Sociology and psychoanalysis have one common insight - that they can conceptualize the objective, symbolically general forms of human interaction. However, they can never grasp the private experience, feelings and unconscious meanings of the individual as they really are. In psychoanalysis this is most outspoken - the real and imaginary spheres in which we all live are to a great extent outside the symbolical. Thus, I think sociology in general, and 'critical' sociology and the sociology of knowledge in particular have something to learn from psychoanalysis. My point in this article is simply to reconsider what sociology can learn from psychoanalysis. In doing so, I am not trying to construct a new 'synthesis'. This article treats three basic features: how sociology and psychoanalysis share basic assumptions on sustainability; how they both have interacted with the modernization of society; finally how my discussion can be related to the difficult project of a 'critical theory'.

The Sociological Discourse

Sociology is a discourse on the 'social', a discourse that was constituted when an understanding of the dynamics of the emerging modern capitalist society seemed imperative. Emile Durkheim found such dynamics in the 'social facts' - the division of labour, collective religiosity and so on. Karl Marx found them in class struggle, that the

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Sociology never was, and will probably never become, a unified homogeneous discourse. One source of heterogeneity is the differences between a conservative perspective, based on cultural criticism and a modernist perspective. The former perspective was dominant in the early German sociology, with proponents such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Alfred Weber, Hans Freyer, and (partly) the young Mannheim.1 The keywords in this conservative sociology were above all Kultur versus Zivilisation. The old traditionalist society was understood as a cultural unit, a Gemeinschaft, while the new emerging society was described as an abstract sum of atomized individuals, a Gesellschaft. The concrete was replaced by the abstract.

This stream can be criticized both for being nostalgic and for having dangerous political implications.2 It is, of course, one-dimensional, dualist and conservative. But a more serious problem is that this dualist tradition is unable to capture important dynamics of modern society - integration, differentiation, system-development. In this light, both Durkheim and Marx (and, of course, contemporary theorists such as Giddens and Luhmann) offer us a more enlightened understanding of modern society. Durkheim 'discovered' 'social facts', that is, when society is modernized and differentiated, the actions of the individuals are coordinated by institutions they often are unaware of - symbolic systems, the division of labour, the market, etc. Among Marx's contributions we find the radicalization of traditional political economy - that the political economy is both a system and a corresponding form of thought unable to reflect upon itself.

Besides this dominant trend in sociology which seeks to understand the dynamics of modern society, I would argue that there exists a trend aiming at constructing a formal theory, a theory that explores what the 'social' is, the sociability. If there is no such theory, sociology loses its right to exist - society might then be understood as nothing more than an economic system. Of course, this was what many of the conservative sociologists were afraid of - that the economic man would exterminate the cultivated man. But besides this 'cultural trend,3 I think that we also can find a 'social' trend. A 'trend' that is neither especially conservative or modernist, but has an interest in finding the roots of sociability.

Here we find contributions by Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead - and Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. The thesis I now want to explore is as follows: as long as we are concerned with a formal theory of sociability, psychoanalysis is impossible to overlook. But when we are to explain social phenomena moving from formal theory to substantial investigations, psychoanalysis must remain in its own discourse, if it is used in sociology it is able to explain everything, and accordingly nothing.

A Formal Theory of Sociability

What I will outline here is neither an established, institutionalized theory, nor a finished system.4 Rather, it is a systematization of something that has to be taken for granted by sociology. My systematization has the form of a number of 'boxes', where each box represents a developed theory, or at least a theoretical fragment. The contents of each box is briefly described after the figure.

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1 The best overview on German sociology so far in English is Volker Meja et. al. (eds.), Modern German Sociology.
2 For a both extreme and one-dimensional example of this kind of critique, see Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason. For a more sophisticated and balanced discussion of the problems associated with using 'Culture' as a standpoint and reference for critique of society and thinking, see Richard Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism.
3 This trend was continued in Germany in the form of sociological and philosophical anthropology. A rather well-known example is Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of Technology.
4 It would, of course, be possible to use 'social psychology' instead as a term. However, that term is used in so many ways, that it would lead to confusions in this context.
1. The central work here is Simmel's analysis of groups: the qualitative difference between a two-person group, a dyad, and a group of three, a triad (Simmel 1983). The triad with its impulsive rules, and its independence in relation to its members, is the nucleus of society. The specific sociability is born in the triad. Mead's 'the generalized other' is also a metaphor for pure sociability (Mead 1990). This other is everyone else and no one, society represented. Mead also contrasts 'game' to 'play', where the former is governed by rules. Such theses represents what could be regarded as sociology's contribution to a formal theory of sociability. But all is not done yet. On the one hand I also want to consider some clear parallels to psychoanalytic thought. On the other hand, the theses mentioned so far have a relational character, that is, the triad, the generalized other and the game are meaningful only if they are related to their 'other side'.

