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Abstract:

Is appealing to emotions in argumentation ever legitimate and, if so, what is the best way to analyze and evaluate such appeals? After overviewing a normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation, I present answers to these questions from pragma-dialectical, informal logical, and rhetorical perspectives, and note positions shared and supplemented by a normative pragmatic perspective. A normative pragmatic perspective holds that appealing to emotions in argumentation may be relevant and non-manipulative; and that emotional appeals may be analyzed as strategies that create pragmatic reasons and assessed by the standard of formal propriety or reasonability under the circumstances. I illustrate the explanatory power of the perspective by analyzing and evaluating some argumentation from Frederick Douglass's "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July." I conclude that a normative pragmatic perspective offers a more complete account of appealing to emotions in argumentation than a pragma-dialectical, informal logical, or rhetorical perspective alone, identifies a range of norms available to arguers, and explains why appealing to emotions may be legitimate in particular cases of argumentation.

Key words:

normative pragmatics, emotional appeal, pragma-dialectics, informal logic, rhetoric, Frederick Douglass

Text of paper:

1. INTRODUCTION

Is appealing to emotions in argumentation ever legitimate and, if so, what is the best way to analyze and evaluate such appeals? From a normative pragmatic perspective, appealing to emotions in argumentation may be viewed as relevant and non-manipulative; analyzed as a strategy that creates pragmatic reasons; and assessed by the standard of formal propriety or reasonability under the circumstances.

To develop these positions, I first overview a normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation. I then present answers to the questions from pragma-dialectical, informal logical, and rhetorical perspectives; and note positions shared and supplemented by a normative pragmatic perspective. I illustrate the explanatory power of the perspective by analyzing and evaluating some argumentation from Frederick Douglass's "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July." I conclude that a normative pragmatic perspective offers a more complete account of appealing to emotions in argumentation than a pragma-dialectical, informal logical, or rhetorical perspective alone, identifies a range of norms available to arguers, and explains why appealing to emotions is legitimate in particular cases of argumentation.

2. A NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE ON APPEALING TO EMOTIONS IN ARGUMENTATION

Although pragma-dialecticians first described argumentation theory as a branch of "normative pragmatics"--as an attempt to merge ideals of argumentation with actual practice (van Eemeren, 1987, 9 and 1990, 40; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, 1993, ch. 1; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, ch. 2)--here "normative pragmatic" refers to the recent work of several scholars studying argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. A normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation involves four main assumptions. In this section I introduce the

perspective and in the following explain how it differs from other perspectives.

First, since a normative pragmatic perspective involves analyzing the activity of arguing, researchers assess emotional appeals as they are actually presented (Jacobs, 1999, 398) rather than first reconstructing the discourse as a premise-conclusion complex. They do not view argumentation as something to abstract from a discourse but instead as an activity that may involve not only reason-giving but a host of other strategies such as appealing to emotions, vividly describing, repeating, and so on that a theory of argumentation ought to explain (Jacobs, 2000, 265).

This assumption and a second--discourse strategies create pragmatic reasons--(Goodwin, 2001, 2002; Jacobs, 2000; Kauffeld, 1995, 1998)--may be clarified by a distinction and an example. We can distinguish between reasons *given in* an argument and reasons *created by* an act. Reasons *given* yield what O'Keefe would call argument₁, a linguistically explicable claim and linguistically explicit reason (1982, 13, 14). Now consider an act like promising. Making a promise gives to or *creates* for addressees practical reasons to believe what the speaker says. Addressees could practically reason that the speaker would not risk her reputation unless she confidently believed she could and would follow through on what she promised to do. Or consider the act of proposing. The act of proposing gives to or creates for addressees practical reasons for tentatively considering a proposal. For example, an addressee may practically reason that "the speaker would have carefully prepared answers to his [the addressee's] questions and objections rather than subject herself to inevitable criticism and resentment for wasting his time" (Kauffeld, 1998, 251). This is a pragmatic reason created or given to the addressee by the act of proposing--a reason distinct from any reasons given in the proposal.

