CGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 December 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II.
Officer Preparatory Course, with non-native English speakers participating in the first part and all new allied officers attending the second. During the preparatory course, Fort Riley hosted the international officers, exposing them to U.S. soldiers training in the field.\textsuperscript{92} At the beginning of the school year, Allied officers attended a reception hosted by the Commandant. One such reception took place on September 14, 1947 with fifty allied officers from 22 nations present. This practice became part of the rhythm of the new academic year.\textsuperscript{93} Throughout the school year, international officers went on cultural trips—Swift and Company, Quaker Oats Factory, and Topeka. The Allied Officer’s Section did the best it could to showcase American military, industrial, and cultural achievements.

Unsurprisingly, learning and living in a foreign country overwhelmed some students. Some problems were of the officers’ own making. Simple things, like a request for a rug for bachelor’s quarters, might spark general officer involvement. When a Republic of Korea (ROK) major general removed a rug from another room, the backlash led to an American general familiar with the situation to opine that “race characteristics” and “differences in opinion” may have accounted for the officer’s actions, adding “it would be well to provide a rug if possible.”\textsuperscript{94}

Adjustments to the curriculum to accommodate international officers varied. With the support of the Allied Officer’s section, most foreign students managed to complete the coursework and graduate, even ahead of their American peers. At times, the school ignored the issue, adding hours for topics that by necessity excluded international officers. Two subjects—intelligence and atomic warfare—formed the bulk of classified topics. As early as 1947, Lieutenant General Gerow commented, “The presence of foreign students at the Command and Staff College makes the teaching

\textsuperscript{91} “Gen. Truesdell Leaves Post,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, November 17, 1945, 1.
\textsuperscript{92} James M. Lamont to Commanding General, Ft. Riley, KS, memorandum, “Visit of Allied Officers to Fort Riley,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{93} “Allied Officers Guests at Reception September 14,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, September 19, 1947, 4.
\textsuperscript{94} Edwin A. Walker to Commanding General, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Ft. Bragg, NC, 7 December 1953, Box 4, RG 546, NARA II.
of Intelligence somewhat restricted even in the common instruction period. This, however, is not a serious difficulty and can be satisfactorily handled.”

Unfortunately, the issue would become an obstacle as the Cold War expanded and the Army became more involved with the atomic battlefield. Classified lessons comprised only fraction of the early curriculum, but the number of hours slowly increased, reaching several hundred hours in 1951, thereby reducing the time international officers spent in the classroom alongside their U.S. counterparts. As this practice grew, the school leadership sought to accommodate the significant number of international officers by restricting the hours of classified instruction or developing alternative activities. By 1951, allies and classified lessons had entered a state of near crisis. The 1951-52 curriculum covered classified subjects in 230 of its 1278 hours. Not all of the material touched on atomic weapons. Hours devoted to confidential or higher instruction included guest speakers, USSR, research and development, U.S. naval operations, joint operations, and a briefing from the Korea Observer Team. Allied officers attended “substitute activities” during 173 hours, leaving a 27 percent gap. On the heels of the Moore Report discussed earlier, the College had proposed in October 1951 to nearly triple the number of classified hours to approximately 600 for the 1952-53 session. To have done so would have halved the course for allied participants. In recognition of the looming problem, Colonel Karl Eklund and Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Showalter of the College faculty prepared an extensive study “to recommend measures to reduce the adverse effect on allied officer instruction at C&GSC caused by an increasingly classified curriculum.” Lowering the October estimate, they still found that a fifty percent increase was necessary, amounting to 389 hours, as the school implemented recommendations from the Moore Report. The writers noted that classified

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95 L.T. Gerow to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, memorandum, “Specialized Instruction at Command and Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 March 1947, 2, Box 212, RG 337, NARA II.
96 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008). Trauschweizer’s study the Cold War Army’s development focused on the development of organization and doctrine as the service tried to accommodate both conventional and atomic conditions. He argued that Seventh Army, located in Europe, had a significant influence on both structural and conceptual changes. Trauschweizer is another historian who recognized the Army’s need for immediate readiness at the outset of war, as opposed to the gradual elevation of readiness that had been the American habit.
content meant classified examinations, which would exclude allied officers, and concluded that the eventual result of such a program would affect the present system of class rankings.97

The authors showed sensitivity to CGSC’s role in furthering U.S. defense pacts and treaties. Eklund and Showalter also acknowledged the legislative mandates that applied to the situation at Leavenworth. The study mentions both NATO and the Rio Pact specifically. Unfortunately, the school had a dilemma: should the curriculum meet U.S. officers’ needs by covering “new developments, and current doctrine and tactics in all fields, with special emphasis on those fields undergoing rapid evolutionary development,” or should the school “provide a C&GSC curriculum which, insofar as the allied officers are concerned, will help foster the objectives of the program under which the allied officers are C&GSC students”? The two officers concluded that the objectives were mutually exclusive and that the decision lay outside CGSC’s domain.98

The next spring, an Army Field Forces’ inspection team noted, “The inclusion in the curriculum of increased amounts of instruction in classified matters presents a major problem regarding the training of Allied students.”99 The rising proportion of classified instruction led the Department of the Army to propose that foreign officers only get a certificate of attendance, which was later amended to say that foreign students would get the same diploma annotated with “Allied course of instruction.” The obvious implication being “Due to the substantial difference in course content, as presented to US and Allied officers, it is apparent that the Allied officers will be prohibited from meeting in full the training standards set for US military personnel.”100

The Eklund staff study resulted in little accommodation for international officers who received a cursory introduction to the effects of atomic weapons in 1953-54, but only after the

97 Karl Eklund and W.E. Showalter, “Problems Inherent in the Instruction of Allied Officer Students at the Command and General Staff College,” Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 December 1951, Folder “Staff Study Instruction of Allied Officer Students at C/GSC,” Box 55, Army – Field Forces Classified Central Files 1951-52, RG 337, NARA II.
98 Eklund and Showalter, 10.
99 OCAFF Inspection Team, Summary Sheet, “Report of Inspection of the Command and General Staff College,” [1952], Box 518, Decimal File, RG 337, Records of the Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II.
approval of Army Field Forces. The central problem of an increasingly classified curriculum reflective of developments in modern warfare and a need to remain engaged with allies through military education remained unsolved.

International student participation in classroom activities formed another point of concern. Perhaps due to the size of the class or limited English skills, foreign students did not contribute as frequently as their U.S. counterparts. College leadership took note of the disparity and called for more international officer input during discussions. At the September 26, 1953 staff and faculty briefing, Colonel Coutts “directed that instructors call upon the Allied Officers in their particular classes to answer questions and enter into discussion pertinent to the subject material being presented.”

For those students—both U.S. and international—who took the time to bridge the cultural gap, the professional relationships established could prove valuable. Allied officer participation in the course furthered national purposes, and the Allied officers at the Regular Course benefitted from association with a full-time faculty and the best curriculum the Army could provide.

Second Class Citizens

That was not the case with regard to another constituency. The opportunity to attend CGSC in residence was not universal. By design, only half of the Regular Army officers would get a seat. Enrollment of about 250 U.S. Army officers in the first class represented a small portion of the total officer strength. Not only did the Army face a surfeit of Regular Army officers without staff college credit, civilian component officers of the Organized Reserve, Army of the United States, and National Guard theoretically required mid-career professional development. For reserve component officers, the chances were miniscule. The composition of the first Regular Course shows that only a fraction of U.S. Army officers in the class came from the Organized Reserve (4.3%), the National Guard (1.9%),


102 James M. Lamont to Department Directors and Section Chiefs, memorandum, “Staff and Faculty Briefing on 26 September 1953,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 September 1953, Box 1, RG 546, NARA II.
and the Army of the United States (1.5%). By the third Regular Course in 1948-49, the proportion had fallen to 2.1% allocated to Organized Reserve officers and 1.1% for National Guard, balanced slightly by an increase of over 100 spaces in the course.

The disparity in opportunity came about in part due to the larger problem of providing a mid-career education to the full-time force. The ten-month course could not satisfy the demand. Various schemes to reach part-time officers and the unfortunate lower half of the Regular Army were tried over the years, with three principal methods used in the postwar period: an Associate Course, which was a condensation of the Regular Course, taught at Leavenworth, lasting four months; a Special Associate Course, attended by reserve officers alternating between weekends and two-week summer periods and usually taught by part-time faculty at a U.S. Army Reserve school site; and an Extension Course, which used the correspondence method. One variation of the Special Associate Course alternated extension courses with two-weeks at a USAR school.

The first Associate Course began January 6, 1947. Responsibility for the abbreviated curriculum, intended for National Guard and Reserve officers and Air Force and Navy officers, fell on the existing faculty, as the Associate Course ran concurrently with the latter half of the Regular Course. The structure of this new program was similar to the long course, but compressed, with proportionally more time spent in the specialized track. Students had one month of common subjects with the remainder of the course taught by one of the four schools, and the last week of the course had a combined phase. The expressed intent of the classes was “to prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at division and higher levels and to keep them up to date as to what is happening in the Army.”

103 The Marine Corps had a greater share of the class—six officers—than did either the National Guard or AUS components. 
104 “Associate Course to be Conducted,” Fort Leavenworth News, December 6, 1946, 1. The fourteen-week course began in January and finished April 5. The course director was Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Clark, a graduate of the 21st class of the C&GSS. At Ft. Leavenworth since February 1945, he had been head of the intelligence section in C&GSS before taking on the director’s role.
105 “Associate Course to be Conducted,” 1. School of Personnel—33, School of Intelligence—32, School of Combined Arms—36, School of Logistics—30.
The War Department selected student-officers using criteria similar to that of the Regular Course: U.S. reserve and national guard officers; no older than 41 years; minimum of seven years commissioned service; graduate of a branch advanced course (regular or associate), or equivalent wartime experience.\textsuperscript{107} The course had a capacity of 200 officers, but the first session registered only 155 of which 131 officers actually attended.\textsuperscript{108} Students’ ranks corresponded to that in the Regular Course, but the average time in service, according to \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, was five years, nine months, well below the seven years set as a prerequisite for selection (table 2). Reflecting the integration of international officers in the Regular Course, six Brazilian officers attended the first associate course.\textsuperscript{109}

| Table 2. Student Ranks, Associate Classes, 1946-1950 |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Brigadier General               |         |         |         |         |
| Colonel                         | 7       | 24      | 6       | 20      |
| Lieutenant Colonel              | 59*     | 72      | 48      | 69      |
| Major                           | 46      | 46      | 55      | 61      |
| Captain                         | 12      | 9       | 18      | 25      |
| First Lieutenant                | 1       |         |         | 2       |
| Allied                          | 6 (Brazil) |         |         | 2 (Siam) |

Source: Breakdown of the first associate class,\textsuperscript{110} Second Associate class,\textsuperscript{111} Fourth Associate Class.\textsuperscript{112}

In the succeeding two years, the College presented additional Associate Courses. The second began about the time of Gerow’s departure on January 5, 1948 with 151 students; it ended April 3.\textsuperscript{113} In January 1949, the third course started, enrolling 130 students, again from the reserve component (table 3). A fourth course began under Eddy’s tenure in 1950. Eddy used the occasion to express his dissatisfaction with the course, writing General Mark W. Clark that “Not only this year’s Associate Class, but preceding post war Associate Classes fully confirms my belief that the government is not

\textsuperscript{107} “Associate Course to be Conducted,” 1.
\textsuperscript{108} “Associate Course to Begin Monday,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, January 3, 1947, 1; “Associate Course Graduates April 5,” 4.
\textsuperscript{109} “Associate Course to be Conducted,” 1.
\textsuperscript{110} “Associate Course Graduates April 5,” 4. Story says 50 lieutenant colonels, but that would not add up to 131. “Command and Staff College is Capstone of Army Ground Forces School System,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, April 7, 1947, 3 has 59.
\textsuperscript{111} “Associate Course to End April 3,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, March 19, 1946, 1. “Associate Course Boasts 151 Student Officers,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, January 9, 1948, 1.
\textsuperscript{112} M.S. Eddy to Mark W. Clark, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 1950, Binder 3, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{113} “Associate Course to End April 3,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, March 19, 1946, 1. “Associate Course Boasts 151 Student Officers,” \textit{Fort Leavenworth News}, January 9, 1948, 1.
receiving commensurate return from the time, effort and money spent on conducting these classes.”

He continued his criticism saying, “over half the class “do[es] not meet the existing eligibility requirements.” While the Army had taken more care to screen Regular Course officers, the opposite occurred with the Associate Course. Eddy went on to complain that field commanders did not adequately review the records of potential students, sending over-age officers or those with inadequate military education. Eddy did, however, offer a solution in the form of an equivalent course to meet the needs of civilian component officers.114

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<td>Office Reserve Corps</td>
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<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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Source: Breakdown of the first associate class;115 Second Associate class.116

Who attended the Associate Course changed dramatically by 1952. In October 1952, Major General Hodes asked for approval to combine the short-lived General Staff Officer with the Associate Course, citing the significant overlap between the content of the two courses.118 In a report prepared for Major General Hodes, the college staff found:

The composition of the resident AC&GSO Classes has changed markedly during the post-war period. The first two classes were made up entirely of non-EAD officers. About 25% of the classes in 1949 and 1950 were EAD officers. In the past two classes, about 60% have been EAD officers (Fall 1951 Class, 65%).119

Hodes agreed, and asked AFF for permission to modify the Associate Course. The following spring, the Army’s G3, C.D. Eddleman, concurred. The revised program had twelve weeks of common instruction and an additional four weeks of instruction oriented on either the combat division or

114 Eddy to Clark, 26 January 1950. Eddy told Clark that only 84 of the 177 officers met both the age and military education criteria. At the time, Associate Course prerequisites paralleled those for the Regular Course and included: “Officers must have credit for completion of advanced or associate advanced branch course; Regular Army and Category III officers must be under 41 years of age, ORC and NG officers not on extended active duty must be under 52.” Eddy recommended an age reduction for ORC and NG officers to 46.
115 “Associate Course Graduates April 5,” 4.
116 “Command and Staff College is Capstone of Army Ground Forces School System,” Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1947, 3.
118 CGSC, Staff Study, “General Staff Officer, Associate Command and General Staff Officer, and Mobilization Courses, CGSC,” 13 October 1953, 1, Box 713, Decimal File, RG 337, NARA II.
119 Original emphasis. Ibid., 6.
logistical commands. In the new Associate Course, half of the students would go into each.\(^{120}\) The resulting two-track approach was reminiscent of the first postwar Regular Courses. It was also an intense experience. One assessment concluded: “Associate course students reported the course presented a ‘too much in too little time’ complex.” Responding to their concerns, the College said it was “revising this program and ‘slowing down’ the course.”\(^{121}\)

In announcing the change, the Department of the Army reallocated seats between the regular and reserve components. At the time, the Army had to devise a suitable means to reduce the number of officers who did not have credit for the staff college. One means was to increase the course’s throughput by funneling officers through the Associate Course. From 100 percent representation in the first three courses, reserve officers dropped to a fraction of the available spaces when the revised course began in August 1953 at Leavenworth.

In addition to the Associate Course taught by Leavenworth faculty, a parallel school system run by numbered armies attempted to reach the large number of National Guard and Organized Reserve officers who did not have the opportunity to attend a longer course. “In the fall of 1948; this Office [OCAFF G3] started a series of Army Area Schools which provide the individual student with two weeks instruction each year for a period of three years.”\(^{122}\) The number of officers enrolling in these courses seemed impressive. A 1949 estimate prepared by Army Field Forces Adjutant General claimed that 1,754 officers would attend the first phase, while 1,421 would study Phase II lessons. Once established, the Army Area schools became Lieutenant General Eddy’s justification for a

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\(^{120}\) C.D. Eddleman to Chief of Army Field Forces, “Associate Command and General Staff Officer Course, C&GSC,” Washington, DC, 20 April 1953. This memorandum also approved the consolidation of the General Staff Officer Course with the Associate Course. The Army G3 initially allocated 25 spaces each to the USAR and National Guard. 250 slots went to the Regular Army and Extended Active Duty officers, which was later reduced to 237 in May 1953. The National Guard received an additional five slots, and the Department of the Army G2 got eight. Description of the new Associate Course in A.B. Chatham to Commanding Generals, memorandum, “Combination of General Staff Officer Course, 250-O-7 and Associate Command and General Staff Officer Course, 250-O-3,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 13 May 1953, Box 713, RG 337, NARA II.

\(^{121}\) Post, “Inspection Report, 1954.” Box 100, Chief of Staff, Combat Arms Advisory Group, Inspection Reports, 1954, RG 337, NARA II.

\(^{122}\) OCAFF G3 to Chief of Staff, DF, “Special Associate Course, Command and General Staff (RCS ATTNG-(OT)-59), 6 July 1950, Binder 4, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.
request to General Clark to close the Leavenworth Associate Course, believing that the Special 
Associate Course now filled the educational need for civilian component officers.\textsuperscript{123}

CGSC considered these campuses to be satellites, and Leavenworth provided instructional 
material, including the examinations. Instructors at the USAR schools issued examinations prepared 
and graded by full-time faculty, according to a 1949 CGSC letter to Army Field Forces. Two reasons 
underlay this measure. At the time, the school had no idea what would constitute a passing grade, 
since the course had never been taught under these conditions. In order to establish the minimum 
score, the CGSC staff would grade all examinations and establish a cutoff score based upon the 
results. Mainly, tight control of the examinations stemmed from concerns about compromise of the 
tests.\textsuperscript{124}

The College faculty and staff engaged the USAR schools in two ways—inspection trips and 
instructor training. Oversight of numbered army schools demanded significant effort on the part of 
CGSC staff. In addition to their own teaching duties, the College detailed officers to observe 
instruction at the USAR locations. Inspection reports found the schools adhered to the lesson plans 
and instructional methods used at Leavenworth. For example, Lieutenant Colonel O.K. Marshall 
concluded “The instruction observed was in consonance with the doctrine taught at this College” after 
his late January 1950 visit to a Phase I course at the Presidio of San Francisco.\textsuperscript{125} Likewise, 
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Francis reported that “the classrooms and the instruction observed 
compared favorably with the facilities and instruction at this College.”\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} OCAFF G3 to Chief of Staff, memorandum, “Associate Course at Command and General Staff College,” 10 February 1950, Binder 4, 
Box 338, RG 337, NARA II. In his memo, Lieutenant Colonel Winn related that Lieutenant General Eddy believed that the Army Area 
schools were “very effective.” The principal objection to the plan came from the National Guard Bureau. 
\textsuperscript{124} L.E. Barber to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Implementation and Administration of Evaluation Program, Special Associate 
Course, Command and General Staff,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 November 1949 and L.E. Barber to Chief, Army Field Forces, 
2, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II. 
\textsuperscript{125} R.J. Maltais to Commanding General, Sixth Army, memorandum, “Staff Visit to Special Associate Course, Phase I, Sixth Army” Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS, 27 January 1950, Binder 2, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II. 
\textsuperscript{126} L.E. Barber to Commanding General, Fifth Army, memorandum, “Staff Visit to Special Associate Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 
February 1950, Binder 2, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II. According to Francis, “Several [students] stated it was the best active duty training 
they had received.” R.I. Culhane to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Special Associate Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 
December 1950 referenced a previous OCADD directive that “charges this College [CGSC] with the responsibility for inspection of the 
Special Associate Course in Army Areas to ensure proper coordination between resident instruction at Fort Leavenworth and that presented
Leavenworth itself engaged in teaching the two-week Phase I and II courses in 1949. This was a move, however, not without controversy, as some commanders of the numbered armies perceived this as a threat to their own schools. Concern over the initiative led Lieutenant General Gerow, who now commanded Second Army, to write General Devers in April 1949. In his letter, Gerow objected to the initial reports that “all resident instruction at the C&GSC level for civilian component officers be given at the College at Fort Leavenworth in lieu of conducting the Special Course in the Army areas.” Gerow maintained that “This training [Second Army’s course] has been well presented by the short-tour Reserve and National Guard instructors and has been well received by the students.” Gerow concluded with a handwritten note, telling Devers “Many student officers have told me they can attend and still keep in contact with their businesses by telephone and through weekend conferences. This they could not do at Leavenworth.” Gerow’s request and Dever’s subsequent acknowledgement show early hints of a desire for a more flexible system for professional development. The challenge of educating a citizen army in modern warfare required methods akin to the regimental system that existed in a prior century, albeit larger and more formalized.

Employing part-time faculty presented unique challenges. Oftentimes, instructors could not absent themselves from civilian employment, leaving the school short qualified faculty. Typical of the faculty at USAR Schools was First Army’s cadre at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The staff of four came from the USAR, while the sixteen instructors had a mix of USAR (fourteen) and National Guard (two) officers.

Instructor training for reservists took place periodically, often at Fort Leavenworth. These courses tended to be subject-oriented, rather than skill improvement courses like the instructor training course provided to resident faculty. In July 1949, a letter from Army Field Forces’ headquarters to the numbered armies announced a Phase I Instructor Training Course to be held at

in the various Army Areas.” Additionally, OCAFF, memorandum, “Special Associate Course,” ATTNG 12 352/89 (CGSC), 24 April 1950, Binder 3, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.

Harry E. Besley to Commanding General, First Army, memorandum, “Report of Special Associate Courses, Command and General Staff, Army Area School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 4 October to 17 October 1953,” Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, 17 October 1953, 1, Box 713, RG 337, NARA II.
Fort Leavenworth. The one-week training session focused on the lesson content of the USAR school curriculum.\textsuperscript{129}

The effectiveness of the early USAR schools is difficult to judge. As noted earlier, Gerow believed them to be on par with the resident course. Shortfalls in producing the desired outcome appeared a few years later, after the enthusiasm for the initial courses subsided. Students who enrolled often did not complete the course. One Army commander recommended consolidating the numbered army schools in 1953, as the effort did not merit the resources.\textsuperscript{130} Despite CGSC’s effort to support the faculty, special associate courses did not result in a large increase in CGSC graduates among reserve component officers.

The lag in special associate courseware relative to resident course formed a constant concern. Leavenworth-based instructors had the advantage in both priority and proximity. Revising the Regular Course required one year. New material selected for inclusion in the offsite courses usually required modification to meet the circumstances of the USAR schools. Special associate course instructors often had to wait an additional year to receive updated material, if they got it at all. Lastly, curricular dynamics at Leavenworth would often supersede the previous year’s modifications, rendering ongoing changes to the special associate courses irrelevant. Given that the USAR School functioned on a two- or three-year cycle, students and faculty could find themselves several years behind their peers at the resident course.\textsuperscript{131} In part, the explanation can be found in the sparse resources devoted to the preparation of courseware.

The last of the three major staff college adjuncts—the extension or non-resident course—enrolled about from 10,000 to 15,000 officers at one point, which was a disproportionate share of the

\textsuperscript{128} Besley, 1.
\textsuperscript{129} Neil M. Matzger to Commanding Generals, memorandum, “Special Associate Course, Command and General Staff (Reports Control Symbols ATTG-(OT)-18 and ATTN-(OT)-19), 5 July 1949, Binder 1, Box 338, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{130} A.B. Chatham to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, memorandum, “Special Associate Course, Command and General Staff,” Army Field Forces Headquarters, Ft. Monroe, VA, 28 July 1953, Box 713, RG 337, NARA II. Chatham relayed the contents of a letter to the Chief, AFF in which the unnamed commander had said only seventeen officers had completed Phase I, eight completed Phase II, and thirteen finished Phase III of the Special Associate Course in his area.
\textsuperscript{131} R.J. Maltais to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, “Revision of Program of Instruction, Special Associate Course, Phases I and II,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 July 1949, Binder 1, Box 338, RG 337, NARA II.
officer corps. Yet this program had the fewest assets. Much of the work supporting the Special Associate Courses came from the extension course section, who served as the coordinator of production and the registrar and support for enrollees. As such, the section was chronically understaffed. For example, the 1953 department director had nine lesson authors to cover 21 subcourses, totaling 210 lessons, for the USAR schools and Special Associate Courses, plus extension course material. Ofﬁcers assigned to the section served principally as authors, since faculty from the other instructional departments provided the expertise, as student solutions were farmed out to instructors for grading.

For the student, the course could be intimidating. Periodically, the non-resident section would mail the student a box of books, manuals, and oftentimes maps. The officer had few, if any, opportunities to interact with fellow students, usually completing the lessons in isolation. Once finished, the student mailed the solution to Leavenworth. And he waited.

By intention, often aggravated by neglect due to lack of resources, the scaled-down versions of the Regular Course imparted the basic knowledge needed to function as a staff officer on a general staff, barely. As a general feature, the courses did not cover the same scope as the longer resident course, usually focusing on a single echelon, usually the division. Educating a citizen-army proved a difficult task, as reserve component officers seldom got the same content, quality, and depth of instruction afforded the lucky fifty percent of their peers in the Regular Army. The trend towards mass professional education paralleled that seen in civilian institutions in the 1960s, similar to the explosion in community colleges and the seedier complement, proprietary diploma mills.

**Toward a New Era**

So what had transpired over the course of these turbulent years? In his critique of the pernicious effect of bureaucracy on academia, Frederick Rudolph said that one must “get beyond process and consider some of the concrete results.” For the early College, the results were decidedly

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132 James M. Lamont to Faculty, Command and General Staff College, Faculty Memorandum No. 78, “Assignment of Subjects for Nonresident Courses of Instruction, 1953-54,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 October 1953, Box 3, RG 546, NARA II.
unsatisfactory. The school’s status had declined to the point that wartime commanders in Korea openly questioned whether CGSC was achieving one of its primary goals—“to prepare officers for duty on the general staff of division, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications zone.” Major General Williston (Willy) B. Palmer, X Corps commander in Korea, wrote the CGSC Commandant in 1951: “I don’t know how well you train your students to do my job, all I know is you don’t train them very well to do their job.” Perhaps unfairly, Palmer’s caustic remark shifted blame to Leavenworth, rather than the individual officer who certainly played some role in the incident, but a growing number of senior leaders (and graduates) began to view Leavenworth with suspicion. While a lonely anecdote, Palmer’s perception that the school had fallen short reflected a growing frustration with the School’s graduates.

The role of CGSC’s various higher headquarters is largely ignored in institutional histories and academic historical studies; yet they form an important link in the school’s evolution. The school’s relationship to higher authority, and the degree of autonomy, shifted over time with the War Department G3, Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces, Fifth Army, and Continental Army Command exercising direct supervision of the College during the forties and fifties. Additionally, Army personnel managers, civilian agencies, other academic institutions, and civilian experts began to exert influence on the school’s curriculum. While the school’s bureaucratic traits moderated responsiveness to external directives and suggestions, significant changes did occur as a result of external findings and decrees.

Early compromises made in the name of inter-service cooperation saddled the College with conflicting roles. Perhaps most significant was the War Department directive to teach the content of

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133 “Information for Instructors,” August 1946, 7-8.
135 Ivan J. Birrer, interview by Major Robert A. Doughty, Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978, 21 April 1978, 23. The school later found that the source of Palmer’s irritation was that a recent CGSC graduate had found it necessary to refer to a book to find the format to prepare a corps order. “According to General Palmer this was *prima facie* evidence that he didn’t know what to do.” The author has attempted to re-locate this document but has been unable to find a copy. In a personal communication with Robert Doughty, he confirmed the prior existence of the letter and that the above represents the essential contents. Robert Doughty, email to author, July 2009. William M. Donnelly’s “The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances” referenced earlier showed the declining quality and capability of Korean War staff officers.
two courses, while allocated time was insufficient for even one. The use of specialized courses to meet the War Department specifications was roundly criticized later and eventually abandoned. The overwhelming task of teaching material applicable to all levels of the Army from the perspective of both command and staff positions diverged from the school’s former role of educating officers for division, corps and army staff positions.\(^\text{136}\) Later, the elimination of the specialized track in conjunction with the Army War College’s revival in 1950, while needed, arrested progress at a critical juncture. The energy devoted by the Commandant and his staff to solving administrative problems had an adverse effect on the quality of the instruction at the College.

The underlying assumption of the Gerow Board and the War Department presumed a continuation of the current War Department structure. The War Department’s imperfect understanding of the radical changes that would occur in defense structure after enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 resulted in more delays in implementing a workable scheme. The Army itself lacked a clear vision. That any institution would expend the amount of effort the Army did between 1946 and 1956 studying officer education underscores the importance it placed upon educating the officer corps. Extensive study, however, did not lead to a corresponding increase in effectiveness of instruction.

The school experienced internal trials as it restarted the traditional Regular Course. The Commandant, staff, and instructors of the Command and General Staff College dealt with numerous organizational issues in the first five years following the end of World War Two. Reflecting the immediacy of the task, the 1946 faculty adopted shortcuts in educational methods that allowed the development of in-depth instructor expertise at the expense of student learning. Only with outside assistance, and the determined effort of a knowledgeable Commandant, did the instructors adopt practices slightly more reflective of contemporary educational recommendations. Lieutenant General Eddy’s tenure was significant, not only to the College but also to the overall officer education system. 

Unfortunately, the resumption of the Army War College and Korean War diverted attention from

\(^{136}\) Masland and Radway, 145-46.
reforming the curriculum, thereby reducing the potential benefits of the Eddy Board’s recommendations to the College.

Organizational turmoil and uncertainty about the College’s basic mission inhibited study and consideration of the Army’s real challenges. The College’s institutional memory was short-lived. Army personnel policies assigned faculty to the College for three years. With few, if any, civilian faculty, the effect created by this policy appeared to be one of institutional inertia except when a Commandant forced change. The institution exhibited a basic bureaucratic trait when faced with uncertainty. “When not sure what to do - reorganize!” best describes the reaction to many of its challenges. The near-continuous internal reorganization of the College consumed an enormous amount of time and resources.

Like the leadership, the quality of students and faculty varied. Clearly, the officer corps had a broad range of intellectual capabilities, reflected in both the achievements and failures of the faculty and students. For the most part, faculty members in the immediate postwar period were of high quality, reflecting the selection process used by the College. But they were not exceptional as a rule, especially after two years of turnover. More tellingly, student officers represented the full span of officer talent. Most passed, but some failed. Tentative steps towards screening out the less-talented officers met with resistance, as the Career Management Division delegated responsibility to the branches. CGSC had little control over admissions, although it made attempts to shape the selection process to reduce student failures. Pressure mounted to modify the increasingly anachronistic system of student rankings, given the heterogeneous nature of the student body.

What to teach confounded the leadership more than how to teach. Uncertainty ruled. Research and the corresponding growth of professional knowledge seemed unable to keep up with developments in military technology. In general, the College faculty exhibited hesitancy to adopt new methods or to attempt to predict some part of the future. The jarring effects of the atomic era on the officer corps are evident in the College faculty’s reluctance to develop a curriculum based on their perception of the future. Neither the army nor the college faculty could assimilate and act upon
external events before a new series of questions reset the standard for professional knowledge.
Leaders and faculty recognized their requirement was to produce officers capable of fulfilling duties
ten years in the future, and military professionals judged the content as increasingly irrelevant to the
future. Not until 1956 would the College take steps towards orienting the curriculum towards the
future, and even then, it only embraced a fraction of modern war.

The Command and General Staff College remained rooted in the past, teaching lessons based
upon World War Two experience. With so much uncertainty, the faculty chose to look to the past
rather than attempt to predict or incorporate future patterns of warfare. An inherently conservative
organization faced with tremendous change and uncertainty about the future transposed the problem
to other military organizations which it perceived as more capable of predicting the future.
Incremental change, rooted partially in the slow rhythms of educational bureaucracy, became the
norm for the College. The centralized process used by the College to manage the education of officers
in the postwar period reflected the most gloomy of Rudolph’s observations. Impetus for change came
less from instructor initiative than external studies and forced organizational changes. Internal
developments and decisions within the college drove little of the adaptation that took place in the
preceding ten years, but the new strategic situation provided the backdrop and, eventually, the next
grounds for revision.
CHAPTER 3

Forward Progress, Slowly, 1954-1963

The great trouble with starting anything new is to break away from the conservative policy of those who have gone before.

Brigadier General William Mitchell

Aboard the USS Blue Ridge on July 1, 1946, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G. Russell donned his safety glasses, darkening the morning sun. Moments later, a second, manmade sun rose over the horizon. Test Able of OPERATION CROSSROADS had begun. Russell, a CGSC logistics instructor, reported to his wife that he was “surprised at the mildness of the shock and flash” of the first Bikini Atoll test that summer. Russell spent the next few weeks inspecting the blast-damaged vessels and cruising the South Pacific before his ship returned to the lagoon for Test Baker. He became something of a minor celebrity upon his return to Fort Leavenworth, for he had personally witnessed the first peacetime test of America’s new military weapon.\(^1\) Vicariously, CGSC had joined the atomic age. A few months later, Major General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General of the Manhattan Project, spoke to the 1946-47 Regular Course students on “Atomic Operations.”\(^2\) The first-hand experience of the faculty and visits by guest lecturers proved interesting, but their individual experience meant little to a military community whose view of warfare came from other battlefields.

In these early years, atomic warfare topics appeared as add-ons and did not bring substantial change to the underlying philosophy espoused via the curriculum. At the tactical level, the division, corps, and field army, and conventional combat, remained the centerpiece of tactical instruction. As early as 1949, the Eddy Board, created to study officer education, emphasized the need for more

\(^{1}\) “Command and Staff College Sends Observer to Bikini,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, June 29, 1946, 1, 8. The article detailed the many unknowns about the test, ranging from tidal waves to the effect of the atomic cloud. “These, and many other answers, are unknown to anyone, including the scientists who developed the bomb.” “CSC Observer at Bomb Test Scene,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, July 13, 1946, 1 and “Tells of Bikini Test,” *Fort Leavenworth News*, August 9, 1946, 1 for Russell’s account of the test.

effort in this area. The faculty had good reason for the delay, since doctrinal and policy changes obscured the future.

During 1950-54, the role of land forces in national defense became increasingly ambiguous. Historian Russell Weigley, closing his discussion about the Korean War and the Truman Administration, wrote that “the acknowledged first purpose of American military strategy was now not to use combats but to deter adversaries from initiating combat.” The change in presidential administrations in 1953, largely a result of the Korean War, brought more uncertainty. The Eisenhower Administration’s policy of “massive retaliation” and NSC 162/2, released in October 1953, emphasized nuclear deterrence and air power. As Andrew Bacevich discussed in The Pentomic Era, the “New Look” relegated land forces to the margins. By 1954, even students at CGSC had begun to ask, “What is the Army’s Story?”

Instructors had little factual information upon which to base lessons, causing a gap to open between policy, technology, doctrine, and curriculum. Faculty tried to anticipate technological and strategic events in the first five years of the 1950s, but the missing component—knowledge as expressed in doctrine—hampered their efforts. The faculty attempted to maintain pace with technological developments, importing information and concepts from the Weapons System Evaluation Group, for example, but secrecy shrouded ongoing experiments. Instructors’ projections of how to use atomic weapons relied on conjecture. Two faculty members, Colonel G.C. Reinhardt

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3 Weigley, 398.
5 John H. Cushman, “What is the Army’s Story?” Army Combat Forces Journal 5, no. 3 (October 1954): 49-51. Major Cushman, a CGSC student at the time of publication, responded to the Army Vice Chief of Staff’s call to “clearly and loudly” tell about the Army’s positive attributes. Cushman said that the Army needed “a statement of fundamental doctrine” but to do so “would require a searching analysis of the Army’s role in today’s world by the best minds the Army can muster.” Cushman, 50.
6 Fautua’s “The ‘Long Pull’ Army” argued NSC 68 became the “intellectual rationale” that allowed the Army to claim its share of defense resources, countering the “psychological and historical prejudices against maintain—and funding—a large ground force during peacetime.” Fautua, 96. Trauschweizer introduces this period, labeling the Army’s contribution to nuclear deterrence as “marginal.” He mentions Leavenworth’s contribution to the Atomic Field Army (AFTA-I) study in 1954. For an overview of the activities and studies of WSEG, the somewhat dated William R. Kintner, Joseph I. Coffey, and Raymond J. Albright, Forging a New Sword, A Study of the Department of Defense (New York: Harper, 1958) tells of the early period of WSEG. John Ponturo, Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976 (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1979) discusses how WSEG originated under Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal and how the agency operated.
and Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintner published a text in 1953, *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*, which represented their thoughts about land warfare in the atomic age. 8 Not until 1954 did the College faculty, under Major General Garrison Davidson, begin to consider seriously how to integrate atomic weapons into lessons. The same year the Army published its concepts in the *Field Service Regulations*. 9 Now, the College faculty had an official basis upon which to update their curriculum. The Army’s senior leadership, however, wanted more. 10

Major General Lionel C. McGarr arrived at Fort Leavenworth in 1956 with guidance to get things moving at what many senior leaders were viewing as a sleepy, hidebound institution. As Commandant, McGarr swept aside the previous curriculum, directing a wholesale re-write of the course. McGarr’s actions marked the culmination of the atomic battlefield’s influence on the curriculum. Alongside the steps toward the integration of atomic warfare, the Army’s Chief of Staff unveiled a new concept of limited war, one which would become the Army’s preferred perspective. 11 McGarr took all of this into account, endorsing a more inclusive, expansive view of war. He directed significant changes to instructional methods, the non-resident effort, and he attempted to increase the quality of the faculty.

Both Davidson and McGarr dealt with the accumulated stresses of technological, organizational, and conceptual shifts during their tours. When McGarr left for Vietnam in 1960, he left behind an institution transformed in many respects. He was one of few officers to place his personal imprint upon the College. His successor, Major General Harold K. Johnson, faced a new situation. Johnson would have to lead the College staff and faculty through yet another strategic shift.

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10 As noted in the previous chapter, CGSC had developed and was teaching the Special Weapons Course starting in 1952. The course lasted seven weeks (1953 figure) and graduated about seventy officers per class. CGSC scheduled five classes per year in 1953-54. Attachment to E.D. Post to Chief of Army Field Forces, “Report of Staff Visit to Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9-10 March 1953” March 20, 1953. 031308-1 150 CGSC created a shorter version to introduce atomic weapons to general officers known as Senior Officer’s Atomic Employment Course.

and its accompanying doctrinal and organizational changes. At the beginning of this period, nine years had passed since World War Two, and little had changed. Over the ensuing nine years, the College’s leadership, prompted or prodded, by outsiders, would establish a new vision for the mid-career education of professional officers. In retrospect, what occurred was not revolutionary, but it was certainly different from the preceding situation.

**Estimate of the Educational Situation**

Garrison H. Davidson’s arrival at Fort Leavenworth signaled a new era, for “Gar” Davidson was not a Leavenworth graduate. Davidson assumed command from acting Commandant Brigadier General Charles E. Beauchamp in the summer of 1954, eight years after the Bikini Atoll tests. As happened frequently, the new Commandant inherited a curriculum, and its underlying educational philosophy, shaped if not wholly determined by his predecessor. The proposed 1954-55 Regular Course consisted of forty-two weeks and 1,688 hours of instruction. Staff functions; division, corps, and field army operations; joint operations, along with instruction in other services’ procedures; and logistics in large units filled the academic day. Classified instruction accounted for a reduced percentage (about 10%) of the lessons, and study of atomic warfare was given twenty-three hours. Regular Course map problems considered a non-atomic situation the norm. General management training (amounting to eight hours) had been added at the direction of the Comptroller of the Army. Eligibility requirements had not changed much from those established for the 1946-47 class (Regular Army or reserve officer on active status, at least eight but no more than fifteen years service, fewer than 41 years of age, have completed a branch advanced course, a top secret clearance, and

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12 Section title from a comment by Ivan Birrer in Doughty, Birrer, 33.
13 Command and General Staff College, “Program of Instruction for Regular Course, 1954-55,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, October, 1954, 2, CARL. Recall that the overall trend had been towards a more classified curriculum to accommodate the exponential growth in missile and atomic weapons.
14 OCAFF, “Common Subjects Letter,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 17 March 1953, 65-66, Folder CGSC 1 Jan 53 – 31 Dec 53, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. The annual Common Subjects letter directed Army schools to incorporate specific subjects into their local programs. It is an example of the external control influencing the College that is seldom acknowledged. In all, OCAFF specified sixteen subjects that the College had to include in Regular, Associate, and other course. A useful discussion of the origins and evolution of American business schools is Rakesh Khurana, *From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). In his social and intellectual history, Khurana, an associate professor at Harvard Business School, raised fundamental questions about claims that management as a profession and the efficacy of past and current business school curricula.
professional potential). U.S. officers competed for one of approximately 525 spaces in each Regular Course class. Since the 1954-55 curriculum had been approved by his predecessor and written by the course authors, Davidson settled in to observe and learn about the inner workings of the school.

As he watched, Davidson discerned the faculty’s reluctance to move ahead, rooted partly in uncertainty about the future. Confusion among the faculty was understandable, given the situation described in Robert T. Davis’ *The Challenge of Adaptation*. The Korean Armistice had recently taken effect, the President’s National Security Council had issued new strategic guidance, the Army’s planned share of future military budgets and manpower had shrunk, early experiments with atomic artillery showed potential, and the Army had revised its doctrine.\(^{15}\)

The curricular content of the Regular Course had remained static for nearly eight years, and along with it, the content of the non-resident courses. The College had no long-range plan. Further, it had no vision as to how it might adapt course content to the future as defined by the Army’s 1954 Field Service Regulations or the strategic environment outlined in NSC 68.\(^{16}\) Curricular planning took place on a year-to-year basis, with the sequence beginning in the late summer or early fall. Given their three-year production cycle, the non-resident and extension courses were in baleful condition.

At the prompting of Dr. Birrer, Davidson asked Army Field Forces and the Department of the Army for authorization to revisit the College’s status, using an independent body similar to the Henry Commission. Davidson’s request did not come to fruition for nearly two years.\(^{17}\) In the expectation of an outside assessment, Davidson busied the staff and department heads with an internal review, creating five ad hoc study groups. Recalling the Eddy Board recommendation to rewrite the CGSC curriculum to emphasize atomic warfare, Davidson asked his senior faculty for a broad assessment of


\(^{16}\) Fautua, 96-98.

\(^{17}\) The Henry Commission, discussed in Chapter 1, had convened in 1946 as the first Regular Course began. It was the first internal assessment of the staff college’s curriculum and methods. Garrison H. Davidson to Department of the Army, “Survey of Educational Procedures of the C&GS College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 October 1954, CARL.
the school in September 1954. Committees considered methods of instruction, questions of curricular scope, and a means to increase the school’s contributions to doctrinal research. The findings of these ad hoc groups are remarkable, for they uncovered myriad issues within the institution.

Major General Davidson expressed apprehension that the College might be preparing officers to fight the last war when the nature of warfare had changed. The Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy and the new Field Service Regulation added to Davidson’s concerns. To achieve some clarity, the Commandant asked infantry Colonel E.F. Easterbrook, head of Department III, for an assessment of the “quality and scope” of the College’s instruction on atomic warfare. Easterbrook’s study confirmed Davidson’s suspicions: the College’s lessons had little material on the Soviets and atomic conflict.

Another committee, led by Colonel J.H. Skinner, looked at instructional methods. Dr. Birrer secured an appointment to this panel, and he successfully argued for a three-phase curriculum—a crawl-walk-run approach to presenting instruction. This feature, embedded in the Skinner Report,

18 Garrison H. Davidson to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Review of the Curriculum of the C&GS College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 1954, N13423.96, CARL. “I am anxious to review our curriculum from the point of view of: what we teach; how we teach it; and; how we plan for the future.” Referred to as 1954 Curriculum Review.
19 Ibid.
20 “Please have the curriculum we are currently presenting reviewed to ensure that… it is modern, i.e., to be certain that we can not [sic] be correctly accused of ‘teaching World War II tactics in preparation for World War III.’” Garrison H. Davidson to Executive for Instruction, draft memorandum, “The Nature of the Curriculum the C&GS College,” n.d., enclosed with 1954 Curriculum Review, 2, CARL. A number of prominent military historians agree with Davidson’s assessment. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 Leavenworth Papers No. 1 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 14-16. Doughty wrote that the 1954 field manual was “a clear descendant of World War II and Korea” but added that “the Army had little choice but to reconsider its methods” given the realization that the new weapons required an updated to tactical concepts, at a minimum. Walter E. Kretchik discussed American doctrine’s efficacy, including its evolution in the forties and fifties. Walter E. Kretchik, “Peering through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000.” (PhD. diss., University of Kansas, 2001), 141-174. Chapter 5 of Kretchik’s research discusses post-World War II doctrine through 1965. Two technological developments in 1953 and 1954—the atomic cannon and the Honest John—marked the Army’s full entry into the inter-service atomic competition.
22 Michael D. Hess, “Tactical Nuclear Warfare: US Army 1945-1960 (thesis, University of Kansas, 1986) explored the early development of Army tactical atomic doctrine and asked whether the Army had the ability to fight on a nuclear battlefield. He concluded that the Army’s doctrine advanced enough by 1960 to have made this possible. In his consideration of CGSC’s tactical instruction, Hess found that the College had “superimposed” tactical atomic weapons on existing tactics in the 1947-1955 timeframe, but he noted the effort used to create integrated lessons for the 1957-1960 classes. His study provides useful details about lessons on offense and defense scenarios. A related work is John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).
23 Doughty, Birrer, 56.
contained seeds of far-reaching import. Upon this foundation, Birrer and future commandants would build a new curricular model along the lines of the concentration-distribution model in use by many American universities. The Commandant adopted the proposal in his planning guidance for the 1955-56 curriculum. As future practitioners, Davidson wanted the students to gain experience making tactical decisions. Affirming the value of the applicatory method, the Commandant stated: “The applicatory exercises are applied to reasonably complicated tactical and logistical problems that require the student to solve problems that become progressively more complex and include a problem on the development of future organization, tactics and doctrine.” He made clear that faculty should not teach new material during this final period, “no additional information is given to the student during this phase,” meaning the student should be developing their professional judgment through application—not sitting in a lecture hall taking notes.

The committees continued their work through the fall of 1954 and on into 1955. The deliberations reflect disagreement across the departments about student evaluation and the optimum organization for the school. In January 1955, Major General Davidson gathered his department heads and other faculty to debate the role of the College vis-à-vis preparation for command duty or staff positions. The problem of providing an education that equipped an officer for future duties had plagued the faculty for years because of the requirement to teach published doctrine. Davidson sought a way to orient the instruction towards the future. At one point, General Davidson asked: “If you are just teaching a commander or staff officer current duties, techniques, and tactics, are you adequately preparing him for future command 10 years from now when he will be faced with new developments in tactics, and new technique?”

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24 Garrison H. Davidson to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Guidance for Planning the 1955-56 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 January 1955, 2-5, Box 17, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, NARA II. “The first phase will provide the student the foundation for his course of instruction. The second phase will teach him the basic application of what he has learned in the first phase and the last phase will practice him in the solution of advanced tactical and logistical problems.” Doughty, Birrer, 35-36.


26 Major General Davidson’s Comments, Transcript of Seminar, “Instruction Mission, CGSC, Grant Hall, 8 January 1955 (0900-1200),” 4-5. Enclosed as a tab to Memorandum by Secretary, CGSC, “Mission – CGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 1955, CARL. Later in the session, General Davidson gave some indication that progress was being made. “We have already decided to put a map maneuver into next
Regular Course would use draft doctrine for the 1955-56 class as a means to look ahead rather than backwards; it was a small step.\(^{27}\)

Not all faculty shared Davidson’s enthusiasm to anticipate the future. An exchange between Colonel J.F. Franklin and Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Desobry at the same seminar underscored the faculty’s unease with use of emerging concepts.

Colonel Franklin: “To your knowledge, has a firm concept of operations in support of our National War Plans, framed in a period 10 years from now when our students may be reaching general officer grade, been injected into our curriculum?”

Lieutenant Colonel Desobry: “No. To the best of our knowledge a firm concept has not been developed by an outside agency or by the College. However, it is known that outside agencies are conducting such studies geared to the future.”\(^{28}\)

Desobry deflected Colonel Franklin’s question by drawing attention to “outside agencies.” He avoided any inference that it was CGSC’s responsibility to independently analyze the existing situation and prepare an estimate that supported the College mission. Dr. Birrer picked up on the opening created by this discussion. He chided the participants for their acceptance of the College situation with regards to future war. “That’s a very neat position, if we want to be conservative.” Colonel Seth Weld echoed Dr. Birrer asking, “what in the world are we doing sitting here passive? We may be forced to be passive in this field by pure workload capacity – this I accept. But as a matter of choice, this pertains to war; we cannot mentally accept a passive position.”\(^{29}\) Within the faculty, those who would reform the institution so that it prepared the leaders of the future Army lost ground to those who awaited definition by an outside agency. Nearly ten years after the end of World War Two, CGSC was still seeking a basis for educating officers of the future.

The mission of CGSC with respect to emphasis of command over staff emphasis was not settled at the conference, nor does it appear that it was settled in Davidson’s mind by February, 1955. The school’s leader faced a dilemma. His organization’s purpose was the preparation of officers for

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\(^{27}\) Major General Davidson’s Comments, Transcript of Seminar, “Instruction Mission, CGSC, Grant Hall, 8 January 1955 (0900-1200),” 4-5, CARL. Colonel Gavin’s Comments, Transcript of Seminar, 28 and Colonel Franklin, 33.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 34.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., Dr. Birrer’s Comments, 42; Colonel Weld’s Comments, 43.
future duties. The future, as defined by the Army, included ground combat against a similarly equipped adversary. Such an opponent may or may not have atomic weapons. “Today, the Army is confronted with the problem of warfare on a battlefield where atomic weapons may be used by both sides. Most of us believe that the basic principles of war will remain unchanged; however, everyone agrees that the techniques of applying these principles will change,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel William O. Quirey.\textsuperscript{30} Accepted methods, embodied in doctrine, formed the basis for instruction. School faculty and graduates recognized the inadequacy of present doctrine, but their professional knowledge had not reached the point at which a substitute could be articulated. The institution most responsible for preparing the leaders of that future Army still sought a path in an uncertain direction.

One final aspect of the ad hoc committees deserves attention and that is their assessment of the organization. The Skinner Report recommended further decentralization of responsibilities, acknowledging that too many people reported to the Assistant Commandant and that academic departments had too many conduits for assignments. Under the Skinner plan, the Director of Instruction served as a buffer between the Assistant Commandants and the departments. As such, the Director of Instruction functioned like the dean of a school. Department directors would gain more autonomy under the Skinner Plan, increasing their authority to determine what their department taught.\textsuperscript{31} Davidson accepted the recommendation. While he retained overall responsibility, the Commandant now was separated by two echelons from the faculty.

While Davidson needed outside support for many of his ideas, he could do something about the inattention to doctrine highlighted by the Weld panel. The College’s role in doctrinal development had been limited up to the mid-fifties. While doctrinal development had been a part of the school’s mission for years, this area received minimal resources and attention. Davidson began to emphasize the College’s role in doctrinal development, and he directed that additional manpower be allocated to this responsibility. Given the College’s reliance on published doctrine as the source for instructional

\textsuperscript{31} J.H. Skinner, memorandum, “Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Methods of Instruction of the Command and General Staff College,” 1955, CARL.
material, Davidson believed it important to protect doctrine authors; a fraction of the faculty should not be consumed with the machinery of day-to-day preparation and instruction. A few faculty and staff looked to the future, even as the majority looked towards the past. Students, on the other hand, were consumed with the present.

**Frustration Friday**

While these deliberations were taking place, the daily and weekly routines of CGSC went on. Students took their seats, a small pile of books, manuals, and notes on one corner. The usually stuffy room had an extra hint of warmth, for today was no ordinary day. As the clock ticked upward towards the appointed hour, a stern-looking lieutenant colonel moved around the room, distributing a small packet of maps along with a few sheets of green paper. Today was exam day—the fifteenth in a long line of such events.

To use the vernacular, the exam program of the fifties resembled a game of “what’s in my pocket?” The faculty, supported by the administration, entertained themselves at the students’ expense. “The complete descriptive title of the Evaluated Exercise will not be given the student prior to the administration of the Evaluated Exercise. The weekly schedule will carry only the number of the exercise and a general title such as ‘Division Operations.’” Students in 1954 came to class not knowing whether the exam covered infantry or armored division operations, or logistics, or the setting of the problem.

In the Commandant’s view, “the burden of proof of ability to meet the academic standards of the college should rest with the student.” The method through which the student demonstrated his ability carried the official label of Evaluated Exercises Program. “The primary purpose of the

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32 This sphere would grow significantly in the coming years, and it is important to note that this fledgling enterprise eventually grew into the research arm of the College. Garrison H. Davidson to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Organization of the C&GSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 1955, CARL. Birrer believed this to be one of the three major accomplishments of Davidson. Dougherty, Birrer, 36-37, CARL.

33 Annex B, Staff Study (Draft), “Summary of the 1954-55 Evaluated Exercise Program (Draft), CGSC, CGSC Evaluation,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1, CARL.

34 Garrison H. Davidson to Assistant Commandant, DF, “Comment 3, Student Evaluation Policy,” 24 February 1955, CARL. “Frustration Friday” was the name given by the students to test days. Frank N. Aaron, “C&GS College Reached Peak in Publicity with Trujillo,” Army-Navy-Air Force Register 79, no. 4103 (July 26, 1958): 13.
Evaluated Exercises Program is to measure and appraise student learning which has been gained as a result of Command and General Staff College instruction,” proclaimed the author of a College staff study. The school used examinations to assess the student’s achievement relative to course standards and as a learning opportunity. Students saw exams differently. For a student, exams were serious business. To the student, they were a test—the outcome of which would determine their rank relative to their peers and, accordingly, their future.\(^{35}\) Failure carried a stigma, but the Army imposed upon CGSC a requirement to “certify” graduates as general staff officers; thus, the need to do well.\(^{36}\) From these multiple views of the examination program sprang a sub-culture that permeated College life.

Graded exercises had grown significantly over the years. The Regular Course now had eighteen graded events, and the faculty set aside fifty-nine hours of class time for them as shown in appendix 2, Regular Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55. The Associate Course had nine examinations totaling twenty-two hours. The proportion of exams in the Associate Course was slightly higher, given its shorter length. The short course’s focus on the infantry division is also apparent in appendix 3, Associate Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55. On average an officer would have two tests per month.

Given their frequency and importance to class standing, it is little wonder that students worried over them. “To determine causes of student ‘examination-consciousness,’” and to recommend procedures to de-emphasize the importance currently attached to the matter of attaining high grades on examinations and high class standing,” the Commandant commissioned another study and designated Colonel U.G. Gibbons to lead the effort.\(^{37}\)

Gibbons’ survey uncovered a number of systemic problems, all of which detracted from the stated purposes. Overall, the committee found that three conditions led to the phenomena of “exam

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\(^{35}\) Annex B, Staff Study (Draft), “Summary of the 1954-55 Evaluated Exercise Program (Draft), CGSC, CGSC Evaluation,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1, CARL.

\(^{36}\) CGSC, “Consideration of Executives’, Academic Staff, and Department Director’s Comments,” enclosure to CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC Evaluation, 3, CARL.

