

Identity Theft: Moral Antecedents, Moral Anger, and Impression Management

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Abstract

In two experiments ($N = 162$; $N = 192$) participants' reactions to identity theft are examined. Identity theft is defined as a situation in which a person intentionally appropriates distinctive characteristics of another person's identity. Identity theft represents a moral violation against an individual's claim to display a public identity. Participants reported greater negative reactions when imagining another person appropriating many, but not one, self-characteristics. Moral appraisals of the theft (i.e., illegitimacy, intention to harm) mediated the relationship between the increase in number of self-characteristics copied and anger expressed by participants (Experiment 1). When the thief acknowledged the theft, anger was attenuated. The perception that the harm was not intentional and the perceived honesty of the copier mediated the relationship between the thief acknowledging the theft and participants' anger (Experiment 2). The implications of the present findings for past identity theft research and impression management is discussed.

Introduction

Since the publication of William James' *Principles of Psychology* (1890), there has been extensive research examining aspects of self and identity. For example, there are over 150,000 abstracts concerning the "self" indexed in *PsycInfo* (Leary & Tangney, 2003), and 110,000 abstracts for "identity." Given the numerous papers and books on topics such as self-esteem, self-concept, and ego-threat, it may be difficult to imagine any area of identity that has not received empirical attention. Indeed, research has examined threats to one's personal self via insults (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998), negative feedback (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), and interpersonal rejection (see Leary, 2001). Threats to the public self have also been examined including associations with groups that are unsuccessful (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976), embarrassment (Leary, Landel, & Patton, 1996), and public failure (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). The key difference between each type of threat (to the public or private self) is whether others' perceptions of one's image is damaged.

Public Identity

Public identity is that which is observable by others and makes one feel like a unique individual (Buss, 2001). In other words, an individual's public identity consists of characteristics that distinguish the person from others (Brewer, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1998; Simon, 1998; Turner & Onorato, 1998) and makes one feel unique (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). Theorists have converged on the notion that individuals seek to engender and

maintain a unique public identity that others recognize (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). The active management of one's identity is meant to control how others view oneself. Indeed, one's public identity could be defined as the impression others form and hold about oneself (Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980).

Individuals actively produce their desired personal identity and seek validation from others regarding that identity (Baumeister, 1986; Brown, 1998; Cooley, 1902/1964; James, 1890; Jones, 1964; Mead, 1934; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999). The feedback or reflections that others then give back to the individual can shape the individual's identity (Leary, 1995; Tice & Wallace, 2003). In other words, individuals display their personal identity and look for validation of that identity from others, which can then be incorporated into the self-concept. A threat to one's public identity is that which threatens the impressions others have of oneself. The present paper describes two studies regarding a new type of threat to one's public identity termed *identity theft*.

Identity Theft

Identity theft is defined as a situation in which another person intentionally copies distinctive and valued characteristics of another person's public identity. I suggest that identity theft requires that the thief publicly display the characteristics. In a series of studies, Reysen, Landau, and Branscombe (2009) examined the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral effects of identity theft. In Experiment 1, participants were

asked to imagine that they met another person (same gender as the participant) at a party, and this other person commented that they liked the participant's shirt. Participants were then asked to imagine that they saw the other person a few days later on campus and that other person was wearing the same shirt as the participant. Participants in a second condition read about the other person copying the shirt as well as the participant's hairstyle. Participants in a third condition read about the other person copying the shirt, hairstyle, and personality. In effect, the three conditions represented an increasing number of self-characteristics being copied by the other person. The results showed that when only one characteristic of the self was copied, participants felt flattered and liked the copier. However, when more than one self-characteristic was appropriated, participants viewed the theft as intentional, felt angry, rated the thief negatively (i.e., as hypocritical, dishonest, and not likeable), and endorsed confronting the thief. Additionally in Experiment 1, participants grew angrier as more characteristics were stolen from them, and this was mediated by participants' perception that the theft was intentional. Anger mediated the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and endorsement of confrontation with the copier.

Thus, in this research, Experiment 1 illuminated the importance of anger following an identity theft incident and was therefore the main dependent variable in subsequent experiments. The attribution of intention to steal was also critical. Participants perceived the copying to be intentional to a greater extent when two and three characteristics were copied compared to only one characteristic. Additionally,

the attribution of intention to steal mediated the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the experience of anger. Experiment 1 also demonstrated that identity theft threatened participants' public image negatively when more than one self-characteristic was copied. In effect, when two or three characteristics were copied, participants viewed the intentional theft as negative, felt angry, and endorsed confrontation with the copier.

In additional experiments by Reysen et al. (2009), participants read about the copier appropriating all three characteristics (i.e., shirt, hairstyle, and personality). Identity theft was found to threaten participants' public identity evidenced by less anger when a third-party validated the participant's identity (Experiment 2), but more anger when a third-party invalidated the participant's identity (Experiment 3). Thus, when identity validation supported the participants' presentation of their public identity, participants felt less angry, and when the feedback did not validate the participants' public image they expressed more anger. The notion that identity theft is a threat to one's public identity was further addressed by providing participants with a chance to focus on internal and unchanging self-characteristics before the identity threat, which buffered participants against a subsequently encountered identity theft incident (Experiment 4).

Overall, the past experiments highlighted the notion that individuals are motivated to create and foster an identity that others concur with (Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980), and they will seek affirmation (Becker, 1971) and verification of consistency (Erikson, 1950; Swann, 1983, 1999) of that identity.

Although the four experiments conducted by Reysen et al. (2009) provided a great deal of knowledge concerning the phenomenon of identity theft, there are still unanswered questions. For example, is the anger felt by participants due to a moral violation, or alternatively, is it due to the loss of control over one's identity?

Similarity or Intention?

Byrne (1971) provides considerable support for the idea that greater similarity with another person predicts greater liking. For example, husbands and wives show a strong positive correlation between their opinions and political preferences; participants rate strangers who are similar as more likeable regardless of whether the interaction is face-to-face or the other is not physically present. Based on such findings, Byrne (1971) argues that the more similar one is to another person the greater the interpersonal attraction will be. Other researchers have converged on similar notions.

Conforming to the values and interests of another person has been associated with greater mutual attraction (Jones, 1964; Newcomb, 1961). Jones (1964) cites a study (Gerard & Greenbaum, 1962) where ambiguous stimuli are presented to a participant and three confederates. The first two confederates always disagreed with the participant, while the fourth confederate either agreed or disagreed at varying points in the experiment. Interestingly, the participant rated the fourth confederate as particularly attractive (i.e., degree of desire to have a future association with the fourth confederate) when the confederate initially disagreed but then later in the

procedure switched to agreeing with the participant. In effect, the confederate's conformity to the opinion of the participant resulted in greater liking.

Research on the chameleon effect (non-conscious mimicry of an interaction partner) shows that mimicking increases liking of the imitator (Bailenson & Yee, 2005) and increases perception of an interaction as smooth and harmonious (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Imitators are more persuasive than non-imitators (Bailenson & Yee, 2005), and are rewarded for their imitation. For example, a waitress who verbally repeats an order to customers receives larger tips than if she merely paraphrases the order (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). Despite the wealth of research concerning the positive relationship between similarity (both attitudinal and behavioral) and favorable impressions, the issue of whether there are limits on this relationship is not clear.

While past similarity research examined the effect of perceived similarity in interpersonal dyadic relationships, other researchers have suggested that individuals desire an optimal level of similarity-differentiation from multiple others (Brewer, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1998; Lemaire, 1974; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Ziller, 1964). Too much or too little similarity is associated with negative emotions and a desire to obtain an optimal level of similarity-differentiation (Fromkin, 1970, 1972; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). While Byrne (1971) focused on the number of characteristics that an individual shares with another individual, Snyder and Fromkin focused on the number of individuals who are similar to a target person. Both paradigms lack data concerning the attribution that the similar other is or is not intentionally imitating the

individual. While discussing the practice of conforming to the opinions of others as a means of ingratiation, Jones (1964; 1990) notes that the ingratiating behavior must be perceived as authentic. If an attribution of authenticity is not achieved, the ingratiating attempt will backfire (Brown, 1998; Jones, 1964, 1990).

With respect to identity theft, a small amount of similarity—when one self-characteristic is copied—can be experienced as positive (i.e., flattering) while too much similarity—two or more characteristics—results in negative reactions (Reysen et al., 2009). The element that is lacking in previous research concerning similarity is the attribution that the copier intended to copy the participant. Perceived intention on the part of the imitator also distinguishes identity theft from research on the motivation for uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), which shows, for example, that people experience negative emotions when they perceive themselves to be similar to many others (Fromkin, 1972). In this research, participants are informed that there are a large number of others who are very similar to them, implying that they are not as unique as they might have thought (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). In the case of identity theft, an active intention on the part of the identity thief to appropriate characteristics of one's public identity is inferred. Likewise, the extensive program of research demonstrating that increasing the number of shared attitudes with another increases interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971) assumes this sharing is not the result of one person appropriating the beliefs of the other.

As shown by Reysen and colleagues (2009), identity theft is not a threat to uniqueness. In their Experiment 1, when a greater number of characteristics were

copied, participants' ratings of uniqueness did not differ across conditions. In Experiment 2, the intention of the similar other person was manipulated. Participants reported feeling significantly less unique when the similar other was a new student (no intention to copy) compared to when the similar other was perceived as intentionally copying the participant. Thus, identity theft is conceptually distinct from past research concerning similarity and mimicry. However, if identity theft does not threaten participants' uniqueness, the question of why identity theft is threatening remains. The answer may be found in the emotional response that occurs in identity theft situations.

Anger

Anger is a likely response when one's self or identity is threatened because one is treated in a way that does not reflect the manner one wishes to be treated (Leary, 2004). The anger felt when one's self is threatened can lead to confrontation with the blameworthy other who is the cause of the threat (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Indeed, Reysen et al. (2009) found that anger was increased, as was the desire to confront the copier, when faced with identity theft. Appraisal theories of emotions suggest that distinct patterns of how individuals interpret an event predict specific emotions and actions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).

In the most prominent appraisal theory of emotion, Lazarus (1991) proposed that there are three types of primary appraisals: goal relevance, goal congruency, and

ego-involvement. Goal relevance is the extent to which an event affects a person's goals. Goal congruency, or incongruency, is whether the event facilitates or hinders a person's goals. Ego-involvement consists of goals that individuals hold (e.g., moral values) that reflect commitments to a certain role in life. Lazarus also claimed there are three types of secondary appraisals: blame or credit, coping potential, and future expectations. Blame or credit refers to responsibility for the event. Coping potential captures whether the person has the capacity to manage the demands of the event. Future expectations refer to whether the outcome of an event can be changed. Emotions are differentiated in terms of their specific primary and secondary appraisals.

Lazarus (1991) theorized that the primary appraisals of events that lead to anger include (1) the event is relevant to the self, (2) the event is incongruent with the individual's goals, and (3) there is a threat to the individual's identity. An additional secondary appraisal concerns whether another person is to blame for the intentional and harmful actions. If individuals cope by perceiving that an attack on the blameworthy other is (1) viable and (2) will lead to a positive outcome then anger is facilitated.

Many other researchers have converged on similar antecedent appraisals that are associated with feelings of anger, such as goal incongruence (Ellsworth, 1994; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Fischer, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Conner, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988; Wierzbicka, 1992), threat to one's ego (Baumeister, Smart, &

Boden, 1996; Fehr, Baldwin, Collins, Patterson, & Benditt, 1999; Izard, 1977; Kemper, 1987; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989; Kliwer, 1986), assignment of blame to another person (Bennett, Lowe, & Honey, 2003; Clore & Ortony, 1991; Clore, Ortony, Dienes, & Fujita, 1993; Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001), and a belief that one can cope with the threat (Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1990). However, the above antecedents do not necessarily imply that feeling anger is connected to moral judgments.

Moral Anger

Research and theorizing about morality typically excludes discussion of anger (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). However, participants are often found to express anger when their moral beliefs are threatened (Skitka, 2002; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). For example, Mullen and Skitka (2006) presented participants with either a morally congruent or incongruent court judgment and found participants reported more anger when the court's judgment was incongruent with the participant's moral beliefs. Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998) asked 2,921 students in 37 countries to describe situations in which they experience anger. The anger eliciting events were found to overwhelmingly describe perceived unjust and immoral events. Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) theorized that anger is associated with individual freedom and rights. The act of identity theft can reasonably be described as violating a victim's right to the freedom to present to the world a unique identity. To violate this right should be viewed by the victim as unjust and evoke moral anger.

