

[This document contains the author's accepted manuscript. For the publisher's version, see the link in the header of this document.]

**Paper citation:**

Manolescu, Beth Innocenti. "Shaming in and into Argumentation." *Argumentation* 21 (2007): 379-95.

**Abstract:**

Shame appeals may be both relevant to and make possible argumentation with reluctant addressees. I propose a normative pragmatic model of practical reasoning involved in shame appeals and show that its explanatory power exceeds that of a more traditional account of an underlying practical inference structure. I also illustrate that analyzing the formal propriety of shame appeals offers a more complete explanation of their normative pragmatic force than an application of rules for dialogue types.

**Text of paper:**

1. INTRODUCTION

Shame appeals may be both relevant to and make possible argumentation with reluctant addressees. Traditionally emotional appeals including shame appeals have been classified as fallacies because they are failures of relevance (Govier, 2005, p. 198; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 134). Critics may judge a shame appeal to be fallacious because feeling shame is not a relevant reason for concluding something; the conclusion ought to be based on the merits of the case itself. But, Walton (2000) has argued, this kind of judgment seems to involve treating a prudential claim--you ought to do something--as an evidential claim--you ought to believe something. Avoiding shame may be a good, prudential reason to do something. Therefore Walton (1992, 2000) has argued that emotional appeals are not inherently fallacious, they may also be strong or weak arguments, and critics ought to evaluate them based on the underlying inferential structure of the practical reasoning they involve as well as on the rules of the type of dialogue in which they occur.

In what follows I aim to build on Walton's insights that critics ought to attend to the practical reasoning involved in and the context of shame appeals. First I propose a normative pragmatic account of shame appeals in argumentation--a model of practical reasoning that explains how discourse strategies pressure addressees to do something. I also make a case for explaining the normative pragmatic force of strategies in terms of the context created by discourse strategies themselves--in terms of formal propriety. I then illustrate the explanatory power of the model by analyzing select shame appeals in Carrie Chapman Catt's 1917 address to the United States Congress. I conclude by noting pedagogical and theoretical implications of this method of theorizing.

This study is based on a meta-theoretical principle shared by pragma-dialecticians: externalization of commitments (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). I do not describe individual states of mind or being such as "feeling shame" or the belief structure of feeling shame (e.g., Taylor, 1985). Instead I explain how arguers design shame appeals to create a context such that doing or failing to do something involves risks. For example an arguer may attempt to show that it is shameful for an addressee to manifest acceptance of some premise, to reason from a premise poorly, to invoke an inappropriate emotion, to fail to respond to a counterargument, and the like. Simply put, there are cases where arguers look badly *qua* arguers, so it is possible to shame them into argumentation--to pressure them to manifest the rationality of their position or risk criticism. The degree to which shame appeals are compelling--that is, pressure an addressee to do something--may be explained by discourse strategies arguers use to engage norms of argumentation.

To support the claims that (1) the practical reasoning involved in shame appeals is better explained by attending to how actual discourse strategies create risks for situated arguers than by

reconstructing an underlying practical inference structure and (2) the force of shame appeals is better understood as a result of discursively engaging norms of argumentation than in terms of adherence to rules based on dialogue types, I submit a normative pragmatic account of shame appeals.

## 2. PRACTICAL REASONING IN SHAME APPEALS

One way of understanding the practical reasoning involved in shame appeals is to reconstruct an underlying practical inference structure. The following analysis is based on Walton's (2000) analysis of fear appeals:

- Do A, or you will feel shame.
- Feeling shame is undesirable.
- Therefore you ought to prevent shame if possible.
- But the only way for you to prevent shame is to do A.
- Therefore, you ought to do A.

This premise-conclusion complex then serves as the object of evaluation. If the support for each premise is acceptable, relevant, and sufficient, and if the argument addresses critical questions, then it may be judged to be a reasonable argument that compels assent. This kind of analysis helps critics to assess intellectual force--to explain why an argument ought to be intellectually compelling in the mind of an individual (Manolescu, 2005b, p. 140).

There are three shortcomings in this model of practical reasoning for explaining how situated shame appeals work to reasonably pressure addressees to do something. First, it does not explain the design of the argumentation. Presumably arguers could design a message that makes a reconstruction redundant because it matches the actual message design. But typically reconstructions do not match message design. As Jacobs (2000) has remarked, a reconstruction "is what could have been said, but wasn't. The puzzle is, why wasn't it said that way in the first place" (p. 265).

