
Azusa Ono

Abstract

This article examines the relocation and employment assistance program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs conducted in the 1950s and explores how relocated American Indians in Denver survived in an alien metropolitan society. Although a few anthropologists and sociologists have investigated the Denver Indians' experience since the 1970s, no historian has ever examined the relocation program and the experience of the Indian participants. Mainly based on the findings of archival research at the federal archives and other research facilities in the Denver area as well as U.S. government publications, this article investigates the actual operation of the relocation program and the difficulties that the Indian relocatees faced in the mainstream society. A close examination of the relocation program and the lives of the Indians reveals that the BIA's plan for rapid assimilation of American Indians ended as a failure in Denver. The Denver Indians, instead, strengthened their pan-Indian identity and created a support system which would substitute for reservations.
Denver, Colorado, surrounded by states with many Indian reservations, has long played a vital role as an urban center for American Indians, especially since the mid-twentieth century. During World War II, the city became one of the host communities for Indian workers in the defense industry. In the post-war era, moreover, Denver greeted new American Indian residents as one of the destination cities for the relocation and employment assistance programs launched by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Scholars who have examined this process of "relocation," in which the federal government sought to replace the "segregation" of reservation life with "integration" of American Indians into the mainstream society, generally described the story of relocation as another example of the federal government's manipulation of American Indians. City life was demanding for American Indians, as it was for other ethnic and immigrant groups, and many suffered from cultural and physical isolation. Yet many relocated Indians survived in Denver, coping with urban life because of the benefits that their reservations rarely could afford. American Indians in Denver began to create an active inter-tribal Indian community in which they searched for a new identity as urban American Indians, while they faced concerns of adjustment and integration. From this experience would come a strong presence of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and other examples of Indian life in the twentieth century.

The emergency situation during World War II affected almost all aspects of American society, and Indian communities were no exception. During the Second World War, approximately 25,000 American Indians, or more than 30 percent of able-bodied Indian males aged between 18 and 50, joined the armed forces. In addition, between 1943 and 1944, roughly 90,000 American Indians moved away from reservations to work in defense industries (about 40,000) or agricultural employment. After World War II, the West continued its wartime prosperity with increases in federal spending and offered American Indians postwar employment. This economic boom in the West contributed to the urbanization of American Indians, which proceeded at a rapid rate. Even though many Indian veterans and war industry workers returned to their home reservations, like their White counterparts, a considerable number remained in cities such as Denver, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Between 1940 and 1950, the distribution of the urban Indian population increased from approximately eight percent to 16.3 percent, while the total population of American Indians increased by only 2.8 percent.

The American Indian experience during World War II contributed to their rapid movement to urban areas in the post-war era. American Indians broadened their perspectives by experiencing life beyond their reservation boundaries. During the war years, American Indians found more stable employment, higher incomes, and a more decent standard of living in urban areas than in their familiar surroundings. Moreover, American Indians who had not moved out of their communities in the war years also learned about the world outside the reservations through the stories of returned Indians. In 1976, a federal task force on urban and rural non-reservation Indians described the impact of World War II on American Indians' lives. Its final report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission...
(AIPRC) claimed that the war "had provided employment and income as well as a broader perspective for many Indians, particularly younger ones." The report, looking back more than 30 years, also described the war as a cause of crisis in the post-war era which dislocated American Indians upon their return to reservations. Their exposure to mainstream society, even if temporarily, prevented Indians from finding a comfortable place either in urban society or in rural reservation communities.

Their lives in war, combined with the disappointing situation on reservations, prompted a considerable number of Indians to migrate to urban areas as permanent city-dwellers. More ambitious Indian people, especially those who had suffered from unemployment and underemployment, believed that life in cities would offer better living conditions. The BIA's advertising campaign to recruit reservation Indians also introduced life in cities through brochures and conversations. Census data on Indian education and health indicated the crisis situation of American Indians in the post-war era. In 1950, 14.7 percent of Indian males received no formal education, while 2.6 percent of all males never attained any formal education. In 1945, the death rate of American Indians was 211.9 per 100,000 persons, more than five times that of the general population. This high death rate among the Indians had not improved for five years when Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 1950 reported, "The death rate among Indian infants and children as a group will continue to be high, proportionally about five times that of the general population." While the general American population improved its educational and health care systems, these improvements rarely affected American Indians.

In addition, most reservations lacked the economic capacity to re-integrate the Indian veterans and former war industry workers. During the war years, unlike conditions outside, reservation economies deteriorated even more as the federal government slashed the BIA budget to meet wartime demands. In many cases, therefore, Indians went back to reservations only to find a worse economy and few occupational opportunities. Reservation communities with overwhelming poverty and unemployment hardly welcomed the returning Indians. In 1949, for instance, the median income for male Indians on reservations stood at $623, less than one-fifth of that of all males ($3,475), while that of urban Indians averaged $1,240. Many returning Indians, therefore, had to move to cities to find more promising employment opportunities.

