The Relations of Terror and Immigration: Preventive Solutions

by

Frances I. Ryder
B.S., Loyola University Chicago, 2006

Submitted to the Department of Anthropology and the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

______________________________
Chair

______________________________

______________________________
Committee Members

Date defended: _________________
The Thesis Committee for Frances I. Ryder certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

THE RELATIONS OF TERROR AND IMMIGRATION: PREVENTIVE SOLUTIONS

Committee: ______________________

Chair

_______________________

_______________________

_______________________

Date approved: ______________________
Contents

Acknowledgments 4

Chapter 1: Introduction 5

Chapter 2: Identifying the Symptoms: The Roots of Terrorism 32

Chapter 3: The Story of Migration 61

Chapter 4: Conclusion 82

References 99
This thesis is a discussion of several world issues on which anthropology has greatly informed my perspectives. When asked why I wrote this particular thesis, the answer is out of a very simple wish to show what anthropology has to offer in terms of understanding international issues. When asked how anthropology has taught me to think and see the world, there is no clearer demonstration than this paper.

I am greatly indebted…

To my family. Thank you not only for your love and support, but also for your understanding – your eager ears that heard my thoughts and your open minds that encouraged my dreams. These were unequivocally the tools passed on to me that have led me to pursue a career in human relations.

To friends near and far: those in Lawrence, KS, Chicago, New York, Tampa and Seattle. You have all been there to listen to my thoughts, complaints, rants and conclusions, and whether you followed my train of thought or not, I thank you for lending me a metaphorical soap box on which to ponder this topic. I thank you even more for offering up your opinion over long nights of conversation. Your perspectives and arguments not only challenged my own, but found their way into my work as well.

To my professors and mentors. I can not thank Allan Hanson enough for his unyielding support and ability to make me think critically about my own arguments. I could not have asked for a more dedicated advisor. Jane Gibson and Brent Metz asked the right questions that evaded me and encouraged me to consider my topic in broader terms. Thank you.
Chapter 1: Introduction

September 11, 2001 is a marked day for people and policy in the United States. From that day forward stricter airline security, communications surveillance, and identification cards were all implemented to protect the U.S. from another terrorist attack. Stricter immigration policy was also promoted as The U.S. 9/11 Commission on Border Control (2004:570) revealed that 15 of the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted by border authorities, thwarting the attacks well in advance. The U.S. government’s response to this information has been to create an institutional link between immigration and terrorism. Since 9/11, U.S. anti-terror and immigration policies have been defensive and have focused on addressing these two spuriously related issues with one solution (immigration reform). This method of defense is counterproductive, as it amasses much larger “haystacks” of suspects (who are suspect only in the sense that they are immigrants) in which the proverbial needle, a terrorist, might be found (Suro 2003). Karen Tumlin (2004) also argues that immigration reform has exacerbated anxieties about the “foreign born” in the U.S. Moreover, this defense strategy shows that the U.S. has not adequately considered reasons behind al Qaeda’s attacks or behind immigration. Thus, while the government continues to suspect another terrorist attack and many U.S. citizens have become alarmed at the number of migrants entering the U.S. on a daily basis, terrorism and immigration have become superficially and ineffectually conflated as “threats” in the public’s consciousness.
In this paper, I show that immigration to and terrorism against the U.S. should not be linked simply because some of those who attacked the U.S. on 9/11 were also immigrants. Because the 9/11 terrorist pilots lived in the U.S. between 1997 and 2000, trained on their mission to topple the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and were likely successful because of this training in their target country, the U.S. government has made strict reforms in immigration to battle terrorism. However, one piece of information seems to have been overlooked: the majority of the 9/11 attackers were by label mere travelers. In the year 2007 alone, the U.S. welcomed “56 million international visitors from 213 countries” (U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration 2008:1). Given this information, it is difficult to imagine how even heightened security checkpoints have filtered through so many individuals to find those, if any, who are determined to attack the U.S. And, while the U.S. has not suffered another monumental terrorist attack since 9/11, other countries have. The argument may be made that the U.S. government’s strict security has warded off other attacks on the mainland, but even then, as Karen Tumlin (2004) argues, the government has not specifically commented on any thwarted attacks. As long as the circumstances remain that encourage individuals to employ terrorist activity, weaknesses will be found and new methods discovered to attack.

One solution to this issue of mass immigration and visitation to the U.S. and the potential for other terrorist attacks specifically on the U.S. is to recognize where immigration to and terrorism against the U.S. are most deeply related. I propose a link between immigration and terrorism in the U.S. that is an underlying cause of why
people migrate to the U.S. and why people terrorize the U.S. This cause is imperialism. Yes, this is an extremely broad cause to be so plainly stated: imperialism is rampant around the world and has taken on several forms throughout history. But to pinpoint one instance of imperialism as a cause of issues around the world such as immigration and terrorism in the U.S. oversimplifies the complex interrelatedness of phenomena contributing to these events.

Today, one key contributor to imperialism throughout the world is neoliberal economic policy. In brief, neoliberalism is a philosophy that diminishes “government interventions in the market” and “eschews social and collective controls” over the practices of corporations in promises of “unleashing” the healing and wealth-producing power of a free market economy around the world (Heynen et al. 2007:3). Neoliberal policy is administered by a number of transnational corporations and financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is enforced by governments in the G7. In countries where neoliberal structural adjustments have been made, the institutionalization of structural violence against the people of these countries has often ensued. Structural violence is defined as violence within a social institution or structure that systematically decreases the quality of life and/or kills individuals by limiting their access to basic needs (Galtung 1978). People respond in various ways to the extreme economic and social disparities caused by structural violence. In some cases the response is with migration. In others, it is with terrorism. There are also other ways to react to structural violence, but, for the purposes of this paper, I only discuss immigration and terrorism and their relation
to neoliberalism and structural violence to exemplify how phenomena around the world are interconnected. If, for instance, the U.S. government were more aware of the relationship between global phenomena such as immigration and terrorism, it might not experience both phenomena as a double threat. I argue that the U.S. will have more control over its experiences of these phenomena when it adopts a more holistic approach to international policy that recognizes these relations.

I start by showing historical instances of imperialism and the emergence and effects of structural violence in Saudi Arabia and Mexico. It is most likely clear why I discuss Saudi Arabia: the majority of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. But why I have chosen Mexico may be less obvious. After all, no one really expects a catastrophic attack like 9/11 to originate from Mexico. Yet, American rhetoric and U.S. policy since 9/11 have suggested all immigrants are potential terrorists (Hayworth 2006; Tumlin 2004). Thus, I discuss imperialism in Mexico because it is from Mexico that the U.S. receives its largest immigrant population. And U.S. counter-terror policy has not discriminated against these migrants.

After discussing historical imperialism in each country, I explain how neoliberal economic policy has aggravated these situations. In the case of Saudi Arabia, historic imperialism has occurred with the help of international interests in oil, the corrupt Saudi monarchy, Saudi Arabia’s overconfidence in oil revenues beginning with 1973 oil embargo, and its oil bust from 1984 to 1996. The U.S.’s role in this imperialism has much to do with what has been known as its “special” relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until 2001, the U.S. influenced Saudi Arabian policy
on oil-production to be a “swing producer” of oil in the Middle East, maintaining the
U.S. dominated corporate oil profits and “stabilizing” the global economy. In
exchange, the U.S. lent Saudi Arabia its economic and military support. Thus, at the
onset of its oil crisis in 1984, at the insistence of the U.S. and the IMF, Saudi Arabia
agreed to slow its oil production to curb the oil price crisis. Saudi Arabia's revenues,
however, took a plunge due to this effort and plunged even further when the country
began producing as usual again. To recover, Saudi Arabia followed advisories from
the IMF and the World Bank (two institutions on whose board of directors Saudi
Arabia served and which Saudi Arabia had generously funded) to adopt structural
adjustment policies and fully integrate Saudi Arabia into the global economy.

Acceptance of these structural adjustment policies bolstered Saudi Arabia’s
corrupt monarchy, weakened the Saudi state, exacerbated structural violence and gave
rise to resistance within the country. In response to these crises, instead of addressing
these antagonizing international policies, the Saudi government accepted more
neoliberal structural adjustments when it joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2000. Reacting to these policies, the Saudi public began violently attacking
the Saudi state. In response, those G7 countries with vested interests in neoliberal
Saudi Arabian policies deployed troops to Saudi Arabia and the surrounding area to
control public dissent in the Middle East.

This caused the Saudi public to seek retribution against those perpetuating
Saudi abuse. The U.S. was one such participant in this imperialism. U.S. forces have
occupied Saudi Arabia, considered a holy land by many of the Muslim faith, since the
first Gulf War in efforts to provide political stability within the region and protect its interests in oil. Secondly, the U.S.’s abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet-Afghan war and the U.S.’s support for Israel and its relative silence regarding Israel’s expansion into Palestine has given many in the Middle East a reason to be frustrated with U.S. international policy. For these reasons, fourteen Saudi Arabian citizens became motivated and dealt the U.S. a vengeful blow on September 11, 2001.

Likewise, the area and people of Mexico have suffered imperialism since the conquistadores first arrived in 1519. And, recently, to service its national debt and recover from the oil price crisis of the 1980s, Mexico agreed to neoliberal structural adjustments to receive loans from both the IMF and the World Bank. These reforms resulted in structural violence as they fragmented and eliminated important public services once provided by the state and further disenfranchised Mexico’s poorest of the poor. During this time, Mexico also signed on with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the U.S. and Canada. NAFTA had monumental effects on Mexico’s already failing economy. As a result, Mexico’s work environment drastically changed as trade liberalization, foreign investment and development greatly altered Mexico’s industries and work became scarce while the population continued to grow (Carrera 2002). To cope with these issues, Mexicans have sought immigration to the U.S. to alleviate the effects of Mexico’s economy on their lives.

In each case, we will see that recent imperialism in the form of neoliberal economics and the U.S.’s international policy has contributed to the U.S.’s experience
of terrorism and immigration. Given these similarities, if the goal of U.S. policy is to curb immigration to and terrorism against the U.S., then a step in the right direction would be to adjust U.S. policy to reduce and prevent the circumstances that drive individuals to migrate to or turn to terrorism against the U.S. in the first place. To do this, a paradigm shift in how we view the causes of international conflict is necessary – a shift away from individualistic perspectives about the world and toward recognition of the interrelatedness of international activity such as foreign policy, terrorism and immigration.

**Problems with U.S. policy on Terrorism and Immigration Today**

After September 11, conventional wisdom aimed to strengthen border security to prevent another terror attack. Overall, strategies the U.S. government adopted to fight potential terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have included increased border patrol, the Patriot Act, “targeting travel,” “biometric screening systems,” screening systems for transportation and access to facilities, and increased communication between countries about suspected terrorists (The U.S. 9/11 Commission on Border Control 2004). President Bush also announced the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and charged it with both immigration and counterterrorism responsibilities. Today, the DHS includes the “Secret Service, the Border Patrol, the new Immigration and Customs Enforcement, [and] the U.S. Customs Service” (White 2006:314). Abroad, conventional methods for counterterrorism against al Qaeda have included seeking out and killing al Qaeda leaders, assuming that once the head of al Qaeda is removed, the body of terrorism will wither. Lastly, “terror camps” have been
destroyed and pressure has been put on countries suspected to house terrorists (Sageman 2004).

There are several problems with these solutions. First, Karen Tumlin (2004:1178) critiques immigration reform and the creation of the DHS, arguing “immigration and immigrant policy has been conflated with and subordinated to terrorism policy goals…[through] the abolition of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),…and the transfer of most of its authority to the newly created DHS.” Tumlin’s argument was demonstrated as, after 9/11, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began looking for reasons to deport individuals, so that when they transgressed immigration technicalities (such as failing to maintain an adequate number of college units on a student visa), they would be deported as criminals, guilty of violating immigration law. (Tumlin 2004:1188). Part of this mission, then, has also been to locate and apprehend 314,000 ‘immigrant fugitives’ who have violated these U.S. immigration laws. Most interesting is the fact that the overwhelming majority of these 314,000 people are “Latin Americans,” while less than 2% (6,000 immigrants) are from “Muslim” nations (Tumlin 2004:1189).

This information goes against the logic that terrorism should be fought on the home front through immigration reform, as we have obviously rounded up or are seeking more Latin Americans than individuals from “terror-housing” countries. The government’s refusal to comment on immigrants being deported or brought in for questioning also makes it difficult to judge if new immigration policies are effectively fighting the War on Terror or not (Tumlin 2004). Thus, there is a distinct disconnect
between the War on Terror and immigration reform, yet Tumlin’s data show that immigration violations are becoming “proxies” for terrorist activities. Tumlin (2004) also argues this conflation has left an indelible mark of xenophobia on our perceptions of migrants. Fears about the threat of immigrants have been exacerbated, and people are calling for tighter border security against cultural impurity, language impurity, unemployment and physical and political insecurity (Huntington 2004; Appadurai 2006; Lutton and Tanton 1994; Hayworth 2006).

Another problem with U.S. government strategies to curb terror and immigration is that they are defensive (not preventive), addressing how the U.S. will respond once individuals have made the decision to become part of a “terrorist” effort or to migrate. The U.S. 9/11 Commission on Border Control (2004:572) states “The 9/11 experience shows that terrorists study and exploit America’s vulnerabilities.” Without oversimplifying, the same could be argued of illegal immigrants. As Hayworth (2006:80) notes, guides to help migrants cross the border have surfaced, advising them to continue trying if caught crossing the border and to “avoid attracting attention” by over-celebrating once successfully crossing the border. The will of the terrorist and migrant to capitalize on the U.S.’s vulnerabilities will not subside as long as circumstances remain in their lives that provoke such behavior.

Another problem with U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism appears to result from a superficial or ethnocentric understanding of these issues. Religious fanaticism, social instability and irresponsibility seem to characterize current explanations of terrorism and immigration. Interestingly, stability and responsibility
are both ideals championed by the American dream and our legendary individualism. These notions appear to have implications for how terrorism and immigration in the U.S. have been explained. For instance, in President George W. Bush’s statements, September 11 is explained in terms of individuals who hate the U.S. for its ideals of freedom: “They [terrorists] hate what we see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government…They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (Bush 2001). President Bush also criticized those who have considered diplomacy as a solution to terrorism, alluding to the idea that terrorists are uninterested in negotiation and live by selfish and inflexible agendas: “Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We’ve heard this foolish delusion before” (Bush 2008). In the case of immigration, J.D. Hayworth (2006) also writes that migrants would rather feed off the economy of the U.S. than take responsibility and solve their own political and economic problems.

In each explanation, the themes of individual responsibility are prevalent. In the case of terrorism, the belief is prevalent that terrorist religious fanaticism, hatred and jealousy of the U.S. are issues over which only terrorists have control. On the same note, immigrants are said to come to the U.S. to reap the benefits of America because they are too “lazy” to fix their own countries. And in the case of both terror-housing and immigrant sending countries, these countries are to blame for poor adaptation to the changing world and poor management of their own social and
political affairs, whether due to lack of economic intelligence or a “backwards”
culture (Friedman 2005). These explanations inhibit our understanding of the
decisions to migrate or terrorize. There are reasons, much broader than personal
agendas, which drive individuals to migrate and terrorism.

A final problem with U.S. policy on terrorism in particular is that terrorism is
a global phenomenon, requiring recognition of multiple global causes and use of
cooperative responses. As Sageman (2004) states, al Qaeda is a globalized
organization that has no association with any particular state and has decentralized
power. Thus, in theory, if Osama bin Laden were captured, al Qaeda’s structure
would allow the organization to live on without its leading spokesperson (Sageman
2004). For this reason, conventional methods of counterterrorism to dismantle al
Qaeda such as going after bin Laden and attacking the states of Iraq and Afghanistan
have been unsuccessful. Al Qaeda is still at work, having claimed responsibility for
the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the July 2005 mass transit bombings in
London, and the April 2007 bombings of the prime minister’s office and a police
station in Algiers.