Second, it does not explain how discourse strategies create practical reasons for an addressee do something--to manifest acceptance of a premise for example. If we assume argumentation can do just that and more, argumentation theory ought to be able to explain how actual discourse strategies work to reasonably pressure addressees to do something including but not limited to manifesting assent to a cogent argument (Manolescu, 2005a, 2005b). To do so it needs to model the practical reasoning of situated arguers and addressees--not just the kind of asituational, clear-thinking addressee implied by a typical reconstructed underlying inference structure.

Third, assessing an underlying practical inference structure rather than actual discourse strategies may prevent theorists from assessing the proportion or intensity of the shame appeal (Brinton, 1988a, 1988b, 1994; Manolescu, 2007). Assessing proportion is necessary because ordinary arguers make judgments about whether emotional intensity "fits" the contours of the argumentation, including its subject matter and occasion. More is at stake here than violating social norms. An appeal that attempts to make an act seem to be more shameful than it is, or an appeal of overwhelming intensity may shut down dialogue. It is a fallible sign that the arguer may not understand the nature of the occasion, subject matter, or addressees' interests. The lack of propriety thus creates a reason for addressees to conclude that the argument does not deserve serious consideration. Because, other things being equal, addressees may risk little in ignoring such an argument, lack of propriety may foreclose the possibility of dialogue.

In what follows I propose a normative pragmatic model of shame appeals in argumentation. Consider a simple case of one student arguing to another that presenting a paper downloaded from the internet as her own work would be a shameful thing to do. How can the arguer design discourse to pressure the addressee to manifest acceptance of this premise? To identify design features that may be expected to do just that we can first consider stock strategies. First, (1) the arguer may manifest that the addressee is in a position to see the action is shameful, perhaps asserting: "You should know better."

This is designed to foreclose the possibility of the addressee responding that the action is not shameful or that she was not aware the action is shameful. Second, (2) the arguer may manifest that the action is shameful in the particular circumstances, perhaps asserting: "That is no excuse for that kind of behavior." This is designed to foreclose the possibility of the addressee offering an excuse such as: "My partner made me do it." Third, (3) the arguer may manifest that others are in a position to see that the action is shameful; even if others perform the action, they should also know better. This is designed to foreclose the possibility of the addressee responding: "They did it too." Fourth, (4) the arguer may manifest that she has not performed the action--that she knows better. This is designed to foreclose the possibility of the addressee responding: "You've done it too."

In all of these cases the addressee may choose to manifest acceptance of the premise that it would be shameful to perform the action. She may pledge not to plagiarize for example. But the addressee may also choose to accept the risks of maintaining that she did not know the action is shameful, or that it is not shameful in her particular circumstances, or that it is not shameful if others or the arguer are doing it. In doing so she risks criticism for a defect in or lack of moral judgment. But it is also possible for her to avoid these risks and in doing so to transfer them to the arguer.

To explain how this works, we may begin by asking: What distinguishes a shame appeal from a threat or bullying? What gives it normative pragmatic force; what reasonably pressures an addressee to respond as the arguer desires, where "reasonably" involves situated judgment rather than compulsion? The arguer must also accept some risk or meet some obligation in making the appeal. These risks and obligations may be built into the design of the shame appeal.

In making manifest (1), the arguer incurs an obligation to have gathered relevant information before impugning the addressee's good name (Kauffeld, 1998). If the addressee is not in fact in a position to know the action is shameful, then--other things being equal--the arguer risks criticism for not acting responsibly. So the arguer ought to make manifest that her position is responsibly formed. In making manifest (2), the arguer risks criticism for not acting responsibly and for a defect in or lack of moral judgment. If an addressee can show that in her circumstances the action was not shameful, then the arguer's claim that the action is shameful in those circumstances may serve as a fallible sign that her position is not responsibly formed--that she has not collected the relevant information. Or it may serve as a fallible sign that she lacks moral judgment--that she has not sized up the situation accurately or fairly or that she cannot see that some norm is on its way out of normalcy; for example wearing to class clothes that expose one's midriff and more may not be shameful if most students dress this way.

For the same reason, even what may at first glance appear to be fallacious moves--(3) *ad populum* and (4) *tu quoque* tactics--may reasonably diminish the force of the arguer's shame appeal. In making a shame appeal an arguer incurs an obligation to have made a responsible moral judgment about who can perform the action in what circumstances. If the arguer or others have not performed the action, their restraint is a fallible sign that only under exceptional circumstances or perhaps under no circumstances is performing the action acceptable. The strength of the obligation depends on the degree to which the action is shameful. For example, the performance of the action by the arguer or others may be a fallible sign that some situations warrant the action; fleeing a battle scene may not be cowardly if doing so offers the possibility of recuperating and defeating the opponent. Or the performance of the action by the arguer or others may be a fallible sign that the action involves a norm on its way out of normalcy. But if the arguer or others have performed the action, and if the circumstances were not exceptional, then the arguer risks appearing perhaps deceptive, perhaps hypocritical, and in any case as shameworthy as she attempts to make the addressee appear. Thus an arguer ought to make manifest that she and others have not or would not perform the action--that they make moral judgments responsibly and hold themselves to the standards they set for others.

