A METATHEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIOECONOMICS

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A good portion of the current debate over socio-economics and economic sociology has been framed in metatheoretical, particularly paradigmatic, terms. Having done a good deal of work in metatheory in general (Ritzer 1988, 1989b, 1990c), and paradigm analysis in particular (Ritzer 1975, 1981), I would like to address the current work in socio-economics, especially Amitai Etzioni’s (1988) The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, from those points of view. Such a metatheoretical examination should allow us to better understand these works, their objectives, and their strengths and weaknesses.

IS EVERYTHING A PARADIGM?

Since the term paradigm is bandied about by many of the new socio-economists, we are entitled to ask precisely what they mean when they use that term and whether socio-economics can be seen as a new paradigm (or a theoretical component of a paradigm). Those who use the paradigm concept leave themselves open to a wide range of criticisms. The basic source of the problem is ambiguities in Kuhn’s (1962) original work on the paradigm concept, as was well documented by Masterman (1970) who enumerated 21 different uses of the concept in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Stung by the critics, Kuhn (1970) later tried to give the paradigm concept more specificity by defining it as an exemplar, or a concrete solution to a scientific puzzle. However, many observers felt that Kuhn had done a disservice to the basic thrust of his original work by limiting the paradigm concept in this way. Their view was that the truer meaning(s) of the paradigm concept was to be found in his earlier, more ambiguous work.

The latter view, of course, leaves considerable latitude in how one uses the paradigm concept. As someone who has been criticized for using the concept too loosely (Eckberg and Hill 1979), I am loathe to critique the new socio-economists on this ground. However, even I am tested by the wide range of things that they call a paradigm. Take, for example, Swedberg’s (1989) notion of the sociological paradigm (homo sociologicus). For one thing, this implies that there was, or is, a single, dominant sociological paradigm. No analyst of sociology from a paradigmatic perspective has ever come to such a conclusion; sociology is always seen as multi-paradigmatic (Friedrichs 1970; Effrat 1972; Ritzer 1975; Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman 1987, p. 318). More specifically, Swedberg sees the sociological paradigm as, among other things,

focusing on a collective actor and on the constraining effects of social structure. However, in my view no sociological paradigm has ever focused on the collective actor. The social facts paradigm comes closest, but its main concern is with social structure and culture and their constraining effects on the individual actor. The social definition paradigm focuses not on structural and cultural constraints, but on the way individual actors create their own actions as well as the larger society. In the social behavior paradigm, the (individual) actor is constrained, but by contingencies of reinforcement, not by social structure and culture. The paradigm described by Swedberg is not in accord with any of sociology's multiple paradigms, let alone with some imagined dominant sociological paradigm. Furthermore, it communicates the erroneous idea that sociology is, or has been, a single paradigm science.

Etzioni does not define what he means by a paradigm, but it seems clear that a paradigm is, for him, characterized by the fact that its assumptions play a key role in a variety of fields. Thus, it appears that the neoclassical approach is a paradigm (in Etzioni's sense of the term) because its assumptions span theories in economics, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history. It is in contrast to the neoclassical paradigm, but with a similar sense of cross-disciplinary breadth, that Etzioni offers his "deontological I&WE paradigm." Socio-economics is portrayed as a theory within the deontological I&WE paradigm that is supposed to provide a way of dealing with economic behavior that stands in contrast to neoclassical economic theory derived from the neoclassical paradigm. Etzioni's very broad sense of a paradigm has little, if anything, to do with Kuhn's original sense of a paradigm, and it certainly is far removed from Kuhn's later sense of a paradigm as an exemplar. I don't want to take this argument too far. The neoclassical and deontological approaches are certainly something and they are perspectives worth thinking about and delineating. We need to call them paradigms we are stretching the meaning of the concept farther than even I can tolerate.