**Solutions for U.S. Policy on Terrorism and Immigration:**

Investigation of the reasons behind terrorism and immigration shows that a
more useful solution to these issues would be a deeper understanding of the
interrelatedness of causes between the two and the adoption of preventive measures
for each issue. Nassar (2005) writes that the phenomenon of globalization, by virtue
of putting developed and developing worlds in contact with one another, spreads
dreams and nightmares about the quality of life. When “nightmares” of imperialism and necessity occur, Nassar (2005) states that terrorism and, as I argue, immigration can occur in response. For the purposes of this paper, globalization is defined in terms of trade liberalization, where trade restrictions are removed, “creating an open…world economy and economic integration between First and Third world economies” (Nassar 2005:5). Nassar (2005), however, takes issue, as I do, with what some may believe globalization to be and how it actually functions. In my argument, contrary to more optimistic views, globalization and its neoliberal philosophy have contributed to the rise of immigration and terrorism in the U.S. One essential element to my argument, however, is an understanding that phenomena such as neoliberal philosophy, globalization, immigration and terrorism did not happen overnight. They all developed over the course of the development of a world market. The precursor to neoliberal economics, for instance, was laissez-faire economics. The French phrase laissez-faire literally translates to “let do” (Kegley and Wittkopf 2001:251). Twentieth century advocates of laissez-faire, now neoliberal economics, attributed the concept of the “invisible hand of the market” to 18th century Scottish economist Adam Smith. But while Smith wrote about an “invisible hand,” he never assigned ownership to the capitalist market. As Lubasz (1998) argues, Smith was a religious man whose “invisible hand” referred to God’s influence on the economic behaviors of moral individuals. The 20th century discursive maneuver legitimized the amoral, unregulated marketplace of laissez-faire economics whereby self-interested behavior in an unregulated market would produce the greatest happiness of all. Thus,
where Smith believed the costs of a free-market would be averted by the decisions of moral individuals, neoliberals see the free market as the domain of self-interested individuals and as an amoral arbiter of the distribution of goods and services, a feat accomplished most efficiently when “let alone.”

Overall, laissez-faire refers to an economic system with no state regulation. This system emerged in response to the subsidies and discriminatory economic measures of mercantilism after the decline of feudalism (“a political system in which village farmers occupy lands owned by local lords to whom they owe loyalty, rent and service”) in the 1500s (Bodley 2005:253; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001:253). By the 19th century, laissez-faire economics was the standard for Western economics, until, in the early 1900’s, when heads of industries began abusing this freedom, seeking to accumulate large monopolies, paying non-living wages, providing little security or safety for workers, and severely throwing off the distribution of wealth in general (Bodley 2005; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). Governments around the world then began to intervene in these economic practices, creating factory laws and consumer protection laws and limiting the growth of monopolies. To address these issues, several monopolies were dismantled and several industries and services were nationalized around the world. Keynesian economics took over, supporting government intervention in the market, as a response to the great depression of the 1930’s. However, by the 1970’s laissez-faire economics made a comeback and was reinvented as neoliberal economics in the 1980’s (Bodley 2005; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001).
Neoliberalism is defined by Kegley and Wittkopf (2001:G10) as “a philosophy which maintains that peaceful change with prosperity can be encouraged through cooperation in institutions that knit the states and peoples of the world together into a true global economy.” Like Nassar (2005), I find the theory to this philosophy honorable and the practice, questionable. Heynen et al. (2007:5) argue that neoliberalism has been championed as “a global project to restore, renew, and expand the conditions for capital accumulation.” The authors, however, also recognize that while the goal of neoliberalism is to accumulate and grow wealth, the means of neoliberalism involve “economic elites more or less intentionally seek[ing] to increase their wealth and income…” and “their political and economic freedom and flexibility by rolling back the redistributive reforms of the mid-twentieth century (particularly those reforms adopted in the aftermath of the global Great Depression of the 1930s)” (Heynen et al 2007:5). Kiely (2007) also writes that neoliberalism happened in tandem with the debt and oil crises of the 1980s, where countries were no longer able to repay development debts and oil profits had declined. Interestingly, neoliberal rhetoric about the debt crisis of the 1980s blamed indebted countries for their situations:

Countries that faced severe balance of payment deficits, and therefore faced difficulties in meeting their interest-payment obligations, were said to have adopted incorrect policies. Countries were therefore in debt, not because of the international economy, but because of the bad policies that they themselves had adopted…The neo-liberal assumption was that the bad policies were rooted in too much government intervention in these economies (Kiely 2007:69).
Conversely, Harris and Seid (2000) write that those countries that did reduce government intervention in their economies by accepting neoliberal policy, had their political, social, and economic destinies pulled from their hands. Transnational organizations took over, persuading the economic superpowers of the world and worldwide trade and financial organizations like the IMF and the World Bank to force indebted countries to abolish regulations that once protected domestic life from unequal competition with international trade and investment (Harris and Seid 2000:7). With this accomplished, Schaeffer (2005:80) writes the IMF and the World Bank then offered relief from the debt crises with loans to rescue the economies of indebted countries. There were, however, several stipulations, or what Thomas Friedman (1999:86-87) refers to as the “golden rules,” to these loans being awarded that included:

- decreases in “state taxation” and “redistributive spending;” “privatization of services” once offered by the state;
- implementation of private and individual property rights;
- liberalization of state restrictions on international trade and investment;
- cutbacks on statewide social services;
- emphasis on private influence over “economic, environmental, and social action” of the state;
- decentralization of government authority and “recruitment” of volunteer organizations to provide social services (adapted from Heynen et al. 2007:6).
- reorientation of economies toward exports and reduction of wages to make exports competitive in the global market (Harris and Seid 2000:9).

In so doing, transnational organizations remade “the economies of debtor countries along neoliberal market lines” (Schaeffer 2005:80). The IMF and the World Bank (the monetary institutions that represented these organizations) then became transnational monetary strong-arms that forced countries in need to make a choice.
They could 1) mortgage their economic resources, allowing multinational corporations to gain access to those resources while imposing monetary structural adjustments and austerity plans to restructure national economies and enable countries to repay their debts with interest (Schaeffer 2005:80, Harris and Seid 2000:7). Or they could 2) risk exclusion from a fast-developing global economy through a loss of purchasing power through inflation leading to a devaluation of currencies and internal economic chaos, isolation and collapse. In this way, Harris and Seid (2000:7) state that “through loans, investments, purchasing agreements, patent controls and licenses transnational capitalist corporations gained dominance” over the economies of developing countries and their state projects and public utilities (Harris and Seid 2000:8).

Because of these concessions, neoliberal policy has come at severe human costs, including decreased wages, “continued high unemployment, the reduction of social benefits for the poorer sectors of the population” (Harris and Seid 2000:14). The informal sector has also grown as an adaptation to these capitalist policies. In this way, the neoliberal philosophy itself is a “rhetorical project harnessed to certain mechanisms of social control, which are at odds with the actual mechanisms by which labor, capital, and other markets work…” (Nomini 2003:165). In the end, neoliberalism is still capitalist and functions on the basis of inequality. As Heynen et al. (2007) note, neoliberalism, then, generally amounts to more wealth and power for elites and the realization of “false promises” of social and economic mobility and even worse futures for the poor. Neoliberalism, then, achieves a series of chronic,
unrealized promises and dreams and societal insecurities, amounting to structural violence against individuals.

The concept of structural violence is generally attributed to Johan Galtung, a sociologist, who came up with the phrase during the 1970s. In his book *Peace and Social Structure: Essays in Peace Research*, Galtung (1978) defined structural violence as violence within a social institution or structure that systematically decreases the quality of life and/or kills individuals by limiting their access to basic needs. To this definition Chasin (1997) added, “The structural approach to violence…stresses the ways in which the distribution of wealth and power influence behavior.” Examples of structural violence are forms of racism, heterosexism, classism, and ethnocentrism that have been institutionalized in national or international policy.

Schiller and Fouron (2003:206) state, structural violence, while “a less visible form” of violence, “can be deadly and can affect large numbers of people around the world.” In effect, structural violence is manifest in “deprivations of food, health care, education and other resources necessary for human life and development that leads [sic] to physical disability, the destruction of human potential and death” (Schiller and Fouron 2003:206). Thus, effects of structural violence on individuals may be seen in “disease and death, unemployment, homelessness, lack of education, powerlessness, a shared fate of misery, and the day-by-day violence of hunger, thirst and bodily pain” (Kleinman 1997:227).
Paul Farmer (1997:263) also states that in structural violence the source of suffering is one’s low position in inegalitarian societies, determined by “large-scale social forces”…which are “structured by historically given (and often economically driven) processes and forces that conspire – whether through routine, [or] ritual…– to constrain [the] agency” of individuals. Farmer’s assertion is pertinent for two reasons. The first is that Farmer identifies broader factors, including history, as determinants of an individual’s experience of structural violence. Secondly and simultaneously, Farmer recognizes that these broader factors limit human agency within such a system. In this way, structural violence involves an interrelatedness of issues of both global and local proportions that have serious implications for individuals.

Continuing from this discussion about human agency, the last piece of the definition of structural violence is captured by Howard Winant (2005) as he discusses U.S. economic interests in the Middle East. Historically, the U.S. has enforced its interests using economic pressures such as sanctions and trade embargos. However, most recently, the U.S. has used military occupation of the Middle East. Today, though former President Bush has argued the contrary, “[s]elf-rule” of Iraq “is not around the corner: the domination of Iraq and exploitation of the country’s resources are well underway, under the auspices of the U.S. military and favored U.S. corporations” (Winant 2005:121).

In fact, the demise of self-rule as a characteristic of U.S. policy in the Middle East is quite obvious when one considers the political and economic activity surrounding oil in the Middle East. Threats to oil profits have been rampant and U.S.
policy has responded to each. In the 1950s, Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq was overthrown by both the CIA and British forces after he nationalized oil industries in Iran. But threats to U.S. oil interests did not end there. In 1960, the founding of The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), created an alliance of petroleum producing countries to ensure that oil remained a stable market that would produce wealth for member states. Then, in 1973, OPEC embargoed the U.S. for its support of Israel, removing a significant amount of control over the oil industry from the hands of investors. And a year before that, in 1972, the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company was nationalized by Ahmad al-Bakr of the Ba’ath party, suffering the U.S. an especially detrimental loss to its share of oil profits (Hinnebusch 2007).

Finally, U.S. policy makers have said their oil interests were further challenged when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and Saudi Arabia’s oil fields were at risk of being overtaken (Bronson 2005). However, several have argued that U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie gave Iraq the “green light” to invade Kuwait when Glaspie stated in her meeting with Hussein and his Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, on July 25, 1990

…we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60’s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly (Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy 1990:6).
Some have argued Glaspie’s statement of the U.S.’s indifference gave the “go-ahead” to Iraq and gave the U.S. a reason to eventually invade Iraq and reconquer Iraq’s oil fields. The stage was set for invasion when the U.S. sent troops to Saudi Arabia, but the opportunity had not yet presented itself for the U.S. to change Iraqi policy regarding oil. This came about after September 11, 2001 when President Bush announced the U.S. would invade Iraq to disarm the country of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), oust Saddam Hussein from office, address al Qaeda links with Iraq and free the Iraqi people. Upon arrival, however, U.S. troops acted and were received more as subjugators than liberators (Winant 2005). Later, when Bush admitted that no WMDs were ever found in Iraq, ulterior motives for the U.S. invasion of Iraq came to light. When U.S. troops finally cleared out the ruling party of Iraq, plans were made to build a more oil-cooperative country.

These plans, however, have been enforced by the barrel of a gun and have incited Iraqi anger. As a result, President Bush’s plans for peace were repeatedly revised as the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq continued to increase. Present arrangements with Iraq also highlight self-serving interests of the U.S. As Andrew Kramer of the New York Times reported in June of 2008, “Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total and BP — the original partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company — along with Chevron and a number of smaller oil companies, are in talks with Iraq’s Oil Ministry for no-bid contracts to service Iraq’s largest fields” (1). These talks will reinstate U.S. and British oil corporation power in Iraq 37 years after it was ousted by al-Bakr’s nationalization.
Under the George W. Bush administration, the suppression of Iraqi resistance and the fact that these companies were talks with Iraq’s Oil Ministry about servicing Iraq’s oil fields as of June 2008 demonstrates Winant’s point about self-rule and how neoliberal policy, transnational corporate activity and U.S. economic policy have engendered structural violence and physical violence in the Middle East. It is not necessarily that individuals directly experience the overpowering pull of global forces such as U.S. economic policy. Rather, the individual experiences the inability or unwillingness of the state to respond to his or her needs due to broader international influences.

Neoliberalism, Structural Violence and the State:

Following Bourdieu (1998), I argue, that the power of the state is undermined by neoliberal economic policy. Bourdieu (1998:33) maintains that “the state exists in two forms: in objective reality, in the form of a set of institutions such as rules, agencies, offices, etc., and also in people’s minds.” James H. Smith (2007) discussed these conceptualizations and neoliberalism’s effect on them in the article “Buying a Better Witch Doctor: Witch-Finding, Neoliberalism, and the Development Imagination in the Taita Hills, Kenya.” Smith (2007:174) found that people in the Taita Hills of Kenya were experiencing “the erosion of local social and moral boundaries, under conditions defined…by recent economic and political liberalization.” The withdrawal of foreign aid, a drop in the export price of coffee, a decline in tourism (due to crime and ethnic violence), “the cutting of public services,” “the privatization of public institutions,” and the “downsizing of state bureaucracies”
were all contributing to hardships for the Kenyan people and the elimination of the Kenyan state as a useful institution and a source of power in the minds of Kenyans (Smith 2007:178).

Because neoliberalism has these effects on the state, Bourdieu (1998:41) argues, “the dominated groups in society have an interest in defending the state [from regression], particularly in its social aspect. This defence of the state is not inspired by nationalism.” This defense is, in fact, inspired by people valuing the state as an institution that protects one’s immediate survival in life and in labor. In the case of terrorism, when the state is threatened by neoliberalism, Bourdieu (1998:20) claims that people become frustrated at their government’s inability or unwillingness to “stand up” to neoliberal rationalism and its resulting structural violence, enforced by economic and political elites, transnational and financial corporations, and superpowers. These groups, then, organize to fight what they perceive to be the source of their problems: the U.S., being an enforcer of these economic policies in the Middle East, has become one of their targets. Likewise, in the case of immigration, groups concede to move with the flow of these recent neoliberal policies and migrate where they may be readily hired to address the structural violence in their lives and their states.

**Research Methodology**

The research for my argument is comprised of popular, philosophical and academic sources. The popular literature is represented by the views of Samuel Huntington (2004a;2004b;1993;1968) and Thomas L. Friedman (2005). The
philosophical literature is represented by Pierre Bourdieu (2004;1998) and Jamal R. Nassar (2005). I have selected these individuals as their works cover a large spectrum of political positions on the subjects of immigration and terrorism. I have also incorporated public statements and news releases from individuals such as Congressman J.D. Hayworth (2006), former President Bush (2008; 2001), and new President Barack Obama (qtd. in Carrigan 2008) on attitudes about developments in U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism.

In Chapter Two, I compare this rhetoric to academic studies by Robert A. Pape (2005), Marc Sageman (2004), and Christopher Hewitt (2002) on factors influencing the turn to terrorism. I then continue to identify the causes of terrorism against the U.S., considering historical U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia by using historical accounts of Saudi Arabia by Bronson (2005), Meijer (2005), Aarts (2005) and Sager (2005). In Chapter Three, I also compare the above mentioned rhetoric on immigration to studies by Maria Cruz-Torres (2001), Jeffrey Cohen (2007) and Nancy Johnson (2001). To identify causes of immigration to the U.S., I explore historical U.S. relations with Mexico by using Raat (2004), Castaño (1984) and Roett (1988). These comparisons of rhetoric with scientific studies and historical accounts are used to underscore commonly held misconceptions about the causes of terrorism and immigration.