The concept of justice is typically defined as a feeling of deservingness based on who one believes one is (Buchanan & Mathieu, 1986; Lerner, 1977, 1987). In other words, if individuals believe they have a right to display a unique identity then the violation of this belief is unjust. Another person who deliberately copies aspects of one's public identity is then responsible for an injustice. Indeed, the attribution that a blameworthy other has intentionally acted in a way that brought about harm implies the other person is responsible for the action (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1995). Mikula (2003) describes this perception as the "attribution-of-blame model of judgments of unjust" (p. 795). Mikula suggests that blaming another person who is responsible for violating a feeling of entitlement or deservingness without reasonable justification will result in moral anger.

The emotion of anger typically entails antecedents (e.g., intention, blame) that can be described as components of moral anger (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). For example, emotion theorists have suggested that perceptions of unfairness (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989; Mikula et al., 1998; Miller, 2001; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986) and illegitimacy (Averill, 1982; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Roseman et al., 1990; Shaver et al., 1987; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) are important for the elicitation of anger. Additionally, if another person is viewed as intentionally trying to harm oneself the resulting emotion is anger (Averill, 1982; Dodge, 1993; Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). The violation of an expectation (Shaver et al., 1987) or the disconfirmation of the expectation that the world is organized in a certain way (Ellis & Tafrate, 1997) has

also been proposed as antecedents to anger. The above anger antecedents suggest that illegitimacy, intention to harm, and violation of one's worldview are important for inducing anger. I propose that moral violations, injustice, and anger are closely tied constructs. Identity theft may be one such situation where moral anger rather than non-moral anger is elicited.

Rationale for Present Research

Individuals seek to engender and maintain a unique public identity that others recognize (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). Identity theft is expected to threaten individuals desire to display a unique public identity. This threat should result in anger and a desire to restore one's identity through confrontation with the copier (Reysen et al., 2009). The underlying mechanism of identity theft is yet unknown.

Given that identity theft is thought to threaten the views others have of oneself, indeed the very definition of public identity, others may view the victim as weak or a pushover. If another person is intentionally copying one's identity and others notice the theft they may mistake the thief as the originator of the identity. The victim of the theft may not receive the feedback they desire from their identity since others may perceive them as copying the thief. Impression management is behavior meant to control one's public identity. If valued others (e.g., friends) are not afforded the opportunity to view the copiers' actions, then participants may not feel that their unique identity is threatened. If the copier freely admits to having copied one's identity, then the credit for that identity remains in control of the victim and this may

undermine the consequences of identity theft (e.g., anger). If there were many copiers this would make the victim's management of their identity conceivably more difficult because confronting each copier to restore the identity would be rather difficult. The underlying mechanism of identity theft may be due to others noticing the theft, the loss of credit for one's identity, the loss of control over one's identity, or simply that one's moral beliefs have been violated. The present paper reports studies designed to examine these possibilities.

Overview of Empirical Studies

The present research includes two studies that attempt to understand the underlying processes of identity theft. First, this research replicates previous research with the addition of dependent measures aimed at assessing moral aspects of the theft (e.g., illegitimacy, intention to harm). Past research (Reysen et al., 2009) found that the theft of an increasing number of self-characteristics resulted in greater self-reports of anger by participants. Furthermore, the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the anger felt by participants was mediated by the perceived intention of the copier. Although the antecedent of intention illuminated the possibility of a moral violation, the research lacked the needed measures of moral antecedents to support the notion that identity theft is a moral violation. Since anger has been linked to reactions to moral violations, the anger felt by victims of identity theft may represent moral anger. I hypothesize that moral appraisals of identity theft (i.e., illegitimacy, perception of an intention to harm) will mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and expressed anger.

Second, this research examines possible reasons why identity theft is particularly threatening to participants. Two explanations that are tested in the present paper include the victims' belief that valued others (e.g., friends) will think less of them, and the possible loss of credit for the valued self-characteristics. First, identity theft may be threatening due to the fact that valued others are able to view the theft. If, for example, the identity thief leaves the country and therefore does not stay in the local environment of the victim, then victims may experience less threat and anger. As previously stated, individuals strive to display a unique public identity (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959) and seek validation of that identity (Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999). If the thief is not in the local environment, and valued others are not able to view the theft, then the individual's identity remains unique and others' validation should not be tainted. Second, a simpler explanation of the threat of identity theft is that victims are losing their credentials or originator rights to their own identity. Previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) has shown that following identity theft validation of one's identity from a friend can attenuate anger and restore credit of the identity back to the victim. If the thief acknowledges the theft, this should also attenuate participants' anger by returning the credit for the identity back to the victim. I hypothesize that both public display of the theft and the loss of credit for one's identity increase the level of anger expressed by participants. Either of these explanations for the threat caused by identity theft may reasonably account for participants' emotional responses.

Third, this research attempts to change participants' experience of identity theft from negative to positive. Inherent in the definition of impression management is the desire to control how others view the self (Leary, 1995). In Experiment 2 the number of copiers is experimentally manipulated varied. If the number of copiers increases to the extent that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to confront each copier then participants may feel less anger. The loss of control over the situation may induce participants to feel less efficacious to restore their identity. Indeed, the notion that feeling that one is not efficacious in a particular situation is associated with less anger (Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1990). Another explanation for why victims might feel less anger is that they perceive the situation as positive since having many people copy them could result in seeing themselves as trendsetters or leaders. If we accept the definition of a leader as someone who has followers (Perrin-Jassy, 2001) then simply having a large number of copycats could reframe the theft as a leader and follower relationship. I hypothesize that the increase in the number of copiers will result in less expressed anger by participants.

Experiment 1

In Experiment 1 participants read about another person copying varying numbers of self-characteristics (one, two, or three characteristics), and the copier either moves out of the country or there was no mention of the copier's residence. Participants then rate their emotional experience, perception of the copier, interpretation of the event, self-appraisals, and likely behavioral actions. The increase in the number of characteristics copied is a replication of the manipulation used by

Reysen and colleagues (2009, Experiment 1). The results of the previous experiment showed that participants felt more angry and anxious, and less positive, as more characteristics were copied. No change in felt uniqueness was observed. Participants rated the copier as more hypocritical, less likeable, and less honest as more characteristics were copied. As more characteristics were copied, participants perceived that the imitation reflected negatively on them, was a theft of their identity, and was intentional. Lastly, past research has shown that participants endorsed the actions of confrontation, avoidance of the copier, changing their own appearance to a greater extent, and less of a desire to befriend the copier as the number of characteristics copied increased. Similar results are expected in the present study when the number of characteristics copied is varied. In addition to the dependent measures previously administered, the present experiments assessed new constructs (e.g., illegitimacy, intention to cause harm).

I hypothesize that identity theft is a violation of participants' moral beliefs regarding ownership of self-characteristics. If this is indeed the case then I expect to observe participants reporting more perceived illegitimacy, believing that the copier is obligated to acknowledge the copying, experience disrespect, and perceiving the copier as intentionally trying to harm them. Additionally, following past appraisal theories of emotion research, participants should report greater efficacy to affect the situation and perceive less respect from the copier when more than one self-characteristic is copied. I expect that moral appraisals of the event (e.g., illegitimacy,

intention to harm) will mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the experience of anger.

One possible underlying mechanism for the threat that identity theft poses to participants is that valued others may notice the imitation. This explanation is empirically tested in the Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 a manipulation regarding the residence of the copier was administered to participants. Participants were either told that the copier is moving out of the country or no mention was made regarding the copier's future residence. This manipulation is meant to test the hypothesis that the underlying threat of identity theft is that valued others (e.g., friends) will change their impression of the victim if they view the copying. Given the agreement that one's public identity reflects how others view oneself (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959, Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980), victims may be concerned about identity theft affecting how others view them. The copier's future out-of-the-country residence should attenuate the anger felt by participants since valued others will not be witness to the imitation. An interaction is hypothesized whereby as the number of characteristics copied increases participants' anger will also increase but to a lesser extent when the copier moves out of the country. In effect, participants' anger will increase in conjunction with the increasing number of characteristics copied in both residence conditions, however anger will be attenuated when the copycat leaves compared to when no mention of the copycat's residence is made.

Two underlying mechanisms will be examined as mediators between the relationship of an increase in the number of characteristics copied and expression of

anger. First, the underlying mechanism of valued others noticing the copying is expected to mediate the relationship between the number of characteristics stolen and anger if indeed participants are concerned about their public reputation and the negative impact of others witnessing the theft. Second, the underlying mechanism of the loss of credit for the identity is expected to mediate the relationship between the number of characteristics copied and anger if indeed the credit as an originator of one's identity is the main concern for participants. Each of these mechanisms are examined in Experiment 1.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants ($N = 162$, 53.1% women) received partial course credit toward their introductory psychology requirement. Their mean age was 19.45 years ($SD = 2.72$), and 85.2% indicated their racial/ethnic group was white. Participants signed an informed consent form, completed a survey packet, and were then debriefed and thanked. The survey package began by asking participants to imagine that someone was copying aspects of their self-characteristics. The vignettes differed by the number of the participants' aspects that were copied (one, two, or three characteristics) and if the copier was going to move out of the country or not (move away, or no mention of future residence). Thus, the design of the study was a 2 (residence of copier) X 3 (number of characteristics copied) between-subjects design. Participants completed the dependent measures in the order described below using 7-point Likert-type scales, from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree* (see Appendix A).

Experimental Manipulations

Three vignettes were constructed to depict an increasing number of characteristics being copied. Participants were asked to imagine that they were “hanging out” with friends and met an individual (“Person-A”) of the same gender as themselves. Participants were then asked to imagine that Person-A comments that s/he likes the participant’s shirt. The vignette then describes how Person-A is seen at a later point on campus with the very same shirt s/he had admired (one characteristic). In the two-characteristic condition, Person-A had adopted, in addition to the shirt, a similar hairstyle as the participants. In the three-characteristic condition, Person-A copied the participant’s clothing and hairstyle as in the prior version, and now also adopted the mannerisms and personality style of the participants. We chose these three characteristics of identity because they have been previously suggested to represent characteristics that are interpersonally distinctive: clothing (Buss, 2001; James, 1890; Leary, 1995), hairstyle (Buss, 2001; Simon, 2004), and personality and mannerisms (Buss, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Onorato, 1998).

A second manipulation was constructed that either informed participants that the copier was moving to a foreign country permanently or no mention of the copier’s residence was made. The absence of the move condition assumes that participants expect the copier to remain in their local environment. The vignettes used are presented in Appendix A.

Dependent Measures

Participants first rated the extent to which they felt nine emotions in reaction to the theft of their identity. Responses were combined into composite scales following a principle components analysis using an orthogonal rotation. The eigenvalues and scree plot suggested a three-component scale was appropriate. The first component, entitled “Positive Emotions,” accounted for 43.65% of the variance. Terms included in the positive emotions index were: pleased, happy, honored, and flattered ($\alpha = .86$). The second component, entitled “Anger,” accounted for 17.27% of the variance. Terms in the anger index were: angry, mad, and disrespected ($\alpha = .83$). The third component, entitled “Anxiety,” accounted for 13.89% of the variance. Terms for the anxiety index were: worried and afraid ($\alpha = .78$). See Table 1 for component loadings for each item. Additionally, we administered two uniqueness items that were not included in the principle components analysis because they are not emotion terms. The two items, special and unique, were combined into a composite personal uniqueness score ($\alpha = .72$). See Appendix A for the items employed.

Participants next completed measures assessing perceptions of the copier in terms of perceived likeability (Reysen, 2005), honesty (Reysen, 2008), and hypocrisy. Four items, “hypocrite,” “impostor,” and “fake” were combined to form the hypocrisy measure ($\alpha = .79$). Additionally, both the likeability (9 items, $\alpha = .90$) and honesty (8 items, $\alpha = .85$) measures were found to be reliable. See Appendix A for the items.

Participants then completed items regarding their interpretation of the event. Participants rated four items (e.g., “Person-A is hurting my public image”) measuring

Table 1.

