This paper analyzes differences between social welfare emanating from a reciprocity orientation that had its roots in charity and the church and social welfare emanating from a pooling orientation that had its roots in work relegated to women in the family. It suggests that pooling welfare is more appropriate to the state, but that the more successful a program is the more likely it is to blunt the public support it requires.

TWO TRADITIONS IN SOCIAL WELFARE

Alvin Gouldner noted that the norm of reciprocity "may lead individuals to establish relations only or primarily with those who can reciprocate, thus inducing neglect of the needs of those unable to do so. Clearly," he added, "the norm of reciprocity cannot apply with full force in relations with children, old people, or with those who are mentally or physically handicapped, and it is theoretically inferable that other, fundamentally different kinds of normative orientations will develop in moral codes" (1960, p. 178).

Children, old people and mentally or physically handicapped people usually depend for their care on women who are either unpaid workers in the home or paid workers in the home or special care-giving institutions. Social welfare programs are one means of covering the economic costs of care-giving. Though these programs have never enjoyed unanimous support, there are indications that they may presently be under greater attack than usual (Offe 1988). The purpose of this paper is to compare two normative orientations toward social welfare: one that usually leads to weak programs and attacks on the welfare state and another that may be its saving moral support.

The orientation that fosters weak programs and strong opposition, is based on norms of reciprocity. Accordingly, I shall call it "reciprocity welfare." The other is based on fundamentally different normative orientations. Drawing on

* I would like to thank several anonymous reviewers for their comments on this paper and Cathy Giorgi for her research assistance.
distinctions Marshall Sahlins makes between reciprocity and pooling, I shall call it "pooling welfare." Reciprocity, says Sahlins, represents "vice-versa' movements between two parties." Pooling represents "centralized movements: collection from members of a group, often under one hand, and redivision within this group."

Their social organizations are very different....Pooling is socially a within relation, the collective action of a group. Reciprocity is a between relation, the action and reaction of two parties. Thus pooling is the complement of social unity... whereas, reciprocity is social duality and 'symmetry.' Pooling stipulates a social center where goods meet and thence flow outwards, and a social boundary too, within which persons (or subgroups) are cooperatively related. But reciprocity stipulates two sides, two distinct social-economic interests (1972, p. 188).

To some extent, all social welfare programs involve both reciprocation and pooling. They all pool resources into a social center, the state, where resources meet and then flow outward, presumably toward those in need. Some reciprocation is also involved in at least two assumptions: 1) that while they are able to work, healthy, adult citizens contribute to the state so that, when in need, they will be taken care of; and 2) that the services the welfare state provides will enhance the chances that all members of the state, especially those who are currently ill or young, will someday be able to work and contribute to the state. Nonetheless, it is possible to sort the arguments for and against welfare policies into these two quite different orientations.

Generally speaking, pooling welfare, a liberal orientation, focuses on beneficiaries as citizens and represents a collective approach toward welfare programs, stressing their usefulness in maintaining the economic and political independence of the poor by providing them with needed resources (Goodin 1988). Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to take an individualistic, reciprocation approach. Here welfare is seen as a form of charity, a gift with strings attached that establishes a relationship between beneficiaries, whose dependency is stressed, and representatives of the state, who require reciprocation, usually in the form of obedience and submissive rituals.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN RECIPROCITY WELFARE AND POOLING WELFARE

In this paper, I shall compare these two orientations along several dimensions: a sense of duality versus a sense of solidarity; assumptions of natural difference as opposed to assumptions of natural similarity; provision for the reform of the morally fallen in contrast with provision for a material floor below which no one shall fall; a focus on relationship or a focus on rights; practices that stigmatize vs. practices that guarantee anonymity; and practices that diminish citizenship compared with practices that expand citizenship. Following this comparison, I shall briefly trace the different historical trajectories these two orientations toward social policy have taken. Welfare is a governmental response to the failure of other institutions to care for those unable to reciprocate. Policies based on a reciprocity orientation have tended to emanate from church incapacities. Policies based on a pooling orientation have tended to emanate from family incapacities, especially inability to ward off poverty and other social costs of the Industrial Revolution. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the political arguments favoring each of these two kinds of welfare and the conditions likely to lead to the adoption of one or the other.