\(^{37}\) CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC Evaluation, Tab C to U.G. Gibbons to Commandant, memorandum, “Evaluation Policy Studies,” 13 June 1955, 1, CARL. Officers were not the only students concerned with grades in the 1950s. Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz discussed Howard Becker’s study of “grade-consciousness” at the University of Kansas during these years. Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, *Campus Life: Undergraduate Cultures from the End of the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 268.
consciousness”: class standing, regular updates to the ranking, and dissatisfaction with the character and content of examinations.38 A survey of veteran instructors highlighted the doctrinaire makeup of examinations. “Students should be examined in the realm of problem-solving. Memorization of forms and petty techniques should be avoided.” The Gibbons’ committee agreed and recommended cessation of “Examination in minutiae, minor matters of technique, items requiring memorization of forms, procedures or data which ordinarily are available at division or higher headquarters.”39

Seeking potential remedies, the committee asked faculty how they would modify the examination program. Faculty responses indicated significant support for a pass-fail system, rather than the current marking scheme (A, B, C, D, D-, and U). Instructors also thought that more feedback, in the form of returning marked-up examinations, was preferable to simply reporting the score, or withholding information about the grade entirely. The faculty also requested that exams be collected after student review, to so “examinations would not fall into the hands of future students whereby some students would see them and others would not.”40 “Unequal access to old examinations” contributed to student anxiety, according to Colonel Gibbons’ committee. 41 This last point uncovered a phenomenon that would shock the Commandant.

Through the years, an underground developed between present and past students. The graduating class handed over a box to friends or acquaintances like tribal lore passing between one generation and the next. The faculty had some knowledge of the network, but the College’s leadership had no idea of its magnitude until 1955. A retrospective account noted: “In the fall of 1955, after a detailed study of the College examination system as it operated during the previous school year, the Commandant of the College issued a directive requiring students to turn in all examinations in their possession which related to the CGSC course. Five tons of examinations were turned in. This amount

38 Gibbons to Commandant, 5.
39 Ibid., 2-4.
41 Gibbons to Commandant, 5.
means an average of some 20 pounds of examinations per student!” Not all students had past exam copies, leading some officers to openly question the moral and scholastic integrity of their peers. But students who worried about the potential adverse effect of Leavenworth’s ranking system on their career had taken advantage of the lax security to their gain. It would not be the last conflict between professional ethics and personal practice.

Over the summer of 1955, Davidson continued to mull over the debate from the January conference and the input from his staff. The months of discussion showed the academic bureaucracy had not adopted an educational philosophy consistent with contemporary educational practices. Without external pressure or firm direction, it was not going to reform itself, either.

By late summer, Davidson made plain his own views regarding an emphasis on command over staff topics. In his remarks to the staff and faculty on August 25, 1955, he said, “In keeping with the overall objective of the Department of the Army, our curriculum here will emphasize command. The necessity for that additionally is brought out by the very title of our College, ‘The Command,’ ‘The COMMAND and General Staff College.’” He did not follow up his rhetorical emphasis with institutional changes, however. Major General Davidson had several paths in mind for the College, which he outlined in a new mission statement. It read: “To prepare selected officers of all components of the Army for duties as: one, commanders of division, corps and Army level; two, commanders at comparable levels in the communications zone; three, staff officers at division, corps and Army

42 Original emphasis. Jacob S. Orleans and others, “Report of the Educational Survey Commission, Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1956, 28. Hereafter referred to as ESC. “Student Evaluation Policy Study, 1955” contained internal staff and director debates, and John F. Franklin, Jr. to Each Officer Assigned to Staff and Faculty, CGSC, memorandum, “Destruction of Old CGSC Examinations,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 August 1955, Box 15, RG 546, NARA II implemented Davidson’s guidance. Students in the next class got similar instructions. As will be seen later, not all exam copies in circulation were returned.

43 Given that one-third of each year’s instructors came from the previous class, one must wonder how much, if at all, the faculty contributed to the problem of old examinations. Major Lucian K. Truscott III, Class of ’55, authored a study that he submitted to the commandant. Truscott’s concern stemmed from the similarities between a 1955 Armored Division operations examination and the 1953 version. “I believe that perhaps an officer compromises [sic] the principles upon which his profession is founded by subscribing to the practice.” As far as scholarship, Truscott observed “The student is apt to overlook entirely the purpose of a particular period of classroom instruction, the notes he took, the discussions among the various students in class, and those ideas and thoughts which may have been original with him.” Lucian K. Truscott III to Commandant, CGSC, memorandum, “Student Use of Previous Evaluated Exercises,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 June 1955, Box 15, RG 546, NARA II. After a tour in Europe, Truscott returned to Leavenworth as a faculty member. Truscott wrote several Military Review articles, including Lucian K. Truscott III, “A Program for Self-Improvement” Military Review 41 (December 1961): 56-60.

44 Memorandum, “Commandant’s Talk to the Staff and Faculty of the C&GSC,” 25 August 1955, 4. CARL
levels; and four, staff officers at comparable levels in the communications zone.”

From an institutional standpoint, Davidson’s mission reflected many of the same unattainable goals from War Department Circular 202. In late 1955, the College leadership saw two distinct components of officer education. Command required education of officers while staff duties needed training. As the College had already learned, to do both within the limited ten-month course was difficult.

To figure out where to go next, the Commandant again looked to outsiders.

**Surveying Education, Revisited**

When the Educational Survey Commission met in early 1956, the six-man committee carried names familiar from the College’s past: Jacob S. Orleans chaired the forum, with retired generals Manton S. Eddy, Troy H. Middleton, and Geoffrey Keyes serving as military representatives. Two civilian professors, Harl R. Douglass and H.F. Harding, rounded out the panel. Three previous external studies had called for adaptation; the report of the Educational Survey Commission confirmed the slow pace.

Davidson’s introductory remarks to the panel outlined the wide gap between the interwar Army’s circumstances and the current situation. “Prior to World War II the average graduate went from here to serve at some small army post. Very few of our graduates ever saw a full division in those days,” he said. “Prior to World War II the graduate of this College had a leisurely atmosphere in which to develop and was confronted with relatively simple problems whose solutions had far-reaching effects. The solution of major problems with far-reaching effects was limited to a relatively few.” Davidson then contrasted the prewar Army with the Army of the fifties, saying today’s

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45 “Commandant’s Talk,” 4, CARL.
46 Doughty, Birrer, 36. Birrer’s opinion was that the three major accomplishments during Davidson’s tenure were: the request that resulted in the 1956 Educational Survey Commission (at Birrer’s suggestion), movement to update to instructional methods, and allocating more officers to the combat developments section. Davidson would leave command within a month of the commission completing its work, leaving his successor to act on its recommendations.
47 ESC, 126-131. It would be one of the last times civilians would serve as full members, and it was certainly the last one headed by a non-military figure. Of the group, only Douglass did not have a previous tie to the school, having served as an education consultant for decades. Harding, whose work was mentioned in the previous chapter, had served as a CGSC visiting research fellow for nearly ten years.
48 ESC, 33. Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars, The American Army, 1898-1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Chapters Seven through Ten painted a picture of Army garrison life in between the wars. General Maxwell Taylor’s graduation address to the Class of ’57 made the same observation. “In the formative period of the careers between the two World Wars, there was, in troop duty, little to gain in terms of tactical and higher staff experience of the kind required in global war. In the absence
“atmosphere places a requirement for a more completely developed officer capable of handling problems of broader scope and more far-reaching effects than heretofore.”

Via his brief introduction, Major General Davidson summarized the predicament of the officer education system. Despite two previous Army-level studies, none had perceived the extent of the relationship between the environment, America’s new strategic position, and the Army’s institutions. By relying on a pre-war structure, the officer education system had thus far proven incapable of meeting the demands of the new profession. The Army of the fifties shared a common heritage with its predecessor, but the demands and strategic surroundings had shifted, rendering questionable the old system.

Meeting in early 1956 at Davidson’s request, the Commission observed the widening gap between instructional methods and the needs of the students. When the commission released its findings in 1956, they began with the usual introductory pleasantries. They found “superior quality in both preparation and performance.” The remainder of the report—some thirty-six pages—offered a critical appraisal of content, planning, instructional methods, faculty selection, and student evaluation. Davidson would later label their effort “an extremely searching report.”

Curriculum design and planning got mixed marks. On the positive side, the members believed that the staff and faculty put a lot of effort into the planning of each year’s material. On the other hand, the commission believed perhaps too much effort went into the process. “It appears to be a
hopeless effort to design the perfect curriculum.” The overly formalized process took too much faculty time.

Hoping to find improvements as a result of the smaller class sections, the team visited a number of classes. Unfortunately, they found the instructional methods wanting, although the College continued the instructor training program as shown in appendix 4. The nature of the school’s classroom was authoritarian, not collegial. Commission members observed “a mechanically rigid and often excessive adherence to the meticulously prepared and detailed lesson plan. The rigid and mechanical adherence was explained as vital because of the influence on the final class standing.” Commenting further, the team found the environment “undesirably instructor-subject matter centered, unnecessarily alike from day to day, and too rigidly controlled.” They observed little flexibility among the instructors, saying “the use of the ‘school solution,’ even in the form of ‘this is only a solution, but not necessarily the only good one,’ tends to further limit the teaching activities of the instructor, and the learning activities of the students;” practices such as these led to “a lack of opportunity for initiative, even in minor aspects of methods.” Interaction between teacher and pupil was formal, governed by the transitory nature of the faculty’s engagement with the student and the ever-present competition for class standing.

As they assessed educational outcomes, they “looked for extensive evidence of learning method that would encourage independence, initiative, resourcefulness, originality, creativeness, reasoning, judgment, and the like. The degree of uniformity of classroom activity which has been so carefully and effectively planned and prepared for has the obverse effect. Comparatively little time is given to committee work, staff conferences, critique activities, and research.” They recommended more flexibility. “It is far better to improve students’ ability to solve problems of the future than to

51 ESC, 14.
52 Ibid., 18.
53 Ibid., 20.
54 Ibid., 19.
55 Ibid., 20.
master details that will be outmoded this year or next." When this did not occur, educational outcomes suffered.

Comments from the field reflected and influenced the Commission’s findings. The Chief of the Armor Section of CONARC told General (ret.) Keyes:

There is one possible area of improvement in the teaching at Leavenworth. There is a tendency towards inflexibility in some C&GSC graduates. In other words they are inclined to perform staff work in accordance with a set pattern which was learned at school instead of applying principles to the problem of the moment and adjusting themselves to the procedures and policies which prevail in the headquarters to which they are assigned.\textsuperscript{57}

Third Army’s commanding general, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey, judged that “the General Staff officer of the past five years” did not have the same professional abilities as did prewar graduates, partly because he perceived that the school emphasized staff functions at the expense of teaching “how the commander approaches a problem and arrives at a solution.”\textsuperscript{58} He went on to say, “the effect at Division, Corps and Army level is that a youngster coming from Leavenworth doesn’t know how to evaluate the problems confronting him.”\textsuperscript{59}

The development of intellectual potential and professional judgment—the positive qualities outlined in their hypothesis—clashed with what they heard from the field. As Major General Palmer had observed during the Korean War, at least some Leavenworth graduates did not meet their superior’s expectations. It is possible that embedded within the ten-month course’s curriculum was a hidden curriculum—one which stressed the search for a right answer and inflexibility in method. It might be safe at this point to attribute at least some of the officer’s post-graduation behavior on the educational experience. The commission certainly saw a connection.

Echoing the Gibbons’ report, Dr. Orleans and his panel excoriated the evaluation program, saying the assessment of learning had little to do with the learning process. “Examinations at CGSC,”

\textsuperscript{56} ESC, 13.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 60. Hickey added, In my own experience, when I have had to disagree with a recent graduate, his mental attitude is that he has received a “U” and it takes him two or three days to get over it.” Hickey knew of that which he spoke as a past instructor at the College from 1940-1942 and as a division, corps (three times), and army commander.
the commission reported, “are almost exclusively used to serve the administrative needs incident to determination of class rank and graduation-nongraduation.” They singled out Leavenworth’s practice of ranking students as a disruptive force. “[A]ll students at the College have been selected on the basis of their demonstrated competence and should therefore successfully complete the course. There should be no academic failures. In the event that the College believes some achievement measure is necessary to identify non-graduates, the present formal examination-class standing program is not the best answer.” The members unequivocally denounced the practice. “The Commission is convinced that the determination and reporting of final class standing, and the use of examinations for this purpose, has a seriously detrimental effect on the educational program of the College. It interferes seriously with the accomplishment of the mission of the College.” Not surprisingly, one of the panel’s recommendations was to end the practice of ranking students.

The results disturbed Davidson. He knew that the Regular Course consisted of a crowded curriculum and too little time. Only last year, the “Commanding General, Continental Army Command, has recommended to Department of the Army the adoption of a plan for a 2-year course at CGSC, in which one-half of the Army students would be ‘selected out’ at the end of the first year.” Two years of experience had given him an appreciation of the institution’s needs and potential solutions. He knew from personal observation and now had an independent study confirming that the Army asked too much of a single educational experience. Davidson had no time to act.

Shortly before the Commission delivered its results, the students of 1955-56 left Fort Leavenworth for hundreds of posts, camps, and stations worldwide. Dozens went to Military Advisory Assistance Groups, including those in Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Curiously, given the school’s stated mission, only fifty-three officers went to divisions, and one joined a corps

60 ESC, 31.
61 Ibid., 29. The wording of this finding is somewhat unusual, given Lieutenant General (ret.) Eddy’s own experience with academic failures.
62 Emphasis original. Ibid., 29.
63 Ibid., 31.
64 Gibbons to Commandant. Referred to as “Plan Blue” in the “Consideration of Executives’, Academic Staff, and Department Director’s Comments,” enclosure to CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC Evaluation, CARL.
headquarters. In comparison, twenty-one remained at CGSC as instructors or staff. Of the over 500 graduates, 248 were majors, and 107 were captains. Brigadier General Train’s remarks to the class highlighted their special place among the officer corps. The title of “Leavenworth graduate” represented “a privilege because you will be given assignments not readily available to nongraduates, and a responsibility because you must live up to the promise which your diploma carries with it.”

Among the majors graduating that year—Major Leonard D. Holder—was the father of a future commandant.

On graduation day, Gar Davidson received his diploma, too. In summarizing his tour as Commandant, Davidson said:

“The College, at the present time, is attempting to accomplish an estimated four times as much as was accomplished here prior to World War II in a course that even then was hardly leisurely. When compared to the pre-World War II program, the changes are striking…. Most important of all is the requirement to prepare students for both atomic and nonatomic warfare — a requirement I have emphasized in the College during the past two years. But in spite of these much greater requirements now than in 1939, we have a one year course and very large classes, whereas until shortly before World War II a two year course was presented to a relatively small number of students and of course did not include atomic warfare.”

Davidson reflected that “the problem of too much course content is continuously aggravated by imposition of new requirements by higher headquarters and changing times. I consider the problem probably the most important one that confronts the College.” Aggravating the problem of curricular scope was the tension between command and staff duties. Davidson came to support a second year of tactical instruction, presented to colonels in generals about ten years after their staff college experience. Given his insights, Davidson might have been able to direct the school towards accommodation between the old and the new. Unfortunately, he departed at a critical juncture. He

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68 Ibid., V-3.
69 Davidson’s summation of the College’s predicament captures the multifaceted pressures on the school. Davidson left for West Point to serve as Superintendent.
would not be present to implement change. Ironically, that too was an observation of the Educational Survey Commission.

**Breaking with the Past**

In mid-1956, the College curriculum shed the influence of World War Two. Lieutenant General James M. Gavin signaled the upcoming shift to the Class of 1956 at their graduation. Gavin intoned, “Now you are the young, coming generation, and I must impress upon you the fact that atomic weapons are here to stay. They will be refined in size and delivery systems until they will serve in every echelon of the military establishment.” Yet the graduates had seen little of this future in their studies. Similarly, the Class of 1957 would not study the topic very extensively. Their successors, on the other hand, would go through a year immersed in the atomic battlefield. If the faculty listened, they might have detected some of what lay ahead. Within a few weeks, Davidson departed for West Point, and a new personality in the form of Major General Lionel C. McGarr arrived to take his place.

McGarr turned the institution upside down, changing content, instructional methods, and organization. He did all three simultaneously. And he did it in a year. The shift in philosophy appeared to be due to several converging events. In addition to the 1956 Educational Survey Commission findings, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) had recently released a policy requiring service schools to “emphasize atomic instruction from the outset, with nonatomic instruction covered as a modification thereto.” Significantly, this directive allowed the school to teach “new concepts and interim doctrine in addition to approved DA doctrine.” Tactical problems should consider ground combat in a nuclear environment normal, while operations not involving

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atomic weaponry received less attention. The Army’s decision to convert from triangular divisions, based on three brigades for each division headquarters, to the Pentomic configuration, with five battle groups per division, influenced the curriculum. New Army field organizations and technical capabilities, coupled with a stinging assessment of the College’s effectiveness, led to the seismic shift.

The fall 1956 Associate Course began as most Leavenworth courses did. Officers assembled in the post theater, which served as the school’s lecture hall, eager to begin their studies but somewhat apprehensive, given the school’s fearsome reputation. As explained by Major General McGarr, the students had come to Fort Leavenworth and the shorter version of the Regular Course to qualify them “for duty with the General Staff of Combat Divisions and Logistical Commands” and to gain familiarity with the procedures used at corps, field army, and communications zone headquarters. McGarr impressed upon the new students the seriousness of the task ahead. Remember, he told them, “What I learn here will someday win a battle and save the lives of soldiers under my command in combat.” To achieve the title of Leavenworth graduate required earnest work, implored McGarr, for Leavenworth had to assign each student “a final class ranking which is required by the Department of the Army as one of the components of your permanent record.” To this point, McGarr’s remarks could have come from the script from most any previous commandant’s talk, but he then described the need for mastery of both atomic and non-atomic conditions. While map problems in this course would use non-atomic conditions for most requirements, it would be the last course to do so for some years to come.

From his arrival, Major General McGarr warned that he would not follow established patterns. In the opinion of the CONARC commander and the new Commandant, Leavenworth had not kept up with the Army. During his introductory remarks to the faculty, the Commandant intimated

74 Remarks by Major General Lionel C. McGarr to Fall Associate Course, 27 August 1956, Box 17, RG 546, NARA II.
that instructional methods required some attention and that he expected the faculty to lead by example in this area. Likewise, Major General McGarr provided his view of the present state of the Army, and the College, with respect to atomic weapons. His vision was that the faculty must actively incorporate emerging ideas into the curriculum, even if the concepts had not been captured in “approved” doctrine.  

What followed was a chaotic period which can best be described as curriculum by fiat. At McGarr’s direction, the faculty began to reorganize and rewrite the curriculum in the fall of 1956. A flurry of guidance and activity followed. “The Atomic Era is upon us,” declared the Commandant in October. “To accomplish the College mission, we must abandon outmoded concepts and procedures and replace them with fresh and forward-thinking approaches that recognize the realities of the present – and the future.” McGarr declared that every lesson, map problem, and supporting texts would be rewritten. With implementation planned for the 1957-58 class, his proposal evoked that of the 1946 CGSS or the 1950 War College faculties who had to accomplish tasks on a similar scale. The Army’s senior tactical school had at long last recognized a need to integrate atomic weapons into the lessons of the Regular Course.

The task for leading the revision fell upon Colonel Ward S. Ryan. Ryan had been at CGSC for several years, serving as the director of Department V under Davidson. With implementation

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75 “Naturally, due to the need for field testing our newly evolved doctrine concerned with atomics, there must be some time lag. However, we must consistently strive to improve our doctrine and it must never lag so much that a war now would find us unprepared to make the maximum battlefield use of the terrifically destructive firepower now in the hands of our commanders. To be current in this capability we must eat, breathe, think and act atomic – not next month, not next year, but now! We must employ our best considered, concentrated ‘professional study’ and ‘original thinking;’ coupled with the greatest possible clarity of vision, to solve this important problem which is, ‘The most effective us of atomics both now and in the future.’” McGarr continued, “The doctrinal tail must never be allowed to wag the instructional dog, or vice versa. In either case, the tail of current instruction, if cut off by unnecessary delay, sterile thinking or complacency, becomes ineffective for our present needs.” Later, McGarr outlined his vision of doctrine. “Doctrine is never a frozen, static, mystical substance coming plasma-like from the mouth of a spiritualist medium. It is a live, vibrant, growing thing which must be flexible enough to allow for its growth and further continuous and continuing improvement.” Lionel C. McGarr, “Remarks by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, Commandant, Command and General Staff College to Staff and Faculty,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 3 August 1956, Box 17, RG 546, NARA II. Quotes from pages 1-2. McGarr often delivered guidance in speeches or through memorandums, but he seldom engaged in direct conversations.

76 Original emphasis. Lionel C. McGarr to Assistant Commandant, “Guidance for Planning the /8 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 October 1956, Box 19, RG 546, NARA II. Referred to as McGarr, “/8 Guidance.”

77 What was significantly different about the 1956 effort was the aim of the Commandant. In 1946 and 1950, the motivation was to restart a course as part of a transition to a peacetime Army. In 1956, the intention was reorientation of the institution from the past towards the future—one that potentially involved atomic war against a peer competitor.

planned for the 1957-58 class, McGarr wanted to reorient the institution from the past towards the future—one that potentially involved nuclear war against a similarly equipped nation. The Assistant Commandant, William F. Train made plain the urgency and magnitude of the task. “It is apparent that the new curriculum must provide for major modification of previous material and substantial original work.”

To hasten production, McGarr delegated approval authority for courseware to department directors, which broke sharply with the past process of review and approval by the College staff.

Outdated content was only one of McGarr’s concerns expressed in his October 1956 guidance. He began to reorient instructional methods, incorporating many of the suggestions from the Educational Survey Commission. Stressing flexibility of mind, McGarr told the Assistant Commandant that the new curriculum “must prepare him [the student] to deal with essentials by developing his command judgment in a decision-making capacity.” The Commandant made clear that classroom work should “stimulate original thinking and initiative” and should move away from presenting a single solution to tactical problems. McGarr also directed that advocates of existing material and practices not become obstructionists. His message was clear: get on board the new program.

The new guidance did not mean that the College had abandoned lesser forms of war. Major General McGarr acknowledged that the faculty must account for Army Chief of Staff’s policy statements on the “Role of the Army” and “Forms of War,” which had articulated a new Army mission emphasizing limited wars. According to these statements, the departments must incorporate several scales of warfare.

McGarr directed the overhaul of the course content and departmental organization, but the faculty had little respect for his style of administration. Neither the faculty nor their wives appreciated McGarr’s initiative. Long hours followed. Weekends and holidays became extensions of the regular workweek. Social lives were disrupted. The faculty considered McGarr a wicked force, and

79 William F. Train to Director of Instruction, memorandum, “Curriculum Plan for 1957-58 Curricula,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 1956, 2. McGarr’s guidance applied to both the Regular and Associate Courses, Box 19, RG 546, NARA II.
80 McGarr, “/8 Guidance,” 3-4.
regardless of their internal disputes, they uniformly disliked their new Commandant. He disrupted their routine. They derisively referred to the decorated combat veteran as “Split Head Magoo,” capturing McGarr’s name, haircut, and the faculty’s perception of his character. John Singlaub, an instructor in the late 1950s, criticized McGarr for his approach: “McGarr displayed malevolent (even paranoid) cunning, not unlike the fictional Captain Queeg of The Caine Mutiny.” McGarr knew of the grumblings, even admitting that he had heard several of them himself.

Few officers fully supported him, but the Commandant was aided in his task by Majors Richard (Dick) R. Hallock and John F. (Jack) Cushman, who were staff officers in the College. In his self-published memoir, Jack Cushman revealed that both he and Hallock assisted the Commandant in preparing concepts for the school’s new look. On the 30th of September, 1956, Jack Cushman and Dick Hallock wrote a letter that was highly critical of the course to the new Commandant. “CGSC instruction is inadequate,” wrote the two. “It is out of date, sterile, stereotyped, inflexible, unimaginative, and fails to prepare for conditions as they exist in the field. Its doctrine is essentially ETO-World War II and its approach to atomic warfare is to superficially impose atomics on conventional doctrine.” The writers found the future bleak, even if atomics were not an issue. “It is even questionable how well CGSC prepares the officer for conventional war, should one occur today.” The two found a sympathetic general, who relied heavily on the two for much of the intellectual content behind the overhaul of the curriculum. According to Cushman, the two worked in secrecy, oftentimes meeting with McGarr in his quarters after hours.

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82 In his December 1956 address to the staff and faculty, the Commandant opened with an assault on gossip. “Shortly after my arrival, the chimes on the tower clock failed. Immediately the rumor started that the New Commandant did not like chimes and had them cut off. This was ludicrous. Gentlemen: ‘Even I can not stop the clock.’ There have been other rumors climaxed a few weeks ago by the statement of a College wife that I had driven our late PIO [public information officer] out of the Army because he did not get my picture in the paper every day. This was not only untrue but vicious.” Lionel C. McGarr, “Remarks on /8 Curriculum and Organization by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, Commandant, to Staff and Faculty, CGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1630, 4 December 1956, 1, CARL.
83 Cushman credited Hallock with the bulk of the work. John H. Cushman, Fort Leavenworth—A Memoir (Annapolis, MD: J. Cushman, 2001). Quoted letter reproduced on pages 14-15. Cushman was the junior officer in the Current Analysis Section of the Department of Research and Analysis while Davidson was Commandant. Hallock had graduated with the 1956 class and had remained as part of the staff. Cushman characterized the initial meetings as surreptitious. Hallock’s role became known to the staff after his appointment as Special Assistant to the Commandant. Cushman gives credit for the intellectual depth behind the revision to Hallock, crediting him with originating Situations Short of War among other developments. Cushman later questioned whether Major General McGarr was the right leader, saying “General McGarr was not a very adept change agent.” Cushman, 17. Cushman returns in the early seventies as Commandant. His experience as Commandant will be explored later.
McGarr’s directive included both the extension courses and the USAR school system, both of which were supported by Department VI. The Commandant no longer accepted the status quo with the non-resident course. By now, the Associate Course had grown to sixteen weeks. The composition of the Associate Course in 1957 had shifted to a mix of 75% active army, 9% National Guard, 6% Army Reserve, and 9% international officers. The infantry division remained the central focus of the course, and students divided into one of two tracks—combat division or logistical command for the final part of the course.

Over the years, mostly due to staffing shortages, the faculty revised the non-resident course on a three-year cycle. McGarr believed this to be unacceptable. On October 1, 1956, the Commandant directed the chief of non-resident instruction to shift from a three-year revision cycle to an annual cycle. So as to not add to the Regular Course faculty’s burden, he accepted the staff’s proposal to expand the non-resident section. In November 1956, he requested Fifth Army provide twelve officers and ten civilians to augment the extension course effort. With this increase, McGarr believed that the school could revise the entire extension course, rather than one-third, each year. McGarr later retained twenty-two officers out of the Class of ’57 to assist in the rewrite. The change affected 3300 students enrolled in extension courses throughout the Army plus the thousands enrolled in USAR schools. One key shift affecting the USAR school program was that the Associate Course became the basis for both the weekend and two-week lessons. This somewhat simplified the task of conversion.

By February 1957, the faculty had delineated the broad outlines of the new Regular Course. Discussion during the February 4 meeting of the faculty board gave little doubt that McGarr’s directives had affected the departments, but these discussions also revealed retention of old habits.

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84 “Analysis of Project [Student Capacity],” 1957, 4. Attached to C.A. Stanfiel to Commandant, memorandum, “Ultimate Capacity of Associate Course, United States Army Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 16 May 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II.
86 Adam S. Buynoski to The Adjutant General, memorandum, “Interim Assignment of Officers at USA CGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 March 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
87 Edward C. Dunn to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Progress Report, USA CGSC Nonresident Program,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 February 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II.
Failure to follow the Commandant’s guidance on any point invited rebuke. Colonel L. Wallace, Chief of the Infantry Division Department, briefed the Commandant and Assistant Commandant on his plan for implementing the December 1956 guidance. Wallace’s proposal incorporated atomic and non-atomic conditions; general and local wars, plus situations short of war; and offense, defense, retrograde, and special missions. As Wallace discussed his vision of the case method, he planned to identify “one of the solutions as the most acceptable.” McGarr countered sharply, emphasizing “that specific effort must be made to insure that the impression is not left with the student that the indicated, preferred solution is the only solution.” Wallace acknowledged the point, but he expressed concern that waffling might lead students to perceive the school was indecisive.  

The new course imported some seventy hours of instruction on atomic weapons effects, characteristics, and employment from the Special Weapons Course. Colonel R.D. Wolfe, Executive Officer of Department VII, had the lead for developing instruction on basic atomic means. The lessons provided basic knowledge about capabilities and the proposed battlefield use of the weapons. Nearly all of the instruction carried some classification, restricting allied participation to but twenty hours, but the department made allowances by including a two-hour session for U.S. officers that pointed out the differences between classified and unclassified data. This allowed international officers to participate in map problems, while enabling the U.S. student to understand the potential uses and effects of the new weapons.

Atomic warfare, while the predominant condition, shared some curriculum space with unconventional and guerilla war. Under the guidance of Colonel A.L. Mueller, the Airborne Operations and Army Aviation Committee sketched out lessons. Lieutenant Colonels R.J. Low, J.K. Singlaub, and T.M. Ariail put together much of the concept. Interestingly, all lessons about the two subjects were classified, excluding allies who might share their insights. In contrast to Wallace,

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88 Emphasis original. John F. Franklin, memorandum, “Faculty Board Minutes,” 4 February 1957, 1-3, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
89 John F. Franklin, Memorandum, “Faculty Board Minutes,” 5 February 1957, 2-3, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. Note that the doctrinal references (including the classified sources) used in crafting the lessons were based on doctrine written in 1952-1956. Adam S. Buyoski to See Distribution, memorandum, “Instructional Packet for Common Subject Atomic Warfare Instruction,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 July 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
Mueller went beyond the guidance to de-emphasize the school solution. His concept allowed the instructor to present the student a situation requiring decision. The student would then “retain his original decision and … apply it to the next situation.” Mueller offered that any flaws in reasoning would become apparent as the situation unfolded, leading to student reflection on perhaps a better method.\footnote{John F. Franklin, memorandum, “Faculty Board Minutes,” 5 February 1957, 2 Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.}

Evidence of changes to structure also can be found in the February meetings. Ivan Birrer recommended in the February 4 Faculty Board meeting that the school should standardize the length of classes. He suggested three hours. He believed that a common class length would assist in scheduling the overall course. While he would not be successful, Birrer would revisit the issue in the future.\footnote{John F. Franklin, memorandum, “Faculty Board Minutes,” 4 February 1957, 3, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.}

As work progressed on the revision, Colonel Ryan’s team grew. McGarr used the team as the nucleus for a new organization designed along functional lines. McGarr hoped to implement the suggestions from the Orleans’ review. The Commandant issued guidance that established parallel departments within the College. One group would continue to teach this year’s course with existing lessons; the second group wrote new material and organized themselves for the 1957-58 class. His new organization did away with the generic Department I, II, and III labels, assigning instead descriptive titles to each of five embryonic committees: the Departments of Armored Division, Infantry Division, Airborne and Army Aviation, Larger Units and Administrative Support, and Staff and Education. Both the existing and emergent sections had a colonel assigned as director. McGarr believed this arrangement necessary to be fully ready to teach the subsequent curriculum, while maintaining the quality of ongoing instruction.\footnote{Lionel C. McGarr, “Remarks on /8 Curriculum and Organization by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, Commandant, to Staff and Faculty, CGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1630, 4 December 1956, 3-4, CARL.} Within each department, directors established a doctrinal element to create training literature and updated doctrine to support lessons.\footnote{CGSC, Williams Board Discussion Points (Draft), “Development of Doctrine” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., 2.}
To gain a better understanding of the Army’s needs, the College hosted a week-long conference on Army roles and the operational environment in early March 1957. McGarr was blunt in his observations about the Army education system and the extent to which it had fallen behind potential enemy capabilities. The Commandant told participants “I do not believe these changes in the Army’s needs, together with the necessary, accurate “Battlefield Picture”, have been reflected in our schools to a sufficient degree in the past. We here at the College are certainly not guiltless in this respect.” Participants explored the atomic battlefield in depth, but working groups on local wars and situations short of war had equal say.

One outcome of the conference was the realization that atomic weapons instruction could use improvement. As Colonel John F. Franklin told CONARC headquarters, the “current experience of the US Army Command and General Staff College in teaching this subject has resulted in a searching reappraisal of the entire problem in an attempt to assess the difficulties involved.” Atomic targeting, in particular the effects tables of the atomic weapons manual, which was a math-intensive section, required a significant effort to master. Franklin pointed out the Special Weapons Course trained the technical skills, while the time needed to teach the subject in the Regular and Associate Courses was prohibitive.

94 CGSC, draft memorandum, “Conference on Roles and Operational Environments of the Army in the Field,” n.d., Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. The purpose was to “produce concept guidance for the continued development of doctrine and instruction which is realistic and appropriate to the current and future needs of the army in the field.” A working paper for the conference listed a spectrum of war with three potential types: general war, local war, and situations short of war. Interestingly, the author observed that in local war, “[t]he ability of the individual to endure hardship and the ability of the force to operate effectively under less than ideal conditions may increase enemy combat effectiveness in the specific locale.” CGSC, “Roles and Operational Environments of the Army in the Field (Working Paper), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 4 February 1957, 7, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. The document could serve as the basis for a broad-based Army doctrine; it does not indicate a single-minded allegiance to atomic war as the only potential condition.

95 Lionel C. McGarr, “Opening Remarks by Commandant, USA CGSC, at Conference on Roles & Operational Environments of the Army in the Field,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 4 March 1957, 2, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.

96 An internal College meeting on instructional methods followed the atomic weapons conference. In this session, the Commandant reiterated previous guidance to update instructional approaches. McGarr distinguished between knowledge, represented by doctrine, and the means used to present that knowledge. His remarks to the department heads indicated his belief that methods held a higher position of importance. “[I]t is the manner in which we instruct that determines the success of the reasoning powers of our graduates, not the course content. Doctrine [sic], staff procedures, and techniques must never become ends in themselves.” Emphasis original. Lionel C. McGarr, “Remarks by Commandant to Departmental Committee Chiefs on Methodologies,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS 11 March 1957, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.

97 “Comments on Contents of Basic Special Weapons Instruction,” draft memorandum, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.

98 John F. Franklin to Commanding General, CONARC, “Improvement in Atomic Weapons Instruction,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 4 April 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. About six months later, the Secretary proposed to ask students about their views on atomic weapons instruction.
Throughout the spring and summer, the faculty labored to create the new course. Outside pressure to add lessons on special topics continued. Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Drye responded to a Department of the Army inquiry about management instruction, informed Fifth Army’s training section that the school had five hours of instruction on the topic, plus the lessons on Communications Zone had these principles embedded. It was not, however, testable material.99

With work proceeding, Major General McGarr introduced the new curriculum to the Army. As part of the implementation of the new content, McGarr directed that the faculty publish a series of sixteen Military Review articles entitled “Keeping Pace With the Future.” The articles began with his essay published in April 1957. In a complete rejection of the status quo argument advanced by some participants in Davidson’s 1955 conference, General McGarr said “The USA CGSC must, by realistic assumption and instruction, insure that our doctrine and training, even without complete field test and evaluation, are sufficient and ready for any future war.”100 As he had done with the faculty, McGarr stated the case forcefully: “Thinking typical of World War II and Korea can negate all progress if applied blindly to new concepts, new organizations, and new weapons on the nuclear battlefield, and could well be fatal to our way of life.”101 Content for ten years, the Command and General Staff College took steps to get ahead of current developments.

By summer, work was not yet complete. It was not for lack of hours expended. An average of one-third of the faculty lost leave in June 1957. Over 64% of the officers in the Department of Airborne Operations and Army Aviation and two-thirds of the College’s supervisors lost leave.102 Still, they left the Commandant unsatisfied. In his review of the draft Programs of Instruction for the Regular and Associate Courses, General McGarr commented that the documents “showed

99 C.W. Drye to Fifth Army, “General Management Training at the Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. The March 7 letter from the Adjutant General relayed a request from Secretary of the Army Wilber E. Brucker for an update on the Army Comptroller’s 1956 direction to add lessons on the topic. Adjutant General to Commanding General, CONARC, “General Management Training at the Command and General Staff College,” Washington, DC, 7 March 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
102 Secretary to Commandant, DF, “Leave Utilization-USA CGSC Officers,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 17 July 1957, Box 25, RG 546, NARA II.
miscellaneous areas where departments have not had as complete an understanding of guidance or objectives as desirable.” He urged the Assistant Commandant to follow up with the department directors to modify the lessons as they were prepared, but he accepted that some changes might have to wait until the subsequent year’s revision.103

The faculty completed the revision in the spring of 1957 just months before the new class began. The 1957-58 course centered on tactical operations. The infantry division remained the centerpiece of instruction, with other divisional instruction building from the principles presented in the infantry division lessons. Lessons used the Army’s newly adopted organizational design for the division. Armored division, airborne division, and army aviation instruction doubled. To emphasize the importance of the subjects, the Commandant created two new departments to teach these subjects. General education subjects crept into the curriculum, and these too had a functional department charged with creating and teaching the lessons. Overlaid on the new content was a fresh emphasis on small group discussion.

To its credit, the new material adopted a forward-looking focus, oriented toward warfare in the 1960-1970 period. The question posed at the conference hosted by Davidson years earlier found traction. The Army’s definition of future war, as demonstrated in the new course, centered on military operations on an atomic battlefield. In the new curriculum, students experienced instruction with an extraordinary emphasis on the atomic battlefield, but limited war, and war without nuclear weapons in particular, was represented.104 Lessons such as “Development and Evaluation of Concepts of Operations in Future War” permeated the revised POI. Students heard from outside experts on future combat developments; each of the existing Corps-level branches briefed the class on future combat developments.

103 Lionel C. McGarr to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “D/F to Commandant from AAC/RI, subject: ‘Regular Course 1957-58 POI, Associate Course 1957-58 POI’ dated 29 June 1957,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 11 July 1957, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II. The POI provided the outline of the curriculum, providing subject, scope, and hours allotted to each subject. The POI, however, was not the lesson plans. Note that six months had passed since McGarr had issued his December guidance. The course would begin in a few months.
Alongside the revised Regular Course, the faculty unveiled its plan for a revamped five-year course for the USAR schools in August 1957. Under the new scheme, reserve officers would devote time throughout the year to completing shorter lessons and would spend two weeks each year in an intensive session. Subsequent years followed a similar approach. During the first three years, lessons covered division operations. Years four and five explored corps and army operations. At the end of five years, the officer would complete the equivalent of the resident Associate Course.  

CGSC had made a significant break with past subjects of instruction. Keeping in mind the nature of the subject, conjecture permeated much of the curriculum. With barely time to assimilate the previous decade’s technological changes, and even less time to think about the future implications, the faculty and staff adopted a version of the future that was more “Buck Rogers” than even Buck himself might have dreamt. Atomic weapons permeated the course. The faculty had incorporated the technological aspects of modern warfare, but it had little appreciation for the intellectual implications. Students found tactical problems “too often on [the] fringe of future or fantasy.” Such was the state of professional knowledge at the time.

Not everyone inside the College was happy with the situation. Cushman noted that two camps had developed. One supported the new direction, and the second opposed change. Surprisingly, the Assistant Commandant led the latter faction. Dr. Birrer found himself a confidant of McGarr, perched precariously at the edge of the Commandant’s inner circle, but members of the opposing view felt comfortable approaching Birrer, too. McGarr noted the backlash among the faculty when he wrote, “Although expected resistance to change has been encountered, this sizable task [curriculum rewrite] is ahead of schedule due to the dedicated officers of the staff and faculty who have given it their full support.” The Military Review articles were also an attempt by the College leadership to reassert
the institution’s leading role in the intellectual development of officers and to convince the Army’s leadership that McGarr had implemented the changes directed in 1956. McGarr’s comments in *Military Review*, intended as much to convince the rest of the Army that a new direction was needed, came just a year-and-a-half after the Davidson conference.

In part, CGSC’s situation reflected a larger issue in the Army’s school system. Continental Army Command (CONARC) Commander, General Willard Wyman, addressed the new direction in his speech to the Association of the United States Army annual meeting in 1958. “To keep up with the accelerated demand for greater professional competence in our officer corps, sweeping changes have been made in the curricula of our combat arms schools and staff colleges. This year, for example, the Command and General Staff College is presenting tactical situations to its students in which the conditions for atomic battle are to be regarded as “normal” rather than “exceptional.” As a result, ground combat in a nuclear environment became commonplace in the classroom, while operations not involving atomic weaponry were to be relegated to a lesser role in the course.

Outside Fort Leavenworth, the work by the Department of Nonresident Instruction had shown quick results. “It is now interesting to note that non-resident student enrollment has increased 33% since this instruction has been brought up to date,” Major General reported to the CONARC Commander. CGSC retained supervisory responsibility for USAR schools, and the non-resident department continued to grade examinations. Inspection teams visited the Command and General Staff department of USAR schools in each of the numbered Army areas. From their reports, one can see the vast difference between the Leavenworth experience and other campuses. In the Second Army schools conducted at Fort Knox and Fort George G. Meade, the inspection team noted that only eighty percent of the enrolled students attended the two-week session, which occurred frequently enough to require a policy allowing students to make up the missed classes using extension course lessons. At both schools, only half of the assigned instructors had attended the instructor training lessons.


course. The team also noted that the availability of texts for student use at these outlying sites continued to be a problem. On the other hand, the inspectors at both Second and Third Army schools reported that “instruction observed was excellent.” The definition of academic excellence, however, could have several meanings.

**Tangible Benefits**

As had been the case from 1946-54, the quality of faculty and students varied. Student ranks dropped sharply in 1957, but this can be attributed to a slowdown in promotions (table 4). Regular Course Ranks, Army Officers, 1955-58). Age and time in service remained relatively stable.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
<th>1956-57</th>
<th>1957-58</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>524</td>
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</table>

Source: Williams Board Discussion Points (Draft), ca. 1958. The program did have a make-up provision for students unable to attend a scheduled session.

The faculty still maintained its seniority up through the mid-fifties. Of the faculty in the seven instructional departments, only nineteen were majors out of 148 officers. Each department (minus the Special Weapons Course team) had at least two colonels, if not more. Reflecting the continued belief that the school was a place to learn the fundamentals of the combat arms, eighty-two percent of the faculty came from infantry, armor, or artillery backgrounds. The next largest group—eight—were from the Corps of Engineers. Only one officer, Major E.A. Rutledge of the non-resident department, was female.

112 Adam S. Buynoski to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, “Staff Visits to USAR School ADT Sites, Second US Army Area,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 1957; Adam S. Buynoski to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, “Staff Visit to USAR School ADT Site in Third US Army Area,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. The program did have a make-up provision for students unable to attend a scheduled session.

113 Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. The discussion paper remarked that ranks could be an unreliable indicator, given that promotion quotas determined the point at which an officer advanced. The paper argued that years in service had been a reliable indicator of readiness for CGSC attendance and should be the standard used for admission.

114 Staff Directory, Command and General Staff College, 17 October 1955. Included as an attachment in Davidson’s 1956 AAR, CARL. Technical and specialist branches represented as follows: Quartermaster-4, Signal-3, Chemical Corps-2, Transportation Corps-2, Ordnance Corps-2, Medical Service Corps-1, Adjutant General’s Corps-1, Military Police-1, and Women’s Army Corps-1. In addition to the faculty, each of these branches, minus WAC, had a special representative on the staff. Only one other female officer served on staff.
While the school looked for instructors from among its graduates, the mid-fifties also allow some examination into the non-graduates who served as instructors. From 1951 to 1955, fifty CGSC instructors received College diplomas by virtue of their service as faculty.\textsuperscript{115} Seven instructors graduated along with their students in the 1956-57 class.\textsuperscript{116} Army policy authorized award of diplomas for instructors who had acquired “equivalent knowledge” by virtue of their service. The process was not automatic, and it entailed some work on the part of the officer. College criteria, as outlined in a letter to the Adjutant General, qualified an officer after two years in an instructional department. They also had to attend the Instructor Training Course, serve as a principal instructor, and participate in instructor workshops.\textsuperscript{117} Each year, these individuals merited special recognition for their accomplishment. Despite individual efforts at self-improvement, the overall quality of the faculty remained average compared to the officer corps as a review of the school would soon show.

Faculty selection from within the student body continued. The Educational Survey Commission had recommended increased emphasis on faculty selection to ensure that the best qualified officers from within the current class remained as instructors.\textsuperscript{118} An update to the school’s policy outlined the procedures used. Instructors observed and reported their observations of student behavior that merited consideration as an instructor. Departments collected these observations and forwarded them to the College staff for future consideration by a board of senior officers. As with many requirements, the school went overboard, mandating that each instructor “submit a CGSC Form 17 on at least three students after completing each unit of instruction of not less than four hours duration.” Form 17, or the Instructor Report, asked instructors to rate the student on eighteen positive

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] CGSC, “Graduates of the Regular, Associate, General Staff, and Special Weapons Courses from 5 September 1951 to 3 August 1955,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 November 1955, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
\item[116] C.E. Drye to The Adjutant General, memorandum, “Regular Army Officer Graduates, 1956-57 Regular Course, USA CGSC (Army Register Data),” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 28 June 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. The list contained three colonels and four lieutenant colonels.
\item[117] Adam S. Buyonski to Adjutant General, memorandum, “Instructor Graduates, USACGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 29 October 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
\item[118] ESC, 23-27; William F. Train to Director of Instruction, DF, “Instructor Selection,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 1956, Box 17, RG 546, NARA II.
\end{footnotes}
traits or ten negative characteristics. Fortunately for the faculty, Dr. Birrer weighed in, calling the requirement “impracticable” as it only hassled “the already overburdened instructor.”

Foreign representation on the faculty was minimal and episodic. For a number of years, the College had allowed a small number of top-performing allies to remain for an additional year as a “guest instructor.” The Commandant halted the practice after the shift to atomic-based curriculum and updated classroom methods in 1958.

The school’s strength relative to its officer authorizations remained steady in 1957. Major General O.P. Newman’s inspection team found 243 of 250 officers present for duty across the College in 1957. The Continental Army Command inspectors noted “This School has been consistently maintained at or near authorized strength.” On the other hand, the strain of the massive rewrite effort underway showed. In the College’s pre-inspection report, 30,125 hours of military overtime and 4,922 civilian hours—for a single quarter. The exertion of the faculty showed in the accounting of their efforts.

In a personal letter, Brigadier General Train outlined the benefits of a faculty assignment. Evident in his comments is the elitism noted in the previous chapter with regards to student selection. “I would say that basic to all other reasons is one of selectivity….‖ Train continued his observations, saying, “The intangible benefits include association with the best of one’s contemporaries as well as a

119 The school also relied on the system of peer ratings then in effect, whereby students would rate their classmates as potential faculty. CGSC Form 17, revised 7 September 1956, Box 17, RG 546, NARA II.
120 Dr. Birrer to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Revision of Faculty Memorandum Nr 46, Potential Instructor Selection,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 October 1956, Box 17, RG 546, NARA II.
121 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Position, “Topic Number 8” attached to CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA to COMDT USACGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KANS, message, ATTN: 50266, 0222234Z November 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. 022208-6 335 A British and a French liaison had been attached to the school for several years as well.
122 O.P. Newman to Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, memorandum, “Report of Annual Inspection of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26-27 February, 1957,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 15 March 1957, 2-3, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. John F. Franklin to Commanding General, Continental Army Command, memorandum, “Annual School Inspection, 26-27 February 1957,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 February 1957, 2, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. Instructor duty, despite the figures given in some official reports, amounted to a forty-one hour week, according to responses given to an Air University inquiry. The average of forty-five instructors’ responses showed 25.2 hours of platform time, 63.3 hours of preparation, 62 hours to lesson author and review duties, 12.8 hours of training literature review, and 3.2 hours of student counseling. Inclosure 1 to William F. Train to Charlie G. Dodge, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 February 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. Responses derived from the 1956 Educational Survey Commission report’s query: “What is the average amount of time you spend per month on the following activities?” Box 25, RG 546, NARA II.
sharing in the prestige and tradition of the College….” Perhaps most attractive were the advantages to
the family and social life. 123

While potential instructors underwent scrutiny, students still entered based upon past
performance. For students, the pressure to perform could lead to cheating among “the very few who
are inclined to moral weakness.” The trend disturbed Brigadier General Train, who distributed an
ethics article to both the Regular and Associate Class. Still, it did not prevent cheating. Officer
integrity came to the forefront in an incident in the spring of 1957 involving two Regular Army
officers. One shared a school solution that had not yet been presented officially to the second officer.
The Class of ’57 lost one potential graduate to a court martial conviction and a further four to
academic failure. Looking at the results of the 1957 Faculty Board, the threshold for failure included
the students’ total points, number of exams failed, and low peer ratings. 215 points separated the
highest-achieving non-graduate from the lowest-achieving officer declared a graduate. The four
failures represented a fifty percent decrease over the period 1951-56, with the notable exception of
the previous year’s class which had no academic failures (table 5). 124

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<th>Table 5. Regular Course Failures, 1951-1956</th>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
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<td>1954-55</td>
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<td>1955-56</td>
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<td>1956-67</td>
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Source: Wm. F. Train to Commandant, Non-graduates Regular Course 1957 FTLV, 14 June 1957.

The Board’s decision did not sit well with the Class Supervisor, Colonel C.E. Kennedy. He
reasoned that since no officers in the previous year’s class had failed, none should fail this year. He
believed the four were victims of circumstance since “it seems probable that no officers in the /8 class

123 William F. Train to Charlie G. Dodge, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 February 1957, Box 25, RG 546, NARA II. “Among the tangible
benefits that go with an assignment here are good family quarters, a stabilized tour of 3 years with frequently a 1 year extension, pleasant
surroundings on a small and attractive Army post, a good Club and Golf Course, food service on the part of the Post Staff and, in particular,
the Post Hospital, and an extremely friendly civilian community.”

124 Wm. F. Train to Commandant, “Non-graduates Regular Course 1957,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 June 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II.
It cannot be unequivocally established that Major Haddock’s court martial and the cheating incident are tied, although it seems likely.
Train’s 29 April 1957 memorandum mentioned that charges had been filed against the two officers. The incident involved an officer from
the Regular Course and the Associate Course.
will be failed….” Hoping to change the decision, Kennedy wrote Major General McGarr claiming that declaring those officers non-graduates did little—they were, after all, “selected from the upper bracket of all officers.” He asked McGarr to “set aside recommendations of the Faculty Board and pass all officers of the /7 [1957] Class.” McGarr’s handwritten notes show he clearly disagreed with his subordinate’s assessment. McGarr wrote “we are not in business to pass everyone. We teach people to think.” As to Kennedy’s claim that failure would be “detrimental to the officer’s morale,” McGarr replied, “Why? I may jar him into increased endeavor.” McGarr supported the Faculty Board, rejecting Kennedy’s request with “Disapproved.”

The Williams Board

In December 1957, the Secretary of the Army directed that the Army form a new board to review officer education. It was the third Army-wide survey since World War Two. Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams, Deputy Commanding General of CONARC, served as board president. Major Generals John A. Dabney and Preston Corderman and six colonels formed the membership. As had happened in 1946 and 1949, the Board had an expansive assignment. Unlike the CGSC surveys, the Board employed no civilian educators as panel members.

The board’s recommendations, issued on July 1, 1958, ranged over the breadth of the officer education system. A number dealt directly with CGSC. On the whole, the Board reacted positively to the changes in curriculum and instructional methods underway at the College. The panel recommended “that the US Army Command and General Staff College continue to conduct a difficult and rigorous course to the extent that it presents a real challenge to the student,” but the board took exception to the trend away from ranking students. A draft College position on the subject of

125 C.E. Kennedy to Commandant, memorandum, “Pass-Fail Determination,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 17 June 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. Kennedy’s claim about no failures in the subsequent year’s class was based upon the new rating scheme that was slated for implementation. He had no data, since the class had not started. One officer was from the Finance Corps, one was infantry, and two were armor, one of whom was a National Guard Officer. Kennedy did point out that one of the four had a J.D., and two had master’s degree.


ranking agreed, noting, however, that “substantial modifications have been made in the College evaluation program.”

Two recommendations in the report involved controversial topics. One considered a proposal that recommended teaching division operations to officers earlier in their career. The board noted, “The proposition has been advanced that the bulk of division level instruction should be conducted at the branch advanced course.” Williams’ Board members offered both advantages and disadvantages to this proposal, saying that shifting division instruction away from CGSC would expose more officers to the subject and reduce the scope of the Regular Course. As disadvantages, the Board listed several to include CGCS’s traditional role, overcrowding of branch school curricula, and fragmentation of division tactics into branch-specific schools. The Board remained ambivalent about the proposal but affirmed that CGSC’s key contribution was the “tactical application of the combined arms and services,” further commenting that the “proven reputation of ‘Leavenworth’ as the place where ground commanders learn the art of battlefield command should be perpetuated.”

The Williams Board also proposed a significant change to the way CGSC students were selected and proposed a higher attendance goal. The Board suggested sixty-five percent of eligible Regular Army officers should attend the Resident Course, an increase above current target of fifty percent. Under the system existing since World War Two, the Department of the Army allocated quotas to each arm and service. Branch officer assignment managers, in turn, selected the officers to fill the available slots. What the Williams Board proposed was an Army-wide selection board. This would have made CGSC selection similar to the process used to slate senior service college students. In the end, the Board did not think that a change was necessary and backed away from endorsing

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128 CGSC, Williams Board Discussion Points (Draft), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
129 Williams Board, 101-02.
130 Williams Board, 178. General Paul Adams echoed the recommendation in a 1962 letter to McGarr’s successor—Major General Harold K. Johnson. Adams wanted to include more time on strategy, reasoning that “It follows then that the Command and General Staff College course must be lifted intellectually, and to do this time must be found. This can be accomplished by pushing division staff officer training down to lower schools.” Paul D. Adams to Harold K. Johnson, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 15 August 1962, 4, CARL.
131 Williams Board, 18.
centralized selection. The Williams Board noted service-wide requirements for CGSC graduates equaled 10,242. Available strength, however, was only 9,000. Given the upcoming increase in capacity with one Regular and two Associate Courses, the panel thought that the gap would be closed by FY 62.

The panel had other concerns with the state of the non-resident and extension courses. Army-level decisions raised the importance of the non-resident courses. The College’s position paper to the Williams Board detailed the limitations of the present system. Objective-type tests and classification concerns, coupled with “no direct contact between the student and a live instructor” prevented extension courses from attaining the same level of educational outcome as experienced by a resident student. Not far from the minds of the Williams Board was a major change in promotion requirements for reserve component officers. Graduation from a CGSC equivalent course became a pre-requisite for federal recognition of promotion to combat arms colonel or general officer in 1958. This decision alone would greatly increase the enrollment in the various non-resident and extension programs.

