member’s entry into the labor market and future mobility. Portes and Rumbaut thus find that employment within an ethnic enclave economy, as typified by the Cubans of South Florida, is the most promising option in terms of economic payoff.

In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the authors discuss the various problems that immigrants face in their adaptation to American society. The authors find that first generation immigrants are the most disengaged from American politics whereas second and third generation immigrants, and refugees in general, appear to be the most involved. The authors also discuss the effects of the U.S. English movement, finding that the movement has been largely unsuccessful in achieving its goals, but instead has fostered increased ethnic solidarity, and sometimes militancy, among immigrant ethnics.

In the conclusion, Portes and Rumbaut examine the macro- and micro-structures of labor migration. Focusing specifically on Mexican and Puerto Rican immigration, they discuss four factors that contribute to their immigration: the history of U.S. intervention in the periphery, the absorption of the Southwest into the United States and the colonization of Puerto Rico, U.S. economic domination of peripheral regions (which has undermined indigenous institutions in the periphery), and a history of direct labor recruitment from these adjacent areas of the periphery. On the micro-level, the existence of ethnic migration networks and the prior experience of migrating family members are discussed as important features determining labor migration.

Immigrant America, while not the intellectual cousin of Latin Journey (Portes’ previous book, written with associate Robert L. Bach, 1985), is instead an excellent resource for those interested in a concise account of immigrant life experiences and recent academic thinking in the field. The book should be strongly considered for use in the classroom but is also accessible to a general audience.

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Anthony Cortese, a sociologist, challenges the late Lawrence Kohlberg’s individualistic view of morality. Kohlberg’s psychological notion of universal levels and stages of moral reasoning is directly challenged by the author. Kohlberg’s levels are: 1. "preconventional," a period during which moral judgments are based largely on expectations of rewards or punishments, 2. "conventional," a period during which moral judgments largely reflect social conventions, a "law and order" approach to morality, and 3. "postconventional," a period during which moral judgments are derived from moral principles and people look to themselves to set moral standards.


Cortese traces the lineage of individualistic moral reasoning back to Immanuel Kant and discusses in great detail how Kant’s reasoning has continued through the works of Jean Piaget, Kohlberg, and Jurgen Habermas. Cortese then writes that moral reasoning and development are brought about through our social and cultural contracts and are not universal.

Cortese notes that Piaget’s model of moral development is taken from Emile Durkheim, who theorizes that moral facts are social. But Piaget claims that these moral facts remain constant between different cultures. Kohlberg goes beyond Piaget’s theory and finds that morality is in the psychological structure of the individual.

Cortese argues that, "While the works of Piaget and Kohlberg are of monumental importance for the study of moral judgment and moral behavior, there is a major flaw in their works. The assertion that there are six and only six stages with one and only one final, mature mode of moral judgment preempts all other moral systems for all time" (p. 107). He also claims that their work seems to ignore the existence of ethnic groups (p. 1):

The literature on moral theory appears to view Anglo-American culture as universal in defining moral development, while unable to recognize virtually all-white research samples as a methodological problem. My central thesis is that morality based on justice cannot be purely subjective, in the sense that it cannot be derived from the principles of individualism alone. Nor can it be purely objective (e.g., universal rules).

The book’s seven chapters are clearly outlined at length in the introduction. The first three chapters deal with the historical aspects of early philosophical assumptions about moral reasoning, and end with how these thoughts affected the formation of Kohlberg’s six stage theory of moral reasoning. Chapter 1 exhibits the cognitive development approach to moral reasoning, and a close critique of Immanuel Kant’s ethical system. How that
system related to Piaget's and Kohlberg's philosophical suppositions is investigated. Chapter 2 examines the socio-historical conditions that dictate how we conceptualize morality, and how these conditions affected the formation of knowledge and the study of language. The distinction between what is "object" and what is "subject" is argued also. In chapter 3 the author conducts a logic-based analysis of the relationship between moral development and the sociology of knowledge as a social product. Kohlberg's six stages are introduced and examined for universality and for other variables.

The next four chapters are less historical. Chapter 4 draws attention to the many methodological problems of using Kohlberg's instruments to measure moral judgment. In chapter 5 Cortese discusses how social class and ethnic background affect human development. A feminist perspective on the cognitive development framework is included, along with Cortese's introduction of his own research of ethnic groups. He then compares his research with other cross-cultural studies. Cortese continues to use his own research in chapter 6 to try to establish a theoretical framework for subcultural variations in moral reasoning. Rather than support the idea of moral reasoning being universal, he offers evidence that the variables of personal autonomy, social level, and ethnic background all affect moral reasoning. In the last chapter Cortese uses Durkheim's dualistic conceptualization of language to disagree with Kohlberg's and Habermas' orientation toward moral theory. He reintroduces the objective-subjective dimension of social reality and concludes that morality is problematic because it is both subjective and objective.

The first three chapters would be of interest to those concerned with the philosophical and historical thoughts and events that contributed to the establishment of Kohlberg's six stage theory of moral development. Some knowledge of philosophy would be helpful in understanding this material. The following chapters would be for those interested in a sociological analysis of Kohlberg's stage theory and in cross-cultural issues.

REFERENCES


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