While Swedberg associates paradigms with disciplines and Etzioni sees paradigms as multi-disciplinary, Kyle (1989) goes in the other direction and describes a specific subfield, the sociology of development, as multi-paradigmatic. Clearly, the paradigm concept cannot be meaningfully applied at all of these levels; it cannot apply across disciplines, to all of sociology, and to a small part of sociology. Some years ago there was a call for a moratorium on the use of the concept of alienation because it was being used indiscriminately; perhaps a similar call needs to be made on behalf of the paradigm concept.

While I do not agree with their use of the paradigm label, I do like several things that Swedberg and Etzioni do with their "paradigmatic" analyses. For example, Etzioni correctly subsumes narrower theories under broader "paradigms." I am especially attracted to Swedberg's focus on the imperialism of the neoclassical paradigm. Good paradigm analysis always leads us into the realm of politics, the battle for power between adherents of different paradigms. I think Swedberg is quite right in arguing that economists have been imperialistic in their efforts to export the neoclassical approach into other fields. By the same token, Etzioni's work can be seen as something of a counterattack into economics of a paradigm informed by different assumptions and based on research results from an array of social sciences. In fact, although he relies primarily on non-sociological sources to make his case, I believe that Etzioni is articulating an eminently sociological approach to economics that focuses on traditional sociological concerns with social, cultural, and personality factors. Needless to say, one can anticipate hostility from supporters of the neoclassical approach within economics.

It also may be that Etzioni harbors imperialistic ambitions of his own. On the one hand, he clearly intends that his approach would subsume neoclassicism within economics. On the other, the issue is whether he intends that his socio-economics apply only to economic behavior or to all social behavior. The fact that he marshals many non-economic examples throughout his book would lead one to suspect that he has the latter, more ambitious objective. But Etzioni (1988, p. 63) is even quite open about the breadth of his objective when he discusses the foundation "for a valid theory of behavior and society, including economic behavior, a theory referred to as socio-economics." Such imperialism fits with basic paradigm dynamics even if we have difficulty thinking of Etzioni's approach as a paradigm.

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Whether or not we label what is occurring a new paradigm, several different things of great importance are happening in and between sociology (and other social sciences) and economics.

First, within sociology a number of observers (Swedberg 1987; Swedberg, Himmelstrand, and Brulin 1987; Ritzer 1989a) have recently called for the resurrection of economic sociology. In their view, recent sociological attention to economic issues has been divided among an array of subfields: sociology of work, industrial sociology, organizational sociology, sociology of development, etc. The problem with these subfields is that they offer only highly limited glimpses of the economy. What is needed is a revival of economic sociology which would adopt a more holistic view of the economy, its relationship to other sub-systems of society, and its impact on actors. The revival of economic sociology is related to, but far narrower in scope than, socio-economics. That is, what is being called for is merely the revival of a long-standing field in sociology, not the development of new theories, paradigms, or disciplines.

At another, even more specific level, we are witnessing increasing interest in sociological theories with strong roots in the neoclassical paradigm, most notably rational choice theory (Friedman and Hechter 1988, 1990) and game-theoretic Marxism (Roemer 1982; Elster 1985). This is part of the economic imperialism described by Swedberg and others; the neoclassical paradigm is clearly making inroads in sociological theory. One metatheoretical issue is how much of this development is a result of imperialistic pressures from without and how much of it reflects legitimate theoretical needs within sociology.
Another issue is whether rational choice theory is part of a new emerging paradigm in sociology, or whether it can be subsumed under extant paradigms. While it may grow into a full-fledged paradigm of its own, my guess is that its limitations and the historic hostility of sociologists to it will prevent it from attaining paradigmatic status within sociology. However, in a more limited way, rational choice theory can be included rather easily as a new theoretical component of the extant social behavior paradigm. In fact, elements of the neoclassical approach were important in the formation of the roots of that paradigm in psychology and of its major theoretical component, exchange theory, in sociology.