Solidarity Versus Duality

In general, pooling welfare presumes solidarity, equality of citizens in their needs and decision-making powers, and a common transfer of resources and power from individuals to the collectivity in order to improve the commonly-shared fate. Reciprocity welfare, on the other hand, presumes duality and sides, and a relationship between those sides. On the one side are those of superior fortune or moral worth who choose to bestow guidance and material goods on poor unfortunates who are expected to reciprocate with deference, obedience and service. Many contemporary welfare policies follow the reciprocity model; some follow the pooling model; and most programs are a combination of both.

Emphasizing the sense of solidarity or oneness necessary to pooling, supporters of the welfare state often argue that it must be "based on 'social solidarity'...a collective responsibility for the fate of each individual" (Esping-Andersen 1983, p. 28). Along these lines, Michael Walzer argues that:

The welfare state...expresses a certain civil spirit, a sense of mutuality, a commitment to justice. Without that sense, no society can survive for long as a decent place to live -- not for the needy, and not for anyone else....Communal provision is required for the whole range of social goods that make up what we think of as our way of life. Not my way of life or yours, but ours, the life we couldn't have if we didn't plan for it and pay for it together (1982:14).

A very different view is expressed by those who complain, as did Lawrence M. Mead in The Public Interest, that too many welfare programs emphasize government's responsibility to help people, not clients' responsibility to help themselves. "Recipients can hardly walk into an AFDC office without confronting signs (in English and Spanish) informing them, not of their work obligations, but of their rights to appeal if the program should cut their benefits for any reason" (1982, p. 23). He faults welfare programs based on rights on the grounds that they "merely give things to their recipients...while expecting next to nothing in return....There is virtually no reciprocity, no need to function or serve others" (1982, p. 22, emphasis added),
Mead would solve this lack of reciprocity by increasing the power of the state to control the behavior of receivers: "questions about behavior must be asked, the staff needs more discretion, and personal authority must be exercised over clients" (1982, p. 24).

Equality vs. Inequality of persons

Underlying the unity of the pool is an assumption of natural equality of persons. Thus Thomas Hobbes, who was in essence legitimating and explicating the pool, begins Chapter XIII of his Leviathan by asserting:

Nature hath made men...equal...For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. And as to the faculties of the mind...I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength (1651).

Underlying the duality of reciprocity welfare, on the other hand, is an assumption of natural inequality of persons. Tocqueville, for instance, believed that rights in general "elevate and sustain the human spirit" but "the right of the poor to obtain society's help is unique in that instead of elevating the heart of the man who exercises it, it lowers him" because his very need manifests his inferiority (1983, p. 113).

Nonetheless, reciprocity welfare allows for a diversity of fates as well as natures: misfortune strikes some but not all and though some unfortunate have only themselves to blame, some are miserable through no fault of their own. Along with Tocqueville most of those who favor reciprocity welfare recognize "inevitable evils such as the helplessness of infancy, the decrepitude of old age, sickness, insanity" (1983, p. 118).

Because misfortune is not general in either its incidence or its cause, reciprocity welfare systems usually have some means to distinguish the "deserving" from the "undeserving" poor. The first English Poor Law, a statute enacted under Richard II in 1388, distinguished between the impotent and the able-bodied poor. Later, in the 1530s, a statute enacted under Henry VIII continued to distinguish between the impotent poor and the able-bodied poor and within that framework it set up a system for licensing beggars and putting the unemployed to work (Hagen 1982, p. 109). Centuries later we find the same principles enacted in those welfare programs that call for means-testing and "workfare."