Before continuing with my methodology, I must, however, address two issues involving my discussion of the above-mentioned rhetoric. First, because I critique the policies of the Bush administration that address immigration and terrorism in the
U.S., I largely present and deconstruct the political rhetoric put forth that supported these policies. I do not deny there is an equal amount of rhetoric on both sides of the immigration and terrorism debate. Second, I must address the apprehensiveness about using rhetoric for data. My research has shown that it is difficult to break down the reasoning connecting immigration and terrorism in the U.S. How does one determine what is legitimate concern or fear and what is simply political agenda? For instance, the tie between immigration and terrorism results from the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists did migrate across U.S. borders, long before the actual attacks, to begin preparations. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) found, al Qaeda trainees Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Midhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi were all granted student visas to go to flight schools in Arizona, California, and Florida between 1997 and 2000. Terrorism and immigration were further conflated when information surfaced showing the U.S.’s southern border with Mexico to be an increasingly easy one to cross. The U.S. Census Bureau states that of the 1.3 million increase in the Hispanic population from July of 2004 to July of 2005, 500,000 may be attributed to immigration (Bernstein 2006:2). Moreover, the 9/11 Commission on Border Control (2004:569) states, “For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.”

This information has given rise to a number of ideas, brimming with rhetoric, about the U.S.’s vulnerability to and responsibility for immigration and terrorist threats. Political figures such as J.D. Hayworth (2006:5) have stated that the U.S.-Mexican border is a way in for terrorists: “a determined and properly equipped enemy
with military training – especially Islamic terrorists trained in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan – would have no problem striking out over those mountains and sneaking into the country.” To support his argument, Hayworth (2006:6) notes that in 2004 the southern Border Patrol arrested 650 “suspected” terrorists. Hayworth (2006:6) also quotes U.S. Admiral James Loy who revealed that U.S. intelligence suspects al Qaeda of intentions to cross the U.S.-Mexican border with a nuclear bomb.

All proponents of the above information, however, admit no conclusive evidence exists that a terrorist attack will result from a crossing of the U.S.-Mexican border. This demonstrates the rhetorical nature of the conflation between immigration and terrorism. Yet, whether exaggerated or not, rhetoric has a way of influencing policy – not only policy change, but blind acceptance of policy, as well. James Davison Hunter (1991), Richard C. Leone (2003) and Alan Brinkley (2003) have all noted a “silent majority,” “a quiet Republic,” and “140 years of silence” with regard to public influence on U.S. policy. This silence results from a majority that resides comfortably between political extremes (Hunter 1991) and feels “in good hands” under the protection of the U.S. government (Leone 2003:21). As Leone (2003) argues, ambiguity of security has become commonplace as threats to U.S. security appeared to be coming from all directions after 9/11: Americans were told of anthrax attacks, terror camps in Afghanistan and Iraq, and weapons of mass destruction in North Korea and Iraq. In the wake of these threats, Leone (2003:15) wrote “most citizens can’t know how to rank-order the dangers or how to judge whether our
approach – heavy on military and law enforcement, light on debate and diplomacy – is the most effective way to proceed.” Thus, “sweeping” changes in U.S. policy at home and abroad have happened with little public debate (Leone 2003:15). It is in this way that a study involving rhetoric for data is, in fact, legitimate. Rhetoric, by nature, is used for persuading people to accept and promote changes in policy. The rhetoric concerning immigration and terrorism has been especially prevalent since 9/11; and, as always, current events on these issues determine which aspects of rhetoric will be more received by the public. Immigration reform and threats of terrorism have been big news lately, especially with the recent presidential elections. Rhetoric, however, is also constructed and the tone of the rhetoric surrounding immigration and terrorism is rendered from dominant perspectives that stand to lose from the occurrences of these phenomena. Whether because of rhetoric, current events or special interests, what is most clear is that policy related to immigration and terrorism has certainly changed in the U.S.

Today’s rhetoric and attempts at policy change in response to the supposed link between immigration and terrorism are misguided attempts at understanding the relations between these two phenomena. In Chapter Four, I note the similarities between historical U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Mexican relations that have led to terrorism and immigration; and, unlike contemporary rhetoric and ideologies would explain them, I believe the individualization of motivations and events has become an antiquated way of understanding these international issues. These similarities may be accounted for by employing World Systems Theory (Frank 1967; Wolf 1982; Arrighi
2005; Sklair 2005), thereby recognizing the world is not composed of unrelated parts, but is rather a manifold of interconnected pieces that influence one another.

The link between immigration and terrorism demonstrates this relation of parts. Though I review short term solutions to policy on both issues, I conclude that the major solution to these two issues is a fundamental change in how we have conceptually organized that world. Wolf (1982) suggested a paradigm shift in our individualized understanding of international conflict. The implications of this shift for immigration and terrorism policy would be that we consider broader causes of the phenomena. I propose, when shaping U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism, we ask if terrorists and immigrants have been victims of the interrelated phenomena of neoliberalism, structural violence and U.S. policy. If the goal in creating U.S. policy on terrorism and immigration (whether a threat or not) is to reduce their occurrences, then to appreciate the connections between these phenomena will create more constructive strategies to these goals and international policy and conflict in general.
Chapter 2: Identifying the Symptoms: The Roots of Terrorism

To unravel the aspects of neoliberal and U.S. policy that have caused structural violence and contributed to terrorism, the first steps are to define terrorism and dispel commonly held assumptions about what makes a terrorist. Definitions of terrorism are especially difficult because terrorism is a concept, not a physical object (Laqueur 1999; Schmid 1983). The U.S. Department of Defense (2008:552) defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.” The U.S. Department of State (2001:4) adds that terrorism is “perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents...” Thus, we see that Washington’s definitions find terrorism to be violence used by anti-state actors to coerce groups and governments into compliance with specific political, religious or ideological agendas.

It is interesting to note, then, by these definitions that states are not capable of terrorism, even though many have argued the U.S.’s activity in the Middle East is state terrorism. These definitions also do not identify causes of terrorism, contributing to the idea that terrorism happens without provocation by the flippant will of individuals. Nasser (2005:18) writes that terrorism is “a political label [my emphasis] given to people who are perceived to be planning or carrying out acts of violence for political objectives.” The fact that Nasser finds the term terrorism to be a label, rather than an objective phenomenon, demonstrates the subjectivity of terrorism.

Washington has been unable to accept this subjectivity because it would threaten the
philosophy of U.S. foreign policy. If “one man’s terrorist” really “is another man’s freedom fighter,” then the U.S. was involved in terror long before al Qaeda.

As Nassar (2005:16) writes, “Terrorism is a symptom rather than a disease. It has other causes.” Groups like Palestinians who have been forced from their homes, denied their rights, “rendered refugees,” and victimized by the Israeli government have been labeled terrorists when they have fought back against their oppressors (Nasser 2005:18). And, interestingly, the state of Israel, which confiscated Palestinian land, imposed restrictions on Palestinian life and subjected Palestinians to state-initiated violence, is labeled a victim of terrorism. Clearly, as Nasser (2005:18) argues, “the label of terrorism…often leads to the disfiguring of genuine causes of liberation,” and it is certainly in the interests of oppressors to put the oppressed in the wrong. In my argument, recently, terrorism against the U.S. has happened due to the effects of neoliberal policy, transnational corporate activity and U.S. foreign policy that have exacerbated structural violence around the world. Those experiencing this violence respond with terror, “carry[ing] their struggle into the heartland of their oppressors” and “bringing nightmares to those who live there” (Nassar 2005:18).

Yet, it should not be assumed that terrorism immediately follows the experience of neoliberalism, transnational corporate activity and U.S. foreign policy and structural violence. Another important aspect to the definition of terrorism is that terrorism is not born over night. Terrorism develops in response to a series of events that may have begun decades ago. Neoliberal economics, transnational corporate activity, structural violence and U.S. policy are simply the most recent pieces to the
puzzle of why the U.S. was attacked on 9/11. Later, the specific steps involving 
interactions between governments and people will be detailed to demonstrate how 
history, recent neoliberal adaptations and structural violence can inspire terror 
responses.

Now that the definition of terrorism has been laid, we may proceed to 
challenge myths surrounding terrorism. First are those myths surrounding why 
terrorist action emerges. One myth proposes that there is a terrorist psyche. The first 
aspect of this myth assumes that terrorists look and behave a certain way, and 
terrorists are products of unfortunate psychological backgrounds and are uneducated. 
In the case of al Qaeda, terrorists are assumed to have pathological personalities 
including narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personalities as a result of childhood 
or adolescent trauma (Sageman 2004:85-91). A second aspect of this myth is that 
terrorists come from disenfranchised backgrounds and are uneducated. Thus, 
terrorists blame and punish others for these misfortunes.

Most disturbing about the terrorist psyche idea is its similarities with early 
20th century phrenology (the study of physical attributes to determine personality) and 
its since deemed superficial uses to determine the “criminality” of an individual 
(Sageman 2004). Against this myth, Sageman finds these conventional explanations 
of terrorism “quick and comfortable,” as they barely scratch the surface of terrorism 
(Sageman 2004:80). On the topic of the terrorist psyche, Sageman (2004) has found 
evidence showing that individuals are not predisposed to join terrorist groups because 
of poor psychological backgrounds. In a study of 61 “terrorists” involved in al Qaeda,
Sageman (2004:85-91) notes that none of his subjects suffered any serious childhood trauma as reported by friends, family and acquaintances, and that “there is no psychological profile for terrorism.” Similarly, on the topic of suicide terrorism, Pape argues that attacks are not waged by desperate psychopaths, but rather socially integrated persons (Pape 2005:23).

The evidence against the second part of the terrorist psyche myth that terrorists are poverty-stricken and uneducated is also intriguing. In a study of American terrorist groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Weather Underground, and the Black Panthers, Hewitt (2002) finds the demographic of American leftist groups tended to be young, middle-to-upper-class, and well-educated individuals (Hewitt 2002:71). The same may be said of many members of revolutionary organizations around the world. For instance, Abimael Guzman, original leader beginning in the 1960s of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru was a professor at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Guzman’s leadership encouraged several students of the school to join Shining Path’s revolution (Hewitt 2002:250). Similarly, subcomandante Marcos, leader of the revolutionary Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), was a graduate of the Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM). Marcos later received his master’s degree in philosophy at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and, before joining the EZLN, he was a professor at UAM (Henck 2007). Given this information, it appears education is a key feature of revolutionary demographics.
These “terrorist” and revolutionary groups have demographic makeups that are quite similar to al Qaeda’s members today. Sageman’s (2004) study of 172 members of the mujahedin (a Muslim guerilla military involved in a jihad) showed that, of the 102 individuals from which Sageman was able to get background information, “18 were upper class, 56 were middle class, and 28 were lower class” (Sageman 2005:73). Sageman also finds that most individuals in al Qaeda were professionals or “semi-skilled” employees such as police officers and mechanics (Sageman 2004:78). Osama bin Laden certainly fits this mold of the affluent and educated individual. He is an heir to his family’s fortune and studied economics and business administration at King Abdulaziz University (Sageman 2004). Bin Laden’s accomplice, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also came from “one of the most prestigious Egyptian families in Cairo” and attended medical school before joining al Qaeda (Sageman 2004:26-34). Thus, as Sageman (2004:76) argues, these statistics “empirically refute the widespread notion that terrorism is a result of poverty and lack of education.”

Other myths surrounding why terrorism occurs are more ideological. Let us consider myths about why al Qaeda attacked the U.S. William Bennett (2002) and Paul Berman (2001) write that the U.S. was attacked because it is a liberal, modern nation that functions well. Berman echoes President Bush’s statements after 9/11 when he argues that “America’s crime [to terrorists]…is to be America herself…to show that liberal society can thrive and that antiliberal society cannot” (Berman 2001:4). Bennett makes a similar claim that the September 11th attacks were an
invitation to the U.S. “to finish” a war between good and evil: “When the advance
troops of al-Qaeda set out to incinerate our innocent civilians, it was not any of our
deeds but the very legitimacy of our existence that for them lay under question – and
it was our existence that they were seeking, quite consciously, quite explicitly, to
cancel” (Bennett 2002:45).

Contrary to these myths about clashing ideologies, Pape (2005) argues it is
foreign occupation that encourages terrorism. The U.S.’s occupation of the Middle
East to protect its economic interests in oil has sparked suicide terrorism in particular
– “a strategy for national liberation from foreign military occupation” (Pape 2005:45).
Pape defines occupation as “the exertion of political control over territory by an
outside group” (Pape 2005:83). Reactions to foreign occupation come in response to
the changes in daily life due to foreign occupation. These changes have amounted to
structural violence. For example, “the growth of Jewish settlements [on Palestinian
land] not only consumed more land and water,” but required the “expansion” of the
 Israeli military in the Gaza strip, increasing violent encounters between Israelis and
Palestinians and creating “more and more checkpoints,” making it difficult for
Palestinians “to travel or carry out ordinary business” (Pape 2005:49). As stated in
Chapter One, the effects of this structural violence facilitate the surrender of self-rule,
as the political, economic and social power defining the interests and identity of the
occupied peoples is lost to the occupiers (Pape 2005:84).

This loss helps explain Sageman’s (2006) point that anyone, despite
socioeconomic or political status, can be motivated to terrorize. This is so because of
the collective experience of structural violence. For instance, the Shining Path began at the University in Ayacucho, an impoverished and “isolated” town in rural Peru (Hewitt 2002:250). The population of Ayacucho suffered from extremely underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of communication means, restricted access to the outside world, and scarcity of water and arable land (Hewitt 2002:254). In 1959, the University of Huamanga reopened in Ayacucho with a mission for economic and social change; and by 1968, a Marxist orientation overtook the activities of the university under the leadership of Professor Guzman. Soon, the institution was ruled by Marxist principles (Hewitt 2002:255). Hewitt (2002:261) states, due to this collective experience and his contact with poverty through interactions with his own students, Guzman was motivated towards revolutionary action.

Bin Laden is also motivated to act revolutionarily by the collective experience of structural violence. Pape (2005) discusses bin Laden’s personal motivations for attacking the U.S. and agrees that bin Laden loathes the U.S. for its abandonment of Afghanistan after its win over the Soviet Union in 1988. However, Pape (2005) also states these motivations are not what bin Laden has used to encourage the public to support him. To gain public support, bin Laden has relied on public outrage at the inconveniences and structural violence caused by foreign economic and military policy in the Middle East. These policies, he states, have caused “severe oppression, suffering, excessive inequity, humiliation and poverty” (bin Laden qtd. in Pape 2005:54). Thus, Bin Laden himself may not be experiencing the full extent of the
effects of the U.S. occupation in the Middle East, but he certainly demonstrates his devotion and solidarity to the struggle against this oppression.

Hewitt (2002) also argues that the motivation to resort to terrorist tactics comes from an overwhelming sense of non-violent protests achieving little success. In many cases, individuals who join terrorist groups recount having been members of non-violent, revolutionary groups whose demands were ignored and unrecognized by their governments (Hewitt 2002:23). Thus, revolutionary groups are more easily recruited to violent activity when their hopes have been dashed and their governments have failed or refuse to address their problems, resulting in their marginalization (Hewitt 2002:48). Thus, it is likely that legal action has been tried, and, beyond dissolving as a group or emigrating from the country, terrorism becomes one method to gain recognition and change from governments (Hewitt 2002).

There is also a religious component to the collectivist argument on which Streusand (1997) elaborates. Islamic groups feel threatened by foreign occupation because Islam purports that everything outside of Islam, Dar al-Harb, is chaotic while everything within the realm of Islam, Dar al-Islam, is peaceful and good. Thus, the U.S.’s occupation of the Middle East is a Dar al-Harb invasion of Dar al-Islam and calls for defense. Sageman (2004) also states that, as a result of alienation from society, disenfranchised individuals seek their roots to help them cope with their oppression. Simultaneously, the privatization of social services in the Middle East as a result of neoliberalism and structural violence has left much care giving and assistance in the hands of religious groups. Islam, being a major Middle Eastern
religion, has helped to fill this void. This explains why terrorism, these days, has predominately Islamic overtones in American rhetoric. The circumstances of marginalization in the Middle East have given rise to Islam as common ground for oppressed peoples. Supporters of political Islam also state that Islamic movements such as those of Hezbollah and al Qaeda have succeeded where Arab nationalism, communism, socialism and democracy have failed the people of the Middle East (Stackman 2006). Thus, in many ways, Islam has become a venue for hopes and dreams. The result of this common ground is that revolutionary organizations and disenfranchised communities come to support one another. This mutual support lends strength to revolutionary groups such as al Qaeda and allows for a chance at terrorist revolutionary success (Hewitt 2002:45).