To further clarify what it means to say that discourse strategies create pragmatic reasons, consider the following example. The American Anti-Slavery Society's "Declaration of Sentiments" (1833) *gives* reasons to oppose slavery in America. One reason *given in* the discourse is that "all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, LIBERTY, and the pursuit of happiness" (2005, 310). But the document is not designed to resolve a difference of opinion; presented at an anti-slavery convention and published in an abolitionist newspaper, addressees would already hold that slavery ought to be abolished. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that the document is designed to increase adherence to abolition--to make it a standpoint not lightly held and easily dropped.

What strategies does the document use to increase adherence? A first strategy is *alluding* to the American Declaration of Independence. What pragmatic reasons does the act or strategy of alluding to the American Declaration of Independence *create* for addressees to adhere strongly to an anti-slavery position? Addressees may practically reason as follows. Other things being equal, an addressee cannot deny the premise without risking criticism for ignorance about what one of the nation's founding documents states or about fundamental principles of American government. This is a pragmatic reason for acknowledging premise adequacy.

A second strategy is *appealing to patriotism*. What pragmatic reasons does the act or strategy of appealing to patriotism *create* for addressees to adhere strongly to an anti-slavery position? Addressees may practically reason as follows. Other things being equal, an addressee cannot deny the premise without risking criticism. Not feeling patriotic serves as a fallible sign that she is unpatriotic, does not recognize the allusion, or does not understand the fundamental position of the premise in American government. Thus appealing to patriotism compels recognition of premise adequacy.

A third strategy is *reason-giving*. What pragmatic reasons does the act or strategy of reason-giving--or giving manifestly adequate reasons--*create* for addressees to adhere strongly to an anti-slavery position? Other things being equal, an addressee cannot deny the conclusion without risking criticism for being irrational. Denying it would be a fallible sign that she does not "see" a logical connection between the premise and conclusion, and presumably she wants to appear to hold a rational position. Thus the strategy or act of reason-giving creates or gives to addressees a pragmatic reason for

holding the standpoint.

This brings us to a third assumption. Since strategies such as appealing to emotions create pragmatic reasons, emotional appeals are not understood as manipulative and wholly psychophysiological but as rhetorical and argumentative. A normative pragmatic perspective assumes that participants in argumentation are autonomous agents, free to accept, reject, or attempt to evade the argumentation (Goodwin, 2003, 3-4). Addressees are free to accept the consequences of not recognizing the adequacy of a premise involving founding documents, for example. If the pragmatic reasons created by emotional appeals are described as carrots or sticks (Goodwin, 2002, 88), then a normative pragmatic perspective assumes that addressees may decide to hold out for something more appealing than the carrot or be willing to put up with the stick.

Fourth, emotional appeals in argumentation are evaluated--judged as "reasonable"--based on their formal propriety (Manolescu, 2004), or "fit" among the appeal, the broader argumentation of which it is a part, and the occasion based on audience expectations. Premises must "fit" each other in a logically coherent manner. If an arguer asserts that all humans are created equal and slaves are humans, then--other things being equal--addressees see the fittingness or appropriateness of the claim that slaves are created as equals to non-slaves. Qualities must also "fit" each other; high emotional intensity may (or may not) seem inappropriate given a tone of neutrality in the rest of the argument, or anger may not fit jubilation. Further, the argumentation must "fit" conventional expectations. There is typically no singing and dancing when delivering a homily.

All of these judgments about fitness or formal propriety are situational; this is why formal propriety may also be described as reasonability under the circumstances. Consider a case where the appeal to patriotism discussed above was the only appeal the committee made to abolitionist listeners and readers. Other things being equal, addressees could drop their adherence to abolition with little risk. While there may be subjects and circumstances where a single argument compels strong adherence, under the circumstances of the publication of the "Declaration of Sentiments" there are ample reasons available and ample space for presenting them. So addressees could practically reason as follows. Not presenting more reasons is a fallible sign of the weakness of the case or the committee's lack of preparation. In addition, addressees would expect that a document that announces itself as modeled on the American Declaration of Independence would be comprised of more than a preamble and aspire to the level of argument in that document. Not meeting these expectations is a fallible sign that the committee members are not familiar with the Declaration of Independence or do not appreciate its level of argument. Other things being equal, addressees could loosen or drop adherence with little risk, because the argument-making does not make manifest that the position is well thought out. On the contrary, it may incur addressees' criticism for wasting their time or insulting their intelligence.