Component Loadings for Emotion Items in Experiment 1.

| Emotion | Component 1 | Component 2 | Component 3 |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Pleased | .818 | -.060 | -.098 |
| Happy | .809 | -.140 | -.216 |
| Honored | .809 | -.184 | -.032 |
| Flattered | .812 | -.198 | -.193 |
| Angry | -.207 | .884 | -.011 |
| Disrespected | -.059 | .755 | .238 |
| Mad | -.210 | .869 | .131 |
| Worried | -.187 | .233 | .836 |
| Afraid | -.156 | .061 | .905 |
| Eigenvalues | 3.93 | 1.55 | 1.25 |

Note: Orthogonal rotation.

the extent to which they believed the copying reflected negatively on their image ($\alpha = .86$). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] stealing my identity”) were combined to measure the extent to which participants interpreted the situation as a *theft* of their identity ($\alpha = .88$). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] intending to copy me”) were combined to measure participants’ attribution of the copier’s intention to copy them ($\alpha = .87$). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] trying to cause me harm”) were combined

to measure participants' attribution that the copying was meant to harm them ($\alpha = .88$). Five items (e.g., "The situation is unjust") were combined to measure participants' view that the copying was illegitimate ($\alpha = .83$). Two items (e.g., "Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image") were combined to measure participants' belief that the copier is obligated to credit the participant for the copied characteristics ($\alpha = .92$). Three items (e.g., "Other people might think that I am copying Person-A") were combined to measure participants' belief that they may lose the credit for their copied characteristics ($\alpha = .83$). Four items (e.g., "People will think less of me if Person-A copies me") were combined to tap participants' belief that the copying will affect their reputation due to their friends noticing it ($\alpha = .86$). See Appendix A for the items.

Next, participants completed a number of items concerning self-appraisals. Three items (e.g., "[I feel] uncertain about my own image") were combined to measure the extent that participants felt uncertain about their own identity ($\alpha = .82$). Two items (e.g., "[I feel] like a leader") were combined to measure the extent that participants felt like a leader ($\alpha = .81$). Participants completed two items (e.g., "I feel I can change the situation") to measure the extent that they felt efficacious ($\alpha = .69$). Two items (e.g., "I feel that Person-A respects me") were combined to measure the degree that participants felt respected by the copier ($\alpha = .75$). See Appendix A for the items.

Participants then completed measures regarding the behaviors they would endorse in response to the copying. Two items (e.g., "I would confront Person-A

about copying me”) were combined to measure participants’ desire to confront the copier ($\alpha = .94$). Two items (e.g., I would do all I could to avoid Person-A, and convince my friends to do the same”) were combined to measure avoidance of the copier ($\alpha = .88$). Two items (e.g., “I would try to become friends with Person-A”) were combined to measure the desire by participants to befriend the copier ($\alpha = .90$). Two items (e.g., “I would change my appearance to be different from Person-A”) were combined to measure participants’ desire to change their own appearance ($\alpha = .93$). Lastly, three items asked participants to rate the extent that their shirt, hairstyle, and personality are important to their image. See Appendix A for all the items.

Results

Correlational Analysis

Zero-order correlations were first conducted collapsing across conditions (see Appendix B. As expected participants’ anger was negatively correlated with their positive emotion ratings. Also as expected, anger was positively correlated with the belief that the copying reflected negative on their image, and that the copier is illegitimately and intentionally trying to harm the participant. The strongest correlation was between the four behavioral actions centered on the desire to tell the copier to stop and anger.

Analysis of variance

A 2 (residence of thief) X 3 (number of characteristics copied) between-subjects univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the dependent variable indices.

Emotional reactions. A main effect for the number of characteristics was found for the positive emotion, anger, and anxiety indices (see Table 2). When three characteristics were copied, participants felt significantly less positive emotion and greater anger than in either the one or two characteristics conditions. The degree of anxiety reported by participants increased significantly by condition. Uniqueness did not differ across conditions. No main effects were found for the residence of the copier on the emotional reactions of participants (see Table 3).

An interaction between residence and number of characteristics was found for positive emotions (see Table 4). Simple effects analysis revealed that when three characteristics were stolen, participants who read about the thief moving away ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.26$) were happier than participants who did not read about the residence change of the thief ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.33$), $t(51) = 2.15$, $p = .037$, $d = -.03$. No differences were obtained between conditions of residence in the one characteristic, $t(54) = -1.47$, $p = .147$, $d = -.39$, and two characteristic, $t(51) = -.01$, $p = .99$, $d = -.01$, conditions (see Figure 1). Replicating past results (Reysen et al., 2009), when there was no mention of the copier's future residence participants who read about one characteristic being copied rated their positive emotions ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.00$) significantly higher than participants in the two characteristics ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.97$, $t(51) = 2.42$, $p = .019$, $d = .66$) and three characteristics ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.33$, $t(52) = 5.10$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.39$) conditions. Additionally, ratings of positive emotions when the no mention of the copier's future residence was mentioned significantly differed between the two and three characteristics conditions, $t(51) = 3.05$, $p = .004$, $d = .84$.

Table 2

Main Effects of Degree of Theft on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | One Characteristic | Two Characteristics | Three Characteristics | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | | | | |
| Positive | 4.54 (1.16) _a | 4.11 (1.26) _a | 3.51 (1.34) _b | 9.35 | .00 | .11 |
| Anger | 2.40 (1.31) _a | 2.74 (1.11) _a | 3.35 (1.30) _b | 7.96 | .00 | .09 |
| Anxiety | 1.56 (0.87) _a | 2.36 (1.28) _b | 3.01 (1.71) _c | 16.60 | .00 | .18 |
| Unique | 3.29 (1.34) _a | 3.57 (1.49) _a | 3.16 (1.50) _a | 1.07 | .34 | .01 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | | | | |
| Hypocritical | 2.48 (1.26) _a | 3.71 (1.12) _b | 4.50 (1.11) _c | 40.99 | .00 | .34 |
| Likeable | 3.95 (0.94) _a | 3.21 (1.01) _b | 2.77 (0.99) _b | 20.44 | .00 | .21 |
| Honest | 4.61 (0.82) _a | 3.88 (1.02) _b | 3.40 (0.94) _c | 23.10 | .00 | .23 |
| Interpretation | | | | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 2.27 (1.34) _a | 2.67 (1.17) _a | 3.55 (1.26) _b | 14.25 | .00 | .15 |
| Stealing Identity | 2.38 (1.65) _a | 3.59 (1.58) _b | 4.38 (1.60) _c | 21.28 | .00 | .21 |
| Intent to copy | 3.65 (1.88) _a | 5.73 (1.08) _b | 5.76 (1.28) _b | 37.08 | .00 | .32 |
| Illegitimate | 3.51 (1.42) _a | 4.47 (1.29) _b | 5.45 (1.46) _c | 25.94 | .00 | .25 |
| Intent to Harm | 1.56 (0.92) _a | 1.92 (0.90) _a | 2.60 (1.36) _b | 12.90 | .00 | .14 |
| Obligation | 3.04 (1.74) _a | 3.41 (1.81) _{ab} | 4.03 (1.80) _b | 4.19 | .02 | .05 |
| Credit | 3.04 (1.67) _a | 3.64 (1.51) _a | 3.62 (1.54) _a | 2.52 | .08 | .03 |
| Notice | 1.96 (1.10) _a | 2.17 (1.01) _{ab} | 2.65 (1.80) _b | 5.12 | .01 | .06 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | | | | |
| Uncertain | 2.66 (1.55) _a | 3.29 (1.40) _{ab} | 3.68 (1.22) _b | 6.32 | .00 | .08 |
| Leader | 4.71 (1.21) _a | 4.54 (1.35) _{ab} | 3.95 (1.55) _b | 4.59 | .01 | .06 |
| Efficacy | 3.04 (1.72) _a | 3.65 (1.44) _{ab} | 4.15 (1.38) _b | 7.33 | .00 | .09 |
| Respected | 4.49 (1.21) _a | 4.21 (1.45) _{ab} | 3.68 (1.47) _b | 4.79 | .01 | .06 |

| Action | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| Tell to Stop | 2.26 (1.58) _a | 3.44 (1.97) _b | 4.42 (1.73) _c | 20.89 | .00 | .21 |
| Avoid | 1.71 (1.23) _a | 2.13 (1.36) _a | 3.03 (1.71) _b | 11.57 | .00 | .13 |
| Befriend | 3.81 (1.46) _a | 2.95 (1.45) _b | 2.52 (1.33) _b | 11.72 | .00 | .13 |
| Change | 2.08 (1.34) _a | 2.33 (1.49) _a | 2.43 (1.61) _a | 0.85 | .43 | .01 |
| Importance of Characteristic | | | | | | |
| Shirt | 4.91 (1.49) _a | 4.98 (1.54) _a | 4.83 (1.45) _a | 0.13 | .88 | .00 |
| Hairstyle | 4.96 (1.60) _a | 4.58 (1.60) _a | 4.79 (1.51) _a | 0.93 | .40 | .01 |
| Personality | 6.68 (0.51) _a | 6.74 (0.59) _a | 6.58 (0.99) _a | 0.59 | .56 | .01 |

NOTE: Means with different subscripts are significantly different, 7-point Likert-type scale, Df = 2, 156.

Table 3

Main Effects of Residence of Copier on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | Move | No Mention | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | | | |
| Positive | 4.12 (1.34) | 4.01 (1.29) | 0.29 | .59 | .00 |
| Anger | 2.72 (1.26) | 2.93 (1.34) | 0.86 | .36 | .01 |
| Anxiety | 2.15 (1.34) | 2.45 (1.53) | 1.93 | .17 | .01 |
| Unique | 3.53 (1.45) | 3.14 (1.43) | 2.95 | .09 | .02 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | | | |
| Hypocritical | 3.53 (1.41) | 3.55 (1.46) | 0.00 | .95 | .00 |
| Likeable | 3.43 (1.05) | 3.21 (1.13) | 1.79 | .18 | .01 |
| Honest | 4.00 (1.09) | 3.95 (1.02) | 0.02 | .88 | .00 |
| Interpretation | | | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 2.73 (1.30) | 2.90 (1.42) | 0.50 | .48 | .00 |
| Stealing Identity | 3.16 (1.67) | 3.71 (1.89) | 4.07 | .05 | .03 |
| Intent to copy | 4.99 (1.76) | 5.06 (1.78) | 0.02 | .89 | .00 |
| Illegitimate | 4.27 (1.64) | 4.66 (1.54) | 2.66 | .11 | .02 |
| Intent to Harm | 1.93 (1.15) | 2.11 (1.16) | 0.95 | .33 | .01 |
| Obligation | 3.41 (1.76) | 3.56 (1.89) | 0.17 | .68 | .00 |
| Credit | 3.24 (1.50) | 3.61 (1.67) | 2.09 | .15 | .01 |
| Notice | 2.29 (1.16) | 2.21 (1.20) | 0.25 | .62 | .00 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | | | |
| Uncertain | 3.19 (1.59) | 3.21 (1.53) | 0.00 | .99 | .00 |
| Leader | 4.40 (1.42) | 4.41 (1.39) | 0.00 | .97 | .00 |
| Efficacy | 3.52 (1.41) | 3.68 (1.75) | 0.37 | .55 | .00 |
| Respected | 4.13 (1.48) | 4.14 (1.35) | 0.10 | .92 | .00 |

| | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------|-----|-----|
| Action | | | | | |
| Tell to Stop | 3.26 (2.03) | 3.45 (1.91) | 0.30 | .59 | .00 |
| Avoid | 2.20 (1.54) | 2.37 (1.54) | 0.46 | .50 | .00 |
| Befriend | 3.09 (1.48) | 3.13 (1.55) | 0.09 | .77 | .00 |
| Change | 2.29 (1.47) | 2.27 (1.50) | 0.00 | .95 | .00 |
| Importance of Characteristics | | | | | |
| Shirt | 4.89 (1.41) | 4.92 (1.57) | 0.01 | .92 | .00 |
| Hairstyle | 4.74 (1.40) | 4.82 (1.73) | 0.07 | .79 | .00 |
| Personality | 6.65 (0.66) | 6.69 (0.79) | 0.15 | .70 | .00 |

NOTE: Means with different subscripts are significantly different, 7-point Likert-type scale, Df = 1, 156.

Table 4


Main Effects of Residence of Copier on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|--------------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | |
| Positive | 3.34 | .04 | .04 |
| Anger | 0.62 | .54 | .01 |
| Anxiety | 1.60 | .21 | .02 |
| Unique | 1.74 | .18 | .02 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | |
| Hypocritical | 0.96 | .39 | .01 |
| Likeable | 0.34 | .71 | .00 |
| Honest | 0.23 | .80 | .00 |
| Interpretation | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 0.34 | .71 | .00 |
| Stealing Identity | 0.26 | .77 | .00 |
| Intent to copy | 0.45 | .64 | .01 |
| Illegitimate | 0.05 | .96 | .00 |
| Intent to Harm | 1.17 | .31 | .02 |
| Obligation | 1.40 | .25 | .02 |
| Credit | 0.41 | .67 | .01 |
| Notice | 0.65 | .53 | .01 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | |
| Uncertain | 0.56 | .57 | .01 |
| Leader | 3.86 | .02 | .05 |
| Efficacy | 0.96 | .38 | .01 |
| Respected | 0.51 | .60 | .01 |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------|-----|-----|--|
| Action | | | | |
| Tell to Stop | 2.22 | .11 | .03 | |
| Avoid | 0.92 | .40 | .01 | |
| Befriend | 0.33 | .72 | .00 | |
| Change | 1.77 | .17 | .02 | |
| Importance of Characteristics | | | | |
| Shirt | 3.04 | .05 | .04 | |
| Hairstyle | 4.47 | .01 | .05 | |
| Personality | 0.57 | .57 | .01 | |

NOTE: Means with different subscripts are significantly different, 7-point Likert-type scale, Df = 2, 156.