But the most important metatheoretical issue is the relationship between socio-economics and ongoing developments in sociological theory. I will argue two points here. First, that socio-economics is in tune with major developments in sociological theory in the 1980s and as we enter the 1990s. Secondly, in spite of such general similarities, socio-economics, especially as it is espoused by Etzioni, seems largely out of touch with these developments. It will be argued that socio-economics can be greatly enriched by drawing on the latest developments in sociological theory.

One of the ironies here is that Etzioni, who is a sociologist, is being accused of being unaware of the latest developments in sociological theory. As I read his book, his major roots in sociological theory seem to lie in Parsonsian structural-functional theory as well as that of Parsons's critic, Dennis Wrong. Parsons' emphasis on culture (in fact he labelled himself a "cultural determinist" [Parsons 1966]), as well as in the relationships among the social, cultural, and personality systems, all play a prominent role in Etzioni's approach. Also important is the Parsonsian emphasis on socialization and internalization as well as Wrong's (1961) caution that we must be wary of producing an oversocialized conception of people. However, these are ideas that reached their height of influence in sociological theory several decades ago. If Etzioni wants to operate within a modified, Parsonsian approach, one wonders why he does not draw upon the work of Alexander and his supporters who are endeavoring to overcome earlier weaknesses by constructing a neo-Parsonian, neofunctionalist perspective.

How could Etzioni, who seems so up-to-date in economics, psychology, and political science, be so out of touch with sociological theory? I think the answer lies in the implicit politics of The Moral Dimension. Etzioni does not have to convince sociologists of the importance of moral, social and personality factors. What sociologist is going to object to Etzioni's (1988, p. 251) closing message that ".socio-economics is...to view pleasure and self-interest within the broader context of human nature, society and ultimate values?" However, he does have to convince others, especially economists, psychologists, and political scientists, with the result that the overwhelming majority of his references are drawn from those fields. Furthermore, Etzioni is also addressing a larger public policy audience, and evidence amassed from these other fields is far more influential than evidence drawn from sociology. Etzioni has clearly done his homework in economics, psychology, and political
Individualism, which is imbued in the neoclassical paradigm, includes individuals who challenge their collectivities. In its theoretical syntheses, including micro-macro synthesis, the paradigm advanced here seeks to characterize the context within which the forces that the neoclassical approach focuses on are played out, a context that sets limits and provides direction to those forces (Etzioni 1988, pp. 3-4).

One of my theses is that Etzioni's work on socio-economics is very much of this time and genre even though there is no evidence that this vast body of work had any influence on Etzioni's thinking. Not willing to lose useful ideas from the neoclassical paradigm, Etzioni begins with and accepts its micro-level insights into individual behavior. However, he believes that there is more to the micro-level than simply behavior, we must also be concerned with personality factors. More importantly, we cannot be content to operate exclusively on the micro-level, we must include macro-level factors. Furthermore, these macro-level phenomena are more than aggregated, micro-level phenomena. Thus, Etzioni includes the basic sociological principle of emergence and focuses a good deal of his attention on emergent social and cultural phenomena. Most importantly, Etzioni is concerned with the interrelationships among these micro and macro-level phenomena. Here is the way Etzioni (1988, p. 181) expresses his integrative, micro-macro concerns:

Radical individualism, which is imbued in the neoclassical paradigm, leads it to focus on one level of human activities in its study of human purpose and its instruments: on that of myriad individuals. The paradigm evolved here sees a great deal of the explanation of human achievements-and what holds them back-on the collective level of historical and societal forces. Individuals do play a role, but within the context of their collectivities. These are pivotal even for those individuals who challenge their collectivities and work together to change their We-ness. Moreover, the collective level is not an aggregation of myriad individual decisions, transactions or actions, but has a form, a structure, of its own, which affects all behavior significantly. Individuals must either act within the constraints imposed by the structure or learn to change it (Etzioni 1988, p. 181).