In what follows I overview answers and approaches by pragma-dialecticians, informal logicians, and rhetoricians to the questions of whether appealing to emotions is legitimate in argumentation and, if so, how emotional appeals may be analyzed and evaluated; and note how a normative pragmatic perspective supplements these perspectives.

3. IS APPEALING TO EMOTIONS IN ARGUMENTATION LEGITIMATE?

Normative pragmatists hold that appealing to emotions in argumentation may be legitimate based on the fact that arguers have been subject to criticism for arguing too vehemently, as well as for lack of emotion or for appealing to the wrong emotion. These responses indicate that the presence, intensity, and kinds of emotions evoked in argumentation are governed by situational norms. A normative pragmatic theory of argumentation attempts to explain in particular cases of argumentation whether appealing to emotions is a legitimate strategy. In the informal logical, rhetorical, and pragma-dialectical perspectives there is room for or there are proponents of the position that appealing to emotions may be legitimate in argumentation.

Some informal logicians hold that emotional appeals "are not good reasons for belief or action" (see for example Govier, 2005, 198); but Alan Brinton holds that some appeals to emotions may be legitimate if they are grounded in beliefs or cognitions that are reasonable. He has described such an appeal as a "pathotic argument" (1988a, 77).

Gilbert's version of the rhetorical perspective views the emotional as a legitimate "mode" of argumentation that may be involved in achieving "coalescence"--the merging of two positions into one, or at least the merging of them to the degree that it becomes possible to discuss points of disagreement (Gilbert, 1997, 111, 112). Gilbert notes a number of roles for emotions in argumentation--they may need to be uncovered in exploring positions, serve as reasons for a position, be expressed or argued about, for example--in part because he objects to argumentation theorists ignoring emotions. Here I focus on emotional appeals or strategies designed to evoke emotions; these have not been ignored so much as traditionally considered objectionable (Walton, 1992). For Gilbert, the fact that emotions are present in argumentation qualifies them as a mode of argumentation.

From a pragma-dialectical perspective emotional appeals ought to be viewed as non-argumentation--as failures of relevance since argumentation and not emotion ought to be used to convince auditors to accept a standpoint. Instead of presenting argumentation, emotional appeals involve "play[ing] on the emotions, sentiments or biases of the intended audience" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Henkemans, 2002, 120; see also van Eemeren et al., 1996, 285, 300-01). From this perspective emotional appeals are external signs of internal states; or, as the pragma-dialecticians have put it, they are "internal motives, which have been assimilated in the discourse" (van Eemeren et al., 1996, 2). Internal motives are not relevant in the pragma-dialectical perspective, because one of its metatheoretical assumptions is that commitments must be externalized. For example, if an arguer "accepts" a proposition, then the arguer is publicly committed to that proposition whether or not she in fact believes it (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, 54-55; van Eemeren et al., 1993, 12).

But the pragma-dialecticians have acknowledged that emotional appeals may be inseparable or at least not easily separated from argumentation, noting that argumentation may be "combined with, or even include, the use of pathos [. . . and that relevant arguments can] be suggested by, or even implied in, apparently irrelevant arguments" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, 192; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 134-35). Moreover, their recent work on strategic maneuvering may enable theorists to incorporate emotional appeals into an analytic overview since emotional appeals could be used at any stage in a critical discussion and since they may be incorporated into an arguer's efforts to focus on a particular topic, adapt to the audience, and use stylistic techniques effectively and appropriately (see for example van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2000, 297-99). Although rhetorical strategies involved in strategic maneuvering may be considered "non-argumentative aspects of discourse" (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1997, 55), it still seems possible to analyze and evaluate at least some emotional appeals as relevant to argumentation from a pragma-dialectical perspective.

