Emplacing Displacement:
Cultural Landscapes of Refugee-hosting in Ukwimi, Zambia

By

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Abstract

In response to calls for increased understanding of and solutions to the issue of protracted refugee situations, this dissertation examines the social and spatial implications of a long history of refugee-hosting in Eastern Province, Zambia. In order to broaden our understanding of displacement and place-making, I pay particular attention to refugee and host community interaction in and around the former refugee settlement in Ukwimi, Zambia. Established in 1987, Ukwimi Refugee Settlement hosted over 20,000 Mozambicans for nearly a decade. After the repatriation of Mozambican refugees, Ukwimi evolved into a government-run agricultural resettlement scheme until it’s re-opening as a refugee camp for Angolan refugees in 2001. Through theoretically-grounded fieldwork in eastern Zambia, I explore refugee-hosting as a dynamic interaction between and among refugee relief organizations, development initiatives, host communities, and refugee populations. In doing so, I analyze how refugee and host community relationships operate, and shift, within particular political, gendered, and historical contexts, thereby creating distinct cultural landscapes of refugee-hosting and resettlement which are constantly “in motion” and emplacing displacement.
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CHAPTER ONE
APPROACHING UKWIMI

Critical theoretical practice of ethnography is typically long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated
(Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177)

The first time I approached the entrance gate (Photograph 1) at Ukwimi Resettlement/Refugee Settlement (URS) in Eastern Province, Zambia, I felt a palpable sense of apprehension and anxiety about adjusting to my new surroundings – and I was only planning on a preliminary, three day stay. I distinctly remember wondering how much more overwhelming it must have been for the over 23,000 Mozambicans who arrived to the same sign over 20 years before, or for the 2,000 Angolans who were transferred from a completely different environment hundreds of kilometers away, or for the thousands of Zambians from all of Zambia’s nine provinces who, for whatever their reasons,
sought refuge at Ukwimi. Though my migration to Ukwimi was entirely voluntary, I could not help but project my own anxieties onto my imaginings of those who arrived at Ukwimi under entirely different circumstances. I wondered about the ways in which they altered the place, as well as the ways in which the place altered them – and what sort of changes I was in store for during my stay at Ukwimi.

I begin by giving you a quick glimpse of my own internal (and otherwise private) thoughts for two reasons. First, I think that it situates one of the fundamental concerns of this dissertation – that of place-making – with a very basic curiosity that I believe motivates any attempt to make sense of the world. Secondly, and most importantly, I begin with my personal recollections of a particular moment in my experience of Ukwimi because I asked the same of those I spent time with at Ukwimi. Each of the nearly 100 interviews I conducted at Ukwimi were intensely personal and although my personal experience of approaching Ukwimi may not be as complicated or traumatic or confused as those I spent 7 months learning about, it is only fair that I share my internal thoughts and dialogues as freely as they shared theirs.

In order frame the events which unfolded at Ukwimi through a wider lens than my own personal experiences, I utilized a number of tools at the disposal of human geographers. In doing so, I have attempted to weave (and in some instances, to unravel) three central threads running throughout the course
of Ukwimi’s story. The first, and perhaps most general, thread links a concern with how places are made and given meaning with the changes that become apparent in the landscape over time. Drawing from the significant contributions of geographers – Tuan, Cosgrove, Entrikin, Harvey, Sauer, Sack– as well as my own “meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” experiences, my understandings and observations of the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of landscapes pay particular attention to role that identity and concepts of identity and positionality to structures of power play in shaping places (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177). As Tuan argues,

place is not only a fact to be explained in the broader frame of space, but it is also a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the people who have given it meaning (Tuan 1974: 213).

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 clearly demonstrate some of the extraordinary (as well as rather ordinary) ways in which places are constantly made, unmade, and remade by those who stay long enough to ascribe meaning to space.

The second thread woven throughout the history of settlement in Ukwimi is the much more overtly politicized exercise of territorialization. Subsequent chapters provide detailed descriptions of the practices and actions of a variety of different players within the context of Ukwimi, from international aid organizations to national governments, political leaders, rebel movements, and ordinary individuals. By bringing the practices of such players into the
discussion, I reveal the ways in which we can understand their actions within the context of the practice of territorality, defined as “the attempt by an individual or group [and states] to affect, influence, or control people, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986: 19). Ukwimi’s history of transformation is littered with adaptations and modifications of the physical and cultural landscape firmly grounded in practices of territorality by a variety of players.

If territoriality is best understood as a “derivative…of mobility” (Cox 2002: 4) then examining the limitations and opportunities surrounding mobility in eastern Zambia is illustrative of how territoriality functions on the ground. Although the issue of territory and mobility runs throughout this dissertation, Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the institutional actors interested in exerting territoriality in refugee situations. In capturing the forcible re-displacement of self-settled refugees from border areas to Nyimba Refugee Camp, Chapter 5 provides perhaps the clearest depiction of the types of practices that emerge from the desire for territorialization and the strategies that arise to resist such practices. Peeling back these experiences within a wider historical and spatial lens than is typically employed in a refugee environment shows how political power is constantly “demonstrated, projected, and contested” (Wilson and Donnan, 1999: 155).
By looking critically at refugee-centered research, we can begin to see the difficulty in reconciling a discourse couched in terms of the territorialized nation-state with the simultaneous struggle to deterritorialize and reterritorialize that discourse. Cathrine Brun has argued that approaching refugee situations as simply another manifestation of deterritorialization leads to a number of problems, specifically to a “romanticizing of displacement, exile, and diaspora as generalized and often preferred conditions of modern life” that is not conducive to effectively addressing the plight of refugees (2001: 19).

Brun suggests that exploring the processes of reterritorialization can overcome the shortcomings of an essentialist or deterritorialized approach. Reterritorialization refers to the way in which refugees construct new networks, cultural practices, and daily routines in their new and often changing environments. According to Brun, it is the means by which refugees develop strategies to cope with the “contradictory experience of being physically present in one location, but at the same time living with a feeling of belonging somewhere else” (2001: 23).

In weaving the third and final thread through this narrative, I am particularly focused on concept (and utility) of “refugeeness” and how such understandings are related to how the international community manages refugee environments. The tendency within the long history of refugee research was (is) to reify the refugee. Though many have cautioned against such depictions
(Kibreab 1991, 1994; Malkki 1995a, 1995b; Jacobsen 1997; Hyndman 2000), the trend remains especially prevalent and most obvious in the public discourse. My goal in interrogating the assumption that the “refugee experience” is always defined solely by loss and uprootedness is not meant to deny that refugees experience loss, but rather to leave room for the reality that loss is not the only event that defines a refugee’s experience or their ability to (de)(re)construct places.

The larger argument here is that Ukwimi provides a viable position through which to examine some of the more complicated questions of globalization, identity, territoriality, security, positionality, and sense of place. Ukwimi and the people who live there have experienced multiple forms of displacements in their lives – displacements from multiple perspectives, at different historical times, and at varying scales. In my attempts to weave these threads together, the tapestry I have come to understand Ukwimi through concludes with the following patterns:

1. **Expansion of temporal scale:** Understanding the ramifications of displacement requires a firm grasp of the particular political, social, and historical context in which displacement occurs. And this type of understanding demands that we expand the temporal lens through which we typically examine
refugee environments. We cannot fully interrogate places like Ukwimi by beginning the story of refugee-hosting areas with the opening of a particular camp or settlement and concluding it at the closing of said camp. We must lengthen our historical gaze and look both before and beyond the operation of a particular camp. Expanding the temporal scale in this way facilitates and contributes to understanding how refugee-hosting can alter, challenge, and sometime reinforce the cultural landscape.

2. **Expansion of spatial scale:** If the intention is to understand the long-term impacts of displacement, then it is not enough to simply examine the needs or experiences of refugees (Malkki 1995a) or to focus only on the legal and institutional frameworks operating in the field (Hyndman 2000) or to rely too strongly on the often xenophobic attitudes of host communities (Crush and Pendleton 2004). Instead, we must widen the spatial lens in which we view
forced displacement. My observations of the evolution of cultural landscapes at Ukwimi highlighted the ways in which displacement is an inherently geographic experience – meaning that it is not simply a process that affects refugees but one that affects a whole host of individuals, organizations, and communities situated within (and part of the construction of) particular landscapes. Because of this, geographers can contribute deeper understandings of refugee-hosting environments at a variety of spatial scales.

3. **Emplacement in motion** – To be “displaced” assumes an attachment to or recognition of being “in place”. Being “in” and “out” in this way also implies a specific space within which a person belongs or does not belong. However, the example of Ukwimi demonstrates that the degree to which an individual is “in” or “out” of place is not static – it fluctuates, it shifts, it is, in fact, in motion. Ultimately, displacement is not just about the loss of
place, but also inevitably about the struggle to make new places (Turton 2004: 26). So although Malkki argues that displacement is the “flip-side” of emplacement (1995: 517), my conclusion is that they are actually one and the same – part of the same narrative.

**Methodological Approach**

Initially, I was inclined to relegate a discussion of methodology to the confines of an Appendix. This inclination originated not from an aversion to disclosing my field methods, but rather from a desire not to disrupt the broader narrative. Yet my own intellectual foundation in feminist theory cautioned me against inserting my methods as a mere afterthought or appendix. It is in this realm of methodology that my training as a human geographer confronted my understanding and appreciation of feminist geography’s commitment to recognizing one’s own positionality. As a human geographer, I am inclined to privilege the narrative, but as a feminist geographer I am also very cognizant of the value of methodological disclosure. At the end of the day, as with many things, such commitments are not mutually exclusive though at times they feel that way.

Upon arriving in Zambia, I spent my initial months buried deep in the Zambia National Archives and Special Collections at the University of Zambia
(UNZA). I also made use of my time in Lusaka interviewing administrators, employees, and participants in a number of Lusaka-based refugee service organizations, such as the Jesuit Refugee Services, Women Refugees Community in Zambia, Lutheran World Federation, Africare, and the Zambia Initiative. Although I was over 500km away from my field site, Lusaka serves as the institutional heart of refugee operations in Zambia and became the source of much of my exposure to and research of operation of the refugee relief regime. Nearly every NGO operating in Zambia’s refugee camps is headquartered in Lusaka, as are all of their institutional reports and records. Additionally, many of these Lusaka-based interviews served to connect me to several Ukwimi gatekeepers and self-described “relics”, such as Eularia Zulu-Synamujaye, former URS Director and current Permanent Secretary for Eastern Province.

The majority of my time (from January 2006 through July 2006) was spent living at URS in Eastern Province, where my primary methodologies included interviewing, focus group discussions, participant observation, and cultural landscape interpretation. After an initial introductory visit in November 2005, I made a final move to Ukwimi in January. Once I had settled in at URS, I began contacting and interviewing provincial, district, and local leaders in order to gauge the political climate and memory concerning refugee-hosting at the institutional level in Eastern Province. Secondly, I began conducting open-
ended surveys and interviews throughout the Ukwimi area, both inside and outside URS boundaries, in order to identify salient themes and perceptions regarding the refugee-host-development interface.

These conversations focused on questions concerning personal experiences of living in and near Ukwimi camp, perceptions toward national and international refugee programs and policies, and issues of land use, land control, and development. As a research method, my field interviews constituted “conversations with a purpose” (Eyles 1988) and although they cannot be replicated, they can be corroborated.

Later in my stay, I was able to identify and contact those Mozambican and Angolan refugees who remained in URS. Additionally, I travelled to the Mozambique-Zambia border to interview self-settled, as well as returned, Mozambican refugees. Discussions with these self-settled refugees, and the community of Zambians with whom they reside, proved to be imperative to understanding the opportunities and limitations of local integration for self-settled refugees.

As observed by prominent refugee studies scholar Harrell-Bond, “one of the most serious methodological issues facing a researcher studying refugees is the pervasive distrust which hangs like a cloud over all relationships” (1986: 378). Upon my initial visit to Ukwimi in November 2005, I was careful to make clear to the appropriate authorities the purpose of my research, the nature of my
activities in the area, and my affiliation with UNZA. Upon receiving confirmation and clearance from URS Scheme Manager, I returned to Lusaka briefly to make arrangements for my extended stay at URS.

I returned to URS in January and quickly settled into the housing so graciously provided by the Scheme Manager in the long-vacated NGO offices (Photograph 2). Although I was anxious to begin interviewing local Zambians, as well as remaining refugees, I was very cognizant of the “cloud” of “pervasive distrust” which Harrell-Bond wrote about. Given my fear of being feared, I decided a slow approach to conducting formal interviews and/or asking many questions was the best approach. Given that URS had officially closed its doors to refugees and any who remained would be subject to immigration proceedings if discovered, a cautious approach was necessary.

After nearly three weeks of exploration and introduction at Ukwimi, I was beginning to worry about whether or not the “cloud” would ever dissipate,
and even if it did, how was I suppose to “know” that it had lifted? All of these thoughts were rolling around in my head late one afternoon as I returned from Petauke where I had been meeting with district representatives. As I turned down the path to my house, I was greeted by the usual cohort of kids from the preschool nearby. As expected, they ran down the path towards me shouting, calling out to me both as a greeting and as a neighborhood-wide announcement that the Mzungu (stranger/white person – as they called me) had returned. It took me about thirty seconds to realize that they were calling out to me using my first name for first time, instead of the usual “Mzungu!” That was the moment that I didn’t know I was waiting for – the moment when I realized the “cloud” had been lifted and I could begin my “real” work. However, in many ways, I learned more about my own personal process of place-making in those first few weeks than I did once the “real” work commenced.

As my interviews began, I was extremely careful in explaining the purpose and intention of my research to those who were willing to talk with me. I tried to emphasize that I was there as a student and, as such, they were my teachers. I had, in fact, come to them to be taught. I made it clear upon any request for an interview that no one had to cooperate. I also took some time to explain that even those who agreed to be interviewed could refuse to answer specific questions at any time. This often also required an explanation of why “no reply” was better than a false response. I assured each interviewee that I
would protect their individual privacy with regard to their personal stories. As such, throughout the text of this dissertation, I have not revealed the names or any personally identifying characteristics of the majority of my informants. I made a commitment to the community to articulate and represent them as honestly as my skills and the information they gave me permitted. Although I acknowledged their desire to be heard and to have a voice, I cautioned them my findings and conclusion would not likely have any immediate impact on their present situation.

Many of these initial precautions were conscious decisions on my part, informed by a litany of studies about the politics of power, difference, identity, subjectivity, and positionality in the field (Flowerdew and Martin 1997; Hays-Mitchell 2001; Myers 2001; Stevens 2001). All of the disclaimers I came with into the field were attempts to acknowledge and make room for Foucault’s assertion that “power…circulates” and is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads: they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting targets; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power (Foucault 1980: 98)

Even though I entered the field well-versed in the messy politics of doing
fieldwork and armed with a commitment to remain sensitive to how power is wielded and perceived in the field, there were still many moments when I found myself extremely uncomfortable with my role as a “vehicle” of power. With Foucault’s observation in mind, however, I was able to recognize those moments when power shifted or “circulated”.

My particular position in Foucault’s “net-like” organization varied daily depending on numerous (and constantly negotiated) circumstances. For example, I often felt any sense of power/control circulate away from me on days when I took to the field alone, with my limited Chichewa capabilities and general unfamiliarity with the area. On the other hand, there were specific moments in which I realized that the community perceived me as enormously powerful. For example, I met with a group of about 40 Zambian women who had married Angolan refugees and were subsequently left at Ukwimi when their husbands repatriated. The women were convinced that I had the power to find, collect, and transport their husbands back to Ukwimi.

Most days, however, I was able to recognize and appreciate the ebb and flow of the shifting power dynamics of fieldwork. For example, while interviewing with the aid of interpreters, I most obviously exercised power by guiding the nature of the conversation and topics covered. But I was simultaneously subjected to the interpreters’ power of translating my inquiries and interpreting interviewee responses. Yet, whenever I recognized the meaning
of a particular word or turn of phrase or more, I sensed power briefly circulating back through me again.

Throughout this narrative, you will also encounter stories dug out of the archives and institutional reports of actors involved. I made extensive use of such material in an attempt to
draw upon long-term research that follows what happens to people over time, upon close comparison using data from other ethnographic studies of people exposed to similar difficulties, and upon the massive historical and other documentation now existing even for what seem to the casual visitor to be remote regions of the world (Colson 2007: 325)

As a discipline, geography is uniquely situated to help me unravel the historical, social, political, and cultural importance of such spaces due to its long-standing commitment to understanding how places are ‘made’. Geographer’s conceptions of the idea of ‘place’ allow me to de-center refugee studies’ privileging of refugees in their understandings of places where refugees live. By taking a geographically informed approach to the study of URS, I am able to move beyond static understanding of the dynamics of such places (which invariably focus solely on the refugee experience) and acknowledge (and investigate) the role that Zambians in the area play in (de)(re)constructing Ukwimi as a place.

It is my hope that these efforts have not been in vain and by attempting
to examine some of these larger questions, we can move beyond refugee studies’ fixation with the “refugee” as a seemingly coherent, self-contained category of analysis. By acknowledging that refugees are not the only characters in the story of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement, I make new connections between various kinds of relationship – between and among refugee relief/management organizations, government officials, refugee policymakers, Zambian development initiatives, host communities, and refugee populations – operating at a variety of spatial scales.

In addition to widening the spatial lens, my study also breaks from much of the research on refugee-hosting areas (which is overwhelmingly concerned with the short-term, crisis stage) by extending the temporal lens to include the entire story of URS’s emplacement in Petauke District, beyond its construction and its closing. Extending the temporal and spatial scope of refugee studies requires drawing from, challenging, making connections between, and contributing to a variety of literatures.

Drawing on Cindi Katz’s call to produce topographies (thick, historical geographies), my project seeks to tell Ukwimi’s distinct story while simultaneously “recognizing that it is connected analytically to other places along contour lines that represent not elevation but particular relations to a process” (Katz 2001: 1229). The refugee landscape of Ukwimi appears to be an appropriate ‘contour’ through which to understand the topographies of forced
displacement in Africa. Just as the epigraph acknowledges that the actual practice of ethnography is “meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated”, so too must we understand the actual practices of place-making to be “meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177).
CHAPTER TWO
PLACING DISPLACEMENT

[S]ome are more in charge of it [mobility] than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it (Massey 1993: 61)

In order to tackle the complex realities, relationships, and dynamics that created (and continue to create) Ukwimi, it becomes necessary to begin by stepping back and grounding the discussion within relevant theoretical frameworks, drawing from a variety of disciplines. As a geographer, I am particularly interested in what the discipline of geography has to contribute to global discussions of and research concerning forced displacement. At a very fundamental level, geography – with its attention to how people make places meaningful – is uniquely situated to grapple with the complexities of human migration and mobility.

Throughout the history of the discipline, numerous scholars have proposed a variety of hypotheses, theories, and frameworks through which to understand these processes (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966; Zelinsky 1971; King 1995; Castles and Miller 1998). In order to “place” displacement, this chapter examines the role of migration studies within the discipline, as well as the development of refugee studies. As an Africanist, I am concerned with how all of these frameworks play out in an African context, and perhaps more
importantly, what the African context can teach us about the wider issues of forced displacement. This chapter makes new connections between migration studies and refugee studies in the African context, in an attempt to bridge the gaps between these sometimes disparate fields of study. In doing so, this chapter sets the stage for understanding the dynamics of refugee-hosting and place-making at Ukwimi by looking at relationships between those who “initiate flows”, those who are on the “receiving end”, and those who are “effectively imprisoned” by (im)mobility (Massey 1993: 61).

Migration Studies

Migration studies are critical to understanding contemporary studies of forced displacement. In fact, many researchers are beginning to advocate that forced displacement be given the same analytical treatment as other types of human migration (Richmond 1988; Stein 1981; Black 1991, 2001; Robinson 2002). In order to do this, we must have a strong handle on previous analytical treatment of voluntary migration. Examining how voluntary migration has been conceptualized over the years provides a basis on which to assess the utility of these conceptualizations in situations of forced displacement. The application of (or at the very least, attention to) concepts developed within migration studies to situations of forced displacement may also shed new light on old ideas and challenge our notions of the opportunities of and obstacles to human mobility.
According to Poole and Whyte (1991), migration studies ask fundamental questions of how many, who, where, and why. However, given the complex processes involved in any migration, geographers, sociologists, economists, and anthropologists have employed a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to address these questions. Migration, as the “spatial reallocation of human resources” (Poole and Whyte 1991: 168) is:

…an interesting phenomenon in itself but is also an important indicator of differences in the social and economic structures of different areas and regions. Variations in the social composition of migratory flows, temporal and spatial differences in the scale and pattern of movement, the motives involved in migration, the information flows and personal contacts which aided migration, the characteristics of source areas and destinations, the official and unofficial reaction to population movements (favorable and unfavorable), all influence and at the same time reflect the nature of society in the areas which send and receive the migrants (Poole and Whyte 1991: 9)

Because migration occurs at a broad range of temporal and spatial scales, many researchers have struggled to identify a single, comprehensive framework or theory through which to fully understand the intricacies of migratory movement (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966; Zelinsky 1971). Such attempts often simplify migratory processes by employing various systems of classification. Some focus on temporal characteristics of the displacement, such as seasonal or periodic. Others stress points of origin and arrival, such as rural-urban, while
still others emphasize motive, such as ecological or behavioral (Cloke et al 1999). A brief overview of the major classification systems that have been proposed over the years demonstrates the failures and successes of such “analytical treatment” in addressing the realities of forced displacement.

In 1885, British demographer E. G. Ravenstein formulated numerous “laws of migration” (Table 1) (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). He used the British census as his database, and therefore, like Rostow's stages of economic growth or the demographic transition model, the utility of his formulations to other places and under different circumstances is questionable. In fact, after reading Ravenstein’s articles, one critic concluded that “migration was rather distinguished for its lawlessness than for having any definite law” (Humphreys 1889: 302).

| Table 1
Ravenstein's Laws of Migration |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Most migration is over a short distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Migration occurs in steps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Long-range migrants usually move to urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each migration flow produces a counter-flow in opposite direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rural dwellers are more migratory than urban dwellers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within their own country, females are more migratory than males, but males are more migratory over long distances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Most migrants are adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Large towns grow more by migration than by natural increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Migration increases with economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Migration is mostly due to economic causes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regardless of such criticism, Ravenstein’s work remains the “starting point for work in migration” (Lee 1966: 47). Since their inception, his “laws” have stimulated an enormous volume of additional research and have yet to be completely rejected. Still, several of the Ravenstein claims become problematic when applied to situations of forced displacement in Africa. For example, children, not the adults observed by Ravenstein, make up more than half of forcibly uprooted populations in the world (UNHCR 2003). Although Ravenstein’s “laws” may not be applicable in situations of forced displacement, his attempts to create laws for understanding migration framed much of the subsequent research in migration studies.

Seeking to find a more general theory of migration, Everett Lee (1966) developed the idea of migration as a response to various pushes and pulls from the origin and destination (Figure 1). According to this thinking, “no matter how short or how long, how easy or how difficult, every act of migration

![Figure 1](image-url)
involves an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles” (1966: 49).

Lee made the critical observation that important distinctions exist between factors associated with the origin and those associated with the destination. He attributed these distinctions to the more immediate and intimate relationship a migrant has with his or her place of origin. Presumably, the migrant’s knowledge of the destination is “seldom exact” and elements of “ignorance” or even “mystery” inform a migrant’s perception of his or her destination (Lee 1966: 50). Lee’s work also acknowledged that obstacles exist to any migration. The most studied intervening factor in geography has been that of distance, but various other obstacles exist including physical barriers such as mountains or the Berlin Wall and legal barriers such as prohibitory immigration laws. In his conclusions, Lee formulated nineteen hypotheses about the nature of migration – six of which were concerned with the volume of migration, another six dealing with the nature of migratory streams, and seven outlining the characteristics of migrants themselves (Figure 2).

Although the applicability of Lee’s hypotheses may be debatable, his influence on how migration is discussed is not. The idea of push and pull factors has become a fundamental concept taught within the discipline. Lee’s concept of push and pull factors, and, in fact, his terminology itself, have
Concerning volume of migration
- Volume of migration within a territory varies with the degree of diversity of that territory; the higher the degree of diversity, the more migration
- Volume varies with diversity of people; the more homogenous the population, the less migratory
- Volume related to the difficulty of overcoming intervening obstacles
- Volume varies with fluctuations in economy; the greater economic expansion occurring, the greater the degree of migration
- Volume of migration increases with time (unless checks are put into place to minimize migration)
- Volume of migration varies with the state of progress in a country

Concerning the development of streams and counter-streams
- Migration takes place in well-defined streams/routes
- For every migration stream, there is a counter-stream
- Efficiency (ratio of stream:counter-stream) is high if major factors of migration were push factors at the origin
- Efficiency is low if origin and destination are similar
- Efficiency is high if intervening obstacles are great
- Efficiency is connected to economic conditions

Concerning the characteristics of migrants
- Migration is selective
- Migrants responding to pull factors at the destination tend to be positively selected
- Migrants responding to push factors at the origin tend to be negatively selected
- Selection is typically bimodal
- Degree of positive selection increases with increasing difficulty of intervening obstacles
- Propensity to migrate at certain life stages is connected to selection
- Between the characteristics of the origin and destination population, migrants tend to demonstrate intermediate characteristics
become a standard way of discussing human migration, as evident by the continued use of the terms in numerous introductory human geography textbooks (de Blij 1997; Knox and Marston 1998; Fellmann et al. 1999; Rubenstein 1999; Jordan-Bychkov and Domosh 2003). Introductory textbooks often further classify push and pull factors into specific categories such as economic, political, cultural, environmental, or technological (de Blij 1997; Rubenstein 1999). Within the context of forced migration, however, the utility of conceptualizing all migration as a dynamic relationship between clear push and pull factors becomes problematic as push factors often have a significantly greater influence in such situations.

In the 1970s, Wilbur Zelinsky used the demographic transition model as a basis to develop a “mobility transition model” outlining the relationship between human mobility and processes of industrialization and urbanization. Combining ideas about demographic transition with human mobility, this model concerned itself with “the fusion of the spatial with the temporal perspective” (Zelinsky 1971: 220). The basic hypothesis argued that “there are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process” (Zelinsky 1971: 221-222). Zelinsky identified five types of migratory movement in relation to five types of societies (Figure 3).
### The Demographic Transition

#### Phase A – Pre-modern Traditional Society
- High, slightly fluctuating, fertility rate
- Mortality nearly equal to fertility
- Little long-range increase or decrease

#### Phase B – Early Transitional Society
- Slight, but significant, rise in fertility
- Rapid decline in mortality
- Rapid rate of natural increase
- Major growth in population

#### Phase C – Late Transitional Society
- Major decline in fertility
- Continuing decline in mortality
- Continued natural increase, but at much slower rate

#### Phase D – Advanced Society
- Low to moderate levels of fertility
- Stabilized mortality to near or slightly below fertility
- Slight or no natural increase

#### Phase E – Future Super-advanced Society
- Fertility carefully controlled by individuals and perhaps by new sociopolitical means
- Stable mortality pattern

### The Mobility Transition

#### Phase I – Pre-modern Traditional Society
- Little migration
- Only circulation as sanctioned by customary practice

#### Phase II – Early Transitional Society
- Massive movement from rural to urban
- Major outflows of emigrants to foreign destinations
- Small, but significant, immigration of skilled workers from more advanced parts of the world
- Significant growth in circulatory migration

#### Phase III – Late Transitional Society
- Decreasing, but still major, movement from rural to urban
- Emigration on decline
- Continued increases in circulatory migration

#### Phase IV – Advanced Society
- Migration levels off
- Rural-urban movement continues but at a reduced rate
- Substantial movement from city to city and within cities
- Significant immigration of unskilled workers from relatively underdeveloped lands
- International migration/circulation of skilled and professional people
- Vigorously accelerating circulatory migration – particularly economic and pleasure-oriented

#### Phase V – Super-advanced Society
- Decline in migration/circulation as better communication/delivery systems instituted
- Nearly all internal migration of interurban/intraurban variety
- Further immigration of unskilled workers from less developed countries
- Strict political control of internal/international movements
The work by Ravenstein, Lee, and Zelinsky sought to systematically categorize the dynamic processes of human migration. However, such an approach is not the only way that geography has engaged in discussions of migration. Considerable attention also has been paid to developing economic models for the extensive rural-to-urban migration that is occurring in the developing world. The first such model, developed in 1954 by W. Arthur Lewis, breaks the economy into two sectors characterized as the rural subsistence and modern urban industrial. Lewis argued that as the demand for labor increases in the modern sector, the rural labor force migrates in to fill that demand. In turn, this increases urban industrial profits, which then fuels the urban industrial sector. The rural subsistence laborers continually fill the demands of the urban industrial sector until the rural labor surplus is completely absorbed (Todaro 1981: 233-236).

Lewis built his model by making several critical, and highly questionable, assumptions (Figure 4). Beginning with the contention that rural-to-urban migration is a much more complicated phenomenon than Lewis envisioned, Michael Todaro developed a new model aimed at addressing the “the apparently paradoxical relationship (at least to economists) of accelerated rural-urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment” (Todaro 1981: 239). Like any good economist, Todaro expressed his theory in mathematical terms (Figure 5). His series of assumptions are outlined below:
Figure 4
Lewis’ Rural-Urban Migration Model

Rural Subsistence Sector
Low productivity
Low incomes
Low savings
Labor surplus

Modern Urban Industrial Sector
Technologically advanced
Higher levels of investment
Higher wages
Profit motivated

Critical Assumptions
Rural sector has surplus labor
Productivity in rural sector nearly zero
Constant demand for labor from urban sector
People will put higher wages into savings

Figure 5
Todaro’s Mathematical Migration Model

\[ V(0) = \int_{t=0}^{n} [p(t)Y_u(t) - Y_r(t)]e^{-rt} \, dt - C(0) \]

\( V(0) \) = present value of expected urban-rural income
\( Y_u, Y_r(t) \) = average real incomes of individuals
\( n \) = number time periods in migrant’s planning horizon
\( r \) = discount rate reflecting migrant’s degree of time preference
• People base their decisions to migrate on rational economic considerations
• Economic considerations are based on expected – as opposed to actual – wage differences
• There is an inverse relationship between probability of obtaining an urban job and urban unemployment rates (more likely to get a job where there is low unemployment rate)
• People will migrate even in excess of urban job opportunity growth rates because it is rational (see first assumption) to expect a higher income (Todaro 1981: 241)

Although Todaro’s model influenced how rural-urban migration is conceptualized and discussed, it also has had an enduring influence on the promotion of development policy in the developing world. Todaro argued that his model contained significant “policy implications for development strategy with regard to wages and incomes, rural development, and industrialization” (Todaro 1981: 241). The policy implications included, but were not limited to, the following:

• Reduction of the imbalances between urban and rural job opportunities
• Creation of urban jobs is an inadequate means by which to reduce urban unemployment
• Governments reduction of higher education investments
• Government elimination of wage subsides and
factor-price distortions

- Focus development policy in the developing world on integrated rural development (Todaro 1981: 241-243)

The reduction of such complex migration phenomena to mathematical formulas and rational-choice models not only undermines the influence of human agency, but also dismisses the impacts of external influences.

In reaction to these somewhat deterministic approaches to migration studies, humanist geography has approached the topic in a much more subjective manner. Its practitioners focus on feelings of particular migrants, conceptualizations of home, and sense of place (Tuan 1977; Appadurai 1988; Cresswell 1996, 2004; Feld and Basso 1996; Casey 1998). Yi-Fu Tuan, for example, identified migration as a form of escapism. In general though, many sense-of-place-geographers seem to conceive of mobility as the antithesis of their interest in place. But this does not have to be the case. Consider Tim Cresswell’s observation:

Why geographers have not subjected mobility to the same scrutiny as the more allegedly fixed and bounded categories of space, time, territory, and landscape is curious. Mobility is just as spatial – as geographical – and just as central to the human experience of the world as place (2006: 3)

Cresswell’s call reveals possible similarities between modern voluntary migration and forced displacement in that both are forms of escape, albeit at
very different degrees. Much of humanist geography concerning migration is anchored in understanding how individuals and groups experience particular places and when/why/how such experiences relate to decisions to migrate to new places.