A second body of work that Etzioni would have found helpful is the wide range of efforts, as we move into the 1990's, at theoretical syntheses, including continuing work on micro-macro synthesis. Once again, even though Etzioni ignores the body of work, his orientation is in accord with it. Specifically, Etzioni seeks to synthesize neoclassical theory and socio-economics. He expresses this goal in this way:

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the approach followed here is one of codetermination: It encompasses factors that form society and personality, as well as neoclassical factors that form markets and rational decision-making. Moreover, we can go beyond suggesting that both approaches need to be synthesized (italics added); we can identify to some extent how they are related to one another: The paradigm advanced here seeks to characterize the context within which the forces that the neoclassical approach focuses on are played out, a context that sets limits and provides direction to those forces (Etzioni 1988, pp. 3-4).

However, Etzioni is far from alone in setting such a synthetic goal for himself. In fact, a wide number of theorists have recently recognized the movement toward syntheses within sociological theory (Smelser 1988; Alexander and Colomy 1990; Ritzer 1990). Nor is Etzioni alone in seeking a more synthetic approach from a base in the neoclassical paradigm.

For example, operating within the neoclassical paradigm, Friedman and Hechter (1990; see also, Friedman and Hechter 1988) offer not only a spirited defense of rational choice theory, but like Etzioni they also recognize some of its limitations and point future theorists in the directions needed to overcome these limitations. Among other things, they, again much like Etzioni, urge more work on the rationality of individual actors and its internal limits, on the origin of preferences within actors, on how to aggregate from individual actions to macrosocial outcomes, and on how rational egoists produce institutions. To put it simply, Friedman and Hechter are urging a fuller sense of the actor and greater concern with various facets of the micro-macro linkage. In emphasizing this linkage, Friedman and Hechter are urging a more synthetic type of rational choice theory than is usually found in the literature. There is a broad correspondence between Etzioni's socioeconomics and efforts by Hechter and Friedman to develop a more synthetic rational choice theory.

Another development of direct relevance to Etzioni's concerns is recent work in exchange theory. After years of micro-level, neoclassical and behavioristic excess, exchange theory too is moving in a more synthetic direction. This has been made possible mainly by the work of Richard Emerson and his disciples, especially Karen Cook (1987a, 1987b). For example, Cook, O'Brien and Kollok (1990) define exchange theory in inherently integrative terms as being concerned with exchanges at various levels of analysis including among interconnected individuals, corporations, and nation states. They identify two strands of work in the history of exchange-one at the micro-level focusing on social behavior as exchange and the other at the more macro-level of social structure as exchange. They see the strength of exchange theory in micro-macro integration since "it includes within a single theoretical framework propositions that apply to individual actors as well as to the macro-level (or systemic level) and it attempts to formulate explicitly the consequences of changes at one level for other levels of analysis" (Cook et al. 1990).
Cook et al. (1990) identify three contemporary trends, all of which point toward a more integrative exchange theory. The first is the increasing use of field research focusing on more macroscopic issues, which can complement the traditional use of the laboratory experiment to study microscopic issues. Second, they note a shift in substantive work away from a focus on dyads and toward larger networks of exchange. Third, and most important, is the ongoing effort to synthesize exchange theory and structural sociologies, especially network theory. (We will have more to say about this last issue shortly.)

Along the way, Cook et al. discuss the gains to be made from integrating insights from a variety of other micro-theories. Decision theory offers "a better understanding of the way actors make choices relevant to transactions" (Cook et al. 1990). More generally, cognitive science (which includes cognitive anthropology and artificial intelligence) sheds "more light on the way in which actors perceive, process, and retrieve information" (Cook et al. 1990). Symbolic interactionism offers knowledge about how actors signal their intentions to one another and this is important in the development of trust and commitment in exchange relationships. Most generally, they see their synthetic version of exchange theory as being well-equipped to deal with the centrally important issue of the micro-macro relationship. In their view, "exchange theory is one of a limited number of theoretical orientations in the social sciences that explicitly conceptualize purposeful actors in relation to structures" (Cook et al. 1990).