Normative pragmatists share with all perspectives the assumption that appealing to emotions is not legitimate in all cases of arguing. In addition, normative pragmatists share with informal logicians and pragma-dialecticians the assumption that emotional appeals are not external signs of internal states. Because a normative pragmatic perspective focuses on discourse strategies, it views emotional appeals not as signs or sources of psychological effects (compare Gilbert, 1997, 108-09; Gilbert, 2001, 239-40) but instead as strategies designed to compel adherence to a thesis, recognition of premise adequacy, acceptance of a burden of proof, and so on by creating pragmatic reasons for doing so.

4. WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO ANALYZE EMOTIONAL APPEALS?

This issue involves two sub-issues. First, should emotional appeals in argumentation be reconstructed as premise-conclusion complexes before evaluation or evaluated as actually presented? Second, should appealing to emotions in argumentation be understood as reason-giving only or also reason-creating? Normative pragmatists hold the second alternative of each pair because they focus on

strategies that arguers actually use and the question of why the strategies create compelling pragmatic reasons. In doing so they both share and depart from assumptions of each perspective.

Normative pragmatists depart from informal logicians and pragma-dialecticians in basing their assessments on actual discourse strategies rather than reconstructions. Informal logicians following Brinton would analyze an emotional appeal into conclusions and premises, where the conclusion is the emotion or proposition that you ought to feel the emotion and the premises are either factual--a presentation of the circumstances that lead or ought to lead to the emotion--or evaluative--certain circumstances ought to lead to a certain emotion (1988a, 82; 1988b, 212). The reconstruction highlights the reason-giving quality of the appeal (1988a, 79, 81). Pragma-dialecticians would analyze the emotional appeal as part of a critical discussion and produce an analytic overview involving, first, a reconstruction of the appeal in premise-standpoint form using the transformations of addition, deletion, substitution, and permutation (van Eemeren et al., 1993, ch. 4; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, ch. 5); and, second, an analysis of the appeal as strategic maneuvering based on the discussion stage in which it appears and using the categories of topic selection, audience adaptation, and presentational devices (see for example van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2001). The pragma-dialectical reconstruction integrates the normative and descriptive by holding up actual discourse to the normative ideal of a critical discussion. Normative pragmatists depart from these positions because they aim to understand what pragmatic reasons strategies create and to explain not only how argumentation may work to resolve a difference of opinion but also do any number of other things.

Normative pragmatists also share with informal logicians and pragma-dialecticians three assumptions about analysis. First, like informal logicians following Brinton (1988a, 1988b, 1994), normative pragmatists agree that the proportion or propriety of the emotional appeal must be analyzed (and assessed). Second, like pragma-dialecticians, normative pragmatists agree that it is possible and useful to identify functional rationales created by discourse strategies. In a pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic maneuvering, for example, the strategy of "[e]xplaining why a certain proposition is denied the status of a common starting point" may be explained as an attempt "to show that the refusal is not gratuitous" (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2003, 5). Third, normative pragmatists aim to integrate the normative and descriptive. The pragmatic reasons created by appealing to emotions or other strategies compel to varying degrees because they invoke norms about how people ought to act; what is compelling is normative.

Normative pragmatists also depart from and share assumptions with Gilbert's version of a rhetorical perspective. Both perspectives focus on actual discourse strategies and consider reasons created by them, but normative pragmatists would not analyze all communicative methods or make a hard and fast distinction between the descriptive and normative. Gilbert holds that anything that takes place in an argumentative interaction is subject to analysis as argumentation or, as he has put it, "[a]nything can happen in an argument and still be considered part of it" (1997, 39, 88), including amplification (91 n.30). Following Willard, Gilbert wants to include in descriptive analyses a full range of communicative methods actually used--both discursive and nondiscursive--that have not been considered to be "rational" by traditional logical standards (1997, 76-77; 2001, 242-43). These communicative methods include "modes" other than the traditionally logical, such as visceral, kisceral, and emotional (1997, 79). Gilbert's rhetorical perspective also holds that making emotional appeals creates pragmatic reasons. For example, passionately avowing love for an addressee may create pragmatic reasons for at least tentatively considering a marriage proposal. It may serve as a fallible sign of the arguer's depth of commitment, sincerity, and so on, and may "demonstrate how we feel about certain claims or aspects of the argumentation procedure" (Gilbert, 1997, 83, 84; see also Gilbert, 2001, 241-42). Ignoring such a proposal may incur the proposer's resentment since she has manifested signs of serious consideration of her proposal.