2. It is quite evident that the triad has a parallel in psychoanalytic thinking. Here the Father represents the third element, the introduction of order, authority, objectivity and law. For Jacques Lacan the Father is equivalent to the symbolic order, that is, language which situates and structures us. Just like the sociological theories mentioned before, psychoanalytic theses are dependent upon their other side, that is, to be 'social' means not being something else.

3. The dyad (Simmel) is a group which lacks a life of its own, if one of the members leaves the group or dies, so does the dyad. It is a unique constellation, the other is everything else than oneself. Unlike the triad, it cannot be mediated or represented, and it is not dependent upon symbolic communication. For example, is it impossible to tell a lie in a dyad. It is a form of concrete pre-sociability, just like Mead's 'significant other', not anyone else, but a concrete person. The processes on this level is not primarily work or communication, but play (Huizinga 1955), imitation (Tarde 1890), and mimesis. In reality, many relationships arise on the border between the dyad and the triad. For example, the passionate love - where the partners are trying to be everything that the other partner desires - at first seems like a dyad. But it might become destructive if the lovers do not discover the triadic element, that they are partly outside and more than their respective mirror-images of each other.

4. In psychoanalysis, the dyadic is the 'imaginary' (Lacan), this is both an 'order' - our phantasms about being a whole person, filling the lack with an object - and a stage in the child's development, where the mother is the mirror-image of the child, the eyes and the breasts confirming the own existence. But the imaginary is not the whole, it becomes impossible to unite oneself with the mirror-image, the mother. She can be absent, and there is an Other also desiring the mother, who the mother desires, and that has something that the child lacks. The child's response to this is the Oedipus constellation, the entrance into language, its acceptance of laws and authority. Freud's famous example of this transitions is the 'Fort/da'-play performed by a little boy, when he plays with a cotton reel he represents the mother's absence symbolically.

The social level, boxes 1 and 2 have in common that its form of existence is digital, and the non-rational level, boxes 3 and 4, exists as analogue. An analogue form of existence has no boundaries, it is amorphous and continuous. One example is the thermometer, which tries to imitate something in nature - 'temperature'. The analogue may be digitalized through a decision, and this marks the entrance of sociability. For example, temperature is without borders, but we can decide what temperature we want to have indoors by using a thennostat, which can be either 'on' or 'off', nothing else. Thus, the social creates boundaries, oppositions, negations, it digitalizes the amorphous, the fantastic and playful. This digitalization is the homological link between social and symbolic structures, and becomes visible in a chain of oppositions: member/not-member, having/lacking, father/mother, man/woman and so on. The transition from analogue to digital also has an ethical aspect. While society is mediated by objective institutionalized laws and rules, the dyadic relation has an immediate character, I am responsible for being everything for, not with the other.

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5 For the distinction analogue/digital, see Gregory Bateson, Towards an Ecology of the Mind, or Anthony Wilden, System and Structure.
5. Sociology often thinks in dichotomies, pairs, while psychoanalysis often is more triangular, therefore this box is empty.

6. This is the place of Being, the body, the Real (Lacan), existence without relations. However, this 'place' is that nameable which constitutes an eternal opposition to society and civilization, and causes Unbehagen. Freud developed this thought, but he had a tendency towards scientism, a hope that this place could be given a neuro-chemical description in the future. In this box we could also place some philosophical counterparts: the vitalism of Bergson; Sorel's cult of myths and violence; certain aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy; but unlike psychoanalysis and sociology who rationalizes the irrational, they tend to celebrate the irrational - Life, Myth, Intuition etc.

In my opinion, the best work clarifying the intricate connections between the boxes, and also giving them a history is Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialektik der Aufklärung. It might seem surprising to mention this extremely fragmentary work in such a context. But I think that, in particular the excursus on Ulysses, can be read and understood as the story of the destiny of "pre-Homeric Man" entering modern society. When confronting the sirens, Ulysses moves from the non-rational to the rational level, from play and Mimesis to the instrumental objectivity that arises in the symbolic world and the triad. The possibility of seeing this, something other than instrumental reason, something before the triad, could be understood as the memory and experience of the childhood with its plays and mimetic activities, its magic. This is also a paradigmatic work in providing clues to understanding the relationship between sociology and psychoanalysis properly. Just as the necessity of the Enlightenment to 'consider itself' - Horkheimer's and Adorno's main thesis - sociology must also 'consider itself'. I will return to this later.