Although no single, comprehensive theory of human migration exists, several attempts have been made to integrate migration studies into economic, behavioral, and social theory. As Poole and Whyte argued, migration studies could “benefit from the use of social theory to inform the speculative interpretation of scanty migration evidence” (1991: 13). Other studies have examined migration in relation to gender (Chant 1992; Indra 1999), policy development (Krtiz et al 1992; Kubat 1993; Crisp 1995, 2000), and global significance (Potts and Bond 1990; Castles and Miller 1993; Skeldon 1997).

Continued engagement by geographers will expand these previous studies and open new avenues of studying and understanding the complexities of human migration. In the end, it is evident that migration – within nations, across international borders, and between continents – creates distinct geographies, determines population dynamics, affects cultural characteristics, and alters identities. In short, migration is an active agent in the construction of place. And, as we will see at Ukwimi, the process of place (de)(re)construction is an integral component in the experience of displacement.
Refugee Studies

The study of forced migration is a relatively new, albeit growing, area of geographic inquiry. However, geography’s concentration on relationships among political, cultural, and environmental issues situates it to be a major contributor in the future development of refugee-related research. For example, the discipline’s long-standing interest in migration (as discussed in the previous section) provides a substantial theoretical and conceptual framework that could potentially be linked to studies of involuntary migration (Black 1991). In fact, many argue (Stein 1981; Richmond 1988; Black 1991, 2001; Robinson 2002) that refugee migration “must be placed in the larger context of migration theory, whereby the parallels between these refugee experiences can be compared to those of other migratory populations” (Bascom 1994: 247). Prior to examining these potential connections, it is necessary to trace the evolution of refugee studies as an important and vital field of study, and geography’s engagement with it.

Refugee studies are defined by “a comprehensive, historical, interdisciplinary, and comparative perspective which focuses on the consistencies and patterns in the refugee experience” (Stein and Tomasi 1981: 5). Given the interdisciplinary nature of refugee studies, scholars from political science, anthropology, sociology, geography, and history, have contributed to the growing volume of research on forced displacement. However, the roots of the
field are “intimately connected” with international, regional, and national immigration and asylum policy development (Black 2001: 58). Much of the early work in the field devoted itself to analysis of and recommendations for refugee policy, often with little or no theoretical reflection (Black 1991, 2001). Because of the field’s strong connections with policymakers and governmental organizations, concern exists within the academic community that “the dominance of policy concerns in refugee research will lead to work that is . . . undertheorized and orientated towards particular bureaucratic interests” (Black 2001: 67).

Seemingly paralleling the significant increase of forced displacement itself, the study of refugee movements has grown considerably over the years, as evidenced by the establishment of refugee-specific academic centers, scholarly journals, and research publications. Since the 1950s, at least twenty major refugee organizations and academic centers have been established across the globe (Table 2).

In an examination of refugee focused bibliographies, Richard Black (2001) noted a dramatic increase in the number of refugee-related article publications. A 1939 bibliography contained one hundred entries (Brown 1939); by the publication of a 1981 bibliography, that number had grown to approximately eight hundred (Stein 1981). In 2001, the RefWorld database contained over two thousand articles. Black’s examination of scholarly journals
also revealed a sharp increase in refugee-related contents. For example, *International Migration Review* published twenty-seven refugee-specific articles in the last ten years, compared to only seven in the previous decade (Black 2001). In addition, the creation of the *Journal of Refugee Studies* by the Oxford Refugee Studies Program demonstrated interdisciplinary, scholarly commitment to the exploration of refugee-related topics.

Given refugee studies’ focus on “the consistencies and patterns of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization/Academic Center</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Association for the Study of World Refugee Problem (AWR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>United States Committee for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>AWR Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Refugee Reports (USCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Refugee Documentation Project; <em>Refugees; Refugee Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Refugee Policy Group - Washington DC; <em>Refugee Abstracts</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Refugee Studies Programme - University of Oxford, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Refugee Studies Programme - Juba University, Sudan; <em>World Refugee Survey</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Centre for Refugee Studies- York University, Canada; <em>Journal of Refugee Studies; Refugee Participation Network; World Refugee Report</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>International Journal of Refugee Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Moi University Centre for Refugee Studies - Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Makerere University Human Rights and Peace Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Refugee Study Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Palestine Diaspora and Refugee Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>University of Dar es Salaam Centre for Study of Forced Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>International Association for the Study of Forced Migration</td>
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establishes links to the following refugee centers:

- Oxford
- An-Najah National University (Palestinian Authority)
- Yarmouk University (Jordon)
- University of Western Cape (South Africa)
refugee experience,” it is not surprising that researchers have attempted to construct classification systems in order to highlight such patterns (Peterson 1958; Rogge 1979; Kunz 1981). Like migration studies before it, refugee research pays close attention to the causes and effects of refugee movement. Conceptual ties can be made from two refugee typologies – one by John Rogge and the other by Egon Kunz – to the migration research of Lee. Because of the nature of involuntary migration, refugee typologies generally focus on the numerous push factors that stimulate the forced movement of people. In 1979, John Rogge expanded the migration typology devised by William Peterson in 1958 to further theorize the nature of refugee movement in Africa.

Rogge’s typology is based upon the degree of freedom an individual has regarding his or her own flight. The typology outlines the distinction between forced refugees and impelled refugees (Figure 6). According to Rogge, forced refugees are expelled by an external force, such as a government, and retain absolutely no choice in the matter. Idi Amin’s expulsion of Ugandan Asians in the 1970s and apartheid South Africa illustrate this type of refugee flow. Impelled refugees, however, retain some degree of choice regarding migration. These refugees have an opportunity to weigh factors, both internal and external, before migrating (Rogge 1979). This is not to imply that impelled refugees are not forcibly displaced, but rather that they retain some control over the timing and nature of their movement. Rogge’s typology is useful in understanding the
Egon Kunz introduced the second major typology into refugee studies in 1981. In it, he classified refugees into three distinct types – self-alienated, influence and power of push factors, yet it also acknowledges the ability of refugees to resist and influence some aspects of their own flight.
majority identified, and events-alienated – based on their attitude toward their own displacement. Self-alienating refugees are those who feel alienated from their society based on a variety of personal, sometimes philosophical, reasons. In Africa, self-alienation is a relatively minor occurrence. Kunz, for example, incorrectly classified the expulsion of twenty thousand Jehovah’s Witness from Malawi to Zambia as an incident of self-alienating refugee movement (Kunz 1981; Wills 1985). Majority-identified refugees are those whose opposition to political and social events at home is shared by their compatriots. These refugees typically “identify themselves enthusiastically with the nation though not with its government” (Kunz 1981: 43). In Africa, most of the refugees produced during the liberation from colonial rule are classified as majority-identified refugees (Kunz 1981). In most cases, majority-identified refugees demonstrate a strong desire to return.

Events-related refugees are those who have been subjected to discrimination and often outright violence, thus warranting a feeling of insecurity in their own homeland. Kunz identified events-alienated refugees as those whose “marginality was latent or suppressed but came to the fore in a sequence of events” (Kunz 1981: 43). Events-related refugees “retain little interest” in what occurs back home and are “irreconcilably alienated” from their fellow citizens such that they only desire to return home when there is “substantial change” in the environment from which they fled (Kunz 1981: 43).
The majority of recent refugee movements in Africa fit into this category. For example, the massive refugee influx of Burundian and Rwandan refugees into Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate a movement prompted by specific, often violent, events. Kunz’s typology went on to identify characteristics of host communities, such as cultural compatibility, population policies, and social attitudes, and to distinguish between anticipatory and acute movements.

Throughout the growth of refugee studies, there have been numerous calls to address refugee issues within the wider context of development (Chambers 1982, 1979; Keeley 1981; Stein 1982; Karadawi 1983; Goodwillie 1983). In fact, some argue that forced displacement can (and should) be treated within the context of other types of displacement, such as urbanization, globalization, illegal border crossing, international travel, and other forms of human mobility, all of which are connected to issues of and consequences of development. Robinson (2002: 326) calls for an understanding of development as

processes of uneven accumulation are unfolding in accordance with a social and not a national logic, and that we may rethink development not as a national process, in which it ‘develops’ as a nation, but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and intermediate population groups occupying contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational environment

Such treatment of forced displacement is not, however, without
difficulties. For example, in *Managing Displacement*, Jennifer Hyndman has discussed the relationship between refugees and UNHCR workers. She notes that although both are ostensibly “displaced,” the staff members in the camps are displaced by choice rather than force. This creates a more privileged position for the staff. According to Hyndman, “to compare these distinct groups of displaced people at all is to risk blurring the acute differences between them” (Hyndman 2000: 111).

*Bridging the Gap*

From concerns over the construction of “sense of place” to examinations of the “production of space,” geographers have become increasingly conscious of their own gaze. They have begun to interrogate, analyze, and theorize the fundamental geographic conceptualizations of space and place (Tuan 1977, 1996; Entrikin 1991; Cosgrove 1985, 1989; Massey 1991; Cresswell 1996, 2004, 2006; Sack 1997; Lefebvre 2002). For example, Cresswell’s 2004 book, *Place: A short introduction*, lays out the ways in which place plays an active role in the construction of society and culture, focusing on the notion of people, things, and behaviors having “appropriate” places.

In the same vein, Sibley’s book *Geographies of Exclusion* examines how places are given meaning by defining who belongs and who does not belong. Sibley argues that the practice of spatial differentiation occurs because “power is
expressed in the monopolization of space and the relegation of weaker groups in society to less desirable environments (1995: ix). Although the majority of Sibley’s book focuses on the geographies of exclusion within Western societies, many of his concepts and conclusions remain useful when applied in other contexts, such as the geographies of forced displacement within Africa.

Numerous other cultural geographers have addressed the issue of the construction of place at length, paying particular attention to who belongs and who doesn’t (Tuan 1977; Harvey 1989, 1996; Massey 1994; Sack 1992; Cresswell 2004). All of these studies represent a growing recognition of the need to understand the complex, dynamic processes involved in place-making, yet they nearly all do so in North American and European settings. As noted by Myers, “humanistic cultural geographers have paid relatively little attention to sub-Saharan Africa” (2005: 21). By examining similar questions in the African context, I aim not only to contribute to geography’s understanding of place, but also to answer Myers’ call for more “African humanist approaches to place meaning” which combine “detail of the political, material, symbolic, or historic struggles of people in places” (2005: 6).

Although a discussion of place-making may seem “out of place” in a study of displacement, the two phenomena are intrinsically linked and mutually constitutive. To be “displaced” assumes an attachment to or recognition of being “in place.” Being “in” or “out” in this way also implies a specific space
within which a person belongs or does not belong. However, as the example of Ukwimi will demonstrates, the degree to which an individual is “in” or “out” of place is not static – it fluctuates and shifts.

When examining the breadth of research coming out of migration studies, refugee studies, and African studies, one can identify a number of “gaps” between each of these disciplines. In fact, Malkki argues that the contemporary category of “refugees” is a “particularly informative one in the study of the socio-political construction of space and place” (Malkki 1992: 25). It is my contention that the disciplinary concerns of geography provide a means through which to bridge some of these gaps. As stated before, geographers have played an important role in the development of migration studies.

Within the realm of refugee studies, geography's role is considerably less discernible. In an attempt to gain a firmer grasp on the contributions of geographers to refugee studies, I expanded Black's 2001 study by recording the disciplinary backgrounds of author's contributing to the cornerstone *Journal of Refugee Studies* since its inception in 1988 until December 2007 (Table 3). According to my findings, geographers contributed 23 articles (or approximately 4%) to the *Journal of Refugee Studies* over the last two decades. Although not as engaged as anthropologists, sociologists, or political scientists, it appears that geographers are speaking to their interdisciplinary counterparts within refugee studies much more than they are speaking amongst one another about refugee
studies. To articulate this observation, I examined the number of articles concerning refugee issues that have been published in major geographic journals over the last fifty years. As seen in Table 4, the discipline’s discussions of research on refugee issues have been minimal. I contend that this is a very serious gap in the discipline. Only *GeoJournal* has anything remotely resembling a commitment to refugee geographies. For the key journals of the discipline, refugees are essentially a non-issue.

Although explicit attention to refugee issues is lacking in geography’s key journals, many of the concepts and topics tackled by geographers have relevance to my approach to understanding Ukwimi. In particular, geography’s use of landscape interpretation shaped a significant portion of work. From early, descriptive accounts to current calls from more ‘critical’ approaches, the study

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<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Number of papers</th>
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<td>Interdisciplinary/Discipline Not Specified</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Organization</td>
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<td>Social Work</td>
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<td>Journalism</td>
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of landscapes has played an integral role in the formation, evolution, and configuration of the disciple of geography.

Geographers have long been attentive to importance of landscape in shaping (and being shaped by) a multitude of economic, social, cultural, and political processes. From arguments that landscape is a stage upon which the impact of human processes can be seen (Sauer) or approaches which conceive of landscape as a “way of seeing” (Cosgrove), to those that view landscape as a ‘text to be read’ (Duncan) or a tool of the masculinist gaze (Rose), geographers have not always agreed on how these dynamic processes operate nor on what role landscape plays.

A discussion of Carl Sauer and the Berkeley School’s interpretation of
landscape is a necessary starting point as Sauer is often credited with making landscape a foci of geography. With his 1925 essay, *Morphology of Landscape*, Carl Sauer initiated an approach to understanding landscapes that continues to influence how geographers approach the study of landscapes.

Sauer’s ideas emerged in a time when the discipline was dominated by the approaches of environmental determinism, which viewed the environment as determinant of the social and cultural processes which took place upon it. Sauer’s conceptualization of nature, culture, and landscape sought to reverse the ideas put forth by environmental determinists, arguing, instead, that humans shaped their environments. This approach concerned itself with the material landscape and questions concerning the (negative) human impact on the natural environment, as well as a focus on tracing the origins and diffusion of cultural practices.

Sauer’s approach to landscape was decidedly historically and culturally grounded. The methods employed by this school of thought include(d) areal description, distinguishing between natural and cultural landscapes, and the examination of cultural artifacts. Of particular interest to this essay is the idea that Sauer’s conceptualization of landscape treated landscape as a stage for human action – in short, landscape was the *object* to be studied.

Denis Cosgrove’s contribution to the evolving understanding of landscape can be characterized as part of the ‘new cultural geography’ turn in
the discipline. Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams, Cosgrove conceived of landscape as a “way of seeing”, rather than an *object* to be studied, described, classified, etc. It is through landscape, Cosgrove argued, that we are reminded that “geography is everywhere”. Cosgrove’s work can be credited with raising an awareness of the symbolic values imbued in landscapes. In his work, Cosgrove called on geographers to begin decoding the symbolic landscapes around us.

In line with much of the critical concerns of feminist geography, Gillian Rose’s work on landscapes is also an important contribution to geography’s attempts to tackle this important, yet contested, idea of landscape. Rose’s concern with landscape seeks to apply a feminist critique of the tradition of landscape (and the practice of landscape interpretation, viewing, and reading) in cultural geography. Rose’s deconstructive take on Thomas Gainsborough’s painting “Mr. and Mrs. Robert Andrews”, argues that the process of “looking” and “viewing” the landscape employs a masculinist gaze, which, in turn, feminizes nature and naturalizes the feminine. By re-interpreting and deconstructing conventional understandings of landscape, Rose challenges geography and geographers to turn its gaze upon itself in a self-reflexive project.

Each of these approaches to understanding landscape share a concern with the ways in which the landscape is/can be the embodiment of social relations. All share the belief that the idea of landscape is an important
component of cultural geography – although they differ on exactly how and why that has come to be the case. In my own interpretation of Ukwimi, I found myself utilizing the contributions of each of these geographers, as well as others.

Conclusions

An overview of the history of geographic thought concerning issues of human mobility facilitates a more complete understanding of how migration, both voluntary and involuntary, has been conceptualized. From Ravenstein’s laws in 1885 to current calls for the “analytical treatment” of displacement, geography has continually engaged in the development of migration studies. This chapter has illustrated numerous attempts to simplify and classify what are essentially dynamic, fluid, and complex processes. The theories, typologies, and classification systems developed within migration studies have, in turn, informed the language and development of refugee studies.

Refugee studies, as an interdisciplinary and comparative field of study, leaves ample room for the participation of geographers. By examining the overriding conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of migration and refugee research, we are able to address the current situations in Africa with an historical and comparative (and essentially geographic) perspective. In addition, just as the language of migration studies influenced the development of refugee studies, so too, have refugee studies informed the mindset of the various national,
regional, and international organizations operating in refugee situations in Africa. The following chapter turns its focus to the institutional context which mitigate in nearly all refugee situations and how the policies of such institutions play out in Africa.
CHAPTER THREE: UNPACKING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Twenty years ago, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees consisted of some lawyers in Geneva revising and amending the international conventions concerning refugees. Now it is a global rapid-reaction force capable of putting fifty thousand tents into an airfield anywhere within twenty-four hours, or feeding a million refugees in Zaire. The United Nations has become the West’s mercy mission to the flotsam of failed states left behind by the ebb tide of empire (Ignatieff 1995)

Before examining the specific experiences of refugee-hosting in Ukwimi, it is necessary to outline the basic definitions, concepts, organizations, and ideologies that come into play in nearly any refugee-hosting environment. Within the institutional framework of refugee situations, a primary concern revolves around the somewhat ambiguous and changing definition of the term “refugee” itself. Numerous definitions have been employed across time and space, making concise and comparative analysis of various refugee situations difficult. For the purposes of this dissertation, a number of international, regional, and national definitions of “refugee” must be examined in order to fully understand the legal and operational constraints (and, in some instances, opportunities) facing the Ukwimi community.

In addition to outlining the evolving operational definitions of the term “refugee”, this chapter also examines two other major tasks of the international/institutional players – namely, that of counting refugees and
settling refugees. In doing so, I address the problematic nature of refugee statistics, describe the multiple organizations involved in assisting refugees, and examine the “durable solutions” advocated by such organizations. In each of these discussions – that of defining, counting, and settling refugees – I pay particular attention to how these activities have played out in the African context.

Defining Refugees

Geographers and other social scientists have shown how analysis of the “power of definition” (Western 1981), as a crucial element of discourse, can have very practical implications for environmental justice, public welfare, and other social issues (Smith 1982). This idea has direct relevance to refugee studies because eligibility requirements to receive refugee status within the international community are of paramount concern and are intrinsically attached to how a “refugee” is defined and who gets to do the defining (UNCHR 1979; Rogge 1979; Kunz 1981; Hathaway 1990, 1991; Chimni 2000). Although what is meant by the term “refugee” can conceivably be determined in a variety of ways (via host government policies, international laws, or shared community experiences), the legal frameworks devised by the international community appear to take precedence in most refugee situations.

Careful examination of international and regional legal documents
reveals the cautious nature in which such defining has been approached, thereby reflecting the significant power retained by the definer. With regard to the legal status of refugees in Africa, three documents provide the foundation:


2. 1967 Protocol to the UN Refugee Convention (1967 UN Protocol)


The first, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, remains the primary defining document within international law. The 1951 UN Convention effectively created the office of the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and established the basic tenets of international refugee law. According to the 1951 UN Convention, a refugee is:

[any person who] . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it . . . (UNHCR 1951).

The 1951 UN Convention limited its definition to people displaced by events
that occurred in Europe prior to January 1, 1951. Because of these restrictions, it is portrayed by some scholars as a Western document with little or no relevance to the definition or protection of African refugees (Onyango 1986; Chimni 1998). In addition, the 1951 UN Convention defined refugees as those who suffered individual persecution by their own governments, thereby considerably minimizing eligibility. With respect to the African context, this particular limitation means that the hundreds of thousands of refugees generated in the struggle against colonialism would not qualify as “refugees” because their persecutors were outside colonial powers, not their own governments. Because of the significant limitations of the definition outlined above, Hathaway described the 1951 UN Convention as “neither historically defensible nor practically meaningful” (1991: 65).

The second major document, the 1967 UN Protocol to the 1951 UN Convention, removed the chronological and geographic limitations of the 1951 UN Convention and therefore extended the UNHCR’s mandate into Africa and the rest of the world. The removal of temporal and geographic conditions can be read as an acknowledgment that refugee situations were neither a temporary, nor solely European, phenomena.

In fact, by 1969, two-thirds of the UNHCR’s global program funds were being directed to Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR 2000). At the same time, however, the 1967 UN Protocol held to the individual, government-inflicted
persecution clause of the original 1951 UN Convention. Most of refugees in Africa during this period were fleeing more generalized violence resulting from the struggles for independence and, therefore, were not actually brought under the protection of the 1967 UN Protocol (Chimni 2000). By failing to amend the persecution clause, the 1967 UN Protocol left African refugees de facto excluded (Hathaway 1990).

In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a refugee protocol (1969 OAU Protocol) of its own in response to massive refugee movements in the 1960s associated with decolonization, the struggle for independence, and civil wars that ensued in several countries. Over half the refugee flows during this period originated in Portuguese colonies, and people who fled independent states were often fleeing situations directly related to the colonial legacy (Arboleda 1991). This third governing document in African refugee situations incorporated much of the UN thinking, but expanded the definition to include anyone who:

through aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events gravely disturbing public order in part, or in all of his country of origin, or the country of which he has nationality, is obliged to leave his usual place of residence to seek refuge outside his country (OAU 1969).

In addition, this broader terminology did not require refugees to justify persecution to the degree necessary for Convention status, reflecting the more
pragmatic nature of the OAU definition (Arboleda 1991). For example, the OAU definition allows for determination of refugee status by group, rather than by individuals. Additionally, the 1969 OAU Protocol contains an absolute prohibition of refoulement (or involuntary return), whereas the 1951 UN Convention allows for refoulement in times of national emergency or in the name of national security. However, it is important to note that the 1969 OAU Protocol is not binding on the international community, thereby significantly reducing many of its intended effects.

Many African countries have signed and ratified the OAU Convention. Their signatures remain valid even thought the OAU has been transformed into African Union (AU). In addition, these AU countries have also ratified both the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 UN Protocol (Appendix A). The ratification of these documents demonstrates widespread acknowledgment of the responsibility of individual states, in cooperation with the international system and regional alliances, to extend protection to those who are able to establish “refugee” status.

The 1951 UN Convention, the 1967 UN Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Protocol lay the institutional groundwork for determining who receives official status as a refugee. Although many argue that all such definitions and distinctions are inadequate, they nonetheless form the framework through which refugee situations throughout the world are examined and understood – a
discourse that wields considerable power in determining whether specific individuals and/or groups are guaranteed refugee protection by the signatories of these three legal documents.

Counting Refugees

As the previous section highlighted, a lot of thought and caution went into establishing definitions and laws prescribing who “gets” to be a refugee and who does not. The institutionalization of such definitions is seen most clearly in the practices and politics of counting refugees. Statistical data is a core component in calls for donor assistance, as well as in the refugee studies discourse. Almost every published work referring to refugee situations begins with a litany of numerical statements. Such publications rarely address or acknowledge the problematic nature of refugee statistics. According to refugee scholar Jeff Crisp, whereas “all of the standard works on refugees are replete with numbers, few even begin to question the source or accuracy of those statistics” (1999: 1).

To ignore these issues is to assume a degree of clarity and validity that is not an operational reality. Nevertheless, the UNHCR website argues that the “complex world of refugees and the work of the UNHCR can often best be told through statistics” (UNHCR 2009). An examination of refugee enumeration and intentional data manipulation on all sides serves to counter the claim that
statistics provide the “best” story of the complexity and fluidity of refugee situations.

The UNHCR’s interest in enumerating refugee populations dates back to its inception in 1950. According a UNHCR statute, the High Commissioner “shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his Office by . . . obtaining from governments information concerning the numbers and conditions of refugees in their territories” (UNHCR 1951). In the early 1990s, the UNHCR established two internal departments – the Registration and Statistics Unit and the Population Data Unit – to collect, compile, report, distribute, and analyze refugee statistics (Hovy 2001). Their Statistical Yearbook, published since 1994, aims to “tell the refugee story on the basis of data, trends, and indicators” (UNHCR 2002c: 17). These developments point to an increased reliance on statistics as a mechanism to assess the “true dimensions of global forced displacement” (UNHCR 2002c: 11).

The previous discussion concerning the shifting definition of the term “refugee” hints at the deeply problematic nature of refugee statistics. Because the term itself is subject to various definitions and interpretations, dependable and comparable data are hard to generate (Crisp 1995). “As a result of these different approaches, an individual who would be counted as a refugee in one part of the world might not qualify for that status in another” (Crisp 1999: 4). For example, those who can be granted refugee status under the auspices of the
1969 OAU Protocol might not gain status under a different regional framework – and vice versa. When the basic unit of measurement is not clearly defined, enumeration exercises become tremendously difficult.

To complicate matters further, the UNHCR is commonly required to rely on numbers provided by the countries of origin and the countries of asylum because the UNHCR mandate does not empower the organization to count refugees on its own in every situation (Harrell-Bond et al 1992). Generally, refugee statistics are calculated via the number of people claiming assistance with ration cards. These figures can be easily manipulated by all parties involved in the collection process. For example, many non-camp, self-settled refugees do not receive formal assistance and therefore do not receive a ration card. On the other hand, many people secure numerous ration cards in an attempt to survive. For example, a study in Ethiopia revealed that more than 75 percent of the Somali refugees carried more than one ration card (Ryle 1992).

Governments, both those in countries of origin and those in countries of asylum, are also apt to distort refugee data for many reasons. To the extent that massive refugee movements symbolize the failure of the state, refugee-producing countries may attempt to minimize the numbers. Countries of origin employ several strategies by which to minimize state responsibility for displacement. For example, Namibia and Rwanda have argued that their citizens have fled with the intention of conducting military activities against the
state on the behalf of opposition groups and not due to a failure of the national government (Crisp 1999). Significant discrepancies also were apparent during mass movement of people between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s, with both countries accusing one another of number inflation (Crisp 1999).

To the extent that returnees signify political success and legitimacy, countries of origin have exaggerated the numbers of voluntarily repatriated populations. In 1984, Milton Obote claimed that 400,000 Ugandans repatriated from Sudan and Zaire, while the UNHCR’s numbers indicated the Ugandan refugee populations in Sudan and Zaire were actually growing (Crisp 1986). The various strategies employed by refugee-producing states demonstrate the ways in which political interests and maneuvering can significantly affect the validity of refugee statistics.

Conversely, asylum countries have a tendency to exaggerate numbers in order to lighten the burden placed on them by the influx of refugee populations. According to Crisp, discussions of the politics of numbers “invariably turn to the way in which countries of asylum in developing regions make exaggerated claims about the number of refugees in their territory” (1999: 9). Crisp has argued that the following set of assumptions about the motives of asylum countries inform the “conventional wisdom” which deems these motives “reprehensible”:

- To embarrass the government of the country of
To attract large amounts of humanitarian assistance

To cast favorable light on the country of asylum’s commitment to human rights

To provide employment opportunities to numerous bureaucrats

To ensure generous supplies of food and other relief items

To maximize the amount of foreign direct investment (Crisp 1999: 9)

Crisp contends that the notion that host countries “always cheat the figures” is “a crude and, given its prevalence in expatriate circles, perhaps even a racist one” (1999: 9). In fact, the motives of African governments to inflate the numbers may actually stem from the inefficiency of the UNHCR to deliver assistance in a timely or adequate manner:

The belief of all staff and officials involved, that emergency relief shipments, at least of bulk commodities such as wheat, are likely to take weeks rather than days, leads officials to further generous overestimates of numbers. For example, one official declared that he usually doubled the figures that he had estimated, in the knowledge that by the time deliveries were made, there might well be a shortfall in quantities delivered and a significant increase in the grand total seeking relief as inaccurately assessed numbers of daily arrivals continued to accumulate. In a sense, this may be described as contingency planning (Romanovsky and Stephenson 1995: 4).

The motivation for inflating the numbers, then, does not always stem from
“reprehensible” motives. Instead, it can illustrate a degree of humanitarian rationale on the part of host countries.

Despite many concerns, UNHCR data remain the principal source of refugee data. As such, this dissertation also necessarily utilizes UNHCR’s numbers in order to provide some indication of the scale of refugee movements. The preceding discussion of the inherent limitations and problems associated with these numbers seeks to reveal the problematic nature of such numbers and to avoid verbatim citation of UNHCR statistics. While we must utilize the statistical data provided by UNHCR as an indicator of realities on the ground, we must do so with an understanding that such data not derived in a vacuum.

The total number of “people of concern” (POC) to the UNHCR reached over 34 million at the end of 2008 (UNHCR 2009). The term “people of concern” is used by the UNHCR to describe a range of categories of people who may or may not be covered under the previously discussed legal frameworks, but who receive attention (and in some cases assistance) from the international community. As such, POC numbers include refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, IDPs, returned IDPs, and various others. Due to the restrictive nature of the legal definition of a “refugee”, 58% of the POC do not receive refugee status and instead fall into other categories.

Several trends emerge from examining the geographic distribution of major refugee-producing and refugee-hosting countries. The top three producers
(Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan) generated nearly 10 million of the 32 million global population. Following these three, Sudan, DRC, and Uganda generated approximately 2 million each. As such, those six countries constitute nearly ½ of the global population. In terms of hosting, two of top three hosting countries (Colombia and Iraq) are also top producers, meaning that most of the POC in these countries are internally displaced. This is true of the fourth, fifth, and sixth highest refugee-hosting countries as well (Uganda, DRC, and Sudan). The fact that the lists of the highest refugee-producing and refugee-hosting countries are nearly identical speaks volumes about the unstable environments in which many of the UNHCR's POC are residing. Such levels of insecurity have very real practical, as well as policy, implications.

Another significant trend in relation to the global dynamics of forced displacement is nearly 90% of the world’s refugees originated from developing countries. Furthermore, these developing countries provided asylum to more than 70% of the global refugee population. The United States and Germany, hosting nearly 1 million and 700,000 POC respectively, are the notable exceptions in the industrialized world. This unequal distribution of refugees emphasizes the responsibilities of developed nations in providing mechanisms for increased burden sharing.

Approximately 10 million of the 34 million “people of concern” to the UNHCR are Africans – 2.33 million refugees and 6.3 million IDPs (UNHCR
2009). Of the top seven refugee-producing countries in the world, four are African countries – Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Burundi (UNHCR 2009). An interesting feature of refugee populations in Africa is that major refugee-producing countries are simultaneously major refugee-hosting countries, such as Sudan and DRC. Tanzania and Zambia are notable exceptions to this trend, generating few refugees while simultaneously hosting millions of their neighbors. Sub-Saharan African refugees also face unique circumstances with regard to their settlement options and realities. Approximately 1/3 of refugee worldwide reside in camp environments, but in sub-Saharan Africa an estimated 7 out of every 10 refugees find themselves living in refugee camps (UNHCR 2009).

Managing Refugees

The practical requirements of managing refugees and their environments are what transformed the UNHCR from “some lawyers in Geneva” to a “global rapid response force” (Ignatieff 1995). Countless organizations operate within refugee situations across the globe. However, the main actors are typically identified as the UNHCR, a collection of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and particular host governments (Blavo 1994). The UNHCR, the leading international coordinator of refugee relief operations, uses NGOs to implement many of its relief operations. Host governments, as signatories to the
international refugee laws, are responsible for providing security to asylum seekers. All three actors operate within refugee situations at various scales and configurations.

According to B. S. Chimni, a leading scholar of refugee law at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, the “history of an organized response to the refugee problem can be traced to the birth of the League of Nations” (2000: 210). This began in 1921 when Dr. Fridtjof Nansen became the first High Commissioner:

In studying the work of the League of Nations on behalf of refugees in the period from 1919 to 1939, it is clear that the handling of the refugee problem, although it was fundamentally a humanitarian one, was constantly complicated and often hamstrung by political, economic, and social factors which demanded an international authority. Only the League of Nations, including among its members most of the countries affected and concerned with the refugee problem, could co-ordinate the efforts of governments and non-governmental organizations, negotiate with the countries of origin, and conciliate the divergent economic and social interests of different countries (Holborn 1956: 3-18).

In 1938, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was established to handle the influx of Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria (Chimni 2000). According to John Stoessinger, the history of international refugee protection is a “procession of temporary agencies, each established to solve what is essentially a long-term problem” (1956: 197). By the end of 1946,
the High Commissioner of the League of Nations transferred his duty to protect
refugees to the IGCR which retained that responsibility until the International
Refugee Organization (IRO) assumed the job in 1947 (Holborn 1956). IRO
policy maintained that the refugee problem was a simple product of war, not an
enduring, global issue (Salomon 1990).