In the case of the U.S., because religious and cultural differences have been matched with an unwanted and inconvenient U.S. foreign occupation of the Middle East, we see that al Qaeda has attacked the United States. Similarly, Hamas has targeted Israel because it has troops occupying Palestine. However, Hamas has not attacked the U.S. outside of Israel or Palestine (even though Hamas detests U.S. support for Israel) because the U.S. has not deployed troops to those places. In the same way, because Israel is not currently occupying Iraq or Afghanistan, al Qaeda has not targeted Israel, even though al Qaeda claims Israel is also to blame for U.S. occupation of the Middle East (Pape 2005:47). Plainly stated, “neither group [Hamas nor al Qaeda] actually expends significant effort to attack opponents who do not have troops occupying their [religious] homeland” (Pape 2005:47). This may be due in part
to terrorist organizations having limited resources and, therefore, needing to be highly selective in and symbolic about whom they attack. However, I also argue in the next few pages that the U.S. occupation of the Middle East to fulfill its economic needs has made the U.S. a structural violence “institutionalizer” in the Middle East; and for that, the U.S. has been attacked.

Another myth is that terrorists are “brainwashed” by religious fundamentalism to hate the West and everything for which it stands. This myth was born as discussions of Islamic jihad, or holy war, erupted after 9/11. Yet, it appears what is most known about jihad is that Islam rewards martyrdom to Muslims who die for specific causes. Thus, it is believed that the majority of terrorists in al Qaeda, being “brainwashed” to envy the West, are ‘tickled’ with the idea of eternal glory by dying for Islam (Pape 2005:15,23).

Further analysis of the history of jihad explains why Muslims in the Middle East feel particularly threatened by the West. The history of this jihad is related to the emergence of Salafism, a movement that believes Islam has strayed from its “righteous path” (Sageman 2004:4). To return to righteousness, the practice of Islam must become as it was in the days of the prophet Mohammed and his followers (Sageman 2004:4). After decolonization of the Middle East and the resulting repression by the new and modern states, some Salafists began to believe that a jihad was necessary to convert the practice of Islam back to more honorable times (Sageman 2004:7). Sayyid Qutb emerged as a central figure of this philosophy and called for a jihad to found the Muslim holy state, asserting the jihad was to be violent
and waged upon all “nominally Muslim regimes” (Sageman 2004:14). In 1966, in response to his revolutionary message, Nasser arrested Qtub and executed him. But, contrary to Nasser’s plan, Qtub’s execution made him a martyr in the eyes of his followers and his message was disseminated among Muslims (Sageman 2004:14).

Despite the spread of Qtub’s word, it does not appear that religious brainwashing has taken shape in Middle Eastern terrorism. Sageman states that of his sample of 137 terrorists, only 17 percent had been educated in the Islamic Salafi tradition (Sageman 2004:74). Sageman also found that individuals came to al Qaeda on their own accord rather than by recruitment. Furthermore, individuals are accepted into al Qaeda only after careful evaluation. They are not taken in as if by cattle call (Sageman 2004:122). This information is evidence that there is a strategic logic to terrorism and the phenomenon should not be relegated to mere issues of idiosyncrasy (Pape 2005). Moreover, while Pape (2005:15) asserts that suicide terrorism has some religious components, it is not fixed solely to Islam. Interestingly, Pape notes that of 315 recorded suicide attacks around the world, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka – a secularist, Marxist-Leninist group – are the “leading instigators of suicide attacks,” having “committed 76 of the 315 incidents, more suicide attacks than Hamas” (Pape 2005:4).

The last myth about terrorism appears prevalent in U.S. strategies to defeat terrorism: it is the belief that terrorist groups are hierarchically organized with one leader. For instance, to break down Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), a leftist terrorist group in Peru, Peruvian authorities hunted down leader Abimael Guzman
and executed him. Shortly thereafter, Sendero Luminoso collapsed (Palmer 1995:303). This strategy succeeded because Sendero Luminoso was completely dependent on one leader. Likewise, after the September 11th attacks, President Bush launched an international manhunt for Osama bin Laden; however, though Bush’s campaign has succeeded in destroying terrorist camps, bin Laden is as elusive as ever and al Qaeda remains active.

Sageman (2004) recognizes that the charge to stop terrorism must begin with recognition that al Qaeda is not hierarchical and requires more involved methods of dismantling. Al Qaeda is a multi-national entity with heterogeneous ethnic groupings that does not hold to any particular state or act as a cohesive entity. The organization of al Qaeda is more of a coalition of jihads of the Maghreb Arabs, the Core Arabs, the Southeast Asians, and the Central Staff (Sageman 2004:139). These groups are composed of clusters, made up of individual cells and built around terror hubs (Sageman 2004:137). The clusters resemble “small-world[s],” where power is decentralized and groups are able to exist and act without instruction passed down from above (Sageman 2004:139). Each small world, then, has a certain amount of autonomy and may act, quite effectively, without direction from any one central leader. This globalized and decentralized nature of al Qaeda makes it a difficult organization to fight by conventional methods and, thus, more preventive measures must be taken to defeat al Qaeda.
Neoliberalism, Transnational Corporations, U.S. Policy, Structural Violence, and the Steps to Terrorism

In the examples above, the concept of structural violence is particularly useful in understanding the eventual turn to terrorism. As noted by Pape (2005), Israel’s expansion into Palestine has caused several hardships for Palestinians and has fueled the growth of the Palestinian terror organization, Hamas, as an answer to this oppression. Similarly, the causes of terrorist attacks from the Arab world on the U.S. may be characterized as responses to the international structural violence exacerbated by neoliberalism, transnational corporate activity and by the U.S. via its foreign policy in the Middle East (Nassar 2005). These policies have poured resources in the forms of money, arms and troops into the support of regimes in exchange for their ensuring political stability and the security of U.S. interests in oil. Yet, states that have complied with these arrangements have had to cut governmental programs and social services for the public to do so, such as affordable healthcare and housing, unemployment, higher education and subsidized food and utilities. Thus, when regimes or Middle Easterners in general have been uncooperative with these requisites, the U.S. has intervened militarily. This is true for the U.S.’s most recent war in Iraq and it has also been the case for the U.S.’s relationship with Saudi Arabia.

So what has been the public reaction in the Middle East to these policies? As Nassar (2005:35) states, because these policies tend to frustrate “certain basic wishes, needs, or instincts,” individuals may react with violent aggression. Gurr (1970) describes this experience of structural violence as a feeling of “relative deprivation.”
the larger the gap in the lives of the disenfranchised between what one has and what one believes he/she should have, the more likely violence will result in response. Gurr (1986) also finds that as empires adopt more forceful and violent tactics to address objectors of disenfranchiseism, it is more likely their violence will be met with violence. As Bourdieu (1998:40) writes, the “law of the conservation of violence” can not be cheated: “all violence is paid for.” Physical violence and structural violence “in the form of layoffs, loss of security, etc., is matched sooner or later in the form of suicides, crime and delinquency, drug addiction, alcoholism, a whole host of minor and major everyday acts of violence” (Bourdieu 1998:40). Since the U.S. deployed troops to Iraq in 2003, we have seen these same reactions from the Iraqi people in response to the U.S.’s presence.

How, then, do these assertions apply to the terrorists of September 11th? Juergensmeyer (2006:78) argues that al Qaeda’s terrorism can actually be described as “guerrilla anti-globalism.” Some have argued that neoliberal globalization is a preventive tool against terrorism because it sparks development in nations that suffer from oppression and poverty. In contrast, LaFeber (2002) argues that these individuals have not considered the limits of globalization – limits that have widened the gap between the rich and poor in underdeveloped countries. Neoliberal globalization “could produce wealth, but it…[does] not necessarily distribute it more equitably or with the necessary intelligence” (LaFeber 2002:11). Too often, in places like Latin America, high economic growth rates have been taken for economic stability and when the woes of the disenfranchised are not addressed because of these
misconceptions, violence and revolution are born (LaFeber 2002). Thus, neoliberal globalization is not equipped to resolve issues of extreme poverty in places where terrorism has developed: if anything it heightens these dire circumstances.

LaFeber’s assertions fit well with analysis of Saudi Arabia’s economic history. Considering that 15 of the 19 highjackers involved in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian, an investigation of U.S. economic policy and influence on Saudi Arabia due to its interests in oil would be instructive. Historically, reasons for the U.S.’s interest in the Middle East have been many. U.S. dependency on oil, especially in its relationship with Saudi Arabia, is the most obvious. As Rachel Bronson (2005:374) argues, “to understand the long-standing U.S.-Saudi relationship, more attention must be given to the political environment in which oil was needed and its profits employed.” On the U.S. end of the relationship, Paul Aarts (2005:408) states “the United States accounts for one fifth of the world oil consumption” while Saudi Arabia is “the world’s largest oil exporter.” The U.S. Department of State (2008:5) also observes that in Saudi Arabia, “Oil accounts for more than 90% of the country’s exports and nearly 75% of government revenues.”

The above statistics result from what has historically been known as a “special” relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia – one in which the U.S. provided protection for Saudi Arabia in exchange for rights to oil production and cheaper oil prices. This began in 1933 when Saudi Arabia granted the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), or the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) now, an oil exploration concession, which proved fruitful in 1938 when
substantial oil reserves were discovered in eastern Saudi Arabia. From then on, the U.S. sought to manage and defend oil production in Saudi Arabia. However, this relationship had several consequences for Saudi Arabia during its oil boom of the 1970s and its oil bust of the 1980s. During the boom, Saudi Arabia experienced such prosperity that the government was able to liberalize its policies, significantly cutting back taxes and downsizing government bureaucracy while still providing ample social services for Saudi Arabia’s growing population (Chaundry 1997).

This fairytale, however, came to an end during Saudi Arabia’s oil bust. Because private funding of public services had been so minimized and the U.S. government had ceased providing economic aid to Saudi Arabia during the boom, the Saudi government had no alternatives for the growing public when oil prices declined. Thus, social programs and services were cut to keep the economy afloat. Meanwhile, despite Saudi Arabia’s economic place at the time, the U.S.’s per capita income was growing. To no avail, the Saudi public eventually demanded reforms of Saudi policy and its oil relationship with the U.S. to right these wrongs. Saudi leaders were unresponsive, and, when public discontent had reached its peak, especially with war in the neighboring Yemen, the U.S. deployed troops to Saudi Arabia in 1991 to protect its oil interests and settle these domestic issues, thereby setting the stage for September 11.
Aarts (2005:404) writes that the U.S.-Saudi Arabia oil-for-security relationship dates back to a formal pledge of security by Franklin Roosevelt to Ibn Sa’ud of Saudi Arabia in 1945, where, until 2001, the U.S. guaranteed protection from external threats and favourable trading terms, while Saudi Arabia committed itself to producing sufficient oil at reasonable prices, and ‘recycled a significant portion of its oil income through the economies and banks of the developed world (prominently including the U.S.).’

This relationship was beneficial to the U.S., especially during the Cold War. Bronson (2005) states that the U.S. used Saudi Arabian oil to help with the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Then, as American oil production declined and demand rose, the U.S. became increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabian oil. It was here, in the mid 1940’s, that the U.S.’s watchful eye over issues in the Middle East became especially important for Saudi Arabia. As Aarts (2005:427) states, “radical domestic political [and economic] changes in oil-producing countries often lead to suppressed output…Substantially higher prices [of oil] would be the inevitable consequence, with concomitant effects on the global and US economies.”

This is not to say that the U.S. is solely responsible for the rise of public dissent in Saudi Arabia. As stated above, a number of worldwide phenomena contributed to this development, including the economic trends prior to the 1980’s, such as laissez faire economics, leading up to neoliberalism and the contributions of transnational corporate policies. However, U.S. policy during this time certainly contributed to the unfolding of neoliberal economics and politics and added to the
structural violence in the future Middle East. U.S. foreign policy held that political, economic and military interventions were necessary to protect its interests in the Middle East. Originally, these interventions happened by “‘off-shore’ balancing,” whereby “U.S. administrations from Harry Truman’s to Ronald Reagan’s used foreign assistance to build strong alliances with key local states [in the Middle East], while developing the capability to rapidly deploy American combat forces into the region should a crisis emerge” (Pape 2005:249). The U.S. government and Saudi Arabia’s “oil monarchy” also maintained a relationship in which the U.S. provided aid in exchange for the monarchy’s maintenance of domestic stability in Saudi Arabia (Jones 2003:43). Prados (2006:18) writes that from 1946-1975, the U.S. supplied Saudi Arabia with $328.4 million in aid, “of which $295.8 million was military and $32.6 million was economic assistance” to curb political uprisings and economic crises. The U.S. also became the primary arms provider for Saudi Arabia, having delivered $22.9 billion worth of arms to the country prior to 1997 (Prados 2006). These arms and aid helped suppress political opposition and sustain stability within Saudi Arabia, which translated to economic growth for the U.S. (Pape 2005).

In this way, U.S. policy supported the Saudi throne to protect U.S. oil interests. For example, in 1960, when King Saud began threatening that he would nationalize Aramco if the U.S. would not share its oil profits 50/50 with Saudi Arabia and when director of financial affairs Abdullah Tariki enlisted Saudi Arabia in OPEC, the U.S. quickly acted, ousting Saud and Tariki from office and replacing each respectively with King Faisal and al-Yamani (Stork 1980). When asked to comment
on these maneuvers, President Kennedy responded that the U.S.’s economic well-being depended on the “firm and wise leadership” of King Faisal (Stork 1980:25). Al-Yamani was credited with leading the opposition to nationalizing the oil industry and, in 1962, Faisal implemented reforms that would eventually overturn sanctions on trade and investment in Saudi Arabia that restricted foreign ownership of industries to 49 percent and prohibited foreign ownership of land for industry and housing employees (Malik and Niblock 2005:88).

Faisal’s reforms emphasized economic development and invited foreign investment in Saudi Arabia (Stork 1980). His plans were carried out by subsequent leaders of Saudi Arabia as well, including King Khalid in 1975, King Fahd in 1982, and King Abdallah in 2005. These plans were neoliberal in nature and improved market infrastructure, extending paved highways, providing electricity and increasing the number of Saudi Arabian seaports. Then, in 1985, reforms were made to open Saudi Arabia to foreign investment so that 70-80 percent of industries in the country were jointly owned by both Saudi and foreign interests. Finally, the Saudi government accomplished its most liberal reforms in 2000 when it joined the WTO (U.S. Department of State 2008). New legislation was passed allowing for complete ownership of companies in Saudi Arabia by foreign investors (Malik and Niblock 2005:88). In effect, Saudi Arabia lifted restrictions “on foreign investment in oil exploration and production, trade, and land and air transportation” (Malik and Niblock 2005:94). Today, emphasis on privatizing Saudi Arabia’s industries remains a chief goal.
But how have these economic and political policies of the U.S-Saudi relationship affected the Saudi public? Though several authors have hinted at domestic dissent and anti-American sentiment within Saudi borders, few have provided specific details of these instances. Paul Aarts’s (2005:403) take on this matter is especially noteworthy:

What certainly has changed is the deepening animosity of both the US and the Saudi public – …clearly showing that the relationship [between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia] has never relied on a broad-based public support on either side of the partnership. In effect, it always has been an elite bargain...

Furthermore, “the formulation of policy and response to policy in the early phase of the recession [Saudi Arabia’s oil bust] was confined to business, bureaucratic, and tribal elites” (Chaundry 1997:293). In effect, as the Saudi oil and economic crises developed, even as the Saudi public demanded reform of domestic policy, Saudi elites protested the reintroduction of public taxation to address these social woes (Chaundry 1997). Thus, as Aarts (2005) states, clearly the interests of the majority of Saudis were not taken into account in U.S.-Saudi policy making.