A formal theory of sociability is partly trans-historical, and partly a modern phenomenon. I say 'formal' because this kind of theory disregards every form of substantial contents, thus it has no opinions of what a 'good' or 'bad' sociability might consist of, instead it wants to explore some structural preconditions that can either be recognized or repressed by social agents. 'Sociability' in our formal sense has not always 'existed'. This needs clarification. Durkheim, Marx, and Weber were the great investigators of the dynamics of development, but they did not investigate the necessary preconditions for this development - the basic forms of social life. What they saw was an economy becoming an economy - money. The other side of 'life' - its irreducible, amorphous and qualitative side becomes damaged in this process of objectification and formalization. This is the tragic, and 'culturalist' aspect of Simmel's philosophy and sociology. However, there is also a strong 'social' side: the sober registration of the role of formality, above all the triad as the essence of social life.

However, Marx implicitly discusses formalism in society and in thinking, but in a more dialectical manner:

Now, it might seem that all that had been achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient relation in which human beings - in whatever form of society - play the role of producers. This is correct in one respect. Not in another. Indifference towards any specific kind of labour presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any longer predominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. (Marx 1973, p. 104)

As far as I can see, Marx relates two matters here: (A) a social epistemology, the more differentiation (division of labour) that exists, the more abstract and formal categories (labour as such, abstract labour) are possible to develop; and (B) that the formal categories also are realized as power, and institutionalized, i. e. labour is measured in time, efficiency and productivity (a Foucaultian element in Marx's thinking, indeed). This brings in a substantial element in social life, that sociability often takes the form of competition and conflict.

Thus, formalization (primarily a theoretical issue)\(^6\) is connected to differentiation (which is primarily a category directed at empirical research). But they are also disconnected: a formal theory of sociability has no directly explanatory power in sociological investigations. Therefore, our next step in reconsidering the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociology will concern the references of the discourses, that is how their objects reflect historical and social processes. We will now see that the differentiation of society - seen both as partial processes, and as a whole, a repressive 'civilization' - lead to the emergence of psychoanalysis as a discourse.

\(^6\) My use of this term is thus not in the sense of being the opposite of an empirical 'informalization' (see Cas Wouters, 'Formalization and Informalization'). In fact 'informalization' - informal ways of talking, greeting etc. - can in a way be seen as a new 'form'.

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From the viewpoint of the sociological discourse the new society is understood as 'modernity' (Marx, Weber) - the Maelstrom, the eternal flux and change, detraditionalization etc. - or as a process of differentiation, which causes a need for system-integration (Durkheim, Parsons). New integrative mechanisms have to be found and created that will serve the needs of the system: socialization, planning and education. For this sociological discourse, the individual as such is not taken as given, rather he or she is seen as a knot that has to be shaped and produced. Due to the rise of new subsystems, more and more discourses, networks and fields, the individual has to exercise new strategies. As Zygmunt Bauman (1991, p. 201), following Niklas Luhmann, puts it: 'All individuals are displaced, and displaced permanently, existentially - wherever they find themselves at the moment and whatever they may happen to do. They are strangers everywhere and, their efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, at all places. There is no single place in society in which they are truly at home and which can bestow upon them a natural identity. Individual identity becomes therefore something to be yet attained (and presumably to be created) by the individual involved and never securely and definitely possessed - as it is constantly challenged and must be ever anew negotiated.'

For sociology, the modern society means the quest for identity for the individuals. As Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor (1978) have said, we see the rise of individual 'identity-work', and the emergence of a whole new industry which sells ego, identity and security. For sociologists with either a culturalist or normative, conservative orientation, this is of course something that has to be criticized. For example, Richard Sennett (1978) has coined the term 'destructive Gemeinschaft', the new forms of social relations destroy classical values such as autonomy, dignity and integrity.

In short, when sociology looks at the individual and her problems, it relates this to the modern private sphere, new sensibilities, new discourses, new professional groups, and, thus comes to define psychoanalysis as an ideology with a new language that transforms these social processes into a meaningful individual code.