In short, in making a shame appeal an arguer creates a context in which he (1) risks criticism for irresponsibly impugning the addressee's good name and for poor moral judgment and (2) makes it risky for the addressee to continue performing some action, namely that she will look blameworthy. To avoid risks to himself--to meet obligations he incurs in making a shame appeal--and to create risks for an addressee--to pressure her to do something, the arguer may manifest that his position is responsibly formed and that his moral judgment is responsibly made. The core of compelling shame appeals, then, is "manifest rationality" (Johnson, 2000).

### 3. EVALUATING SHAME APPEALS IN CONTEXT

One way for theorists to understand the context of argumentation is as a dialogue type--critical discussion, persuasion dialogue, negotiation dialogue, and the like. Arguments may then be evaluated based on how well they work to achieve the goals of a given dialogue type (Walton, 1992, 2000). This may be described as a top-down approach to context; theorists place upon argumentation an ideal model from which norms or rules are deduced. Goodwin (2007) has detailed problems with defining the context of argumentation as a dialogue type in which arguments function. Here I will simply point to one limitation of this approach to context and propose an alternative.

The limitation is that much complex discourse does not fit squarely into any single type of dialogue. Political discourse is a conspicuous example. For example political elites may argue in order to manifest that their position is responsibly formed or to hold others accountable for their positions (Goodwin 1999, 2002). Rhetorical studies of public argument including the arguments of early woman's rights advocates have taken into account arguers' multiple purposes and a range of strategies arguers use to accomplish them (e.g., Campbell, 1989; Palczewski, 2005, esp. pp. 389-90 n. 31). This study extends that work by explaining how strategies work to reasonably pressure addressees to do something related to the activity of arguing. Arguers alter a context by what they say and how they say it; a Waltonian pragma-dialectician may describe this as a shift in dialogue type. Instead of using a top-down approach to context, a normative pragmatic perspective involves analyzing the context created by the argumentation--how saying something changes the context because it involves incurring and transferring obligations (Kauffeld, 1995, 1998; Goodwin, 2001) or, put differently, creates reasons that did not previously exist for doing something (Goodwin, 2003). It explains how strategies arguers use to engage norms of argumentation in particular cases create practical reasons for addressees to respond as the arguer desires. The normative generates force.

One way of systematically analyzing the context created by discourse strategies is considering their reasonability under the circumstances or formal propriety (Manolescu, 2004). The concept of propriety is featured throughout the history of thinking about rhetoric and argumentation, from Callicles's protests about how Socrates argues in Plato's (1952) *Gorgias* to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's position that the audience is the controlling factor in matters of form and substance (1969, p. 25). Propriety has meant different things to different thinkers (McKenna, 2006, ch. 1); for Socrates the appropriate is what best reveals truth without regard for a general public audience (see also Weaver, 1985, ch. 6) while for Perelman audience is everything. Here, based on Burke's (1968) conception of form, I view formal propriety as a fit among the appeal, argumentation, and occasion based on audience expectations generated by the discourse and situation, because this view of propriety enables critics to systematically analyze and assess situated arguments.

There are five kinds of form. Most recognizable to students of argumentation is syllogistic form, where stating one or more premises creates an expectation that another particular premise will be stated. Based on what has been said before in the argument, addressees may see that a premise is fitting or not. If an arguer states the premises "Women are citizens and citizens have the right to vote," then the message is designed in a way that enables addressees to anticipate that "Women ought to have the right to vote" may or will be asserted. Thus syllogistic form incorporates inferential structures

as they are manifested in the actual presentational design of the message. Another kind of form recognizable to students of argumentation is conventional form. Here addressees note whether argumentation meets expectations generated by the conventions of, say, an institution and its procedural rules. Courts of law and parliaments permit and prohibit different kinds of arguments. An argument may meet the standard of formal propriety if it fulfills conventional expectations.