Pooled welfare may establish user categories, but these are without invidious moral distinctions. Categories of users are usually one of three types: first, they may be people in particular life stages such as childhood and old-age; second, they may be people in circumstances to which all members are almost equally subject, such as sickness or natural disaster; and third, they may be user categories, such as drivers, readers or tennis players. The pool provides resources -- schools, hospitals, roads, libraries, tennis courts -- which are available to those who fit the designated categories. Sometimes, especially for the last category, there may be user fees. These are generally priced low enough so that those who can afford to use the service can also afford the fee.

The purpose of pooling is to provide a floor, an agreed upon quality and quantity, of whatever resources are being pooled. In pools, certain resources are socially constructed as communal rather than individual possessions. An example is the Brooklyn Bridge. The quality of a pool is expressed in the well-being of a commonweal. It is the public good, something "which all must enjoy if anyone does" (Goodin 1982, p. 157; also see, Miller 1981, p. 326). In a sense, pools are Durkheim's social facts. They include the national defense, law and order, public health, "the literacy rate, the level of unemployment, the crime rate, [and] the rate of technological progress" insofar as these indicate "the condition and environment of a society" (Steiner, 1970, p. 31). These are the resources that Walzer has in mind when he speaks of welfare as the state or condition of well-being. Pools may also be rights deemed to be inalienable. Pools are used, not exchanged nor reciprocated, and use-value predominates in pooling where resources flow, like water, toward the lowest level.

Pools are established to ward off a common fate. Hobbes depicted a war "of every man against every man" where "the life of man" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." In order to avoid such wretchedness, humans "confer...their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men...[which] reduce[s] all their wills, by plurality of voices unto one will...This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth." In return for contributing some individual power and strength to the pool, a member enjoys peace and security, and even, according to John Locke, "Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise" (1698; also see Sugden 1982, p. 209 and Frohock and Sylvan 1983, p. 542).

Decisions: Through Democratic Means or By Authority

In democratically designed pools, some apparatus, such as the vote, is established so that decisions concerning the pool have at least the appearance that they are made equally by all members of the pool with neither users nor replenishers having greater say about which goods are to be pooled, the rules that will guide their use, or the means by which they will be replenished.

Reciprocity welfare, by contrast, assuming as it does that need often derives from moral slack, usually places the authority to design and administer policy in the hands of the "givers" -- one reason private charity is preferred by conservatives to public welfare. Reciprocity policy strives to raise not the common floor but the moral and work habits of the fallen. The material subsistence that is sometimes provided is secondary to the forced work and moral instruction that is almost always included.
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Rights or Relationship

Not rights but relationships are the central feature of reciprocity welfare. The giver is presumed to be morally better. Partly because of that superiority, givers are responsible for receivers' subsistence. The power to determine the quality and quantity of assistance rests with the giver.

In return for subsistence, the receiver is expected to defer to the giver and accept moral and behavioral guidance. Receivers must plead for help. Their chances of receiving aid usually depend on how impoverished, powerless and docile they can appear to givers. Supplicants should be supple for they must agree to enter a relationship where they take instruction with their bread.

As Tocqueville put it:

[I]ndividual alms-giving established valuable ties between the rich and the poor. The deed itself involves the giver in the fate of the one whose poverty he has undertaken to alleviate. The latter, supported by aid which he had no right to demand and which he may have no hope of getting, feels inspired by gratitude. A moral tie is established between those two classes whose interests and passions so often conspire to separate them from each other, and although divided by circumstance they are willingly reconciled (1983, p. 113-4).

Many contemporary critics of welfare follow Tocqueville in their attacks on programs that undermine the reciprocal relationships between givers and receivers. Michael Novak, for example, recommends that all welfare programs be returned to the private sector where "[s]ocial needs can be met more efficiently, more cheaply and with greater effect," and to local communities "which can be in closer touch with and exert greater control over the poor" (1982, p. 13).