However, for psychoanalysis Unbehagen means more than a search for identity, it is a symptom of the search for truth, a glimpse of what 'being' means, an acceptance of death and lack, and a new relation to language. Psychoanalysis thematizes this experience and constructed a theory about it (Trieb vs. civilization), i.e. a transhistorical theory, in order to cure the individual Unbehagen. Sociology on the other hand sought to cure social pathologies, caused by society, not by civilization. Where sociology notes differentiation and autonomous systems or fields, among these the private sphere, psychoanalysis notes the growth of civilization, a threatening process, which has a price to be paid. This is one good reason for keeping the two discourses apart from each other, and to drop the attempt to 'synthesize' them. If we drop such an ambition, we can acknowledge their respective strengths better.

Sociology has of course been sensitive to this Unbehagen. Especially the rise of fascism necessitated considerations on the need for integration again. As many of the sociologists saw, modernity meant Sommerlust, and the search for new integrative institutions and mechanisms had to be started. We have already mentioned Parsons, and many more could be added. For example those concerned with planning as a way of strengthening the democratic institutions. Here we find Mannheim during his English exile, he even saw a new mission for the Christian church, going hand in hand with a new welfare state that could transmit its essential values successfully. However, as we know today social engineering is difficult enterprise. Post-modernity has given us the experience of contingency, and a new awareness of incalculability and risks. But apart from this integrative aspect of sociology, where it becomes a part of the administrative power, there is also another side, which sometimes goes hand in hand with system-integration: The study of social determinations, the revealing of illusions, false consciousness', 'ideologies' - a paradigm created by Marx and Mannheim. 'Social determination' have two sides or aspects: 1) the study of how parts interact and are integrated into a whole (e.g. functionalism); 2) the critique of illusions, the demonstration of how actions and communication serve the interests of the actors. In both cases a formal theory of sociability is needed: in the former case, to explain how the integrative mechanisms work; in the latter case to explain how interests arise. The first aspect, the study of institutional interaction is connected to the second, the critique of illusions, since the former requires a sober perspective. However, the primary reason for the rise of a sociological critique in the form of a sociology of knowledge was social-historical - as Fritz Ringer (1990: 236) says:

They (the sociological modernists of the Weimar republic) were so totally disenchanted with the main line of mandarin orthodoxy that they came to see it primarily as ideology, as rationalization. Instead of merely arguing against commonly held notions, they began to debunk or to unmask them, to treat them primarily as defences of social privilege. Max Weber's attack upon the 'literati' who produced the ideas of 1914 was based on this type of criticism.

After this, there were no way back to a mandarin attitude, that is the belief that 'science' is to be excluded form sociological investigations.
The keywords for the study of social action are struggle (Simmel), competition (Mannheim), and exchange. These forms occur when we move to real life, where more than one triad or conjunctive community exists, when sociability becomes institutionalized. The sociological perspective, the reason for its existence, means to show how these forms penetrate social life and processes. In this, sociology often uses a Freudian concept - the unconscious. Let me give two examples.

In one of his early essays, Mannheim (1952) argues that one of the central knowledge-sociological concepts is 'documentary meaning'. He gives an example: one man giving alms to a beggar. How it this to be understood? The 'objective meaning', the pure registration and description does not provide us with any new knowledge. The 'expressive meaning', the giver's own intentions, to be 'kind' is subjectivist and tells us nothing about the context. But the 'documentary meaning' of the act is hypocrisy, that the giver masks and hides the social fact of poverty, and the 'expressive meaning' is only a repression of the real meaning. As Joseph Gabel (1991) has pointed out, this act can best be understood as 'an unconscious manifestation of the desire to abreact his social guilt feelings.' Thus, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge depends upon psychoanalysis.

