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APPENDIX: CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES ANALYZED

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**Significant at the .01 level.

AGE: Age in years.
EDUC: Years of education.
INCOME: Income from wages in 1975.
HEALTH: Perceived health compared to others of same age.
ORGACT: Active participation in organizations or groups outside of work.
RELACT: Religious activity compared to others in congregation.
LIFSAT1: Satisfaction with life as a whole.
LIFSAT2: Satisfaction with income.
LIFSAT3: Satisfaction with standard of living.
LIFSAT4: Satisfaction with success and achievement.
LIFSAT5: Satisfaction with job.

OBSTACLES TO COLLECTIVIZATION AMONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES: TWO VENEZUELAN CASES

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University of Kansas


State-sponsored programs of collectivization continue to generate a great deal of theory and policy debates. When Indian communities are involved in such national programs, the debate acquires newer and even more complex dimensions which have not yet been adequately addressed. In this paper, I examine a program of collective Empresas Indigenas organized in Venezuela in the early 1970s, with particular focus on two of those empresas. I argue that pre-existing forms of economic and social organization (whether traditional or inherited) are not necessarily contradictory with more complex forms of cooperation in production. In fact, these pre-existing arrangements often represent an important foundation for the transition to higher forms of collectivization. However this is not an automatic process and much depends on the particular approach that is used to effect the transition, as well as on contingent, external forces which impinge upon the development of these cooperatives.

INTRODUCTION

For those of us who value principles of collective organization and participatory democracy in economic production, the news concerning the success rates of production cooperatives and collectivization programs around the world is mostly bad. Galleski (1973), Fagen, Deere, and Coraggio (1986), and others tell us that peasants historically have resisted collectivization. For Latin America, Stavenhagen (1975), de Janvry (1981), Fals Borda (1977), and Zamosc (1986) present us with pictures of collapses and parcelization of cooperatives, and eventually total disillusionment with collectivization programs. Yet, neither governments, independent organizers, nor social scientists appear ready to abandon the idea of production cooperatives as a means to address both the agrarian and peasant questions. This is partly due to the fact that, despite general consensus on the forces which shape the successes and failures of cooperatives, many questions remain about obstacles to democratic forms of production within a capitalist environment, and about how the different compositions of peasant groups affect their socio-economic situation.

Both policy makers (concerned with intractable rural poverty and recurring food crises) and progressive intellectuals lured by components of equality and self-determination continue to consider collectivization as a viable option for individual communities and entire societies in Latin America. However, the disturbing co-existence of big failures with small successes, and of unquestionable
"improvements" with failed "transformations" (Long, 1980) puzzles even the ardent supporters of collectivization. Some wonder whether supporting state-initiated cooperatives and full collectivization is politically correct, while others, such as de Janvry (1981), believe state-supported rural development programs in general, may simply prolong the misery of the peasantry.

The questions surrounding collectivization, and rural development programs in general, become even more complex when they are raised in conjunction with Indian communities. The historical and structural particularities of Indian communities dictate that we carefully assess the validity of widely accepted explanations about the forces which shape rural development programs, and which affect their long-term consequences. To date, very few studies which base their analysis on field data have done this.

In this paper, I help to address this research void by examining an unprecedented Indian development program which emerged in Venezuela in the early 1970s, and which had as a major objective the establishment of collective production enterprises or _empresas Indígenas_. I argue that within a certain category of Indian communities, one finds unique socio-economic and cultural features which facilitate (rather than obstruct) the organization of more encompassing cooperative arrangements. However, this is not an automatic process, and the benefits of new cooperative arrangements are not uniformly positive across communities. The effects depend on the particular approach that is used to create collectives, and on a composite of structural and contingent (external and internal forces) which impinge upon them.

I focus specifically on two _empresas_: the _empresa_ of Kumani organized among the Pume or Yaruro in the state of Apure and the _empresa_ of Saimadoyi organized among the Bari in the state of Zulia. The data for this paper was collected during six months of field work in these two _empresas_ communities, and from government archives.

In the following section I briefly review the most widely accepted theses on rural development projects and the establishment of production cooperatives in Latin America. This will help situate the local debate that took place in Venezuela as a result of the Indian collectivization program. The main purpose is to demonstrate that while the broader critique of rural development projects and collectivization in Latin America has been generally accurate, a mechanistic application of such analysis to the case of Venezuelan production collectives results in serious inaccuracies. Much of what are assumed as foregone conclusions of state-supported _empresas Indígenas_ must instead be empirically investigated.