There are three additional kinds of form that may be less familiar to students of argumentation but that help critics to evaluate discourse strategies that may be left out of traditional reconstructions. First, qualitative form involves a situated judgment about whether one quality fits with another. We can imagine a sustained tone of solemnity in an address such that any kind of humor would be inappropriate; the quality of humor may not fit with the quality of solemnity. This kind of judgment is also relevant to evaluating the proportion of emotional appeals. Second, repetitive form--repetition of the same principle in different guises--involves a situated judgment about consistency. For an appeal to exhibit formal propriety, addressees recognize a fit among premises within the argument more broadly--an absence of inconsistencies--whether this broader argument is conceived as the arguer's entire case on a particular occasion or her case developed on a number of occasions or a case developed by numerous people on numerous occasions. Third, minor or incidental forms are parts of an argument that are formal events in themselves; any single argument for example may be isolated from the argumentation as a whole and analyzed as a separate episode. The same is true for other kinds of strategies such as digressions or descriptions.

#### 4. CASE STUDY

Carrie Chapman Catt's 1917 "Address to the United States Congress" is a good case study for illustrating the explanatory power of a normative pragmatic theory of shame appeals in argumentation. Catt uses shame appeals throughout the address to pressure members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage, and Catt was well known for devising other kinds of tactics designed to pressure members of Congress (Campbell, 1989). Moreover at the time people publicly and proudly opposed woman suffrage, so simple assertions that it is shameful to vote against woman suffrage could not be expected to generate much pressure. Catt is in a situation where she needs to bring to bear a full range of resources available to arguers for designing forceful shame appeals.

Catt first orally delivered the address to participants in the 1917 National American Woman Suffrage Association convention. In the speech she directly addressed members of Congress who of course were not present. But afterwards a pamphlet version was presented by women on the NAWSA's Congressional Committee to every member of Congress in person. I have chosen to focus on Catt's address as an appeal to members of Congress but, as will be discussed below, it is significant that she also delivered it to members of the woman suffrage convention. Certainly Catt intended for the address to pressure members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage, and one strategy she uses is making shame appeals. For example she asserts that "your vote [against woman suffrage] will compel your children to apologize for your act" (1989, p. 527). If they do not vote for it, she pressures them to at least explain why they are voting against it--to manifest the rationality of their action; she shames them into argumentation. Pressuring them to argue is an important task because behind-the-scenes lobbying and deal-making involving the liquor interest had been a key factor in women not yet having the right to vote (Catt and Shuler, 1926); the liquor interest feared that if women had the right to vote, they would vote for prohibition. Catt wants to hold members of Congress accountable for their vote; arguing is a way for them to manifest responsible decision-making (Goodwin, 1999, 2002). She may want to do so not for the good of maintaining the legitimacy of political deliberations, although her strategies contribute to this good as well, but because she believes she has the better argument. The following discussion explains how Catt uses shame appeals to pressure members of Congress to either manifest acceptance of the premise that women ought to have the right to vote or argue against it. After

sketching a more traditional analysis I explain how it may be supplemented by a normative pragmatic analysis.

The following is an excerpt from a shame appeal designed in part to convince members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage.

Do you suppose that any woman in the land is going to be content with unenfranchisement when she once comprehends that men of other countries have given women the vote? Do you not see that when that time comes to her she is going to ask why you, her husband, her father, who were so placed, perhaps, that you could observe the progress of world affairs, did not see the coming change of custom and save her from the humiliation of having to beg for that which women in other countries are already enjoying? (Catt, 1989, p. 526)

One way of reconstructing the practical inference structure of the shame appeal is the following based on Walton's (2000) analysis of fear appeals:

Vote for woman suffrage, or you will feel shame.

Feeling shame is undesirable.

Therefore you ought to prevent shame if possible.

But the only way for you to prevent shame is to vote for woman suffrage.

Therefore you ought to vote for woman suffrage.

The passage quoted above may be understood as support for the initial reconstructed premise: Vote for woman suffrage, or you will feel shame. The passage invokes a potential scenario where a member of Congress may be in the shameful position of having to explain why he did not see what Catt describes as "inevitable" (1989, pp. 503, 508, 511, 525, 529)--the arrival of woman suffrage--and why he put United States women in the humiliating position of having to beg for what women in other countries already had. This would be particularly shameful since, as Catt (1989, pp. 504-05, 521) makes manifest, at the time of the address the United States was fighting in the Great War "to make the world safe for democracy." A more traditional analysis would involve asking whether the support provided by the passage and elsewhere in the address is acceptable, relevant, and sufficient; and asking critical questions such as whether feeling shame may be avoided by some other means. It would also consider whether the appeal helps or hinders achieving the goal or goals of the dialogue. The complication with this case as with other examples of political discourse is that it seems to be at once a persuasion dialogue, negotiation dialogue, and critical discussion. In any case, if the appeal meets these criteria, then a critic might judge it to be a good argument and perhaps assert that it shifts the burden of proof.

But how does it do this? How could it pressure even reluctant addressees, such as those who plan to vote against woman suffrage because they want campaign contributions from the liquor interest, to argue? Why would Catt reasonably expect her discourse to shame them into voting for woman suffrage or into argumentation?