Figure 1. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for ratings of positive emotions.



When the copier was reported to be moving away, participants did not differ in ratings of positive emotions across the number of characteristics conditions. The one characteristic condition did not differ significantly from the two, $t(54) = 0.56, p = .58, d = .15$, and three characteristics, $t(53) = 1.22, p = .23, d = .33$, conditions.

Additionally, the two and three characteristics conditions did not significantly differ when the copier was reported to be moving, $t(51) = 0.54, p = .59, d = .15$. No other interactions were significant.

Ratings of copier. As the number of characteristics copied increased across the three conditions, participants rated the copier as significantly more hypocritical and less honest. The copier was also rated as significantly more likeable in the one characteristic stolen condition than in the two and three characteristics conditions. No other main effects of residence of copier or interactions were significant.


Interpretation of the event. As the number of characteristics copied increased, participants increasingly perceived the copying as a theft of their identity and as illegitimate. Participants in the one and two characteristics conditions perceived the copying to reflect negatively on their image and the copier as intentionally trying to harm them to a lesser extent than participants in the three characteristics condition. Participants in the three characteristics condition assigned an obligation for the copier to admit the copying and believed that others (e.g., friends) would think less of them to a significantly greater extent than participants in the one characteristic condition. The perception that the copying was intentional was rated significantly higher in the two and three characteristics conditions than the one characteristic condition. Participants' perception that they are losing the credit for their own image did not significantly differ across conditions. A main effect of residence of copier was found where participants rated the perception that the copier is stealing their identity higher compared to participants who read about the copier moving away. No other main effects of the residence of the copier or interactions were significant.

Self-appraisals. Main effects were found for the number of characteristics for each of the self-appraisal variables. Participants in the one characteristic condition felt

more uncertain about their own identity, more efficacious to change the situation, less like a leader, and less respected by the copier than participants in the three characteristics condition. No main effects of the residence of the copier were significant. An interaction was found for feeling like a leader. Simple effects analysis revealed that when there was only one characteristic copied, participants who read about the copier moving away ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.39$) reported feeling marginally significantly less like a leader than when no mention was made of the copier's future residence ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 0.92$), $t(54) = -1.80$, $p = .075$, $d = -.48$ (see Figure 2). Additionally, when three characteristics were copied participants who read about the copier moving ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.32$) rated feeling like a leader marginally significantly higher than participants who did not read about the copier moving ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.67$), $t(51) = 1.95$, $p = .057$, $d = .54$. There was not a significant difference between conditions of the copier's residence in the two characteristic condition, $t(51) = -0.71$, $p = .48$, $d = -.19$. When the copier's future residence was not mentioned the participants in the one characteristic ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 0.92$) condition rated feeling like a leader significantly higher than participants in the three characteristic ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.67$) condition, $t(52) = 3.93$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.07$. When the copier's future residence was not mentioned the participants in the two characteristic ($M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.06$) condition rated feeling like a leader significantly higher than participants in the three characteristic condition, $t(51) = 2.90$, $p = .006$, $d = .79$. When no mention of the residence was made participants did not differ in ratings of feeling like a leader between the one and two characteristic conditions,

$t(51) = 1.20, p = .24, d = .33$. When the copier's future residence was reported participants did not differ in ratings of feeling like a leader between the one and two characteristic, $t(54) = 0.06, p = .95, d = .01$, one and three characteristic, $t(53) = 0.18, p = .86, d = .04$, and two and three characteristics, $t(51) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .03$, conditions. No other interactions were significant.

Figure 2. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for ratings of feeling like a leader.



Behavioral Reactions. Main effects of the number of characteristics were found for three of the four behavioral variables administered. As the number of characteristics copied increased, participants increasingly endorsed confronting the copier. Participants in the three characteristics condition endorsed avoiding the copier to a greater extent than in the one and two characteristic conditions. Participants endorsed befriending the copier to a lesser extent in the two and three characteristics conditions compared to the one characteristic condition. The extent that participants expressed a desire to change their own identity did not significantly differ across conditions. No main effects for the residence of the copier or interactions were significant.

Importance of characteristics. No main effects for the number of characteristics or the residence of the copier were significant for ratings of the importance of participants' shirt, hairstyle, or personality. Interactions were found for self-ratings of the importance of the shirt and hairstyle. Simple effects analysis revealed that when there was only one characteristic stolen, participants who read about the thief moving away ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.46$) reported less importance of their shirt than when no mention was made of the copier's future residence ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.44$), $t(54) = -2.11$, $p = .04$, $d = -.56$ (see Figure 3). Participants did not differ in their ratings of the importance of their shirt between the conditions of the future residence of the copier for either the two characteristics, $t(51) = 0.62$, $p = .54$, $d = .17$, or the three characteristics, $t(51) = 1.22$, $p = .23$, $d = .34$, conditions. When the copier was reported to be moving there was no significant difference between the one and

two, $t(54) = -1.48, p = .15, d = -.39$, one and three, $t(53) = -1.56, p = .12, d = -.42$, and two and three characteristics, $t(51) = 0.09, p = .93, d = .03$, conditions. When no mention was made of the copier's future residence there was no significant difference between the one and two, $t(51) = 1.19, p = .24, d = .32$, one and three, $t(52) = 1.75, p = .087, d = .47$, and two and three characteristics, $t(51) = 0.57, p = .57, d = .16$, conditions. When there was only one characteristic copied, participants who read about the copier moving away ($M = 4.45, SD = 1.55$) reported less importance of their hairstyle than when no mention was made of the copier's future residence ($M = 5.52, SD = 1.48$), $t(54) = -2.64, p = .01, d = -.71$ (see Figure 4). No significant differences between conditions of copier's residence were found for the two, $t(51) = -0.72, p = .48, d = .20$, and three characteristics, $t(51) = 1.36, p = .18, d = .38$, conditions. When the future residence of the copier was not mentioned participants in the one ($M = 5.52, SD = 1.48$) rated the importance of their hairstyle higher than participants in the two ($M = 4.42, SD = 1.77, t(51) = 2.45, p = .018, d = .67$), and three characteristics ($M = 4.52, SD = 1.76, t(52) = 2.26, p = .028, d = .61$) conditions. No difference was found when no mention was given of the copier's future residence between the two and three characteristics conditions, $t(51) = -0.20, p = .85, d = -.06$. When the copier was reported to be moving no differences were found between the one and two, $t(54) = -0.73, p = .47, d = -.19$, one and three, $t(53) = -1.69, p = .10, d = -.46$, and two and three characteristics, $t(51) = -0.94, p = .35, d = -.26$, conditions. No other interactions were significant.

Figure 3. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for ratings of importance of shirt for self-image.





Figure 4. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for ratings of importance of hairstyle for self-image.




Mediational Analyses

Possible mediators of the effect of the increase in the number of characteristics stolen on the anger felt by participants were examined. Using the SPSS macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for testing mediation with bootstrapping (1,000 iterations), I entered the condition (number of characteristics copied: 1 = one characteristic, 2 = two characteristics, 3 = three characteristics) as the independent variable, and anger as the dependent variable. I included the previously

theorized antecedents of moral anger as the mediators: (a) participants' perception that the copying is illegitimate, (b) attribution that the copier is intentionally copying characteristics to harm them, and two variables proposed to influence anger experienced after identity theft (c) concern over the loss of the credentials of one's identity, and (d) concern that valued others will notice and think less of the participant due to the copying. As shown in Figure 5, number of characteristics copied predicted participants' experience of anger ($\beta = .30, p < .001$). Condition also predicted the perceived illegitimacy of the copying ($\beta = .50, p < .001$), and the perception that the copier is purposefully trying to harm the participant ($\beta = .37, p < .001$). Condition marginally predicted participants' concern for the credit of their identity ($\beta = .15, p = .054$). Condition predicted participants' concern that others will think less of them due to the copying ($\beta = .24, p = .002$). Illegitimacy predicted anger ($\beta = .40, p < .001$). Participants' attribution of the copier's intention to harm them predicted anger ($\beta = .30, p < .001$). Participants' concern regarding a potential loss of credentials did not significantly predict anger ($\beta = .12, p = .123$). Participants' concern regarding a loss of respect from friends and others who may notice the copying did not significantly predict anger ($\beta = -.07, p = .360$). When the mediators are included, the relationship between condition and anger becomes non-significant ($\beta = -.03, p = .614$). The total effect of the mediators combined show a full mediation of the relationship between condition and anger as indicated by the absence of zero between the 95% confidence interval at the $p < .05$ (two tailed) level ($CI = .351$ to $.740$). The perceived illegitimacy of the copying ($CI = .170$ to $.505$), and perceived

Figure 5. Mediation Analysis.



intention of the copier to harm the participant ($CI = .119$ to $.336$) were significant mediators of the relationship between condition and anger. However, the concern over the loss of credentials ($CI = -.008$ to $.103$), and negative reflections from valued others due to the copying ($CI = -.110$ to $.033$) were not significant mediators because they contained zero within the confidence intervals.

Discussion

Experiment 1 was designed to examine the notion that identity theft is a moral violation and test the possibility that the underlying reason that identity theft is threatening to participants is that others will witness the theft. The results concerning the moral appraisals of the theft support the hypothesis that identity theft is a moral violation. However, the results do not support the hypothesis that identity theft is threatening due to the presence of the copier in the victim's local environment.

Number of Characteristics Copied

The effects of the increase in the number of characteristics replicated past results obtained by Reysen and colleagues (2009). As predicted, when only one characteristic of the self was copied, participants felt flattered and liked the thief. However, when more than one self-characteristic was stolen participants viewed the theft as intentional, felt angry, rated the thief negatively, and endorsed confronting the thief. Ratings of the new measures regarding participants' interpretation of the event and self-appraisals supported the notion that identity theft is experienced as a moral violation.

Moral Violation

Participants reported feeling greater efficacy and disrespect when three characteristics were copied compared to one characteristic. Furthermore, participants interpreted the theft as illegitimate, and believed the copier intended to harm them and was obligated to admit the copying. The mediation analysis lent additional support to the notion that the anger experienced can reasonably be described as moral anger. The two antecedents (i.e., illegitimacy, attribution of intent to harm) that mediated the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the anger felt by participants have been previously suggested as moral appraisals. Lazarus' (1991) appraisals of anger (i.e., relevance, incongruent, threat to ego, blame, efficacy) did not mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and felt anger when the moral antecedents (i.e., illegitimacy, intent to harm) were included in the mediational model. However, past theorists have suggested that not all of the antecedent conditions need to be present for every individual to feel anger (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; Parkinson, 2001; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2001; Shweder, 1993). In effect, some moral appraisals of the event were more important in predicting anger than other moral appraisals or non-moral appraisals that have been previously investigated.

Residence of Copier

No significant main effects were found as a function of the future residence of the copier. This may be due to a failure to properly manipulate whether or not others can view the copying, or that the underlying threat to participants is not dependent on

whether others will view the theft. Overall, the results support the notion that participants are *not* threatened by valued others witnessing the theft. The manipulation of residence of the thief did not affect ratings of anger. Participants' concern that others will witness the copying did not mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the experience of anger. Together the findings lend support to the view that participants are not concerned about valued others' reactions to the theft. In other words, participants are angered by the theft regardless of whether the copier stays in town or leaves the country.

The manipulation of the residence of the copier did influence four dependent variables. Interactions were observed between the residence of the copier and the number of characteristics for feeling positive emotion, feeling like a leader, and ratings of the importance of the shirt and hairstyle to the participant's image.

First, participants who read about three self-characteristics being copied rated their positive emotions higher when the copier was reported to be moving rather than when no mention was made of the future residence of the copier. Participants may have expressed positive emotions because since the need for confrontation was obviated when the copier moved out of the country. In effect, participants are still angered by the copying but may feel happy that they do not have to confront the copier.