The relocation and employment assistance programs of the BIA advanced the urbanization of American Indians further. The initial idea of Indian relocation began in the 1940s, when a devastating winter blizzard swept across the Navajo and Hopi reservations of eastern Arizona. The federal government airlifted relief supplies to prevent starvation among Indians on these two reservations, who suffered from hunger and cold. The plight of the Navajo and Hopi drew national attention, and moved Congress in 1950 to pass the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act. The act authorized expenditure of $88,570,000, and offered these tribes ten-years of rehabilitation programs, such as health and education projects.
The federal government concluded that the major source of poverty on the Navajo and Hopi reservations was overpopulation on unproductive lands. Along with the long-term development on reservations, the federal government found it necessary to offer off-reservation employment opportunities to the Navajos and Hopis. In 1948, the BIA launched a job-placement program for these two tribes and opened placement offices in Denver, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City. More than 90 percent of the jobs offered to the Navajos and Hopis were seasonal, primarily in railroad construction or agriculture. By the end of 1951, more than 17,000 Navajos had found temporary work in fields or with track crews. Even though the BIA sought permanent jobs for Indian people, their limited skills caused by a lack of education prevented the BIA staff from finding these ideal occupations.

The Tabulation of Requirement for Navajo-Hopi labor for Spring and Summer, a document presented in March 1952, showed that the program focused on obtaining temporary employment for the Navajos and Hopis. Among 23,950 job openings for Navajo and Hopi workers in the spring and summer of 1952, 13,500 were railroad workers hired by the Railroad Retirement Board, 10,150 were in agriculture, and only 300 were in industry. The Denver Placement Office offered 3,700 jobs in Colorado. Of these opportunities, 3,200 were cultivating sugar beets, onions, and cucumbers, and another 500 jobs were with the U.S. Forest Service in Denver on insect-control projects. Commissioner Myer explained the situation in which the BIA placed more than 90 percent of the Navajo and Hopi workers in agricultural or railroad labor “because this work is most available in and near Indian country and because most Indian workers are unskilled.”

Immediately after the Second World War, federal policy began to move toward withdrawal of responsibility for American Indians; a policy known as “termination.” The Indian New Deal of the 1930s, with its burgeoning budget and bureaucracies, encountered a backlash during the conservative post-war era. The patriotic attitude of American Indians during the Second World War, which showed their loyalty to the United States and its cause, led the federal government to confirm their readiness for complete citizenship, and thus to be subject to the responsibilities of citizens of the United States. In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission Act, the first legislative step toward termination, followed by a continuous flow of bills to end the special relationship with American Indians. By “liberating” American Indians from the federal-tribal trust relationship, policymakers argued, Indian people would enjoy their citizenship while the federal government could eliminate its special services dedicated to Indian people.

The relocation program developed as a part of the termination policy during the Cold War, an era when the government and society discouraged dissent. Government officials claimed a direct link between traditional communal living of Indians and “communism,” thus trying to erase Indian customs by installing mainstream ideas of capitalism among American Indians. A typical idea of policymakers, which connected the lifestyle of American Indians to “communism,” appeared when one senator claimed in 1953:
While we are spending billions of dollars fighting communism and Marxist socialism throughout the world, we are at the same time, through the Indian Bureau, perpetuating the systems of Indian reservations and tribal government, which are natural Socialist environments.

The most effective way to introduce the lifestyle of mainstream culture was, in the government officials' understanding at least, to remove Indians from reservations where they pursued this unfavorable way of life. The relocation program, like Indian education at off-reservation boarding schools, attempted to enhance assimilation among the Indian people by placing them into an urban community and ending the connection between American Indians and their traditional culture. Only by stepping out from what the BIA once called "inland islands of isolation," which "by and large have been blocked by peculiar social, economic and political conditions from moving from positions of isolation," could American Indians merge into the mainstream society to enjoy a fuller American life.

Advocates for the termination policy came not only from conservative politicians, but also from American citizens in general. Indians's wartime efforts and patriotism resulted, even if temporarily, in their social acceptance among the American public and indicated an ability to live as ordinary citizens. In World War I, American Indians constituted roughly 10,000 volunteers during 1917-1918. This identified American Indians as responsible citizens, and led to passage in 1924 of the Citizenship Act, whereby Congress sought "to make certain none were left out" of citizenship. The Second World War became the stimulus for a further step toward complete citizenship, which required American Indians to accept responsibility without special help from the federal government. Many Americans supported the termination of federal responsibility toward the Indians, as this would "emancipate" Indian people from unnecessary guardianship and offer them "freedom" in dealing with their land and property.

The reduction of government spending became another of the definite goals for terminationists, who saw the trust relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes as a heavy burden for the non-Indian population. To appeal to a broader audience, supporters of termination emphasized the economic benefits of the program which would reduce unnecessary expenditures. A report entitled "Situation of American Indians in the United States" claimed:

It would save our Government money if we had no such services for our Indian tribes. The taxes that cover much of the expense of the schools, hospitals, the social services, and the salaries of officials serving our Indians are paid by all the people of the United States, and not just by Indians.

The economic advancement of American Indians would result in a reduced tax burden upon the non-Indian population. Once the federal government ceased to
support economic advancement of American Indians, the terminationists reasoned, self-sufficient Indians would reimburse the federal expenditure by paying taxes. At the same time, the higher employment rate among Indians meant that federal and local governments could reduce their spending on welfare for Indians.

Under the Truman administration (1945-1953), Indian policy underwent a critical change. President Harry S. Truman's "Fair Deal," which sought to support the poor through equal treatment without regard to ethnicity, required American Indians to enter into the mainstream society as regular citizens. President Truman appointed Dillon S. Myer as new Commissioner of the BIA in 1950 where he remained for three years. Myer endorsed the Fair Deal policy by focusing on the assimilation of American Indians and withdrawal of special services of the BIA. Unlike the two former commissioners, William A. Brophy and John A. Nichols, who never favored termination, Myer's experience as the director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) created the basis of his idea for the relocation program for American Indians.