Most often in social life, social structures and processes are unconscious and understood as something else, but they nevertheless determine the sociologist's object. Pierre Bourdieu's (1991) study of Martin Heidegger and his *Sein und Zeit* is a paradigmatic work in this context. As Bourdieu demonstrates, philosophy, especially in Heidegger's case, is a method of making its social genesis invisible, even if philosophy in its own institutionalized field is autonomous. Heidegger - a true 'conservative revolutionary' - performs a remarkable manoeuvre: through a denial of the social and modernity (which, for Heidegger is understood as the inauthentic terrorism of das Man, the denial of individuality and personal richness) he constructs a clean and eternal sphere. This sphere is constructed as Being itself. After this Heidegger has to look for how this sphere can return to reality. As we know, Heidegger found his answer in national socialism. Thus, the fatality with Heidegger's anti-modern philosophy was that he first denied the social genesis - ontology and 'Being' as having no connection to social and historical reality - and then claimed that his insights have to be realized socially. Thus, what Bourdieu performs is to expose the 'social unconscious' in Heidegger's thought. This 'social unconscious' is a construction, that is, nothing that is waiting 'out there' to be discovered, but the construction of the sociologist, which thereby casts a new and clarifying light over reality. As far as I can see, this understanding is homologous with Lacan's, for whom the Real Subject just 'is', but can be glimpsed in dialogues and a narratives. Another important implication is, of course, that the genesis explains the validity, there is no objective reality that comes to life outside our active social interaction and communication. If we can learn to accept this, we become more wise and realistic.

The point here is that one should not take social actions at face value, as 'expressive meanings'. Where there seems to be love, solidarity etc., rivalry, aggression and egoism might be hiding. This is a way of taking sociology to its rightful place: one of the discourses of suspicion. There are good reasons for being suspicious, even Karl Popper would agree. One reason is Nietzsche's speculative thesis that the 'weak' are the strongest in the long run, since they develop techniques of manipulation, lies, treason etc. This argument has been given some historical substance by Norbert Elias (1978). According to him, we can trace the modern form of suspicion back to the rise of the 'hofischen' society. In the nobility of the Middle ages, at the edge of the Renaissance, there emerged non-violent strategies of how to act in order to realize interests. It was simply more efficient to play roles, lying, acting strategic, planning intrigues, than killing each other at the court-yard. As Shakespeare said: 'The whole world is a theatre!'. The result of this was the rise of an hermeneutics of intentions - is the other lying, playing a role, what is he or she planning etc.? Here we see the embryo of modern suspicion. Later on this was reinforced by the breakdown of traditional authorities, and of course it is even more reinforced by the breakdown of paternal authority (Mitterlich 1970). The appearance of suspicion is an indication of a more fundamental modern condition - the strangeness. We are all 'strangers' to each other and to the world. Since everything changes, the hunt for the 'real', un-strange starts. What we see is that it is our ability of asking critical questions that has become more comprehensive, and modern sociology is of course a part of this. It seems better to be suspicious than not - a pragmatic strategy, taking the 'bad' for given, to take the 'sneaky', not the 'honest' and 'good' for given. This line of thought culminates in the sociology of sociology and the sociologies of science and knowledge, where also the own premises and presuppositions are studied. We are then watching the end of suspicion, since the categories constructed by the suspicious mind - theory/reality, essence/appearance - are now recognized as constructions. Not reality 'as such', but what can be given a broader meaning becomes the point of the sociological project.

Unlike many others, I do not believe that this development leads to a destructive nihilism and relativism. On the contrary, it is the logical outcome of sociology taken seriously. However, there are barriers to the fulfilling of this sociologist project, for example the eternal questions

7 In German 'hofisch' means both being 'polite', and taking place in a court (Hof).
about the interaction between the society and the individual. As I see it, it seems like a rather fruitless attempt to strive for a final solution of the problem of the interaction between 'Individual' and 'Society'. There is no 'solution' since the problem is an antinomy, where spokesmen for both 'individualist' or 'collectivist' perspectives can claim its correctness by using seemingly correct and rational arguments. The problem is a historical and empirical question. The same goes for other antinomies: 'realism' or 'relativism', 'materialism' or 'idealism'.

If we then avoid the antinomies and barriers mentioned and try to fulfill the project of sociologism, there remains one problem, a problem I think can be, if not solved, but at least reflected, by a consideration of psychoanalysis. The problem is the question of relativism, validity and truth. One classic text that exposes this problem is Pitirim A. Sorokin's work on Social and Cultural Dynamics from 1941. In this brilliant work, Sorokin demonstrates how truth criteria are set up, and how the criteria change through history. But if these change, what about Sorokin's own claims of presenting a 'true' and valid analysis? This is the well-known problem of a sociology of knowledge, and I think that the problem can be, not 'solved', but reflected by distinguishing between 'truth' and 'Truth'.