The UNHCR was established by the UN General Assembly under Article
22 of the UN Charter in 1950. Originally established to handle refugee
situations in Europe, it has extended and expanded its mandate since 1967.
UNHCR’s growing budget reflects the extent of this expansion – $300,000 at
inceptions, $5 million in the 1960s, $70 million in the 1970s, $1.3 billion in the
1990s (Zetter 1999). In addition, the UNHCR has greatly expanded its
partnerships with NGOs. In the mid-1960s, the UNHCR worked with fewer
than 20 NGOs and nearly all of those 20 were large, international NGOs. Today,
UNHCR works with more than 600 NGOs, the majority of which are non-
international (local or national) NGOs. Another indication of the UNHCR’s
expansion is geographic: the organization now has 268 offices in 111 countries
and 144 countries are signatories of the UN Refugee Convention and/or
Protocol. At its inception, the UNHCR staff numbered 33; however, today,
UNHCR employs 6,289 people, creating a ratio of UNHCR staff to refugees of
approximately 1: 5,000 (UNHCR 2000).

In most cases, the international community’s response to mass
displacement via the UNCHR has been reactive in nature, rather than preventative or proactive. The UNHCR reacts in phases, or what Zetter outlines as a “classical model.” Before mobilizing any aid, the UNHCR must obtain a mandate agreement with the host country, thereby officially establishing international recognition of a refugee emergency (Zetter 1999). The second phase consists of an assessment mission that focuses on defining the scale and distribution of the situation. The mobilization of supplies, the third phase, is driven by basic emergency response tactics aimed at reducing disease, starvation, and mortality. The final stage, referred to as “care and maintenance,” concentrates on development programs to promote self-sufficiency (Zetter 1999). These phases are constantly evolving, especially given the relatively recent focus on repatriation and the complexity of new forms of displacement.

Generally speaking, the UNHCR is not an operational agency and, therefore, depends on its operational partners (NGOs) to deliver and execute relief programs. In 2006, the UNHCR worked with 649 such “implementing partners” (UNHCR 2006). Because of the massive numbers of different NGOs that operate in refugee situations, much of the following is, necessarily, a broad generalization. In a sense, NGOs operate as subcontractors to the international community via the UNHCR. They populate the front lines of relief operations and have fewer restrictions than the UNHCR, which is accountable to the UN General Assembly. Lower levels of bureaucracy allow NGOs to react rapidly to
refugee movements. For example, Oxfam installed a water supply system for 800,000 Rwandan refugees in only eighteen days (Zetter 1999). According to Zetter, the nature of NGOs inevitably gives way to a patron-client relationship with refugees (and their hosts – as Ukwimi demonstrates), which has the danger of reinforcing a discourse of refugee vulnerability while ignoring the resilience of refugee communities.

Host governments also play a critical role in relief operations. Zetter (1999) outlined three objectives that drive host policies regarding refugees: containment, control, and burden-sharing. Most of the developed world has considerable choice when trying to contain refugee flows, often implementing quotas and strict asylum-granting policies. However, developing countries do not have this luxury. Frequently, the only way they are able to contain refugee flows is by restricting the population to a specific geographic area, typically a borderland near the country of origin (Westin 1999).

Control, the second major objective, requires the host government to maintain its institutional credibility (Zetter 1999). However, the increased internationalization of relief operations can threaten and undermine state authority. This fragile balance between needing help yet maintaining state autonomy leads into the third, and perhaps most important, objective of host governments – burden-sharing. Although the causes of refugee movements are often global in nature, the burden is generally heaviest on host governments,
which are typically some of the poorest countries in the world themselves. Burden-sharing was formally institutionalized by the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa II (ICARA II) in 1984 (Blavo 1994). ICARA II sought to secure additional assistance for refugees in order to meet needs without depriving host countries of existing development resources. As we move into the details concerning Ukwimi in subsequent chapters, it will be evident that ICARA II was more than just a meeting of words and proclamations. In fact, ICARA II funds actually built the road upon which I approached Ukwimi (Photograph 3).

Photograph 3: ICARA II-funded road to Ukwimi

Settling Refugees

Although refugees themselves ideally should make decisions to resolve their own situations, the language of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other dominant players controls the discussion of
potential solutions for the African refugee crisis, and such policies effectively
dictate the future settlement patterns and opportunities of most refugee
populations. Within that context, three options typically exist for handling a
given influx: resettlement to a third country, local integration, and voluntary
repatriation.

Generally speaking, local integration has been the least-problematic
solution, although it becomes more difficult as the sheer scale of displaced
people increases. Voluntary repatriation involves the autonomous decision by
refugees to return to their country of origin. It is the latest “best solution”
according the UNHCR, NGOs, and host governments. However, voluntary
repatriation has yet to prove a durable solution because of questions of the
“voluntariness” of said repatriation. The third and least utilized option is
resettlement to a third (typically Western) country. The three options are not
mutually exclusive, and refugee populations often employ variations of each.

Many factors influence the degree to which refugees integrate into and
affect the local community. These include, but are not limited to, length of
displacement, size of displaced population, ratio of refugees to locals,
appropriateness of aid, and ways in which refugees settle. Two distinct patterns,
self-settlement and organized settlement, emerge following the massive influx of
refugees into a community (Kuhlman 1994). According to the UNHCR, 50
percent of African refugees reside in refugee camps while 10 percent live on
their own in urban areas (2002). The advantages and disadvantages of each type of settlement strategy have been debated within refugee studies, with some scholars clearly on one-side or the other. I would however suggest that it takes careful consideration of events on the ground to assess the feasibility or value of either system.

The disadvantages, advantages, and effects of self-settlement are difficult to assess because of limited study and the unregulated nature of such settlements. Self-settled refugees rarely register with any entity and, therefore, must rely on the local, rather than global, community for assistance. Relationships with local people enable self-settled refugees to rent or borrow land and other common property resources (Jacobsen 1997). Additionally, the pressures on the environment and community are less concentrated when refugees self-settle.

The UNHCR and their NGO partners advocate the settlement of refugee populations into organized communities. Proponents of such settlements cite the merits of concentrating and containing the environmental impacts placed on the land by a sudden influx of people (Jacobsen 1997). Generally, organized settlements emerge in one of two forms – an agricultural settlement or a refugee camp.

Agricultural settlements were strongly encouraged by the UNHCR and host governments in the 1960s as alternatives to camps. In fact, between 1971
and 1988, over 155 agricultural settlements for refugees were established throughout Africa (Jacobsen 1997). The objectives of agricultural settlements are threefold: to encourage self-sufficiency, to relieve donor countries of long-term financial responsibility, and to promote rural development. There are, however, some negative consequences to agricultural settlements. The allotments of land are often insufficient in meeting the needs of individuals and families. As a result, refugees engage in continuous cultivation that degrades the soil quality and thereby decreases yields. In the end, the insufficient becomes decreasingly sufficient.

In his study of the socioecological consequences of agricultural settlements in Kenya, Asmarom Legesse demonstrated the problematic nature of settlement schemes that do not take into account “proxemic, social, or ecological imperatives” (1998: 235). Legesse revealed stark contrasts between the traditional Borana built environment and the one constructed in response to the influx of displaced populations. The planned settlement, Olla Hiyyessa (“Village of the Poor”) did not incorporate the traditional settlement principles and relied instead on “modern” designs and technologies. The result was a disruption of customary social and spatial organization, and thereby a loss of community and increased dependence on missionary aid (Legesse 1998). According to Legesse, the incompatibility of these planned settlements demonstrated that “economic aid, agricultural and technical expertise, and good
intentions are not enough to effectively rehabilitate uprooted communities” (1998: 243).

Camp settlements, which dominate the refugee landscape in Africa, are typically constructed as temporary, emergency relief centers near borderlands. However, many have become permanent fixtures and some observers argue that they constitute “virtual cities” (Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000). Present-day camps are comparable to cities with regard to their population density, layout, infrastructure, and trading activities. The infrastructure and amenities developed by the UNHCR/NGOs instigate the economic development of the refugees and local population.

Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja’s examination of the Kakuma and Dadaab camps in northern Kenya revealed that the camps had better health and educational facilities than the rest of the region. In the Dadaab settlement, the population had access to electricity, running water, a slaughterhouse, and numerous health facilities. In fact, the presence of refugees can stimulate trade, create jobs, and attract humanitarian aid. According to Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja, these camps “emerge as urban enclaves in a sparsely populated and economically underdeveloped part of Kenya” (2000: 206).

The challenge of organized settlements lies in their degree of sustainability. Governments tend to favor organized settlements because then international NGOs have the responsibility to meet the needs of the displaced
population. This diminishes the strain on the local population. From an environmental perspective, organized settlements hinder local integration and thus inhibit the transference of local knowledge. In situations where refugees are displaced to environments that are not similar to the environment they are fleeing, the dispersion of local knowledge regarding appropriate land use practices becomes important (Jacobsen 1997).

The sustainability of large-scale organized settlements is debatable. Jacobsen has argued for the construction of smaller, more widely dispersed settlements. She suggested that host governments re-evaluate their current preference for large organized settlements because it would be in their best interests to promote the dispersion of developmental inputs such as health clinics, improved water supplies, roads, and other infrastructure. However, this process cannot and should not occur overnight.

A major obstacle to the reduction and dispersion of organized settlements is the inherent outlook of the UNHCR, which sees itself as an apolitical, humanitarian organization rather than as a development organization, and even less so as an environmental organization. Additionally, Jacobsen has urged that, “just as refugees have access to local resources, so local peoples should be able to benefit from the assistance provided to refugees such as health care and clean water”. However, the UNHCR’s mandate and commitment to being apolitical virtually eliminates the feasibility of such cooperation.
Conclusions

After providing a brief overview of the history of the international response to refugee situations, this chapter has demonstrated the problematic nature of some of the taken-for-granted assumptions inherent in the institutional context. The disjuncture between legal definitions of “refugee” and the operational realities of displacement exposes some serious flaws in the international system and suggests that the international community – the UNHCR in particular – may need to employ its “power of definition” to better reflect the realities of forced displacement.

These definitional flaws, coupled with intentional manipulation, feed into the unreliability of refugee statistics. The overview of the three major players within the refugee system illustrated some of the strategies and objectives held by each player and argued that greater attention should be applied to a fourth set of actors – the most powerful nations of the developed world. The final section of this chapter examined the “durable” solutions proposed by the UNHCR and its partners. These solutions are informed by ambiguous definitions of the term “refugee,” highly questionable statistics, and numerous geopolitical interests. In their failings, such solutions have significant, and often hazardous, environmental, social, and geographic consequences. The task now is to situate the preceding chapters into the Zambian context by reviewing Zambia’s relationship with the refugee relief regime.
CHAPTER FOUR
OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE-HOSTING IN ZAMBIA

It is customary to talk about a war ‘breaking out’ as though it were a bush fire in which a tuft of grass begins to smoulder and soon there are flames everywhere without any human agency being to blame. But wars do not ‘break out’ in this sense; someone causes them although it may sometimes be hard to identify the original aggressor. Equally when I read of a nation “drifting into” war I do not know what is meant – this is another of those phrases which mislead us into thinking that wars are not human creations but scourges like the plague sent by the gods. On this reckoning, violence has no human agents, only human victims (Kaunda 1980: 143)

The overwhelming majority of research conducted within refugee studies is focused on the experiences, challenges, and needs of refugees, with little to no sustained efforts to understand the experiences, challenges, and needs of their hosts. I maintain that such privileging of the refugee within our research is detrimental to our ability to understand the realities on the ground in any place that finds itself hosting refugees.

Whether the goal of a particular research project is to provide a critique of refugee relief aid, or to incite policy change at the international level, or to contribute to geography's concern with the construction of places, we cannot achieve such goals without explicit, direct, and substantiative attention to refugee-hosting communities. As argued by Bakewell:
For the people who live in the villages on both sides of the border, the focus on the ‘refugee problem’ deflects attention from the difficulties which they share with all the other residents of this isolated area of Africa. For the most part, people’s major worries are not special problems for refugees but problems shared by all (2000: 371).

By calling for increased attention to hosts, I want to make clear that I am not advocating for yet another essentialist representation (Bracken et al 1997; Eastmond 1998) which would add “refugee/host” to an already burgeoning list of binary (and often oppositional) representations (victim/survivor, resilient/vulnerable, bogus/genuine, regular/irregular, displacement/emplacement, rooted/uprooted, deserving/undeserving, outside/inside, asylum seeker/citizen, problem/resource) which only serve to highlight the pervasive influence of Cartesian dualism in our western mode of thinking. Instead, I am simply arguing that nearly every piece of refugee-centered research would have been better served had it been more inclusive of host communities.

In order to understand the dynamics of refugee-hosting at Ukwimi, we must have a general grasp of the national context in which the people of Ukwimi were situated. Just as the previous chapter provided the institutional context for refugee situations, this chapter establishes the national context in which refugee-hosting occurred by providing a basic historical overview of Zambia, outlining Zambia’s continual commitment to refugee-hosting, turning the gaze away from
the concerns of the international and/or institutional players and focusing on how particular states manage the burdens (and, in some cases, optimize the benefits of) being host to substantial numbers of refugees.

In setting this national context, I begin by examining precolonial history of present-day Zambia with particular attention to migrations into the area. Next, I outline Zambia's colonial history, especially in relation to the creation of its present-day boundaries. In the final sections of this chapter, I provide a general history of Zambia from independence onwards, alongside a description of major inflows of refugees during this time and the subsequent camps and/or settlements established to provide them protection.

**Pre-colonial Period**

When outlining the pre-colonial history of the people of Zambia, it is important to keep in mind that “there is no such thing as a sure point of origin...but that doesn't mean there isn't history” (Hebdige 1987: 1). As such, the human history of Zambia is a “continuous history of the movement of peoples” (Brelsford 1956: 4). Archaeological digs are rich with evidence of humans in the Early, Middle, and Late Stone Age (Brelsford 1956, Roberts 1976, Burdette 1988). The famous human skeletal remains of “Broken Hill Man” provided evidence of human presence around Kabwe over 125,000 years ago. However, archaeologist Brain Fagon suggests that a variety of
circumstances (tsetse fly, grass shortages during dry season, and problems clearing the tropical hardwood forests) kept prehistoric Zambia relatively under-populated (Fagon 1966).

Between the fourth and sixth centuries, the first Bantu migrants began their southward migration into present-day Zambia. The gradually Bantu expansion continued for about 1,700 years “slowly and no doubt spasmodically, but nevertheless quite surely and definitely southwards” (Brelsford 1956: 1). By 1500, much of Zambia was populated by farming people who are more or less ancestral to the majority of Zambia's present-day inhabitants (Burdette 1988).

During the 18th and 19th centuries, chieftainship grew into the “most important political institution” (Burdette 1988: 80) in Zambia. There is general agreement that the first chiefs came and settled in Zambia from the Lunda and Luba people of southeastern and southwestern Congo respectively (Langworthy 1972; Chipungu 1992). From this migration, several strong kingdoms and dynasties emerged – the Undi Dynasty and the Bemba (under Chitimukulu) in the east and the north-east, the Tonga, Lenje, and Ila in the south, and the Luvale and the Lozi in the west.

During the middle years of the nineteenth century, Zambia was profoundly changed by external pressures, influences, and intrusions, such that “one continual theme of Zambian history is the link between events in Zambia and events in neighboring areas” (Langworthy 1972: 10). From the east
(Mozambique) and the west (Angola), the Portuguese arrived, seeking slaves and ivory. East African traders came from the north to compete with the Portuguese for slaves and ivory.

Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for the purpose of our coming discussions, an “outpouring of peoples from South Africa, fleeing the conflicts of Boer and Zulu over land and cattle” arrived on Zambia's doorstep (Burdette 1988: 9). In 1820, the Ngoni, led by Zwangendaba, fled north from Chaka's mfecane in South Africa, conquering and settling in eastern Zambia (as well as Malawi and Tanzania). Additionally, the Kololo, under the direction of Chief Sebitwane, fled Chaka's wars, reaching Barotseland in 1823 and conquering the Lozi. Though Chaka is often credited with the “scattering” of peoples across southern Africa, the incursions of the Portuguese and Afrikaners into Zulu land also played a role.

The territory of present-day Zambia provided a sense of security due to three critical characteristics:

- It was geographically distant from origin of flight (especially with Kololo and Ngoni)
- Its prior inhabitants were numerically and/or militarily ill-equipped to resist
- Its environmental conditions suited the agricultural or pastoral practices of migrants

These three factors combined to turn 19th century Zambia upside-down, turning
it into a place of refuge where a variety of ethnicities regrouped and in doing so recreated geographies across the territory.

As this discussion has demonstrated, Zambia’s pre-colonial history is a story of migrations – but not just any kind of migrations. In fact, if we were to use today's institutional framework (as laid out in Chapter 3), Zambia's precolonial history would be more accurately described as a story of refugee movements. From the Bantu expansion to the flight of the Ngoni and Kololo, the vast majority of Zambian settlers came from areas outside the present-day territory of Zambia. Given these realities, Nyerere (1983) argues that:

If one looks at what are called African tribal migrations over recent centuries, many of the movements would today be defined as a ‘refugee problem’. Minority groups, or dissident families, were fleeing from the dominant authorities and moved to what is now a different country. Very many African nations are made up of a lot of waves of refugees.

As noted by Nyerere, the majority of these migrants were quite similar to refugees of today in terms of the casual (or “push”) factors of their forced migrations. However, unlike their present-day counterparts, precolonial migrants' refuge was “provided primarily by geography and ecology rather than by sovereign power or international conventions” (Chanda 1995: 18). However, that was about to change with the colonial construction of Northern Rhodesia, the imposition of colonial rule, the significant alterations to traditional systems
and borders, and the subsequent independence from such rule.

**Colonial Period**

The formation of modern-day Zambia into its “colonial present” can be traced to the early groundwork of slave traders and missionaries throughout the 19th century (Gregory 2004). Although the activities of these groups predated formalized colonialism, many of the records, reports, and maps they produced provided the necessary details to entice the interests of colonial powers. The Berlin Conference in 1885 carved the continent into formal holdings, resulting in a “patchwork of colonial possessions” (Barratt-Brown 1997: 20). Britain and France were the two dominant colonial powers, in terms of territory and lasting impacts, while Portugal, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Belgium claimed other key parcels.

The artificial and geometric borders (and therefore modern African state territories) were devised in conjunction with the geopolitical interests of particular colonial powers. The resulting lines therefore had (and have) little to no regard for existing nationalities, physical features, or historical legitimacy (Aryeety-Attoh 2003). Clearly, the nature of these borders influences the experiences, root causes, and potential opportunities of displaced Africans:

The geography and history of Africa means that one common feature of refugee movements on the continent is that the refugees often arrive in the host countries in remote rural areas far from the state
capital. The borders imposed by colonial powers cut across many ethnic groups and in many cases the people of the frontier areas have a loose relationship with the distant state whose authority is frayed at its edges. The people of different nationalities on either side of the border may have more in common with each other than either group has with their corresponding co-nationals from the capital (Bakewell 2001: 2).

All of the boundaries mapped at the Berlin Conference required each potential colonial power to demonstrate some degree of “effective occupation” and, as such, the post-Berlin Conference period is often referred to as the “Scramble for Africa” as each colonial power sought to reinforce the territories it had grabbed in Berlin. For the British, much of this work in southern Africa was done by Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC). In 1889, Rhodes persuaded the British government to grant him a charter for BSAC – a charter which allowed him to use the authority of the British government to stake out claims in the region and make treaties with African rulers.

The boundaries within which Rhodes’ BSAC was allowed to operate were not clearly defined at the time, so Rhodes’ set out to fulfill his vision of asserting British control from Cape to Cairo. Rhodes’ vision of coloring the African map red from Cape to Cairo put him in conflict with the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Belgians in the Congo Free State, and the Germans in east Africa. A treaty was struck easily with the Germans; however,
the Portuguese, Belgians and British worked quickly in fierce competition with each other to obtain treaties with indigenous kingdoms.

With respect to the region comprising modern-day Zambia, BSAC first secured a treaty with the Lozi Litunga [King], Lewanika, in 1890 which granted mineral rights in the area to BSAC. Rhodes later used this treaty (Lochner Treaty) as the basis upon which to form North-western Rhodesia out of the Barotseland Protectorate. Treaties with kingdoms and chieftainships in the eastern region led to the formation of North-eastern Rhodesia. The two BSAC holdings, divided by the Kafue River and eventually by a railway were administered separately.

The northern boundaries of BSAC's charter were not explicit and neither were Leopold's southern boundaries, and so an intense scramble for the Katanga area ensued (Map 1):

Although Leopold had declared his southern boundary, there was virtually no Congo State presence of any kind in large parts of the area within it. Rhodes, also drawn by the mirage of gold, had his own designs on the Katanga region. In 1890, he and the Congo State sent separate expeditions to secure the submission of Msiri, ruler of that part of Katanga where gold was thought to exist. The State's expedition got there first, killed Msiri, and established what was considered in diplomatic circles, though without much concrete evidence on the ground, effective occupation (Katzenellenbogen 1973: 27)
Rhodes' greatest defeat was not gaining the copper-rich Katanga area which comprises the thumb of the Democratic Republic of Congo dividing Zambia in the north (Roberts 1976). Although Rhodes' designs on Katanga failed, his success in securing North-western Rhodesia and North-eastern Rhodesia at least “enabled him to challenge any attempt by the Portuguese to link up their colonies from east to west” (Roberts 1976: 161).

Colonial Zambia was officially created in 1911 when North-western Rhodesia and North-eastern Rhodesia were formally joined and renamed
Northern Rhodesia. For much of the BSAC’s rule, Northern Rhodesia was merely a supplier of labor and little else. In fact, Northern Rhodesia’s “original raison d’être was as a labor reserve for the developing white areas of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa” until at least the 1920s (Henderson 1974: 295). For much of its initial control under BSAC, the country took a back seat to the more productive Southern Rhodesia, becoming “an awkwardly shaped piece of debris resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga” (Roberts 1976: 175). However, BSAC “rapidly discovered what would become the raison d’être of this territory for the entire twentieth century, its metals” (Myers 2003: 57).

In 1924, the BSAC’s Northern Rhodesia passed into the possession of the British Colonial Office. At the time, BSAC negotiated to maintain its mineral rights in the north-west, which the British Colonial Office considered (wrongly) to be a “minor concession” (Roberts 1976: 182). At the time of hand-over, the Colonial Office was determined to find a way for Northern Rhodesia to “pay its own way” (Roberts 1976: 183) by encouraging white settlement:

When the Colonial Office assumed administrative responsibilities in colonial Zambia in 1924, the white population was relatively small. However, this was soon to change. The man responsible for this change was the first governor of the protectorate after the BSA Company had relinquished its rule on 1 April 1924. Governor Herbert Stanley, who began his African career in South Africa, envisaged a large white-controlled dominion stretching from the Cape to Kenya in which the Rhodesians were to play a key role. To encourage white settlement in Northern Rhodesia,
he set aside blocks of land for European use. Governor Stanley put in place measures that encouraged white settlement of the territory. This development soon brought them into direct conflict with African social, economic, and political aspiration and interests (Phiri 2006: 15)

Under Stanley's guidance, the government set aside blocks of land for European migration. Following the example of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the Colonial Office created distinctions between Crown land and African reserves, forcibly moving locals from their land onto native reserves (Roberts 1976, Chipungu 1992). Although the creation of native reserves was in some ways a response to pressure from Europeans for land, their desire to occupy the land did not last. For example:

In the Eastern Province, the tobacco industry collapsed in 1927, forcing many settler farmers to abandon their farms, which reverted to bush. On the other hand, the reserves were overcrowded with livestock and human beings, contributing thereby to excessive soil erosion, poor crop yields, famine, and death (Musambachime 1992: 18 – 19).

According to one resident of Petauke District at the time,

We were moved away from our homes (so) that Europeans might come and live there. No Europeans have come and soon there will be none of us left here. If we stay here, we shall know that the government has destroyed us (NAZ/SEC2/733).

In 1929, the British government introduced the Native Ordinance on Indirect
Rule that solidified the system of government begun by the BSAC thirty years prior (Hinfelaar 1994: 54).

During the 1920s and 1930s, the discovery of underground ore bodies along the Zambian Copperbelt attracted large scale investment from abroad (Holmes 2004), eventually making the area one of the world’s most densely concentrated mining areas. The labor demands of mining companies required the massive migration of Zambians from across the country into the Copperbelt area, laying the foundation for a united opposition to colonial rule.

As much as colonial authorities promoted ‘tribalism’ in their system of indirect rule though the chiefs, the Copperbelt broke it down, creating a unity of interest that was eventually to be expressed in the state motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ (Holmes 2004).

As the Copperbelt thrived as an industrial region, politics in Northern Rhodesia found a new voice with the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1951 under the leadership of Harry Nkumbula (Roberts 1976; Makasa 1981). The British embarked on a plan to create a federation between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (Malawi), which Zambians viewed as an attempt to funnel their copper and mineral wealth to the benefit of Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers (Makasa 1981). The formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 fostered intense Zambian opposition and nationalism, which set the path for independence
(Roberts 1976; Makasa 1981).

In terms of refugee-hosting during this era, the first officially recognized and protected refugees to enter Zambia arrived as a result of conflict very far from Zambia’s borders. During World War II, nine Polish refugee camps were established in the African continent – four in Tanzania, two in Zimbabwe, and three in Zambia. These camps (Table 5) were home to approximately 2,300 Polish war evacuees and were under the administration of a Polish delegation based in Nairobi, Kenya (Mijere1995).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Name</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albercorn</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Northern Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bwana Mkubwa</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2341</td>
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Table 5
Polish Refugee Camps in Zambia

Although today many of the previously discussed pre-colonial migrants as well as forced migrants from neighboring countries during the colonial period would qualify to be defined as “refugees”, there is little to no evidence that the colonial government concerned itself in any way with the movements (forced or voluntary) of Africans from neighboring countries into Northern Rhodesia, unless we examine colonial controls over urban areas. This probably has more to do with the operationalization of indirect rule and formal colonialism than it
does with an absolute absence of refugee movements. As Gould (1974a: 350) reminds us:

Discussion of international migration normally assumes the existence of states with fixed and internationally agreed boundaries and area, and movement between these states is recognized to be across these boundaries from one sovereign area to another. This essentially European concept of the nation-state as the framework within which international migration takes place was until about 1960 inapplicable in Africa. There were no nation states, apart from Ethiopia and Liberia, but large areas of colonial territory, the antithesis of the nation state (Gould 1974a: 350).

As such, the colonial government did not establish any formalized refugee camps or settlement schemes for Africans from neighboring countries, depending instead on such populations’ abilities to self-settle spontaneously in border regions.


Although the anti-federation groups lost their initial battle against the federation, the momentum and organizational capital developed during the struggle against the federation fueled the movement for independence. One of Zambia’s most prominent leaders in the years leading up to independence was Kenneth Kaunda. Born in 1924, Kaunda helped form the Lubwa branch of the ANC. By 1952, he was elected ANC’s Secretary-General. In 1958, Kaunda
broke away from the ANC to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). On March 11, 1959, the colonial regime banned ZANC in an attempt to silence the nationalist movement in Zambia (Makasa 1981).

In late August 1959, several nationalist parties (ZANC, United Freedom Party (UFP), African National Independence Party (ANIP) merged to become the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and secured the release of their leader, Kaunda, from prison (Makasa 1981). By December 1963, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved. Less than one year later, on October 24, 1964, Northern Rhodesia obtained independence from Britain and became the Republic of Zambia (Map 2). At independence, Kenneth Kaunda became Zambia’s first president.

Map 2: General Zambia Map
As leader of the First Republic (1964 – 1972), Kaunda embarked on a political path he would walk until 1991. Like many of Africa’s nationalist founding fathers, Kaunda began this journey with great optimism and faith in his country’s future. Upon his inauguration, Kaunda rallied the people, urging that:

If we all pull our hands together Zambia cannot fail. Zambia has sufficient institutional resources to overcome its problems. Indeed Zambia will overcome. With greater determination, unity, cooperation, planning, and effective organization, nothing can stand in our way to progress (Ranganathan 1986: 41).

Kaunda’s vision for Zambia’s future was embodied in a political philosophy he introduced at the National Council of UNIP in April 1967 and referred to as Humanism. Kaunda described Humanism as “African democratic socialism” (Roberts 1976: 246). According to Kaunda, under Humanism, “there is no absolute leadership for anyone” and “those who lead are led by those they lead” (Ranganathan 1986: 26). However, the term and the philosophy itself were so loosely defined and randomly applied that the term became synonymous with the ‘thoughts of Kaunda’ rather than any clearly defined theoretical or ideological base.

Unlike many African countries, Zambia’s situation at independence was significantly improved by its vast mineral wealth in Copperbelt Province (Roberts 1976; Getzel et al 1985; Myers 2003). However, Zambia faced a number of other problems as an independent state. To begin, the country was
severely lacking in any trained and/or educated citizens who could lead the country forward. At independence, less than 100 Zambians held a university degree and fewer than 1,000 Zambians had obtained a secondary school certificate (education thresholds that were reached by Ghana in 1943 and Uganda in 1955 (Getzel et al 1984). Within the first few years of independence, the Zambian government opened over 100 secondary schools (Roberts 1976: 234). In addition, the entire mining industry, and therefore the entirety of Zambia’s economy, was deeply dependent on foreign technical expertise.

The second major obstacle Zambia faced at independence concerned its geopolitical situation. As a landlocked country in the middle of southern Africa, Zambia was (and is) deeply dependent on the stability of its neighbors. Major geopolitical events, such as the Angolan and Mozambican liberation struggles, the Zimbabwean war, and the Namibian struggle, all affected Zambia’s political and economic position (Burdette 1984: 30). As Kaunda himself rightfully recounted:

As for Zambia, she has lived with this tragic problem for as long as she has been an independent state. She was truly a war baby, born to the sound of gunfire on her northern, western, and eastern frontiers (Kaunda 1980: 158)

In fact, of Zambia's eight neighbors, five were directly involved in serious conflicts (Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and Zaire) and only one (Tanzania) could be considered an ally or a friend. According to the US
Secretary of the State at the time, Dean Rusk, Kaunda's nation was a “potential island of stability in an ocean of angry cross-currents” (Dean Rusk, memo to President Johnson, “Your meeting with President Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia”, 28 November 1964, “Zambia Kaunda Visit” Box 102 NSF-Country File, LBJ, DeRoche 2004).

Zambia actively supported oppositional forces against colonial and white rule and acted as a host for guerrillas (UNITA – Union for Total Liberation of Angola, ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People's Union, ANC – African National Congress of South Africa, SWAPO (Southwest Africa Peoples' Organization). However, the political turmoil surrounding Zambia had disastrous effects on the state’s ability to export its mineral wealth due to the frequent disruption of its trade routes. Geopolitically, Zambia’s new regime struggled with the swirling complexities of the conflicts around it and the Cold War dynamics embedded in them.

Zambia’s geographic position and political ideology situated the country as a Frontline State committed to the decolonization of its neighbors and the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. Part of Zambia’s commitment to this struggle meant hosting those seeking refuge from the oppressive governments in their home countries. As such, major inflows of refugees into Zambia came on the heels of Zambia’s independence in 1964. And Zambia was
faced with the need to maintain a politically suitable stance with its neighbours, protect itself from the incursion of the rebel forces from these same neighbouring countries and at the same time, make provisions for a group of refugees who are growing not only in number but in length of stay (Brooks 1988: 1-2)

This was an immensely tall order for a country whose own geographical sense of itself was nowhere near fully formed.

The first major influx of refugees occurred from December 1965 to June 1966 as Angolans and Mozambicans fled the beginning of armed conflict in the struggle for independence from Portugal. Nearly 63,000 Angolans crossed into Zambia’s Western Province (Map 3) and began settling along the border areas.