The main section of this paper contains such an investigation.

**COLLECTIVIZATION: MOTIVES, FORCES, AND CONSEQUENCES**

Students of rural development remain skeptical about the motives behind government-initiated collectivization programs in Latin America, because the organization of collectives is inevitably tied to the national political and economic goals of capitalist states. State intervention often leads to a neglect of the more peasant-oriented goals of egalitarian and democratic forms of participation in production. For example, Bartra (1976) demonstrates that reorganization of Mexican peasants into collective ejidos was intended to avert a serious economic and political crisis likely to result from the advanced decomposition and proletarianization of the peasantry.

Zamose (1986), writing about Colombia, contends that institutionally supported efforts to mobilize the peasantry, and the organization of _empresas campesinas_ (peasant cooperative enterprises) during the late 1960s, were part of a larger economic and social strategy to resolve a severe crisis of poverty, unemployment, and capital accumulation.

Fals Borda, (1977:15-my translation) in summarizing the classical works on the subject, concludes that in "Latin America, the cooperative movements have generally been stimulated by political motives: they are like a medium to pacify a rising people...they have taken place primarily during economic and political crisis or in the middle of threats of a rural uprising; or when fears about the 'threat of communism' have emerged and the impact of the Cuban revolution is being measured."

Although somewhat less critical of government goals, those who have studied Peruvian collectivization during the early seventies write of the ultimate subordination of peasant empowerment, self-determination, and equal distribution of rural resources, to issues of productivity and efficiency -- both political and economic (Huizer, 1984; Kay, 1983; Long, 1978).

Critics of the Venezuelan _empresas Indígenas_ have also tied the birth of this program to broad economic and political goals of the state. Generally, they view the program as a concerted attempt by a variety of state agents to transform the Indian population into either a full- or a semi-proletarianized peasantry contributing their cheap food and labor to the capitalist market. The program has also been seen as a mechanism of political control allegedly thwarting a spontaneous Indian movement, and which, through clientelist politics, created an Indian leadership tied to the _empresa_’s administrative bodies and state supported Indian Federations.

However, the rather insignificant place that frontier Indian communities occupied in the overall pattern of Venezuela’s economic development raises serious doubts about such sweeping criticism. Perhaps critics are guilty of simplistically applying broad theoretical concepts and popular explanations about rural development in Latin America among the non-Indian peasantry to the special situation of the Indian communities. The issue of subordination of more democratic goals to those of economic productivity set by national plans must then be carefully investigated rather than assumed.

_Empresa_ critiques have also argued that decision to implement a "design" of collective economic organization chosen by the promoters of these _empresas_ was also connected to the "state's" need to control Peasant/Indian production, and that such a design was highly contradictory with the internal socio-economic organization of traditional Indian communities.

I believe the literature on cooperatives points to a more fruitful approach which considers the success of group farming to be determined by a combination of broad political and economic factors which are external to the individual production units, and by factors internal to particular communities and their collectives (Gallesky, 1987; Reed, 1975; Fals Borda, 1977; Carter and Kanel, 1985). Such an approach suggests that the successes or failures of these economic organizations are not inevitably connected to a contradiction between all pre-existing Indian socio-economic forms of organization and the establishment of government collectives.
of more extensive forms of cooperation. In fact, and as I contended earlier, it is possible in some cases to argue the exact opposite: pre-existing forms of cooperation will facilitate the establishment of more complex cooperatives. Similarly, the "relative autonomy" of some of these communities and control over the most important aspects of their socio-economic reproduction, can facilitate the retention and even fortification of democratic and emancipatory goals.

Space does not allow me to address both the broad political and economic factors and the factors related to the internal organization of Indian communities. The investigation of the first set of factors is part of a larger project (Gouveia, 1988). Here, I will summarize my conclusions in the larger research project about "external" factors, introduce the background discussion on "internal" factors, then examine the connection between pre-existing internal organization and the empresas' particular trajectories in the two cases of the Pume and the Bari.

External Factors in Collectivization

Among the broader "external factors" affecting collectivization projects, scholars have invariably focused on the issue of state commitment. Such commitment is evaluated in terms of adequate funding, technical assistance, and favorable marketing strategies. But beyond these narrower goals, those interested in collectivization as a means to rural transformation look toward policies which provide mechanisms for the implementation of broader goals of self-management and autonomous development.

