ON THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY*

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In a book meriting thorough-going elucidation, Landshut seeks to lay bare the roots of the "possible unfolding" of the problems of sociological research. His investigation takes the form of a "critique of sociology," which springs from a "confrontation with outmoded and prevailing research tendencies." Besides unearthing the original ground of the sociological problematic (Problematik), the author seeks to prove that this ground has been lost as the social sciences have developed historically, and that the "originally motivating mode of questioning" is no longer alive in "contemporary research trends" (p. 7).

This critique thus rests on a definite presupposition. An "original research foundation," specifically a "factual questionability [faktische Fraglichkeit] of reality" (p. 10), is assumed as decisive, giving meaning not only to the historical formation of the sociological problematic but also to the objective authenticity (Echtheit) and inauthenticity of its claims. "Our search for the mode of inquiry that originally motivated sociology as a science rests in particular on the presupposition that such a mode of inquiry is by no means arbitrary, but that it has a particular connection to the object of scientific labor, a connection which is ultimately grounded in some way in the essence of the things themselves" (p. 7). The starting point of inquiry (Landshut's "factual questionability of reality" as "concretely meaningful") is determined by the substantive character (Sachcharakter) of the discipline and its "methodology."

This presupposition, which is and remains the ground of the whole of Landshut's critique, will be discussed further below.

The "factual questionability of reality" -- the "original research foundation" which permits, shapes, and carries forward the problematic of sociological science -- is shown to spring from "bourgeois society," which, in its opposition to the state and "personality," figures as the arena in which claims to freedom and equality are supposed to be fulfilled.

Landshut then shows "society" to be factually the "source of all freedom and

unfreedom" through a definite development and transformation in the "Christian-Germanic understanding of life." This shift is marked by a growing externalization (Veräußerlichung) of the Christian notion of the "true destiny of people" and their "proper life." State and society cannot assume the decisive role in the fulfillment of human destiny until, to a growing extent, the "inner and inalienable" Christian freedom and equality of individuals before God becomes an external freedom and equality of choice in the world, i.e., when the "inner freedom to choose" is transferred "from the conflict between people and their drives to the relations of individuals and the lawful order of life-with-others" (p. 150).

Now humanity, with its "pathos of claims to freedom and equality," steps out of inwardness into concrete social reality and -- finds itself "disappointed" to the core, with "hopes" yielding "disillusionment." And thus the circle is drawn, in which the original social problem must be grasped as a real problem of unfulfilled hopes (p. 116).

According to Landshut, this antagonism between human direction (Bestimmung) and worldly fulfillment (Erfüllung) leads to yet another decisive shift in the outlook on "the situation of humans in the world": Humanity and world have come into "disjunction," framed as autonomous, separate "potencies" which later assume a functional or even causal "relationship," so that ultimately even humans can be conceived as the "products of their relationships." And it is on exactly this basis that the presupposition is given for the central tendency of sociological research since Lorenz von Stein and Marx: that social reality can be construed in terms of "action factors" (Wirkungsfaktoren), and that one of these factors (production relations) contains the decisive lever for the fulfillment (Erfüllung) of the true telos (Bestimmung) of humanity, the "emancipation of humankind." The "disjunction of humanity and world" is thus only "the presupposition for the anticipation of a resolution of personal prospects arising from the organization and transformation of society" (p. 152). (This disjunction of humanity and world will be discussed more extensively below.)

The best parts of this book are those in which evidence is offered to account for this development: in particular the analysis of Lorenz von Stein's orientation and the elucidation of decisive tendencies in Rousseau and in the theory of natural right. Landshut succeeds in showing that such a development has taken place and in elaborating its main stages -- but the interpretation that he brings to this development must be strongly opposed.

It would correspond to the sense and presupposition of Landshut's critique to see the constitution of a wholly "inner," "alienable" human destiny and freedom as an expression of the "disjunction of humanity and world" which

Landshut so sharply condemns in Marx. But at exactly this point the historical deconstruction (Destruktion) stops! Indeed, it almost seems as if Landshut sees the "shift" in inner human prospects to be in reality only a misunderstanding of the "true" (Christian) definition of humanity and of the ancient, especially Aristotelian determination of Being, an "exculpation" of individuals from their original responsibility: "in this way all the categories that originally determined the individual person as human -- freedom, happiness -- acquire meanings in which individuals are disregarded save as 'products of their relations', and in which their hopes and claims are derived from these (the orders and institutions of life-with-others)" (pp. 154f). As the result of an endeavor lasting centuries, the individual was first "derived" from the "orders and institutions of life-with-others"; this "derivation", in turn, "dispensed" the individual from his true destiny (Bestimmung) "as man," whose chance of self-realization in actual social life was seemingly none of his business! Such a view is doubtless the most crass "disjunction of humanity and world" imaginable!