#### 4.1. *Strong Shame Appeals*

In the first sentence of the passage quoted above Catt uses a line of argument that she uses throughout the address to shame members of Congress into voting for woman suffrage: "men of other countries have given women the vote." She asserts that nations including Great Britain, Canada, Russia, France, Italy, and Germany have enfranchised women or are seriously considering it (1989, pp. 509-10); therefore "[a]ny man who has red American blood in his veins, any man who has gloried in our history and has rejoiced that our land was the leader of world democracy, will share with us the humbled national pride that our country has so long delayed action upon this question that another country has beaten us in what we thought was our especial world mission" (1989, pp. 510-11). Likewise she asserts that continuing to vote against woman suffrage "threatens to make our nation a jest among the onward-moving peoples of the world" (1989, p. 507). Now, there are cases where world opinion and actions apparently have little effect on whether shameful actions in another nation continue; at the moment for

example the United States continues to execute prisoners and wage war in Iraq. What gives Catt's shame appeal normative pragmatic force? Why could she expect it to pressure members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage?

First, she manifests that her position is responsibly formed. She does so in a number of ways including the following. Presenting historical evidence and testimony from people around the world--Great Britain, Canada, and more--manifests that she has examined a broad range of material. Presumably members of Congress are in a position to know these facts, but the strategy of presenting evidence holds them accountable for knowing it. Any addressee--including members of Congress--can presume its veracity; they can reason that Catt would not want to risk criticism for not having command of relevant facts since this could provide opponents with evidence that she is not fit to vote. At the same time any addressee can hold others--including members of Congress--accountable for this knowledge; to deny that they know it is a fallible sign that they are not paying sufficient attention to Catt, to others in the woman suffrage movement, or to world events. The risk is serious since it is a fallible sign that they are not taking steps to responsibly form a position on the issue--not undertaking a civic responsibility and, significantly, their responsibility as political representatives.

The strategy of first orally presenting the argument to members of the NAWSA and then having them personally deliver a pamphlet version of the speech to members of Congress works for similar reasons. It helps to foreclose the possibility that members of Congress can in the future excuse their vote against woman suffrage by simply asserting: "I didn't see it coming." She forewarns members of Congress about the possibility of being held accountable in the future for their vote. Orally delivering the warning first to women of the NAWSA and then having them hand-deliver a pamphlet version of the warning to members of Congress shows members that women know that the members have been forewarned. So to deny that they saw it coming may mean they did not read her argument--shameful since it manifests signs that it is responsibly formed. Or to deny it may mean they did not believe her even though it turns out that she was right. This may be particularly shameful because it is a fallible sign that women can have better moral judgment than a man--a potentially troublesome implication for a member of Congress who would dare to advocate against woman suffrage on the grounds of women not being fit for politics. Even if a member of Congress could claim to have never before encountered a woman intellectually fit for politics, due to the strategy of first orally presenting the speech to women who then handed the pamphlet version to members of Congress, he could not claim this without risk.

Second, Catt manifests responsible moral judgment. Presenting evidence of other countries that have enfranchised women is not a fallacious *ad populum* tactic but rather is designed to serve as a fallible sign that an antisuffrage position is a norm on its way out of normalcy; the appeal is designed to pressure members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage or risk criticism for lack of moral judgment. Signs that Catt's appeals are designed to work this way include her statements about risks to members of Congress of not voting for woman suffrage: they will be seen as among those who are "too blind to see that the end has come" or "unrelenting and unreasoning" as they "stubbornly deny" that it is inevitable (Catt, 1989, p. 512), or as among those "few 'women haters' left, a few 'old men of the tribe'" (Catt, 1989, p. 531). Her statement of risks brings to bear on the situation norms of argumentation: looking at evidence rather than blinding themselves to it, accepting the logical force of the evidence and reasoning upon it rather than stubbornly denying it, examining the merits of the case rather than acting based on emotions (like "'woman haters'") or tradition (like "'old men of the tribe'"). So even if the shame appeals in her argumentation do not shame members of Congress into voting for woman suffrage, they shame them into argumentation. If members of Congress do not manifest the rationality of their position, they risk criticism for irresponsible decision-making and poor moral judgment.