My larger research project has confirmed that, contrary to empresa critics the Venezuelan government was not committed to a major policy of incorporation of Indians to the national economy through the organization of empresas Indígenas. From the beginning, the program was plagued by budgetary problems and inadequate resources to provide the empresas with much needed technical assistance and adequate marketing mechanisms. In brief, rather than being vehicles for pursuing dominant aims of Indian policy, the empresas were, at least for some important elements in the state, a potential threat to such aims. The fact that these semi-autonomous communities were not as easily controllable as the less autonomous non-Indian clientele meant that the Indian empresas and the accompanying Indian federations could become (at least in some cases) mechanisms for entrenching the territorial roots of Indian communities. This entrenchment effect was an important factor behind the drastic moves made by two administrations to constrain the program's personnel scope, and direction after the personnel had moved to significantly strengthen the program.

But external factors were not the only forces related to the problems and few successes experienced by individual empresas. Critics are certainly correct when they point to the poor fit that existed between empresa "design" and at least some of the communities where they were established. However, such a claim must be empirically established. Furthermore, the internal socio-economic composition of Indian communities and levels of political organization can introduce important variations in the final outcomes of policy processes at the local level. In the next section, aided by the theoretical and empirical literature on cooperatives, I select key factors affecting the connection between internal socio-economic organization and the organization of complex cooperatives. Then, I illustrate those factors in my case studies.
organized, or whether there was a problem of implementation – meaning basically a lack of state support.

Proponents of these collectives have spoken in very general terms about “communal property and exploitation of the land” being part of the “Indigenous cultural world” (Clarac and Valdez, 1976) and of how the existence of “mutual help” and reciprocity networks supported collectivization (Heinen, 1981).

On the other hand, Morales and Jimenez (1981), two of the staunchest critics of the empresa program, concluded that the extended family is the basic unit of production and consumption for three different groups of Carib families, even though land is communally held. Therefore, the organization of production worked against collectivization.

A few points are in order concerning the Venezuelan debate. First, proponents of the empresa program were too vague about their conceptualization of traditional communal arrangements. Much of this vagueness was due to the already mentioned dearth of studies, a fact recognized by both sides. Unfortunately, in practice, empresa promoters often assumed the homogeneous presence of communal patterns in Indian communities. On the other hand, Morales and Arvelo (1981), failed to appreciate the significance of community-wide patterns of cooperation in such activities as the clearing of fields. They also underestimate the importance of communal ownership of critical means of production, such as land, which, especially in the case of Indian communities, encourages strategies for maintaining territorial integrity. As Roseberry (1986) points out, the fact that the household was the main unit of production in traditional peasant societies does not mean that it was always identical with a residential unit, nor that there were no other community-wide relations of production also crucial for the socio-economic and cultural reproduction of these communities.

Significantly, both sides fail to take into account the varied forms of socio-economic organizations in contemporary Indian communities resulting from the uneven penetration of capital and state agents into their areas. Such penetration may have in fact reduced production to the minimal level of the family, and, concomitantly, undermined traditional leadership structures (often identified with the authority of the elders). In others cases, however, it might have generated new forms of cooperation and communal practices. Uneven penetration appears to have had these divergent effects in the two cases considered here.

An additional concern is whether the transition from simple to complex forms of cooperation is attempted in an abrupt, totally top-down, and radical manner (i.e. jumping from very minimal forms of mutual assistance to full collectivization). Top-down, abrupt collectivitization programs (starting with the Russian Kohokoz) handled only ineffectively the tension between family and collective production. But this problem can be solved, as in Hungary, Santo Domingo, and others. There is no necessary “ideological” opposition on the part of the peasantry (although there may be on the part of the analysts of the peasantry) to balance more traditional forms of kin-based economic strategies with new forms of joint work. Successful, and willing, collectivization among different categories of rural toilers is related to the degree of control they are allowed to exercise over the transitional process, and their own evaluation of the benefits which will accrue from such a transition (Petras and Haven, 1981; Williams, 1982).

The above discussion indicates that both sides in the Venezuelan debate on empresas indigenas are inadequate because they stress one or another cause of the empresas’ problems. The thesis maintained here is that problems arise due to a combination of both, unequal support from the state throughout the implementation of these projects, and the poor adaptation of the collective’s design to the real conditions of each Indian community.

In the next section I focus on the program of the empresas indigenas, and two empresas in particular.

THE PUME AND BARI EMPRESA COMMUNITIES

Despite the problems confronted by the Venezuelan Indian program, and general lack of support for the empresas Indigenas by powerful state agents, a few empresas have managed to survive and a few others have been organized anew, yielding very mixed and heterogeneous results. The empresa of Kumani of the Apure plains was organized during the period of lowest state commitment (1977-1979). The Bari empresa of Saimadoy was organized later, in 1982, after the temporary return of the Indigenistas (pro-Indian intellectuals) to National Agrarian Institute (IAN) offices. It is these surviving empresas that permit evaluation of the role played by local factors in the determination of heterogeneous results.