To illustrate the public experience of Saudi policy, a discussion of Saudi Arabia’s oil economy is in order. The oil price boom of the 1970s drastically altered domestic policy and the Saudi Arabian state as an institution. From 1973 to 1983, Chaundry (1997) states oil was so profitable for Saudi Arabia that taxation became relatively unnecessary. King Khalid’s government was able to fund state-wide public services such as the General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI), so private corporations were no longer required to make social security payments (Chaundry 1997). The second oil price boom of 1979 allowed for more welfare programs for
“the handicapped, abandoned women, and illegitimate children” and social security benefits packages were improved (Chaundry 1997:149). Chaundry (1997) argues, however, that this “end” of taxation led to a decrease in the bureaucracy of “extraction” from Saudi Arabian society; and this bureaucratic decline had severe consequences when its oil boom became a bust in 1984. Essentially, as Niblock (2007:51) states, though the goal of the liberalization of the Saudi state was development, Saudi Arabia’s period of oil profiteering should, however, be thought of as a transitional stage, where the economy was being taken in a new direction with a vision of substantive change, but where the resources, availability of trained Saudi personnel and infrastructure were insufficient to bring about a major social or economic transformation.

In 1986, the U.S. Department of State (2008:5) reports that higher oil prices led to development of more oil fields around the world and reduced global consumption. The result…was a worldwide oil glut, which introduced an element of planning uncertainty for the first time in a decade. Saudi oil production, which had increased to almost 10 million barrels per day (b/d) during 1980-81, dropped to about 2 million b/d in 1985. Budgetary deficits developed, and the government drew down its foreign assets. At the insistence of the IMF and the U.S., Saudi Arabia decreased its production so that prices would not dip below $30 per barrel to curb the oil price crisis and avoid crippling the wealth of transnational corporations (Schaeffer 2005:49). However, other oil-producing countries, especially those in OPEC in need of oil profits, did not follow Saudi Arabia’s lead and continued producing beyond their oil quotas. As a result, Saudi Arabia saw their oil revenues “decline from $119 billion in 1981 to only $26 billion in 1985” (Schaeffer 2005:49). In response, Saudi Arabia abandoned its position as “swing producer” of oil in the Middle East and soon increased production.
Oil prices, then, plunged to $10 a barrel, bringing the Saudi Arabia’s oil crisis into full effect. Saudi Arabia’s high oil profits would not return either, as, in the 1990s, the country’s profits fell by 40% and the government “ran a $13 billion budget deficit in 1999” (Schaeffer 2005:168). To rebound, as a main supplier of funding to the IMF and the World Bank, Saudi Arabia followed advisories from each institution on how to recover from its oil crisis. Each emphasized structural adjustment and development (Niblock 2007). This set the stage for the liberalization of the Saudi economy which would antagonize structural violence within the country.

Saudi Arabia’s experience of its oil bust was also exacerbated by its relationship with the U.S. Toby Jones (2003:43) finds that in 1981, the U.S. and Saudi Arabian average per capita incomes were both around $18,000. However, by 2003, the U.S. average per capita income had grown to $36,000 while the Saudi per capita income had fallen to $7,500 and unemployment rates had risen to about 25 percent. This was coupled with an exhaustion of Saudi funds due to its funding of the U.S.’s first Gulf War; and, in the years to come, military spending would continue to increase “at an annual rate of $18 billion per annum for the period 1990 to 2002” (Sager 2005:238).

The above numbers demonstrate that the liberalization of Saudi economic and social policy and the Saudi relationship with the U.S. made the country weak during its oil bust. By the time the oil crises developed, Chaundry (1997:294) states “the organizations and institutions that had protected domestic populations from price fluctuation, foreign exchange uncertainty, and scarcities during the rapid
internationalization of the 1970s – [essentially] the government in Saudi Arabia…–
had become dysfunctional.” In this way, ironically, structural violence had been institutionalized at the height of Saudi Arabia’s economy.

As its oil bust worsened, structural violence in Saudi Arabia amounted to extreme budget cuts in areas of social services, healthcare, affordable housing and funding for infrastructure to help repay the Saudi debt. The Saudi public felt this violence as welfare programs in the form of “state-sector employment, higher education, and subsidized food, housing and utilities” were all scrapped (Chaundry 1997:295). Several factories declared bankruptcy, and, according to Saleh al-Toaimi, secretary general of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, “the number of merchants, retailers, commission-holders, agents and industrialists in Riyadh declined by 80 percent in the mid-1980s” (qtd. in Chaundy 1997:273). Finally, Sager (2005) notes despite these conditions, Saudi Arabia’s population continued to grow and a surplus of youths, educated and uneducated alike, composing about 55 percent of the Saudi population, fell victim to unemployment.

The oil crises contributed to an eruption of political instability in Saudi Arabia and the surrounding area, and, eventually, physical violence became the means by which the Saudi government maintained domestic control. Political dissent began on a small scale. Meijer (2005:274) states it began with petitions by “businessmen and intellectuals” for more open and democratic government. Protestors were also angered at Saudi Arabia’s dependence on foreign troops for protection, a fact that made Saudi Arabia appear malleable to the demands of its protectors, mainly the
United States. Yet, the Saudis also wanted a government that could maintain the state as a useful institution for the people. The drop in oil prices paired with the liberalization of the Saudi government had made the state weak; and, as Sager (2005:247) declares, what Saudis demanded was nothing less than the construction of institutional pillars for the edifice of the Saudi state to be supported and cemented by the principles of equal citizenship for all, the rule of law, respect for human rights, social justice and modern institutions capable of riding the globalisation wave with confidence.

Unfortunately, Meijer (2005) states these protests were not taken seriously; and it was not until radical and, at times, religious, groups began to protest that the Saudi government felt particularly threatened. These groups demanded Saudi Arabia build up its own military to become independent of the U.S. They also accused the Saudi monarchy of “nepotism, corruption and moral decadence” (Meijer 2005:275). Groups also encouraged disloyalty among Saudi citizens if the government did not submit to these demands or abide by *shari’a* law.

Initially, King Fahd responded by arresting signers of these petitions and those who were publicly contentious (Meijer 2005). In turn, Islamist opposition mounted in frustration with the Saudi government and pushed for more action-based political discussion and reforms of Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the monarchy opted for all out repression. For example, members of the Committee for Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), a human rights organization in Saudi Arabia, were forced to flee the country or spend life in jail for raising Western support for a democratic Saudi Arabia (Meijer 2005:276). Two of the CDLR’s members actually chose the latter option, yet,
eventually the Saudi government succeeded in quieting their protests. The Saudi government was also forced to crush subversive activity such as “terrorist car bombings in the capital of Riyadh and running gun battles in Mecca and Medina” (Jones 2003:43). These military endeavors actually amounted to use of 40 percent of the Saudi budget, exacerbating the poor Saudi economy while it suffered from its oil bust and subsidized the U.S.’s first Gulf War (Jones 2003:43).

*The Gulf War, U.S. Occupation of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Repression*

Because oil is and has been the “lifeblood” of the U.S. economy – supplying “more than 40% of our total energy demands and more than 99%” of our automotive fuels – the U.S. was alarmed at Iraq’s nationalization of its oil fields in 1972 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, taking over 19 percent of the world’s oil, the U.S. could finally begun collecting reasons to invade Iraq (Bronson 2005). It was argued Iraq’s invasion could have threatened the U.S.’s oil relationship with Saudi Arabia. In response, the U.S. immediately stationed troops in Saudi Arabia to “protect” the country and its resources from the Iraqi threat (Bronson 2005). When Hussein’s forces retreated from Kuwait, the U.S. pulled its troops out of Saudi Arabia; but, in 1994, Iraqi forces threatened Kuwait again. The U.S. came to aid Kuwait, stationing 36,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. As a result, domestic tension mounted from the buildup of American troops within Saudi borders to counter Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait (Bronson 2005). Bronson (2005:386) also states from this point on, American troops in Saudi Arabia only
increased, contributing to “domestic dissent,” Saudi restrictions on U.S. military action, and lack of support of Saudi citizens for U.S. operations against Iraq.

As Chaundry (1997) and Meijer (2005) argue, it is here that religious fundamentalism and extremism became the beacons for those less fortunate of Saudi Arabia. According to Chaundry (1997), many of these movements could be characterized as the expression of fear and uncertainty about Saudi Arabia’s economic future. Suddenly, the “language of identity and morality” were used to “reconstitute the borders of economic community” in Saudi Arabia (Chaundry 1997:294). Furthermore, as Gurr (1986) would argue and Chaundry (2005) and Meijer (2005) demonstrate, Saudi state repression of political dissent eventually led to violent movements. At one point, King Fahd created a consultative council and the 1992 Basic Law to allow for public influence on government policy and the creation of a Saudi Arabian bill of rights (Jones 2003:44). Yet, Jones (2003:44) says, despite these reforms, Fahd used these reforms to “centralize” the oil monarchy’s power and make public access to politics more difficult.

As a result, attacks on the Saudi government and symbols of U.S. influence increased. For instance, there was a bomb attack in November of 1995 on an American building in Riyadh that killed seven people, five of them Americans. In this particular instance, three Salafi Jihad organizations took responsibility, each making similar claims that more attacks would ensue if the U.S. did not cease its influence on Saudi affairs. In 1996, the American Khobar Towers in Dhahran were attacked. Then, after Saudi Arabia had made the final neoliberal reforms to join the WTO in April of
2000, the stage was set for structural violence against the Saudi public to increase because more state-wide protections had been removed. Thus, Saudi discontent had reached a new level when 9/11 happened. The “external” and hidden enemy of the Middle East, the U.S. – an enforcer of globalization and neoliberalism – was finally attacked on its own territory (Meijer 2005:277).

In sum, as Nassar (2005:34) argues, the September 11th attacks were in response to American economic and military expansion in the world and the resulting economic disparities resulting from this empire. Furthermore, Nassar (2005:34) argues that even after 9/11, American expansion continued:

the main goals of the war against Iraq had nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction or democratizing Iraq but rather with controlling 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves and fulfilling a regime change against a dictator who no longer played ball with American interests and demands.

Gurr would argue that the “relative deprivation” felt by Saudi Arabians as their government continued to serve U.S. oil interests contributed to frustrations with the Saudi monarchy. Gurr (1986), Hewitt (2002) and Sageman (2004), then, continue that because Saudi citizen attempts at reform by legal means were met with more government corruption and violence, Saudis turned to their own methods of change. These violent methods were met with extreme military power, and as the Saudi government grew more actively suspicious about the Saudi public, Saudi Arabians bonded through Islam and their shared experience of economic, political and military oppression (Gurr 1986; Sageman 2004). The last step in the equation was Saudi recognition of the global influences on their local experiences. As Jones argues, a “deep fear that external forces threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the country
had taken root, particularly as the U.S. expand[ed] its military efforts globally” (Jones 2003). Consequently, members of al Qaeda took note of this, sympathizing with the disaffected of Saudi Arabia and fighting their enemy directly on September 11th.

**Solutions for U.S. Policy on Terrorism:**

Terrorism against the U.S. will end when the U.S. reduces its contributions to the circumstances which lead law-abiding peoples to illegal terrorist methods. Pape (2005) and Nassar (2005) propose the first step: U.S. forces leave Iraq since occupation is what leads groups to feel threatened. Pape and Nassar also agree that democracy may be an effective governmental form for the Middle East, but public enthusiasm for democracy is vital to its institutionalization. Democracy can not be enforced by the barrel of a gun; it must grow from within (Pape 2005; Nassar 2005). Pape also stresses reducing our economic interests in the Middle East, so that Middle Eastern political strife does not directly affect our interests. Here, Pape is specifically referring to U.S. dependence on oil. By becoming energy independent, the U.S. will not only be self-sufficient, but it will also stop economically supporting the very insurgent activity it is fighting in the Middle East (Pape 2005:249).

Long term solutions to U.S. policy on terrorism will be discussed in Chapter Four, emphasizing the connectedness among worldwide phenomena and using World Systems Theory as elaborated by Arrighi (2005) and Sklair (2005) to explain these connections. For now, however, the Saudi Arabia example shows that terrorist threats on the U.S. today arise out of recognition of global expansion and economic policy
influencing local lives. Individuals become infuriated at their government’s inability or unwillingness to “stand up” to global powers, such as neoliberal economics and the U.S., that have caused extreme structural violence and social and economic disparities (Bourdieu 1998:20). These groups, then, organize to fight what they perceive to be the source of their problems; and the U.S., being an enforcer of neoliberal policy in the Middle East, becomes their target. In this way, a more constructive view of terrorism is that it is “a political label” given to those “planning or carrying out acts of violence for political objectives” (Nassar 2005:17). What is encouraging about this perspective is that, unlike the stifling concept of a “terrorist,” governments and political groups are accessible. They may be negotiated with, and knowledge of what turns them to violence will help prevent the adoption of terrorism to fight their causes.
Thus far, I have discussed how U.S. participation in the enforcement of neoliberal economic policies in foreign countries has produced structural violence and the conditions for terrorist action against this oppression. Now, I will elaborate on how the U.S.’s enforcement of neoliberal economic policy has induced structural violence and prompted immigration to the U.S. As in the case of terrorism, there seem to be misunderstandings as to the full story behind immigration. For example, consider the public reaction to statements made by Senator Barack Obama on Sunday, April 6, 2008, during a presidential campaign speech in San Francisco. Obama commented on the effects the recession is having on Americans, specifically small town people:

You go into some of these small towns in Pennsylvania, and like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for 25 years and nothing’s replaced them. And they fell through the Clinton administration, and the Bush administration, and each successive administration has said that somehow these communities are gonna regenerate and they have not. So it’s not surprising then that they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations (qtd. in Carrigan 2008:1).

Obama’s remarks made headlines and letters to the editor in many newspapers read “I’m not bitter!” A few days later, Obama admitted his word choice was unwise, but he would not renege on the substance of his statement. Obama’s statement brings to the forefront important questions about the root of anti-immigrant sentiment. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanics make up about one-sixth (42.7 million) of the country’s 296.4 million people. Furthermore, from 2004 to 2005, the U.S. population grew by 2.8 million people, with Hispanics comprising about half or
1.3 million of that total. While 800,000 of the 1.3 million are attributed to natural increase (birth minus death), 500,000 are attributed to immigration (Bernstein 2006:1). Given these statistics, controversy over migrants from the South taking American jobs, seems grounded. It is logical to observe an influx of migrants, a decrease in employment opportunities due to the economy and assume that jobs and wealth are being snatched up by immigrants of the largest and the fastest growing minority group in the U.S. (Bernstein 2006:1). Animosity towards these groups is also heightened by the idea that even those Americans with jobs have no job security: individuals may lose their jobs any day to migrant workers willing to work for less. This overall fear of losing one’s job is summed up by Thomas Friedman’s observation that “When you lose your job, the unemployment rate is not 5.2 percent; it’s 100 percent” (2005:226).

However, the extent to which these jobs are lost and being “taken” by immigrant workers should be questioned. On the U.S. side of the U.S.-Mexican border, for instance, we should be asking how companies feel about employing immigrant labor. Studies by Delgado Wise and Cypher (2007) show immigrant workers are beneficial to industries as they allow companies to make profits while spending less on labor. On Mexico’s side of the border, we should be asking what circumstances dictate migrant life. Why do so many migrants make the decision to live divided lives, leave home, brave multiple day trips crowded into coyote (illegal immigrant smugglers) vans, endure high-speed chases with the border patrol (which
The answer to this question is equally complicated. Yet, while both opposing and supporting sides of immigration in the U.S. have made pertinent arguments concerning immigration, it is apparent that a comprehensive understanding of the social, political and economic factors of the “sending” country, in this case Mexico, which lead migrants to the “receiving” country, the U.S., is lacking in the general public. As in the case of Saudi Arabia, a review of the U.S.’s economic relationship with Mexico as Mexico made neoliberal structural adjustments will reveal structural violence in the form of “Disease and death, unemployment, homelessness, lack of education, powerlessness,…misery,…hunger, thirst and bodily pain,” making migration to the U.S. an adaptive strategy for many Mexicans (Kleinman 1997:227).