In making the shame appeal, Catt not only pressures members of Congress to vote for woman suffrage or manifest the rationality of an antisuffrage position. She also incurs an obligation to exercise

responsible moral judgment and therefore risks criticism for its defectiveness if others do not see the facts as she does. She meets it in part by the strategy of presenting evidence--a fallible sign of responsible moral judgment. Another discourse strategy designed to avoid this risk is foregrounding the act of reasoning--making manifest the quality of her moral judgment. She foregrounds the analytical structure of the address for example as she actually numbers the "[t]hree distinct causes" (1989, p. 504) that make woman suffrage inevitable, the "three reasons why" proponents choose the Federal method of enfranchisement (an amendment to the United States Constitution) "and three reasons [they] reject the State method" (1989, p. 513), and "the objections Congressional opponents urge against suffrage by the federal method" which "also, curiously, number three" (1989, p. 520). This is also a fallible sign of careful preparation and clear judgment. At other points in the address she points to the reasoning involved in arriving to standpoints. Arguing against the state method, for example, she asserts: "It is our sincere belief based upon evidence which has been completely convincing to us that woman suffrage amendments in several States have been won on referendum, but that the returns were juggled and the amendment counted out" (1989, p. 519). She also foregrounds the act of responsible decision-making as woman suffrage passed in the state of New York: "The case against woman suffrage, carefully prepared by the combined wit, skill and wisdom of opponents, including some men of high repute, during sixty years, has been closed. The jury of the New York electorate heard it all, weighed the evidence and pronounced it 'incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial'" (Catt, 1989, p. 512).

By making manifest her standards of reasoning--evidence from different sides heard and weighed--Catt makes it difficult to deny that her position is responsibly formed. Doing so would subject addressees to criticism for not understanding what responsible decision-making is. To show that they are also attaining this standard, then, addressees ought to manifest that they are weighing her evidence. Thus Catt's strategies are designed to show that if the addressee is making decisions responsibly, then he is in a position to see that voting against woman suffrage is shameful, or at least must manifest serious consideration of that possibility.

Another way Catt manifests that she has made the shame appeal responsibly and that her moral judgment is responsibly made is formal propriety. Consider for example the formal propriety of the shame appeal quoted above--what may be described as a "minor" or "incidental" form. The appeal is part of a series of questions near the conclusion of the address that Catt poses to "those who still harbor honest misgivings" (1989, p. 525) about voting for woman suffrage. The appeal does not involve an abrupt change in level of intensity within the address as a whole or within this particular part of the address, and therefore fits the contours of the qualitative form of the address itself. The level of intensity as well as other design features also fit conventional expectations for an address to Congress. This judgment is grounded in a reading of the House debates on the resolution following Catt's address; representatives' speeches are comparable to Catt's address in terms of quality of arguments, emotional intensity, length, and the like (e.g. 1918, pp. 765, 769, 771, 772, 774, 778, 780, 794). The repetitive form of the appeal also exhibits propriety as throughout the speech Catt makes similar points in different guises about the United States looking badly in the eyes of the world and with respect to world actors (e.g. 1989, pp. 507, 508, 511).

Formal propriety is not trivial or irrelevant to the argument. It is a fallible sign that Catt is a serious person who understands politics, the situation, and how to argue. This is a significant matter since--as Catt notes after telling a story about a committee chairman who "said to a fellow member: 'There is no man living or dead who could answer the arguments of those women,' and then he added, 'but I'd rather see my wife dead in her coffin than going to vote',"--"there are those of you who have said that women are illogical and sentimental" (1989, p. 523) and therefore ought not to have political rights such as the right to vote. Formal propriety in this case makes it difficult for members of Congress to ignore her on the grounds that her views do not deserve serious consideration. It creates a context

such that doing so may subject them to criticism for not recognizing that her moral judgment is responsibly formed--that denying women the right to vote deserves the level of indignation that she exhibits, for example. The risk is serious given that members of Congress ought to understand the proprieties of addressing each other in the course of political deliberation.

Moreover, this is a relevant appeal to shame--not a kind of *ad baculum* tactic that may not even qualify as an argument (Levi, 1999). Catt does not threaten to shame members of Congress by exposing their indiscretions, for example. Instead, the appeal to shame is grounded in norms of argumentation such as taking seriously an argument that manifests signs of understanding the nature of the subject, occasion, and addressees' interests; other things being equal, addressees who do not engage such argumentation may be vulnerable to criticism. These discourse strategies also show that Catt in some respects has acted consistently with the standards she sets for members of Congress and therefore generate normative pragmatic force.

#### 4.2. *Weak Shame Appeals*

However, in significant respects her shame appeals lack normative pragmatic force. Consider the episode in the peroration that begins with this question: "Do you realize that in no other country in the world with democratic tendencies is suffrage so completely denied as in a considerable number of our own states" (1989, p. 529). This is the shame appeal that we have been considering so far--an appeal that involves looking badly with respect to the actions of people in other nations. I submit that the force of the shame appeal diminishes as she continues:

Do you realize that no class of men in our own or in any other land have been compelled to ask their inferiors for the ballot?