Perhaps most importantly for the future of the College, the Board’s report showed an increased interest in using CGSC to teach peacetime duties. The Army Regulation governing the officer school system gave responsibility for preparing officers to “perform efficiently in peace and war.” One pre-survey question revealed that the Army had in mind a purpose beyond serving as the senior tactical institution. “How much attention should USACGSC give to leadership, personnel management, maintenance, financial management, and supply management,” asked the Board. The College’s position, as expressed in its response, was that the Regular Course covered all five subjects in conjunction with lessons on related material. The author used some creative accounting in that he

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132 Williams Board, 159.
133 Ibid., 153.
135 Edgar C. Erickson to Commandant, CGSC, memorandum, “Military Educational Requirements for Federal Recognition or Promotion of National Guard Officers to General Officer Grade,” Washington, DC, 7 January 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
reported personnel—194 hours, supply—105.2 hours, logistics—386 hours, maintenance—3 hours, and general management—90 hours. A careful reader would have noted the duplication among many of the areas and might have questioned the grand total of 778.2 hours against a course with little over 1100 hours of total instructional time.\footnote{Williams Board Discussion Points (Draft), “Leadership, Personnel Management, Maintenance, Financial Management, and Supply Management,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. Another trick used to inflate the numbers was the inclusion of self-study time in some of the totals. As will be shown in a subsequent chapter, the staff used similar accounting tricks to run up the hours for partisan and counterinsurgency instruction. Attached to the discussion paper is an excerpt from CONARC to add instruction on peacetime subjects such as community relations, consumer funding, and headquarters organization.}

Introduction of new topics occurred incrementally as the College noticed the need for broader focus in officer education. This trend would continue in succeeding years with the addition of regional studies briefings to the curriculum in 1959-60. One of these wide-ranging lectures examined Southeast Asian countries from the standpoint of “economic, geographical, sociological, political and military potential.”\footnote{CGSC, “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course, 1959-60,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 1959, 24, CARL.} While the school had integrated new material, it had not completely accepted the broader definition of officership implied by the new topics. The task to further update the curriculum and to correct structural problems would fall to later Commandants.

The question of non-tactical topics did not rest with publication of the Williams Board report. Colonel Robert F. Seedlock of the Department of Defense staff wrote to the Commandant in September 1958 to ask about “the aspects of military education which broaden officers beyond purely military subjects.” In his response, the College Secretary told Colonel Seedlock that CGSC had made tentative movement to expand beyond the “purely military” by consolidating these type subjects under a single department, the Department of Staff and Education, and by paying attention, starting in 1957, to subject matter of general educational interest.\footnote{Adam S. Buynoski to Robert F. Seedlock, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.}

Coded within the College’s educational philosophy provided to Colonel Seedlock were two points that meant more than they said. “There would be an increased emphasis on the educational approach in all instruction to the extent appropriate and practicable.” “Educational approach” implied something different than the phased applicatory method used for tactical and logistical instruction.
second aspect indicated that professional officers did not possess the knowledge needed and that expertise from other fields would be needed. “The hours which in previous courses were categorized as general education would be consolidated in one department to ensure a cohesive approach; and advice in this area would be sought from universities. The subject matter selected would be specifically appropriate to the educational development of the professional officer, and at the same time would reinforce other instruction.” The full import of these two statements became clear within a few years. In the meantime, the College staff and faculty found themselves consumed with daily affairs, and students.

Blue Goose

Barely two and one-half weeks after the 1957-58 Regular Course started, the staff began to plan next year’s course. Much work remained. Some guidance had not been implemented due to time or resistance. The coming year would be a pilot of the new lessons. Updated material from the in-house doctrinal elements needed to be integrated into the next course. The faculty would try out the new instructional methods in the coming year. New department directors would take control of the courseware and their new departments. The institution had to absorb many changes.

Officer integrity and student evaluations attracted more attention, too. Brigadier General Train hoped that a new rating system would reduce the impulse to cheat, so he called upon the Class Supervisor, Colonel Kennedy, to look for ways to emphasize “moral values” in the next course. Train implemented a new grading scheme for students for the 1957-58 courses, which he handed off to his replacement, Brigadier General Frederick R. Zierath. The first indication of its effectiveness came with the graduation of the Associate Course in December 1957. Ivan Birrer “pointed out that

139 Adam S. Buynoski to Robert F. Seedlock, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. Educational subjects included military geography, military history, legal status of the military, military organization and management, comparative military systems, and leadership.

140 James L. Frink, Jr. to Department Chiefs, DF, “Sequence of Events for ’58 Planning,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 1957, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II. Initial guidance was issued on 12 September 1957. Frink’s memorandum outlined a nine-step process that would be followed to produce an overall college directive for the 1958-59 course.

141 Wm. F. Train to Commandant, memorandum, “Student Officer Integrity, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 29 April 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. McGarr followed up in his guidance for the ’58 course. He directed the Resident Instruction chief to prepare “a more definitive memorandum on instructor responsibilities and techniques for developing integrity and moral courage in the officer corps.” Memorandum by John F. Franklin, “Implementation of Commandant’s ’59 Curriculum Guidance and Decisions on ’59 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 December 1957, 3, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.
there had been no occasion during the course to send any warning letters of possible failure to
students, again indicating that they were successfully absorbing instruction.” He reported to the
Faculty Board that the “last man on the graduation list…had 12 B’s, 19 C’s, and only 4 U’s.” The
bottom four officers were international students.¹⁴²

The perennial issue of sufficient instructors to teach all of the courses worsened in 1957-58.
Based upon the Educational Survey Commission’s findings about instructor workload, CGSC had
requested that Fifth Army conduct a manpower survey, which took place in April 1957. Fifth Army’s
team recommended an additional twenty-two officers, two enlisted men, and twenty-eight civilians.
Of this number, CGSC received only twelve officer spaces and eight civilian spaces. Exacerbating the
existing problems with instructor workload was the school’s increasing share of writing doctrinal and
training literature.¹⁴³ Creating new knowledge required effort beyond the teaching faculty’s
capabilities. Officers in the mobilization augmentee program, which had begun in 1948, took some of
these special projects or taught summer courses at the College. The part-time military faculty took on
a variety of duties, from special studies to instructor training courses, but the College remained
woefully short of full-time staff and faculty.

Faculty turnover for 1958 stood at sixty-six. As the Faculty Board considered potential
replacements from the 1957-58 classes, it looked for evidence of “initiative” and “originality,” which
were traits added by the Commandant, who valued “mental inventiveness” in prospective faculty. The
Board recommended sixty-three officers from the Class of ‘58 as turnaround instructors, expecting to
get fifteen to twenty of them approved by Department of the Army. Of the selected officers, twenty
did not have four years of college, and three had the required four years but no degree. Three of the
officers recommended were captains, added with the proviso that none of them would be assigned to

¹⁴² Adam S. Buynoski, memorandum, “Faculty Board Meeting Minutes,” 17 December 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
¹⁴³ As of 1958, CGSC was responsible for twenty-four field manuals, fifteen training texts, a few Department of the Army publications,
and numerous “doctrinal studies.” During the year, faculty had reviewed an additional 153 manuals written by other schools and Army
The College projected an increase in the doctrinal workload of 25% in FY 59.
the teaching departments until promotion. The faculty recommended thirty-one officers from the Fall 1957 Associate Course as potential instructors. Through this system, instructors selected those who most resembled themselves or what they believed to be the ideal instructor. Anticipating an increase in Regular Course students from 622 to 750 and from 320 to 400 in the Associate Course for 1959-60, Colonel Buynoski wrote the personnel chief of CONARC about the situation. The school’s authorization for officers was to increase to 316 as the College expanded, yet CGSC fell below overseas assignments and the Air Defense and the Guided Missile Schools for priority. Speaking of the current year, Buynoski observed “Because of delays in assignments by the Department of the Army, the College began the current Academic Year with an actual shortage of 19 officers against the fully justified and documented requirement for 281…. “ Buynoski warned that the excessive workload might lead to a “lowering of the quality of the Leavenworth product.”

The ongoing issue with sufficient personnel to meet the College’s needs peaked in 1958. The College’s pending expansion raised the most concern among the leadership. Major General McGarr wrote the Chief of the Officer’s Assignment Division at The Adjutant General’s office to declare his support for an initiative to increase faculty quality. Under consideration was a plan to require four years’ of college as a prerequisite for instructor duty. “We are convinced that, since this is a college level institution, only officers with an educational background of four years of college should be assigned to the Staff and Faculty.” McGarr reported that of the 252 officers assigned, sixty-five had less than four years of civil education, fifty-five had less than three years, and ten had no college education whatsoever. Fifty-one percent of the faculty had no degree.

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144 Adam S. Buynoski to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Regular Course Instructors Nominated by Faculty Board for S&F,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 December 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II. The departments nominated thirty-six captains, of which only three captains were deemed acceptable by the Board: John H. Van der Bruegge, William R. Stroud, and George S. Patton, Jr. The only department director indicating that he would accept captains was the non-resident instruction head.

145 John F. Franklin, memorandum, “Faculty Board Minutes,” 5 February 1957, 2, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. Branches of the officers: 19 infantry, 4 artillery, 3 armor, 2 signal, 1 ordnance, 1 Corps of Engineer, 1 Military Police Corps, 1 Quartermaster Corps, 1 Chemical Corps.

146 Adam S. Buynoski to Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, CONARC, memorandum, “Personnel Requirements for USACGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 1958, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.

147 Lionel C. McGarr to James L. Richardson, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 28 January 1958, 1, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
The Commandant and his staff continued to press Fifth Army, CONARC, and the Department of the Army for highly qualified officers to fill instructor slots. At the time, one-third of each year’s replacements came by extending tours, one-third from the graduating class, and one-third from the Army. The faculty and leadership controlled the first two-thirds, while they relied upon the Army to provide the remainder. The Commandant outlined what he believed to be the current needs for officers in a letter to Brigadier General M.M. Magee, Acting Chief of the Officer’s Assignment Division: four years of college credit and combat service. He told Magee that the School’s mission meant that the School needed 100% fill of all open spaces, and those officers assigned had to remain until the end of a full tour. Early departures disrupted the classroom routine.

Quality became an issue between the College and its higher headquarters. In a briefing paper prepared for the Commandant’s meeting with Brigadier General Ben Harrell, head of the Infantry Branch, a staff officer told the Commandant:

The principle which D/A [Department of the Army] must recognize is that the quality of the Staff and Faculty must improve if the Army is to have an officer corps to meet the challenge of the times. The standards of the past are definitely not good enough. This has been recognized by the Educational Survey Commission and others. The simple issue is – is D/A willing to pay the price or not?

Already short officers to accomplish existing tasks, Major General McGarr, his Chief of Staff, and Colonel James F. Frink, discussed calling off the expansion because of projected shortfalls. Fifth Army responded to CGSC’s request for a higher priority saying it had no more personnel to allocate. According to the response on September 17, personnel authorizations and other needs within Fifth Army precluded the assignment of more officers. Exchanges between Fifth Army, CONARC, and the Adjutant General reveal the problem did not lie with Department of the Army and CONARC, who recognized and supported CGSC’s requirement. Instead, Fifth Army had siphoned some of the faculty augmentation to other purposes, leaving CGSC potentially short sixty instructors for the 1959-
60 class. CGSC competed with an Army in need of the best. Apparently, a Leavenworth education was not the priority it once had been.\textsuperscript{151}

Within the course, the Commandant looked closely at the work of the faculty. A few points left him unsatisfied. He believed that the map problems still emphasized the European theater too much. McGarr preferred a broader approach, which he relayed to the departments through his Secretary.\textsuperscript{152} McGarr’s preference for a wider selection of areas reflected a growing appreciation of American defense commitments. His guidance to consider more options besides Europe indicates that he, at least, understood that conflict could take place around the periphery of the expanding Soviet bloc.

War absent nuclear weapons existed, too.\textsuperscript{153} Davidson had reminded the faculty of this second condition—referred to as non-active atomic, or conventional, conditions back in 1955.\textsuperscript{154} The Army Chief of Staff had articulated a new Army mission that emphasized limited wars. In this view, the Army had a role in limited wars that atomic weapons could not fulfill. By design, the other aspect of the curriculum outlined by the Educational Survey Commission—increased emphasis on local

\textsuperscript{151} Twelve memoranda between the four headquarters showed that CONARC and DA had recognized the need for more faculty. Fifth Army’s Adjutant General, Colonel Albert A. Lindquist, wrote a letter to CGSC directing the school to prepare “a statement of the additional requirements, to include a justification for such requirements,” despite having already received CONARC and DA concurrence in March 1958 for the augmentation. It is plain that Fifth Army skimmed some of the authorizations for other organizations. Albert A. Lindquist to Commanding General, Fort Leavenworth, memorandum, “Annual Reassignment of Officers to Staff and Faculty, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1st Indorsement,” Chicago, Illinois, 17 September 1958, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.

\textsuperscript{152} “Stress is laid on world-wide selection of tactical exercise locales. The trend will be to reduce the number of locales in Central Europe (exclusive of USSR) without increasing the number in Western Europe. New Locales [sic] for consideration include areas like Italy, Scandinavia, Alaska, Afghanistan, Korea, India, Pakistan, South America (Western Hemisphere defense) and USSR. Furthermore, coverage of Africa (Algeria, etc.) and Middle East, if practicable, will be improved.” Adam S. Buyenoski to Chief of Operations, memorandum, “Interim Planning Guidance for 79 in so far as it Affects Budget Program Planning,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 October 1957, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.


wars and other situations short of general atomic war—received less attention in the first rewrite.155 On the other hand, these two areas were not ignored.

By 1958, Birrer had succeeded in making the phased approach part of the course structure. In the guidance for planning the 1960 course, Major General McGarr directed that more time (32%) be shifted to the third phase, advanced application, and less to the earlier application phase (35%). The fundamental phase would remain constant at 15%. McGarr noted that departments had “to avoid the definite annual tendency to increase fundamental instruction at the expense of more advanced instruction.”156 He would battle with these issues until he left.

As 1958 drew to a close, the Commandant looked ahead to the 1960 curriculum. His outline reflects a broad appreciation of the American strategic situation. McGarr assessed the likelihood of general war involving widespread use of atomic weapons as decreasing, but he interpreted recent events in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits as indicators of limited conflicts requiring equal levels of preparedness. As he saw it, the Army must contribute to “strategic deterrence, tactical deterrence, and application of selective, measured force.”157 To this end, his guidance allocated percentages to each of the three forms of war: general war – 35%, limited war – 55%, and Situations Short of War – 10%.158 While he was satisfied with the progress made for the previous and ongoing courses, he called for better efforts in sixty-three areas. Among the ones he wanted to see modified for the 1960 course, McGarr directed the departments to “aggressively further develop the concept of Unconventional Warfare doctrine and instruction, as previously directed.”159

155 Robert E. McMahon, “Keeping Pace With the Future – Air Mobility in Army Forces,” Military Review, 38 (July 1958): 61-62. This article, one of the Keeping Pace series, devotes a page to outlining the College’s course on unconventional operations. A later section will review this aspect of the curriculum in further detail.
156 CGSC, “The Commandant’s /60 Curriculum Guidance and Decisions on /60 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 3 November 1958, 97, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. By 1958, a fourth phase had been formalized—general education.
157 Ibid., 5. In April 1958, the Assistant Commandant, F.R. Zierath, circulated a release copy of the President’s April 3, 1958 address to Congress about defense reorganization. F.R. Zierath, memorandum, “Message of the President, 3 April 1958,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 April 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
158 /60 Guidance,” 24-32. Percentages on page 91-92. He further distinguished between nuclear and non-nuclear conditions in each of these. General war was 100% atomic; limited war scenarios were to be evenly divided; and situations short of war were 100% non-active nuclear, meaning one or more sides had nuclear weapons but did not employ them.
159 The Department of Airborne Operations and Army Aviation was renamed Department of Airborne Operations, Army Aviation, and Unconventional Warfare to reflect the Commandant’s attention to this area. “/60 Guidance,” 71. McGarr was perturbed by the lack of progress on this area. “As previously directed, and not fully accomplished, the development of the doctrinal basis for this instruction
Departments had understaffed the doctrine writing effort, dual-tasking some officers with doctrinal duties so the department could maintain a larger instructor pool. McGarr made clear this was unacceptable, issuing a number of do’s and don’ts to curtail the departments’ attempts to circumvent his guidance. He specified that each department maintain an in-house doctrinal capability, staffed with a minimum number of officers. He also mandated a level of quality, saying “Officers selected…must be experienced author/instructors who have demonstrated particular capability for original, creative doctrinal work.”

He continued to press for better instructional techniques as shown in his educational philosophy at appendix 5. The Commandant found deficiencies in small group discussions particularly troubling, and McGarr reiterated his position that instructors should never use lesson plans as a “rigid script.” He directed that the faculty de-emphasize the school solution and even freed instructors to give their own opinion in the classroom. He instituted two written requirements, although he left some freedom for the student to choose the form (thesis, research paper, or article for publication).

One should not believe Major General McGarr was alone in his beliefs. General Bruce C. Clark reinforced the expectations of what graduates should be able to do in his opening remarks to the class of 1959:

Despite the sweeping changes in subject matter and techniques that have taken place at this College, the fundamental objective of the course remains the same: to produce officers with the mental discipline to think straight and the moral courage to make resolute decisions. Thinkers and deciders are what the Army has always expected from Leavenworth and never have they been more urgently needed.

Among the audience were 620 officers, including allies (table 6). The trend towards more captains in attendance continued, with a slight decrease this year.

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160 Original emphasis. “/60 Guidance,” 102-103.
161 Original emphasis. Ibid., 15-16.
Table 6. Regular Course Ranks, 1958-59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>U.S. Army</th>
<th>Other U.S. Service</th>
<th>Allied</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel*</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major*</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To achieve the outcome directed by the Commandant, and desired by other Army generals, the faculty shifted some of the instructional workload to the students, using them to lead group projects. Guidance from Colonel R.A. Broberg formalized two types of group work: the staff exercise and the committee. The two forms differed principally in the degree of decision making authority vested in the student leader. In staff exercises, the student role played a principal staff officer, and the faculty evaluated the student based upon their performance. In the second type of group work, “the leader is not vested with the right of decision.” Students in a committee were expected to solve the problem using “democratic group processes.”163 The methods employed in the classroom tied to the desired outcome of a thinking officer.

To aid student leaders in their tasks, lesson authors provided a “Student Leader Guide” covering housekeeping details like the lesson’s purpose, time, and training aids; preparatory reading for the student leader; and the requirement itself—a briefing, usually. A separate set of guidelines on how to manage time and guide discussions formed part of the guidance. The faculty expected students to prepare introductory remarks, manage time, prepare questions, cover all main points, and control group activity. One essential duty of the student leader was the lesson summary. “[T]he leader must leave no doubt in any member’s mind as to what the specific purpose of the period was and what significant points were covered.” In essence, the student leader became the assistant instructor, responsible for managing the group’s learning. The school transmitted the requirement and the

functions of an instructor—taught in a three week course and refined through preparation—a few days before the problem was scheduled. Students came to dread the “Blue Goose.”  

Sons of Important People

From 1952 to 1958, both the number and proportion of foreign officers in the Regular Course rose slightly. International officers increased by nineteen, reaching eighty by the 1957-58 class. This represented a 2.7% increase. U.S. officers, on the other hand, remained relatively unchanged at 541 in the final year. The Educational Survey Commission of 1956 asked whether it was wise to give so many slots to allies, when the backlog of American officers remained so large. “The presence of Allied officers creates a problem relative to classified material. There is also the question as to whether Allied officers do not replace some US officers who would otherwise be able to profit from the course offered by the College.” The administration believed that the ratio of one allied student to seven U.S. students represented a maximum for the Regular Course. Any increase, according to the school, risked “detract[ing] from the ability to conduct profitable classroom discussions.” The 1958-59 Regular Course had 621 officers. One hundred were allies or from other U.S. services. Only seven of the U.S. Army officers came from reserve components.

The Associate Course had fewer individuals and a smaller proportion. Across the five shorter courses in 1956-58, foreign students comprised 0.0%, 4.3%, 2.1%, 10.4%, and 9.2% of each class. Academic subjects began with general staff functions but centered on the infantry division. Students had limited time with armored division, corps, and army operations, and they had twenty-four hours of instruction on atomic warfare, as it was understood at the time. CGSC hosted a few sixteen-week Foreign National Associate Courses, one of which the school held in 1955-56 for Nationalist Chinese

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164 “Suggestions to Group Leaders and Participants” attached to R.A. Broberg, “Group Work at CGSC,” Circular Number 8, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 May 1961, CARL. Students named the “Student Leader Guides” the “Blue Goose” since the College printed them on blue paper.
165 ESC, 33.
166 Adam S. Bynonski, “Roster Number 2, 1958-59 Regular Course,” CGSC, 28 November 1958 2, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. 345 Army officers came from the traditional combat arms—infantry, armor, and artillery. This came close to the target of sixty-five percent established by the Williams Board as the correct representation across the branches.
The principal reason for segregated courses was their inability to understand English. The importance of the course to international diplomacy became apparent when President Chiang Kai-Shek personally appealed to General Taylor for an additional Special Associate Course for Chinese officers. These special courses overcame the language barrier through translators, but the staff expressed the view that it was far more preferable for allied officers to attend the Regular Course.

In contrast to earlier statements, the staff conceded that atomic instruction would increase, but “it does not appear that this increase will be of such a degree that it would nullify the value of the course for foreign officers.”

The Allied Officer’s Section continued to oversee the Allied Officer’s Preparatory Course, somewhat modified from earlier versions. In 1955, the course lasted eight weeks. In the first phase, non-native English speakers through 157 hours of English instruction; the second phase of seventy-seven hours covered basic Army doctrine and organizations. The intricate connections between the various Leavenworth courses can be seen in the actions subsequent to McGarr’s directive of October 1956. The move to atomic conditions and the incorporation of the Pentomic division required more than a revision of the Regular and Associate courses. In the fall of 1956, James E. Mrazek, the colonel in charge of the Allied Student section, advised Brigadier General Train of the need to revise fifty-one of the approximately eighty hours of academic subjects. No one had accounted for this in the initial estimate, and Mrazek was desperate for assistance. He asked for four more officers out of an already stressed faculty to rewrite the twelve subjects in need of revision; for without modification, the Allied Preparatory Course would teach old doctrine—something not acceptable to the

168 T.J. Marnane to Commandant, CGSC, memorandum, “Conduct of a Special Course for Thirty Non-English Speaking Senior Chinese Officers at CGSC,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 4 May 1957. The President asked for an additional course like the Special Associate Courses taught previously at Leavenworth. Another course was presented from January to May 1959 for Republic of China officers (colonel to lieutenant general). Lionel C. McGarr, “End of Tour Report of the Commanding General Fort Leavenworth and Commandant United States Army Command and General Staff College,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1960, 95, CARL.
169 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Position, “Topic Number 3” attached to CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA to COMDT USACGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KANS, message, ATTN 50266, 082234Z November 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II. Once again, housing was mentioned as a constraint on attendance.
170 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Position, “Topic Number 5” attached to CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA to COMDT USACGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KANS, message, ATTN 50266, 082234Z November 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
171 CGSC, “Program of Instruction for Allied Officers Preparatory Course, CGSC 1955,” May 1955, CARL.
Commandant. Mrazek’s situation was such that he was willing to accept students-in-waiting as instructors the following summer.172

As had been past practice, the summer 1957 preparatory course had two phases: English instruction followed by basic Army subjects.173 Upon conclusion of this course, Colonel Mrazek again noted the recurring problem of the tactical portions of the Allied Officer Preparatory Course, reversing his earlier position. As he saw it now, the course was a standing requirement that needed dedicated instructors and curriculum planning. He outlined a haphazard system that used snowbirds (a student who had arrived early) to put together a course on a “crash basis” using whatever means could be scraped together. The last-minute nature of the project incurred significant overtime charges and in his view did not present a professional image to newly arrived international officers. Worse, temporary instructors had little familiarity with the material and oftentimes presented inaccurate information. Mrazek recommended that “professionally qualified authors and instructors” from the resident faculty prepare and present the lessons.174

The Allied Officer’s section continued to press MAAGs for cooperation in screening potential students. “[O]ne single factor which most influences the degree of academic success of foreign students is English proficiency.”175 Citing poor English skills as an ongoing concern, the section shared with the Foreign Military Training Conference the need to select officers who had demonstrated proficiency, because CGSC’s approach “integrated” international officers alongside their U.S. counterparts, giving both the same instruction to the degree classification guidance allowed.176 The focus on meeting the Army’s demands for future officers submerged considerations

172 James E. Mrazek to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Allied Officers Preparatory Course, Phase I,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 October 1956, Box 18, RG 546, NARA II.
173 Adam S. Buynoski, memorandum, “Class Schedule – Allied Officers Preparatory Course, Phases I and II, First Week through Eighth Week,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II.
174 James E. Mrazek to Chief of Resident Instruction, memorandum, “Allied Preparatory Course, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 11 October 1957, Box 23, RG 546, NARA II.
175 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Position, “Topic Number 4” attached to CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA to COMDT USACGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KANS, message, ATTN 50266, 082234Z November 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
176 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Position, “Topic Number 1” attached to CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA to COMDT USACGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KANS, message, ATTN 50266, 082234Z November 1957, Box 21, RG 546, NARA II.
about allies’ participation in the school. That is, until one student drew national attention to the
College and the resulting commotion embarrassed its most famous graduate.

Other crises interrupted the daily work of the Allied Officer’s Section. In July 1956, 
Ecuadoran Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Gonzalez began to complain that his ulcer was acting up. After
medical examination, the doctor found Gonzalez to be in a “rather marked anxiety state” at the
prospect of the Regular Course. “In his own mind he is convinced that he can be relieved of his
symptoms only by being allowed to withdraw from the impending course.” Shortly thereafter,
Lieutenant Colonel Gonzalez returned home. Despite an extensive program of social activities and
local sponsors, occasional homesickness affected an international student. The extreme case of an
Ethiopian officer in 1956 led the Department of the Army to direct that in the future, no less than two
Ethiopians would attend CGSC simultaneously.

For the most part, assisting in the transition to American society and culture fell to the
military sponsors of each allied student. Each year, the Allied Officer’s Section canvassed the post for
sponsors for the new class of allied officers. The section circulated a list of nations for the next year’s
class. Ideally, the sponsor would meet the new student at the airport or train station and convey them
to the post. For some, this was a simple task as they were housed in bachelor officer quarters on post.
For others, especially those with families, the student had to rent a house in town. Sponsors helped
arrange housing, transportation, schools for children, banking, and answered any number of questions
about daily needs. The program merited the attention of the Commandant, for a despondent or
discontented allied officer could create lots of work.

Lieutenant General Rafael L. Trujillo, Jr., a general in the Dominican Republic’s Air Force,
arrived in the summer of 1958. Trujillo was a problem from early on. To skirt Army regulations that
precluded allied general officers from attending schools such as CGSC, Trujillo arrived wearing the

177 John C. Bondurant to Commandant, USAH [U.S. Army Hospital], DF, “Medical Evaluation of Lt Col Jorge Gonzales,” Ft.
Leavenworth, KS, 10 July 1956, Box 18, RG 546, NARA II.
178 DA ODCSOPS to CHMAAG ADDISABABA ETHIOPIA, message DA416907, 111519Z, Box 18, RG 546, NARA II.
179 Lionel C. McGarr to Staff and Faculty, memorandum, “Allied Officer Sponsorship,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 April 1958, Box 27, RG
546, NARA II.
rank of colonel, a fact well-known to those who arranged his attendance. This never sat well with Trujillo, who promptly made a scene when he found other allied generals among his classmates.

Trujillo pressed his own embassy for instructions that would allow him to wear his general’s rank—a request the embassy was only too happy to oblige, given that dad was the head of state.180 As the situation worsened, the College Secretary, Colonel Adam Buynoski, wrote the chief of the Foreign Military Training Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations to outline the problems and to request clarification of Trujillo’s status. Was he a lieutenant general, or was he a colonel as his orders stated?181 Trujillo himself played the part of jet-setter.

Trujillo never took his studies seriously, attending class at his leisure. His antics became legendary among the faculty and staff. Trujillo’s notoriety soon expanded beyond Kansas. His excesses finally drew the attention of Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio. In closed testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Hays reportedly told committee members about Trujillo’s lavish lifestyle. “Generalissimo Trujillo’s son occupied a Kansas City hotel and used a fleet of automobiles, a weekend ranch house and other luxuries costing an estimated million dollars a year.”182 Hays, and fellow representatives, were infuriated that American foreign aid underwrote these extravagances. Thoroughly outraged by this time, House legislators still attempted to “punish the Dominican Republic for the gay life in Hollywood of Rafael Trujillo, Jr.” as they debated the FY 59 foreign aid program.183 Trujillo claimed the money spent came from his own pockets.

Trujillo’s yacht anchored in southern California, where he spent a lot of time. During the year, he dated Zsa Zsa Gabor and Kim Novak, buying both extravagant gifts and foreign sports cars. Somewhat surprised by the news of his friendship with Gabor and Novak, Trujillo’s wife, and the

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180 Cesar A. Baez to [Rafael L. Trujillo, Jr.], “Confirmation of rank of Lieutenant General,” Washington, DC, 20 November 1957, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II. “You are notified by means of this letter in view of the fact that General Officers are attending the College you are attending, I am instructed to confirm upon you the grade of Lieutenant General and that in the future you do not use the transitory rank that you were designated unofficially and only so that you could attend said studies. This is of Superior Order.”

181 Adam S. Buynoski to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, memorandum, “Transitory Rank of Allied Student,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 23 January 1958, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.


mother of his six children, sought a divorce in Mexico. From this point on, Trujillo became a media sensation. Following a medical procedure, he recuperated in Hollywood “on leave ‘for medical reasons’.” As Trujillo recovered from his surgery, his entourage added to the spectacle. Trujillo’s aide, Victor Sued, got convicted of drunken driving in Torrance, California. Three days later, Trujillo returned to Leavenworth and the remainder of the course.184

His excessive absences, however, had now drawn the attention of the administration. A debate ensued as to how to treat his case. A month later, Trujillo was declared a non-graduate for failure to attend sufficient classes. Trujillo quickly dismissed the action, declaring “the Good Neighbor Policy instituted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull was gone without hope of revival.” Trujillo lashed out at the school, saying CGSC “had been converted to political purposes. The diploma it confers no longer constitutes an honor.”185 Having declared this, the Dominican Republic recalled all officers attending U.S. military training the next day.186 A few days later, Trujillo’s father announced his promotion to full general of the Army and Air Force. Trujillo got the news while in Los Angeles.187

The fallout continued throughout the summer, peaking with the Dominican Republic’s deliberate absence during President Eisenhower’s address to the United Nations on August 13. The New York Times reported the insult on page one. The next month the Dominican Foreign Minister called for voters to oust three U.S. representatives in the November 1958 elections. Representatives Alvin M. Bentley, Republican of Michigan; Charles O. Porter, Democrat of Oregon; and Charles B. Brownson, a Republican from Indiana came under attack by Dr. Porfirio Herrera Baez. The Minister dispatched letters to governmental, business, and civic groups calling for the defeat in the coming

The sensitivities of international participation at Leavenworth could have undesired results. The sensitivities of international participation at Leavenworth could have undesired results. The sensitivities of international participation at Leavenworth could have undesired results. A New Home

On the west bank of the Missouri River, the colorful banners of many nations swayed gently in the frigid breeze. A gray overcast sky contrasted with the bright reds, greens, and yellows of the flags, while gleaming windows and new reddish-brown brick formed the backdrop to this symbolic gathering. Inside, the bustle and fuss of ceremony accompanied the freezing temperatures. On this brisk January day, Kansans gathered together with the governor, George Docking, to dedicate a new academic building at Fort Leavenworth. James Franklin Bell Hall, new home to the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC), opened with all the formalities expected in the unveiling of a new military building, especially on a historic post. Major General Lionel C. McGarr performed the necessary introductions. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, a serious and slightly balding man, delivered the dedication remarks in the building’s cavernous auditorium. Alongside the Secretary sat elected officials, military officers, even the Chancellor of the University of Kansas. With the conclusion of the ceremony, the assembled guests spilled out into the corridors to consider the new building’s modern features. Expecting great things, an advertisement in the Leavenworth Times proclaimed, “Son…It’s More Than Just a Building”.


Trujillo’s antics and the resulting diplomatic snub were not the first time Leavenworth’s most famous graduate had encountered controversy tied to the post. The President’s son, Major John Eisenhower, attended in 1954-55. The New York Times announcement of his selection raised expectations, highlighting the President’s accomplishment as honor graduate of the 1926 class. The most notable event of Major Eisenhower’s attendance turned into a national flap over alleged favoritism. In an unfounded story, news organizations reported the President’s grandchildren received Salk polio vaccinations well before other children. Not true, said the President’s press secretary; however, when Dwight David Eisenhower II received his vaccine in April 1955, the media was on hand to record the event. Grandson David quipped afterwards, “well, that didn’t hurt any.” His dad, by the way, did not make the top ten. “President’s Son Follows Father,” New York Times, June 2, 1954, 22; “Eisenhower’s Son Reports,” New York Times, August 25, 1954, 19; “White House Denies Report,” New York Times, April 17, 1955, 52; “President’s Son Gets Polio Shot,” New York Times, April 26, 1955, 22; “610 Officers Graduated, President’s Son Among Class and Army’s Command School,” New York Times, June 25, 1955, 16.

“Secretary of the Army Brucker at Opening of J. Franklin Bell Hall,” Leavenworth Times (Leavenworth, KS), January 14, 1959, 1-2. Congratulatory ads appeared in the Leavenworth Times, Leavenworth, KS, January 13, 1959, 1-6. The quote comes from an advertisement in the January 13, 1959 issue, page 6. Correspondence relating to the justification for Bell Hall can be found in CGSC, “Justification for Academic Building,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 4 October 1954, which includes memorandums through 1956. Several detail the collapse of a twenty foot section of angle iron (part of a roof rafter) in Andrews Hall in January 1956. The concept of a new academic building dated to July 1951, although the appropriation was eliminated as part of the Eisenhower administration’s cost-cutting measures in 1955. A second
James Franklin Bell Hall was a project conceived under Major General McBride’s tenure, although construction did not begin until McGarr had taken over. Throughout the period preceding its opening, construction delays, budget cuts, and personnel shortfalls threatened the expansion. Weather and labor strikes prevented its scheduled opening in July 1958. This worried the administration, because an increase in the class size was tied to the availability of this new facility. Army-wide budget cuts deleted the funding for Bell Hall’s furnishings, leaving the project underfunded by $331,350. The same weather problems that had afflicted classroom construction had put new student housing behind schedule. An increased class size meant extra instructors, which had been provided for by a Fifth Army manpower survey in April 1957. Much work remained to be done before the College could move to its new home.

Soon after the groundbreaking ceremony, CONARC directed the Commandant to consider the “Feasibility of using all or part of the increased College capacity which will become available on completion of Franklin Bell Hall in August 1958, to increase capacity of the Associate Course.” Could the College teach three Associate Courses per year? Bell Hall had twenty-four classrooms designed to accommodate fifty students each. To make effective use of this capacity, the School leadership and CONARC had allocated 900 spaces to the Regular Course and 300 to the Associate Course. Given that the school presently taught two Associate Courses annually, the College could graduate up to 1500 officers from resident courses. CONARC, hoping to increase the number of qualified officers, wanted a third course to assist in reducing the backlog that still existed.
The new academic building gave the College a central home. No longer scattered across multiple locations, including a former riding hall, a converted stable, and a gymnasium, the School’s faculty and students occupied a common building. It was the last of the major changes made under Major General McGarr’s command. It turned out to be the most enduring.

McGarr’s reputation as a tyrant must be reconciled with the progress made during his four years as Commandant. Under McGarr’s watch, CGSC moved to a new building, enlarged the faculty, and expanded the student population. Krepinevich’s assessment, unfairly, looks at his tenure through what happened later in Vietnam, rather than what existed as McGarr experienced it. Ample evidence from McGarr’s own writings suggests that he had a broader appreciation of the U.S. strategic situation than has been previously acknowledged. McGarr—and Davidson—sought permission to use draft doctrine, which was a distinct break with their predecessors. McGarr managed the expansion of the Regular and Associate Courses, gathering the needed resources to increase the capacity of both. At his direction, faculty overhauled the extension course and USAR schools’ curriculums, bringing them closer to the resident Associate Course. From the perspective of educational effectiveness, his continual emphasis on small group methods and development of individual decision making ability indicate a willingness to use more modern approaches.

Dr. Birrer, who had served Commandants since 1948 as the Educational Advisor, reflected back on the changes at CGSC that began with McGarr’s initiatives. In a retrospective look, Dr. Birrer characterized McGarr’s first two years as “turbulent,” but the reforms had taken hold and lasting changes were made by the time the Commandant departed. In part, change was made possible by McGarr’s extended tenure—over four years—as Commandant. Perhaps the unfavorable characterization of the Commandant’s actions by others reflects the outcome of his professional life.

Regular Course officers and 300 Associate Course students. Although the staff had recommended a reduction in allied officer slots, CONARC and the Department of the Army had set the number at 110. 195

Like the Army of which he was a part, McGarr’s subsequent service in Vietnam played out in the form of a Greek tragedy.

**Transition to War**

At the conclusion of the Korean War, CGSC’s leaders had assessed the institution. Major General Davidson had discovered that during years of war the College had done little to accommodate external changes. The Army had broadened the view of CGSC’s mission. From a school focused overwhelmingly on staff duties in large tactical level units, the College had expanded, albeit slowly, its scope. The College no longer concentrated on teaching staff skills and tactics. Too, the broad outlines of a growing uncertainty about the purpose of CGSC, and officer education in general, emerged during this period. One internal assessment, two College-specific commissions, and an Army-level board came to widely different conclusions.

Change could be detrimental, however. The radical shift in the 1957-58 curriculum shows an organization caught up in the moment without a full understanding of the future. With little time to assimilate the technological changes ongoing around it, and even less time to think about the future implications of those changes, the faculty and staff had overreached, adopting a version of the future that went too far beyond the limits of professional knowledge. Although understandable given the innovations of weaponry the late 1950s, the nuclear battlefield was not the only version of the future. A strong antithetical argument existed as well. In this view, the Army had a role in limited wars that atomic weapons could not fulfill. The routine use of tactical nuclear weapons competed with quasi-wars for curriculum space. The College accommodated three versions of the future as best it could in the ten months available. The range of potential battlefield conditions, the presence or absence of atomic weapons, and the unknowns of the new combat organization encompassed too many variables to cover each adequately.
In 1959, the Army’s leadership had not achieved consensus on the role and direction of the Army, much less what should be taught to students.196 When Bell Hall opened, faculty taught officers the art and science of war using a new curriculum developed in 1957. A new building brimming with updated, but well-worn, ideas greeted the class of 1960. New concepts of war took hold slowly. Procedural barriers and manpower shortages exacerbated the delayed response to external developments. Most importantly, a fundamental flaw in course planning procedures prevented an agile response to rapid technological, organizational, and social changes. On the eve of the Vietnam War, the College had significantly altered the content, scope, and method of the Leavenworth resident course. Most adjustments came from outside developments, since structural inertia retarded the adoption of new ideas within the College for much of the era after World War Two. On the whole, the school reacted to external events rather than seeking to shape the future; the focal point for new knowledge lay outside CGSC. Meanwhile, the imperceptible shift to a peacetime orientation gained momentum.

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CHAPTER 4

Defining Professional Jurisdiction, 1954-1964

When we finished World War II, small wars had never occurred. We didn’t realize that international leadership was very likely to bring us into contact with problems we hadn’t faced before.

Frank Pace, Jr.
Secretary of the Army, 1950-53

The Leavenworth student of the 1950s—expected to be a skilled leader conversant in new forms of war—faced numerous challenges. The first was learning about duties on a battlefield yet to be defined. For over thirty years following World War Two, the officer corps struggled to adapt intellectually to the changed security circumstances of the United States. Sketching a theory of war which would accommodate warfare spanning atomic weapons to insurgency was to prove extremely difficult, especially given competing viewpoints within the Army itself.\(^1\) Modern war in the twentieth century required an expansive definition, encompassing the atomic battlefield, conventional major conflicts, limited war, and guerilla war. Integrating the atomic weapon into existing schema confounded doctrine writers as well as generals. A working definition of modern war, in all its forms, remained elusive. Neither those responsible for providing doctrine, nor those responsible for teaching it, could produce a satisfactory explanation of the collective means necessary to perform effectively in this new environment. Army schools lagged even further behind external developments, because military professionals remained uncertain of the future. The resulting lack of coherent direction stymied the officer education system.

It is said by some historians that guerilla war, also called partisan warfare, received the least attention in the Army’s schools. Andrew Krepinevich offered this thesis in *The Army and Vietnam.* More recent scholarship, such as the two-part history of Army counterinsurgency doctrine by Andrew

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\(^1\) Linn, 4-5. “Limited War: The Prospects and Possibilities,” *Army Information Digest* 13 (June 1958): 10. In this issue, Army leadership unveiled its view of limited war. The article said, “The forces required to wage an unlimited war and the priority of tasks will be significantly different from forces and tasks in limited warfare.”
Birtle, plainly shows that the Army experimented with counterinsurgency and had recognized the unique character of this form of warfare. Likewise, as will be established, the College and its instructors did not totally ignore the issue of small wars. Communist insurgency, especially the Maoist variation, intrigued American officers, and the subject generated professional discussion amongst faculty. Officers had individually dissected components of the whole. Interestingly, the College’s professional journal, *Military Review*, showed an early awareness of guerilla warfare, partisans, and Southeast Asia, but not always in a form applicable to the eventual situation the United States confronted in Indochina. Collectively, the College formally studied the topic and offered some tentative conclusions. The efficacy of their communal efforts forms a major focus of this chapter next section.

**The Artful Dodge**

In general terms, the United States Army acquitted itself well during World War Two. Glaring World War One deficiencies regarding mobilization, large unit logistics, and battle command were studied and corrected during the interwar years. Experienced instructors from the American Expeditionary Force populated the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) faculty after the First World War, and they helped develop and sharpen many of the interwar operational concepts. While not having recognized the potential of airpower, among other miscues, officers had made effective use of the interwar years, largely through education. Army schools played a key role in identifying and inculcating American land warfare concepts prior to the Second World War. Students from this cohort transformed a skeleton army into an effective military force deployed and employed across the globe.

Officers faced a wholly new situation after 1945. In spite of the expanded national responsibilities and increased size of standing forces, the Army faced questions of relevance in the

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3 Schifferle, 201.
dawning atomic age. Russell Weigley noted, “For most Americans, including most of the
government, the Army in the late 1940’s seemed almost irrelevant to the Communist challenge.”

Demobilization proceeded rapidly, as the Truman administration and Congress responded to public
opinion and citizen-soldier demands. Having completed their task, service members were returned to
civilian life by the millions. The Army’s dilemma can be seen in Secretary of the Army Frank Pace,
Jr.’s 1952 comments:

The Army must prepare itself for possible global war against an enemy who outnumbers us on the ground—an enemy capable of marshaling his resources to strike without
warning at a time and place of his own choosing. If global war does not suit his purpose,
this enemy can also incite “local wars” anywhere along the global boundary between the
Free and Communist worlds. The Army can choose neither the time nor the place of war,
or the type of war to be fought. Ours must be a flexible plan of defense.

America’s position as a European and Asian power, a new national defense structure, and an overhaul
of the officer personnel system led to expanded professional requirements; however, military
intellect, that of the officer corps in particular, labored to accommodate the exponential growth in
technology and new trials arising from growing national involvement in world affairs. As Secretary
Pace observed, the United States inherited the role of global policeman as European colonial regimes
in Asia and elsewhere collapsed.

The Cold War-era Army has had numerous critics. Even before the North Korean attack
exposed the weaknesses of an occupation army, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times openly
questioned the combat readiness of tactical forces. Later, T.R. Fehrenbach and Andrew Bacevich

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5 Ibid., 486. Weigley argued throughout his work that the general American pattern called for demobilization of its citizen-based Army
following completion of each war. Weigley also argued the Army’s greatest institutional concern was the perennial question of manpower.
William M. Donnelly’s study “The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances,” referenced earlier, applied Weigley’s
thesis to the manpower shortage the Army experienced during the Korean War.
6 Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. quoted in Military Review 32 (November 1952): 28.
told of the regional instability following the Japanese surrender. Strategic policy influenced the Army’s regeneration during the early 1950s.
Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army,” 93-120. Fautua argued that NSC 68 gave the Army the strategic rationale to remake itself institutionally
and to claim a balanced share of defense resources.
8 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Condition of the Army,” New York Times, June 22, 1950. Baldwin wrote of nine areas of significant concern,
including inadequate discipline, lax or unethical officers, and inexperienced non-commissioned officers. On the eve of the Korean attack,
Baldwin observed, “the Army in the United States is today in the best shape since the [Second World] war.”
assailed the quality and performance of the 1950s Army. Likewise, much has been said about America waging the wrong kind of war in Vietnam. Andrew Krepinevich’s *The Army and Vietnam* criticized the Army for misunderstanding the nature of the conflict and for using the wrong approach as a result. Krepinevich found the school system ignored counterinsurgency in favor of “The Army Concept.” He asked, “What has the Army done these past fifteen years [prior to 1965] to prepare itself for a war quite unlike those “traditional” wars—World Wars I and II and the Korean War—that it had become accustomed to waging?” In fact, very little attention was paid to the subject of counterinsurgency in the ten years leading up to expanded American involvement in Vietnam. Krepinevich was not the only harsh critic. Russell Weigley observed: “The old Indian-fighting Army had habituated itself to fluid tactics with elements of guerilla-style war; the Army of 1950 had long forgotten the tactics of Indian wars.” Historian Ronald Spector later wrote: “The entire question of antiguerilla or, as it was coming to be called, counterinsurgency warfare was complicated by the fact that the U.S. Army had paid little attention to the need to develop counterinsurgency training and doctrine during the 1950s.” Existing methods had worked to defeat guerillas in “Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Iran.” The prevailing attitude was that American techniques would be successful against the Viet Cong, too.

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10 Prominent among authors who criticize the military and political failings of the American Vietnam effort are Shelby L. Stanton, H.R. McMaster, Harry Summers, George W. Ball and Neil Sheehan. Each of these authors finds fault with some aspect of the political, diplomatic or military machinery that waged war.
11 Krepinevich makes an implicit assumption that an American Army employing counterinsurgency techniques could have been successful in the mid- to late-1960s, thus forestalling further North Vietnamese actions. Shelby Stanton says that the battle between national armies began as early as 1965. As was seen after Tet 1968, the North chose to use conventional forces once it determined that the southern-based insurgency had failed. The character of the war in the South changed, especially after 1968, and it is not very likely that it would have responded to counterinsurgency techniques. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
12 Krepinevich, 5. “The Army Concept of war is, basically, the Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged and is reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its troops for battle.” Emphasis original.
13 Ibid., 4. His brief review of the CGSOC curriculum found little of value to an Army preparing for counterinsurgency, 50-52.
16 Spector, 273.
This line of inquiry, however, places Vietnam at the forefront of the American Army’s consciousness during the prelude to the Vietnam War, rather than as just another facet of a complicated world. As will be shown, the staff and faculty of CGSC in the 1950s lacked the stimulus needed to embrace the problem of counterinsurgency. While the U.S. Army had extensive experience with combating guerillas and partisans over its history, a combination of persuasive ideology, political indoctrination, and military capability inherent in the communist form of insurgency required a re-examination, if not wholesale reappraisal, of old methods.

Moreover, digesting the World War Two experience, especially in light of the rapid build-up of the Soviet Army and the increasing threat of atomic weapons, proved too great an intellectual leap for the professional officer of the 1950s. If a recasting of professional form and thought were to have taken place through the officer education system, an institution which logically had to have played a key role was CGSC. The extent to which the school incorporated events in Indochina into the education provided to officers at the Army’s mid-career course serves as a reference point for assessing later criticism of the Army. Did the CGSC modify its curriculum based on early experience in Indochina? If not counterinsurgency, what was taught to officers? Tracing the adjustments made by the College after America became directly involved in Vietnam illuminates the process of jurisdictional expansion and the creation of new knowledge applicable to the profession. The role of postwar military schools in shaping the professional outlook of student-officers also emerges. If CGSC incorporated lessons on limited war, counterinsurgency, or Vietnam specifically, in the 1954 to 1964 courses, these developments may

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18 John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 2002, 2005), 50. Nagl contrasted the organizational learning of the British and American armies during these two conflicts. Nagl found that the 1956 Regular Course had no lessons on small wars. Nagl’s contention (142) that the U.S. Army did not begin to develop doctrine until the 1960s ignored the publication of FM 31-20 and FM 31-21 discussed in Birtle.

19 Andrew Abbott proposed a theory of professional interaction between professions in which competition formed a dominant force. Abbott’s structural approach described the system that linked “professions with tasks.” Abbott explained this tug-of-war between professions as a struggle to establish professional domains, which he labeled professional “jurisdictions.” One profession can preempt another’s claim to a task by extending its jurisdiction. Central to his concept of professions, Abbott said that the “practical skill [of a profession] grows out of an abstract system of knowledge, and control of the occupation lies in control of the abstractions that generate the practical techniques.” Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 8, 53.
help to understand whether officers had the foresight to recognize and adapt to this new form of warfare. Contrasting the 1954 to 1964 Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) curriculum against the American advisory efforts in Vietnam during the same timeframe reveals a profession struggling with its core tenets.

**America Inherits a War: Advisory Efforts 1954 – 1958**

National Security Council (NSC) paper 64, issued in February 1950, proved to be a remarkably prescient analysis. The document expressed the belief that Indochina was a key area in the containment of communism and defined the U.S. policy towards the region for ensuing ten years. It directed “the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina.” In the ensuing years, despite the Korean War and the buildup in Europe, Indochina would slowly become more central to American efforts to counter the spread of communism.

Bernard Fall provided officers the first practical introduction to Indochina in his October 1953 *Military Review* article, which described the situation in Indochina since V-E Day. He covered Vietminh capabilities, the Vietminh’s interleaving of political ideology with military force, and an unflattering description of French tactical mistakes. Despite continuing French difficulties, Fall concluded: “It cannot be considered a modern war since one of the opponents is entirely devoid of armor and air power.” Perhaps readers thought so as well.

American military involvement in Vietnam began as a series of observation and logistical support efforts intended to bolster the French struggle to counter the communists. In 1950, the United States began to provide military aid to the French forces. After the French defeat in May 1954, the

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U.S. assumed an increasingly direct role in Vietnam. The Collins Mission culminated a series of assessment and support missions to the French, and it marked the transition from French to American dominance regarding South Vietnamese affairs.

Over the next five years, the American presence evolved quietly. The U.S. Military Assistance Group, Indochina provided the framework upon which the Collins Mission would build. Re-designated as MAAG Vietnam on October 28, 1955, Lieutenant General S. T. Williams became chief of the American advisory group in November. Troop strength of the MAAG had risen to 342 in 1955 and still stood at this level in early 1956. Much of 1954 to 1958 saw the MAAG devote its energy to designing a workable army for the South Vietnamese, although it was an army patterned after American forms.

Near simultaneous with the evolution of the MAAG, Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel headed a joint training venture with the French known as the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). Formed in February 1955, the mission was allocated 217 U.S. trainers of the 342 authorized Americans in-country, and it had about 200 French advisers, although the French withdrew trainers throughout the coming year. Given the mission to “train and develop the efficiency of the South Vietnamese armed forces,” the group soon found itself involved in operational matters.

The next increment of U.S. involvement hid behind the premise of logistical thrift. Departing French forces left behind a huge surplus of American equipment. On the pretext of recovering materiel, the Americans circumvented the Geneva Accords advisor ceiling in a sleight-of-hand. The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) of 1956 sought to gain control of the mountain of

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23 Spector, 240. The gap in the Center of Military History’s series on American military advisory efforts in Vietnam diminishes the historiography of the American Vietnam experience. The missing middle volume covering 1960-65, said to be in preparation, coincides with the period that may be the most crucial in the escalation of the American phase of Vietnam’s long struggle for independent rule. Constructing an accurate sequence of events in the absence of this resource continues to be difficult at best.
24 Ibid., 242.
military equipment using 350 U.S. personnel. However, the troops rapidly shifted from equipment recovery to logistical training of South Vietnamese forces. Together with the MAAG, this meant there were around 740 Americans in Vietnam at the end of 1956.26

At this point, U.S. training and logistical assistance missions to Vietnam provided very little to convince the CGSC leadership to substantially alter the curriculum. The missions that did exist concerned themselves principally with training or equipping the Vietnamese. American troops had limited direct contact with the insurgents, and the overall numbers of soldiers in country during this time were relatively small. In a force averaging over one million troops, an advisory force of less than 800 in a distant Asian land drew little notice.27

**Infiltrating the Curriculum, 1954 – 1958**

Direct involvement of American forces in Vietnam began after the July 21, 1954 Geneva Accords. Was this sufficient to cause the Army to modify its view of warfare, or did the Army’s educational institution hold to previously established patterns? Krepinevich’s study found little evidence of direct applicability to the emerging form of war. On the other hand, Andrew J. Birtle’s* U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* documented the Army’s extensive post-World War Two experience in smaller conflicts that became increasingly common.28 Field Manual 31-20, *Operations Against Guerilla Forces*, published in 1951 and a related volume, Field Manual 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare*, clearly demonstrate that the Army did not ignore irregular forces and counterinsurgency.29 On the other hand, neither of the manuals nor the topic itself claimed a substantial share of the curriculum. Central to understanding why insurgency was never a regular feature of the curriculum is to remember what was

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26 Spector, 257-262. Note also the U.S. experience with MAAGs past and present in Greece, the Philippines, Korea, and, increasingly, Latin America.
27 Weigley, 569.
28 Birtle does not refute Krepinevich’s assertion that Army schools did not cover counterinsurgency, but he does clearly show that experience and doctrine reflected an appreciation of the subject.
being taught. The meandering course the College took to infuse atomic weapons into the Regular Course highlights the Army’s widespread difficulty in defining a hypothetical war. The College experienced great difficulty coming to grips with what the Army temporarily came to see as its primary role—land combat on an atomic battlefield. The inability to integrate atomic weapons into land combat operations meant little attention would be given to ancillary topics. New topics appeared as add-ons and not a substantial change to the underlying philosophy. The College did not completely disregard the topic of guerilla warfare, although CGSC hardly emphasized the topic to the level called for by later experience.\footnote{Birtle, 1942-1976, 151-152.}

Army officers showed some interest in learning lessons from its recent experiences other than World War Two, and they studied anticipated enemies. Their rationale for interest in the topic can be found in professional writings of the early 1950s. Officers thought that the Army might have to employ guerillas, and the Second World War had exposed the limited familiarity most officers had with the employment of guerilla forces. Writing about an OSS unit’s harrowing experience leading guerillas against the Japanese, Lieutenant Colonel William C. Wilkinson, Jr, said, “From the beginning, this group was beset with problems which would not have occurred if previous experience had been available to draw upon.”\footnote{William C. Wilkinson, Jr. “Problems of a Guerrilla Leader,” \textit{Military Review} 32 (November 1952): 24.}

Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf’s “Offensive Partisan Warfare” enunciated the principles of offensive partisan operations for friendly purposes in 1952. Metcalf, a CGSC instructor, emphasized that “future warfare undoubtedly will exploit the partisan potential to a vastly greater degree than ever before,” but he noted “there is a notable deficiency of training in and understanding of the offensive capabilities and limitations of partisan movements.” Metcalf outlined potential roles for a partisan force, mainly as an adjunct to conventional units. He urged service schools to devote
more instruction to the subject, stating that “professional military personnel must receive thorough orientation and training in the offensive, as well as the defensive, aspects partisan warfare.”