Normative pragmatists depart from this version of the rhetorical perspective because they

attempt to integrate the normative and descriptive and do not analyze all communicative methods. Gilbert's rhetorical perspective involves making a hard and fast distinction between the descriptive and normative (Gilbert, 1997, 78-79, 89, 102; compare van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 6; van Eemeren et al., 1993, 1-2, 39; Manolescu, 2004, 116-17). Normative pragmatists attempt to integrate the normative and descriptive in part to maintain the integrity of argumentation--to avoid collapsing it into rhetoric or communication more generally (Jacobs, 2000, 263-64; Manolescu, 2005, 142). Not all symbolic inducement--grimaces for example--would seem to be best understood as creating pragmatic reasons.

5. WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO EVALUATE EMOTIONAL APPEALS?

Normative pragmatists evaluate emotional appeals according to the criterion of formal propriety or reasonability under the circumstances, because they aim to identify norms involved in a range of actual argumentative practices, including the adversarial and non-cooperative. This criterion encompasses and supplements the criteria of other perspectives.

First, normative pragmatists agree with pragma-dialecticians that the rules of a critical discussion are a reasonable normative ideal; but they hold that such rules are less relevant in circumstances where the argumentation is not best understood as designed to resolve a difference of opinion. Pragma-dialecticians would use rules for a critical discussion to evaluate emotional appeals (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2000, 302), and one relevant rule would be to use only argumentation to attack or defend a standpoint (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, ch. 12; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, 143). From this perspective it is unclear whether any emotional appeal could be judged as good argumentation. In their discussions of strategic maneuvering, pragma-dialecticians note other kinds of criteria for evaluation--maintaining an appearance of reasonability, meeting audience expectations, and using appropriate style, for example (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999, 481, 485; van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2000, 295, 298)--but in the end the argumentation is evaluated (and analyzed) based on the normative ideal of a critical discussion. These rules are less useful for evaluating argumentation in cases where emotion is expected and where a range of emotional levels or intensities is possible and therefore ought to be evaluated to assess the reasons that arguing in this way gives to addressees.

Second, normative pragmatists agree with rhetoricians following Gilbert that in some circumstances coalescence is an ideal; but they hold that in some circumstances coalescence is not possible or desirable. In Gilbert's version of a rhetorical perspective, emotional appeals are evaluated based on the normative model of coalescent argumentation which emphasizes agreement between dispute partners (Gilbert, 1997, chs. 8, 9). Arguers uncover each other's goals, explore reasons in the various modes for their own and each other's positions, attempt to find points of coalescence in order to discover how they may come to agreement or how their positions may accommodate each other, and attempt to merge their positions as much as possible. In this view emotional appeals may serve as a point of coalescence or as a point that arguers need to try to work around in order to achieve coalescence. They may be evaluated as a "useful" mode or not for a given dispute (1997, 122). Gilbert's model offers a standard of reasonability in cases of cooperative dialogues.

A normative pragmatic criterion of formal propriety encompasses this ideal and also includes argumentation that is adversarial and presented in the form of a monologue. Under the circumstances of many instances of interpersonal argumentation, Gilbert's normative ideal is certainly attractive. It may be less possible and less desirable under different circumstances, such as a civil or criminal trial or political deliberation, because some judicial and political institutions are designed to induce adversarial argumentation and because clients and causes would seem to be best served by having opportunities to make the most strongly-presented case for a position and to withstand the most strongly-presented case against the position (see also Goodwin, 2000, 289-90). Moreover, these kinds of civic deliberation may involve significant cases of argumentation that are better understood as monologues even though

it may be possible to reconstruct them as moves in a dialogue; European and North American traditions of civic oratory offer numerous examples, including Douglass's "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July."