Labelling vs. Anonymity

Reciprocity requires relationship, and reciprocity welfare is designed to establish a relationship between receivers and their betters. Relationship means that reciprocity systems must be arranged so that givers and receivers are not only identified and visible to each other, but that the invidious distinctions between the two are maintained, even emphasized. At some point in the process there must be a face-to-face encounter between the giver, or the giver's representative, and the receiver. When the church was the primary agency for welfare, the minister represented givers. The Elizabethan Poor Laws established the position of local overseers. That role is now played by social workers. They administer means tests and advise those who are assumed, on the basis of their need, to be incapable of autonomous self-direction (Goodin 1988, p. 35).

No such intermediary is necessary in pooling welfare, for its main feature is unity. In order to preserve that unity, pools are usually designed to protect the anonymity of users. Although the pool must have agencies of administration and social control, such as the Internal Revenue Service to maintain order and prevent cheating, pooled welfare, such as income-tax deductions for blindness, medical expenses and mortgage interest, has no privacy-invading means test. Following the principles of equality and anonymity, the pool has but a single level. All individuals in a category receive the same kind and level of assistance.

Expanded vs. Breached Rights of Citizenship

As new resources are added to the pool, citizenship rights expand. The opposite, breached rights of citizenship, is usually part of the reciprocity welfare package.

Face-to-face encounters are a necessary part of reciprocity welfare. They ensure that goods and services go to the "deserving poor," that the recipients are uplifted, not only economically, but, more important, morally, and that welfare funds are not misspent. But as social workers check to make sure that no eligibility rules are broken, privacy rights of recipients are often breached. For example, unannounced nighttime visits were necessary to ascertain whether or not a recipient of AFDC was cohabiting with an able-bodied man (Rainwater and Yancey 1967). Though pools too have investigatory powers, these are likely to be less intrusive (audits at an IRS office, not flashlight searches under a bed), narrowly focused, and designed to prevent or change specific behaviors, not deep-seated moral attitudes.

Typically, too, when reciprocity is the underlying orientation of welfare policy, the right to free movement must be relinquished. At the time when the English Poor Laws were being enacted, landowners were abdicating their traditional obligations of allowing subsistence to peasants. Enclosures of commons forced the landless to roam the countryside in search of waged employment. In order to stem the tide of vagrancy, the Poor Laws gave overseers the right to return potential claimants to the jurisdiction of their birth. The 1388 statute that distinguished between the impotent and the able-bodied poor, for example, was primarily designed to "regulate the movement of laborers and thus prevent vagabondage." Later, the Settlement Act of 1662 gave powers to parish overseers to return any newcomers likely to become public charges to their "parish of legal settlement" (Hagen 1982, p. 109). Thus at the very moment when markets were beginning to demand mobile labor, welfare legislation curtailed the movement of labor (one of several ironies suggesting that the market and reciprocity welfare stem from different orientations).

In the United States, it was not until 1941 that the courts began to protect the right of free movement for those who received welfare assistance. The case was Edwards v. The People of California. In it, the court held, first "that the state could not restrict the transportation of indigent persons across its boundaries because [in so doing] it interfered with interstate commerce"; and second, that "in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character...the relief of the needy has become the common responsibility and concern of the whole nation" (Hagan 1982, p. 112, italics added).
The Politics of Pooled and Reciprocity Welfare

Political controversies often center on questions of which resources are to be circulated in the market as commodities, which are to be reciprocated, and which are to be pooled within a given community. For example, one issue in the 1984 U.S. election was the level of the welfare pool. Both parties subscribed to the idea that there should be a pool—some level below which a citizen should not fall (the safety net). Democrats favored categorical entitlements and tried to defend existing levels of the pool. Republicans, on the other hand, argued that the level was too high—it included goods and services that belonged in the market exchange system. Indeed, they argued that should the pool be too well endowed, those with only their labor-power to exchange would not work in the market or would seek too high a price for their labor (Carleson and Hopkins 1981). Believing that the greatest danger in welfare is that the more generous it is, the more it will encourage the human frailties it should cure, they sought to turn the pool into a reciprocity system by favoring means-tested programs that required recipients to show their faces and submit to behavioral guidance in return for benefits.