I will concentrate on the combination of two factors: the internal organization of the communities, with special emphasis on the presence of communal elements; and, the two empresas’ final organizational structure, as well as available skills and resources.

Organization of Production: Communalism and Relative Autonomy

The Bari and the Pume are tropical horticulturalists occupying rather different ecological systems. The Bari are located in the remote Sierra de Perija on the frontier with Colombia. The Pume live in the open savannas of the Apure state.

Both groups’ “ethnographic pasts” reveal an important presence of communal elements, though perhaps more evident among the Bari than among the Pume. Originally the Indians inhabited longhouses, or bohios. The bohios housed up to 50 people in the case of the Bari, and even more for the Pume. Each bohio was organized into different hearth groups consisting of individuals or small groups of families, with or without close kinship ties. A communal garden, informally divided into parcels for each hearth group, encircled the bohios. However, many garden tasks, such as clearing and burning, were performed collectively by the bohio (and according to a culturally prescribed gender division of labor). Fishing and hunting expeditions were often organized by different combinations of community members. This was particularly true for the Bari, where fishing was truly communal because it required the labor-intensive task of damming the river.

There were other differences in the traditional organization of these two groups. For the Bari, major activities, including building the bohio, were supervised by a respected chief (whose name was subsequently given to the bohio). A second chief assisted the first in all of his functions and took his place during his absences. Authority was much more diffused for the Pume, partly because they moved more often. They moved with every change of season, from wet to dry, and were fragmented into small family units with no logical need for more formal...
authority. Production during the dry season was literally reduced to the household level, usually consisting of only a nuclear or extended family. Since colonial times, the capitan has replaced the Pume chief, but his authority continues to be quite limited. He acts primarily as a go-between for the community and the regional and national authorities.

The Bari experienced successive cycles of severe confrontations with Hispanic and Criollo elements, always resulting in a major reduction of their territory. Yet, they were not only warriors and escaped the conquistadores' encomiendas, the missionaries' pueblos de Indios (missionary outposts called Indian towns), and Shell Oil Company's infamous Indian hunting expeditions. Many individual Bari died but the social group survived.

By the 1960s, however, the Bari had been driven higher into the hills and onto ever-smaller parcels of land by the advancement of "civilization" into the rugged terrain of the Perija Sierra and the lowlands. Ironically, the same Catholic missionaries who established the pueblos de Indios, the Capuchins, came to their rescue, demanding that the state decree an Indian reserve. The Capuchins then established four missionary outposts in the reserve. Saimadoyi was one, today the largest of all Bari settlements (about 300 inhabitants) and proudly called by the missionaries the "capital" of the Bari territory.

The change from a semi-nomadic to a sedentary residence pattern brought several changes to the Bari. The most important was the disappearance of the communal longhouse and its surrounding community garden. However, the Bari continue to organize production around a combination of individual and communal principles. Land is still held collectively by all residents of Saimadoyi and the old hearth groups have been reconstructed around sets of single-family households located in close proximity and tied by closer kinship relations. But the disappearance of the bohio and communal garden has also meant that the labor process in crop production has been increasingly reduced to the level of individual families or shrinking hearth groups. In fact, assistance from non-family workers is now often remunerated in cash. On the other hand, labor and food exchanges still take place in the building of houses. Most significantly, fishing, carried out twice a week, continues to be organized at the level of the community. The only difference is that "community" now means 300 as opposed to just 20 to 50 people.

The Bari are still largely self-sufficient, and are not significantly "proletarianized." Similarly, their level of subordination to financial or commercial capital seems to be quite low, given their sporadic participation in the market economy as sellers of cheap agricultural products. In summary, the Bari retain a large degree of control over their own labor process, the overall social organization of production, and the marketing of their products.

Their "relative autonomy" is not simply due to the protective presence of missionaries, or to their capacity to resist additional encroachments. It has also been conditioned by the unique configuration of the local agrarian structure. Contrary to the situation in Apure where large estates dominate the local economy, capital penetration in Zulia was largely based on small livestock husbandry. As an exciting new chapter in the peasant literature has begun to point out, the latter type of local agrarian structure is much more conducive to the rise of independent and even capitalized family farms than is a local structure dominated by large estates.