Between 1942 and 1946, Myer managed ten Japanese-American detention camps, where some 119,000 descendants of Japanese were relocated from the West Coast. Myer encouraged immediate resettlement of the Japanese-American internees and tried to disperse them throughout the country. By the end of March 1946, 57,000 "evacuees" had returned to the West Coast, while another 50,000 had established new homes in midwestern and eastern states. Myer's actions toward the internees led to criticisms. Under his order, for instance, Japanese-Americans could enjoy neither self-governance nor cultural activities at the camps, and he required loyalty oaths from those who desired to move out of the camps. In later years as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Myer found a parallel situation between Japanese-Americans and American Indians and used the same tactics of relocation to enhance assimilation of American Indians into the mainstream society. As he encouraged rapid integration of Japanese-American evacuees into the general American society, Myer promoted amalgamation of the Indian population by relocation.

Commissioner Myer also denounced the former policymakers's attempt to preserve the strong tie between the Indians and their land, for "there are and always have been large numbers of the Indian people who have no desire to be farmers or stockmen." Myer stressed instead the Indians' growing interests in off-reservation employment opportunity, and simultaneously applied the "surplus population" theory on reservations. This he justified as the "liberation" of American Indian population from "something akin to large detention camps." He strongly believed that the BIA "has no desire to continue providing the Indians with any service which can be rendered just as efficiently and cheaply by some other agency or organization." Under the "termination-minded" commissioner, the termination policy accelerated its operation toward total withdrawal of federal responsibility for the American Indians.

To rationalize his idea for relocation of American Indians from impoverished reservations to industrial centers, Myer emphasized the ineffectiveness of economic
development on barren reservations and claimed, "Today, if we were to develop all the Indian land resources to the fullest extent, we would still find ourselves with a surplus Indian population on those lands of 40 to 50 percent." Therefore industrial development on reservations would never become an alternative solution for severe poverty among Indians, and the relocation program became the most dependable cure for "Indian problems." To gain immediate support for the relocation program, which would enable the BIA to withdraw its special services for American Indians, Myer stressed the importance of timing. "If we miss this opportunity to relocate and to raise the standard of living of the surplus Indian population," Myer cautioned, "it will mean a subsidy continued indefinitely by either the federal government or the states for the social and welfare services that will be necessary for these overpopulated and poverty-stricken areas."37

The findings of overpopulation on Hopi and Navajo reservations became the basis of program extension. Generalized ideas of reservation economics and resources found on the Navajo and Hopi reservations offered the federal government a justification to emphasize the need for a relocation program.38 Moreover, the rapid increase of Indian population on reservations with inadequate resources, the relocation supporters reasoned, could not sustain even the Indians's substandard reservation existence. A typical claim appeared in a House Committee Report in 1954, stating:

Most of the reservations are greatly overpopulated, and could not support the present population at anything approaching a reasonably adequate American standard of living. Past studies indicate that the resources of many reservations, when fully developed, could support no more than 60 percent of the current population, and the Indian population is increasing rapidly.39

The BIA projected the situation on Hopi and Navajo reservations as a universal phenomenon on every reservation, and expanded the relocation program by offering it to other Indian tribes.

In the fall of 1950, the BIA introduced the placement and relocation program to other parts of the nation. By the midsummer of 1951, the BIA had appointed officials to work in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah. In November of 1951, the Department of the Interior established a new Field Placement Office in Chicago. It then transformed the original Navajo-Hopi placement offices in Denver, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City to Field Relocation Offices to serve other Indian tribes.40 That year, the BIA placed more than 20,000 Indians, two-thirds of them Navajos or Hopis, in seasonal employment.41 At this early stage of the relocation program, the Relocation Branch served as an employment agency without providing any financial aid for the relocatees in moving to cities, many of whom lacked adequate savings to start a new life in an unfamiliar environment.
In 1952, the BIA started a financial assistance program to provide transportation and limited subsistence for eligible relocatees and their dependents. With this program, 25 percent of the most needy applicants for the relocation program received payments for their transportation from their reservation to a destination city, and subsistence for a maximum period of three weeks. Other applicants received only non-monetary assistance, such as the job placement and counseling both at local agencies and field offices in cities. For that year, 442 "family units" or 868 persons received financial assistance through the program. With this monetary support for relocatees, the BIA hoped that the relocation program would attract more applicants.

Reorganization of the BIA became another major task for Commissioner Myer. He removed from the BIA its supporters of the "Indian New Deal," which he believed had contributed to the mushrooming federal expenditure in unnecessary Indian services. Instead, he surrounded himself with former colleagues from the WRA. One of the chief officers appointed by Myer was Charles F. Miller, who had worked with Japanese-American internees in the Denver area and in California. He now obtained another job that would assist "people to adjust to new surroundings." On December 10, 1952, Miller became the chief of the BIA's Branch of Training, Placement, and Relocation Office. He declared his support for the idea of termination, "The sooner we can get out, the better it will be for the Indians and for the country." As one of the termination officials, Miller devoted his energy until his retirement in 1962 to expansion of the relocation program.

Glenn L. Emmons, a banker in Gallup, New Mexico, then accepted the position as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs under the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Emmons continued Dillon S. Myer's goal of termination and expanded the relocation program. He implemented, however, a different approach from his predecessor. While Myer received harsh criticisms for disregarding Indian people's opinions and needs, Emmons stressed Indian consent to the policymaking process. In a 1956 memorandum to the Area Directors and Superintendents, Emmons clarified the ideal procedure for the new Indian policy. He wrote:

> It is not enough for us to go on from day to day just providing certain services and carrying out our trust responsibilities. We must sit down with the Indian people and reach a common understanding and mutual agreement upon the means and methods for their reaching the stage where they will have developed the self-reliance necessary to conduct their personal affairs with the same degree of independence as other American citizens.