Map 3: 1960s Refugee Flows into western Zambia
In 1966, the government of Zambia (GRZ) attempted (and failed) to open and manage a settlement scheme for the Angolans at Lwatembo. The poorly planned settlement was intended to hold 1,500 refugees, but by January 1967, only 452 had arrived. Even with these low numbers, it quickly became clear that the site at Lwatembo would not be adequate. In 1967, GRZ began resettling Lwatembo refugees, as well as border-refugees, into independent Zambia's first official refugee camp, Mayukwayukwa in Kaoma District (Mijere 1994; Clark 1985). By late 1967, the total population at Mayukwayukwa reached 2,200 (Clark 1985). Throughout 1969, GRZ conducted a number of “raids” into the border areas to round up “defectors”, bringing the population at Mayukwayukwa to 5,000. Like Lwatembo, however, Mayukwayukwa was poorly planned, having been sited without a soil survey or adequate consultation with the local people.

It wasn't until a year into its establishment that schools, clinics, water towers, or wells were constructed. Due to space limitations and land pressures in and around Mayukwayukwa, Meheba Refugee Settlement was opened in 1971 in Solwezi District to handle the substantial overflow of Angolans from Mayukwayukwa. By the end of 1971, all but 1,000 Angolans had been transferred to Meheba. However, all of the fluctuations and transfers caused problems in Mayukwayukwa. For example, many of the refugees were aware of the plans for establishing Meheba at least a year prior to its opening which
meant that many refugees “did not wish to put effort into a settlement that was not going to be their permanent home” (Clark 1985: 172). Those who remained at Mayukwayukwa did however benefit from an infrastructure designed for a larger group, receiving five hectares each for private cultivation.

The construction of Meheba Refugee Settlement began in 1970 and many of the Mayukwayukwa refugees who had received training in carpentry and bricklaying participated in its construction. In contrast to Mayukwayukwa, Meheba Refugee Settlement was purposefully sited in a very remote area, away from local populations with the “conscious intention of opening up relatively unpopulated areas for further development” (Zulu-Syamujaye 2006). Although the majority of the refugees at Meheba were Angolan, approximately 10% of the population came from Namibia and South Africa.

Throughout the early 1970s, Angolans were rounded up from the border areas for resettlement on 5 hectare plots in Meheba (Hansen 1990; Clark 1985). However, this process of identifying and relocating Angolans from the border regions was deeply problematic. Following the Luvale saying - *mutondo watela mafwo mwangana atela uatu* (a stick without leaves is not a tree) - local Luvale chiefs were reluctant to “out” the refugees staying among them. In fact, most of the “refugees” in the border regions were “not regarded by chiefs as refugees but as their subjects who have asked for and been granted the chief’s protection” (Freund and Kalumba 1986: 301).
While Angola won its struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975, most of the Angolan refugees did not return to their country due to an almost immediate eruption of violence and civil war, aided by foreign interventions. Added to this was the complexity that the Kaunda regime supported UNITA, while most its allies in southern Africa supported its victorious rival movement, MPLA. Hence, many of Zambia’s Angolans in the mid-1970s were in all likelihood UNITA supporters, or at the very least perceived to be UNITA supporters by MPLA forces. This most certainly heightened their fear of returning home in the midst of the MPLA-UNITA civil war.

During this same period, the Mozambican refugees were settled at Nyimba Refugee Camp in Eastern Province (Map 4). Detailed discussion of the

Map 4: 1960s Refugee Flows into eastern Zambia
situation in Eastern Province is provided in the following chapter. Unlike their Angolan counterparts, the majority of these refugees returned to Mozambique when it gained its independence in 1975.

In terms of internal political arrangements, the multi-party system worked relatively well in the early years after independence in Zambia, with the UNIP and ANC serving as the main contenders for political power, void of the violent conflict and civil strife witnessed in neighboring states. The relatively smooth operation of the multi-party system was enabled by relatively high levels of economic growth. With regards to refugee-hosting, Zambia’s economic situation meant that it could afford to play host to incoming refugee groups.

The first five years of independence were marked by substantial wealth and economic growth due to Copperbelt profits. In fact, in the years following independence, Zambia’s real GDP grew at 2.3% per year (Woldring 1984). However, the economic growth Zambia experienced “disguised but did not overcome Zambia’s dependence upon copper” (Gertzel et al 1984: 6; Roberts 1976). Copper prices began to fall drastically in the 1969 and Zambia’s underdevelopment in every other sector began to show (Gertzel et al 1984).

The realization of its dependence on copper, coupled with the consequences of uneven colonial development, placed enormous pressure on the First Republic. Although Zambia remained a multiparty state until 1973, many of the political parties maintained very little national support. The only party
with any claim to a national constituency, the UNIP, suffered from internal factionalization. For example, in 1968 the UNIP expelled its Lozi leader Nalumino Mundia who later formed the United Party (UP) (Roberts 1976; Makasa 1981). The major opposition parties of the early multi-party era were Simon Kapwepwe’s United People’s Party (UPP), Mwaanga Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC), and Nalumino Mundia’s UP. However, many of these parties were regionally focused and few, if any, had any larger national support. The ANC dominated in Southern Province, the UP in Western Province, and the UPP in Northern Province and Copperbelt Province. In many ways, the regionalization of parties during the First Republic was a remnant of the uneven penetration of colonial development (Gertzel et al 1984).

The regionalization of opposition parties, the factionalization of UNIP, and perhaps most importantly, the drastic fallout of copper prices in the world market placed tremendous pressures on the government and threatened UNIP’s hold on the state apparatus. In 1971, a splinter group within the UNIP, led by Kapwepwe, formed the United Progressive Party (UPP). UNIP leaders “seized the opportunity of the formation of the UPP to demand introduction of a one-party state in Zambia” (Mwanakatwe 1994: 58). Pressure also instigated major economic reforms which gave the government ultimate control over all major sectors of the economy, including the mining industry (Mwanakatwe 1994; Kees van Donge 1998; Saasa 2002; Rakner 2003).
The Second Republic

All of the threats and pressures, along with the desire to remain in power, instigated a regime transition in the early 1970s. A regime transition is defined as a “shift from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 10). In the case of Zambia, the regime transited from a multiparty system to a competitive one-party state. In early February 1972, the UNIP government banned the UPP and the UP. Kaunda jailed his longtime friend and UPP leader Simon Kapwepwe as a warning to other opposition leaders (Sakala 2000).

On February 23rd, citing the need for unity as a necessity for development, the government announced plans to create a *de jure* one-party state in Zambia by appointing a Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party State (Mwanakatwe 1994; Rakner 2003). Later in the year, the Choma Declaration, which cemented the merger between the ANC and UNIP, created a *de facto* one-party system (Sakala 2000). A December 4th constitutional amendment made the UNIP the only legal political party and on the 13th of December, Zambia’s Second Republic was inaugurated with Kaunda as President. The new constitution of the Second Republic intensified the strong presidential system put in place at independence, eliminated any organization of opposition parties, provided for a unicameral National Assembly, and instituted what Kaunda called “one-party participatory democracy”.

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Using Bratton and van de Walle’s modal regime type categorization, Zambia’s Second Republic is best described as a competitive one-party system, meaning that it was as inclusive as plebiscitary systems yet allowed for a relatively higher degree of competition (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). As with other competitive one-party systems, the state invested considerable power on its nationalist founding father, Kenneth Kaunda. Like many other single party powers in Africa, UNIP justified its creation of a one-party system by arguing that it provided the “institutional base for the unity and greater political participation which the development process required” (Gertzel et al 1984: 20). However, Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel argue that the one-party state was simply a “device to ensure greater central control over factional conflict” (1984: 19).

Zambians’ support of the one-party system can in some ways be measured by evaluating their turnout at the polls. Prior to the installation of the Second Republic, 94% of the population voted in 1964 and 82% voted in 1968. Gradually, voter enthusiasm greatly diminished (Mwanakatwe 1994). Ultimately, voter turnout fell to less than 40% during the Second Republic (Mwanakatwe 1994; Saasa 2002; Rakner 2003). This trend corroborates with Bratton and van de Walle’s observation that competitive one-party systems can “sustain genuine turnout figures at relatively high, though declining, levels” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 80, emphasis mine).

The institutional base of the Second Republic suffered from a lack of
independence, transparency, and accountability. For example, the Zambian judicature (Supreme Court, High Court, Industrial Relations Court, Subordinate Courts, and Local Courts) were directed by and reported to the UNIP and the executive such that “in reality they only served to institutionalize the very crimes they were meant to eradicate” (Sakala 2000: 22; Mwanakatwe 1994). The UNIP party constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia gradually fused and the Second Republic took major steps to “bring the latter in line with the former” (Chiluba 1995: 44). Under Kaunda’s “one-party participatory democracy”, the government controlled everything. “Civil society outside the design, control, and benefit of the ruling party was considered dangerous and with suspicion to the well-being of the state” (Mwinga 2002: 10).

Government control also extended beyond civil society to the management of refugees. Generally speaking, during the 2nd Republic GRZ was increasingly intolerant of self-settlement by refugees, strongly preferring and advocating the resettlement of refugees into designated camps. For example, the following transcription of a speech to villagers in the border region of western Zambia given by the District Governor demonstrates an effort to divide and intimidate border communities and advocates the exclusion of refugees:

You have allowed a situation in which the border is open to anybody, to infiltrators. You people of the border have allowed others to come and share your houses that are built in Zambia. Zambia sympathizes with the freedom fighters and refugees, but they should be controlled and taken care of.
They are not indigenous inhabitants. I have received reports…that some refugees have left Lwatembo and are starting to build their own villages. They have forgotten their own country. Some people have used refugees for cheap labor and exploited them and used them to set themselves up as separate headmen. Now these people want recognition as headmen. Here there are some refugees who haven’t even reported and are being sheltered by you people! You are encouraging them to delay their independence and to become parasites. Freedom fighters have been given a place to fight. They should not leave there and settle in other villages…Only the cowards live in the villages. They cheat you by saying they are freedom fighters because they ran away from their friends. If the Portuguese discover you harbor them in houses, the Portuguese will come and bomb you. We do not want to endanger the lives of Zambians. I have a list of those villagers that are hiding deserters. I have talked with the President of M.P.L.A., and he said freedom fighters in villages are deserters. If you continue to hide them after I talk to you, I warn you that you will be in trouble. If you are an anthill, we will bring something that can take care of you in 5 minutes. And if you are not an anthill, but are an elephant, we will bring something that can take care of an elephant. In fact you are very lucky that I warn you, because my intention was to take you by surprise. Because I had a list of people, houses and villages. But I was a good Humanist and I am warning you instead (Hansen 1979b: 376 – 377).

Throughout the 2nd Republic, Zambia’s refugee hosting challenges continued to grow. A new wave of Angolan refugees in the mid-1980s resulted in the expansion of Meheba (into “New” Meheba) in 1987. During this same period, tensions flared in Mozambique as well and Eastern Province experienced
a new influx of refugees. Unlike the situation in Meheba, the UNHCR and GRZ decided not to re-open or expand Nyimba Refugee Camp to accommodate this new influx. From archival research, it is evident that the GRZ was concerned with the proximity of the Nyimba site to the Mozambican border. These security concerns led GRZ to situate the new Mozambican camp at Ukwimi, more than 100km from the border. In proceeding chapters, I outline in detail how such decisions were made and enforced by GRZ, in relation to the shifting political culture from Lusaka.

*Third Republic*

After 18 years of one-party rule, the process of reintroducing multi-party politics in Zambia was not an easy task. Like the rest of Africa, Zambia’s democratic transition occurred during what Samuel Huntington refers to as the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991). Zambia’s transition followed the definitional processes of democratization which “begins with political challenges to authoritarian regimes, advances through the political struggles over liberalization, and requires the installation of a freely elected government” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 194).

The Second Republic experienced a severe lack of legitimacy due to its inability to deliver basic political freedoms and economic stability for the overwhelming majority of Zambians. The crisis of legitimacy was exacerbated
by popular protests and demonstrations (Makasa 1981; Mwanakatwe 1994; Chan and Clancy 2000; Sakala 2000). For example, in June 1990, protesters organized a boycott of the staple maize meal in response to its 120% increase in price. The uprising led to the looting of several stores and a government-imposed 24 hour curfew. According to Chan and Clancy, the “uprising was expressed in violence precisely because no other means sufficed. The rise in food prices, while real income dropped, contrasted sharply with the very visible wealth of party leaders” (2000: 124).

These economic and social protests served as a catalyst for political and constitutional reform in Zambia. The Second Republic was further threatened by an attempted coup by Lt. Mwamba Luchembe on June 30, 1990. Although unsuccessful at replacing the government, the coup seriously undermined UNIP’s position and revealed its weaknesses (Chiluba 1995).

Initially, the Second Republic responded by jailing and deporting numerous labor, union, and opposition leaders. However, as the demands became further politicized, Kaunda was forced to grapple with the realities of the situation. Internal conditions, coupled with an international intolerance for authoritarian regimes, meant that he could no longer respond with absolute suppression or instigate a regime transition as he did when faced with pressures in the early 1970s.

Kaunda attempted to address the concerns of the masses by
implementing several economic reforms and deepening political liberalization. Political liberalization requires the “relaxation of government controls on the political activities of citizens, with particular reference to civil liberties” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 108), but it does not require true democratization. True democratization for Zambia became dependent on the organizational and cooperative aptitude of the opposition forces.

The desire for multi-party democracy “crystallized into the formation of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MDD)” at the Garden House Motel in 1990 under the leadership of Fredrick Chiluba (Sakala 2000: 6). Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba was born April 30, 1943 and raised in the Copperbelt. Chiluba gained his leadership and organizational skills serving as a union activist and chairman of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). During the Second Republic, Chiluba successfully organized a series of strikes for which he was detained and released (Sakala 2000).

The high degree of opposition cohesion was critical to the success of the democratic transition in Zambia. Although some saw the MMD simply as a “marriage of convenience formed by people with a range of different backgrounds, some pursuing political ideals and others said to be just interested in improving the economic outlook” (Chiluba 1995: 73), the marriage effectively bridged class, status, linguistic, and ethnic divisions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 199). According to Bratton and van de Walle, those who could
foster some degree of opposition cohesion were able to “induce incumbent rulers to concede to competitive elections” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 199) and often went on to win. Such was the case in Zambia.

Initially, Kaunda pushed for a national referendum on multi-partyism. Facing a highly mobilized and organized opposition force, Kaunda realized that a return to multi-party politics was inevitable and on December 17, 1990, Kaunda signed a parliamentary amendment which re-legalized political parties. A total of 12 parties took advantage of this new opening by registering with the government. A government appointed commission, led by Professor Patrick Mvunga, was established to draft a new constitution for the Third Republic (Mwanakatwe 1994: 209). The new constitution provided for a total of 150 members of the National Assembly with the Presidential power of nomination of up to ten additional members. Perhaps more importantly, the constitution made specific provisions for a democratic transition through free and fair elections (Mwanakatwe 1994). However, the MMD refused to accept the terms of the new constitution, threatening to boycott the entire electoral process.

After several exchanges between UNIP and MMD, Zambia reached a “constitutional stalemate” (Mwanakatwe 1994). The students at the University of Zambia (UNZA), long-time opposition voices against the UNIP, offered to serve as mediators in the process. The intervention of the UNZA students, coupled with that of the Christian churches in Zambia, broke the stalemate.
On July 23, 1991, the MMD and UNIP struck a compromise at a meeting between Kaunda and Chiluba in the Anglican Cathedral in Lusaka (Mwanakatwe 1994). Some of the compromises between MMD and UNIP included requiring the President to consult the Cabinet before declaring a State of Emergency, removing the President’s power to declare martial law, and increasing the number of Presidentially-appointed Parliament members (Mwanakatwe 1994; Burnell 2002a, 2002b).

The agreed-upon constitutional arrangements included a hybrid form of government characterized by a strong executive presidency coupled with parliamentary traditions inherited from the Westminster model (Burnell 2002a, 2002b). According to the constitution, the directly-elected President serves as both the head of state and the head of government and the National Assembly is comprised of 150 elected seats and up to 8 Presidentially-appointed seats. In addition, the executive is invested with the power to dissolve the National Assembly.

Founding elections constitute the “first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 196). Zambia’s founding elections occurred in October 1991. In the first multi-party elections since 1972, both the Presidential and Parliamentary seats were contested and the MMD emerged with a landslide victory. Fredrick Chiluba secured the
presidential office with 73% of the total votes (Table 6). In addition, the MMD won 125 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly (Kabwe 1997). Although the MMD demonstrated nation-wide support, several regional variations are important to note. The MMD received all of the Parliamentary seats in Copperbelt, Luapula, Western, and Southern Provinces and most of the seats in Northern, Lusaka, and North-western Provinces. By contrast, UNIP gained all the seats (19) in Eastern Province (Kabwe 1997).

The founding elections marked the success of Zambia’s democratic transition. The elections were declared free and fair by the Zambian Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), the Carter Center, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (Mwanakatwe 1994). However, ZEMCC reported that the elections, although free and fair, were “marked with problems in the pre-election phase and on the day of elections” (Mwanakatwe 1994: 229). To begin, in all of the constituencies, less than 50% of the registered voters went to the polls (Mwanakatwe 1994). The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Chiluba</th>
<th>Kaunda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>72.07%</td>
<td>24.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>88.39%</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>24.69%</td>
<td>70.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>86.69%</td>
<td>10.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>74.24%</td>
<td>22.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>81.90%</td>
<td>14.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>68.35%</td>
<td>29.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>82.69%</td>
<td>14.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>78.73%</td>
<td>18.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.37%</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.45%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
lack of high voter turnout may be explained by voter fatigue in that elections had been held less than two years before under the one-party, Second Republic. Secondly, low voter turnout also reflected the inefficiency of the administration of the electoral process (Mwanakatwe 1994). The ZEMCC also argued that the less-than-average voter turnout was due to widespread rumors of potential violence on election day.

Nevertheless, on Saturday, November 2, 1991, Kaunda made an appearance on Television Zambia (TVZ) to concede his electoral defeat (Kabwe 1997). Later that day, Fredrick Chiluba was sworn in as President of Zambia’s Third Republic. As noted by Bratton and van de Walle, democratic transitions occur only when the “results are accepted by all participants” (1997: 194). As such, Kaunda’s concession enabled a peaceful transition to democracy in Zambia. In fact, the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) carried the following message on its “Thought for Today” program:

It is not easy to be gracious to a successor, but some manage it…Kenneth Kaunda has been President of Zambia for almost 30 years…At the weekend he was defeated in a democratic election. “You win some you lose some”, he said. He showed his successor around the State House. Gave him the keys and headed for his home farm. Whatever other contributions he may have made to his nation this will surely have been one of his greatest. To pass on his work to his successor without fuss or bitterness. In a continent where bloodshed more often accompanies the transfer of power, this is statesmanship of the highest order” (Kabwe 1997: 122 – 123).
Kaunda’s concession, coupled with the amazing degree of opposition cohesion fostered by the MMD, resulted in one of the relatively few full and peaceful democratic transitions in Africa’s “third wave” democratization project. Zambia followed the modal route to democracy which led from protest, through liberalization, to free and fair elections (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). As such, it can be defined as a true democratic transition.

The 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Zambia provided the first opportunity to test the level of democratic consolidation or “slippage”. Unfortunately, the 1996 Zambian elections were seriously flawed and the “general verdict has fallen on the side of slippage” (Gould 2002: 299). Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 1996 elections occurred well before the elections were to take place and contributes the ambiguities of identity and mobility in Zambia. Utilizing MMD’s overwhelming majority in the Parliament, Chiluba successfully pushed through a constitutional amendment barring anyone whose parents were born outside Zambian from contesting the Presidential seat (Ihonvbere 1996; Gould 2002). This move was a deliberate attack on Kenneth Kaunda’s prospects for challenging Chiluba in the Presidential race (as Kaunda is the son of missionaries from Malawi). Chiluba went further by declaring Kaunda an alien and attempting to deport him to Malawi (AP 1995; Ihonvbere 1996; Gould 2002). Several other UNIP leaders were successfully deported to Malawi (Amnesty International 2001). The fact
that the “father of the nation” Kaunda can be declared an alien and a non-citizen strongly reinforces the argument that the idea of being “Zambian” is a very fluid identity – to be taken advantage of and manipulated for political gain. In fact, in the years following this attempt to strip Kaunda of his citizenship, UNIP leaders sought a similar course of action against Chiluba, questioning his paternity and accusing him of adopting the identity of a schoolmate (McNeil 1999).

These moves by the MMD government prompted Kaunda to call for an electoral boycott. In addition, international observers refused to monitor the elections due to inconsistencies preceding the vote. These problems notwithstanding, 592 candidates competed for 150 seats (Kees van Donge 1998). Chiluba emerged from the 1996 elections with nearly 70% of the vote and the MMD secured 131 of 150 available Parliamentary seats (ECZ 1996; Table 7). However, the MMD’s victory was seriously undermined following the declaration that the elections were not free and fair by the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC). In any case, it was clear that although MMD could claim to be popularly elected, it had also

reproduced many of the less commendable habits of its predecessor (which it strongly resembles not least because of the number of ex-ministers who have managed to regain power by switching parties at the appropriate time), but has also managed to be more deeply immersed in the culture of smuggling and corruption than its predecessor (Ellis 2000: 44).
The MMD’s manipulations leading up to the 1996 elections created serious internal and international legitimacy problems for the new government, leading Human Rights Watch (1997) to portray the MMD’s first term in office a “retrogressive betrayal of the democratic principles that brought it to office”.

The events leading up to the 2001 Zambian elections were reminiscent of many of the manipulations that occurred prior to the 1996 elections. For example, Chiluba launched a campaign to remain in power for an unconstitutional third term (Africa Confidential 2001). Chiluba’s bid for a 3rd term required two major undertakings. First, he needed to be selected as the

Table 7
1996 Election Results
(% of total vote cast)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Chiluba</th>
<th>Mung'omba</th>
<th>Mulemba</th>
<th>Mbikusita</th>
<th>Chakomboka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>ZDC</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>MDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>69.62%</td>
<td>13.57%</td>
<td>4.92%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>81.94%</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>60.28%</td>
<td>18.43%</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>82.44%</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>4.75%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>69.95%</td>
<td>16.04%</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>77.38%</td>
<td>11.47%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>50.19%</td>
<td>6.08%</td>
<td>36.23%</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>2.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>63.60%</td>
<td>17.37%</td>
<td>4.92%</td>
<td>4.44%</td>
<td>4.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>40.50%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>7.63%</td>
<td>27.68%</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total:</td>
<td>68.96%</td>
<td>12.11%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
<td>4.47%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MMD = Movement for Multiparty Democracy
ZDC = Zambia Democratic Congress
NP = National Party
AZ = Agenda for Zambia
MDP = Movement for Democratic Process
presidential candidate by the MMD leadership at the party convention. Second, and perhaps most difficult, Chiluba needed a large majority of Parliament to pass a constitutional amendment allowing for a 3rd term in the executive.

Although wholly undemocratic in nature and contrary to the principles upon which he entered the office, the fact that attention was paid to constitutional legalities and requirements demonstrated a respect, albeit minimal, for the democratic institutions in place. Ultimately, Chiluba realized the futility of his quest to remain in office, but not before creating serious divisions within the MMD concerning the issue. In the end, the party narrowly selected Levy Mwanawasa to serve as MMD’s candidate for the presidency.

The second major area of manipulation concerned the date of elections. Historically, Zambian elections are held in October, before the onset of the rainy season during which a considerable portion of the country is inaccessible. The 2001 elections, however, were held on December 27, in the middle of the rainy season and during the height of holiday travel, meaning that people were traveling outside of the constituency in which they registered and were therefore unable to vote (Kees van Donge 2001). Mwanawasa and the MMD emerged from the 2001 elections victorious, but not even remotely close to the landslide victories they had enjoyed in the past. Overall, the MMD received 112 Parliament seats. The first-past-the-post (FPP) plurality system seriously hindered the opposition’s showing on election day. In fact, Reynolds calculated
that under a proportional representation electoral formula, the MMD would have only secured 36 -38 seats (Kees van Donge 2001).

The 2001 elections were the tightest elections in Zambian history. Much of this had to do with fragmentation within the MMD, illustrated by the fact that 5 of the presidential candidate had a history of membership in the MMD (Benjamin Mwila, Christon Tembo, Godfrey Miyanda, and Michael Stata). The close race is also attributable to the lack of cohesion on the part of the opposition. The unpacked opposition secured 71% of the presidential vote; however, their lack of cohesion made Levy Mwanawasa the 3rd President of the Republic of Zambia with only 29% of the vote and a slim margin of victory. Anderson Mazoka of the newly established United Party for National Development (UPND) placed second in the Presidential race with 26.27% of the vote – a difference of less than 34 votes. An examination of the MMD’s share of votes cast over the three multi-party elections also reveals a considerable turn of events (Table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>non-MMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>75.21%</td>
<td>24.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>68.96%</td>
<td>31.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>28.96%</td>
<td>71.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In September 2006, President Levy Mwanawasa was re-elected by securing 43% of the vote (Table 9). On the surface, Mwanawasa’s victory could be read as an endorsement of his management of the country, his very public fight against corruption, and his policies of “good governance”. But for others, such as Larmer and Fraser, the 2006 elections were important not because of what they resulted in for MMD, but because of the “significant break in Zambian politics” and the “new dynamic in urban society” created by the “rapid and largely unanticipated emergence” of the opposition party Patriotic Front under the leadership of Michael Sata (Larmer and Fraser 2007).

The discussion of electoral processes since founding elections clearly demonstrates that “political pluralism does not guarantee accountability” (Burnell 2001: 259). Although the reintroduction of multi-partism in Zambia
did allow for some important changes, such as the alternation of power and the elimination of the *de jure* one-party state, it also maintained several continuities as well. Perhaps the most obvious and impacting continuity has been the persistence of neopatrimonialism, particularly that of presidentialism.

Continuities such as these do not only impact Zambian citizens, they also have very real consequences and impacts on the operation and management of refugee spaces. Although refugee camps and settlements are nearly always thought of or treated as “internationalized” zones, the fact is that these settlements are situated in particular nation-states with a whole set of political considerations at play. An understanding of Zambia’s general political history and players provides an additional context in which to understand refugee spaces in Zambia. But this national context is not enough to fully understand what unfolds at a place like Ukwimi. Full understanding requires a more humanistic, micro-geography. In fact,

> elections, albeit an important institutional aspect of national politics, do not determine the manner in which a state operates and are not even the most important elements of factional political competition…The real stuff of politics…is situated in other sites [which are] increasingly informal in nature (Ellis 2000: 45 – 46).

It is to these sites that I now turn my attention.
Most often, contemporary refugee situations are discussed in the absence of their historical context. It is a basic premise of this dissertation that refugee environments must be examined in relation to longer historical lenses than the majority of refugee research employs. It is this longer view that helps us to not only understand the host community better but also anticipate the degree to which refugees will successfully integrate into their host communities.

At the very least, the historical approach provides an appreciation and recognition that contemporary refugee situations do not exist in a vacuum – refugees do not descend upon a place without a history. At first this may seem like an unproblematic, common-sense assertion. However, a thorough
examination of the refugee relief regime’s discourse demonstrates and reinforces time and time again the notion that refugees have nothing. Consider the imagery and text of the UNHCR poster in Appendix B which states characterizes refugees in the following manner:

Each one has something: a tool or implement here, a bicycle or a briefcase there. All completely normal and unremarkable. But wait. Something’s amiss. That nice fellow near the bottom – third row down, second from the right. He doesn’t seem to have anything. Indeed. You see, he’s refugee. And as you can see, refugees are just like you and me except for one thing: everything they once had has been destroyed or taken away, probably at gunpoint. Home, family, possessions, all gone. They have nothing. And nothing is all they’ll ever have unless we help (Appendix B).

Much as previous research and humanitarian calls for assistance may have us believe refugees come to the table empty-handed, they most certainly bring their own histories with them. So although they may carry little physical luggage, they do carry an enormously rich history which if one bothers to ask remains very much a part of their oral tradition and identity. Additionally, the places into which refugees arrive are not empty spaces. More often than not, places designated for refugee hosting also have particular histories and identities which should be a part of the discussion.

I firmly maintain that our understanding of the contemporary successes and failures of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS) is well-served by stepping
back and understanding Ukwimi in the wider historical context of both its hosts and its guests. Stepping back requires an examination of the wider Ukwimi area prior to the establishment of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement, as well as an examination of the refugees prior to their placement at Ukwimi Refugee Settlement. In doing so, I am not attempting an exhaustive or comprehensive pre-colonial or colonial history of Eastern Province, but rather a deeper (than “normal”) look at aspects of that history that are particularly relevant to questions of territory, nation, identity, and place – which are in and of themselves critical to my wider project.

I am not a historian by training, nor is this dissertation intended to provide a comprehensive or exhaustive historical account of eastern Zambia. I am, however, very much concerned with situating the contemporary circumstances within a wider historical frame than most refugee research generally employs. I find that providing this wider frame is absolutely necessary due to my desire to understand Ukwimi geographically – as a place. If I were interested solely in the refugees or the hosts or the NGOs or a certain moment in Ukwimi’s story, I could arguably bypass the following historical narrative. But because I am interested in Ukwimi as a place, it becomes imperative to trace out its evolution as such prior to the official establishment of a refugee camp in the area.
Historical Background of Area

As outlined in Chapter 4, the history of Zambia is a “continuous history of the movement of peoples” (Brelsford 1956: 4) and the eastern region is no exception. The earliest oral traditions recorded in eastern Zambia relate to the establishment and development of Undi’s Chewa kingdom in the late 16th century (Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 1976). Undi’s kingdom ruled throughout present-day Malawi, Zambia’s Eastern Province and Mozambique’s Tete Province. Other communities in the area, such as Kalindawalo’s Nsenga people in present-day Petuake District “maintained their separate distinction within Undi’s kingdom, although aspects of their culture were greatly modified by Chewa influence” (Langworthy 1972: 26). The degree of cultural modification described by Langworthy is evident today when examining linguistic similarities between Chichewa and Chinsenga, as well as shared cultural traditions.

The Ngoni, led by Zwengendaba, first entered Undi’s kingdom from the south in November 1835 (Langworthy 1969; Langworthy 1972). The Ngoni settled just at the edge of Kalindawalo’s Nsenga kingdom in the Petuake area, often raiding and capturing the Nsenga and their cattle (Langworthy 1969; Phillipson 1976). As tensions mounted between the Ngoni and Nsenga, Zwengendaba led his people northward into Bemba territory. During this migration, Zwengendaba died and the Ngoni split into two separate groups under different leadership. The first group followed the leadership of Mbelwa
and continued northward into Bemba land. The second group fell under the leadership of Mpezeni and returned south to Petauke (Langworthy 1969; Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 1976). It was there, near Petauke, that the Ngoni began to challenge the supremacy of Undi’s kingdom in the area. After a series of confrontations, Mpezeni succeeded in effectively destroying Undi’s kingdom. As outlined in the opening epigraph, the “powerful and prosperous” people who Crawford encountered and described were, in fact, the Ngoni.

But Ngoni rule was cut short by the arrival of Europeans into the area after Mpezeni granted a large mining concession to German hunter and trader Carl Wiese, who worked closely with the Portuguese. “In April 1891, he [Carl Wiese] obtained from Mpezeni a general territorial concession covering 25,000 square kilometers and persuaded the chief to accept the Portuguese flag” (Phillipson 1976: 12). It is important to note here, however, that Mpezeni was not fully aware of the symbolic meaning tied to accepting the Portuguese flag. As Wiese (1891) himself notes, he had to instruct Mpezeni that the flag was not used as an article of clothing. During the next several years, the Ngoni continued to dominate the region, with the help of their occasional (less than 10) white visitors, and “developed a feeling of self-confidence in understanding European intentions” (Rau 1974: 240).

A few years after the original deal between Wiese and Mpezeni, Wiese sold his concession to the Mozambique Gold Land and Concession Company.
(MGLCC) for approximately 1,500 pounds (Zgambo 1983). To the frustration of MGLCC, the colonial administrator of Nyasaland (now Malawi), Harry Johnston, refused to issue MGLCC a certification of their claim and instead recognized the claims of the North Charterland Exploration Company, firmly controlled by British South Africa Company (BSAC), thereby placing Mpezeni’s territory “firmly in the British sphere” (Barnes 1954: 71; Phillipson 1976).

Although this is a somewhat obscure piece of the story, I think it is a historical moment that significantly altered how the issue of forced migration and refugee-hosting ultimately played out in the area. Consider for a moment if MGLCC’s claims had been fully recognized. It is likely that the majority of Wiese’s concession, including the Ukwimi area, would have come under Portuguese rule and ultimately become a part of Mozambique at decolonization. This becomes important in the context of forced migration and refugee-hosting because it is the existence and exact placement of the Zambia-Mozambique border that served to define those fleeing violence as refugees (instead of IDPs).