**U.S.-Mexican Relations, Neoliberalism and Structural Violence**

The following history illustrates what has been the case for U.S.-Mexican relations since Mexico’s independence. Where the Mexican government makes strides for its people, those benefiting from Mexico’s transnational ties quickly reprimand Mexico for “acting up” and neglecting that its interests are served when their interests are served first. The U.S. is no exception to these interested parties. Since Mexico’s independence, the U.S. has repeatedly contributed to structural violence in Mexico through its foreign policy. One such policy exacerbating this violence was NAFTA, a multilateral trade agreement with the U.S. and Canada that conferred trade advantages to foreign investors in Mexico and disadvantages (such as
wage decreases or loss of jobs) to Mexican workers. Though NAFTA was not specifically an example of neoliberal structural adjustment, it was introduced during Mexico’s era of neoliberal structural adjustment. Thus, NAFTA may not have been neoliberal according to the Washington Consensus, but to Mexico, its implementation and effects could easily have been tossed with the lot of neoliberal reform. In fact, neoliberal reform and NAFTA served as a “double whammy” of unfair economic conditions for Mexico’s government, workers and industries (excluding those that have managed to endure, such as glass and cement). Today, because Mexico has liberalized trade regulations in line with neoliberal structural adjustment requisites and opened its market to foreign investment, the country’s once successful industries have lost their hometown advantage against competition from foreign industries. Migration has helped to make up the difference. Because Mexico does not pay for the labor of its migrant workers, money brought home by workers is essentially profit to Mexico’s economy (Castaño 1984:13). Overall, the “savings from work abroad subsidize the state [Mexico], which is unable to fill the basic needs of the general population” (Castaño 1984:13).

Unfortunately, this relationship does not always work out in Mexico’s favor. Paired with NAFTA’s precepts, migration from Mexico to work in the U.S. is a doubled-edged sword for the country’s well-being (Carlsen 2008). Mexico recognizes migration remittances to be one of its most important ‘industries,’ bringing in $24 billion for the year of 2007 (Solís and Corchado 2008:1). Thus, without migration to the U.S., Mexico would lose a main source of income. With migration, Mexico makes
money at the physical loss of workers, from those untrained to those educated (a phenomenon known as the “brain drain”), who could be making Mexico’s own industries more competitive (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007:133). Furthermore, as Mexico’s industries are put out of business by mega-corporations such as chicken producer Tyson, Mexico’s out-of-work employees lose again when they go to work for Tyson across the border, making small wages and enjoying few to no benefits (Carlsen 2008).

Speaking of Mexico’s industries, which ones have stayed afloat and how much profit do they turn? Despite the proposed successes of NAFTA that, for instance, Mexico’s exports increased by an annual rate of 16.3 percent from 1991 to 2000, 78 percent of these exports come from maquiladoras (factories along the U.S.-Mexican border where U.S. manufacturers use “low-cost labor” in Mexico to assemble products for export to the U.S.), making up the majority of the 90 percent of Mexico’s exports that go to the U.S. (Bailey 1988:28; Roett 1988:4-5; Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007). What’s more is that of these exports sent to the U.S., 75 to 90 percent were originally sent in unassembled and untaxed from the U.S. to Mexico because of free trade and then assembled and exported back to the U.S. In this way, the U.S. reaps the benefits of cheap Mexican labor (after all, maquila workers only earned about $4 to $10 a day in 2005) (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007). Thus, Mexico’s real export is labor from which it derives very little profit, unless, of course that labor is performed in the U.S. and pay is being sent back to Mexico.
How did it get to this point? Mexico’s dependence on the U.S. did not happen overnight. As stated above, Mexico has been in a relationship of dependence with other countries since it was first occupied in 1519. Mexico’s independence brought a new found hope for self-determination for the country. However, with little development or experience in the processes of development, Mexico had a hard time exploiting its resources. This is where the industrial revolution and modernization became so pivotal for Mexico’s relationship of dependency with other developed countries. In the early 19th century, the Industrial Revolution changed the course of societal development permanently as manufacturing and agricultural industries dramatically increased their production capacities (Bodley 2005). As Arrighi (2005) writes, industrialization and modernization were believed to be the keys to economic growth. Thus, Mexico accepted loans and investment from abroad to finance the development of its industries and agricultural sectors. But before this could happen, Mexico’s constitution had to be changed.

Structural violence developed largely from changes made to Mexico’s constitution and social policies to prepare and adjust for neoliberal economics as required to receive loans from the IMF and the World Bank in response to the debt crisis of the 1980s. I unravel this development by discussing Mexico’s history beginning with the 1917 Constitution. Upon ratification, Mexico’s Constitution represented a revolutionary step in the country’s policies toward foreign investment. After a century of surrendering the resources of its lands to foreign parties, Mexico finally claimed ownership of its own riches in the 1917 Constitution. Article 27 of the
Constitution in particular protected Mexico’s human resources by limiting the work day to eight hours. It also limited the size of privately owned estates. Most importantly, Article 27 promulgated a redistribution of privately owned large estates to land-poor Mexicans, satisfying their new right to ejido, or communal lands (Raat 2004).

These reforms provided both land and water resources “to a community or group of producers,…with each producer, or ejiditario [sic], obtaining usufruct (temporary) rights over a parcel of land and access to common lands” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:295). But the U.S. disagreed with Article 27, as it threatened its oil interests, businesses and other U.S. properties in Mexico. As a result, in 1920, the U.S. attempted negotiations with a Treaty of Amity and Commerce that would “prevent Mexico from treating article 27 retroactively” (Raat 2004:116). President Obregón of Mexico, however, would not agree to these terms, so the U.S. refused to recognize Obregón as Mexico’s president. This strained Obregón’s ability to stay in office, as other revolutionary figures in Mexico were also vying for presidency. Feeling this pressure, in 1923, Obregón agreed to the Bucareli Accords, which stated Mexico would not nationalize land if it had already been developed (Raat 2004). This rescued several U.S. properties from confiscation and, upon accepting these terms, the U.S. restored its support for Mexico’s president, providing “arms, munitions, [and] shared intelligence” to suppress threats to Obregón’s power (Raat 2004:117).
Despite the Bucareli Accords, when Cárdenas assumed Mexico’s presidency in 1934, he redistributed 18 million hectares of land to “800,000 recipients, and the *ejido* share of the nation’s cultivated land rose from 15 percent in 1930 to 47 percent by 1940” (Klooster 2003:98). Still, Mexico’s industries and farms suffered from lack of development and modernization. For this reason, though *ejidos* guaranteed land to Mexico’s peasants, their low productivity was the most often cited disadvantage of the Agrarian Reform (a problem eventually influencing President Carlos Salinas to reform the program and eliminate the constitutional right to *ejido* land) in 1991 (Raat 2004). Thus, under Cárdenas’s rule, Mexico also participated in the Green Revolution, bringing new machinery and technology such as pesticides, irrigation projects, synthetic nitrogen fertilizer and improved crop varieties developed through genetic engineering to Mexico (Bodley 2005). In the short run, the Green Revolution succeeded in increasing the production of food in Mexico, allowing for the sustenance of a growing population. For instance, the Green Revolution improved Mexico’s wheat production from importing half its wheat in 1943 to becoming completely self-sufficient in 1956 to exporting half a million tons of wheat by 1964 (Dewar 2007). Some, however, have argued that in the long run the Green Revolution had several serious implications, including population growth (which was becoming increasingly more difficult to sustain), environmental degradation and the shift from traditional subsistence-based agriculture to mass production-based agriculture for export (Bodley 2005). The social and environmental implications of the Green Revolution that have contributed to immigration will be elaborated upon later.
Finally, under Cardenas, Mexico nationalized its oil companies in 1938 in retaliation to the U.S.’s refusal to obey Mexican labor laws and to bolster Mexico’s economy (Raat 2004:249). The U.S., preoccupied with the onset of WWII, did little to prevent this. Thus, in the 1970’s, Mexico’s oil boom seemed to be the solution for Mexico’s lack of economic and industrial development. It was believed that discoveries of oil in Mexico in the 1970’s could “generate the foreign exchange necessary to finance rapid economic expansion” (Philip 1987:4). However, under Lopez Portillo (1976-1982), Mexico spent most of its profits from oil “immediately and worse, leveraged its expected future income from oil in order to borrow massively from international banks” who were more than happy to lend the surplus of petrodollars to Mexico (Trebat 1988:72). Thus, being fully confident in its future ability to pay off debts, like Saudi Arabia, Mexico received a devastating blow to its economy when oil prices suddenly plunged in the 1980s (Bennett 1988:89). To save its economy, Mexico agreed to take on neoliberal structural reforms in exchange for aid from the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S.

These reforms involved opening up markets, divesture in Mexico’s state industries, and privatizing parts of industries such as oil. The privatization of oil was no surprise, seeing as Mexico has long been among the top four exporters of oil to the U.S. (Saudi Arabia being another) (Raat 2004). In theory, once these industries were sold, Mexico could begin to repay its debt. However, from the beginning, Mexico was dependent on the United States’ technology to extract and process its crude oil, and since the economic crisis of the 1980’s, Mexico has spent the majority of its
income from oil exports repaying its foreign debts, which have been “aggravated by high inflation and increasing interest rates” (Castaño 1984:10-11). Mexico’s structural adjustments had served to support its lenders, not rescue its economy.

In order to repay this debt, Mexico’s government was forced to institutionalize structural violence by cutting funding for social welfare programs for public education, healthcare and housing. Middlebrook (1989:196) notes, the Mexican government also stifled wage increases, and “government subsidies for basic commodities, mass transportation, electricity, natural gas and gasoline were drastically reduced or eliminated.” As a result, the poor of Mexico paid the greatest price for investment mistakes made by the government and foreign banks (Raat 2004).

Another requisite of neoliberal reforms was instigated in 1992: a second agrarian “reform,” which was more a reversal of the first agrarian reform. During negotiations with the U.S. and Canada, which had already signed NAFTA, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari lifted many restrictions on the communal control of ejido land and eliminated the constitutional right to ejidos. The Mexican public had mixed feelings about the reform. Though some were satisfied that the ejidos would become more privatized and that Mexico’s government was interested in modernizing its agricultural practices, others had doubts about what the reforms meant for the Mexican people. As Johnson states, “ejidos remained politically popular in Mexico in part because they served as a visible sign of the government’s continuing commitment to the principles of the [Mexican] revolution” (Johnson 2001:294).
Nevertheless, Salinas was intent upon “market reform and international competitiveness” and pushed for privatization (Johnson 2001:294).

The principles of the new agrarian law put an end to agrarian reform and land distribution. It provided security for private land owners. Conflicts would be resolved using Agrarian Tribunals as opposed to federal agrarian reform ministries. *Ejidatarios* (owners of *ejidos*) had the right to “sell, rent, sharecrop or mortgage their land” to interested parties, including those private and foreign (“The Reform of Article 27 and Urbanisation of the *Ejido* in Mexico” 1994:327). The government also created a new agency called PROCEDE (*Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales*) to help implement the provisions of the *ejido* reform (Yetman 1998:73). In this way, agrarian reform was advertised as a way “to give farmers both the ability and incentive to invest in new technologies and improved production practices” (Johnson 2001:292).

However, the concerns of the Mexican masses about the reform were well grounded with Mexico’s inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Because Salinas believed in comparative advantages and had witnessed some Mexican industries benefit from trade arrangements with the U.S., he reformed Mexico’s market structure, including *ejidos*, to open Mexico to more private investment at the U.S.’s urging and “prepare” Mexico’s economy for the implementation of NAFTA (Johnson 2001). And though those industries associated with the PRI (Mexico’s previous governmental administration) benefited from NAFTA, the majority of Mexican industries found themselves at the mercy of U.S. economic interests. According to Bartra (2004:25), under NAFTA in 1994, “poultry,
pork, sheep and lamb, beef, wheat, rice, barley, coffee, potatoes, warm-weather fruits and tobacco, among others, plus all their derived products such as sausages, fats and food oils” all entered Mexico without tax from both the U.S. and Canada. Only corn, beans, powdered milk and sugar remained controlled, that is, until January 1, 2008 when they were also liberalized under NAFTA. From this day on, these crops steadily lost value for local Mexican farmers. Furthermore, as Schulz (1996) writes, the second agrarian reform exacerbated inequality and “land concentration” became “much worse, as peasants, unable to compete with cheap foreign imports,…[came] under growing pressure to sell out to large agroexport producers.”

Interestingly, the Clinton administration and several members of the U.S. Congress touted NAFTA as the job-producing solution to the immigration “problem” in the 1990s, but, as Schulz (1996:144) notes, the Salinas administration estimated that the reforms would influence the emigration of 13 million people by the year 2000. Overall, Schulz’s statements illuminate that a number of changes in Mexico’s industries, imports, exports, and environment due to Mexico’s market and agrarian reforms influenced the displacement of so many people, causing them to flock to Mexico’s cities to find work. There would not be enough work in the cities for these people. Wages would decrease, the standard of living would decline sharply, and more and more individuals looking for work and a decent living would look to migrate to the U.S. (Schulz 1996:145).

*The Reforms and Structural Violence*
Cruz-Torres (2001:112) states that the *ejido* reform paired with other “fiscal policies of the neoliberal economic model…institutionalized” structural violence via a decrease in public investment and an unequal distribution of natural resources that further marginalized and impoverished Mexico’s poor. Furthermore, in a study of whether or not the *ejido* reforms would allow farmers to “gain access to collateralized credit” and, therefore, increase the productivity of their land, Johnson (2001) argues that if PROCEDE was functioning as it should, there would be a positive correlation between *ejido* assets and participation in PROCEDE. Johnson does not find this correlation and, therefore, states that the *ejido* reforms cannot be expected to increase “the capital intensity and productivity of *ejido* agriculture” (Johnson 2001:304). As it turns out, Johnson’s results stem from the fact that in practice PROCEDE only benefited medium to large agroproducers, while small producers received small handouts instead of real investment in their industries.

Davis, Stecklov and Winters (2002) demonstrate similar findings regarding the productivity of land since the *ejido* reform in the article “Domestic and International Migration from Rural Mexico: Disaggregating the Effects of Network Structure and Composition.” The authors analyze the migration of Mexicans from *ejido* lands to Mexico’s cities and to the U.S. in search of work. The study demonstrates factors influencing migrants to leave the rural setting for urban Mexico and for the United States. Their data is taken from 5,260 individuals living in *ejido* households in 1994 and 1997. The authors find that those households with family members employed in the agricultural sector “have the lowest household income,
show the lowest levels of agricultural modernization, are located in more isolated communities, and report lower levels of household infrastructure” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). Those households who report family members having migrated to Mexico’s cities to do non-agricultural work have “greater access to irrigated land and show higher levels of agricultural modernization” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). Finally, households reporting migrants in the U.S. are “linked with [household assets such as] cattle production” and “greater levels of rainfed land and cattle stocks” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296).

Thus, David, Stecklov and Winters (2002) find, in the case of the agricultural worker, the urban migrant and the migrant to the U.S., that despite Salinas’s neoliberal reforms to bolster Mexico’s economy, the reform of the agricultural sector especially has had little to offer Mexico’s poor. Opportunities for modernization or industrialization have not flourished in the agricultural sector. In fact, as the research of the authors shows, agricultural access, benefits and livestock have only become available when families have received income from relatives working outside of agriculture in Mexico’s cities or in the U.S. This indicates a relationship between neoliberal reforms and those with the lowest income. Because many Mexican citizens had little to no access to capital to begin with, neoliberal reforms achieved nothing for them.

Those farmers who have resisted selling their lands have been unable to compete with the technology, subsidies, higher production and thus cheap prices of large-scale agricultural industries, and therefore have had to take the next step and
sell their *ejido* land to large agro-businesses who do have the capacity to develop and utilize the land (*Bartra* 2004). The next two options for subsistence are then migrating to work in Mexico’s manufacturing industries or to the U.S. Yet, as *Carlsen* (2008) reports, those working in Mexico’s industries, such as the poultry industry, have also suffered or been shut down as import controls and tariffs have been eliminated on U.S. goods in Mexico. In the case of the chicken industry, tariffs were eliminated on imported chicken from the U.S., causing individuals like Pedro Martin (factory worker) and Lorenzo Martin (president of the Tepatitlan Poultry Farmers Association and owner of a successful poultry farm) to fear for their jobs (*Carlsen* 2008).

As a result, U.S. exporters such as Tyson chicken have pulled out two wins from the removal of tariffs on their products. *Carlsen* (2008) reports that those who lose their jobs then find themselves working for lower wages and with fewer rights for the very U.S. industries that put them out of work in the first place. In some cases, this is on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexican border, working at *maquiladoras*. Other times, this is on the U.S. side of the border, where illegal migrants work “*bajo amenanza*” (under threat) that if they do not comply with their working conditions, they will be deported (*Carlsen* 2008:2).