Even though the approaches to execute the current Indian policy differed between Emmons and Myer, termination was the ultimate goal that the two commissioners shared and pursued. Emmons elucidated his position and his understanding of the employment assistance programs as a means to withdraw
the federal responsibility for Indian people by encouraging their economic sufficiency. He said:

I emphasize the important thing is for each group to have as a goal, with or without legislation, the development of the group to the point where, from a realistic point of view, special services or assistance because of Indian status will no longer be necessary.48

While Emmons recognized that economic development was necessary for reservation Indians who preferred to stay within their community and homeland, he concluded, "Relocation may well prove to be the only feasible answer to the problem."49 BIA officials estimated that "40 percent of the reservation population should move off to permanent outside jobs" to improve the reservation economy.50

Under Emmons’s direction, reorganization and expansion of the relocation program in search of more efficiency proceeded. The BIA chose Denver as its new office for the relocation program, and on August 1, 1954, moved its headquarters there. After World War II, the federal government had created new bureaus and built enormous regional complexes in several areas of the country, including Denver. The former World War II Denver Arms Plant gradually became the Denver Federal Center, where various agencies, including the BIA office, established regional branches.51 For the BIA, Denver proved to be especially convenient for its operation, as Charles F. Miller, the chief of the service, explained it "puts the bureau closer to the major Indian reservations."52 As the wall of the Rocky Mountains and its distance from both northern and southern borders appealed to the defense industry in the Cold War, Denver’s proximity to the surrounding reservations attracted the BIA.

The expansion of the relocation program continued in the mid-1950s through the reorganization of offices, as the BIA sought an effective process for its program. In July 1954, the BIA closed its Salt Lake City Field Relocation Office because of limited opportunities for employment. Instead, it opened the Oakland Office to provide services for the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Area, which later became one of the three largest destination cities for relocatees.53 In 1956, the BIA opened offices in St. Louis, Missouri, San Francisco, and San Jose, California. Between July and November of 1957, the agency established additional offices in Dallas, Texas, Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio, and Joliet and Waukegan, Illinois. By the end of fiscal year 1957, the number of relocated Indians totaled 20,433, costing more than $6 million.54

With Emmon’s energetic support, the Relocation Program increased expenditures, available funds for applicants, and the number of relocatees. From 1952 to 1956, the number of relocatees and their dependents grew by more than six times (from 868 to 5,119), while the total cost for the program increased from $567,480 to $991,617.55 The critical change, however, came with passage of Public Law 959, the Indian Adult Vocational Training Act of 1956. This added extra goals
and objectives to the relocation program. The emphasis placed on the removal of reservation Indians had shifted to the educational aspect of the program.

The Indian Adult Vocational Training Act offered technical training for a period of less than two years "primarily to Indians who are not less than eighteen and not more than thirty-five years of age and who reside on or near an Indian reservation." Since the planning stage of the relocation program, the BIA had requested appropriations for vocational training for Indians, as most of them had never acquired the necessary skills to be successful workers in an industrialized mainstream society. However, a conservative Congress, which focused on the reduction of federal funding and termination of special services solely for the Indians, had rejected such plans until 1956.

During the debates over passage of the training measure, several members of Congress criticized the inefficiency of the relocation program and the problems that it caused. Congressmen from states with large Indian populations especially targeted the termination of federal responsibility, as it would increase expenditures for state and local governments. Mike Mansfield, a Democratic Senator from Montana, attacked the Interior Departments' noticeable enthusiasm to promote the relocation program, acknowledging that off-reservation Indians were ineligible for federal aid. "Hasty action in these matters," Mansfield cautioned, "only adds to the over-burdening of State and local governments and discredits the Federal Government." Skilled Indians who would receive adult vocational training "will earn more money, pay more taxes, need fewer special services from the Federal Government," said E. Y. Berry, Congressman from South Dakota. He claimed that this would, "thereby [create] a saving to the Government in services, and his [Indian's] income tax might be considered as an offset to the expenditures for training other Indians." Thus supporters of the act argued that by offering vocational training and educating unskilled Indians, the process toward termination would advance more rapidly without wasting federal or state funds and manpower resources.

In spite of its relatively small size compared to others of the relocation centers, Denver proved to be a popular destination for relocatees. Between 1952 and 1971, the Field Relocation office in Denver processed 6,144 applicants, or slightly less than eight percent of the total of 32,065 relocatees in the Direct Employment program. Sioux tribes from South Dakota provided the majority of relocatees arriving in Denver, especially in the early years of the relocation program. During the same period, 2,490 trainees, or approximately 14 percent of total trainees, arrived at the Field Relocation office in Denver to participate in the Adult Vocational Training program. Los Angeles, Oakland, and Chicago were the three most popular destinations of the 14 cities with offices for the relocation and employment assistance programs. These cities greeted approximately 60 percent of the total number of the direct employment relocatees and adult vocational trainees.