It is not presupposed in this separation of man and world that man in society has "expectations" for his critical potentialities, but rather the reverse: that the original union of human and world is sundered by the restriction of decisive human possibilities to the sphere of the inner and internalized, to inward instead of objective freedom. Man need not be "exiled" (Verweisung) to social life as the field of his "realization" (Erfüllung): he is, rather, wholly dependent upon it, and can only be expelled from it by force.

This state of affairs was still plain in antiquity. We know that the Aristotelian definition of man as "objectively slave" (seinmässig Sklave) and "objectively master" refers to the human "constitution of Being" as such (p. 123); in spite or precisely because of this, the actual fate of man, his actual freedom and unfreedom, remains in view! Since, for Aristotle, the being of humans is constituted by facticity -- including the social -- a great deal could be "expected" from the worldly unfolding of decisive human faculties. For Aristotle, the world is not given to the wholly inner or internalized; even the most "inward" possibilities, those of the bios theoreitkos, require a definite ordering capacity (Verfügenskonnen) which in no way extends only to "theoretical conduct" as such. And therefore the Aristotelian "ethic" culminates

1. In Reason and Revolution ([1941] 1960, pp. 374ff.), Marcuse devotes a section of his chapter on positivism and the rise of sociology to an analysis of von Stein, whom he credits with a leading role in the shift from dialectical to positivist styles of thought.

2. The Heideggerian term Destruktion is commonly rendered "deconstruction." Marcuse's connotation here is similar.

3. Marcuse often uses the terms Mensch and Menschen, which can be translated as either "man" or "human," "men" or "humanity." Unless Marcuse uses gendered pronouns as well, we will render these terms using gender-neutral language.

4. This is a reference to Aristotle's Politics, paragraphs 1324 and 1325 (wrongly listed as "1314" in Marcuse's original article). Marcuse is
in and completes itself in "politics," which is certainly not limited to an "ontology of man" as zoon politikon.\footnote{Marcuse} It is not that a departure from the true Christian definition of the social reality of mankind converts the possible realization of this destiny into an "illusion." Instead, Christian inalienability (Unveräusserrlichkeit) derives from the disjunction of objective connection between humanity and world, and in the social realm this illusion (inalienability) is repeatedly exposed. The prospects of humanity are neither internal nor external, but transcend this opposition. Hence, the social problematic does not develop only through an externalization of the internal, but is already given in human existence. That it became so pronounced in bourgeois society, where it was apprehended through sociological research, is a fact rooted in the historical development of society itself.

With these formal considerations behind us, we now turn to Landshut's critique of sociology per se. Sociology today, according to Landshut, has adopted a methodological approach which springs from the disjunction of man and world as it derived from a changing social reality but is divorced from the living research tradition which this separation originally inspired. This "rupture" explains the inner emptiness and formlessness of inquiry, the "pushing away" (Abdrängung) or reduction of reality to simple "examples," the conversion of problematic social facticity into an "irrelevant object of scientific analysis," as Landshut shows with typical examples drawn from the work of P. Barth, Oppenheimer, Simmel, Spann, Tönnies, and Vierkandt (pp. 11ff). For Lorenz von Stein and Marx, and again for Max Weber (whose point of departure and research aims Landshut analyzes more profoundly than traditional interpreters), the decisive problem of sociology was the concrete questionability of historical reality; this problem has since been forgotten or has become an abstract object of "pure" science. For Landshut this is not only a methodological mistake, but affects the "fundamental character" of sociology as science. Since the object of sociological inquiry is historical by nature, sociology renounces its subject matter when this "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) is either overlooked or "distilled" into a form "pure" of historicity. Hence, sociology must once again refer to Aristotle's claim that "the active life need not, as some suppose, be always concerned with our relations with other people, nor is intelligence 'active' only when it is directed towards results that flow from action. On the contrary, thinking and speculation that are their own end and are done for their own sake are more 'active', because the aim (telos) in such thinking is to do well (eupraxia), and therefore also, in a sense, action (praxis). Master-craftsmen in particular, even though the actions they direct by their intelligence are external to them, are nevertheless said to 'act', in a sovereign sense." Aristotle (1981), p. 401.