Also relevant are the emerging ties between network theory and exchange theory. Network theory appears to offer exchange theory a highly compatible macro-theory that complements exchange theory's micro orientation. For example, network theorists, like exchange theorists, are little interested in individual motives. The network theorist's interest in objective ties meshes nicely with the exchange theorist's interest in objective patterns of behavior. Network theory also allows exchange theorists to see the dyads of traditional concern to them as being embedded in larger networks or relationships. This means that exchange theorists can examine the effects of interpersonal exchange transactions on larger networks and conversely the effect of those networks on exchange transactions.

However, Cook et al. (1990), like others, (e.g. McMahon 1984) are wary of the dangers associated with moving a traditionally micro-level theory in a macro direction:

While exchange network theory has much promise, there are potential pitfalls in any attempt to extend a well-developed micro-level framework to apply to more macro-levels. Exchange theory will need a more explicit specification of the processes at the macro-level it seeks to explain and some vision of the nature of these macro-level processes in relation to other existing structures and events (e.g. an explicit acknowledgement of the historical, political, and institutional context in which events of interest are likely to occur).
of Giddens, Bourdieu and Alexander. For example, he argues that "values...render some decision-making more effective" (Etzioni 1988, p. 4). Or, later he argues that "normative values often play important positive functions, and...they are not merely hindrances to reason" (Etzioni 1988, p. 108). A similar viewpoint applied to macro-objective structures would have greatly enhanced Etzioni's effort.

Another type of work on micro-macro linkage that Etzioni might have found useful deals with the nature of the relationships between micro and macro. Munch and Smelser (1987) discuss such relationships as aggregation; externalization; creating, sustaining, reproducing the macro; conformity; internalization and limit setting. Some of these, especially internalization, are found in Etzioni's work. He could have utilized these other relationships and enriched his analysis of the relationships he did deal with by drawing on works such as this.

Turning to the new synthetic work being produced as we move into the 1990's, Etzioni would have profited from, among others, the recent work of the neofunctionalists. The adoption of the label "neofunctionalism" is clearly designed to show continuity with structural functionalism, but also to indicate that the new perspective seeks to overcome some of the problems associated with structural functionalism as well as to extend that perspective. Alexander (1985, p. 10) has enumerated the problems associated with structural functionalism that neofunctionalism will need to surmount including "anti-individualism," "antagonism to change," "conservatism," "idealism," and an "anti-empirical bias." Efforts are being made to overcome these problems programmatically (Alexander 1985) and at more specific theoretical levels, for example Colomy's (1986) attempt to refine differentiation theory, but even Alexander (1985, p. 16) had to admit that "neofunctionalism is a tendency rather than a developed theory."

However, Alexander and Colomy (1990) have now staked out a very ambitious claim for neofunctionalism. They do not see it as, in their terms, a more modest "elaboration," or "revision," of structural functionalism, but rather a "reconstruction" of it in which differences with the founder (Parsons) are clearly acknowledged and explicit openings are made to other theories (e.g. conflict, interactionism). Efforts are made to integrate into neofunctionalism insights from the masters such as Marx's work on material structures and Durkheim's on symbolism. In an attempt to overcome the idealist bias of Parsonsian structural functionalism, especially its emphasis on macro-subjective phenomena like culture, openings are urged to more materialist approaches. The structural functional tendency to emphasize order is counteracted by a call for rapprochement with theories of social change. Most importantly, to compensate for the macro-level biases of traditional structural functionalism, efforts are made to integrate ideas from exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, phenomenology, etc. In other words, Alexander and Colomy are endeavoring to synthesize structural functionalism with a number of other theoretical traditions. Such reconstruction can both

revive structural functionalism and provide the base for the development of a new theoretical tradition.