One of the areas that the BIA officials emphasized in the relocation program was its recruitment and promotion procedure. The rosy picture of city life that
program brochures described lured many Indians from impoverished reservations, filling them with hope (if not always reality). A brochure circulated in 1956 by the United Pueblo Agency of Albuquerque, New Mexico, defined relocation as follows:

It [Relocation] means going from a place where there are not enough good jobs to a place where you can get a good job. It means going to a place where jobs are steady and where you can secure training which will improve your earnings—make a still better living—as you gain new skills.  

Another brochure, with enlarged letters saying “Come to Denver: The Chance of Your Lifetime!” showed pictures of a smiling family, a young Indian studying at school, a middle-aged Indian on a forklift truck, and a beautiful mountain in Colorado. It suggested that if relocatees would come to Denver, they could obtain “Good Jobs, Happy Homes, Training,” and enjoy “Beautiful Colorado.”

Handbook: Relocation Services, an employee manual published by the Interior Department in 1956, reveals how intensely the BIA devoted its energy to sell the relocation program among Indians. It instructed the Field Relocation offices to distribute the “success story of previous relocatees” to the Area agencies, such as “the purchase of a home, or a car, or telling of a job promotion.” Especially after the authorization of the vocational training act, BIA recruiters worked harder to find applicants for the direct employment program, as the new programs, adult vocational training and on-the-job training, would now divert some prospective applicants from the direct employment program.

Critics of relocation also pointed out that the BIA had adopted a quota system in recruitment, which put enormous pressure on the relocation service staff to find applicants. For instance, in 1956, the BIA planned “to accomplish the relocation of 5,000 or more persons,” based on the idea that 40 percent of reservation Indians needed to move at the earliest possible time. The central office also requested that each area agency meet the required number. Both the Papago Agency and Pima Area Field Offices of Arizona needed to send 24 “singles” and 48 “family units” to the cities by the end of fiscal year 1956. To meet that goal, the relocation staff members, who “resembled army recruiters trying to fill quotas,” reduced the application criteria, which led to the appearance of ill-prepared relocatees in cities.Reacting to enormous pressure from the Central Office, officers at BIA Area agencies, more often than not, condemned the relocation service. When the Central Office questioned the reason for a slower flow of applications from the agency, the director of the BIA’s Billings Area Office angrily replied:

The Reservation Indians whom we seek to serve and lead to better opportunities through Relocation find themselves faced with decisions akin to those discussed in Hamlet’s soliloquy. After a full consideration of their (oftentimes deplorable) situation, they still—have that dread of the undiscovered country.... I feel that an increase in salesmanship type
activity on our part will not at this time produce a corresponding increase in applicant activity in the Billings Area.  

The recruitment strategies of the BIA caused a huge gap between the real life in cities and the optimistic prospect of relocatees. George H. J. Adams, a Seneca anthropologist living in Denver, described the situation of relocatees, stating:

They have often been misled by over zealous placement personnel and have had no clear idea about what to expect once they reached places like Denver. Many whom I’ve talked to were given minimal assistance and counseling once they arrived.  

With all the attractive information given by BIA officials and promotional brochures, many relocatees anticipated a better life at the relocation destination, despite their lack of accurate image of city life. Waiting for them, however, was limited support and disappointment overall given their high expectations. In 1960, the population in the Denver Metropolitan Statistic Area totaled approximately 930,000, with more than 95 percent of the population categorized as “white.” The American Indians in the Denver area, who in 1960 represented less than 0.2 percent of the total population, became isolated in an overwhelmingly “white” society without receiving adequate support from government agencies.  

From the beginning of the relocation program, criticism of the poor screening and quota system also emerged within the Bureau. Alida C. Bowler, Field Placement Officer at the Los Angeles Field Placement Office, recommended revision of recruitment procedures by emphasizing quality rather than quantity. He argued that “one applicant successfully, happily, and reasonably permanently relocated is worth a dozen who take a tour at the public’s expense and go home in a week or a month.” Bowler pointed out that the most serious problem that the Field Relocation Office encountered was alcoholism among Indian relocatees. Alcoholism not only caused the unemployment of individual Indians, but more importantly, it jeopardized the credibility of successful Indians and acceptance in their new community. Alcoholic Indians, who lost their jobs more often than not, “have continued to hang around, living off other Indians.” The Area Agencies of those Indians who threatened the reputation of other Indians at the relocation destination might count them as “successfully relocated” if they never returned to their home reservations.  

The issue of alcoholism among urban Indians appeared nationwide, and Indian residents in Denver were no exception. In 1978, Pat Caverly, a Rosebud Sioux Indian who had moved to Denver, explained how the relocatees came to depend on alcohol. Caverly said:

A person comes to Denver because someone has told him about better jobs or schooling. When he gets here he realizes that he doesn’t have the background and education to take advantage of these things. Not only
that, but he doesn’t even know where to go for help. He gets desperate and to calm his fears he starts hanging out in one of the Indian bars in town. At least here he sees other people like himself and he can be more comfortable.73

Disillusioned by the difficulty in Denver, including unemployment or underemployment, social isolation, and continued poverty, many became dependent on alcohol to escape the reality, and gathered in the “Indian bars” located in the Capitol Hill area and southeast of downtown.74

The rate of returnees led to an enormous controversy between the BIA and critics. With regard to the BIA’s official report, Economist Alan L. Sorkin stated that between 1953 and 1957, roughly 30 percent of all relocatees returned to their reservations within a year.75 Relocation services director Charles F. Miller commented on the return rate, which in 1956 constituted approximately 30 percent, “This is far littler than we thought it would be. We thought that if it was only 50 percent, we’d be lucky.”76 In opposition, some critics claimed that the rate soared much higher, and one suggested that in the early years it went as high as 75 percent.77 Universal statistical data had never been available, primarily because of inadequate records and reports prepared by the BIA. No one could ever know the exact number or rate of returnees; however, disputes over the rate became another source of controversy over the relocation program.78