American officers wrote about their counter-guerrilla experiences in other regions and in more recent conflicts. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick H. Loomis, a CGSC instructor, acquainted officers with the situation in Greece during 1949. He detailed the organization and operations of the Joint United States Military Aid and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), which was part of General Van Fleet’s United States Army Group Greece (USAGG). Loomis’ emphasis on the advisory role foreshadowed similar methods adopted in Vietnam. The example he used of Greek army tactical operations, however, read more like a conventional attack on a defended position than a case study in anti-guerilla operations.

The general theme of friendly partisans as an economy of force carried forward throughout the next ten years. On the eve of increasing American involvement in Vietnam, the Army viewed guerrillas as something to be dealt with using conventional means. An early CGSC lesson built upon this appreciation. The 1953-54 lesson on guerilla operations introduced students to the idea that conventional forces might have to both employ guerrillas for their own purposes as well as defend against them in combat operations. Points considered in the lesson included:

(a) implications of defense on extended frontages for guerilla and infiltration action; (b) use of reconnaissance and combat patrols and infantry-armor-air teams in offensive action to combat enemy infiltration, (c) defensive plans by small units to insure coordinated reaction to local attack, and (d) countermeasures employing friendly partisans as security forces in conjunction with specially trained reserves.

The curriculum changed little for the next few classes. Officers had a classified lesson on guerrilla operations, but little other evidence of the issue can be found in the course. The 1956-57 school year was essentially a repeat of the previous one. From a review of the CGSOC Programs of Instruction (POI) in the 1950s, it is apparent that the college paid negligible attention to the type of situation that officers faced in Vietnam during the late 1950s and early 1960s. While counter-guerrilla

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34 POI, 1953-54, 87-89.
lessons were never an extensive, much less central, feature of the curriculum, their presence in an already crowded schedule demonstrates some level of interest within the officer corps.

Subsequent modifications to lesson plans in the late 1950s reveal several minor additions related to ongoing operations in Vietnam. The 1958-59 POI called for a guest speaker on Military Assistance Programs, and students heard another lecture on “Political and Economic Aspects of Local War.”

In themselves, these three-hour briefings are relatively unremarkable; however, compared to the previous curriculum material, nothing similar had been taught since the restart of the course in 1946. Communism also appeared in the offerings in the form of an FBI briefing on communist activities in the United States. The 1958-59 POI called for a guest speaker on military assistance programs, and students heard another lecture on “Political and Economic Aspects of Local War.”

A lecture on communism also appeared in the form of an FBI briefing on communist activities in the United States. In themselves, these three-hour lectures were relatively unremarkable; however, nothing similar had been taught since the restart of the course in 1946. Current events lessons, along with general management classes and similar topics, symbolize an early movement away from the school’s tactical focus towards a curriculum far more expansive than had been the case earlier. The introduction of such topics is an indication that the College had noticed the need for broader focus in officer education—three years before President Kennedy took office.

This trend would continue in succeeding years with the addition of regional studies briefings to the curriculum in 1959-60. One of these wide-ranging lectures examined Southeast Asian countries from the standpoint of “economic, geographical, sociological, political and military potential.” But the school had not completely embraced the changed focus hinted at by the new topics just

36 POI, 1958-59, 44.
37 POI, 1958-59, 74-75.
38 POI, 1958-59, 44.
39 CGSC, “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course, 1959-60,” 24, CARL.

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mentioned. Just how thoroughly the Army had accepted the use of nuclear weapons in limited war can be seen in the one tactical problem that mentioned Vietnam in the 1950s.

Vietnam made a brief appearance in the 1959-60 war fighting lessons. In a six-hour map problem entitled “Fundamentals of Employment of Army Transport Aviation,” the author selected Vietnam as the setting for the practical exercise. This was a division-level tactical problem that made students apply basic airmobile doctrine to a tactical situation. The situation given to the students had the allied forces, operating under SEATO control, in the midst of a general counteroffensive. Students were to incorporate helicopters into their plan for an attack across the Song Ca River near Vinh in the eastern portion of South Vietnam. The reason for the selection of Vietnam as the setting remains obscure, but it is apparent that the author was more concerned with a conventional attack akin to the Korean War than combating an insurgency. The problem’s opening statement anticipated that:

In November 19__, fearing open revolt and claiming treaty violations, the Aggressor-controlled military forces of NORTH VIET NAM, including some Aggressor volunteer units, attacked south across the 17th parallel. The Aggressor-controlled force, employing nuclear weapons in a tactical role, met with initial success and penetrated approximately 50 miles in a period of 5 days. Here, because of the stiffening defenses of the Armed Forces of the Republic of VIET NAM (AFRVN) and overextended Aggressor lines of communications, the advance was contained.

The only mention of guerilla forces was a link-up with friendly guerillas after completion of the river crossing by American forces.

The structure of the problem and the information given to the students diverged widely from the existing Vietnam situation in 1959. The exercise scenario allowed the use of nuclear weapons by both sides. Students were allocated six nuclear devices and were required to plan for their

42 Advance Sheet, L1-11. In an almost whimsical reversal of the actual situation between North and South, the lesson author wrote: “For several years the Aggressor-controlled North Viet Namese puppet government has been endeavoring to gain control of the South Viet Namese Government by propaganda and subversive activities. SOUTH VIET NAM has successfully resisted these efforts. During this period, the people of NORTH VIET NAM began to resist the economic, political, and military controls enforced by the puppet government. Several resistance political groups and guerilla bands have been formed with the announced purpose of overthrowing the Aggressor-controlled government and uniting with SOUTH VIET NAM.” The College leadership was well aware of the presence of U.S. officers in Vietnam. Major General McGarr solicited donations from the military community in response to a request from the Deputy Chief of the MAAG in Vietnam, Major General Samuel L. Myers. Major General Myers requested copies of unclassified lesson material from the College. Lionel C. McGarr to Samuel L. Myers, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19 March 1957, Box 24, RG 546, NARA II.
employment as part of their analysis of the best solution.\(^{43}\) As the problem continued, both sides had employed tactical nuclear weapons—the allies in the preparation for their attack, and the Aggressor forces in a counterattack.\(^{44}\) Overall, the problem differed little from other conventional war scenarios. The choice of Vietnam appears not to be an attempt to reflect actual circumstances in the late 1950s.

The lesson’s after action report reflected the general lack of awareness at Fort Leavenworth (and, indeed, within the body politic) about the growing Vietnam crisis. Major George E. Handley stated that this map problem was identical to that of another airmobile lesson set in Eastern Germany. He commented, “This subject, which is the initial and fundamental subject for airmobile operations, is better portrayed in general war and under environmental conditions favoring airmobile operations.”\(^{45}\) He went on to recommend that the subject be subsumed into the East Germany lesson to make better use of class time. The college adopted his recommendation, and Vietnam left the tactical curriculum as quickly as it had appeared.\(^{46}\) The short-lived lesson reflects both the depth to which atomic weapons and Europe had penetrated the thinking of the Army, and how distant Vietnam really was from the consciousness of instructors.

**The Advisor Buildup, 1958 – 1964**

Events in the late 1950s convinced officers deployed to Vietnam of one thing—the South Vietnamese needed help if they were going to win. American involvement in 1958-59 remained at relatively low levels with continuation of training advisory missions. During the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, the Army took increasing notice of the activities in Vietnam even as the situation continued to worsen in South Vietnam. Clearly, some officers in the 1950s and 1960s understood the problem in Vietnam was not solely a military issue.\(^{47}\) Staff reports, journal articles, and suggestions from the scene confirm this. By all measures, the Viet Cong insurgency had gained

\(^{43}\) Advance Sheet, L1-11 and L1-III-1. The problem allocated one eight-inch howitzer nuclear round (2 kiloton yield), two Honest John (10 kiloton), two Lacrosse rockets (20 kiloton each), and one aircraft-delivered weapon (50 kiloton). Students were told to “prepare your recommendations for the employment of nuclear weapons to support the course of action selected.”

\(^{44}\) Advance Sheet, L2-II-1.

\(^{45}\) CGSC, “USA CGSC 1959-60 Regular Course Afteraction, 4026/60,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 3, 1959, 3, CARL.

\(^{46}\) POI, 1960-61.

strength by 1960. In the past few years, Special Forces troops assumed increasingly direct roles, while advisors proliferated and took posts down to the battalion level. By the time that American advisors, both political and military, had realized the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam, it was too late for the education system to respond.

Advisors shifted from training and support towards active participation in combat operations by the early 1960s. The number of advisors had doubled in 1960 from the previous year and then increased over 350% to more than 3,100 in 1961. During this period, American helicopters and crews arrived and participated in operations against the Viet Cong. Further augmentation in 1962 brought the total American force to 11,326. And by 1964, U.S. troops numbered 23,310.

American advisory efforts in Vietnam and the Command and General Staff College directly intersected when the new MAAG Vietnam Chief arrived.\textsuperscript{48} Lieutenant General McGarr had just completed a tour as the college’s commandant, and he then moved to Vietnam to assume his new post on September 1, 1960. As outlined earlier, McGarr had driven the CGSOC curriculum in a new direction in 1957 with his concern about anticipating the directions of future warfare. In doing so, he had forced change upon an educational system rooted in past success and confused about the future. McGarr’s ability to foster change in Vietnam was less successful by all measures, but assessing the influence of his time at CGSC on McGarr’s performance as the MAAG Chief requires reconciling two widely divergent views.

In \textit{Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960}, Ronald Spector depicted General McGarr’s efforts in Vietnam in a very positive manner. He asserted that “General McGarr had carefully prepared for his assignment while commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.”\textsuperscript{49} \textit{The Army and Vietnam}, however, portrayed a totally different image of the general.

\textsuperscript{48} MAP Staff Study, 6. The college assessed the military advisory efforts with the Vietnamese. The college published a massive Staff Study on Army Aspects of Military Assistance in Vietnam in June 1960. Numbering over 200 pages, the college attempted to determine the overall effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program using Vietnam as a test case. For an organization largely unfamiliar with Vietnam, the staff study did a noteworthy job of distilling some of the key non-military factors affecting South Vietnam at the time. In particular, political, economic, and cultural aspects of the South Vietnamese situation merited an honest appraisal. In some areas, however, the report demonstrated a lack of understanding of the circumstances.

\textsuperscript{49} Spector, 364.
“McGarr proved to be an eccentric MAAG chief; nevertheless, his erratic views on counterinsurgency were quite representative of the Army’s during the advisory years.”⁵⁰ Krepinevich went on to present evidence that the MAAG chief was ill-suited to the task of counterinsurgency. Spector credited McGarr for viewing “counterinsurgency as a distinct species of warfare requiring development of special doctrine and techniques,” while Krepinevich assailed the MAAG Chief as giving “lip service to counterinsurgency doctrine, while operating in accordance with the “Concept.”⁵¹ Given the turbulence and uncertainty of upper-echelon assignments, it is difficult to support Spector’s claim that McGarr could have foreseen that he would be assigned to Vietnam in 1960 and “prepared” himself during his tenure as commandant. Even he ceded that the Army’s late attempt at a counterinsurgency plan under McGarr returned to old ways. “On the whole, the plan represented a culmination of the traditional American approach to Vietnamese problems. With the drastic deterioration of the security situation, American military leaders fell back on organizational, technical, and bureaucratic measures as the most appropriate devices to combat the Viet Cong.”⁵² By the time of his departure, the situation in South Vietnam had reached a new level of crisis.

In February 1962, General Paul D. Harkins replaced McGarr as the senior U.S. military representative to South Vietnam. Carrying the rank of full general, Harkins symbolically represented a major shift in U.S. policy.⁵³ Harkins established a new command, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) which would remain in place until America left the field in Indochina. Thereafter, American advisors became principal combatants and would continue in this role until the arrival of U.S. combat forces in 1965.

**Expanding Professional Jurisdiction – CGSOC, 1960**

Major General Harold K. Johnson succeeded McGarr as Commandant in 1960. Johnson had been a student in the first year-long class after the Second World War, and he had remained as an

⁵⁰ Krepinevich, 56.
⁵¹ Spector, 365; Krepinevich, 57.
⁵² Spector, 372.
⁵³ The 1960 MAP Staff Study reinforces this point. “…MAAG-Vietnam [in 1960] in unique in that it is the only US MAAG in the world where the Chief’s billet is that of a Lieutenant General.” MAP Staff Study, D-1.
instructor until 1949.\textsuperscript{54} In the summer of 1960, Major General Johnson faced a situation quite unlike his predecessors. The Army’s consensus on modern war had solidified in the time since his days as a student; publication of Maxwell D. Taylor’s \textit{The Uncertain Trumpet} capped the Army’s position in a long-simmering feud over national strategy.\textsuperscript{55} The concepts captured in Taylor’s work heralded yet another change in the Army’s thinking. By the time Taylor’s book had circulated, the Army had already begun to move away from the failed organization of the Pentomic division, and Leavenworth followed.\textsuperscript{56} Planners had begun studying an alternative to the Pentomic division design as early as 1959. Taylor, and other Army officers, did not believe the Air Force—and nuclear weapons—could serve as the sole guarantor of national security. The book heralded dominant, yet repressed, trends in Army thinking, and Taylor’s work received significant attention at Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{57} CGSC’s leaders understood that their profession had made mistakes after World War Two by not outlining a broader vision of modern war. Publication of Maxwell Taylor’s \textit{The Uncertain Trumpet} prompted Colonel H.L. Ash to ask the editor of the Military Review:

\begin{quote}
During the crucial 47, 48, 49, 50 years when the mould of future (the present) defense force structure was being set, did the Army actually have the necessary forward looking visualization, grasp and understanding of the impact of new ideas and concepts being forced by technology (of which Hiroshima was but one) to ensure that its own interests and those of our country’s defense were best being served.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

Colonel Ash’s inquiry acknowledged the intellectual gap which had existed for the previous fifteen years. Missing from Ash’s query is any mention of what role CGSC should have played in shaping a new understanding of the future. CGSC, under Johnson’s guidance, would take much of Taylor’s new perspective and emerging Army organizations and put them into the classroom. The College that took shape in the next decade would bear little resemblance to the one that Johnson inherited in 1960.

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\textsuperscript{58} H.L. Ash to editor, \textit{Military Review}. Colonel Ash’s directive to the editor of \textit{Military Review} included the comment.
If the faculty had little use for McGarr, Johnson quickly earned the respect of the faculty, staff, and students. One student remarked, "General Johnson should speak more. He has something to say and says it well." A prisoner of war in World War Two, Johnson was himself a postwar student and faculty member at the College, having been at Leavenworth from 1946-1949. As an instructor, he had experienced the Gerow and Eddy era, and he had participated firsthand in the initial modifications to the course. His attitude toward officership emphasized intelligence, imagination, initiative, and integrity.

The persistent struggle to define the College’s basic purpose continued into 1960. Under Johnson, the institutional vacillation between an emphasis on staff or command shifted in favor of command. In one of his first actions as Commandant, Johnson re-named the Department of Staff and Education to the Department of Command. He issued further guidance to strengthen the commander’s perspective during instruction. Gen, Paul A. Adams, a former CGSC instructor, seemed to agree with Johnson’s assessment, but Adams went further in his critique. “My first, and I believe most important observation is that we are becoming an Amy of technicians, as opposed to an Army of professional soldiers in the true sense of the word ‘professional.’” Adams continued, writing “The art of staff work seems to have become an objective within itself rather than quick efficient operational aids enabling a commander to obtain the information he needs for reaching decisions and getting the decisions appropriately disseminated to the command and implemented. It has been very interesting indeed to note the inhibiting effects that the long detailed formats now published have on the thought of staff officers, as they frequently appear to be concerned more with matters of form than matters of

59 CGSC, “USACGSC, Regular and Associate Course Analysis and Evaluation /60, Summary of Student Comments,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., 6, CARL. In the College’s shorthand, /60 referred to the current year, such as 1960. It would later be truncated to a single digit, making 1963 read /3, for example.
60 Sorley, 87-8. Johnson’s biography gives little direct testimony of his influence on the curriculum. He did, however, have a calming effect on the students and faculty, given the contrast between his style and that of his predecessor. Just over a year after his tour as Commandant ended, Johnson would go on to serve as the Army Chief of Staff under Lyndon Baines Johnson.
61 Ivan J. Birrer, “USA CGSC 1956-66, A Fateful Decade,” Military Review 46 (May 1966): 8. Birrer wrote, “The new Commandant [Johnson] believed that throughout the Army the status of command vis-à-vis staff was declining.” It must be reaffirmed that Johnson’s two predecessors had believed command to be foremost of the two as well.

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Despite the modifications of the past six years, more remained to be done to satisfy the Army’s senior leaders.

Tactical content under Johnson’s tenure moved away from the nuclear battlefield—a departure consistent with Taylor’s *The Uncertain Trumpet* and President John F. Kennedy’s new strategic vision. Under Johnson’s watch, the College found the doctrine of Flexible Response, a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear defense options, inviting. Adjustments based on new doctrine continued. Added content balanced tactical problems with and without nuclear weapons, and the new decade’s curriculum reflected a growing awareness of global challenges. By August 1961, the College had added emphasis on joint operations and incorporated the redesigned Army division, known as the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD), concept into lessons. The infantry and armored division departments merged soon afterwards, forming the Department of Division Operations and a new department formed—the Department of Joint, Combined, and Special Operations. In the next year, the College incorporated the 1962 *Field Service Regulations*.

The years just prior to full-scale commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam provide the most direct evidence of a link between ongoing advisory actions in Vietnam and a response by CGSC. Counterinsurgency, although imperfectly understood at the time, found its way into the course. Students found the lessons fascinating, and some asked for more time for the subject. Still, the inflexible curricular model of the Regular Course inhibited the teaching of new topics and approaches. Unconventional warfare lessons rose to a total of seven topics with thirty-eight hours allocated; however, the emphasis remained on exploiting the capabilities of partisans for the benefit

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62 Paul D. Adams to Harold K. Johnson, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 15 August 1962, 1. CARL.
64 By 1962, the College had four resident instruction departments: Command; Division Operations; Joint, Combined, and Special Operations; and Larger Unit Operations. The Department of Nonresident Instruction maintained the extension courses.
of American forces in the 1960-61 POI. One three-hour lesson looked at countering guerillas in a limited war, but this problem was set in Iran.\textsuperscript{66}

Map problems reflected a wide range of American defense pledges of the early 1960s. A growing awareness of worldwide commitments, coupled with professional interest, led to the addition of a “strategic subcourse.” Starting in 1961 with approximately twenty-four hours, the faculty added political science topics and comparative military systems, which were outgrowths of the military history and geography lessons. In support, the faculty developed twenty-five area studies, covering thirty-nine countries. While no South American countries formed the basis for any of these analyses, the school had area studies for a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.\textsuperscript{67} Guest lecturers supplemented the classroom instruction.

As it would do with other new developments, CGSC faculty added topical lessons as introductions. Instructors continued to add material related to the situation in Vietnam and the general subject of counterinsurgency. A lesson on “Military Advisory Groups and Military Missions” corresponded with the rapid growth of the MAAG in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{68} The “Nature of Communism” appeared in 1961.\textsuperscript{69} An additional briefing, “Communism in Practice,” was added the next year.\textsuperscript{70} A slightly expanded strategic overview of Southeast Asia introduced students to “Current developments in Southeast Asia with emphasis on actual and potential trouble areas to include forces involved, political alignments, internal disorders, potential inter-nation conflicts, and considerations affecting

\textsuperscript{66} POI, 1960-61, 59-60.
\textsuperscript{67} CGSC, “Area Studies Employed in USACGSC Instruction,” Circular Number 7, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 July 1961, 3, Box 19, RG 546, NARA II. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam were subsets of a larger study on Southeast Asia. One might explain the absence of South American coverage by the inclusive nature of the Rio Treaty. It would be difficult to create an enemy from one of the forty-seven signatories to the 1947 treaty.
\textsuperscript{68} CGSC, “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer, Regular Course, 1960-61,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 1960, 15, CARL.
\textsuperscript{69} CGSC, “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer, 1961-62,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, July 26, 1961, 24, CARL.
\textsuperscript{70} CGSC, “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer [1962-63],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 1962, 35, CARL.
the application of military power by local coalitions, East, West, or United Nations,” although this synopsis merited but a few hours. 71

The lessons that did appear illustrate the immature understanding of the faculty with respect to counterinsurgency. Like the earlier air mobile lesson, some new material suffered from a general lack of understanding about the topic. Inattention to outside developments caused some courseware to fall short of what other Army officers did know. The 1962-63 course description for “Introduction to Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations Against Irregular Forces” betrayed the author’s lack of familiarity with current operations and professional writings. The combination of unconventional warfare with counterinsurgency assumed a simple relationship between employing forces for one’s own benefit and the techniques for countering a communist-backed effort. Worse, the course taught students that “continuous aggressive offensive action” was a requirement to successfully combat insurgencies, ignoring some of the early findings from the MAAG staff study. 72 Not until the next year did a similar course include a discussion of the political, economic, and social aspects of combating insurgencies, but it still retained the emphasis on offensive action. 73 The tactical class most closely related to the Vietnam situation used a West African scenario to introduce students to measures used by the country team and MAAGs to combat insurgents. 74

Not all work produced by CGSC faculty and students deviated from actual situations. A remarkable document appeared in June 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Sam C. Holliday, U.S. Army, and Major Pierre C. Dabezies, French Army, wrote “Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell,” which was their observations on “combat as it is being fought.” Their study looked at the characteristics of irregular warfare, defined a typology, and summarized instances of irregular warfare in the past fifteen years. Mixing philosophical with practical, the authors considered diverse subjects from how Clausewitzian

72 POI, 1962-63, 46. In contrast, most modern counterinsurgency approaches call for restraint, and previous articles in the Military Review had outlined contemporary approaches, which held that offensive action could be counterproductive.
73 POI, 1963-64, 60.
74 POI, 1963-64, 61. “Combined Operations – Counterinsurgency” used Ghana as a setting.
principles might be applied to irregular warfare to the counterinsurgent’s need for information. The chapters on offense and defense condensed the French experience in Indochina to pragmatic concepts. In all, Holliday and Dabezies produced a remarkable study that would have been a useful text in any class on the subject.\textsuperscript{75}

The 1962-63 course goal remained broad, but it added an explicit behavioral objective similar to the principle expressed by Major General McGarr some years earlier: development of “student proficiency in problem solving and decisionmaking….”\textsuperscript{76} CGSC’s faculty hoped that students would achieve some competence in critical thinking skills, much like those developed in civilian universities. Course designers valued professional competence over the student’s mastery of specific content. New guidance for the 1963 course directed that 75% of the problems be situated in limited or general war settings. Far fewer of these problems assumed routine use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{77} In 1962-63, the administration added to the number of hours devoted to providing officers a strategic appreciation, increasing to sixty-six hours.\textsuperscript{78} In this small step, the Army’s senior tactical institution began to drift from its long-time role as the institution where officers learned how to fight and sustain divisions, corps, and armies.

The move came under the guise of preparing officers for peacetime duties. This broadening of the school’s focal point had begun a decade earlier with the Army Comptroller’s guidance to add management training. Major General McGarr later mentioned the need to consider garrison and administrative duties in his guidance and end-of-tour report as did the Williams Board.\textsuperscript{79} Movement toward a broader curriculum accelerated in the early sixties, resulting in further structural changes that would reshape the College so that it bore little resemblance to its lineage.

\textsuperscript{75} Sam C. Holliday and Pierre C. Dabezies, “Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 13 June 1962, N-17350.20, CARL.
\textsuperscript{76} CGSC, “3 Guidance, Inclosure 2,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., 2, CARL.
\textsuperscript{77} “3 Guidance, Inclosure 2,” 1-5.
\textsuperscript{78} Eddleman, 10, 36. R.A. Broberg, Circular No. 9, “1962-63 Command and General Staff Officer Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 June 1962, CARL.
In a related initiative, the College began taking steps toward a civilian graduate school model. One measure of this development is the implementation of student research and writing requirements. During the first postwar class, the Henry Commission had indicated the merits of such a requirement. A few years later, Lieutenant Colonel Harding recommended a term paper requirement similar to a civilian master’s project. Field commanders agreed that officer schools should develop officers who could write and speak more effectively. General Paul D. Adams wrote Major General Johnson over the summer, saying, “There has been a long standing resistance to requiring students to conduct analytical studies, and write papers, because getting this done well is hard work for instructors and for students, and they sometime even become allies in opposition to them.” Under Birrer’s guidance, the idea of a master’s level program gained acceptance and moved forward with tentative steps in 1961.

Major General Johnson made a number of changes in his first year, but he firmly believed that a reassessment of the College was needed given the massive reorganization of the field army, experience with the new curriculum, and a new strategic backdrop. The Commandant approached CONARC with the concept of an educational survey commission similar to the 1956 panel headed by Dr. Orleans. CONARC granted him the authority to conduct such a survey in Fiscal Year 1963. The Commission’s charter was scripted in broad terms, but the Commandant’s interest clearly lay in the breadth of the CGSC educational experience.

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80 Paul D. Adams to Harold K. Johnson, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 15 August 1962, 3, CARL.
81 A 1961 graduate remarked, “suggest that the College gain full accreditation and adjust curriculum as needed to award ‘Master’s Degree in Military Science, Tactics, and Education.’” CGSC, “Summary of Student Comments, /1,” Inclosure 6, Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d.), 2, CARL. Sorley, 134. Originally instituted as an honors program, the initiative would later become a full-fledged master’s degree under Congressional authority. The North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools acted quickly, conferring accreditation on the Honors Program in early 1963. Congress passed legislation in 1974 authorizing the College to confer degrees. The bill was signed into law on August 5, 1974. A 1975 student research project by Major Robert E. Ahrens is a good historical study of the origins of the MMAS program. Robert E. Ahrens, “A History of the Master of Military Art and Science Program and Related Activities,” (CGSC: Independent Research Paper, 1975), N8224.1324-2, CARL. Ahrens (wisely) hesitates to credit any single individual with originating the idea. Dr. Birrer, however, shepherded it through the decade-plus from conception to passage of the bill authorizing the College to grant a degree.
83 “The Commission is asked to determine if the resident and nonresident courses of instruction are fully responsive to U.S. Army qualitative requirements for CGSC graduates.” Clyde D. Eddleman and others, “Report of Educational Survey Commission of the United
The Commission had both civilian and military representation, although the two civilian educators were both retired officers. General (ret.) Clyde D. Eddleman served as chairman; Lieutenant General (ret.) E.L Cummings and Lieutenant General (ret.) Edward J. O’Neill accepted the invitation. Earl Rudder, President of the A&M College of Texas, also a Major General in the Army Reserve, and Dr. George B. Smith, Vice Chancellor of the University of Kansas joined the panel. This group of former officers met on September 27, 1962 at Fort Leavenworth. After their orientation, they visited the Army War College, the Air University, the Naval War College, and the Marine Corps’ equivalent schools to obtain data for comparison to the Leavenworth program. Once back at Fort Leavenworth, the Commission looked at resident and non-resident instruction.

The Commission completed its work quickly, rendering its findings before Thanksgiving. In contrast to previous surveys, the Commission had far fewer criticisms of the College’s curriculum or teaching methods. The positive nature of their conclusions contrasted sharply with earlier reports.

Many of their significant findings dealt with policies or matters outside the school’s control: student selection, student ranking, housing, and the Army’s organization for doctrinal writing.

Not all internal problems escaped their notice, however. The committee passed judgment on a number of proposals under consideration at CGSC. Nascent discussions about adding language training and a cooperative civil-military master’s degree program were met with skepticism, although the Commission approved of an initiative for an in-house master’s program. “The introduction of a nonmilitary graduate course of study for the purpose of permitting students to obtain a master’s degree is considered unwise in view of the demanding requirements presently imposed on the students.” It is important to note that their finding was based upon workload and not professional
need. While they questioned was the ability of students to complete a joint degree, Eddleman and the others accepted the plan to award a Master of Military Art and Science degree under the aegis of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.  

The question of whether to rank students numerically or by thirds surfaced in the report, too. CGSC reported an officer’s class standing by numeric order, as required by the Department of the Army. The Commission expressed dismay at the relatively low number of examinations used to establish class rank. The 1963 class underwent thirty-four hours of testing. Surprisingly, this figure represents a midpoint, as the hours devoted to exams in the postwar period ranged from 23-55 hours. The Commission took the low percentage of hours devoted to testing to be a fundamental flaw, so they asked the Commandant to appear before them. His explanation did not dissuade the Commission from making this an issue, given the significant effect a poor ranking could have on an officer’s career. In their report, the commissioners said, “the hours devoted to testing provide an inadequate basis for reporting a precise class standing.” The retired officers questioned why those selected to attend should be handicapped in the future, since a poor ranking might result in unfavorable personnel actions in the future. Much of their basis for questioning the practice came from the fact that students were selected to attend based upon their prior performance relative to their peers. If the Army insisted on requiring CGSC to report class standing, the panel recommended a system of upper-, middle- and lower-thirds.

87 The panel compared the programs that the Air University (both courses), the Army War College, and the Naval War College (both courses) had arranged with George Washington University. Eddleman, 13, 17.

88 Test scores formed the basis for student ranking, with the exception of the period 1958-61, when writing, speaking, and “overall worth to the service” ratings were integrated into a numerical score. “As a result of current CGSC policy pertaining to academic reports, the Armed Services are furnished a dearth of information about the officer’s performance while he is in a student status at the College. Consequently, at a critical time in the officer’s career, and in a setting in which he competes with many of his contemporaries, official records deal with a very limited aspect of his performance.” The commission then pointed out a key difference between CGSC and similar professional schools. “In contrast, at the corresponding Colleges of the other services, academic reports include a word description of the officer and, in some instances, recommendations regarding future personnel actions. Of special note is that none of the corresponding colleges report an index of relative achievement.” Eddleman, 12, 16. CARL. Harry J. Lemley, Jr to Ivan J. Birrer, DF, “Student Evaluation Program,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 December 1962. Also pertinent is Birrer’s response on 24 January 1963. Birrer’s reply to Lemley pointed out that the Army War College did not report relative ranks nor did the staff colleges of any other military service. “A rational basis for this distinction is obscure,” the Educational Advisor maintained. Ivan J. Birrer, Staff Study, “Annex A to Study (Student Evaluation Program),” 24 January 1963. Birrer highlighted that the Orleans report in 1955 also recommended that the College terminate the practice of reporting ranks. He believed that Major General McGarr disagreed, leaving intact the previous policy. All documents in Folder N-13423.303-E, CARL.
The Eddleman Commission did question whether the course gave enough attention to the “cold war environment,” specifically citing a need to assess coverage of MAAGs, military missions, international treaty organizations, and cooperation with allies. The Commission hinted that equivalent military schools had greater exposure, which was a problem McGarr had attempted to remedy several years before. The other scholastic problem brought up by the Commission stemmed from the general lack of writing and speaking skills among the officer corps. While acknowledging this was part of a larger problem, the Commission members felt that CGSC could do more.\(^9\) As had been the case previously, external reviews finally prompted the College to admit it had a need.

In the past, atomic weapons had been the shortfall; now the Eddleman Commission called for increased counterinsurgency instruction. The College’s response to the Eddleman Commission of 1962 prominently featured counterinsurgency in its report:

> As the course begins, we are taking a hard look at our mission and our instruction and are being very frank about our evaluations in preparing for next year’s presentations. For example, we believe that the number of hours devoted to counterinsurgency instruction can well be increased. Our review of comments from last year’s class revealed a deep interest in these subjects. In addition, many of the officers in present classes will be assigned to Southeast Asia, and they are vitally interested in the techniques of counterinsurgency and special warfare. This interest, coupled with the emphasis throughout the Department of Defense, would indicate that we continue adding hours in this and related fields.\(^9\)

Like the case of atomic warfare, it took significant external pressure to cause the school to seriously consider moving aside other material in favor of counterinsurgency classes.

Behind its fledgling attempts at tackling the topic, the staff presented outside agencies a grossly inflated accounting. In an effort to satisfy external interest, the college used creative means to increase hours well beyond the forty-eight hours found in the 1961 POI. Dr. Ivan Birrer, Educational Advisor to the Commandant, observed:

> It became expedient for Leavenworth to appear to be immersed with unconventional and insurgent warfare. We solved this problem … by careful definition. Into the setting of our problems we would include a sentence or two suggesting that there might be the

\(^8\) Eddleman, 10-11, 16.
\(^9\) Ibid., 57.
possibility of some irregular forces…. This permitted us to count the entire subject as unconventional warfare and it was by such a device that we ran the hours up to 437. But the point to be made is that at no time … did unconventional warfare really occupy any substantial place in the College Program.\textsuperscript{91}

As mentioned in a previous chapter, this was not the first time the College staff and administration attempted to deflect change by a broad interpretation of orders.\textsuperscript{92} The college employed the same dishonest accounting techniques used later by combat units in the looming war.

The College’s higher headquarters, CONARC, asked the faculty in 1963 to consider incorporating the then-new concept of “coup d’état” into the course. CONARC had become concerned with the violent overthrow of legitimate governments by communist rebels. The College’s response demonstrated a general lack of curiosity: “It does not appear that there is enough substantive matter in the field of investigation of the coup d’état as a form of revolutionary warfare to produce any meaningful instruction at USACGSC.”\textsuperscript{93} Once again, the faculty demonstrated an unwillingness to create or integrate new knowledge based upon outside events.

These instances of duplicitous responses established a pattern the College would use later when faced with new developments. Instructors and course developers waited for accepted solutions before making significant course changes, rather than engaging actively in the creation of new knowledge. When new concerns began to compete with established norms, the College would incorporate topical lectures as an introduction to the subject. Slowly, and only if the topic had substantial outside interest and a doctrinal basis, did the College add lessons to the curriculum. The reasons, however, had as much to do with process and resources as it did intellectual sluggishness.

As mentioned earlier, CGSC’s position as the Army’s senior tactical school had been the one constant theme over its history. Perhaps the most far-reaching comment in the Eddleman Commission report questioned the College’s fundamental purpose. Commission members observed that Army Regulation 350-5, which governed officer education, said at the time that the purpose of the College

\textsuperscript{91} Dr. Ivan J. Birrer quoted in Krepinevich, 51-52.
\textsuperscript{92} Recall the College’s response about management instruction covered in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{93} Colonel William H. Blakefield to CG, US Continental Army Command, memorandum, “Evaluation of Suggestion,” 1 August 1963, CARL.
was “to provide progressive military education and appropriate practical training for officer personnel of all components at appropriate levels in order to prepare them to perform efficiently in peace and war….” Eddleman’s report formally endorsed a broader interpretation of this statement, stating “The precise mission statement of CGSC should be modified to direct preparation of officers for both wartime and peacetime duties.” Just seven years prior, the Commandant, Major General Davidson, had lamented the brevity of the Regular Course, saying a second year of tactical instruction was needed. In the Eddleman Commission, one sees a sharp departure from a purely professional school with a limited jurisdiction over wartime subjects. The Commission’s findings highlighted the building pressures on the officer education system. Serious proposals to move division operations instruction to branch schools and the inclusion of “educational” subjects represent a turn away from Leavenworth’s traditional role as the Army’s senior tactical institution. While it would never cast off this responsibility, the faculty and future commandants would embrace the wider scope.

The recommendations came too late for Johnson to implement, however. Soon after the New Year, Johnson departed Fort Leavenworth for an assignment in Washington, D.C.

**Too Little, Too Late**

John Paul Vann wrote “Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam” in September 1965. His proposal expanded upon his disagreement with the policies and tactics being used by American forces. The next year, a 1966 Army education board questioned why the Army had essentially ignored the topic of counterinsurgency since “United States aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the subsequent expansion of the Truman Doctrine into a broad program of military and economic assistance brought the United States into world-wide confrontation with international Communism.” By the time the question was asked, it was too late. The Army school system had not developed the comprehensive view of modern war called for by General Gerow twenty years earlier.

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94 Eddleman, 5, 17.
96 Ralph E. Haines and others, “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools,” vol. 3, Washington, DC, February 1966, 633. This commission was known as the Haines Board.
Those inside the Army and without who criticized the Army for failing to act in the period before U.S. full-scale intervention in Indochina suggest a broad self-awareness, intellectual agility, and capacity to act quickly that did not exist, especially inside the officer education system. Even in instances in which the College faculty had recognized new developments, technological, organizational, doctrinal advances and bureaucratic dynamics slowed the response. The ponderous CGSOC curriculum had little flexibility to adapt to rapidly shifting circumstances. The effort required by Major General McGarr in 1956-57 to bring the college up-to-date with the latest technological and organizational developments aptly illustrates this point. CGSOC’s focus on tactical operations of divisions, corps, and armies, coupled with a rigid curriculum design process, slowed the institution’s adaptation to the American officer’s broad new jurisdiction. Instead of “Keeping Pace With the Future,” CGSOC found itself struggling to assimilate not only the actions of potential enemies but also those of the Army itself.

The College’s slow incorporation of counterinsurgency suggests a threshold of professional awareness and corresponding action akin to Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. “Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.” Since the methods used against guerillas had worked, but the ability to fight a hypothetical war with the Soviets was highly suspect, the latter merited proportionally more intellectual effort. It is somewhat understandable given the strategic situation and existing defense policies, particularly in the late 1950s, that the Army chose to concentrate on atomic warfare. The world from an American perspective was a very complicated place with communism pressing outward on several fronts and nuclear weapons seemingly everywhere. The Army had not developed concepts it thought appropriate to the atomic battlefield. Unfortunately, the Army’s limited view of modern war caused the officer corps to neglect the subjects of limited war and guerilla war at precisely the wrong moment.

In contrast to its previous role as the Army’s seminal educational institution, CGSC participated tangentially in the definition of professional boundaries. Leaders accepted the status quo

as the safe alternative to a new definition of modern war. The hybrid military-educational bureaucracy, coupled with real uncertainty about modern war, retarded the evolution of the CGSOC curriculum. The jarring effects of the atomic era on the officer corps are evident in the faculty’s reluctance to develop lessons based on their perception of the future. Instructors exhibited hesitancy to adopt new methods or to predict some part of the future, whether limited war, nuclear battlefield, or an insurgency. An inherently conservative organization faced with tremendous change and uncertainty about the future transposed the problem of professional judgment to other military organizations which it perceived as more capable of predicting the future. With so much uncertainty, the faculty chose to remain wedded to the past rather than attempt to predict future patterns of warfare.

In retrospect, the College reacted too late to significantly influence the officer corps that would wage the war in Vietnam. The low level of U.S. commitment to Vietnam in the 1954 to 1959 timeframe drew little notice from the leadership engaged in another, more pressing, transformation. Concentrating on the worst case, or even the preferred case, did not prepare professional officers to meet all the challenges they later faced. As the faculty coped with implementing the enormous revision of 1957-58, events in Vietnam had just reached the college’s doorstep. While not completely disregarding the growing conflict, instructors had neither the doctrinal resources nor the operational experience to modify the curriculum. The College did not act upon the parallel trend in warfare until 1960, and even then it required outside force. The incorporation of strategic situation briefings along with college studies and courseware demonstrates that the Army had become aware of situation. With the preponderance of the course devoted to general war, the dash of counterinsurgency topics would have appeared as momentary diversions to the student immersed in a school for general war.

The College’s experience in this period shows the difficulty of anticipating and recognizing external events which would require new approaches. The challenge of educating a doctrine-based army in a time of change—absent approved, relevant doctrine—could not be overcome. It also highlights the very real difficulty in adapting a centrally-managed curriculum to accommodate new
material. Military history, and the Army’s own recent experience, played a miniscule role in shaping the approach to modern war. Writers in the journal most closely affiliated with the College had limited influence, even though they served as College instructors and staff officers.

Escalating American involvement in Vietnam had minimal effect on the school’s curriculum between 1954 and 1964. How to apply military power to achieve a solution in a quasi-war lay just beyond the boundary of professional knowledge in the fifties. Once the College inserted lessons appropriate to the Indochina situation in the 1950s, other events—in the U.S. but especially those in North and South Vietnam—made the new material largely irrelevant. After the conflict’s sad denouement, Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, who advised CGSC commandants for thirty years including the entire period of American involvement in Vietnam, was asked about the impact of the war on the College. “In summary—probably not very much,” he replied.⁹⁸ Whether it would have mattered at all is left to the imagination.

CHAPTER 5

Confronting Modern War, 1963-1973

At some great military schools the idea of making the theory of the guidance of armies the subject of a special course of instruction has already been entirely abandoned, and each individual is left to himself to ascertain its principles from a study of military history, careful observation of extensive exercises of troops, and personal reflection. ¹

Colmar, Baron von der Goltz

Peacetime concerns filtered into the Army’s senior tactical institution in the midst of the most tortuous war of the Army’s postwar experience. A growing sense within the officer corps that professional knowledge encompassed more than the command, control, and to a lesser degree, sustainment, of fire and maneuver became apparent in the discussions and actions of the College’s faculty and leadership. For some officers, the new fields were a welcome addition, meeting a professional need that had been glimpsed but never quite realized. For others, the shift to a host of administrative and managerial topics represented heresy. To the fundamental skills of an army in the field—some might argue the core of land warfare’s profession—the faculty added coverage of management, administration, and technology.

The curriculum began to reflect a view that took for granted professional acumen in large unit tactical operations—the mainstay of the Leavenworth curriculum since its inception—and replaced it with knowledge gathered from distant fields. New studies on officer education, new Army organizations, the Vietnam War, and a changing role in joint operations reshaped the content of the College’s curriculum in the years ahead. Some issues, such as allied student participation and faculty shortages, persisted, ebbing and flowing in response to new stimuli. Paradoxically, the Vietnam War seems to have had the least effect on the College’s curriculum.

External demands made themselves apparent in changing assignment patterns of students, which led to significant adjustments to the content of the Regular Course. Maintaining a large standing army in peacetime, and supplying its attendant bureaucracy, required officers conversant across a broad range of knowledge. The accumulated inconsistencies between the duties given to CGSC graduates and their studies influenced Leavenworth’s faculty to try new approaches. Very quickly, these tentative steps became accepted norms, and these in turn led to new curricular structures. Alongside the radical shift in content, the College leadership adopted a new curricular form, shifting from a unitary course common to all students to a program favoring student choice. Non-resident studies changed dramatically, too. The options for non-resident studies shifted in response to changes in the Regular Course but just as quickly fell back to existing schemes.

By 1973, as we shall see, CGSC no longer was the Army’s senior tactical school. The institution was something much more—broader in scope, more diversified in offerings, and less centralized as an organization. Surprisingly, war had little to do with the change.

**The Junior War College**

Colonel L.M. Wilson, Director of the Department of Division Operations, was piqued. The Director of Resident Instruction’s plan for the 1963-64 curriculum reduced once again the hours allocated to division operations. Wilson’s department had to trim lessons to make room for classes on political science, among other additions. In Wilson’s view, this move was ill-advised, guiding the College away from its traditional role as the school where officers learned to fight large units. He criticized the new guidance, telling the Director of Resident Instruction, “My views on the degradation of the College curriculum from being the senior school of applied tactics in favor of becoming more and more a junior war college are well known….” Wilson objected not only to the proposed modifications to content but also to the general sense within the administration that the school needed to broaden its scope. His opinion put him in conflict with the Assistant Commandant, Harry Lemley, Jr., a staunch proponent of including strategic subjects to expand the officer’s perspective. Lemley frequently referred to the new series as the “Junior War College” lessons, which
disturbed Wilson and others on the faculty who shared his views.\(^2\) These officers quickly became the minority, as the school would follow Lemley’s vision, guided by Ivan Birrer and the results of a new officer education board. Over the next ten years, the College leadership was to alter fundamentally the nature of curricular content and the form of the curriculum.

Resistance to new ideas is not unique to military educational institutions. Clark Kerr in *The Uses of the University* observed that “change is a traumatic experience for an academic community, as for others.”\(^3\) Commandants and faculty commented on the continual tension between integrating emerging topics and the displacement of existing courseware repeatedly. Addition of peacetime subjects displaced instruction on military subjects, lessening the time students spent covering the complexities of tactical warfare. Robert Doughty’s three tensions should be refined, since the conflict that emerged between war and peace originated in the opposition between the duties of an officer in peacetime and the demands of modern warfare.\(^4\) Both required wholly different conceptualizations of knowledge. The former relied on academic knowledge from business, political science, and management; officers drew the latter from their own unique experience and culture. The trouble, as faculty soon learned, was neither fit neatly into a ten-month course. The curriculum became the arena for another discussion about the nature of professional education in a large standing army.

College faculty and leaders had previously struggled with the dichotomy. The two-part course of 1946-50—one portion dedicated to war and the other to training bureaucrats—had never satisfactorily met either of its contradictory goals. The Eddy Board had ameliorated the conflict by recommending resumption of the Army War College. A growing interest in administration, an aroused political awareness, and the absence of a mid-career opportunity to prepare officers to run a

\(^2\) L.M. Wilson to Director of Resident Instruction, DF, “Draft Faculty Memorandum No. 1, /4 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 13 August 1962, Binder Curriculum Planning Actions Pertaining to the /4 Plan, CARL. Wilson’s successor would have to take hours from other tactics lessons to create time to for instruction and minimal practice on the infantry division in the attack.

\(^3\) Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 75.

\(^4\) Doughty established three tensions: generalist – specialist, education – training, and scope of instruction. Doughty broadly defined the latter as a catch-all term for anything not related to the “army in the field.” Somewhat more precision is warranted, for the source of the conflict stemmed from the different educational needs of the fighting and administrative arms of the army. Doughty, CGSC, 2-3. Later scholars may discover another dimension of the tension between “combat and noncombat operations,” given the blurred distinction between preparing for combat and the peace operations of the 1990s. Volker Franke, *Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 7.
peacetime army again raised the question of teaching field grade officers management skills at the staff college.

The blurring of distinction between the civilian and military sphere, if there had been such a clear demarcation, contributed to the expansion of what Army officers considered relevant professional knowledge. The College’s parent organization, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) recognized the increased breadth and new demands of the profession in 1964—nearly twenty years after Lieutenant General Gerow, the school’s first postwar commandant, hinted at the challenges of modern war for officer education.\(^5\) Now, the challenge had shifted, becoming a need to compete internally in matters heretofore considered the province of civilians. CONARC’s guidance for officer education stated:

As the Army career officer progresses to positions of greater responsibility, he needs the professional development and increased perspective that comes from formal education. The characteristics of modern land warfare require that he be able to consider logically many diverse factors and produce swift and valid decisions. He must understand the military aspects of national security and the economic, political and psychological factors that influence military behavior.\(^6\)

The situation arose, according to information provided by CGSC to the U.S. Department of Education, from “the increasing participation of the military with other agencies in the affairs of government and the increasing intercourse with the civilian world….” As a result, the report stated that “America’s hitherto held view that the Army should confine its activities to strictly military affairs no longer obtains.”\(^7\) Army officers saw a greater role for themselves in extra-military affairs, and they set about reshaping the staff college to meet this new requirement.

The conflict between a centralized curriculum and the ever-broadening scale of professional knowledge reached the point in 1963 where the College’s leadership believed new direction was

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needed. As Robert Doughty showed in his study of the College, the hours allocated to large unit
tactics declined appreciably during the 1960s. Leavenworth’s faculty, prompted by outside experts
and internal agitation, began to adjust the course to reflect CONARC’s understanding represented
above. From this point forward, the proportion of time spent on tactical operations in Army units
would decline.

The change did not occur overnight, and the reasons have not been fully explored. Major
General McGarr had made tentative allowances for peacetime aspects of professional life, creating a
separate department to ensure that the subjects got the attention he thought they needed. Both the
Williams Board and the Eddleman Commission had mentioned the advisability of instruction on
peacetime duties. Under McGarr, the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects managed and
taught the lessons. Later, Major General Johnson renamed this department, calling it the Department
of Command, but its role remained similar. Major General Johnson adopted the Eddleman
Commission’s view that peacetime subjects should be included, going so far as to modify the purpose
of the College. The College purpose as expressed in his 1963 guidance was:

To provide officers with a working knowledge for wartime and peacetime duty, to
include the joint aspects thereof, as commanders and general staff officers at division,
corps, field army and army group (operations only) to include their combat service
support systems. To provide a basis for satisfactory performance in a wide variety of
command and staff positions at nontactical headquarters. To provide the basis for future
development for progression to higher command and staff responsibilities.

The three-part purpose contained familiar elements, notably the concentration on command and staff
functions of large tactical units. But prior statements had paid little attention to the administrative
duties of an officer, and none had mentioned “joint aspects” or the developmental role education
might play in future service. This shift paralleled the rise of so-called educational subjects in the
course. In addition, Johnson’s guidance for the 1964 course stated that “the general instructional
objective is the development of student proficiency in problem solving and decision making; the

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8 Doughty, *Birrer*, 73.
Actions Pertaining to the /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
ability to communicate decisions to subordinates and to insure compliance therewith, plus the development of facility with the procedures, skills, and techniques employed by commanders and general staff officers.”

As expressed here, the course was to produce officers who could apply their knowledge creatively to future situations as well as apply the methods used by staffs in support of their commanders. As Johnson departed, his deputy, Harry Lemley succeeded him—a first, for Lemley had been part of the very discussions and planning he now implemented as Commandant.

The newfound concerns of the Army profession coalesced under the heading of strategic subjects. Planning for their integration began in 1962 under Johnson’s tenure. The original plan allotted 99 hours, later increased to 100, for coverage of these learning areas, and built upon a loose collection of subjects. The College’s Department of Command proposed six objectives under the broad category of strategy:

1. The basis of national power.
2. The nature of national objectives.
3. The process of developing national strategy.
4. Major factors and influences from which national strategy is derived.
5. National agencies which support and execute national strategy with emphasis on the military services.

Within the block, suggested lessons resembled an undergraduate survey. One proposed lesson read like the syllabus for a course on comparative international politics. The scope covered “the nature of democratic and totalitarian forms of government” and “the dynamics of the world political power pattern.” A second lesson looked at the principles of economics. Another compared “democratic and totalitarian forms of government.” None of these explored the topic in any depth, allocating it from three to nine hours in most cases. In practical terms, this meant as little as half a day up to one and

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10 Faculty Memorandum 1, “/4 Curriculum,” 3, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
one-half class days to absorb entire academic fields. To supplement the in-class work, the department recommended that the guest speaker program be reoriented to directly support the lessons, carving fifty-four hours from the program and reassigning them to lectures on strategic topics.12

The “non-tactical” duties referenced in the guidance Lemley carried forward marked a clear break with the College’s past purpose. While a seemingly innocuous, and needed, addition, the inclusion of such material in an already crowded course would necessarily displace other content. As Colonel Wilson had realized, the material considered dispensable was the tactical subjects. The tension between war and peace created conflict within the institution. “Things were a lot simpler at Leavenworth,” Ivan Birrer said, “when we were concerned with only firepower and maneuver.”13 It would be more than a decade before the institution reoriented toward its traditional role.

Part of the justification for shifting the emphasis lay with the distribution of general staff positions across the Army. According to Colonel Jasper L. Wilson, Director of Resident Instruction, divisions and logistical commands had about six percent of the Army’s general staff positions. The staff also cited the assignment pattern of graduates as a reason to adopt new curriculum. The Long Range Plan: Increased Output of Regular Course prepared by Wilson noted that “at least one-third of the recent graduates of the Regular Course has been assigned to joint or combined headquarters, or to DA staff,” based upon assignment data provided by the Department of the Army (table 7).14

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12 Department of Command, “A Plan for Strategic Subjects Instruction, /4 Regular Course,” [24 September 1962?], 7, Binder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL. The program grew significantly, adding another 33 hours when it was implemented for the 1963-64 course. Tab I to Faculty Memorandum 1, Folder Curriculum Planning Actions Pertaining to the /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
13 Doughty, Birrer, 82.
Table 7. Post-graduation assignments, 1960-1962

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<th>Assignment</th>
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</table>


For the two years shown above, officers left CGSC for non-tactical assignments in roughly the same proportion as those assigned to divisions, corps, and army-level units—forty-nine percent to Army staff and “other” assignments versus fifty-one percent to large unit headquarters. Personnel assignment patterns exerted an influence on the curriculum. Preparing officers for their next job, therefore, became part of the rationale for the College’s content.

Deep beneath CONARC’s explanation and Leavenworth’s actions lurked another impetus. The gradual erosion of the Army’s claim to unique military knowledge, abetted by the bitter debate over Massive Retaliation in the previous decade, coupled to a growing politicization of the officer corps, aligns with the expansion of the curriculum. As Andrew Bacevich explained in “The Paradox of Professionalism,” Army officers had become more politically conscious as a result of the civil-

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15 The figure of forty-nine versus fifty-one percent is intentionally conservative. The actual number of officers going to non-tactical assignments is higher by an indeterminate percentage. The Department of the Army and Other categories clearly reflect non-tactical duties. The specific echelon for overseas and joint headquarters’ postings was not given; some percentage of these officers went to non-tactical assignments, while others went to forward-deployed divisions and corps; therefore, the actual percentage of officers going to non-tactical positions is higher than stated above.

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military conflict between Matthew B. Ridgway and Maxwell D. Taylor and the Eisenhower administration. In part, the acceptance of strategic subjects as a proper course of study in the staff college stemmed from the de-professionalization that Bacevich claimed had occurred during the years leading up to the decision to add the lessons to the course.\(^\text{16}\)

By January 1964, the influence of strategic studies made itself apparent in new departmental objectives. The Department of Command added the intention “to provide a general knowledge of strategy, strategic planning and the environmental factors which influence the development of national strategy.”\(^\text{17}\) Reflecting internal debates at Fort Leavenworth, Martin Blumenson wrote in his 1964 essay, “Some Thoughts on Professionalism,” that “the world has become so complex and the role of the soldier in that world so important and difficult that an officer who expects to make a significant contribution in his calling must continue to study throughout his career.”\(^\text{18}\) CGSC began to reach upwards into content that had once been the domain of the Army War College. The reaction was like lifting the lid off a boiling kettle.

The evolution of the curriculum and the subjects taught reflect, in part, what the Army as an institution considered important. “In a sense, the curriculum had been getting broader in a piecemeal fashion since 1948,” Ivan Birrer observed.\(^\text{19}\) External influences brought to notice new challenges. Even if the school’s response to an ever-broadening scope of officer responsibilities had taken decades to form, the new ideas competed with long-standing traditions and entrenched beliefs. Once begun, the transition to a broader curriculum occurred relatively quickly. Individuals within the

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16 Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955,” *Journal of Military History* 61 (April 1997): 333. In concluding his piece, Bacevich observed, “Yet as Ridgway had foreseen, once soldiers abandoned the constraints inherent in the tradition of military professionalism so too would they be obliged to relinquish its prerogatives. No longer able to claim that warfare provided the basis for their role in society and as the wellspring of their authority, neither would they be able to claim to be the authoritative source of advice on military matters.” The long-term effect of the disagreement between Eisenhower and his generals led to the reorganization of the Defense Department twice, which placed a barrier between the President and the service chiefs. Donald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals” *Journal of Military History* 71 (October 2007). Daun Van Ee, “From the New Look to Flexible Response” in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). Carter did not interpret the conflict between the Army’s senior leaders as a crisis in civil-military relations, although other authors, such as Bacevich and Daun Van Ee, found that Army Chief of Staff Ridgway’s conduct did cross the threshold of acceptable dissent.

17 Memorandum by Marvin H. Merchant, “Description of Course of Study – Regular Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description of Course of Study /5 Curriculum Plan (Regular Course), CARL.