The transition of Wiese’s concession into British hands, in addition to the increasingly aggressive nature of European involvement in the area led to a “crisis of choice” in 1897 (Rau 1974: 240). The “crisis of choice” for the Ngoni revolved around how they were to handle their relations with Europeans. Although often depicted as monolithic, ethnic groups in Africa encounter the same kinds of internal conflicts and complexities of any other society and the
Ngoni were not an exception. According to Rau:

Mpezeni and his older indunas... felt that peaceful relations [with the Europeans] were possible and desirable. Nsingo, Mlonyeni, Kamzembe and other younger men feared that the European presence within Ungoni [Ngoni land] and to the east was a direct threat to their country and security. They urged Mpezeni to kill the locally-based agents of the North Charterland Exploration Company, and thereby remove the most immediate threat to Ungoni. Mpezeni, under strong pressure, resisted these demands until January 1898 when an invasion by Protectorate troops resolved the issue. Defeat for the Ngoni was quick and definite as a new phase of colonial rule was introduced into eastern Zambia (1974: 241).

From this point forward, the Ukwimi area fell under the BSAC-controlled and administered Northeastern Rhodesia. As early as 1898, colonial administrators instituted a five shilling hut tax (Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 1976; Vail 1977; Chipungu 1992) which most local families were unable to pay. In response to the hut tax demands of the colonial administrators, a significant majority of the healthy young males in the area headed to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) for employment, leaving their families behind typically for periods of two years, but frequently longer. Archival research revealed that the social impact of this out-migration significantly altered the local social landscape. Ironically, colonial administrators also used the out-migration (necessitated by colonial policy) to justify the lack of the development in the region. As explained by the District Officer:
It is inevitable that the absence of 60 per cent of the able-bodied males...should slow up development. Often the actual...population of a village is found to be a horde of women supported by a handful of elderly men and weaklings. Indeed, it is a matter of some surprise that so much can be done in the way of subsistence production and improved agricultural methods when the material is so weak and scanty” (NAZ/SEC/NAT/66).

In the eyes of colonial administrators, the lack of development throughout the province was the product of the “absence” of able-bodied males. Yet there appears to be little to no recognition that such absences were the product of deliberate colonial tax policies. In many ways (and in a different era), this out-migration constituted a forced migration of a specific portion of the population out of the area and ultimately had “grave results” for the local economy (Vail 1977: 137).

In addition to this significant, gendered out-migration, communities in eastern Zambia also faced internal relocation and reconfiguration of social networks due to the imposition of colonial laws concerning resettlement to native reserves and other very spatial aspects of life and subsistence, such as hunting. In fact, colonial restrictions on hunting and colonial preferences for closely settled village communities “led to the development of large areas of bush in which an ever-growing animal population dwelled and set the stage for one of the major ecological reverses in eastern Zambia's history – the spread of tsetse fly and, with it, human and animal sleeping sickness” (Vail 1977: 138).
Although some negative consequences of colonial policies could be described as unintended (such as the spread of the tsetse fly), other disruptive outcomes were quite consciously pursued and intended. For example, Livingstone Bruce, the General Manager of the North Charterland Company, argued that the colonial authorities should restrict Africans access to land precisely to force them to enter into the local (and regional) labor market for survival. According to Bruce,

> It would be politic to procure Reserves on the basis of the bare subsistence of the Native, giving an allowance for that only, assuming that the policy of the country is to encourage European development. I shall not go so far as to say that the Natives in the whole of the Territory should be cut down to a bare subsistence allowance, but I do say so as regards the Concession (NAZ/ZP 1/1/5)

It is upon such logic that the colonial administration demarcated native reserves in 1913 and 1914. In Eastern Province, approximately 3,500mi$^2$ of the lowest quality land was set aside for the entire African population, while 6,500mi$^2$ of the best land was allocated to the 80 European settlers (Kay 1965, 1968; Vail 1977). As discussed in Chapter 4, colonial administrators in Eastern Province anticipated the arrival of large numbers of Europeans into the area. European settler populations never reached anticipated numbers due to the crumbling tobacco markets of the 1920s (Roberts 1976; Vail 1977; Chipungu 1992; Musambachime 1992). Over the course of several decades, the areas
delineated for European settlement returned to bush, while the native reserves became “devastated from overuse, severe soil erosion, deforestation, and a falling water table” (Vail 1977: 149).

It is important to note here that this devastation did not occur without considerable opposition from the local communities. For instance, the Ambo community residing just outside the Ukwimi area lost an estimate of 54% of their population from 1928 to 1938 (NAZ/SEC/2/534). In response to such overwhelming loss and social disruption, Chieftainess Mwape pleaded with the Governor for the restoration of her people to their land. The Chieftainess conveyed her people’s desperation to escape the tsetse fly infested reserves (NAZ/KSY 2/1). According to the archival evidence, the Governor concluded that he was well “aware of the wish of her people” to return to their lands, but “the government could not ask the North Charterland Company to part with their most fertile land” (NAZ/KSY 2/1).

With continued pressure from Chieftainess Mwape and her colleagues, colonial administrators at the provincial level began corresponding to colonial administrators in Lusaka. In a 1937 letter to the colonial secretary, the provincial Governor wrote that the “reserves are in a woeful plight and the...paramount need of the natives is for more land immediately. The natives cannot understand the delay and have become embittered” (NAZ/SEC 2/734).

The District Commissioner wrote to Lusaka about the desire of the local
people to acquire the “empty, silent” lands that had been set aside for European settlers, but that had now “filled with bush and game and tsetse fly” (NAZ/SEC/NAT/363). Ultimately, the colonial government awarded 154,000 pounds to the North Charterland Company in exchange for transferring land to the government ownership in 1941 (NAZ/SEC/2/734; Chipungu 1992; Vail 1977).

This transaction did not immediately or quickly translate into the return of people to their lands. Several major obstacles fell in the way of the people’s return to their lands. First, most of the 6,500mi² set aside for European settlement had reverted to bush land and filled with wild game, as well as tsetse fly. The colonial government began an extensive program in 1943 to clear the land and thin out the wild game populations (Vail 1977). Secondly, the colonial government determined that, due to the severe erosion, any agricultural production in the region must employ “modern” agricultural techniques – techniques which the local communities had neither the capital nor the labor supply to engage. So although the colonial government was interested in converting the land to agricultural use, the out-migration to more lucrative employment in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Copperbelt was “far too high to allow for the sort of agricultural revolution that the Government was seeking” (Vail 1977: 151-152). A 1946 Land Commission Report concluded that the end result of this policy created a “profoundly unsatisfactory situation in
many of the reserves” and caused much “unnecessary suffering and ill-will” (GRZ 1946: 2). For the people of Eastern Province, the “unnecessary suffering” and land displacement technically concluded in 1941, but the spatial legacies of these forced migrations remain today.

Mozambique’s War of Independence and Nyimba Refugee Camp

Although 1960 was a watershed year for the independence of African countries, the Portuguese colonies across the continent were only just beginning what would become fifteen year long struggle for liberation. In fact, in 1960 Mozambique was only just witnessing the formation of its first political party, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), led by Adelino Gwambe from Harare, Zimbabwe. In 1961, two additional nationalist parties formed in Dar es Salaam, Mozambique National African Union (MANU) and União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI). In September 1962, all three parties merged to form Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO).

FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, was one of a handful of black Mozambican graduates, with a degree from the United States. On September 25, 1964, FRELIMO began its long struggle for independence, launching a number of attacks in the Mueda area, fifty miles south of the northern border with Tanzania (Englund 2002). Under Mondlane's leadership,
with its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, FRELIMO steadily increased its power in the two northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, effectively creating liberated areas freed of Portuguese control (Henriksen 1976; Nunes and Wilson 1991).

In 1968, FRELIMO held its first meetings inside Mozambique, re-electing Mondlane as president and setting the strategy for the liberation of the entire country. The following year would deal FRELIMO many blows, undermining many of the achievements they had made. In February, Mondlane was assassinated by a parcel bomb and a power struggle within FRELIMO intensified between those who were fighting for socialist restructuring of society and those who basically wanted to substitute Portuguese elites with black elites (Hastings 1974). Ultimately, the military commander Samora Machel emerged from the struggle as Frelimo's leader and president. According to Englund, a “new sense of common purpose was embodied by Samora Machel” (2002: 6). At the same time, Portuguese General Kaulza da Arriaga, “Portugal's hope in the Mozambique war”, arrived in Mozambique to combat FRELIMO and bring an end to the independence movement (Hastings 1974: 265).

Zambia remained firmly committed to the anti-colonial struggle of its neighbor, demonstrated most vocally in the drafting and subsequent adoption by 14 African nations of the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969. The Lusaka Manifesto is probably most noted for laying out the following statement in its opening words
By this manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex.

But buried a bit deeper into the Manifesto is an assertion that I believe also has something quite significant to add to concerns of boundaries, identities, and place-making within the context of the struggle against colonialism. The Manifesto asserts the following about Zambia’s neighbors:

In Mozambique and Angola, and in so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, no legislation passed by any parliament in Portugal can make Africa a part of Europe (Lusaka Manifesto 1969).

Although indeed Africa could not be made a part of Europe, Portugal’s violent resistance to the liberation of its colonies made many Mozambicans “Zambians”. In December 1965, several thousand Mozambicans crossed the border into Zambia, either fleeing from or attempting to avoid violence associated with the liberation struggle.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the border between Mozambique and Zambia was (and is) a remnant of the colonial era and for many of these refugees the “border between the two countries is a fiction” (Aall 1967: 30). So
much so that the archives are filled with correspondence concerned with distinguishing between Zambians and Mozambicans and making fiction into reality. For example, several letters grapple with the challenge of determining the refugee-status and citizenship of individuals in inter-border marriages. In fact, special attention was needed to discern between “Zambians” and “Mozambicans” with regard to the issue of inter-border marriages. A 1969 letter to the Chadiza District Immigration Officer details the common practice of deriving the citizenship of women through marriage, rather than birth. According to the letter:

If a Zambian was long ago married to a Mozambique in Mozambique, that woman after running away from the Portuguese terror in Zambia with or without her husband, is a refugee because she qualified on the citizenship of the husband in Mozambique. Likewise, a Mozambican woman whether to be a refugee or not if married to a Zambian man she qualifies on the citizenship of the husband and be treated as Zambian (NAZ/EP5676 4/20/82)

The long history of interaction, intermarriage, and movement across the border in the area meant that nearly all of these refugees crossed the border intending to stay with Zambian friends and relatives (Hamrell 1967).

The few who did not have friends or relatives on the Zambian side of the border successfully petitioned local chiefs and headmen for protection (NAZ/EP5676 4.20.82; Field Interviews). As the number of Mozambicans
seeking refuge in Zambia grew, the Zambian government decided to transfer all the self-settled refugees to one place “for the sake of proper administration” (Hamrell 1967: 29). The government quickly established Nyimba Refugee Camp, just south of the Great East Road, and within one year, more than 2,000 Mozambicans were relocated to Nyimba.

Refugee research and literature often begins the story at this moment – with the establishment and subsequent growth of a particular camp – and rarely unpacks the complicated and contested nature of establishing and populating a refugee camp. In beginning the story in such a manner, most refugee research obscures the problematic processes which compel refugees to transition from self-settlement to organized settlements/camps. Utilizing archive material as well as interviews, I have pieced together some of the complexities that underlay the “establishment” of a refugee camp. In telling such stories, I seek to reveal the very real ways in which people challenged and resisted attempts to control their movements and settlement choices.

The transition from self-settlement with friends and relatives into the organized settlement of Nyimba Refugee Camp was anything but smooth as many of the Mozambican refugees were unwilling to voluntarily move to Nyimba. Several incidents created a refugee population wary of the merits of organized settlement at Nyimba Camp. Zambian police and immigration officials were sent into the border areas to convince (and in some cases coerce)
refugees to relocate to the camp (Hamrell 1967; NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). Many refugees ran into the fields to hide when the police and immigration officials approached.

Reflecting on such difficulties, Mr. Moonga, an Immigration Officer, informed the Permanent Secretary of Eastern Province that he had been unable to resettle a group of approximately 60 Mozambicans to Nyimba because “each time I go there to try to contact them, they run away and hide in the bushes towards Mozambique” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). The archives detail extensive attempts to identify and relocate Mozambicans to Nyimba Refugee Camp, often commenting on the difficulty of such exercises.

Even after processing, documenting, and transferring (see Chapter 3 on defining, counting, settling, and managing) some of the self-settled refugees to Nyimba, other factors complicated the success of Nyimba as a viable option for Mozambican refugees. Shortly after an early influx into Nyimba, an outbreak of measles caused the death of a significant number of children at the camp hospital (Hamrell 1967; Field Interviews). Many of the refugees connected the deaths with the camp itself and as the “rumour about the epidemic spread, [it]... made those refugees still in villages even more reluctant to go to the camp … [and] many who were [already] at the camp left” (Aal 1967:31). In fact, the Portuguese are reported to have used this incident to begin an effective propaganda campaign among the refugees, convincing many that if they went to
Nyimba Refugee Camp their children would die and their men would be sent as forced labor to Kariba Dam (Hamrell 1967; Field Interviews.). These negative impressions and fears of Nyimba Refugee Camp, together with the refugees' relatively successful and effective survival among friends and relatives in the border areas, coalesced in such a way that sustained resistance to resettlement at Nyimba continued (and intensified) throughout the liberation struggle.

Judging from the archival material, concern about the presence of self-settling refugees in the area intensified in the early 1970s. In a July 14, 1971 letter from F.S. Kameli to the District Secretary in Chadiza District, the Immigration Officer detailed his growing concern with the presence of refugees in the border areas. According to his report, Kameli sent three Immigration Assistants to the border villages to “collect” refugees and recorded his “astonishment” when they returned with only two Mozambican refugees (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). The rest of the refugees living in the border villages had run into hiding upon the advice of locals. Throughout the letter, Kameli is clearly frustrated by the lack of cooperation by village headmen, arguing that it is “high time” that the headmen along the Zambia-Mozambique border be “shaken-up” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). Kameli stated that upon questioning by his Immigration Assistants the village headmen “clearly admitted that they had plenty of refugees from Mozambique and that they could not reveal their names...for fear they could be taken to Nyimba” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).
Kameli explicitly connected the presence of refugees “wandering about in the border villages” to larger questions of national security (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). He requested that the District Secretary speak to the headmen about the “dangers they and the state could face by harbouring new entrants” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). Kameli further suggested that those refugees who refuse to relocate to the “prescribed resettlement” at Nyimba be handed over to FRELIMO in Mozambique (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). Kameli’s letter provides useful insight into the complications involved in trying to “collect” refugees into camps, revealing both the frustrations of a district level bureaucrat and the coalition between self-settled refugees and their local hosts, especially village headmen.

The archives also revealed significant disagreements within the government bureaucracy concerning the proper procedures and methods by which to monitor and document Mozambican refugees along the border. In September 1971, the Katete District Secretary, E.C. Nbita, wrote a scathing letter to the Chief Immigration Officer in Lusaka to voice his frustration with the “collection” methods employed by Immigration Officers in his district (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). According to Nbita, the Immigration Officers’ documentation activities were an “unnecessary burden...on my office” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). The following excerpt from his letter details his objections to the way in which Immigration Officers were conducting affairs in
his district:

23 September 1971
From: E.C. Nbita – District Secretary, Katete
To: Chief Immigration Officer, Lusaka
Re: Minute KAT/28/71 of 17th September 1971

I have disagreed with the method [by Immigration Officers] of documenting refugees and leaving them in villages and then bringing copies of documentation forms with a request that I send District Messengers to collect them. This method is not effective and has led to a waste of funds without achieving desired results. Several times when District Messengers have been sent on collection of refugees upon receipt of the reports from the Immigration Officer, it has been proved when reaching the place in question, refugees are not found and reports in more or less all cases indicated that refugees return to their country of origin immediately when immigration staff left the place after effecting documentation.

In some cases, we find it too expensive to detail a Messenger to escort only one refugee to Nyimba. It is further not realized enough that unlike Colonial days, a district like Katete has very little number of District Messengers and indeed transport and other facilities which can assist to keep a refugee for a few days before removal to Nyimba can be made.

To cut this minute short, I have to state that the present role played by the immigration staff in this particular exercise is not a relief but unnecessary burden placed on my office… I just wonder why immigration staff can not be made to do more practical work rather then ending at mere documentation, and expect the District Secretary to go hunting for refugees who leave convenient places after being alarmed as a result of documentation.

Last not the least, the unquestionable need to
remove refugees in Zambian villages along the borders can not be overemphasized by anybody but what is required is to pay attention to the factors involved and not merely to end at documentation” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82)

Upon further investigation into the archives, I discovered that Nbita’s letter to the Chief Immigration Officer in Lusaka was in reaction to a complaint filed by the Katete District Immigration Officer, L.K. Zimbiri. Apparently, Zimbiri filed a complaint against Nbita due to an incident involving the escape of Mr. Olokani Banda, a Mozambican refugee under the guard of one of Nbita’s District Messengers at the time of escape. In response, Nbita wrote the preceding letter to Lusaka, as well as a letter to Zimbiri himself. Nbita maintains that Zimbiri’s complaint is not “genuine” because Mr. Banda was not under arrest and was “merely being moved to the refugee camp with a liberty of a free person” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). Nbita’s letter to Zimbiri is interesting in that it acknowledges a contradiction in the government’s conception and treatment of refugees – on the one hand, refugees have the liberties of a “free person”, yet on the other hand, they are consistently described as needing to be “rounded up” or “collected” as though their presence outside of Nyimba Refugee Camp is in fact a crime.

As the number of Mozambicans seeking refuge in Zambia accelerated throughout the early 1970s, the government of Zambia grappled with both its
inability to effectively identify and “collect” refugees and the growing inadequacy of Nyimba to sustain such large numbers of refugees. The approach advocated by the Ministry of Rural Development in Lusaka was to maintain the status quo and continue pushing refugees into Nyimba Refugee Camp. This decision appears to have been reached without the consultation of local bureaucrats, local headmen, and/or Mozambican refugees.

According to Chipata Land Use Officer, T.E. Bourne, the proposal from Lusaka was “completely and absolutely unacceptable to us in this province, from the economic, agricultural, ecological, political, and humanistic aspects” (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90). In his November 15, 1971 letter to J.D.B. Eerdamns (Planning Officer – Social Aspects in Ministry of Rural Development, Lusaka), Bourne outlines the shortcomings of Nyimba as the solution to the current refugee crisis in the province. He calculated that Nyimba could handle fewer than 400 refugee families, leaving over 600 refugee families with no place in the organized settlement at Nyimba (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90). Additionally, Bourne cautioned the government against proceeding without consultation with the local border communities. He warned that the “local people are already a little disturbed by the fact that these people [Mozambican refugees] are pouring in and receiving aid, while they themselves have no development projects. They would be even more disturbed if they see vast areas of their land being taken
away” (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90). In response to Bourne’s concerns, the Ministry of Rural Development began to re-evaluate its plans for Mozambican refugees.

According to archival evidence, several changes in government policy necessitated that alternative land be allocated for Mozambican refugees who could not be accommodated at Nyimba Refugee Camp. The most significant policy change came in the area of agricultural development. Prior to 1972, the agricultural policy at Nyimba was one of communal farming, with heavy “mechanization and intensive use of fertilizers” as managed by the Ministry of Projects of the Ministry of Rural Development (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90). According to a letter from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, each refugee family would now be allocated an individual family farm plot, which was to be cultivated “traditionally” without the use of fertilizers or mechanization.

Due to this shift in policy, the Permanent Secretary concluded (in agreement with Bourne) that “the Refugee Settlement at Nyimba is now utterly inadequate”. In his letter, the Permanent Secretary addresses the fact that with less than 600 acres of arable land, Nyimba can only support 120 refugee families, at 5 acres/family, leaving over 800 refugee families in need of land (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).

In response to this “insoluble dilemma” (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90), numerous alternatives to Nyimba were pursued by various government offices. The first
such alternative is outlined in the following letter from the Planning Officer in Lusaka.

6 January 1972
From: J.D.B. Eerdamns – Planning Officer (Social Aspects), Lusaka
To: T.E. Bourne – Land Use Officer, Chipata
Subject: Nyimba Farm

After discussions with the Commissioner for Refugees, it appears that the position is as follows:

- The Ministry of Home Affairs prefers to concentrate refugees in large camps of at least 2,000 people for administrative reasons
- At Nyimba not enough arable lands is available to settle a large number of families
- It is not desirable to take over Trust land for settling refugees in areas like Nyimba where population density is relatively high
- It is not desirable for political reasons to “settle” refugees among people of the same linguistic and tribal grouping. The refugees may tend to forget their temporary status in the country.

For these reasons it is preferable to move all refugees from Nyimba and resettle them at Meheba, North Western Province, where about 90,000 acres are available. Each family will be given a 10 acre plot. Though no final decision has been made yet by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is hoped that at least part of the present Nyimba refugees will move to Meheba after this growing season. (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90)

Eerdamns’ response to Bourne is enlightening in many ways. To begin, his first assertion reinforces the preference of refugee-hosting governments to consolidate refugees into organized settlements. If we pause here to unpack the
idea of organized settlements, I think it quickly becomes clear that what is being advocated is the creation of highly governed spaces. Spaces in which the government can, with the assistance of its international partners, monitor and govern the activities and, most importantly, the movements of refugees within its borders. The second interesting aspect of the government's approach is found in Eerdamns' fourth point: that refugees should be settled away from hosts with whom they share cultural characteristics. The culmination of Eerdamns’ four basic assumptions leads him to advocate that Nyimba refugees be resettled to Meheba Refugee Camp, nearly 1,000km away in Western Province.

The second alternative to Nyimba Refugee Camp sought to find a suitable site for refugee-hosting within the province, signaling a repudiation of Eerdamns’ contention that refugees should be sent far from those with whom they share cultural traits. Zambian authorities were particularly concerned with movement between Nyimba and border regions and increasingly viewed Nyimba refugees as “militant supporters” and “carriers” for FRELIMO (NAZ EP5676 4/20/82). The following July 14, 1972 letter written by Immigration Officer Matalaka in response to a government directive to forcibly resettle a group of 350 Mozambican refugees to Nyimba explains some of these concerns in detail:

I interviewed the leaders of the groups on 13th July 1972, including the representatives of Frelimo, who explained to me that the reasons to enter the country was not to settle permanently in Zambia, but that their village in Mozambique was destroyed by Portuguese planes and four people were captured.
They were therefore advised by Freedom Fighters to seek shelter in Zambia.

(a) Before they entered the country, the Frelimo Leaders went to see Chief Mwanjawanthu in order to allow them to camp near the border and permission was granted to them.

(b) It is a problem to remove them to Nyimba Refugee Camp as they indicated that they are essential to Freedom Fighters in the area by supplying food and labour.

(c) They also emphasized that should they be away from Freedom Fighters, they will not be able to support the freedom fighters as they do now.

(d) These people are willing to go back to Mozambique, but it is a risk to them because the Portuguese soldiers are aware of their movements and their villages have on several times been bombed.

Please advise what action can be taken as soon as possible (NAZ EP5676 4/20/82)

My own field interviews with former soldiers confirmed that local border communities were “essential to the Freedom Fighters in the area by supplying food and labour” (NAZ EP 5676 4/20/82). The Eastern Province archival folder (NAZ EP5676) is filled with similar letters and correspondence concerning the security risks of Nyimba’s proximity to the border areas. One final example of this concern can be found in another letter written by Matakala on July 21, 1972. I have placed it here in its entirety because I believe that it demonstrates a number of instructive points concerning security, community, and resettlement away from Nyimba.
21 July 1972
During my tour of inspection in Chief Mwanjawanthu’s area in Petauke District and Chief Mwangala’s area in Chadiza District, I discovered that our people have their villages less than a mile from the boundary with Zambia and Mozambique where Freedom Fighters are operating [and] harassing the Portuguese. It appears that a day will come when Portuguese soldiers will retaliate by bombing villages and our people will continually subjected to air attacks, even at Nyimba.

Both chiefs mentioned above, Freedom Fighters, and their supporters mix with our people in beer parties. When I visited Chief Mwangala’s area 24 miles from Chadiza boma, I was informed that Frelimo are camping 5 miles inside Mozambique but their supporters, men and women including children, have camps in Zambia in separate groups. I failed to see their leaders. I was informed that all men went out assisting in transporting ammunition for freedom fighters. This case is similar to that of chief Mwanjawanthu’s area in Petauke District. In Chief Mwangala’s area Chadiza District, there is a hill 5 miles away which serves as a boundary and towards Zambia there is a thick bush with big and tall trees which makes difficult for Portuguese soldiers to track freedom fighters. I and my officers walked to the border but returned after being warned of landmines. We visited another [border] camp but it was deserted leaving only two small boys of 10 years old who were capable enough to answer few questions we asked them. One of the two boys revealed that his father had left in the morning to assist freedom fighters and would return in the evening.

On my return I was contemplating that women and children of those people are certainly not part and parcel of Frelimo and I fail to understand why they should be regarded as supporters of freedom fighters. I felt women and children should be
separated away from the area and by kept into a refugee camp where children will attend school rather than to leave them in the bush starving. (NAZ EP5676 4/20/82)

The push to close Nyimba was also motivated by security concerns and frustrations with local authorities. The District Secretary of Petauke, H.S. Lubinda, wrote to the Commissioner for Refugees and stated that “the present camp at Nyimba is a security risk” and poses a “danger” to administration of refugee relief operations (NAZ EP484 1/1/90). In the end, officials proposed that Nyimba refugees should be transferred to Sasare Farms, a farm block that had originally been planned to house Watchtower refugees from Malawi (NAZ EP484 1/1/90).

Throughout May 1973, government officials spent considerable time and energy (as evident in the archives by frequent correspondence) planning for the relocation to Sasare Farms. On January 21, 1974, Stokes confirmed the governments intentions to begin resettling Nyimba refugees to “Sasare Refugee Settlement” after the rains (NAZ EP484 1/1/90). This resettlement to Sasare and the creation of “Sasare Refugee Settlement” did not transpire as events in Mozambique began to deescalate throughout 1974, with the signing of a transfer of power agreement between Lisbon and Frelimo. On June 25, 1975, Samora Machel became the first president of a newly liberated and independent Mozambique.

With the de-escalation of violence, many of the self-settled and Nyimba-
settled refugees crossed back over the border and returned home. Upon their return, Nyimba-settled refugees maintained communication and trade with their Zambian hosts on the other side of the border. According to one Mozambican refugee, inter-border trade and communication resumed to levels that existed prior to the disruptions of colonialism:

People from Mozambique used to take meat and fish for sale to Zambia in the border area. After the sales, they could buy whatever they wanted, mostly salt, clothes, soap, ploughs, and other fancy things. Again from the Zambian border line people could take salt, some sugar, clothes, and soap to Mozambique to exchange for fish and meat. Sometimes ploughs could be taken in exchange for cattle in Mozambique. This trade became very famous so much that is made many people from Mfingoe and Maloera bomas in Mozambique friends with many people again from Petauke and Katete bomas in Zambia. Because of that, relationships were being made; marriages across the border became famous again” (RSC/MMZ/MZ-43 UKW – emphasis added).

Returning Nyimba-settled refugees also implemented a series of changes to their agricultural practices, changes they had encountered and learned while staying at Nyimba. For example, numerous informants signaled that the introduction of extensive plowing on the Mozambican side of the border only began when the Nyimba refugees returned from the camp with ploughs and other agricultural implements. Such practices point to another chapter in the wider Ukwimi story – that of how certain places in Mozambique evolved and
changed as a result of the presence, absence, and return of these refugee communities. Although this extended story into Mozambique is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is nonetheless significantly tied to the events which occurred in and around Ukwimi.

Conclusions

Although the creation and populating of a camp like Nyimba is often described in very objective, unproblematic language, my reading at the National Archives uncovered a much more complex and problematic story. The narrative documented in the archives at the very least points to the contested nature of such exercises. Interestingly, and contrary to the prevalent narrative of host-refugee tensions, the archives give evidence of the degree to which local Zambians, especially chiefs and headmen, and Mozambicans resisted efforts to be re-displaced to Nyimba. These types of unexpected partnerships and relationships are precisely the stories that go untold in our contemporary understandings of displacement.
CHAPTER SIX
EMPLACING UKWIMI REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

We know very well that that country [Mozambique] can never give us peace. It’s only in this country [Zambia] where we’ve found it. My parents and all my relatives died while we were watching. I saw my relatives getting shot. They slaughtered them like animals and then loaded them in a pickup truck like bags of maize or pigs while we were watching from afar. When the UN told us it’s time to go [at repatriation], we said we’re not going anywhere. Where would we go? Where we don’t have relatives or roots? The UN told us that if we remain there won’t be any help from anybody. The times of free food and free everything was over. We said we’ll manage. We’ll do the farming like we used to. This place is home.

(Field Interview with Mozambican refugee 2006)

As a civil war broke out in Mozambique and violent conflict intensified, many Mozambicans once again crossed the border to seek refuge with their Zambian relatives and friends. Just as they did during the liberation struggle, the majority of these refugees self-settled with the border villages, foregoing the direct assistance from official refugee relief operations. As was the case with the Nyimba resettlements, the GRZ once again faced considerable resistance to their efforts to relocate Mozambicans into organized settlements. This chapter examines the creation of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement in 1987 as a ‘new’ place, by unpacking the institutional practices involved in the planning and design of URS and tackling the evolving landscape and place-making that occurred.
**Resumption of Violence**

On June 25, 1975, Samora Machel became the first president of a newly liberated and independent Mozambique and FRELIMO now faced a period of transition from freedom fighters to ruling party leadership and bureaucracy. It quickly became apparent that the transition would not be a smooth or easy transformation. To illustrate some of the challenges facing FRELIMO, consider the following recollection by a village headman in the Chide area:

People were indeed happy that they were out of the bondage of the Portuguese; such things as live skinning and the whipping with Chamboko (thorned whip) stopped. However, by 1978 onwards, people saw that things became different and difficult, they could not even own a shop apart from the government. The government would not allow me to start a shop on my own without having to join hands with other persons (ten or more) even if these people had no money. This ruined most businesses. People at that stage thought Frelimo should be kicked out. During the time of Frelimo, the economy was deteriorating; no matter how much you sold the money you got could not buy anything (Juergensen 1994: 16).

Shortly after their victory over the Portuguese, FRELIMO faced opposition from an externally-funded, but internally-operating rebel force called *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO), under the leadership of Afonso Dhlakama. Although many historians (Isaacman 1987) dismissed RENAMO as South African or Rhodesian funded terrorists, Englund cautions
that “in actual fact, however, RENAMO could appear in very different guises in different parts of the country and at different points in time” (2002: 10).

According to one former soldier I interviewed no one really knew what it was they were fighting over:

As to why they began fighting each other...In every situation there is always a fight to prove who can be a man. But other than that, I wouldn't know the reasons behind the fighting – only themselves, those at the top positions – can know that answer

In my interviews with former RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers, both groups openly acknowledge using strategies and tactics of war to target and attack civilians. Consider the following narrative of a former FRELIMO soldier:

The Frelimo movement did not allow civilians to be involved in giving food to the rebels. Reports began to reach the Frelimo base that civilians are giving food to our enemies. Because of this lawlessness – that's how we turned against civilians.

It made our superiors realize that this war would be difficult for us because of the civilians. Now we must not choose – let us lapula [fire/attack] everyone. So that those who can run will find themselves in other countries. So that we remain just ourselves – just soldiers.

Then even RENAMO was surprised, saying ‘ahhh… they are killing even their own people, let us now wire them also.’ That's how the war fully began. An informer would come into the villages, do head counts, learn the way of life there, and take that back to the base. Slowly the war was spreading
– people were just joining the army anyhow. Our people are suffering/getting hurt too much. And people needed to be free to run to a country near to them. The door first opened in Zambia and people entered.