\footnote{We will try to provide a more detailed explanation of this thesis elsewhere; in-direct support is furnished by the sociological camp, since, as we can demonstrate, social being in its basic sense and basic character is unexplained in sociology it-self, indeed remains an open question, at best adapted from some philosophy. [Marcuse]}
concepts). Landshut first mentions this Sachcharakter in connection with a reading of Max Weber's work on "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" (p. 2). This does not, in itself, warrant methodological objections; but Landshut does not advance beyond received formulations. The result is that an approach which, for Max Weber, given his very different intentions, was suited to the problem, becomes in Landshut's study a palpable error. For Max Weber, as even the title of his cited essay makes clear, the question is primarily one of "epistemological" contemplation (Bewusstsein), and the real subject matter of the social scientific problem is illumined only in this light. Yet a critique which seeks to question the substantive character of the sociological discipline precisely in its "original" condition, apart from its manifestation in sociological method, cannot remain at this level. And for Landshut, Max Weber's epistemological formulations remain in the forefront of all attempts to identify this Sachcharakter as historicity. But historicity as the objective determinacy (Seinsbestimmung) of social reality cannot be adequately distinguished and explained through a textbook-like characterization of concepts such as "context of motivation and meaning" (p. 9), "concrete contexts" (p. 10), "individual effectiveness contexts" (p. 13). Does Landshut really believe that he has said anything about "social-historical reality" when he writes, "Reality means: to be motivated in this or that way"? (p. 25) In Dilthey, whom Landshut cites several times, there is sufficient guidance on how to pursue a genuine determination of historicity. The principal question is the manner in which the historically addressed object arises; how it is related to itself and other objects, etc. Historicity must be grasped and determined as motility (Bewegtheit), not as an epistemic condition.

Not until the objective character of historical reality is clarified can something definite be said, as well, about the relationship between the substantive problematic of sociological science and the "factual questionability of reality" as its "original research basis." It is hence not by chance that this nexus terminates for Landshut in the darkness of "in some fashion" (p. 7). Inasmuch as he inquires into this self-understanding, Landshut interprets Marx's research orientation in connection with the issue of the concrete original situation (Ursprungs situation) of sociology. He finds the true sense of this orientation in the "tendency towards transformation in the world": "From the outset Marx's whole work is geared towards this transformation of reality. His whole inquiry begins here, and it is precisely because Landshut grasps the proper sense of Marx's point of departure that his further interpretations make so little sense; they represent a complete inversion of the true state of affairs.

Landshut deduces from Marx's premise "that, in general, a division of person and world is assumed, a division in which the person is a function of the world" (p. 74). We reproduce his argument here, since its utter lack of support leaps to the eyes of all who can read: "That... in general the transformation of reality is expected to contribute something to the emancipation of humanity contains a specific precondition of the situation of people in the world: Humanity and world are brought into disjunction, established as powers for themselves, and are then brought into union with one another through a deterministic schema of relations" (p. 69).