When one characteristic was copied participants reported feeling like a leader to a greater extent than when the copier stayed in the local environment. This finding was reversed when three characteristics were copied. The interaction resulted in no

difference across the number of characteristics when the copier is purported to be moving away, yet feeling like a leader drops significantly when a greater number of characteristics are copied and no mention of the residence is given. I suggest that what is driving this interaction is when no mention of the copier is made participants felt less and less like a leader the more characteristics are copied. When only one characteristic was copied participants rated their shirt and haircut as more important to their image when the copier moved compared to the no mention of the future residence condition. The increase in importance of the shirt when the copier remains in town may be due to participants feeling like a leader and being proud that another person values a self-characteristic of theirs. The increase in the importance of the haircut is most likely an artifact because participants were not informed of the theft of their hairstyle in the one characteristic condition.

Overall, the results of Experiment 1 support the prediction that identity theft is a moral violation that results in anger and a desire to confront the copier. However, the results do not support the prediction that an underlying mechanism of identity theft is that valued others may view the theft. Although the mediation analysis in Experiment 1 did not support the notion that the loss of credit for one's identity contributes to the anger felt by participants, credit for one's identity was more directly manipulated in Experiment 2.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was designed to assess the possibility that the loss of credit for one's identity is the threat underlying identity theft effects. Second, Experiment 2 was

designed to attempt to change the meaning of identity theft by increasing the number of copiers. I have suggested that identity theft threatens one's ability to display a distinctive public identity. While the results of Experiment 1 suggest that identity theft is not a threat due to the theft being witnessed by valued others, the possibility still remains that the identity thief is harming the victim's ability to display a distinctive public identity by stealing the credit for that identity. Past studies (Reysen et al., 2009) have shown that if a third-party acknowledges the thief is stealing the victim's identity this attenuates the victim's anger. Conversely, if a third-party accuses the victim of being the thief this accentuates the victim's anger. When a third-party acknowledges the theft the credit for the identity remained in the victim's control. When a third-party invalidates the victim's identity the credit for the identity was given to the identity thief. In both cases the victim's identity was stolen, however losing the credit was more threatening and resulted in greater anger. Thus, the loss of credit for one's identity may be an underlying reason for the threat of identity theft. To test this, the credit for the participant's identity is manipulated in the present experiment. I hypothesize that participants will feel less angry when they retain control over the credit to their identity.

A second manipulation was undertaken in an attempt to change the meaning of the theft. Inherent in the definition of impression management is the desire to control how others view the self (Leary, 1995). The number of thieves was varied in attempt to manipulate the amount of control participants feel they have over their identity. If one person copies self-characteristics, victims can conceivably confront

the copier and regain control over their identity. If however, 64 people copy the participant, the action of confrontation to restore one's distinctive public identity is much more difficult. Past emotion theorists have suggested that efficacy is an antecedent to feeling angry (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990). If an individual believes he or she can deal with the threat, then more anger is predicted. In effect, if one person is copying the victim then the victim should feel efficacious and therefore feel angry. Indeed, Experiment 1 showed that efficacy was significantly positively correlated with anger, and greater efficacy was reported when three characteristics, as compared to one characteristic, were stolen. If there are 64 thieves this should be perceived by the victim as an uncontrollable event and subsequently attenuate felt anger. The manipulation of number of copiers may also change the perceived meaning of identity theft. Instead of feeling threatened by the theft in this case, participants may reevaluate the situation as positive and feel that they are leaders of a trend. Consequently, participants should express less anger because: (1) they should feel less efficacious, and (2) they may feel like a leader.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants ($N = 192$, 53.6% men) received partial course credit toward their introductory psychology requirement. Their mean age was 18.97 years ($SD = 1.13$), and 84.4% indicated their racial/ethnic group was white. Identical to Experiment 1, participants signed an informed consent, read a vignette containing the experimental manipulations, rated the same dependent measures (e.g., emotional reactions,

interpretations of the event) as those presented in Experiment 1, and were debriefed and thanked. The design of the present experiment was a 4 (number of copiers) X 2 (acknowledgement of the copying by the copier) between-subjects design.

Experimental Manipulations

All participants read about a person who has copied three characteristics of another person's identity (i.e., shirt, hair, and personality). To manipulate the number of copiers participants were asked to imagine that 1, 16, 32, or 64 people purportedly copied three characteristics from the participant. A second manipulation informed participants that when asked, the copier, or copiers, admitted that they had copied those attributes of the participant or no mention was given of the acknowledgement. In effect, the no acknowledgement condition assumes that participants do not expect that the thief is acknowledging the copying. See Appendix C for the vignettes.

Dependent Measures

The dependent measures were identical to those administered in Experiment 1 (see Appendix A). The emotion items were combined into composite scales following a principle components analysis using an orthogonal rotation. The eigenvalues and scree plot again suggested a three-component scale was appropriate. The first component, entitled "Positive Emotions," accounted for 48.00% of the variance (4 items, $\alpha = .90$). The second component, entitled "Anger," accounted for 17.02% of the variance (3 items, $\alpha = .80$). The third component, entitled "Anxiety," accounted for 12.19% of the variance (2 items, $\alpha = .81$). See Table 5 for the component loadings for each item.

Table 5.

Component Loadings for Emotion Items in Experiment 2.

| Emotion | Component 1 | Component 2 | Component 3 |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Pleased | .786 | -.212 | -.060 |
| Happy | .812 | -.388 | -.078 |
| Honored | .893 | -.183 | -.092 |
| Flattered | .862 | -.153 | -.132 |
| Angry | -.237 | .879 | .024 |
| Disrespected | -.259 | .613 | .275 |
| Mad | -.215 | .871 | .168 |
| Worried | -.064 | .168 | .893 |
| Afraid | -.130 | .122 | .897 |
| Eigenvalues | 4.32 | 1.53 | 1.10 |

Note: Orthogonal rotation.

Other measures included: uniqueness (2 items, $\alpha = .73$), hypocritical (3 items, $\alpha = .58$), likeable (9 items, $\alpha = .87$), honest (8 items, $\alpha = .83$), negative image (4 items, $\alpha = .84$), stealing identity (2 items, $\alpha = .85$), intent to copy (2 items, $\alpha = .75$), illegitimacy (5 items, $\alpha = .78$), intent to harm (2 items, $\alpha = .86$), obligation to acknowledge (2 items, $\alpha = .90$), credit (3 items, $\alpha = .80$), notice (4 items, $\alpha = .85$), uncertain (3 items, $\alpha = .79$), leader (2 items, $\alpha = .81$), efficacy (2 items, $\alpha = .62$),

respect (2 items, $\alpha = .70$), confront ($\alpha = .86$), avoid (2 items, $\alpha = .85$), befriend (2 items, $\alpha = .88$), and change (2 items, $\alpha = .94$). Lastly, three items asked participants to rate the importance of each characteristic (i.e., shirt, hairstyle, personality) for their image.

Results

Correlational Analysis

Zero-order correlations were calculated collapsing across conditions (see Appendix D). Identical to Experiment 1, participants' anger was negatively correlated with positive emotions, anger was positively correlated with the belief that the copying reflected negative on their image, and that the copier is illegitimately and intentionally trying to harm the participant. The strongest correlation between the four behavioral actions and anger was the desire to tell the copier to stop.

Analysis of Variance

A 4 (number of copiers) X 2 (acknowledgement of copying) between-subjects univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the dependent variable indices. No significant main effects were found for the number of copiers (see Table 6). Further, no interactions between the number of copiers and acknowledgement by the copiers were significant (see Table 7). Significant main effects for whether or not the copier(s) acknowledged copying the participant's self-characteristics were obtained (see Table 8). Participants reported greater positive emotion, uniqueness, ratings of the copier(s) as honest, and a desire to befriend the copier(s) when the copier(s) acknowledged the copying compared to when the copier(s) did not acknowledge the

Table 6

Main Effects of Number of Copiers on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | One | Sixteen | Thirty-Two | Sixty-Four | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | | | | | |
| Positive | 3.41 (1.27) | 3.78 (1.46) | 3.53 (1.34) | 3.81 (1.64) | 0.89 | .45 | .01 |
| Anger | 3.63 (1.35) | 3.78 (1.47) | 3.44 (1.34) | 3.40 (1.40) | 0.79 | .50 | .01 |
| Anxiety | 2.76 (1.39) | 3.14 (1.70) | 2.82 (1.69) | 2.91 (1.67) | 0.52 | .67 | .01 |
| Unique | 3.02 (1.46) | 3.09 (1.56) | 3.16 (1.62) | 3.10 (1.71) | 0.06 | .98 | .00 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | | | | | |
| Hypocritical | 4.21 (1.17) | 4.25 (1.13) | 4.37 (1.09) | 4.33 (1.31) | 0.21 | .89 | .00 |
| Likeable | 2.93 (0.97) | 3.00 (0.92) | 2.86 (0.98) | 2.95 (0.78) | 0.22 | .88 | .00 |
| Honest | 3.51 (1.07) | 3.48 (1.06) | 3.30 (0.98) | 3.42 (0.88) | 0.50 | .68 | .01 |
| Interpretation | | | | | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 3.32 (1.31) | 3.84 (1.20) | 3.52 (1.34) | 3.75 (1.67) | 1.45 | .23 | .02 |
| Stealing Identity | 4.40 (1.87) | 4.98 (1.47) | 4.65 (1.68) | 4.55 (1.82) | 1.03 | .38 | .02 |
| Intent to copy | 5.91 (1.26) | 5.84 (1.22) | 5.84 (1.11) | 5.44 (1.39) | 1.29 | .28 | .02 |
| Illegitimate | 5.24 (1.49) | 5.47 (1.36) | 5.62 (1.41) | 5.22 (1.36) | 0.91 | .44 | .02 |
| Intent to Harm | 2.52 (1.45) | 3.16 (1.37) | 2.76 (1.22) | 3.20 (1.72) | 2.55 | .06 | .04 |
| Obligation | 4.38 (1.66) | 4.48 (1.63) | 4.46 (1.86) | 4.48 (1.77) | 0.03 | .99 | .00 |
| Credit | 3.96 (1.58) | 4.07 (1.44) | 4.12 (1.47) | 4.06 (1.67) | 0.10 | .96 | .00 |
| Notice | 2.83 (1.53) | 3.04 (1.13) | 2.90 (1.35) | 3.04 (1.33) | 0.29 | .83 | .01 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | | | | | |
| Uncertain | 3.71 (1.66) | 4.17 (1.51) | 3.94 (1.46) | 3.87 (1.55) | 0.74 | .53 | .01 |
| Leader | 4.29 (1.53) | 4.36 (1.66) | 4.44 (1.51) | 4.58 (1.62) | 0.29 | .84 | .01 |
| Efficacy | 3.51 (1.21) | 3.81 (1.14) | 3.30 (0.87) | 3.47 (1.16) | 1.84 | .14 | .03 |
| Respected | 3.60 (1.66) | 3.34 (1.31) | 3.32 (1.24) | 3.60 (1.54) | 0.58 | .63 | .01 |

Table 7

Interaction between Number of Copiers and Acknowledgement of Copying on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|--------------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | |
| Positive | 0.15 | .93 | .00 |
| Anger | 0.05 | .99 | .00 |
| Anxiety | 0.09 | .97 | .00 |
| Unique | 0.03 | .99 | .00 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | |
| Hypocritical | 0.68 | .56 | .01 |
| Likeable | 0.84 | .47 | .01 |
| Honest | 1.48 | .22 | .02 |
| Interpretation | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 0.37 | .78 | .01 |
| Stealing Identity | 0.15 | .93 | .00 |
| Intent to copy | 0.10 | .96 | .00 |
| Illegitimate | 0.08 | .97 | .00 |
| Intent to Harm | 0.73 | .54 | .01 |
| Obligation | 1.07 | .36 | .02 |
| Credit | 0.20 | .90 | .00 |
| Notice | 0.52 | .67 | .01 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | |
| Uncertain | 0.26 | .86 | .00 |
| Leader | 0.58 | .63 | .01 |
| Efficacy | 1.24 | .30 | .02 |
| Respected | 0.14 | .94 | .00 |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------|-----|--|-----|
| Action | | | | |
| Tell to Stop | 0.24 | .87 | | .00 |
| Avoid | 0.98 | .40 | | .02 |
| Befriend | 0.77 | .51 | | .01 |
| Change | 0.44 | .73 | | .01 |
| Importance of Characteristics | | | | |
| Shirt | 0.73 | .54 | | .01 |
| Hairstyle | 0.68 | .57 | | .01 |
| Personality | 1.64 | .18 | | .03 |

NOTE: 7-point Likert-type scale, Df = 3, 184.