19 Doughty, Birrer, 82.
faculty had their own ideas about what officers needed to learn, prompting Colonel Francis W. O’Brien, the College’s Director of Resident Instruction to write: “This is a continuing problem—what to include in the POI; what to leave out. Everyone wants more of their areas of interest.”

Old concerns resurfaced as the College leadership began to reorient the College from its traditional role as a combined arms staff college. Limited people, knowledge, and time became distracters. The dearth of instructors continued into the 1960s. Lack of manpower to maintain and create lessons once again became an issue since faculty served dual roles as course developers and instructors. College faculty, already pressed to accomplish their duties, resisted any extra assignments.

The faculty shortage would soon be exacerbated, for the College lost a number of faculty spaces as a result of personnel reductions. By August 1963, the College had 200 officers assigned out of the 240 authorized by Fifth Army. Earlier personnel studies had set the required number of officers to effectively accomplish its mission at 254. Using either figure as a guide left the school short of the number needed to staff the departments, prepare lesson materials, conduct research, and write doctrine. CGSC faculty, affected by an Army-wide reorganization, struggled to keep up with the many demands on their time. Comments such as “the projected College personnel situation favors minimum, essential changes and rewrite,” appeared frequently in annual reviews. Instructors had limited time to prepare, and they taught more frequently than they would have otherwise with a full complement of instructors. Major General Lemley proposed several cutbacks, including the combination of the non-resident instruction department with teaching departments, the elimination of certain specialty courses, and the transfer of the annual fifth-year phase of the associate course to a USAR schools unit. In October 1963, Colonel James E. Simmons questioned a new task given to his

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20 Francis W. O’Brien to Chief of Nonresident Instruction, “Tour End Reports,” 27 June 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
21 Hewes, 345-365.
22 Colonel O’Brien to Commandant, memorandum, no subject, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 Nov 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
23 Harry J. Lemley, Jr. to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, “Programmed FY 64 Reduction in USACGSC Military and Civilian Spaces,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 August 1963, N-13423.489, CARL. The Acting Chief of Staff of CONARC replied to Lemley’s letter sympathetically, but he offered little relief, saying the Army-wide reduction in FY64 left no other allocations to spare at the moment. 21,200 officer spaces would be lost. He did promise two additional officers in the second quarter. George T. Duncan to Commandant,
department, saying “In review of recent personnel cuts, and more cuts which are anticipated, the present personnel policy appears to be toward saving instructor manpower. This is borne out by the reduction of the Associate Course from eight sections to six and by the increased use of Sister Service instructors.”24 The cuts were implemented and by 1965 the College had only 84% of the faculty needed to provide instructors for each classroom.25

The shortage of faculty and the required effort to produce new courseware combined to limit significant modifications. Seemingly minor additions demanded extraordinary effort. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ablett captured the problem as he detailed the production of a new lesson on electronic warfare. To develop a single one-hour lesson required 508 hours of effort, according to Ablett’s meticulous accounting. Between the author’s time, typing, production, and printing, over twelve man-weeks of work were needed to create this lesson.26 The development of this lesson, another example of an emerging topic, explains the faculty’s reluctance to tackle new subject matter. In a course containing over 1100 hours of material, it is little wonder that internal change occurred slowly, despite rapid modernization outside the College.

Instructor shortages and frequent turnover affected daily instruction and lesson preparation. Army personnel policies continued to dictate assignment of faculty to the College for three years. As a result, the College’s institutional memory was short-lived. With few, if any, civilian faculty, the personnel problem contributed to institutional inertia. One constant was the presence of reserve component officers on the faculty. Mobilization augmentees continued to contribute to the College on an annual basis. Major Francis H. Heller, who had been part of the program since 1949, made the annual trek from Lawrence to Fort Leavenworth. Major Heller, known as Professor Heller at the University of Kansas, spent his summers working with one of the departments and serving as

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24 Original emphasis. James E. Simmons to Chief of Resident Instruction, DF, “Draft Faculty Memorandum No 1, /5 Curriculum, Comment 2” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 October 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
25 Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr., “Information to Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 September 1965, D-9, CARL.
temporary editor of *Military Review*. The rapid turnover of personnel caused each incoming cohort of instructors to rely heavily on what previous instructors passed down to them.

One advantage to the turnover, however, was the arrival of new ideas. Ivan Birrer often commented on the insular nature of the College. But constant rotation of faculty had a positive effect, too, as noted by Dr. Birrer. The field experience an incoming officer had acquired brought a fresh perspective to the course. Major Joseph T. Palastra, Jr. was one such officer. He attended the Regular Course from 1965-66. Palastra came to Leavenworth a few months early, which led to his designation as an instructor for the summer’s Allied Officer Preparatory Course. He found teaching the basis of American society and government a meaningful experience, having not really considered them from an outsider’s perspective. He then joined his former pupils as a student in the Regular Course. During the year, he attended numerous social functions and came to believe that the extended informal association with old and new peers to be a very important part of the course. He did not have the same high opinion of the instruction, however. In particular, Palastra did not think much of the airborne and special operations lessons, and he wrote as much on his course evaluation sheet.

The response of the College faculty to his suggestions was to have his orders changed. Palastra, who had been en route to an assignment to Germany, now found himself detailed to duty as a Leavenworth instructor. Naturally, the College assigned him to the airborne department. Major Palastra remained there for two years, teaching the very courses on airborne and special operations topics he had criticized earlier. Unfortunately, the course structure muted the effect professional experience had on the overall course, limiting it to a small circle of students with whom the instructor had contact. After a year or so, if the officer became an author, he could inject his experience into

27 Francis H. Heller, *Steel Helmet and Mortarboard: An Academic in Uncle Sam’s Army* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009). Heller’s autobiographical account of his dual existence as an officer and academic is an entertaining, highly-readable story. He served as a CGSC mobilization augmentee from 1949 to 1975, except when he was recalled to active duty during the Korean War. Heller tells a story about his role in assisting the commanding general’s son, Keith Johnson, re-enter college after a rebellious phase.

28 Doughty, *Birrer*, 94.

29 Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., Senior Officer’s Oral History Program. 188-198. Copy author’s possession.

30 This feature explains in part the limited effect Vietnam had on the curriculum. Birrer attributed the cause to the “rigid, required core curriculum.” He listed three things that did occur as a result of Vietnam: curtailment of some faculty members’ tours, addition of a few
the lesson plans. In practical terms, this did not occur until one-two years after his arrival, meaning the experience gained would not make its way into the overall course for several years.\textsuperscript{31}

Lack of faculty and limited time impeded change, but bureaucratic restraints blocked the curriculum’s adaptation, too. Unlike the idiosyncratic course planning in an American research university, CGSC developed courses using a bureaucratic approach that ensured uniformity of the content and method. The college staff used a centralized curriculum planning and development process. Orleans’ committee had remarked back in 1956 that “too much effort is being expended in this area.”\textsuperscript{32} For a brief period under Major General McGarr, department directors made decisions regarding lesson content. The decentralized approach did not last long, as Major General Johnson believed it to be too loose an arrangement. He directed Colonel Jasper Wilson to impose tighter controls on the process.\textsuperscript{33} Wilson did so, establishing a formal process similar to the one used back in the late forties and throughout the early fifties to manage the preparation of lessons. The centrally-managed curriculum once again assumed a rigid form once the curriculum was in place. As the course began in August, the process for readying the subsequent year’s course began.

The annual review process became the focal point of curriculum design. The CGSC Commandant’s report to the Army in 1965 stated that “the entire procedures, i.e., receipt of comments and recommendations and their translation into Commandant’s guidance, is consolidated once each year into Faculty Memorandum No. 1, the guidance for the ensuing course.”\textsuperscript{34} Faculty Memorandum Number 1, usually published in draft in the fall of each year, was central to the overall effort. While the basic memorandum might have few pages, the attachments added dozens of pages and instructions. Each school year, starting in July or August, the College staff managed fifty-two

\textsuperscript{31} Doughty, \textit{Birrer}, 105-106.
\textsuperscript{32} Doughty, \textit{Birrer}, 88. Birrer claimed that the greatest contribution an officer made during his tenure came during the period he served as a lesson author. Doughty, \textit{Birrer}, 104.
\textsuperscript{33} Eddleman, 16. “If any criticism is to be offered of the procedure followed, it cannot be that the process is inadequate for the purpose. On the other hand one may well criticize the excessive amount of time and effort expended on curriculum planning. There is always a point in complex operations when effectiveness ends and wasted effort begins.”
\textsuperscript{34} Birrer, 74.
separate steps to prepare the next year’s courseware. Departments added milestones of their own to revise or create individual lessons, adding to the burden. Barely four months into the current year, department directors briefed the Commandant on their plans for the subsequent year. Given the annual turnover among faculty, department directors, and administrators, few key participants had witnessed an entire year of instruction, yet they made judgments about modifications to lessons they had never presented in a classroom. This process allowed central management of common resources such as typists and reproduction capabilities across the College, but it slowed the response to outside developments.

The guidance, and its subsequent replies, became the forum for debate as departments sought to advance a particular topic or to insert new material. Over time, the system evolved to referee the annual squabbles between departments over the allocation of available hours. The allocation of hours to topics became one of the overriding concerns of the directors. As an example, in the mid-sixties, the course length remained a constant 38 weeks. Of this time, the College planned on 1672 hours of duty time with about two-thirds allocated to academic subjects. From this finite resource pool, five departments vied for platform time. Available classroom time had to be divided among the departments and subjects. In an annual accounting battle, departments jealously guarded their share of hours, and directors and faculty resisted any attempt to shuffle the status quo. In some instances, one classroom hour became the subject of debate among departments and the College staff.

Time with students became a transactional commodity, and departments measured their relative merit by their share of hours. This made itself plain during the planning for the 1964 course. For the coming year, Department of Command subjects totaled 316 hours, while DJCASO lessons

35 Colonel F. W. O’Brien to Commandant, memorandum, “Faculty Memorandum Nr. 1,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 November 1963, CARL. The process is outlined in “Inclosure 1 to Faculty Memorandum 1.”
36 The amount of time given to classes during the year ranged from 68% to a high of 84% in 1967-68. Derived from the course hours in the POI between 1962-73. CARL.
37 Jasper L. Wilson to L.M. Wilson, DF, “Comment 2, Subject M6480/4,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 28 Feb 1963, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL. Wilson denied the division operations department director’s request to shift one hour from a lesson on mountain operations to a related lesson on winter warfare. According to the Chief of Resident Instruction, the proposal would un hinge the three-hour block scheduling plan. L.M. Wilson to Jasper L. Wilson, DF, “Subject M6480/4,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 February 1963, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
came to 172 hours. As Assistant Commandant, Brigadier Gen Lemley, proposed to shift the strategic studies lesson from the Department of Command to the Department of Joint, Combined and Special Operations (DJCASO) under Colonel William Blakefield. One reason given was the more equitable distribution of hours across the departments. The Department of Command’s director, Colonel Wilson M. Hawkins, strongly dissented to the proposed transfer in a three-page memorandum. The director raised objections ranging from suggestions that the topics aligned more naturally with command functions to office space considerations. The director even went so far as to suggest how Blakefield’s department might take the writing and speaking programs, which were principal reasons the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects—the Department of Command’s predecessor—was created in the first place. The memorandum obfuscated the real concern. The Department of Command had the preponderance of instructional hours and wanted to keep them. Interdepartmental relativism became more important than learning outcomes when determining the curriculum.

Still, modifications to content began to alter the way the College managed the internal structure of the course. “As the total scope of the curriculum offerings widened, in recognition of the widening vista in which the Army officer functions, it just simply became impossible to maintain centralized control,” said Ivan Birrer. The trend he noted would accelerate in the next few years.

Old concerns about learning outcomes remained unanswered. Perceptive faculty members knew a gap still existed between the desired outcomes and the classroom practices. Despite the College leadership’s stated preference to emphasize reason and logic in student solutions, proximity to the school solution remained the standard measure of success in the classroom. This gap continued

38 Department of Command, “Considerations for Retention of Strategic Subjects in DC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL. The Department of Command’s shift was transparent to the Chief of Resident Instruction. Back in August, the Department of Command had written, “DC does not object to the proposed transfer of subjects and hours to DJCASO.” This three-page memorandum made no mention of the writing and speaking programs. DC to C/RI, DF, “Draft Faculty Memorandum no 1, /4 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 August 1962, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL. In October 1962, Colonel Jasper Wilson had written that “DC feels a moral obligation to keep them [writing and speaking programs], and for once, the other departments are not hankering to enlarge their empire in this fashion.” Jasper L. Wilson, memorandum, “/4 Curriculum,” 19 October 1962, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
39 The final decision gave the Department of Command the strategic studies block. Jasper L. Wilson to Directors, DC, DJCASO, DLU/O, DDO, DF, “Draft Faculty Memorandum No 1,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 October 1962, Folder /4 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
40 Doughty, Birrer, 82.
in spite of reforms implemented in the past five years. Part of the explanation was the overscheduling endemic throughout the curriculum. Previous discussions have made clear the full schedule, with six-hour class days and four hours of homework. Daily lessons had as little flexibility as the overall curriculum. Likewise, faculty members recognized that the imposition of a uniform expectation on a class of several hundred resulted in a Pavlovian, not reasoned, response. A departing faculty member wrote in 1963:

Although we disclaim that we are “answer oriented” now we are kidding ourselves. A great many of our requirements are stated, “What is your decision and why?”, but the students know that if they choose the College solution their reasons do not make much difference. How can it be otherwise if we give the student 15-20 minutes to reach a decision and allow ourselves only 5-10 minutes to critique?\(^\text{41}\)

The overgenerous allocation of content to each session created a condition that made it difficult to explore the reasons underlying a student’s response. The faculty member’s critique of the classroom methods, which presents a very different picture from the official view, said:

We have a very intelligent group of students and there is no reason why we have to be content with producing a group of intuitive decision makers. We do a fairly good job of forcing students to make decisions. We should insist, also, that students demonstrate the logic behind those decisions. And we should critique the logic as much as we do the answer.

The Army is going to need tough thinkers for the future and the College can contribute by demanding rigorous thought from its students.\(^\text{42}\)

What made this officer’s utopian vision difficult, if not impossible, to attain was the size of the class, (which remained at fifty students during this period); the transient expertise of the instructors; and the mechanistic approach which underlay the program. Over the years, teaching practices conformed to the necessity to dispense a set amount of material in a finite period of time. Complicating matters, faculty members did not prepare their own exams, tailored to the content they taught and the individual learners. As a result, they had to deliver the programmed content of each lesson lest their students be unable to complete the graded requirements.

\(^{41}\) “Report by Departing Member of Staff and Faculty,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 June 1963, 3. Attachment to Francis W. O’Brien to Secretary, memorandum, “Tour End Report,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 July 1963. Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. O’Brien forwarded the unknown officer’s comments to the College Secretary, observing, “the proposals…had merit….” The instructor had three years’ experience teaching the Regular Course.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.
As a result of such insights, faculty training began to concentrate on developing abilities as a discussion leader. Dr. Birrer continued to teach the Instructor Training Course, and he made adjustments from polishing an officer’s public speaking skills in favor of a course that developed effective two-way communicators. Birrer realized during the transition to smaller groups under McGarr’s command that most officers arrived with some inherent ability to transmit information in one-way settings. What they did not know how to do well was engage in a give-and-take situation between an authority figure and a group of students. Birrer attempted to cultivate this skill by instituting a substantial amount of practice and critique during instructor preparation, so the newly-assigned officer would have a better sense of his expected role.43

For several years, the curriculum design had followed the rule that no day should exceed six hours in length with four hours of homework. To ease scheduling, classes conformed to a standard of three hours each.44 As planning continued for the 1964-65 academic year, the rigidity of the standard three-hour lesson made itself apparent. The broadening of the course scope created pressure on this longstanding system, as no department had all the hours it believed it needed to cover all the material it thought important. In 1963-64, the school had to tack extra lessons onto the end of already crowded days to meet unforecast additions, and “in the case of the Regular Course, the use of Saturday mornings in a number of instances” was the only way to cram everything in to the regimented schedule. Planning for the following year recognized this trend, but no department director was willing to cede time to other departments. The addition of more subjects like a computer technology lesson and the unwillingness to trim hours inside each department meant that the course would have to exceed the six-hour rule to accommodate all of the planned lessons. Colonel O’Brien wrote the

43 Doughty, Birrer, 105.
44 One departmental response to the mandate of three-hour lessons was to append extra material to existing lessons in order to lay claim to the full three hours. “A number of current subjects, incorporated into the curriculum under the arbitrary ‘only three-hour subjects’ were inflated to meet this length of time.” Francis W. O’Brien to Commandant, DF, Tab B, “Summary of Department Recommendations Not Incorporated into Faculty Memorandum No 1,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 November 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
Commandant, saying “I foresee an increased number of eight hour days and the use of Saturday mornings for the Regular Course as a normal practice.”

Colonel O’Brien proposed to get below the planning figure by trimming hours from six lessons, including special weapons, division defensive operations, and Aggressor operations and by allowing one- and two-hour lessons. To arrive at the recommended reduction, Colonel Edward R. Lewitz, the staff officer charged with planning the curriculum, compared the hours needed to obtain a “working knowledge” of division operations in the Regular and Associate Courses. Lewitz made much of the fact that the desired level of tactical knowledge could be reached in thirty-three hours during the Associate Course, but it supposedly took twice as long to attain the same level of proficiency in the Regular Course. Lewitz saw a potential saving of twenty hours by reducing both offensive and defensive instruction in the Regular Course.

Colonel John W. Callaway, division operations director, was incredulous. He fired back at O’Brien. “I am concerned over your D/F [disposition form] in which you compare the regular and associate courses based on a descriptive term known as ‘working knowledge.’” Callaway continued: “To use it internally to compare our courses is in my view very dangerous because it is used as an exact term to describe a very inexact level of knowledge. If we accept the exact meaning of this term, I could make a good case for reducing the regular course to six months.” In a clear rejection of the comparison, Callaway added that “comparing the Associate and Regular Courses, I would say that graduates from the Associate Course have a marginal working knowledge of division tactics whereas graduates of the Regular

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45 Francis W. O’Brien to Commandant, DF, “/5 Curriculum Plan,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 January 1964, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. CGSC, “/5 Curriculum,” Faculty Memorandum Number 1. Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 November 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. For the coming year, allocations by department were: Department of Command – 317 (+17); Department of Joint, Combined, and Special Operations – 169 (+3); Department of Large Unit Operations – 205 (+0); Department of Division Operations – 283 (-6); Navy-Marines – 23 (+0); Air Force – 25 (+0); and Other College Departments – 128 (-17). The plan was ten hours over the design; the previous year’s course exceeded the design by thirteen. Tab C to Faculty Memorandum 1.

46 As expected, Dr. Birrer, the chief architect of the three-hour lesson, objected. “College experience with the standard three-hour lesson has been most satisfactory. Author-instructors have developed a good understanding of the amount of content that can be comfortably handled in a single lesson. The three-hour lesson has proved to be long enough to permit the instructor necessary flexibility within the classroom and still attain his assigned objectives. The three-hour lesson has proved effective from the standpoint of student attention—the lesson being of a length that holds student interest. And there are a number of significant administrative benefits from standard-sized lessons.” Ivan J. Birrer to Chief of Resident Instruction, DF, “Draft Faculty Memorandum No 1, /5 Curriculum,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 11 October 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.

47 E.R. Lewitz to Colonel O’Brien, memorandum, no subject, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 1964, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
Course have an exceptionally fine working knowledge of division tactics.” Regardless, the Commandant disagreed with half of O’Brien’s proposal, leaving the schedule intact. One staff officer summed up the challenge in a memorandum to the Chief of Resident Studies: “The problem is still in total hours—no change since approval of draft FM1 [Faculty Memorandum 1].…”

For the 1965 course, the Department of Command projected two new lessons, the major revision of eleven subjects, and the deletion of seven. Other departments proposed less drastic revisions. Joint and combined subjects remained roughly as before, with one lesson reduced by two hours. The Department of Large Unit Operations replaced a theater combat service support lesson with two, allowing more detailed coverage of the difference between logistics in a field army and in the communications zone. The department significantly revised two lessons, due to organizational changes in the European and Pacific theaters. Division operations included 270 hours of instruction and ten hours devoted to examinations. Thirty-seven hours of common instruction preceded lessons on armor, infantry, mechanized, and air assault division operations. The department dropped two lessons and reduced the hours for two others. Lessons on jungle operations and the infantry division in the attack were added. Overall, the Commandant reduced the division operations lesson by eighteen hours and increased joint lessons by fifteen hours and command lessons by ten.

Once in place, the faculty resisted modification to the guidance, even if directed by the Commandant or Assistant Commandant. One such instance came after the Assistant Commandant,

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48 John W. Callaway to Colonel O’Brien, DF, “Comparison of Regular and Associate Courses,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 1964, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. Callaway labeled the memorandum “Personal For,” indicating he meant the message to go to the chief, and not a functionary. Note that within a few years, the total of all mandatory Regular Course tactical instruction (179 hours for division to army) would fall below the 189 hours on division operations in the 1964 Associate Course. Doughty, 135.
49 “Proposed Changes to Reduce to Normal Curriculum Hours,” Tab D to Faculty Memorandum 1, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
50 E.R. Lewitz to Colonel O’Brien, 10 January 1964.
51 Memorandum by Marvin H. Merchant, “Description of Course of Study – Regular Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL.
52 Memorandum by Frank H. Linnell, “Description of Course of Study – /5 Regular,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, ca. January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL.
53 Memorandum by James F. Simmons, “Description of Course of Study – Regular,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL.
54 Memorandum by John W. Callaway, “Description of Course of Study – Regular Course, Corrected Copy” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL.
55 A.J. Weigley to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, “Draft Program of Instruction for the Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C2), the Associated Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C3), and the Mobilization Command and General Staff Officer Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 June 1964, 5, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
Brigadier General E.C. Townsend, reviewed preparations for the 1964-65 course. He did not see coverage of automatic data processing (ADP)—an emerging topic of interest. Townsend asserted that “we have reached a point in time where this matter is of sufficient importance to warrant breaking it out in the College curriculum for separate treatment.” He asked the staff to look into adding a lesson on the subject. The response from Colonel Francis W. O’Brien and Colonel Marvin H. Merchant came swiftly. The curriculum had no room, a guest speaker might not meet the objective, and it was too hard to put together quickly. But, if the general was serious, the staff could add it to the planning guidance for the 1965-66 course. The only suitable way to add a lesson, according to the Chief of Resident Instruction and the Department of Command director, would be to schedule the lesson on a Saturday morning. Colonel O’Brien thought perhaps one of the guest speaker lectures held in reserve might be dedicated to this use, but there was a danger there, he noted, as previous experience indicated this time would be consumed by another unscheduled visitor. Much of what O’Brien had postulated would soon become irrelevant. A new officer education review lay just beyond the horizon.

The Haines Board

1966 marked a fissure in CGSC’s development. While not quite revolutionary, events of 1966 and beyond show a markedly different approach to officer education. Once solidified, the course structure of 1972 became the norm for the next three decades. The board that created the environment for change began in 1965 but did not publish its findings until the following year. Lieutenant General Ralph Haines led a team of nine officers in the most comprehensive survey of Army officer education conducted to date. Haines’ team examined and questioned every aspect and assumption underlying the Army school system and measured these considerations against a worldview of large standing forces, repetitive stability and limited war operations; the resulting “urgent, unprogrammed

requirements” on officer corps; and accelerated doctrinal, materiel, and organizational development. The Board anticipated continued consolidation of administrative responsibilities in the Secretary of Defense and renewed emphasis on sound management skills.58 Training and education of officers would be demanding under such conditions. New expertise in automatic data processing (ADP), operations research and systems analysis (ORSA), aviation, and electronics would supplement, or even supplant, existing skills. Officers would share responsibilities with civilians, as the Army expanded its non-military workforce. The needs of field units and administrative headquarters would limit the time available in an officer’s career for training and education.59

The Haines Board began in the summer of 1965 with the charge to “determine the adequacy and appropriateness of the current Army school system and the education individual school training of Army officers in light of responsibilities which will confront the Military Establishment for the foreseeable future; and to recommend such changes in the direction, structure, or operations of the system or in the academic program during the next decade as will make the greatest contribution to the discharge of those responsibilities.”60 The Board’s members faced a significant task. The officer education system at the time consisted of two colleges, 22 branch schools, a dozen specialty schools, and the military academy and academy prep school. Many of these schools and colleges had associate or extension courses.

When the panel arrived to look at CGSC, they found the Regular Course and biannual Associate Course, plus refresher and specialty courses. The Board acknowledged the unifying nature of CGSC, given that this was the first educational experience that included a heterogeneous student body. Prior to CGSC, the officer attended a school whose students came almost solely from a single branch. CGSC, as the combined arms school, mixed representatives from all arms and services. The

59 Ibid., 7-8.
60 Ibid., 1-2.
Board commented on the unique character of this developmental experience, saying that “C&GSC is today the hub of the Army school system.” 61

The “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools” was perhaps the most influential officer education document of the postwar era, because it provided the mandate that led to sweeping structural changes in the mid-career course. The Board’s recommendations for CGSC rested on three observations. The Board considered the prior tactical experience of students 62 to be vastly superior to decades past, with approximately sixty percent of the class having served in a division or higher tactical unit. For the Board, this statistic represented an opportunity, since the familiarity with division operations could offset reductions in tactical instruction, which in turn allowed coverage of peacetime subjects. Next, for well over half the class, CGSC was their last professional education. Given that the average student attended during their eleventh year, they could expect another eight to ten years of service without another school. In addition, one-third of the graduates left CGSC directly for non-tactical assignments, and all of the graduates could reasonably be expected to serve in one or more such assignments post-graduation. The Army’s officer education system made no allowance for this third point. 63 The Haines Board rediscovered the problem that War Department Circular 202 attempted to solve twenty years earlier.

The Haines Board substantially altered the Army’s view that CGSC was exclusively a tactical institution. The Board proposed an expanded mission to “include responsibility for preparing its students to serve in the total military environment, although the primary focus of the course should

61 Haines Board, 65.
62 This philosophy would carry forward in subsequent years. Substitution of experience for education occurred during the Vietnam War. Some officers received “constructive credit” for their service in Vietnam. Under this waiver, officers who needed CGSC credit for “promotion, duty assignments, or higher level military schooling” could have their wartime records reviewed by a personnel board and get credit for the course, even if they had not attended. “Some Individuals Offered USACGSC Credit for Vietnam Service,” Army Logistician 3, no. 1 (January-February 1971): 3.
63 Haines Board, 35-36. A civilian study of officer education noted the problem with selectivity at intermediate and higher levels. “Because smaller and smaller numbers of officers attend at each successive level, the schools at all levels may be considered terminal for large numbers of officers. For others the schools at a given level are part of a sequence of professional military education. This creates a problem in curricular development. Each school must provide appropriate instruction for officers who will end their formal professional military education upon graduation, as well as for those officers who will attend a school at the next higher level.” James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, Education in the Armed Forces (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1965), 88.
remain clearly on the Army in the field." As will be shown, the College embraced the former, while relegating the qualifying statement to a diminished position. The Board’s recommendations are curious in two respects. American involvement in Vietnam had escalated by this time, placing the Army in the field yet again, and, more surprisingly, only ten years previously the Commandant had bemoaned the absence of a second year devoted to tactical instruction.

What distinguishes the Haines Board from many previous boards is that the Army adopted most of the recommendations, and the Army did so rather quickly. As opposed to previous officer education studies, the Army’s Adjutant General closely tracked the status of the approved recommendations. A number of significant actions affecting CGSC took effect within a year.

Two interrelated suggestions of the Haines Board led to an eighty percent increase in the size of the Regular Course class. Associate Courses, designed to serve the needs of reserve component officers, ended temporarily as a result of a Haines Board finding. “There is cause to question the validity of the current concept of conducting both regular and associate courses at branch school and C&GSC levels.” As evidence for their assertion, the Board cited attendance figures for FY 65, which showed seventy-six percent of the class came from the active army, eighteen percent from the reserve components, and six percent from allies. This distribution subverted the stated intent and purpose for the course, allowing the Army to graduate more active service officers from the staff course, while doing little to educate reserve component officers. “The Board sees no professional reason for their continuance in their present form,” concluded the report. Instead of an eighteen week course that reserve component officers did not attend anyway because of constraints due to civilian employment, the panel recommended a mobilization course for reserve officers. It said CGSC’s extra

64 Haines Board, 36. The Board proposed to fill the gap with a shift of division instruction to the branch advanced courses, a mandatory extension preparatory course, and electives. The recommendation read: “That the Command and General Staff College prepare its students primarily for duty with the Army in the field, and secondarily for duty with Headquarters, Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, and staffs of major Army Commands.” Haines Board, 76.
66 Haines Board, 42.
capacity should be given to the Regular Course. The Board believed that the full capacity of Bell Hall—1,344 students—should be dedicated to meeting the Army’s need for staff college graduates.67 The Haines Board echoed the earlier Williams Board recommendations regarding who should attend the staff college. This position was not without controversy, since the DCSLOG had begun to question the basis for allocation of spaces back in 1957. The DCSPER had declined to act, given that the Williams Board was studying the education system at the time.68 Since 1954, student selection had followed the scheme set out by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Walter L. Weible.69 Under this allocation, the three combat arms branches—infantry, armor, and artillery (including air defense artillery)—received most of the spaces in both the Regular and Associate Courses. The proportion of the Regular Course class from these three branches came to about 65% in each of the eight years. Officers from the arms amounted to about 60% for the associate courses. The remainder was distributed among the Army’s technical and administrative branches.70 Notably, no Women’s Army Corps officers attended the Regular Course during the period 1955-63.

Rivalry between service branches resurfaced in 1965. As the Haines Board confirmed, combat arms officers got 65% of the spaces, yet they comprised only 55% of the qualified pool. “After careful and detailed consideration of the many factors involved, the Board reaffirms the traditional philosophy employed in allotting quotas to the C&GSC: i.e., that priority for attendance

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67 Haines Board, 46. Doughty, Birrer, 86-87. As had happened since 1946, the Board applied an unsubstantiated estimate to determine the Army’s needs for CGSC graduates. In the case, the Board used the figure 15,000. CGSC’s output alone was insufficient to meet this figure, so the Board further recommended that the Army declare the Armed Forces Staff College equivalent to the Leavenworth resident course. By equating the AFSC to CGSC, the report said that the annual output would meet Army requirements. For reserves, the Haines Board endorsed the USAR school system to meet the educational needs of reserve component officers, given the difficulty many had securing four and one-half months of time off from civilian employment to attend the resident Associate Course.

68 Eddleman, 5. The DCSPER response to the chief logistician’s challenge was reproduced in the Eddleman report. The report intimated the existence of a military sphere, which was purely the province of professional officers, and of logistical sphere, associated with but not wholly unique to the military. The blurring of lines between the technical and administrative branches and civilian counterparts becomes quite clear in the DCSPER’s response. DCSPER cited two reasons why the allocation should not be changed. “Combat arms officers can satisfy the senior service college prerequisite of CGSC attendance only by going to Ft Leavenworth; logistics officers can acquire this prerequisite at Ft Leavenworth and, for attendance at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces by participation in the industrial mobilization training program.” The second reason rested on subsequent assignments. “CGSC does not train officers to fill specific positions, but rather to meet overall requirements and to provide feeders for general officer positions. Further, there must be enough CGSC graduates in the combat arms to meet mobilization requirements, whereas civilian industry will contribute large numbers of officers to meet logistical mobilization requirements.”

69 Eddleman, Appendix D to Annex 1, “Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Briefing,” 1962, 3. Weible led a study in April 1954 that divided the available spaces among the branches.

70 Eddleman, 9.
should be given to those for whom the instruction has direct application, rather than to those for whom it is largely a valuable orientation on the functions of others.”

The Board recommended that selection of students should remain under the purview of the officer’s career branch, given the system seemed to work. The Haines Board believed that an Army-wide board would be impracticable due to the number of records that would require review.

Additionally, the panel said that only majors and lieutenant colonels should attend CGSC, reversing the trend towards a more junior class, heavily attended by captains. The Army later adopted the Haines Board recommendations about quotas. 65% of the class came from armor, infantry, and artillery branches, while the technical and specialist branches and allied officers got the remaining 35%. For the time being, the composition of the class would follow tradition, even as the course itself began to reflect the officer corps’ wider perspective.

Fresh on the heels of the Haines Board followed a most unique investigation of CGSC. The MMAS program had suffered a significant setback in 1966. Delays in obtaining authority from Congress led the North Central Association to withdraw its recognition of the College’s degree program. The concept had encountered resistance, especially among the civilian bureaucrats of the Department of Defense, and they had attempted to terminate the program. The survey was part of this effort. After the Haines Board, Birrer and others renewed the push to gain authority for the MMAS degree. A review committee formed by the U.S. Commissioner of Education sought to understand the College’s desire and qualifications to award a master’s degree. The committee’s true purpose was to quash the MMAS concept.

71 Haines Board, 46-47.
72 Ibid., 45. The Board believed the window for CGSC attendance should extend from the ninth to the fifteenth year of service.
The report did little to help opponents of the MMAS. Instead, the committee contended that “a greater degree of professionalism will be demanded of the commander,” and it clearly lay claim to a broad swath of professional responsibility outside the traditional military sphere. Officers now functioned in “broader arenas,” meaning civilian government and industry. The profession had redefined itself in just a few years, and Leavenworth recognized the implications. The Army’s senior tactical institution now set about recasting itself as an educational institution on par with any American research university.75

The embryonic MMAS program now prompted an adjustment to the faculty in 1968. Even though the North Central Association had withdrawn its accreditation in the spring, the College administration still sought to meet the guidelines given by the accrediting committee a few years earlier. To meet the need for faculty who held doctorates, the Commandant added reserve component officers as consulting faculty. The adjunct faculty members formed the core of a graduate faculty; implying that CGSC had no such body, it being a professional school but not a graduate school in the sense used in American higher education institutions.76 The addition of these reserve officers with academic credentials marked yet another point at which the profession reached outside its core membership to obtain professional knowledge and acceptance.

Educating Citizen-Officers

The Haines Board recognized the contribution of non-resident instruction to the Army’s overall quality. According to the Board’s report, CGSC extension courses of all types served the needs of 11,000 officers across the Army. 65.1% came from the reserve components. Just under

75 “At the time when the officer’s sphere of activity was confined to the Army proper, his rank and his Leavenworth diploma were accepted as a badge of professionalism.” The report then stated a civilian master’s degree was the “accepted badge of professionalism” in the new field of play. CGSC, “Information for Review Committee, U.S. Department of Education,” 7, CARL.
76 “Reserve Officers Join Faculty at CGSC,” Army Reserve Magazine 14, no. 9 (October 1968): 6-7. “The program resulted from recommendations to increase contacts and communication with the civilian academic community made by both civilian and military boards after visits to the college.” Among the consulting faculty were twenty-nine Army Reserve and two Marine Corps Reserve officers. Ahrens, 11. Donald F. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the Soldier in Contemporary America,” Parameters 1, no. 2 (Fall 1971): 2-13. Bletz outlined the growing philosophical differences between the military officer and professors. He ended on a positive note, showing where academia and the military continued to cooperate.
thirty-eight percent of the non-resident course students were active army, and a surprising seven percent were foreign officers.77

Efforts to provide a CGSC education to a broader cross-section of the officer corps continued throughout the sixties, but diametrically opposed forces created serious difficulties for the various programs. The Haines Board resolved some of the underlying issues of priorities, but the Board’s recommendations did not anticipate some subsequent developments. To understand the outcome, some review of the situation surrounding this responsibility is necessary.

Non-resident studies underwent a number of modifications during the period of the Vietnam War. These modifications carried forward a trend from the mid-fifties that had increasingly tied promotions in the reserves to military education. Starting in 1956, promotion to reserve component general officer hinged on completing CGSC. In 1962, graduation from the course became a requirement for promotion to colonel in the combat arms, and completion became a requirement for technical and specialist branches four years later.

Back in 1962, Eddleman Commission recommendations had spurred internal CGSC assessments using the Commission's findings as the justification for change. Like the Haines Board, the Eddleman Commission had questioned whether the classrooms and faculty used for the Associate Course could not be put to better use. CGSC’s parallel study concluded that it was indeed possible to increase the number of Regular Course spaces by eliminating the Associate Course and developing a new short course to replace it. Before he departed, Major General Johnson dispatched a copy of his Long Range Plan to CONARC’s commander, Lieutenant General John K. Waters. Based upon staff work done during the Eddleman Commission’s visit, Johnson proposed four major initiatives: “An increase in the size of the Regular Course, a reduction in the size of the Fall Associate Course, the elimination of the Spring Associate Course, and the initiation of a special course tailored specifically to the requirements of and aimed at attracting the highest type of ADT officer.”78 Implementation of

77 Haines Board, 44. The figures above include preparatory and refresher course students.
78 Harold K. Johnson to John K. Waters, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 February 1963, N-13423.489, CARL.
any one component hinged on acceptance of the entire plan. Classrooms, faculty, and housing constrained the College’s ambitions as had been the case for years.

The Department of Nonresident Instruction inactivated in the summer of 1963 because of Army-wide manpower reductions stemming from the Army’s 1963 reorganization. What became quickly clear to the departments who assumed their responsibilities was that the College’s “poor cousins” did a lot more than anyone had realized. Exams had to be graded—and written. Translation of the Associate Course into the correspondence format took time, too. Before long, the department directors complained to the Director of Resident Instruction, Colonel O’Brien, who in turn forwarded their concerns to the Assistant Commandant. “The impact of the additional non-resident workload is greater than forseen, [sic]” wrote Colonel O’Brien in August. 79 To compensate, departments dropped some subjects or reduced their length, rather than attempt to maintain the previous content. 80

CONARC’s acting Chief of Staff, Major General George T. Duncan, forwarded the “Long Range Plan for Use of the US Army Command and General Staff College” to the Department of the Army’s operations staff in July, 1963. Based upon CGSC’s internal study stemming from the Eddleman Commission, CONARC endorsed a five year phase-in of the four major changes proposed by Johnson six months earlier: increase of Regular Course slots from 750 to 1008, reduction of the fall Associate Course from 448 to 336 officers, elimination of the spring Associate Course, and initiation of the new Special Course for reserve components. CONARC’s letter supported the proposal to conduct a course for reserve officers from January to March, consisting of five two-week increments, to 100 hours of extension prep beforehand, interchangeable with the non-resident extension course. 81

Implementation proved problematic. Coordination across the reserve components and within the Department of the Army revealed a host of objections. Major General Ralph E. Haines (in his

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80 Memorandum by Marvin H. Merchant, “Description of Course of Study – Regular Course,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, 5, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL.
capacity before the Haines Board) relayed these to CONARC in an October 1963 letter. Haines questioned the figures used to establish Army requirements for CGSC graduates, saying “the number of graduates who are requisitioned consistently exceeds the number available for assignment.” The Army staff rejected the proposal to eliminate the Associate Course, but the letter did endorse the idea of the special course. As a result, implementation of the Eddleman Commission’s most significant finding came to a halt. As Major General Lemley pointed out in his December reply to CONARC, the Long Range Plan was an integrated solution, requiring adoption of all components to make feasible the individual elements.\textsuperscript{82} Notwithstanding this setback, CGSC had introduced the idea of eliminating the Associate Course in favor of increasing the size of the Regular Course. It would not be too many years before the idea came to fruition.

As already noted, personnel cutbacks at the College resulted in the elimination of the department responsible for writing the courses, although the duties remained. Increasing demand for the non-resident courses, caused by changes in promotion policies for reserve officers, placed new demands on the system. Lastly, the ongoing modifications to the Regular Course, which formed the basis for the Associate Course, USAR school curricula, and extension courses, created a constant need for updates to the existing material. The tight links between the various components of the system began to weaken.

The Associate Course’s purpose, as stated in 1964, was twofold: “to provide officers with a working knowledge for wartime and peacetime duty as commanders and general staff officers of divisions and logistical commands and a general knowledge of the duties of commanders and general staff officers at corps and field army to include their combat service support systems” and “to provide the basis for future development for progression to higher command and staff responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{83}


\textsuperscript{83} A.J. Weigley to Commanding General, CONARC, “Draft Program of Instruction for the Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C2), the Associated Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C3), and the Mobilization Command and General Staff Officer Course,” memorandum, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 June 1964, 2, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL.
Intentionally omitted was any reference to the strategic subject matter. Students outside Leavenworth would get the bare minimum training needed to qualify for staff positions, while reaping none of the benefits of the new Regular Course emphasis.

Until 1966, the options for a reserve component officer or an active duty officer not selected for the course remained stable: the Associate’s Course, the USAR school system, the extension course, or a combination of the last two. The Associate Course ended in 1967 as a result of the allocation of Bell Hall’s classroom space to the Regular Course according to a Haines Board recommendation. As a replacement, CGSC offered three options. The USAR schools continued as in the past with four years of weekend and summer training. Officers could choose to take twenty-eight subcourses through the correspondence course over four and one-half years. What was somewhat different was the allocation of lessons to phases, now numbering ten.

Lieutenant General W.G. Rich, who served as the Department of the Army’s senior reserve component representative, advised reservists to get started early on the CGSC course. “I think the day a man makes captain is the day he should start thinking about CGSC. He should plan his schooling so that he will complete CGSC well in advance of the time when it will be required for his promotion to colonel.”

The differentiation between a certificate and a diploma and a third option for completing the coursework forced reserve officers to make a choice. Finishing the first nine phases via the correspondence course or USAR system led to a certificate. To earn a diploma, officers had to attend the tenth phase in residence at Fort Leavenworth. A third scheme—the Mobilization Course—also led to a diploma. The first class graduated 289 officers in August 1967. This track required the non-resident student to take half the course through the mail and USAR school system and half through a

85 “GSO Mob Course: Key to Advancement,” Army Reserve Magazine 14, no. 2 (February 1968): 16-17.
part-time resident course offered over the summer at Fort Leavenworth. In this format, the student attended two four-week courses at Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{88}

In all cases, the reserve component officer was forced to choose between family, career, and military duties, to include acquiring professional education. Major General Rowland F. Kirks’ speech to the graduating class of the July 1969 graduates of Phase X highlighted the duality of a reserve component officer. “As a civilian he is a civic leader in every facet of our daily life.” He later observed, “As Army officers you are the inheritors of the finest military traditions that the mightiest nation in the history of man has hammered out on the anvil of more than 150 military campaigns.”\textsuperscript{89} Despite some heroic language, attaining the designation of CGSC graduate took fortitude and forbearance, given the nature of the material. Divining the school solution from the mass of material in front of the extension course student proved difficult, if not impossible.

Many officers chose to blend the “box of books” approach with interaction in a classroom environment. USAR schools continued as a popular option. A January, 1967 article described the extent of the USAR school system. By this point, 106 USAR school units led classes in cities and towns across the United States and overseas. About 6,200 Army Reserve and National Guard officers attended classes year-round. Students attending the Associate Course, on which the USAR school curriculum was based, completed CGSC in eighteen weeks. By comparison, an officer enrolled in the USAR school system took four and one-half years to cover the same material. He attended twenty-four two-hour lessons held at night from September to May, and an additional two weeks each summer. Should a student not live near a USAR school, he could complete the twenty-four lessons by correspondence. With no breaks, the officer could obtain a certificate, not a diploma. Unfortunately, the vast majority of student-officers did not receive any pay for their efforts.\textsuperscript{90} If the system sounded complicated, it was.

\textsuperscript{88} “New Steps that Lead to Diploma from CGSC,” \textit{Army Reserve Magazine} 13, no. 3 (March 1967): 16-17. “GSO Mob Course: Key to Advancement,” \textit{Army Reserve Magazine} 14, no. 2 (February 1968): 16-17.
\textsuperscript{89} “Challenge Posed CGSC Graduates Wins Award,” \textit{Army Reserve Magazine} 16, no. 5 (May 1970): 8-10.
The efficacy of the entire reserve officer education and promotion system came under scrutiny soon afterwards. Following the Detroit riots of 1967, Federal authorities were appalled at the actions of the National Guardsmen and initiated a sweeping reassessment of their training programs and readiness. One of these commissions, the Hollingsworth Board of 1967, revamped the Army’s approach to reserve officer management and promotion.91 One key finding of this study affected CGSC’s non-resident course. Reserve component majors now had to complete half of the non-resident course to be eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Officers had three years to complete the rest of CGSC’s coursework, and graduation was a requirement for promotion to colonel. The new rule took effect in July 1972.92

In the end, much of the effort expended to contrive a workable reserve component officer education strategy during the late sixties amounted to naught. The demise of the resident short course proved temporary. A new eighteen-week resident course started in 1971—nearly the same model used for the Associate Course.93

Allies

During the 1960s, international graduates began to receive more attention, particularly if the press could make a negative association between CGSC and the actions of graduates. Lieutenant General Trujillo was the first of a number of foreign officers who were linked to CGSC, especially if their newsworthiness came as the result of a coup. Two instances of such linkages occurred in South Vietnam in 1960 and 1963. The paratrooper revolt of 1960 and the November 1963 coup that led to President Diem’s death both involved CGSC-educated officers.94 Two African graduates drew

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national attention because of their successful coups. President Goafur al-Nimiery, the leader of Sudan, made headlines for his overt criticism of U.S. Middle East policy. Colonel Ignatius “Ike” Acheampong, a late sixties graduate, rose to power in Ghana during a coup in 1972. Together, the examples might cause one to question what allied students learned, and indeed press reports inferred a connection between the officer’s attendance at CGSC and the coup.

The Military Assistance Program, which gave the Army the authority to enroll allied officers, came under scrutiny as a result of such events. The programs were criticized because of the notable outliers, such as coup leaders. There is little if any evidence, however, that attendance at CGSC spurred the individuals to act against their civilian government. One must note the hundreds of international graduates who did not rise to power through coup d’état. What is interesting is that the number of officers attending Leavenworth’s resident course nearly equaled the total at all other service colleges. For FY 70, 103 Allied officers attended CGSC, while 126 foreign officers went to other military schools. The large number kept the small section busy.

Local issues also concerned the department. Not every American the allies encountered proved a gracious host. Students periodically encountered problems with local residents. “The principal problem of living in the local community takes the form of limited discrimination in housing and related areas which a few inhabitants of Leavenworth practice.”


96 “Training programs for foreign military men have been attacked because the students often have returned home to become leaders or members of authoritarian governments hostile to the United States.” As this brief review shows, a number of such instances occurred in the sixties and seventies; however, the cause-and-effect relationship and frequency asserted in the article are weak. Drew Middleton, “Thousands of Foreign Military Men Studying in U.S.,” New York Times, November 1, 1970, 18. In 1970, Senator J.W. Fulbright, D-AR, amended the Foreign Aid Law bill to restrict the number of allied military personnel attending schools. His amendment capped the number to not exceed the number of foreign civilians who studied in American colleges and universities the previous year.

97 Middleton, 18. The 126 students included the Air War College (both courses), the Naval War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. Computation of an exact percentage is not possible because the figures do not include Army War College students. Conceivably the most one can say is that the type of allied officer selected to attend by their country may be a common thread.

local government in an attempt to curtail such occurrences, but students occasionally found themselves turned away from establishments or isolated by their neighbors.

Readiness to receive instruction resurfaced as a concern of both external and internal reports. The Haines Board report indicated that efforts to improve screening of Allied officers had not met with much success. The goodwill generated as a result of attendance was tempered by the limited comprehension of the material by foreign officers whose English skills did not match the level of instruction.\(^99\) Over the span of the Regular Course, some accommodations could be made. Not so with the Associate Course, which also had international students. Allied officers attending the Associate Course received an abbreviated orientation, which the College leadership found unsatisfactory. Before the Regular Course, students got up to eight weeks of preparatory training, including the English language instruction. On the other hand, Associate Course students got a mere twenty-two hours of orientation. The Director of Resident Instruction coordinated with CONARC and the Department of the Army’s DCSOPS to have allied officers scheduled to attend both the FY65 Regular and Associate Courses attend the preparatory course.\(^100\)

For the Regular Course, the Allied Officer Section managed an extensive program to introduce allied officers to American culture. By the early sixties, the trips covered government, industry, social, and technological venues. In the Kansas City area, officers visited the Kansas state legislature, industry, the Truman Library, Corps of Engineer projects, art museums, and professional sports games. Outside trips to Washington, D.C., United Nations’ headquarters, West Point, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania filled other weeks during the course.\(^101\) This broad-based program acquainted international officers with American culture, government, and society. Soon, the College’s leadership would take steps to create an equally diverse academic experience for students, but only for those lucky enough to attend the Regular Course.

\(^{99}\) Haines Board, 73-74.
\(^{100}\) Chief of Resident Instruction to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Improved Orientation for Allied Students Attending USACGSC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 July 1963, Folder /5 Curriculum Planning, CARL.
Election

No other structural development affected modern American officer education more than the decision to offer electives at CGSC. In the elective program, the faculty found a solution to a problem it had experienced for years under the traditional, centrally-managed curriculum—how to account for change without rewriting the entire course. Electives allowed the student latitude to shape their educational experience. On the other hand, electives displaced material that had long been the hallmark of the College experience. Within a few years, the presence of an elective program led to a fundamental redesign of the course, further reducing the time available for combined arms instruction. Lastly, the elective program opened the Army’s senior tactical institution to the influence of other professions—a move that the officer corps seemed to welcome.

While the idea of an elective system in American higher education originated in the 1850s, CGSC did not consider and implement a similar program until over a century later. In civilian universities, a mixture of concentration and distribution marks nearly every undergraduate curriculum. A core of required courses supplemented by Lernfreiheit form the degree requirements. The elective curriculum model began at Brown University in 1850. Later, Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard University, implemented the model over several decades, and he is the one widely credited for overcoming institutional resistance, gradually shifting the students, faculty, and institution in a new direction. Eliot “recognized the fundamental importance of the individual” and gradually instigated a broad series of reforms between 1869 and 1897 to achieve his vision.  

The freedom afforded professors and students to design and select courses based upon preference did not always have positive outcomes. Rudolph showed two results were possible from an electives-based curriculum. The institution would either see increased “depth of study” and “spirit of

102 Rudolph, Curriculum, 246-255.
scholarship,” or the school would find itself adrift with no common purpose to guide the institution. Rudolph conveyed the downside in his observation that “one of the most creative, and also one of the most destructive, educational developments of the post-Civil War years, the elective curriculum, played the paradoxical role of both contributing to the motivation problem and keeping it from being far worse than it was.” Regardless of the potential faults, few alternative systems allowed civilian academia the flexibility necessary to accommodate the growth in academic fields and knowledge.

The College’s elective system originated from the opinion of Jack E. Babcock, a promotable colonel, who in 1965 argued for the idea’s inclusion as part of the Haines Board report. The 1966 recommendations claimed that a fixed curriculum “directed at the lowest common denominator in the class” failed to account for the individual’s needs. An elective system, on the other hand, gave the student a choice, offering intellectual diversity to accommodate a wide range of professional and personal interests. With electives came flexibility and the ability to adjust rapidly to new developments by adding a new course, instead of changing an entire year’s worth of material. From a management standpoint, the Board said that an elective system could curtail “the growth of specialist courses by giving different groups of students a specialist’s knowledge in certain fields without requiring that they attend specialist courses.” The report gave electives legitimacy, applying the concept to the entire Army school system but restricting implementation to the colleges. The Board recommended that the course include “greater flexibility to keep it fully responsive to the demands of a rapidly changing military environment.” This comment became the faculty’s touchstone as they made substantive alterations to the integrated curriculum model that had been in place since the College’s inception.

104 Rudolph, History, 300.
105 Ibid., 290. Motivation problems occurred perennially at Leavenworth. After each tactical problem, instructors issued the College’s example answer. The students found the continual reference to the “College solution” numbing. Students also felt alienated from the faculty. “Allow a channel from students to [the] College,” one student commented. “[The] present system kills motivation faster than any school I’ve ever been in.” Summary of Student Comments, /1. 9.
106 Doughty, Birrer, 92. Haines, 105. Babcock was promoted while the Board was in session. Babcock held a Ph.D. from Georgetown University. He was the U.S. Army Materiel Command representative.
107 Haines, 39.
108 Ibid., 465-6.
CGSC’s leaders had specific purposes in mind when they began the elective program. As with many of the arguments employed a century earlier by civilian institutions, electives at CGSC were meant to spur interest or to offer greater width and depth than did the mandatory courses. The college leadership outlined five components of the program in the 1968 POI. Electives were meant to “extend the depth of coverage in selected areas of the curriculum; round-out previous schooling or experience; assist in development of a specialty; further the student’s branch qualification; or satisfy intellectual curiosity.”\(^{109}\) The more flexible curricular model would allow future College faculty to quickly implement newer material, too.

The elective system began modestly during the 1967-68 school year (table 8). Each student had to take one of seventeen forty-hour courses. The eclectic mix resembled the modern university: Spanish, German, French, Speaking, Writing, Statistics, Operations Research, Automated Data Processing, and the fledgling Graduate Study Program.\(^{110}\) The jumble was shaped by what was available, rather than a calculated need based upon analysis. All classes were taught on Thursday afternoon, compounding the problem by requiring a full complement of spaces at the same time each week. Some of the courses were taught by University of Kansas faculty, a necessary step given the peculiar blend. Military electives included logistics, internal defense (a corollary to counterinsurgency), and military history. Language classes, something under consideration since the early sixties, were added in an attempt to mimic the U.S. Marine Corps staff college.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{110}\) The Army War College implemented electives in 1967-68 as well. Ball, 392.

\(^{111}\) Doughty, Birrer, 92, 94. Because there were not enough spaces for all students, some officers took correspondence courses from a senior service college. Carol Reardon looked at the use of military history in the education officers between the American Civil War and the end of World War One. Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865-1920 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
Table 8. Elective Course Growth, 1967-73.

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<td>2</td>
<td>6(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Each</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40-56(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offerings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>76(^c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Doughty, 40, 47; POIs, 1967-1973.

\(^a\) Each officer took 4 professional and 2 associate electives.
\(^b\) Associate electives were 40 hours; professional electives were 56 hours each.
\(^c\) 23 were professional and 53 were associate.

The following year, the students could choose from twenty-four courses. The next major step took place in 1970 when the College required two electives. Offerings included Applied Cultural Anthropology, and each course took 45 hours to complete.

More internal assessments pushed the elective program forward, being easier since the necessary consent was in place. CGSC’s 1969 Long Range Curriculum Study, led by Colonel Jennings, projected a course of study in 1975 with two sections. The second half of the year would allow a student to take electives instead of a specified track. For the first time since 1946, the College looked well beyond the present to anticipate needed adjustments.