What might Etzioni have gained from this new synthetic work in neofunctionalism? For one thing, he might have avoided the tendency to exaggerate the significance of moral and cultural phenomena. As the title of his book makes clear, Etzioni errrs in this direction and fails to give equivalent attention to macro-structural phenomena. Indeed, explicit and detailed attention to such phenomena is left to the last part of the book. And when he does deal with macro-structural phenomena, he tends to focus on their subjective aspects; the ways in which they are internalized in actors (Etzioni 1988, p. 189). The opening of neofunctionalism toward more structural theories and phenomena would have helped here. In addition, Etzioni fails to give adequate attention to micro-level sociological theories and their insights. Again, the efforts by the neofunctionalists to integrate ideas from various micro theories would have been helpful. Or, Etzioni could have turned more directly to micro theories such as symbolic interactionism and phenomenology for ideas and insights. For example, Etzioni stresses the idea that unlike in the neoclassical paradigm, rationality for him involves conscious deliberations and not automatic, unconscious responses. Micro-theorists have had a lot to say about such conscious processes that Etzioni would have found useful.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has been largely a critique of socio-economics in general, and Etzioni's work in particular, from a metatheoretical point of view. Clearly, there are important weaknesses in that work from a paradigmatic, and more generally metatheoretical, perspective. However, this emphasis on critique should not be taken to imply that there are not important strengths in this body of work. I do think that sociology needs a revival of economic sociology and that theories derived from the neoclassical approach (e.g. rational choice theory) have an important role to play in sociological theory. More specifically, I think Etzioni is to be praised for seeking to systematically delineate a socioeconomic alternative to neoclassicism. In doing so, he has mined the literature in fields such as economics and psychology to present a highly detailed picture of socio-economics. While he continually reminds the reader that he is offering only a first approximation, the detail represents a real strength of this work in contrast to the theoretical literature within sociology discussed above. While Etzioni could certainly profit from exposure to that literature, those theorists could greatly enrich their theoretical perspectives by following Etzioni's model of utilizing detailed empirical literature and evidence to support each position. While most sociological theorists present hollow theoretical shells, Etzioni has created a theoretical structure that is rich in detail. My main quarrel is not with the detail, but with the theoretical structure which could have been greatly enhanced by exposure to recent work in sociological theory.
ENDNOTES

1. Swedberg might be on firmer ground on his image of the neoclassical paradigm (homo economicus). However, it may not even be possible to think of economics as a single paradigm science. The work of critics such as Simon, Lindberg, the historical economists, etc. are so influential that we can conceive of economics as possessing competing paradigms. Etzioni offers an image of the neoclassical paradigm similar to that of Swedberg, although he is certainly cognizant (as is Swedberg) of, and even stresses, its critics and alternatives.

2. In another essay, Swedberg (along with Himmelstrand and Brulin) use paradigm in still another way to describe the paradigm of economic sociology, but at least they acknowledge that its usage is closer to Merton's sense of a paradigm (in functional analysis) than Kuhn's (Swedberg, Himmelstrand and Brulin 1987).

3. In spite of this, as well as the previously discussed confusion over the term, I will, following the work of the authors being analyzed, use the (ambiguously defined) term paradigm throughout the rest of this paper.

4. In my (Ritzer 1975) sense of the term.

5. Parsons and structural functionalism also play a central role in Etzioni's (1968) earlier major theoretical work, The Active Society. He writes of "the functional analysis employed here" and makes it clear that he is modifying it so that it is better able to deal with change (Etzioni 1968: 121; see also p. 418).

6. Coleman (1986) also sees himself as a methodological individualist endeavoring to build a more integrated theory.

7. By the way, work on micro-macro integration and theoretical syntheses are not the only relevant bodies of work in sociology that Etzioni ignores. To take another example, Etzioni has a lot to say about emotions, but shows no familiarity with the growing body of literature on the sociology of emotions.

8. Turner and Maryanski (1988) have recently challenged neofunctionalism by arguing that it is not really functional in its orientation; it has abandoned many of the basic tenets of structural functionalism.

9. This seems to be in accord, at least partially, with Turner and Maryanski's (1988) claim that neofunctionalism has little in common with structural functionalism.
Mid-American Review of Sociology


Mid-American Review of Sociology