Third, normative pragmatists agree with informal logicians following Brinton that evaluation of emotional appeals needs to consider both their reasonability and proportion (1988a, 78, 81; 1988b, 212-13); but they hold that proportion is best analyzed and assessed as a dimension of formal propriety. Addressing the questions of acceptability and relevance of premises is not unproblematic but there is a strong foundation for such assessments in the work of informal logicians. The less established kind of assessment is "proportion." Brinton suggests that this kind of evaluation may be "more like the critical evaluation of a work of art or literature than it is like the evaluation of a categorical syllogism" (1988a, 84) and that we might turn in ethical and rhetorical directions to logically assess appropriateness (1988b, 215). He proposes that in the case of *argumentum ad misericordiam* rhetorical embellishment or amplification "may play an essential role in grounding the emotion" by recreating "the compassion-evoking state of affairs for the hearer or reader or viewer" or, put differently, "[p]erfectly appropriate rhetorical embellishment would reconstruct the situation for us in such a way that we experience it in exactly the same way we would experience it as first-hand observers" (1994, 40). In this way amplification may "somehow actually help to provide grounding, or count among reasons for miser cordia" or other emotions (1994, 39, 40). Ethical considerations enter as Brinton, following Aristotle, suggests that how one is affected is a sign of one's virtue; if one's feelings hit the mean, then one has an appropriate level of virtue (1994, 36-37; 1988a, 78; 1988b, 209-11). This kind of judgment can ground a critic's assessment of the appropriateness of an emotional appeal.

A normative pragmatic perspective shares the assumption that assessment of emotional appeals must consider proportion but offers a different method. The proportion of an emotional appeal is not measured by the degree to which it makes addressees virtual spectators of some circumstances, event, or character. Most techniques of rhetorical amplification are not best understood as being designed to recreate the situation in a way that allows addressees to experience it as if they were first-hand observers. Although vivid description--the technique that comes closest to recreating a situation--is an important technique of amplification and, since classical times, has been recognized as argumentative (Innocenti, 1994), any number of other techniques may serve to amplify and argue: allusion, antithesis, repetition, and exclamation are a few examples. Argumentation theorists working from a normative pragmatic perspective ask whether emotional appeals exhibit formal propriety--a "fit" among the degree or intensity of emotion in the appeal, the argumentation, and the occasion based on audience expectations established by conventions of argumentation and the discourse itself.

6. A NORMATIVE PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF EMOTIONAL APPEALS

Some brief background on "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July" will help to justify its use as a case study for illustrating the explanatory power of a normative pragmatic perspective on emotional appeals. Douglass delivered the speech by invitation from the Rochester Ladies' Anti-Slavery Society to an audience of 500 to 600 in Rochester, New York on 5 July 1852 (Blassingame, 1982, 359). Douglass was born a slave, escaped, and became an abolitionist agent and lecturer on the lyceum circuit as well as an author and newspaper editor. Whereas a typical Fourth of July oration involved praise of American ideals, Douglass proposes to explain the Fourth of July from the slave's perspective. The address is an emotional indictment of American hypocrisy: while slavery exists, America is not achieving the ideals of humanity, liberty, the United States Constitution, or the Bible. It was published as a pamphlet, and a portion of it was reprinted in his second autobiography. I will reference by paragraph number this abridged version rather than the full address because it stands on its own as argumentation and focuses on the topic most relevant to this study--how to persuade, or the appropriateness of traditionally logical argumentation compared to "scorching irony" (11). Following an introduction asking what he (Douglass) has to do with the white audience's national independence and if they have invited him to speak in order to mock him (1-4), Douglass proposes to "see this day and its popular characteristics from the

slave's point of view" (5). Following this proposition is a refutation (6-11) anticipating and answering arguments about how he should argue. The final two paragraphs function as both "proof" and peroration (12-13)--a statement of what the Fourth of July is to the American slave and a rebuke of America's "revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy" (13).