Apart from contradicting the formula quoted above -- namely, that people are a "function of the world" (p. 74) -- this conclusion is derived "purely logically," without regard for the circumstances to be interpreted, and is thus false from the start! It should read instead: If the transformation of reality is expected to contribute something to the emancipation of humanity, people must "belong" to the world from the start, in such a way that they cannot face it in disjunction as an independent power.
But let us shift from these formal "arguments" to the interpreted texts themselves. When Marx speaks of the interactions or relations between social being and consciousness, humanity and production relations, economic base and ideological superstructure, etc., he is not offering a schema of superimposed relations between "powers in and for themselves," an "immanent determination" (Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the world in opposition to people or the like, but an account of the basic structural condition of their inherent, concrete original association: human being as historical. In this way, and only in this way, can the "transformation" of reality mean something for the "emancipation of humans," indeed for emancipation purely and simply, not because the world affects humans as a different "substance" but rather because it "belongs" to the inner being of humanity itself, constituting its "substance." It is precisely the overcoming of the traditional dichotomy between human and world that characterized Marx's mode of inquiry from the beginning. One has only to read the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the opening of The German Ideology, where this overcoming is expressly described as decisive for the new research! Note, to start, the subsequently deleted section of the first paragraph [of The German Ideology]: "We know only one science, the science of history. History can be viewed from two angles...divided into the history of nature and the history of people. The two sides, however, ...are not to be separated; as long as people exist, the history of nature and the history of humanity condition each other" (p. 237). And then follow, in ever-different formulations, the "presuppositions" of the new method: the rejection of every abstraction of humanity or the world in itself, the affirmation of "real individuals" in the full concreteness of their "actual life processes," in their "actual empirically plain development process under specific conditions." Further formulations in The German Ideology, this first clear elucidation of the "materialistic view of history," are possible only in the elaboration of this approach: the person is no longer viewed as an abstract "species being" (Gattunsgwesen), approachable and definable as Being for-itself, but rather as concrete historical life in the concrete historical world; neither humanity nor world is an independent power which can be related to the other only.post hoc -- the two unite, rather, to form an indissoluble unity, which exists and can be understood from the beginning. This premise is not lost with the later turn to pure economy, but is driven forward on exactly the same basis in the "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy." Here we find further explicit formulations, placed into bold relief by the maxim that the categories are only "existence forms, determinations of existence" (Daseinsformen, Existenzbestimmungen). The simple fact that one of the main tendencies of Marxian economy is to divest the objectivity of the economic world of its reified character (Dingcharakter) by grasping its origin in concretely historical human conduct is already proof that the ontological (seinsmassige) union of human and world, taken in full concretion, is the premise and foundation of Marx's pure economy. It is only on the basis of this premise, as well, that the "doctrine of ideology" can be understood, according to which all consciousness and its forms is "nothing other" than "conscious being," that is, the "actual life process" of people (Deutsche Ideologie, p. 239). This ideology doctrine, in its original sense, is not subject to the constraint of an undiscussed, presupposed materialism, but springs from the pursuit of an inquiry into this concrete union of human and world as historicity. Now how does Landshut interpret the Marxian call for the "emancipation of humanity"? "It must first be seen how humanity is approached in Marx, and consequently what emancipation means to him" (p. 68). And the answer: "The truly human emancipation, which brings man into his true destiny (Bestimmung), is the one which makes him a species being: the true human reality is to be an exemplar of a species. For Marx in general, the person becomes relevant only as an exemplar, if only an exemplar of particularization, of private existence -- as bourgeois" (p. 71).

8. This passage is cited by Marcuse from the 1926 edition of the opening chapter of The German Ideology. He cites it again in another Die Gesellschaft article (Marcuse [1931] 1978, p. 481). A variant rendering appears in the Marx-Engels Collected Works: "We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides, however, are inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men exist." Marx and Engels ([1846] 1976), p. 28.

9. This refers to the famous "Einleitung" of 1857, which first appeared in Die Neue Zeit, 1 (23-25), in Stuttgart in 1902-1903. This was Marx's introduction to the bulky "rough draft" of his critique of political economy, now renowned as the Grundrisse. See Marx, Grundrisse ([1857-58] 1973).

10. Marcuse found these phrases near the end of the "Einleitung" (see Note 8, above). They appear in Marx, Grundrisse ([1857-58] 1953), p. 26; cf. Marx ([1857-58] 1986) and ([1857-58] 1973) for translations. Marx's point -- that all immediate historical and economic categories comprise Existenzforms of underlying social realities -- is pivotal to the whole of his later analysis of value in Capital. Marcuse sees this, and draws out the resemblance between Marx's language of Daseinsformen and Heidegger's parallel vocabulary. Robert Pippin (1988, p. 83) is hence in error to believe that, in Reason and Revolution ([1941] 1960, p. 274), when Marcuse cites this phrase again, he is "inserting in the text, ...without elaboration and defense, ...notions crucial to the Heideggerian period, 'Daseinsformen' and 'Existenzbestimmungen.'"
As evidence for this interpretation a few passages are quoted from the "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," in which Marx does indeed use the expression "species being" in connection with the problem of emancipation. At precisely this point Landshut could well have demonstrated his method of clarifying these notions by returning to their "concrete original situation." Perhaps then he would have realized that the notion of "species" in Marx does not signify what we generally mean by this term today; it is not an abstract generality which finds its particularization only in mere "exemplars." Here, rather, species refers exactly to the fulfillment of the whole person in the whole environment (Umwelt), in contrast to the "dehumanized" existence of mere individuals in capitalist society (Nachlass 1, p. 414). Perhaps then Landshut would have traced the use of this notion to Hegel's Logic, where "species" appears as one of the categories of life -- as a "result of the life process," as a "living totality." Moreover, for a substantive interpretation, it is impermissible for Landshut to seek answers to his question exclusively in the essays in the Deutsch-französischen Jahrbücher. He asserts that there "alone is to be found the implicit presupposition, the foundation of the whole analysis of political economy in Capital" (p. 69). This is doubly false. First, when Landshut's book was written, a volume of great importance for his theme had probably already appeared: The German Ideology. Second, Landshut fails to see that Marx soon abandoned the standpoint of the Deutsch-französischen Jahrbücher.