The differing effects of local agrarian structures highlight the importance of a relational approach in examining the internal logic of these communities.

One last point needs to be made with regard to communal elements present in today's Saimadoyi. An interesting syncretism, cleverly manipulated by missionaries, between the old collective values represented in the Bari cosmology and the "new" Catholic "patrimonialism" upholds both the collectivity as a superior entity and the natural hierarchical order where "God and the Prince" stand above the collectivity. This ideology, reinforced daily in a variety of ways, has further unified the Bari against outside influence.

In contrast to the history of the Bari, the Pume lost all of their land to the large cattle ranches which cover the entire territory. Today, they are confined to small plots of government land where they have regrouped in the form of corporate communities composed of individual nuclear families connected by kinship and marriage. Although endogamous marriage is still the norm, Pume women are increasingly marrying criollos, very possibly in an effort (not always successful) to escape the poverty and social disintegration of their own collectivity. As a result, the Pume are a much less homogeneous social group than are the Bari. Social homogeneity can play an important role in the internal solidarity and potential formation of ethnic or regionally based movements. On the other hand, it can also preclude wider solidarity networks.

Unable to practice shift cultivation, or to expand their level of production given the small size and relatively poor quality of their land, the Pume are highly integrated into the local cattle ranching economy. This integration takes place within the context of what Bonacich (1980) calls a split labor market: Pume are consistently paid at levels below those of criollo workers. Subsistence production is now totally organized at the level of the individual family or household, and individualistic elements are evident in various aspects of Pume socio-economic organization and cultural representations. For example, families fence their individual gardens to both delineate their private ownership of the land and to limit sharing of their products with other community members. They also greatly prefer to work by themselves and to have individual rights to various means of production (an aspect that became very obvious during the organization of the empresa). Reciprocal work exchanges, locally known as cayapas, have almost disappeared and succumbed to the monetized economy, even further subordinating their reproduction to local commercial and industrial capital.

As with the Bari, there is a sort of ideological syncretism between the Pume's ancient cosmology and current local values. But, this helps to reinforce contemporary forms of Pume reproduction and subordination, and individual as opposed to communal practices. New circumstances render largely meaningless the value the Pume had traditionally placed upon the careful balance between individual and communal practices. Today, the Pume's cosmology is heavily penetrated by notions of rugged individualism and male dominance, both more consonant with the local capitalistic herding society. Moreover, de-humanizing notions have been formally incorporated into contemporary versions of Pume creation myths. According to one contemporary myth, the explanation for the Pume's lack of horses and cattle (key factors in the local economy) is that Pume were destined to perform the less prestigious and poorly paid trabajo de mano (hand work), while the more skillful criollos could literally grow up "to be cowboys" (montas).
On the other hand, new forms of collectivism and communal ties have evolved as necessary adaptive strategies for survival. These are no longer based on the rather disrupted traditional kinship system, but on a broader "emergent ethnicity" which activates new systems of mutual help (particularly within communities, but also between the various ethnic enclaves and individuals dispersed across the state). However, local repression precludes the evolution of these new forms of ethnic solidarity into organized social movements. Rather, political actions take the form of defensive measures. These include a capacity to retreat into their native language and ethnic enclaves, and a mutism which continues to puzzle and confuse the criollos. Unfortunately, as with the Bari, ethnic-based separatist strategies (though they may be necessary) aggravate the political fragmentation of the peasantry into Indian and non-Indian factions, thus reducing their capacity to form meaningful alliances.

Organizing the Empresas of Kumani and Saimadoyi: Skills, Resources, and the Reorganization of the Political Economy

The different paths followed by the Bari and Pume as capital and state agents penetrated their territories left them with an unequal inventory of new and old skills, resources, and adaptive strategies. The structural background just outlined, together with this inventory of the "human capital" of each community, conditioned the manner in which the empresas were organized.

The Bari empresa of Saimadoyi emerged from a prolonged and rather smooth process of transition from crop to mixed crop and livestock production. In the early 1970s the missionaries distributed a few cattle to individual families who used them mainly for milk and sporadic sales. Later, in 1979, IAN donated 90 cattle to be managed by the community as a whole. Teams formed to clear pastures and perform the general tasks connected with animal husbandry. In addition to this incremental acquisition of skills related to livestock production, a few Bari worked on surrounding ranches performing similar tasks.