As stated earlier, this is not meant to be a comprehensive exposé on the formation of RENAMO or FRELIMO nor a dissection of the anatomy of a civil war. With regard to the wider concerns of this dissertation, I am more concerned with the lasting impacts of these politics of violence than with an exhaustive discussion of the geopolitical concerns, causes, justifications, and/or maneuvers of the RENAMO/FRELIMO war. Given that particular lens, I turn now to the impacts that this larger geopolitical game and politics of violence had on communities living in proximity to the Mozambique-Zambia border.

In his eloquent and persuasive ethnography of conflict and displacement in Mozambique, Stephen Lubkemann contends that “in Mozambique…migration was one of the most important and common ways people coped with violence and its effects” (2008: 2). As such, intensified internal conflict in Mozambique’s Tete Province precipitated an influx of 3,000 Mozambicans into Zambia in June 1985, seeking refuge from the ongoing and escalating violence on the Mozambican side of the border. Within a year, more than 22,000 Mozambicans had “poured” into Zambia, spontaneously settled themselves along the border areas (Malatsi et al 1987: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 MAL; Beyani 1986; Mijere 1988; Wilson and Shumba 1990 RSC/MMZ/MZ-43
Just as in the decade before, spontaneous self-settlement in the border areas made sense to the Mozambicans due to the artificial nature of the boundary in the first place, the cultural and historical affinity of the communities on either side of the border, and Mozambicans experiences in the Zambian border regions as refugees less than 10 years before during their liberation struggle. Many of these Mozambicans self-settled with their relatives on the Zambian side of a colonially constructed border. In her account of their movements at the time, one Mozambican refugee woman reflected on this feeling of familiarity in Eastern Province. According to one Mozambican refugee I interviewed:

First I settled in Chikalaba [in Zambia]. We settled in some relative’s village. The way we live is different to here [refugee settlement]. We had villages from both sides of the border. The borderline did not make sense to us. We could settle in both areas if you want. So when I started off from there [Mozambique] to Chikalaba [Zambia], I knew I had an already existing home there [Zambia].

Consider the following photographs of the Mozambique-Zambia border (Photograph 4 and Photograph 5). What you are seeing in these images is the way the border between Mozambique and Zambia appears when you move away from controlled-border crossings. As you can clearly see in both images, the probability of this “border” holding significant meaning for local people is
unlikely. Nearly every Mozambican refugee I interviewed, both those still living in the camp and those who had returned to Mozambique, shared her sentiment and conceptualization of the Zambian border villages as “existing homes” and the irrelevance of the Mozambique-Zambia border to their conceptualizations of home.

Rising security concerns about the risks posed to both Zambians and refugees along the Mozambican border led to discussions about resettling
refugees further from the border region. In order to address these challenges (both perceived and real), the government, in conjunction with UNHCR, began planning for the construction of a refugee settlement in Eastern Province (Mijere 1988; Black et al 1990; Anderson 1991). As it had 10 years earlier, the GRZ insisted on resettling refugees into an organized settlement rather than continue to tolerate self-settlement along the border.

The basic assumption that resettlement away from border areas and into organized (controlled) settlements would “provide greater security for the refugees and ...offer them an opportunity for self-reliance” permeated the discourse throughout the planning period (Anderson 1991: 4; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996). In addition to these public discussions concerning the benefits of organized resettlement, Chapter Three also illustrated the financial motivation of economically struggling, developing countries to lift some of the financial burdens of informal, self-settled refugee-hosting by passing responsibility (legal and economic) onto the international community, via the UNHCR and its implementing partners. The overwhelming security concerns, coupled with severe financial burdens – required GRZ to solicit the UNHCR to establish a new refugee camp in Eastern Province.

Site Selection and Needs Assessment

By June 1986, GRZ began pushing UNHCR to once again transfer

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Mozambicans from the border regions to a planned refugee camp, once again citing security concerns in the border regions as an argument against the self-settlement of refugees. Though firmly committed to the resettlement of refugees into an organized settlement, GRZ did not entertain the idea of reopening Nyimba Refugee Camp. Without the detailed history of the Nyimba operation provided in Chapter 5, the decision to create an entirely new refugee settlement instead of using Nyimba would not make much sense. But, given the deteriorating stability of the Nyimba camp towards the end of its existence and the recorded desire to close Nyimba as early as 1972, it should not come as a surprise that GRZ authorities were not keen to re-open Nyimba as an organized settlement, especially given its problematic history and its proximity to the border.

As the Nyimba area was not an option, the GRZ proposed that the new camp be located near Sasare Farms in Msanzala constituency, Petauke District. In response to GRZ demands for the organized settlement of all self-settled Mozambican refugees, the UNHCR requested the demarcation of approximately 5,000 hectares of land in order to settle the estimated 10,000 Mozambicans from the border region. From July 10 to July 13, 1986, UNHCR representatives, together with Petauke District authorities, made a preliminary site assessment in the proposed area near Sasare Farms.

Almost immediately upon arrival, it became clear that the local
leadership did not support the demarcation of their land for the purpose of refugee resettlement. To begin, the District Council delineated only 500 of the requested 5,000 hectares. Msanzala leaders made tentative commitments to delineate more land in the future, but only “if necessary” (Schelhas 1986: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH). However, even a very cursory glance at the site revealed that any “necessary” expansion would be problematic and highly unlikely given that the 500 hectare area was bound on one side by a prison and on the other by Zambia National Service (ZNS) land. Additionally, both the ZNS and prison authorities strongly objected to the formation of the camp, claiming it to be a potential “security hazard” (Schelhas 1986: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH). Perhaps the most decisive blow against the prospects of opening a refugee settlement at the Sasare location was struck by the reaction of the local community who voiced “intensive opposition” (Schelhas 1986: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).

After the on-site failures of the UNHCR at the Sasare location, GRZ proposed the Ukwimi area as a potential site for the new refugee settlement. Like Sasare, Ukwimi is also located in Zambia’s Eastern Province – 500 km from the capital of Lusaka, 70 km north of the district center Petauke, and more than 100 km from the Mozambican border. According to Black et al, Ukwimi was identified for a refugee settlement “not on grounds of ecological or economic suitability, but because it was nearly uninhabited” (1990: 8). It was
not, however, completely uninhabited. Prior to the placement of the refugee settlement, the area was inhabited by approximately 1,000 people organized into 20 villages (Map 5).

According to Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye, former Ukwimi Scheme Manager under LWF, the authorities relied on past experiences from other refugee settlements in Zambia when planning Ukwimi:

From the two lessons they [UNHCR, GRZ, and implementing partners] had learned – the first one removing the indigenous people [Mayukwayukwa in 1968] and the second one settling them in
isolation [Meheba 1971] – they said this one we are going to settle them together with the people.

It is this sentiment of integration which dominated the discourse on Ukwimi and can also be viewed as a precursor to many of the ideas that drive the Zambia Initiative, which we will examine in more detail later.

Although the Ukwimi area is located within the same constituency (Msanzala) as the Sasare Farms area, government and UNHCR negotiations with the local Ukwimi community were not met with the kind of organized, “intensive opposition” that characterized the failed negotiations at Sasare Farms. Officials reported that the small local population at Ukwimi seemed to be “quite favourable” to refugee resettlement in their area as it promised to provide them “better access to markets, work and social services…for which they usually have to walk long distances” (Schelhas 1986: 31 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).

Although I found nothing in my research to dispute that the local Ukwimi community felt “quite favourable” about the creation of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement, I strongly believe that ease of negotiations at Ukwimi was not as simple as official reports suggest. The ease of negotiations at Ukwimi was also the result of a general lack of leadership from within the community. At Sasare Farms, officials had to negotiation directly with the Chief and his ndunas, but at Ukwimi no such clear leadership existed at the time. From my extensive interviews with local villages inside the settlement, as well as Zambian villages just on the outside edge of the scheme, it is clear that officials...
requested “permission” from individual headmen and headwomen on a village-by-village level. Consider the following accounts:

They came here to ask if they could use this land to keep their people since they were coming from a place of heavy war, saying “So we’ve been wondering where we could put our people and that’s what’s led us to your area.” My relative, Mr. Chibaba, said “You can come and use my area for as long as you want.” The agreement was signed between Mr. Chibaba, the Boma, and the UN people. That’s how the refugees were brought here (URS border village interviewee)

Q: Did anyone come here to ask about bringing refugees to settle?
A: They asked themselves there in the Boma. Us? Well, we were just surprised to see that we have visitors. (URS village interviewee)

We were agreed because we saw the refugees could share. *Tidzadya nao* [We shall eat with them].

Although at the surface this may seem more complicated than negotiating with a single Chief (as was the case at Sasare), I would argue that this particular negotiating technique worked to the benefit of the officials. Let me explain. Since the British government abolished the native court for Chief Ukwimi in the 1930s and the entire chiefdom in the 1950s, the Ukwimi area has had a series of chieftainship wrangles. Because of this, when officials were “negotiating” for use of land in Ukwimi they were not negotiating with any individuals who had direct, uncontested authority to make any such decision
over the land. It was an entirely different exercise than the negotiations at Sasare because at Ukwimi no clear authority existed. The difference it seems is one of “intensive opposition” and a reaction that is “quite favourable”.

Unlike the prior approaches to refugee settlement at Nyimba and in western Zambia, this time GRZ and UNHCR made the decision to conduct a thorough site assessment in Ukwimi, as well as schedule interviews with Mozambicans along the border in order to better anticipate their needs and expectations. As with refugee settlements throughout the world, the planning stages of the new settlement involved numerous participants from global and national institutions and organizations. However, no evidence was found as to the participation (or lack of) by the potential host community, other than the initial “negotiations”.

The original site assessment, conducted by planning consultant B. Schelhas, resulted in a number of very critical recommendations and conclusions concerning the location, land availability, soil suitability, water resources, site accessibility, agricultural potential, district development, refugee receptiveness, and budget projections. A detailed reading of Schelhas’ assessment is instructive not only in illustrating the institutional processes at work in the creation of organized refugee settlements, but also in foreshadowing some of the particular challenges that refugees would encounter during their stay at Ukwimi.
With regards to the proposed site location, Schelhas emphasized Ukwimi’s distance from the Mozambique border (approximately 150km) as an inherently positive characteristic. This characterization of distance from the border as a net positive should not come as a surprise given the historical context and archival discussion of Nyimba’s border proximity as an inherent negative. The second aspect of Schelhas’ site assessment revolved around the question of whether the proposed site could support the number of refugees in need of resettlement. In order to tackle this very critical question, Schelhas relied on a detailed soil survey conducted in the area. The soil survey identified 13 separate soil mapping units, each with varying degrees of fertility and agricultural potential (Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soil Mapping Unit</th>
<th>Highly Suitable</th>
<th>Moderately Suitable</th>
<th>Conditionally Suitable</th>
<th>Unsuitable</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>H</td>
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<td>1869</td>
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<td>U1</td>
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<td>U2</td>
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<td>321</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1S</td>
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<td></td>
<td>625</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>1183</td>
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<td>423</td>
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<td>G3B</td>
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<td>2025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Hectares</td>
<td>3411</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>5903</td>
<td>2190</td>
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<td>as %</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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</table>
As mentioned earlier, the UNHCR indicated a need for 5,000 hectares of land for the resettlement of Mozambican refugees (when planning for the Sasare Farms location). Given the soil variability and infertility at Ukwimi, Schelhas’ report concluded that the request of 5,000 hectares of land would “not be sufficient” (1986: 17 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).

Based on his reading and interpretation of the soil survey, Schelhas called for a significant expansion in the amount of land being considered for refugee settlement. In fact, Schelhas estimated that the District Council would need to delineate an additional 7,000 hectares of land in order to provide enough fertile land for a maximum of 10,000 refugees. Although this meant more than doubling original projections, the District Council agreed to the expansion. Of the now proposed 12,000 hectares, approximately 1/3 was moderately to very suitable for agricultural production, while approximately 47% of the soils were defined as barely suitable for agricultural development (Anderson 1991).

According to this finding, the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that Ukwimi be developed as two separate entities, as households assigned to the sandier soils would require larger plots (Anderson 1991). Although Schelhas advised that 2 hectares per household would be sufficient, he warned that in order for his estimates regarding carrying capacity to be correct, district authorities needed to ensure that “no further suitable land will be occupied by
With regards to water resources in the Ukwimi area, the site assessment identified the Lusandwa and Kasangazi rivers as the two main sources of surface water. However, neither river is able to provide a year-round water supply as both dry up during the dry season (from May to August). Other methods for securing water resources, such as groundwater or dams, were non-existent in the area at the time of assessment. Schelhas suggested that groundwater drilling and dam construction would be necessary in order to adequately provide the refugee population with a secure, year-round water supply.

In addition to securing and/or developing water resources, the report also tackled the issue of site accessibility. At the time of assessment, the Ukwimi
area’s only link to Petauke (and to the Great East Road) was via an 80km dirt road, which proved entirely inaccessible for the duration of the rainy season. Schelhas’ report advised GRZ and UNHCR that not only would that 80km road link need to be realigned, grated, and graveled, but an additional 40km of service roads inside the settlement would also need to be opened, as well as 2 bridges and at least 20 culverts.

Aside from the development of road infrastructure, the resettlement of Mozambican refugees to Ukwimi also required development in other areas of infrastructure. For example, the initial site assessment budgeted for all of the following infrastructure developments:

- 6 administrative office blocks
- 3 medium cost houses
- 4 low cost houses
- 1 general store
- 1 equipment store
- 2 machine sheds
- 1 fuel tank
- 4 to 5 schools (for estimated 3,000 children)
- 1 rural health center

Schelhas also reported that the overall settlement project should be implemented in three separate phases. Phase I (Planning) included all of the planning and preparatory activities involved in constructing the basic infrastructure needed at the camp. The actual resettlement of border refugees to Ukwimi was scheduled to occur beginning April 1987 as part of Phase 2 (Implementation). Schelhas made the very critical (and political) assumption
that GRZ and UNHCR could begin Phase 3 (Repatriation) by May 1990.

Given this projected four year duration, the initial assessment also outlined the staffing requirements required to construct, operate, and maintain a refugee settlement at Ukwimi. Assuming his recommendations regarding the development of Ukwimi were followed, Schelhas ultimately concluded that the idea of refugee resettlement into the Ukwimi area would “fit very well into the development plan of the district, in particular with respect to the agricultural sector, infrastructure development, and social services” (1986: 34). What we will see as the story unfolds are the ways in which many of Schelhas’ basic assumptions proved to be false, as well as the manner in which numerous institutional actors essentially ignored many of Schelhas’ most critical recommendations – which begs the question, why even go through the motions of a preliminary site assessment?

Approximately three months after Schelhas conducted the initial site assessment at Ukwimi, the UNHCR financed a series of field interviews with self-settled Mozambican refugees along the border. Save the Children Foundation (SCF) on the behalf of the UNHCR and GRZ interviewed Mozambicans along the border in order to provide a preliminary needs assessment survey, with the explicit intention of assessing refugee needs and expectations and preparing self-settled refugees for resettlement. According the authors, the SCF study was meant to ‘illuminate on the refugees’ overall profile
and assist in the development of appropriate, realistic, and specific places for facilities and services to be provided prior to and during refugee resettlement” (Malatsi et al 1987: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 MAL).

The SCF study is both rare and useful to the overall concern of this project. It is rare because it was one of the very first (and few) studies of a refugee community undertaken prior to their resettlement so as to “anticipate their fears, aspirations, and needs in advance” (Malatsi et al 1987: v RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 MAL). It is also very useful to this project because it captured the voices of these refugees prior to their resettlement at Ukwimi and provides a glimpse of how they processed their experiences as refugees while displaced. It is also a major secondary source affirming the sentiment expressed in the opening epigraph that Ukwimi eventually became “home” for many of these refugees (See epigraph).

My own fieldwork and interviews provide insight as to how the time of resettlement is remembered, whereas the SCF report captured not the memories of these individuals, but rather their hopes and fears for the future at a very critical point in the overall narrative. In addition to contributing these important voices, the survey also provides some baseline data concerning the demographic composition, attitudes, and expectations of the Mozambican refugees who were ultimately resettled at Ukwimi.

SCF conducted approximately 1,000 interviews along the border from
December 1 to December 20, 1986. The refugee population around the time of the interviews was approximately 23,000. According to SCF, 47% of respondents crossed the border into Zambia sometime prior to December 1985 (over one year prior), while the rest of the respondents (53%) had arrived within the last year. The overwhelming majority (89%) of respondents lived in rural village settlements prior to their displacement. Only 7% indicated that they lived in isolation from others and only 2% had previously lived in urban areas. As such, 67% of the men and 85% of the women surveyed categorized themselves as farmers by occupation. The 2nd and 3rd most represented professions were fishermen and artisans respectively. The majority of the artisans were engaged in carpentry, bricklaying, welding, and/or weaving.

I am not presenting this type of information concerning these self-settled refugees merely because it is available. I believe that this type of data goes some distance in reinforcing one of my central themes – that refugees are not nearly as “stripped of their humanity” as a lot of refugee research presumes. Whether fishermen, carpenters, or weavers, these refugees carried their particular skills and knowledge along with them when they crossed into the Zambian countryside. In fact,

...some of the skills which people brought with them from Mozambique were useful for earning income...Men were able to sell the traditional mats and baskets which they wove. Some women were skilled at making clay pots which they sold. These women would accept cash or, in some cases, the...
amount of maize it took to fill the finished pot. Men who felled trees often fired their wood to make charcoal for sale. Both men and women were able to earn money through casual labor (Anderson 1991: 13).

Ignoring this very important aspect of refugees’ humanity by assuming that refugees come to the table empty-handed very often becomes a source of frustration for refugees, their hosts, and those tasked with managing organized settlements.

The data in the SCF survey confirmed the continued existence and maintenance of extended family ties and relationships between Mozambicans and Zambians on both sides of the border – ties that had predated colonial boundaries and had been strengthened during Mozambique’s liberation struggle. A majority (54%) of respondents indicated that they had relatives on the Zambian side of the border. However, when asked whether or not these relatives gave them any assistance, a larger percentage (65%) reported that they received no assistance from their extended family. Approximately 20% of the respondents acknowledged receiving food and clothing from their Zambian relatives. The majority (63%) of self-settled refugees engaged in piece work (day labor) on local farms to make ends meet and provide for their unmet needs.

Although the surveyed refugees openly conveyed the day-to-day struggles they encountered as self-settled refugees, they also openly voiced their general opposition to the idea of being resettled into an organized settlement far
from the border. Many of the same sentiments and reactions to organized settlement during the Nyimba era popped out quite boldly in the SCF interviews and interviewee commentary. In fact, negative memories and experiences during their stay at Nyimba 10 years earlier were significant reasons for many of the self-settled to express their distain for resettlement to Ukwimi, or resettlement anywhere for that matter.

However, not everyone in the border area was resistant to being resettled at Ukwimi. One Mozambican refugee still living at URS described to me how she became convinced to resettle at Ukwimi:

The Red Cross brought us here. They came to ask whoever was interested in coming to this camp. They promised us that if we come we’d be given each a piece of land where we’d live freely.

We were the first ones to come. Others refused to come here because they heard stories that this place was full of wild animals. Stories were that there were lions and plenty snakes that you wouldn’t even come out of the car.

As I said earlier, these people are liars saying if they go give you free food and things they will keep you like prisoners.

So some of us, we didn’t care – we just wanted to come and experience it ourselves. When we came here it was fun to note that all that was said was not true. Along the way to Ukwimi the Red Cross people passed through the nearby villages assuring us that we won’t be lonely. That’s why we came here to settle. And we were the first bus.
The SCF survey is also instructive because the interviewers asked the refugees to express their own views and preferences for resettlement at Ukwimi. So although the general sentiment along the border was against resettlement, the SCF interviewers solicited a series of “what if” types of scenarios from the refugees in order to gauge their preferences with respect to the organization and operation of the new refugee settlement. It appears from the SCF report that the refugee respondents cooperated in this exercise by answering the questions, regardless of their expressed desire to remain along the border. For example, when asked to choose from four settlement pattern options for their new settlement, 75% said they would prefer to have their houses built in rows but far apart, 17% chose a scattered settlement pattern, 4.7% expressed a preference for a circular settlement pattern, and 2.8% preferred rows near one another.

When asked who they would prefer to have as neighbors in the new settlement, a large percentage (35%) indicated a desire to be settled near any “close relative”. When SCF asked about what type of leadership structure the refugees wanted at Ukwimi, the majority (47%) indicated a preference for a traditional leadership system, while 40% expressed a preference for political party leadership.

Throughout the SCF interview process, it became obvious that the majority of the refugees were already well aware of the plan to resettle them to Ukwimi Refugee Settlement. Due to this, SCF decided to question the refugees
about their intentions to remain in Ukwimi “permanently”. Only 15% of respondents indicated a desire to remain at Ukwimi permanently, while over 60% said no and 24% were unsure.

As we will see in the next section, Ukwimi planners did not necessarily incorporate the pre-resettlement preferences of these informants when it came to a number of the issues they were soliciting opinions on. Because of this disjuncture between the questions solicited/preferences expressed during the preliminary needs assessment and the operational realities of URS, numerous Mozambican refugees I spoke with expressed a belief that the preliminary needs assessment was simply a façade, meant to give border refugees a false sense of input/control over their eventual (and inevitable) resettlement to Ukwimi in an attempt to alleviate resistance to resettlement. Though I have no way of either confirming nor denying their suspicions, the fact that twenty years later many of the refugees so clearly remember the discrepancies between what they expressed to SCF representatives and what they observed and experienced upon arrival at URS is testament to their overall disillusionment with the preliminary needs assessment.

After completion of both preliminary reports, the UNHCR and GRZ signed a tripartite agreement with Lutheran World Federation (LWF) calling for and committing to the relocation of 10,000 to 15,000 Mozambicans by December 1987 (Anderson 1991; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996).
The agreement formally laid out the basic framework for establishing a 150km² Mozambican refugee settlement named Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS).

Adopting the recommendation set out by Schelhas, the original Basic Agreement planned for a phase-out of aid by 1991 (Mijere 1988; Black 1990; Anderson 1991). While the UNHCR provided about 80% of the total project funds to its implementing partners, LWF took the lead role in settlement management, responsible for “preparing for the arrival of the refugees, the development of settlement infrastructure, and the promotion of agricultural self-sufficiency” (Anderson 1991: 6; Mijere 1988).

Under the Basic Agreement, several other implementing partners were also assigned specific tasks in relation to the operation and management of Ukwimi. The UNHCR hired SCF to organize and direct community development within URS. The Zambian Red Cross Society took responsibility for the transportation of refugees from the border villages to Ukwimi. AustCare, based out of Australia, supplemented the training/community development efforts of SCF. And, finally, *Medecins sans Frontieres* (France) worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Health in developing and providing health services throughout URS.

In their role as lead implementing agency, LWF hired three foreign specialists – a Project Director, an agricultural specialist, and a civil engineer – to begin the process of transforming the Ukwimi area into a model refugee
settlement scheme. LWF’s choice of Project Director, Jere Getachew, came to the table with extensive experience in planning and managing agricultural resettlement schemes in his native country of Ethiopia, as well as in other African countries. According to all accounts, Getachew arrived on the ground at Ukwimi with little more than a tent and some very basic supplies and immediately began “consulting with and discussing with people” (Getachew 2006). Getachew strongly advocated that when it came to URS “our role was not to impose what we know to those people, but to do things both ways”, acknowledging that “top-down has never worked and even this [bottom-up] struggles”.

However, from the very beginning LWF felt tied to the “top-down” recommendation of a 1991 phase-out deadline which meant that the some “staff felt that to meet this deadline, they would have to complete the Settlement’s infrastructural development prior to the arrival of the majority of refugees” (Anderson 1991: 7). Utilizing local labor, LWF threw itself into priority construction projects, such as roads, wells, and a temporary clinic/reception area. Planners imposed a new layout and toponymy throughout the settlement, dramatically changing the physical landscape of the Ukwimi area (Map 6).

The initial 16 villages were numbered and organized in rows along the main road, contrary to the preferences expressed in the initial needs assessment study. Villages were grouped under an administrative unit referred to as a
satellite. According to the planning documents, each satellite would be equipped with a school, health clinic, warehouse, grinding mill, and cooperative shop in its headquarters. When I arrived in 2006, the changes in the landscape that occurred in 1986 were still very much visible. For example, each satellite still had a sign posted with the numbers and names of each village within the satellite (Photograph 7). As the photograph demonstrates, the institutional actors had considerable influence over alterations in the physical landscape. Several villages were named after UNHCR and NGO staff – Bob White, Don Moss, J.
Getachew. The disjuncture between such naming mechanisms and the lived realities/place meanings of the local communities explains why such village names never caught on. The residents of URS chose then and continue to choose to refer to the villages by their numbers rather than their names.

Opening & Operating Ukwimi Refugee Settlement

On May 18, 1987, the first bus of Mozambican refugees arrived at the newly constructed Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS) in Petauke District,
Eastern Province, Zambia. According to one Mozambican who arrived on that first bus, “it was a bush when I entered”. Another recalled that there were no permanent structures – no houses, no offices. We were kept in tents. The only thing which looked permanent was a small wooden clinic. The offices were being built as we arrived.

URS’s official opening came two days later on May 20th with an opening ceremony (Mijere 1988). The official statement by the Government of Zambia evoked President Kaunda’s humanism by declaring “even though our finances and personnel have been taxed to the full, we have no option but to shelter our persecuted brothers and sisters in our traditional spirit of humanism” (Beyani 1986: 9). While appeals to humanism make for good newspaper coverage and a great public relations strategy for GRZ, I believe that it is quite clear from both archival and oral evidence that the GRZ’s greatest motivation to shelter their neighbors had much more to do with geopolitics and security than Kaunda’s loosely defined and often arbitrarily applied philosophy of humanism. In fact, as outlined in Chapter 4, Kaunda was plagued with internal opposition and in need of demonstrating his understanding of and control over complex geopolitical questions.

Upon arrival at Ukwimi, settlement staff allocated each head of household a temporary tent, as well as tools, seeds, fertilizer, food, household items (cooking pots, blankets, clothes), a homestead plot, and 2 hectares farming
we didn’t stay for long in the tents. When we came in May, we stayed in tents for two weeks. Then they gave us plots. While you’re staying in the tents, one was expected to start building our own houses on the plot. The tents were just used for arrivals and for two weeks.

In my interview with Getachew he confirmed that upon arrival refugees were allocated tents which they lived in while constructing their own houses at their assigned plots.

Contrary to the refugee preferences expressed during the needs assessment exercise, the homestead plots were clustered into village arrangements and farming plots were allocated according to date of arrival. For those arriving on the initial bus that meant they received farming plots close to their homestead plots, while later arrivals received farming plots at further distances from their homestead plots. This particular method for allocating plots frustrated refugees for a number of reasons. Most frequently, refugees expressed their desire to be allocated plots next to or near their relatives or friends who may have arrived at an earlier date, but the allocation method did not leave room for such adjustments (Black et al 1990; Anderson 1991).

Disagreement and varied interpretations over who qualified as a “head of household” also complicated the allocation procedures. As seen in other refugee
environments, considerable confusion – and in some cases manipulation – surrounded the definition of the designation “head of household”. The designation appeared to be rather arbitrarily applied, often with considerably inequitable consequences for various families. For example, in the case of polygamous marriages, some husbands (as “head of household”) were assigned a single 2 hectare farming plot regardless of the number of wives involved. In other polygamous arrangements, each wife was allocated her own 2 hectare farming plot. According to Anderson (1990), some refugee men married additional wives in an attempt (albeit not always successful) to increase their land holdings.

In addition to these allocation problems, URS administrators entirely ignored the advice of Schelhas and the Ministry of Agriculture by allocating each household 2 hectare farming plots, regardless of the plot location within the settlement. As detailed in the previous section, both Schelhas and the Ministry had suggested that households located in sandy soils would need larger allocations, but URS administrators did not follow the soil survey when allocating plots and left “almost no land free for those households allocated on bad patches of soil” (Black et al 1990: 8). Judging from the lack of application of their recommendations, it appears as though the extensive preparatory work of Schelhas and SCF was not seriously incorporated into the operational realities of URS.
Aside from GRZ’s geopolitical and national security concerns, the UNHCR and its implementing partners also placed their unique stamp on the operation and management of Ukwimi. Each of the international actors involved in the design of URS were keenly interested in proving that an organized refugee settlement such as Ukwimi could reach self-sufficiency and break the ubiquitous “dependency syndrome” observed in other camp environments across the continent.

In order to push this program of self-sufficiency from the very beginning, refugees were informed immediately upon arrival that they would “only be eligible for food aid and other free inputs for two agricultural seasons” (Kantamati 1990: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-51 KAN). According to Getachew,

> The policy at Ukwimi is to reduce subsidies every year. Thus in their first year, refugees receive 100% of their food requirements. In their second and third year, they receive 50% and 25% respectively. The refugees are expected to fend for themselves in their fourth year at Ukwimi” (Mijere 1988: 13; Personal Interview 2006)

This window for achieving self-sufficiency was based upon what the institutional actors defined as the “average family” – calculated as two adults and three children (Black et al 1990). As you can probably anticipate, the majority of Mozambican refugee families were anything except ‘average’, often including elderly, disabled, sick, and orphaned members. Kantamati’s 1990 study provides a snapshot of the actual, lived realities of the refugee families
living in Ukwimi Villages 1 – 16. For example, 44% of these families must cope with at least one or more vulnerable characteristics, 21% of the families are single-family, female-headed households, and more than 10% care for four or more dependent children. This is quite a stretch from the two-parent, nuclear family assumed by international actors. This erroneous assumption also had very real consequences for URS refugees and negatively affected institutional actors’ ability to accurately plan and anticipate potential shortcomings. As Kantamati notes, LWF made its calculations concerning self-sufficiency based solely on mathematical equations involving total acreage under cultivation and overall crop sales, “without attention to individual differences in household labour supply and capacity to produce” (1990: 2). Ultimately this meant that many of LWF’s expectations and calculations were incorrect and many of the needs of the refugee population went unmet.

Because much of the infrastructural development was incomplete when the first buses began arriving at URS, many of the initial resettled refugees were employed by LWF for construction purposes. In fact, approximately 80% of the construction workers were refugees, while 20% were local Zambians (Anderson 1991). At the peak of activity, LWF employed approximately 300 men in both skilled and unskilled wage labor (Anderson 1991). Over the course of two years, LWF constructed all of the following within the original 150km² designated as URS:
• 4 schools (plus teacher’s housing)
• police station
• guest house
• office block
• 4 clinics
• warehouses/grinding mills in each satellite
• staff housing in Ukwimi A and Ukwimi B
• at least 1 borehole in each village (some 3 or 4)
• 3 dams to address water shortages

The following series of photographs provide images of the infrastructure built in Ukwimi at the time (Photograph 8, 9, 10, 11).

For its part in fostering and enabling community development, SCF outlined the following mandates:

• Promote refugee self-management via the formation of village development committees, clubs, and cooperative societies
• Assist refugees in identifying and establishing self-help projects according to their own priorities
• Provide necessary training skills and capital to enable the groups to achieve objectives which they themselves set (Anderson 1991: 9)

In order to achieve each of these mandates, SCF hired an American Project Director and four Zambian social development assistants (Anderson 1991). As with the physical landscape, the implementing partners brought in their own models of community and social organization. The settlement was
organized into three administrative levels – village development committees (VDCs), satellite development committees (SDCs), and the central development committee (CDC) – in an attempt to decentralize the provision of services (LWF 1989). The VDC was comprised of elected leaders in each village and the following sub-committees: food and agriculture, crisis and action, water and
sanitation, education, and women. Some VDCs also added sports and/or cultural sub-committees to the list. The SDC was, in turn, a collection of the leadership of ten to fifteen villages (and their VDCs). The SDC membership consisted of the following representation:

1. Chairpersons and secretaries from each VDC within the satellite
2. Two representatives from women’s clubs
3. One representative from other clubs
4. One representative from small-scale enterprises
5. One representative from health services
6. The chairperson of the Parent-Teacher Association
7. Chairperson and secretary from the Zambian villages in the satellite

By the end of 1989, Ukwimi’s 47 villages comprised 4 satellites and each satellite had a school, clinic, warehouse, grinding mill, co-operative shop, and at least one borehole (Anderson 1991).