11. Marx drafted his "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" in 1843; the introduction alone was published in 1844 in a yearbook edited by Marx and Ruge, the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. The full text is available in Marx ([1843] 1975), pp. 3-129.

12. This refers to one of the earliest anthologies of Marx's writings: Marx et al. ([1841-43] 1902), edited by Franz Mehring.

13. See Hegel's Science of Logic ([1812] 1969). Hegel discusses species (and "genus") in Section 3, Chapter 1: "Life" (pp. 761ff.).


15. This is an accurate guess, since the most relevant sections of The German Ideology were available to Landshut when his book appeared in 1929. Short passages from this hitherto unpublished manuscript had first appeared in print in socialist journals in 1903-04 and 1913. The opening chapter on Feuerbach, which is the source of most of the passages cited by Marcuse, first appeared in German in 1926. Six years later the complete text appeared in the so-called MEGA: see Marx and Engels (1932).

16. See Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" ([1845] 1976, pp. 6-8). In the sixth thesis, Marx writes: "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations." Feuerbach fails to see this, however, and is forced by the logic of his views to "abstract from the historical process...and to presuppose an abstract -- isolated -- human individual." Hence, "the essence of man...can with him be regarded only as 'species', as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals only in a natural way."

17. See Marx ([1846] 1976), p. 77. Marx speaks here of the "development of individuals, which proceeds within the common conditions of estates and classes, historically following one another"; he adds: "...if this development is considered from a philosophical point of view, it is certainly very easy to imagine that in these individuals the species, or man, has evolved, or that they evolved man -- and in this way one can give history some hard clouts on the ear." Marx does not actually use the phrase "species being," but he's clearly disdainful of the abuse of the "species" concept. Elsewhere (p. 52) he calls the idea that society evolves as the "self-generation of the species" a "speculative-idealist, i.e., fantastic" surrogate for a genuinely historical view; earlier (p. 29) he remarked that the concept "species" is simply a secularized version of Hegel's mystified notion of transcendental substance. In his manuscript "Alienated Labor" ([1844] 1964, pp. 126-27) -- as in other early writings that first appeared in 1932 -- Marx does speak of alienation from "species being." By this he means, however, only that the individual "makes the community...his object" and, in so doing, acquires the freedom conferred by participation in the "universal" dimension of social life. Marx thus especially on the question of the concrete elaboration of the problem of emancipation. The ground of the critique of political economy lies not in the abstract formulations of these essays, but in the new insights into the structure of capitalist society which he achieved by pursuing the approach sketched above -- by delving deeper into the structure of social being per se. Once humanity and world were conceived in their union as historicity, Marx could no longer uphold a notion as unhistorical as species, and so he polemized against it quite vehemently. In the "Theses on Feuerbach," he criticized Feuerbach for acknowledging the "person" only as an "abstractum," "only as species" (p. 229). And in The German Ideology he ridiculed the designation of people as "species beings" as a pure fancy of so-called "philosophical" contemplation: "When this development of individuals is contemplated...philosophically, it is easily possible to imagine that in these individuals we have the species or mankind, or humanity in its development; a delusion, which gives history a hearty slap in the face" (p. 288).
To be sure, Marx never explained what the liberated humanity of classless society would look like at the terminus of radical emancipation. This, however, was not because the liberated person was an abstract exemplar of a species but because emancipation was always for Marx an unfolding (Geschehen) of concrete social being, so that the manner and meaning of its construction could only be determined in a historical situation in which emancipation had become urgent. The existence (Dasein) posited by Marx as the union of person and world is historical in its Being (Sein). The what- and how-being of humanity and the what- and how-being of the "world" constitute themselves first and only in "history" -- in the concrete unfolding of existence (Geschehen des Daseins). Thus, for Marx, there is no "true reality" or human freedom which could be defined from the start as the goal of emancipation; even the most radical liberation and freedom is always liberation and freedom in and for the concrete situation in which it occurs.