It was only later, in 1982, that the Bari accepted IAN's suggestion that they form a legally constituted empresa Indígena and thus become eligible for additional state support and credit sources. By this time the Indigenistas who had conceived the adaptation of the empresas campesinas model to Indian collectivities were back in IAN's Indian Development program. This meant that, at least at the level of this state office, there was a renewal of commitment to an empresa organizational structure that would yield not only economic results, but would support principles of democracy and self-management. The structure was intended to generate new levels of social cohesiveness and solidarity. This was, in fact, reflected in the organizational process.

Major decisions were made with the active participation of the entire Bari community, and concessions were made to adapt the legally prescribed structure to the system of production and leadership operating in the community. With regard to leadership, the Bari tried to meaningfully merge the office of empresa president with the authority of the community chief. Similarly, the old notion of a second chief was revived in the figure of the cattle boss, who also assumed responsibilities for the empresa in the absence of the president.

The Kumani (Pume) empresa was organized in 1977, after the exodus of IAN indigenistas, and after general support for the organization of collective empresas (as conceived by these indigenistas) had plunged to the lowest levels. Nevertheless, and despite tremendous opposition from local capitalists, a new group of well-intentioned individuals (taking advantage of a political opening provided by the election year) successfully obtained the transfer of a ranch to the Pume families. But the Pume's lack of experience in the production and management of large collective enterprises, and livestock production in particular, resulted in their minimal participation in the design of the empresa's administrative and production structure.

The contrasts between the Pume and the Bari are notable. The absence of a Pume land base meant that a collective enterprise, also with an emphasis on livestock production, could only be organized on large tracks of available government land. Individual Pume families were thus relocated to a cattle ranch that had been expropriated during the early years of the agrarian reform. This resulted first and foremost in the additional fragmentation of family and other primary ties. But it also meant that subsistence production was reorganized in very radical and sudden terms. This 30,000 hectare ranch with a herd of approximately 500 cattle was managed according to an extensive production system requiring significant labor as well as capital inputs and husbandry skills. In contrast to the Bari, the Pume had very little, if any, experience in livestock production, despite the predominance of this activity in Apure. They also had lower levels of literacy and formal education in general. Literacy was a requirement for empresa office holders, and its concentration undermined the democratic principles behind the organization.

Production was, as with the Bari, organized around work teams of individuals as opposed to families or other types of primary relations. Many of the members did not even know each other before the organization of the empresa. But in the Pume case, this constituted a much more drastic change because they lacked the benefit of the Bari's years of practice with this organizational pattern. In the first, and only, organizational assembly, the Pume expressed their preference for cattle (not land, which must be collectively owned by law) to be distributed to individual families or groups of families as opposed to the membership as a whole. They maintained that the collective aspect should be confined to the larger management tasks and to the marketing of livestock. But these notions were rejected.

Also critical, independent Pume families from three different communities established three separate settlements inside the ranch. This inevitably inhibited collaborative relations and communication among all members, aspects crucial to collective organization. Finally, the change from an informal authority figure like the capitan to the rigid administrative structure of president, vice-president, and treasurer contrasted with the Bari's relatively successful integration of old and new political structures.

THE EMPRESAS' PERFORMANCE

Not surprisingly, results both in terms of economic gains and social changes were very different for these two empresas Indígenas. Economically, the Bari more than doubled their herd, and showed a moderate positive balance during the 1982-1985 period. In addition, with very few exceptions, semi-proletarianization among the
Bari of Saimadoyi has been virtually halted. In contrast, the Pume reduced their herd by more than two thirds, and experienced a progressive loss of capital. Semi-proletarianization became even more prevalent as the productivity of subsistence plots was greatly diminished due to the combined factors of poor soils, labor requirements of extensive livestock production, and the incapacity of the empresa to generate any meaningful incomes.

Social change and benefits were equally divergent. Social cohesiveness, educational opportunities, and a consciousness of the collectivity were much more evident among the Bari. In contrast, the difficult conditions that have confronted the Pume since their move to the empresa have often fostered conflictual and anti-collective behavior, such as the illegal sale of cattle by individual members.

While the Bari retained control of their labor process and a degree of autonomy in decisions pertaining to the organization of production and distribution of their products, the same cannot be said of the Pume. The problems involved in running a large hacienda, combined with the aggressive antagonism of local criollos toward land-owning Indians, increasingly led IAN indigenistas to assume almost total control over the operation of the empresa. The principles of self-management and participatory democracy were never really upheld in Kumani. Instead, the Pume's continued reliance on semi-proletarianization, plus the state's increasing control over their empresa's productive process, meant that their subordination to outside agents had not been alleviated, but had actually increased.