From the beginning of the operation of the relocation program, BIA officers stressed the importance of detachment of the relocatees from their reservation communities. The intimate connection between the relocatees and their family or friends back on reservations not only threatened a primary goal of the relocation program-assimilation of American Indians—but also individual relocatees’ “success” in the program. A manual for counseling presented in 1957 at the Gallup Area Conference of the BIA’s Branch of Relocation Services revealed how the BIA instructed its relocation officers to deal with the new relocatees. Mary Nan Gamble, an officer in the Community Adjustment Section of the BIA, wrote:

When a person moves to a new area, he should make new friends in his new home. He should not go back to the reservation and to the people he has known, for all of his recreation.... If someone is ill, unless the illness is of a dangerous nature, it is not necessary for him to go home.... Many people fail in their relocation because they tend to commute between the reservation and the relocation point.79

The connection of relocated Indians to their home reservations and their family or friends threatened not only the success of individual relocatees, but also the relocation program’s primary role as an accelerator of assimilation.

To reduce the return rate, BIA officials used relocation services to put pressure on applicants. The relocation brochure distributed to the Navajo tribe in 1959 stated, “A Navajo, like any other citizen, is free to move anywhere in the country
he wants to.” Yet it also stressed that the federal government offered its services so that relocatees would “establish permanent homes away from [their] reservation.” Congress would appropriate funds “only as long as a fair share of those people it assists are succeeding in establishing permanent homes in the cities they move to.”

To the prospective applicants of the Adult Vocational Service, the BIA cautioned, “If too many come back to the reservation, cannot find jobs, and have to look to their families to help support them, this program will be doing little good and Congress is likely to discontinue it.” By hinting that the applicants’ failure to stay in cities and demonstrate their considerable achievement in a new environment might endanger the future welfare of Indian people, the BIA showed its desire for relocatees not to return to their familiar community.

By the mid-1950s, a number of critics had begun writing in popular magazines, attacking the very nature of the relocation program. This program fractured the Indian community without encouraging benefits for Indian people. Dorothy Van de Mark, for instance, in an article in Harper’s Magazine in 1956, pointed to the nature of relocation program. She claimed that “the plan consists primarily of inducing as many Indians as possible to leave their reservations.”

Calling the economic-minded businessmen who controlled tribal resources the “present land-grabbers,” Van de Mark concluded that the relocation program would solve none of the Indians’ problems, such as poverty and poor health. Instead, Indians were simply “dumped into urban centers” with all the concerns they had on reservations.

To counter persistent condemnation of its program, the BIA prepared a report in 1957 entitled Relocation Services: A Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA tried to justify the relocation program as a helpful service for the Indians and overstated the effectiveness of the program. According to the report, of 17,000 individuals who utilized the service between 1952 and 1957, “more than 12,000 persons are still relocated and are self-supporting and are enjoying advantages of self-dependence.” Those who remained in cities, the report continued, “are steadily employed, better housed, better fed and better clothed than ever before.” These descriptions provided a counterargument to critics who found a devastating situation of Indians in cities, where they endured substandard housing, discrimination, and worked at unstable jobs to survive in an unfamiliar environment.

The critics generally denounced the relocation program, but the situation of relocated Indians varied city by city. Some host cities received favorable recommendations, while other cities became the target for harsh criticisms for the devastating conditions of relocatees. St. Louis, Missouri, was one of the cities denounced for its lack of job offerings and inadequate housing. Denver, on the other hand, remained among the recommended destination cities for relocation. It faced less serious racial discrimination problems according to the local newspapers, the city’s officials, and some critics. In 1956, La Verne Madigan claimed in The American Indian Relocation Program, that relocation was harmful to Indians.
She wrote:

It is unfortunate that more Indians have not chosen to go to Denver and that the Denver office cannot yet supply employment at the wages which would support large families there.... New York Negroes living in Denver—and they are a sophisticated group—say that Denver treats its minorities comparatively very well.\(^8\)

Indian leaders also spoke of the favorable situation of Indians in Denver. On May 23, 1957, Hoska Cronemeyer, Chairman of the Relocation Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council, reported after his visits to all the relocation cities, stating:

They feel that they are better off in Denver than they were on the reservation. They have steady incomes, good places to live and they feel that there is more opportunity for their children in the city. Many have automobiles and television sets and a few have established savings accounts. All the people were well dressed and appeared healthy and happy.\(^9\)

The Rosebud Sioux Council also found a sympathetic attitude in Denver and expressed their appreciation to Mayor Will F. Nicholson of Denver for “having no discrimination” against the tribal members in the city. In 1957, Mayor Nicholson received from the council the title of “Wambli Wa Ki Ta,” or “The Eagle that Observes.”\(^10\)

While some critics and tribal members claimed Denver to be a tolerant city, relocated Indians there faced many obstacles, even if they encountered little overt discrimination. A panel discussion entitled, “Denver’s New Indian Citizens,” held in mid-July of 1957 at Denver’s main library concluded that the most serious problems facing relocated Indians in Denver were “primarily those of adjustment.” D’Arcy McNickle, a Cree Indian from the Flathead Reservation in Montana and Director of the American Indian Development Association, attended the discussion. He claimed that “little education, poor health and general lack of contact with modern society” caused major problems among the relocated Indians in Denver.\(^9\)