Two views of welfare prevail on the left. One school has several features in common with the reciprocity framework. Like the conservative view, it perceives two classes, not a unity, and argues for a moral difference between contributors and receivers. It traces welfare policy back to Christian charity or to the system of feudal reciprocal obligations. Cloward and Piven's cyclical theory, for example, argues that public relief provides a means of establishing a relationship between classes where receivers' behavior is controlled by the givers. In this view, welfare functions to regulate the labor force within capitalist society by curbing political dissent among unemployed workers with expansive relief policies during periods of unrest and enforcing work norms with restrictive relief policies during more stable periods (1977).

Unlike the conservative view, Cloward and Piven's analysis places the mantle of virtue on receivers, not givers. It also argues that powerful givers have been successful in controlling the behavior of the poor through welfare, something conservatives believe ought to be, but is not the case.

A very different approach to welfare emerges when it is framed, not within the duality of reciprocity welfare, but rather within the unity of pooling welfare. Here the focus is on solidarity and the condition of the collective. History begins not with enclosures and the English Poor Laws, but with the liberal state, which develops into a welfare state and "guarantees a decent standard of living to all, as a citizen's right" (Esping-Andersen 1983, p. 34). The focus here is on issues of solidarity and the common good. From this point of view, the greatest danger of welfare is that the more degrading and stingy it is, the more it exacerbates dependencies, inequalities, and divisions endemic to market economies, thereby undermining the solidarity from which the state draws its strength.

DIVERSE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES

These diverse attitudes toward welfare have been developing over several centuries. They are the ideological vehicles that helped transport obligations for the care of children, old people, and those who are mentally or physically handicapped from feudal estates and the family to the church and the state. Reciprocity welfare, with its emphasis on status differences and reciprocal obligations, has often characterized state assumptions of welfare provisions that formerly resided with the church. Direct transfer from the family to the state tends to characterize the development of pooling welfare. However, the path from the household to the state is not straightforward.

In practice, the two types of welfare are often combined. The Church became actively involved in poor relief probably as early as the 6th century A. D. (Webb and Webb 1972). Several centuries later, codification of welfare rights and duties appeared in a 1140 "Decretum," that granted eligibility for relief to all members of the Church (Williamson and Branco 1985, p. 4). Based on the Decretum, medieval canonists argued that the poor had a right to relief and those who were better off had the obligation to provide it (Coll 1969, emphasis added). According to Church doctrine, some were born rich and some were born poor. Poverty was part of God's design—not a reflection of personal failure or moral turpitude, but an opportunity for the well-off to demonstrate Christian charity (Tierney 1959; also see Coll 1969). The Church had its ecclesiastical tax, the tithe, to finance its relief efforts. Here we see pooling reflected in the notion that everyone was a member of the Church and that all were subject to God's design, while reciprocity is reflected in the notion that God's design created difference, and difference implied duty.

In England, when the state began to take on social welfare responsibilities that had once been considered a Church function, notions of commonality and pooling faded. Codification of the state's treatment of the poor began under Richard II in 1388. The English Poor Laws of 1531, 1576 and 1597, later synthesized in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, are the codifications most often cited. They were designed less to relieve the poor and more to relieve communities of vagabondage and begging caused largely by the breakdown of the Feudal order in the wake of the bubonic plague, the commodification of wool, and the enclosures of the commons. The first two laws called for public whipping of all able-bodied beggars, the last for a poor tax to generate revenues needed to provide relief.

The shift of poor relief from the church to the state reflected both the economic transformation toward capitalism, and related shifts in moral orientation, to wit, the Protestant Reformation. The latter included the Calvinist stress on thrift, industry, and sobriety that fit well with the entrepreneurial orientation of the growing and increasingly influential middle class. It also harmonized with the Calvinist conception of predestination which led to the search for signs that one had been selected for salvation. (Coll 1969) economic success being one such sign (Weber [1904-5] 1958). These
interpretations led the way to the practice of blaming poverty on the poor rather than on God’s design.