Do you realize that when you ask women to take their cause to State referendum you compel them to do this; that you drive women of education, refinement, achievement, to beg men who cannot read for their political freedom?

Do you realize that such anomalies as a College President asking her janitor to give her a vote are overstraining the patience and driving women to desperation? (1989, p. 530)

This appeal lacks formal propriety so it lacks force. In the address Catt argues against sexism but here manifests acceptance of elitism and classism by suggesting that she and other "women of education, refinement, achievement" ought to have the right to vote if illiterate men or male janitors--"inferiors"--do. Since Catt manifests adherence to the principles that "*Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed*," "*Ours is a government of the people, by the people and for the people*," and "*We are fighting for . . . democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government*" (1989, pp. 504-05, emphasis in original), she cannot with propriety qualify "the governed" and "people" because she cannot with propriety hedge on the universal status of these principles.

First, she commits herself to their universal status as she designs a shame appeal suggesting that members of Congress not voting for woman suffrage will look badly to historians. Historians have explained that "[c]lass by class" people such as "[c]ertain denominations of Protestants, Catholics, Jews, non-land holders workingmen, Negroes, Indians" were given the right to vote not for transitory political motives only or primarily but because of "the unassailability of the logic of these maxims of the Declaration" (1989, p. 505). Second, she holds addressees to the standard of consistency in moral judgment. For example she describes the slogan of fighting in the Great War to make the world safe for democracy and an antisuffrage position as an "indefensible inconsistency" (1989, p. 507); repetition of the prefix makes manifest the link between accepting contradictory premises (inconsistency) and the difficulty of arguing well (indefensible) that this creates. Third, she holds herself to the standard of consistency in moral judgment. She makes manifest that, in contrast to these members of Congress,

women advocating for woman suffrage "know what it means 'to fight to keep the world safe for democracy'" (1989, p. 528); their positions are consistent with the universal status of the principles.

On one hand, consistency is a fallible sign that people for suffrage are more reasonable than those against it, that the soundness of proponents' moral judgment is superior to that of members of Congress. The foundation of this soundness is the syllogistic propriety of the manifestly adequate premises. This strategy increases the risk to members of Congress of voting against woman suffrage because it means they do not understand the nature of the logic of the Declaration of Independence or of their own pro-war slogan; their moral judgment lacks clarity.

But on the other hand, in any circumstances and particularly in a case such as this where there is not a consensus that voting against woman suffrage is shameful, the degree to which Catt's shame appeals are compelling depends in part on whether she manifests that she holds herself to the same standards. Although she uses strategies designed to manifest this, Catt--and other woman suffrage advocates--falls short in this regard. She cannot with propriety exhibit indignation that educated women have not been given the vote despite the universal status of the principles, and at the same time exhibit indignation that illiterate men and male janitors have the right to vote while educated women do not. Elitism and classism make her vulnerable to charges that, first, her position is compatible with rather than contrary to sexism and, second, she argues unreasonably because she is inconsistent. These are fallible signs of a problem with her ability to argue and the responsibility of her moral judgment. Therefore these strategies create a context that reduces the risk to members of Congress of not manifesting acceptance of the premise that women ought to have the right to vote or of not seriously considering her argumentation.

## 5. IMPLICATIONS

I have proposed and illustrated a model of shame appeals that explains why they may have normative pragmatic force. The model has more explanatory power than an account of an underlying practical inferential structure alone and an assessment based on goals of dialogue types. It explains how a range of actual discourse strategies work in complex, situated arguments.

However, as the analysis shows, critics and arguers without ideal models are not without standards. Strategies pressure addressees because they engage standards or norms of argumentation. What is normative--including but not only cogent argumentation--is forceful. What is not normative--inconsistency for example--is not forceful because, other things being equal, such argumentation can be ignored without serious risk. Judgments about what is normative or not are situated, practical judgments made by arguers as they argue and by critics as they analyze. These judgments are grounded in the context created by the argumentation itself--a context that, in turn, engages what may be described as "external" contextual features including the institutional setting. Both the contexts created by strategies and by "external" conventions may be analyzed systematically by considering dimensions of formal propriety.

A pedagogical implication of the discussion is that it is worthwhile to consider real cases of complex argumentation. This may be cumbersome but, at the same time, may enable students to make their implicit assumptions about norms of argumentation explicit. A theoretical implication of the discussion is that we need not and ought not assume that cooperation is the norm. It is possible to reasonably pressure even reluctant addressees to argue in a way that invokes and reinforces norms of argumentation--by shaming them into argumentation.