Realizing the problems of Indians in its community, the Commission on Community Relations of the City and County of Denver formed the Committee for Study of Relocated Indians on October 30, 1957. Between October 1957 and February 1959, the Committee held conferences and meetings “to ascertain whether or not the program of the Relocation Service of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs was placing an undue burden on City agencies.”\(^2\) The study sought to examine whether Indians relocated by the BIA’s program caused a “burden” on Denver City agencies. The committee also examined problems that relocated Indians in Denver faced. In addition to committee members, officers of the BIA Relocation Service and members of local community agencies, such as the White Buffalo Council of American Indians, Denver Christian Center, and Catholic Charities, joined the meetings and exchanged opinions to address the problems and needs
Almost all the agencies realized that the Indians in Denver had no reliable contact with social agencies, and this made their conditions worse. The number of American Indian residents in Denver sparked a controversy. According to a 1957 report by Stanley Lyman of the BIA Relocation Field Office in Denver, 1,600 Indians had relocated through the Bureau to the state of Colorado, and 1,300 of them had moved to Denver since the beginning of the relocation program in 1952. Two years later, Chester E. Hazard, an officer at the Field Relocation Office in Denver, claimed that the exact number of Indian people in Denver was virtually unavailable because Indians often came and went without notification to the BIA. “Roughly, the figure stands at about 4,000,” Hazard estimated and claimed that the majority of them were members of the Navajo and Sioux tribes. Census Bureau data showed a much smaller number of Indians in Denver. In 1950, the American Indian population in the Denver Standard Metropolitan Area stood at 280, and by 1960 had grown by more than five times (to 1,554). Therefore, a huge gap (the difference close to 2,500) surfaced between the census data and the data of the BIA.

On April 2, 1958, the Denver Commission on Human Relations submitted to Mayor Nicholson a report entitled, “Indians in Denver—Relocated and Non-Relocated.” The report revealed that many relocatees suffered from severe poverty. Only a few of them were eligible for public assistance “due to their employability and non-legal residence in Denver.” Newly arriving Indians, having lost resident status on their reservations and not recognized as legal residents in the State of Colorado or the City of Denver, could not receive welfare.

In Denver the American Indian population spread throughout the city and its surrounding areas. Most of the relocatees arriving in the earlier period moved into Capitol Hill or West Side neighborhoods, and began their new life in the city in apartments or boarding houses. There the relocated Indians met people from other tribes and shared experiences in an unfamiliar city. Helen Peterson, former chairman of the Denver Commission on Community Relations and later Executive Secretary of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), claimed in 1969 that relocated Indians would move to neighboring areas such as Arvada, Commerce City, Lakewood, and Littleton because “they like a little more elbow room.” Arapahoe County, located next to Denver County, also had a large number of American Indians because of the presence of the BIA Plant Management Engineering Center (PMEC), which hired a certain number of Indian workers.

Housing proved to be another serious problem for relocated Indians in Denver. While the relocation services placed a certain number of relocatees in low-rent public housing, strict qualifications for applications prevented many Indians from admission. One of the requirements for admission set by the Denver Housing Authority was six months of residence in the city, except for veterans. Most of the relocated Indians, especially those with large families, had to live in overcrowded living quarters and pay “prohibitive rents,” in addition to facing overt discrimination.
Among the various problems that plagued relocated Indians, cultural concerns drew much attention from both private and public agencies in Denver. The Denver Human Relations Commission admitted that Indian residents in the city lacked stability because of frequent movement between reservations and the city. The relocated Indian also faced separation from the rest of community, for “he cannot become readily communicative, even though friendly, he is not understood and accepted.” The picture of Indians in Denver drawn by the committee countered positive images published locally, and revealed the hidden concerns of the relocatees.

Area newsletters circulated among relocatees also emphasized the reality of American Indian life in Denver. In 1968, the Indian Times, a newsletter published by the White Buffalo Council, stated that “many returned ‘home’ for reasons of loneliness, inability to take the life of the city.” It claimed that approximately “50 percent of Navajos who come to Denver return in six months, while 90 percent return within a year.” As for participants in the vocational training program, the Indian Times estimated that trainees “who choose not to stay after vocational training or reject the life of the city range from 40 to 70 percent.” This represented a much higher return rate compared to that of the BIA.

Some studies that focused on economic aspects of the relocation program revealed that the program had little economic impact on the Indian population. Even if the earnings of Indians in cities increased, their ineligibility for federal services (which applied only to reservation Indians) placed upon Indians an additional economic burden. The situation became more serious for migrants who relocated with their families. Dominic Jamarillo, an Indian employee of the U.S. Bureau of Mines and a relocatee from New Mexico to Denver, revealed that he could not afford to live in Denver due to its high cost of living, and that he might have to return to Albuquerque. “I love living here,” said Jamarillo, “We have wonderful friends, both Indian and non-Indian. But we are finding it difficult to meet the expenses.”

The condition of the Jamarillos worsened after Mrs. Jamarillo quit her job to take care of their children. The loss of considerable income forced the father to decide whether to stay in Denver by himself and send his family back to the reservation, or to return home so that the whole family could be together.