Electives began to displace core material when year-round electives became part of the curriculum. As Ivan Birrer related, the Thursday afternoon scheme could accommodate the single elective requirement within the existing program structure, since the requirement was only forty hours. During the 1960s, the officer corps had gradually embraced civilian education as a cornerstone of officer development. The Haines Board had noted that seventy-five percent of officers had a baccalaureate degree or higher, but fewer than nine percent had a master’s degree or higher. The Board recommended a more thorough study of advanced degree requirements.\(^{112}\) Guidance from the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, to “get as many master’s degrees as

\(^{112}\) One recommendation of the Haines Board was to establish a baccalaureate degree as a requirement for a Regular Army commission. The Board also considered advanced degrees. Haines Board, 17-18, 266-271. The Army Educational Requirements Review Board (AERB), established in 1963, determined the duty positions requiring an advanced degree. The Army sent officers to graduate school to fill these positions. In 1965-66, the AERB had “validated” 3,420 positions, and approximately 900 officers were attending civilian schools to obtain their post-graduate degree. About ten percent of these officers were future U.S. Military Academy instructors. The Haines Board noted that the number of AERB-validated positions had increased by 100% since the AERB’s inception. Engineering, business, and social sciences accounted for over eighty percent of the positions. Haines, 267. The large number of officers seeking full-time graduate degrees is indicative of the professional status an advanced degree granted. Given that the Army was engaged in a war, the number possibly points to a surplus of officers.
possible,” as Birrer put it, resulted in a new program known as the Cooperative Degree Program. Officers applied for the program while at CGSC. During the Regular Course, the officer attended CGSOC classes and fulfilled some of their participating graduate school requirements. After graduation from CGSC, the officer then went to school full-time to complete the university’s degree requirements. Upon implementation of the program in 1970, the College had to offer electives throughout the year to give the student sufficient hours to transfer to the participating university. The Commandant, Major General John Hay, saw this new mandate as detrimental, because it reduced the hours of instruction devoted to meeting course objectives. Nonetheless, the staff and departments trimmed the lessons and made room for a second elective.

The College overhauled the curricular structure and replaced it with seven core courses plus two required electives. The range of elective topics doubled to forty-eight with many courses in business and social science topics. This system remained in place for two years as the College prepared for its next transition. While CGSC had departed substantially from previous methods, it had one final step to take.

**Institutional Heresy**

Inside their Bell Hall offices on September 28, 1971, Colonel Hal Kressin, Colonel E.D.H. Berry, and Dr. Ivan Birrer leafed through a freshly-arrived three-page memorandum from the Deputy Commandant. Colonel Kressin had headed the Department of Non-resident Instruction. Close to retirement, Kressin read the pages and realized his last few months in uniform would not be undisturbed. Colonel Berry, assistant head of the resident instruction department and already

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115 Another reorganization of Fort Leavenworth took place in 1968. This one split responsibilities between the post management function of the headquarters and the school’s direction. For the College, the most notable point was the renaming of the Assistant Commandant’s position to Deputy Commandant. The reorganization had little effect on the College itself, as the principal concern was to establish an assistant to manage the many functions of the post, rather than concentrate responsibility for staff management from post management. "Reorganization at Army CGSC," *Armed Forces Journal* 106, no. 14 (7 December 1968), 31. The reorganization had little effect on the College itself. The principal concern was to designate an assistant to manage the many functions of the post.
swamped with the day-to-day management of the Regular Course, saw it as an extension of previous work based upon the move to standardized two-, four-, and six-hour lessons. Birrer read the memorandum and saw opportunity, for Gibson’s directive proposed to change the entire scheme of mid-career officer education. Gibson had in mind breaking the rigid curriculum and reshaping it to meet the needs of the present. The select group set about their task, assessing the details of Gibson’s plan, for the Deputy Commandant gave explicit guidance for the way ahead. The team was to assess the existing lessons and determine “those subjects which are common in our curriculum and need to be taught to all our students,” followed by the allocation of remaining material to one of three general areas: tactical, logistical, or administrative topics. The last three Gibson labeled “Professional Electives.” He proposed that students would take the common subjects then transition to one of the Professional Electives. Courses that did not fit into the above categories would be known as Associate Electives, and students would take one of these. September 28, 1971 did in fact prove to be a fateful day.

Ivan Birrer had sat on the sidelines for the previous twenty years. He quietly had advised the College’s senior leaders for nearly two decades. His accumulated experience gave him insights as to what could work and what would not. Beginning with Major General Johnson’s tour, Birrer became a central figure in shaping CGSC leadership’s decisions. During the sixties and early seventies, he was a participant in, or the initiator of, each major step that led to a fundamental restructuring of the College. Now, he would openly lead the team that reoriented the institution. His office became the project’s headquarters; his chalkboard the palette for idea after idea. Kressin, Berry and Birrer identified weaknesses in Gibson’s original proposal, concluding a common core and one of three tracks (tactics, logistics, or administration) would not work for practical reasons. The school simply did not have enough officers to write all the courseware needed to support such a large undertaking. After some initial discussions among the three, they began to engage with Brigadier General Gibson,

testing new schemes to achieve his concept, while changing the fundamental details of his original plan. Gibson agreed with the team and told them to continue working the details.117

A few weeks after release of the Gibson directive, the Commandant, Major General Hennessy, released his Plan for Institutional Development (CGSC – 1975). Much like his predecessors, Hennessy wanted to make specific improvements in curriculum, instructional methods, facilities, and faculty qualifications and training. His vision added a unique element, “Interface with Higher Education,” which he elaborated as the desire to “gain acceptance and recognition as a full-fledged member of the higher education community.” The loss of prestige associated with the North Central Association’s withdrawal of accreditation still stung, even though it had happened years beforehand. Hennesssey intended to pursue a broad series of reforms, which singly and corporately would result in recognition of CGSC as a graduate school on par with American higher education institutions. The Commandant’s image of the College’s future and the Gibson directive had a direct relationship. The work of Birrer’s group was to attain the objective: “Modify the present curriculum, in both content and design, as required for graduate education.”118

Once the team began to market the idea to department directors, however, resistance quickly formed. Colonel John White, Director of the Department of Division Operations, wholeheartedly disagreed with the concept, not unlike his predecessor of a decade earlier. White saw the proposal as an unimaginable departure from the staff college’s role as a tactical institution. He was joined by the Class Director, who objected on the grounds that managing the particulars of each student would become an unwieldy affair. Birrer noted that two other department heads did not support the idea, but they were less vehement in their opposition. Only Colonel Mike Sanger of the Department of Strategy supported the plan. Opposition was inconsequential; the Deputy Commandant was not seeking their approval. CGSC was heading in a new direction, and he was going to make it happen.119

117 Doughty, Birrer, 112-114.
119 Doughty, Birrer, 115-116.
Gibson and Birrer then approached the Commandant, Major General Hennessy. He listened, asked a few questions, then gave the two guidance to socialize the concept with a few others groups. After consulting with the student curriculum committee, whose members endorsed the idea, Gibson and Birrer returned to his office. Hennessy believed the time had come to approach the CONARC commander. Just over two months had passed since Gibson’s memorandum had arrived.\textsuperscript{120}

A key event in the decade-long progression from a unitary course to a concentration-distribution model took place on December 5, 1971. The dawn of the modern CGSC transpired during a briefing from Ivan Birrer and the College’s Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General Gibson, to the CONARC commander, Lieutenant General Ralph Haines. Birrer pitched the plan in a Friday afternoon session. The timing was ideal, for two separate trails met in the early winter of 1971. The first was the pending implementation of the Army’s Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), which modified officer career patterns to a dual-track, specialized, system. The second, and more relevant to CGSC, was the release of the Norris Report.

Beginning in November 1970, Major General Frank W. Norris led a review of the officer education system. Norris, one of the Williams Board members back in 1958, had recently stepped down as Commandant of the AFSC. A significant part of the report dealt with CGSC. Norris concluded that “the proper role for CGSC in the seventies is to act as a professional university for the Army. This should not be a one-course, one-curriculum university. Its principal emphasis should be on the conduct of high-caliber military education across the spectrum of professional skills required by the modern Army.”\textsuperscript{121} Norris proposed a split course with a portion devoted to core subjects and the remainder of the course devoted to staff specialist lessons.\textsuperscript{122} Lieutenant General Haines did not care for the Norris Report—a fortuitous situation when the College’s briefing team arrived that afternoon. Birrer outlined the core and electives program, and he proposed an immediate changeover

\textsuperscript{120} Doughty, \textit{Birrer}, 115-118.
\textsuperscript{122} Norris Report, vol. II, 6-5.
to the new arrangement—beginning with the 1972-73 Regular Course. Birrer briefed the plan, and when Lieutenant General Haines asked when the scheme could be implemented, Birrer replied that the College could start in August. Haines accepted the Birrer-Gibson proposition, giving Hennessy and Gibson the necessary latitude to reorganize the College’s curriculum to a four-term program. Birrer returned to Leavenworth knowing the import of the decision.\textsuperscript{123}

After the Christmas break, Dr. Birrer sat down to capture the new program in writing. The early January “Report of Ad Hoc Committee for Regular Course Curriculum Review – CGSC 72-73” outlined the overall program. Sixty percent of the academic year would go to common subjects, while the remaining portion would be allocated to electives, individual study, and guest speakers as shown in figure 1 below. The program made a distinction between professional and associate electives, and it set the graduation requirement at four professional and two associate electives. The plan divided the year into two semesters, and each semester was sub-divided into two terms of about nine weeks. Using the two-hour standard lesson developed last summer as a building block, the plan divided each day into four two-hour sessions. Common subjects and associate electives would be taught year-round, while the student would two professional electives in each term of the second semester in addition to the core lessons.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} The internal College initiative trumped the Norris Report proposals. Doughty, \textit{Birrer}, 118-122. Doughty, \textit{CGSC}, 47.
\end{itemize}
The memorandum listed seven courses in the common core totaling 668 hours. It was this feature that earlier had disturbed Colonel White. Division Operations, Course Three, now amounted to 143 hours of the entire year, which meant division operations comprised a mere twenty-one percent of the common core—and proportionally much less when electives and other academic events were factored in to the computation.\textsuperscript{126}

The Haines Board’s recommendations took full effect in 1972. The school implemented the proposal as promised during the December briefing to Lieutenant General Haines. Students in 1971 had studied strategy and joint operations in roughly equal measure with tactics. In the summer of 1972, the Regular Course stepped off in a new direction. Officers would, it was postulated, acquire the “hallmark” Leavenworth skills—estimates, orders, and problem solving expertise—in what amounted to twenty-two weeks.\textsuperscript{127} In addition to a reduced core of classes, students took 224 hours of electives. Birrer described the changes as creating “a professional graduate school affording career

\textsuperscript{125} Kressin, Berry, and Birrer, Tab C. Graphic Allocation of Hours., 13423.437-2, CARL.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 3. Course 1 – Staff Operations, 92 hours; Course 2 – Command and Management, 100 hours; Course 3 – Division Operations, 143 hours; Course 4 – Larger Unit Operations, 122 hours; Course 5 – Strategy and Strategic Studies, 70 hours; Course 6 – Joint and Combined Operations, 56 hours; and Course 7 – Internal Defense-Security Assistance, 50 hours. Also included in the 668 hours was 35 hours of "General Subjects."
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 2. The Ad Hoc Committee’s report contained one significant assumption regarding the reduced core curriculum. “Implicit in this characteristic is the judgment that a common curriculum of about 600 hours can produce CGSC graduates qualified for duty with the army in the field—the traditional CGSC mission.” In his oral history, Birrer highlighted this passage underlying the new curricular scheme. Dougherty, Birrer, 123.
education” to Army officers in an article written for Military Review. What had been a focused, professional school run on the classical model now resembled a modern liberal arts university. CGSOC’s structural changes of 1972 coincided with the beginning of the Army’s critical reassessment of itself. In the years ahead, the College would continue to widen the professional education opportunities provided to officers by increasing the choices available, while sticking firmly to the basic plan developed in 1971.

**Conclusion**

From 1963-1973, the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College underwent some of its most enduring and significant structural changes since its inception. The transformation of the Regular Course between 1963 and 1973 reveals a belated attempt by the faculty, and the Army’s education system, to catch up to the global developments, particularly a new definition of professional jurisdiction and the expanding basis for professional knowledge. Non-resident instruction followed haltingly.

In general, the College faculty continued to exhibit hesitancy to adopt new methods or attempt to predict some part of the future after World War Two. In times of prolonged peace, intellectual stagnation overcame outside technical, societal, and military advances. Rapid change induced paralysis as the professional body struggled to assimilate changes and to create new paradigms. The inherently conservative College organization, faced with tremendous uncertainty about the future, lagged behind contemporary developments, oftentimes due to structural limitations or faculty shortages.

By the mid-sixties, CGSC’s offerings had fallen well behind the increasing specialization of the officer corps and the proliferation of professional military knowledge. The school’s faculty simply could not keep up with external developments. The process used by the College to revise the courses required an intensive amount of labor. Attempts to maintain a relevant, centralized curriculum caused

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it to fall short of the Army’s needs. Although the faculty had played a minimal role in creating new knowledge, they taught new ideas that did emerge to a more professionally diverse officer corps.

The hybrid military-educational bureaucracy, coupled with institutional inertia rooted in faculty turbulence, retarded the evolution of the curriculum. With nearly a year required to shape changes to a POI and little developed doctrine on emerging subjects, the faculty had difficulty rewriting and implementing new courseware. The pace of technological change in the Cold War contributed to the Army’s confusion and thus to its educational dilemma.

During the move to the elective system from 1967-1972, the College led change from within, and a civilian stood at the forefront of the campaign. Until the elective system was introduced, CGSC did not have a mechanism to respond to the Army’s needs. Electives freed the faculty from the rigid classical curriculum, but the program came too late to prevent the College’s struggle with military and social transformation. For several years before the formal adoption of electives, the College’s leadership had moved in the direction of a divided curriculum, although not in the form anticipated by Johnson, or even Norris. The general staff tracks used in 1946-1950 recognized the trend towards specialization in officer duties. The curricular model developed in 1971 endured for nearly thirty years. The system developed by Birrer and others provided professional education to several generations of officers. The changes made by 1972 poised the College to play a central role in the doctrinal, personnel, and training revolution that began in 1973.

A few individuals directed the shift from a centrally-managed, classical curriculum to a completely new scheme. Major General Johnson’s decisions in late 1962 and early 1963 allowed his successor, Major General Lemley, to move ahead with structural changes. Lemley’s unique circumstances—serving as assistant during the planning phase—allowed him to make informed decisions about the direction and content of the curriculum. Similarly, Brigadier General Jim Gibson’s service as a department head immediately before assuming the Deputy Commandant’s role gave him unparalleled knowledge about the personalities and norms of the College. Gibson, along with Cols. H.R. Kressin and E.D.H. Berry, and, of course, the long-serving Educational Advisor, Ivan
Birrer crafted a new direction. The question then became: how effectively did the new scheme meet the needs of the officer corps and the profession of arms?
CHAPTER 6

A Great Awakening, 1973-1986

The characteristics of the next war are as insoluble as are those of an unborn babe.

George S. Patton

The year 1973 marked a significant turning point for the Army. Vietnam faded rapidly from institutional and national memory as the last advisers and prisoners of war returned home.1 But the memories of protestors shouting obscenities at returning soldiers did not. The Army, however, gained no respite, transitioning to an all-volunteer force and thus further isolating itself from American society.2 In the next two years, the defeat of one proxy army followed the pyrrhic victory of another. The swiftness and lethality of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War shocked U.S. Army officers. The Yom Kippur War allowed the U.S. Army to foresee the form of a potential war against the Soviet Union. The war, fought by surrogate armies as it were, dissipated the veil of future combat, and the perceived lessons shocked American officers. From the Israeli experience, senior leaders derived an understanding that future war against the Soviet Union


would be a “come-as-you-are” affair; they became aware of the necessity for immediate preparedness and fighting outnumbered. They had little confidence in their Army’s abilities.³

The post-Vietnam Army was an institution in deplorable condition. Robert Scales described it as undisciplined and incapable:

Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly hashish; a significant minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin. Crime and desertion were evident in Germany, with at least 12 percent of soldiers charged with serious offenses. In certain units, conditions neared mutiny as soldier gangs established a new order in the barracks through extortion and brutality…. Soldiers rebelled for many reasons. In part, their ill-discipline reflected a concomitant decline of order within American society. Whether right or not, many in American society took out their collective frustration with Vietnam on the most visible American presence there—the Army…. The lower standards for induction forced the Army to lower its standards for discipline and training…. A 1973 Harris Poll revealed that the American public ranked the military only above sanitation workers in relative order of respect.⁴

Given the abysmal state of the service, these poll results should surprise no one, but there remained a kernel of professionalism among the U.S. Army’s leadership. Otherwise, the events that followed likely could not have occurred.

The Army’s actions to reform itself in the mid-1970s admitted that significant components of the Army had decayed. Army leaders recast military doctrine, created new organizations, overhauled the officer education system, and turned their intellectual energy to conventional war in Europe against the Soviets.⁵ Why so many changes, and why so many a generation or two after military

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success in a global war? In the dominant narrative, Fort Leavenworth and a select group of officers figured prominently in the renaissance.6 This story, as told by early writers and more recently by historians, centers on Army officers and their role in creating a capable, fit, trained Army.

The situation at Fort Leavenworth mirrored that of the parent organization. The people who occupied the rabbit Warren of offices in Bell Hall were exhausted by war, and all judged the future uncertain.7 Contextualizing the College’s evolution over the next period requires consideration of major organizational and conceptual shifts and their consequences for the officer corps. External events and trends greatly influenced the development of the College after the Vietnam War.8 The reorganization of the Army and consequent formation of “TRADOC” (Training and Doctrine Command) had a significant effect on the College, as CGSC fell under a new headquarters.9 The acquisition and management of military manpower directly influenced the officer education system.

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8 Over half of Robert Doughty’s “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976” dealt with the events of 1973-1976. In Chapter 3, Doughty established the causes of change at Leavenworth as arising largely from external factors: Operation STEADFAST, the Army’s reorganization of the school system; the adoption of the Officer Personnel System (OPMS); the Echelon Above Division program; the ending of the war in Vietnam; the shift towards continental warfare against the Soviets; the change to the Volunteer Army (VOLAR) system; and the 1973 War. The development that most affected Leavenworth was the division of operational and training responsibilities formerly invested in COANRC. The establishment of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its subordinate headquarters, the Combined Arms Center (CAC), gave Leavenworth a new structure superior and saddled the Commandant with a vast range of new responsibilities. Operation STEADFAST added the significant task of doctrine writing to the College’s list of responsibilities, which was something the College faculty had not done since 1962. Doughty, CGSC, 55-71.
The cessation of the draft, the shift to a volunteer-based system for raising defense manpower, and a new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) affected the College, both directly and indirectly. One result of these events was a comprehensive reassessment of the officer education system—the Review of Training and Education for Officers (RETO). Soon, a rise in the number and effectiveness of civilian critics of the military began to erode the profession’s claims of exclusive jurisdiction over military matters. Alongside these events, the U.S. Army fashioned a new operational concept, which took over ten years to develop, refine, and propagate.

“Point A”

In the summer of 1973, the twenty-seventh Regular Course of the post-World War Two era graduated. The average age of students remained very close to that of the 1946 class, rising slightly to thirty-seven years, two months as depicted in appendix 6, Allied and U.S. Student Profile, 1973-74. Attitudes toward professional education had changed, though. Over the past several decades, selection to the Regular Course superseded the educational experience itself. An officer lucky enough to be selected was deemed to have been successful professionally. Attendance at the Regular Course was seen as a reward for professional accomplishment, rather than a formative experience. Graduates were directed into assignments that would guarantee further professional opportunity. Field experience, not military education, became the standard for promotion. The Army’s leadership sought to change that attitude.

In the age of organizational effectiveness, the difficulties of CGSC merit examination. As explained earlier, the scope of the curriculum had broadened over the past decade, and subjects more in line with the War College’s mission crept into the program. The influence of a new headquarters—

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9 Understanding TRADOC’s role in Army reform is necessary for establishing the context of CGSC’s activities regarding officer education in the late seventies and throughout the eighties. The training focus of TRADOC’s commander had a significant effect.
10 The average age reported for the 1946-47 class was 36.7 years.
11 “Recognizing that such uses spring from attitudes developed in the days when selection for CGSC was the significant event with attendance being anticlimactic, the Council opined that such is no longer the case.” Donald B. Vought to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [20 February 1976],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 March 1976, 3, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
12 The CAC Organizational Effectiveness Studies Office conducted an “Organizational Scan” of CGSC in May 1985.
its commander a force majeure—significantly, but slowly, reshaped CGSC, even when its faculty and leaders would not admit change was occurring, or even needed.

General William E. DePuy assumed command of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on July 1, 1973. Not long after, General DePuy contacted the outgoing CGSC Commandant, Major General Hennessey, to express his belief that the Leavenworth curriculum should center on the division, with the remainder allocated to corps and brigade echelons. \(^{13}\) DePuy’s directive generated immediate concern among the College faculty, and the Departments of Command and Strategy sparred repeatedly with the Department of Tactics over the wisdom of the guidance. \(^{14}\) The next thirteen years saw a new tension between traditionalists, who believed the mission of the College should center on warfighting, and progressives, who valued the freedom and flexibility of the core-elective model. As had happened often in its history, the guidance given to or by one Commandant would fall upon another to implement. Major General John H. (Jack) Cushman followed Hennessey as Commandant; Cushman’s arrival during a hot Kansas summer placed him in the middle of a firestorm.

A number of historians have examined the critical period from 1973-1976 at Fort Leavenworth. The prevailing narrative, briefly summarized, holds that the relationship between TRADOC’s new leadership and Fort Leavenworth was anything but cordial. Fundamental disagreements between the TRADOC and CAC commanders and staff over the role of doctrine, the inability of Fort Leavenworth’s doctrine writers to produce draft doctrine acceptable to General DePuy, and a difference of opinion as to the balance of education against training, specifically CGSC’s role in preparing officers for the future, led to a strain between the two organizations. To get by this obstacle, General DePuy formed a team at TRADOC headquarters to produce the new

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\(^{13}\) John J. Hennessey, Memorandum for Record, “Telephone Call from CG TRADOC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 July 1973, CARL. DePuy told Hennessey that half of CGSC’s instruction should cover division operations, and twenty-five percent should go to both corps and brigade instruction. This is an important point, clearly showing that the primary impetus spurring the transition to a more tactically-oriented curriculum occurred before the October 1973 War.

doctrine, which became known as the “active defense.” As a result, Fort Leavenworth played a tangential role in the development of combined arms doctrine for the next several years until the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5, Operations, when a small group of hand-picked officers crafted AirLand Battle doctrine. In this story, Fort Leavenworth’s corporate contribution remains somewhat cloudy.

From the very beginning, Major General Jack Cushman signaled his intent to bring change to the institution. The new Commandant opened the Regular Course in August 1973 with a nine-page, single-spaced address, which covered his “blueprint” for the next thirty months. Major General Cushman had an image of what the Leavenworth experience ought to be, and, after a short period spent acquainting himself with the personalities of his command, he met with the department directors to outline his new vision for the course. He delivered his plan in September 1973.

Cushman’s strategy centered on four principles: realism, hard work, emphasis on thinking, and development of character.

Given that the 1973-74 curriculum was already set, the Commandant for a time tinkered on the margins, introducing a voluntary “Commandant’s Requirement.” Students who chose to participate read a short essay then responded in writing, sometimes limited to twenty-five words.

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15 Cushman described the opportunity to learn about the profession in the year ahead and emphasized the interrelationship between the students, teaching faculty, and combat developments faculty (knowledge). Cushman’s ten points for a successful year give good counsel: 1. Study and master the Army as it is, in its current state; 2. Study the Army as it would be if mobilized or employed; 3. Gain a historical perspective of at least some part of the Army in some detail; 4. Learn the tools of your trade; 5. Improve your ability to solve a problem; 6. Improve your ability to write; 7. Improve your standards; 8. Enjoy the year; 9. Participate with us of the faculty as we help move the Army from “A” to “B”; and 10. Take the year seriously. In outlining his vision of “controlled adaptation, the general said, “Imagine two points. Point “A” is where we are. Point “B” is where we want to be.” He defined “controlled adaptation” as “the systematic program that moves us from point “A” to point “B” and it applies to anything.” John H. Cushman, “Commandant’s Welcome to Regular Class,” 15 August 1973, reproduced in John H. Cushman, Fort Leavenworth—A Memoir (September 2001) vol.2, Annex A, 6-9. Controlled adaptation described on page 3.

16 B.L. Harrison to Staff and Faculty, USACGSC, memorandum, “/5 Curriculum Planning as Viewed by the Commandant,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 September 1973, 2-3, Folder Miscellaneous College History Documents from 1969 to 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Harrison ‘s memorandum recorded the session and reflected the Commandant’s remarks as delivered.

17 The initial planning for AY 74-75 started when the Department of Resident instruction reorganized during the summer of 1972. During June 1972, the Deputy Commandant, BG J.M. Gibson, gave verbal guidance to the Plans Officer, LTC Harlen O. Elliott, to develop a curriculum concept for AY 74-75 that would meet the overall aim contained in the plan for institutional development (CGSC 1975) dated 4 October 1971. General Gibbon also envisioned a curriculum that would allow a student to tailor his programs to gain in-depth knowledge of one or more of the traditional curriculum areas with all students receiving a working competence with the traditional Leavenworth curriculum. The first step taken by the curriculum planners was to answer the question ‘What qualifications did the Army expect the officer to acquire in CGSC in the AY 74-75?’ The author continued, writing “Several joint conferences were held at CGSC....It was determined from these conferences that the need would exist in the 1975-77 timeframe of providing individualized instruction for the student....This basic change acknowledged that all officers did not and would not have the same job assignments after graduation; therefore,
Major General Cushman took great interest in the responses, reading them before bringing together the respondents for a discussion. Cushman selected topics intended to make officers think. The subject of each requirement proved less important than the debate they generated over professional ethics. As Cushman recounted, officers found the questions “troublesome material,” for the students had to grapple with issues of integrity—supposedly a hallmark of the profession, but a trait that all knew too many of their peers lacked. By the next year, the Commandant’s Requirements had become a full-fledged course—Profession of Arms. Major General Cushman had been forthright in his guidance. Course 9 was one result.

Developments under Major General Cushman, assisted by Brigadier General Ben Harrison, established the foundation for later evolution of the College. Several accomplishments stand out. First was the renewed emphasis on tactical instruction (even if it did not meet the standards of General DePuy). Second was the broad discussion Cushman encouraged about professional ethics. His direct involvement with student evaluation, which had suffered from grade inflation and lax standards for some time, established a new standard using subjective grading. He also introduced the case study method and small groups, while emphasizing the development of reason and judgment. Major General Cushman brought more civilian instructors into the classroom, including the Morrison Professor of Military History. Lastly, Major General Cushman was one of the last Commandants to enjoy a personal association with the students. Even he noted the growing reliance on his principal assistant, because of the new responsibilities thrust upon Leavenworth by TRADOC.

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18 Cushman, 56. The Commandant initiated a series known as “Symposium on Officer Responsibility.” One took place in March 1974 and a second the next year in April. The symposia survived only during Cushman’s tenure. Correspondence related to the 1974 symposium is located in Folder Symposium on Officer Responsibility, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Ivan Birrer assisted the Commandant in drafting the requirements. For the third one, which Cushman made mandatory, he enlisted the aid of retired Lieutenant General Ray Peers. J.R. Cushman to Lt. General W.R. Peers, [Ft. Leavenworth, KS], 26 October 1973, Folder Miscellaneous Materials-1975-1978, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA.

19 The details of this development will be covered in a later section.

20 Robert W. Berlin, Information Paper, “The John. F. Morrison Chair of Military History,” 29 January 1987, CAFLA. “The Morrison Chair was established in honor of Major General John F. Morrison, an instructor at the CGSC from 1883-1885 and 1906-1912. The impetus for the Chair came from the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee and was approved in 1974 by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Secretary of the Army.” Appendix 7. The John. F. Morrison Chair of Military History Incumbents, 1974-1986.

21 Cushman, 83.
to end here, one would believe that Leavenworth simply transformed itself under the guidance of a strong leader. But the truth is far more complex.

Understanding Major General Jack Cushman’s time as CGSC’s Commandant requires reconciliation of two widely different viewpoints. One account depicts him as visionary leader, who recognized the College’s unfulfilled potential and sought to establish a new standard that capitalized on the institution’s possibilities. Cushman, having served closely with Major General McGarr during a period of great change in the fifties, knew that any substantive alteration of Leavenworth’s curriculum required firm direction from the top. Further, he knew the year-long teaching and development cycle governed the Leavenworth curriculum and, therefore, had some sense of the short time he would have to initiate sustainable reform. Further, no one could doubt the clarity of DePuy’s guidance given to Hennessey, especially after the October 1973 War. On the other hand, faculty and department directors at CGSC viewed Cushman as autocratic or simply indifferent. What irritated the faculty was not necessarily his guidance for the subsequent year’s course, which they could accommodate—and, if necessary, resist—within the existing system. The problem, from their perspective, was the constant adjustments, corrections, and interventions that began soon after Major General Cushman began to delve into the details of ongoing lessons. The intensity and interest the Commandant brought to their domain upset the existing balance of power between faculty and Commandant. No longer obedient to this style of leadership, the faculty resisted. Frustration grew between leader and led.

22 General DePuy’s letter to General Abrams on 14 January 1974 and DePuy’s undated presentation “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine and Systems” leave little doubt about the revelations of the war and the lessons DePuy had drawn from the study teams’ work. The foremost lesson was the “new” battlefield was extremely lethal. For example, the fourth slide of his presentation cited Arab tank losses at 1500-2000 and Israeli tank losses as 700-1000—all from eighteen days of combat. William E. DePuy, Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, compiled by Richard M. Swain, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 69-74 and 75-111.

23 Over time, the CGSC Faculty Council began to document their disagreement in their monthly minutes. The February 1976 minutes noted: “CGSC has undergone a period of accelerated change and since there are vast differences in individuals’ abilities to cope with change, this has resulted in a stressful environment.” To remedy the situation, the Council recommended a survey by the Army Medical Department. In a note attached to the minutes, Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought labeled the proposal “idiotic and we knew it.” “How does one tell a military leader of our era that he and his inept subordinates (all senior to those doing the telling) are the problems and not mere observers?” D.B. Vought to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [28 January 1976],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 February 1976, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFL-A.

24 Doughty’s portrayal of the College during this period is one of turmoil imposed by an autocratic leader. In the end, Major General Cushman’s efforts paid off for the institution, but at the cost of his subordinates’ goodwill. Doughty, CGSC, 106.
Simultaneously, the relationship between Fort Leavenworth and TRADOC unraveled. In the fall of 1973, TRADOC had directed CGSC to produce scenarios for a Middle East and European war. Presented at a TRADOC Commander’s Conference in December 1973, General DePuy and other school commandants met the proposals with skepticism. DePuy began to watch Leavenworth more closely. In February 1974, he wrote the Commandant a very blunt letter. “Frankly, Jack, I am concerned about the depth and the quality of work being done at Fort Leavenworth.” DePuy then proceeded to criticize the scenarios under development at Fort Leavenworth, especially the one concerned with the Middle East. DePuy then indicated his preference for the work being done at Fort Knox by Major General Donn. A. Starry and his team. The TRADOC commander then turned his attention to the shallowness of the elective program, expressing particular concern:

I am concerned that the electives which are being offered for the next school year may fall below the acceptable quality level. I say this hoping very much that I will be proved wrong. However, when I think about the difficulty in the tactical electives alone, it raises my level of concern. If they are not excellent they will be counter-productive and they will bring down on Leavenworth much opprobrium from officers throughout the Army.

DePuy committed to writing what a number of officers throughout the Army already thought. Leavenworth had lost its mystique. DePuy’s concerns reflected a conflict between two intellects, but more fundamentally, the letter showed the depth and early origins of a disagreement between senior and subordinate. The difference disturbed Cushman, for he had an entirely different perspective of what Leavenworth should do for an officer’s intellect. The ongoing struggle between education and training now crystallized into the professional difference of opinion between senior and subordinate. Major General Cushman summarized the difference as follows: “General DePuy was determined to

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25 The scenarios to which DePuy referred were a European-based scenario employing a heavy corps and a Middle East scenario using a light corps. Most reproachful was DePuy’s characterization of the employment of the 101st Airborne Division as “unimaginative.” Cushman’s previous assignment had been as the 101st division commander. William E. DePuy to John H. Cushman, Letter marked “Eyes Only”, Ft. Monroe, VA, 19 February 1974. Reproduced in Cushman, Annex E, vol. 2.

teach the Army in the field, and Leavenworth students, ‘how to fight.’ I wanted to teach the students
‘how to think about how to fight.’”

Cushman valued the military experience of the students, and he sought to incorporate it into
the classroom. Students in the last of the wartime classes had accumulated many tours in Vietnam. In
his second year of command, the class of 980 U.S. officers had 419 students with one tour, 510 had
two tours, twenty-six had three tours, and three had four deployments to Vietnam. One way to bring
out this expertise was to design learning activities that allowed more student participation. Cushman
favored the case study method, employing smaller groups, and directed that lessons use this
technique. On the other hand, faculty claimed to be the sole expert in the classroom. The resulting
move to smaller groups for some classes, initiated in 1974-75, threatened the faculty’s self-image.
The result was discord between faculty and the leadership.

Outside, the quarrel between TRADOC and Leavenworth deepened. DePuy dispatched his
deputy, Lieutenant General Talbott, and a team of eighteen TRADOC inspectors on a “special
mission” to survey the elective program in June, 1974. In its report, the team expressed concern
about the structure of the program and freedom granted to students, but Talbott did not recommend
cancelling any of the planned electives for AY 73-74.

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27 Cushman acknowledges the fractious relationship between DePuy and himself in his memoir. Herbert, 51-59, recounted the disagreement between the “DePuy school of doctrine” and the “Cushman school.”


29 A draft article by Lieutenant Colonel Moss M. Ikeda described the change as follows: “The College’s thrust to have at least fifty per cent of instructor student contact time devoted to classroom discussion is a significant move. This change will demand a new breed of instructor. The instructor will no longer play the role of dispenser of information and ‘the’ expert on the subject being taught. The new role of the instructor has become that of a director of learning who guides and motivates students in the process of learning.” Moss M. Ikeda, draft, “The Evolving, Dynamic Process of Education at the United States Army Command and General Staff College,” 31 July 1974, 7.

30 Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Fort Monroe, VA, 7 June 1974, Folder Correspondence (CGSC) - MG J.H. Cushman, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CAC/Fl. Leavenworth, CAFLA.

31 The team included Brigadier General Paul Gorman, the Deputy Chief of Training and Schools for TRADOC. The tension between TRADOC and CAC is evident in one College account of the meeting. “The overall tenor of the visit was set by General Talbott in his opening remarks when he indicated the visit was not an inquisition, an AGI [Annual General Inspection] or anything like that.” The fact he had to make such a statement indicates the level of enmity between headquarters. Attachment to James K. Murphy to Operations Division, LTC Stockett, memorandum, “Input to College History, 17 January 1975, 4, Folder Director of Resident Instruction Historical Input, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Ivan Birrer noted that Major General Cushman was a proponent of the British syndicate system. Doughty, Birrer, 148. Doughty's history has a detailed discussion. Doughty, CGSC, 81-83.
Planning for 1974-75 included a new three-term model. A sixteen-week term took place before Christmas, followed by two twelve-week terms. Elimination of the Associate Course came with an agreement to offer reserve component officers seats during the first term of the Regular Course. Over eighty reserve officers joined the Regular Course in the fall of 1975 (table 9).

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<tr>
<th>Table 9. Students by Component, 1975-1978</th>
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<td>Extended Active Duty</td>
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<td>Active Duty for Training (RC)</td>
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Source: William J. Weafer, Memorandum, Student Profile For /5, /6, /7, and /8 Regular Courses, Ft. Leavenworth, 5 August 1977, Folder CGSC Mission, History, Statistics, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

Meanwhile, the disagreement over electives continued into the summer of 1974 and winter of 1975, and it now involved the question of how the elective program would support the Army’s new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). OPMS strengthened the relationship between CGSC and civilian higher education institutions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Director of Graduate Degree Programs managed not only the MMAS program but also associations with the University of Kansas, Kansas State University, University of Missouri-Kansas City, Wichita State University, and Florida Institute of Technology. By 1976, Dr. Birrer had taken over this responsibility. Some courses were taught as contract courses, but many were under the Cooperative Degree Program, which led to a master’s degree.

The school adopted other practices of civilian universities. Seeing that the student needed some guidance navigating his way through the college catalog, CGSC added counseling to the faculty’s duties in July 1974. Closely related, the College introduced “majors,” which required that

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33 “Commandant’s Welcoming Remarks, Opening Exercises, Regular Course,” 11 August 1975, Folder Letters – HQ – Misc 75-76, CARL.
34 The reserve officers stayed with the Regular Course students for all but two weeks of their course.
35 The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was implemented in 1974. Each officer would have two specialties—one designated as a basic entry specialty and the second, alternate specialty designated at some point in the future.
the student declare a field in the first term, normally one aligned with their specialty or branch. Adding more structure to the electives, grouping them into a series of concentrations, much like a major field in an undergraduate college, did nothing to parry TRADOC’s probing criticism.

TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General Talbott, wrote: “The current method of packaging the electives into a major program does not appear to be the best solution to support OPMS.” Talbott then brought up the depth of the curriculum, asking the Commandant to reassess the number of map exercises, given that the curriculum only had one for the entire year. A second visit in April 1975 resulted in more direct censure. Lieutenant General Talbott’s letter to Major General Cushman after the 8-10 April visit revealed that the TRADOC’s view of Leavenworth as a problem had solidified. The criticism shifted from individual courses to a broad-based attack on the entire curriculum. According to Talbott, the grading program needed “a major revision.” He singled out the elective program, never favored by General DePuy, as needing significant reform. In Talbott’s view, the proliferation of electives led to lower quality, stretched the faculty, and expended unnecessary funds. He also questioned the use of small groups, saying that these were labor-intensive and “inappropriate.” He questioned the strain on the tactics department, too. “The members of this department should not be over-extended…,” warned Talbott. Lieutenant General Talbott suggested reducing electives and the use of small groups, but he left the details to the Commandant.

The carte blanche granted by Lieutenant General Haines to Major General Hennessey and his subordinates resulted in wholesale restructuring of the curriculum. The freedom created by the new scheme decentralized planning and delivery of a substantial portion of the course, given that electives

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36 The underlying process was rather intensive, given that students had few ideas about the offerings other than catalog descriptions. In the 1974-75 class, students met with their branch representatives the first week of school. A follow-up session between the student and the departments took place from 28 August to 13 September. Students met with their counselor and drafted an elective plan. This was then fed into a computer using punch cards to tally the student choices in October. Director of Resident Instruction, DF, “Input to College History, 1 July 1974 – 31 December 1974,” n.d., 6, Folder Historical Input 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

37 Talbott’s principal objection was to the alignment of the majors along departmental lines, rather than the grouping by OPMS specialties. Talbott wrote that the program was too unstructured. Letting students choose six of their twelve electives left too much choice to the student. Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 January 1975, Folder Correspondence (Service College Coordination) 1974-75, Drawer 1975, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. Talbott’s remarks paralleled a trend in undergraduate education towards concentration. Rudolph, Curriculum, 248.
comprised forty percent of the curriculum. A positive example of the flexibility the new arrangement permitted was the development of an elective covering the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Faculty in some departments, notably the Department of Strategy, began to develop electives as a reflection of their personal interests. With new electives appearing almost weekly, the Commandant found it difficult to corral the faculty, and, as Frederick Rudolph had observed, electives could obfuscate an institution’s purpose.

Pressure from outside the College did not relent. In the fall of 1975, a Department of Defense Subcommittee on Excellence in Education, known as the Brehm committee, circulated the idea of a six-month CGSC. Cushman countered with a multi-page letter to General DePuy outlining the pros and cons of such a move, but he ended with an impassioned statement of the need to leave CGSC as a ten-month course. Next, TRADOC imposed the “TRADOC School Model” on CGSC. The organizational scheme separated lesson development from instructor duties. The TRADOC School Model, an idea sponsored by Brigadier General Max Thurman, complemented Instructional Systems Design (ISD), another TRADOC mandate, which was a systematic, resource-based approach based upon job analysis. ISD proponents advocated that TRADOC schools, including CGSC, adopt a

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40 “Lessons of the 1973 Middle East War” was one of four electives Major General Cushman added to the curriculum for the second half of the 1973-74 year. Additions included “Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat,” Code of Conduct,” and “a model of an automated tactical operations center.” Attachment to Murphy memorandum, 10. Harrison memorandum, 3, contained remarks that indicate these were not spur-of-the-moment decisions. In September, Cushman stated, “As I have noted, we should modify 4 as a means of developing material that might be suitable for the common curriculum in 5.” Two areas he specifically mentioned were “Computers as an Aid to Commanders, Staffs and Managers” and the “Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat.” Also DRI, memorandum, “Development of an Elective on the YOM KIPPUR War,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 1974, Folder Director of Resident Instruction Historical Input, Drawer, 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

utilitarian approach, imparting the knowledge necessary to “fight and win” and not much else. Both Major General Cushman and the Assistant Commandant, Ben Harrison, expended much effort to deflect and delay this latest directive.43 The College leadership found itself caught up in a bureaucratic snare.

At the time, the initiatives were too much, too quickly. Faculty saw the changes as revolutionary, rather than an evolutionary improvement upon an already solid foundation. Many years later, Major General Cushman would agree that perhaps too much had occurred in too short a time span, although he would remain convinced of the appropriateness of the reforms. Tactic instruction did need updating; the profession ought to consider its nature; and grading should rest upon subjective judgment of a fellow, slightly more experienced, professional.44 Upon later reflection, a number of officers, and Ivan Birrer, came to respect what Cushman had instigated at Leavenworth, saying, “On my personal scale of Commandants—the scale is in terms of personal effect over the long term—he stands with the top three. Perhaps twenty years from now, my successor will put him at the top. I wouldn’t be surprised.”45

In the midst of doctrinal and organizational turmoil, students, supposedly the raison d’etre of the College, continued to leave Fort Leavenworth for a wide variety of post-graduation assignments. A 1976 analysis of five-year trends showed that less than twenty-five percent of the graduates went directly to tactical units (battalion through corps) as their first assignment. Fewer than eight percent went to a corps or division staff after graduation. First tours at joint and combined headquarters, the Department of the Army staff, and major commands, on the other hand, accounted for over forty percent of each graduating class. As a percentage of total assignments over a five-year period, battalion to corps assignments rose slightly to 27.8 percent. Roughly three-fourths of the composite

42 Doughty, Birrer, 165. TRADOC Pamphlet 350-30, Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development, all five volumes of it, implemented TRADOC’s vision of training and education.
43 Doughty, Birrer, 164-172.
44 G.S. Meloy to Chief of Staff, United States Army, memorandum, “Evaluation of CGSC Curriculum, Ft. Leavenworth, KS,” Washington, DC, 1 February 1982, 1, CARL.
45 Doughty, Birrer, 175.
graduates’ time was spent in non-tactical assignments in the five years following graduation. Like their predecessors for the past thirty years, graduates left CGSC for a very large Army.

The “Leavenworth Problem”

In the summer of 1976, Major General John R. (Roy) Thurman inherited the dysfunctional relationship between CGSC and TRADOC. Senior officers had for some time (even prior to Cushman’s arrival) referred to it as the “Leavenworth Problem:” an ill-defined but quite real malady that had befallen the Army’s senior tactical institution. No single document summarizes the myriad issues facing the College in the seventies. While Leavenworth’s leaders and the faculty may have had some culpability, the problems at Fort Leavenworth were merely a symptom of an underlying cultural bias that had crept into the officer corps. The Army officer education system had a grave weakness, and it needed an overhaul.

The adversarial relationship between the College and TRADOC headquarters accounted for part of the perception. There was, however, more substance to the argument than mere misunderstandings between divergent viewpoints. The compounding effect of a rigid approach, marginal faculty, and personal experience with “the best year of their lives” had tainted several generations of officers, who now valued experience over education. Leavenworth did have problems—a number of them, and many stemmed from the resources allocated to Leavenworth’s leaders to accomplish a host of tasks. Faculty quality and quantity topped the list of daily concerns for the College’s leadership. No amount of vision and personal inspiration could compensate for a lack of competent faculty in sufficient quantity.

The systematization of officer education continued. In 1977, TRADOC foisted another system upon CGSC: Criterion Referenced Instruction (CRI). CGSC had a structured approach to developing lessons; indeed, the concept of plan, prepare, execute, and assess had guided instructors’


work in the past. CRI, a commercial approach, turned lesson and course development into a starched process. The imposition of CRI by TRADOC in 1977 created confusion throughout the faculty. Authors had to restructure every lesson to fit into CRI’s system of terminal and enabling learning objectives. Ivan Birrer, who was soon to retire, looked on incredulously as the Training Management Institute’s “missionaries” converted the faculty and staff to the new system. Professor Archer Jones, the outgoing Morrison Chair, added his criticism to the faculty’s widespread condemnation of CRI. The faculty split into two camps. One abhorred the concept. “[T]his is a management nightmare…. The second group, a minority in fact, embraced it.” Little suggests that CRI helped instructors and course writers create a better learning environment for students. Regardless, the administration mandated following TRADOC’s guidance, so the faculty set about rewriting every piece of lesson material to conform to the new structure. Within a few years, the College had faculty bulletins describing how to reconcile graduate education with tasks, conditions, and standards.

Meanwhile, faculty quality, as measured against professional norms, fell below the Army’s average—and stayed there for a sustained period. This is not to infer that highly competent officers did not serve on the faculty, for there is ample evidence to the contrary. The 1970s faculty had an image of the ideal instructor, which rested on two principal features: outstanding military records and “a master’s degree in an area directly related to the Staff College curriculum.” In the classroom, a good instructor, entertained, prodded, and imparted. Once identified, the better officers in the College tended to be pulled up to staff positions in the College. The Army personnel system, and many of its

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51 A number of talented officers, such as Hersch Chapman and Bill Stofft, taught at Fort Leavenworth. Decorated officers—Roger Donlon among them—served in the College, too. But officers of this competence and professional esteem were exceptions in a time of scarcity.
constituents, had a different view. Instructor promotions—one indicator of the service’s judgment of relative standing—seemed to lag behind Army-wide rates.\textsuperscript{53} The College administration perceived a disparity, and the faculty themselves did, too.

Recruiting faculty had to overcome years of accumulated disdain. Army officers had a poor image of CGSC duty, especially during the 1973-1984 period. One initiative the College attempted to solve the shortage was faculty tenure. The Army personnel chief denied the request but did indicate that extensions past the three-year mark might get approved. The Chairman of the Faculty Council, Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought, believed this to be counterproductive, stating “we have always found it easy to retain those whom no one else wanted.” Vought continued his dire assessment of the College’s position with regards to a quality faculty:

A long tour at CGSC has never been career enhancing, now we cannot even legitimize it as a recognized activity. In all honesty, the question of “quality” faculty is not only multifaceted (knowledge, ability to import [sic] it, etc.) but critical to CGSC’s institutional integrity. We run the risk of degrading the faculty by shifting those people identified as “exceptional” from teaching to functioning as staff action officers.\textsuperscript{54}

Word-of-mouth increased the problem of faculty recruitment. After the December 1976 Faculty Council meeting, Vought wrote, “Our currently tumultuous image is having its effects on faculty recruitment (i.e., no one wants to join the faculty unless his alternatives are thoroughly undesirable).”\textsuperscript{55} Faculty and the leadership hoped to improve the image of instructor duty, but they believed that “CAC will achieve solution to the problem of having adequate numbers of quality officer personnel only when young officers throughout the Army recognize the opportunities and challenges that exist here.” Then writer added hopefully “Quality will breed quality….\textsuperscript{56}"

\textsuperscript{52} DTD to Commandant, Fact Sheet, “Maximizing Faculty Expertise,” 17 November 1976, Folder DOD Committee on Excellence in Education-Fact Sheets, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{53} DTD to Commandant, Fact Sheet, “Quality of Faculty,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 1976, Folder DOD Committee on Excellence in Education-Fact Sheets, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. In the November 1976 staff memorandum prepared for a survey of intermediate staff colleges, the author noted, “There appears to be concern that promotion selection rates for faculty members varies from average selection rates.”

\textsuperscript{54} Donald B. Vought to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, “Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [7 April 1976],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 1976, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{55} Donald B. Vought to Harold W. Nelson, memorandum, “Major Channon’s Proposal to ‘Modernize’ the CGSC Classrooms Over a Period of Two Years,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 December 1976, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{56} Harold W. Nelson to Brigadier General William C. Louisell, memorandum, “Minutes of the Faculty Council Meeting [28 April 1977],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 29 April 1977, 2, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
Outside experts sought to increase the voice of the faculty in governance. The North Central Association accrediting team expressed concern about lack of a representative faculty council during accreditation visit in 1975. Since World War Two, the College’s faculty council had been comprised of department directors. The NCA recognized that the teaching faculty had no forum for governance, and the Association called this matter to the attention of the College’s leadership.57 Other external reviews reinforced the role faculty expertise played in the mix between student, faculty, and knowledge A January 1978 comment by the CGSC Advisory Committee highlighted this relationship:

In the judgment of the committee, it appears that the College’s approach to education reflects an almost obsessive concern with system, methodology, and classroom geography. It should be remembered that the quality of the faculty remains the most crucial variable in any school program. Indeed, it is the faculty quality that is the real essence of greatness in any educational institution.58

The committee’s reasoning formed the argument for later requests to obtain officers approximating these standards.

Recruiting faculty from within the student body, as one means to identify “good” officers, continued in the late seventies. The task proved difficult, because the administrative procedures imposed by the College staff turned the process into a paper drill. In-class observation was supplanted by reviews of student qualification cards, given the administration’s policy of requiring recommendations before the first term had finished. The Faculty Council, deeming the process illogical, requested an extension, since the policy resulted in “the hasty submission of a specific minimum number of names to meet an administrative requirement, rather than identification of

57 Memorandum by Charles H. Gregor, “Faculty Council Fact Sheet,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 June 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Interested in accommodating all aspects of the team’s recommendations, the College administration directed the faculty to come up with an organization. Department representatives met and drafted a structure consisting of sixteen members: ten elected by the departments and one appointed by each department director; one from Combat Studies Institute; and one elected and one appointed member from the sister services.

58 B.L. Harrison and others, “A Review of Education and Training for Officers, Career Progression,” vol. 2, E-4-7. Referred to as RETO.
specific officers whose personality, aptitude and knowledge indicate they would make good instructors.”

By the summer of 1978, CGSC’s leaders had an even stronger justification to request the Army send its best officers to teach. While he was TRADOC commander, General DePuy had lobbied for an Army-wide survey of the service’s needs for officer training and education. The Army’s Chief of Staff assented, and established the Officer Training and Education Review Group in August 1977, under Brigadier General (promotable) Ben Harrison’s chairmanship. Harrison, Cushman’s Deputy Commandant, released A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) in June of 1978. Similar in scale to the Haines Report, the comprehensive five-volume RETO study discussed every aspect of officer education. Some key findings concerning CGSC will be considered later, but the report reinforced the admonition of CGSC’s Advisory Committee:

The critical ingredient at USACGSC is the teaching faculty. No educational system, in the absence of good teachers, can insure a quality product. No student body can fully educate itself. Peer learning can reinforce, no replace, expert teaching. Not even an expertly designed course of instruction can overcome the absence of high quality faculty in sufficient numbers to create a favorable learning environment.

Unfortunately, not all of the Army’s senior leaders were convinced of the need to staff Leavenworth with the best. A January 1979 briefing to TRADOC’s Major General John Seigle highlighted the negative perception the Army had of CGSC. Brigadier General Robert Arter, the Deputy Commandant, reported to the Commandant that Major General Seigle had opened the session with two CGSC staff officers with the quip: “he was not sure the quality is there [CGSC] and asked the rhetorical question of ‘Who’s gotten promoted there?’ from the CGSC staff.” Majors DeReu and Van Steenburg, the two CGSC representatives presenting the briefing, pressed him on this point,


60 Implementation of major RETO findings would be greatly facilitated by Major General William R. Richardson, the Army DCSOPS. Richardson’s successive assignments allowed continuity during a period of significant realignment of the Army officer education system. Richardson became the next CGSC Commandant in October 1979, and he followed that assignment with service as the TRADOC Commanding General. His influence on the Army officer education system has been overshadowed by accounts focusing on General Donn A. Starry’s role. At the time of the RETO study, Richardson provided Major General B.L. Harrison, Chairman of the Review of Education and Training for Officers panel, with “wise counsel.” B.L. (Ben) Harrison to William R. Richardson, Washington, DC, 4 May 1978, Folder Officer Training, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA.

61 RETO, E-4-7.
highlighting the need for high-quality officers if the school was going to deliver a first-rate education. Seigle countered, saying, “CGSC should do a better job of training officers rather than ‘educating them.’”

In addition to the expertise deficit, Fort Leavenworth’s leaders had to cope with a severe shortage of officers, limiting the school’s ability to carry out existing tasks, much less introduce new ideas or return to proven practices, namely small groups. The RETO report noted that from 1974-1978 Leavenworth had lost approximately half of its faculty complement. This reduction led to larger classes, including the cessation of work group discussions. The faculty slipped back into old habits, as the “flashy, instructor-centered lesson” once again became the norm. Their technique broadcast the learning points to the students, and the student was expected to “pick up the important points.” Workloads rose, and faculty morale fell. In October 1980, the personnel situation worsened. TRADOC conducted a manpower survey that recommended the elimination of seventy-seven spaces within CAC. The combat development (CACDA) and training development (CATRADA) activities gained spaces, but CGSC lost slots. CAC spread the losses among its headquarters, but the number of officers available to teach dipped yet again.

The summer of 1982, while not too unfavorable from an accounting standpoint, looked very bad as a matter of practicality. During the summer rotation in June, CGSC had 179 of 223 authorized officers. The Deputy Commandant projected the loss of thirty-two more officers and sixty replacements. A new instructor still had to undergo faculty training, learn the material, and then

62 Robert Arter to Commandant, memorandum, “Trip Report of Majors DeReu and Van Steenburg,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 January 1979, Folder Miscellaneous Memos (1 of 2), Drawer 1978, Cabinet CAC, CAFLA. The two majors had been at TRADOC and the Pentagon to coordinate manning for CAS3. Seigle also made negative comments about the elective program, which he “viewed…as a waste of time.” Brigadier General Arter’s handwritten note at the bottom added “I’ve had several discussions with John re CGSC level instruction to include the benefits which come from the syndicate instruction method, calling for first rate people, smaller classes and the like. I read his comments in this light.”