Since Douglass is speaking to abolitionists more than a decade into the abolitionist movement, his purpose is not so much to gain adherence to the thesis that slavery is wrong as to increase adherence. In this address he also aims to persuade addressees to use a particular style of arguing or, as he puts it, to use "scorching irony, not convincing argument" (11). A normative pragmatic analysis will show that Douglass's highly emotional prose advocates a method of address not only by stating reasons (Fusfield, 1999) but also by making emotional appeals that create compelling pragmatic reasons.

Douglass presents his position against using traditional logical argumentation as follows. It is not an emotional appeal but helps to indicate how Douglass expects his emotional appeals to work.

Is it [the question of "the wrongfulness of slavery"] to be settled by the rules of logic and argumentation, as a matter beset with great difficulty, involving a doubtful application of the principle of justice, hard to be understood? How should I look to-day in the presence of Americans, dividing and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom, speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively? To do so, would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding. (8)

Here Douglass's discourse *gives* reasons for his position: arguing in a traditional logical manner would make him look ridiculous and insult his addressees' understanding. In addition, the strategy of inventorying possible argumentative moves--dividing and subdividing, speaking relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively--*creates* a pragmatic reason for attending to his argumentation. The strategy is a fallible sign that Douglass has arrived at his position by careful thought; he could make sophisticated logical arguments but has chosen not to. The strategy exerts some pressure on addressees to at least consider his position, because addressees who tend to favor argumentation rather than "scorching irony" would want to appear reasonable and to ignore a carefully considered position would appear to be unreasonable and consequently subject them to criticism (Kauffeld, 1995, 1998).

To illustrate a normative pragmatic approach to emotional appeals, consider Douglass' answer to the question "What to the American slave is your Fourth of July":

I answer, a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denunciations of tyrants, brass-fronted impudence; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery, your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy--a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a nation on the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody, than are the people of these United States, at this very hour. (12)

Given the confrontational, accusatory, and indignant tone of the passage, an informal logician following Brinton would have good reason for reconstructing the conclusion of the appeal as "shame" or "you ought to feel shame" or, given the audience and purpose, "indignation" or "you ought to feel indignation." (One reason the address is a classic is that the emotions evoked are complex rather than stock responses.) The premises could be reconstructed as: from the slave's perspective your boasted liberty is unholy license, your shouts of liberty and equality are hollow mockery, and so on. Given the number and range of contrary perceptions, the premises seem acceptable, relevant, and sufficient. Since this list of contrary perceptions enables addressees in a sense to witness for themselves the circumstances that lead to the emotion--whether shame or indignation--and since it seems reasonable to question the virtue of someone who does not feel shame or indignation for vanity, hypocrisy, and so

on, an informal logician would have grounds for calling this a logically good argument.

A normative pragmatist would explain appealing to emotion as a strategy that, under the circumstances, is compelling. Here the strategy of appealing to emotions such as shame and indignation, and the strategy of using a series of contrasts--what may be described as a presentational strategy of which the emotional appeal is comprised--compel recognition of premise adequacy. First, the strategy of using a series of contrasts makes public an apparent surplus of evidence that these celebratory activities are shameful or cause for indignation and a suggestion that more exists. To deny that there are numerous celebratory activities that are shameful when viewed from the slave's perspective would mean that addressees are lying or not paying attention to Douglass's words (Goodwin, 2003, 6), and that addressees are blind to the numerous marks of just desert that Douglass--a former slave, editor, and orator who is thinking, speaking, writing before their eyes--exhibits. Such blindness would make them vulnerable to criticism for, as Douglass suggests when he notes that there are laws forbidding the teaching of reading and writing to slaves but no such laws for beasts, even dogs, fowls, cattle, fish, and reptiles can "distinguish the slave from a brute" (6).