At the level of individual enterprises, it is evident that communal factors became even stronger among the Bari compared to the Pume. And contrary to empresa critics, the household-based organization of production most prevalent among the Pume was not a remnant of their traditional economies, but evolved as a result of capital penetration in their areas. Contrary also to modernization and orthodox Marxist theories, the presence of communal elements in these communities do not necessarily constitute a backward obstacle to more complex forms of collectivization, but can, as in the case of the Bari, be mobilized on behalf of complex collectivization.

The presence of collective modes of cooperation and ideologies are not sufficient grounds for the creation of new forms of collectivization. In the context of the Venezuelan political economy, state support was again crucial. The erratic and minimal levels of commitment to Indian collectivization by dominant class factions in the state proved fatal in the case of Kumani where the historically problematic situation of the Pume could not be overcome. In the case of the Bari, however, the presence of a coherent set of collective values, a communally-held land base, pre-existing joint work arrangements, and even the kind of protection provided by the church, presented the appropriate incentives and special qualifications for experimental forms of cooperation in production. Internal organizational factors impinged on each group's risk calculations and their ability to determine the level at which they would commit themselves to a new and rather risky production process. The Bari had, in the land, a relatively self-sufficient economy, and in the missionaries, an 'insurance policy' that the Pume did not have. The Pume resorted instead to those defensive strategies that had helped them survive for so many years among the exploitative and repressive criollos. They retreated; said "yes" when they meant "no"; held on to the empresa land while working on someone else's livestock ranch; and sold the cattle to feed their families.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Collectivization is not the soundest solution to the economic and social problems of all Indian communities. Gros (1987) has indicated that those Indian groups which have experienced a situation much like the semi-proletarianized non-Indian peasantry, no longer possess many of the attributes which contribute to more autonomous forms of cooperative development. The Pume certainly fall under this category. A question remains: what alternatives are available for ameliorating the exploitative conditions under which these groups live and for reconstructing the sense of community which was lost in the not-so-distant past? This question cannot be fully answered here, but several relevant points can be raised.

First, contrary to those who maintain a functionalist view of peasant production, individual empresas (like that of the Bari) can not only survive, but can even achieve levels of growth and diminish Indian subordination to various capital and state agents. Admittedly, given the present direction of the Venezuelan Indian policy, chances are rather dim for a large number of communities to achieve this status.

Secondly, there is some possibility that these and other cooperative experiments taking place among Venezuelan Indian groups will ignite the spark for a more autonomous grass-root movement which would help to spread and improve the success rates of a variety of forms of cooperatives (including health and educational services cooperatives). Again, the possibilities for building broad coalitions are not great. The unfortunate polarization of the peasantry into Indian and non-Indian fractions (while recognizing the validity of ethnic-based movements) forestalls the possibility of a new alliance which could once again redirect the course of Indian policy.

Yet, transitions from state-initiated efforts to more autonomous movements in other countries suggest that broad-based coalitions demanding alternative to exploitative forms of community organization as relations are not at all that far-fetched. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of CRIC in Colombia, and from the Shuar in Ecuador. But even in the Venezuelan context, there are certain elements that give at least some hope that progressive coalitions will emerge. Serbin (1983), for example, recognizes that despite mediation by state interests, and factionalism problems, the Indian movement which emerged as part of IAN's efforts has had a significant grass-root component. I have found ample evidence that many attempts to subordinate the movement to dominate party interests and goals were soundly defeated. Despite the absence of a coherent Indian movement, and at least partly as a result of the mobilization efforts of the early 1970s, Indian groups have become a permanent voice in the Venezuelan media and a frequent and influential presence in government offices where they come to protest the latest affronts to their lives. Just a few months ago, the Bari, together with other groups from the state of Zulia, made the front pages of leading Venezuelan newspapers as they protested new government leases for open pit mining which again raised fears about the stability of their land rights.

An exhaustive analysis of the Indian development program's intended and unintended long-term consequences could not be performed in this article. But,
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it should already be evident that empresa evolution has seldom conformed to the interests and purposive actions of the policy makers who created them.

NOTES

1. The first question is often used to refer to the economic issue of productivity while the latter refers to the socio-economic situation of the peasantry within the agrarian structure.

2. This is not to suggest that Indian groups have not before been directly or indirectly affected by national agrarian reform programs. See for example Stavenhagen (1977). I am referring here to the very special cases in which the program is designed specifically for Indian communities as opposed to an all-encompassing category of peasants. Also, the main category of Indian communities I have in mind is that of frontier and more isolated groups which have retained some degree of autonomy from the national society. As we will see however, one of the cases studied here did not quite conform to that definition, and it was in essence a deviation from the intended clientele of the empresas.