63 RETO, E-4-7.

64 “A return to workgroup discussion as the predominate mode of instruction is blocked, or made extremely difficult, by a lack of instructor personnel, a product of personnel cuts based on the arbitrarily reached figure of 450 hours = 1 instructor. We do not teach basic training! A more appropriate basis for deriving required instructor strengths must be developed!” Unlabeled notes, Faculty Council meetings, ca. 1978, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

prepare to instruct. The late arrival of most replacements meant that the 1981-82 students would be instructed by experienced faculty two-thirds of the time, while one-third of the faculty would be see students, the classroom, and the lesson for the first time, simultaneously.67

In 1982, the College’s leadership began a sustained campaign designed to better the faculty situation. The Deputy Commandant, Major General Crosbie Saint, wrote his counterpart at the Army’s personnel center, asking for his assistance in promoting CGSC as a career-enhancing assignment. “It is my belief,” Saint observed, “that we must have the very best officer available to perform the vital tasks necessary in developing and teaching the Army’s future leaders doctrine and its application. Marginal or average doctrine/instructional developers do not train or educate superior performers for our Army.”68 The Deputy Commandant personally selected twenty-five officers from the 1983 class to stay as instructors, repeating a pattern from decades past.69

An opportunity to improve the personnel situation began when the Commandant, Lieutenant General Richardson, moved to the Pentagon to take an assignment as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and, therefore, the Army’s principal staff officer who oversaw TRADOC’s functions. This placed him in a unique position, having witnessed firsthand the need for higher-quality officers. He wrote Lieutenant General Maxwell R. Thurman, the Army’s personnel chief, in April 1982 to ask for assistance in staffing the College with faculty of better quality (appendix 8).70

Within the profession, quality had definable characteristics, hinted at by Richardson’s letter. Four

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67 Crosbie E. Saint to Commandant, memorandum, “Priority Functions and Staffing Constraints,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 1982, Folder Mission and Resources, HQ-002, CGSC 83, CAFLA. Within the teaching departments, Saint proposed increasing class sizes, eliminating electives, reducing conferences and participation in exercises, reducing faculty development, and delaying revision of the non-resident courses, among thirteen labor-saving measures.
68 Crosbie E. Saint to William C. Roll, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 March 1982, Folder Correspondence (MAR)-BG Crosbie E. Saint, Drawer 1982, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Saint’s letter also summarized the dismal situation regarding personnel on-hand. The College had 192 of 223 officers authorized, and the rolls were 100 officers below the required figure (292). TRADOC did host an “Officer Quality Conference: on 2 September 1982 at TRADOC headquarters at the urging of CAC’s leaders. Leavenworth’s personnel shortage was part of a general shortage of Army officers. The Army reported a shortage of 4000 majors and 1800 lieutenant colonels in September 1982.
70 William R. Richardson to Lieutenant General Thurman, Faculty for Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) and Army War College (AWC), Washington, DC, 1 April 1982, Folder RETO (Army Ed) Study, HQ-001, CGSC 79, CAFLA. A July 1982 staff paper excerpt mentioned that CGSC’s priority for personnel fill had been raised to the top-most level. Attachment to William A. Stofft to
basic criteria defined a top-notch field grade officer: selection for staff and senior service college attendance, military and civilian education level, selection and completion of command at the battalion and brigade, and selection for promotion the first time eligible. By those measures, Leavenworth and Army schools in general lagged behind other assignments. An analysis of lieutenant colonel promotion rates from 1981 showed school faculty and staff fell twelve percent behind the Army at large, although the two years before had been on par with average rates.71

Meanwhile, Fort Leavenworth’s leadership labored to accomplish their mission with the personnel at hand. Leaders grew frustrated, and their comments showed that they believed CGSC no longer was important to the Army. Major General Crosbie Saint, the Deputy Commandant, spoke frankly: “I would say that Leavenworth’s view of its importance and its true importance to the Army has significantly changed. (I’m talking in terms of the last two years; nothing startling has happened within the last year.) Leavenworth’s true importance and Leavenworth’s view of its importance…but the Army has not seen that…You can tell how a commander feels by where he puts his money—the Army doesn’t do it here. ROTC, recruiting, reserve components, and the initial entry training—that’s TRADOC’s preoccupation.”72 Saint said, “The quality isn’t here. I have maybe 10 people I can give a job to.”73 Brigadier General Saint would not see the positive effect of his efforts, but his successors benefitted from the work he did along with Lieutenant General Richardson.

Lieutenant General Richardson’s request seems to have resulted in a turnaround by 1984. The promotion board for lieutenant colonels selected twenty-six of thirty-one eligible majors in the primary zone of consideration, plus one officer selected from below the zone category. The eighty-three percent rate topped the Army-wide average by 12.8 points. Still, instructor duty did not rank highly among officers, and the individual officer’s perception of instructor duty at CGSC remained

one of the critical obstacles to recruiting a more-capable faculty. An interview with June 1984 graduates of the Regular Course revealed that they believed there was a “stigma attached to staying at CGSC to teach—students would fight [an] assignment.”

Faculty quality, measured against the personnel system’s standards, may have improved, but the quantity issue lingered. In 1984, personnel cutbacks forced departments to teach with fewer than half the number of officers their Table of Distribution and Allowances required. The Department of Tactics furnishes one extreme example. Organized into four committees—corps, division, threat, and doctrine—the department had 63.5 percent of its required personnel. The division and corps committees each had twenty-one of forty-one authorized officers. The department offset this gap with professional experience. All but two in the department had been to a staff college, over two-thirds had master’s degrees, and all had staff experience. The chiefs of the division, corps, and doctrine committees had commanded battalions and were slated to attend, or had attended, a senior service college. Officers in the department worked hard, though, to meet the incessant demands of the academic calendar. Instructors were the bare majority in the department of sixty-eight officers. The remainder wrote doctrine, worked on special studies (the AirLand Battle Study Group for example), or tended to administrative tasks.

Military faculty now shared the classroom with civilian professors, who had increased significantly since 1967. By 1975, Dr. Birrer no longer was the lone civilian professor on the faculty. The addition of electives brought more civilian instructors to CGSC classrooms, but these professors had not been part of the permanent faculty. Dr. Philip J. Brookes had joined the Department of Command faculty on July 1, 1975, although he had enjoyed a close association with the College since 1967 as part of the University of Kansas’ support to the elective program. Two other civilians, Drs.

73 Interview, Major General Saint, 4.
74 Alzheimer to GEN Richardson, “CGSC Interviews,” Ft. Monroe, VA, 4 October 1984, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, CAFLA. CGSC’s response, prepared under Major General Dave Palmer’s guidance noted that the perception was “hard to overcome….“ Unlabeled notes, “Issue – Response,” n.d., Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, CAFLA.
L.L. Sims and J.R. Goldman, served in the tactics and strategy departments, respectively. The creation of the Combat Studies Institute in 1979, discussed later, added full-time civilian faculty to the College. Ten professional historians were part of CSI in 1986. A smaller number of civilians, including Dr. Brookes, who had succeeded Dr. Birrer as the graduate program director in 1978, staffed other College departments. The presence of civilians, few of whom had any prior military service, denotes a striking departure from past patterns of professional education at CGSC.

When they were not teaching, instructors wrote lessons using the five-phase Accountable Instruction System (AIS) (an outgrowth of Instructional System Design), and they followed a fifteen-step course development process (appendix 9). Part of the over-engineered approach to instructional development imposed by TRADOC in the late seventies, lesson authors followed over 200 pages of detailed instructions contained the 1980 Author’s Handbook draft. The details focused on task analysis, treating graduate education as no more complicated than teaching someone to repair automobile engines. Its guidance included how to dissect complex topics as staff operations for tactical missions. The handbook suggested that an appropriate list might include:

- Staff estimates
- Tactical nuclear targeting package
- Mission analysis
- Mission statement
- Course of action can best be supported with personnel, logistics, or command and control
- Rear area protection plan
- Concept of the operation
- Course of action to accomplish the mission
- Required changes to OPORD [operations order] during battle
- Select most expedient mode of transmission
- Tactical plan
- Tactical movement plan
- Warning order

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Applying Cartesian principles to warfare, the lesson author reduced the complexities of combat to mechanical formulae, and they created lessons accordingly. In such an environment, overworked instructors had little patience for new ideas from the top.

**Teaching Tactics**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the core of the Leavenworth curriculum at one time was fire and maneuver. In that “simpler” time, a student immersed themselves in the study of operations of the Army in the field. The curriculum since the early sixties had most certainly moved away from that knowledge as the sole focus of the course. Even the term “course” had become a misnomer, for the Regular Course had expanded to a variety of courses, some having little to do with an army at war. Major General Cushman had attempted qualitative upgrades to the tactical curriculum, but progress was difficult. Colonel Bill Louisell, director of the tactics department, made what improvements he could, but when he departed in the summer of 1975, much work remained.

Changes in the tactics department spilled over to the rest of the College. The tension between departmental perspectives and what was viewed as retrenchment in the curriculum spilled over into the Faculty Council. Faculty members argued that peacetime skills needed as much emphasis as did those required for combat. As they became more familiar with the active defense doctrine and the new FM 100-5, officers reacted negatively to the 1976 manual and guidance to re-emphasize operations. “The emphasis on combat skills is really a holdover from training a mobilization Army,” recorded on participant at the February 6, 1977 council meeting. Sometimes comments bordered on the illogical. “We emphasize ‘win the first battle’ but spend too much time on the combat aspects of

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78 Doughty discusses the first round of changes in tactical instruction implemented in 1974-75. Among the changes were an introductory lesson based on the Battle of Schmidt and coverage of platoon, company, battalion, and brigade operations. Doughty, CGSC, 76-82.

battle.” The Army’s senior leaders had a different view of the matter of tactical proficiency. “There are very few Majors and Lieutenant Colonels running around in the Army today” wrote Brigadier General Paul F. Gorman in 1978, “who have much more than a kindergarten idea of how to put together all combat power to insure that every dollar invested gets three dollars back.” Gorman was not alone in his criticism.

Sixty-eight percent of the graduates of the 1981 Regular Course responded to a CGSC survey about post-graduation assignments. Slightly over thirty percent went to joint, combined, Army, or major command staffs. Tactical units gained 29.2 percent of the graduates, and 139 respondents, about twenty-eight percent, went to training assignments, such as service school instructor, ROTC, Recruiting Command, or further schooling. The wide range of post-College assignments strengthened the argument for a broad curriculum, but Army leaders began to question the wisdom of such an approach to officer education.

A genuine concern regarding the Army officer’s ability to plan and conduct tactical operations surfaced in the late seventies and early eighties. From the perspective of a tactical commander, “Leavenworth had become an orientation course for majors, with emphasis on humanities, political and social sciences. The major could graduate from Leavenworth without having read a single ‘hard’ book, professional or otherwise.” Christopher Bassford’s *The Spit-Shine Syndrome* detailed the many failures of the modern military officer in performing his duties. Bassford, looking back at the post-war military, claimed that officers lacked the ability to carry out

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80 Faculty were not alone in their professional skepticism. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to William E. DePuy, SHAPE, Belgium, 10 September 1976, Folder Al Haig’s Comments on 1976 100-5, CAFLA.
82 Sidney L. Linver to Deputy Commandant, memorandum, “CGSC Graduate Assignment Profile (1),” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 January 1982, Folder Correspondence (January-February)-BG Crosbie E. Saint, Drawer 1982, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
83 Donn A. Starry to Richard M. Swain, Fairfax Station, VA, 7 June 1995, 19-20.
their basic functions, and the military possessed none of the skill of its immediate predecessor.\textsuperscript{85} “Today’s army was born in the 1950s, and in the process the older, genuinely military tradition was obliterated.”\textsuperscript{86} Another wider issue was the preparation of officers to serve as planners in high-level staffs. A Strategic Studies Institute report, “Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners,” raised more questions about professional competence and whether the Army as a service had the ability to develop officers capable of performing duties in operational headquarters.\textsuperscript{87} Notwithstanding the emerging interest in operational art, the Army, and other services, had lost the ability to plan contingency operations on a large scale. As more and more Army leaders had come to appreciate since Vietnam, the profession had lost more than a war.

The effects of the 1976 doctrine can be seen in a major change in the College’s mission, which was publicized in revised curriculum guidance for the 1978-79 course. Issued on January 20, 1978, the new mission statement reflected the belief that CGSC should produce battalion commanders. In stark contrast to the post-war mission statement, the College was now expected to “prepare graduates to…command battalions, brigades, and equivalent-sized units in peace or war.” The directive added the educational requirement to prepare officers to “serve as principal staff officers from brigade through division, to include support commands, and as staff officers of higher echelons, including major Army, joint, unified or combined headquarters, major Army installations and agencies.”\textsuperscript{88} For an institution that had previously experienced difficulty teaching division and higher operations, the lowering of focus to the brigade and battalion added an extraordinary burden.

\textsuperscript{85} Bassford, 2.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 3. Bassford recommended changes in the Army’s evaluation system, the organization of units, and the selection of officers.
\textsuperscript{87} Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, the Army DCSOPS, asked the Commandant of the Army War College to “identify deficiencies in the Army’s planner production system,” meaning officer education, and to “determine what can be done to enhance planning in the Army by improving the Army’s planner production system.” In his study directive, Richardson said, “The greatest potential source of planners is the Command and General Staff College. However, until recently its curriculum was deficient in planner training.” The report did observe the problem had deeper roots than simply a deficiency at Fort Leavenworth. Strategic Studies Institute, “Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 30 September 1982. Judith Hicks, Stiehm, \textit{U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy} (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002) sampled the Army War College experience in 1985, 1990, and 1995. Stiehm attributed the “civilianization” of the Army War College to shifts at the Naval War College, the Skelton hearings (discussed in conclusion), and the end of the Cold War. Stiehm, 182-183.
At CGSC, the lack of stable, understood, and accepted doctrine contributed to an interregnum in which the Department of Tactics could do little more than delay. The curriculum development cycle hampered the ability to adapt to the new “how-to-fight” doctrine. In October 1980, Colonel Clyde J. Tate, director of the tactics department, wrote Lieutenant General Richardson about the widespread confusion over Active Defense doctrine. Tate wrote, “I don’t believe that the solution is to issue fresh circulars, pamphlets, or executive summaries to the field. Such efforts might be viewed as edicts from the Ivory Tower which compound confusion rather than dispelling it.” Colonel Tate believed that the best option was “to let the process of doctrinal development take its course while continuing to train our people according to published doctrine.”

An unexpected consequence of the Instructional Systems Design model contributed to the deferral. The separation of doctrine development from the teaching of doctrine—the division of research from the teachers—created a situation in which “the instructors were very shallow,” since “they did not know the reasons behind the words that were in the doctrine, nor the reasons, the theories, the tradeoffs, the arguments, or how certain words were arrived at in doctrine.”

In the course of revising tactical instruction, the College faculty nearly succeeded in extirpating low intensity conflict, small wars, internal defense, and counterinsurgency from the curriculum by 1980. Low intensity conflict instruction for the 1981-82 course fell to a mere eight hours. Security assistance operations lessons in 1980-81 claimed forty-six hours to, including scenarios in Thailand, Africa, and Latin America. The original guidance for the 1981-82 [1981-82] Regular Course cut the subsequent year’s lessons to four one-hour topics (an introduction, insurgency, internal defense and development strategy, and security forces) and two two-hour lessons.

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89 Clyde J. Tate to William R. Richardson, memorandum, “Continued Confusion on the Active Defense,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 October 1980, Folder Continued Confusion on Active Defense, Drawer 1980, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. Interestingly, one of the principal drafters of active defense doctrine, Lieutenant General Starry, had discovered as the V Corps commander in Europe the untenable nature of Active Defense doctrine. His insights from this period led to the concept of AirLand Battle. Starry to Swain, 13-17 recounted his time as corps commander.

90 Brigadier General Donald R. Morrelli by John L. Romjue, Oral History Interview, 12 January 1983, 11-12, Folder DTAC 030, Drawer 1983, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
(terrorism and security assistance). Colonel Tate’s counter-proposal in March 1981 would have added hours to the lessons plus hours for an application exercise, which were not part of the plan, and two case studies. Department directors refused to give up any of their allocated hours to increase the coverage, so it remained at its lowest point since the early sixties. By the 1983-84 Regular Course, LIC instruction increased from sixteen to twenty-three hours (table 10).  

The subject of tactical expertise continued to simmer. Following a division commander’s conference in December 1981, the TRADOC commander, General Glenn K. Otis, sent a message to the CAC commander asking for ideas of how to identify and cultivate “selected tacticians for battalion level command.” Lieutenant General Howard F. Stone’s March 1982 response did little more than deflect the idea, saying that the “Army requires a much broader base of tactically competent officer than those few ultimately selected for battalion and higher command.” In Stone’s view, selecting tactically competent officers was the function of personnel selection boards. The College did institute a Master Tactician Program “to identify and recognize tactical excellence displayed by students during their academic year . . .”  

The year AirLand Battle doctrine was released, Colonel Tate wrote the Director of Academic Operations, Colonel Sidney L. Linver, to express concern over the proposed shift of some tactical instruction to programmed texts and self-study. Tate observed, “The rest of the army is saying we need to get back to the fundamentals, ‘stress the basics,’ and we at CGSC continue to reduce the fundamentals. Are we at cross purposes?” Tate thought some of the non-military instruction could

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92 Attachment to Clyde J. Tate to LTG Richardson, memorandum, “GO Workshop on Air Assault and Airborne Division,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 March 1981, Folder Miscellaneous Documents, Drawer, 1981, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.  
94 CDR TRADOC to CDR USACAC, message, “Division Commanders Conference,” Fort Monroe, VA, 031600Z FEB 82, Folder Training Tacticians, CTAC-007, CGSC 82, CAFLA.  
95 CDR USACAC to CDR TRADOC, message, “Identification and Training of Tacticians,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 162000Z MAR 82, Folder Training Tacticians, CTAC-007, CGSC 82, CAFLA.  
be reduced. Linver’s reply signaled agreement but conceded it would take time before substantive change could occur. “I am in wholehearted agreement with your comment recommending that ‘we reduce core hours in the soft subjects that have little relevance to teaching Army officers how we fight.’ It would greatly assist in the planning for /4 if you would be more definitive in your recommendation for those hours of soft subjects which should, in your opinion, be eliminated.”

Linver continued, “Since /4 and /5 will largely center on combat operations in the division, corps and echelon above the corps, it is imperative that the College get your best judgment with respect to the instruction in this critical area. Clyde, I sorely need your attention to this far ranging policy matter.”

Embedded in Linver’s reply is the admission that the doctrine of AirLand Battle would not be fully implemented in the upcoming course. The work of improving tactical instruction would wait another year.

In January 1984, the Department of Tactics reorganized into a corps and division committee. Previously, the department had an offense and a defense committee. Faculty adapted to their new configuration as they prepared to teach AirLand Battle. A message later that year from Robert W. Garrott, Jr., CGSC’s Department of Tactics director, showed what had been accomplished and just how much work remained to be done. The origins of his message, entitled “Tactical Training at CGSC,” remain obscure, but in quoting a conversation on the topic of tactical instruction, Garrott highlighted the slow pace of change:

I am concerned that tactical teaching and application in TRADOC schools are falling short of our goal of developing competent and confident tacticians to become the Army’s future battalion commanders. Tactical mastery requires stimulating instruction and rigorous intellectual application, yet my sensing is that tactical teaching is mostly pedestrian and students’ thinking is largely rote. Thus, there is a tactical void that will not


99 CGSC, briefing, “Comparison of AY 82-85 Curriculum,” 6 January 1984, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 85, CAFLA.
be corrected without a powerful effort on the part of CGSC and branch schools alike to widen tactical appreciation and deepen tactical understanding.\textsuperscript{100} Garrott’s message revealed that only in the past year had students engaged in division tactical exercises in which they had to make tactical decisions. The 1985 lesson on division operations (P316), largely a result of Lieutenant Colonel William D. Meier’s efforts, had the students both plan and execute a division offensive operation. This was a major shift, as previous tactical instruction had ended with planning. Meier later said, “It worked so well in October of ’85 that after it was repeated in December ’85 its methodology was adopted and transposed to elements of various pre-command courses and to the tactical seminar as well as throughout the Department of Tactics.”\textsuperscript{101} Officers had few, if any, opportunities to test their concepts against a thinking opponent. Garrott also pointed out that there was no equivalent applicatory exercise at the corps level.\textsuperscript{102}

One last development merits mention before proceeding to other aspects of the College’s evolution. During this period, a broader view of large unit operations, one more consonant with the historical experience of armies, began to take shape. Logistics, long separated from the College’s lessons on tactical operations, began to show up more frequently in the faculty’s and leader’s discussions. The faculty began to look at the idea that “logisticians must be tacticians, and vice versa,” as retired Lieutenant General Galvin wrote in December 1983.\textsuperscript{103}

The lingering question of purpose and audience led Captain Raymond Drummond of the College staff to believe he had found an inconsistency between the Army’s newfound interest in tactical operations and the composition of the class. Drummond calculated that combat arms officers

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\textsuperscript{100} Robert W. Garrott, Jr., message, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 132200Z SEP 85, Folder Papers on Tactical Training, DTAC-009, CGSC 85, CAFLA. In the file, Garrott’s message may be missing the full addressee list; it is not certain whether he was writing one of the other branch schools or TRADOC. The source of the message’s quote is not attributed, although they resemble almost verbatim the General Richardson’s remarks to DTAC. Dr. W. Glenn Robertson noted in his analysis of the tactics courses from between 1973-74 and 1984-85 that the percentage of hours had declined by five percent. The more telling comment is his subjective observation: “I can’t prove it, statistically or otherwise, but the perception of reduced tactics instruction may stem not from a reduction in the number of hours, but instead from the manner in which the subject has been taught in recent years.” W. Glenn Robertson to Colonel Frasche, memorandum, “Analysis of Course Three (Tactics), 1974-84,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19 September 1984, Folder AHR Input, CTAC (DTAC)-001, CGSC 85, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{101} Michael Pearlman interview with Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) William Meiers, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1986, Folder General, CTAC-003, CGSC 85, CAFLA. Major William D. Meier, “D316/6, Lesson 4, Instructor and Controller Guide,” 10 September 1985, Folder General, CTAC-003, CGSC 85, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{102} Robert W. Garrott, Jr. message, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 132200Z SEP 85.
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comprised a smaller proportion of the student body. The 1980 class had 178 infantry officers, but had declined to 150 by the 1984 class. Artillerymen had dropped, too, from 104 to seventy-five. Much of the decrease could be attributed to the smaller class size, but even then, combat arms officers fell below fifty percent of the course’s students in 1984. Attendance by officers of support branches had increased slightly.  

During 1982-85, the College curriculum used a planning figure of 1,624 hours. As shown in table 10, core academic hours ranged from 670 to 796. Added to this load was 240 hours for Individual Development Courses, as electives had come to be known, and hours for guest speakers, COMPS, counseling, fitness, and physical training. Individual study hours accounted for thirty-four percent of the course in 1981-82 but decreased steadily to twenty-seven percent of the course by 1985. Tactics, it should be noted, shrank to less than 150 hours (table 10).  

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Source: CGSC, Briefing, Comparison of AY 82-85 Curriculum, 6 January 1984.


105 While it may appear that tactics decreased overall, the college-wide exercises used tactical scenarios and thus should be factored in to any conclusions. CGSC, briefing, “Comparison of AY 82-85 Curriculum,” 6 January 1984.
It is not difficult to see why some might question whether Leavenworth was doing enough to create competent tacticians.

If there remained any doubt as to the direction the former Commandant, now TRADOC commander, intended the College to move, General Richardson’s remarks to the Department of Tactics on October 28, 1985 dispelled them. “Warfighting is the core of our profession. Unless Leavenworth builds warfighting competence, we don’t stand a chance of executing our doctrine and winning the next war.” Richardson then laid out his expectations: “All departments at CGSC are important, but DTAC sets the tone.” This meant that instructors “can’t approach responsibilities with an attitude of business as usual, can’t be satisfied staying one jump ahead of the student,” and the instructor “can’t be reduced to acting as a transmitter of canned material.”

Knowing the propensity to interpret platitudes to mean something else, Richardson did not leave to the instructors’ imagination what he expected. “This is what I want,” the general continued:

- Instructors who are authorities rather than mechanics—who teach students how to think, not what to think and what to do.
- A balance in the instruction that covers the entire spectrum of warfighting but emphasizes the principles of AirLand Battle through a focus on the execution of division tactical operations.
- An emphasis on the quality of student thinking and a halt on mechanical approaches to instruction that reduce learning to techniques and formula.
- Instruction focused at the student who is prepared to profit from attendance.
- In short, I want less form and more content—an emphasis on product rather than process.
- DTAC instructors set the tactical standards for the Army. If it is not done here, it won’t be done.

General Richardson closed with one final observation, “What you are trying to accomplish is not measured on exams but is the foundation of warfighting competence for the Army.”

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106 The notes from Richardson’s talk continued with two significant critiques: instruction lacked balance and “classes are sterile and pedestrian and exercises mechanical and rote.” “Remarks by General William R. Richardson to DTAC,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 28 October 1985, Folder Papers on Tactical Training, DTAC-009, CGSC 85, CAFLA.

months later, the revival of tactics in the CGSC curriculum led to the re-designation of the Department of Tactics as the Center for Army Tactics.\textsuperscript{108} The new name reflected an increasingly positive atmosphere among the faculty and leadership within the College. Tactics was not the only subject taught at Fort Leavenworth, however. Military history and the operational level of war had flourished. A newfound interest in studying professional knowledge led to the establishment of new organizations. Major General Palmer noted this in 1985, as he closed out his tour as Deputy Commandant. “There has been a renaissance in the way we think about our business—warfighting—and that thinking is centered in and around Bell Hall on the banks of the Missouri.”\textsuperscript{109} All that remained was to convince the faculty and students this was indeed the case.

**The “Leavenworth ‘B’”**

In 1973, student evaluation at Leavenworth bore little relation to student achievement. Grade inflation had pushed the preponderance of grades into the upper reaches. In Major General Cushman’s assessment, this was wholly unsatisfactory. For AY 74-75, he imposed a cap of twenty percent on “A”s.\textsuperscript{110} Paradoxically, this measure decreased student motivation. Instead of striving for excellence, students had little incentive to put effort into their studies, since the chances of failing were miniscule. Over time, the term “Leavenworth B” became synonymous with half-hearted effort.

Major General Cushman’s edict, while seemingly draconian, simply highlighted that the standards in the College had slipped. Evaluation meant little. If all students were doing that well, perhaps the wrong measures were being applied, or the tests were too easy. Regardless, the symptoms called for an evaluation of the evaluation program.


\textsuperscript{109} Dave R. Palmer to Commander, CAC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 1985, Folder Major General Dave R. Palmer, Deputy Commandant, HQ-004/001, CGSC 85, CAFLA.
In December 1973, Major General Cushman announced more adjustments. In the time since Major General Johnson had done away with exam weeks, the College had resumed dedicating a week for examinations. This was going to change. The Commandant directed that common curriculum would no longer be evaluated during an examination week, scheduled in January. He introduced subjective grading to the College. Instead, “a method of more continuous and subjective evaluation” was to be employed, using a variety of techniques: “formal oral presentations, informal oral presentations, classroom contributions, written homework assignments, research products, book reports, quizzes and examinations. Course grades could not be derived solely from an end-of-course examination.”  

Evaluation standards collapsed. Four Regular Course officers failed to graduate in June 1974 for academic deficiencies. In the next five classes, no Regular Course officers failed.  

“...The perceived decline was attributed to an increase in subjective evaluation. Some members asserted that “we now have problems in this area because we often teach from ephemeral sources reflecting new doctrine and, lacking definitive sources, cannot require specific student responses.”  

Between 1981 and 1983, five U.S. officers failed to complete the course—three active and two reservists. The reasons for failure shifted significantly, however. The scales kept more officers from graduating than did any inability to learn. Two were declared non-graduates for academic or ethical reasons, and three were dismissed for failing to meet the Army’s height and weight standards. Officers kept Academic Boards busy during the 1982-83 course, however. The Board met four times during the year to

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110 Doughty, 69, 85-86. Birrer, 150-151. “Jack had read about the so-called grade inflation that plagues all colleges; his solution was an interesting one. He said, ‘I’ll fix that. By definition we will have no more than 20 percent A’s.’” Birrer continued, “Jack said, ‘Except for the top 20 percent, the typical grade will be the Leavenworth B.’”

111 Attachment to James K. Murphy to Operations Division, LTC Stockett, memorandum, “Input to College History, 17 January 1975, 11, Folder Director of Resident Instruction Historical Input, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.

112 Charles H. Gregor to Deputy Commandant, “Address to Faculty,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 July 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.


114 Sidney L. Linver, Fact Sheet, “Status of Non-Graduates,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 20 June 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA. In AY 81-82, one captain failed the Reserve CGSOC course academically, and one major was declared a non-graduate and subsequently separated from the Army. The next year, one Reserve CGSOC student and two full-year class students could not meet the weight standards for graduation. Also corroborated in W.G. Robertson, Memorandum for Record, “Interview with Mrs. Betty Overfield of
consider academic deficiencies of twenty-six officers. Despite the relative ease of the course, academic ethics slipped. Cheating among students drew increased notice. An Academic Board dismissed one officer involved in a 1983 cheating incident on a staff communications assignment. U.S. students were not the only ones singled out for reproach; the Board placed four Allied officer placed on academic probation in the winter and spring of 1983. Overall, the “Leavenworth B,” and its close relative, the “Leavenworth A,” supplanted the “school solution” as the standard for achievement.

The College staff proposed an evaluation system of credit or no-credit in March 1979. The Faculty Council recorded its concern during its May 3, 1979 meeting. During an extensive discussion, the nine members expressed their collective frustration at the evaluation program. “We appear to be moving at a rapid rate away from the stringent evaluation of our officers that has allowed identification of officers clearly superior in performance and intellectual capability, an identification process that has served the Army well.” In the faculty’s view, Leavenworth’s grading policy should encourage a “competitive environment” creating “the stimulus for eager and active participation in the learning process.” They warned that continuing present practices would taint the faculty’s view of their role, leading to further decline as faculty would begin to accept average work as superior. “[T]he Council feels that the issue of the quality and credibility of the CGSC educational experience as perceived by other military and civilian agencies must be considered.”

The perceived impertinence of the faculty infuriated the Director of Education and Curriculum Affairs. In a hotly-worded rebuttal, Colonel Warne D. Mead lashed out at the “mis-information” and “lack of knowledge” displayed in...
the Council’s minutes saying the members were “totally unaware” of the written guidance “approved by all the Department Directors and the Deputy Commandant.” In Mead’s view, the proposed policy had none of the negative qualities mentioned by the Faculty Council, and, in fact, had remedies for every single objection raised. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Gregor, in turn, fired back:

As Director, DECA, you are satisfied that such evaluation will have certain required characteristics. The ‘policy’ says so. This is your ‘reality.’ The instructor, however, has another reality….He observes that the evaluation process in credit/no credit courses can become nominal at best. The evaluation process is watered-down, reduced, and becomes a perfunctory exercise that wastes time and reduces the learning levels originally intended….It is the reality the Council feels it must reflect and convey if it is to continue to contribute to this institution.

The faculty felt that the school’s senior leadership did not support them, even when the faculty attempted to impose uphold academic standards in the classroom. The Deputy Commandant took notice. Gregor, chairman of the Faculty Council, wrote the Deputy Commandant after his address to the faculty in July 1979. Gregor said, “the specific issue involved is support of faculty recommendations to relieve officers from the Regular Course for academic failure.” He continued, saying “The feeling that no officer will fail the College prevails, reinforcing the ‘Leavenworth B’ syndrome on the part of students, encouraging academic lethargy.”

Grades rose perceptibly in the 1980s, in some instances reaching nearly ninety-nine percent of the students rated above average and superior. As one example, the grades for P455, a core course in the Department of Sustainment and Research Operations, showed only eight officers rated as

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118 Charles H. Gregor to Deputy Commandant, memorandum, “Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [3 May 1979],” 15 May 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
119 Warne D. Mead to Faculty Council Members, memorandum, “Minutes of the 3 May Faculty Council Meeting,” 17 May 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
120 Charles H. Gregor to Director, DECA, “DECA Memorandum for Faculty Council Members Dated 17 May 1979,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 May 1979, 2, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Gregor’s memorandum is notable for his nerve; he was a lieutenant colonel writing to a colonel demanding an apology to the Council. “You have called them assinine [sic], ignorant, misinformed and unable to understand their work. You have said they have done nothing to contribute to this institution. I am insulted by such presumptuous, crass and puerile comment. I assume my colleagues are no less so. I suggest appropriate apology.” The open disagreement between the faculty council and DECA resulted in DECA receiving a non-voting seat on the council. Charles H. Gregor to Deputy Commandant, memorandum, “Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [24 May 1979],” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
121 Charles H. Gregor to Deputy Commandant, memorandum, “Address to Faculty,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 July 1979, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
average, and a single failure (table 11). While civilian graduate schools commonly require maintenance of a B average, the proportion of As in the class indicates a return to leniency.

Table 11. Overall final grades P455 in AY86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Student Divisions</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P455/AY86 PIC, Folder Post-Instructional Conferences, DSRO-004, CGSC 86, CAFLA.

The College as a whole fared no better. The cumulative grades for all Term 1 courses in the subsequent year’s course showed ninety-six percent of the students granted above average and superior marks, although the grades were more evenly distributed between As and Bs.122

Mediocrity, fueled by grade inflation and intellectual torpor, became commonplace. Students had little fear of failing the course, and they did not feel challenged by the material, going so far as to state that the 1980 “course is not graduate level” in their end-of-course reviews.123 The course simply was not challenging them to think, and officers did not need grades to tell them so.

The level at which instruction should start lingered as a significant question, and one that had many answers, depending on whom one asked. From the instructor’s perspective, the diversity of the class mandated that basic material be taught and tested first. From the advanced students’ perspective, instruction on fundamentals was a waste of valuable time, leaving untouched the more complex subjects they thought they had come to Leavenworth to learn. In their opinion, they knew the basics and were ready for graduate-level courses.124

On the other hand, the results of pre-course testing instituted in 1977 and 1978 told a different story (appendix 11). Similar to the inventory tests of the late 1940s, CGSC’s Deputy Commandant

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122 The Directorate of Academic Operations reported a composite distribution of grades for all classes taught in Term I during a post-instructional conference held on 4 February 1987. The percentages showed 45% (3,413)-A, 51% (3,784)-B, 3% (218)-C, 1% (7)-U, and 1% (30)-I. Folder Post-Instructional Conference for Term I, CTAC-010, CGSC 86, CAFLA.

123 C.W. Hendrix, DF, “Results of Commandant’s After Course Critique for the CGSC /0 Class,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 June 1980, Folder After Course Critique, Drawer 1980, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
added an Inventory Examination as a prerequisite for Regular Course students. The exam tested comprehension in seven areas, including military subjects like tactics and strategy and subjects like history, management, and geography. In the 1977-78 course, the cumulative average across the College was 59.8 percent; the next year’s class scored 0.4 percent better. The results were not attributable to the diversity of the class, either. In the 1978 class, combat arms officers averaged 63.0 percent on the tactics section, while the lawyers, dentists, and doctors in the class achieved 54.1 percent in that area. The outcomes disturbed the senior leaders; the scores gave the faculty some satisfaction.

The AY 82-83 entrance results did not show much improvement. In fact, they showed a slight decline in officer general knowledge. A message sent to TRADOC reported, “Test results in AY 82/83 showed that only 123 (19%) of 648 students achieved 50%, 19 (3%) of 648 students achieved 60%, and not a single student achieved a 70% score on the baseline survey.” It was clear that officers, very busy in their pre-enrollment assignments, had little time to keep themselves current on preparatory material.

As one means to impart fundamental knowledge, the College developed the Combat Skills Comprehensive Phase (COMPS) consisting of two parts: non-resident and resident. About five months before the course started, the school sent extension course materials to officers who could voluntarily study the books prior to arrival at CGSC. During COMPS Week (part of the academic

124 “State of DECA,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 1979, 18, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
125 Ibid., 3. Major General Cushman had explored the concept of requiring “officers to develop, and hopefully to demonstrate, a high order of military competence prior to their selection for CGSC…. In support of this idea, he had asked the TRADOC Educational Advisor, Dr. Joseph H. Kanner, about testing the 1974-75 class using the Graduate Record Examination and Miller Analogies Test. John H. Cushman to Dr. Joseph H. Kanner, Letter, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 July 1974, Folder Correspondence (CGSC)-MG J.H. Cushman, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA.
126 Jack B. Farris, Jr., memorandum, “Comparison of Inventory Exam Results (/8 vs /9),” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 September 1978, Folder Inventory Examination, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. The examination consisted of five parts: an English grammar test; the Nelson-Denny Reading Test; national security, geography, management, and budget; threat, logistics, and combat service support; and tactics and resources. The multiple-choice sections asked questions such as: “The primary mission of the United States Army is:”; “The Secretary of the Army is responsible for:”; and “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is:”. Part 3, Inventory Examination, n.d. [ca. 1978], Folder Inventory Examination, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
127 CAC to TRADOC, message, “CGSC Research in Support of Training and Doctrine,” 141230Z APR 83, 2, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83.
year), officers studied self-paced lessons and then took a post-test. Students deemed “marginal” or “not competent” were offered remedial training, later known as “Bonehead Tactics.”

Despite the effort invested in creating COMPS, faculty continued to re-teach the material in the classroom, rather than using it as a foundation for advanced instruction. “An abiding problem of the CGSC core curriculum has been its remedial character. A great deal of the core curriculum is devoted to providing basic factual information required of our students before substantive military education can be conducted.” Students, faced with a lecture on material already studied, did a “mind dump” or became “frustrated.” The Chief of the Division Operations Committee in DTAC made no apologies for demanding students learn the basics on their own time.

In a graduate school classroom, if you displayed ignorance of a fundamental concept, the instructor did not stop, take you back to your undergraduate (or some enabling course) learning, and reteach that concept. He told you that you needed to spend some extra time studying that which you should already have learned and that he would not take valuable class time to go over fundamental material. We have to move in that direction….If we don’t, then the word goes out and we will never be able to teach that which we should be teaching.

Faculty contributed to the motivation problem by unprofessional conduct. Surveys of the 1979 and 1980 classes revealed the nature of CGSC from a students’ perspective. The College treated student-officers as if they had set aside their “self-discipline, curiosity, intellect, and sense of responsibility” the day they reported to class. Students saw their relationship with instructors as adversarial; some faculty ruled by threats or intimidation from the platform, insulting students or other departments during presentations. Field grade officers, treated as unruly, petulant children, took on the mantle, stacked arms, and waited for graduation.

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128 Sidney L. Linver, Fact Sheet, “Combat Skills Comprehensive Phase (COMPS),” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 June 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA. Crosbie E. Saint to CGSC Student Officers, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d., Folder Correspondence (MAR-APR)-MG Crosbie E. Saint, Drawer 1983, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. The idea of an entrance examination continued to surface. In 1986, a staff paper proposed a “Military GRE” for prospective CGSOC students, citing both CAS3’s prerequisites and SAMS’ entrance examinations as support for the idea. Officers selected by the board would be designated as candidates and would have to pass an entrance examination before admission. CGSC, “The Military GRE,” n.d. [ca. 1986], Folder SGI, HQ-011/003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.


131 Meloy Report, Executive Summary, 4, CARL.
Faculty lowered their own credibility, too. Students quickly sensed whether an instructor was prepared for the day’s class or simply unmotivated to teach. Subjective comments from the Class of 1980 rated the quality of instructors as “mediocre” or “poor,” questioning whether teachers were screened. Instructors who remarked, “I don’t like the class either; I just teach it,” and “I’m sorry this will be boring, but I’m not the author” quickly lowered the class’ expectations. Students learned soon after the academic year started that doing homework was fruitless, since the instructor would often present the homework during the lesson. In very few instances, students were asked to actively participate, and when they did, it was usually upon receipt of a “Blue Goose.” In such cases, the officer received a packet of blue papers, a requirement to perform, and not much guidance beyond what was printed. Only 4.4 percent of the 1979-80 students rated the quality of instruction as excellent. 36.6 percent thought it good, while 44.9 percent believed it “adequate.” On the other hand, approximately sixty percent of the class thought the year had prepared them for their next assignment.132 In total, the Regular Course officer hardly saw this as the “best year of their lives.”133

Sustaining motivation in the classroom drew the Deputy Commandant’s attention. Shortly after the start of classes in August 1980, Brigadier General Robert H. Forman expressed his concern about some instructors’ attitudes in the classroom.134 He wrote all of the department directors, “I’m already receiving feedback that some of our instructors are introducing their subjects with ‘this isn’t testable”. The signal there somehow is, it isn’t important….Let’s get it stopped.”135

The College did attempt to reward the highly-competent student. The Master Tactician Program, mentioned earlier, the Marshall Award, the Pershing Award, and the Eisenhower Award recognized academic achievement. As a further incentive, the school offered the option to “test out”

132 C.W. Hendrix, DF, “Results of Commandant’s After Course Critique for the CGSC /0 Class,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 June 1980. The students did not complain about everything, naming ten instructors as “good guys,” along with the strategy, Men in Battle, and logistics exercises.
134 General Starry had little respect for doctrine writers, or instructors, at Fort Leavenworth. His 1995 letter to Richard Swain details the sluggishness with which the Leavenworth writers approached the task of FM 100-5 and, more importantly, how they acted after DePuy rejected their draft manual. Starry characterized their actions as “shabby” and highly non-professional.” He described the collective attitude on the banks of the Missouri as the “Leavenworth malaise.” Starry to Swain, 9-10, 12-13, 15, and 19-20.
of fundamentals courses. A student who chose to challenge a subject could take a subject exam; those who achieved eighty percent or better got credit for the course. Of the 1982-83 class, forty-seven students attempted in one or more Term 1 courses; nineteen passed. The entry-level of the officers was less than they themselves supposed but that factor only partially explains the dynamic of student, knowledge, and faculty. The school’s leadership pondered their options.

By Extension

Major General Harrison’s RETO study addressed a systemic issue that had affected the Army’s officer education system since World War Two. For approximately half of the Army’s active officers, attendance at a branch advanced course was their last formal professional education. Any further development took place during subsequent assignments. True, they could enroll in the staff officer’s course through correspondence or the USAR school system, but as will be shown, these two paths became increasingly disconnected from the College’s curriculum, much less the Army’s new environment.

Non-resident options retained much of the same character that they had acquired in the previous decade; however, inside the College system, the non-resident program declined in importance. An organizational change in January 1976 had abolished the Department of Non-resident Instruction, formerly led by a colonel, and aligned the function under the Department of Education and Training. The newly-minted Extension Training Management Division graduated 2,359 officers in 1975-76.

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137 Options available other than the Regular Course in 1972-73 included correspondence plus a two-week resident phase at Fort Leavenworth; a USAR school plus the two-week resident phase at Fort Leavenworth; completing half the course by correspondence and the second half in residence at Leavenworth; or any combination of the above. The course took eighteen to thirty-six months. Enrollment in all correspondence courses and the USAR schools totaled 16,861. An additional 157 Allied officers were enrolled. CGSC, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, January 1974, 10-11, Folder Annual Historical Summary-JUL 72-JUN 73, Drawer, 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. CGSC, “POI (Program of Instruction) Command and General Staff Officer Course Nonresident/Resident 3 Year and 4 Year Options 1974-75,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1974, CARL.
138 ETM Division, “History of DNRI,” n.d., Folder DNRI Historical Input, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
In years past, the school had struggled to maintain some parity between the Regular Course and the extension course. The situation worsened in the mid-seventies. The College staff continued to distribute preparation requirements, but the quality of the work produced by faculty varied significantly. As a result of the instability in the basic curriculum, the non-resident program plunged into disarray. 1977 saw a renewed interest in non-resident studies from four sources: inside the College, Forces Command (FORSCOM), TRADOC, and the Army’s RETO study group. In a summary of the January 1977 Faculty Council meeting, the chairman captured the grim situation portrayed by the Deputy Commandant. During his discussion with the council, the Deputy Commandant remarked, “Non-resident Instruction—vast improvement is required. We need answers to basic questions such as selection procedures, course content and conduct. Tremendous effort must be brought to bear to bring non-resident instruction in line with the resident program.” Soon afterwards, the College staff began an in-depth review of the entire non-resident program, leading to a rewrite of all non-resident instruction. After a year and a half, the College leadership could say that the non-resident material had some resemblance to the core material in the Regular Course. By December 1978, the authors had prepared the additional versions of their lessons, and the leadership could claim “We now export the same product that is taught to the resident class.”

One “improvement” implemented in the summer of 1977 was the termination of the Fort Leavenworth Phase, the two-week wrap-up session that permitted non-resident students some contact with Bell Hall. The last of the two-week phases graduated 1,469 active and reserve component officers on August 5, 1977. Thereafter, the College reported a sharp decline in enrollments as shown in figure 2. Also during the summer, the College Commandant, Major General J.R. (Roy)

143 CGSC. briefing, chart 1, “Student Population Growth,” n.d. [ca. 1986], Folder General, SOCS-003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
Thurman, pursued the elimination of the USAR school option, citing considerable per-graduate budget savings that would accrue. Underlying Thurman’s recommendation was a belief that USAR school instructors were “incompetent” to teach CGSOC material. The proposal gained little support from TRADOC’s staff. Thurman’s proposal did have support from the RETO study, which recommended that the Army “discontinue the current nonresident program…and substitute a ‘Corresponding Studies Program,’ based on the full academic year regular course along the lines of the current Army War College model....”

Figure 2. Enrollment in CGSOC Non-resident Courses, 1978-1986 (annual average).
Source: CGSC, Briefing, Chart 1, Student Population Growth, n.d. [ca. 1986], Folder General, SOCS-003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.

The late 1970s and early 1980s represent the low point in a chronically mediocre effort to educate officers unable or not selected for the resident course. The practical problem of three

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144 Thurman’s recommendation, which was never seriously considered by TRADOC due to the political sensitivity of the proposal, would have made the extension course and a two-week finishing phase the only non-resident option. J.R. Thurman to Commander, USATRADOC, memorandum, “CGSC Nonresident Program,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 17 August 1977, contained in “Report of Evaluation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Nonresident Program,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1977, CARL. Additional background in CGSC, “Working Conference, Evaluation of USAR Schools CGSOC at 1976, 9-10 September 1976,” n.d., CARL. Only a year earlier, FORSCOM commander General Bernard W. Rogers had written General DePuy stating, “The USAR School System is and has been an important means of improving the qualifications of individual National Guardsmen and Reservists….The TRADOC assistance to the USAR School System in the past has been most helpful The support rendered by the Command and General Staff College has been outstanding.” Bernard W. Rogers to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “US Army Reserve Schools,” 14 September 1976, contained in “Report of Evaluation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Nonresident Program,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1977, CARL.
separate, but parallel courses, continued. Authors for a resident course lesson also had to prepare a version for presentation at the USAR schools plus a correspondence version. For CGSC’s leadership, the Regular Course was CGSC; the other versions simply served as distracters and drained already short instructor resources to low-payoff efforts. In 1979, the Director of Curriculum and Educational Affairs confirmed what many already knew—the resident course was the priority.  

Paradoxically, in some respects, the educational needs of reserve component officers drove the form of the Regular Course. The decision in the seventies to eliminate the Mobilization Course and to integrate the Reserve Component Course within the first term of the Regular Course meant that all graduation requirements for the short course had to be accomplished before the Christmas break. The efficiency measure reduced flexibility within the year-long program, since the scheme required that the essential material be presented in a condensed period.

To the officers who needed the CGSC diploma for promotion, the non-resident courses provided a great service, if not good training. Non-resident courses—USAR and extension versions—claimed to have graduated 34,000 officers between 1966 and 1980, averaging about 2,300 per month. This total included 7,084 Active Army, 19,545 Army Reserve, and 7,191 Army National Guard officers, plus 180 others.

The extension course, unsurprisingly, was not very difficult. A hundred or more active duty officers proved the point each summer, coming to Fort Leavenworth on permissive temporary duty for the purposes of completing the course. Some showed up having not done any of the coursework. The Regular Course faculty, learning about this in 1979, objected:

[T]his practice is contrary to the best interests of the Army, CGSC and the officer involved; that this practice subverts the intent, goals and fundamental principles of this, an accredited graduate level institution; and that this practice makes a mockery of the

147 Robert Berlin to William A. Stofft, memorandum, “Faculty Council Meeting with MG Saint, 10 JAN 1983,” 2, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA. There was some discussion of removing this obstacle in 1983, with one faculty member saying, “Reservists were driving the curriculum. No more. In future Term 1 may not end at [Christmas]. We will not be so front loaded.”
academic and professional value of not only the correspondence course curriculum, but the resident course curriculum as well.

The record for arrival to completion, according to the non-resident department, was two and one-half weeks. Many finished the requirements in three weeks. The school was powerless to prevent the ritual, since the officers successfully passed all prescribed examinations and writing requirements. Having done so, they left in a few weeks after their arrival with diploma in hand.\footnote{The time lag between mailing, grading, and receipt of the next set of subcourses could be substantial. “Faculty Council resolution,” 13 December 1979, Folder Faculty Council Subcommittee on the Matrix Organization, Drawer 180, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.}

The incremental efforts to improve the non-resident courses met with little success. The CGSS Planning Guidance for AY 86-87, issued on November 26, 1985, reaffirmed the policy that the two non-resident options “mirror, where possible, the [resident] version” of the course. Although the guidance stated that all three versions should be prepared simultaneously, the document allowed no more than one year’s difference between the resident and non-resident course materials.\footnote{“Annex A, CGSS Planning Guidance, AY 86-87,” 26 November 1985, 12, Folder CGSS Planning AY 86-87, Drawer 1986, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.}

In January 1986, the Assistant Deputy Commandant, Colonel John F. Orndorff, presented the College’s options to bring the resident and non-resident tactics courses into consonance with the guidance by May 1986. The faculty considered plans that would produce updated resident and non-resident materials simultaneously, but they could not arrive at a workable scheme. The most significant obstacles were the pending transition to small group instruction and the ongoing revision of the core tactics lessons. The tactics department could produce a resident and USAR school version, but then there would be two dissimilar sets of tactics lessons. One advantage of waiting a year, according to Colonel Orndorff, was that the faculty could base the non-resident materials on the new, classroom-tested, resident course. Seeing the magnitude of the transition, Brigadier General Franks concurred with the delay.\footnote{Michael T. Chase to Deputy Commandant, DF, “CGSOC Nonresident POI,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 1986, Folder General, SOCS-003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.}

As shown in the earlier figure 2, enrollments increased in the 1985-86 school year, reaching 13,960 in March 1986, and 1,026 students had graduated by that month. By April, another 180
students completed the course. The non-resident department reported ten officers had failed the course that month. Curiously, the statistics show an unexplained gap—the ratio of graduates to enrollees. Since the course was designed for completion within three years, approximately one-third (or more) of the officers enrolled in any one year should complete the course. Yet the number fell consistently short of the theoretical graduation rate. One probable explanation lies within the behavior of captains, since the spike in enrollments included a number of most junior officers. They believed that completion of the non-resident course would increase their chances for promotion to major, and completion of the non-resident course bettered their chances at one of the few slots to the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps staff colleges. Once selected for the resident course, however, a number of these officers dropped the correspondence course. There is little other to suggest the reasons why, but more telling, few within the College asked why either.

Brigadier General Franks had reason for concern. The number of active duty officers enrolled in non-resident programs nearly equaled the number of Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve officer combined (6,013 to 6,568) in January. Franks asked for an update on improving the non-resident course. The non-resident director, Lieutenant Colonel Thurlow D. Young, had few answers. Outranked and unable to claim equal status with the teaching departments, Young struggled to keep up with the daily volume of work. Several months of delay followed. Now very concerned about the state of the entire program, Franks ordered the Director of Academic Operations, Colonel Michael T. Chase, to conduct an in-depth review in May. Chase found in fact that “very little ‘mirror image’” existed between the resident and USAR school versions of the course. Chase found extensive gaps among the tactics, logistics, and writing portions of the course. The tactics course, for instance, still centered largely on brigade operations—material that had not been in the Regular Course for over two


In some areas that did resemble the resident course, like leadership, the inspection found that lessons plans and supporting materials did not exist. Colonel Chase judged only the history, military law, and force integration lessons as meeting the standard for currency and completeness. Brigadier General Franks, irritated with the chronic procrastination, scribbled on his reply to the DAO: “Your mission: Fix this. Franks.”

More reviews followed along with more bad news. A September review of Phases 2, 3, and 5 found more deficiencies. Four of ten lessons met the “mirror image” standard; seven of ten were judged effective. Three lessons were assessed as marginally or very marginally effective. The Low Intensity Conflict lesson had material dating back to 1981. Additionally, the inspectors found that most of the examination program was written in such a manner as to test far below desired cognitive levels. Despite some improvements made as a result of Franks’ interest, a lot of work remained to rehabilitate the non-resident studies program.

A Bigger Bag

Scholars have asked how the Army managed to revive itself following Vietnam. Several assert that one of the central intellectual developments of the 1980s was that of operational art. Operational art, discussed heavily by Soviet military theorists in the interwar years, linked the tactical and strategic levels of war. Although the U.S. Army did not formally recognize the concept until the 1980s, it incorporated the theory into its doctrine, making it a centerpiece of post-Vietnam thinking. Richard Swain offered a succinct history of the Army’s adoption of operational art in his essay “Filling the Void.” He summarized the personalities and conceptual underpinnings of the Army’s

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154 The state of tactical instruction in the non-resident course is somewhat understandable. The resident course instruction had changed every year for the previous four years. Release of the 1982 version of AirLand Battle doctrine led to significant revisions. The shift to the division and corps echelons, vice brigade, created additional rewrite requirement in 1983-84. Unfortunately, the 1984 scenarios depicted NATO forces attacking into East Germany. The next year, tactics instructors had to rewrite most every map problem due to NATO objections to the “deep attack” scenarios used at the College. Crossing the Inter-German Border (dividing line between West and East Germany) was a very sensitive political issue.


version, while lamenting the apparent return to technology-based solutions dominant at the time he wrote his piece.  

Shimon Naveh attributed the Army’s intellectual engagement in the 1980s to civilian defense reformers. William Lind, one of the civilian commentators, believed that education played a vital role in the abilities of the officer, who “must be able to put whatever military situation he faces into a larger context of military history, theory, and men’s behavior in combat. The development of an ability to think logically, under stress of battle, must always be a fundamental objective of military education.” One should not infer, however, that academic attention to education’s importance translated to perfection in practice.

The Army’s own view, both official and unofficial, is that the revitalized Army emerged phoenix-like from Vietnam, largely from internal efforts, particularly those of General DePuy and the 1976 version of FM 100-5, later supplemented by General Stary and the AirLand Battle concept. Robert M. Citino offered a critical review of the concept’s origins in *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*. In assessing the Army’s doctrinal renaissance, Citino agreed that Vietnam had pressured the officer corps into a reassessment of warfighting. Citino added a coda to his assessment: “The 1986 FM 100-5

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160 Another aspect of reform is the restructuring of the military services. A 2003 dissertation by Suzanne Nielsen explored the nature of U.S. Army reform in the seventies and eighties. Nielsen highlighted the unique nature of large military organizations including their status as federal bureaucracies. She studied the nature of change in the U.S. Army using the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as a case study. She concluded that leaders within the organization prompted change, as contrasted with Naveh’s inferences. Suzanne Nielsen, “Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform.” (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, June 2003).
[the Army’s primary operations manual], in fact, would represent for the army a kind of intellectual culmination point.”

Within CGSC, the establishment of three new entities: the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the School of Advanced Military Studies served as hallmarks of the intellectual enthusiasm. Two new schools—one imposed from above, the other an innovation from below—reached well beyond the Regular Course. All had a positive influence on the Regular Course.

The first of the three new organizations to appear, the Combat Studies Institute, grew out of an existing team of military historians then subordinated to the Department of Unified and Combined Operations. An artifact of Major General Cushman’s tenure, the “Applied Military History Team” of four officers and two visiting historians taught core and popular elective classes. In 1978, the TRADOC commander, General Starry, asked the Commandant, Lieutenant General Thurman for a concept that would use military history research to inform Army concepts. As told by Roger Spiller in “War History and the History Wars: Establishing the Combat Studies Institute,” both Starry’s staff and the College leadership waffled, presenting half of an answer to the direct question General Starry had asked, When given the opportunity, Major Charles R. Shrader prepared and won approval of a much more extensive concept—a full-fledged military history department for the College. Shrader proposed an Institute that possessed attributes of an academic department in a civilian university: faculty who had earned academic degrees in their discipline, an extensive research and publication program, and teaching responsibilities. From the viewpoint of its benefactor, CSI was to serve the Army’s practical needs. The faculty wanted to insure that history remained true to its professional ethos. Shrader’s concept balanced these concerns: professional historians to teach military history to

the Regular Course students and a historically-minded research arm that could meet General Starry’s intent.\textsuperscript{165} Lieutenant General Thurman approved the plan on September 14, 1978, and CSI became an official College department in June of 1979.\textsuperscript{166} In the future, CSI’s professors would become the nucleus of a growing civilian presence within the professional school.