Table 8

Main Effects of Degree of Theft on Dependent Variables.

| Variable | No Mention | Acknowledge | F-value | P-value | η_p^2 |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|------------|
| Emotional Reaction | | | | | |
| Positive | 3.38 (1.37) | 3.88 (1.44) | 6.10 | .01 | .03 |
| Anger | 3.78 (1.40) | 3.35 (1.34) | 4.57 | .03 | .02 |
| Anxiety | 2.98 (1.69) | 2.83 (1.53) | 0.50 | .48 | .00 |
| Unique | 2.79 (1.45) | 3.40 (1.64) | 7.08 | .01 | .04 |
| Ratings of Copier | | | | | |
| Hypocritical | 4.39 (1.09) | 4.19 (1.19) | 1.28 | .26 | .01 |
| Likeable | 2.82 (0.84) | 3.05 (0.98) | 3.00 | .09 | .02 |
| Honest | 3.23 (0.93) | 3.64 (1.04) | 7.88 | .01 | .04 |
| Interpretation | | | | | |
| Reflect on Image | 3.72 (1.39) | 3.48 (1.38) | 1.35 | .25 | .01 |
| Stealing Identity | 4.80 (1.65) | 4.49 (1.20) | 1.58 | .21 | .01 |
| Intended to copy | 5.69 (1.30) | 5.85 (1.19) | 0.86 | .36 | .01 |
| Illegitimate | 5.51 (1.41) | 5.27 (1.40) | 1.52 | .22 | .01 |
| Intent to Harm | 3.10 (1.55) | 2.69 (1.33) | 3.85 | .05 | .02 |
| Obligated | 4.52 (1.72) | 4.37 (1.72) | 0.48 | .49 | .00 |
| Credit | 4.09 (1.54) | 4.02 (1.52) | 0.10 | .76 | .00 |
| Notice | 3.04 (1.40) | 2.86 (1.27) | 0.86 | .36 | .01 |
| Self-Appraisals | | | | | |
| Uncertain | 3.97 (1.49) | 3.79 (1.59) | 1.49 | .22 | .01 |
| Leader | 4.30 (1.59) | 4.52 (1.55) | 0.82 | .37 | .00 |
| Efficacy | 3.61 (1.14) | 3.44 (1.07) | 1.09 | .30 | .01 |
| Respected | 3.36 (1.37) | 3.57 (1.51) | 1.05 | .36 | .01 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|
| Action | | | | | | | | | |
| Tell to Stop | 4.59 (1.92) | 4.76 (1.56) | 0.42 | .52 | .00 | | | | |
| Avoid | 3.32 (1.84) | 2.77 (1.40) | 5.36 | .02 | .03 | | | | |
| Befriend | 2.45 (1.22) | 2.91 (1.36) | 5.70 | .02 | .03 | | | | |
| Change | 2.82 (1.69) | 2.78 (1.77) | 0.03 | .86 | .00 | | | | |
| Importance of Characteristics | | | | | | | | | |
| Shirt | 4.76 (1.45) | 4.71 (1.35) | 0.06 | .80 | .00 | | | | |
| Hairstyle | 4.56 (1.47) | 4.38 (1.48) | 0.55 | .65 | .01 | | | | |
| Personality | 6.62 (0.64) | 6.68 (0.61) | 0.54 | .65 | .01 | | | | |


NOTE: 7-point Likert-type scale, Df = 1, 184.

copying. Participants reported less anger, perceived less intention to harm, and less desire to avoid the copier(s) when they read about the copier(s) acknowledging the copying compared to participants who did not read about an acknowledgement by the copier(s).

Mediational Analysis

Potential mediators of the effect of the acknowledgement by the copier(s) on participants' anger was examined. Using the SPSS macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for testing mediation with bootstrapping (1,000 iterations), I entered the condition (acknowledgement: 0 = no mention of acknowledgement, 1 = copier(s) acknowledge the theft) as the independent variable, and anger as the dependent variable. I included the attribution that the copier is intentionally copying characteristics to harm the participant, and the perceived honesty of the copier(s) as mediators. These mediators were chosen because intention to harm was found to be important for predicting anger in Experiment 1, and honesty should be closely related to viewing another person as not attempting to harm the participant. As shown in Figure 6, condition (0 = no mention, 1 = acknowledge theft) predicted participants' experience of anger ($\beta = -.15, p = .033$). Condition marginally significantly predicted the perception that the copier is purposefully trying to harm the participant ($\beta = -.14, p = .055$). Condition predicted participants' perception of the honesty of the copier(s) ($\beta = .21, p = .004$). Participants' attribution of the copiers' intention to harm them predicted anger ($\beta = .35, p < .001$). Participants' ratings of perceived honesty of the copier(s) predicted anger ($\beta = -.36, p < .001$). When the mediators are included in the

Figure 6. Meditational Analysis.



equation, the relationship between condition and anger becomes non-significant ($\beta = -.03, p = .601$). The total effect of the mediators combined indicated mediation of the relationship between condition and anger as indicated by the absence of zero between the 95% confidence interval at the $p < .05$ (two tailed) level ($CI = -.615$ to $-.114$). The perceived intention of the copier to harm the participant ($CI = -.341$ to $-.006$) and the perceived honesty of the copier(s) ($CI = -.413$ to $-.073$) were significant mediators of the relationship between the condition and anger.

Discussion

Experiment 2 was conducted to assess the viability of loss of credit for one's identity as a possible explanation for the threat posed by identity theft, and to examine whether the meaning of identity theft can be manipulated by increasing the number of copiers. The hypothesis that an individual's loss of credit for an identity is the underlying threat posed by identity theft was only partially supported. Acknowledgement by the copier(s) did attenuate the anger expressed by participants. The number of copiers, however, had no effect on participants' reactions to the identity theft. Participants felt angry regardless of how many followers copied them. Thus, the second hypothesis was not supported.

When the copier(s) acknowledged the theft, participants felt happier and less angry compared to when the credit for the identity was not acknowledged. Furthermore, participants rated the copier(s) as honest and would befriend them to a greater extent when there was an acknowledgement of copying compared to when none was given. The findings suggest that honesty was rewarded, but only to a certain

extent. The acknowledgement may have validated the participants' identity and provided them with a boost in feelings of uniqueness. The reduction in anger was driven by the participant's view that the copier(s) was not intentionally trying to harm them and the perception that the copier(s) was honest. However, regardless of acknowledgement, participants still believed that the theft was illegitimate, damaged their image, and they endorsed confrontation. The manipulation of acknowledgement appears to have simply changed the perceived honesty and the copier's intention to do harm, which affected felt anger. Yet, regardless of whether an acknowledgement of the copying is made or not the moral violation has still occurred and participants continue to believe that the incident is unjust.

Overall, Experiment 2 reinforces the idea that identity theft leads to anger due to a moral violation rather than concern for the loss of credit for an identity. The number of copiers had no effect on the anger felt by participants. The acknowledgement by the copiers aided in attenuating the anger, however the moral violation is evident in participants' responses (e.g., illegitimate). When the credit of the identity is returned to the victim, anger is attenuated, although the act of copying is still viewed as illegitimate and harmful to the person's public identity. In effect, identity theft is still threatening even when credit for the identity is retained.

General Discussion

The present research attempted to illuminate the underlying processes that occur when people perceive themselves to be victims of identity theft. Possible reasons for the threat that identity theft poses include (1) the belief that valued others

may view the theft, (2) a violation of moral belief, and (3) loss of credit for the identity. Additionally, I attempted to manipulate the perceived meaning of identity theft for victims. The hypotheses that valued others not witnessing the theft and an increase in the number of copiers would attenuate the anger felt by participants were not supported. The hypothesis that the loss of credit was an underlying mechanism of identity theft was only partially supported. Anger was attenuated when the victims of identity theft retained the credit to their identity, however the perceived honesty of the thief and the perception that the thief did not intend to harm the participant were the important variables predicting the reduction in anger. The potential underlying basis of the threat tested in the current studies adds to our knowledge of what identity theft is and is not. Identity theft is not threatening because of concerns regarding valued others noticing the theft, and it is not threatening because the credit for the identity is taken away. Rather, the results suggest that identity theft is threatening because a moral violation is perceived to have occurred. In effect, identity theft represents an insult to one's belief that one has a right to present a unique public identity that should not be copied. This insult is viewed by participants as unjust and intentionally harm-provoking.

Moral Violation

Past research has shown that anger is the primary response to moral violations (Mikula et al., 1998; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2000). Supporting appraisal theorists, the moral antecedents of illegitimacy (Averill, 1982; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Roseman et al., 1990; Shaver et al., 1987; Skarlicki &

Folger, 1997; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) and an attribution of intent to harm (Averill, 1982; Dodge, 1993; Orobio de Castro et al., 2002) were found to mediate the relationship between an increase in the number of characteristics copied and greater felt anger. I suggest that identity theft violates the belief that one has a right to the freedom to present a unique identity to the world. As shown in Experiment 1 participants were more likely to state that the thief should acknowledge that they are copying the participant when three compared to one characteristic was copied. In a manner, participants are stating that a social norm has been violated whereby another person has wronged them and the copier should admit that they have committed the action. Although there was not an explicit measure of moral belief regarding copying, the obligation measure (e.g., Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image) provides support for the notion that an expectation has been violated. When a thief copies multiple self-characteristics participants are angered by the unexpected (Shaver et al., 1987) disconfirmation of their worldview (Ellis & Tafrate, 1997). The difference between a non-moral and moral violation requires further research, however the results thus far support the notion that identity theft is perceived as a moral violation.

Underlying Threat of Identity Theft

The proposed underlying bases of threat stemming from identity theft (i.e., witnesses viewing the theft and the loss of credit for one's identity) were not supported as explanations for the threat that identity theft poses. The mediation analysis in Experiment 1 showed that these two variables did not contribute to the

anger felt by participants. The manipulation of the future residence of the thief also did not affect the anger felt by participants, indicating that participants were upset regardless of whether friends might view the theft or not. In Experiment 2 participants either retained credit for the identity or not, and while anger was attenuated when credit was retained the reduction was most likely driven by the fact that participants did not view the copier(s) behavior as intentionally harm-provoking. Participants still believed the copying was illegitimate, that it constituted intentional identity theft, and the copier(s) should admit that they copied the participant. Additionally, confrontation was the highest rated of the likely actions to take against the copier(s). In other words, although participants were less angry when the copier(s) admitted to the theft, participants still viewed the identity theft as a moral violation.

Manipulating the Meaning of Identity Theft

In Experiment 2, the meaning of identity theft was predicted to be viewed as positive when multiple people copied the participants because the participants could view themselves as leaders and the situation would be more difficult to change. Emotion theorists have suggested that efficacy is an antecedent to feeling angry (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990). If an individual feels able to deal with the threat, then more anger is predicted. These hypotheses were not supported. The theft was seen as a moral violation regardless of the number of copiers. In fact, the manipulation of number of copiers had no effect on any of the dependent measures. The hypothesis that participants may feel more like a leader or less efficacious when there were many copiers was also not supported.

Implications for Past Identity Theft Research

The results of the present studies add to existing knowledge of identity theft. In previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) the authors examined the conditions under which identity theft is threatening and might elicit negative emotions and confrontational intentions. The results showed that for situations to be experienced as identity theft multiple characteristics must be stolen, participants must perceive that the thief is intentionally stealing their identity, and that the theft concerns their own personal identity characteristics. Furthermore, third-party validation and priming internal unchanging characteristics attenuated participant anger, while third-party invalidation accentuated participant anger. The aim of the present experiments was to gain a deeper understanding of why identity theft is particularly threatening to participants. In Experiment 1, the increase in the number of characteristics copied replicated past findings. This result supports the reliability of the effect of identity theft on participant emotions, interpretations, and behavioral endorsements. However, Experiment 1 added to our understanding of the moral implications of identity theft. Additional measures that were meant to tap moral appraisals of the event (e.g., illegitimacy, intention to harm) were administered and found to affect the anger experienced by participants. This finding lends support to the notion that victims of identity theft believe that the theft is illegitimate and immoral.

Given that past studies have shown that third parties can both attenuate and accentuate the anger experienced by participants, I reasoned that a possible cause of the threat posed by identity theft is that valued others may witness the theft. Others

may think less favorably of the victim or misattribute the originator of the identity to the thief. Both explanations suggest that the threat of identity theft affects the victim's public identity. Indeed, in past research as well as Experiment 1, as more characteristics are copied, participants report that the theft harms their image to a greater extent. The manipulation of whether or not others could view the theft had no effect on the dependent variables. This may be due to a problem with how participants interpreted the manipulation. The manipulation states, "You later learn that Person-A is moving next week to a foreign country and will not be moving back." Participants may have interpreted this to mean that they learned of the information through a friend, or that others may witness the theft before the copier moves out of the country. In both instances, others may be thought to have a chance to witness the theft. If that is the case, it may have undermined the purpose of the manipulation. If, however, the manipulation was correctly interpreted by participants, the results suggest that others witnessing the theft is less important than the fact that a moral violation has occurred. Participants may be more concerned that someone is wronging them than that other people will see the violation. A second possible reason for the threat that identity theft poses is the loss of the credit for one's identity.