Second, the strategy of appealing to emotions such as shame and indignation compels recognition of premise adequacy. The appeal "fits" expectations generated by the occasion and the address itself--engages situational norms--and thus creates a pragmatic reason for believing that "scorching irony" is preferable to traditional logical argumentation. The occasion calls for a ceremonial address, so addressees would expect some degree of emotional appeal. If indictments of American hypocrisy had become commonplace among abolitionist Fourth of July orations (Branham, 1999), then addressees would expect these kinds of emotional appeals. In addition, the level or intensity of emotion generated "fits" with Douglass's statements that he "will use the severest language [he] can command" (5) and that he will answer those who say abolitionists would "make a favorable impression on the public mind [. . .] [w]ould you argue more, and denounce less, would you persuade more and rebuke less" (6); as well as with the level of emotional intensity in appeals that preceded it. Thus the emotional appeal "fits" the occasion and the argumentation itself. The emotional appeal is a fallible sign that another "mode"--such as traditional logic--would lack propriety, so here appealing to emotion creates a pragmatic reason for believing that traditional argumentation would make Douglass look ridiculous and insult addressees' understanding. It is a compelling reason because not acknowledging propriety would subject addressees to criticism for not understanding the nature of the occasion or for not following the contours of Douglass's argumentation, both of which would render them unfit to pass judgment upon the argumentation. This analysis suggests why the reasons created by appealing to emotion may attract addressees to recognize premise adequacy: they become fuller participants in the occasion and argumentation--something that nineteenth-century audiences attending a ceremonial event, or perhaps any audience attending a ceremonial event, would expect and want.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of Douglass's argumentation has illustrated how a normative pragmatist analyzes and evaluates emotional appeals and how the perspective supplements pragma-dialectical, informal logical, and rhetorical perspectives. First, the discussion of Douglass's address shows that some emotional appeals may be analyzed and evaluated as reasonable, non-manipulative strategies in argumentation. Second, it shows not only that emotional appeals may be understood as reason-giving--as premises, conclusions, and the like--but also that appealing to emotions creates pragmatic reasons. Thus a normative pragmatic perspective involves two levels of analysis to supplement an analysis of the appeal as reason-giving: the strategy of making emotional appeals creates reasons and the presentational strategies that comprise the appeal create reasons. Third, it shows that emotional appeals may be judged by the criterion of formal propriety. This standard applies not only in cases of cooperative but also adversarial argumentative practices. Because a normative pragmatic perspective accounts for a range of argumentative strategies, offers additional levels of analysis, and accounts for

argumentation in a range of situations, it offers a more complete account of emotional appeals in argumentation than either the pragma-dialectical, informal logical, or rhetorical perspective alone.

By focusing on the strategies arguers actually use and identifying norms that may be invoked in using them, a normative pragmatic perspective offers the possibility of identifying norms available to arguers that may be overlooked or elided if the method of analysis itself involves a particular set of norms. Since the force of argumentation is not wholly logical but also pragmatic, since not all argumentation is best understood as being designed to resolve a difference of opinion, and since argumentation is not and ought not always be cooperative, focusing on the strategies that arguers use--including making emotional appeals--and the norms they engage is necessary.

A normative pragmatic perspective helps to explain why ordinary arguers in particular cases may reasonably accept and expect emotional appeals in argumentation. The explanation need not reassert that reason and emotion are inseparable or that humans are not only rational creatures but also emotional. The explanations offered by normative pragmatists take us more deeply into the actual, situated practice of argumentation itself. They consider the occasion of the argumentation, conventions of argumentation, and the contours of the argumentation itself, as well as criteria such as relevance and acceptability given particular kinds of occasions and circumstances, in order to explain particular cases of argumentation. In this case appealing to emotions creates pragmatic reasons to acknowledge premise adequacy; the expectation for emotional appeals on this occasion exists, and a normative pragmatic perspective explains why ordinary arguers would judge them to be reasonable and why the expectation itself is reasonable.

Although it may never achieve the scope or elegance of a single grand theory of argumentation, a normative pragmatic perspective works well for theorizing particular cases. If Isocrates was right in thinking that rhetoric was best learned not only by precepts but also by examples and imitation, then theorizing cases may be a worthwhile pursuit for students of argumentation.

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