## REFERENCES

- Brinton, A.: 1988a, 'Appeal to the Angry Emotions', *Informal Logic* **10**(2), 77-87.  
Brinton, A.: 1988b, 'Pathos and the "Appeal to Emotion": An Aristotelian Analysis', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* **5**, 207-19.

Manolescu, Beth Innocenti. "Religious Reasons for Campbell's View of Emotional Appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric*." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 37 (2007): 159-80. Publisher's official version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02773940601021205>. Open Access version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.

- Brinton, A.: 1994, 'A Plea for *Argumentum ad misericordiam*', *Philosophia* **23**, 25-44.
- Burke, K.: 1968, *Counter-Statement*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Campbell, K.K.: 1989, *Man Cannot Speak For Her*, vol. 1, Praeger, Westport/London.
- Catt, C.C.: 1989, 'Address to the United States Congress', in K.K. Campbell (ed.), *Man Cannot Speak for Her*, vol. 2, Praeger, Westport/London, pp. 503-32.
- Catt, C.C., and N.R. Shuler: 1926, *Woman Suffrage and Politics*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
- Eemeren, F.H. van, and R. Grootendorst: 1992, *Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective*, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
- Eemeren, F.H. van, and R. Grootendorst: 2004, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Goodwin, J.: 1999, 'Good Argumentation Without Resolution', in: F.H. van Eemeren (ed.), *Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, June 16-19, 1998*, International Centre of the Study of Argumentation, Amsterdam, pp. 255-259.
- Goodwin, J.: 2001, 'Cicero's Authority', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* **34**, 38-60.
- Goodwin, J.: 2002, 'Designing Issues', in F.H. van Eemeren and P. Houtlosser (eds.), *Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentation Analysis*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 81-96.
- Goodwin, J.: 2003, 'Manifestly Adequate Premises', *IL@25*, Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, retrieved 19 March 2007 <[http://venus.uwindsor.ca/faculty/arts/philosophy/ILat25/edited\\_Goodwin.doc](http://venus.uwindsor.ca/faculty/arts/philosophy/ILat25/edited_Goodwin.doc)>.
- Goodwin, J.: 2007, 'Argument has no Function', *Informal Logic* **27**, 69-90.
- Govier, T.: 2005, *A Practical Study of Argument*, 6th ed., Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
- Jacobs, S.: 2000, 'Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics', *Argumentation* **14**, 261-86.
- Johnson, R.H.: 2000, *Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument*, Erlbaum, Mahwah.
- Kauffeld, F.J.: 1995, 'The Persuasive Force of Argumentation on Behalf of Proposals', in F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, and C.A. Willard (eds.), *Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation*, vol. 2, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 79-90.
- Kauffeld, F.J.: 1998, 'Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing', *Argumentation* **12**, 245-66.
- Levi, D.S.: 1999, 'The Fallacy of Treating the *ad baculum* as a Fallacy', *Informal Logic* **19**(2&3), 145-59.
- Manolescu, B.I.: 2004, 'Formal Propriety as Rhetorical Norm', *Argumentation* **18**, 113-25.
- Manolescu, B.I.: 2005a, 'Norms of Forcibleness', in: D. Hitchcock (ed.), *The Uses of Argument: Proceedings of a Conference at McMaster University, 18-21 May 2005*, Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, Hamilton, pp. 336-45.
- Manolescu, B.I.: 2005b, 'Norms of Presentational Force', *Argumentation and Advocacy* **41**, 139-51.
- Manolescu, B.I.: 2007, 'A Normative Pragmatic Perspective on Appealing to Emotions in Argumentation', *Argumentation* **20**, 327-43.
- McKenna, S.J.: 2006, *Adam Smith: The Rhetoric of Propriety*, State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Palczewski, C.H.: 2005, 'The Male Madonna and the Feminine Uncle Sam: Visual Arguments, Icons, and Ideographs in 1909 Anti-Woman Suffrage Postcards', *Quarterly Journal of Speech* **91**, 365-94.
- Perelman, C., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca: 1969, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.
- Plato: 1952, *Gorgias*, trans. W.C. Helmbold, Macmillian, New York.
- Taylor, G.: 1985, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- United States Congress: 1918, January 10, *Congressional Record*, vol. 56, part 1.
- Walton, D.: 1992, *The Place of Emotion in Argument*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University

Manolescu, Beth Innocenti. "Religious Reasons for Campbell's View of Emotional Appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric*." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 37 (2007): 159-80. Publisher's official version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02773940601021205>. Open Access version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.

Park.

Walton, D.: 2000, *Scare Tactics: Arguments that Appeal to Fear and Threats*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London.

Weaver, R.M.: 1985, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA.