

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COVERT ACTION AND SECRET
DETENTION:
THE PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF LEGITIMACY AND GOVERNMENT
DECISION MAKING
BY
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Submitted to the graduate degree program in Psychology
and Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master's of Arts

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Date defended: April 21, 2009

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Date approved: April 28, 2009

Abstract

Governments are driven by a desire by to maintain their legitimacy, and so must take public perception into account in its decision making. We present four studies using the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) to explain why public perception matters to the government. Following our hypotheses that the public is motivated to have a consistent view of countries, governments, and people that it sees as related, we present evidence in our first study that the public links its perceptions of foreign governments to their alliance with the United States. The second study shows that manipulating the perceived level of democracy in Iran can affectively change the perception of its alliance with the United States. Likewise manipulating Iran's perceived level of alliance with the United States can affectively change the perceived level of democracy in Iran. As Iran's democracy increases so does its alliance and vice versa. The next two studies show that these public perceptions are linked to government action. We provide evidence that the United States is motivated by public perception in its decisions to use military force against other nations and in its detention of combatants in the “war on terror.” The third study shows that when aggressing against other nations the United States uses covert actions at a greater rate against democracies than non-democracies. Likewise, the study shows that combatants from democracies apprehended in the “war on terror” are more likely to be subjected to extraordinary rendition than those apprehended from

non-democracies. Both these studies are used as evidence of the government's desire to hide actions that the public would perceive as illegitimate.

The ability of a government to act and have its actions supported and followed by its public is a result of that government's legitimacy. The ancients Greeks addressed the conditions in which governments could wield power and the consequences that followed (see Zelditch, 2001). Most political theorists recognize governmental power as coming from one of two sources: coercion or legitimacy.

Coercion involves forcing ones will upon another through the use of superior strength. The difference in strength allows the stronger to shape the behaviors of the weaker. Coercion is usually associated with authoritarian states where, the government is able to enforce its policies upon the populace through the use of superior force. Governing through force has disadvantages: it is costly, has limited influence, and can lead to instability. Taking these disadvantages into account, it is in the best interest of authorities to convince the public of their legitimacy.

Legitimacy of a government follows when the public believes that government actions and decisions ought to be followed, not through the use of government force, but because they are right and appropriate. By convincing the public of their legitimacy, governments can increase compliance while decreasing the amount of resources necessary for such compliance. Legitimacy is so important to effective governance that scholars on the subject have even advanced the claim that, "Every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy" (Zelditch & Walker, 2003).

The question then becomes, how are some governments able to convince the public that their authority is legitimate? One way a government can build its

legitimacy is by allowing the public to be represented in the decision making process. In this way the public comes to perceive that they have some control over or voice in the outcomes of governance. The perceived participation in governing by the public leads to an increased adherence to the decisions of that government and a belief in its legitimacy; democratic forms of government obtain legitimacy in this way (Lipset, 1959; Buchanan, 2002).

Public participation in the governing process is not the only way in which governments can and have attempted to develop legitimacy. “Legitimizing myths” (Sidanius & Pratto 1999) are another way in which authorities and political institutions attempt to garner public support for their actions; the belief in “divine right” or the right of kings to rule based on “God’s will” is an example of such myths used to increase public support for a ruler. Still, an election is one of the best ways to increase legitimacy through the process of elections and some will even go as far as to hold fake elections in an attempt to legitimize their rule. For example, Saddam Hussein held an “election” as late as October, 2002, in which he garnered 100% of the vote (BBC News, 2002).

Governments are willing to go to extensive lengths to convince the public of their legitimacy, and they are also motivated to act in ways that will *Maintain* that legitimacy. Democracies engender legitimacy by creating the perception of citizen participation (Lipset, 1959), but even in democracies it is not feasible to have citizens vote or be represented in every decision that the government makes. One way in which governments can maintain their legitimacy without holding votes for every

action is by convincing the public of the procedural fairness of justice behind their actions (Tyler, 1994). Individuals look for fairness in the decision making procedures of authorities, especially when they do not have a direction hand in those procedures, this fairness comes to be equated with the authority's legitimacy. The public comes to see government actions as legitimate as long as they perceive the process leading to those actions to be fair. Even groups negatively affected by government action will continue to see those actions as legitimate if they perceive that the process was fair (Tyler, 1994). If judgments of fairness lead to legitimacy, the question becomes how perceived fairness comes about. Theories in social psychology concerning the formation of perceptions provide some answers.

Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy

The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) provides an explanation on how the public comes to perceive and maintain the perception of a government's legitimacy. The theory is builds upon the social perception work of Fritz Heider and his theories on balance and attribution. Crandall and Beasley apply these ideas to legitimacy; showing that the legitimacy of governments and leaders has its foundation in the perceptual process. Their theory uses three main principles to illustrate how legitimacy is developed:

Principle 1. *Perception is motivated to create structural balance, clarity, and affective uniformity.*

Principle 2. *Attributions of controllability create a perceptual “unit relationship.”*

Principle 3. *People should have outcomes consistent with their “moral value”*

Balance is a classic in social psychology and is summarized by Crandall and Beasley in their paper on political legitimacy:

“people prefer affective consistency among the various elements that are related to each other. People are motivated to have a coherent emotional representation of people and objects, and the simultaneous presence of conflicting positive and negative relations among elements is disconcerting and unwanted” (Crandall and Beasley, 2001, pp. 78).

In other words people are motivated to perceive elements that are related in a consistent manner and to have them acted upon in accordance to this perception. In this way, “People and governments have a moral value that people can perceive; they see in a person, in a nation, or in an action a degree of good and bad that is equivalent to legitimacy”(Crandall & Beasley, 2001, pp. 78). This theory can be applied to public perception of governments and their actions; citizens of a given country are motivated to have a positive view of their nation and its actions. When there is an inconsistency between the government and its actions the legitimacy of those two elements comes into question.

The implications of this theory can also be used to understand public perception of foreign countries. United States citizens are motivated by balance to have a positive view of democracy because in democracies the act of voting creates a unit relationship between the public and the government. Balancing then leads individuals to view democracy as “good” or the right and legitimate form of

governance and to view other countries with democratic regimes as good and legitimate. Predictions based on balance hold that countries perceived to be allied with the United States will be viewed positively and this perception will lead them to be perceived as more democratic, another positive trait.

When countries are perceived as allies, there is a motivation to view them and their political system as all positive or all negative. Thus, being an ally with the United States, a positive trait, is consistent with being more democratic, a positive trait. When no ally status is perceived there is no motivation toward balance. Balance, however, is a two way-street in which perception can be motivated from either end; people can know that a country is democratic and thus perceive it to be an ally of the United States or know that it is an ally of the United States and thus perceive it to be more democratic. These public perceptions of foreign countries dictate what sort of foreign policy actions will be perceived as legitimate. Following the third principle of the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy these countries should have outcomes that are consistent with their perceived moral value; the United States should not enact foreign policy detrimental to positive, good, democratic nations.

Democratic Peace

“Democratic peace theory” is based on the observation that democratic nations never or very rarely come into armed conflict with one another. Immanuel Kant, in *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795), wrote that constitutional republics are the main condition for perpetual peace because a majority of people would never vote to go to war, unless in self-defense. Kant’s theory points to the idea that it is the mass

public that drives the phenomenon; support for war must come from the people. The first empirical work on the theory was not conducted until 1964 (Babst, 1964), which produced statistical support for the theory. The idea gained widespread attention with the work of Singer and Small (1976) in *The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965*, which found only marginal support for the hypothesis but spurred much research. Since then the theory has become one of most researched in the field of political science. Maoz and Russett (1993) define the phenomenon this way,

“(1) democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as non-democracies; and (2) over the last two centuries, democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent or potentially violent conflict and (by some reasonable criteria) have virtually never fought one another in a full-scale international war. (pp 624)”

The theory has received much empirical support since the work of Singer and Small and is even considered by some in the field; “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1989, pp. 270). Democratic peace is usually explained in political science or international relations in one of two separate ways: theories that focus on the *structure* of democratic institutions or ones that rely on the *normative influence* of democracy to encourage peaceful negotiations in international relations.

Structural Explanations

Structural explanations for democratic peace hold that democratic nations by their nature are set up to contain a system of checks and balances. In democracies the

mobilization to war is a difficult task involving many steps (Hermann & Kegley, 1995). Not only is it necessary to obtain the support of the nation's leader, but the various other institutions of government must also be brought together in support of war. In the United States this would have to include the both houses of congress, as they are the governing bodies with the right to declare war. These constraints make it more difficult for two democracies to end up in conflict because of the multitude of steps required for both states to decide upon war. States with authoritarian regimes, however, do not experience such constraining factors and can be mobilized for war in some circumstances on the decision of one individual. Hermann and Kegley (1995) explain the structural explanations this way:

“Explanations centering around institutional constraints assume that democratic leaders have a need to enlist widespread support before engaging in large-scale violence which, in turn, slows down and reduces the likelihood of such decisions (pp. 514).”

Normative Explanations

A second approach to explaining democratic peace used by political scientists relies on the normative influence of a nation's political system. Adherents to the normative model of democratic peace argue that in democracies, a norm of peaceful political competition arises in which conflicts are settled through negotiation and compromise rather than the elimination of opponents (Weart 1998). This norm of peaceful resolution is then applied by democratic countries and their leaders to the

realm of international conduct. Maoz and Russett (1993) contend that the normative model is based on two assumptions:

1. States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions." Democratic states develop a norm of cooperation and negotiation through institutional practices, while non-democracies do not develop such a norm.
2. The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former (Maoz & Russett, 1993, pp 625).

The implication for the second assumption is that when two democracies come into conflict the norm of peaceful resolution will hold, however when democracies come into non-democracies it is the norms of the non-democracies that will predominate the conflict resolution. Non-democracies instead are accustomed to competition and conflict in which the goal is the elimination of the opponent. If this norm indeed comes to dominate the conflict between to countries then there is a much greater probability of violent conflict.

Theorists of democratic peace have argued whether this normative influence in democracies lies at the level of people or with the leaders of the country. Kegley and Hermann (1995) have pointed out that studies often have a hard time finding a direct correlation between public opinion and foreign policy choice and in the short run; leaders seem highly inattentive to public pressure. A decision to go war,

however, are not always made in the short run and indeed as the structural model argues, democracies are set up to avoid quick war-making decisions. It may be possible that mass opinion does influence the decisions of policy makers on whether or not to go to war, and social psychology may provide a theoretical basis for this. In this paper I use the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, I argue that public opinion does matter in the decision making process leading to violent international conflict.

The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy's explanation democratic peace is based on the simple ideological principle related to balance. Crandall and Beasley (2001) state the principle as "bad people deserve bad treatment (and good people deserve good treatment)(pp.79)." This simple balancing of moral affect and treatment or outcome is used everyday and as the authors point out are the underpinnings to ideas about justice and deservingness. People like to see another's actions as consistent with their treatment; good behavior warrants good treatment and those who misbehave should be subject to punishment. The motivation toward structural balance and this moral principle provide the basis for understanding the mechanisms of democratic peace. Individuals in democratic countries view democracy as good and perceive that countries with democratic political systems as related. Seeking balance between two related entities these individuals come to perceive other democratic countries as good. Following the principles of deservingness, good countries are entitled to good treatment and thus should not be aggressed against. In this way balance produces the normative influence that constrains democracies from engaging in violent conflict with one another. The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy is a naïve

theory and speaks to perceptions of the public, who are constrained from holding a nuanced view of foreign policy and relations. Elites, on the other hand, are more able to hold a nuanced view of foreign relations and tolerate imbalance and dissonance. The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy does not apply directly to elite perceptions, with the exception that elites are aware of the mass opinion structure.

I report here four studies meant to illustrate balance in the public's perception and the government's enactment of foreign policy. The first two studies examine balance in the public's perception of foreign governments and the United States, while the second two studies show how public perception is motivating government action. To establish balance acting on public perception I will measure their perceptions of foreign governments and those government's relations to the United States. Next I will seek to establish the bidirectional relationship in perception produced by the motivation toward consistency; a manipulation of a country's democracy will change its perceived alliance with the United States, and manipulating a country's alliance will alter the country's perceived level of democracy. The final two studies link the public's perceptions to government action and provide examples of United States foreign policy decisions motivated by public perception.

Study 1: Perceptions of United Nations

The first study sought to establish the public's use of balance in forming their perceptions of foreign countries. Because democracy is seen as "good" and the USA is a democracy, then any nation that is in a significant relationship with the USA

should also be “good.” I hypothesize that allies of the USA will be perceived to be democracies, or that a country’s perceived level of democracy would be positively related to its perceived level of alliance with the United States. Causation in these perceptions will go in both directions, and so I predict a correlation between perceived alliance with the USA and perceived level of democracy among the nations of the world.

Method

Participants. Data were collected from 350 participants in an undergraduate general psychology course at the University of Kansas in the spring of 2007. Participants received extra credit toward their course grade for agreeing to participate. Only self-identifying U.S. citizens were included in the final sample. Participants were told they would be filling out a questionnaire regarding their perceptions of several different foreign countries within the United Nations.

Questionnaire. Each participant received at random a one-page questionnaire consisting of five or six member nations within the United Nations grouped at random. Member nations were grouped by random assignment to produce 33 different questionnaires. The questionnaires provided some brief innocuous information for each target nation these items included: Location, capital, population, language, gross domestic product, and main export commodities. Information for each category was obtained through use of the CIA’s world fact book website; in all 190 of the 192 member nations were rated.¹

After having read the brief information concerning the target nation, participants were prompted to answer four questions assessing their perceptions of each target nation: How important is this country on the world stage, how similar is this country to the United States, how democratic is this country, and what level of relation does this country hold with the United States. Participants then completed two items examining their perceptions of the United States: “The United States is the greatest nation in the world,” and “how democratic is the United States government?” (see Appendix for sample questionnaire). The various response variables were then correlated with each other to see to what degree they were related.

Results and Discussion

Correlating the perceptions of democracy and alliance with the United States a positive relationship was found $r=.23, p< .001 n=190$ (see Figure 1). Because Iraq was a statistical outlier and because its relations with the USA were complex during the time of data collection, we removed it from analysis, resulting in a correlation of $r=.26, p<.001 n=189$.

Participants who viewed a nation as allied with the U.S. were also saw that nation as more democratic. The positive correlations support the hypothesis that as perceived levels of either democracy or alliance increases so does the other so as to maintain a balanced state. Along with the democracy and ally variables, the correlations between several other variables were examined. Correlations between a target nation’s perceived level of similarity and alliance with the United States $r=.63, n=190$ and target nation’s perceived importance and alliance with the United States

$r=.24$, $n=190$. There was also a correlation between a target nation's perceived importance and similarity to the United States $r=.69$, $n=190$ (see Table 1). All these findings offer good support to the idea that individuals show consistency when forming their perceptions of foreign governments and global relationships.

In addition we examined the within country correlations to see if our observed effects were due to differences in nations and not just differences within participants. The mean and median correlations were found to be negligible $r=-.02$ and $r=-.03$ respectively; suggesting that the perceptions were stemming from differences in nations differences within people.

Taken together these findings express support for the idea that the public seeks consistency in its perceptions of foreign nations. Perceptions of democracy and alliance with the United States are significantly correlated and this is probably due to the motivation of people to seek consistency in elements they see as related. In this case the public sees democracy and the United States as good and so they desire to see our allies as also democratic. It is possible that these perceptions are actually just observations of reality and that the public is not using balance to form its perceptions of foreign countries but just reporting the observed reality. One way to attempt to measure the degree to which our findings are due reality would be to catalogue the actual level of alliance and democracy of foreign nations and then compare those correlations to the ones we obtained. We do not have a data set that measures the actual alliance between the United States and foreign countries so we instead attempted to support our contention in a second study. The second study manipulated

the participant's perceptions in this way our manipulation could get away from reality and see if participants still displayed consistency in their perceptions.

Studies 2A & 2B: Perceptions of Ally Status and Perceptions of Democracy

Study 2 seeks to manipulate perceptions of democracy and level of alliance to determine causality. Theories of balance hold causality should be bidirectional; manipulating democracy should cause a change in perceptions of alliance and manipulating alliance should cause a change in perceptions of democracy. To test both directions of causality, we split this study into two parts. In Study 2A Perceptions of Ally Status, we manipulated the level of democracy in Iran and hypothesized that increasing the level of democracy would cause the participant's perceptions of the level of alliance between the United States and Iran to increase as well. In Study 2B Perceptions of Democracy we manipulated the level of alliance between the United States and Iran and hypothesized that increasing the level of alliance would cause an increase the participant's perception of the level of democracy in Iran compared to when the nation is not viewed as the United States ally.

Method

Participants. Participants were randomly assigned to take part in one of two studies. The first "perception of democracy by ally status" Study 2A consisted of 49 participants, 23 female and 26 male, with a mean age of 20 years. The second "perceptions of ally status by democracy" Study 2B consisted of 57 participants, 26 female, 30 male, and 1 not reporting gender, with a mean age of 21 years. Participants

for both samples were recruited from a general psychology course and received partial course credit for participating in the study. Participants in both sections were told they would be filling out a questionnaire about American society and foreign relations and that the survey would take no more than ten minutes of their time.

Questionnaire. The study was broken into two distinct parts which both sought to examine the relationship between a target nation's perceived alliance with the United States and its perceived level of democracy. The first portion of the questionnaire remained the same across the two sections. Participants first filled out some brief demographic questions concerning their gender, citizenship status, and age. Four participants who were not U.S. citizens were excluded from study 2A, but none from study 2B.

Immediately following the demographic questions participants were asked to answer four questions meant to assess their degree of previous knowledge in the subject area. The study manipulated knowledge of Iran so all three questions dealt with information regarding that country. Two questions were fill-in-the-blank format asking "The language spoken in Iran is" and "The Islamic Republic of Iran was formed in what year?" The third and fourth questions were both multiple choice. The third asked, "The word 'mullah' is best translated as" with the optional answers; a leader, dictator, priest, or general. Priest was the options scored as correct. The fourth questions asked, "Which of the following countries does NOT share a border with Iran" and the multiple choice options; Afghanistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, or Turkey. The correct answer was Kazakhstan. Any participant who correctly answered

all four questions was excluded from our final sample to avoid a failure of the manipulation based on prior knowledge in the area. No participants were excluded from study 2A for this reason; however, three participants were excluded from study 2B. Having completed the previous knowledge items, all participants were then presented with the manipulation item, a vignette titled “History of Iran.”

Study 2A vignette. Participants receiving this form of the study were randomly assigned to read a vignette containing one of two supposed histories of Iran. The vignettes were broken up into two conditions; “Democracy during the 70’s” condition, or “Democracy during the 80’s”. The democracy during the 70’s condition read that during the 1970’s the country of Iran saw a flourishing of democracy, but a downward trend toward tyrant-driven theocracy during the 1980’s. In the ”Democracy during the 80’s” condition, they were told that a theocracy existed during the 70’s, and democracy began to flourish in the 80’s. The two forms were designed for counterbalancing, but they also allowed the results to be compared to Iran’s actual history.

Study 2B vignette. Participants in this section again read a vignette very similar to the materials for Study 2A, but instead of describing democracy in Iran, the vignettes described their status as a US ally (or not). Iran was described as either a US ally during the 70’s, or as a US ally during the 80’s. In this section they either read the 70’s condition with a history that stated Iran and the United States saw an increase in friendly relations during the 1970’s only to have those relations sour dramatically during the 1980’s, or the ally during the 80’s condition where Iran and the United

States experienced starkly sour relations with each other during the 70's but saw marked improvement in those relations during the 80's. Again, the counterbalancing allowed for a comparison between the responses to the historically correct information and the incorrect vignette. Participants were then informed that a lot of time has elapsed since the 1980's and that the country is going through many political changes but still remains an important nation on the world stage.

After reading a vignette, participants received the final questionnaire to complete. The heading of each section of questions reminded participants as to which condition they were in and prompted the questions to follow. The headings for study 2A democracy during the 80's condition read, "Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1970's, when the country was presided over by an unelected mullah." A second section directly under the first prompted participants to answer questions about Iran in the 80's when it was a democracy. The reverse was used in the democracy during the 70's condition and the same headings were used for the two conditions study 2B only participants were reminded of whether Iran was an ally as opposed to democracy. Each section then contained seven questions meant to assess participant's perceptions of either Iran's level of alliance with the U.S. or democracy during the two separate time spans: "How much of an ally was Iran to the United States, how similar is the Iranian government to the US government, how well does the head to the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people, how responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian people, from what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy,

how corrupt do you think the government of Iran is, and does Iran sound like a place that you might like to live (see Appendices for questionnaires)." All participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time.

Results and Discussion

The Study 2A "Perceptions of Ally Status" led participants to view Iran as democratic in the 1970's and theocratic during the 80's in democracy during the 70's condition, while the democracy during the 80's condition reversed the order with participants viewing Iran as theocratic in the 70's with a shift to democracy in the 80's. Participant's perception of the level of alliance between Iran and the United States was then measured from the participant's answer to the 1-4 Likert type question on perceived alliance; how much of an ally was Iran to the United States, a major ally, a partial ally, a very limited ally, or no ally at all, with a major ally being scored 4.

When participants were led to believe that Iran was democracy in the 70's and theocracy in the 80's they perceived the level of alliance to change accordingly M= 3.03 in the 70's and M=2.45 in the 80's. Likewise in the democracy during the 80's condition where participants saw Iran as a theocracy in the 70's and democracy in the 80's they again perceived the level of alliance change to be consistent with level of democracy, M=2.37 during the 70's and M=3.15 in the 80's. The resulting interaction was significant $F(1,56)=20.75, p<.001$ (see Figure 2) and supports the hypothesis that viewing Iran as democratic leads participants to also view it as more allied with the United States.

Study 2B "Perceptions of Democracy" manipulated participant's view of Iran as either an ally or adversary of the United States. This time the outcome of interest was perceived level of democracy in Iran and this variable was measured by creating a democracy scale from the answers to the questionnaire items: "How democratic is the Iranian government?", "How similar is the Iranian government to the US government?", "How well does the head of the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people?", and "How responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of the Iranian people?" The four items in the scale hung together well $\alpha=.84$ in both conditions. In the ally condition, participants were informed that the United States and Iran were allies in the 70's but not in the 80's. In this condition participants perceived the level of democracy in Iran to change in order to be consistent with its level of alliance, $M=4.67$ in the 70's and $M=4.08$ in the 80's. When the level of alliance was reversed and Iran was said to be the United States' adversary in the 70's and its ally in the 80's, the participants' perceptions of Iran's democracy also changed, $M=3.85$ in the 70's and $M=4.70$ in the 80's. Again a significant interaction was observed $F(1,47)=10.45, p<.01$ (see Figure 3), supporting the hypothesis that perceiving a country as allied with the United States will cause participants to view that country as more democratic.

Both of these results provide evidence in support of the idea that balance is a powerful motivating factor in individual's foreign policy perceptions and decision making. Individuals desire balance in the relations they see in the world and this includes politics. Americans seek to understand the world in a way that allows them

to continue to have a positive view of themselves and their country and balance is the mechanism through which they hold on to that view. Many Americans do not hold a nuanced view of world politics and balance provides an easy cognitive solution for perceiving foreign countries which allows people to hold on to their own positive view of themselves and their country; if a country is America's ally, it must also be democratic like America and likewise if a country is democratic like America, it is most likely going to be its ally. For a majority of the public, balance enables an understanding the world politics with greater speed and ease. They do not have to waste cognitive resources on matters of which they do not have much knowledge. Elites, however, need not rely on simple balance to guide their perceptions of politics; having a more nuanced and knowledgeable view of world politics they are able hold views that are not in a state of balance. While able to hold a more nuanced view of world politics, these elites must still grapple with public perceptions, and the elite's awareness of mass opinion guides their actions.

Study 3: Democracies and Covert Action

Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that the desire for balance is determining the public's perceptions of foreign countries. Study 3 seeks to provide evidence that government authorities take these public perceptions into account when making foreign policy decisions. To do that, I looked at governmental actions that make the best sense if understood as being guided by concerns about public opinion.

Democratic peace theory provides evidence of that government does take public perception into account when making decision about which countries to

aggress against. In case of democratic peace, however, competing theories exist in political science which claims to explain the phenomenon's existence. What the competing theories cannot account for is that democracies do aggress against one another in covert interventions. The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, on the other hand, predicts that the government is constrained by public perceptions from overtly aggressing against democracies, so to the extent that democracies desire to aggress against other democracies they will do so covertly. Following the theory, United States citizens view democracy as good, people in democracies are in unit relationship with their governments, so people in democracies are good. Finally war is bad, so war against democracies is inconsistent previous statements and thus illegitimate. To study this we need to examine the incidence of overt and covert actions by the United States to determine if there is a difference in the level of democracy of the nations target by those actions. Our hypothesis is that: The United States engages in overt militarized international disputes or international war at a significantly greater rate against non-democracies than against democracies and when the United States uses force against democracies, it will use *covert* force at greater rate than against non-democracies.

Method

Participants. This study used an archival data analysis method where events of United States aggression toward foreign nations became the participants. Using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005) every nation state with a population greater than 500,000 was included in the study.

Measuring Democracy

The Polity IV dataset, developed by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989) contains information concerning the governing system of the different nations from 1800 through 2006. Each year represents a different data point; in this way a nation such as the United States has 206 separate data points representing its governance. Data points from 1950 to 2000 were used because following World War II the world saw a flourishing of democratic states and this allowed for a large enough sample from which to make comparisons. The data set gave scores for each nation's level of *democracy* and *autocracy*, which are on a 0-10 scale. Each nation's autocracy score is then subtracted from its democracy score to give the nation's "true democracy" score which could range from -10 to 10, with +10 being the highest level of democracy.

Measuring Overt Military Operations

A second dataset, the Correlates of War Project (Ghoson & Palmer, 2003) was used to examine all of the countries which have been involved in overt Militarized Interstate Disputes with the United States for the same time period above 1950-2000. The dataset listed all of the countries taking part in the dispute and the hostility level reached in this dispute. Hostility level ranged from 1, no militarized dispute, to 5, open war. Only disputes rated 2 (threat of force) and higher were included in the analysis; this is a conservative estimate that errs on the side of the null hypothesis because it includes minor acts of aggression that the general public are less likely to pay attention to. The low level acts of aggression were included, however, as a match the covert actions which often fall far short of full-scale war. These two dataset

allowed a comparison of the rates at which the United States engages in overt militarized disputes with non-democracies versus other democracies.

Measuring Covert Military Operations

In the final comparison we sought to make was between the frequencies that the United States uses covert interventions in non-democracies versus other democracies. No reliable dataset was found that listed covert interventions taken by the United States against foreign nations, so the researchers set about to create a list of such occasions. To generate such a list archival research was conducted through the use of history books concerning the CIA and United States interventions. Most research materials were obtained through the University of Kansas Library and a listed is provided in the appendix. To be considered a reliable intervention each action was to be considered a true intervention by at least three separate sources and needed to achieve a level of action higher than simple threats of forces; the action needed to be in fact some form of action to be considered. To be considered covert these actions were compared against the MID's from the Correlates of War Project to be sure of no overlap.

In addition, these covert actions were independently examined in contemporaneous news articles by a pair of research assistants. These research assistants looked at news articles relating to such actions anywhere from the time the supposed action took place up to a year after such action in New York Times and Washington Post (two of the main newspapers of note in the United States). The research assistant then rated the level of "covertness" of each action based on whether

the action was mentioned at all in the newspapers and if so was mentioned as a United States action and did the government take responsibility for said action. Actions in which the United States claimed responsibility for at the time of the action were excluded. This left 29 cases of covert intervention in which the United States was engaged. Again, the rate at which the United States used covert intervention against non-democracies was compared to the rate it used such interventions against democracies and these two scores were then compared to the rates of overt militarized disputes against non-democracies and democracies.

Results

To control for the fact that some countries had multiple observations a dummy variable was created for each country and removed the direct effect of its direct effect. The model was statistically significant $F(1,202)=32.67, p<.001 \eta^2=.26$ even when controlling for the effect of country $F(1,48)=5.41, p<.001$. The United States used covert force at a greater rate against democracies than against non-democracies and used overt force at a greater rate against non-democracies than democracies $\chi^2(1df) =24.56, p<.000001$ (see Table 2). When aggressing against democracies the United States used covert action 33% of time, while it used covert action just 5% of the time it aggressed against non-democracies. Alternatively, the United States used overt actions 95% of the time when aggressing against non-democracies compared to just 67% of the time we aggressed against democracies.

Another way of looking at the results is by comparing the mean amount of democracy targets of aggression had in covert versus overt operations. The target

nations of overt aggression had a mean level of democracy of -6.08, while the mean level of democracy for targets of covert aggression was -.05 (see Figure 4).

Both of these results provide strong evidence for our claim that public perceptions motivate the foreign policy decision making of leaders in a democracy. Leaders of democracies covertly aggress against other democracies at a greater rate than non-democracies; the desire to have their actions viewed as legitimate motivates the government to hide actions that the public would find inconsistent or out of balance with their perceptions of foreign countries. The government only needs to hide the actions from its own citizenry as this is the group that supplies the government's legitimacy. A covert action allows the government to aggress against other democracies while their citizens are unaware and thus allows such actions to take place without negatively affecting its perceived legitimacy.

Study 4: Democracy and Detention in the “War on Terror”

Is there a difference in the allocation of detainees in the “war on terror?” The United States government has used two options (of course, they had more, but they tended to pursue only these two) to deal with high value prisoners from the “war on terror,” they could either be sent to the United States detention center at Guantanamo Bay or they can be subjected to “extraordinary rendition,” a process where they are turned over to a foreign nation to be interrogated.

I suggest that the public would not support sending detainees from democracies to Guantanamo Bay for “enhanced interrogation.” For these detainees the United States government will be motivated to hide their interrogation and

detention by having them extraordinarily rendered. Our hypotheses in this study are:

Suspects, who are citizens of a *democracy*, are more likely to be subjected to extraordinary rendition than sent to Guantanamo Bay, and suspects from non-democracies will not see this increased likelihood of extraordinary rendition.

Method

Participants: Participants in this study were in a very real sense unwilling participants-detainees picked up by the United States in its “war on terror.” The detainees consisted of two separate groups for comparison and were obtained through two separated sources.

The first group of detainees was those being held at the United States detention camp at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the island of Cuba. Information concerning these detainees was obtained through a *United States Department of Defense* document procured off of their website (U.S. D.O.D., 2006). This list provided the names of 759 individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay and also provided the detainee’s country of citizenship.

The second group of detainees being examined was those which the United States government had decided to detain through the process of extraordinary rendition. Because extraordinary rendition is a covert operation, the U.S. Government does not provide online lists of those rendered. Instead, a list of these detainees was obtained through an online article published by Mother Jones (Mother Jones, 2008) which was extensively researched through sources such as Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights Watch. This list named 53

individuals who had been extraordinarily rendered from 2001-2006 the same time span as those held at Guantanamo. The list also provided the detainee's country of citizenship, where they were rendered from and to, and the dates of the rendition. The key variable in both lists for the purpose of this study was the detainee's nation of citizenship.

Again, as in Study 3, I sought to compare the rates at which detainees from non-democracies versus democracy were either sent to Guantanamo or extraordinarily rendered. To determine the level of democracy in the detainee's countries of citizenship ship we again used the Polity IV dataset and determined a "true democracy" score for that country as we did in Study 3. Countries with democracy scores above 0 were treated as democracies and all others were treated as non-democracies.

Results and Discussion

Detainees from democracies made up just 10% of those in Guantanamo Bay but made up 35% of the detainee population that was extraordinarily rendered $t(250)=5.96, p<.001, \eta^2=.35$ (see Figure 5). Another possible explanation of these findings could be that the data we obtained was possibly biased in favor of under reporting the number of individuals from non-democracies who were extraordinarily rendered. To address this possibility we ran a pseudo file draw test to see how many detainees from non-democracies would have had to gone unreported in our data set for our findings not to have achieved statistical significance at $p=.05$. Adding in fabricated detainees from non-democracies to our data it was determined that an

additional 62 detainees would be necessary for the results not to achieve significance. This would nearly triple the amount of individuals from non-democracies that were included in the original analysis suggesting that a biased sample is not driving our findings. Also, it is unlikely that 100% of the detainees our data set might miss would be from non-democracies adding to the likelihood that our model is picking up a real phenomenon.

These results provide yet another example of government's motivation to act in accordance with public perceptions. The United States government was motivated to "hide" its detainees from democracy by subjecting them to extraordinary rendition rather than processing them in its own detention center where they are more visible to the public and subject to our legal system. The public would see the enhanced interrogation of detainees from democracies as illegitimate and not support the technique's use, therefore the government attempted to hide such actions. Enhanced interrogation of detainees from non-democracies carried with it no such detriment to perceived legitimacy and could therefore be carried out in our own detention center.

Discussion

The four studies presented here provide strong evidence that balance is at work in the public's perception of foreign policy and that this perception drives government action. Studies 1, 2A, and 2B all supported our hypothesis that the public is motivated by a need for balance when it constructs its perceptions of foreign nations and that this balancing is a bidirectional process. In the first study a positive relationship between perceptions of foreign country's level of democracy and their

level of alliance were found suggesting that they were motivated to have a consistent positive view of countries they perceived as tied to the United States. In this way they bestowed democracy on the United States allies and alliance on democracies. Our second study looked to manipulate both perceived democracy and level of alliance to show bidirectional causality. The findings supported our hypothesis; when participants were lead to believe Iran was a democracy they saw as more of a United States ally, and when we lead them to believe that a strong alliance existed between the two countries they perceived Iran as having an increase level of democracy.

Studies 3 and 4 both provided evidence that the government may be taking public perception into account when crafting its foreign policy action. Study 3 three showed that the United States government used covert military actions at a greater rate against democracies than non-democracies. Study 4 showed that detainees from democracies were more likely to be extraordinarily rendered and sent to secret prisons than were citizens of non-democracies. Both these studies point to the fact that the government appears to be hiding negative treatment of other democracies and their citizens. This hiding appears to be motivated by a desire to appease public perception which would find such acts illegitimate.

Although the evidence provided here appears to back up the contention that public perception is driving government action, it could be that this is not the process taking place. It is possible that government action is actually driving the public's perception and thus not taking the public's a priori perception into account before it acts. The observation that the government appears to be "hiding" some of its actions

through covert aggression and secret detention, however, would seem to support the idea that the government is motivated by the public and the desire to maintain its legitimacy in the public eye. This leads it to act toward foreign nations in ways that the public will view as in balance with their perceptions, and when these actions will be perceived as out of balance the government is motivated to hide its actions.

Balance leads the American public to perceive other democracies as our allies. Balance is bidirectional which also means that when the public comes to view a country as our ally through either the media or another source they will also come to perceive that country as a democracy. This step provides an instance where the government may have the opportunity to shape public perception and thus increase the likelihood that the public will support its foreign policy. Our studies do not directly speak to what the original source of the public's perception is, but they do illustrate the importance of those perceptions.

Another problem that was encountered in the analysis had to do with the using democracy as our dependent measure. While I am confident in the measure of democracy used from the Polity IV dataset, exactly what each score on the democracy scale means maybe up for interpretation. Countries scoring on the extreme ends of the scale certainly seem to be representative of our measure; that is countries scoring 7-10 on the scale appear to be good examples of democracies and countries scoring on the extreme low end are representative of autocratic regimes. It is the middle of the scale that may provide some problems in the analysis. I am not exactly sure, for example, what it means to score 2 on the democracy scale. These countries do display some

democratic traits but may not be the types of countries the public would think of as a true democracy. A more accurate analysis may leave out these middle ground democracy scores and instead focus on more reliable democracies and autocracies. This problem, if anything may muddle the obtained results because the countries scoring in the middle range of the democracy scale are likely not the ones that the public perceives as democracies. The fact that even with them included in the analysis the results were significant may point to the robustness of the findings.

The importance of the finding that the public uses balance to form perceptions of foreign countries comes from the fact that the government appears to be using this public perception to guide its foreign policy and actions. Whether the government creates these public perceptions is beyond the scope of the studies reported there. What the studies show us is that the government is motivated to take account of public opinion so that it can maintain its legitimacy. If the public comes to view their government and its actions as inconsistent or not in a balanced state they will come to find those actions or even the government as illegitimate.

Legitimacy is important to authorities because it allows them the ability to act and have their actions supported more easily than if it is absent. A government that lacks legitimacy must then rely on force to get its citizens to comply with its actions and policies. For these reasons it is desirable for governments to try and maintain their legitimacy by acting consistently with public perception and when their actions are out of step with the public's opinion it will attempt to hide those actions so their legitimacy is not questioned. Legitimacy not only allows a government to act and

have its actions supported, but also constrains the ways governments are able to act.

When pursuing foreign policy goals a government must keep in mind that only certain actions will be viewed as legitimate in the public eye and actions that are outside this scope will challenge the public's belief in the legitimacy of the government.

In studies 3 and 4, the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy is used to account for the real world phenomenon of democratic peace and the government's allocation of detainees where the government appears to be stepping beyond the behaviors that the public would consider legitimate. In both studies the government hid actions taken against other democracies and their citizens, by acting covertly or by hiding our actions behind another country. Our model is able to account for this government action where as other explanations for democratic peace can not and as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have stated, "the only final test of a model lies in its ability to assist in understanding real phenomenon (pp. 21)."

All of the findings point to the fact that consistency plays an important role in public perception and that public perception is playing a role in shaping government action. Balance, as we have discussed, is bidirectional and these studies cannot address is where the public perception is developing. It could actually be the case the government is driving public perception by cultivating beliefs about foreign countries levels of democracy or alliance with our own country; it could also be the media influencing public perception. What our findings do tell us is that the public perception, no matter what source it arises from, is motivating government decision making.

¹ The United States was left out of the survey as some of the questions were about the target nation's relations with the U.S. The other nation to be excluded was the Democratic Republic of the Congo because one of the questions asked for participant's perceptions of the target nation's level of democracy and any undue influence stemming from a nation's name wanted to be avoided.

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Table 1: *UN Correlations study 1*

	Democracy	Ally	Similar
Ally	.23**		
Similar	.22*	.63**	
Important	-.007	.24*	.69**

* $p < .001$, ** $p < .0001$

Table 2: *Overt vs. covert actions against non-democracies and democracies*

	N	Overt	Covert	Odds Ratio (Overt:Covert)
Non-Democracy	209	209	12	17.4
Percentage		94.6%	5.4%	
Democracy	31	21	10	2.1
Percentage		67.7%	32.3%	

$\chi^2 (1df) = 24.56, p < .000001$

Table 3: *Number of detainees held by level of democracy in nation of origin study 4*

	N	Guantanamo	Rendition	Odds Ratio (Gitmo:Rendition)
Non-Democracy	716	681	35	19.5
Percentage		95.1%	4.9%	
Democracy	91	73	18	4.06
Percentage		80.2%	19.8%	

$\chi^2 (1df) = 29.18, p < .00001$

Figure 1: Plot of participant perceptions study 1




Figure 2: *Perceptions of alliance with U.S. by democracy status study2B*




Figure 3: *Perceptions of democracy by ally status study 2B*





Figure 4: *Mean level of democracy by type of intervention study 3*



Overt vs. Covert $t(250)=5.96, p<.001, \eta=.35$

Appendix A:
Study 1 sample questionnaire

I am a U.S. citizen (circle one): Yes / No

Haiti (24 October 1945)

Location: Caribbean Capital: Port-Au-Prince Population: 8,308,504 Language: French

GDP per capita: \$1,800 Export commodities: manufactures, coffee, oils, cocoa, mangoes

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

Afghanistan (19 November 1946)

Location: Southern Asia Capital: Kabul Population: 31,056,997 Language: Farsi GDP per capita: \$800

Export commodities: opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

Slovenia (22 May 1992)

Location: Central Europe Capital: Ljubljana Population: 2,010,347 Language: Slovenian

GDP per capita: \$22,900 Export commodities: manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, food

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

Qatar (21 September 1971)

Location: Middle East Capital: Doha Population: 885,359 Language: Arabic

GDP per capita: \$29,400 Export commodities: liquefied natural gas (LNG), petroleum products, fertilizers, Steel

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

Poland (24 October 1945)

Location: Central Europe Capital: Warsaw Population: 38,536,869 Language: Polish

GDP per capita: \$14,100 Export commodities: machinery and transport equipment, intermediate manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured goods, food and live animals

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

Togo (20 September 1960)

Location: Western Africa Capital: Lome Population: 5,548,702 Language: French

GDP per capita: \$1,700 Export commodities: reexports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa

How important is this country on the world stage?

Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Extremely important*

How similar is this country to the United States?

Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very similar*

How democratic is this country's government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

What level of relation does this country hold with the United States?

Enemy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Ally*

The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world

Very strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very strongly agree*

How democratic is the United States government (circle one)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

Appendix B:
Study 2A sample vignette

History of Iran

The history of country of Iran encompasses more than six thousand years, and is included among the few nations that make up the cradle of humanity. Iran's history, like most nations, is varied and has seen different periods of prosper and decline. During one of the country's cultural peaks under the rule of Cyrus the Great (590-530 BCE), Iran is credited with the first declaration of human rights, the Cyrus Cylinder. Iran has also seen its power challenged and has been conquered several times, including the Turkish invasion of the 11th century and Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan in the 13th century. However, throughout its history Iran has remained an important country both economically and culturally.

In the 20th the history of Iran began to converge with that of the United States as the U.S. began to become the main player on the world stage. One of the factors facilitating new contact between the two countries was the emergence of crude oil as the most important energy producing resource, a resource abundant in the region Iran occupies. Beginning in the early 1970's the United States began to see a significant growth in its ties with the country of Iran. Government relations improved dramatically over the decade. Many state officials exchanged trips between the two countries and diplomatic communications increased dramatically leading to the brokering of substantial treaties between the countries. The U.S. President even flew into Iran to meet with country's leaders. In addition to the increase in cooperation between state departments, the 70's also saw an influx of student exchange programs between the U.S. and Iran. Both students and tourists began to travel more freely between the two countries also helping to develop closer ties between the two countries and establishing Iran as a key U.S. ally in the region.