Today, the CIA (2008:9) reports Mexico’s population is about 109,955,400 people with an unemployment rate of 3.7 percent and an estimated 25 percent of the population suffering underemployment. This, along with “the 1994-5 Peso [sic] devaluation and subsequent inflation,” in which “the value of US dollars almost
doubled while Mexican wages fell” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002: 296) motivated more migration. The dollars earned in the U.S. became essential for supporting families and communities in Mexico, including for the creation of small businesses and cooperative infrastructure projects (Cohen 2001; Martinez 2001; Hayworth 2006). The willingness of U.S. employers to hire migrant labor due to its exploitative advantages is another influential reason. These factors make it no surprise that between 1994 and 1997, the authors report an 8 percent increase in the number of ejido households with a family member in the U.S. (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:295).

Davis, Stecklov and Winters’s findings also show that migrants who chose non-agricultural work or migrated to the U.S. were able to increase their opportunities in life. For instance, non-agricultural workers in Mexico and migrants to the U.S. tended to “have higher levels of education” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). Migrants to the U.S. specifically also tend to be young males, composing 80 percent of the sample (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). This is especially interesting considering Ruben Martínez’s (2001) findings on the motivations of young Mexican men who migrate to the U.S. Martínez (2001) states that the desires of young males to migrate to the U.S. are to fulfill their sense of adventure, gain knowledge of the outside world, and, most importantly, “make something of themselves” in the sense of climbing the socio-economic ladder. It appears, then, there is a belief that the way to achieve these goals of self-fulfillment and overcome the structural violence caused
by NAFTA and neoliberal reforms in Mexico is not through employment in Mexico, but rather employment in the United States.

**Environmental State of Mexico**

One last effect of Mexico’s modernization and development projects such as the Green Revolution and neoliberal reform has been environmental degradation throughout Mexico. As Cornelius and Myhre (qtd. in Cruz-Torres 2001:112) state, “increased mechanization of agricultural production, the opening of grazing lands to farming, more extensive use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides and other kinds of changes” created “new environmental problems, especially soil erosion and groundwater pollution.” As a result, massive deforestation, desertification, destruction of marine habitats and industrial waste have been just some of the environmental effects of NAFTA and neoliberalism in Mexico today.

But how does environmental degradation affect Mexico’s economy? Cruz-Torres (2001) states that at the time of the *ejido* reform, Mexico’s economy suffered in correlation with the exhaustion of its natural resources. Today, Cruz-Torres (2001:112) notes “81 percent of the land [in Mexico] is eroded and thirty-one of the nation’s most important aquifers are contaminated.” These environmental issues actually contributed to a drop in the productivity so needed from *ejido* lands. Deforestation led to desertification, making soil unproductive and decreasing production for agricultural sectors. Soil erosion also ran into the ocean, suffocating coastal reefs and depleting fish populations. In this way, when policies of the 1917
Constitution, which had protected Mexico’s delicate eco-economy, were removed, major industries such as fishing and agriculture suffered a major blow.

Finally, as mentioned above, due to the failure of these industries, individuals desperate for work began to accumulate in urban areas. Yet a side effect of this migration was a rise in air pollution in Mexico’s cities. Over Mexico City, for instance, smog hovers due to the high altitude of the surrounding countryside, which traps air pollution in rifts and valleys. This pollution along with water shortages has resulted in serious health problems for Mexico’s people, who have overwhelmed the public service and resource sectors which have been unable to improve the situation (Philip 1987:2).

**Solutions for U.S. Policy on Immigration**

In sum, neoliberal reforms and Mexico’s opening up for the activity of transnational corporations have not been a success story for many in Mexico. The U.S.’s participation in this via development aid, NAFTA and U.S. influenced World Bank and IMF policies have not helped either. Both have come at the cost of social services and communal land ownership, and have not diversified Mexico’s economic opportunities. Competition with commercial agriculturalists has also forced many *ejido* owners to seek new means of subsistence. They have traveled to the cities to seek better opportunities only to find job scarcity, labor surpluses, and the depreciation of wages. The *ejido* reform also exacerbated pre-existing environmental problems, depleting more natural resources, debilitating Mexico’s industries and most severely impacting Mexico’s already impoverished populations. Finally, the fact that
labor has become Mexico’s greatest export and the fact that “one-third of the economically active population [in Mexico] is in the so-called informal sector” (i.e. economic activity not taxed or regulated by the government) of employment illustrate the unequal trade relationship between the U.S. and Mexico (Delgado Wise and Furio 2004:150,151). In this way, it is understandable that immigration to the U.S. has become the solution to Mexico’s “‘accumulation through crisis,’” as NAFTA, neoliberal policy and structural violence are “impoverishing…millions of people, destroying communities [and] degrading…bioregions” (O’Connor qtd. in Cruz-Torres 2001:111).

On the other side of the border, Delgado Wise and Furio (2004) recognize that the U.S.-Mexican relationship has been historically beneficial to U.S. industries. However, as individuals such as Huntington, Hayworth and Appadurai note, fears that wealth and employment are becoming rare are being realized as more and more Mexicans cross the U.S. southern border and find work. Job security, healthcare, education, welfare and many others services of the U.S. government are all rumored to be strained and overwhelmed due to immigration. Yet, the blame has been placed on immigrants for these inadequacies in the American infrastructure, while those groups who attract and benefit most from migrant labor or outsource jobs such as U.S. industries, have only been recently and briefly identified as promoters of migration.

Short term solutions to the Mexican immigration problem require recognition that both Mexico and the U.S. benefit from and need migrant work (Racheotes 2007).
Immigration initiatives prior to September 11th to make the U.S.-Mexican border more fluid should be reconsidered, allowing for more work visas, tighter border security, the initiation of guest worker programs, more regular, legalized migration to and from the border, and devoting certain sectors of U.S. industries to migrant labor (Delgado-Wise and Furio 2004). In addition, if the border becomes more accessible, the phenomenon of “entrapment” of illegal migrants on the U.S. side of the border, as described by Núñez and Heyman (2007), would become less common. Contrary to common knowledge, movement of migrants, both legal and illegal, is not only from Mexico to the U.S. Legal and illegal migrants also wish to return to Mexico for various reasons, most commonly just to go home for a bit, if not forever. However, due to heightened border security and restrictions on immigration since 9/11, movement across and back has become increasingly risky. And if one’s papers are not in order or if one is caught, future crossings of the border are less likely. Thus, movement of migrants has been greatly diminished and avoiding the risk of being caught has meant that more and more migrants reside in the U.S., never making the trip back to Mexico (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). If, however, regulation and accessibility become the vocabulary and philosophy of immigration reform, the “immigrant threat” to American livelihoods will also subside.

Long term solutions, as in the case of solutions to terrorism, will be discussed in the next chapter by way of Arrighi (2005) and Sklair’s (2005) discussions of the World Systems Theory and how it explains the connections between neoliberalism, structural violence and immigration. Using World Systems Theory theory, I argue
that immigration, like terrorism, is a global phenomenon that has global causes.

Mexico is not solely responsible for its economic, social and political environment.

Transnational organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank and other international investors have contributed to Mexico’s problems. The U.S. has done its part especially with NAFTA, creating a negative ripple effect in the form of structural violence on Mexican life. If the goal of U.S. immigration reform is to quell immigration, the U.S. must first consider its role in making migration a strategy of livelihood for those suffering poverty and instability in Mexico.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

Investigations of the causes of terrorism and the causes of immigration in the U.S. show that the two phenomena have similar causes. Though each phenomenon has a specific history, one constant in these histories has been imperialism. The most recent form of imperialism I have identified in instances of immigration to and terrorist attacks on the U.S. is neoliberal economic policy. Those who administer this policy, such as the World Bank and the IMF, influence the G7 countries to help enforce the requirements of neoliberal structural adjustment. In countries where these adjustments have been enforced, one potential result is the institutionalization of structural violence (consisting of social services being cut, labor exploitation being ignored, issues of poverty remaining unaddressed, and governments becoming unresponsive to the needs and demands of their people). What is most unfortunate is that these effects work against already disenfranchised groups of people. These groups respond in various ways to this extreme structural violence. For the purposes of this paper, I have discussed a terrorism response and an immigration response. Because the U.S. is one such enforcer of neoliberal policy, it has felt the effects of these responses. Thus, solutions to both immigration and terrorism should turn a critical eye to U.S. foreign policy.

This information, however, begs two questions: 1) why do we not also see Mexican terrorists and Saudi Arabian migrants? And 2) have I not simply solidified the notion that all immigrants are terrorists and vice versa? The answer to the first question requires that one consider the economic and ideological differences between
Mexican migrants and Saudi Arabian insurgents. As described in the previous two chapters, al Qaeda was able to carry out its Sept. 11th terror plan because it had the economic resources to do so. Osama bin Laden and others were able to fund this kind of attack. On the other hand, in Mexico, resources for this kind of action are lacking. Those who have organized and rebelled such as the Zapatistas have had to learn to conserve their resources for the sake of their cause. And, at best, in their 1994 uprising, they were only able to confront the Mexican government. They did not have the resources to carry their message to the powers that be in the G8. Secondly, the Saudi terrorists of 9/11 operated under a unique religious philosophy that encouraged violent rejection of foreign attempts at determining the destiny of middle-eastern, Muslim countries. In fact, this philosophy stated very clearly that these individuals wanted to be nothing like their Western counterparts and outwardly protests U.S. occupation of its religious homeland. Mexican migrants on the one hand do not adhere to any particular religious teaching such as that of the 9/11 terrorists, nor do they appear to communicate any strong distaste for Western influence. In fact, to migrate to another country, at bottom, implies tolerance and, for many Mexicans, a desire to be submerged in Western influence whether to complete a rite of passage, increase status, or acquire remittances for “development” and capital for informal sector activity in Mexican communities. The Mexican migrant and the Saudi terrorist are not interchangeable.

The answer to the second question ties in with the first. In this paper, I have illuminated a set of circumstances whereby immigration and terrorism have similar
causes. I do not, however, claim that these causes necessarily lead to the same effects. The purpose of this paper has not been to argue that the terrorism and immigration are the same in terms of how they are carried out. The similarity I discuss lies in the fact that, in each case, individuals are faced with dire circumstances and they chose to do something about it in accordance with whatever societal, cultural and economic norms that exist for these them. Why does this astound us so? It is astounding because we do not know the circumstances that lead one to migrate or terrorize.

Thus, there are interested parties such as transnational corporations, financial institutions, and governments interconnected with one another perpetuating these circumstances within the globalized capitalist system to make a profit, who must not only maintain their practices to continue making money but also explain to those unaware of these transnational activities the hows and whys of terrorist attacks and immigrant movement. This is where the rhetoric surrounding immigration and terrorism have been so instrumental. As it is elaborated upon in the next section, paired with the American ideology of individualism, the rhetoric surrounding terrorists – that they are hateful, intolerant and backwards – and migrants – that they are lazy, parasitic and incompetent – flows well with the American public. This is why the myths of immigration and terrorism were discussed at the beginning of the previous two chapters. The myths are the rhetoric, and the rhetoric is perpetuated so that transnational corporations, financial institutions and governments of the G8 can continue to have the public support that allows them, for instance, to invade another country supposedly guilty of housing WMDs and terror camps for the purpose of
establishing an oil foothold in the Middle East again. This rhetoric also allows companies and governments to condemn the movement of migrants across U.S. borders and maintain the legislation that allow them to profit from not having to pay a living wage, provide safe work environments or provide other benefits such as health insurance to legal workers. The fact that four of the 9/11 terrorists were also technically immigrants was simply an added perk that tied these two lines of rhetoric together in a double-whammy of threats to the American way of life.

Thus, in many ways, though individualism has its awe-inspiring perks, it has made Americans ignorant of a collective world. American individualism is in many ways the “third culture” to be considered in discussions of the circumstances driving individuals to immigration or to terrorism. The environment determining the perception of the perceiver is just as valid as what is perceived, and I will discuss the usefulness of World Systems Theory to illuminate these perceptions and their connections in the last section.

**Ideological and Conceptual Impediments to Solutions to Immigration and Terrorism**

**Ideological Impediments**

A critique of U.S. foreign policy, however, is an undoubtedly difficult course of action, as it requires a paradigm shift in how we view cause/effect relationships in times of disaster. Harry Triandis (1990:42) argued that “perhaps the most important dimension of cultural difference in social behavior, across the diverse cultures of the world, is the relative emphasis on individualism versus collectivism.” In the U.S.,
individualism is the reigning ideology. Triandis (1990:42) defines individualist behavior below:

In individualistic cultures most people’s social behavior is determined by personal goals…When a conflict arises between personal and group goals, it is considered acceptable for the individual to place personal goals ahead of collective goals.

Individualism also has connotations of personal responsibility. If an individual “places personal goals ahead of collective goals,” the individual must do so knowing and having accepted responsibility for the consequences.

Perhaps, then, one reason why solutions to immigration and terrorism in the U.S. have been unsuccessful is because immigration and terrorism have been viewed through the ideological lens of individualism; the choice to migrate or to terrorize has consequences for which only the individual is responsible. I argue, on the contrary, that to characterize the turn to terror and migration as purely individualized decisions is to misunderstand the complexity of each phenomenon. And, yet, it appears even recent attempts at understanding this complexity come up short. Even broader causes of terrorism and immigration have been chalked up to failures on the part of terrorists’ or migrants’ native countries. For example, Friedman (2005:323) writes that in a world becoming “flatter” through the global economy, some countries are able to mobilize and use free markets to their advantage, while others get “tripped up.” Friedman (2005:324) explains this phenomenon as a matter of culture: “the key factor is actually a country’s cultural endowments, particularly the degree to which it has internalized the values of hard work, thrift, honesty, patience and tenacity.” These values are all championed in American beliefs about individualism and are,
supposedly, lacking in countries that have not benefited from the globalized economy. Friedman (2005:324) continues, then, explaining the ideology of bin Laden and argues that this mindset cannot possibly operate in the globalized world because it is “tribalist,” against “glocalizing and collaborating,” and suspicious of “strangers.” It is for this reason that the Middle East remains underdeveloped and has born “terrorists,” who – faced with the supreme development and expansion of the West and the East – have lashed out at those who are successful (Huntington 1993). The partisan nature of this argument fails to recognize a relationship between those countries benefiting from and those suffocating under the global economy.

Similarly, on the topic of immigration, Hayworth (2006:81) writes, “The sad fact is that successive Mexican governments have found it easier – preferable, really – to actively encourage illegal entry into the United States rather than to fix Mexico’s ailing economy and the corruption endemic throughout all layers of Mexican society.” Considering Mexico’s economic environment and the amount of immigration coming in from Mexico to the U.S., this argument is easy to make. Mexico’s foreign debt is $179.8 billion (CIA 2007). Ninety percent of Mexico’s total production is exported for very little profit to the U.S. (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007). And Mexico makes about $24 billion a year off of migration remittances (Solís and Corchado 2008:1). How should we think about these figures? As causes or effects of Mexico’s relationship with the global economy and the U.S.? Or both? Once again, arguing as to which came first, Mexico’s economic exploitation or migration, does little to solve both issues. What is useful is to recognize Mexico’s economy depends
on remittances from migrant workers in the U.S. And the fact that Mexico’s economy is dependent on the U.S., and vice versa, ought to raise questions the U.S.’s role and power.