The second organization, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, abbreviated CAS3 and pronounced Cass-Cubed, resulted from the recognition that much of the staff work in the American Army was done by field grade officers. The proposal to teach division operations fundamentals to captains in the branch advanced course, first raised years earlier, had never materialized. To a degree, the Regular Course curriculum adjustments in the 1970s had proceeded as if that suggestion had been implemented. More importantly, a gap existed for over half the officers in the Army, who had no formal learning opportunities after their branch course—a technical school. One of the most significant findings of the RETO report was “all field grade officers need some staff training,” but the Army could not afford to send all majors to CGSC. Rather than decimate the Regular Course, thereby allowing the other sixty percent to attend, the board recommended a new school to “train all majors (Active and RC) for service as staff officers, with the Army in the field, in peace and war.” The nine-week course was an entirely new feature of the officer education system; it had few parallels in the Army’s history. Conceived as a staff course for majors (later amended to captains), the course featured a mandatory correspondence phase followed by a resident phase taught at Fort Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{167} The first course began in April 1981. The difference between it and the Regular Course was striking—nearly all of the new school’s instructors had commanded battalions as lieutenant colonels, and all of the instruction took place in small groups.

\textsuperscript{164} Roger J. Spiller, “War History and the History Wars: Establishing the Combat Studies Institute,” \textit{The Public Historian} 10, no. 4 (Fall 1988): 65-81. Spiller detailed the significant efforts to establish and maintain the Institute within the College. What seems commonplace today—study of military history by officers—was not a widely-held view.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 74, 80.

\textsuperscript{167} As originally stated in the RETO report, all majors would attend CAS3, and twenty percent of the officer corps would later attend the Regular Course. Under the proposal, 200 active and reserve graduates could enroll annually in an extension version of the Regular Course. Unlike the Regular Course, CAS3 students were to learn staff functions in the context of a battalion and brigade. Division operations were
A second school, begun soon afterwards, acknowledged a gap existed inside the Regular Course. A second year of professional schooling had been part of the interwar CGSC program. In large part, this additional year provided extended coverage of tactical operations in divisions, widely recognized at the time as a complex body of knowledge requiring extensive study. It has become common to equate the School of Advanced Military Studies, known as SAMS, with the second-year course of the interwar period. While both recognized that professionals needed to study in depth, SAMS was not started to fulfill the same role as the second year of the interwar school. The school began to provide a place to study the lost knowledge of warfare, which proponents claimed formed the core of the profession.\textsuperscript{168} It began with one officer’s idea.

That one officer, Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, made the case for a second-year course, but he relied on significant support from Commandants and general officers outside the College, for what he proposed needed a patron, and the Army’s senior leadership needed to recognize the merit of such a course.\textsuperscript{169} In a fortuitous convergence, Lieutenant Colonel Wass de Czege’s idea of a second-year course came at a time when the Army’s senior leadership questioned the efficacy of CGSC. Wass de Czege’s findings followed the harsh criticism levied on CGSC by the DCSOPS Director of Training, Major General Guy S. (Sandy) Meloy. Meloy, surveying CGSC at the request of the Army’s Chief of Staff, reported a plethora of shortcomings. Meloy’s report, dated 1 February 1982, is worth quoting at length, for it catalogs the ills of a professional, academic institution that, despite internal attempts at reform, had gone adrift, intellectually and organizationally.

Faculty quantity, quality and stability is surprisingly poor; the Deputy Commandant job is a revolving door; the College mission has a low floor (brigade) and a virtually

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\textsuperscript{168} “A Proposal for a Two-Year CGSC Course for Selected Students” described the CGSC curriculum as covering too much in one year. The solution proposed was to give CGSC a “bigger bag.” Jack N. Merritt to General Glenn K. Otis, “A Proposal for a Two-Year CGSC Course for Selected Students,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 November 1982, Folder Input for CAC Semi-Annual Historical Review (JUL-DEC 83), Drawer 1983, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Another officer who believed education to be an important supplement to personal experience was Arthur L. Wagner. T.R. Brereton, \textit{Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 43.

\textsuperscript{169} An in-depth exploration of the founding and development of SAMS can be found in Kevin Benson, “Educating the Army’s Jedi: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into U.S. Army Doctrine, 1983-1994” (Ph.D. diss. University of Kansas, 2010). The purpose of the brief overview presented here is to establish the origin of SAMS as it relates to the shortcomings in the Regular Course and to establish the basis for SAMS’ later influence on the Regular Course.
unending ceiling; the student population coupled with the current student evaluation system promotes teaching form more than substance; the diversity of material presented in ten months, much of it selected to support both the mission and implied OPMS requirements, allows little opportunity for much more than superficial treatment of any given subject (to include command, staff and tactics); and the basic purpose of the course is neither sharply defined not understood by students or instructors.170

Major General Meloy did not place the blame on CGSC for the situation, however. He found that the College attempted to cover too much content because the Army’s leadership had not focused the school on an achievable mission, given the allocated ten months. “The College mission should be limited to the achievable, and recast so its translation does not mean all things to all people and its interpretation open-ended to the eyes of whoever happens to be the incumbent holder.”171 He noted too that the Army had not supplied the school with faculty of sufficient expertise to allow the school to meet expectations. In the tactics department, he rated five instructors “exceptionally qualified,” twelve officers “fully qualified but not best qualified,” another dozen officers “marginally qualified,” and eleven faculty members “totally unqualified” to teach.172 Most importantly, Meloy’s report noted the dynamic between faculty, students, and knowledge—a faculty beset by turbulence, left to their own to select what to teach, possessing little or no expertise in the subjects, given no time to prepare, and allocated little time to delve into student reasoning during class—could hardly produce the thinking officer needed by the future Army.173 On this last point, Major General Meloy signaled a shift away from previous TRADOC guidance, which had emphasized Leavenworth’s role as a training institution to the near exclusion of education.

As the Army began to consider anew the question of officer education, Lieutenant Colonel William Stofft thought deeply about the challenges facing his profession, and more importantly, what

170 Meloy, 1. Meloy’s five-day visit in January 1982 looked at the College using General Marshall’s 1933 critique as the basis for asking Meloy to: “evaluate Leavenworth as a training/education institution....” A month after its release, the memorandum had wended its way through the Army Staff. Known as the Meloy Report, the three-page memorandum and its attachments got the Army Chief of Staff’s attention. General Edward C. Meyer scribbled on the upper right-hand corner, “Glenn Otis [TRADOC Commander] – please discuss this paper with me – Bill Richardson and Max Thurman.”


172 Meloy Report, Executive Summary, 2. Included in the exceptionally qualified category was the department director.
the officer education system should do about them. He wrote that the officer of the eighties faced “a more volatile and complex environment where the application of military force is more demanding, exacting and perhaps more dangerous than at any time in recent history.”174 He then asked, “What is the major task of the professional military officer in peacetime?” His answers echoed many of Meloy’s observations: “To be prepared to fight and win.” As to what might be done, he criticized the career-mindedness of some of his fellow officers and instructors. “Thus, the role of the college must be to produce a graduate better able to fulfill this role when he arrives [leaves] here. Not to prepare him for his next assignment, not to help him mark time until retirement, not to make him more promotable.” The purpose of education, Stofft wrote, was “to prepare him intellectually – i.e. in habit of mind to meet any challenge that might come his way;” “to prepare him to think beyond branch, battalion, or assignment—to think in terms of what General Meyer calls the ‘whole’ army.”175

While the postwar Army professed to understand the importance of an educated officer corps, Stofft and Wass de Czege suggested that the outcome of officer education fell far short of the expectation. Wass de Czege’s 1983 study, building on the Meloy Report, condemned the intellectual agility of the officer corps, particularly with regard to tactical expertise. Wass de Czege, a fellow at the Army War College, judged officers as unable to think clearly about the demands of modern warfare. “Not being able to spend enough time in simulated combat situations to become comfortable with this increased complexity, too many of our officers seek simple formulas, recipes, and engineering solutions to make order of potential chaos.”176 The longstanding aversion to the “school solution” had inverted itself. Now officers demanded a procedural guide to solve dynamic problems, rather than apply professional judgment to the inherently difficult situation of combat. The need to create a new school arose from his realization that intellectual reform was not possible using the

173 Ibid., 3-4. The examination program was the course, since “classroom instruction focuses on evaluation rather than transfer of knowledge….” Meloy noted that 65% of the combat arms officers had made an A on the defensive tactics exam, but so had 56% of the “professional” officers—doctors, lawyers, and nurses. Meloy Report, 5.
175 Handwritten notes, n.d., [ca. 1980], Folder Faculty Council Sub-Committee on the Matrix Organization, Drawer 1980, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
College as the nucleus; CGSC’s faculty would resist any change imposed upon them. The only suitable solution was to go outside the existing structure.

The argument for an additional year of study rested in part on criticism of CGSC, which in turn centered on two points: “CGSC is overloaded with topics and issues” and as a result “had to reduce commitment to tactics and operations (from 800 to 200 hrs of school);” and second, “CGSC, at best, can teach an officer to be competent in current doctrine: it can’t hope to teach the principles and history on which the doctrine is based.” SAMS started because the officer education system that had evolved did not teach the unique knowledge required by the profession, and professionals recognized this situation. “War [should be seen] as a science and an art,” recorded one interviewer. The Army needed a school that can “teach how to think about war, rather than applying abstract generalizations [and] principles.” Freed of the dysfunctional triad existing in CGSOC at the time, the Extended Curriculum, as the second-year course was first known, sought to deepen “professional judgment” through in-depth study of tactics, history, and something called operational art. Partially a result of the Regular Course’s failings, SAMS became the symbol for intellectual renaissance in the officer corps.

The Advanced Military Studies Program (the second-year course’s name evolved over several years) taught the history and theory underlying the doctrine, mixing in copious amounts of practical experience through exercises that allowed students to experience the dynamics of battles and engagements—the fundamental building blocks of tactical operations. Soon, the first graduates of AMSP began to exert an influence on the Regular Course. One such graduate was Lieutenant Colonel James H. (Jim) Willbanks, assigned to the department of tactics after graduation from SAMS.

Willbanks took responsibility for developing a course, known as A391, The Operational Level of

177 Michael Pearlman, undated notes from interview with SAMS, n.d. [ca. 1986], Folder General, SAMS-003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
178 Ibid.
War, based in part on the material from his SAMS coursework.\textsuperscript{180} It was a small step, but the leavening influence of SAMS began to exert itself on the courses taught in Bell Hall. Likewise, CAS3 graduates began to arrive in the Regular Course in increasing numbers. Well-practiced in staff operations, the CAS3 graduate knew the fundamentals of the Army’s decision making process.\textsuperscript{181} In a few years, both CAS3 and SAMS would have an even greater influence on what happened in the CGSOC classroom.

\textbf{Spray and Pray}

Student motivation, discussed earlier, suffered from the continued practice of re-teaching material that had been assigned as homework. Michael Pearlman’s notes from an interview recorded Birrer’s response to a question about classroom methods. Birrer said, the student “didn’t have to do work….the lecturer would tell you whatever is important.”\textsuperscript{182} The benefits of smaller class sizes had been mentioned in numerous surveys and educational reports in the past.\textsuperscript{183} Signs that the philosophical change had taken hold appeared in College publications. The to-and-fro between student- and instructor-centered methods continued, even after Major General Cushman’s initiatives began to infuse the College. The 1977-78 history stated: “Students are expected to be participants in a learning experience in every class rather than be just an audience for the instructor.”\textsuperscript{184} Yet little changed overall.

In 1981, Lieutenant General Richardson took notice and directed the staff undertake a study to determine the optimal class size.\textsuperscript{185} One difficulty had always been the number of faculty needed to implement small group instruction—a limitation noted in Brigadier General Crosbie E. Saint’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Center for Army Tactics, syllabus, “A391, The Operational Level of War,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, AY 1986-87, Folder Papers on A391, CTAC-008, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Although discussed extensively in the correspondence about CAS3, there is little evidence that CGSOC faculty ever reassessed the start point for the Regular Course. For example, theoretically, the CAS3 graduate should have had a firm grasp of the military decision making process.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Michael Pearlman, Notes from interview with Ivan Birrer, July 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/003, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Under Eddy’s direction, the school adopted the forty-man classroom. The 1956 Educational Survey had mentioned the desirability of smaller classes. Major General Cushman had directed the shift of some instruction to the work group model in 1974.
\end{itemize}
memorandum to Brigadier General R.J. Sunnell, TRADOC’s acting Deputy Chief of Staff – Training.186 The Commandant followed with a letter to Major General H.G. Crowell, Jr.: “The Leavenworth experience suffers due to class size and faculty constraints, and I want to initiate a process to address this shortcoming by reducing the class size beginning with FY82.”187 The transition envisioned by Lieutenant General Richardson faltered, since TRADOC did not support the initiative with the increased spaces and needed manpower.

Tied to the small group methodology was a requested decrease in overall class size. Lieutenant General Richardson initiated action in July 1981, asking TRADOC to consider sending fewer officers each year, which in turn would allow CGSC’s Regular Course to create classes of 12 to 14 students each.188

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185 Sidney L. Linver, Fact Sheet, “Reduction in CGSC Regular Course Class Size,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 July 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA.
186 Crosbie E. Saint to Brigadier General R.J. Sunnell, memorandum, “CGSC Program of Instruction,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 21 July 1981, Folder SGI, HQ-011/003, CGSC 86, CAFLA. The definition of “small group” varied, ranging from twelve to not more than twenty students. In early documents, the staff held that a small learning group consisted of twelve-fourteen students. In computations leading to the recommended class size, the staff settled on fifteen as a practical balance. Another 1981 CGSC paper defined small groups as not more than twenty students. The paper outlined the principles constituting small group instruction, including the instructor’s role as facilitator and student’s responsibility for learning. Office of Curriculum Assistance, Fact Sheet, “Small Group Instruction,” 14 August 1981, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
187 William R. Richardson to H.G. Crowell, Jr., Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 16 July 1981, Folder SGI, HQ-011/003, CGSC 86, CAFLA. Richardson’s note recommended a reduction of Regular Course slots to 845, as opposed to the current quota of 960.
As shown in figure 3 above, CSI and DTAC taught most of their courses in the 15:1 configuration, whereas the departments as a whole taught most of their instruction at the section level (60:1). 189

The Deputy Commandant continued to press the case for smaller class sizes, explaining to TRADOC in an August 1983 message the rationale behind a smaller overall Regular Course. By then, the College had over two years’ experience with the small group approach in CAS3. “Sound educational principles and our own experience demonstrate to us that the small group methodology is the most effective way to teach much of the CGSC curriculum.” 190 Another three years would pass before further movement occurred.

A May 1984 request from TRADOC to CGSC asked for a recommended class composition. In June 1984, the College proposed retention of the 960 officer class based upon sixteen sections of

189 This should not be interpreted to mean that the preponderance of classroom hours took place in 60:1 settings.

190 Message, 021530Z August 1983, Reduction in CGSC Class Size, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA.
sixty students each. The proposal for U.S. Army officers is shown below (table 12). The remainder of the class would be composed of international students (100) and officers from other services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Arms</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
<th>Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Army Total</th>
<th>Reserve Components</th>
<th>Sister Service</th>
<th>Foreign Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>708</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Howard S. Paris, Fact Sheet, CGSOC and Sister Service College Class Composition, FTLV, 11 June 1984, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 85, CAFLA.

The actual attendance for 1985, shown in table 13 below, indicates the combat support branches had fewer than recommended, but the combat service support and specialized branches had twenty-four and fifteen more officers than the recommendation.
Brigadier General Frederick Franks arrived in the summer of 1985. The new Deputy Commandant, himself not a graduate of the Regular Course, echoed a familiar sentiment. In his view, curriculum was the interaction between students, instructors, and knowledge. The curriculum was “rigid.” Franks observed that the contact between the two human elements—teacher and student—tended to be highly formal. Franks sought to break down the formality permeating the curriculum. Both CAS3 and SAMS used small group instruction, but the resident course relied heavily on lectures for delivery. Franks took notice, and he began to explore the possibility of implementing small group techniques in the Regular Course. “Now the ‘body of knowledge’ is sound,” said Brigadier Gen Fred Franks, the College curriculum can “move to small group instruction.” The student would participate in a more effective learning experience. The “Army needs ‘bold and adaptive thinkers: able to think and decide in a time of change.’” For the College faculty, “How fast” and “how much” the new

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**Table 13. Regular Course Composition, Active Army by Branch, 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Arms</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
<th>Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>141 Engineer</td>
<td>38 Ordnance</td>
<td>23 Chaplain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>75 Intelligence</td>
<td>47 Adjutant General</td>
<td>49 Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>82 Signal Corps</td>
<td>28 Transportation Corps</td>
<td>22 General Army Medical Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>36 Military Police</td>
<td>18 Quartermaster Corps</td>
<td>30 Medical Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>74 Chemical</td>
<td>8 Finance Corps</td>
<td>11 Business Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>408 Total</td>
<td>139 Total</td>
<td>39 Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Source: James E. Tucker, Fact Sheet, Class of 1985, FTLV, 13 June 1984, Folder Mission and Resources, HQ-002, CGSC 85, CAFLA. |
technique should be used in the classroom was the question.\textsuperscript{191} From many on the faculty, the answers were slowly and as little as possible.

Soon after his arrival, Brigadier General Franks revisited the simmering issue of small group methods.\textsuperscript{192} In September 1985, he instructed the Director of Academic Operations to study “how we can improve the use of small group teaching methodology in CGSOC.” Franks told the director he wanted the study completed in time to embed the findings in the guidance for the 86-87 course. Franks closed the note by recognizing the immensity of the task. “I know what I have asked you to do is difficult but I believe it imperative that the College move in the direction outlined above.”\textsuperscript{193}

Brigadier General Franks, being practical, rejected some of the more radical options. For instance, the syndicate model in use at the British staff college was deemed impractical because “it demanded too much change, too fast.”\textsuperscript{194}

On December 19, 1985, Brigadier General Franks made the decision to proceed with partial implementation in the 1986-87 school year, using the Combat Studies Institute and the Department of Tactics as the test cases.\textsuperscript{195} Franks asked that the faculty move from an instructor-centered method to one that hopefully placed the student at the center and that made the instructors uncomfortable. Despite having communicated his intent openly, Brigadier General Franks still encountered resistance. His concept required a significant amount of work, and it certainly required modification to the faculty’s approach. For the faculty, such an approach meant loss of authority, since they were no longer the classroom expert. The faculty of 1946, 1956, and 1974 had grappled with demands of

\textsuperscript{191} Michael Pearlman, Handwritten notes from interview with Brigadier General Franks, 28 January [1986], Folder SGI, HQ-011/003, CGSC 86, CAFLA. Michael Pearlman, Memorandum for Record, “Small Group Education, Interview with BG Franks,” 28 January 1986. Dated 20 February 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA. 111909-1 311 From the Deputy Commandant’s perspective, waiting did little good. Too many obstacles (he mentioned budget reductions and war) could arise the following year.

\textsuperscript{192} Michael T. Chase to See Distribution, memorandum, “Committee on Small Group Instruction,” Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26 August 1985, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA.

\textsuperscript{193} Frederick M. Franks to Director of Academic Operations, memorandum, “Small Group Instruction Study,” 9 September 1985, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA.


similar scale—prepare a new course while teaching the old. For the transition to succeed, he knew that the instructors must cooperate within the spirit of his vision. One difference in this situation was that the “body of knowledge,” expressed in the 1982 doctrine, had some measure of stability.

Franks began by convincing his department directors, starting with a director’s meeting on February 14, 1986. Few of them supported the idea. At the session’s opening, he explained why the long-established Leavenworth method needed to change:

By looking at our doctrine and by understanding the environment of the future battlefield we should see that our officer corps must be comprised of agile thinkers and problems solvers, therefore we must structure the educational system to teach them how to think in a fluid, dynamic environment. The state of the Army and the College are intertwined. After WWII we still held on to prescribed curriculum and set piece ways of teaching. We have been evolving from the information dispensing method to a real educational environment ever since. Now is the right time in that evolutionary process to move into small group instruction…. Considering that this is the right move and time the question we must address is, “how do we do it?”

The conference revealed the deep apprehension among the directors. They brought up many impediments. What concerned them most is how to prepare to instructors for this environment. Colonel Frasche of the Combat Studies Institute countered his colleagues, remarking that “SGI is nothing new. We are already doing that in Terms II and III. This will be the same process…” Colonel Sinnreich of SAMS pointed out one key difference between the concept and present classroom practices. “Presently the student is the audience and the instructor is the performer. What we are seeking is the reverse.” The group agreed that the key issue facing the faculty was preparing the instructors for leading small groups, and they agreed to meet in a few weeks to follow up on evaluation.

On March 10, the directors gathered again with the Deputy Commandant to review the last meeting and to consider how to evaluate students in a small group setting. The department directors

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196 Notes from Small Group Instruction meeting, 14 February 1986, 0700-1200, Cooke Hall, n.d., 1, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
197 In a handwritten note from Richard Sinnreich to Michael Pearlman, Colonel Sinnreich said, “In the beginning, directors were nearly unanimously opposed to any increase in small group instruction…. Franks literally had to force the issue.” Richard Sinnreich to Michael Pearlman, Note, 9 August 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
198 Notes from Small Group Instruction meeting, 14 February 1986, 0700-1200, Cooke Hall, n.d., 2, 4.
listed many reasons for evaluating student learning. As the discussion progressed, the difficulties inherent in assigning grades to thinking and judgment became apparent to participants. The ranking system still in existence allocated points and fractions of points across the entire curriculum to each of the core course subjects. Starting with 1000 points for the course, the Department of Academic Operations allocated quotas to each department’s subjects (table 14). Students learned of their performance through monthly grade slips; for some, the most important number was their quintile. Despite efforts by Major General Cushman and other leaders to evaluate thinking and decision skills, examinations still relied heavily on objective measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Number</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Scheduled Hours</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Staff Operations</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Management</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Applied Military History</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Theater Operations and Plans</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Profession of Arms</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>677</strong></td>
<td><strong>1000</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Edward F. Stein to Assistant Deputy Commandant, Core Curriculum Course Suballocation of Hours, AY 83-84, 21 June 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA.

Small group instruction contributed more to the demise of the ranking system than perhaps any other development. The impossibility of maintaining the structured evaluation system, given that “traditional testing could be an insurmountable handicap to staff group instruction,” meant that some other means of evaluating learning had to be implemented.

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199 When asked “What is it we are trying to get done with evaluations in the College?,” the directors replied with a lengthy list: measure learning, Academic Efficiency Report input, educational purpose, reinforce learning, satisfy the requirement for record keeping and accreditation, a motivator, establish standards, rank order and determination of honors, evaluate teaching, and individual competition. Notes from Small Group Instruction meeting, 10 March 1986, 0700-1145, Cooke Hall, n.d., Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA.


201 Michael Pearlman, draft, “Staff Group Instruction at the Command and General Staff College: A Study in Historical Development,” n.d., 20, Folder SGI, HQ-011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA. “Once grading was changed to support (not undermine) staff group instruction, a new problem arose: that of class rank and honors. College-wide rank is not very meaningful when each staff group is uniquely tested and taught. Furthermore, grade points, now discarded, was the method by which class rank had been set.” The Haines Board had recommended that ranking be discontinued.
Next, how to implement the change became the focus of discussion. As Michael Pearlman wrote in his historical perspective on small group instruction, once the faculty absorbed that change was going to occur, they began to debate how to teach small groups. One group advocated the CAS3 and SAMS model—one instructor per small group for the entire year. The second group, comprised of most Regular Course instructors, wanted a departmental model, which limited the depth expected of the individual instructor. In an undated, unsigned paper, Dr. Phil Brookes, Director of the Graduate Degree Program, outlined the arguments surrounding the various forms of small group instruction. Brookes discounted the syndicate system, saying the breadth of CGSC’s resident course would not allow such practices, but he endorsed the alternative based upon departments. By organizing students into small groups and rotating departmental instructors—the experts—through the classrooms, the school could ensure quality instruction. Brookes’ suggestion became the model that the College implemented the following academic year.\footnote{202} The accommodation between faculty, students, and knowledge thus complete, the staff and faculty adjusted their lessons to reflect the new scheme.

The new approach started out slowly in 1986. Difficulties quickly came to the Deputy Commandant’s attention. According to the directors, peer pressure caused students to spend too much time preparing briefings; international officers found the new environment difficult, since they were expected to participate more; and some students complained. One Air Force officer was quoted, “he came here to learn from experts, not from other students who know no more than me.”\footnote{203} By September, signs that the new approach was having a positive effect began to emerge. Student enthusiasm appeared to be high. They appreciated the close interaction with their fellow students and the instructor, even registering complaints about the less-common 1:60 classes. The directors noted other indicators of the positive change. The classes converted to small group instruction—corps and

\footnote{202} “Reflections on Small Group Instruction in the CGSOC Curriculum,” n.d., ca. 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA. While the paper has no author listed, two key comments point to Brookes’ authorship. The opening sentence reads, “Since DGDP [Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs] has no common curriculum hours to arrange, I restrict myself in this paper….“ Later, the author writes, “For my purposes, as an educator….”

\footnote{203} Michael Pearlman, handwritten notes, “Comments from students, ACEs, teachers, etc.,” n.d. [ca. August 1986], Folder SGI, HQ-011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA. In February 1987, CGSC dispatched a message informing military attaches and combatant commands of the
division operations, Soviet operations, and military history—saw improved student responses. “Written complaints are virtually non-existant [sic].” Colonel Chase, who was a reluctant supporter, was forced to admit the program was a “success up to this point; [it] exceeded my expectations.” “Today’s students are telling CGSOC grads that the school is great…grads think they are crazy,” wrote one instructor in mid-September.204 Brigadier General Franks simply looked back with satisfaction.

Toward a New Era

The College’s 1986-87 student handbook recognized the bond that Frederick Rudolph posited about American higher education curriculum: “Education at the Command and General Staff College is a function of reciprocal relationships between three essential and interrelated components: the faculty, the student, and the body of knowledge.”205 When these became imbalanced, or one or more elements were absent, the effectiveness of professional education at CGSC declined. The College’s long-standing ability to resist change imposed from the outside diminished, as the considerable weight of a resource-conscious bureaucracy insinuated itself into Leavenworth’s affairs.

Starting in 1973, TRADOC intruded into the fabric of the College more deeply than had any previous headquarters. The corresponding growth of CAC, which resulted in the separation of the commandant from the College, placed the deputy commandant in the position of leading the organization. The frequent rotation of brigadier generals, many of whom went on to become the Army’s most distinguished leaders, negated much of their potential influence.

The complexity of large organizations complicated the task of implementing change when the need was recognized, and the web of the organization absorbed the efforts of leaders to modify the school. The faculty clearly resisted direction from senior officers as seen in Major General

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204 Michael Pearlman, handwritten notes, 15 September 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA.
Cushman’s experience as Commandant and Brigadier General Franks’ time as Deputy Commandant. The College was not the obedient hierarchical organization normally associated with military units.

The maturation of the elective system, the inclusion of reservists in the first term of the Regular Course, and the creation of two new schools modified the Regular Course. Non-resident studies, never a priority, languished as the faculty attempted to keep up with day-to-day changes in doctrine, which led to constant updates of resident course materials. On the other hand, the needs of reserve component officers, and the unlucky half of the officer corps, periodically attracted attention.

The faculty continued to draw knowledge from outside the profession of arms, adding civilian faculty, creating CSI, and cementing relationships with regional higher education. The actions of the Commandant and other College leaders in the late seventies and early eighties suggest that the pendulum had swung too far away from the profession’s core competencies, and a more moderate approach was needed. The creation of the Center for Army Tactics is but one artifact. Equally suggestive is the growing role of military history in officer education, dating back to Major General Cushman’s addition of historical examples. The near extirpation of small wars, and their limited resurgence, shows that professionals were cognizant of the need for a broad definition of warfare, even as they struggled to re-establish the tenets of conventional war.

All of this required good people. The Army short-changed its officer education system in this regard. Their leaders, students, and even profession looked upon instructors as inferior. A chronic shortage of qualified faculty made daily life difficult. Instructors served mainly as vessels to deliver pre-selected content for much of the period, except when given the freedom to create electives based upon their own interests. Instructors dealt with broad shifts in content and method. Not until an outside agent made the suggestion did the faculty gain a collective voice in the institution’s governance. Even then, the hierarchy muted their observations, regardless of merit. Somehow, officers assigned to instructor duty found their way through the system existing within the College.

Lastly, one must look at the experience of the students. Overscheduled students plodded through the stultifying curriculum. Each gathered what they could from the experience. A few failed.
Most, by the measures established, succeeded. Given the arena, they chose to emphasize the social aspects of the year at Leavenworth—“best year of your life”—as the saying went. Most graduated and went on to further assignments, never desiring to return again.

By 1986, one can discern an improvement in the prevailing attitudes within the College. Reforms begun under Major General Cushman had taken time to mature, but many components of his original vision had become accepted norms by 1986. Smaller, student-centered classes, more attention to tactical operations, and expanded consideration of military history were ideas first proposed by Major General Cushman. A decade of professional dialogue had created an operational concept that officers discussed and studied in the classroom. Faculty expertise had grown, largely due to General Richardson’s continuous attention. The positive influence of two new schools and a core of professional historians infused the Regular Course with a new energy. To the faculty and the College’s leadership, the future looked more hopeful.
CONCLUSION

Teaching a Future Army

I shall always urge that the tendency in the future should be to prolong courses of instruction at the colleges rather than to abridge them and to equip our young officers with that special technical professional knowledge which soldiers have a right to expect from those who give them orders, if necessary, to go to their deaths. Professional attainment, based on prolonged study, and collective study at colleges, rank by rank, and age by age—those are the title reeds of the commanders of the future armies, and the secret of future victories.¹

Winston Churchill

Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 marked a new direction in officer education.² For at least ten years beforehand, small hints of what was to happen revealed themselves in conferences and other events. The Joint Staff’s creation of intercollegiate coordinating bodies and the expansion of Congressional interest in military education preceded the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.³ Soon after its passage, Congress took a more direct interest in military education.⁴ Military professionals would renew their concern about officer education, too.⁵

¹ Quoted in House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 4, April 21, 1989, 12.
³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the Intermediate Military Education Coordination Conference (IMECC) in 1975. Representation came from the Joint Staff and each of the five intermediate staff colleges. In November 1983, the President of the National Defense University wrote the CAC commander, Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono to request CGSC send a representative to a professional military education policy conference. Lawrence had been asked by the JCS J-1 to assist in drafting JCS policy on officer education. Richard D. Lawrence to Carl E. Vuono, Washington, DC, November 17, 1983. Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, CAFLA. The JCS directive, signed by the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt (a former CGSC Commandant), stated “This document will have significant implications, not only the National Defense University, but also for the professional military educational institutions of each of the Services. Jack N. Merritt to President, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 16 November 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, CAFLA.
From this point forward, the armed services lost their autonomy in selecting the knowledge taught in the staff colleges. Joint instruction requirements and professional military education accreditation standards introduced mandatory coverage of learning areas, which added curricular requirements to the services’ staff schools. As a result, external directives would encroach upon CGSC again. The services still deal with the ramifications of this legislation. For that reason, it is fitting to end this story, since subsequent histories must consider an even greater scope.

For a time after World War Two, CGSC filled its traditional niche as the Army’s senior tactical institution. No other American institution, military or civilian, taught the management, sustainment, and employment of the Army in the field. The Army’s senior leaders, however, questioned its effectiveness, starting shortly after World War Two and continuing up until 1986, when this story ends.

Between 1946 and 1986, the Army expected CGSC to prepare an officer for at least the next ten years of service in peace and war, at echelons ranging from division (and even as low as battalion) staff and command to the Joint Staff and combined headquarters. The War Department gave the Command and General Staff School a similar task in 1946. After reconsideration and restructuring, the Army re-established the Army War College, allowing CGSC to return to the business of educating and training large unit tacticians. Slowly, and almost unnoticed by the larger Army, CGSC claimed an expansive swath of intellectual and professional knowledge and attempted to dispense it to those officers fortunate enough to be selected for attendance. The transition to a less-focused organization, which occurred around 1962, placed CGSC in competition with other military education and training institutions, or even American universities. The move fulfilled professional aspirations, but it eroded the College’s claim to be the Army’s senior tactical institution. During the prolonged conclusion of the Vietnam War, senior Army leaders, William E. DePuy, Donn Starry, and William Richardson

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among them, began to take notice, and questioned, what had happened at Fort Leavenworth while the Army was away at war.

The Command and General Staff College declined in professional stature after World War Two. The waning of the College left its reputation as a curious amalgamation of past and present. Still able to claim a lineage to the great captains of World War Two, Leavenworth’s leaders retained the air of confidence. Underneath the brick façade of Bell Hall, however, deep rifts appeared.

What had occurred? For one matter, the Army’s personnel system had forgotten Leavenworth. In the post-war Army, officers no longer considered the staff college education at Fort Leavenworth to be a seminal experience. For students, selection to attend, rather than learning while in attendance, became the mark of professional achievement. Boards seldom looked at class ranking after the fifties, and the practice of ranking became completely impractical when the College shifted to small groups. The school’s faculty no longer winnowed the gifted from the less-capable, displaced by a personnel system that valued operational experience over education.

Instructors fared less well. As pointed out by numerous commissions and the College’s leadership, the institution required talented faculty. Inexplicably, the Army put more effort into selecting the students than it did instructors. A broad cross section of Army officers taught the Army’s top fifty percent. The officer promotion system placed less value on teaching than it did other pursuits. Unlike other countries, or even the interwar Army, the Army did not seem to value the other graduating class—departing instructors. The officers who had taught for two to three years were not seen as valuable commodities, which was a significant departure from previous eras. One should note the role new faculty played in bringing knowledge into the school. The all-too-frequent observation of a faculty member lacking the professional qualifications to teach his subjects may indicate a principal reason why the College experience fell short of expectations. In the 1980s, the College’s leadership, notably Lieutenant General Richardson, worked hard to convince other senior leaders that investing in a quality faculty was necessary.
Major George S. Patton once said of the interwar Army, “[We are] seeking so hard for an approved solution that will avoid the odious task of thinking…” Commandants and faculty commented on the desire to teach officers how to think and how to make decisions, yet the faculty found it difficult to accommodate this ideal. The faculty used teaching methods in the College classroom known to be less effective than others in stimulating thought. In those days, officers were neither educated nor trained—but indoctrinated—through the Leavenworth method. Gradually, and grudgingly, the faculty adopted teaching practices more appropriate to teaching how to think.

The institution did not always serve its profession well. Commandants, and later the deputy commandants, found themselves unable to implement a long-range plan due to shifting resources, new educational philosophies, or external changes. The constant rotation of decision makers crippled any opportunities for substantive modifications to the school. At times, the U.S. Army bore the blame. As seen in several examples here, an army without an operational concept has a difficult time educating itself. The periodic marriage and divorce of doctrine writing from teaching inserted a wedge between research and knowledge. In a period of great stability, this may be acceptable. In times of momentous change, it proved dysfunctional, since the College relied upon published doctrine for lessons. Students and faculty came to the College expecting to learn the latest, only to find that the documents used in the classroom were years out-of-date. On the other hand, packaging the latest fad as knowledge could prove devastating. The College’s adoption of the atomic battlefield as the norm, absent any experimentation and proof of concept, led to fictional, even fantastical scenarios. Leaders educated using such lessons led the Army in Vietnam. As the post-Vietnam experience demonstrated, recreating an educational base without an operational concept to guide military culture required decades to accomplish.

Over time, too much of the curriculum became remedial, and not necessarily because of the presence of non-combat arms officers as has often been presumed. From its resumption after the war,

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CGSC had representatives from other branches and services. The collective curiosity of the officer corps had declined to the point where each entering class had to be reminded of basic factual information before engaging in graduate-level study. Officers too busy to study on their own appeared at Fort Leavenworth’s gates ready to receive the imprimatur of Leavenworth graduate. Ten months later, they left just as eagerly. In between, they attended classes—lots of classes.

Deficient in basic knowledge of their profession upon arrival, but not challenged enough to recognize this for themselves, students sat through lecture after lecture, absorbing five learning points per fifty minute period. An examination discerned how much of the content the student had retained, but more importantly, how closely the individual student’s response approximated the “school solution.” Taught to search for perfection in complexity, graduates became symptoms of an institution that no longer challenged students to think nor taught the lessons of war effectively.

What officers learned at CGSC shifted perceptibly during this period. The officer corps redefined professional expertise, moving away from “purely military” considerations towards a body of knowledge that was no longer unique. As a result, the curriculum, and therefore the institution, distributed its resources—the most critical being time devoted to learning—across too broad a front. True, officers in peacetime needed a broad range of management skills. To teach these and, simultaneously, to become proficient in large unit operations across multiple levels of war was far too much to ask of a ten-month training and education experience. Too late, military professionals realized that fighting wars—of any scale—required intensive study. Vietnam, the Mayaguez incident, Lebanon, Grenada, and Desert One all stood as evidence of the decline in professional acumen.

Senior leaders’ efforts to “fix” the College in the 1980s reflected their realization that officers did not possess the needed competence in their most vital professional function.

During the late fifties and early sixties, officers expanded their view of what was considered relevant professional knowledge. They came to believe that mid-career officers needed to know subjects such as management, political science, and international relations. The staff college
curriculum changed to accommodate this new perspective, adding “general education” and “peacetime subjects” to the course. This led to further changes, including the addition of electives and then the realignment of the course into “terms.” Not long afterwards, officers returned to traditional views (warfighting as the core knowledge of the profession) as part of a broad reform and adjusted the curriculum to reflect this view. Throughout this period, CGSC’s leaders attempted to balance the competing demands of peacetime and wartime subjects in a ten-month course, finding it difficult to accommodate the demands of both. The core of the profession of arms remained fire, maneuver, and sustainment, but the administrative Army needed support from the educational base of the Army, too. The College’s leaders recognized that their school could not do everything asked of it in the time available, so they compromised.

Outside influences shaped the College curriculum more than those inside the College’s administration admit. Although change took time, many of the notable developments during the period arose from, or were vetted by, review boards and educational survey commissions. Electives, small group instruction, faculty councils, and the MMAS all relied upon the sanction of outsiders. The more direct role of TRADOC in College affairs is a notable inflection point; the formerly inward-looking staff college began to be shaped by a distant bureaucracy.

The significant influence of civilians is under-recognized in official histories. Ivan Birrer served as the vanguard of civilian contributions to the officer education system. He participated in the development of, or introduced, the most significant structural changes to the mid-career education scheme. The transitory tenure of commandants and assistant or deputy commandants, the frequent rotation of instructors, and the relatively brief enrollment of the officer-student placed Birrer in a unique position. Unequivocally, his continuity sustained the nascent MMAS program. Absent any formal authority for most of his thirty years, Birrer shaped the College curriculum by suggesting, illuminating, and questioning, which by the way, are attributes of good graduate educators.
A subsidiary question remains. To what degree was CGSC itself a graduate institution? The evidence is contradictory. Dr. Birrer certainly attempted to give it all of the trappings of one—graduate degree accreditation, membership in a recognized higher education association, and relationships with universities. Yet in some respects, these were appliqués. What happened in the classroom counted most, and while the material taught was certainly advanced to some, or even new, it is difficult to argue that the overall experience approached graduate level work. Faculty and students recognized that much of the work was remedial, that the examination program did not test mastery, and that the course could have achieved more in other circumstances. The master’s degree program, on the other hand, encouraged officers to explore their profession and to create new knowledge. Professors associated with the MMAS degree imposed traditional graduate standards on their students. The choices available to the CGSC student of the 1980s preclude broad generalizations. Perhaps it is safest to conclude that each student drew from his educational experience what he wanted, based upon his experience with the faculty, his peers, and the lessons.

Frederick Rudolph’s observation about the curriculum as a “social artifact” applied to CGSC, too. As shown, one cannot assess the educational experience by leafing through the CGSC catalog.\(^7\) CGSC’s curriculum formed through the interaction of faculty, students, and knowledge. An exceptional program does not maintain international acclaim by resting on prior accomplishments. The upswing in the College’s importance in the 1980s came from renewed attention to the needs of the modern university—a professionally qualified faculty; motivated, capable students; knowledge, expanded by research; and often overlooked, classroom methods appropriate to achieving mastery.

The research presented explained the evolution of the Command and General Staff College after World War Two, but the historical characteristics of the postwar CGSC may lend insight to current Army challenges. As shown here, the Army chose not to close CGSC during the Korean and Vietnam wars. This was a distinct departure from the pattern of World Wars One and Two. In fact,

\(^7\) Rudolph, *Curriculum*, 6-7.
student attendance at the Regular Course expanded during the Vietnam War. Understanding the reasons why may assist contemporary decision makers as they resolve personnel and education policies for the present and future officers. Additionally, the strategic outlook seems uncertain, leading to speculation about how to prepare professionals for an ambiguous future. Those who would consider reform of the officer education system would be wise to consider the evolution of CGSC from 1946 to 1986.
APPENDIX 1

Instructional Methods Allocation by Hours, Academic Year 1946-47

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<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Lecture</th>
<th>Demonstration</th>
<th>Map Exercise</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Map Maneuver</th>
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APPENDIX 2

Regular Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55

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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Armored Division, Attack Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Infantry Division, Attack Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Infantry Division, Defense Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Infantry Division, River Crossing Administration &amp; Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Armored Division, Attack Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Airborne Division</td>
<td>Administration &amp; Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Corps Operations</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Army and Corps Operations</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Army Operations</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Communications Zone Operations</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annex B Summary of the 1954-55 Evaluated Exercise Program (Draft), CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC Evaluation, 2.
Appendix 3

Associate Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Exam Title</th>
<th>Emphasis</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>G1 Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>G2 Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>G3 Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>G4 Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Infantry Division, Attack</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Infantry Division, Defense</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Infantry Division, Attack</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Armored Division*</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Communications Zone Operations**</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annex B Summary of the 1954-55 Evaluated Exercise Program (Draft), CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC Evaluation, 2.*Only combat track students. **Only logistical track students.
APPENDIX 4

Instructor Training Course Subjects, 1954-55

Opening Exercises
Mission and Organization of CGSC
Administration of CGSC
Principles of Learning
Methods of Presentation
The Oral Presentation
Planning the Instructional Unit
Preparing the Instructional Unit
The Evaluation Program
The Lesson Plan
Question Composition
The Map Exercise
Oral Presentation Exercises
The Conference
The Lecture and Demonstration
The Class Supervisor and Advisor-Advisee Program
Operations Section Orientation and Tour of Schedules Unit
Editing and Publishing Services
Planning and Production of Instructional Aids
Practical Teaching Devices
Oral Presentation Laboratory
The Exercise
The Map Maneuver
The Terrain Exercise
Tour of AFPP and Instructional Aids Production Facilities
Tour of Class halls and A&D
Practice Teaching – 20 Minute Conference
Library Services
Orientation on Research and Evaluation Activities
Special Instructional Activities
Practice Teaching – 40 Minute Exercises
The Academic Staff Seminar
Closing Exercises

Source: Regular Instructor Training Course No. 4 Schedule, Box 17, Command and General Staff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Correspondence 1953-1958, Records of the United States Continental Army Command RG 546.
APPENDIX 5

1958 Educational Philosophy
Major General Lionel C. McGarr

1. Continue the USACGSC tradition of serious student application and hard work.
2. Emphasize decision-making and problem-solving.
3. Teach staff as a vital and essential component of command.
4. Emphasize the command point of view.
5. Use an educational approach whenever practicable.
6. Appropriately emphasize the preparation of student officers for the future.
7. Eliminate minutiae and unnecessary repetition.
8. Encourage and develop student reasoning powers, inquisitiveness, creative thinking, and a critical approach.
9. Exploit the individual and collective experience and maturity of the student body.
10. Keep elementary introductory type instruction to the minimum practicable.
11. Ensure that instruction is continuously more “reason” and less “solution” oriented.
12. Place maximum appropriate responsibility for learning on the student.
13. Create a classroom atmosphere and learning situation that inculcate and refine integrity, moral courage, intellectual honesty, and leadership.
14. Develop in the student an analytical and constructively critical attitude toward doctrine. He must be objective and creative.
15. Suitably emphasize future warfare and new concepts throughout all courses of study.
16. Further both interservice and Allied understanding and cooperation without harming Army objectives. Ensure Combined Arms and Services approach whenever possible.
17. Give full recognition in all aspects of the College mission – resident, nonresident instruction, current doctrine, and combat developments – to the importance of the Reserve Components of the Army as an essential and vital element of the Army team. Also be alert to the need for markedly increased quality and state of readiness of all reserve components organizations and activities as the result of time compression factors brought about by the Nuclear Age.
18. Emphasize the concept of the use of instruction to test, develop and evaluate doctrine as appropriate.

Source: CGSC, “The Commandant’s /60 Curriculum Guidance and Decisions on /60 Curriculum” FTLV, 3 November 1958, 13-14, Box 27, RG 546, NARA II.
APPENDIX 6

Allied Student Profile and Comparison to U.S. Students, 1973-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>No. of Allied Officers</th>
<th>Allied Percentage</th>
<th>No. of US Officers</th>
<th>US Officer Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Allied Percentage</th>
<th>US Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32 or less</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 – 39</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 or over</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Age: 37 years, 2 months (34 years, 10 months)
Minimum Age: 28 years (29 years, 5 months)
Maximum Age: 56 years (46 years, 3 months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Allied Percentage</th>
<th>US Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: 15 years (11 years, 2 months)
Minimum: 8 years (8 years)
Maximum: 25 years (19 years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Allied Officer Exp.</th>
<th>Allied Officer Percentage</th>
<th>US Officer Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Staff Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Allied Officer Exp.</th>
<th>Allied Officer Percentage</th>
<th>US Officer Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Marital Status

- No. Married: 94
- No. Single: 3

### Accompanying Dependents

- Wives: 66
- Children: 139
- Other Adults: 6

Average number of dependents per accompanied student: 3.2

Maximum number of dependents (two officers): 8

Source: Allied Student Profile 73/74 – 1 October 1973, Folder College History, Miscellaneous College History Documents from 1969 to 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
APPENDIX 7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Harry L. Coles</td>
<td>The Ohio State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>Warren Hassler, Jr.</td>
<td>Pennsylvania State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>Archer Jones</td>
<td>North Dakota State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>K. Jack Bauer</td>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>Dudley T. Cornish</td>
<td>Pittsburg State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>Ira D. Gruber</td>
<td>Rice University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>D. Clayton James</td>
<td>Mississippi State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>David Syrett</td>
<td>Queens College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>Raymond A. Callahan</td>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>Theodore A. Wilson</td>
<td>University of Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>Bruce W. Menning</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>Donald W. Smythe, S.J.</td>
<td>John Carroll University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>Peter Maslowski</td>
<td>University of Nebraska</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 8

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Washington, DC 20310

Reply to attention of DAMO-ZA 1 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL THURMAN

SUBJECT: Faculty for Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) and Army War College (AWC)

1. You and I are committed to insuring our Army’s ability to provide unparalleled training to those in our Officer Corps who are to lead our forces in the future. Although there are many fronts upon which to attack this concern, in my view none represent a more direct and potentially profitable course than a revitalization of the education our officers receive at both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) and the Army War College (AWC). These two institutions are absolutely essential elements in our pursuit to broaden the base of knowledge and interests of our Officer Corps. It goes without saying that the Officer Corps looks to these colleges for the lead in providing doctrinal and strategic focus to the preparation and conduct of war.

2. We already have underway or under study a number of initiatives to improve the curricula of these two key colleges. The authorized number of faculty members does not present a serious problem at either institution; nor does the quality of the Faculty at the AWC. But the Faculty at C&GSC must be substantially improved if we are to produce the future leaders the Army needs and that we both want. The crucial need to improve the quality of the Faculty at C&GSC is the subject of this memorandum.

3. Traditionally—up to about the period of our involvement in Vietnam—faculty service at C&GSC was one of the most prestigious assignments in the Army. In my judgment, it was also one of the most valuable to the Army in that it produced double benefits: students were guided, taught and tested by the highest quality officers we could produce; these faculty members emerged from this experience with a greater depth and breadth of understanding of the military art that prepared them even more fully for key command and staff positions. As General Maxwell D. Taylor reminisced in a recent conversation, “The instructors I had at Leavenworth emerged as the corps commanders in World War II.”

4. More recently, we have learned that other armies with high professional values—especially the British and German Armies—place an extraordinary emphasis on selecting the most highly qualified officers for the “Directing Staff” at their staff colleges. Then they insure that these officers are stretched and made to grow. It is not too much to say that they regard the “graduating faculty” as being at least as important to the professionalism of their armies as the students these officers taught.

5. Compared to this high standard—similar to the one we maintained for many decades—MG Meloy confirmed during his recent assessment of the C&GSC Faculty, at the CSA’s request, that quality was
low. One student summarized it succinctly: How can the Army, he asked, justify hand-picking former battalion commanders to teach twelve captains how to be battalion and brigade staff officers, yet assign relatively inexperienced majors and lieutenant colonels to teach fifty field grade officers how to be battalion and brigade commanders and staff officers at every level up to international NATO staffs?

6. I would be pleased to assist you in whatever portrayal of costs and opportunities is necessary to permit the CSA to judge what measures are both affordable and necessary to raise the quality of the Faculty at C&GSC. Among the measures that might be undertaken are the following, which are not mutually exclusive:

--Make appointments to the Faculty by nomination.

--Establish successful completion of specified duties as a precondition for some percentage of the Faculty: principal division staff officer, battalion or brigade command, etc.

--Direct assignments to the Faculty, as compared to other assignments.

7. The Army needs your able assistance in providing the requisite level of professional competence at C&GSC. I am convinced that an upgrade in quality and experience on the Faculty at C&GSC will improve the competence of our Officer Corps. Indeed, it will heighten the professionalism of the entire U.S. Army.

William R. Richardson
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

CF:
General Otis
Lieutenant General Stone

Source: Folder RETO (Army Ed) Study, HQ-001, CGSC 79, CAFLA.
APPENDIX 9

Course Development Cycle, 1977

Step 1. OCAD will identify the critical subjects/learning tasks for the course/subcourse. These are converted to TLO’s for the College and given to the academic departments responsible for the presentation of instruction in a given area.

Step 2. The academic department reviews the TLO’s it has been given, develops guidance, and assigns TLO’s to instructional committees for course/subcourse development and implementation.

Step 3. The instructional committee assigns an author/instructor (A/I) to develop LO’s and lesson plans (LP’s) based on the TLO’s.

Step 4. The A/I conducts research into the subject material and the media available for use. Combined these two factors, he develops a concept for the course. Individual A/I’s may coordinate with OCAD regarding media concepts.

Step 5. Using the TLO’s and any guidance received, the A/I translates his concept into draft LO’s and LP’s. This is a critical point in the development cycle. The A/I must insure that each LO contains tasks, conditions; [sic] and standards that support the TLO. The LP’s must contain well-structured learning steps and events that guide the student in a logical direction toward the accomplishment of each LO. Assistance in selection of media, instructional methods, classroom arrangement, and writing of LO’s may be provided by OCAD.

Step 6. The A/I briefs the committee/department head who reviews the concepts to insure that LO’s, learning steps, and LP’s best support the achievement of the TLO.

Step 7. Based on the results of the concept briefing, the A/I will write/rewrite course/subcourse material in final form and begin circulating draft coordination copies to other departments and to OCAD for comment.

Step 8. At this point, the A/I should prepare a Course/Subcourse Data Card, CGSC Form 951 (example B-1). This information must be received in OCAD 6 months prior to course/subcourse start date.

Step 9. On completion of coordination, the A/I reviews final drafts of the entire course/subcourse to insure that all LO’s of the course/subcourse support the TLO’s in the best possible manner.

Step 10. The A/I will submit the final draft to the Editing and Publications Branch (E&P) for complete edit on the date specified for that course/subcourse in the Printing and Training Aids Schedule.

Step 11. The drafts are forwarded to the Army Field Printing Plant (AFPP) for publication. There will also normally be a suspense date for arrival at the AFPP. The AFPP sends proofs of materials to the A/I for proofreading. When completion dates are very near, the A/I may be asked to review proofs at the AFPP. He will also be furnished a date when the material will be completed.

Step 12. The A/I presents a briefing of the class to associates who will also be presenting the class or will have a direct interest in its content. Usually this will take place within a department. Some courses/subcourses may be briefed to the entire faculty.
Step 13. Rehearsals are conducted by instructors as appropriate. Reviews may be conducted at committee/depart level.

Step 14. The course/subcourse is implemented through scheduling by the DET.

Step 15. Feedback is provided to OCAD and the academic departments from several sources. The students provide feedback by means of informal comments, student sheets, the Student Curriculum Committee, and the End-of-Course Survey. Faculty provides information on course content, methodology, and student receptivity. The Combined Arms Training Developments Activity (CATRADA) provides information regarding educational needs of the Army. All of this input is consolidated, evaluated, and considered for course/subcourse revision.

Source: CGSC, Faculty Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, April 1977), 2-1-2 – 2-1-4, CARL.
## APPENDIX 10

Comparison of Evaluation Systems—Intermediate Level Staff Colleges, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Class Size</th>
<th>Classification of Students</th>
<th>Grading Scale</th>
<th>Core Instruction</th>
<th>Electives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Yes, top 5% Honor Graduates; next 15% Commandant’s List</td>
<td>A, B, C, U</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Naval Command and Staff</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Yes, top 5% Highest Distinction; next 15% With Distinction and for any subject in which 3.6 or better was earned</td>
<td>4.0 scale</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>Yes, about 20% Distinguished Graduate</td>
<td>O, E, S, U</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Command and Staff College</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Yes, about 30% Outstanding</td>
<td>Percent of mastery</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Staff College</td>
<td>270 (two classes per year)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Achievement tests for student reference; not recorded</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DTD to Commandant, Fact Sheet, Evaluation Procedures, 17 November 1976, Folder DOD Committee on Excellence in Education-Fact Sheets, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA.
APPENDIX 11

Inventory Exam Result 1978 and 1979 Classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Raw Score Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Not tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jack B. Farris, Jr., memorandum, Comparison of Inventory Exam Results (78 vs 79), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 September 1978, Folder Inventory Examination, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CGSC.
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Bell Hall Dedication Collection

Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Collection

Command and General Staff College Commencement Collection

Command and General Staff College Curriculum Records

Photograph Collection

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth (CAFLA) Archives;
Combined Arms Research Library

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth Records

Harry S. Truman Library

Record Group 220, Records Of Temporary Committees, Commissions, And Boards.

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Richard A. Sinnreich Papers
Donn A. Starry Papers
Harold R. Winton Papers
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National Defense University Library Digital Collection

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_____. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review (RCS CHIS-6 [R3]) 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1987. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, no date.


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_____.


_____.


_____.


_____.


_____.


_____.


_____.


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