3. Case studies are most commonly found among Peruvian Indian communities during the military reform of the late sixties, and of the Chilean Mapuche during Allende. In both cases, however, we are still dealing with Indian communities which were largely integrated into the local and regional political economy. More traditional anthropological studies of alternative development projects among native groups are reported in publications like Cultural Survival. In Venezuela, Heinen (1983-1984) conducted evaluations of an empresa Indigena among the Ye’kuanas and in this article contends that the empresas do not produce negative changes in the communities. Frechione (1981) also did a study of a cooperative among another Ye’kuana community which was independent of IAN’s empresa program.

4. The empresas Indigenas were conceived as alternative forms of collective organizations which stressed autonomous self-development, (autogestion), and the development of a cash economy that would not compromise the subsistence sector in these communities.

5. This notion is generally supported by the works of authors like Galleski (1973) and Fals Borda (1977).

6. I spent approximately six months in Venezuela in 1985 divided between the two Indian communities and national and regional government offices. I conducted informal interviews with many community members as well as the founders and current staff of the program. I continued to collect archival as well as interview data through 1987 primarily with the assistance of Venezuelan colleagues. This paper is part of a larger study I conducted for my doctoral dissertation and in which I address the second question more fully.

7. Semi-proletarianized peasantry refers to those individual producers who due to the reduced side of their holding are no longer able to reproduce themselves without also participating in wage labor activities.

8. This is a simplified and combined version of several of those critics. See for example Morales and Arvelo-Jimenez, 1984; Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo, 1983; Serbin, 1980.

9. Galleski (1973), in particular, elaborates this point more fully. He points to the logical connection between communal land tenure and socialized work. However, he also notes that degrees of socialized work will vary significantly between different cases.

10. The three groups considered were The Pemon, the Ye’Kuanas and the Karinas in Venezuela. However, the authors did not conduct a parallel study of the empresa, only of the traditional forms of production and as far as I can determine at least some of the data was based on studies conducted as early as the 1970s.

11. Roseberry’s argument is made in the context of a renewed debate in the peasant literature about the importance of family economy and its equivalence with peasantry or simple commodity production.

12. The following analysis is based on both a large number of ethnohistorical materials, my own field interviews, and archival materials.


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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DRIVING BEHAVIOR: COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF JOINT-ACTION

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This paper identifies destiny-drivers, casual-cautious drivers, and social-occasion drivers, as the primary participations in the driving environment, and argues that accidents occur when there is a breakdown in establishing joint-action among and between these drivers. Leflumers are also discussed within the context of the above designated drivers, and another potentially dangerous driver, the mediator, is introduced. The mediator is one who, for a variety of reasons, has some unresolved issue in contemplation. Other drivers emerging in the driving environment are dining-room, powder-room, library, and indicator drivers.

INTRODUCTION

Social scientists have paid little or no attention to driving behavior as a social phenomenon even though it has been the case of thousands of deaths and injuries. Driving is one of the most intense forms of communication and interaction -- where joint-action, interpretation, observation and social participation take place. Driving behavior is said to account for over 50,000 deaths each year. It has been argued that more deaths have resulted from accidents than resulted from all the wars in which the United States participated. In Houston, Texas, approximately 250 of an estimated 260 to 530 accidents are reported each day to the Records Division of the police department. This suggests a serious breakdown in joint-action in the driving environment of the city.

Fitting lines of action together or establishing joint-action in the driving environment requires taking note of the action of others as indications are made. This assumes that the meaning of the indications are shared by the actors in the environment.

Eighty-five percent of the accidents in the city occur when drivers are not taking note of action in their driving world. This means that they are not able to fit their action to the actions of others or form joint-action in driving. The other fifteen percent of the accidents result from inadequate interpretations of acts and symbols, inappropriate designations, confused meanings, and mishoken alternative responses.

Most accidents occur in Houston between 7 to 8 a.m and 5 to 6 p.m. Thus, hostility is not a powerful enough variable to explain accidents, as psychoanalysts might be tempted to suggest. Other explanations of freeway accidents cite rampant aggressiveness, high speeds, and crowded freeways and highways. However, these are not distractions to establishing joint-action on highways. Some distractions are the attitudes of drivers, their dispositions in driving, combing hair, eating, feeding babies, husbands, and wives, applying make-up, lighting cigarettes, attempting to kill an insect, picking up objects on the car floor, meditating or reflective thinking,