The anger felt by participants can be attenuated by validation from a third-party (Reysen et al., 2009) or by acknowledgment by the thief (Experiment 2). In both cases the public identity that is displayed by the participant is validated by a statement that the credit for the identity remains with the victim. Instead of suggesting that participants are angry about someone claiming that another person is threatening

their distinctiveness I would suggest that the act is still a moral violation regardless of who validates one's identity. As shown in Experiment 2, validation by the thief can attenuate anger, but the theft continues to be seen as illegitimate, negative for one's image, and intentional. Further research is needed to determine if participants indeed believe that copying one's identity is a moral violation, however the current studies provide support for this contention.

The meaning of identity theft was not affected by manipulating the number of copiers. A greater number of copiers was expected to affect participants by affording them the opportunity to re-evaluate the situation so they felt like leaders and by reducing their efficacy to change the situation. No changes in participants' ratings of efficacy or feeling like a leader were observed. I interpret these findings as suggesting that a moral violation is driving participant anger rather than feeling that one can change a situation or how many people are committing that violation.

Overall, previous research suggested that when more than one characteristic is intentionally copied the victims of identity theft react with anger and a desire to confront the thief. Those results were supported via a replication in Experiment 1. The present research suggests that the threat participants perceive in an identity theft event may have less to do with a threat to uniqueness, and more to do with the fact that a moral violation against the self has occurred. Identity theft is threatening, although the reason for this threat appears to be due to the experience of a moral violation against the self. Identity theft was proposed to affect one's ability to display a distinctive public identity to the world. A thief copying multiple aspects of that

identity violates the expectation that one can present a public identity unimpeded, and results in anger and a desire to confront the thief.

Theoretical Implications

The present experiments add to our understanding of identity theft as a psychological phenomenon. As individuals strive to present a unique public identity (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980) and seek validation of that identity (Baumeister, 1986; Brown, 1998; Cooley, 1902/1964, 1964; James, 1890; Jones, 1964; Mead, 1934; Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999) the appropriation of multiple self-characteristics by another person represents an important threat to people's expectation that they have the right to present a public identity without being copied. In effect, individuals faced with identity theft feel they are being treated in a way that is incongruent with their expectations of how others are supposed to react to their identity, and this represents a moral violation (Goffman, 1959). The theft is not threatening personal uniqueness per se; rather the theft upsets people's view that they have a right to present their public identity as they wish and not be copied. The injustice of the situation coupled with the attribution that the thief is intending to harm the self leads to feelings of moral anger. In order to save face, following this intentional act, participants feel the need to confront the thief (Horney, 1982) as a means of managing the impression others have of them. As shown in these experiments, the threat of identity theft is not simply based on the loss of credit or the concern that valued others will view the theft. Instead, the moral violation against

oneself appears to be sufficient to cause moral anger. This line of research adds to theories regarding threats to the self and coping responses. Participants in the present study expressed a desire to manage their identity by confronting the thief. Further research is needed regarding the lengths to which individuals will go to end the copying.

Identity theft research has limited implications for marketers and advertisers. Individuals often copy fashion and styles from television and print media. However, this imitation flips the focus of the copying from the victim to the copier. The present research considered the victims' perspective on being copied. While individuals do copy advertisers of course, the companies selling the style expect consumers to purchase the product (i.e., copy them). Additionally, consumers of media often copy actors, singers, or other famous individuals. Again, popular figures in the media have come to expect followers to copy them. Consideration of the implications for copying the media raises indicates the importance of expectations of being copied. The present studies do not imply that copying is ever expected. If the victim were to expect that the thief will copy them I suggest the situation will not be viewed as a theft and felt anger will be dramatically attenuated.

Limitations

The present experiments were limited in a number of ways. First, the manipulation of an increasing number of self-characteristics that I employed may have confounded number with permanence or importance of those self-characteristics. In previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) and in Experiment 1 of the

present paper, the addition of each self-characteristic followed the pattern of shirt, then shirt and haircut, then shirt, haircut, and personality. The results of both experiments showed that participants reacted favorably when one characteristic (i.e., only the shirt) was copied, but unfavorably when the two (i.e., shirt and haircut) and three characteristics (i.e., shirt, haircut, and personality) were copied. There might be something specific regarding imitation of the shirt that elicits favorable results compared to either the hairstyle or personality alone. The shirt may hold less importance for the individual or may be less permanent than one's hairstyle or personality. Indeed, the proposition that one's personality is more important to one's public identity than a shirt is a reasonable argument. A shirt can reasonably be described as less permanent than either a haircut or personality. Victim of identity theft can change a shirt to regain their unique public identity. However, a haircut or personality may last longer and it may therefore take longer before distinctiveness can be again returned. I am currently conducting two experiments to address the possibility that something other than the number of characteristics is responsible for the results of the present experiments.

In the first experiment I am examining the effects of identity theft for each self-characteristic separately compared to the three characteristics combined. Participants will be randomly assigned to read about the (1) shirt, (2) haircut, (3) personality, or (4) all three characteristics combined being imitated by another. I predict that the increase in the number of characteristics is what changes participants' interpretation of the event from positive to negative. Therefore, I hypothesize that

each characteristic alone will elicit significantly less anger from participants than the three characteristics condition, while each characteristic alone will not differ significantly from one another.

To test whether the number, permanence, or importance of the characteristics copied is the key dimension manipulated in previous identity theft experiments I am conducting a 2 (number: one or three) X 2 (permanence: temporary or permanent) X 2 (importance: low or high) between-subjects experiment. The self-characteristic chosen for this study is a tattoo since a tattoo can be considered a public expression of one's identity. Participants are selected for the study only if they currently do not have a tattoo, but are open to getting a tattoo in the future. Participants are asked to imagine that they have one or three tattoos (manipulation of number of characteristics). Participants are then asked to either list what the tattoo would be and why it is important to them (high importance) or are asked to imagine that they got the tattoo on a whim because all of their friends were getting tattoos (low importance). The copier comments that the tattoo is cool and is later seen by the participant with the same tattoo (or three tattoos in the high number condition). The copier either has a temporary tattoo (low permanence) or a real tattoo (high permanence). Significant main effects for number and permanence of characteristics are predicted, while importance is not expected to significantly affect participant anger. The importance of characteristics has not differed as the number of characteristics copied increased in past experiments. Additionally, the number and permanence of the characteristics copied may prove to interact such that when three

permanent tattoos are copied participants will express the most anger. The results of this experiment will aid in teasing apart aspects of the initial manipulation that may have been confounded.

Second, all of the participants in the research concerning identity theft have been undergraduate students at the University of Kansas. Participants may react to identity theft with anger because their age group is especially concerned with identity formation while older adults might be less concerned with impression management (Erikson, 1956). Additionally, the desire to present a unique public identity could be especially strong in individualistic cultures. Further research is needed to assess if identity theft is similarly a threat to individuals who hold a more collectivistic worldview.

Third, the experiments examining the consequences of identity theft that have been conducted thus far have asked participants to imagine the events occurring rather than actually manipulating the theft in a realistic environment. Although the envisage task has been successful and produced change in the dependent variables, a laboratory study would provide greater support for the proposition that identity theft is threatening. Such an experiment could be ethically possible if the theft is to a lesser degree than those described in the current experiments. For example, a participant may interact with a confederate before an experiment and share information about various attitudes. During the discussion the confederate could disagree with the participant on various opinions. Upon entering the lab the experimenter could ask for opinions about the same topics and the confederate could reverse his/her previous

opinions to match the participant's attitudes. The number of opinions copied can be varied to represent identity theft.

Fourth, the materials used in the present experiments may have been interpreted differently than intended. The manipulations in the present experiments may not have validly manipulated the construct of interest, or the scales may not have been appropriate to detect the constructs as intended. Explicit measures of whether or not participants read the vignette were not included in the present studies since the manipulations were straightforward. The manipulation of future residence of the copier, specifically when the copier was reported to be leaving the country, may have been misconstrued by participants. Participants may have thought that friends have already witnessed the theft before the copier left the country. Participants may have also thought that a friend was the person who relayed that information to the participant. If participants imagined either scenario then this would have hampered the operationalization of the manipulation. The residence of the copier manipulation was meant to manipulate the opportunity for valued others (e.g., friends) to either witness the theft or not. If participants imagined that others have already witnessed it or a friend is the person who told them about the theft this would harm the validity of the manipulation. However, as shown in the mediation analysis (Experiment 1) the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and felt anger is not mediated by concern that others will notice the theft. Future research is needed to examine the possibility that the residence manipulation was interpreted differently than intended.

Future Research

A number of questions remain concerning the phenomenon of identity theft providing many opportunities for future research. For example, individuals feel they have a right to get angry at the intentional wrongdoing of blameworthy others (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Confrontation with a blameworthy other may be socially acceptable after a threat to one's public identity. Past identity theft studies have shown that confrontation is given the strongest endorsement by participants as their most likely response. What happens if confrontation does not stop the thief? For example, the thief could apologize, reject the victim, or lie about stopping while continuing to steal one's self-characteristics. As shown in Experiment 2, acknowledgement by the thief attenuates participant anger, but such acknowledgement does not necessarily mean that the copier intends to stop. If the thief promises to stop copying, will participants feel they have restored their identity?

Additionally, although the current experiments suggest that identity theft is a moral violation, future research is needed to confirm whether this is indeed the case. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that identity theft represents a moral violation to participants. However, the results are correlational in nature thus an experimental manipulation is needed to test this proposition. Indeed, Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) suggest that by manipulating the independent variable and the mediating variable separately in a sequence of experiments one can provide stronger evidence regarding the causal chain of events. To manipulate the moral violation, a non-moral comparison condition should reflect a situation where another person copies the

participant yet the copying is perceived as not intending to harm the participant and legitimate. For example, another person may be copying the participant to play the part of the participant in a play. As suggested by Skitka (2002), one's identity is often shaped and guided by moral mandates (i.e., a clear belief in what is right and wrong). Events that are perceived as illegitimate are often viewed as moral violations. A situation in which the copier has a legitimate reason to copy the participant should be viewed by the participant as not violating a moral belief. If participants are asked to imagine that another person is copying multiple self-characteristics in order to play the participant in a future play or movie role this should attenuate anger.

Conclusion

Identity theft is a threat to one's public identity that has potentially powerful consequences. When another person intentionally appropriates two or more distinctive characteristics of one's identity, participants feel a moral violation has occurred. The emotional response of moral anger is evoked and participants desire to confront the thief. The future residence of the thief and the number of thieves do not affect the moral anger elicited from the moral violation. Acknowledgment by the thief aids in reducing moral anger, although the violation continues to be viewed as illegitimate and harmful to one's identity. The present studies illustrate the importance of the ability to display a unique public identity for the individual's emotions, and the imperative to protect that public identity against theft. Additional research is needed to assess the strategies that people use to manage their impression following identity theft.

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Appendix A: Materials for Experiment 1

Vignettes

Manipulation 1: Number of self-characteristics stolen

One characteristic stolen

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. In effect, Person-A has adopted the same shirt you own.

Two characteristics stolen

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours. In effect, Person-A has adopted the same shirt you own, and a hairstyle similar to yours.

Three characteristics stolen

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants. In addition, Person-A has adopted your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. In effect, Person-A has adopted your appearance, personality, and style.

Manipulation 2: Residence of thief

Foreign Country

You later learn that Person-A is moving next week to a foreign country and will not be moving back.

No mention of leaving the country

Dependent Measures

Positive Emotions

Pleased.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Happy.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Honored.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Flattered.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Anger

Angry.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Disrespected.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Mad.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Anxious

Worried.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Afraid.
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Unique

Unique (distinct).
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Special (one of a kind).

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Hypocrisy

A hypocrite.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

An impostor.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Fake.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Likeability

Friendly.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Likeable.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Warm.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Approachable.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would ask Person-A for advice.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would like Person-A as a coworker.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would like Person-A as a roommate.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would like to be friends with Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Knowledgeable.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Honest

Honest.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Honorable.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Not believable. (Reversed)

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

I would trust Person-A to tell me the truth.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

I would believe what Person-A says.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Person-A is **not** ethical. (Reversed)

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Person-A has integrity.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

A liar.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Reflect negatively on image

Reflecting poorly on me.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Hurting my image.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Person-A is hurting my public image.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

My reputation is hurt because Person-A is copying me.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> | <i>7</i> | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|

Stealing

Stealing my identity.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Stealing part of who I am.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Intention to copy

Intending to copy me.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Purposefully copying me.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Intention to harm

Trying to hurt my public image.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Trying to cause me harm.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Illegitimacy

Justified in her/his actions. (Reversed)

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Unjust.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

The situation is unjust.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

The situation is unfair.