For relocated Indians accustomed to rural living, the modern technological facilities in cities could add more stress and difficulty to a life in unfamiliar surroundings. The New York Times reported in 1953 of the experience of many relocated Indians:

Some Indians find that city noises bother them. Others imagine that tall buildings are falling on them. Learning to ride elevators, rapid transit lines, buses and streetcars often presents problems. And for the Indian housewife, shopping and operating gas or electric ranges and other appliances can cause concern.
Hazel Taylor, an Oglala Sioux who relocated to Denver, acknowledged the difficulties that relocated Indians faced in strange surroundings when she recalled her experience with public transportation. "When I first came to Colorado," said Taylor, "I was so backward I didn’t even know how to get off the bus... When you come from a place which has few paved roads, let alone buses, a pull cord may not be very obvious—it may be frightening." For the majority of relocated Indians who had little contact with modern society, new conveniences compounded their transition from rural to urban life.

The relocation and employment assistance programs not only contributed to the problems of relocated Indians in cities but also proved to be a failure since the programs could never achieve the goals prescribed by the BIA. The primary objective of the programs (improvement of the economic situation of Indians on reservations by transporting the "surplus" population to urban areas), never produced impressive results. Even though the BIA employed the quota system and aggressively forced Area agencies to meet the goal, the number of relocatees, compared to the total population of Indians, had little effect on improving conditions for reservation Indians. From 1952 to 1967, 61,614 relocatees moved to urban areas, while the rural Indian population increased from 287,302 in 1950 to 436,992 in 1970. As the Urban and Rural Non-Reservation Task Force summarized in 1976, the federal government "has basically accomplished nothing more than a transfer of the crisis from the reservation to the urban setting." The program had become an instrument of the BIA that "relocated" the problems of reservation Indians, such as poor health and poverty, to urban centers along with the relocatees themselves.

The BIA’s expectation of rapid assimilation of American Indians into the mainstream society by keeping physical distance between the relocatees and their home communities had failed. The relocatees would adjust their traditional customs to a new environment by engaging in cultural activities. As Jacque Gray, an Osage who relocated to Denver, said in the late 1970s, "Just because we live in cities doesn’t mean we stop being Indian." Moreover, the problematic situation of relocated Indians created close relationships among them and blurred distinctions of tribal identity. The program for accelerated assimilation of Indians had the reverse effect of contributing to the creation of pan-Indian organizations throughout the nation, especially in urban centers. In Denver, relocated Indians formed local Indian organizations such as the White Buffalo Council and the Denver Indian Center. Contrary to the intention of the federal government, Indian migrants in Denver slowly but steadily shaped their own community while striving in an unfamiliar urban environment. During the 1960s and 1970s, the city offered relocated Indians both the challenges and benefits which reservations could not provide.
Notes


2. Sorkin, American Indian and Federal Aid, 104-105.


5. Bernstein, American Indians and World War II, 76.


7. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1950 Census of Population, Vol. IV, Special Reports, Pt. 3, Chapter B, Nonwhite population by Race. Table 10, Social Characteristics of the Indian Population 14 Years Old and Over, for the United States, by Regions, Urban and Rural: 1950, 32; Pt. 5, Chapter B, Education, Table 6, Nonwhite Population by Race and Nativity: Persons 14 Years Old and Over, by Years of School Completed and Age, for the United States: 1950, 54; Table 9, Employment Status: Persons 14 Years Old and Over, by Years of School Completed, Age, Color, and Sex, for the Unites States, by Regions: 1950, 73.


11. Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 134.


17. "Minutes of Spring Conference of Navajo Hopi Off-Reservation Employment,

22. Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 32.
27. Ibid.
28. Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 45.
37. Ibid., 199.
40. The Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General of the United States: Administration of Withdrawal Activities by Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, 18.
42. Burt, Tribalism in Crisis, 57; The Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General of the United States, 18.


47. Memorandum “Programming for Indian Social and Economic Improvement, April 12, 1956, from Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs to Area Directors and Superintendents,” Box 2, File 003 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1969-1971, 8NS-075-95-022 BIA United Pueblo Agency, Mission Correspondence, 1936-1971, National Archives, Denver, Colorado.

48. Ibid.


54. Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General of the United States, 19.

55. Sorkin, American Indians and Federal Aid, 106.


63. Found in Wilcomb E. Washburn, Ed., Handbook of North American Indian, Vol. 4:
48 Azusa Ono


66. “From W. Barton Greenwood to Frederick M. Haverland” Box 21/3/3:4, Folder Correspondence with Central Office FY 55 + 56, 8NN-075-87-039 BIA Phoenix Area Office “Employment Assistance Reports, FY 1964, National Archives, Denver, Colorado.


72. Ibid.


81. “Adult Vocational Training,” Box 21/3/2:5, Folder Relocation-Addresses, News


84. Ibid., 49.

85. “Relocation Services: A Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,” Box 5 Manuscript: Denver (Colorado) Commission on Community Relations, WHC, DPL.

86. Ibid.


92. “To Mayor Will F. Nicholson from Denver Commission on Human Relations, 2 April 1958,” Box 6, Manuscript: Denver (Colorado) Commission on Community Relations, WHC, DPL.


94. “Minutes: Committee for Study of Relocated Indians, October 30, 1957,” Box 6, Manuscript: Denver (Colorado) Commission on Community Relations, WHC, DPL.

95. Ibid., 4.


98. “To Mayor Will F. Nicholson from Denver Commission on Human Relations, April 2, 1958,” Box 6, Manuscript: Denver (Colorado) Commission on Community Relations, WHC, DPL.


102. “To Mayor Will F. Nicholson from Denver Commission on Human Relations,” April 2, 1958,” Box 6, Manuscript: Denver (Colorado) Commission on Community Relations,

105. Ibid.


109. Ibid.