While the 1970's saw a highpoint in U.S.-Iran relations, the 1980's witnessed a rapid downturn in this relationship. In 1979, violent demonstrations within the country were initiated by factions outside the government; eventually these uprisings led to the ouster of the Iranian government and the takeover over a new governing body. Afterward, government relations between the U.S. and Iran deteriorated dramatically over the next decade. Communication between the two countries all but ceased as each country withdrew their diplomats. Travel restrictions were imposed and students and tourists were forced to return home further straining the already tenuous ties between the countries. By the end of the 1980's, the relationship would best be characterized as adversarial and indeed the countries butted-heads numerous times on the floor of the United Nations.

A lot of time has elapsed since the 1980's and the current relations between the U.S. and Iran are a product of the many changes that have taken place during that time. Different leaders are now in charge of both countries and ties between the two will greatly depend on these new leaders and their policy decisions.

Appendix C:
Study 2B sample vignette

History of Iran

The history of country of Iran encompasses over six thousand years, and is included amongst the few nations that make up the cradle of humanity. Iran's history, like most nations, is varied and has seen different periods of prosper and decline. During one of the country's cultural peaks under the rule of Cyrus the Great (590-530 BCE), Iran is credited with the first declaration of human rights, the Cyrus Cylinder. Iran has also seen its power challenged and has been conquered several times, including the Turkish invasion of the 11th century and Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan in the 13th century. However, throughout its history Iran has remained an important country both economically and culturally.

The political history of Iran has seen many different periods of change, and the 20th century was no exception. One example of political change was in 1970, when the people of Iran enjoyed a flourishing of new democracy. Nearly all important government officials were elected to their posts and regular elections were held, usually with high voter turn-out. Voting rights were extended to an ever-growing proportion of the population and the country was generally considered a model democracy by other countries within the United Nations.

All this democracy came to an end, however, late in 1979. Throughout the end of 1979 and into 1980s, violent uprisings began to spring up in Iran and increased in frequency until the democratically-elected government was eventually ousted. Taking the place of the old government was an unelected mullah who abolished elections and declared himself supreme ruler of the Iranian people. During the 1980's the mullah kept himself in power through his tight control of the military, which he used to keep any opposition to his leadership in check. The secret intelligence service inspired fear amongst the country's population, and the leader had almost unchecked power within the country for the entire decade of the 1980's.

A lot of time has elapsed since the end of the 1980's and the mullah system of Iran; this particular leader died, and the system he developed has been out of power for decades now. The country of Iran is currently going through many political changes and the government no longer resembles this period. Iran, however, continues to be an important player of on the world stage.

Appendix D: Study 2A sample questionnaire

Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1970's, when the USA and Iran were allies.

1. How democratic is the *Iranian government* (*circle one*)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

2. How similar is the *Iranian government* to the US Government?

Very different from the US government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very similar to the US government*

3. How well does the *head of the Iranian government* represent the majority of the *Iranian people*?

Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

4. How responsive is the *head of the Iranian government* to the will and goals of *Iranian people*?

Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

5. From what I can tell, the *Iranian people* seem moral, good, and trustworthy.

Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very good, moral, and trustworthy*

6. How corrupt do you think the government of *Iran* is?

Not at all corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Extremely corrupt*

7. Does *Iran* sound like a place that you might like to live?

Very undesirable place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very desirable place*

Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1980's, when the alliance between the country had ended.

1. How democratic is the *Iranian government* (*circle one*)?

A complete democracy *A partial democracy* *A very limited democracy* *No democracy at all*

2. How similar is the *Iranian government* to the US Government?

Very different from the US government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very similar to the US government*

3. How well does the *head of the Iranian government* represent the majority of the *Iranian people*?

Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

4. How responsive is the *head of the Iranian government* to the will and goals of *Iranian people*?

Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

5. From what I can tell, the *Iranian people* seem moral, good, and trustworthy.

Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very good, moral, and trustworthy*

6. How corrupt do you think the government of *Iran* is?

Not at all corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Extremely corrupt*

7. Does *Iran* sound like a place that you might like to live?

Very undesirable place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very desirable place*

Appendix D: Study 2A sample questionnaire continued

Please answer the following questions about the United States

1. The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world

Very strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very strongly agree*

2. The United States of America is a trustworthy and honorable country

Very strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very strongly agree*

Appendix E: Study 2B sample questionnaire

Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1970's, when Iran had a democratic government.

1. How much of an ally was *Iran* to the United States (*circle one*)?
A major ally *A partial ally* *A very limited ally* *Not an ally at all*

2. How similar is the *Iranian* government to the US Government?
Very different from the US government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very similar to the US government*

3. How well does the *head of the Iranian government* represent the majority of the *Iranian* people?
Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

4. How responsive is the *head of the Iranian government* to the will and goals of *Iranian* people?
Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

5. From what I can tell, the *Iranian* people seem moral, good, and trustworthy.
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very good, moral, and trustworthy*

6. How corrupt do you think the government of *Iran* is?
Not at all corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Extremely corrupt*

7. Does *Iran* sound like a place that you might like to live?
Very undesirable place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very desirable place*

Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1980's, when the country was presided over by an unelected mullah.

1. How much of an ally was *Iran* to the United States (*circle one*)?
A major ally *A partial ally* *A very limited ally* *Not an ally at all*

2. How similar is the *Iranian* government to the US Government?
Very different from the US government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very similar to the US government*

3. How well does the *head of the Iranian government* represent the majority of the *Iranian* people?
Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

4. How responsive is the *head of the Iranian government* to the will and goals of *Iranian* people?
Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very well*

5. From what I can tell, the *Iranian* people seem moral, good, and trustworthy.
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very good, moral, and trustworthy*

6. How corrupt do you think the government of *Iran* is?
Not at all corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Extremely corrupt*

7. Does *Iran* sound like a place that you might like to live?

Very undesirable place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *Very desirable place*

Appendix E: Study 2B sample questionnaire continued

Please answer the following questions about the United States

1. The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world

Very strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very strongly agree*

2. The United States of America is a trustworthy and honorable country

Very strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Very strongly agree*

Appendix F:
Study 3 covert action sources

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