*Conceptual Impediments*

How, then, do these relationships exist? Eric Wolf (1982:3) wrote that “the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes,” but “inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality.” These segmenting inquiries bestow “nations, societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects” (Wolf 1982:6). In this way, Wolf (1982:5) argued that the segmentation of our global histories and interconnections contributes to a phenomenon in which each “runner” in the developmental race of a country “is only a precursor of the final apotheosis and not a manifold of social and cultural processes at work in their own time and space.” For example, in the U.S., our nation’s history has been taught as an epic battle for morality. During the Cold War, the West was considered to be the modern world, while the East had submitted to communism – where “life was cheap and slavish multitudes groveled under a variety of despotisms” (Wolf 1982:7). If the West could circulate the vaccine of modernization, the third world would be saved from the outbreak of communism. This “history” has made the U.S. the end-all be-all “force for good in the world;” and, today, America is believed to be the superpower that restores order and enforces freedom and justice all over the world (Hunter 1991:116).
Historically, the “saving graces” of America, for instance, have been quite twisted around the world. This is one reason why “salvation” philosophies such as neoliberalism, modernization and individualism are so contested in the international arena. Wolf (1982:7) argues, in the 1960’s, during the rise of communism, when “peoples in other climes began to assert their political and economic independence from both West and East…we assigned these new applicants for historical status to a Third World of underdevelopment;” and we acted in superpower fashion to restore “order.” However, as in the case of Vietnam, eventually social groups began mobilizing for the “enactment of their rights” and the philosophy of class conflict no longer seemed adequate to explain these social problems (Wolf 1982:8). Thus, according to Wolf (1982), to better our understanding of these conflicts, we adopted a conceptual divide between functionalist theories of social integration and political economy and relegated each to its own discipline. The result of this divide has been the segmentation of a most certainly interwoven world; and our comprehension of conflict has been partial ever since. As Bourdieu (1998:39) critiques,

Who would link a riot in a suburb of Lyon to a political decision of 1970? …All the critical forces in society need to insist on the inclusion of the social costs of economic decisions in economic calculations. What will this or that policy cost in the long term in lost jobs, suffering, sickness, suicide, alcoholism, drug addiction, domestic violence, etc., all things which cost a great deal, in money, but also in misery?

Examples of how this conceptual divide has resulted in the misinterpretation of international events include the consequences of U.S. economic and military activity in Saudi Arabia and Mexico. I have argued that U.S. policy in each country has had consequences in the form of terrorism and immigration. Yet, as seen in
explanations put forth by Hayworth and Huntington, in many ways, culture has been essentialized as the cause of these international issues. By the creed of these authors, each “society” has responded to their own failures with terrorism and migration. This simplified explanation of ‘failure’ exemplifies the segmentation of interrelated parts and the denial of responsibility for the consequences of these global relationships.

The last problem in finding solutions to immigration and terrorism is in identifying the global processes affecting these phenomena. We have only recently conceptualized and developed the vocabulary to describe them. As Roger Rouse (1991:8) states, suddenly the language used that describes “nation-states and national languages, [of] coherent communities and consistent subjectivities, [of] dominant centers and distant margins no longer seems adequate.” Thus, discussions of the processes of globalization have been highly convoluted. For example, Pierre Bourdieu (1998:19) wrote

the rationalism of the mathematical models which inspire the policy of the IMF or the World Bank, that of the law firms, great juridical multinationals which impose the traditions of American law on the whole planet, that of rational-action theories, etc. – is both the expression and the justification of a Western arrogance, which leads people to act as if they had the monopoly of reason and could set themselves up as world policemen, in other words as self-appointed leaders of the monopoly of legitimate violence, capable of applying the force of arms in the service of universal justice.

One idea seems to run constant through several critical definitions of globalization – the belief that once the “neutral mask of ‘globalization’” is removed, “raw imperialism” will be revealed (Harvey 2005:91). For instance, Nassar (2005:25) states that colonialism was “the cruelest amalgamation of globalization…as millions
of people perished under the guns of colonists.” Today, Nassar (2005) argues that globalization operates via neoliberalism and is enforced by economic, political and military pressure in the international arena. The neoliberal processes of globalization, then, instigate structural violence, as the expansion of empire through the expansion of economy suppresses the dreams of many in the effort for world power (Nassar 2005:27).

The Interrelated Causes of Terrorism and Immigration

Recent migratory and political terror movements call for these ideological, conceptual and linguistic impediments to be overcome. Moreover, because those migrating or terrorizing identify global causes of their problems, we must understand their rationale to address these issues. For example, Martínez (2001) reports that in 1994 several Mexicans described a phenomenon called “la crisis” – an economic crisis in which the stock market dropped, the value of the peso plummeted, and unemployment rates were high. Meanwhile, the U.S. “enjoyed throughout the late 1990’s a historic boom in practically every corner of its economy, and among the fastest-growing was the ‘service sector’” (Martínez 2001:8). As described above, the backdrop of these two events was NAFTA, which took effect after President Carlos Salinas instigated neoliberal reforms of Mexico’s constitution, restructuring the agrarian sector and opening Mexico to private investment, mainly from transnational corporations (Johnson 2001:294). And today, Mexican migrants report, “Because of la crisis, you borrow[ed] a thousand dollars and risk[ed] your life sneaking across the U.S.-Mexico border” to make a living (Martínez 2001:10).
Bin Laden has also justified the call for Muslims to “kill all Americans and their allies – civilians and military,” arguing:

for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples (qtd. in World Islamic Front Statement 1998:1).

And, finally, in the 1990s, in what may be regarded as an interesting cross between what motivates migrants and terrorists, a revolutionary group called the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) emerged in Chiapas, Mexico, demanding an end to the neoliberal policies of the U.S. that created extreme structural violence in their lives. Leader subcomandante Marcos, a strong critic of globalization, exploitation, commercialization and neoliberalism, argued that “NAFTA represented a ‘death certificate for the indigenous peoples of Mexico, who are dispensable for the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari’” (Marcos qtd. in Harvey 1996:188).

Interestingly, Harvey (1996:188) states, because the Zapatistas chose to rebel on the day in which NAFTA became effective, it is clear the guerrillas understood the connection between the international arena, their government’s economic policies and their local experience. These three examples show that individuals are making the choice to migrate or to turn to subversive activity upon recognizing a link between their local situations and global powers.

**Recognizing the Links between Global Phenomena**
Because neoliberalism has the potential to affect severe social and economic disparities and to institutionalize structural violence once it has been accepted, Bourdieu (1998:40) argues that the precept of neoliberalism as “a strictly economic policy” to engender development “is not necessarily economical – in terms of the insecurity of persons and property, the consequent policing costs, etc.” As long as neoliberalism reigns as a supreme ideology for economic development, individuals, such as migrants or those who turn to terrorism, will continue to adjust, adapt, and resist for survival – all while they are blamed for the very forces that threaten them to begin with. While neoliberal policies for economic development continue dominating governmental authority, states will continue to be undermined by the individualization (or privatization) of social responsibility. What once belonged to the public sector and was the state’s responsibility in terms of social protections and services is delivered by the private sector. Structural violence by neoliberalism emerges in this way. Thus, Bourdieu (1998:40) is justified when he states, “…there is a need to radically question the economic view which individualizes everything.” Questioning neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank and the U.S.’s enforcement of them may actually reverse the effects of regressed states and diminish the turn to options like immigration and terrorism.

To better our international relations, the segmentation between social relations and political economy and the limits of individualization must be addressed. In the 1960’s, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) began answering this call with his contributions to Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, in which it is argued the world is
organized between those societies who compose the “core” and those societies who compose “periphery” of the world. Those on the periphery were underdeveloped and in a relationship of dependence with the core – the developed, metropolitan, capitalist center of the world. According to Frank, the core made the periphery into “dependent satellites” by extracting “the surpluses produced in the satellites to meet the requirements of the metropolis [the core]” (Frank 1967).

Frank’s arguments were elaborated in 1974 as several individuals, including Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin expanded on World Systems Theory, stating (as summarized by Kegley and Wittkoph 2001:133) that

the perpetual and widening inequity among states is explained by capitalism’s international division of labor and production, which over time allows the wealthy core countries to become richer while the peripheral states supplying raw materials and cheap labor become poorer.

Originally, as Wallerstein argued, the world system was composed of the European core and its peripheries. However, with the industrial revolution, the world system expanded from Europe and became a global system (Bodley 2005). The expansion of the global system created a core composed of countries of the northern hemisphere, while the periphery was composed of countries in the southern hemisphere. The northern core tended to be wealthy because it was modern and industrialized while the southern periphery was poorer because it was less modern and industrialized. However, as industrialization and the global system grew, modernization projects developed in the south (Bodley 2005).

Since then, some have argued that the north/south divide clause of World Systems Theory can not hold true because modernization and industrialization of the
south has taken place. However, as Arrighi (2005) argues and as we have seen in the case of Mexico, modernization and development have scarcely worked out for the periphery. Though development and industrialization projects in the south grew, economic growth in the south did not. To be sure, in 1960, the south’s per capita GNP was 4.5% that of the north and 4.6% in 1999 (Arrighi 2005). Much of this was due to the fact that periphery countries struggled as they competed with new commodities, markets, trade routes, innovations and new sources of supply and demand within the world system (Schumpeter 1954; Vernon 1966, 1971; Arrighi 2005). Periphery countries also found themselves at a shortage for resources and dependent on the resources of the core to become modernized. Ironically, in several cases, the resources for which the periphery was short were the very resources the core actively removed from the periphery – all while it advertised the mission of modernization and development to draw profit from this extraction (Frank 1967; Wolf 1982; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001; Bodley 2005).

These disadvantages aside, even when modernization was profitable, it was mostly only the elites of the periphery who could afford and benefit from it (Sklair 2005). Sklair (2005) refers to these elites at the transnational capitalist class (TCC): individuals with both global and local perspectives concerning their transnational interests. These individuals may be

1. Those who own and control major transnational corporations (TNCs) and their local affiliates (corporate fraction)
2. Globalizing state and interstate bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction)
3. Globalizing professionals (technical fraction)
The IMF and the World Bank fit into the picture as they helped to finance, govern and enforce these modernization projects under the direction of the TCC core (Arrighi 2005; Sklair 2005). Thus, as in the case of underdeveloped states such as Saudi Arabia and Mexico, neoliberal policy of the IMF and the World Bank enforced by U.S. dominated TCC’s around the world turned these countries into “dependent satellites” on the periphery of the “metropolitan,” capitalist center (Wolf 1982:22). In this way, underdevelopment and structural violence, the exhaustion of resources, and the undermining of the state have been the standards for neoliberal influenced policies of TCC. These arrangements have led to the consideration of migration and terrorism as strategies for change.

**Long Term Solutions for U.S. Policy on Immigration and Terrorism**

Wolf (1982) argued that to view the causes of conflict and global phenomena in terms of Marx’s materialism and modes of production, instead of pure individualization, would better capture the motivations of individuals as determined by a broader structure of social and economic forces. It would seem then that a holistic human science calls for universalism. However, though Marx sought holism to understand humanity, he did not advocate for a universal human history. He, in fact, argued “against those who wanted to universalize Society, or the Market, or the Political Process” (Wolf 1982). Indeed, as Wolf (1982) argues, universal histories contribute to some entities, such as the U.S., assuming a superpower attitude over the world. Unlike universalism, Marx believed there were different modes of production throughout various human histories due to the many possible “combination of
elements’ per mode of production (Wolf 1982:21). Modes of production were specific to certain societies. Marx’s relativity of modes of production relates to my argument as lack of respect for the governments, environments, economies, and people – the modes of production – of Saudi Arabia and Mexico have yielded structural violence, immigration and terrorism.

One holistic way of understanding the globalized world is through the use of World Systems Theory. Addressing the issue of U.S. foreign policy as a form of globalized structural violence using World Systems Theory will contribute to the creation of a holistic human science that takes all disciplines and phenomena into account in attempts to explain conflict. Once this is implemented, the U.S. will be better equipped to avoid structurally violent action and those economic policies that push individuals to migration and terrorism.

There is, however, one unavoidable impediment to solutions to U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism. In his book Patrolling Chaos: the U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas, Lee Maril (2004:305) argues that technology may advance and laws passed, but the greatest challenge to the mission of the Border Patrol comes down to human agency: “While new technologies are vital in combating terrorism, ultimately it is human decisions and actions that are essential…” and these decisions will begin with individuals. Likewise, long-term solutions to immigration and terrorism are long term because they will also require human decision and determinacy. Change on this level will not happen over night. People must collectively become critical of their present perspectives and ideologies. This will
happen when they are encouraged to be more informed about current events, educating themselves in world history, and actively participating in the future of the U.S. by, for example, voting in elections. These forms of human agency will reveal how the paradigm of the segmentation of political economy and social relations and the dominance of individualization have shaped our thinking on globalized issues; and, once this constraint is finally loosened, more comprehensive solutions to issues such as immigration and terrorism can be imagined.
References

Aarts, Paul.

Appadurai, Arjun.

Arrighi, Giovanni.

Bailey, Norman A.

Bennett, Timothy.

Bennett, William J.
2002 Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism. New York: Doubleday.

Berman, Paul.

Bernstein, Robert.

Bodley, John H.
Bourdieu, Pierre.

Bronson, Rachel.

Brinkley, Alan.

Bush, George W.

Castaño, Gabriel Murillo.

Carlsen, Laura.

Carrigan, Lucy

Central Intelligence Agency

Chasin, Barbara H.
Chandy, Kiren A.

Cohen, Jeffrey H.

Cruz-Torres, Maria L.

Davis, Benjamin, Guy Stecklov and Paul Winters.

Delgado Wise, Raúl and James M. Cypher.

Delgado Wise, Raúl and Victoria J. Furio
2004 The Hidden Agenda of Mexico’s Fox Administration. Latin American Perspectives 1(5):146-164.

Dewar, James A.

Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy

Farmer, Paul
Frank, Andre Gunder
Buffalo: Catalyst.

Friedman, Thomas L.
2005 The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
1999 The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Galtung, Johan.
1978 Peace and Social Structure: Essays in Peace Research 3. Copenhagen:
Christian Ejlers.

Gurr, Ted Robert.
1986 The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical

Harris, Richard L. and Melina J. Seid.
2000 Critical Perspectives on Globalization and Neoliberalism in the
Developing Countries. In Critical Perspectives on Globalization and
Neoliberalism in the Developing Countries. Harris, Richard L. and Melina J.
Seid, eds. Boston: Brill.

Harvey, David.
2005 From Globalization to the New Imperialism. In Critical Globalization
Studies. Appelbaum, Richard P. and William I. Robinson, eds. New York:
Routledge.

Harvey, Neil.
liberalism Revisited: Economic Restructuring in Mexico’s Political Future.

Hayworth, J.D.
2006 Whatever it Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security, and the War on

Henck, Nick.
Press.
Hewitt, Christopher.  

Heynen, Nik, James McCarthy, Scott Prudham, and Paul Robbins.  

Hinnebusch, Raymond.  

Hunter, James Davison.  

Huntington, Samuel P.  
2004a The Hispanic Challenge. Foreign Policy 141: 30-45.  

Johnson, Nancy L.  

Jones, Toby.  

Juergensmeyer, Mark.  

Kegley Jr., Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf.  

Kiely, Ray.  
Kleinman, Arthur

Klooster, Dan

Kramer, Andrew

LaFeber, Walter

Laqueur, Walter.

Leone, Richard C.

Lubasz, Henri

Lutton, Wayne and John Tanton.

Malick, Monica and Tim Niblock.

Martinez, Ruben.
Maril, Robert Lee

Meijer, Roel.

Middlebrook, Kevin J.

Nassar, Jamal R.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

Niblock, Tim.

Nomini, Donald M.

Núñez, Guillermina Gina and Josiah McC. Heyman

Palmer, David Scott.

Pape, Robert A.
Philip, George.  

Prados, Alfred B.  

Raat, W. Dirk  

Racheotes, Alex  

Roett, Riordan.  

Rouse, Roger.  

Sageman, Marc.  

Sager, Abdulaziz.  

Schiller, Nina G. and Georges Fouron.  

Schmid, Alex.  
Schulz, Donald E.

Sklair, Leslie.

Smith, James H.

Solís, Dianne and Alfredo Corchado.

Stackman, Michale.

Stork, Joe.

Streusand, Douglas E.

Suro, Roberto

The Reform of Article 27 and Urbanisation of the Ejido in Mexico.
Trebat, Thomas J.

Triandis, Harry.

Tumlin, Karen C.

US 9/11 Commission on Border Control

U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration.

U.S. Department of Defense
2008 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1-780.

U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of State

White, Jonathan R.

Winant, Howard.

Wolf, Eric R.
World Islamic Front Statement

Yetman, David
   1998  Twenty-seven: a Case Study in Ejido Privatization in Mexico. Journal of