Over the centuries, English, European and American legislation regarding the poor fluctuated from the mildly to the fiercely repressive. Except for a short and unsuccessful experiment with wage supports between 1796 and 1834 (the Speenhamland System), welfare policy remained reciprocal in its orientation. It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that a significant change in welfare policy and in its legitimations was introduced. Then, in Germany under Bismarck, with more or less universal pensions and health insurance programs, Western states began to design programs that took on features of what has come to be called “entitlements,” and they began to assume responsibilities that had previously been met by the family and private philanthropies.

These changes in attitudes toward welfare were closely linked to the development of markets and market rationalities along with concomitant developments in the family and especially in the social position of women which tended to generate the late nineteenth- and twentieth century trends toward pooling rather than reciprocity welfare.

Between the first awakenings of state welfare in the fourteenth century and the modern universal guarantees of such resources as education, old-age pensions, and medical care, the idea of “women’s sphere,” developed. It was more subtle and far-reaching than were the Poor Laws in solving the problems of human dependency associated with growing market dominance. Its doctrine was promoted in society’s major institutions, including the press, churches and schools, and was so wholeheartedly accepted by the public that women who violated its commandments were considered unnatural.

By normatively assigning the burdens of generative and household work to women, the idea of women’s sphere guaranteed that while male labor-power was freed from feudal normative obligations so that it could be exchanged for incomes in the market, female labor-power would remain tied to a feudal-like system of obligations. Thereby, those without commodities to exchange in the market—not even their labor power—would be supplied with the resources they needed to survive. Women’s sphere guaranteed male children their upbringing free and clear—in spite of the market exchange presumption that nobody would get anything for nothing.

Otherwise there could have been no market economy. As Marx observed, profits depend on the commodification of labor power; and labor power cannot be commodified unless the individual who sells his labor power is “the untrammeled owner of his capacity for labour” (1967, p. 168). In order to produce laborers free from the obligations of the feudal society, women had to continue to be obligated to the feudal-like family if there were to be new generations.

In the United States, during the first half of the nineteenth century, women, sequestered in their sphere, were providing obligatory labor, not only to reproduce the next generation of workers, but also to produce those social service organizations in which women worked to remedy problems like poverty, disease, and helplessness (Baker 1984, p. 625; Buhle 1982; Smith-Rosenberg 1979). A half-century later, as the market achieved its social domination, as the Gilded Age generated greater divisions between rich and poor, and as Social Darwinism became an influential ideology, women and women’s sphere were ideologically and materially degraded. No longer considered the keepers of a higher morality, women were relegated to a subordinate and peripheral social place. No longer able to ameliorate problems of poverty and disease through voluntary, charitable associations, women were advised to remain at home and there create the little haven that would reform the world (Ryan 1971, p. 170-71).

Out of these new disabilities a new vision was created. “[I]deas that had informed women’s efforts, as well as the scope of their work, markedly changed” after the Civil War (Baker 1984, p. 635). During the Progressive era, women’s voluntary work took on the methods and language of social science with a new emphasis on Comtean ideas of altruism, centralization and prevention of social problems (Baker 1984, p. 636; Leach, 1980, pp. 133-213). No longer satisfied with aid to poor people, women aimed to prevent poverty itself. They looked to the state—“the only institution of sufficient scope...and turned their efforts toward securing legislation that addressed what they perceived to be the sources of social problems” (Baker 1984, p. 641). Largely through the efforts of women, “social policy—formerly the province of women’s voluntary work—became public policy” (Baker 1984, p. 640). Women spearheaded labor laws, health legislation and education reform. Political concerns that generally have been termed “women’s issues”—education, public health, care of the young, the elderly and infirm—became the programs of the welfare state.