It is primarily in transforming and in being transformed that existence (Dasein) is historical. Historicity as [the] ontological motility [of Dasein] does not unfold with or towards [Dasein], but is itself this unfolding and only this unfolding (Geschehen). Whatever situation Dasein encounters it must deal with -- and change. Since the situation is itself "unfolding," it carries within itself the possibility and necessity of its transformation. This transformation is the proper category of the historicity of Daseins. It has been discovered and grasped by Marx on the ground worked by Hegel and was by no means a fixed or preconceived idea of humanity, like that concerning the alleged reality of disjunction with the world.

"On the ground worked by Hegel" -- even Landshut speaks of an "appropriation of the whole Hegelian framework" through Marx, but says: "The Hegelian identity of consciousness and being, which at first looks like a disjunction of world and human beings, is nevertheless precisely the ground for its most blatant development. It is exactly for Hegel the justification of 'spirit' as 'objective', capable of acting in such a manner that it presents itself as nothing less than the unfolding of the self-determined dialectical movement reigning in the world (i.e., in Being), for which people are only instruments, manipulated by the 'Cunning of Reason'" (p. 75).18 If, however,

criticizes individualistic, profit-seeking society for turning "species life into a means of individual life," and for turning "the latter, as an abstraction, into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form." Marcuse returned to this theme often. See, e.g., his first book on Hegel ([1932] 1987, pp. 123, 159, 280) and his essay on Marx's early writings ([1932] 1972, p. 15).

18. In his book on Hegel's ontology ([1932] 1987, p. 187), which appeared a year after this article, Marcuse notes that "...Hegel's programmatic claim in the introduction to the Logic that the activity of thinking and being... are for Hegel, people are truly nothing more than organs of the principle of movement in the world, then it is truly inconceivable that a disjunction of humanity and world could develop; since, on the contrary, this "instrument" can be so little divided from the "self-determined movement" of reason that reason can move only in and through these instruments. And it remains wholly unclear why, for Hegel, "in this manner...all meaning- and motivation-relations become causally regulated networks of effective relations" (Wirkungszusammenhängen).19 The category of causality appears in Hegel under the category of Essence and already finds its supersession (Aufhebung) there; in the dimension of authentic Being, the "Notion," it has no further meaning.20

19. The translation of this awkward term is borrowed from Seyla Benhabib (1987, p. xvii). A variant rendering is that of Michael Allen Gaspie (1984, p. 145), who writes of "a natural process of action and reaction...a chain of causes and effects (Wirkungszusammenhänge)." Gaspie's study is one of the most insightful books yet written on the Hegel/Heidegger nexus.

20. In his Logic, Hegel discusses "causality" in the closing chapter of the second book ([1812] 1969, pp. 558 and ff.) vis-à-vis the Doctrine of Essence. He makes it clear that, like Kant, he considers subjectivity to be exempt from causality in the natural-scientific sense. He says, for example, that "In so far as the object con-fronts the living being in the first instance as an indifferent externality, it can act upon it mechanically; but in doing so it is not acting as on a living being; where it enters into a relationship with a living being it does not act on it as a cause, but excites it...With the seizure of the object, therefore, the mechanical process passes over into the inner process by which the individual appropriates the object in such a manner as to deprive it of its peculiar nature (Beschaffenheit), convert it into a means for itself, and give its own subjectivity to it for substance" (pp. 771-72, emphasis in the original). Marcuse discusses causality further in his book Hegel's Ontologie ([1932] 1987), pp. 99ff. Like Dilthey, who believed that the human studies or Geisteswissenschaften fall outside the purview of strictly causal analysis, Marcuse believed that cultural facts must be referred back "to a

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consciousness that is itself 'understandable' (verstehbar), and which experiences (erleben) an 'inner world' of meanings as opposed to the 'external' and 'mute' (stumm) one of causal relations." (This is Seyla Benhabib's paraphrase of Marcuse [1931] 1978, in Marcuse [1932] 1987, p. xvii.)