The utterance 'I am lying' shows that there is a Subject telling the Truth, outside language, impossible to give a full symbolical description and expression (Lacan 1979, p. 138ff.). This marks the return of 'validity', while the Truth is outside sociology, it is put up as a problem in psychoanalysis, where it sometimes makes a glimpse, where the unconscious Subject speaks, 'it' speaks. This conception of 'Truth' does not mark an entrance of a new ontology, a belief in that the 'it', as I see it, let as it is. The Truth — the object of psychoanalysis — is something else than sociological investigations of 'truth'. In order to avoid total relativism and total rootlessness, sociology must recognize that there is Truth — at the place where the Subject speaks. The Truth is found in the Real — the order where the body, life and death, Being or not Being, is situated.

Critical Social Theory and Psychoanalysis

Let me now summarize my discussion, and add a few words about how the perspective of critical theory broadens the problems discussed.

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1 I have studied a part of this work, 'Fluctuation of Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate Systems of Truth and Knowledge', in Mathilda White Riley, Sociological Research.

2 I think that this insight can be found already in Freud's works. For example in the book on the 'interpretation' of dreams (Traumdeutung), the Dream takes place in the constructed narrative, there is no direct line to the original 'dream-thought', which only leaves traces that has to be put together. Cf. Dahl 1995.

3 See Alfred Schmidt, 'Aufklarung und Mythos im Werk Max Horkheimers'.

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where the one seeks to be everything for the other, not recognizing that there always is something both unknown and truly social in the relation; a critique of seducing power relations; of eroticism where it does not belong. Thus, 'sociability' is an alternative keyword for the anchoring point of critique, an alternative to 'culture', 'communication' and 'being'. Let me make a few comments to these alternatives.

I am critical of the concept of 'culture', since it is (in Mannheim's words) more ideology than utopia, more rooted in a dream of return to something forever lost while 'communication' and 'sociability' still have utopian qualities.

'Communicative rationality' is Habermas' well-known proposal for a normative basis of a rational, critical theory. I am quite sympathetic to this, since it, just like my own proposal aims at a rational reconstruction of what must is presupposed in social action. However, Habermas', or more correct, Apel's ambition of a 'final grounding' (Letzbegründung) - a rational, final criteria for rationality - is hard to maintain. At least at one point the communicative rationality is depending upon an irrational criteria: that people must be willing to be rational. This 'decisionist' criteria seems to be very hard to overcome. In this case, I think that 'sociability' is a better keyword for the anchoring point of critique, since a formal theory of sociability should include non-rational and irrational levels.

The psychoanalytical conception of Truth was presented as a mean to let sociology 'consider itself'. This Truth belongs to box 6 in the figure outlined above, and is thus located on the same level as 'Being', which also can be used as a critical counterpart. And it has been used as a such: Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of modern society is, as I noted above, depending on a mobilization of the critical potentials of all the levels in my figure. But they seem to prefer the second level (childhood, mimesis, art, dance) and the third (the negative, Being). And in Marcuse's Eros and Civilization Being, in the form of the playful Eros, is mobilized against the dominating instrumental reason, because the Unbehagen has to be cured! This fact enables us to recognize an affinity between critical theory and Heidegger.12 Lacan the Heideggerian is not far away in this context, in his insistence on that the Real is the body, is the Truth. Furthermore, 'Being' is a keyword in the post-structuralist approach where it plays a critical function. However, one has to be careful, the risk for a new 'jargon of authenticity' (Adorno) is evident, if the whole Truth

is only where Being is, we run the same risk as Heidegger in transforming something partly social into an ethereal sphere, where arguments do not matter, only the philosopher who knows the Truth knows. Nevertheless, if these reservations are reflected upon, I think that Being is beyond both utopia and ideology, a name for the unconscious and real, summing up Unbehagen and unrealized possibilities, and if we do not accept the idea that it is the 'it' that speaks through us, we have to give up psychoanalysis totally, and run the risk of becoming nihilist, cynical, and power-affirmative sociologists.

The psychoanalytical concept 'the unconscious' is of crucial importance for sociology. What the sociologist does is to write a discourse on what is most often unknown, unconscious, for the social actors. Furthermore, our understanding of the unconscious has consequences for our understanding of sociology. My discussion of Mannheim's and Bourdieu's different understandings above is a central example here. On the one hand we have a 'modernist' understanding which keeps the idea of a grammar waiting to be 'found', on the other hand we have a 'post-modernist' understanding that emphasizes the fruitfulness and richness of a certain description. However, this is a too narrow reading of Mannheim. As I have showed elsewhere (Dahl 1995), 'documentary meaning' is both Deutung and Auslegung, that is both a construction where we use our tradition and sociological skills, and a reconstruction of something 'given' in the world.

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