These programs, as T. H. Marshall (1964) suggests, added a new set of social rights to the definition of citizenship. In their attempt to create a more perfect society, nineteenth-century reformers sought to provide citizens with resources that would make them able to participate in the full social life of the community. With these goals, reciprocity welfare began to give way to pooling welfare.

CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO POOLING WELFARE

Some resources may be added to the pool simply because they are more easily pooled than divided. Such is the case with roads, military defense and air or water quality. But most of the resources needed for a decent standard of living are just as easy to divide as to pool. Inclusion of these within the pool depends on conditions that generate a sense of unity. Nations with few ethnic, religious or racial divisions are more likely to enjoy a sense of solidarity, which may be one reason the Scandinavian countries have more advanced pooled welfare systems than most other industrialized nations. Wars, for all the harm they do, may generate a sense of national cohesiveness from which the pool may be expanded. As Tintuss noted, the British post-war government constructed “the welfare state out of the beginnings of collectivist responses in war” (Rose 1981, p. 485).
Economic depressions, like wars, tend to threaten whole nations and thereby to generate collective solutions such as the New Deal reforms. Prosperity, on the other hand, because it favors those able to reciprocate over those who cannot, often leads toward greater reciprocal policies and fewer pooling policies in welfare. Theda Skocpol has argued that one reason there is so little support for the welfare state was the New Deal's failure "to legitimate new national welfare programs in communal terms".

New Dealers after 1935 mostly gave up the rhetoric of collective solidarity as an antidote to excessive individualism, and instead sought to justify New Deal reforms as a better means for achieving or safeguarding traditional American values of liberty and individualism... The welfare state cannot be easily defended against individualist, market-oriented and anti-statist ideologies (Skocpol 1983, pp. 36-7, 40).

It may also be that by the time recovery was in sight, the nation had lost touch with its common fate and begun to turn a deaf ear to the rhetoric of collective solidarity.

Without a sense of solidarity, welfare programs tend to be based on principles of reciprocity welfare. These suffer an inherent contradiction: They are based on the premise of natural difference, but citizens are equals. Therefore, where state welfare policies attempt to follow reciprocity principles they tend to create divisions rather than the reconciliation of classes that Tocqueville saw as a virtue of private voluntary charity. In addition, they degrade citizens rather than upgrading them by demanding, in return for subsistence, the relinquishment of such rights of citizenship as privacy, free movement, and freedom to own property.

State welfare has been used effectively, as Piven and Cloward argue, as a weapon in class wars. But then the social contract on which the state is based is bent and the nation is turned into an arena for conflict rather than a collective. It can then provide neither the peace of which Hobbes wrote nor the protection of property that Locke claimed was the reason we give up some of our liberties to create the state.

Pooling principles, on the other hand, are compatible with these of the state. These principles include the following elements: (1) anonymity must be preserved, at least use must be free of moral opprobrium; (2) the quantity of the goods or services must be sufficient to avoid duplication in private charity programs; (3) the quality of services must be high enough so that the overwhelming majority of potential users will not turn to the market for alternatives; and (4) the goods and services available in the pool should have the same quality and quantity for all users.

Some welfare state programs follow all these principles, most follow some but not others, and several follow none at all. Roads generally meet all the qualifications. Schools meet the first and second, sometimes the third, but seldom the fourth. Social Security conforms to the first, but not the other three.

CONCLUSION

This has been a preliminary analysis of the differences between social welfare emanating from a reciprocity orientation and social welfare emanating from a pooling orientation. It suggests that pooling welfare might be more appropriate to the state, but that its very processes are likely to work against the public support it requires. Future research might explore some relationships suggested by this analysis such as the following: 1) that policy will tend toward reciprocity where recipients are likely to be poor or powerless and toward pooling where they are likely to be more powerful; 2) the quality of child care will depend on whether middle-class parents turn to public or private institutions when both parents are employed outside the home; 3) policy will tend to be based on pooling orientations during times of general crisis; and 4) nations with
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homogeneous populations are more likely than nations with heterogeneous populations to use policy based on pooling orientations.

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