At the highest level, the CDC was regarded as the main planning body of the entire settlement and was comprised of the following members:

1. Chairpersons and secretaries of each SDC
2. Sub-chief Sandwe under whose supervision Ukwimi fell
3. Ward chairperson and secretary

All of this social reorganization was aimed at fostering an environment
of self-sufficiency and local integration. For example, Zulu-Syamujaye, one-time RSZ office and eventual LWF Project Director at Ukwimi, reflected on her initial understanding of the imposition of URS in the area at the time

I used to go to Ukwimi as a Program Officer when Ukwimi was just opened. So I was part and parcel of the opening of all those satellites. When they were handing over Mzumwa – you know it’s called New Mzumwa School because the school was there before. So LWF, together with UNHCR, they just renovated it. But all those Haugen, Kasangazi, all those new ones [schools]… Those were never there.

That place was a jungle. Between Ukwimi A – there’s a land that is between Ukwimi A, Sopa, and Kasangazi – up to now no crop can grow. You know the place? Njoka [Snake] Road… It was a jungle. People never lived there. There was those small, small villages I don’t even know how they survived. And it’s very close to the game management area. And they were just setting up expanding Mfuwe at the time… Actually, do you know that the setting up of the refugee camp there saved some of those villages? … because they were going to evacuate them and make it part of…[Mfuwe]. Because they really wanted to expand that. There was very little activity going on… human life was not so rife there.

In a follow up interview, Zulu-Syamujaye, who is now the Permanent Secretary for Eastern Province, reflected a bit more carefully on how the implementing partners’, such as LWF or the UNHCR, quest for integration had adverse effects on the local community. According to Zulu-Syamujaye,

What happened was the indigenous people –
because they wanted to share the social amenities— they just kept quiet about their own headmanships. They became a part of Village #4, Village #1… Now what the government and UNHCR and implementing partners like ourselves wanted to promote was unity— but in doing so we destroyed the culture of the indigenous people.

In addition to some initial anxieties and tensions between the refugees and their hosts, institutional reports as well as field conversations revealed a considerable degree of tension between institutional actors at URS, particularly between LWF and SCF. According to Anderson, SCF staff was “unhappy” from the very beginning with LWF’s emphasis on a fixed timetable for withdrawal.

From their broad experience in community organization and development, they were convinced that encouraging people to manage their own lives and to develop necessary leadership skills required more time. They also felt that training in various other income-generating skills could not be done according to the tight timetable (1991: 10).

LWF and SCF also disagreed on the acceptable use and role of the VDCs. SCF staff had a general sense that LWF used VDCs to communicate settlement-wide messages and elicit labor needs; whereas SCF staff envisioned the role of the VDCs to much more integral to the operation of the settlement, whereby VDCs could be empowered to explore their own ideas, agendas, and visions concerning the development of URS (Kantamati 1990 RSC/MMZ/MZ-51 KAN; Anderson 1991). For example, in early 1989, SCF assigned staff
members to work with the VDCs to establish and develop an agricultural co-operative with URS in order to sell agricultural products through the Zambian Cooperative Union (ZCU) in the belief that a relationship with ZCU could provide refugees market access and an income source. Within 2 months, 200 refugees joined the Ukwimi Farmers Association (UFA) cooperative and by December 1990 UFA membership was at 1,032 (Anderson 1991) (Photograph 12). This was the type of activity SCF wanted to see VDCs engage in, not simply to “carry water” for LWF. SCF and LWF also disagreed on the role of waged labor with the settlement. LWF paid wages to refugees in exchange for labor, such as construction. SCF, in contrast, relied on volunteer labor in its attempts to foster a sense of community identity.

As mentioned earlier, in the original Basic Agreement, the UNHCR and the GOZ agreed to and budgeted for the relocation of 10,000 to 15,000
Mozambicans by December 1987. However, by May 1988, only 3,000 refugees had been settled at Ukwimi (Anderson 1991). Numerous delays at the institutional level contributed to the slow pace of resettlement, as well as delays on the ground in the development of infrastructure (Anderson 1991). As the process dragged on, GRZ began to pressure the UNHCR to speed up the relocation process as they faced incursions into Zambia by RENAMO and FRELIMO.

A decision was made to move as many refugees in as short a time as possible, increasing the numbers to be settled in Ukwimi from the original 15,000 to about 23,000…Virtually the entire population along the border (Anderson 1991: 5)

The stepped-up speed and scale of resettlement meant that the original 150km$^2$ allocated for URS would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the “entire population along the border”. The UNHCR secured an additional 150km$^2$ adjacent to the original settlement and began construction of what became called “Ukwimi B”. By 1989, villages 48 through 64 of Ukwimi B had been constructed, settled, and organized into two new satellites. And what had originally been planned for 10,000 refugees quickly became to home to nearly 30,000 Mozambican refugees (Photograph 13).
In fact, in the span of only two years, the population of Ukwimi equaled that of Meheba Refugee Camp, a camp which had been in existence for 18 years. With all of this expansion came dramatic changes in the physical landscape of Ukwimi, as recounted by a refugee who arrived on the first bus and who remains in Ukwimi today:

It was a bush when I entered and we were kept in tents at the start. They built that wooden warehouse – the very one near the trades [Ukwimi Trades College]– that’s where they were keeping our food. From here they built that office block. Then after the office block, that’s when they started building the wooden houses that the lecturers are staying in now. When they realized that they’ve got too many members of staff and that they’d be here for a long time that’s when they started building those [prefabricated] houses. Schools were also being built. I saw everything with my eyes. Even from digging the foundation of all the houses, my eyes were open. The construction started in 1987 and by 1989 they were through because they were fast.

Construction was not the only thing URS leadership became “fast” at doing. As stated earlier, LWF was deeply committed to its relatively arbitrary calculation that URS should achieve self-sufficiency by 1991. In fact, by June 1989 settlement authorities declared Villages 1 – 16 (approximately 3,650 people) “self-sufficient”. By June 1990 a similar declaration was made for Villages 17 – 46. Studies conducted in 1990 found that villages that had been declared self-sufficient were only able to grow about 60% of their actual food
requirements. In fact, nearly all of the households to have been declared self-sufficient had applied for reinstatement into the food program. LWF responded by establishing a committee to review each application on a case-by-case basis. By fall 1990, over 3,000 refugees were reinstated into the food assistance program (Anderson 1991; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996).

Throughout 1990 several major institutional shifts occurred within URS. First, MSF turned over responsibility for the entire Ukwimi project to the Ministry of Health (Anderson 1991). In addition to that transition, SCF phased-out its participation at Ukwimi, transferring most of its responsibilities to the newly formed, Zambian-run organization, Refugee Services Zambia (RSZ) (Anderson 1991). RSZ staff established and administered 20 pre-schools throughout the settlement, serving nearly 1,500 preschool-aged children, both refugees and Zambians.

RSZ also provided skills training in carpentry, tailoring, bricklaying, and home crafts. After completion of a particular training program, trainees were granted access to a small loan program in order to start-up business. Recognizing the unmet needs of women, RSZ designed a number of programs targeting women at Ukwimi, but was often met with resistance from male-dominated VDCs. For example, RSZ staff designed a female literacy program to tackle the extremely high female illiteracy rates (90% compared to 30% for men) and planned to hire 12 refugee women to teach literacy to various
women’s groups throughout the settlement scheme. However, the program ultimately failed as the

women who were selected faced a problem in that their husbands refused to let them attend the two-week training of trainers’ course at Ukwimi headquarters. They feared that their wives might marry another man while they were away from home (Anderson 1991: 13).

These gender dynamics remained in place even during my own fieldwork at Ukwimi, as I faced difficulty finding female field assistants due to resistance and opposition from their husbands.

Nearly every account I gathered concerning this particular moment in Ukwimi’s narrative reflected on the degree to which Ukwimi seemed very “alive” at the time. For example, the now dilapidated and unused Ukwimi Social Club was “the” spot to be during this era (Photograph 11). Those with whom I spoke recounted stories of Ukwimi’s nearly cosmopolitan and even urban flavor.

Ukwimi was like a town. Everything was available – starting from transport. We used to be given a lot of respect from the Mozambicans as Zambians. At that time, if you’re planning to travel you wouldn’t have any worries to say what time am I going to make it back here? You could go to town even 3 times in a day. And most of the things were free.

This place was a town. There were many people. It’s not like it is nowadays where we are staying far from each other. The place was like a village.
There was life here then. And we moved and we shared and we struggled, but we did it in a place that was alive.

What you see nowadays are the residues of good things.

Despite the detailed challenges and narrative I have presented in this Chapter, according to most sources, the settlement of Mozambicans in Ukwimi Refugee Settlement was “one of the UNHCR's most successful programmes for achieving a viable durable solution” (Anderson 1991: 3; Anderson 1991; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2002 RSC/MZ-53.22 LAS). Unpacking and assessing this commonly-expressed sentiment has the potential to contribute greatly to our understandings of what does and does not work in refugee situations and provides a moment in which to reflect upon lessons learned – a space from which to emplace our own understandings of displacement.
CHAPTER SEVEN
REINVENTING UKWIMI

The plots we’ve been given are for people who are homeless, people who suffered where they came from, other people living here are rejected people from wherever they came from. But still they have found refuge and peace in Ukwimi.

Field Interview

After approximately ten years in Zambia and eight years at Ukwimi, Mozambican refugees repatriated to their country of origin in 1994.

One-by-one, the large vibrant villages of Ukwimi fell silent; the long queues of women at grinding mills dwindled to a few patient souls; the clamorous voices of children in the seven primary schools were replaced by the shrill whistle of local birds and the humming of insects; handpump handles which had been burnished to a high gloss shine by thousands of eager water carriers hung silently down, testimony to the diminished use by villagers who had returned home” (LWF 1994: 19).

These Mozambican villagers who repatriated left behind hundreds of hectares of cleared land, 73 villages, 101 boreholes, seven primary schools, and four rural health clinics. Perhaps the most vital component left at Ukwimi were the nearly 100 Mozambican families who refused to repatriate.

After months of living at URS, several of these families revealed themselves to me as Mozambicans and I was able to spend a considerable amount of time with these families in the final weeks of my stay. By and large,
the Mozambicans who chose to remain at Ukwimi were those who witnessed (or perpetrated) the violence of that time first-hand:

Going back [to Mozambique] was to a person’s choice. We were asked if we wanted to go. As for me, I decided to stay because I know those who are going back did not actually see the war. They just heard about the war from afar and that’s how they ran into Zambia here. As for us who saw it, for me who even killed with my hands, I saw a lot of blood and I did not wish to go back. I saw all the wars – beginning with the first Portuguese war. So no one would tell me that I didn’t see the war. I saw what it means to be at war. The first time I set my foot in Zambia I saw that there’s life here and I wasn’t interested in giving that up.

_Bana tisunga bwino bad_ [They kept us nicely bad – “bad” meaning too good]. Bad up to today. That’s why for me even during repatriation time, I said I’ll go to Mozambique later not now. I still have fear.

In Zambia, I’m very free. But in Mozambique you need to have a lot of papers to move – there’s a lot to carry to prove yourself in Mozambique. So for me I realized this type of life would trouble me even more further.

This place is my home. No one can come and take me out of this land. Many people say they want this place if I’m to go back to Mozambique. I tell them, I’ll never leave this piece of land for anybody.

As these statements clearly demonstrate, those Mozambican refugees who made the decision to remain at Ukwimi did so both out of a fear to return to Mozambique and out of a general sense of being _in place_ – emplaced – at Ukwimi.
Ukwimi for Zambian Resettlement

Shortly after the massive repatriation, GRZ, seeking to avoid the
dilapidation and vandalism of the remaining infrastructure, converted Ukwimi
Refugee Settlement into Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme. The motivation for this
transition came from lessons learned from other countries’ negative experiences
after large scale repatriation. For example, all that is left of the millions of
dollars spent at Benaco Refugee Camp in Tanzania are a few faint wheel marks
(Harrell-Bond 2002). After the transfer of refugees from Mombasa camps to
Kakuma, only one health center remained for local use. And northern Uganda’s
Ogujebe Transit Center, complete with hundreds of businesses, homes, and 100-
bed hospital, was bulldozed within one week of repatriation (Harrell-Bond
2002). Well-aware of such failures, GRZ sought alternative uses for Ukwimi
after repatriation so that the investments into the area to facilitate refugee-hosting
could be harnessed for the development of Zambian hosts.

Void of any UNHCR mandate, GRZ requested the continued presence
and assistance of LWF in the management of the scheme. GRZ also requested
the joint management and assistance of the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ).
In addition to the CCZ/LWF management team, GRZ also invited two other
NGOs to participate in the development of Ukwimi as a resettlement scheme,
the YMCA and the Catholic Diocese of Chipata (CDC). On the heels of the
repatriation of Mozambican refugees, GRZ opened Ukwimi Resettlement
As an agricultural scheme, Ukwimi now fell under the Office of the Vice President, Department of Resettlement. Ukwimi was by no means Zambia’s first attempt at opening and managing an agricultural scheme. The first agricultural resettlement scheme, Miengwe Resettlement Scheme in Masaiti District, Copperbelt Province, opened in 1975. The majority of the rest of Zambia’s 70 agricultural schemes opened in the early 1990s after MMD’s electoral victory (Appendix C)
The mission of the Department of Resettlement is “to make available farm land for the resettlement of unemployed (youths and adults), retrenched and retired persons who wish to engage in agriculture as a means of livelihood” (Department of Resettlement 2006). The objectives of the Department of Resettlement are threefold:

1. Resettle the unemployed, retired, retrenched, displaced & disabled to make them self sufficient
2. To coordinate the provision of infrastructure to schemes in order to make them socially and economically viable
3. To mobilize and provide extension & support services to promote household food security (Mulongo 2006)

The mission statement, together with these stated objectives, translated into the settlement of many disenfranchised Zambians into the area. In fact, at the onset, LWF argued the success of agricultural resettlement at Ukwimi could “provide a model for resettlement and an incentive to all those who have said that planned rural settlements cannot work” (LWF 1994: 22).

According to district officials and LWF annual reports, CCZ and LWF were responsible for ensuring that Zambian settlers into Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme reach food self-sufficiency within the shortest-possible timeframe. In an attempt to exert some control over the type of settlers in the “New Ukwimi”, several interested organizations and government departments conducted
interviews for applicants wishing to enter the settlement scheme. Approval criteria included the following:

People must be rural residents of the province who have been deprived of good farming land but have the physical resources (labour and will) to effectively utilise a 5 hectare block of land, one to each family (LWF 1994: 22)

When taking a closer look at what is laid out above, one striking adjustment is apparent – a doubling of plot sizes from the refugee time (2 hectares) to the “New Ukwimi” (5 hectares). This is, in part, recognition of the continual struggles refugees faced in trying to achieve food self-sufficiency with only 2 hectares of relatively poor agricultural land at Ukwimi.

Although the expansion of household plots from 2 hectares to 5 hectares was a move in the right direction if the objective is indeed to “promote household food security”, it is important to step back for a moment and put these 5 hectare plots into the wider context of agricultural resettlement schemes in Zambia. In my interview with Manifold Mulongo, the Director of the Department of Resettlement, he indicated that the Ukwimi plots are some of the smallest plot sizes of all the resettlement schemes in Zambia. So although Ukwimi is intended to be an agricultural

Photograph 15: Chilicheka Farm
scheme, many settlers also engage in alternative economic activities as a means of survival (Photograph 15 & 16).

By the end of 1994, nearly 200 families had relocated to Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme and authorities were expecting 2,000 families by the end of 1995 (LWF 1994). However, the initial re-settlers – some of whom were forced to Ukwimi by their own chiefs – quickly became frustrated at the lack of assistance they were provided, especially when compared to Ukwimi’s former refugee inhabitants. After only a few months, the majority of these initial re-settlers gave up and returned home. In order to drum up potential settlers, LWF utilized nation-wide television and radio advertisements and posters to inform the nation that land was available at Ukwimi.

As retirees from every province in Zambia made their way to Ukwimi, they arrived with an expectation that living conditions, standards of living, and development investments within the settlement area would mirror the levels experienced during the refugee-hosting period. While most concede that the development put in place during the Mozambican era continues to benefit them, especially clinics and schools, the lack of upkeep and maintenance of those developments was a constant complaint and easily visible in the landscape. One interviewee remarked “these things like schools and clinics are permanent, but the road is not permanent” (Photographs 17, 18, & 19). Another reflected that “we’re left only the buildings because those things are unmoveable – they can’t
be stolen”.

In addition to complaints over title deeds (which I will address in the following section) and infrastructure maintenance, I also consistently encountered a very particular narrative about the hand-over which occurred in 1994 at the time of repatriation. Every settler I interviewed who was in the area at the time recounted the same series of events in which the UNHCR and GRZ (through then Vice President Christian Tembo) expressed their gratitude to the people of the Ukwimi area by leaving the “people of Ukwimi” UNHCR property. The “property” in question varies according to each storyteller (most frequently including items such as an ambulance, truck, tractor, grinding mill, generators, water pumps, sewing machines, and other small items), but the end of the story is always the same – the disappearance of said property. To give a sense of how this narrative flowed, I’ve placed two examples below:

Even myself, I was there. Christian Tembo was there and we were given – first item those people left to us Zambians, #1 ambulance, #2 tractor, #3 truck, #4 motorcycles. They said, all these things were being left for you settlers who’ve come to settle here. Now as we’re leaving, we’ll leave these items. These items are yours to use all of you. But we didn’t benefit from those items. We were told strongly you Zambians of Ukwimi, these items are not only for you. These items belong to all the people of Eastern Province. Then the items just disappeared.
Photograph 17: Ukwimi Road Condition

Photograph 18 & 19: Ukwimi Bridge
The ambulance was there, even a truck and tractor was also there. All these items were at the Scheme Manager’s house. This also includes a grinding mill. When the Vice President – Mr. Christian Tembo – came, he handed them over to the scheme. I saw the ambulance running, the truck too, but I never saw the tractor running. People are trying to re-group themselves in satellites so that they can ask for these things to be back. There’s a coordination committee in which satellites come together and address the problems of the whole of Ukwimi. I heard this committee went there, talked to the big man there at the office [Musumali]. But the answer which came there – those things are not for you farmers. Those things were left to the government. They were from UNHCR to the government. And these are government property. You have no say over it. If you want you should produce your own things. That’s how the coordination committee disbanded and the committee was dissolved.

Although Musumali was not around during this particular period, he confirmed the “drama” surrounding the hand-over and the general confusion about who took ownership over the property left by the UNHCR. However, in my excursion around the scheme, I stumbled across several curiously painted (UN powder blue?) agricultural equipment (Photograph 20) which I can neither confirm nor deny once belonged to the UN.
Tensions arose after the Mozambicans departed as the local people hoped they would recover their land and move in from surrounding villages. GRZ’s vision for Ukwimi, however, did not include a village set-up but rather sought to settle people on individual family farms. GRZ’s strategy of individual plot settlement significantly altered the way in which indigenous Ukwimi residents lived their lives and the degree to which they could form effective community organizations.

Nearly every settler that I interviewed raised the issue of title deeds, arguing that because GRZ wanted to settle them on individual family plots and
not in a village arrangement then they had a right to demand for and receive a title deed for their land. Consider the following discussions concerning title deeds:

This is our fourth year hearing stories of the same paper [title deed]. Mr. Musumali has always told us – wait, next year it will be processed – year after year. Just cheating us…

I can’t say that we have title deeds because when you question what you call “management” they say we are preparing maps…They are preparing maps up to now? How long can somebody prepare title deeds?

Feeling stable here will depend on the possession of the title deed. If it was given to us, the aim was to stay here forever. But I’ve been waiting [for title deed] since I came. We’ve made groups in the community to try and push Musumali. If he fails maybe we should try to see someone else who can help us have access to the document.

I carried the names, about 50 names to Lusaka with me. These are the people [shows me list]. Now we could not get fertilizers because of no title deeds. We referred the matter to our Zambian National Farmer’s Union, saying that we have an Association here and we are requesting for fertilizers but we can not receive because we do not possess title deeds. So the farmers union assisted us saying definitely according to the conditions they were supposed to have title deeds after two years, assist them. That was the answer. That was 5 years ago.

Not even a one person has been given any title deed. We had been promised strongly that ‘Prepare K250,000, you’ll be given that’ but nothing, nothing completely. So it is totally, really a problem.
As for the GRZ Scheme Manager, Musumali maintains in the exchange below that the GRZ has every intention of issuing title deeds at Ukwimi once the proper surveying has been completed and once each farmer pays the necessary fees:

Gray: Is there a fee for the processing or acquisition of a title deed?
Musumali: To get the title deed, when we number the plots we come and recommend them [farmers]. Count one: we give the title deeds because of what he has done on the farm. He has put a toilet…he’s growing sufficient food…he’s put a permanent house…the surrounding is clean…he’s cooperative. So after that now, when we recommend now to the Commission of Lands will send their surveyors. Apart from our surveyors ourselves, the Commission of Lands when they come now to make sketch maps of that farmer indicating infrastructure that is there. That’s why we are saying it’s expensive because they’ll come with their tools and start measuring boundaries. That’s when it becomes expensive. Currently we are requesting that you keep money, more than K250,000, for that venture so that it include allowances for those people. It will include also their printing of those maps. And other things. Because if the government is waving away such costs, the beneficiary is that person. The government should not pay money for him. Let him also meet those costs. So those are the costs I think which they may go. The round figure will be K250,000 per farmer. By then after that, they will be paying those K10,000s each year.

Gray: How long is it going to be for the Department of Resettlement to process title deeds for Ukwimi farmers?
Musumali: Usually they are supposed to wait for two years. Then we assess them. Then we give them their title deeds. But here we have a problem with this
resettlement scheme. Some of the plots were demarcated by the different departments, like Agriculture. Various surveyors came and demarcated. Then our office came and demarcated. We’ve had problems on plots that were demarcated by Agriculture. All the mapped plots were not put on the main map. The Agriculture plots only ended up on the sketch maps. That resulted into problems. Now, us? We want to capture all the plots and put them on the main map and then send that information on the maps for title deeds numbering. We struggled with this for a long time. They came and did a bit of survey work. But even up to now, I will have to go to Chipata next week. We have just said that all the plots that are on the map, let them go for title numbering.

However, I am in possession of a letter from W. Ndhlovu, Acting Senior Land Use Planning Officer for the Office of the Vice President assuring Ukwimi farmers that issuance of their title deeds is “long overdue”. And that letter is dated 1998 (Appendix D). In the same letter, Mr. Ndlou assures Ukwimi farmers that their title deeds will be issued by 1999. It is clear from my discussions that resettled Zambians at URS are frustrated by and suspicious of the continued delays.

When I look over my discussion with Mr. Musumali certain red flags are raised (like the implication that one must be “cooperative” in order to receive a title deed) that make the settlers suspicions something more than simply rumors and conspiracy theories. Ukwimi farmers’ desire for title deeds, coupled with GRZ’s apparent reluctance to process titling requests, points to the often critical connection between land titling and development. Though still under debate,
many development experts view land titling as the essential baseline for
developing the entrepreneurial potential of the poor (Besley 1995; Soto 2000;
Toulmin and Quan 2000; Gilbert 2002; Home and Lim 2004; Manji 2006;
Bromley 2009). If the “disenfranchised” Zambian farmers at Ukwimi are in a
precarious position regarding title deeds then the Mozambican refugees who
remained at Ukwimi remain in the most marginalized position, given that they
are lacking title deeds as well as any form of legal immigrant status.

On numerous occasions, Ukwimi farmers expressed their discontent and
dissillusionment with the management of the scheme. However, Musumali and
his colleagues at the Department of Resettlement also have their own
frustrations with settlers at Ukwimi:

We have certain poor people in this place. Some of
them came barefooted. Some of them who are
pensioners, we ask them how much money do you
have to start farming this year? They say “ndilibe”
[I’ve got nothing]. So sometimes we just give up as
management. Even if we are asked why do you
allow such people? But the mission statement says
you have to give the land to the poor. So maybe we
hope that they will change. But we are trying by all
means to see that they change though have a slow
pace of changing.

The general sentiment expressed through institutional actors at every
level – both in Lusaka, Petauke, and Ukwimi – was that the people of Ukwimi
were a people who had become use to being given and had come to depend on
such mechanisms for their own survival. Indeed, the idea that “Tidzadya nao”
we will eat together] which had served to establish Ukwimi the first place, was now threatening to destroy it.

Ukwimi as Space of Refuge

The longer I stayed at Ukwimi and the more I spoke with Zambian resettlers at Ukwimi, it became increasingly apparent to me that Ukwimi had become a space of refuge not only for refugees fleeing violent conflict, but also for a whole of displaced Zambians. Although outside the jurisdiction or protection or even concern of the international refugee relief regime, many Zambians at Ukwimi had experienced displacement from their regions of origin. Over time, many revealed that they had been pushed out of their home villages for being the source or cause of tension or conflict at the village level. For example, one resettler reflected that:

Many of us are people who are condemned by our relatives elsewhere. But we have found refuge in Ukwimi. It seems we can’t be kicked from here.

They [GRZ] asked me if I like this place and I told them I like this place. But they insisted that I won’t manage because another person who earlier occupied this land left, saying that the soil is not fertile. I pleaded with them that I needed the land because I was desperate. Where I came from we always fought for land with family members.

Look on the southern side at my buns and answer yourself [full buns]. You can see the answer for yourself that I’m comfortable here. But I sometimes go there [to Katete] to tell my parents that there’s a
country here where your son has found peace and freedom. Even if you use to say that I’m a useless son, I’ve found a place where we as a family can grow all we need.

You must know and go tell the people that we live nicely here in Ukwimi because the plots we’ve been given are for people who are homeless, people who suffered where they came from, other people living here are rejected people from wherever they came from. But still they have found refuge and peace in Ukwimi.

As the opening quotation reflects, Ukwimi had very much been transformed into a space of refuge, even for those not legally or traditionally understood to be refugees. For many of these “rejected people”, Ukwimi had indeed become a place of “refuge and peace”.

CHAPTER EIGHT
REFUGEES “RETURN” TO UKWIMI

What I want is not to go home to Angola because I’m so scared. My fears are based on the fact that all the years of my life, I’ve learnt to know that war in Angola never ends because it has always been like that – it would end now and later on it starts, ends, starts, ends. But as it is now, it’s difficult for me to be convinced because I’ve seen too much sufferings in Angola. I came here and I’ve settled nicely. I wake up at my own time. My love is in this country.

(Field Interview with Angolan Refugee 2006)

Re-opening Ukwimi

Seven years after its closing as a refugee settlement, Zambia re-opened Ukwimi’s doors to refugees in response to growing security concerns in refugee settlements on the other side of the country. In late 2001, over 1,000 former National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel soldiers from Nangweshi refugee camp in Western Province, Zambia, were transferred to the newly reconstituted Ukwimi Refugee Camp (Map 7). According to the UNHCR, the transport of these Angolan refugees to Ukwimi sought to “maintain the civilian character of the Nangweshi refugee camp and avoid the risk of militarization or recruitment in the camp” (UNHCR 2001). In addition to the 1,000+ Angolans, the GRZ also transferred a small population of Rwandan and Burundian refugees into URS.

The arrival of Angolans and the opening up of a newly constructed satellite on the edge of Ukwimi A brought with it several institutional changes.
that would prove to significantly alter the operations of URS. As mentioned in the previous section, when Ukwimi transitioned into a resettlement scheme several new NGOs were brought in by GRZ to assist in managing the scheme.

Over the course of those seven years, a number of events transpired which ultimately led to UNHCR adding Africare as an implementing partner at Ukwimi, tasked with overseeing community services, including HIV/AIDS prevention activities, agriculture and income-generating activities, and other community-based educational activities. However, this shift in institutional control over the aid operation at Ukwimi was not simply a bureaucratic or
arbitrary decision handed down from Geneva, it had its roots in events on the ground. Consider the following exchange between myself and the Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme Manager, Allan Musumali:

Gray: So the time you arrived here as Scheme Manager – when these NGOs were still around here – how were you coordinating with them, as the representative of the boma [GRZ]?

Musumali: Usually these NGOs...there were NGOs that were specifically working with the government then there were other NGOs that UNHCR appointed to deal with the refugees, like LWF. I think after their contract finished – it was a 3 year contract – they didn’t have any funding and were phasing out. So they didn’t have any resources to go ahead with assistance to the community. So when that [resettlement] program came I think they watched. And when we brought the other NGOs – like CDC – it brought confusion just within. And then later on through the problems they [LWF] were causing, UNHCR and government said no we are bringing another NGO, then they brought Africare.

Gray: What kinds of problems are you referring to? Musumali: [problems] on themselves…I think they…UNHCR said that LWF has been a long friend in working together but because they have been long, they’ve also decided to…relax and misuse resources that were given to them. They also became big-headed. They thought they were the only fish in the pond…So you find there were certain things they were told to implement & they’d be delayed. The money and everything would come. The money was not coming direct to the offices here it was funneled through the head office in Lusaka. Resources died with them. Those were the administrative problems with LWF. So they said ahhh, we’ll split some of these duties. You remain with camp supplies. And then other skills – training of farmer skills, what what
– we shall give it to Africare.

Gray: When Africare came in, did things seem better?
Musumali: Yeah. They divided the…because again in LWF they changed the Manager 2 or 3 times. They were required to change them out. What you did, you’ve been there. I think all of them performed better because there was competition now.

Musumali’s assertion that LWF had become “big-headed” is reflected in several internal UNHCR documents which I was able to access at UNHCR headquarters in Lusaka. For example, one internal UNHCR report called for a special investigation of LWF. The report expressed frustration with LWF’s desire to “have it both ways” by submitting “glossy reports about achievements” while at the same time producing funding documents to its own donors “painting a sorry picture of partialized implementation” in an attempt to solicit additional funding. The internal UNHCR memo strongly criticized LWF’s lack of public accountability.

LWF plays the donor card by providing each donor with a partial version of the truth (what activities are LWF’s by request of UNHCR and what other donors provide). And then proceeds to implement activities as it understands them, reporting to different donors on activities funded indistinctly. Since religious duty and conscience motivate some donors, no single donor exercises oversight on LWF. In that sense, the controls established by UNHCR have become a nuisance to the agency, whose staff appear tired of humanitarian work.

The report concluded that LWF had become “bloated and dishonest” and should
no longer claim to be the lead agency of the UNHCR. It was only after reading this report that I began to understand the resistance and lack of transparency that had come to describe nearly all of my interactions with LWF at that point.

Aside from the institutional politicking that took place, the arrival of the Angolan refugees at Ukwimi caused concern with all of the Zambian communities – both the indigenous villagers and those who had resettled in the area. By this time, Ukwimi had become home to approximately 6,000 resettled Zambians and their initial reaction to the idea of hosting Angolans was hostile. According to one informant:

We were normally scared of the idea of the Angolans because of stories that we heard that these people were soldiers. There were a lot of rumors spread that Angolans are able to kill you anytime.

If you were walking alone and you see an Angolan approaching you would feel scared as anything may happen. So we were very careful in terms of our movement, staying away from their satellite and keeping our distance on the road.

One of the most interesting explanations for the generalized resistance to the settlement of Angolans at Ukwimi took on a particularly geo-political understanding of potential conflict. Consider the following:

The fear was that the longer they [Angolans] stay around here, they would know the weaknesses of this country. And in case in future this country and their country would have problems, they could easily find their ways in Zambia. Most Zambians did not want the Angolans to come and they really
wanted the Angolans to go once they got here.

As such and in sharp contrast to the way in which Ukwimi was originally established – with integration as a key component – an entirely new satellite (Lusandwa) was constructed for the Angolans in order to keep a physical buffer between settlers and refugees.

As settlers struggled with how to live among the Angolans, the Angolans themselves faced numerous challenges. Zulu-Saymujaye recounted some of these struggles in the following statement:

> It’s not easy...and they come to strange people. Like those who were brought to Ukwimi from Angola. Strange terrain, strange environment, strange culture of the Nsenga, strange everything. There was a bunch. Those that came from the province adjacent to Western Province, they should have kept them in Western Province...for their cassava, for their fish. They uproot them and bring them to a maize belt, no fish at all, they’re not used to groundnuts, pounding groundnuts and putting in their sauces. It’s everything is different...You can see them really getting difficulties and pressure and even their skin changes you know. There’s a lot of changes.

Although the Angolan refugees faced considerably more obstacles to local integration than their Mozambican predecessors, they were still determined to make Ukwimi into a place that worked for them – even if that meant breaking the “rules” that had governed refugee movement in Ukwimi in the past.