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

I believe that it is legitimate for Person-A to copy me. (Reversed)

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| <i>Strongly Disagree</i> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | <i>Strongly Agree</i> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|

Obligated

Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Person-A has an obligation to admit that I am the originator of the style.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Credit

Other people might think that I am copying Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I am upset that I might not get credit for the image I created.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I am upset about the copying because I spent so much time and energy to create my public image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Notice

My friends would think less of me because Person-A is copying me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

People will think less of me if Person-A copies me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Other people might treat me differently now that Person-A looks like me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I am worried that my friends will think less of me because of Person-A copying me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Uncertain

Like I am in competition for my own image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Like I am no longer the originator of my own image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Uncertain about my own image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Leader

Like a trendsetter.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Like a leader.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Efficacy

I feel I can change the situation.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I could, working by myself change the situation.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Respected

Person-A respects my opinion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I feel that Person-A respects me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Confront

I would tell Person-A to stop copying me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would confront Person-A about copying me.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Avoid

I would tell my friends to not talk to Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would do all I could to avoid Person-A, and convince my friends to do the same.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Befriend

I would try to become friends with Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would talk with Person-A and show support.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Change

I would try to change my clothes and style to be distinct from Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

I would change my appearance to be different from Person-A.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Importance of Characteristics

My clothes are important to how I see myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

My hairstyle is important to how I see myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

My personality is important to how I see myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Strongly Agree*

Appendix B

Zero-Order Correlations between Dependent Measures in Experiment 1.

| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|
| 1. Positive | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2. Anger | -.37* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 3. Anxiety | -.36* | .32* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 4. Unique | .61* | -.27* | -.11 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 5. Hypocritical | -.39* | .62* | .43* | -.10 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 6. Likeable | .60* | -.36* | -.34* | .26* | -.57* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 7. Honest | .50* | -.46* | -.41* | .12 | -.73* | .78* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 8. Reflect on Image | -.22* | .59* | .32* | -.12 | .68* | -.38* | -.53* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 9. Stealing Identity | -.22* | .55* | .30* | -.03 | .73* | -.42* | -.48* | .77* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 10. Intent to Copy | -.23* | .39* | .36* | .00 | .67* | -.55* | -.55* | .51* | .59* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 11. Illegitimate | -.42* | .62* | .38* | -.13 | .69* | -.61* | -.68* | .67* | .64* | .52* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 12. Intent to Harm | -.33* | .60* | .43* | -.18* | .60* | -.33* | -.51* | .70* | .60* | .32* | .58* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- |
| 13. Obligation | .02 | .38* | .12 | .06 | .41* | -.15 | -.26 | .60* | .61* | .36* | .51* | .44* | 1.0 | -- | -- |
| 14. Credit | .02 | .37* | .06 | .04 | .37* | -.13 | -.20* | .61* | .68* | .42* | .45* | .33* | .64* | 1.0 | -- |
| 15. Notice | -.02 | .31* | .20* | -.03 | .36* | -.06 | -.23* | .64* | .51* | .29* | .39* | .45* | .48* | .58* | 1.0 |
| 16. Uncertain | -.17* | .59* | .17* | -.10 | .60* | -.23* | -.33* | .67* | .74* | .45* | .49* | .55* | .49* | .66* | .46* |
| 17. Leader | .70* | -.16* | -.24* | .55* | -.15 | .40* | .33* | .01 | .02 | -.05 | -.18* | -.14 | .19* | .22* | .13 |
| 18. Efficacy | .02 | .31* | .24* | -.00 | .33* | .03 | -.15 | .35* | .28* | .20* | .25* | .38* | .34* | .22* | .30* |
| 19. Respected | .54* | -.41* | -.26* | .25* | -.39* | .56* | .57* | -.30* | -.27* | -.16* | -.54* | -.41* | -.10 | -.09 | -.02 |
| 20. Tell to Stop | -.25* | .50* | .36* | -.09 | .54* | -.35* | -.43* | .60* | .58* | .50* | .62* | .57* | .54* | .44* | .36* |
| 21. Avoid | -.17* | .43* | .30* | -.10 | .49* | -.32* | -.46* | .61* | .53* | .35* | .59* | .56* | .44* | .44* | .54* |
| 22. Befriend | .44* | -.24* | -.26* | .17* | -.42* | .73* | .62* | -.29* | -.33* | -.41* | -.51* | -.22* | -.07 | -.13 | -.05 |
| 23. Change | -.05 | .24* | .08 | -.03 | .30* | -.15 | -.18* | .43* | .39* | .23* | .27* | .39* | .27* | .43* | .39* |
| 24. Shirt | .18* | .20* | -.14 | .25* | .20* | .01 | -.01 | .26* | .32* | .22* | .20* | .11 | .29* | .38* | .20* |
| 25. Hairstyle | .20* | .19* | -.13 | .14 | .09 | .02 | .05 | .22* | .24* | .15 | .19* | .08 | .28* | .30* | .14 |
| 26. Personality | -.10 | .03 | .04 | .16* | .12 | -.27* | -.15 | -.02 | .07 | .23* | .11 | -.02 | -.02 | -.02 | -.10 |

NOTE: * $p < .05$

| Variable | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 |
|----------------------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-----|
| 1. Positive | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2. Anger | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 3. Anxiety | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 4. Unique | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 5. Hypocritical | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 6. Likeable | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 7. Honest | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 8. Reflect on Image | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 9. Stealing Identity | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 10. Intent to Copy | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 11. Illegitimate | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 12. Intent to Harm | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 13. Obligation | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 14. Credit | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 15. Notice | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 16. Uncertain | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 17. Leader | .03 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 18. Efficacy | .26* | .10 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 19. Respected | -.24* | .42* | .10 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 20. Tell to Stop | .48* | -.06 | .42* | -.35* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 21. Avoid | .42* | -.05 | .38* | -.26* | .55* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 22. Befriend | -.18* | .30* | .04 | .49* | -.22* | -.34* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 23. Change | .37* | .02 | .24* | -.15 | .36* | .43* | -.03 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- |
| 24. Shirt | .28* | .32* | .08 | .04 | .21* | .25* | -.05 | .12 | 1.0 | -- | -- |
| 25. Hairstyle | .24* | .24* | .05 | -.01 | .17* | .28* | -.05 | .09 | .77* | 1.0 | -- |
| 26. Personality | .01 | .14 | -.11 | -.08 | .07 | -.08 | -.21* | -.02 | .23* | .24* | 1.0 |

NOTE: * $p < .05$

Appendix C: Materials for Experiment 2

Vignettes

Manipulation 1: Number of thieves

One thief

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants. In addition, Person-A has adopted your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. In effect, Person-A has adopted your appearance, personality, and style.

Sixteen thieves

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants. In addition, Person-A has adopted your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 16 more people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 16 other people have adopted your appearance, personality, and style.

Thirty-two thieves

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants. In addition, Person-A has adopted your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 32 more people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 32 other people have adopted your appearance, personality, and style.

Sixty-four thieves

Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let's call this person "Person-A." Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got

it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants. In addition, Person-A has adopted your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 64 more people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 64 other people have adopted your appearance, personality, and style.

Manipulation 2: Acknowledgement of theft

Acknowledgement when one thief

When asked, Person-A says they copied the style from you. Thus, admitting that you are the originator.

Acknowledgement when more than one thief

When asked, Person-A, and the (16, 32, 64) other people, say they copied the style from you. Thus, admitting that you are the originator.

No mention of Acknowledgement

Appendix D

Zero-Order Correlations between Dependent Measures in Experiment 2.

| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| 1. Positive | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2. Anger | -.53* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 3. Anxiety | -.25* | .35* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 4. Unique | .65* | -.46* | -.14 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 5. Hypocritical | -.26* | .55* | .19* | -.24* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 6. Likeable | .54* | -.44* | -.19* | .42* | -.44* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 7. Honest | .44* | -.50* | .14 | .37* | -.63* | .73* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 8. Reflect on Image | -.21* | .50* | .28* | -.15* | .57* | -.31* | -.42* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 9. Stealing Identity | -.33* | .60* | .24* | -.23* | .62* | -.39* | -.48* | .76* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 10. Intent to Copy | -.02 | .22* | .19* | -.09 | .30* | -.26* | -.23* | .31* | .39* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 11. Illegitimate | -.51* | .64* | .28* | -.39* | .55* | -.61* | -.64* | .57* | .62* | .32* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 12. Intent to Harm | -.27* | .49* | .35* | -.19* | .51* | -.31* | -.40* | .70* | .58* | .16* | .51* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- |
| 13. Obligation | .07 | .28* | .13 | .00 | .26* | .00 | -.13 | .34* | .33* | .22* | .37* | .22* | 1.0 | -- | -- |
| 14. Credit | -.05 | .43* | .05 | -.05 | .32* | -.11 | -.27* | .56* | .59* | .24* | .42* | .34* | .45* | 1.0 | -- |
| 15. Notice | -.04 | .33* | .23* | -.05 | .28* | -.06 | -.17* | .69* | .50* | .11 | .34* | .53* | .29 | .60* | 1.0 |
| 16. Uncertain | -.29* | .61* | .30* | -.34* | .47* | -.33* | -.37* | .55* | .63* | .28* | .52* | .48* | .25* | .49* | .43* |
| 17. Leader | .71* | -.27* | -.17* | .52* | -.08 | .41* | .32* | -.01 | -.09 | .09 | -.31* | -.13 | .19* | .11 | .03 |
| 18. Efficacy | .06 | .06 | .17* | -.02 | .02 | .14 | .03 | .18* | .19* | .10 | .07 | .21* | .25* | .33* | .39* |
| 19. Respected | .50* | -.51* | -.15* | .46* | -.45* | .64* | .68* | -.33* | -.41* | -.19* | -.61* | -.35* | -.16* | -.18* | -.13 |
| 20. Tell to Stop | -.25* | .49* | .22* | -.22* | .48* | -.34* | -.39* | .46* | .52* | .36* | .54* | .44* | .38* | .31* | .22* |
| 21. Avoid | -.21* | .34* | .27* | -.13 | .31* | -.30* | -.35* | .51* | .43* | .20* | .42* | .51* | .28* | .25* | .48* |
| 22. Befriend | .34* | -.35* | -.11 | .19* | -.40* | .70* | .61* | -.29* | -.32* | -.25* | -.51* | -.25* | -.11 | -.19* | -.08 |
| 23. Change | .08 | .21* | .01 | .03 | .12 | .03 | -.03 | .19* | .22* | .08 | .13 | .09 | .10 | .37* | .25* |
| 24. Shirt | .11 | .14 | -.14 | .19* | .06 | .06 | -.06 | .18* | .17* | .13 | .05 | .10 | .17* | .41* | .17* |
| 25. Hairstyle | .09 | .14 | -.03 | .14 | .01 | .07 | -.07 | .19* | .26* | .09 | .13 | .09 | .33* | .50* | .21* |
| 26. Personality | .06 | .06 | .11 | .01 | .04 | .03 | .01 | .01 | .05 | .19* | .01 | -.04 | .05 | .03 | -.07 |

NOTE: * $p < .05$

| Variable | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 |
|----------------------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|
| 1. Positive | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2. Anger | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 3. Anxiety | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 4. Unique | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 5. Hypocritical | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 6. Likeable | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 7. Honest | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 8. Reflect on Image | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 9. Stealing Identity | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 10. Intent to Copy | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 11. Illegitimate | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 12. Intent to Harm | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 13. Obligation | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 14. Credit | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 15. Notice | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 16. Uncertain | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 17. Leader | -.12 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 18. Efficacy | .14* | .12 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 19. Respected | -.43* | .44* | .07 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 20. Tell to Stop | .42* | -.05 | .15* | -.36* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 21. Avoid | .28* | -.14 | .15* | -.33* | .36* | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 22. Befriend | -.26* | .24* | .12 | .51* | -.27* | -.46 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 23. Change | .31* | .13 | .22* | -.06 | .15* | .01 | .03 | 1.0 | -- | -- | -- |
| 24. Shirt | .14 | .19* | .12 | -.01 | .16* | .19* | -.12 | .18* | 1.0 | -- | -- |
| 25. Hairstyle | .21* | .20* | .25* | .02 | .16* | .15* | -.09 | .28* | .61* | 1.0 | -- |
| 26. Personality | .14 | .10 | .06 | -.01 | .12 | -.07 | .00 | -.05 | .15* | .14 | 1.0 |

NOTE: * $p < .05$