The NGOs in charge they saw that those people [Angolans] never followed the rules. They were
always on the move. The Angolans and Burundians always broke the rules. Mozambicans always followed the rules. In fact, I can tell you that some of the Mozambicans left this place without ever reaching Katete or Chipata. They always followed the rule that you should only come out when you’re allowed. Anytime you wanted to go anywhere, you would go and get passes. But these Angolans just go, using the bush until they’re in Chipata, even Malawi. When they’re done with their businesses, they come back in the camp. In 2002, one Angolan refugee was found dead in the borders of Mozambique and Zambia without border passes.

But not everyone viewed the Angolans efforts in a negative light. Numerous Zambians expressed astonishment (and even appreciation of) of Angolan work ethic:

They left us this clinic of which we were not expecting that we’d have that clinic. They left us that school of which it can take almost Grade 1 to Grade 12. For that point, definitely we thank them. If it was not for those people we wouldn’t have those items

We learnt something from those people. Definitely we congratulate them because they were very strong to work. They were powerful people.

In fact, in their efforts to make Ukwimi their own, they were able to counteract many of the negative assumptions and stereotypes that had characterized their initial arrival.

Gender Politics in Refugee Camps

In the following section, I examine the gendered politics of Angolan
repatriation in 2005. However, before proceeding into that particular discussion, I feel that in order to fully investigate the evolving gender dynamics which unfolded during the repatriation of Angolan refugees, it is necessary to step back a bit and delve into the gender dynamics at work in refugee camp environments more generally. In relation to gender politics, it is important to note that refugee camps are vital devices of power whereby “the spatial concentration and ordering of people” facilitates numerous processes, including the (de)(re)construction of gender relations and politics (Malkki 1995b: 498). Refugee camps, despite claims of being spaces of asylum and protection, are also unstable, violent environments (Hyndman 1998). The instability and violence in refugee camps actively restructures gender relations. It is necessary to examine how this restructuring affects both men and women.

The realities of life in a refugee camp significantly alter pre-existing familial and gender structures. The artificial aspects and spaces of camp life challenge preconceived notions of masculinity. Refugee women from Somaliland reported that “men seem to have lost their bearings about their family concerns, lost confidence in their abilities to maintain their families” (Sideris 2003: 719). In several refugee camps in western Tanzania, Burundian men expressed frustration at the substantial changes to gender roles instigated by camp life (HRW 2000). Prohibited from cultivating or seeking employment in the host country, these men found themselves unable to fulfill traditional
responsibilities and incapable of providing for their families as they had prior to flight.

Many of these men directed their frustrations at their self-appointed “protector” – the UNHCR. One man noted that the “UNHCR now provides housing for my family, food for my kids, and clothing for my wife. What use am I anymore?” (HRW 2000: 26). The loss of control experienced by these men and other male refugees in camps can give way to frustration and anger which sometimes translates into domestic violence, depression, and alcoholism.

Despite the historical construction of refugees as male, women and their dependents constitute nearly 80% of all refugees worldwide, making forced displacement a significantly gendered issue (Oswin 1999). Yet, this widely cited statistic has yet to be reflected by programming and policy developments which fully integrate women and their particular concerns. According to the head of the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit of the UNHCR, Jeffrey Crisp, “because of the domestic role that they play, women are the most affected by the design of refugee camps. If a water point is put in the wrong place, or a distribution point is put in the wrong place, it is women who suffer from that” (UNHCR 2002b: 25). Unfortunately, Crisp’s acknowledgement is not necessarily linked with appropriate measures on the ground. According to an African refugee woman:

Women are left out of everything. We do not participate in planning or designing programs which are aimed at us. We are second class citizens when it comes to food, water, and shelter distributions.
We remain the world’s invisible refugees (Wilkenson 2002: 7).

The invisibility of refugee women results in misguided policies that do not adequately address their unique needs while simultaneously ignoring potential contributions refugee women could offer.

According to a special issue of *Forced Migration Review*, women refugees face a number of consequences from displacement, including but not limited to, the following:

- Additional responsibilities and workloads in the absence of male heads of households
- Limited access to and control over resources
- Increased sexual and domestic violence due to conflict and the breakdown of customary laws (El-Bushra 2000)

The uncertainties of camp life concerning housing, personal security, and food often exacerbate violence and instability for the majority of women refugees.

Domestic violence is the leading cause of injuries to women around the world and is enabled by the unequal status of women in most societies (HRW 2000: 20). Human Rights Watch (HRW) conducted an extensive, temporal study of nine refugee camps in the Ngara and Kigoma sub-regions of western Tanzania in order to access the degree of domestic/sexual violence and policy responses to such violence. HRW documented numerous situations in which Burundian women refugees suffered assault with fists, bottles, shoes, sticks, and, in some cases, machetes. These women, bearing visible scars, bruises, broken
fingers, and missing teeth, felt particularly vulnerable in the camp situation without the availability of previously relied upon social and familial networks. According to the HRW, “despite the seriousness and prevalence of domestic violence neither UNHCR nor the Tanzania host government had developed effective programs in response” (HRW 2000: 23).

As noted earlier, domestic violence often stems from the loss of control and frustration experienced by men in refugee camps. The domestic sphere becomes a space in which refugee men can exert a degree of control and power over their situation. Several factors serve to discourage women from reporting instances of abuses. Perhaps the most critical factor concerns access to food rations. As a rule, the UNHCR issues family ration cards to male heads of households. The only circumstances in which women gain access to food ration cards are when there is no male head of household or when a woman makes a special request (HRW 2000). Often times, women do not obtain their own ration cards out of fear of their husband’s reaction. This fear can be attributed to the relative inaction of local police to respond to complaints of abuse. For example, Gaudencia T. in Mtendeli camp reported the following account to HRW:

My husband beat me and insulted me using vulgar and obscene language about my body. He compared my body to other women’s whom he had before, and this was in the presence of our children. After beating me, he forced me to have sex with him. I did not report this case to the police because
in the past they have not arrested him after I reported similar incidents (HRW 2000: 36 – 37).

In addition, in cases where women did report abuse, the UNHCR was slow to respond. For example, Epiphanie B. reported that:

My husband threw me and our three children off the plot of land where we lived. He now lives on that plot with his girlfriend, and I have nowhere to stay with the children. I reported the case to the police, and they did nothing to help me. I also reported the case to UNHCR and requested a plot and separate ration card. UNHCR has not yet responded to my requests. I made the requests four weeks ago (HRW 2000: 36).

Sexual violence is also prevalent in refugee camps. Women are often attacked while conducting routine, daily tasks such as gathering firewood, farming, or seeking employment from local populations. Although statistics on rape are unreliable and many rapes go unreported, a study in Kenya found that sexual assault and rape were daily occurrences, with over 200 incidents of rape in Dadaab Camp reported (Mwangi Kagwanja 2000).

In instances of violence in their country of origin, women relied on extensive social networks of family, friends, neighbors, and community leaders. However, once in the camps, these social networks are weakened, unreliable, and, in some cases, entirely destroyed. Consider the following testimony by two refugee women from Mozambique:

I found that all my relatives who were left in Mozambique, my uncle and his children, all died. This happened when Renamo was still there. They
lit a fire and all the people in this house were killed. It is really terrible because if you know that maybe you have got a problem, you always go to your relative. But now I have got no on, nowhere to go even in Mozambique (Sideris 2003: 717).

I am not okay with my husband. Even when he works and gets some money he doesn’t look after me and the children. He spends his money on drinking. If all these things were happening while I was in Mozambique, I would have left him. I would have had my family to go to (Sideris 2003: 718).

In the absence of traditional social networks to deal with abuse and assault, women are often left with very few alternatives. The destruction of pre-existing familial structures, coupled with the restructuring of gender roles, translates into potentially dangerous environments for refugees, contrary to popular notions of camps as safe spaces.

Investigating the relationship between gender and refugee policy reveals the ways in which refugee women remain marginal to the overall operation of refugee relief. Although the UNHCR and its NGO partners have written, published, and discussed the particular challenges facing women refugees, many of their guidelines and policies have not been actualized in the field. Only by listening to the voices of women refugees will the international refugee regime succeed in making them visible, and by doing so reveal the “dangers of subscribing to or unintentionally reproducing categories of difference, without attending to their practical implications” (Hyndman 2000: 63).
Gender Dynamics of Angolan Repatriation

As the previous section demonstrated, there are important reasons to begin to listen a bit more closely to the voices of women refugees. To this I would also argue that the women in refugee-hosting communities also have very critical contributions to any discussion of gender relationships in and around refugee camps. As noted in Chapter 1, I was fortunate enough to spend an extended period of time with small groups of Zambian women who had been married to Angolan refugees and who remained living in Lusandwa satellite after being left during repatriation. Their stories, their voices, and their concerns add an additional layer of complexity and ambiguity to an already complex and uncertain narrative.

In late 2004, GRZ in conjunction with the UNHCR and the government of Angola began making plans for the massive repatriation of Angolan refugees. According to Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye, representative from the Angolan government travelled to Ukwimi in order to hold meetings with refugees and encourage them to return home to Angola. For the Angolan government, the successful repatriation of its citizens served as a litmus test for Angola’s future development.

You see, every government feels very bad to have refugees – to produce refugees – it’s an indicator of something bad happening back home. They are failing to manage their own things...So when they can have a repatriation for their people – to have returnees back home – it’s a major achievement.
And so they benefit a lot on the international market. They gain a good name...They’ll be admitted to this and to that. So that is one factor (Zulu-Syamujaye 2006).

The other major factor influencing the timing and nature of Angolan repatriation exercises had to do with donor fatigue and the UNHCR’s inability to meet its budget demands for maintaining camps. And when faced with funding choices, the UNHCR and its implementing partners were hard pressed to justified continued spending on refugee populations from conflict that had been “solved”.

As Zulu-Syamuajye explained:

In this case, these refugees were told that at one point they’d have to go back home. And Ukwimi was...the Ukwimi that you are looking at now of the Angolans – the one you are talking about – it was a special case because most of those were ex-combatants. And there’s no war now in Angola. The peace talks had succeeded. There’s peace back home so why stay away? You know? So they had to go.

Although as a matter of policy and international law, the institutional actors involved with this repatriation insist that the entire exercise was voluntary, sentiments expressed by those who witnessed the events often disagreed with such assertions. For example, here are just a few of the response I received when I inquired whether it seemed as though the Angolans wanted to repatriate:

They were being forced. Others refused completely saying we don’t want to go. Completely. Totally refused.
Because of the problems facing them in their country, they were refusing – no, don’t take us back again to our home.

Many felt fear to return. They said to us that it’s better we stay here in Zambia where it’s very nice. We are working hard here – they had a nice market, they farmed well here and bought plenty property. Amazing since to their life they have never come to that point of which they found here.

The interesting thing here is that because GRZ was removing Ukwimi Angolans back to camps in western Zambia and not directly to Angola, this seemingly forced re-resettlement did not technically break international laws regarding non-refoulment and voluntary repatriation.

In the course of organizing the repatriation of Angolans from Ukwimi, one major issue arose as a point of serious contention among institutional actors, refugees, and hosts – the issue of Angolan-Zambian marriages and the manner in which such unions were handled by the international refugee relief regime, GRZ, and the refugee husbands. As the majority of the Angolans were suspected ex-combatants relocated from Nangweshi, they were also overwhelmingly male. Upon resettlement at Ukwimi, many of these Angolans married local Zambian women and started families and life in Ukwimi. When it came time for repatriation, considerable debate emerged as to whether the Angolans would be able (or willing) to repatriate along with their Zambian
wives. Based on my interviews, it became quite clear that the institutional actors at Ukwimi doubted or questioned the legitimacy of the vast majority of these Angolan-Zambian unions. Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye described the situation in the following manner:

First and foremost, the marriages were marriages of convenience. Maybe we start it from there because those that remained definitely it was marriages of convenience. Those that were married and they meant a lot for each other, they went together. They were allowed to repatriate with their wives. Quite a number of Zambian women went. So those that remained were just those that were abused and left there (Zulu-Syamujaye 2006).

However, according to Allan Musumali (Scheme Manager), only five Zambian wives actually repatriated with their Angolan husband – and one eventually returned to Ukwimi. Zulu-Syamjaye recounted the tension that continued to build in the months leading up to repatriation, as many Angolan men who registered for repatriation failed to list their wives on the registration manifest:

We used to talk to couples – special couples like those that had taken on Zambian women. We would find out from them – find out from the man – because if in the registration manifest, we don’t see him carrying his wife…his wife!?. Then we’d talk him down and find out from him – Why? Really? You know? Often times we’d find that there are some people who’d even…some people would even come in confidence and say no, it’s not possible for me because I left a wife at home, you know? I left a wife. You know? And my wife ran the opposite direction with the kids and so I don’t think I’d go back with another woman. You know? That kind of
thing. Of course, when they lived together with their Ukwimi wives, it was difficult for the man maybe to tell them they didn’t want them after Ukwimi, you know? Of course, we saw some people really getting hurt. Even those who had commitments elsewhere… getting very hurt to leave their partners in Ukwimi. But they had no choice.

Unfortunately my sisters who were left behind maybe they didn’t have full knowledge of what was going on. I suspect so. Because a lot of them use to shunt between their homes and our offices. I would see them become very desperate. He wants to leave me. And then we’d put them together. The man would have his own reasons. And why force a man to carry a woman that he might not keep very well?

My general conclusion after listening to Ukwimi farmers’ version of events is that the institutional actors at Ukwimi may not have explicitly prohibited these women from accompanying their husbands, they certainly did not encourage it. Many of the Zambian wives who were left at Ukwimi expressed to me that they felt at some level their husbands and the NGOs were conspiring together to ensure these women remain stranded. They insisted that they were told, “you are not a refugee, you are a Zambian and we don’t have space to carry you along. So you will have to remain”. When it came to the actual days of departure, the tensions around Ukwimi A headquarters were extremely emotional and tense. Consider the two following narratives of departure day by Musumali and Zulu-Syamujaye, respectively:

I saw one man, for instance, ready to go home who had taken on a Zambian woman from the Lozi borders in Western Province as a wife. And so time
came for him to go back home. He didn’t even tell the authorities that he’d left a dying woman [his wife] in the hut. He just jumped on the bus and then somebody came “This bus should not go because he has left a woman dying in the house”. We had to halt the convoy to go and check. We went and checked and there was a woman who was a stretcher case. And we took her to the clinic at A and we asked this man not to go. And this man had two big girls and the big girls were very upset. They didn’t understand why they were not going to go home. But you see here is a man who had left his wife in Angola who came with his two daughters who were now big and he had taken on a Lozi woman from the borders of Zambia and now he didn’t want to have anything to do with her. But unfortunately he was going to leave her dying and no one of us knowing.

Some were getting very hysterical. I mean, the husband is on the bus and she’s screaming. But what could we do? And the kids are crying “Dad, Dad, Dad, Dad”. And then we also have in the opposite direction, we have a woman from village 10 who went with two of her own children to Angola and this man while he was here he was saying “No, no problem”. But we knew that back home he might have a wife…and that wife might give hell to that woman and her two children. But you know there’s very little you can do as refugee workers. You let go.

In the aftermath of all of the tension surrounding repatriation, the GRZ and Musumali were left with questions about how to handle the Zambian wives left at Ukwimi. According to Musumali, the GRZ had to ask itself if it should chase these women off the land because they came into the settlement “only because of marriage”. Fortunately for the women involved, the NGOs at
Ukwimi (who had played a role in discouraging their husbands to travel with their Zambian wives) now intervened on behalf of the wives, insisting that GRZ give these women the land. Musumali and the Department of Resettlement agreed to transfer the Angolans’ plots into their wives names. But in all the time I spent with these women, their focus was never on the land but rather on reconnecting with their husbands. Many of the women actually expressed anxiety over managing to hold onto their land and farm it at the level expected by GRZ. One woman stated that as a group

We remain here, like stagnant water with our children. We are suffering and still in problems. These are the disadvantages of hosting those people. We’ve been discarded by our men, by our relatives, by our boma [government], and even by our neighbors. This is our thank you.

The lingering tension and suffering out at Lusandwa satellite permeates out into the rest of the scheme. Many Ukwmi residents raised the issue of the Lusandwa wives as an example of the lasting negative consequences of hosting Angolans:

Gray: would you be happy if they reopened this place again for refugees?
Zef: We wouldn’t be happy. We cannot be happy, ahhhhh! We are looking at both sides – the advantages and disadvantages. Now the disadvantages of which we are talking about: they come here, showed us love, got married to our Zambian women and leave them with children. But the government were marrying these people in love and happily. But when it is time to go, they just go. No assistance. For that point definitely and in other ways, they are snakes.
“After Everyone Leaves”

By the time I arrived in at URS in November 2005, the Angolan refugees had been officially repatriated, Ukwimi had once again closed its doors as a refugee settlement, and the Department of Resettlement was managing the scheme yet again. Although I did not personally observe how URS functioned as an operational refugee settlement, I am confident that I witnessed enough of the lasting impacts that refugee operations had in the area to gain a clear picture of the principle role refugees played in the construction, destruction and in some cases, reconstruction of what it meant to make Ukwimi home, if even only temporarily.

Many of the very same questions, complaints, and challenges which faced the Ukwimi community during the Mozambican repatriation in 1994 were fresh on the minds of Ukwimi residents when I arrived. Fears about what happens, as one Zambian instructor at Ukwimi Trades Technical College phrased it, “after everyone leaves” were palpable. The “everyone” in this case is not only in reference to the refugees, but perhaps more pointedly, a reference to the mass exodus of aid agencies and the kinds of capital and investments they take with them.

Everywhere I went in URS, I heard and collected stories of people’s struggles to make a go of it at Ukwimi and the constant obstacles they found in their way. Consider the following snapshot of some of the most frequently
raised issues:

But *kuno ku* [here in the] scheme definitely we’re in problem. The problem we are facing….we don’t have place or somebody who can buy our produce when it grows. So that is the problem which we are facing. If we want to sell something we make a journey going to Petauke – selling just a small thing like Irish potatoes, cassava, groundnuts, just like that. But the NGOs which we have here definitely ahh….there’s completely nothing of which they are helping with.

We are in a problem indeed. Just imagine people they are traveling almost 2 km looking for water. Women suffer looking for water. Others walk 3 to 4km, all that side in the hills are people living there. People are suffering here 3km looking for a place where they can draw water for…we’ve even forgotten how to bath.

People are suffering in the bush and all over. They are willing to farm but…They’re not lazy, they are willing but…The refugees, they were comfortable – as if they were the owners of this country Zambia, but we, the owners? We are suffering as…ahhhh…. You can’t like it.

Now that they’re going even the government has forgotten about us here – the Zambians – they’ve forgotten that there are Zambians here. Up to date, we are still suffering. Maybe the government is thinking of that we are animals, I don’t know, that’s the problem of which we are still facing.

At the time, and for a long time afterward, the list of needs and concerns were all too overwhelming to completely wrap my head around. After taking a step back and while discussing some of what I encountered with a Zambian
colleague, I realized that trying to fully understand the enormous obstacles facing Ukwimi residents one-by-one is a potentially apathy-inducing and certainly overwhelming exercise. It is perhaps easier and more effective to understand the concerns and worries of the people of Ukwimi in the aggregate – ultimately as concerns over accessibility – access to markets, access to water, access to title deeds, access to education, access to fertilizers, access to transportation, access to hospitals, etc. Over the last 50 years, NGOs served as the sole gatekeepers of development and access in and around URS, so it should not be entirely shocking that the people of Ukwimi are worried about what their fate will hold “after everyone has left”.
This dissertation opened with the recognition that the path on which I chose to walk was “long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177). And yet, as I come to the end of this particular narrative, Arendt’s assertion that understanding is an “unending activity” feels increasingly true. Coming to terms with this reality has also been a “long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” journey. So although I fully realize my attempt to understand Ukwimi was and will continue to be “unending” and “meandering”, I also believe that I have made considerable strides in my desire to emplace Ukwimi “at home in the world”. And in doing so, I am able to make certain conclusions based on my own experiences and the experiences of those I met along the way.

The conclusions that I’ve come to regarding Ukwimi run along the three contours outlined in the opening chapter of this dissertation. First, in expanding
the temporal scale, I was able to provide a much fuller and richer understanding of Ukwimi which recognized a long history of migrations and connections which played out without regard for the same spatial boundaries in existence today. Additionally, the longer historical view enabled this narrative to achieve two very critical goals:

1) Recognition of the fact that many of the Ukwimi refugees had in fact experienced a series of displacements prior to their resettlement at Ukwimi. Because of this, a narrative of Ukwimi that takes as its starting point May 20, 1987 (opening day) is missing a significant portion of the story.

2) Move away from the crisis narratives usually written about refugee experiences and environments. Instead of using a sharply focused temporal lens, I consciously chose to soften the focus and in doing so take a more complete picture.

The second contour that I used to map this story involved the expansion of the spatial scale to include actors and places that extend far beyond Ukwimi – to Geneva and back again. My observations of the evolution of cultural landscapes at Ukwimi highlighted the ways in which displacement is an inherently geographic experience – meaning that it is not simply a process that affects refugees but one that affects a whole host of individuals, organizations, and communities situated within (and part of the construction of) particular
landscapes.

The third, and final, contour enframing my examination of Ukwimi depended on an understanding of emplacement and displacement being integrally tied together in constant motion as part of the same narrative. My experiences at Ukwimi reinforced nearly everyday the degree to which whether an individual is “in” or “out” of place is not static – it fluctuates, it shifts, it is, in fact, in motion. Ultimately, displacement is not just about the loss of place, but also inevitably about the struggle to make new places (Turton 2004: 26). So although Malkki argues that displacement is the “flip-side” of emplacement (1995: 517), my conclusion is that they are actually one and the same – not opposing narratives, but actually part of the same narrative.

By examining some of the processes of place-making in Ukwimi, this dissertation hopes to move us beyond crisis narratives concerning refugees to new, and more productive, understandings of displacement which focus attention on the ways in which refugees and their hosts create and alter their landscapes. In fact, I strongly contend that focusing only on the destructive capacity of conflict does not accurately or fully capture the realities on the ground. As Boas contends, “conflict zones represent not only the disruption/destruction of previous existing social systems, but also the creation of new systems” (2003: 78). It is these new systems – or more geographically, these “striated” spaces and “entangled” landscapes (Moore 2005: 22) – that I was most interested in
exploring.

In this closing chapter, I would like to step back out of URS and once again widen the lens in order to examine the current refugee-hosting landscape as it is operating in Zambia today. And to address Kuhlman’s critical observation and question:

UNHCR and other members of the humanitarian community have a natural tendency to concentrate their attention on ... new refugee emergencies and large-scale repatriation programmes. But the majority of UNHCR’s beneficiaries find themselves trapped in protracted refugee situations, unable to go home and without the prospect of a solution in the country where they have found asylum. Such situations, which are often characterized by long-term care and maintenance programmes and the confinement of refugees to camps, are not in the interest of the refugees, local populations, host government or donor states. And yet they have been allowed to persist. Why is this so and what can be done to remedy this situation? (Kuhlman 2002: 1, emphasis added)

*From Exclusion to Inclusion – The Zambia Initiative*

Before delving into the future possibilities of Zambia’s unique alternative to emplacement and displacement, I would like to take a moment and step back to 1966 and consider the following excerpt from President Kenneth Kaunda’s speech at the opening of the University of Zambia:

There is one constant danger I have observed facing this young country of ours. This is a tendency to keep to the beaten track. We must be original. I repeat-just because a system is there does not mean
that it is good. It may have been appropriate in the past. It may still be the suitable system in some other country. But the real test is whether it is the best system for Zambia of 1966-or 1976. We must be courageous in breaking with outmoded traditions and determined in our efforts to explore new paths into the future (Kaunda 1966).

Although Kaunda was not talking about the challenges of refugee-hosting, the sentiment he expressed here – an plea to be “original” – takes form in Zambia’s markedly new approach to minimizing the burdens and optimizing the opportunities that protracted refugee-hosting presents. Finding alternative narratives of emplacement/displacement – or “spaces of hope” – requires “actual engagement with emancipatory politics” (Daley 2008: 235). And in some very interesting and innovative ways, Zambia may just be creating “spaces of hope”.

As the refugee population in Zambia expanded, reaching its peak at 280,000 in 2001 and the pressures of protracted refugee-hosting increased, GRZ began to seek out alternatives to traditional understandings of refugee camp management structures. GRZ focused its attention on Western Province, home to Zambia’s largest refugee populations and the least developed region of Zambia. According to the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) conducted by the Central Statistics Office in 2000, Western Province exhibited the highest poverty levels in Zambia (CSO 2000). As demand on the limited resources in the area intensified, friction grew between refugees and their host communities, increasing xenophobia and insecurity in the area (GRZ 2006: 4).
Within this context of increased hostility, GRZ, in cooperation with the UNHCR, developed the Zambia Initiative (ZI), an innovative pilot project aimed at reducing the negative socio-economic impact of refugee-hosting while promoting self-sufficiency and reducing poverty of both host populations and refugees. According to my interview with the ZI National Coordinator, Dr. Dominic Minyoi, ZI is:

based on the concept of development through local integration which promotes a holistic approach to addressing the needs of refugee-hosting areas and enhances integration of refugees with their host communities (Minyoi 2006).

The Zambia Initiative has been lauded as the model for donor coordination in linking refugee aid to national and local development planning. Research on refugee hosting is well-served by examining the Zambian case, as it is the first case in which a national development program has explicitly focused on the interests of and cooperation among refugee populations and their local hosts. For example, in a statement to a visiting United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) delegation, the Minister of Home Affairs, Lackson Mapushi, highlighted the potential utility of linking the management of protracted refugee situations with development projects:

..this initiative is not only an effective way of burden sharing, but also an effective exit strategy by the international community from the perpetual aid handouts to refugees in Africa, as it is aimed at equipping refugees to be productive and ensuring
the enhancement of the socio-economic situation in refugee hosting areas thereby combating poverty, as well as improving the integration between refugees and host populations as a way of addressing the protracted nature of our refugee problem (UNHCR 2002a: 17).

The Zambia Initiative was designed to enable participatory, bottom-up approaches to development by promoting and aiding in the creation, formalization, and legalization of Local Development Committees (LDCs) throughout Western Province. In late 2002, the GRZ, ZI Program Unit, Ministry of Home Affairs, and the LDCs signed a memorandum of understanding constituting the institutional framework for the operation and management of ZI. ZI targets four major areas of intervention – agriculture, health, education, infrastructure and natural resource management – and identifies three themes – governance, gender, and HIV/AIDS – which cross-cut each of the four target areas. The bulk of ZI’s initial intervention occurred in four particular districts within Western Province – Kaoma District (near Mayukwayukwa), Senanga/Shangombo Districts (near Nangweshi Refugee Camp), and Mongu District (provincial capital). ZI reporting assessed the overall financial requirement for the period from 2003 through 2008 to be approximately US $55 million, much of which required donor funding.
In the first three years of its implementation, the ZI successfully implemented a number of programs and projects which have positively impacted refugees and their hosts. In fact, the majority of the development inputs created under the ZI have been, and continue to be, accessible to host communities and have gone a long way in preventing conflict between refugees and their hosts. Table 11 clearly demonstrates the degree to which Zambian hosts have benefited from this innovative, and markedly inclusive, approach to refugee management.

In 2005, ZI extended its geographic reach into Northwestern Province, near Meheba Refugee Camp.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Refugee Community</th>
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<td></td>
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Conclusions

The overwhelming majority of research conducted within refugee studies is focused on the experiences, challenges, and needs of refugees, with little to no sustained efforts to understand the experiences, challenges, and needs of their hosts. I maintain that such privileging of the refugee within our research is detrimental to our ability to understand the realities on the ground in any place.
that finds itself hosting refugees. Whether the goal of a particular research project is to provide a critique of refugee relief aid, or to incite policy change at the international level, or to contribute to geography's concern with the construction of places, we cannot achieve such goals without explicit, direct, and substantive attention to refugee-hosting communities. As argued by Bakewell:

For the people who live in the villages on both sides of the border, the focus on the ‘refugee problem’ deflects attention from the difficulties which they share with all the other residents of this isolated area of Africa. For the most part, people's major worries are not special problems for refugees but problems shared by all (2000: 371)

By calling for increased attention to hosts, I want to make clear that I am not advocating for yet another essentialist representation (Bracken et al 1997; Eastmond 1998) which would add “refugee/host” to an already burgeoning list of binary (and often oppositional) representations (victim/survivor, resilient/vulnerable, bogus/genuine, regular/irregular, displacement/emplacement, rooted/uprooted, deserving/undeserving, outside/inside, asylum seeker/citizen, problem/resource). Instead, I am simply arguing that nearly every piece of refugee-centered research (and policy) would have been better served had it been more inclusive of host communities.

Throughout this dissertation, I have borrowed concepts and ideas from a variety of different trajectories within geography, as well as within refugee
studies and development studies. In my journey to constructing Ukwimi’s story, I came to appreciate Myers’ reflection that

> Despite all of the varied efforts of power structures draped in different ideological banners…African conceptions of space not only endure. Within circumscribed areas and often within repressive parameters of their own, they remain powerful forces… (2003: 167).

Ultimately, the task has been to construct a humanist geography not only of Ukwimi but also of the various experiences of displacement. Such a task has been and continues to be anchored in an understanding of humanist geography to be “the move from 'knowing about' places in an objective way, their facts and features, to 'understanding' places in a more empathetic way, their characters and meanings” (Daniels 1992: 311). It is precisely in our encounters with such “characters” and their “understandings of place” that I as a geographer came to understand Ukwimi and that we as geographers can make significant contributions to contemporary understandings of and solutions to forced displacement. Contributions which demonstrate that the process of displacement actively creates and recreates places – displacement, it turns out, emplaces itself in particularly “entangled” cultural landscapes.

We know that places differ and that these differences are not imaginary, but rather are actual features of the world. We also suggest that these differences matter, and we self-consciously employ this knowledge in our everyday lives. It is only when we begin to go behind appearances and ask questions concerning why places differ and what effects these differences have on actions and events that we encounter difficulties associated with the ambiguities of the concept (Entrikin 1991: 13)
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NAZ/ZP 1/1/5

Personal Interviews with Institutional Actors


## Appendix A

### African Signatories to Refugee Conventions

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Appendix B
Refugee “Have Nothing” Fundraising Imagery

**WHAT'S WRONG HERE?**

Look at this nice happy people. Notice that each one has something—a tool or implement here, a bicycle or a briefcase there. All completely normal and unremarkable. But wait. Something’s amiss. That nice fellow near the bottom—third row down, second from the right. He doesn’t seem to have anything.

Indeed, you see, he’s a refugee. And as you can see, refugees are just like you and me except for one thing: everything they once had has been destroyed or taken away, probably at gunpoint. Home, family, possessions, all gone.

They have nothing.
And nothing is all they’ll ever have unless we help.

Of course, you can’t give them back what’s been destroyed, and we’re not asking for money (though every penny helps). But we are asking you to keep an open mind. It may not seem much, but to a refugee it can mean everything.

UNHCR is a strictly humanitarian, organization funded only by voluntary contributions. Currently it is responsible for more than 25 million refugees around the world.

UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Appendix C  
Agricultural Schemes in Zambia

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## Appendix C
### Agricultural Schemes in Zambia

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Appendix C
Agricultural Schemes in Zambia

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Appendix D

Ukwimi Farmer’s Association & Land Titling

Dear Sir,

Re: TITLE DEEDS FOR UKWIMI RESettlement SCHEME SETTLERS

I wish to refer to the above underscored subject.

I am obliged to inform you that the title deeds for the members of the Ukwimi Farmers Association are in a process of being prepared.

The Department of Resettlement is currently pursuing this issue at its local office in Plot 121, so that the modalities of compiling the necessary documents to enable the issuance of the title deeds to the association members is expedited. This is due to the fact that as many settlers have already fulfilled our prescribed conditions for acquiring title deeds.

In view of the foregoing, I would like to assure you that the title deeds will be issued to most of the settlers in the coming year, 1999.

With this assurance, therefore, you may wish to consider assisting the Association members access your fertiliser from facilities to enable them grow food this rain season.

Attached, is a copy of a list of names for the Ukwimi Farmers Association for your consideration and action.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

M.Mbikana
ACTING SENIOR LAND REGISTRY OFFICER
For/Director
DEPARTMENT OF RESettlement